[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF NATO: NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-23
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/,
http://docs.house.gov, or http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-790PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennesse
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Jones, James L., USMC, Retired, Jones Group International........ 6
Farkas, Evelyn N., Resident Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund
of the United States........................................... 13
Wilson, Damon, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council........ 22
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Materials submitted for the record from General Jones............ 26
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 47
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 48
Hearing Attendance............................................... 49
THE FUTURE OF NATO: NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the
Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Keating [presiding]. This hearing will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
future of NATO and our American commitment to it.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Mr. Keating. I will now make an opening statement, and
then, turn it over to the ranking member for his opening
statement.
This Thursday marks the 70th anniversary of our NATO
alliance. We recently reflected on the importance of NATO in a
hearing last month held by the full committee. Today, I would
like to follow on that by discussing and examining the future
of NATO and America's commitment to it over the next 70 years.
We have watched NATO evolve in significant ways since its
inception. And looking at the different threats we now face
today, we must anticipate that it will again evolve in new ways
to address this changing landscape. This evolution is important
because NATO has long been, and will continue to be, a
cornerstone of our security and defense policies. Our strategic
advantage over our competitors is that we have a coalition.
Russia and China cannot say the same. And that is something we
cannot lose sight of nor ever take for granted.
However, to maintain this advantage, we need strong
American leadership along two fronts. The first is by making it
clear that we are committed to NATO and that the alliance
cannot be broken or undermined by our adversaries. The second,
and the focus of this hearing today, is America's role in
leading NATO and its member States and partners through this
unique period of change, as new members join and as we face new
threats that challenge NATO's readiness and ability to respond
in an effective and a timely manner.
NATO expansion has meant new and often smaller States are
being integrated into the alliance, and this presents questions
for how best to coordinate this integration, their
contributions, and the strengths and the vulnerabilities that
they bring with them.
Further, NATO must adapt in order to address new and
emerging threats from China, Russia, cyber, hybrid warfare,
terrorism, and climate change, among others. This means
contemplating possible changes in NATO's structure and thinking
strategically, not only about how NATO should adapt to this
landscape, but also how the U.S. and other member States must
work together, now more closely than ever, to strengthen the
alliance and their own capabilities. We addressed our shared
values in our previous subcommittee hearing last week, and NATO
is one example where our shared values really matter.
There is no disagreement over commitment to reach the 2
percent benchmark that has been the case since at least 2014,
and that was the continued understanding as recently as 4 weeks
ago when I was in Brussels. And that is the understanding as
NATO members gather this week in Washington. As more members
meet the 2 percent and the 20 percent thresholds for defense
spending, I would like to examine in this hearing how member
States should prioritize their investments within the context
of new threats NATO members are facing.
As I take stock of the threats we are facing, it could not
be clearer to me that this is what we need and this is the time
we need to be standing shoulder to shoulder with no daylight
between us. Our friends and allies must stand together,
defending our shared values that are most sacred to our
security and that are under attack, values of freedom and
democracy.
We need NATO allies who are equally committed to those
values as we are and who we can trust completely, because our
NATO alliance is about our security. Lives are on the line. We
must hold new and aspiring members to the standard, but,
perhaps more importantly, we must hold current members
accountable to upholding these values that are at the very core
of our NATO alliance. We should look at what our new member
countries are ready to bring to the table as well as democratic
backsliding among our current members, as well as possible
action like Turkey's purchase from Russia of S-400's and
working with China on FG networks in Europe.
I, therefore, look forward to addressing these important
issues today and hearing from our witnesses. We have incredible
insight into how we should go planning in the next 70 years as
a country, and we have that same insight as allies. And it is a
pleasure to hear from our witnesses today with their opinions
about which direction we should go.
With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the panel for being here with us today.
Look, NATO is not just an ally; they are our most important
group of allies. We understand that strong alliances protect us
from aggressors and guard our shared values.
We appreciate you guys all being here. If you wonder why
there may not be a huge turnout today, it is because this is
the third hearing in 3 weeks that we have had on our friendship
with NATO and Europe. We understand it is very important.
Tomorrow morning, we are going to have the NATO Secretary
General Stoltenberg address our Congress in advance of the 70th
anniversary of our security cooperation, 70 years of working
together to face down oppression. It is sufficient to say that
our alliance is strong.
That being said, there are a lot of other issues we need to
actually finally address on this committee has well. In the
past week, we saw the first round of elections in Ukraine,
Brexit's status changing on a nearly hourly basis, and Russia
landed soldiers in our own backyard to prop up the corrupt
Maduro regime.
And Ukraine exit polls show that the political newcomer and
the comedian won about 30 percent of the vote, while current
President Poroshenko won about 18 percent. These two candidates
will now face off on April 21st. By all accounts, it is likely
that both candidates will support Ukraine's move toward NATO
and EU accession. It is a good thing for our alliance and the
United States. We also need to be having a hearing on what we
saw in that first round of elections and what we can expect
from the runoff.
In the U.K., Prime Minister Theresa May has indicated that
she will resign following a successful Brexit. However, we are
now seeing a coalition formed to push for a soft Brexit where
the U.K. retains its membership of the European economic area.
We could be having a hearing on how this would affect
transatlantic trade and security with Great Britain, with whom
we have the most special bilateral relationships.
Russia, the largest focus of this subcommittee, is not only
responsible for the death of thousands of Syrians, but now has
entrenched themselves to protect Venezuelan dictator Maduro as
he starves his own people, a firsthand example of how socialism
never works. There was once a time when this committee cared
about Russia's activity in our own backyard, and we need to
continue to do that, instead of trying to handcuff the Trump
administration from having a military option on the table
during diplomatic negotiations. Had Congress threatened to
block President Kennedy's strategy to militarily quarantine
Cuba from receiving Soviet ICBMs during the Cuban missile
crisis and use military force, if necessary, to protect our
Nation, I do not know if our negotiations would have gone as
well as they did.
I believe that some on this committee are being blinded by
their opposition of the current administration, resulting in
the same hearing 3 weeks running. The only reason, because the
administration is telling our NATO allies the hard truth, that
you can do more. And I would agree at the beginning. We can say
it differently, but it is a message that needs to be said.
So, I reiterate my support for NATO, this committee's
support, and the Congress' support for NATO and Europe. I just
think it is time to begin to move on to other pressing issues
in this world as well.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Keating. I thank the ranking member.
And I thank our witnesses for being here today. I realize
that your schedules are greatly under strain, and we really
appreciate your offering your thoughts here.
I will now introduce our witnesses. General James Jones
served as Commander of the U.S.-European Command and Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe. He also served as President Obama's
National Security Advisor and the State Department's Special
Envoy for the Middle East Regional Security. He is currently
the chairman of Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at
the Atlantic Council.
Dr. Evelyn Farkas is a Resident Senior Fellow at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States. Previously, she served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and
Eurasia, and as a Senior Advisor to the Supreme Allied Command
of Europe and Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
the NATO summit. Welcome.
Mr. Damon Wilson is the executive vice president of the
Atlantic Council covering Europe and NATO. He previously served
as Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and Senior
Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council,
and Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO
Secretary.
We appreciate hearing you today, and please limit your
testimony to 5 minutes. And without objection, your prepared
written statements will be made part of the record.
I will now go to General Jones for his statement. Thank you
very much, General, for being here. Thank you for your service.
STATEMENT OF JAMES L. JONES, USMC, RETIRED, JONES GROUP
INTERNATIONAL
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Kinzinger.
I am honored to be here, in part, to celebrate the 70th
birthday of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I was
privileged to serve as the 14th Supreme Allied Commander from
2003 until 2006. I was honored to be in NATO when we went from
19 to 26 countries in 2004, and I am delighted to see that
North Macedonia will be joining us, to bring the total
membership of NATO to 30 members in the near future.
One of the things that NATO has to deal with, and has dealt
with I think and is doing quite well at, is understanding that
there is a great difference between the 20th century and the
21st century in terms of what NATO does. Without going into too
much detail, NATO is undergoing, in my view, a transformation
that needs to continue from being a reactive defensive alliance
to a more proactive, engaged alliance to actually prevent
future conflict.
Projecting influence in the face of new threats, in a way
we are going back to the future to face the rise of autocrats,
and intelligent autocrats that have the economic capability to
cause us great harm. Dominant among those challenges is China's
quest for influence, not only total control inside its borders,
but also the most control as it can gain outside of its
borders, and it is moving into the European land mass with
alarming speed.
Russia, not too much needs to be said about that. Mr. Putin
is very clear on what he thinks about NATO, and his most
cherished ambition is to do anything he can to bring about
disruption and, in fact, ultimately, the demise of NATO.
Iran continues to be the world's greatest exporter of
terror. Africa remains a challenge for the European land mass
that NATO has to be involved in, non-State actors and hybrid
warfare, just to name a few.
Gentlemen and ladies, the defense of Europe has shifted
from Germany to the Black Sea and to the Baltic States in the
east, and certainly to the North African coastline to the
south. And that fact brings with it a number of threats that
our friends and allies are concerned with.
NATO is relevant today I think in real terms. It is active
outside of its borders in many ways that not many of our
countrymen really understand. In Afghanistan, Operation
Resolute Support is underway since January 2015. In Kosovo,
4,000 troops are deployed. In the Mediterranean, Active
Endeavour has been replaced by Sea Guardian, again, a very
important operation to counter terrorism. In Iraq, the NATO
mission is underway since 2018 to help with training. And the
African Union peacekeeping operations, going back to 2007 in
Somalia, air policing in 2014 in the NATO land space where
countries do not have adequate air forces to protect
themselves. In short, this is a different world that we live
in. It is a world that demands a very proactive and engaged
NATO. And it also demands American leadership and
participation.
The financial picture is looking better. We have not
arrived where we need to be, but we are getting there. NATO is
buying the right type of equipment, in my view, and is
partnering with the economic reality and the economic threats
that countries like China and Russia, in particular, bring to
the European land mass.
In my view, peace and stability can only be maintained in
the European land mass and elsewhere with American leadership,
with involvement in three areas: security, economic
development, and governance and rule of law. If you combine
those three things, particularly I might bring to the attention
of the committee the Three Seas Initiative, which was brought
about by the Atlantic Council in 2014, which is to help the
Central and Eastern Europeans with their own type of Marshall
Plan, if you will, a north-south corridor from the Baltics to
the Adriatic involving energy, telecommunications, and
transportation renovation. Everything during the cold war was
built east to west. Twelve countries are now involved in this
project, and over 50 projects are underway. The U.S. Government
has supported it very well. And this, combined with the
military posture of NATO, which is encouraging, I think will
contribute measurably to peace and stability in the European
land mass.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, General Jones.
Dr. Farkas?
STATEMENT OF EVELYN N. FARKAS, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE
UNITED STATES
Ms. Farkas. Thank you. It has been a while since I have
been on the House side, though I worked for 7 years on the
Senate side. But I started here with this committee as a fellow
in 1992, and they had me sitting in that anteroom there. So, it
is nice to be back, but I do not have familiarity with the
buttons.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, all of
you members, for taking the time today, I know for now the
third hearing on NATO. It is important because today our
international system, NATO, and democracy around the world have
never been in graver danger than they are today since the cold
war.
Today, Americans and our democratic allies in Europe, Asia,
and elsewhere, are in a standoff against autocratic dictators
working to destroy our democracy and to thwart our domestic and
international objectives.
First and foremost among these adversaries, as the ranking
member mentioned, is the Russian government, led by Vladimir
Putin. Russia is our greatest threat. The Kremlin is not
satisfied solely by threatening our international interests, it
seeks also a corrupt, weak, and undemocratic America.
Russia, together with China, which seems to co-opt rather
than destroy the international order, aims to return us to a
19th century sphere-of-influence system. Now we know from
history that this alternative to the current global order leads
to great power military competition, economic protectionism,
and, ultimately, war.
Russia would like nothing more than a United States
uncoupled from the alliances that have brought us unprecedented
success. NATO, our only operational collective security
alliance, is in the sights of Putin's Russia. Yet, in this
moment of danger, NATO is strong. In the decades since 1991,
NATO expanded in territory and mission, as the general
mentioned, and the recent historic agreement between Greece and
North Macedonia means the latter will become the 30th alliance
member. Countries want to join, and when they qualify, we
welcome them.
NATO did not grow in size, however, solely to deter Russia,
though that was a motivation. NATO primarily enlarged to
strengthen democracy and free markets. Today, deterring Russia
is, however, once again at the top of the NATO agenda. And I
would prioritize that. Russia violated the sovereignty of
Georgia and Ukraine with invasions and occupations and the
sovereignty of almost all, if not all, NATO neighbors with
cyber and information operations.
Meanwhile, China hopes to develop 3G communications
networks in Europe, which would leave NATO members more
susceptible to Chinese espionage. This comes on top of Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects which have
threatened to put European countries into debt traps, beholden
to Chinese entities for decades.
NATO must focus on countering autocracies like Russia and
China. And again, that is where I would put the priority.
First, NATO must provide military support and advice to
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. NATO should seek a way to bring
Georgia into NATO, perhaps temporarily carving out the occupied
areas, as we did with East Berlin during the cold war. And I am
sort of stealing this idea from my colleague, Damon Wilson, who
once set it forth in an Atlantic Council paper several years
ago. Maybe it will catch on now.
Second, NATO must prepare the two remaining Balkan
aspirants, Bosnia and Kosovo, for membership and neutralize the
threat posed by Russian influence and presence in the Balkan
region.
Third, NATO members must contribute more to building
military conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Allies, of
course, should meet their pledge to spend 2 percent of their
GDP on defense and to invest 20 percent on real capabilities by
2024, but NATO should also establish, among other things--and I
have listed a bunch more in the written testimony--a fund to
help Eastern European allies and partners who still have legacy
Soviet and Russian equipment. This was something that we did
not have money for under the Obama Administration, but I would
have liked to have done it dearly.
Fourth, NATO must protect its military cutting edge and
competitiveness vis-a-vis China.
Fifth, finally, and most importantly, NATO members must
renew their vows to democracy. Democratic backsliding cannot be
ignored, especially when Russia works every day to cripple
NATO's cohesion and resolve. The governments of Hungary,
Poland, and Turkey must be held accountable.
In the United States as well, we must heed the warning of
the authors of How Democracies Die. Democracies die when
leaders do four things. One, refuse to play by the democratic
rules. Two, de-legitimize their opponents. Three, tolerate or
encourage violence. Four, prepare to curtail the civil rights
of political opponents and the media.
We must shore up our democracy and improve the processes
and functionings of its institutions. We must ensure civility
and democratic culture. We must fight corruption and improve
our capitalist system to provide transparency, opportunity, and
basic well-being for all Americans. Any alliance is only as
good as the sum of its parts.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Farkas follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Farkas.
Mr. Wilson?
STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the future of NATO, and thank you for
your leadership on our alliance.
NATO is the most successful alliance in history, in large
part because of its ability to adapt. So, as ministers gather
in Washington today, it is appropriate that this committee
focuses not on the past, but on the future. As our Nation
prepares for a long period of strategic geopolitical
competition, we need to put our alliances in NATO, in
particular, at the core of our strategy. And to make them
effective, U.S. leadership is the key ingredient.
The United States and its allies increasingly agree that
the great challenge of the 21st century will be the competition
between a free world and authoritarian, State-led capitalism,
especially China and Russia. That means U.S. interests are best
served when Washington and its allies act together. We need our
allies as force multipliers of our interests and values when we
face Moscow and Beijing. For NATO, this means responding to
Russia's aggression today while preparing for the challenge
posed by China's global reach.
With regard to Russia, in my view, this requires a
significant continuous U.S. military presence in the Baltic
States, Poland, in the Black Sea, and Balkan regions, together
with our allies. Today, our allies are forward positioned in
the Baltic States; the United States is not and should be.
The Russian challenge to us is likely to remain asymmetric.
Therefore, we should double down on our support, working with
the European Union to strengthen the resilience of democratic
societies through efforts that range from diversifying energy
routes and supplies to democratic defense of disinformation.
At the same time, we need a common approach with our allies
on how to handle China's challenge, including by agreeing to
common trade practices and approaches to set global standards,
supporting our allies and establishing CFIUS-like review of
foreign investment, and forging a concerted transatlantic
effort to ensure the free world harnesses new technologies such
as secure 5G before the authoritarians do.
In an era of great power competition, our goals should be
to keep and expand our alliances. This means that we should
stand by NATO's open-door policy, recognizing that welcoming
new members is about expanding the zone of security and the
community willing to defend freedom. Enlargement to those
willing and able to accept the responsibility of membership
should be seen as in our interest, not just in the interest of
the aspirants. The Senate will have the next opportunity to act
to welcome North Macedonia as NATO's 30th member, demonstrating
that Russia's effort to disrupt our interest in the Balkans is
failing.
Looking ahead, however, we should keep an open mind with
regard to additional members, whether that be other Balkan
nations, Cyprus as part of a settlement, Ukraine and Georgia in
a way that Article 5 would not apply to their occupied
territories, or Sweden, Finland, or Malta, if their publics and
governments opted for it.
While geopolitics have returned to Europe, today's
competition is global. Russia is back in the Middle East and
Latin America. Witness China's global reach.
Recognizing this reality, the United States should lead a
more concerted effort to thicken the political bonds and
operational ties between NATO and its global partners. Today,
these partnerships are an under-invested asset at NATO
Headquarters, and we should begin to change that. This means
the United States could consider formalizing the links among
U.S. treaty allies in Europe and those in Asia. And at the same
time, we should begin fostering alliance-like links among our
existing allies with strategic partners such as India and, in
Latin America, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, as we consider
what unfolds in Venezuela.
Beginning to build a network of alliances now with the
United States at the center would provide a more capable and
intentional global democratic response to the authoritarian
challenge. It could also be a precursor to a more formal set of
alliances among democracies who are committed to protecting
their way of life and a democratic international order.
So, as NATO leaders being arriving here today, there is no
doubt a lot of attention will focus on which allies are making
strides toward their defense investment pledges, and rightly
so. While much more remains to be done, we can recognize that,
since 2016, European allies have spent an additional $41
billion and have plans through 2020 of an additional $100
billion.
That said, I am concerned about the current burden-sharing
debate, that it can misplace the focus on what is strategically
important inside the alliance. America's friends and allies are
the United States' best competitive advantage. Indeed,
Congress, the administration, and the American people can view
our alliances as a national strategic asset. As such, each
administration serves as a steward of these assets with a
responsibility to defend, strengthen, and lead them. U.S.
leadership, after all, is the decisive element in determining
the success of NATO's future.
Thank you for the privilege to testify today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
This week, we look back and celebrate NATO and look back at
the history. But this hearing is about looking forward.
General Jones, you hit, I think, the theme of that hearing,
talking about a new way of viewing, a much more proactive way.
We will look at the 2 percent, the 20 percent, but, really,
what is NATO's role in coordinating how that is going to be
spent, how we are going to move in that direction, eliminating
unnecessary redundancies and ensure improved deterrence and
readiness in that regard? So, in that proactive sense that you
spoke about, could you share some of your thoughts in that
regard?
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that this is really the moment for the alliance to
really transform itself in its thinking philosophically in
response to some very, very serious threats that are coming our
way. NATO is included in all of these 5G discussions that are
going on about China and the U.S. and Huawei, and the like.
NATO can, and is showing signs of moving toward, buying the
right type of equipment for the future. It is showing signs of
moving into the countries that border the Black Sea and the
Baltic States with expeditionary missions. There is even talk
in Poland about encouraging the United States to establish
fixed bases again in Poland.
China and Russia are devoting a large part of their weapons
acquisition to area and access denial in terms of reinforcing
NATO, the European land mass, or in the Pacific. That will
cause us to have to think about how we are able to react
quickly in times of emergency.
But I also really think that, as the example--and if you do
not mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to include this manual on
the Three Seas Initiative as part of my testimony.
Mr. Keating. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Jones. Thank you.
Because it is the combination, I think--the future of NATO
is not just a military future. It is about economic strength.
It is about governance and rule of law, as Dr. Farkas pointed
out. And it is about ways in which we can and must be
successful against the rise of these new autocracies that are
actually quite smart in terms of using----
Mr. Keating. If I could, General, I would like to use that
comment you just gave as a point to include our other witnesses
on this question.
General Jones. Sure.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Wilson mentioned a misplaced focus on just
the percentages. It does not mean it is not important. It just
means that it seems to be too much of a focus.
And going back to Dr. Farkas' comments in that regard, I
was troubled when I was in the Munich Security Conference just
about 4 weeks ago--there was a poll in Germany that said the
view of the German people is 85 percent unfavorable to the
United States.
Dr. Farkas, you were mentioning the role of the U.S. in
NATO, particularly in terms of trying to stop democratic
backsliding. And if you look at areas like civil rights and
issues of autocracy in Hungary and Poland and Turkey, how can
the U.S. do a better job assuming that mantle that we should
have in this regard, given the current way the U.S. is being
viewed? What can we do to perhaps resume being the mantle of
all these civil rights, rule-of-law, democracy issues that you
mentioned?
Your microphone. There you go. You are in the House again.
All right.
Ms. Farkas. So, first, Mr. Chairman, I would say, looking
internationally, which is where most of my expertise is, we
need to do more helping put pressure, helping the opposition,
frankly speaking, in Hungary, in Poland, in Turkey, to put
pressure on the government to do better, so to be more of a
liberal democracy, if you will. If you recall the famous
statement by Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, he
very proudly said, we are not a liberal democracy, but without
the liberal you are not really much of a democracy.
So, there needs to be more pressure put on these countries.
But what we have found--and here we saw different types of
approaches taken to Hungary under the administration. I worked
for the Obama Administration and now the Trump administration.
And I think we need kind of a mix of the two, where we speak
frankly and directly to the Hungarians and to our allies, to
the leadership, and we appreciate them for their military
contributions, because those three countries are actually very
strong contributors, with Turkey and Poland making the 2
percent cut and, also, having the highest--Turkey certainly has
one of the highest numbers of people under arms. So, we
recognize that, but at the same time we know that their
democracies are weak; we know that they need help. We need to
put more money into that through our foreign assistance
programs to help the opposition, to help their democracy and
their civil society.
Here at home. I would say the polls--and I think Damon is
probably also familiar with these polls--the polls, I believe
that they tend to ask about our President and how the German
public views our President, and then, America. But these two
things obviously become intertwined. And President Trump is not
popular in Europe because of how he has spoken out with regard
to the German Chancellor and the Prime Minister of the U.K., so
Prime Minister May, and other leaders. He is seen as not being
respectful, and I think the push for increased assistance to
NATO, while it is very consistent with all of the other
Presidents who have come before our current President, he does
it in a way that, obviously, is irritating not just to the
leadership, but to the people.
With regard to what we have to do about shoring up our
democracy----
Mr. Keating. Appreciate that.
Ms. Farkas. Yes, sorry. Obviously, more needs to be done
there. And I would really just urge Congress to do what you do
best. I love Congress, and Congress just needs to have a robust
role in our democracy.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Farkas.
I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And just respectfully, on the polling front, as you were
asking that, I looked up an old poll from 1983. And in Britain,
Great Britain, in England, Ronald Reagan's popularity was 21
percent in 1983 in England. And I would argue that he was
actually a pretty good President in hindsight.
Typically, I think if we look at Eastern Europe, there
would probably be a much more popular, as we have always seen,
view of the United States because they remember what it was
like to live under oppression. And this is why I think this is
so important to keep NATO together.
I am going to go 2 degrees of separation from NATO for a
second and just say one of the challenges I think we face as a
country is people think they are tired. I think they feel
exhausted, even though they really are not. And we are fighting
on an economic front in many cases, I think primarily China.
And so, I think this is part of the reason I came out and
said that I think cutting off aid, for instance, to El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala was not smart, because as we
back away from it, right now I think Central and South America
are on the verge of, frankly, democratic governance, a major
change. But every time we pull away, the Chinese will show up
and they are going to ask how much money we were giving El
Salvador, for instance, get that number and double it.
We saw, in fact, a few months ago El Salvador de-recognized
Taiwan. And you wonder why that happened? Well, it was because
they got money from China to do it. So, this is the battle we
are in.
So, I think when we talk about, whether it is in Europe and
NATO, and things like that, we have to keep in mind the
importance of the economic side of what we do. And so, with
that, I want to talk, because obviously Putin being a prime, I
guess, adversary of the United States, I want to talk about his
movement into Venezuela, even though this is not, again,
specifically NATO.
Maduro has lost trust in his own armed forces. So, Putin
has to come in and protect him. That is what is going on. We
have seen this play out before when Russian forces entered
Syria to protect Bashar al-Assad. And I remember Russia said
they are just here for maintenance; they are here to take care
of a base we have. The next thing we knew, there were thousands
of them. Now they illegally occupied Georgia, Ukranian
territory, and now they are in Venezuela.
So, Mr. Wilson, should we be concerned with Russia's
strategy of illegally occupying land as well as propping up
despot regimes around the world? And what would you recommend
to this administration to do to counter Russia in that?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, thank you for that question.
I think the reality is we are facing a declining Russia
which is seeking to disrupt our interests, and doing so pretty
effectively. When your goal is disruption rather than building,
it is actually an easier threshold to achieve. We have seen
that close to their neighborhood. We are seeing it play out
globally.
So, I think the twofold issue of an alliance that is
transforming, to be focused more on defense and deterrence, is
quite important. And I think the alliance has begun that
process. I think it is still begun and playing out on the home
front in Europe.
But I think we need to be a little bit more strategic about
how we think of disrupting Russia's interests on a more global
platform. We should have a strategy that thinks about how
Beijing and Moscow do not become allied in their efforts, but
that we drive that wedge. We should be paying attention to what
Russian forces are doing in the Central African Republic and in
Venezuela. It is pretty astonishing. So, I think thinking
through a strategy of not just deterrence in Europe, but
disruption of Russian interests on the global playing field is
overdue.
We look at Venezuela, where Cuban intelligence, Russian
military, and Chinese money, debt, is fueling this crisis. It
is why I have suggested that we should not just support what is
happening on the part of the Venezuelan people, but think about
how we work with Colombia, Brazil, and back the regional
countries, and bring our European allies into this kind of
conversation, so that we can actually have a more intentional
effort of disrupting this effort here in Venezuela.
A quick word on what you said at the beginning, the Chinese
strategy. The economic piece is fundamental. We are never going
to outspend the Belt and Road Initiative, and we should not. It
is not how we play. We do need to recognize that U.S. capital
markets, private sector investments, private equity dwarf what
the Chinese government can do in BRI over time.
Part of it is that it is difficult. We do not want our
government telling our private sector what to do. But how do we
think of harnessing in a geo-economic term American capital
markets to advance American interests and values in these
places? At the end of the day, whether you are in Serbia or
other countries, they will accept and take Chinese money, but
usually a mother wants her child to study in the United States
or Europe. And if a young person is competing for a job, they
want the opportunity to work for a U.S. company, where they
know there will be a meritocracy.
We can win this because we see individual decisions
recognize the difference between their strategy and ours, but
we need a stronger approach to a geo-economic----
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
And I think Eximbank is a prime example. That is still
languishing right now. And that is, I think, a very effective
thing for our economy.
I had more questions for you, General, but I am out of
time. So, I yield back.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Costa of California.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
my colleague for yielding.
General, we appreciate your commitment and service to our
country.
And you made a number of comments. I think we are all in
agreement that the 2 percent goal for commitments by NATO
countries is something that has been determined necessary. We
need to continue to press them, especially some of our allies
who have been backsliding. We know who they are. How we do that
is critical.
You talked about their making the right choices on
equipment. In terms of procurement, what do you mean by that?
General Jones. I am sorry, in terms of equipment?
Mr. Costa. Procurement of equipment. You say they are
making the right decisions.
General Jones. I am really talking about investing in real
war-fighting capability and upgrading the systems that they
have in terms of airplanes, ships, and war-fighting equipment,
as opposed to----
Mr. Costa. What about the notion that the European Union is
talking about putting its own defensive capabilities? Do you
think that is compatible? I know that is still being sorted out
among the EU.
General Jones. Well, I think that whatever the alliance can
do in the regard of organizing itself in such a way that they
buy the right things and they do not all try to do the same
thing----
Mr. Costa. I think that is very important.
General Jones. It is very important.
Mr. Costa. They do not all need--some of them have certain
talents in certain areas.
General Jones. Exactly.
Mr. Costa. And we should encourage them to pursue that
instead of areas that are less effective.
General Jones. Exactly. You will find that some of the
smaller countries in NATO are actually specializing in quite
impressive special operations capability, abilities to make
significant contributions in electronic warfare, and the like.
So, there is some specialization going on.
And if you look at the graph that shows the equipment
expenditure as a share of defense expenditures, well over half
of the countries in NATO are approaching the NATO guideline of
20 percent of their purchasing power being spent on relevant
equipment. And so, that is very encouraging.
Mr. Costa. Because of my time situation, I do not know--I
think General Gerasimov, who is, I guess, equivalent to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked about their asymmetrical
potential. And, Mr. Wilson, you made reference to Russia
playing a disruptive hand, but smartly--those are my words, not
yours--but using democratic elections as a means to undermine
not only NATO as a deterrent to peace, but also undermine the
European Union as an economic force.
And frankly, if you look back to 2013-14, he gave that
speech. They have done a fairly effective job. I mean, they
have been undermining European elections even before 2016 with
ours.
And so, I guess my question to you is, what is the best
way, Mr. Wilson and Dr. Farkas, to combat this, this real
threat? Because while this may be the third hearing on NATO, I
think it is important, when we tomorrow hold the Joint Session
of Congress, realize that not only has this been the safeguard
of our common values and rule of law, but it is the longest
peacetime period in Europe for the last 70 years in over 1,000
years. And that gets overlooked.
Mr. Keating. And if you could--we are up against a roll
call--if you could just keep that combined under a minute, that
would be great.
Ms. Farkas. I can be very quick.
I did cover this in my written testimony. I would just say
one part is resilience, so strengthening our democracy and
transparency. The second part is deterrence.
And then, I would say a little bit, based on the comments
and question from the ranking member. We need to communicate
very clearly to Russia what our expectations are, and if they
cross a line, we need to be willing to take action. That was
critical in Syria when the Russians attacked us, when their
contract workers attacked us. And I think if we keep a firm
line against Russia, keep the dialog open, hopefully, we will
have a new regime at some point in the not-foreseeable future.
Mr. Keating. General?
General Jones. If I could just add to that, to the ranking
member's statement, there is a difference, I think, in Europe--
and I noticed at the Munich Security Conference as well--
between how Western Europeans feel about the United States and
how Eastern Europeans feel about the United States. So, that is
something that it is real and it has to be dealt with.
But what I have noticed in Western Europe is more of a
trend toward appeasement against these autocrats in Russia and
China. And that is a very dangerous thing. But the further east
you go, the more you have solidarity with the U.S. philosophy,
U.S. fears, U.S. identification of the threats that are coming
toward us, be they military or economic or political.
So, we really need to shore up the Western Europeans, I
think, more so than we have. And that is why I think these
initiatives, like I mentioned the Three Seas Initiative, are
important in righting the balance in Europe, where the Eastern
Europeans' economies can rise and make Europe a more powerful
entity to combat these----
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Thank you, General.
The chair recognizes Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank all of you for being here today.
But, General Jones, your colleagues have already addressed
this, and that is the admission of Georgia into NATO. I would
be interested, because Georgia was promised in 2008 at the
Bucharest summit that they would have the opportunity to join.
Since then, the alliance has recognized Georgia already
possesses all the practical tools for NATO membership. Georgia
spends more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense, has committed
the largest number of soldiers per capita of any allied nation
in Afghanistan. How would you assess the potential for
Georgia's admission to NATO?
General Jones. Speaking as a personal opinion, I think
Georgia has demonstrated fight way beyond its weight in terms
of its contribution to Afghanistan and the quality of their
soldiers and their commitment. Of course, admission to NATO and
accession to NATO is largely a political question, but on the
basis of performance, I would say that Georgia deserves our
admiration, our support, and our encouragement for whatever it
is they want to do with their own future.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I agree. Thank you to all
three of you. It is amazing.
Mr. Wilson, Poland, which appreciates very much the
temporary placement of troops, currently U.S. troops, in the
country, has announced that they would support stationing a
permanent U.S. brigade in the country and finance the
infrastructure and basing. What would be your view of putting a
permanent U.S.-NATO presence in Poland?
Mr. Wilson. I think we need to recognize that the challenge
we are facing from the Kremlin today is not temporary and we
should not plan as such. This is a long-term challenge. We need
to have a continuous presence and be permanent as long as we
face a Kremlin that is intimidating and threatening our allies.
Two other small things I would say is that we need to be
comfortable with an uncomfortable relationship with Russia. And
in response to some of the conversation, we should not be going
through a political cycle that would consider any reset
approach with Russia, for example.
And finally, to consider enlargement as a stabilizing force
rather than a provocative one. And that is a way to
reconceptualize how we think about Georgia's role.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I an really grateful to
serve as the co-chair of the Bulgaria Caucus. March the 29th
marked the 15th year of Bulgaria being part of NATO. How would
you assess, Mr. Wilson, the benefits of Bulgaria as a part of
the NATO alliance?
Mr. Wilson. I think Bulgaria has been the fundamental story
of how you create a Europe whole and free, where former
adversaries become allies. That is the story from France-
Germany to former Warsaw Pact countries, to Bulgaria itself. It
has been an important ally, helping to anchor the southeast
flank.
It also is where I have some concerns about Russian
disinformation and penetration, where I think some of the
Russian efforts are the most active and sometimes the most
effective. I think Bulgaria is underappreciated in terms of our
ability to push back on those influences.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And, Dr. Farkas, you have
already addressed this, but, again, Russia has described
further NATO enlargement as provocation in a variety of efforts
to intimidate. Again, what can we do to push back on the
infringement by the Russian Federation?
Ms. Farkas. Well, first, of course, the Russians themselves
have been provocative, not us. And our enlargement, as Damon
said, and as I said in the opening statement, was aimed at
spreading stability, not at provoking Russia. However, we found
out we really do need to deter Russia. We need to keep having a
dialog with Russia. Unfortunately, it is not going to happen
within the normal context that NATO used to have the dialog
because of Russia's infringements, because of the things that
they have done, first and foremost, of course, occupying and
illegally annexing territory.
But I would argue that we have to hold the firm line on
deterrence. For too long, we were hoping--and this spans
multiple administrations and really the whole NATO alliance--
there was a hope that somehow the Russians would realize that
this was a bad policy. Unfortunately, this Kremlin, this leader
of Russia is not going to realize that. So, we have to hold a
firm line.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you.
And a final question for the general. In regard to Turkey
purchasing S-400's, should the United States still be
providing, through NATO, F-35s?
General Jones. Yes, I believe that that topic is being
discussed almost as we speak between Turkey and the United
States. I also serve as the chairman of the American-Turkish
Council, a venerable institution for over 40 years. We just
returned from a big trip to Turkey where we were received by
the President, the Vice President, and every cabinet minister
we wanted to speak. They are very active and very desirous to
rebalance the relationship with the United States, working on
these difficult problems, but also some resurgence in the trade
relationships between our two countries.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Well, thank you for your
personal efforts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the vice chairman of the committee,
Ms. Spanberger from Virginia.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses today.
So much of our national security relies on global
telecommunications infrastructure, including military systems,
diplomatic channels, intelligence reporting, not to mention the
critical infrastructure for day-to-day uses across this country
and the world. Several countries, in addition to the U.S., have
barred the Chinese company Huawei from supplying components for
5G networks, citing national security concerns, including
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Yet, European allies have
not. As recently as February of this year, the head of
Britain's cybersecurity agency, GCHQ, said they needed to
better understand the opportunities and threats from China's
technology. My question for you all today is, how great of a
risk do Chinese 5G network providers pose to NATO's security in
your estimation?
General Jones. Thank you for that question.
5G represents to me one of the big challenges that the
United States faces with its competition with China. It is up
there with John F. Kennedy's man-on-the-moon project. It is up
there with the Manhattan Project for the 1940's. When I was a
teenager in Europe in 1957, I witnessed the Sputnik moment
where the headlines of the newspapers around the world said,
``Russia Beats the United States to Space''. I do not want to
see a headline where it says, ``China Beats the United States
in Technology of 5G''.
5G is the most disruptive technology that is going to come
our way. It is absolutely critical to our national security and
economic future that the United States not cede control over
the infrastructure required for 5G and, more importantly,
secure 5G. NATO's interoperability will be affected if there
are countries in NATO who are showing signs of forgiving China
and believing the theology that they advocate, which is
cheaper, more reliable, no strings attached, and, you know,
back doors to Beijing. This is a very, very serious threat.
We are behind. And our private sector is going a pretty
good job of developing the technology we need to ensure our
security, but we need more government oversight and
participation because this is really a moonshot for us. This is
as important as anything we have ever done. If we lose this, we
will lose a substantial portion of our ability to influence the
world.
Ms. Spanberger. And in your assessment, is there a way for
NATO to mitigate the risks from Chinese 5G technology or do you
believe that the United States should continue to pressure our
European allies to avoid any agreements with China altogether?
General Jones. So, there is 5G and there is secure 5G. By
far the most important one is the secure 5G. On that score, I
can tell you that our private sector is coming up with some
very exciting technologies that would give us hope that we can
prevail at least in the secure 5G world, technologies that are
impenetrable, technologies that cannot be reverse-engineered.
You cannot have a smart city without a secure network. That
is obvious. And the United States I think can prevail. There
will be countries that will buy Huawei equipment. And by the
way, a lot of them are thinking twice about that right now, and
that is a good thing. But if they do not care about it, if they
just want cheap equipment and they do not care about the back
door or the ability of China to eavesdrop on what they are
doing, then more power to them.
But it is absolutely incompatible, since we are talking
about NATO, with the 30-nation alliance, that they would have a
combination of Chinese technology and Western technology. That
is just simply not going to happen.
Ms. Spanberger. OK. Thank you, General Jones.
I yield bak.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
We have Mr. Pence, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Guest. Having called
the roll call, those members can choose to cut their questions,
if they so choose, to 3 minutes, so we can get them all in
there.
The chair recognizes Mr. Pence from Indiana.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairman Keating, Ranking Member
Kinzinger.
Thank you all for being here today.
Mr. Wilson, in your prepared testimony, you stated the
following, and I quote: ``But the Russian challenge to us is
likely to remain asymmetric. Therefore, we should double down
on our support, working with the European Union to strengthen
resilience of democratic societies through efforts that range
from diversifying energy routes and supplies to democratic
defense of disinformation.''
I am glad you mentioned energy security. In our hearing
last week that Congressman Kinzinger mentioned, I brought up
this very topic and would be interested in your thoughts. This
is my question to you all: is NATO doing enough to enhance
energy security in the alliance, and how might we encourage
NATO to engage with the EU to address their collective energy
security challenges?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much for that question.
I will sort of refer to, as General Jones noted, this Three
Seas Initiative. I do not think NATO is doing enough, and I
think the key is an integrated strategy between NATO and the
European Union. If Russia uses energy and weaponizes it against
our allies, we need to work with our allies in a common
strategy to defend against that. That, obviously, requires work
with the European Union. So, part of this effort is how can the
European Union, with the United States, help diversify those
energy routes and supplies, particularly into Central and
Eastern Europe, so that they are not found in a vulnerable
position.
And I think that is where the effort of the Three Seas
Initiative is, how to build a cross-border infrastructure that
is required, that is often not attractive to some private
investment, but is quite necessary to give options to some of
our more vulnerable allies. We have made progress on this
agenda, but it has been too slow. We have not treated it as a
first-order strategic priority of alignment between NATO and
the EU on a common strategy, and I think it is an imperative
one to add to that.
Ms. Farkas. Yes, I would basically agree with all of the
points that Damon made. NATO needs to get more actively
involved, at a minimum, in a consultative fashion. But NATO
members rely, their militaries rely on energy; they rely on
fuel, and maybe to some extent on natural gas. So, there is a
role for the defense ministries of these countries as well in
putting pressure on their governments. But the EU largely has
the lead on the issue. They took a while to become activated
again, to become sufficiently alarmed to coordinate this, and
they are doing a better job.
General Jones. Thank you for that question.
Philosophically, President Putin of Russia has shown that
he is more than capable and willing of using energy as a
weapon, and he has done so. The U.S., having catapulted itself
into a position of global leadership on energy, has adopted a
much more benevolent strategy. We care about military security,
economic security, political security, and energy security.
And with the Three Seas Initiative, and what it does, it
reduces the dependency of about 20 different countries in
Central and Eastern Europe off of the Russian ability to
manipulate the political spectrum through threats to cutoff
energy. It will effect better prices. It will effect the whole
stability of the continent. And I think that arrival of the
United States as a great power on energy should go beyond
Europe. We should also compete with China aggressively in
Africa on energy security as well, because energy is not the
commodity that China can export. We can.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Keating. The chair recognizes Mr. Cicilline of Rhode
Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses.
As you have all said, NATO is, obviously, rooted in a
bedrock of shared democratic values. And I think, like many,
you have expressed concern about democratic backsliding,
particularly in Hungary and Poland, and, of course, Turkey is
hardly democratic today. And I am just curious, maybe starting
with you, Mr. Wilson, what can Congress do to kind of shore up
these democracies in Europe and within the alliance? Some have
suggested NATO should begin an annual report or review of
democracy within the alliance. I wonder what you think of that
and what Congress might do to support that.
And, Dr. Farkas, if you could follow? I know you said that
these countries must be accountable. I think we all agree, but
it is unclear exactly how we do that under the current kind of
structure of NATO. How do we actually hold these countries
accountable?
So, maybe start with you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that question.
My approach is a little bit different perhaps than as Dr.
Farkas outlined. I think our premise should be to keep our
allies as our allies. And if we look 10-20 years out, the last
thing we want to see is an alliance in which Turkey is not
aligned with us, but perhaps someone else. I think the openings
there of the cleavages within our alliance are a strategic
vulnerability that a country like Russia can exploit.
It does not mean that we do not have concerns about what is
developing. But if you look at local elections in Poland, local
elections in Turkey, there is a vibrancy to these civil
societies, to these opposition parties, to their political
class. And I think that, through engagement rather than
isolation, rather than ostracizing our allies, being engaged,
and I think that helps with the congressional body, with other
parliaments, meeting cross-party--you know, as you are doing
meetings, doing cross-party parliamentary meetings with your
counterparts. Because my view of the alliance is to provide an
architecture, an infrastructure, which provides a bedrock sense
of security that our democracies, whether it is our own or
others, can be self-correcting and help nurture this.
So, I am reluctant to go down the path of a NATO passing
judgment on democracies within that club while trying to set
the standards that we want to uphold, but understand that this
isolating, calling out, or not meeting with, going 20 years
without a head-of-State meeting with the Hungarian leadership,
is not the best way to pursue democracy, in my view. I think it
opens up opportunities for the Russians to play games and to
potentially cause danger of peeling back our alliance.
Mr. Cicilline. Dr. Farkas?
Ms. Farkas. Yes, in my written testimony I also wrote a
little bit more extensively on this. And I noted that, when
Secretary Pompeo was recently in Budapest, he talked about a
new fund, new funding to help boost the civil society, to boost
the--he did not say the opposition, but the civil society in
Hungary.
So, I think I would agree with Damon's approach, which is
we do not need to set, certainly not another public litmus test
like 2 percent, because I do not think it helps. And as he
said, our adversaries will exploit it. But, behind closed
doors, I think we have to speak frankly with the heads of State
and the ministers, but, then, engage, as Damon said, not just
in the meetings we hold, but our government needs to put more
money back into those programs that we used to fund to help
bolster civil society in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. So, I
think those are very important, and media outreach programs,
and Fulbrights, and all of these people-to-people things, so
that, hopefully, we can help their societies evolve either back
to where they were before or to a better place.
General Jones. Thank you for that question.
I would strongly encourage more congressional engagement
with NATO. When I was over in SACEUR, the congressional visits
were always well-received by our European partners. I would
double down on those missions. I think they are very important.
I would recommend that our country reaffirm, without any
question, our commitment to Article 5 and NATO. I think that
has got to be--we should not ever dangle that as a negotiating
tool because it makes everybody nervous. And by the way, Russia
needs to hear that as well.
We should praise what the alliance has done. We criticize
it quite a bit, but I do not see enough praise coming from this
side of the Atlantic to what they are doing.
I think, frankly, I would champion a revamping of the
partnership program and the membership program, which I think
should be divided. There are countries like Brazil and
countries all over the world that would like to have an
interoperable mission with NATO, and I think we should
encourage that. The membership side should be completely
distinct. There should be a very rigid, step-by-step process
where countries can become members. But, right now, the two are
kind of in the same building, if you will, and it is unclear.
The distinction between the two is unclear.
So, I think there is a lot more we can do. I just think we
need to praise NATO when they deserve to be praised because we
do not hesitate to criticize them.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, General.
The chair recognizes Mr. Guest from Mississippi.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NBC News reported earlier today that the United States has
blocked turkey from receiving equipment related to the F-35
fighter jet until its NATO ally cancels an order of the Russian
missile defense system, which we know to be the S-400. Assuming
that that information is correct, General, do you agree with us
canceling their receiving the F-35s?
General Jones. Before the hearing started, I saw another
newsclip that said that Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan
said that he believes that the S-400 issue will be resolved and
that the F-35 will be included in Turkey's architecture. So, I
am on the private sector. I cannot----
Mr. Guest. Well, let me ask, as a former general and as a
private citizen, would you agree with canceling the F-35 if
Turkey does not agree to cancel the S-400 missile system? Do
you think that is a prudent decision by the United States
Government?
General Jones. My military friends tell me that the
compatibility of the F-35 operating in the same vicinity as the
S-400 gives away some of the technology of the F-35 that the S-
400 system could not otherwise acquire. I am very hopeful that
this is going to be resolved because this is really important
for the alliance. It is important for the bilateral
relationships.
I would like to remind the committee that years ago Greece
bought the S-300 from Russia, and the alliance put so much
pressure on Greece that they bought the system, but they never
deployed it, and it averted a crisis.
I know from my Turkish friends that there is some
willingness to consider the deployment options available to
them. And so, I hope this thing is working out. I was very
encouraged to see this clip before I appeared before you.
Mr. Guest. And, Dr. Farkas, the same question to you. If
Turkey refuses to cancel that order, do you agree that we
should not sell them the F-35s?
Ms. Farkas. Congressman, I am not sure whether I would link
the two, just because I have not studied the issue. So, the
kind of political scientist, policymaker, geek in me says I
need to study it.
But I will tell you that it is deeply disturbing that
Turkey is dangling this in front of us. I do not know how
serious it is. And the reason I say that is because, when I was
in the Pentagon, they also were toying with buying a Chinese
system. And some of this plays into Turkey's desire to show
that they are somehow independent of the United States, of our
pressure. It is not helpful at this time in history.
It may also be part of their overall effort to put pressure
on our government vis-a-vis Syria and what is happening there.
So, I think I would look very closely at the macro picture. I
am not sure I would, again, tie the F-35 directly to this S-400
deal, but the S-400 deal, I would say it cannot stand.
Mr. Guest. And, Mr. Wilson, I will give you an opportunity
to answer the question as well.
Mr. Wilson. I think, strategically, we want Turkey in the
F-35 program. We need to recognize that we are in the Turkish
bazaar negotiating right now. And I think even today's
statements are playing out. There is a high-stakes negotiation.
Now that we are through Turkish elections, I hope they can
be serious. We understand that the Russians put real pressure
on Erdogan after the shootdown of a Russian jet over Syria in
Turkish airspace to go through with this. I think we need to
see it either canceled or deployed in such a way that it is
actually deployed/mothballed at the same time, so that it does
not provide a cleavage place, a vulnerability for the F-35,
which has to be our No. 1 priority to protect that program's
integrity.
Mr. Guest. And would you agree, Mr. Wilson, as the general
spoke of a few moments ago, that if the S-400 was deployed in
Turkey at the same time our fighter jets were, that it would be
able to give the Russians or our adversaries information about
capabilities that they do not currently have?
Mr. Wilson. That is what I understand from people who have
more technical expertise than I do. That is where this either
comes in, do we either come out of a negotiation that leads to
a cancellation or is there a saving-face option where the Turks
end up paying for this and it is not deployed and used in such
a way that it would cause that concern for us?
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Guest.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here and the
subcommittee members as well, working around roll calls and
hearings.
It is critical to have a strategy for NATO to grow and
evolve and address the new and emerging threats. And I look
forward to working with my colleagues on the committee this
Congress to address it.
We appreciate the comments you have made about the role of
Congress going forward. I think it is a very important role.
Members of the committee may have an additional time to ask
questions of our witnesses in writing, and we ask our witnesses
to please respond to those questions in writing as well. The
record will be open for 10 more business days to receive those
responses.
Mr. Keating. Again, we thank all of you for being here and
an important discussion about the future of NATO and where we
are going, certainly an evolving one.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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