[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-615PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
KAREN BASS, California, Chair
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota Ranking Member
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania RON WRIGHT, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Janet Yarwood, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
PREPARED STATEMENT
Prepared statement submitted by Chairperson Bass................. 4
WITNESSES
Thomas-Greenfield, Linda, Senior Counselor, Albright Stonebridge
Group, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 14
Coulibaly, Dr. Brahima, Director, The Brookings Institution...... 34
Meservey, Joshua, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation. 45
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Amnesty International report submitted from Representative Omar.. 66
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 79
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 80
Hearing Attendance............................................... 81
Additional materials submitted for the record.................... 82
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Questions submitted from Representative Smith.................... 87
LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS
TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
Room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass (chair
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Bass. Good afternoon, everyone. This hearing for the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony. And
the title of our hearing is ``Africa Looking Forward: U.S.-
Africa Relations.'' Without objection all members may have 5
days to submit statements, questions, materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
I will now make an opening statement and then turn it over
to the ranking member for his opening statement.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations. Basically, we are here
to ask what U.S. engagement with African countries should look
like moving forward.
We mentioned in the first hearing that we wanted to take
our first few hearings as an opportunity to really provide an
overview of the jurisdiction that this committee covers. And
recognizing that the only two members on this committee that
have been on this committee for a while, we have all new
members, and so for that reason wanted to take a step back and
really provide an overview.
The African continent is comprised of 50-plus countries and
more than 1.2 billion culturally distinct peoples in different
geographic regions. This diversity results in diverging
political, economic, and social experiences across the
continent. This means that our policy has to take that
diversity into consideration. The continent cannot be painted
with one brush.
After years of democratic progress, African democracies
have faced ups and downs. Some countries are progressing while
others appear to be backsliding. Meanwhile, African citizens
favor democracy and continue to take to the streets to demand
responsive and accountable governance.
How do we encourage countries to support the desire for
democracy by their citizens?
What tools should we be using?
Regarding issues around good governance, democracy, and
human rights, there are a number of countries that I look
forward to hearing about in your testimony or in the Q&A.
Cameroon is very concerning at the moment, and the government's
reaction to protests in Sudan is also an area of concern.
In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing major
demographic changes, including a youth bulge and urbanization.
People age 35 and under account for more than 75 percent of
Africa's population, with the continent expected to become the
world region with the highest urbanization. While the continent
is undergoing this major urban transition and youth bulge, some
of the world's fastest growing economies are in African
countries. In fact, several international observers have named
the continent the future economic growth engine of the world.
Other nations are deepening their relationships with
countries across Africa, and instead of critiquing, we have to
find ways to show up and engage. I look forward to hearing
witnesses' recommendations on what this engagement should
entail.
Most of you know that I advocate for increased trade,
investment, and business activity between Africa and the U.S.
From my perspective this is a win/win situation. We help U.S.
businesses again access to new markets while creating jobs and
building capacity across Africa. And we know that this is
increasingly essential, given the youth bulge.
We are often critical of China's involvement on the
continent. And I am not sure what we expect the African
countries to do, but the solution that I like to promote is
that the United States needs to step up.
In his December 2018 public remarks, National Security
Advisor Bolton identified three core U.S. interests in Africa:
expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties with African
countries; countering the threat from terrorism and violent
conflict; and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid
and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region.
My hope is that the witnesses can highlight other areas
that we should focus on when we consider U.S.-Africa relations.
I have been disappointed that the Administration has not
emphasized democracy, good governance, or human rights. That
said, the Administration has maintained most Africa-focused aid
initiatives launched by previous Congresses and, in some cases,
has sought to fund them, however, at far lower levels. These
include the global President's Emergency Plan for AIDS, or
PEPFAR, and Feed the Future, and Africa-specific Young African
Leaders Initiatives, and Electrify Africa. Electrify Africa and
Feed the Future were initiatives that were put in the statute
by the former Chair Ed Royce.
And I am glad that those initiatives have continued, but
concerned about the cuts in funding.
I will conclude by stressing that U.S.-Africa relations
with--that U.S. relations with Africa has always enjoyed
bipartisan support here in Congress. And we expect to continue
to work together. Each time the Administration has sought to
reduce funding to the State Department or USAID, especially
those that would impact African countries, we have worked
together in a bipartisan manner to restore that funding.
I now recognize the ranking member for the purpose of
making an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bass follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the
witnesses for coming forward today and spending time with us.
I believe I speak for all of us when I say that the
importance of U.S. engagement in Africa cannot be overstated. I
was pleased to see the Administration recognize this and
release a dedicated Africa strategy in December. It's critical
for the American people to understand our interest in Africa,
and for Africa to see our commitment to the continent. In my
opinion, the strategy goes a long way in both respects.
In recent years, policy and debate on Africa has centered
on counterterrorism, foreign assistance, conservation, women
empowerment, development, good governance, and human rights,
among other things. While I am proud of the progress we have
made in our counterterrorism efforts, we must continue to be
proactive, particularly in the Sahel. As we have seen in the
Middle East, left unchecked, extremist organizations have the
potential to carry out deadly attacks across the globe and spur
tragic humanitarian crises as people flee from harm's way.
The same can be said on development and women empowerment.
The BUILD Act and the Women's Entrepreneurship and Economic
Empower Act, which were both signed into law last Congress,
will have a tremendous impact, but we must do more. Africa
continues to grapple with high poverty rates, food insecurity,
insufficient healthcare and education systems, and
infrastructure deficiencies. Addressing these issues is not
only in the best interests of Africans but in the best
interests of Americans.
For this reason, I introduced the Digital Global Access
Policy Act which promotes expanding internet access in
developing countries and, in turn, will help Africa overcome
many problems I just mentioned. It is my hope that this
committee and the House of Representatives will soon take up
this critical legislation.
While many of the previous issues I have highlighted will
continue to dominate our efforts in Africa, we must turn our
attention toward countering China and Russia as they expand
their financial and political influence across the continent.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has secured
significant leverage over many African countries, and access to
Africa's precious natural resources. China's construction of
its first overseas military base in Djibouti is also a cause
for concern, given its close proximity to ours.
We see similar interest from Russia, albeit it even more
defense-focused.
Checking Chinese and Russian investment and influence in
the region, and the rest of the world, is critical to U.S.
national security. We cannot write blank checks or discount
requirements that come along with U.S. assistance, but we must
think critically and innovatively about how we can offer an
alternative.
I look forward to what will certainly be a productive and
enlightening discussion about our next steps in Africa. Thank
you, and I yield back.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. I now
want to introduce our witnesses.
First, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield. She joined ASG
as a senior counselor after serving as the U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs from 2013 to 2017. In
this capacity, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield led U.S. policy
toward sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on peace and security,
democracy and governance, economic empowerment, and investment
opportunities.
Prior to this appointment she served as Director General of
the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources where she
oversaw all personnel functions for the U.S. Department of
State's 70,000-strong work force. Previously, Ambassador
Thomas-Greenfield served as the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from
2008 to 2012, and held posts in several other African nations.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is also a distinguished
resident fellow in African affairs at the Institute for the
Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University.
Dr. Coulibaly is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa
Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institute. His research
focuses on creating economic opportunities and prosperity in
sub-Saharan Africa by improving development, finance, local
trade, monetary policies, and banking, financial institutions,
and markets. His most recent work includes the research papers
``Mobilization of Tax Revenues in Africa,'' ``Meeting Africa's
Employment Challenges in the Changing World,'' as well as
serving as the editor for the Initiative's Annual Flagship
Report, ``Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent.''
Joshua Meservey is a Senior Fellow Policy Analyst, Africa
and the Middle East, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes
in African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy.
In 2009 he joined Church World Service based out of Nairobi,
Kenya, and traveled extensively in East and Southern Africa
interviewing refugees. He ended his time at CSW as, as field
team manager responsible for a multinational team of nearly 100
staff.
In 2012 he worked at the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command and helped write an Army concept paper. He is the lead
author of a monograph on al-Shabaab's insurgency, and his other
work has appeared in many other publications.
I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time. Again, I
want to thank you for your patience. Apologize for the delay.
And ask you to begin your testimony.
We do not have a clock. I will be keeping track on my
trusty iPhone here, and will notify you when 5 minutes are up.
I know that you all have written testimony that you have
submitted, so within 5 minutes if you could summarize your
testimony. And could you begin, Madam Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, SENIOR
COUNSELOR, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, FORMER ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you very much. I will
do my best.
Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Wright, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
at this important hearing on the future of United States policy
toward Africa. Allow me to thank all of you for your commitment
and service to Africa, and some of you for your support during
my tenure as Assistant Secretary from 2013 to 2017.
I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the dreadful
situation in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as a result of
Cyclone Idai which has led to hundreds of deaths, and thousands
of displacement, and millions of dollars in destruction. This
should be at the forefront of our thinking on Africa today.
2019 is a critical time for Africa policy. There have been
a series of long-term trends and recent developments which have
put the continent at the forefront like never before. That is
why it is crucial that there be sustained and consistent U.S.
engagement on the content.
The U.S. has consistently shown great bipartisan leadership
on African issues. The bipartisan focus of our government led
to the passing of programs as the--as Congresswoman Bass
mentioned, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief, the President's Malaria Initiative, the Africa Growth
and Opportunity Act, YALI, the Millennium Challenge Account,
Feed the Future. All of these programs have withstood the tests
across, of time across administrations. And these programs are
laced with our value system at the core: democracy, good
governance, human rights, and prosperity, all of which made the
U.S. a major player on the continent of Africa.
The positive bipartisan engagement with Africa continued
with the current administration's BUILD Act and PROSPER Africa
initiatives. These initiatives seek to further strengthen trade
ties with a still burgeoning Africa market full of
opportunities.
The United States brings many resources to the table that
other countries do not. The United States hosts a large and
vibrant African diaspora community who have made significant
contributions to America, both economically and socially. And
as we commemorate the 400-year anniversary since the first
African arrived to this land in bondage, we must remember the
deep historical connections between the U.S. and Africa.
Allow me to touch briefly on a few issues we should
address. My full testimony is provided in writing and gives a
more fulsome list.
First, Congressman Bass, you mentioned the youth bulge.
Africa is facing an unprecedented demographic evolution with
half the population under the age of 19. Estimates are that by
2050, the population of the African continent will have doubled
from 1.2 million to 2.--1.2 billion to 2.5 billion,
representing a quarter of the world's population. It is vital
that the United States work to help African countries use this
growth to foster prosperity.
Security and terrorism, maybe one of the most critical
areas of collaboration with African States, involves security.
Continued U.S. engagement with African stakeholders to tackle
these threats is necessary. The proposed reduction of 10
percent of American troops deployed on the continent sends the
wrong message to our partners.
On democracy and democratic transition, the fact that the
national security advisory did not mention democracy in his
December Africa policy speech did not go unnoticed on the
continent. The United States must continue to promote democracy
programs across the continent. In the long-term, democracy
contributes to better governance, human development, security,
and economic growth.
Climate change. It is important that we engage African
policymakers on climate change and adopting environmentally
conscious policies. Renewed international commitments to
elements of the Paris Climate Change Agreement would benefit
Africa's efforts to address some of the environmental changes
it now faces.
And while I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to
engage on the entire continent, there are some countries that I
believe decisionmakers should prioritize.
First, Nigeria. The importance of the most populous country
in sub-Saharan Africa and its No. 1 economy is self evident.
And as President Buhari embarks on his second and final term,
the U.S. needs to remain supportive of reforms that will help
entrench democratic values.
South Africa will hold elections in May of this year. And
as the next administration in South Africa deals with
institutional corruption and the tricky waters of land
redistribution, the U.S. needs to support the country's
transition to let the South African people know we are standing
side by side with them.
Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an example of the profound change
that African countries can go through quickly with principled
leaders at the helm. The United States should ramp up its
engagement with the Government of Ethiopia to ensure these
reforms continue unhindered, and that they become
institutionalized within Ethiopia. The United States should not
squander the opportunity to build closer relationships with
this vital player.
South Sudan. In South Sudan the U.S. has fallen behind on
diplomatic leadership, and I believe we have abdicated
responsibility for a State we helped birth. The United States
should designate a special envoy to provide U.S. leadership who
can work with leaders in the region to break the cycle of
continued conflict in South Sudan.
I welcome in DRC the appointment of Dr. Peter Pham as the
Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa in November
2018. It is important following the election that the U.S.
continue to engage with the Congolese president.
And I see you are about to grab, so I am going to skip.
But I have mentioned Ghana. And I do mention Tanzania,
Sudan, Cameroon that I know in particular that you think is
very important.
But finally, let me just say that to achieve our goals in
Africa and around the globe we must have sustained, strong
diplomatic efforts. The visit, recent visit of Deputy Secretary
Sullivan to South Africa and Angola, and Assistant Secretary
Nagy to Cameroon, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda, highlight the type
of engagement that is needed. But they need help from more
senior officials in the administration to engage. And I think
for this reason it is time for a second Africa Leaders Summit.
And also, we have, we have too many Ambassadorships in
Africa that are still vacant. And many of them are in some of
these important countries that I mentioned. And in order for us
to have successful engagement with the African continent we
need to invest in more diplomatic presence on the ground,
particularly our Ambassadors.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Ultimately, the United States
should take a more positive, proactive approach to Africa,
emphasizing the potential of the continent rather than its
risks. It is absolutely in the interests of the United States
to see the continent of Africa grow and thrive.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Dr. Coulibaly.
STATEMENT OF BRAHIMA COULIBALY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Mr. Coulibaly. Thank you, Madam Chair Bass, and Ranking
Member Wright. So let me begin by applauding your leadership as
well as that of Congressman Smith, and your active role in
fostering the bipartisan collaboration that has traditionally
characterized the U.S. legislation in Africa.
And my appreciation to the members of the committee for the
opportunity to share my views on the subject.
This is indeed an opportune time to reassess the future of
U.S.-Africa relations because there is an emerging consensus,
which I share, that the U.S. is falling behind in Africa. In my
view, this is not because U.S. policies toward Africa have
failed. In fact, and as was mentioned earlier, U.S. policies
and programs such as AGOA, PEPFAR, the Malaria Initiative,
Power Africa, YALI, have all been successful in impact overall.
But whether it is because Africa is transforming rapidly
and the architecture of our engagements needs to adapt to this
dynamism and to the evolving aspirations of the African
countries. So, following a period of political and social
instability, as well as weak economic growth, Africa's fortunes
have begun to turn around the year 2000. Since then, thanks to
better domestic policies and favorable global environment,
economic growth has been strong, boosting commercial
opportunities.
Importantly, Africa is experiencing a demographic boom and
rapid urbanization. By the turn of the century, 40 percent of
the world's population, and 42 percent of its work force will
be African.
And to better respond to the growing needs of the
populations, Africa's leadership and institutions are becoming
more assertive in the ownership and advancement of the
continent's agenda. The unprecedented dynamism on the continent
is creating tremendous commercial opportunities in trade and
investment, and it is not an exaggeration to say that Africa is
on a course to be the world's next big growth market.
Earlier this month the cover page of the Economist magazine
read, ``The New Scramble for Africa.'' It was capturing what
those following developments on the continent already knew.
Commercial opportunities that Africa presents, as well as some
of the transnational threats originating from the region are
attracting interest from an increasingly diverse group of
foreign countries working proactively to strengthen diplomatic,
defense, and commercial ties with the continent.
The most active foreign countries are non-traditional
partners, and their emergence is challenging the partner of
choice status that traditional partners, including the United
States, have enjoyed. While diplomatic and the defense ties are
broadening and strengthening, shifts in commercial ties have
been the most significant.
Between 2010 and 2017, Africa's trade with countries such
as Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and China, have risen
very fast. In contrast, trade with the United States fell by
more than half over this period. And the United States is no
longer among Africa's top three trading partners.
Although the United States still has the largest stock of
foreign direct investment, this stock has barely increased
since 2010, while investment from other countries, particularly
China, has increased significantly.
So, in this new scramble for Africa what can the United
States do to keep up?
First, I think the U.S. should articulate a clear
bipartisan, long-term vision for its U.S.-Africa policy
following broad consultation with key stakeholders, including
U.S. and Africa businesses but, importantly, the African Union.
The vision should align to the extent possible with the African
Union's Agenda 2063 and the U.N.'s Agenda 2030 that African
countries have adopted.
Given increasing interdependencies between defense,
diplomacy, and development, the vision should encompass
engagements on all three dimensions but with greater emphasis
on the commercial ties with the most potential to yield the
most significant mutually beneficial outcomes.
Second, to accelerate the commercial engagement, the United
States should appoint a high level White House official with a
mandate to work across U.S. agencies to advance U.S. commercial
policy.
Third, the U.S. should initiate a regular high level summit
between the United States and African States, as the external
partners, including China, India, Japan, Turkey, and the
European Union, all have held two or more high level summits in
recent years which have advanced their engagement with Africa.
In contrast, the U.S. has held only one high level summit, and
that was in 2014.
While not a panacea, I believe these recommendations will
go a long way to provide the needed clarity, predictability,
and stability in U.S. engagement with Africa. The presence of
other countries on the continent will only strengthen with
time. And the United States does have a solid foundation and
the legacy in Africa on which to build. However, without more
proactive approaches the U.S. is just falling further behind.
Ultimately, the future of U.S.-Africa relations will be
determined more by U.S. policy and actions, or lack thereof,
toward Africa than by those of other countries toward Africa.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coulibaly follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Meservey. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Members Wright, and
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify. Thank you as well for your continued focus on and
championing of deeper U.S.-Africa ties. The views I express in
this testimony are my own and should not be construed as
representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
In may remarks I will focus on what I consider to be the
four most important U.S. strategic priorities in Africa.
First, the U.S. must retain sufficient influence and
positioning to protect its national interests on the continent.
This is an evergreen challenge that has grown more urgent given
the rising great and middle power competition in Africa.
As is often commented upon, Djibouti is a good example of
this problem. Its port is critical to U.S. military operations
in East Africa, yet the Chinese government has built such
influence there that there is concern the U.S. will be unable
to maintain the necessary level of access.
The U.S. is already far behind in the competition to
develop and deploy 5G mobile network technology in Africa. The
winner of this competition will gain great economic and other
advantages. Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have built most of
the existing telecoms infrastructure in Africa, and several
large African telecom companies are already negotiating with
Huawei on building 5G networks.
Huawei's and ZTE's dominance in Africa is also an obvious
counterintelligence problem for the United States. Relatedly,
Chinese companies have built, or renovated, or Beijing has
financed at least 63 sensitive government buildings in at least
29 African countries. We should assume most, if not all, of
those buildings are bugged or otherwise compromised, as was the
Chinese-built African Union headquarters.
Second, the U.S. should facilitate regulatory and normative
environments that ensure U.S. companies can compete on an even
footing in Africa. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies
will be growing by 5 percent or more per year and the continent
will likely constitute a $3 trillion economy. It will harm the
U.S. and ordinary Africans if anti-competitive behavior becomes
the norm and further disadvantages U.S. firms.
Third, the U.S. should encourage the growth of African
democracy. It is the political system that best promotes human
flourishing. And shared democratic values facilitate mutually
beneficial relationships between the U.S. and other countries.
After years of progress on the continent in this regard there
has been worrisome backsliding in a number of countries.
Finally, the U.S. must ensure terrorists cannot use Africa
as a staging ground for attacks against the U.S. There have
been gains against some of the continent's worst groups, but we
are also in the midst of a resurgence of terrorist activity in
the Sahel region. The Islamic State West Africa Province and
Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen have been particularly
active and ambitious.
A long-term component of the terrorism problem is the
spread of the Wahhabist practice of Islam in Africa. Saudi
Arabia in particular has proselytized this fundamentalist
practice, important components of which most current Islamist
terrorist groups subscribe to.
Responding in a constructive way to the problems and
prospects of Africa requires a thoughtful, committed approach.
In that spirt, I think the U.S. should do the following, and
this is not a comprehensive list:
Assess with which governments it can reasonably expect to
have a mutually beneficial partnership. Good candidates should
receive a full suite of U.S. engagement, while poor candidates
should be more economy-of-force operations.
Assist African countries to become more business friendly;
foster African entrepreneurs; aid African countries to get the
best possible deals from Chinese investments; task U.S.
embassies with identifying and facilitating commercial
opportunity for U.S. companies, foster good governance in
Africa by assisting civil society, fighting corruption, and
deepening cooperation with non-African allies active on the
continent; create a strategic messaging plan that explains to
African countries the benefits of partnering with the United
States; make the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit a routine event;
and ensure that the new International Development Finance
Corporation achieves its stated purpose of supporting the U.S.
in its strategic competition with China.
The U.S. already has a strong foundation of African
engagement of which it should be proud. But it also can and
should do more. I thank the committee again for doing its part
to ensure that U.S. policies protect American interests and
contribute to a safe, prosperous, and free Africa.
I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. I want to thank all three of
our witnesses today for your testimony. And would now like to
begin with members asking questions. And I actually will hold
my questions and ask them last, since I know members have
numerous conflicts.
So, I will go to the ranking member.
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I was happy to hear
you mention Cameroon in your opening statement because I also
have very deep interest there. I have a number of constituents
in my district from Cameroon. And I have heard from both sides.
And there is a concern that as the resistance in Anglophone
Cameroon continues that security forces of the Government of
Cameroon will continue to clamp down which will cause even
further growth in resistance and the whole thing will spiral.
And so, my question is what can and should, in your
opinion, the U.S. Government do in Cameroon? And, Madam, I am
going to ask all of you that question. Madam Ambassador, I am
going to start with you.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you very much.
I think the first thing that we can do, and this has
already, was already done by Assistant Secretary Nagy, was
engage with the government on this issue. I think for a number
of months and for the past year we have ignored what was
happening in any consistent way.
So Assistant Secretary Nagy was there and I know that he
did raise this issue with the government. I do not know the
gist of the conversation, but I can imagine that he expressed
our concerns about this issue.
I think in the long run we may have to take some actions
against the government and other parties who are committing
human rights violations. I am sure you have seen the pictures
that we have all seen coming from that situation. And the
pictures are coming from both sides. The atrocities are being
committed by both sides, and people should be held accountable
for that to send a strong message, that this is not the way you
address these kinds of issues.
Mr. Wright. Dr. Coulibaly.
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes, I would echo off Ambassador Thomas-
Greenfield's sentiment for the U.S. to take a stronger stance
where it deems there to have been some already violations of
the human rights and an opportunity to put as much pressure on
the government as possible to respect the rights of all.
Mr. Wright. Mr. Meservey.
Mr. Meservey. Yes, I agree with my colleagues comments. I
think it is very important that the Cameroonian Government
understand that the U.S. is watching. I think regional
engagement is always very important in these sorts of conflict,
so the U.S. should be working very actively with neighbors and
other concerned countries, the Africa Union.
This doubtlessly concerns many African countries, and the
U.S. should be playing the unique role that it can as a
facilitator and a convener to try to get them working or
pulling in the same direction, working with a singular purpose
on Cameroon.
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bass. Oh, wonderful.
Representative Omar.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Very excited to see all of you and hear your testimony.
Ambassador, I do not know if you remember me, but we met in
Minneapolis right after I had been elected to the Minnesota
House. And so, as you probably know, there is a little crisis
right now that is happening to many of my constituents and
friends and neighbors who are from Liberia, who are on a DED
status. And I know that in your history that you served as an
ambassador to Liberia.
And so, I wanted to see if we can maybe chat about this
particular crisis that is being visited upon many of my
constituents. Last week was a recess week for us, and so I got
home. And, you know, we visited many workplaces. There are the
majority of the Liberians in my district and in Minnesota are
healthcare workers, and so one of the places that I visited was
an assisted living center where 177 of their employees were DED
recipients. And their status ends on the 31st of this month.
And so if that is not renewed, most of them are most likely
going to be returned back to Liberia.
And so I know that there is going to be a great impact on
our community. There is going to be a great impact on my
district. But I wanted to see if you maybe can help us sort of
fully understand the impact that it might have on the folks in
Liberia.
Do you know how many, how much money in remittances do
Liberians here in this country send back to Liberia?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I do not know that exact
figure. But I know that it is significant, just as it is across
the continent of Africa. It plays a huge role in the economy of
Liberia.
But I appreciate the question related to Liberians who are
beneficiaries of DED. This was an issue that came up numerous
times during my tenure as the Ambassador to Liberia. I will
admit that at the time, given the fact that President Sirleaf
was president of the country, and the country was going through
significant transformation in a positive way, that I wanted to
encourage Liberians who were living in the U.S. to come back
and be part of the success that was Liberia.
In the meantime, you know, as I have returned to the U.S.,
this is a much more comprehensive and bigger issue than
Liberia. I met a young Liberian women a few--last week, in
fact, who was a DACA recipient. And she had lived here in the
United States since she was 4 years old. She does not know
anyone in Liberia. She is currently a student at a university
here in the United States, doing quite well, interning in
Washington, DC. And she is fearful of what she will find in
Liberia.
And I tried to encourage her by telling her there is
nothing to fear. But it is easy for me to say that sitting here
without the fear of being returned to a place that I do not
know. And I left that discussion with her extraordinarily
sympathetic to her plight. And I do believe that as we look at
the broader DACA issues related to all of the nationalities
here in the United States, the Liberians have to be part of
that comprehensive solution.
Whether that can happen by the end of March, I do not know.
But I do know that if they are to return to Liberia, right now
they are going to return to a country that is at peace. But I
think the economy there is in a bit of a downfall. And so it
will be very, very difficult for these individuals to
reintegrate back into Liberia, having been out of Liberia as
long as they have been out of Liberia.
Ms. Omar. Yes.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. In addition, their family
members who have been dependent on their remittances will no
longer have that benefit.
Ms. Omar. Yes. Thank you for that broad overview of the
issue.
And that brings me, actually, to the second question I was
going to ask you is that while you say it is at peace, many of
my constituents and my friends and neighbors say that it is not
economically or physically safe for them to return. And we know
that an assessment usually is done for a country before we
decide to terminate the temporary status. And so, do you think
that this president and Secretary Nielsen have done or at least
asked for that assessment to be made before making a decision
to terminate? That is the first part of my question.
And then the second part is do you think Liberia is ready
to absorb all of the people that are going to be returned back
to it? And will that maybe harm any peace or stability it might
currently have?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would assume, and I do not
know, that any assessments that are required have been done
either by our embassy or by the State Department. But I cannot
answer that question with any----
Ms. Omar. We have not been able to see one, so.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. So, again, I do not know the
answer to that.
Again, having lived in Liberia for 4 years and worked on
Liberia, Liberian issues my entire life, I know the country
quite well. I think the country will have difficulty absorbing
a large number of people because they are having difficulty
dealing with the economic challenges of the people who are
living there now.
That said, in terms of the safety factor, we were dealing
with a country that was at war for 14 years, where people were
being killed regularly. That does not happen in Liberia
anymore. I did find Liberia to be safe.
Ms. Bass. I am going to go to Mr. Burchett and then we will
do another round.
Mr. Burchett. I can yield a minute if she wants to finish
her thoughts. I hate to come back. She might have to go
somewhere. I have got to go somewhere, too, but I would be----
Ms. Omar. I have got time. I am good.
Mr. Burchett. You are good?
Ms. Omar. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. OK. I thank the chairlady, ranking member,
Ms. Omar.
I have just about two or three different questions, and I
will try to hit them pretty fast because I know our time is
limited.
As you all know, violent extremist groups threaten State
stability, regional security, and international interests in
Africa. And I want to focus mainly on the Lake Chad Basin
region and Boko Haram. What are your thoughts on this terror
group now that the Islamic State has recognized a rival faction
as opposed to Abubakar Shekau; does this fragmentation make
them more or less of a threat?
Go ahead, ma'am, in that pretty outfit. I am going to call
on you first, if that is all right, Chairlady. Am I allowed to
do that.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. You know, I think the threat
that Boko Haram and any groups that have spiraled from that
organization continue to have a major impact in the region. We
have seen that impact in Northern Nigeria, we have seen that in
Chad, in Niger, and further afield. And this is why I think it
is important that we continue to engage with African countries
to address this issue, because terrorism, wherever it happens,
impacts all of us.
When there was an attack on a hotel in Mali a couple years
ago an American citizen was killed in that attack. So we are
not safe if we are not working with those countries to address
these issues.
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. I think the Lake Chad region more
broadly to look at it is basically where issues like terrorism,
climate change, State fragility all come together. And the
solution in my view today has to be a long-lasting one that is
able to encompass both economics as well as security
interventions.
If you take the Lake Chad region, for example, in 1963 we
have the bed shed of about 25,000 square kilometers. Now it is
only 2,500 square kilometers due to climate change. So it is
now one-tenth of what it used to be. So, what that has done is
create conditions for conflict that is affecting now about 50
million people or so in that region.
So, I think a comprehensive approach needs to be taken to a
solution if we want it to be really long-lasting and impactful.
Mr. Meservey. And I think the terrorism challenge
associated with Boko Haram and its splinter group is profound.
The good news is that Boko Haram has lost most of its
strongholds over the last number of years because of this
multinational force.
But the Nigerian Government has been unable to deliver the
security and the services and other things that are necessary
to really stabilize the northeast, so Boko Haram has survived
and is now actually resurgent, I would say, as is its splinter
group ISIS West Africa Province, which just at the beginning of
this year conquered hundreds of square miles of territory in
three different countries.
They are establishing a State. They are now administering
it in some ways. They have--it is not nearly as extensive, of
course, as the ISIS State in, or was in the Middle East, but
those are clearly their aspirations. And they have made very
serious gains in recent times.
So it is a very difficult problem set in a belt, as my
colleague just mentioned here, where you have all sorts of very
negative trends converging that makes it very hard to eliminate
these groups.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. One more, if I have time,
Chairlady, for one more question?
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, ma'am.
I am concerned about the investments that China is making.
And I am wondering what the U.S. should be doing to counter
some of the influence that they are having in Africa? And to
what extent are some of these investments a threat to our
interests, including our diplomatic development and security
objectives?
And the followup of that, if the United States were to
significantly reduce its foreign aid to Africa, would China, do
you all feel like China would seek to fill the gap, and how
they would do that?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. China, over I would say the
past decade, has gone into Africa fast and furiously. They have
changed their approach. It has evolved over, over time.
Initially, they would go in and do a stadium or some small
project and to buy influence. Now they are doing major
infrastructural projects. The issue at hand is that all of
these infrastructural projects, some of them better than
others, are needed on the continent of Africa. Africans need
railroads, they need roads, they need refurbished airports and
ports. And we have ceded that space to China.
And it is important if the U.S. sees its role as
competing--and I do not see us as competing with China because
I think we have different resources that we bring to the table;
we are not going to bring those large projects--I think the
better approach for us to take is to work with our African
partners to ensure that they have the capacity to strike and
negotiate better deals with the Chinese. Because, again, the
kind of deals that they are getting with the Chinese, we do not
have the wherewithal to do that.
But we need to pay attention to what is happening because
our influence on the continent is waning in comparison to
China. And if we start to decrease our foreign aid the Chinese
will come in in some way or another to support these countries.
They are not going to come in with the same values that we
bring to the table.
And in my conversations with African leaders and business
people alike, their preference is to have the United States
there. And their question to us every day is: Where are you?
Why are you not there? And you cannot tell us we cannot engage
with the Chinese if you are not prepared to engage with us.
Ms. Bass. Did anybody else want to respond to that?
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. I just wanted to underscore the
Ambassador's point.
So, the really best way to counter China, if that was the
objective, really is to solve Africa's infrastructure problem.
It is really huge.
Mr. Burchett. Say that again.
Mr. Coulibaly. Is to solve----
Mr. Burchett. I am sorry, I am from East Tennessee and I
did not understand that.
Mr. Coulibaly. Is to solve Africa's infrastructure
problems. I mean, the demand there is huge, huge because of the
low point where they are starting from given the stage of
economic development. But also huge because they are
experiencing very rapid demographic growth and rapid rate of
urbanization. Estimates put it at about $130 to $170 billion a
year. That is what is needed for infrastructure financing in
Africa. And two-thirds of that amount, or 60 percent or more,
is unfunded.
And I think that is what China has aligned itself with the
African nations, and that is why they are responding
positively. But I am hopeful that at least as we roll out the
Development Finance Corporations that was part of the BUILD
Act, that is going to be able to come in and allow the U.S. to
begin to play more in that space.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Did you want to say something? Go ahead.
Mr. Meservey. Just briefly.
Ms. Bass. Sure.
Mr. Meservey. I think it is I agree, I do not think the
message to our African partners should be us or them. That is
not going to work because China does provide certain things
that African countries need. But helping African countries
strike better deals, as the Ambassador mentioned, with China is
really important, but also providing an alternative.
We cannot do that, frankly, on most big infrastructure
projects because we do not have a lot of companies that do that
sort of thing. We do not heavily subsidize them as the Chinese
Government does with its State-owned, obviously, enterprises.
So, we need to look at competitive advantages that the United
States has, which industries do we have a real, obvious
advantage, focus on those.
And I think that we need to in terms of the larger
competition with China, where we do compete is around the
model. And, you know, Beijing is increasingly pushing this idea
to African countries that you can have economic growth but you
just need to crack down on the pesky journalists and the civil
society and things of that nature, as we do. And look at how
successful we have been.
So that is, there is an obvious competition there. And the
U.S. needs to engage in that competition of ideas especially,
and make sure we are messaging properly about the benefits of
democracy, of the free enterprise system, and things of that
nature.
Ms. Bass. You know, I would continue with that because I
think one of the big concerns right now is we are not really
sending a strong message from the Administration in that regard
to counter that. And, you know, my experience, along with the
witnesses, and I am sure many people in the room, is that the
African countries would rather do business with us. But we
cannot, we are not in a position to tell them they should turn
their backs on China when China is there and we are not.
And really, the question is, you know, for us to step up
our involvement.
And so, to my colleague from Tennessee, two things. You
know, one, hopefully, because you were asking the question
about security, hopefully, if you are available, you could
attend the CODEL, the congressional delegation. Because that is
exactly what we want to look at.
And then in terms of Africa's infrastructure, we are
working on a piece of legislation we are calling Move Africa
that the purpose is to incentivize U.S. businesses to do
transportation-related infrastructure projects. And so, I think
that overall our perspective on Africa, we treat the continent,
frankly, like we treat inner city communities, which is from a
point of view of charity as a point of view, as opposed to
partnership, and recognizing that on the African continent
there are tremendous opportunities.
It seems like the rest of the world knows that but we are a
little bit, you know, late to the party. So we need to, you
know, improve our game.
One of the--so my questions are really focused on what we
need to do here in Congress to improve the situation. So, one
of the issues is our designation of middle income countries
that then make some countries not eligible for, like, MCC and
other programs. And I wanted to know if anybody on the panel
has any solution as to how we should come up with the--what
formula we should use. Because if we just use income, it does
not take into account the inequity. So, you know, the annual
income of somebody might be $15,000 but we know that that is,
that is averaged because people at the top are making so much.
So, I would like to take a look at middle income countries,
that designation, since I believe it excludes so many other
countries.
In terms of Mozambique, want to know your thoughts on if we
are doing enough. Should we be providing more assistance?
On the issue of Sudan, there is a lot of people that are
concerned with what is happening in Sudan right now. And the
Obama Administration and the Trump administration was
continuing, I do not know about a rollback but, I mean, you
know, the different phases, and we have not gotten to Phase 2.
But there is some push here in Congress to actually move back
to sanctions, you know, in a much bigger way as opposed to the
movement forward toward normalization and relationships.
And so my question is, given what is happening in Sudan
right now, do you think the time is now for us to strengthen
sanctions, strengthen State-sponsored terrorism in terms of
that designation. And by strengthening it I mean in moving it
from the administration deciding to, you know, having to have
congressional approval, which is actually kind of the way it is
now, but restating it and making it stronger, stricter before
we would consider lifting it.
So, I will start with those. And I will start with Madam
Ambassador, go down the row. And then if Representative Omar
has additional questions she would like to ask, we will go
there.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I am going to bunt a little
bit on the designation of middle income countries because I
think, I am not sure it is a U.S., it is just the U.S. that
makes that designation. And I do, I am aware of several
countries who benefited from the MCC----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield [continuing]. And then
suddenly they no longer benefited because they had moved up the
scale. So, we punish them for their improvement.
Ms. Bass. Yes. We do that domestically, too.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes. So we----
Ms. Bass. As soon as you get better we cut you off.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. So we need to look at, I
agree that we need to look at it. I do not know how.
Ms. Bass. But where does that designation come from? That
is not--is it U.N. or?
Mr. Coulibaly. No. I am not aware of really a precise
scientific method that has allowed for that limitation.
Ms. Bass. Well, I am sure it is not scientific. I just
wondered where it came from.
I am glad you guys do not know. That means there is room
there then.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. There is room there.
Ms. Bass. OK.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. On Mozambique, Madam Chair,
there is so much to be done there. The pictures that we are
seeing coming out of Mozambique are just horrifying. And I know
that the U.S. is there on the ground, along with others. I
think we were a little bit late in responding. It was almost a
week before it even started getting press coverage here in the
United States.
So, again, I think our colleagues from USAID and the State
Department are actively engaged. Our military is engaged. But I
think it is going to take more engagement and more resources
for them. So I think we need to look at the resource, resource
base that they are working from and see if there are any
possibilities of increasing the funding and the resources that
they have to respond to this.
Ms. Bass. Well, it is appropriations season, so it is
definitely time for us to look at that.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. And on Sudan, you know, your
question was an interesting one. I think part of what is
happening in Sudan is because of what we have been working
toward in the Sudan. So I do think, and again I am coming from
a position of having worked on this issue during the Obama
Administration, but I do think that we should continue the path
we are on with them, continue pushing and pressuring the
government. Part of the reason the government is responding to
our pressure is because they want this to continue.
And on the issue of State sponsor of terror, they have
regularly told us that we have continued to move the goalposts
on them on that particular issue. And I believe that this is an
unrelated issue, but I suspect that the handwriting is on the
wall in Sudan, and the transition and the changes that are
taking place are changes that we have all been watching and
waiting for. And I think any efforts on our part to pull back
now may send the wrong signal. The government may decide there
is no reason that they cannot really crack down. And they have,
I think they have been somewhat restrained.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Coulibaly. On the issue of the middle income country,
the limitation, so, although I am not aware of a scientific
method that determines it, one of the guiding principles for
this is that is these are countries that have reached a certain
stage whereby they can now tap into the markets. They can use
their other sources for financial needs.
Ms. Bass. But it is not true; right?
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes, it is not exactly always true.
One perhaps approach, and I think you are right that with
inequality sometimes you may have the income and the country as
a whole at a high level of income, but many parts of it are
still struggling. And I think that was an important clause of
the BUILD Act in setting the U.S. IDFC to recognize there could
be needs even for upper-middle income countries where it is
showing that some segments of the population are still, still
struggling.
So one possibility then is to, to start there, but then to
also look at the Sustainable Development Goals.
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Coulibaly. The Sustainable Development Goals trackers
are now just coming out.
Ms. Bass. Yes. Are you saying maybe look at both? Because
if you look at, if you add in the Sustainable Development Goals
then it goes south. You know what I am saying? Because just
because you reached an income status does not mean you achieved
those goals at all.
Mr. Coulibaly. Well, I think the Sustainable Development
Goals, of course, should be taken certainly into account,
particularly some of the priority area targets. Right? So we
can start there.
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Coulibaly. And then see, which are the countries that
are way off track.
If you look at, for example, sub-Saharan Africa, the
poverty rates we have been tracking out of Brookings, some of
my colleagues' work, show indeed that the continent, the number
of people, poor people is actually increasing.
If you take a closer look, a large part of it is due to
Nigeria, for example, which it would classify as being in a
better income level than some other countries. But Nigeria is
one of the countries that is way off track.
Ms. Bass. Do you know a country where they graduated to
middle income status where they cannot actually tap into the
world markets?
Mr. Coulibaly. So, I think you take a country like South
Africa, I think they can tap into markets. And over the past
years, since 2006, we have had about over a dozen countries
across Africa that have tapped into the global financial
markets for the first time.
But I also subscribe that some of them may have tapped into
it while not being fully ready to----
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. To take on more debt than they
should be taking on.
And you may very well know that there is now an issue of
whether Africa is facing another debt crisis.
Ms. Bass. To China?
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. Reminiscent--China is part of it.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly. But there is also the markets precisely, a
lot of Euro bonds that have been issued.
And then there is a question then as to whether we are
facing, again, another debt forgiveness episode like what we
have seen earlier in the decade. So I think starting with the
SDGs, trying to see whether we can come in and then assess the
alternative sources of financing that they might have. Do they
really have access to markets at a reasonable cost like it is
somewhat portrayed today.
And then speaking of debt and Mozambique, to get to your
question on Mozambique, I think they could definitely use help
because it is one of the countries that has had a debt level
over 100 percent of GDP. And they are now classified as being
in debt distress.
So there is really not much scope from them to mobilize
their own resources to deal with this tragedy. And I think they
could use as much help as possible, especially through regional
actors as well as the U.S., to step in a leadership role to
galvanize more support for Mozambique.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Meservey?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. On Mozambique I agree, I think the
critical part of this will also be a sustained effort. Because
the level of devastation is really extraordinary. And this is
going to be a long-term challenge. So, yes, obviously the
disaster response is crucial and the U.S. is involved in that
and should continue to look for options to ramp up its
engagement. But certainly thinking through, OK, after, you
know, a week has passed, or two or 3 weeks, how do we continue
to help ameliorate some of the fallout of this crisis.
And then just quickly on Sudan. I think it is important to
keep what is happening as far as protestor concerns separate
from Phase 2 because they are in some ways separate issues. So,
I do not think that the any sort of activity or actions by the
U.S. to punish what Sudan is doing, and they have engaged in a
brutal crackdown, to use the Phase 2 negotiations as a vehicle,
I do not think that is the best vehicle to use.
I think it is very appropriate to think about Magnitsky,
for instance, or some other avenue that we have because the
Sudanese Government has responded brutally and it should be
held accountable. But it is a separate issue from the Phase 2
negotiations.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Representative Omar.
Ms. Omar. Dr. Coulibaly, you talked about the use in Africa
on the continent that 40 percent of the world's population are
going to be in Africa and 42 percent of the work force will be
in Africa. And when we were in Ethiopia and Eritrea just
recently, a lot of the young people talked to us about the
hopes and aspirations that they have as we move into the world
in ways that we can invest.
So, I just wanted to see if you had an idea of one
particular investment we can make as a country to assist the
youth in Africa that would make a real impact.
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. I would emphasize the area of education
and skills. I think, as I mentioned, 42 percent of the global
work force, and now imagine that work force being imparted with
the skills of the 21st Century. This would really be a global,
not just African, economic success. And the opportunity is
going to really expand the global middle class and create
market opportunities that everybody is going to benefit from.
But when you look at the educational systems they are being
crammed because of demographic growth, the infrastructure in
classrooms--we touched on that earlier--is not keeping up. So,
in classes where they are supposed to have 40 students they now
have, like, 80 students or 100 students. In that context, it is
becoming difficult to test them. The quality of education
itself, even the lucky ones who get one, could be decreasing.
And another area that could be helpful is to leverage
technology, for example, initiatives that can bring technology
to education can allow to maintain that quality and be able to
scale up.
Ms. Omar. That is wonderful.
I was just meeting with some tech folks from Africa. And
when the Black Caucus has its conference in September I hope
that that will be my sort of sessions around technology and
investments that we could make in Africa. So, we will see how
that goes.
But I wanted to come back to something that was in the
testimony of Mr. Meservey. Right?
Mr. Meservey. Yes.
Ms. Omar. All right. You had mentioned in your testimony
that Saudi Arabia has promoted Wahhabism in Africa, and that
has contributed to the rise of jihadist thinking and terrorist
recruitment on the continent. I would say, you know, we could,
we could sort of agree on that.
Is it fair to say that our unwavering support for the Saudi
Government has been counterproductive to our security goals in
Africa?
Mr. Meservey. Saudi Arabia is one of those very difficult
situations because there is no doubt that they are an important
counterweight to Iran in the Middle East which, as we know, is
involved in all sorts of nefarious activities in Syria and
beyond. But I also, as you referenced in my testimony, I think
there is no doubt that their activities--and it is not just
Saudi Arabia that is engaged in this but they have been the
primary and the most aggressive in proselytizing this way, that
I think that is a long, that presents a long-term strategic
challenge to the United States, and to African countries
frankly.
There are African governments concerned about this
phenomenon as well.
So, I think that the U.S. has addressed this, or I know it
has, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Needs to do more. And I
also think it needs to press Saudi Arabia to think, OK, how do
you put the genii back in bottle so to speak because they have
proselytized this all across the world. Now what? How do you
start rolling this back? Because I think it is very much part
of their responsibility to work on that.
Now, whether their domestic politics will ever allow them
to do that is an entirely different question. But I think that
is part of the message the U.S. should be sending.
Ms. Omar. OK. So let me see if I understand. They are
spreading this ideology. And then we have reports that they are
actually funding terrorists. But we are partnering with them to
help us fight the ideology and terrorism? Is that what you are
saying? That is the suggestion?
Mr. Meservey. Well, it is two separate ideologies we are
talking about.
Ms. Omar. You are the problem and we need you to fix the
problem?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. Well, so Iran is, is----
Ms. Omar. No, no, I, I get that. I am just saying on Saudi
Arabia,----
Mr. Meservey. Sure, sure.
Ms. Omar [continuing]. So they are the problem but they
are, we are also going to partner with them to fix themselves.
And the problem that they are creating is precisely what you
said; right?
Mr. Meservey. Well, it is, I mean, unfortunately these are
the sorts of decisions you have to make in foreign policy
sometimes. And so in the Middle East arena we have this very
obvious problem of a country, talking about Iran, that has, for
instance, during the Khobar Tower bombings killed scores of
American soldiers. They did it in Afghanistan. They have been
aggressive enemies of the United States.
Ms. Omar. Yes.
Mr. Meservey. So, so there is that sphere. And then you
have this other sphere of this Wahhabist problem that I
referenced.
And I think you can do both. It is one of those strange
bedfellow situations but it is the unfortunately reality,
frankly, of the Middle East.
Ms. Omar. Right.
Mr. Meservey. So I----
Ms. Omar. No, I, I hear you. I appreciate that. It is a
challenge but one that is not often looked at with clear
lenses.
So, in your testimony you also mentioned that 12 of the 23
countries most affected by terrorism are in Africa. In the
report you reference Somalia, which is where my family is from
and I was born, and it is ranked sixth in the world and second
in Africa after Nigeria in terms of impact of terrorism. As you
know, the major part of U.S. strategy of combating al-Shabaab
in Somalia has been the use of drones. Under the Trump
administration, drone strikes in Somalia have tripled, now
totaling more than Libya and Yemen combined.
AFRICOM denies any civilian casualties resulting from drone
strikes in Somalia. But this is contradicted by reports from
numerous investigative journalists and human rights
organizations. Just last week Amnesty International released a
report, which I will be submitting for the record, a report
documenting the killings of 14 civilians in just five drone
strikes.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Omar. AFRICOM confirms that four of the strikes were
conducted by the United States but denies any civilian
casualties took place. Their spokesperson said that the way
they determine civilian casualties is not available to Amnesty
International or, indeed, any other non-military resource.
My question to you is do you find this to be credible in
the face of overwhelming reports that are to the contrary? And
that we have not killed any civilians in the decades of drone
strikes that we have had in Somalia?
Mr. Meservey. Sure. Thank you for the question.
So, a couple thoughts. One, it is I know that the U.S.
military takes every effort to avoid civilian casualties. It is
part of their SOPs, it is part of the ethic to which they
subscribe. I also know that there is a fog of war in a place
like Somalia and that, given the context of the conflict there,
it is very difficult to sometimes distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants.
So it is, you know, you can either have indiv----
Ms. Omar. Could a drone strike be 100 percent accurately,
right, attacking? Or could----
Mr. Meservey. I think it is possible.
Ms. Omar [continuing]. A report that says 100 percent no
civilians----
Mr. Meservey. Yes, so that is actually----
Ms. Omar. Would that be correct, is what I am asking you?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think it is possible. But I think it
is, frankly, impossible to know given how, what a non-
permissive environment it is.
How do you even gather the facts on the ground in some of
these places that are still controlled by al-Shabaab? You
cannot go there safely. And, again, how do you distinguish
between a combatant and a non-combatant when, you know, you
have farmers who are armed sometimes? Some join al-Shabaab and
leave, and then join again and leave. So it is incredibly
difficult.
And so I think it is possible that civilians have been
killed. I also think it is possible, maybe not. For me it is,
frankly, impossible to know, I think.
Ms. Omar. Right. I hope it is not. It is a very challenging
thing which, you know, it is one of those situations where they
were making an investment to infrastructure, or figuring out if
we invest in education, or how to best fight terrorism if we
are not truly finding a path to have partnerships with the
individual countries that are being impacted. Then we sort of
kind, you know, are short-ending ourselves and them. And any
investment that we are making, really, truly it is not ever
going to have the kind of impact that we want it to have
because there is a correlation between every--some of the
reports say that there are correlations between every drone
attack and the increase of suicide bombs that happen in
Somalia.
And so when we are trying to be effective in combating
terrorism but our actions could lead to an increase, and we get
to have a problem for investing in education, and we, we are
saying, you know, we are going to be sending you books but we
do not really make the investment that the communities
themselves need where they need the brick and mortar
investment, then there is a problem if we are talking about
diplomacy. And we are not really having a conversation about
what it means for us to send thousands and thousands of
Liberians back to a country that could be fractured by that,
without having the proper conversations with the Government of
Liberia whether they could sustain that. Then it is a problem.
And I hope that as we continue to have a conversation about
Africa, that we engage Africa and what that process looks like.
Ms. Bass. OK. I just have one last question and then we
will wrap up.
I believe a couple of you mentioned the idea that we needed
to have a second African Leaders Summit. And I wanted to know
if you would just expand on that. How do we do that now?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I was part of the planning
for the first Africa Summit that took place in 2014. I saw the
positive impact that came from that summit, bringing African
leaders from across the continent to the United States to
engage with our leaders.
Other countries are doing it on a regular basis. China has
one I think every other year. The Japanese host one every other
year. The Europeans are hosting one.
Ms. Bass. So the question would be who would host it?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Who would host that?
Ms. Bass. Right. I mean, you know, the issue would be would
the African leaders respond to Congress.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think they would.
Ms. Bass. You do.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think they would respond to
a request to come to the United States by President Trump. They
want to engage with our leadership. They want to engage on
issues that are important to them. And I think it will send a
positive signal if the president were to invite them to attend.
Ms. Bass. So, what I said was Congress.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes.
Ms. Bass. I mean, you know, and I am just saying that just
because I do not know. You know what I mean, in terms of the
Administration, if the Administration was not interested in
doing it, you know, is there another way you would convene a
leaders summit.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. You know, when I think about
the prayer breakfast and how many leaders come to that, I think
an invitation from our Congress would probably--you may not get
all 54 but you would get a significant enough number that it
would, it would be successful. And others would be, the ones
who did not come would regret that they had not come. And it
would, you know, you can set some goals to achieve during this
conference. And I think leaders would respond.
Ms. Bass. You know, to my ranking member, when we, as
Representative Omar mentioned, we went to Eritrea and Ethiopia.
And, you know, just so excited about the potential in Ethiopia
and the fact that the prime minister has established peace with
Eritrea. And, you know, they are trying to come together in the
Horn. That it would be nice to invite the prime minister over.
Maybe he could even, you know, address both houses of Congress.
We have that happen occasionally as to send a strong signal.
If either of you have any other closing thoughts?
Mr. Coulibaly. I would like to even go a step further to
suggest a regular, every three or 4 years, kind of a summit
between U.S. and African head of States. That gives us an
agenda to work toward and some clear targets to achieve by
then. But then in between obviously lower level staff can
engage across the different African governments and the U.S.
agencies, et cetera, to prepare for the summit, also to work on
what came out of the summit.
And as the Ambassador mentioned, it has been a resounding
success for all the countries who are holding those regular
summits in terms of advancing their agenda in Africa. And it is
really one place where there is a feeling that the U.S. is
missing.
So I think that is very critical. When the U.S. held the
summit in 2014, I think about $14 billion or so was mobilized
as far as U.S. businesses' investments intentions in Africa.
So, clearly, there is scope for it to really boost the U.S.
commercial ties with the continent.
Just one point in closing. It is basically the level of
engagement with Africa, there is really a strong tendency now
or aspiration for Africa to unite and then to take some
regional approach to some issues that are of mutual interest.
And you may be very well aware of the Africa Continental Free
Trade Area.
Ms. Bass. Yes. I am familiar with that, yes.
Mr. Coulibaly. That is advancing. And I think as of----
Ms. Bass. How many countries are left to sign on?
Mr. Coulibaly. As of last----
Ms. Bass. Just one? Who is that?
Mr. Coulibaly. As of last week we are one vote away, from
it coming into effect.
Ms. Bass. Good.
Mr. Coulibaly. However, I think as outlined, too, in
Ambassador Bolton's strategy but also some commentary that came
out of the AGOA summit over the summer, the U.S. approach and
that of the African counterparts is not quite fully syncing
yet. The U.S. is currently talking bilateral engagement while
the African countries----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Are talking regional
engagement.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly. So, hopefully, there could be some middle
grounds where they will feel like----
Ms. Bass. That is a little bit of a disconnect.
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. So they will feel like that their
viewpoint is important----
Ms. Bass. The administration as Congress'.
Mr. Coulibaly. But it is an important one because it is
going to signal to what extent the U.S.----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Is supportive----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Of the regional initiatives for
integration. And we know that they need that integration
because the States are sort of small States----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. And it is going to scale that
integration that can help boost economic opportunities and
competitiveness on the continent.
For example, intra-Africa trade is only 17 percent.
Ms. Bass. Uh-huh.
Mr. Coulibaly. And if you look at intra-European trade, 70
percent. Asia, 60 percent plus. Here in North America you are
looking at 30 percent or more. So it is indeed quite important
and critical.
So as I begin to think about the post-AGOA architecture for
U.S.-Africa engagement, taking into account that regional
dimension would be important.
Ms. Bass. And I think it is right to think about post-AGOA.
But we do still have a few more years left. And so I would also
like to think about how do we maximize the time that we have.
Mr. Coulibaly. Yes. To be able to have something even
earlier----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Coulibaly. --I think that is better.
Ms. Bass. It is right to think about that.
Mr. Coulibaly. But clearly the thinking should be----
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Coulibaly [continuing]. Going on now. And if you look
at the European Union at their summit in 2017, they made a
promise to actually go toward a continent-to-continent kind of
arrangement.
If you look at China during FOCAC, they try to align their
programs with Africa's aspirations such as the Continental Free
Trade Area, for example. So it is important also in the U.S.'s
engagement to incorporate the views and aspirations of the
African people to align the two agendas.
Ms. Bass. You would think?
Any more thoughts?
Mr. Meservey. Yes. I think I would like to see a routine
U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit as well for all the mentioned, or
for all the reasons that Dr. Coulibaly laid out.
I also think regular meetings between the presidents in the
Oval Office with a head of state or African head of state maybe
once a quarter or something. These high level engagements
really matter.
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Meservey. The, you know, CODELs are important. I am
glad when those happen.
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Meservey. Just to maybe give some--to put a point on
this, you know, President Xi Jinping his, in each of his two
terms his first overseas trip was to Africa. The Chinese
foreign minister's first overseas trip every year is to Africa.
They understand the importance of this high level
engagement. And the U.S. just, this is one of the areas the
U.S. needs to be better.
Ms. Bass. Yes. And I think, you know, one of our challenges
is to, you know, as I have learned in Congress, administrations
come and go but Congress stays the same. So I think all of us
would love to see high level engagements but we cannot, you
know, control that.
And so, and I do know from talking to a number of heads of
State that they want to come over here. But, frankly, it is a
little inappropriate unless they meet the head of State. And
they have not received an invitation from the President. So a
number of them have not come because it is like, you know, I
cannot go over there until, you know.
So that is, that is a little bit of a dilemma. And I would
really like to----
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I would argue against that
though, Madam.
Ms. Bass. OK, please.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I know that the President of
Ghana has been here several times.
Ms. Bass. Yes, that is true.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. And he has had very good
meetings on The Hill, with the private sector, with its
diaspora.
When I meet with African leaders and they tell me they do
not want to come because they cannot get a meeting with the
president, I tell them they are missing out on the opportunity
to meet with you.
Ms. Bass. OK. OK. And you know what, as actually the
President of Ghana is in the U.S. right now. I mean, he is
going to be speaking at Harvard in a day or so. And we both
recently met with the President of Sierra Leone. And maybe we
could ask them to take that message back. Because I could see
us having consistency with leaders, but it is not--you cannot
speak for whatever, you know, administration is going to come
and go.
Well, I want to thank everyone for the time, the patience.
And just in closing, a couple of closing comments.
You know, we have said that we were doing this hearing. And
we are going to do several more that really we are calling
Africa 101. It is to just give the broad strokes as to where
the continent is, where U.S. policy is, to figure out where we
go from here, recognizing that we do have some immediate crises
and issues that we need to attend to right away, but to provide
the members of the committee with a broad overview of U.S.-
Africa relations.
So, I want to thank the witnesses and members for being
here today. And if there is no further business, without
objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]