[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROPOSED SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS: BIG IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-17
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-614 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada AMY WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TED BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
AMI BERA, California, Chairman
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota LEE ZELDIN, New York, Ranking
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York Member
TED LIEU, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
Nikole Burroughs , Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE ZELDIN
Letter from the National Sports Shooting Foundation submitted by
Representative Zeldin.......................................... 5
WITNESSES
Torres, Honorable Norma J., a member of Congress................. 10
Abramson, Jeff, Senior Fellow Arms Control and Conventional Arms
Transfers, The Arms Control Association........................ 15
Waltz, Dr. Susan, Professor, Gerald R. Ford School of Public
Policy, University of Michigan................................. 24
Reeves, Johanna, Executive Director, F.A.I.R. Trade Group........ 29
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE LIEU
CNN article entitled ``Trump's New Gun Export Rules Could Aid
Terrorists, Tyrants, and Criminals.''.......................... 46
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 56
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 57
Hearing Attendance............................................... 58
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BERA
Opening statement submitted for the record from Chairman Bera.... 59
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM CHAIRMAN BERA
Photos submitted for the record from Chairman Bera............... 65
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. ABRAMSON
Photo submitted for the record from Mr. Abramson................. 67
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record from Chairman
Bera........................................................... 68
PROPOSED SMALL ARMS TRANSFERS: BIG IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Tuesday, March 26, 2019
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ami Bera
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Bera. This hearing will come to order. The hearing
titled Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S.
Foreign Policy will focus on the implications of the Trump
Administration's proposal to transfer approval for small arms
sales from the State Department to the Commerce Department.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitations in the rules.
I will now make an opening statement and turn it over to
the ranking member for his opening statement.
And hopefully Mr. Zeldin will make it to the hearing soon.
We have 2 panels today. If Mr. Zeldin does not make it in time
after I finish the opening statement, we will turn it over to
Congresswoman Torres, for her statement.
So, let's frame this hearing and why I think this is an
important topic. When we are thinking about this, this is not a
hearing about gun control. There is already a decision that we
will be selling, exporting small arms, regardless of what my
personal opinion might be or the opinion of others. That is not
what this hearing is about.
In addition, this hearing is not meant to be a criticism of
the Trump Administration. That is not what we are talking about
here as well, since the Obama Administration actually
contemplated a similar rule change and then made the decision
not to go through with it. What this hearing really is about is
something that I think we can all agree on--Democrats and
Republicans. When we choose to export these weapons, we want to
make sure that they are going to legitimate allies, that they
are being used for legitimate purposes, and that they are being
used by our friends.
We also want to make sure we have a thorough vetting
process to make sure the weapons are not being used to commit
human rights atrocities. We need to ensure that we have
mechanisms in place to ensure they end up where they were meant
to be shipped. And since this is the Oversight Committee, we
also want to make sure Congress has appropriate oversight and
the abilities, and there is a congressional notification
process.
Now, we have been exporting more and more arms to Latin
American countries, particularly those in the Northern
Triangle. And if I can have the first slide.
If you look at this slide, again, you will see it is not
just under the Trump Administration. You will see the exports,
both to Mexico where we have seen a rise in violence, but also
to the Northern Triangle countries, and that has been going up
over the last few years. And the reason why I am choosing to
focus in a little bit on the Northern Triangle countries is,
when we think about the crisis we are having on our southern
border right now, it is in part because of the rise of violence
in these 3 countries.
If you look, there were 110,000 asylum seekers in 2015 from
the Northern Triangle. That was a 5-fold increase from 2012. In
2016, 42 percent of those apprehended at the southern border
came from the Northern Triangle. These countries rank in the
top 10 for homicides. Doctors Without Borders, doing a survey
of Northern Triangle citizens in Mexico, said 40 percent had
relatives who had been killed in the last 2 years; 31 percent
knew someone who had been kidnapped.
Again, look at that graph and look at the exports of small
arms to those countries. That is the reason I believe we should
be having a process to make sure we are not inadvertently
creating the chaos in the Northern Triangle, we are not
inadvertently creating that unrest, because when I think about
addressing the crisis at the southern border, these are
individuals that are human beings.
They are just choosing to try to find a better life for
themselves. They are fleeing that violence. And if we do not
address it in the countries there and try to create some
stability and find solutions in the Northern Triangle, we will
have to do it at our borders.
Now, State can do a better job ensuring arms do not fall
into the wrong hands, but removing oversight mechanisms will
increase the probability these weapons are being misused to
create further violence.
Again, I will acknowledge that all of us want to prevent
U.S.-manufactured weapons from ending up being used against
civilian populations and human rights abuses. In fact, in the
Philippines, security forces have committed thousands of
extrajudicial killings. According to the Simpson Center, the
U.S. has sold some $2 billion in arms to the Philippines, and
it is likely American-made pistols have been used in many of
these killings.
What we are talking about today is what department has the
best mechanism to control this, and both Commerce and State
have different approval processes for arms exports. The U.S.
Munitions List administered by the State Department under the
Arms Control Act provides more control over arms exports than
the Commerce Control List.
It requires sales advance our foreign policy objectives and
the national interest. Sales must be for friendly countries,
solely for the use of internal security, legitimate self-
defense, or to participate in U.N. efforts to restore
international peace and security.
Additionally, it requires annual registration of
manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of defense articles or
services. It ensures no security assistance is provided to
countries with a pattern of internationally recognized human
rights abuses. Under the Administration's plan, many small arms
would be transferred to the new 500 Series of the Commerce
Control List from the U.S. Munitions List.
Although the Department of Commerce would still conduct
interagency review before approving a small arms export
license, there will still be significant shortcomings as
compared to the State Department review. Philosophically,
Commerce and State differ. State has to have the big picture
foreign policy considerations and human rights considerations
in mind. Commerce aims to boost our exports.
In addition, no annual registration of manufacturers,
exporters, and brokers of defense articles or services would be
required, if this rule change were to go through. There would
not be a specific criterion for human rights abuses. Items on
the U.S. Munitions List currently require congressional
notification for small arms sales over $1 million.
This goes away with the transfer of these items to
Commerce. And, again, that is not to say State Department is
perfect. A State OIG report requested by the office responsible
for export control licensing found that the office had not
followed proper internal controls, and that licensing personnel
were not properly trained. And this, in some ways, was
attributed to a 28 percent reduction in staffing.
So as we kind of go through this hearing, I think it is
important for us to--again, it is not a hearing on gun control.
It is not a hearing on whether we will be exporting small arms
or not exporting small arms. But it is a hearing on the proper
way to make sure these arms are ending up where they are
supposed to end up, that we are selling these to friends,
allies, and that they are not being used to commit human rights
atrocities.
And with that, I want to acknowledge our colleague,
Congresswoman Norma Torres. I also want to acknowledge the
witnesses on the second panel.
And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member.
The ranking member is now recognized for 5 minutes to deliver
his opening remarks.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
of our witnesses who will be testifying today on the decision
to transfer certain defense articles and services from State to
Commerce that began in the prior Administration. This was part
of a larger interagency process to modernize the United States
Munitions List to ensure the State Department retained
oversight over only the most critical military and defense
articles with military end use.
This rule was supposed to be rolled out in December 2012.
This rule change had strong bipartisan support but got caught
up in a domestic gun control debate that had nothing to do with
export control reform. The process to remove certain defense
articles has already begun. In fact, here are just some of the
categories of weapons that have already moved to Commerce
licensing controls--launch vehicles and missiles, explosive,
military aircraft, submersible vessels, tanks, and the list
goes on.
Once again, these defense articles have already moved to
Commerce control. The jurisdictional transfer of certain
defense articles in Categories I, II, and III, to Commerce will
reduce the regulatory burden on State to create a simpler and
more robust system of compliance. And the U.S. Government is
not removing export controls for firearms or ammunition.
Commerce still requires that U.S. companies obtain a
license to export or re-export to any country any weapon
currently on the Commerce Control List, a function it already
performs. Any licenses that include these transferred items
would still be reviewed by the State Department.
Additionally, the government--that is, both State and
Commerce--will continue its longstanding end use monitoring
efforts, including vetting of potential end users, to help
prevent human rights abuses. This rule change should be
finalized. After years of input from both sides of the aisle to
make the change from State to Commerce, there is no reason this
decision needs to be delayed any longer.
I ask unanimous consent that the following letter from the
National Sports Shooting Foundation be submitted for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Zeldin. And if I may yield 1 minute to Mr. Perry of
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. I thank the chairman and the ranking member. I
hope that we have a robust conversation this morning about our
export control system and the ways we can make it more
effective and efficient.
In 2009, the Obama Administration launched the Export
Control Initiative with the goal to strengthen our national
security and increase the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing
and technology sectors. The Administration rightfully
determined that our then-export control system was overly
complicated, contained too many redundancies, and an overly
protective posture diminished our ability to focus our efforts
on the most critical national security priorities.
I am disappointed that this common sense, good government,
and bipartisan, or should I say once-bipartisan issue has been
politicized, and our domestic industries will continue to be
unduly overregulated until the government takes action. The
proposal we are about to discuss is the epitome of this
politicization.
This bill does not provide ideas of how we can better
regulate the export of defense articles or lift the burdensome
regulations and registration fees our domestic industry is
suffering under. Instead, it proposes to completely stop this
conversation and halt the actions that the current and former
administrations embarked upon to create a better export system.
We must work together and propose ideas that will create a more
effective export control regime.
I look forward to this discussion and hope that we can once
again come to a bipartisan agreement on export controls that
protect our national security, our constitutional rights, and
our constitutional rights while promoting American industries.
And I yield.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Perry, and I yield back to the
chair.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin.
I am pleased to announce and welcome our witnesses to
today's hearing. We are first joined by my friend and fellow
Californian, the Honorable Norma Torres. She will give 5
minutes of remarks and then depart because I know you have got
another hearing to get to.
Following that, we will be joined by our second panel. Jeff
Abramson serves as a senior fellow for arms control and
conventional arms transfers for The Arms Control Association.
Dr. Susan Waltz is a professor at the Gerald R. Ford School of
Public Policy and the University of Michigan. Finally, Ms.
Johanna Reeves is an attorney and executive director of the
Firearms and Ammunition Import/Export Roundtable, F.A.I.R.
Trade Group.
I ask that the witnesses limit their testimony to 5
minutes. And without objection, your prepared statements will
be made part of the record.
Thank you so much for being here today. I now ask Ms.
Torres to summarize her remarks.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NORMA J. TORRES, A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS
Ms. Torres. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today. It is
good to be back in the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Across the world, firearms are used to kill people in a
range of settings--the armed conflict in Syria, turf battles
between drug cartels in Mexico, the repression of public
protest in Venezuela, and terrorist attacks in a mosque in New
Zealand.
Whatever our views on firearms policy, we should all be
able to agree that putting more firearms in the wrong hands
would make the world a more dangerous place. Some of the most
urgent challenges facing this committee-addressing the root
causes of migration from Central America, defeating ISIS,
ending the scourge of human trafficking--are more difficult
because dangerous people have firearms.
Failure to address these challenges will not only pose
risks to the safety of U.S. service members and citizens
abroad, but will also impact our homeland in the form of
increased migration, terrorism, and crime.
That is why I am so concerned about this Administration's
plan to change our firearms export licensing system. Under the
status quo, if a U.S. company wants to export firearms, the
company needs to apply for a license from the State Department,
which will weigh the risks of that sale before granting a
license. If the sale is over $1 million, the appropriate
congressional committees, including this committee, receive a
notification and can review the sale before it moves forward.
The system is not perfect; I get that. For example, the
State Department should have more resources to track where
firearms are used, and to carry out due diligence on recipients
before the sales are approved.
Sadly, the Administration is taking the opposite approach--
proposing to move licensing authority from the State Department
to the Commerce Department. This is a bad idea for several
reasons. I will describe just a few of them here.
First, the Commerce Department has different priorities, a
different mission, than the State Department. If Commerce is
making the final decision on firearm exports, I worry that they
will do what is best for firearm manufacturers, even if it puts
our national security at risk. When it comes to keeping
firearms out of the hands of terrorists and drug cartels, we
should err on the side of caution. That means keeping the State
Department in charge.
Second, the Commerce Department is not required to notify
Congress before a sale proceeds. That means this committee
would lose the ability to object to sales that raise national
security or human rights concerns. It also means that Congress
would be in the dark about where guns are going. This would be
very dangerous, as it would undermine Congress' ability to
conduct effective oversight.
Third, taking on this new responsibility would require
significant additional staff time and expertise at the Commerce
Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, but this
Administration has not provided Congress with a plan for
increasing the Bureau's capacity.
For these and other reasons, many experts and Members of
Congress have expressed their deep concerns about this change.
I am glad that Senator Menendez has placed a hold on the rule.
To permanently block the Administration's dangerous
proposal from moving forward, I urge this committee to consider
a markup of my legislation, the Prevent Crime and Terrorism
Act.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Torres follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Torres.
We will now briefly recess, so that the second panel can be
seated.
[Recess.]
Mr. Bera. Thank you. We will now reconvene.
I will first go to Mr. Abramson.
STATEMENT OF JEFF ABRAMSON, SENIOR FELLOW ARMS CONTROL AND
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Abramson. Good morning, Chair Bera and Ranking Member
Zeldin and other members of the committee. It is a privilege to
testify before this committee today and discuss concerns about
how the United States exports some of the weapons most used in
violence around the world and proposed changes that I fear
could lead to greater human suffering.
My comments here are an abbreviated version of my longer
written testimony. In brief, the weapons and ammunition that
are currently controlled under U.S. Munitions List Categories I
to III belong there and should stay there. There are many
concerns about the administration's proposal to move
semiautomatic and select other weapons from State Department
regulatory control of military weapons to the Commerce
Department's control of so-called dual-use items.
Rather than transfer responsibility to an arm of the
executive branch whose mission is to promote sales and for
Congress to abdicate oversight, the best way to move forward is
to strengthen the State Department's capacity and for Congress
to better use its authority.
We commend Representative Norma Torres and co-sponsor Eliot
Engel for introducing H.R. 1134, which a number of members of
the subcommittee have also now co-sponsored, and Senator
Menendez for introducing S. 459, which keep the control lists
from changing.
These legislative efforts have the backing of a wide range
of civil society organizations, including Amnesty International
USA, Brady, Giffords, Global Exchange, the Violence Policy
Center, and the Arms Control Association, where I am a senior
fellow.
The proposed regulatory changes are problematic for several
reasons, many of which have already surfaced so far. First, the
type of weapons pictured here this Administration wants to
remove from State Department review and congressional
notification actually merit the tightest export control.
Research indicates that AR-and AK-type rifles and their
ammunition are weapons of choice of drug trafficking
organizations in Mexico and other Central American countries.
Many can also be easily converted to fully automatic
weapons. Many sniper rifles that would be moved to Commerce
control are currently in U.S. military use. And as in the Sig
Saver advertisement from this year's catalog, many of these
weapons are marketed domestically as ``featuring the same
innovation and versatility as the U.S. Army's available in a
civilian version.''
Second, the fact that these weapons may be widely available
in the United States does not mean they should be widely
exported. In many of the countries where these weapons are
likely to be marketed, they are considered military weapons and
are tightly controlled. The fact is that anyone can build their
own army with guns you can buy retail in the United States.
While the rationale for the shifting to Commerce was that
the State Department should focus on weapons that provide the
United States with a critical military or intelligence
advantage, or that are inherently for military end use, drawing
that distinction in this case does not match the realities of
the world.
Third, by shifting licensing authority to the Commerce
Department, these weapons will be removed from the statutory
regime devised for them by Congress. This has significant
implications because there are a number of counterterrorism,
humanitarian, and human rights provisions of the Foreign
Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act that are tied to
the State Department's control list.
To begin with, Congress will not be notified of the sale of
these weapons. In recent years, congressional involvement has
helped forestall firearms transfers to repressive forces in
Turkey and the Philippines, but it is difficult to imagine how
Congress could do that moving forward if never provided the
information that such sales were under consideration.
My longer testimony details how the current regime provides
requirements for suspension of future sales, reporting of
misuse to Congress, and other critical capabilities for
identifying and enabling prosecution of bad actors that will be
threatened or lost under a Commerce-controlled system.
Unfortunately, we know abuses of U.S.-supplied weapons will
occur as in Guatemala last year when that government used U.S.-
donated military vehicles to surround the U.S. Embassy as seen
here, and as with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates who
reportedly transferred U.S. weapons to al-Qaeda linked militias
in Yemen. Under State Department authority, Congress will
simply have greater awareness and ability to act on such abuse.
Fourth, the Commerce-led approach is different than that of
the State Department and creates new risks, including capturing
less information in licensing requests, a different end use
monitoring approach, lack of enforcement personnel in the
Western Hemisphere, exemptions and broad implications for the
proliferation of untraceable ghost guns and 3-D printed guns
for which the Commerce Department is expected to abandon
control efforts. Many of these differences are detailed in a
recent Government Accountability Office report.
Looking ahead, the United States is far and away the
world's largest arms exporter, and as such, can and should
uphold the highest standards. That begins with Congress
continuing to receive arms sales notifications, so that they
are informed and are able to act. Congress can also play a role
in improving transparency in the State Department-led direct
commercial sales process through which the majority of small
arms sales occur.
Congress can block or amend the sale up until weapons are
delivered, and it is important for Congress to scrupulously
monitor the entire process. Congress should also mandate much
greater transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S.
weapons deliveries.
Finally, this committee, with its oversight over the State
Department, should consider looking into the hollowing out of
this critical part of the executive branch. As already
mentioned, an alarming Office of the Inspector General report
last month found that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
did not implement sufficient internal controls.
While proponents of the rule changes argue that Commerce is
better staffed, the State Department has the most appropriate
expertise to consider the human rights, security, and political
implications of arms transfers. If further investment is needed
to improve State's capabilities, that is the correct path to
explore.
Wrapping up, we must be mindful that we are not talking
about benign trade commodities, but, rather, the types of
killing machines that are arguably the ones most responsible
for death and injury worldwide. In the words of Maria Herrera
of Mexico, 4 of whose sons were forcibly disappeared by heavily
armed men, ``They have their gun factories and they send them
here as if they were pears or apples. They should think about
the damage and destruction these weapons bring.''
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abramson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Abramson.
Ms. Waltz.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN WALTZ, PH.D., PROFESSOR, GERALD R. FORD
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Ms. Waltz. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Zeldin,
and members of the subcommittee. I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify about the proposal to remove certain
weapons from the U.S. Munitions List. In a nutshell, I am
concerned that we are on the verge of unraveling an
interlocking set of policies that are intended to prevent
exported U.S. weapons from falling into unintended hands where
they can be used for human rights abuse and criminal activity.
I have long been associated with Amnesty International, and
my remarks are informed by its published human rights research.
In an internal review that was undertaken about 10 years ago,
Amnesty International found that some 60 percent of the grave
human rights abuses it had investigated involved firearms.
If that inventory were to be updated today, it would
include, for example, the recent cold-blooded execution of
civilians by uniformed Cameroon soldiers--an event that
prompted the U.S. to withdraw millions of dollars of military
aid earlier this year. It would also include Philippines, where
since 2016 the government has encouraged targeted political
killings that have claimed more than 4,000 lives in operations
specifically conducted by the police.
My concerns about the proposal under consideration were
only heightened last month when the State Department released
its audit report about a 2017 of 400,000 semi-automatic rifles
to Philippines, a sale that never should have been licensed and
for which the license was ultimately revoked.
In my remarks today, I want to make 3 key points. First,
the proposed regulatory changes seek to draw a bright line
between fully automatic weapons on one hand and semi-or non-
automatic weapons on the other. And in human rights situations
where it really matters, this is a distinction without a
difference. It is a false dichotomy.
In practical reality, there may be little difference
between the semi-and fully automatic types of firearms. A semi-
automatic firearm can fire about 45 rounds a minute, and non-
automatic sniper rifles can shoot with great accuracy over long
distances.
These are powerful lethal weapons. The soldiers in Cameroon
last summer used semi-automatic rifles. In Mexico, the local
police in Guerrero State that were responsible for the enforced
disappearance of 43 students in 2014 were armed, again, with
semi-automatic rifles.
The point here is that in many perilous human rights
situations the weapons that are slated for transfer to the
Commerce Control List are every bit as threatening as fully
automatic weapons. The bright line, as I have said, proposed by
the Administration makes a distinction without true difference.
And, second, there is more to the proposed regulatory
changes than first meets the eye. What is ultimately at stake
here--and this is I think a crucial point for the committee--is
which rules, which laws will apply to the exports of these
small but lethal weapons.
Over the years, Congress has embedded important human
rights provisions in 2 key statutes--the Arms Export Control
Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. And the provision of these
laws, generally speaking, apply only to defense articles as
defined by their presence on the U.S. Munitions List.
So if you remove these weapons from that particular list,
then ipso facto you exempt them from the related statutory
constraints, and therein lies the rub. These various statutory
controls are tied together in an elaborate legislative
architecture that in the past 15 years American officials have
touted as the gold standard of arms export laws and
regulations.
The ``cradle to grave'' control system that we have
promoted internationally includes multiple statutory
requirements, including, among others, a multi-step
registration and licensing procedure for exporters that
provides several opportunities to detect irregular aspects of
an application. It requires, as has been noted, congressional
notification of firearm sales that exceed $1 million. It
includes tough controls on brokering and the possibility of
both pre-and post-shipment review through the State
Department's Blue Lantern Program.
So together these provisions constitute a robust oversight
mechanism. And without mitigating action from Congress now, the
straightforward and seemingly innocuous act of transferring
items from one regulatory regime to another would essentially
nullify the export laws as they apply to non-automatic and
semi-automatic weapons in one fell swoop.
My final point relates to a specific concern about the
regulation of firearms brokering and human rights implications.
I do not have time to go into details now, but let me just say
that brokering activities, which by statute are defined as
financing, transport, and freight forwarding, are understood by
human rights advocates to be the weakest link in the chain of
regulatory controls.
And it is of note that in the case of the 2017 Philippines
sale it was an issue with the middlemen in Florida that alerted
U.S. Embassy personnel to the likelihood that something was
awry with that transaction.
In closing, I want to say that I am not opposed in
principle to export control reform, but it strikes me that
these particular regulatory changes are irresponsible. As far
as I have been able to ascertain, these are the only complete
lethal weapons that are being transferred to the Commerce
Control List.
In December 2000, the U.S. pledged to the world that we
would observe the highest standards of restraint in our small
arms export policies, and these proposed changes betray that
pledge.
The best course of action, in my view, would be to retain
the current range of firearms on the U.S. Munitions List by
supporting H.R. 1143. And failing that, I would urge you to
amend the statutes to ensure that the weapons transferred to
the Commerce Control List would be included in the statutory
definitions of defense articles and security assistance.
Thank you very much for your attention and the opportunity
to share these concerns.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Waltz follows:]
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Mr. Bera. Thank you, Professor Waltz.
And Ms. Reeves.
STATEMENT OF JOHANNA REEVES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, F.A.I.R. TRADE
GROUP
Ms. Reeves. Good morning and thank you. Chairman Bera,
Ranking Member Zeldin, and other distinguished members of this
subcommittee, thank you for inviting the F.A.I.R. Trade Group
to testify today on this important issue of reform to our
export control regulations and the perceived impact such reform
may have on our national security and foreign policy.
The Firearms and Ammunition Import/Export Roundtable, or
F.A.I.R. Trade Group, is made up of firearms and ammunition
manufacturers, importers, and exporters who serve both civilian
and government customers. We work closely with U.S. Federal
agencies to improve regulations governing the import and export
of firearms, ammunition, and other similar articles.
The proposed rules that are at the heart of today's hearing
are to transition commercially available firearms from the
export controls of the U.S. Department of State's International
Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR, to the controls of the
U.S. Department of Commerce known as the Export Administration
regulations, or EAR.
Since the publication of the proposed transition rules,
there has been a plethora of misinformation and
mischaracterizations. First, the proposed transition rules are
not a de-control of manufacture, transfer, or export of
firearms or ammunition. The proposed changes are part of an
effort to reform outdated regulations and right size our export
control system--an effort that started under President Obama in
2010.
The proposed shift in oversight responsibility is long
overdue and will help strengthen the national security of the
United States by ensuring the exporting licensing authorities
can focus on those items that warrant control under the ITAR
rather than waste resources on export licensing for springs and
bolts or for items that are available in sporting goods stores
and retail outlets.
Not all firearms and ammunitions are slated to transition
to the Commerce Controls. The firearms that will remain under
the Department of State are those that are inherently military,
including fully automatic firearms, modern large-caliber
munitions, such as mortars and howitzers, high-capacity
magazines and drums, and all specially designed parts and
components for those articles.
For the firearms and ammunition that will transition over
to the Department of Commerce, this is not a de-control or a
deregulation of those articles. Under the EAR, exports and
license applications for firearms and ammunition will be
subject to controls under national security, regional
stability, crime control and detection, the Firearms
Convention, United Nations sanctions, and anti-terrorism.
Indeed, the proposed rules make it abundantly clear that
the Commerce Department will require a license to export or re-
export firearms or ammunition to any country, including Canada.
The proposed changes are to licensing processing, not
policy. End use monitoring will continue under the Commerce
Department, including vetting of potential end users. In
addition, the State Department, as well as the Department of
Defense, will remain very involved in the review of export
license applications for national security and foreign policy
reasons, pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act.
Further, the Commerce Department will not approve any
license application if the export will violate the laws of the
destination country.
Another myth is that the Department of Commerce does not
have the capability to control firearms or ammunition exports.
This is not true. The Office of Export Enforcement is the only
Federal law enforcement agency exclusively dedicated to the
enforcement of export control laws, specifically the EAR, and
does so to protect the national security, foreign policy, and
economic interests of the United States.
OEE works closely with the Department of Justice to
prosecute criminal violations and with the Office of Chief
Counsel for Industry and Security for civil enforcement cases.
This reform to our export control system is long overdue.
Because of the age and wide-scale availability of the
underlying technology, many firearms and ammunition do not have
the characteristics that provide critical military advantage to
the United States, nor are they exclusively available from the
United States.
Unfortunately, the current policies and regulations have
prevented the U.S. firearms and the ammunition industries from
becoming reliable suppliers to our allies and, in general,
competing effectively in the global marketplace.
We, therefore, urge Congress to permit the right sizing of
the outdated one-size-fits-all export policy for firearms and
ammunition, so that these industries may be regulated like the
other defense sectors that have experienced export control
reform.
This reform will not result in the de-control of firearms
and ammunition, and it is critical to the positioning of our
manufacturers in the world market and, thus, our national
security.
Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Zeldin, and other
distinguished members of this subcommittee, this concludes my
testimony on behalf of the F.A.I.R. Trade Group. Thank you for
the opportunity to speak today, and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Reeves follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Reeves. And thank you to all of
the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Abramson, in your opening remarks you touched on
something about 3-D printing rules, and so forth. And I think
this is an important component that we ought to touch on.
Within State Department, when 3-D printing and how to make a
gun that was undetectable was going to be posted on the
internet, the State Department put a stop to it.
Now, there was a lawsuit that was filed with that, and
State Department settled it. But right now that lawsuit is
being contested by about 20 state attorney generals. What we
are told is if this rule change goes through, Commerce will not
enforce, the ruling not to post this on the internet.
We do not know how this lawsuit is going to get settled,
but I do think, from an oversight perspective I have some
concern, and I think this body ought to have some concern, as
to whether we think it is a good idea for people to post how to
make a 3-D printed gun that might not be detectable. That puts
our kids at risk. That puts all of us at risk.
All of you had to go through security screening when you
came into this building. Again, from my end, I do not think it
is a great idea for someone to figure out how to make a 3-D
printed gun. That, hopefully, is something that we can work on
in terms of trying to figure out how do we make sure that
technology does not end up in the wrong hands.
I just thought it was important for us to point that out,
and I actually think State Department did the right thing. I am
not thrilled that they settled this, and I am glad the state
attorney generals have stepped up to try to prevent that
posting.
Again, this hearing is not about gun control, from my
perspective. That is not the intent. It is also not about
putting our manufacturers at a disadvantage to the rest of the
world. I have long been an advocate for looking at our export
control regime and making it a little bit more streamlined.
In some of my dealings with other countries, and India in
particular, there are items that do not make sense to be on the
Export Control List, that, if they are not purchasing from us,
they will be purchasing from others.
My concern in this hearing--and what might happen with this
rule_change is I want to make sure we are not treating everyone
the same, that as we are interacting with countries that are
allies, that share similar values, et cetera, that is one
thing. But the reason why I focused on the Northern Triangle
countries is in areas where we know there is an increase in
violence, we know there is an increase in homicide, our values
as Americans, and as leaders in the world and wanting to occupy
the higher moral ground, we should not want you to think that
our guns are contributing to that, or our small arms are
contributing to that destabilization, particularly, as the
President has pointed out, some of the crises on the southern
border.
If we do not try to address it in the countries that, are
contributing to some of this migration, we will be addressing
it on the souther border. And I think, again, as the world
leader, we have a responsibility to try to address this.
So maybe I will turn to either Mr. Abramson or Professor
Waltz on this one. It does seem to me that there is, a lack
of--once these arms are sold, to be able to trace whether U.S.
arms are being used in some of these atrocities.
Professor Waltz, you touched on, what happened in Cameroon
and other places, and I think that is something that we ought
to figure out. Whether that is State Department doing this,
whether that is Commerce, whether it is an interagency process,
but if atrocities are happening, are these U.S.-made arms that
are being used in those atrocities?
Ms. Waltz. I would say that this is the most difficult
issue with regards to these weapons. They are small, and they
come from many different places. And to try to do a ballistic
analysis to figure out what weapon was used in what particular
instance is really, really challenging.
On top of that, trying to figure out whether the weapon was
transferred in a lawful way or in an unlawful way makes it a
really tricky issue to tackle, period. That is the reason why
doing all of the due diligence up front to make sure that you
have done as much as you possibly can to prevent the arms from
going in the direction where they are going to end up in
unintended hands is so important.
We do have some examples of U.S. weapons being used--of
weapons that were known to be transited from or supplied via
U.S. channels that have ended up in hands, but very often these
are not ones that were sold commercially. They were sold,
perhaps transferred by U.S. military.
But that is in many ways besides the point. The part that I
think all of us are really concerned about is the prevention.
What is the best system for keeping the weapons from getting
out and into the wrong hands in the first place? The system
that is now in place has a review at registration, a second
review at licensing, and the possibility of going into a place
and looking at the weapons.
The last comment that I would make here is that while
Commerce Department does have uniformed and armed officers,
they do not actually have anyone on the ground in place
overseas in the Northern Triangle of Central America. So they
are really without the possibility of pursuing on the ground
investigations at this point.
Mr. Bera. Right. Well, I would love to work with the
ranking member again, if we are selling small arms to Canada,
it is one thing. If we are selling, small arms to Honduras, it
might be another thing.
And what I understand is it is better to be sure and do our
due diligence on the front end to make sure where those weapons
are going, and then at least on the back end having some
ability to make sure they ended up in the right place. So I
would love to work with you, Mr. Zeldin, on what that might
look like.
And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, Ms. Reeves, is there anything that you would like to
weigh in on the conversation I was just having--taking place?
Ms. Reeves. I think one--regarding the registration point,
I think it is important to notice that under the Gun Control
Act manufacturers of firearms and ammunition must obtain a
Federal firearms license from ATF. And the form to do that is--
it is an application for a Federal firearms license, and on
that form manufacturers or would-be licensees must disclose all
responsible persons who are at the company. And a responsible
person is not a nomination; it is actually a role of the job
function.
So if you have the power to make decisions at the company
pertaining to firearms or ammunition, you must be designated.
The background check that goes into that licensing process is
pretty extensive, and on the form itself it includes country of
birth, it includes citizenship, and it includes addresses for
the last 5 years.
So in terms of registration, it is not a completely black
hole because that will be covered domestically under the Gun
Control Act for licensing.
Mr. Zeldin. And how does the Commerce's license review
process differ from State's?
Ms. Reeves. Actually, not that much different because what
will happen on the back end is when a license application is
submitted, Commerce Department will take that license
application and put it through an interagency review process.
This is actually going to be required under the Export Control
Reform Act.
Part of those agencies include Department of Defense and
the Department of State. The Department of State will refer
everything to the Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau, DRL, so
they will be intricately involved in reviewing license
applications on the front end, and they will do so under
foreign policy and national security.
Mr. Zeldin. Do either of the 2 witnesses want to weigh in
on that?
Mr. Abramson. Yes, briefly. It is not a question in my mind
of the Commerce Department suddenly wants weapons to end up in
the wrong hands. I do not think that is the concern. Obviously,
I have concerns about Commerce's approach, more toward sales,
but the reality is the way the system is set up the State
Department captures more information during the licensing
process, and ICE officials and others have told us that that
information is very helpful as a deterrent value, but also
later for prosecutions.
The State Department will have a role in the Commerce--if
Commerce is taking control, but the State Department will not
have the primary authority of making that decision. Commerce
will still hold that, so the State Department's role will be
lessened. But there is other pieces of this where the Congress
will not be notified of misuse. That will happen if it is
something that is controlled through the State Department.
But when we go through the Commerce Department, you have
different requirements about how the law is applied, so your
oversight capacity will change. That is some of the big changes
that we are talking about.
Ms. Waltz. If I might add, the changes and the processes
that we are talking about right now, once these items move off
of the U.S. Munitions List and are no longer defined as defense
articles, will no longer be mandated by law.
It is all a matter of regulatory practice and procedures
within the--and I think that that is a crucial point, because
what is required--in the early years, in the 1970's, when some
of this was set up, for 6 or 7 years the administrations did
not follow the general guidance of Congress. It was not until
it was locked into law that these became really enforceable
provisions. And what we are really talking about is possibly
exiting them from the legal requirements.
Mr. Zeldin. I appreciate all 3 witnesses for that exchange.
But, just to sum up some of the items that have already
transitioned from U.S. ML to the CCL, Category IV, launch
vehicles, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets,
torpedoes, bombs, and mines; Category VI, surface vessels of
war and special naval equipment; VII, ground vehicles; IX,
military training equipment; X, personal protective equipment;
Category XIV, toxicological agents; Category XV, spacecraft and
related articles; Category XVI, nuclear weapons-related
articles.
So it is just really important to note just how much of a
transition has already been completed between U.S. ML and CCL.
I appreciate the hearing and the conversation today, but,
Commerce has already established quite a robust and proven role
in many other pieces of equipment that, people would also
suggest are consequential for this related debate as to context
of this hearing. And I yield back.
Mr. Bera. Yes. If I could just comment on the ranking
member's observation, that last observation. I think, Professor
Waltz, you talked about the difficulty of tracing and tracking
small arms, which is why much of the due diligence I suspect
has to be done on the front end, whereas if we are selling an
aircraft carrier to a country, we can probably better track how
that aircraft carrier is being utilized and used. So, but I
appreciate that, I am glad that we made some of those.
I will now turn to Mr. Malinowski for purposes of
questioning the witnesses.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Reeves, you
mentioned the State Department's DRL Bureau. I ran the State
Department's DRL Bureau, so I can speak a little bit to these
questions. And when we were having this debate at the State
Department in the last administration, there were arguments on
both sides, but let me first attest the arguments have nothing
to do with our domestic uncontrolled debate. They have to do
with a broad understanding that violence against civilians
around the world, mass violence by militias, by criminal
terrorist organizations, by rapacious abuse of governments, is
not committed by aircraft carriers. It is not committed by
boats, largely not by planes or by tanks or by howitzers or by
mortars. It is committed by small arms.
The reality of places like Congo, Central America, Burma,
is that small arms are the weapons of mass destruction of our
time, and that is why we are very, very sensitive about getting
this right.
One case I was involved with involved the Philippines where
we discovered an impending commercial sale of small arms, not
to the Philippine government or Philippine police, but because
we, in the State Department, had a thing called an Embassy in
the Philippines and large numbers of people who monitored such
things, we realized that the Philippine police was purchasing
arms from the dealers to whom these small arms were going to be
sold.
This was at a time when the Duterte Regime--well, it is
still doing so--was conducting a campaign of extrajudicial
executions as part of its so-called drug wars, including a lot
of innocent kids who were being rounded up, killed in the
middle of the night by gangs that were actually police officers
off duty.
And so we made the decision at the State Department to
freeze that sale. I can 100 percent guarantee to you that if
the Commerce Department had the final say in that sale they
would not have made the same decision because the Commerce
Department's ethos, mandate, and mission was to support
American manufacturers in their efforts to export their
products. That is perfectly fine. That is exactly why the
Commerce Department exists. The State Department exists to
raise foreign policy, human rights, and national security
considerations.
So let me ask a few questions. Maybe, Mr. Abramson, Ms.
Waltz, you can take the first few. Does the Commerce Department
have personnel at U.S. embassies around the world that monitor
these sorts of issues? Yes or no.
Ms. Waltz. No.
Mr. Abramson. No.
Mr. Malinowski. Does it have any staff assigned to review
firearms sales to Central America, the Philippines,
Afghanistan, Congo, Cameroon, Sudan, any of the countries where
these issues might be of concern?
Ms. Waltz. It has a few--3 or 4 people stationed in various
parts of the world, but none for Latin America. And I do not
believe any for Africa as well.
Mr. Malinowski. All right. And does it perform these due
diligence checks, particularly on human rights, before a sale
goes through?
Ms. Waltz. It has not so far.
Mr. Malinowski. So let me ask you, Ms. Reeves, you spoke in
your testimony about outdated regulations. Is the requirement
that Congress be notified of sales over $1 million an outdated
regulation?
Ms. Reeves. No, I would not call that an outdated
regulation for items governed by the U.S. Munitions List.
Mr. Malinowski. For small arms, for semi-automatic weapons.
So if we were to sell 20,000 AR-15s to the Philippines, would
it be an outdated regulation for Congress to be notified of
that?
Ms. Reeves. Well, one thing that I will point out is that
the $1 million threshold only applies to small arms, and it is
significantly different from the next highest threshold, which
is $14 million. This, of course, affects significantly U.S.
manufacturers from being able to ship to our allied
governments, because when they have contracts that exceed that
amount of money it is significantly delayed.
Mr. Malinowski. So if the rules change goes through, would
you support legislation that would impose the same $1 million
threshold reporting requirement, even though it is going
through the State Department for small arms?
Ms. Reeves. I would have to see what the legislation is.
Mr. Malinowski. Would you support legislation that would
require the Commerce Department to do a review of the potential
human rights implications of a sale before the sale takes
place?
Ms. Reeves. I think the legislation is already there. I
think under the Export Control Reform Act there is a review
process that is specified under the statute. And in the review
process, DRL, State Department objections to a license would
not be overruled.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. Well, I can just--I will close by
saying, in my experience, for any item or issue where the
Commerce Department had the final say, under current rules--and
I can say, for example, surveillance technology is a very good
example of this, where there is a vote by a committee in which
Commerce, DoD, and the State Department each have one vote.
In literally every single case, in my experience, where the
State Department did not have the final say, and the Commerce
Department had either a vote or the deciding vote, the Commerce
Department 100 percent of the time voted for the export of,
say, surveillance equipment to dictatorships that were going to
use them against dissidents, journalists, et cetera.
Unless there is a change in the ethos, mission, and mandate
of the Commerce Department, I have no reason to believe that
that will change. And I would hope that the industry, in its
own interest, would support maintaining a very robust review
process, because if you do not have that, you are going to find
yourselves caught up in front page stories about U.S. weapons,
weapons manufactured by your members, being used for things
that will outrage the American people, and people will wonder
who is responsible. You need the State Department to protect
you from them.
Thank very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. And I will recognize Mr. Perry for
purposes of questioning the witnesses.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Reeves, are you familiar with the IRGC? Do you know who
that is?
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Are you familiar with the fact that the IRGC or
components of those folks are driving around in Iraq in
American-made M1 tanks?
Ms. Reeves. Am I aware of that?
Mr. Perry. Yes. I am just asking.
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Yes. Right? And we are outraged by it, but the
point--and do you suspect that a tank, an M1 tank, is
significantly more lethal than, let's say, an AK-47 or an AR-
15?
Ms. Reeves. That would be my assessment.
Mr. Perry. That would be mine as well. So let me just--in
the last--I think you characterized it--I do not know the exact
date, but this transfer to the Commerce Control List. When did
that start? When did that effort start?
Ms. Reeves. 2010 is when it really started.
Mr. Perry. 2010. Did you come to the Hill and testify in
that regard?
Ms. Reeves. No, I did not.
Mr. Perry. And at all, between 2010 and now, have you come
and testified?
Ms. Reeves. No, I have not.
Mr. Perry. Why do you suppose that when that action was
being proposed under the previous administration there did not
seem to be any aversion to it, but now there appears to be? Why
do you suppose that is?
Ms. Reeves. I think that is a really good question. My own
perception is that it is a different landscape right now. It is
highly political. I think that there is a lot of conflation
between modernizing our export control laws and domestic gun
control and gun control arguments.
Mr. Perry. And in the context, I mean, look, I hate to
bring this up, but I think it is important to bring this up,
you are familiar with the Fast and the Furious----
Ms. Reeves. Yes, I am.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. Operation, et cetera.
Ms. Reeves. Yes, I am.
Mr. Perry. Even in the context of the previous
administration and the--let me ask you this. How did that arms
transfer take place, if you know?
Ms. Reeves. That was a lawful--as far as I know, it was a
combination of lawful transfers and also unlawful exports by
non-U.S. persons purchasing weapons from licensed firearms
dealers who were trying to get ATF involved in monitoring and
preventing the transfers.
Mr. Perry. Was the State Department involved?
Ms. Reeves. Not that I know of.
Mr. Perry. Was the Commerce Department involved?
Ms. Reeves. Well, the State Department was involved in
terms of the lawful exports that went down there.
Mr. Perry. OK. But they still went, right?
Ms. Reeves. Right. They did.
Mr. Perry. They still went. And they are credited with
killing not only people of a foreign country but American
citizens; is that correct as well?
Ms. Reeves. Correct.
Mr. Perry. It seems to me that the current process, if that
is allowed to happen, is certainly lacking for a lot of
reasons, and it also seems to me that even in the face of that,
at that time, nobody apparently--well, certainly you were not
asked to come--and you are an expert in what you do, you are
here now, but nobody at the time in Congress thought it
important enough to bring you to testify and answer questions
under that administration. But now that it is this
administration, is the action significantly different under
this administration than the previous one?
Ms. Reeves. No. My understanding is that the proposed rules
are largely unchanged from what was originally drafted. These
categories were the first categories drafted.
Mr. Perry. OK. And even under the Commerce Control List,
national security, foreign policy, review of applications still
takes place; is that correct?
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Would they still be reviewed by the State
Department for human rights, illicit trafficking, and other
security concerns?
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Perry. So it is essentially the same thing.
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Just streamlining it. But because we have a new
administration--my words, not yours--that we disagree with--
what before was OK is now not OK. That is--those are my--but
you would tend to agree with them.
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Do American small arms manufacturers sell
abroad? I mean, is it a part of their--a significant part of
their business profile and their ability to stay in business
and make a profit and produce not only items that are used by
the military but by American citizens to defend themselves, by
law enforcement in America, and around the world?
Ms. Reeves. For some companies, it is very significant.
Mr. Perry. It is very significant. This technology has been
around for a fairly--for a long time I think.
Ms. Reeves. For a long time. I think it might have
originated with the Chinese.
Mr. Perry. About the 11th century, right?
Ms. Reeves. Something like that.
Mr. Perry. So the question is--and you have already heard
the list that--which is incomplete, but you heard the list that
my good friend from New York enumerated about the things that
are already moved here of military concern.
But is there any critical military advantage in the items
listed in Categories I, II, or III, that are proposed to move
to the CCL that would imperil the United States or where we
would be giving away a significant and military advantage,
understanding one of the items that Mr. Zeldin talked about was
nuclear weapons. Just one of them was nuclear weapons. That is
already there.
Ms. Reeves. From what I understand, this was looked at
very, very closely, and very extensively by experts within the
government. And what they found is that the items listed to
transition over to the Commerce Department do not give any
significant improvements or--yes, exactly, for United States
security.
Mr. Perry. I thank the ladies and gentleman. And I have
exceeded my time. I yield.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
If I could just--clarify, the purpose of this hearing is
not because it is the Trump Administration proposing the rule
change. I was not in Congress when the Obama Administration was
proposing this rule change. Otherwise, I would have hoped we
would have had a similar hearing. It really is: how do we make
sure, when we are exporting these small arms, they do not end
up in the hands of the wrong people?
Again, I think we can all agree that we do not want, as Mr.
Malinowski was pointing out, to see U.S.-made weapons on the
front page of our hometown newspaper being used to kill
civilians. We ought to figure out the best way to prevent that
from happening.
With that, I will recognize my colleague from California,
Mr. Lieu, for purposes of questioning the witnesses.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for being
here today. Let me just say for the record I opposed the Obama
Administration's unauthorized war in Syria. I oppose the Trump
Administration's unauthorized war in Syria. I would have
opposed this rule change had I been able to vote on it under
the Obama Administration. I am going to oppose it now under the
Trump Administration. This is not a partisan issue. This is
about saving lives.
So I have heard my colleagues' statements. I simply note
there are troops who are stationed in Afghanistan and Syria and
Iraq on the front lines that are not being killed by nuclear
weapons, by directed-energy weapons, or by torpedoes. Many of
them are getting shot. They are being killed by small arms
weapons.
And I have this article here that I want to enter into the
record. It is called Trump's New Gun Export Rules Could Aid
Terrorists, Tyrants, and Criminals. And it is from CNN dated
February 14, 2019. If I could enter that into the record.
Mr. Bera. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lieu. All right. So let me ask some questions. Either
Mr. Abramson or Professor Waltz, the U.S. has lost weapons that
we gave to Syrian rebels and other folks that now end up in the
hands of ISIS; is that right?
Mr. Abramson. That is correct.
Mr. Lieu. And this is under the State Department, and would
have even less regulations and less oversight under the
Commerce Department; is not that correct?
Mr. Abramson. That is correct.
Mr. Lieu. What we actually would want is more oversight,
not less, if these weapons are ending up in our enemy's hands
and then they are killing U.S. troops; is not that right?
Mr. Abramson. That is correct.
Mr. Lieu. OK. So, Ms. Reeves, I have a question for you.
You had said that a bunch of these weapons could be brought in,
commercial retail places. Flamethrowers are one of the things
here that will be transferred to the Commerce Department,
right?
Ms. Reeves. Yes.
Mr. Lieu. Do you know----
Ms. Reeves. Up to 20 meters.
Mr. Lieu. Right. So do you know if Dick's Sporting Goods
sells flamethrowers?
Ms. Reeves. No, they do not.
Mr. Lieu. That is right.
Ms. Reeves. Not that I know of.
Mr. Lieu. So there is actually items here that you could
not actually go to a commercial retail establishment and buy,
like flamethrowers, correct?
Ms. Reeves. OK.
Mr. Lieu. OK. Now, I am going to reference this article we
entered into the record from February. It says that ``Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are wagering a
brutal war in Yemen, has killed a thousand civilians and pushed
the country to the brink of famine have''--actually, thousands
of civilians--``have aggregately requested to buy hundreds of
millions of dollars of firearms from the U.S.''
You would not want Congress to know that that is the case,
that countries are going to buy hundreds of millions of dollars
of these kinds of weapons? Why would you want to Congress to
not know that?
Ms. Reeves. Well, for military weapons, Congress will know
about that. That is written into the law, and there is the
potential for including congressional notifications. That is
something that should be worked out between Congress and the
Commerce Department.
Mr. Lieu. So you would not oppose that if there was this
rule change that Congress would still be notified of sales over
$1 million?
Ms. Reeves. I would have to see it.
Mr. Lieu. OK. Another part of this article was that the
Philippines ordered $22 million worth of guns from the U.S.
Professor Waltz or Mr. Abramson, would not Congress want to
know about that?
Ms. Waltz. Yes, of course they would. And they should have,
actually. And in the case that I referred to earlier, one of
the big problems was that they did not receive the notification
by error.
Mr. Lieu. So now that this proposal is to have a bunch of
these weapons go under the Commerce Department's jurisdiction,
I would simply note that the head of the Commerce Department,
Wilbur Ross--do any of you know if he has any military
experience? He does not have any. He is a banker, and so we are
going to have a banker make these kinds of decisions, which
does not make a lot of sense to me.
I have got another question for either Professor Waltz or
Mr. Abramson. What was your understanding of the original
rationale under the Obama Administration for proposing this?
Mr. Abramson. My understanding was it was just part of the
broader export control reform initiative, which had this
process of changing how things were done, and eventually ending
up with one list that we never got to that point. But the
arguments that this was never raised--no one raised an alarm
during the Obama Administration--disregards the fact that it
was never introduced for us to raise an alarm. We certainly
were ready and at that point would have raised this. We have
been waiting for many years knowing this was coming, and so to
say that somehow this is an Obama era thing, and why did not we
raise an alarm, really is a false reading of the history.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And we just heard from our colleague,
Congressman Malinowski, which basically said that he was
opposed to it. He was in charge of one of the main offices at
the time.
Mr. Abramson. Yes.
Mr. Lieu. I also want to just make 2 requests for the
consideration of the chair. I do hope that either this
subcommittee or their House Foreign Affairs Committee will mark
up the legislation that Congresswoman Torres presented on
today.
I also want to offer for the chair's consideration my
legislation called the Arms Sales Oversight Act. Right now, in
the U.S. Senate, any member of the Senate can introduce a
privileged resolution, which would cause a vote on arms sales
transfers. We do not have the same thing in the House. This
legislation would simply harmonize that and would request this
committee to look at that legislation as well and decide what
we want to do with it.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. And with that, thank you all for being here, and
I yield back.
Mr. Bera. All right. Thank you.
I will recognize Congresswoman Omar for purposes of
questioning the witnesses.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, and I hope you all will indulge me
because I know that many of the people who are watching this
testimony are like me. They are not really following most of
the conversations and the kind of questions a lot of my
colleagues are asking. It seems like a little inside baseball
conversation.
So I just want to simplify and sort of ask particular
examples, and I hope you will give me leniency with time as I
try to get the public to sort of understand what we are really
talking about.
So I will start with you, Mr. Abramson. There was a mass
shooting in Munich in July 2016 that left 10 people dead, and
there was a Glock 17 semi-automatic weapon that was used. It is
my understanding--is it your understanding that this
administration's policy would make a weapon like that for gun
manufacturers to export?
Mr. Abramson. Yes. The semi-automatic weapons would move to
the Commerce Control under this proposal.
Ms. Omar. Wonderful. Thank you. And then, as there were
about 67 of the 77 people killed in the 2011 attacks in Norway
were killed by gunfire. The shooter was armed by a Ruger Mini-
14 semi-automatic rifle and a Glock 37 semi-automatic handgun.
Is it your understanding that this administration's policy
would make a weapon like that for American manufacturers to
export?
Mr. Abramson. That is my understanding, yes.
Ms. Omar. Wonderful. Thank you. And in 2015--I mean, on
March 15 of this year, there was a shooting at a mosque in
Christchurch, New Zealand, that left 50 people dead. The
shooter was armed with 5 guns, 2 of which were semi-automatic
rifles. Is it your understanding that this policy would make it
easier for American manufacturers to export that weapon?
Mr. Abramson. Indeed. That is exactly what we are talking
about.
Ms. Omar. OK. So according to Insight Crime, 85 percent of
the pistols that are used by MS-13 in Guatemala were stolen
from Guatemalan law enforcement agencies. Is it your
understanding that this administration would make it easier for
American manufacturers to sell weapons to Guatemalan police?
Mr. Abramson. Yes. I mean, there is going to be a process
either way, but, yes----
Ms. Omar. Wonderful.
Mr. Abramson [continuing]. That is the case.
Ms. Omar. Thank you. And so, Ms. Reeves, I also have a few
questions following up to that. In your testimony, you talked
about the need for American gun manufacturers to have an easier
time selling weapons to NATO and none NATO allies. Norway and
Germany are our allies. So I can have this be clear for our
constituents who are watching, is it your position that the
United States should make it easier to export the kind of
weapons that were used in the mass shootings that I just
mentioned in Norway and Germany?
Ms. Reeves. I do not agree with the word ``easier'' because
in fact if it does--if these items do move over to Commerce
Department, I do not think it is going to be easier. It is
going to be different. It is going to--we are talking about
right sizing the export control policy, and so it is a
difference of who is going to be issuing the licenses----
Ms. Omar. In your testimony----
Ms. Reeves [continuing]. Because I do not think what we are
talking----
Ms. Omar [continuing]. You did say we have to ease the
process, we have to make it a little easier for these weapons
to move. So in that, would it make it easier for us to sell? It
is just very simple. Would it make it easier for us to sell
these weapons in Norway and Germany?
Ms. Reeves. The licensing process would still be in place,
and it would be a very extensive review on the front end for
national security and human rights issues and foreign policy
issues. So all of those reviews would still be in place by
Commerce, State Department, and DoD.
Ms. Omar. All right. Wonderful. And, Ms. Reeves, in light
of what happened last week, I find it a little disturbing that
we are having this conversation after 11 days of the shooting
in New Zealand, talking to people who manufacture guns, arguing
for the need to loosen restrictions to import assault rifles.
But as you mentioned, domestic laws of trading with our
partners still does not violate the Administration's policy.
That means that American gun manufacturers will not be able to
export semi-automatic rifles and assault rifles to places like
New Zealand, even under these regulations, correct?
Ms. Reeves. Well, again, I mean, we are not talking about
loosening controls over exports of firearms. We are talking
about a different agency that would be in charge of issuing
licenses. And, again, those reviews would still be in place,
and there would be reviews after the fact with end use
monitoring and end use checks by Commerce Department.
Ms. Omar. In New Zealand, would we still be able to sell
these semi-automatic weapons with----
Ms. Reeves. I am not going to speak for the government and
what they will or will not approve. But my understanding is
that there is a long history of the State Department issuing
export licenses for New Zealand.
Ms. Omar. The reason you are not speaking on it, is it
correct, is that in New Zealand they had just passed a law that
prohibits these kind of weapons to be used and sold?
Ms. Reeves. I think the law was passed after.
Ms. Omar. Yes. After the shooting happened.
Ms. Reeves. Right. And so the U.S.----
Ms. Omar. No. That was----
Ms. Reeves [continuing]. Government would not issue a
license, though, if it would violate local law.
Ms. Omar. Precisely. That is what I was trying to get at.
Thank you so much.
And then I will just finish up with asking Dr. Waltz, I
believe that insisting on human rights standards around the
world is not just a moral responsibility but a national
security imperative. You mentioned in your testimony that 60
percent of the grave human rights abuses investigated by
Amnesty International involved firearms.
The country that I come from--Somalia--really is an example
of what my colleague from New York was talking about. He
mentioned Congo and other places, but Somalia is a really good
example of what happens when we just allow firearms to run
rampant. Is it correct that the Administration's policy would
make it easier for gun manufacturers to sell to governments
with patterns of human rights violations?
Ms. Waltz. I think it would, yes. And if I might add, I
think the big error in the consideration of this category of
weapons is not to consider their lethality. It is to treat them
as though they are simple commercial products that are easily
available instead of the dangerous items that they are.
Ms. Omar. Yes. And, last, I just wanted to--I had the
opportunity to visit Honduras when the elections were happening
in 2017, and so I know that we have a lot of interactions with
Honduras, and so I wanted to talk to you a little bit about the
post-electoral violence in Honduras where dozens of people were
killed by State security forces, and the military police and
other Honduras security forces.
They used semi-automatic weapons to kill a lot of these
protestors. The post-electoral crisis was one of the main
drivers of the current refugee crisis that we are seeing from
Central America. And so I just wanted to have on the record, is
it correct that the administration's policy would make it
easier for gun manufacturers to sell weapons to Honduras
security forces?
Ms. Waltz. It could very well have that effect.
Ms. Omar. Thank you so much. And thank you for your
indulgence.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. And I will recognize my colleague from
New York, Mr. Espaillat, for purposes of questioning the
witnesses.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member. I
am proud to be a co-sponsor of H.R. 1134 for multiple reasons.
First and foremost, I believe it is important that this
function remains within the State Department.
Simply, it just sends the wrong message that moving arms,
export from the Department of State to the Department of
Commerce sort of like creates the real impression that this is
a commercial transaction, right? That no human factor is
involved. That it is going to be so clean and septic that no
one is ever going to die. It is like, we are trading coffee or
sugar or something, but in this case obviously it is arms.
Second, I believe that it is vital that Congress continues
to conduct strong oversight over these transactions, as we must
be able to ensure that American interests and priorities are
upheld. And, obviously, this does not strengthen oversight. I
believe that it weakens it.
Finally, I believe that it is vital because of the threat
of gun violence at home and abroad that we must do all we can
do to ensure that guns do not fall into the wrong hands. I want
to address this from a sort of like different angle, right,
because although semi-automatic weapons are horrible and they
show their ugly face every so often, and the consequences are
so tragic as we just saw in New Zealand, it is handguns really
that are taking the vast number of lives here in the United
States and in urban cities across the world.
And as sectors, very radical sectors of urban settings
begin to radicalize themselves, and begin to act in very
aggressive and violent ways, I think it is incumbent upon us to
make it even more difficult for the wrong people to get their
hands on handguns.
Now, I sponsored a piece of legislation that is called the
Ghost Guns are Guns Act, because ghost guns are a way to
circumvent local measures to restrict access to guns as well as
3-D printed guns. How do you see this whole debate with regards
to access to handguns? Is it going to make it easier to access
handguns, ghost guns, 3-D printed guns, et cetera, across the
world? Are we going to be the great exporter of death now, not
just through semi-automatic weapons but also through handguns?
Anybody that would like to tackle this.
Mr. Abramson. I am glad you asked this question, because
this is clearly one of the areas where our export policy has a
big play on this, because currently ghost guns, or 3-D printed
guns, are regulated as an export. You put them online and
anybody can get them. That is what this proposal would change,
and it is completely alarming. It is completely alarming for
domestic reasons and for international reasons that you are
talking about, which is where, we are not having a domestic gun
control debate when we are talking about the export, but in
this case we are and it is very important.
Dr. Waltz has been looking at this a bit more than I have,
if you wanted to----
Mr. Espaillat. Dr. Waltz.
Ms. Waltz. Well, just simply in terms of the regulations
that are involved. The Commerce Department has, as part of its
rules, that if any technology is available open source, and
readily available for anyone, they do not make any effort to
regulate it. They have asserted that for firearms that migrate
over to the Commerce Control List they simply will not have any
control at all over open source instructions for 3-D
production.
We have seen slightly different approaches in the previous
State Department and this State Department, but I think we are
at a place where right now the possibilities of control for
export remain in place as long as they are on the State
Department side of the divide. If they move over to Commerce,
it is crystal clear that there will be no control.
Mr. Espaillat. Finally, Mr. Abramson, there is a pending
court case that prevents the online publication of 3-D printed
guns. How did this lawsuit come about? And with the transfer of
some of these items, how will this lawsuit be impacted?
Mr. Abramson. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is
functionally, if this transaction were to happen and it is
moved over to State Department, there would be no longer any
control--moved over to Commerce, there would no longer be any
control in the State Department. So I do not understand why the
lawsuit would continue. Other lawyers may know better, but
functionally you would abdicate the suit because there would be
no purpose for it because it is no longer a State Department-
controlled weapon.
Mr. Espaillat. Any lawyers in the house? No.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. I will recognize my colleague from
Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline, for purposes of questioning the
witnesses.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
you and Ranking Member Zeldin for holding today's hearing on
the importance of export controls to properly regulate the sale
of defense articles and firearms, and I thank our witnesses for
being here today and for their testimony.
Our Nation's export control regime is a critical tool for
ensuring that the weapons, materials, and technologies that we
produce for military and commercial purposes, particularly
those that can inflict deadly harm, do not end up in the wrong
hands. Recent proposals from the Trump Administration in the
last year to remove several types of military model firearms
from the U.S. Munitions List under the jurisdiction of the
State Department, and move them to the Commercial Control List,
could jeopardize our ability, in my view, to determine the
manner in which these weapons may be used and could ultimately
lead to these weapons ending up in the hands of those who would
threaten our Nation's security interests.
And I thank the witnesses for their testimony regarding the
impact that these policy proposals could have on foreign
policy, and the suggestions that you have made in your
testimony and ways that we can strengthen our export control
system.
I would like to start with you, Mr. Abramson. In your
testimony, you mentioned that the State Department requires the
suspension of sales to countries that violate human rights.
Could you talk a little bit about some kind of historical
examples of that and what the implications of this new proposal
might be on those efforts?
Mr. Abramson. Certainly. And I think maybe the most
relevant right now is what we are seeing with the arming of the
Saudis and the Emiratis as they conduct their war in Yemen.
There have been concerns about their misuse of U.S.-supplied
weapons. It is very rare, actually, to hear publicly that the
Administration has found a violation of human rights, but that
does seem to be what is happening, and that is what has driven
a lot of concern about how that misuse of weaponry could occur.
It is very important that these regulations within the
current system also provide a chance for the Congress to be
notified if violations occur, and then actions do occur. My
understanding is if it is moved to Commerce, that would not be
the case any longer.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And, Professor Waltz, would you
speak a little bit about the relationship that you have
observed between countries that have security forces that--and
may not have kind of strong internal controls and that
relationship to organized criminal activity in those countries,
and the danger of weapons falling into the hands of, organized
crime or criminals, and the significance of that, particularly
in countries with weak internal controls, and how these
policies might impact those dangerous.
Ms. Waltz. So, really, you are talking about issues of
diversion. There may be one authorized recipient, and then
because of lax controls, as we have seen in Mexico where all of
the weapons that are lawfully commercially supplied to Mexico
go to the Army (National Defense Secretariat). They transfer
them, and then, in the hands of local police, they are used to
violate human rights, sometimes in the most awful sorts of
extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances.
We are seeing something very similar with the Philippines.
So it is not at all uncommon for the controls locally to be
lax. If you are thinking particularly about issuing a license
for a country as a whole and not scrutinizing which units might
actually receive those weapons, you are multiplying the
possibilities of abuse.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And I thank the chairman and the
ranking member again. You know, as we all know, we have a very
pernicious gun violence problem in this country. We ought not
to put forward policies that will in any way export that very
pernicious problem we have in America to other countries around
the world and bring less stability and more unrest to places
all over the world.
So I thank you for convening this hearing on this very
important subject, and I yield back.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses and all
the members for being here today.
And with that, the committee is adjourned.
Ms. Waltz. Chairman Bera, may I ask for just 1 second?
Mr. Bera. Yes. I will----
Ms. Waltz. I know this is----
Mr. Bera. With some latitude, I will go ahead and give you
a second. I will then extend the same courtesy to Ms. Reeves
and Mr. Abramson, if they----
Ms. Waltz. I realize this is highly exceptional. But I want
to say that over the weekend I spent a lot of time combing
through the Commerce Control List looking for items that have
been transferred, the 600 items--the 600 Series items. And what
I found were not military lethal weapons.
What I found were unarmed, unarmored vehicles, non-
submersible, unarmed submarine rescue ships, shelters that were
specifically to provide against nuclear or biological
contamination, radar equipment, telecommunications, joysticks,
circuit boards, rheostats, et cetera. I did not find any
weapons, any items that were recognizable as lethal weapons.
The one item I am aware of that has caused concern in the
human rights community is the equipment to spray tear gas. I
would really appreciate that being entered into the record.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Bera. It will be. Ms. Reeves, I will extend you----
Ms. Reeves. What I will say to that is one of the--some of
the items that have moved from the U.S. Munitions List is riot
control agents, and those have moved over to the Commerce
Control List.
I will also just reiterate that, again, State Department
will have absolute visibility in the review process of license
applications. If there is any objection or reservation from the
State Department on issuing a license, that will not be
overruled, my understanding is, by Commerce Department.
So those review processes for human rights and unrest in
certain regions will be reviewed and adhered to.
Mr. Bera. Great. And with that, this committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BERA
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MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. ABRAMSON
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