[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HISTORIC AMERICAN ALLIANCE WITH EUROPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 26, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-20
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois, Ranking
GREGORY MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
DAVID TRONE, Maryland RON WRIGHT, Texas
JIM COSTA, California MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Executive Summary presented from Representative Cicilline........ 5
WITNESSES
Burns, Nicholas, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the
Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University............... 16
Wormuth, Christine, Director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, Rand Corporation;............................... 25
Brands, Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor, School
of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
and Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments.................................................... 34
Conley, Heather, Senior Vice President, Europe, Eurasia, and the
Arctic, and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 42
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 65
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 66
Hearing Attendance............................................... 67
THE HISTORIC AMERICAN ALLIANCE WITH EUROPE
TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the
Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Keating [presiding]. The hearing will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on an
historic American alliance with Europe.
Without objection, all the members will have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the
record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Mr. Keating. I will now make a brief opening statement, and
then, we will proceed to the hearing.
I just want to thank the witnesses and apologize for the
fact we have these nasty things called roll calls, and they
occur from time to time. But I think the interruptions are
over, I hope.
I would like to welcome Ranking Member Kinzinger who is
here with us, as well as Representative Cicilline, and we may
be joined by other members as their interrupted schedules
allow.
A generation ago, the ties the United States had with
European nations were valued. They were hard-earned. They were
part of the American DNA, our history, our personal heritage.
Like so many of us, my grandparents were Europeans who
became Americans. In times of happiness, we celebrate. We renew
this relationship with uniquely Americanized holidays like the
recently observed St. Patrick's Day, something very special to
me; Columbus Day; our own version of Bastille Day. In times
that are more poignant, we observe shared sacrifices and loss,
Memorial Day, Veterans Day, and personal loss. My own uncle was
killed defending democracy on French soil.
Perhaps it is the fact that this relationship was so
ingrained that we saw no need to share this with following
generations. However, in conversations I have had with our
counterparts on both sides of the Atlantic, they reflect the
need to remember and, more importantly, to renew this
relationship.
One cannot help but be profoundly moved visiting the
monuments at Normandy to see, even to this day, homes in the
area displaying both French and American flags. The alliances
we forged with our European partners during and after World War
II were a testament to the brutally hard-learned lessons that
we cannot escape what is going on in the rest of the world.
Instead, we learned that the best way to ensure our security at
home is to promote peace and stability abroad.
As a result, America committed to supporting a Europe that
is whole, free, and at peace, and to working closely with our
Western allies to define the rules and institutions that would
hold nations accountable for respecting shared values and
norms. Through these commitments, we would work to ensure that
future generations would never witness the same terror and
carnage of their forebearers.
The United States invested heavily in economic terms such
as through the Marshall Plan, but also in military and
leadership terms, to make sure these institutions would hold.
And to this day, we continue to benefit tremendously as a
result.
The Western alliance set the rules for the trade of goods
and services, giving American businesses access to more
predictable and profitable opportunities around the world. In
fact, one-fifth of our trade today is with Europe.
We also achieved a level of collective military strength
that has since World War II, deterred another major attack on
the U.S. by a foreign government. Even when we were attacked on
9/11, our allies came to our defense and triggered NATO's
Article 5. Since then, of the more than 3,500 men and women
serving in coalition forces in Afghanistan, nearly one-third
were not Americans.
By coming together to forge institutions and rules grounded
in our shared values of freedom, democracy, rule of law, and
the entrepreneurial spirit, we have worked together to ensure
that we could live in relative peace, security, and prosperity
for nearly a century now.
We are here today because we find ourselves again in
uncertain times, facing grave threats to our security, and we
cannot afford to forget why we committed to our alliance with
Europe. Today, there are renewed threats from nuclear weapons,
not only in Asia, from North Korea, but in Europe from Russia,
and possibly, also, from Iran, if they, too, decide to pull out
of the nuclear deal. The threat from terrorism is also not
over.
And while we can agree or disagree over the causes, climate
is already affecting our military readiness, and there are
estimates that effects from climate change could cost our
economy 10 percent of GDP by the end of the century.
Further, Putin has aggressively pursued hybrid warfare and
tactics designed to undermine the very pillars of our security
and our democracy and democratic alliances. And China has
embarked on a strategy to reshape the global economy to its
benefit at our expense.
Automation and new technologies are also rapidly changing.
They are changing our work force and our economy, and what it
means to go to school and get a job, so the next generation is
better off than their parents were.
We can try to face all these threats and challenges alone.
However, there has not been a single instance in U.S. history
where we successfully did it alone. Rather, history teaches us
that we are stronger when our allies are stronger and we are
working in lockstep together against common threats and
adversaries.
Any actions or rhetoric, therefore, that weakens our allies
and our alliances with them, is against our national security
interest. We must continue to strengthen our capabilities and
cement ever-closer ties with our European partners, and, in
turn, embrace the same from each other and every one of them.
The greatest difference-maker we have--and when I say
``we,'' I mean both the United States and Europe--the greatest
difference-maker we have versus China or Russia is that we have
this historically unprecedented coalition, and they do not. Our
European friends and partners, our NATO and non-NATO allies,
the EU, and our joint multilateral institutions have been
synonymous with the American prosperity and security, and that
continues unchanged today.
So, I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us for
this important discussion during our very first hearing this
year of this subcommittee.
And I will turn now to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger,
for his opening statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here on the first hearing for
this subcommittee. I could not think of a better topic to
discuss. This is an issue that unites us all, and I think that
is important to know.
Since the end of the Second World War, America and European
resolve has formed the cornerstone of national security policy
for the post-war order. Through our partnership with European
nations, we have successfully defeated communism, halted
genocide in the Balkans, countered threats from terrorism,
defended human rights around the world, and maintained cohesion
with our like-minded democratic partners.
While we no longer face the same existential threat posed
by the Soviet Union, Western resolve and stability has helped
to maintain peace in a world drowning with strawmen and in
chaos. One of my growing concerns is our European allies
continue to be reliant on oil and gas from Russian strawman
Vladimir Putin who is using energy security to weaken our
alliance.
That is why I introduced, with Chairman Keating, H.R. 1616,
the European Energy Security and Diversification Act, which
last night passed the House with overwhelming bipartisan
support. We know that the Russians are using energy as a weapon
against our allies, and this bill reassures Europe and shows
America's willingness to help our transatlantic partners in
their energy growth.
Sometimes it seems like our enthusiasm, however, that we
have in the United States for NATO is not always matched in
Europe. I think Europe needs to step up in many cases, whether
it is on their military spending, whether it is on a lean-
forward attitude, or understanding, in fact, that they are on
the front lines and, frankly, have the most to lose of any
hostilities between Russia or any hostilities with terror or,
frankly, the new cold war with China that is occurring even in
Eastern Europe. Sometimes Europe comes across as tired. And I
think if anybody needs to not be, it is Europe because they are
on the front lines of this.
There are other challenges that we still have to address.
There is a genocide in Syria that, despite a brief cessation on
hostilities, I think is going to continue to get worse. We have
the issue with Huawei and China, and we have allies that
sometimes go to the lowest bidder, but put themselves in great
harm and great possibility of harm by buying Chinese
technology. And we have a new cold war with China, as I
mentioned.
And I think in many cases in the United States we have
politicized what we spend on the military and made it a
partisan issue, when, in fact, our underinvestment in the
military is the reason that we now have parity, which we should
never have. We have parity with some of our near-peer
competitors like China and Russia.
So, all these are very important. These are a lot of issues
that unite us. But I look forward to asking the questions of
our panel today.
With that, I will give back 2 minutes and 20 seconds.
Mr. Keating. Well, I would like to thank the ranking
member. That is quite generous and unusual in Congress to give
back that time. And I have just cut into half of it by thanking
him.
[Laughter.]
Our other members have the opportunity, if they so desire,
to give a 1-minute opening statement as well. And I would like
to go to Representative Cicilline from Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank you and Ranking Member Kinzinger for calling this
hearing, so that we can have an opportunity to discuss one of
the most important relationships in the world, the
transatlantic alliance.
I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here and
for their extraordinary public service.
The partnership between Europe and the United States is an
enduring alliance. It is a community based on a shared set of
democratic values. It is a partnership that has fostered
unprecedented peace and prosperity in Europe and the United
States since the end of World War II. It is an alliance to
celebrate and one we must continue to adapt for the future.
As we gather today, we must be clear-eyed about the
challenges to the transatlantic alliance and we must be
proactive on what Congress can do to shore up this critical
bulwark. In Europe itself, the strength of the alliance is
being tested by Brexit, the rise of populism in Europe,
alarming antisemitism, and concerning democratic backsliding in
places like Hungary and Poland. Here at home, our own President
poses one of the greatest challenges to transatlantic
relationships.
And I want to commend Ambassador Burns and Ambassador Doug
Lute for your excellent report on ``NATO at 70''. I ask
unanimous consent that that be made part of the record.
Mr. Keating. Without objection.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Cicilline. It is a thoughtful analysis of the current
state of the alliance and roadmap for its future. The report
warns, and I quote, ``President Donald Trump is regarded widely
in NATO capitals as the alliance's most urgent and often most
difficult problem.'' End quote.
This is an extraordinary statement. NATO, an alliance
founded by the United States and our closest allies in great
part to defend the United States, now sees the President of the
United States as a threat. Incredible.
Today, I want to send a clear message to our European
allies. The United States is committed to our partnerships with
Europe, and Congress will continue to support the transatlantic
alliance, as we stand together to face new threats to
democracy, peace, and global stability.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
Now no one else wants to have any opening statement. So, I
would like to introduce our witnesses and thank them for their
presence here today.
Ambassador Nicholas Burns is the Roy and Barbara Goodman
Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International
Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. During
his distinguished career as a member of the Foreign Service,
Ambassador Burns served as Undersecretary for Political Affairs
at the Department of State, as well as U.S. Ambassador to NATO.
Not unimportantly, he resides in Massachusetts and spends a
great deal of time in the wonderful community of Westport.
Ms. Christine Wormuth is the Director of the RAND
International Security and Defense Policy Center. She
previously served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy at
the Department of Defense, and prior to that, as Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces;
Special Assistant to the President; Senior Director for Defense
at the National Security Council, and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense.
Dr. Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished
Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies, and a Senior Fellow at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He previously
served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Strategic Planning, and as a leader writer for the Commission
on the National Defense Strategy for the United States.
Finally, Ms. Heather Conley is a Senior Vice President for
Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, and Director of the Europe
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Previously, Ms. Conley served as Deputy Assistant Secretary at
the Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs.
We appreciate all of you for being here today and look
forward to the testimony.
Please limit, although we are not going to hold a clock
over your head, testimony to the vicinity of 5 minutes.
And without objection, any of your written statements will
be made part of the record.
I will start with Ambassador Burns for his statement.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS BURNS, ROY AND BARBARA GOODMAN FAMILY
PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Burns. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank
you very much for the pleasure of being here. And, Mr.
Chairman, as you said, I am happy to be here as one of your
constituents from Westport, Massachusetts.
I have submitted my testimony for the record. I just have
three points in this short presentation.
First, thank you for doing this. Thank you for focusing on
what does unite us, as the ranking member said. We believe in
NATO and we believe in the European Union. And if you think
about it, they are the cornerstones of the democratic West.
They have become that, the U.S. relationship with the European
Union on economics and on political affairs, and on climate
change, and our NATO alliance.
NATO prevailed in the cold war. And when communism
collapsed, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, who was
a great transatlanticist, we found a Europe ``whole, free and
at peace''. And that was a tremendous accomplishment for the
United States. And the U.S. and the EU and Canada,
correspondingly, created unparalleled prosperity on both sides
of the Atlantic Ocean.
We learned a lot of lessons over the last 70 years. NATO's
anniversary, of course, is next Thursday. April 4th of next
week will be the 70th anniversary of the creation of the
alliance. We learned that engagement with the world, and our
leadership in it, strengthens the United States.
And the major insight that the founders had, Truman and
Eisenhower, Acheson and Dulles, Republicans and Democrats, was
that, to defend the United States at home, we have to be
deployed overseas. We have to be in Europe in alliance with the
Europeans, and that is how we have kept the peace and great
power relationships since the Second World War. That is my
first point.
My second point is that, much I think to everyone's regret,
certainly mine, much of what we have achieved may be at risk,
as President Trump has belittled and, in my view, weakened
NATO, and he has branded the European Union as a foe of the
United States, the first President to do that.
Congressman Cicilline mentioned the report that Ambassador
Doug Lute and I have just authored on ``NATO at 70,'' which we
term ``an alliance in crisis''. We say there that NATO's
largest problem is that, for the first time in its history, it
lacks a strong, principled voice in the White House, in the
American Presidency. We have always had Presidents, Republican
and Democratic, who believe in NATO. And right now, we have a
President who has failed to commit clearly and unequivocally
that he will back up an Article 5 scenario on attack, a threat
of attack, against one of our allies.
He has also failed to lead the alliance in responding to
President Putin's interference in the American election in 2016
and the Dutch, French, and German elections of 2017. And I
think most importantly, he has become a constant critique of
the small ``d'' democratic leaders, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel
Macron, Theresa May in Europe, while he has embraced some of
the anti-democratic populist leaders like Viktor Orban in
Hungary.
We hope, I certainly hope, that Congress can right the
balance. You did at the Munich Security Conference on a
bipartisan basis, and there are bills in Congress that would
reaffirm our Article 5 commitment, which I certainly believe
Congress should act upon.
Third and finally, this is not just yesterday's story.
There was an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal this morning
essentially saying NATO was a great story, but it is
yesterday's story. This is about our future, because we cannot
preserve a democratic, united, peaceful Europe without NATO in
it. We are not going to have partners to fight in the anti-ISIS
coalition, which has been very successful under both President
Trump and President Obama's leadership, without Europe. They
are fighting with us in the Horn of Africa. They are fighting
with us, as you know, in West Africa. They are important to us
on climate change as a potential partner as we re-enter--I hope
we will--the climate change agreements in the future. They are
important to us on Iran.
And finally, I would say, we are going to fight two big
battles with the authoritarian powers in the years ahead. One
is the battle of ideas. The Russians and Chinese believe that
their big idea, central planning, one political party, denial
of the human and civil rights of a population, that that is the
way forward, and they are saying that. That is Xi Jinping and
Putin's message. We need to defend our Western catalyst, rule-
of-law societies. The United States and Europe have to be in
that together. That is a first big battle.
The second is the battle for technological predominance in
our military with the Chinese. And that maybe is the most
important for our future, that we retain technological military
superiority. It is at risk. We need Europe and our East Asian
allies to compete with the Chinese. So, we are tomorrow's
alliance, not just yesterday's alliance.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Ms. Wormuth.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE WORMUTH, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION
Ms. Wormuth. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
members of the committee, thank you for this hearing and for
the opportunity to be here.
Our cooperation with the countries of Europe is based on
our shared values. This is picking up on something Ambassador
Burns just said, our shared belief in democracy, in individual
liberty, and the rule of law. And we have shared a common
purpose with Europe to protect and advance these values. And I
saw that time and time again in my government career, how
important it is to work with our European allies and partners.
I wanted to just give a few examples this afternoon of some
of the benefits of the transatlantic relationship, looking at
three different periods: the post-cold war period, the moments
after the 9/11 attack, and then, the era we are in now, and
will be in, an era of strategic competition.
Four decades of close cooperation with the Europeans during
the cold war ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and
the collapse of the Soviet Union just 2 years later. We
immediately began working with Western Europe on Germany's
reunification within NATO and the larger goal of building a
Europe whole and free. We and our European allies focused on
engaging the former Warsaw Pact countries as well as the former
Soviet Republics, working to help them transition and
stabilize.
Through programs like NATO's Partnership for Peace, the
SEED Act, and others, NATO nations helped these countries
emerge from communism. Many of them eventually joined NATO, and
many others also joined the European Union. And the work that
we did during that period made both sides of the transatlantic
relationship safer and more prosperous.
After al-Qaeda attacked us on September 11th, 2001, Europe
again showed their solidarity. NATO invoked the Article 5
collective defense pledge for the first and only time in its
history. European nations fought with us in Afghanistan from
the earliest days, losing more than a thousand military
personnel on the battlefield. Under the NATO umbrella, many of
the European countries are still with us in Afghanistan today.
Some of our European allies also joined us in Iraq, fighting
alongside our military, training Iraqi security forces, and
working to rebuild Iraqi institutions.
And then, in the summer of 2014, when the Islamic State
seized territory in Iraq, many Europeans joined us in the anti-
Isis coalition. Some joined the air campaign or contributed
special operations forces. Others provided trainers on the
ground, and still others gave weapons to the Kurdish peshmerga,
and the Iraqi security forces. Many Europeans also provided
much-needed reconstruction funding. Ending the physical
caliphate, which just happened in the last few days, in Iraq
and Syria would have taken much longer and cost much more
without the support from our European allies and partners.
Our close relationship with Europe has given us basing and
access rights that would help us not only defend Europe, if we
had to, but also help us defend our own interests far from our
shores. The network of American bases we have in the UK,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey are strategic assets
that help us respond more quickly, whether it is to conduct
non-combatant evacuations, provide humanitarian assistance, or
respond more quickly to crises.
It is also important to note we have cooperated with Europe
on a range of non-military challenges. In 2013, several
European nations helped with the destruction of Syrian chemical
weapons. During the 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa, the UK
and France sent military personnel, and the EU contributed
substantial financial resources to the countries fighting the
disease.
As Ambassador Burns says, the Europeans also worked with us
to negotiate the nuclear agreement with Iran and the Paris
Climate Agreement. And although the United States has withdrawn
from both of those agreements, the Europeans have stayed in
both.
Now, as we look to this new period of competition, Europe
continues to help us pursue our strategic goals. They have been
our closest partners in pushing back against Russian violations
of sovereignty. For the past 5 years, together we have
maintained sanctions against Russia because of its aggression
in Ukraine. And standing together, the United States and 24
European nations expelled 115 Russian diplomats in response to
the brazen chemical weapons attack on the Skripals.
President Putin seems intent on undermining the rules-based
order that the United States and Europe worked so hard to build
all these many years. Preventing that outcome is going to
require us to work closely with Europe and NATO. We have taken
a number of measures already to shore up deterrence, including
forward deployment of multinational battle groups in Poland and
each of the Baltic States.
Motivated substantially by the need to deter Russia, many
NATO members are increasing their defense spending. A majority
of them will be on target to meet the 2 percent goal by 2024.
And although several European countries absolutely need to
spend more on defense, the increasingly fraught debate over
burden-sharing runs the risk of overshadowing the many benefits
of the transatlantic relationship.
I would just close by saying, looking ahead, the rise of
China will likely be the most important geopolitical challenge
for the foreseeable future. Our principal advantage in that
competition, as the chairman has said, are our alliances with
Asia and Europe, and it is one we cannot afford to jettison.
So, just as we have worked together on security in Europe, we
need to work closely with Europe today to form common
political, economic, and security approaches to China.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Ms. Wormuth.
Dr. Brands.
STATEMENT OF HAL BRANDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER DISTINGUISHED
PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Brands. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
distinguished members, thank you for having me. I will jump
right in, in the interest of brevity.
The modern transatlantic relationship anchored by NATO
emerged after World War II during the early cold war, and the
creation of NATO, in particular, marked a historic departure in
U.S. policy that was rooted in a threefold logic. It reflected
a realization that America had a profound interest in shaping a
favorable balance of power in Europe, and that persistent U.S.
diplomatic and military engagement was the only way of doing
so. It reflected the idea that only a U.S. security guarantee
could provide the reassurance necessary to generate economic
recovery and prosperity and protect democratic institutions in
Europe. And finally, the U.S. commitment was meant to suppress
historical rivalries between Germany and its neighbors, and
thereby, facilitate European economic and political
integration.
Over the subsequent decades, the U.S. role within NATO and
the alliance itself have evolved considerably, but for
generations that relationship has produced a range of critical
benefits, not just abstract global benefits, but concrete
benefits for the United States.
First, NATO has significantly increased America's military
punching power. During the cold war, European forces were vital
to maintaining something like a balance of power vis-a-vis the
Warsaw Pact. Since the cold war, NATO countries have made
significant contributions to every major U.S. military
intervention. America almost never goes to war alone, and a key
reason for that is that it can draw on the support of European
allies. For decades, the U.S. relationship with NATO has also
provided access to bases, logistical facilities, and strategic
real eState that make it far easier to project American power.
Second, the relationship with NATO provides geostrategic
influence and global stability. NATO binds some of the richest
countries in the world to the United States. It, thereby, helps
us maintain a significant overbalance of power vis-a-vis any
competitor. NATO has deterred aggressive States that might be
attempting to destabilize Europe or the broader national
system. It has tamped down European instability by making it
virtually unthinkable that war could occur between NATO
members. NATO also acts as an impediment to nuclear
proliferation by convincing historically insecure countries,
such as Germany and Poland, that they do not need the world's
absolute weapon.
Third, NATO enhances U.S. diplomatic leverage. Put bluntly,
Europeans have to listen to us on European and global issues
because the United States plays the leading role in NATO, and
that makes it the central player in European defense. The
United States has also used NATO and its institutional
structures as vehicles for deep cooperation on
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counter-piracy, and
other challenges.
Fourth, the relationship with NATO provides economic
benefits. For decades, U.S. diplomats and trade negotiators
have used the security leverage provided by its NATO
commitments to extract more favorable terms in bilateral
economic agreements. More broadly, NATO and other U.S.
alliances sustain a climate of stability in which trade and
free enterprise can flourish, thereby bolstering U.S. and
global prosperity.
Finally, the relationship with NATO provides political
legitimacy. Formal alliances like NATO provide greater
international legitimacy for the use of force, especially in
cases such as the Kosovo conflict when we cannot secure a U.N.
Security Council resolution. Allied support also enhances the
perceived legitimacy of military action at home.
For all these reasons, maintaining a strong transatlantic
relationship is critical to U.S. interests. There are, of
course, challenges that are currently testing the U.S.-NATO
relationship, just as there have always been such challenges. I
discuss those challenges at greater length in my written
statement, but just a short list would include: building a
stronger and more credible deterrent against Russian aggression
in Eastern Europe; ensuring that key allies such as Germany are
making necessary military investments; adapting the alliance to
confront unconventional threats like political warfare and
economic coercion; reconciling NATO's collective defense
mission with its out-of-area responsibilities; confronting
growing political illiberalism within parts of the alliance,
and, most importantly, reversing the erosion of U.S.
credibility within the alliance as a result of statements
questioning America's Article 5 commitment.
The seriousness of these challenges should not be
understated, but I believe that the transatlantic relationship
can overcome them, just as it has overcome even greater
challenges before, so long as the United States continues to
provide the leadership that has proved so important for the
past seven decades. And if anything, I think the relevance of
NATO to American strategy is increasing today, not simply
because of the Russian threat, but because it is hard to
imagine any effective strategy for dealing with an autocratic,
assertive China that does not include deep cooperation between
America and its closest democratic allies in Europe.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brands follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Ms. Conley.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, EUROPE,
EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC, AND DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Conley. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member
Kinzinger, members of this committee. What a privilege it is to
be your kickoff hearing. Thank you so much.
And let me just say thank you for the kind invitation to
NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to speak at a Joint
Session of Congress next week. That sends such an important
message. So, thank you for that leadership.
Seventy years ago, the United States knew who we were, what
we stood for, and what we needed to do to safeguard freedom. We
were the good guys. We stood for freedom. We were those can-do
Americans, said with equal parts envy and exacerbation by our
allies. America's Greatest Generation, having fought twice in
Europe in the span of 28 years, understood the extraordinarily
high cost of freedom and the scourge of nationalism and hatred.
To honor that American sacrifice from two world wars, that
generation of leaders knew that European stability was
essential to ensure America's security, exactly as you said,
Chairman Keating, and it understood that strong alliances win
wars against aggressors then and now.
As I was preparing for this oral statement, I looked under
my computer keyboard, and I keep a copy of Senator John
McCain's farewell message to the Munich Security Conference
last year, which Mrs. McCain read, and it inspired me. And I
just want to offer this quote to you from Senator McCain:
``Together with our allies, we kept faith with those on the
other side of the walls that divided the oppressed from the
free. We were confident that they wanted the same things we
did--freedom, equal justice, the rule of law, a fair chance to
prosper by their own industry and talents. This is our greatest
inheritance, and it did not happen by accident.''
Today I would argue we are having a tough time answering
the question of who we are and what we stand for. We are tired
of spending funds overseas that are so urgently needed at home.
We are frustrated and burdened by the yoke of leadership. We
want others to shoulder that burden, and sometimes we appear as
victims that other countries are taking advantage of.
Congressman Kinzinger, you noted how weak our allies are
acting right now. They are very divided. They are having a hard
time resisting China's economic strength, I would argue
Russia's malign influence. We cannot take America's greatest
foreign and security policy success, Europe, for granted. We
need to engage them. We need to work with them. We need to push
them very hard, but that requires deep American diplomatic,
economic, and security engagement.
But I leave you with this final thought: this discussion is
really not about our allies. It is about who we are and what we
stand for in the future. This anniversary gives us an
opportunity to put forward the hard-fought wisdom, values,
principles, and knowledge of previous American generations, but
we must bring it forward to a new generation. I have to
convince my young daughters why NATO is as important to them as
it is to me. As representatives of the American people, you
must do this. As former officials that are sitting on this
witness table, we must do our part as well. This is our
greatest inheritance and we must fight every day to preserve it
and strengthen it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Ms. Conley, and thank all the
witnesses. In a very short period of time, I think you
capsulized what this hearing is about.
And I, too, had the privilege of going to the Munich
Security Conference as part of the CODEL led by Senator McCain.
What an experience that is, trust me, in every respect. But his
patriotism, his love of this country, his understanding of the
role of our country, and an understanding of the alliance that
we are talking about, was as deep as any person I had ever met
in my life, and he will be missed. One of the best legacies we
can all serve to honor him is to do our best at this difficult
time to move forward.
Because, in my opinion, this is not just a hearing. This is
really the beginning of a central mission of this committee
during this Congress. Each of us is here and have been elected
at different times in our country's history, but I honestly
believe that what we do as a Congress during this 2-year
period, in particular, will have fundamental impact on our
relations with our most important allies and create a bond of
greater security and prosperity in our country in an area where
we have never had such an ability to do so.
I came back--and I saw Ambassador Burns there--from Munich
with the Speaker and several other of our leaders just a little
over 3 weeks ago. We had the opportunity to go to Brussels
after that, and in the whole course of that, met with most of
the key European officials.
Really what I want to get to is this: I was really taken
aback by the depth of the challenge we have in front of us as a
Congress. There was a poll in Germany that came out just about
the time that we got there, and it showed that the German
people had 85 percent unfavorability toward the United States
and only 10 percent favorability. The German people, those are
among our closest allies, people that, as our witnesses
detailed, have fought with us and lost lives. So, these are the
critical issues we have in front of us.
And also, we met with those leaders. And I will share with
you without identifying them, because there are Chatham Rules
that took place in these private meetings. But during those
recent meetings, during those meetings that we had, the leaders
were using words like ``painful,'' ``hurtful,'' describing our
actions at that time. They centered, for instance, on the U.S.
rationale for the tariffs that are imposed on Europe right now,
and they wanted us to explain why we were using emergency
security powers to impose those tariffs. They said, ``When did
we become your enemies? When did we become a security risk to
your country?'', our closest allies.
So, if you could, that is why I led with this question. We
have work to do with the people in Europe, and that is why we
are here today. That is why this is central to what we will do,
reminding them of the importance of this alliance. Because I
think when people focus back on what we took for granted a
generation ago, they will understand better how to invest
personally, financially, and in terms of our security interests
together.
So, if I could, those two comments: what can we do to help
improve as a Congress? And I must tell you, I am not casting
our meeting just on those issues. I have been to many CODELs
traveling as Members of Congress. I cannot recall a time that I
felt as appreciated with us being there as Members of Congress
as we did during that period. And that is encouraging. But what
can we do? Because the people that will be making decisions--
and there are elections coming this spring--will be guided by
their own constituencies. And it is concerning to see that
unfavorability that is there with a close ally, and also the
work we have to do with these other officials, our counterparts
in Europe.
Mr. Burns? Ambassador Burns?
Mr. Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would also say this: politics is a two-way street.
Relations across the Atlantic are a two-way street. I think
there are things that we need to do and they need to do.
On our side, it was pretty clear from the Munich
Conference--it was an extraordinarily insightful conference to
hear from the Europeans--they are looking for a reaffirmation
of the American commitment to NATO, especially focused on
Article 5, because the President just has not done that. He has
had his first visit in 2017. He did not mention Article 5. In
fact, it was taken out of his speech. And then, last summer, on
the day of the summit with President Putin in Helsinki, he was
highly ambivalent about whether he would respond to an attack
on Montenegro, a country that was attacked politically, an
attempted coup by the Russians 2 years ago.
And the second thing that we need to do is reaffirm our
relationship with the European Union. Every President since the
Coal and Steel Community was created in 1948 has believed that
the European Union is a partner of the United States. It is in
our interest to see them succeed. The President consistently
has called them a foe, a competitor, only looking at them
through a prism of trade, but not also in our political
partnership, which is very deep.
I think on their side of the ledger--and here, the ranking
member I thought made a very productive statement--we have to
push the Europeans as well, as we always have. They are
excessively reliant on Russian natural gas. They are endanger
of being excessively reliant on Chinese capital investment
through the Belt and Road Initiative. You saw that Italy joined
it formally over the weekend. They are insufficiently
distrustful of Huawei on the 5G issue.
And so, I do think we have a right and an obligation in a
two-way street relationship to push back. And the one that I
feel most strongly about is German defense spending. It is the
largest and most successful economy. They have a surplus. And
yet, the Bundestag reported out last week a budget that will
not get them to 2 percent by 2024, which is the target. They
may barely get to 1.5 percent. President Trump is right to push
them. President Obama was right to push them. The only silver
lining there--I will finish on this--is that we have seen four
consecutive years of real growth in European defense spending
since Putin's annexation of Crimea, mainly not in Germany, but
in the other allies, and that is something we can push forward
on with them.
Mr. Keating. My time is up, but I think that you will have
the opportunity, the other witnesses, to address some of those
issues with some of the other questioning.
So, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Chairman, I am going to swap places with
Ms. Wagner.
And I will say, from my side, if you could, let's be very
disciplined on the 5-minute clock because of the hour.
But I will switch places with her, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Wagner. I greatly appreciate the courtesy of the
ranking member. I have to get to a Financial Services markup.
And so, I am on roller skates today.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this hearing.
And thank our witnesses.
I had the great privilege of serving as a United States
Ambassador in Western Europe, Ambassador Burns.
And, Ms. Conley, I would like to associate myself with your
opening statement greatly.
Although we work closely with partners in the EU bloc, our
goals are not always in step. We have historically relied on
the United Kingdom to bridge gaps between the United States and
EU countries.
Ms. Conley, how will the UK's departure from the EU affect
EU policies in areas of interest to the United States, such as
sanctions and trade and regulatory policies?
Ms. Conley. Thank you so much for that question.
The European Union will be greatly reduced, should the
United Kingdom depart the EU. On an almost daily, hourly basis,
the story is in constant change. But, all things being equal,
the United Kingdom provides for the European Union a very
export-oriented, very market-economy-driven--it is driving the
European Union on foreign and security policy. And this will be
a great loss to the European Union when the United Kingdom
leaves.
If anything, we focus too much on the ins and outs of this
extraordinary Brexit debate, but we have not focused enough in
thinking about how much the EU will diminish, and in some ways
how much the United Kingdom will diminish from being out of the
European Union. This is why we are seeing in the EU the
creation of what they are calling the Hanseatic League, which
is Northern European economies that are trying to in some ways
fill the space that the UK will leave in being market-driven,
export-driven, much different from the Southern European
economies.
Mrs. Wagner. There will definitely be a void.
Ms. Wormuth, many of our European partners share the United
States concerns regarding Russia's non-compliance with the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF. The United
States has since withdrawn from the INF with NATO support. I
understand these recent developments worry some European
stakeholders who fear resurgent U.S.-Russian competition will
destabilize Europe. What is the future of arms control in
Europe, and what role can European countries play in pressuring
Russia back into compliance?
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
I am very concerned about the future of the arms control
regime in the wake of the decision to withdraw from INF,
primarily because I am concerned about what it means for
whether we extend the New START agreement in 2021, which I
think is very much in the interest of the United States,
despite the fact that we are in a very low period with the
Russians. So, figuring out how to extend that agreement, which
is in our interest, I think is item No. 1 on that agenda. I
think we need to continue to have our European allies and
partners put pressure on Russia to work with us to extend that
agreement and to call out their bad behavior, as they have in
many instances.
I do think that part of having a credible deterrent is
showing a unified front. I think the way the United States
withdrew from INF did not shore up that unity inside of the
alliance. So, going forward, we need to coordinate, so that we
show a unified front.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Ms. Wormuth.
Ambassador Burns, during the cold war our alliances with
European countries helped the United States maintain a durable
balance of power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, preventing
catastrophic conflict, frankly, between the great powers.
Today, we are seeing China step into the balance or into the
place, I should say, that the Soviet Union once occupied. What
role will Europe play in countering the rise of China?
Mr. Burns. I think, as Heather Conley said, the Europeans
seem to be disorganized and not united on how to respond to
China, a great deal of divisiveness as the Chinese seek
inroads. The Chinese are running and own the Port of Piraeus--
--
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Mr. Burns [continuing]. The biggest port in the Eastern
Med; significant investments in the Balkans, now in Italy. So,
the European Union needs to organize itself. It needs to
develop a common policy because this is a major threat. And
they understand that the military advantage that the United
States has had since the Second World War will be at risk if in
AI, machine learning, quantum computing, biotechnology, our
government does not have the ability to keep up with the
Chinese in the technological arms race. Europe is going to be
part of that. Their labs, their tech companies, their research
universities have to be with us and united in that.
So, I think that, on a NATO basis, China has become an
issue. And in Ambassador Lute's report that I did with him,
that is one of our recommendations: we have to think about
China as a threat.
I would close on this, Congresswoman. General Milley said
this morning when he testified up here on the Hill that he felt
that Russia was still the great existential threat. I think we
are facing two big authoritarian threats----
Mrs. Wagner. I agree.
Mr. Burns [continuing]. In Europe.
Mrs. Wagner. I agree.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Again, I thank the
ranking member for his courtesy.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Representative. Thanks for
bringing that point across because one of the highest-ranking
members of the EU that we had private conversations with said,
if we are on the course we are now, and we could look back 30
years from the future, we would find out by far the greatest
threat is China and their activities.
I yield to Mr. Cicilline, who I understand might yield his
position and time.
Mr. Cicilline. My position, not my time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Costa. I thank my friend and colleague from Rhode
Island for yielding this time. I have another subcommittee that
is going on.
We have an all-star group of testifiers today, and I want
to thank you all for your service to our country and your
efforts there.
Chairman Keating, I want to commend you for this effort. I
do agree that we are in a transitional time in world history,
and I think this subcommittee will and can, if we do, play an
important role in combination with our allies in Europe in
being, in essence, the glue that reaffirms, as we have stated
earlier, the importance of this transatlantic relationship.
Seventy years--70 years--of this history is the longest
peacetime period in Europe in over 1,000 years. I am certain
that the majority of Americans, certainly the majority of
Europeans, do not think about that. Probably the majority of
them do not even know that, that these institutions that we
have helped create from NATO to the other efforts with the
European Union and stabilization of that, the World Trade
Organization--the list goes on--these are things we did not
just for Europe; we did for ourselves. Countries do what is in
their own interest. And this peace dividend that has resulted
in this 70-year transatlantic partnership must be reaffirmed.
So, let me ask you a few questions here, and I just want to
go quickly through it because of time.
Ambassador Burns, do you view the European Union as our
adversary?
Mr. Burns. No, they are our partner strategically.
Mr. Costa. Ms. Wormuth, do you view the European Union as
our adversary?
Ms. Wormuth. No. I would affiliate myself with Ambassador
Burns' view.
Mr. Costa. Yes. And, Ms. Conley?
Ms. Conley. Absolutely not. The European Union is our great
partner.
Mr. Costa. And Hal Brands?
Mr. Brands. The European Union has provided the political
and economic cohesion to go along with NATO's military
cohesion.
Mr. Costa. Right. And I think that some of the comments
made here earlier--certainly there are wealthy countries in
Europe that should do more in terms of their commitment,
Germany being one of them. And we need to continue to push
them, as the previous administrations have done. But there are
constructive ways that you can do that. And I know the chairman
here and I, as chairman of the Transatlantic Legislators'
Dialogue, are committed to doing just that.
I am looking for the four of you to give us some thoughts
and suggestions on how at this transitional time in history we
can use these institutions, these committees, these efforts
with the NATO PA and Transatlantic Policy Network, to be this
glue that reaffirms that America still cares.
Because the comments that Chairman Keating made when I was
at Brussels last month with him and others--these are questions
that our European friends are asking, where is America? And
they are dealing with the same challenges that we are:
populism, extremism, fear from immigration, racism, bigotry,
antisemitism that not only is raising its head here, but in
Europe as well.
So, what suggestions would you have in terms of using our
legislative tools with our partners in Europe over the next 2
years? Ambassador Burns, do you want to begin, quickly?
Mr. Burns. I would just say that Congress has a real
opportunity here. If the administration is not willing to work
with the Europeans on refugees or climate or Iran--and there is
a question about whether or not the Trump administration
actually sees the EU as a strategic partner--Congress can step
forward, and these legislative exchanges are important.
Mr. Costa. I think it has been very clear, the
administration sees these relationships as transactional and
does not really believe in multinational partnerships. Clearly,
that is what they have exhibited. It is just a different view
and it is jarring, I think, for this partnership.
Thirty years ago, the Berlin Wall fell. These are really
historical things, if you think about it, and it is due, in
part, to the success of this partnership I believe.
Other comments? Yes?
Ms. Conley. I would just add, I think, obviously, visiting
often, traveling, speaking out, making sure that they are
hearing other voices of support. I would also encourage you to
think about how your district and the States can work more
collaboratively with Europe, the sister city partnerships,
economic relationships. If this cannot be a top-down approach,
we have to stabilize and maintain it. Really energize your
constituents to reach out to economic ties that bind, and
continue to send the strong messages.
Mr. Costa. And working with AmCham; there is also the
private and the public sector. There are NGO's. There is a lot
of things that are tools, Mr. Chairman, that I think we need to
employ with our European colleagues as well.
My time has run out, but I do not know if any of you care
to comment. In 2013, the equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of Russia, General Gerasimov, talked about a policy using
democratic institutions, elections, to undermine the European
Union and the U.S. as an economic force and as a military
force, to play on those divisions. Think he has done a pretty
good job so far with their limited hand?
Mr. Keating. If I could, perhaps that could be answered in
the course of the other questioning, too. If you could filter
that in, it would be appreciated.
Thank you, Representative.
Mr. Costa. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. I now call on Ranking Member Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
enforcing the 5 minutes, because I know a lot of us have stuff
to do this afternoon.
Let me just say again, all of you, I appreciate you being
here. I think this is a fantastic hearing. I think there is a
lot that unifies us.
I have heard a few shots kind of coming from the other side
about the administration. Let me be clear. I think the
administration appreciates Europe and sees Europe as a friend.
I think the administration appreciates NATO and sees NATO as a
friend. But sometimes Europe and NATO do not like being called
out when they are not doing what they need to do. And, I mean,
it is a reality.
Back post-World War II, Europe was in a position where they
needed the United States, basically, to provide a whole lot,
and there was a lot of benefit to us. Now we are in a position
where we have a lot of very strong countries, and we all have
to rely on each other for a security situation.
I think it is important to note that we get as much out of
NATO as NATO gets out of us. So, I think it is important. This
is not just a United States doing a favor for Europe situation.
But, that said, the fact that we all kind of have something to
play, I do not think there is anything wrong with calling out
Europe when they are falling short in those areas.
I think looking at the issue with Russia, as the chairman
mentioned and others mentioned, Russia is a huge problem. We
see it in our own hemisphere as we get reports that Russia has
landed troops in Venezuela, a socialist nation that is failing
its people that are starving to death. And Russia, once again,
appears to be using its military, as it did in Syria, to hold a
terrible person in power because it benefits them in power.
So, that is why pushing back against Russia through NATO in
Europe, taking away energy as a weapon for them, pushing back
against them in our own hemisphere, which we have neglected for
too long, is very important. And we need our friends in NATO to
step up with us. We need them to spend a little money with us,
too.
Ms. Conley, I want to touch on Germany with you and I want
to ask you a question. Germany's willingness to continue the
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and to connect 5G
with the Chinese telecom firm Huawei is only a few of the
questionable choices that they are making. What does it say
about the strength of the U.S.-European alliance when Germany,
the largest economy in Europe, is taking actions that are
counterproductive to our joint security interests?
Ms. Conley. Thank you, Congressman.
That is exactly what we do; we work on tough problems. The
challenge is Nord Stream 2 follows Nord Stream 1, and we should
have been much stronger on Nord Stream 1. I think there is an
awareness in the German government that they cannot proceed as
to how they wanted to. Chancellor Merkel has said that she
wants to ensure that Ukraine does have transit, gas transit,
before the end of this.
But you are absolutely right, this is where we have to roll
up our sleeves and work very closely with them, not scream at
them through Ambassadors, but work constructively with them.
They respond to a parliament. They are just like our system.
They can demand change. We let this go on for too long.
I would argue we have been sort of in a benign neglect
phase for over a decade. We are very transactional. We ask one
thing, and then, we will come back and ask for another. We do
not engage in a sustained way.
If we are concerned about Nord Stream 2, we had better be
as concerned about TurkStream because TurkStream is a
reconstituted South Stream. So, we have to look at this very
holistically.
The 5G issue, you are absolutely right, Europe is falling
very far behind in IT infrastructure. They know that. And what
they are trying to do is make sure the U.S. companies are
affected to try to level the playing field. We have to join
with them, and if we do not join with them, they will be very
susceptible to our adversaries----
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes, I agree. And, look, this has been an
issue that has come under Republican and Democratic
administrations prior. We have let this kind of relationship
sleep. We have basically said, OK, the fact that NATO exists is
enough, and we have not taken into account these creeping
problems that we are now having to deal with head-on. But I
think we need to be careful not to assume that, when we take on
these problems head-on that atrophied for so long under us,
that is not disappreciating NATO or hating Europe that we are
finding them as competitors. This is us saying, look, the
future of the United States and the future of Europe is relying
on this.
Let me just ask you in only the 30 seconds left--Germany
continues to be the member that does the most to stifle NATO
growth. Year-in and year-out, they are near the bottom of
defense spending. Why does Germany continue to be such a
problem when it comes to defense spending and in reaching the 2
percent GDP target?
And I gave you 18 seconds. You can topline it and figure
the rest later.
Ms. Conley. So, I am deeply concerned not only in the State
of the Bundeswehr and the lack of functional capabilities in
the maritime as well as their air and land power, but please
understand we are talking about different scales of economies.
So, when you talk about the German economy, it is not the
Estonian economy. So, when we put this marker at 2 percent, we
put ourselves into this corner where we benchmark at 2 percent.
You can spend 2 percent to defend against another NATO ally,
which is the Greek posture, or we can have allies that have
capabilities that the U.S. can use.
Mr. Kinzinger. It would be good if Germany had one of
those.
Ms. Conley. Well, Germany absolutely has to increase their
defense spending, and we have to work very closely with them on
Bundeswehr reform. But the Germans are also the lead framework
nation in Lithuania and the NATO battalion. They are
contributing, but we have to work much harder and hold them to
account, I agree with you.
Mr. Kinzinger. I think we all agree.
With that, I am going to yield back just because of time.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Keating. OK. Thank you.
Now I would like to recognize the very patient
Representative from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you again to our witnesses for your really
helpful testimony.
Ambassador Burns, I want to start with you. As I mentioned
in my opening statement, you referred to the challenges faced
by NATO at 70, particularly as it relates to the failure or
absence of leadership from the U.S. President, and how unusual
a circumstance that is. Although we are trying to do as much as
we can as Members of Congress to reaffirm our support and our
understanding of the importance of this relationship--we did a
resolution which was overwhelmingly supported in a bipartisan
way; we are having this hearing--my sense is still that world
leaders look to the words and actions of the President and not
the Congress. And so, I am wondering if you could speak a
little bit about what the absence of American Presidential
leadership in this moment has meant in terms of the future of
NATO and what we can do to undo some of the damage that is
being done by the President in this regard.
Mr. Burns. Thank you, Congressman.
One of the most striking things that Ambassador Lute and I
heard--we took 6 months, interviewed 60 leaders, current and
former on both sides of the Atlantic--one of the most striking
things was that a lot of Europeans said there could not be next
week a head-of-government summit here in Washington to
celebrate the 70th anniversary because the European leaders and
some of the Americans were not quite sure if President Trump
would blow up the summit with rhetorical attack on NATO, the
way he did the last two NATO summits in 2018 and 2017. That is
a sad reflection.
I think what we have lost is we have never had a President
who is so ambivalent, and this is a kind characterization,
about NATO. Article 5 is the key. A lot of people have been
saying, watch what the administration does, not what it says.
But, for deterrence to work, your words have to be clear and
they have to be credible, and they have to be firm. If you
backslide on Article 5, that does give an opening to an
adversary like Vladimir Putin. It may not be a conventional
attack of the type that we might have feared, and we did fear,
in the 1950's and 1960's, but now a hybrid attack or a
cyberattack on our election system. And so, I think we have
lost a lot. And we need the next President, whenever that
President appears after a vote of the American people, to
really dig us out of a hole.
Congress does have an opening right now. Ironic for someone
who is a creature of the executive branch--I served my entire
career in the executive branch--to ask Congress to exercise its
constitutional responsibilities. But I can tell you, what I
have heard from Europeans is the resolutions you passed
reaffirming American support for NATO did make a difference for
them. And I think we saw that in Munich as well.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Ambassador.
I think one of the other things that we have heard a lot
about is, obviously, the shared democratic values that both led
to the creation of NATO and it has sustained it for these 70
years. But I think many of us are very concerned about, and you
have written about this, the democratic institutions that are
weakening, particularly in Hungary and Poland. I think it is
also quite a stretch to claim that Turkey embodies democratic
values. Populist parties are growing all across Europe, and
you, Ambassador Burns, highlighted this in your report, this
democratic backsliding as a cancer within NATO.
And so, I am curious to know what you think Congress can do
to shore up the foundations of democracy at the core of the
transatlantic alliance and what your assessment is of the State
of democracy in Europe. And obviously, any of the other
witnesses who want to contribute to that, answer.
Mr. Burns. Two big challenges. The biggest challenge in
Europe right now, the existential challenge is the rise of the
anti-democratic populists, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders,
Alternative for Deutschland. They are contesting the European
parliamentary elections. They may, unfortunately, do well in
them this spring.
Very important for the United States to be on the right
side of that issue. And there is a perception, more than a
perception, a strong belief that the President has embraced
Viktor Orban in Hungary and the Polish government, and Salvini,
the right-leaning leader in the Italian coalition. We should be
behind the Christian democrats and the social democratic
leaders, the true small ``d'' democrats in Europe like Angela
Merkel, and we are not right now. And that is hurting us.
On the NATO side, I have to tell you, when Ambassador Lute
and I suggested in our report that NATO look into the
democratic practices of Hungary, Poland, and Italy, there was
widespread opposition among most of the people in NATO. They
say, ``It will divide us.'' But NATO is not just a military
alliance; it is a political alliance. The second sentence of
the Washington Treaty is about our values, rule of law,
democracy, human rights. We have got to pay attention to that.
There ought to be an annual assessment of whether countries are
backsliding. There have to be some penalties, but right now
there is no agreement in NATO that we should do that.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
And the chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Greg
Pence.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member
Kinzinger. Thank you for holding this important meeting.
I thank the panel for their service to this country, and
thank you for being here today and providing a lot of
information.
In some of your written testimony, Ambassador Burns and Ms.
Conley, you stated, NATO deters Russian President Putin from
invading or seeking to destabilize our NATO allies in Eastern
Europe. And two, the United States must return to Europe
economically through enhanced trade and investment
partnerships.
I would like to discuss these items and switch gears a
little bit from some of the things we have been talking about
and talk about energy security. According to our congressional
Research Service, the EU remains highly dependent on Russia for
natural gas. More than 40 percent of total European gas imports
are from Russia, and some EU members are almost totally
dependent on Russian gas, as you know.
At the same time, Russia has demonstrated its willingness
to use its energy resources to further its foreign policy. For
example, Russia cutoff gas supplies to Europe for periods in
2006 and 2009, and has repeatedly manipulated flows through
Ukraine.
NATO is not blind to this challenge. According to NATO, and
I quote, ``NATO's role in energy security was first defined in
2008 at the Bucharest summit and has since been strengthened.''
My question, is NATO, America's greatest security asset,
doing enough to enhance energy security in the alliance, and
what more should they be doing, if not? And I ask each of the
panelists.
Ms. Conley. Congressman, thank you so much for that
question.
I think NATO certainly is at the center of thinking about
security very widely and has created a center of excellence to
focus on energy security. But, ironically, it is the European
Union that has the most input into demanding diversification of
European energy. The European Union's Third Energy Package
tries to break the upstream and the downstream requirements and
tries to seek and ensure diversification. It has had successes;
yet, it has had failures such as Nord Stream 2.
We have to continue to work very closely with our allies to
make sure that this cycle of dependency--and it is not just oil
and gas; there is a malign economic influence that also comes
as part of the dominance of, whether it is Gazprom or Rosneft,
in NATO countries. We have to break that cycle of dependence.
And this is exactly where NATO and EU cooperation is absolutely
essential. NATO is the security provider, but the EU has the
economic tools to try to help break this cycle of dependency.
Mr. Brands. I would agree with that. I would just add, to
the extent that the United States can promote or facilitate the
export of LNG and other energy exports, that can provide a
useful counterweight to Russian influence as well.
The point I would make in terms of addressing this is that
it is important for the United States to apply pressure and
apply encouragement, but to do so in a constructive way.
Because if it comes across as hostility or outright
condemnation, that turns this issue or the defense spending
issue into a referendum on the current political leadership of
the United States, which is not an argument that we will win in
Europe right now.
Ms. Wormuth. And just to amplify that, I very much agree
with what Ms. Conley said about Germany and its need to step
forward in the area of defense. But, unfortunately, I think
because so much of the German government feels like they have
been singled out by the current administration, they are
letting that color their decisions. And it almost feels as if
part of deciding not to spend as much on defense is a
reflection of feeling like they have been singled out unfairly.
And so, I think we really need to get to a place where we
are pushing the Europeans, as the ranking member said, but we
are doing that against the backdrop of the complete
understanding of the positive relationship that we have and how
much our European allies bring to the table. I think without
grounding those hard conversations in that backdrop, it is very
easy to have those conversations be unconstructive.
Mr. Burns. Congressman, NATO thought a lot about energy
security at the beginning and the middle part of the cold war
decades ago. We had to in terms of our contingency planning;
less so now. NATO should think more about this, but I think,
realistically, the EU is going to be the focal point of the
institution that the U.S. can work with most effectively. U.S.
LNG, Norwegian, Algerian gas are substitutes, and we have got
to work with the EU to get there.
Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative.
The chair now recognizes the vice chair of the committee,
Representative Abigail Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to
serve as the vice chair of this subcommittee as we continue to
reinforce our shared fundamental values of international
cooperation, mutual security, and democracy.
My question today for the witnesses--and I thank you very
much for joining us--relates to trade policy. Recently, we have
seen the White House invoke restrictive trade policies,
particularly the imposition of tariffs in response to trade
imbalances and in the name of national security. Yet, it is the
farmers, business owners, and everyday people across my
district, central Virginia's 7th district, and across the
country who are hurt both by these tariffs and the retaliatory
tariffs countries have imposed in response.
Mr. Brands, in your view, and, Ambassador Burns--and to the
other witnesses if you would care to respond as well--in your
view, are these tariffs serving our national security interests
or are there other, more effective diplomatic avenues for
resolving trade disagreements that would not have this outsized
negative impact on our own citizens that we should consider
pursuing instead?
Mr. Brands. I do not believe that the tariffs are serving
the national interests. And I would simply add that I think
they are undercutting U.S. goals in other respects as well.
One thing I would give the administration credit for is
trying to bring pressure on China to address its unfair trade
practices, but that will be much more effective if we are not
isolating ourselves by picking trade fights with our allies at
the same time.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Mr. Burns. Congresswoman, I would just say it is
complicated. We have always competed with the EU in trade. We
are going to have our differences, but we need to fight fairly.
The smarter play for us right now is to combine forces with
the EU and Japan and South Korea against China. The President
is fighting. I think he has made a lot of good points about
China's predatory practices. We need that EU support, and right
now we have got a divided team on our side.
I would also say, in the mid to long term, we should go
back to thinking about a U.S.-EU free trade agreement. Nine
hundred million people, the two largest democratic spaces in
the world, and the two largest economies in the world, and this
could help our economy and it could help us to confront the
predatory nature of the threat from the Chinese.
Ms. Spanberger. And given the tenor that so many of these
conversations have had related to our trade policy and related
to our engagement with our allies, what do you see the path
forward to dial back some of this aggression, to put us back on
the right path, and potentially move toward, as you said, sir,
combining forces, particularly in the face of the greater
challenge, which is China?
Mr. Burns. You know what we do not have right now is a
productive relationship between the American President and the
German Chancellor. President Obama and President Bush, George
W. Bush, both had very productive, frank relationships with
Angela Merkel. You could work things out with her because she
is the strongest leader; to a lesser extent with President
Macron of France. We do not have those relationships. The
President and the Chancellor, I am told, do not talk often. If
you do not have a conversation between the two most important
alliance leaders on trade, then you get into situations, very
unfortunate, where we are threatening a trade war.
And I think a lot of people fear, when the U.S.-China trade
war ends, that the President is going to go after the EU for
our next trade war, and that is going to hurt everything that I
think the four of us have talked about this morning. It is
going to have an impact on the military and political issues as
well.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Ms. Conley. I would just add, Congresswoman, that we do,
like in the other areas, we do have very big differences with
the European Union on a whole range of trade issues from data
privacy and protection and agriculture. We cannot shy away from
those. We have to dig into those.
But placing tariffs on steel, aluminum, threatening tariffs
on auto parts, we are self-harming ourselves. And exactly what
we should have done is create a Japan-EU-U.S. full-spectrum
approach to China on State-owned enterprises, the whole sweep
on the AI issues. We could have had a dramatic impact on
China's behavior. We just are choosing to fight our allies and
our adversaries at the same time. We need to husband our allies
and go after the same thing.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much for your time today.
And I really appreciated your comment about fighting our allies
and our adversaries at the same time. I think that is
counterproductive. And I thank you for your comments this
afternoon.
I yield back.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Representative, and thank you for
that line of questioning because, as a person in the last
Congress that cofounded the then-called TTIP Caucus, there is
no question--and I reached a great reception, as a matter of
fact, when we brought this up when we were in Europe just
recently--that if we work together, even if we are not
successful in standardizing even the majority of products we
have, we will have one-half of the world's GDP. If we really
want to be effective with China, we should deal from strength.
So, I appreciate that line of questioning. It was well received
by the leaders there. I am not unmindful of obstacles we would
have, but at least we will be going down the right road. So,
thank you.
And now, the gentleman from Mississippi, thank you for
joining us. Representative Michael Guest, welcome to the
committee, and thank you for being here.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to turn my focus just for a few minutes on NATO
spending. And I think there was, during some opening statements
made by you, Ms. Wormuth, that, currently, of the 29 NATO
countries, eight have met the 2 percent GDP, which is the NATO
spending standards that have been set, is that correct?
Ms. Wormuth. Congressman, it is actually five currently now
who are meeting the 2 percent target.
Mr. Guest. Only five?
Ms. Wormuth. That is correct.
Mr. Guest. And you said that we are on track by 2024 to
have additional countries that would meet that 2 percent GDP.
What number?
Ms. Wormuth. I think we are expecting it to be somewhere
between 14 and 15. I mean, these are projections, but it will
be a majority of the 29 members.
Mr. Guest. So, we will still have, roughly, 14 or 15 then
that do not meet that standard?
Ms. Wormuth. That is possible.
Mr. Guest. And some information that I saw--and tell me if
any of you believe this is accurate or not--but some research
said that, in 2017, the U.S. paid for over 70 percent of the
combined defense expenditures of NATO. Does that number sound
accurate to you?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, I think it is easy to mix up the math
because there's NATO common funding. There is sort of NATO
budgets, and then, there are the individual national defense
budgets. So, I am not sure which statistic that speaks to.
Mr. Guest. All right. Let me ask, I guess my question is,
since we currently have only five of 29 countries that meet
that, even in 2024, we expect only to have, roughly, half--you
believe 14 to 15--what can we do, as a Congress? I guess two
things. What can we do, and then, what should we do to make
sure that other NATO members are meeting their obligation?
Ambassador, I will start with you, and I will work down the
table from left to right.
Mr. Burns. You know, the real problem is in the parliaments
of these countries, particularly in Germany where the Bundestag
does not want to spend the money. And they have, as you know, a
surplus in their budget. So, speaking to them legislature to
legislature I think is something that our members, Republican
and Democrat, should do.
Second, there is actually no common standard to how to
measure 2 percent across the alliance. Individual allies
measure it differently. We need a clean, regular metric that
everyone can agree on. And I would say expand the 2 percent
category to include spending on cyber defense and spending on
intelligence, because some of the members, that is their
comparative advantage. That is where they could help us. And
right now, we are not counting what they are spending under 2
percent. This is a major problem, but it really has to focus on
Germany as well.
Mr. Guest. So, is what you are saying that we need to
expand the categories that we consider counting toward that 2
percent? So, we would not be putting money necessarily 2
percent GDP into soldiers and battlefield equipment, but that
money could be counted in additional spending? Is that your
suggestion?
Mr. Burns. That is a suggestion that Ambassador Lute and I
made in our recent report, and it is striking to know that
there is not a common assessment of how this is all measured.
Some countries include pensions for military veterans and some
countries do not, for instance. But cyber and intelligence,
that is very important to counter the Russian threat, which is
the most pernicious threat to NATO now.
Mr. Guest. Ms. Wormuth, do you have any suggestion what we
can do to get the majority, and ultimately all, of the
countries to that 2 percent GDP amount?
Ms. Wormuth. I do, Congressman. I think, first, we have to
continue to speak constructively and do the hard work and have
the hard conversations with our NATO allies about the
importance of meeting that target. The projection today is
that, by 2024, a majority of the 29 will get there, but we
still have time and we can work with those countries to get
more of them closer to the target. And again, that, I think,
means having those difficult conversations against a backdrop
of recognizing that we are all in this together.
Another point I would make is that 2 percent is about the
input. What is as important, if not more important, is the
output. What are we buying with that? I do not want to see our
NATO allies spend more money on their pensions and on some of
their personnel accounts. I want to see them buying new
equipment. I want to see them investing in research and
development. And I would say the NATO countries are doing
better. Part of the Wales Defense Investment Pledge was to have
20 percent of their defense budgets go to new equipment and
R&D, and several members are reaching that target.
So, I think we need to be focusing on have those hard
conversations and have conversations about what they are buying
and making sure what they are buying is useful for the alliance
and for deterring Russia and dealing with the range of other
challenges NATO faces.
Mr. Guest. Dr. Brands, do you have any suggestions?
Mr. Brands. I would endorse all this. I would also say,
``single out the high-performers for praise and recognition.''
Mr. Guest. And then, finally--I know I am about over time--
but, Ms. Conley, I will give you a chance to answer the
question.
Ms. Conley. Yes, thank you.
And I think just to pull on Dr. Brands, I mean, we need to
do more with those allies that are contributing more. More for
more, is how I would put it.
Also, appreciate that our allies provide host nation
support in the basing, and that is a contribution. Many times
when the U.S. invests in European security, there is a rebate.
NATO, through its common funds, reimburses the alliance. So, it
is not as clear and simple.
But you are absolutely right, every leader at the Wales
summit made a commitment to 2 percent to 2024. Now, like this
Congress, they could not make a commitment of funding to 2024.
They are democratically elected. But the trajectory has to be
there. The capabilities have to be there. The message has been
received, but, boy, we have to keep their feet to the fire and
accept no excuses.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going over and I yield back.
Mr. Keating. As we conclude, I just want to institute
quickly a second round, but make it more of a lightning round.
I do not know if you have planes to catch or what your
transportation issues might be, but a couple of issues just for
brief comment. And I will also give my colleagues any chance to
put those questions in the queue as well.
But we have not touched on Turkey and S-400, especially
from its NATO implications. This is very serious. I did not
want this hearing to go by without bringing up that issue
because I do think it presents a very grave threat to our
alliance if this continues. So, if you could comment on Turkey
and the possible S-400 purchases from Russia?
Ms. Wormuth. Chairman, I am very concerned about the
Turkish decision to acquire the S-400, and so concerned that I
think, frankly, we are in a position where we need to
reconsider going forward with the F-35s to Turkey. We cannot
have our planes essentially plugging into an adversary air
defense system. We have been having this conversation with
Turkey for some years now, but it feels like we are at the
tipping point. But I certainly would not be comfortable going
forward with the F-35s.
Mr. Burns. I agree with Secretary Wormuth. The statements,
recent statements, by Chairman Dunford and Supreme Allied
Commander Scaparrotti I think have been straight on target. And
that is, we cannot integrate this system into our alliance. And
so, I agree with Secretary Wormuth. If the Turks proceed with
this--and Erdogan is threatening to do that--then I think the
F-35 should be at risk. How can we have close strategic
coordination if they are importing a Russian system in the NATO
ally defenses?
Ms. Conley. Chairman, I would just argue that the S-400
picture is a symptom of a much broader and larger strategic
picture that Turkey is turning away from Euro-Atlanticism--its
approach to Venezuela, its approach to Iran, its rapprochement
with Russia, some of the instability in the Aegean Sea. This
deserves a hearing from this subcommittee to look at the
totality.
And much of NATO's containment strategic rationale was
anchoring Turkey and Greece, Euro and the Euro-Atlantic
community. This anchor is starting to push in a different
direction.
I would also argue, for the Congressman's comment, Hungary,
you need a hearing dedicated to Hungary and understanding what
is going on and whether we can maintain NATO classified
information with that country. Family first. These are
important countries. We are losing them. We have to find a
strategy and a way forward to return them to the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Mr. Keating. Great. Well, I would like to thank the
witnesses and say this has been a day of interruptions with the
roll calls, but this has been so important.
We had very good participation from the subcommittee
members running in and out. A couple of them had to leave. And
the members of the committee, those members or other members,
will have the opportunity to ask additional questions in
writing. And we ask the witnesses to please respond to those
questions. And the hearing record will be open for 10 business
days in order to receive those responses.
Mr. Keating. Thank you so much for being here. This is just
the beginning of an important journey. I think in the short
time we had to discuss this we covered so much ground, but are
left with so many more issues to pursue.
With that, I will adjourn this hearing and thank you for
your participation.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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