[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING ON H.R. 1004, PROHIBITING UNAUTHORIZED MILITARY ACTION IN
VENEZUELA ACT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-14
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE
Hon. David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Rhode Island................................................ 7
WITNESSES
Bill Chavez, Dr. Rebecca, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Inter-
American Dialogue.............................................. 14
Pearlstein, Deborah, Professor of Law and Co-Director,
Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University...................... 23
Neumann, Dr. Vanessa, President, Asymmetrica..................... 34
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 62
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 63
Hearing Attendance............................................... 64
HEARING ON H.R. 1004, PROHIBITING
UNAUTHORIZED MILITARY ACTION IN VENEZUELA ACT
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2019
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Engel. The committee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to
the length limitation in the rules.
This afternoon, the committee continues its examination of
the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, with particular focus on
legislation offered by a member of this committee, Mr. David
Cicilline of Rhode Island. That bill is H.R. 1004, the
Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act. Mr.
Cicilline will testify on this bill presently, then we will
welcome a second panel of experts.
My position on Venezuela has been clear: I believe that the
United States and our allies in the Lima Group and the European
Union must continue to squeeze Nicolas Maduro and push for a
peaceful, democratic transition. The suffering in Venezuela is
a man-made humanitarian crisis in what was once the wealthiest
country in South America. The people of Venezuela deserve far
better than what Mr. Maduro's dictatorship and his predecessor,
Mr. Chavez, have given them. And I stand with Juan Guaido as he
bravely leads his fellow citizens toward a brighter future.
At the same time, we must be clear: U.S. military
intervention to shape the future of Venezuela is not an option.
I continue to worry about the Administration's saber rattling
and constant reminders that military action remains on the
table. The Lima Group, which includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Colombia, the EU, and even my friend, former Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe, have rejected that possibility. Our
former SOUTHCOM commander, Admiral James Stavridis, has written
powerfully about the perils of U.S. military intervention in
Venezuela.
Today's hearing is to explore this issue in greater detail.
Now, I have heard arguments that we in Congress should not
debate the use of force in Venezuela, that we should wait and
see what course the President takes before we take up this
issue. I disagree. Under Article I of the Constitution,
Congress desides whether America will go to war; under Article
II, the President has the power to defend our country, but that
is not what we are talking about here.
The longer I have been in Congress, the stronger I feel
that the Congress declares whether or not we should go to war.
And, of course, we have not been doing that since 1941.
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution are clear
that it is our responsibility to consider the use of force
before any troops are introduced into hostilities. The law
requires, and I quote, the President in every possible instance
shall consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, unquote.
And the President's obligation does not end with
consultation. If he decides to deploy our military, he needs
congressional authorization before they are introduced into
hostilities.
I will be the first to admit that Congress has not done a
good job in holding administrations of both parties to the
letter of the law. We have handed over the keys for too long,
and the executive branch has left Congress in the dust. We
should not stand for it anymore, and I am not going to put off
this debate a day longer. These are the gravest decisions our
government must face, and we must do so only as the
Constitution provides.
As I have said again and again, I oppose military
intervention in Venezuela. But since the Administration keeps
raising the possibility, I want to know what would it look
like, how does the Administration see this playing out. I would
like to think after our disastrous war in Iraq, we have learned
our lesson about plunging the United States into another war
without a clear path forward. And let us not forget, Venezuela
is more than twice the size of Iraq.
Would Maduro's colectivos join with rogue elements of the
Venezuelan security forces and develop into an insurgency, what
would be the impact of such a conflict be on Colombia, a
country that has opened up its heart and homes to over a
million Venezuelan migrants? Would a government that comes to
power with the backing of the U.S. intervention have any
legitimacy in the eyes of the Venezuelan people and other
governments in the region?
These questions barely scratch the surface, which is why it
is so important that this committee deal with the serious and
weighty concerns that accompany a military intervention before
it occurs, not after it has already begun.
I would like to close with this reminder: I did not call
this hearing and Mr. Cicilline did not introduce his
legislation as a solution in search of a problem. We have a
problem when the Administration keeps telling us that the use
of force remains on the table.
Frankly, I would rather be focusing on how to support the
people of Venezuela in their struggle for a better future.
Tomorrow we will be considering three bills that would do so.
But as a coequal branch of government with key
responsibilities, dealing with questions of war and peace, we
cannot just stand here and shrug our shoulders. We cannot wait
for American servicemembers to be placed in harm's way and then
start to ask questions.
So I hope we have an instructive discussion this afternoon.
I will now yield to our ranking member, Mr. McCaul of Texas,
for any opening remarks he might have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The situation in Venezuela is really going from bad to
worse. For the past week, the country has been struggling with
nationwide energy blackouts, there are shortages of food and
medicine. Simply put, this is a result of Nicolas Maduro's
socialist policies, criminal activity, and corruption.
Over 3 million people have fled the country, with more
escaping every day. Maduro has even turned his armed thugs or
colectivos against those who are trying to deliver humanitarian
aid.
Our colleague and witness today, Congressman Cicilline,
previously stated that the Maduro regime's corruption and
negligence has devastated Venezuela's economy, starved its
people, and brought the Nation to the brink of collapse. I
could not agree more.
All clear-eyed and freedom-loving people around the world
want to see Maduro gone so free and fair elections can be held.
To make that happen, Maduro and his cronies must understand
that the best outcome for them is to step down and leave the
country peacefully. I know all of us want that as well.
However, this legislation we are discussing today jeopardizes
that outcome in several ways by appearing to take military
force off the table.
First, it immediately takes pressure off the regime with
punishing sanctions, a coalition of 54 countries supporting the
opposition, and massive protests. Maduro is feeling the heat.
We should not give him reason to breathe a sigh of relief.
Second, it would put the security of Juan Guaido and his
family in jeopardy, something I personally talked to the Vice
President about. Maduro could easily become more aggressive in
cracking down on the opposition. In fact, Ambassador Vecchio, I
talked to this morning, told me that the attorney general has
applied for a writ in the Venezuelan Supreme Court to arrest
President Guaido. This could all lead to violence and potential
casualties.
As I said just yesterday, the attorney general launched a
baseless investigation of Guaido for an alleged attack on the
power grid. So the threat is real. We should not undermine the
security of the very people we are trying to support, the
people of Venezuela.
Third, it sends the wrong signal to both our allies and
adversaries. Without the threat of military force, it will look
like we are hedging our bets. This will deflate Juan Guaido and
his supporters and embolden our enemies, Russia and Cuba. This
bill also plays right into the Maduro regime's strategy.
Just last month, in remarks at the United Nations, Maduro's
illegitimate foreign minister called on the Security Council to
reject the threat of the use of force against the Venezuelan
people.
Finally, it will show a divided Congress, something the
Ambassador has warned us about. As I said, I have personally
spoken with the Vice President and Special Representative
Elliott Abrams, and as recent as this afternoon with the
Ambassador Carlos Vecchio, who all expressed concern about
discussing this bill at this critical time. They all stress the
need for bipartisan unity.
Maduro's repeated mention of U.S. military intervention is
simply a ploy to divide the coalition of 54 countries
supporting democracy and the people of Venezuela. Opponents of
this legislation are not pushing for military actions. I for
myself am a strong believer in the sole power of Congress to
declare war under Article I of the Constitution.
I do not believe that this administration is planning to
invade Venezuela. And if it did, I would be the first to push
Congress to act. But this premature signal sends a dangerous
message at a very delicate time. The nations that support
Maduro's illegitimate regime, especially Cuba and Russia, are
the very ones carrying out the real foreign intervention.
As Secretary Pompeo recently stated, the United States is
drawing a clear line between those who aid forces of repression
and those who give life to the Venezuelan people's democratic
dreams. One immediate step we can all take here today is to
show our solidarity with the people of Venezuela and to
directly recognize interim President Juan Guaido as the
legitimate President of Venezuela just as 54 other countries
have. I strongly do and encourage my democratic colleagues to
do so today as well.
The people of Venezuela have suffered enough. They are
finally on the verge of taking their country back. Let us not
do this bill. Let us not let this bill complicate their efforts
to achieve freedom from socialist tyranny, and put an end to
this humanitarian crisis and disaster.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul.
Let me now introduce our first witness, though he is
certainly well known to all of us. David Cicilline has
represented Rhode Island's First congressional District in the
House since 2011. He is a senior member of this committee and
chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial
and Administrative Law. And he is the author of H.R. 1004, the
Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Act.
Mr. Cicilline, you are recognized to offer your testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. DAVID CICILLINE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member McCaul and distinguished colleagues on this committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to speak about my legislation, H.R.
1004, the Prohibiting Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela
Act.
I appreciate the committee's willingness to take on the
important issue of executive overreach in military engagement,
an issue that is fundamental to the constitutional role of
Congress and on which there is bipartisan agreement that
Congress must take a stronger stand in ensuring appropriate
consultation and oversight.
As we meet here this afternoon, the people of Venezuela are
suffering in darkness, literally. Millions have been without
power for days. We all agree the Maduro regime has destroyed
Venezuela's economy, starved its people, and engaged in
widespread corruption and repression. We all agree the people
of Venezuela deserve a better future, a future they determine.
We all believe the Venezuelan people have a right to pick their
leaders, a right Maduro has denied his people by refusing to
hold free and fair elections.
To be absolutely clear, Nicolas Maduro is a dictator who
does not care about the Venezuelan people. Maduro's corrupt
kleptocratic regime has left Venezuela's economy in shambles,
its people without food, and its hospitals without basic
medicines. Millions have fled this despair and oppression.
The people of Venezuela deserve better. They deserve a
democratic future. They deserve to pick their own leaders,
which is why I joined many of my colleagues in supporting the
Venezuelan National Assembly's decision to choose Juan Guaido
as the interim President of Venezuela.
It is my hope that there will be a diplomatic solution that
allows for free and fair elections in the near future, and I
believe U.S. policy should be conducted with this end in mind.
As the chairman said, we would not be here and considering this
legislation, but for the actions and words of the Trump
administration.
This administration's rhetoric implying that they are
willing to use military force in Venezuela is unfortunate. Not
only would military intervention be illegal; it would also come
with serious consequences that I fear would not only hurt the
Venezuelan people, but also the prospect for democracy.
Under the Constitution and War Powers Act, the President
may not take unilateral military action and must consult with
and receive authorization from Congress. As Special
Representative Elliott Abrams confirmed when he was testifying
here before this committee, the conditions for unilateral
Presidential military action have not been met. Congress has
not declared war on Venezuela. There is not any existing
statutory authorization that would allow for military
intervention in Venezuela. And Venezuela has not attacked the
United States, its territories or possessions or its Armed
Forces.
That is why I introduced this legislation, which would
simply prohibit funds from being spent on any unauthorized
military engagement in Venezuela. Although the Administration
is well aware they do not have proper authorization to engage
in a military action in Venezuela, they have continued the
drumbeat of aggressive saber rattling rhetoric promoting
military intervention as an option.
We know from the past they have not seen the need to seek
proper congressional approval for military intervention when
they took action against the Assad regime in Syria without
proper authorization. In my view, military action in Venezuela
is not an option, not without congressional authorization.
To be clear, nothing in this bill prevents military action
against or in Venezuela or anywhere else. It simply prohibits
funds to be used for unauthorized military action in Venezuela.
Should the situation in Venezuela pose an imminent threat to
American national security, nothing in this bill stops the
Administration or any administration from seeking authority
from Congress for military intervention per the War Powers Act.
However, without meeting the conditions under the War
Powers Act, any U.S. military action with respect to Venezuela
would be illegal and ill-advised. Americans do not want another
foreign military engagement, and the Administration has not
made any case for military intervention in Venezuela.
The United States must continue to work with the Lima
Group, Europeans, and the international community to use
diplomatic and economic tools to pressure Maduro to honor the
will of his people. Humanitarian aid must be allowed into the
country to aid the suffering Venezuelan people. Congress should
do everything in its power to support a peaceful, truly
democratic transition of power in Venezuela.
The Constitution gave Congress, not the executive branch,
the power to determine when the United States goes to war. And
it is time we assert our constitutional duty and send a clear
message that without congressional authorization, this
administration or any administration cannot take the country to
war unilaterally.
It is also worth noting that many foreign policy experts
have noted that Maduro uses the threat of military action in
his propaganda campaign to try to say in power. I am sensitive
to the arguments that my colleagues may make that the timing is
sensitive and we do not want to do anything to seem like we are
supporting a dictator. While I appreciate the sincerity of my
colleagues' arguments, I have to say, when will the timing of
military intervention not be sensitive?
We are 18 years into war in Afghanistan, 16 years in Iraq,
engaged in various ways in numerous engagements elsewhere, and
yet Congress has never found time to reassert our control over
military engagement. It is also important to note that the
absence of congressional action sends its own message. The time
for Congress to weigh in is now.
I am thankful to the more than 50 bipartisan cosponsors,
many of them members of this committee who are supporting this
bill. I want to thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member
McCaul, for how holding this important hearing and for
considering this piece of legislation. And I look forward to
the committee holding a markup and passing this legislation in
the near future. And I thank you again.
[The statement of Mr. Cicilline follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline.
We will now pause to allow our second panel of witnesses to
take their seats.
Chairman Engel. Well, good afternoon. Let me welcome our
witnesses. Dr. Rebecca Bill Chavez is a nonresident senior
fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue. She previously served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, from 2013 until 2017, as a senior advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on Latin America. Dr. Chavez focused on
supporting the Colombian Ministry of Defense's role in the FARC
peace process, increasing Mexico's commitment to regional
security cooperation, and shaping DoD contributions to
President Obama's Central American strategy.
Dr. Vanessa Neumann is the founder and president of
Asymmetrica, a consultancy on political risk and strategies to
dismantle illegal trade. She served for 4 years at the OECD,
where she worked on the task force on countering illicit trade.
Dr. Neumann has been published in The Wall Street Journal, the
Guardian, and is an author of the 2017 book, ``Blood Profits:
How American Consumers Unwittingly Fund Terrorists.''
And to introduce our third witness, I will yield to Mr.
Espaillat of New York.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
Before I do that, I just want to acknowledge an 8th grade
class here from Harlem Academy that I met outside of the
hearing room, Mr. Chairman.
I spoke to them a little bit about Venezuela, and they seem
to know a little bit more than many of us here, so maybe they
have a bright future.
But I am proud to introduce Professor Deborah Pearlstein, a
professor of constitutional international law at Cardozo Law
School, a part of Yeshiva University, whose main campus is
right in the middle of my district. A leading voice on law and
counterterrorism, Professor Pearlstein has held positions at
Princeton, Georgetown, and the University of Pennsylvania. She
also currently serves on the editorial board of the Journal of
National Security Law and Policy.
Professor Pearlstein has researched, written, litigated,
and advocated extensively on the human rights impact of the
U.S. National Security Policy and U.S. detention and
interrogation operations. And from 2003 to 2007, she served as
the founding director of the law and security program at Human
Rights First. Throughout her tenure, Professor Pearlstein
worked closely with members of the defense and intelligence
community, including helping to bring together retired military
leaders to address key policy challenges in U.S.
counterterrorism operations.
Thank you for your time this morning, Professor, and
welcome.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
I will now recognize our witnesses to offer their opening
comments. Why do not we start with you, Dr. Chavez.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, PH.D., NON-RESIDENT SENIOR
FELLOW, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Ms. Chavez. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
potential U.S. military intervention in Venezuela. And thank
you also for your bipartisan commitment to maintaining focus on
Venezuela and to helping resolve the crisis there.
My name is Rebecca Bill Chavez. I am a senior fellow at the
Inter-American Dialogue. From 2013 until January 2017, I served
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western
Hemisphere, where I oversaw U.S. defense policy in the
hemisphere. Before that, I was a tenured professor of political
science at the U.S. Naval Academy.
I am deeply troubled by the humanitarian crisis and the
unraveling of democracy under Nicolas Maduro, a brutal and
corrupt dictator. And I want to be clear here, Maduro stands at
the center of Venezuela's manmade disaster. He has followed
Hugo Chavez' footsteps by systematically dismantling democratic
institutions and shamelessly violating human rights.
The U.S. has a role in resolving the impasse, but the
question today is whether the U.S. should use military force to
remove Maduro from power. My answer is no. I will highlight two
reasons for this.
First, military intervention would be much more difficult
than many believe. It would not be quick, and it would involve
engagement with the Venezuelan military, armed civilians, and
non-State actors.
Second, international pressure via regional partners and
European allies is one of our most important tools. We will
squander that partnership if we continue to threaten military
intervention and much more so if we do intervene militarily in
Venezuela. We also risk losing the trust so painstakingly built
in the region over the past couple of decades.
There have been many references to the 1989 invasion of
Panama as a potential template. This comparison is very
misguided. At the time of Operation Just Cause, SOUTHCOM was
headquartered in Panama, so logistics and intel collection were
relatively easy. The conflict lasted less than 2 weeks and
required 24,000 U.S. troops.
Venezuela is a mountainous country, twice the size of Iraq,
with multiple urban centers, which would mean thousands of
civilian casualties. An invasion would likely require between
100,000 and 150,000 U.S. troops, four to six times the number
needed in Panama. In Panama, U.S. Forces had to contend with
4,000 Panamanian combat troops. The Venezuelan military is
comprised of 356,000 members. And, unfortunately, defections
have not been on the scale that we had hoped.
Maduro has deftly used both carrots and sticks to ensure
military loyalty. Chavez' practice of purging anyone seen as a
threat has continued under Maduro. On the carrot side, Maduro
gave officers control over food distribution, a lucrative black
market. Promotions have been given for loyalty, which is why
there are over 2,000 generals in Venezuela. But the military
would not be the only challenge.
Our troops would face an insurgency comprised of armed
groups, such as the violent colectivos, and nonState actors
with access to funding through drug trafficking, illegal
mining, and extortion. Even Colombian ELN guerillas and
dissident FARC members would have incentives to join the fight,
and the conflict would certainly spill over into Colombia,
adding to Colombia's challenges as it struggles to implement
the 2016 Peace Accord.
Another consequence would be the unraveling of the hard
fought regional and international consensus that has
marginalized Maduro. The vast majority of our partners have
unequivocally stated their opposition to military intervention,
including Lima Group members Colombia and Brazil. A military
intervention would set us back at a time when China and Russia
are gaining influence in the region.
For these reasons, it is critical that Congress play a role
in any decision to intervene militarily in Venezuela.
Congressman Cicilline's proposed legislation would help
accomplish that goal.
Thank you again for shining a light on what is happening in
Venezuela. I would be more than happy to assist the committee
as it formulates policy approaches to address the ongoing
tragedy in Venezuela.
[The statement of Ms. Chavez follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Dr. Chavez.
Ms. Pearlstein.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, PROFESSOR OF LAW AND CO-
DIRECTOR, FLOERSHEIMER CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, YESHIVA UNIVERSITY
Ms. Pearlstein. Thank you very much.
Chairman Engel. If you can pull the mike a little closer.
Is the button pushed?
Ms. Pearlstein. Thank you. Is this better?
Chairman Engel. Yes.
Ms. Pearlstein. Thank you very much, Chairman Engel and
Ranking Member McCaul and the members of the committee. Thank
you for giving me the opportunity to discuss legal issues
surrounding H.R. 1004, a bill to restrict Federal funding for
the introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities in Venezuela.
As I teach my first-year students in constitutional law, a
few things were as clear in the documents designed, is the
expectation that Congress would play a central role in our
democracy and defining the purpose and regulating the use of
U.S. military power, most importantly, when it comes to the
introduction of U.S. Forces into hostilities. This allocation
of responsibility was made evident throughout the
Constitution's text and structure and was unmistakable in the
Framers' intent. As James Madison put it, in no part of the
Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the claws which
confides the question of war or peace to the legislature and
not to the executive. The trust and the temptation, Madison
said, would be too great for any one man.
While the past half century or so Presidential practices at
times have obscured that design, it has not changed two key
propositions of Constitutional law that I would like to
highlight in these few minutes.
First, Congress enjoys exclusive power under the
Constitution over the expenditure of Federal funds. Congress
holds not only sweeping spending authority under Article I,
Section 8, to provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States, but also authority directed
toward spending for the military, particularly, including the
power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a
Navy, and of course, declare war.
Of equal significance is the parallel requirement in the
Constitution in Article I, Section 9, providing that no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of
appropriations made by law. As reflected in these and other
provisions, Congress' power in the purse is among our
democracy's most fundamental checks on the exercise of
executive power.
H.R. 1004 is an unremarkable exercise of Congress' power in
this respect under Article I of the Constitution. The bill, as
drafted, is consistent with many such appropriations
restrictions Congress has enacted in the past, restricting the
actions of Republican and Democratic Presidents alike, and is
limited by its terms to preserve the United States' ability to
respond in self-defense to armed attacks.
Second, while there has long been a debate among
constitutional law scholars and others about the scope of the
President's power under Article II of the Constitution, to use
force in the absence of congressional authorization. There is
far less debate on the effect on the President's power of an
express congressional prohibition.
As has been clear since Justice Jackson set the framework
for evaluating questions and executive power in the steel
seizure case, a framework the court justices of both parties
continue to embrace vigorously today, the scope of the
President's power under Article II of the Constitution depends
first and foremost on the position of Congress. When the
President takes steps incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, whatever independent constitutional
power he possesses, is at its lowest ebb.
At this lowest ebb, the President's claim to any power to
act in the face of a congressional prohibition must be
scrutinized with caution, the court wrote, for what is at stake
is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
This is an equilibrium, in my view, that ensures the President
is bound by the duly enacted laws of the United States.
This equilibrium is far from altered in the realm of
foreign affairs. On the contrary, Congress' full engagement is
critical in ensuring that the activities of America's military
enjoy the full support of America's people. As the Supreme
Court emphasized only recently, the executive is not free from
the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because
foreign affairs are at issue. It is not for the President alone
to determine the whole content of the Nation's foreign policy.
While the President can rightly argue that he has the
independent constitutional duty to repel sudden attacks against
the United States, I do not think 1004 can be read to infringe
on the President's power in this respect. The bill exempts from
its coverage circumstances in which it may be necessary for the
armed forces to respond to attacks on U.S. Forces or on the
United States. And were there any doubt in this regard,
longstanding principles of statutory construction require that
a court facing a statute of ambiguous meaning prefer a reading
of this statute that avoids any constitutional question.
The Framers knew acutely, personally, what war could cost
republics, so they built in a series of hurdles. The
Constitution would require Congress to publicly authorize
military expenditures in the face of their constituents every 2
years. The Armed Forces would be manned, the idea was, by the
citizen soldier, one incapable of acting inconsistent with the
will of the people of which he and she were part. And a
majority of the country's elected representatives would be
required to approve any decision to commit the country to war.
Fast forward two centuries, and all of those checks have
been disabled. What we spend on military action is at times
obscure to the public by vast sums spent on private
contractors. Just half of 1 percent of Americans serve in the
military. We are a Nation, according to poll results, in which
80 percent of Americas support the troops. But during the
height of the war in Afghanistan, 90 percent of Americans were
unable to locate Afghanistan on a map.
Today, Congress is one of the last nominally operating
checks on the President's power in this regard. I am enormously
grateful for this committee's decision to engage it. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Pearlstein follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Dr. Neumann.
STATEMENT OF VANESSA NEUMANN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, ASYMMETRICA
Ms. Neumann. Thank you. Thank you very much. We had--there
are some visuals, I do not know what the protocol is, they have
been entered as the exhibits.
To my credentials already presented--and it is Dr. Neumann,
by the way. Thank you for having me very much, members of the
committee, for inviting me to testify here today, but more
broadly, for your concern for my beloved Venezuela.
As you know, I am an Venezuelan American. I hold both
passports. And I am a long-time vociferous advocate for
Venezuela's return to democracy. To my credentials already
presented, I would only add, I am also a fellow at Yale
University's Global Justice Program. My company, Asymmetrica,
is part of the research network for the U.N. Security Council's
Counterterrorism Executive Directorate, CTED. I worked
reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia, which is why I am
also the academic reviewer for U.S. Special Operation Command's
teaching manual on counterinsurgency in Colombia.
My doctoral dissertation in 2004 from Colombia University
was specifically about--it is entitled, The Autonomy and
Legitimacy of States: A Critical Approach to Foreign
Intervention. And it is ironic to me that it is now directly on
point to my home country 15 years after its publication.
In many ways, Venezuela is already suffering from war. The
functions of State have been captured by a serious
transnational criminal organization that provides safe haven
and financing for terrorists, actively bombing their neighbors,
as the ELN did a month ago to the Colombian police academy. It
is the main transit point for cocaine into the rest of the
world, destabilizing Central America, and therefore our
southern border, all while wresting territorial control from a
legitimate government, and intentionally murdering Venezuelan
citizens.
On February 23, Maduro used armed gangs to blockade the
entry of humanitarian aid and shoot to kill unarmed civilians
carrying food to their starving relatives. On the border with
Brazil they massacred the Pemon tribe. On March 11, the
dictator Maduro went on national television ordering armed
gangs to slaughter the people. This is what Third Sergeant
Miguel Torrosa warned us of when he crossed a bridge into
Colombia on February 22. ``Maduro wants to slaughter the
people,'' he shouted. The dictatorship certainly seemed happy
to let us starve and die of treatable disease.
For me, the paradigmatic case is of the woman who took her
19-year-old daughter who was dying of starvation to a hospital
that was closed because of the first night of blackouts. The
child died, and she roamed the streets carrying her 19-year-old
child's body that weighed 10 kilos, that is 22 pounds. It is
the perfect storm of nightmares.
It has worst inflation than any war zone, about to hit 10
million percent in 2019; a higher infant mortality rate than
Syria. More than 330,000 people have been killed by violence
under the Bolivarian Revolution. 18.7 million Venezuelans are
losing weight rapidly, 25 pounds in the past year. That means
we are facing a massive starvation that rivals that of
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Darfur, but in our hemisphere. And
according to Gallup 2018 Global Law and Order, Venezuela is the
least safe country in which to live. It is no wonder that
Venezuelans are leaving in droves.
At 3.4 million, Venezuela is the second largest refugee
population in the world, second only to Syria. There are more
Venezuelan refugees than South Sudanese, Somalis, or Afghans.
Before the pervasive blackouts caused by the greatest
kleptocracy the world has ever seen, the U.N. And the OAS
estimated that 2 million more Venezuelans would flee this year
alone, making the total refugee to 5.4 million. And Brookings
and the OAS estimate that that would be 7.2 million refugees by
the end of 2020. That would absolutely destabilize the entire
hemisphere. Now, that was before the lights went out and before
we ran out of gasoline, which is happening now. We can easily
anticipate that we will skyrocket past those horrific
projections.
Such a massive and rapid exodus will also mean that they
would destabilize the hemisphere. People will look for
employment that could well be provided by the ELN, FARC, or
even ISIS in Trinidad and Tobago, which has alarming rates of
recruitment. And there recruitment patterns are very different
from what we have seen in Europe and North Africa. They are
better suited to the profiles of Venezuelan refugees.
If we have learned something from our past experience with
ISIS, is that when gasoline is a rare and precious commodity,
as it is now becoming in Venezuelan, armed groups make those
forward operating bases. Venezuela has 960 political prisoners.
The catastrophic state of repression and chaos is entirely
predictable and part of regime policy.
In the 19th century, Immanuel Kant in his Metaphysical
Elements of Justice argued that one of the results of
globalization is not just of money and information, but also of
responsibility. Let us meet that responsibility. Rid our region
of our greatest threat, restore the dignity and freedom of
millions of Venezuelans who were once our close friends. Let us
find a path back to democracy and friendship and cooperation
and not hand a dictator a carte blanche for further slaughter
of our only democratic forces and your friends with a
legislation that is unnecessary and serves only to plunge my
people's misery in DC partisan politics. The Venezuelan crisis
has been a source of bipartisan cooperation. Thirty-two million
of us need you to keep it that way.
I thank the committee for its time in letting me speak here
today and for its concern for Venezuela. I remain at your
service as you develop policies that will be productive for
both my countries. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Neumann follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. I thank you, Dr. Neumann.
Let me ask Dr. Chavez a question. Let me ask you about the
position of the Colombian Government on military intervention
in Venezuela. Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, a friend
with whom I worked closely when he was head of State and I was
chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee between 2006 and
2010--President Uribe is certainly no dove, yet he was crystal
clear last month that military intervention in Venezuela must
not be an option. And the current President of Colombia, Ivan
Duque, signed his government on to the February 25 declaration
of the Lima Group, which also included major countries in the
Americas like Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, stating that a
transition to democracy, and I quote, ``must be conducted by
Venezuelans themselves peacefully and within the framework of
the constitution and international law supported by political
and diplomatic means without the use of force'', unquote.
My feeling is that Colombia has more at stake in the
Venezuela crisis than any other country. And the Colombian
people have opened up their hearts and homes to over 1 million
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
So let me ask you, Dr. Chavez, why do you think President
Duque and former President Uribe have been so adamant in
rejecting any type of military intervention in Venezuela? What
is at stake for Colombia?
Ms. Chavez. Thank you for the question. I think it is
really important to note, as you did, that Colombia is the
country--arguably the country that is most impacted by the
refugee crisis in the region. I think the current number, it is
at 1.2 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants are in
Colombia.
And as you said, President Ivan Duque, as well as former
President Uribe, have unequivocally stated their opposition to
military intervention. This is because military intervention in
Venezuela would destabilize Colombia when it is already--it is
a very precarious moment for Colombia.
The low-intensity conflict that I described in my remarks
and in my written statement would certainly spill over into
Colombia, undermining the 2016 Peace Accord and the delicate
PDR process. And it would make consolidation of control over
the Colombian territory even more difficult.
Dissident FARC members as well as ELN guerillas, and then
there are the BACRIMs, the armed criminal bands in Colombia,
would likely join the struggle. I think their numbers are
currently--there is 1,500 to 2,000 FARC members that have
refused to disarm; they would definitely be part this of. And
we have to remember that the border between the two countries,
that is 1,400 miles long and it is very porous, so spillover is
inevitable.
Chairman Engel. Professor Pearlstein, in your testimony,
you explained why enacting H.R. 1004 would be a constitutional
assertion of congressional war power. In my view, Congress'
role as a check on the President's use of military force, has
been diminished over the years, and we are no longer really
fulfilling the role the Framers of the Constitution intended.
Do you have any recommendations for steps Congress could
take to reassert its constitutional role in decisions over
America's use of military force, not just in Venezuela, but in
other contexts as well?
Ms. Pearlstein. Certainly. And thank you for the question.
To be clear, I think 1004 is supported by multiple facets of
congressional power under Article I, Section 8, not just the
declare war power. But in terms of additional steps that
Congress could take in this context and beyond this context to
reassert its role as a coequal branch, I think there are
several.
One, and this is an initiative that I know Senator Kaine
has worked on and others on the Senate side, there are what he
would call zombie authorizations for the use of military force,
not just the 2001 authorization for the use of military force
that authorized the invasion of Afghanistan. The 2002
authorization for the use of military force that authorized the
initial invasion of Iraq, and there are actually a number of
others on the books. Authorizations that have long outlived
their purpose, but are nonetheless still sitting on the books
that any President might at any time invoke as a source of
statutory authority for the use of force. Repealing the zombie
AUMFs would be an important first step.
A second step that comes to mind, just this week, the
President made a decision to rescind an Obama-era order that
had required the reporting of civilian casualties in areas
outside of active hostilities, not only casualties that are as
a result of military activities, but CIA activities as well.
Congress could easily restore those reporting requirements.
Congress can frequently, and I think more frequently than it
does, use the power of the purse that it is trying to do here
to restrict and guide the President's exercise of authority
where it does believe that the use of force is possible.
And then, of course, there is the 2001 authorization for
the use of military force, the statute that has now been on the
books for nearly 18 years that has justified or been used to
justify now by three different Presidents, use of military
force in well over a half dozen different countries all over
the world. It is possible, and there are variety of ways to do
this, to clarify, limit sunset, and in other ways constrain the
exercise of the President's authority over this way outdated
authorization for the use of military force that it is, in my
view, past time for Congress to revisit.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just first say at the outset that I think you and I,
and I think I speak for pretty much every member of this
committee, clearly believe that Article I of the Constitution
gives Congress the authority to declare war. And the Founding
Fathers thought that constitutional democracies would never go
to war with each other, which why they gave Congress that
authority, I believe.
If the President were to commit troops in Venezuela, I
would be the first member to call upon you, Mr. Chairman, to
hold a hearing for unauthorized use of military force, but that
is not where we are today. This is a premature--premature bill
that takes all options off the table.
Anybody that has ever negotiated in the State Department
knows that you need all options on the table to achieve results
so the diplomats can do their job. That is what the diplomats
have asked of me, not only of the U.S. Government, but the
legitimate President Guaido's administration.
So, Dr. Neumann, let me first say that I believe you speak
for those millions of Venezuelans who are oppressed and
starving and dying. I want to thank you for your courage to
come forward before the Congress. President Guaido has clearly
stated his support for the use of--or the threat of the use of
military force against Maduro. I believe it is the one thing
keeping him alive today.
In your opinion, what impact does this debate and this
legislation have on the life and safety of President Guaido and
others who are risking their lives on the ground as we speak?
Ms. Neumann. Thank you so much for having me again, and
thank you for your kind words. I can only hope or be honored
enough to represent my fellow compatriots, many of whom have--
some people who are here in the audience today have been
tortured by the Maduro regime. I am not--it is not for me to
identify them, those are private matters, but there are
several. And I have had my own address posted online by
Chavez', claiming I was out to have him assassinated. That was
back in late 2011. Fortunately, he got my address wrong. After
I accused him of being--funding--being in cahoots with money
laundering for Hezbollah, and it turned out I was right,
because I then went to Lebanon to go see for myself.
So the impact that it would have is terrible because it
gives Maduro something to hold up to say that even--even the
gringos, you know, do not agree with this, that there is
division. That even within the Empire, which is--these are the
words he likes to use--have people who side with him and see
the beauty of the Bolivarian Revolution. And we will see--and
for us he will take it that they would understand, ``you would
be entangled in domestic wranglings. These people are thugs.
All they understand is force.''
If they think that there is no force coming or no force
possible, I firmly believe that he will view it as carte
blanche to continue to slaughter us and possibly take Guaido
and other people who support him and work with him, and that
would be the utter devastation of the last vestige of democracy
in my country. These are also some of my friends, so it is a
deeply felt matter as well as a moral duty.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Dr. Neumann, let me ask you one more question.
Fifty-four countries have now recognized the interim President
Guaido as the legitimate President of Venezuela today. How
important is it, in your opinion, that the U.S. Congress also
make that same recognition?
Ms. Neumann. It is hugely important. I actually cannot
think of a way to overstate its importance, because we need the
United States to stand behind us. We understand that the United
States is part of a broader coalition. We want a broader
coalition. It is very important. But the moral standing of the
United States, it is well-known that the United States has a
complicated relationship with Latin America. The best book on
the subject was actually written by a Venezuelan, called The
Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United
States.'' However, it has always been a beacon of some north,
and we have already been intervened and invaded. We continue to
send oil to Cuba, literally over the bodies of my compatriots.
So the importance of consistency and coherence and
leadership by the United States, which is our north, in this
issue of human rights and democracy, we welcome the opportunity
for the United States to take up that role and that mantle
again.
My own family were refugees from the Nazis and then the
Soviets and into Venezuela. And now, of course, we have the
Maduro regime. We have always looked to the United States for
support and guidance on these moral issues.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Neumann, for your powerful
testimony.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
to our speakers today.
You know, today, the Venezuelan people are suffering under
a crisis caused by authoritarian leader, Nicolas Maduro. Since
Maduro came to power in 2013, he has consistently repressed
human rights and caused an economic collapse that has left 90
percent of Venezuela in poverty and forced over 3 million
Venezuelans to leave the country.
A week ago, I chaired a hearing in the Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, examining the
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. One key takeaway from our
hearing was that the U.S. should follow the lead of our allies
in the Lima Group in pursuing a regional solution to this
crisis. After many years of disagreement, there is now
consensus in the region that Maduro is an illegitimate
president, and new elections must be called.
It also came through in our hearing that the U.S. should
convey solidarity with the people of Venezuela who have shown
incredible resilience in the face of a brutal authoritarian
regime. I believe we in Congress should be unified in
condemning the Maduro regime, expressing our full support for
the interim government of Juan Guaido, and calling for free and
fair election as soon as possible.
It is important that while we conduct the appropriate and
necessary oversight of this administration, we never lose sight
of who caused the manmade crisis. I encourage my colleagues to
make every effort to call out Maduro and his thugs for who they
really are as we consider next steps to support the Venezuelan
people.
I have been following the Venezuela issue very closely for
many years, and I have seen how Maduro has repeatedly called
for dialog. Each time he merely used it as a stalling tactic to
weaken the political opposition. That said, I do not feel that
military intervention is the answer to this problem. It is not
the way to bring democracy back to Venezuela. The Venezuelan
people and governments throughout the region have all been loud
and clear in calling for a peaceful, civilian-led solution to
this crisis.
But in pressing for a peaceful transition to democracy, we
need to be careful not to play into Maduro's tactics for self-
preservation. I firmly belief that in this battle between
democracy and dictatorship, we must stand on the side of the
Venezuelan people who are clearly demanding change.
So with this goal in mind of free and fair elections in
Venezuela, I want to ask Dr. Chavez, can you talk about what
steps the Administration could take to further coordinate its
diplomatic and humanitarian responses with the allies in Latin
America?
Ms. Chavez. Thank you for the question. So I think you are
touching on two issues that are both very important. One is the
delivery of humanitarian assistance, which I will get to a
second. The first, though, I think is about the role of dialog
and working in a multilateral fashion.
So I do agree, I think there have been, in the past, I
think three major attempts at negotiation with Maduro, and in
all cases he used them to buy time, basically. However, I think
that there is a new opportunity now with the International
Contact Group, which was created in early February, to push--
you know, with the sole purpose of pushing for new elections
and also for delivering humanitarian aid.
It has been very active behind the scenes as sort of a
shuttle diplomacy, discrete meetings with Maduro--with the
Maduro regime, with the opposition, and also with civil society
members. I think we should continue to encourage that.
The other thing that I think is very important about this
new effort at dialog is that it includes preconditions, which
is something that the other dialog's previous attempts did not.
You are right about the Lima Group. I think we need to
continue to let it take this leadership position to find
diplomatic solution. And I do not think we should underestimate
the fact that the Lima Group actually exists and has been so
outspoken and has taken a front seat, given the very hands-off
approach that we saw from the Latin American countries until
2017. And I also think that OAS, under Luis Almagro's
leadership, has also had a lot of potential and is having
impact.
As far as the delivery of humanitarian assistance, I think
it is very important that we, as much as we can, we
depoliticize it, which would mean the U.S. and other donors
turning--at least taking a lower profile and turning to a more
neutral organization, such as the U.N. or the International Red
Cross, or even local NGO's that are ready and standing by to
support the delivery of humanitarian assistance into the
country.
Mr. Sires. My time is up. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline [presiding]. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Yoho, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
panelists here.
Dr. Chavez, what form of official government does Venezuela
have that is recognized? What is the form of it? Or, Dr.
Pearlstein, whichever one wants to answer that. Go ahead.
Ms. Chavez. So the current under Maduro, it is not a----
Mr. Yoho. No, what is it recognized as? If you look it up,
what form of government does it have?
Ms. Chavez. It is a dictatorship.
Mr. Yoho. It is registered as a Presidential constitutional
republic is what it is registered as.
Ms. Chavez. Right.
Mr. Yoho. And that is what is recognized in the world. But
as you pointed out, that is not what is being practiced, right?
Were the last elections fair?
Ms. Chavez. No. So, first of all, Maduro was Chavez's
handpicked successor.
Mr. Yoho. OK. So we are all in agreement with that. The
Venezuelan Government, or the Constitution, allows for Juan
Guaido to claim the Presidency, does it not, if we go by the
Constitution?
Ms. Chavez. So----
Mr. Yoho. Their Constitution.
Ms. Chavez. So actually, the Constitution, the Venezuelan
Constitution, does not really address the possibility that
something like this--that this would happen. However, because
the National Assembly is really the only----
Mr. Yoho. The National Assembly----
Ms. Chavez [continuing]. Democratic institution and Juan
Guaido is president of the National Assembly, it makes--I mean,
it is appropriate that he is interim president.
Mr. Yoho. OK. Does anybody have a different opinion? Dr.
Neumann?
Ms. Neumann. Yes, I am sorry. It actually is entirely
foreseen in the Constitution, which was actually drafted and
passed in 1999, that would be under Hugo Chavez. So Juan Guaido
is the interim president of Venezuela, under the Constitution
that is supposed to be defended by the dictatorship.
Ironically, it is the Guaido side that is defending the
Constitution. It entirely foresees that if the position is
vacated because the election is not recognized, as it was not
at the time by more than 60 countries in the world, and the
Venezuelan National Assembly, then it is vacant. And then it
falls to the President of the National Assembly. That is
written in the Constitution.
Mr. Yoho. That was my understanding. We met with the
Ambassador Vecchio and we talked about that. The research I did
says that there are approximately 65 countries that recognize
Juan Guaido as the legitimate president. That is about a third
of the world's countries. You know, of 195 countries,
approximately about a third of them recognize Juan Guaido.
And then you have Maduro, who, as you said, is a dictator.
There are roughly 33 million people. There has been blackouts.
It is one of the richest countries, resource-wise, that they
have plundered. And they have stolen over $11 billion worth of
petroleum revenues from and robbed them from the Venezuelan
people.
So now, as you pointed out, there is a third of the
population has lost over 25 pounds. There is rampant debt.
There is starvation. Maduro is stopping the humanitarian crisis
there. And, you know, and I cannot fathom this, but it is like
a 1.3 million percent inflation. Now, I cannot imagine anything
getting any worse, but if we do nothing, it will be worse.
And, Dr. Chavez, you were talking about, you know--and I
agree with David, my colleague here, Mr. Cicilline, about
interfering in there, that it may destabilize that area. But I
would argue it is destabilized now. And the 14,000 FARC
members, they are going to destabilize anyways, whether we are
there or not.
And I agree with the sentiment that I would rather have an
AUMF authorized by Congress, but to argue now at this point is
going to jeopardize the legitimate president that is recognized
by their Constitution and the National Assembly.
And, you know, let me ask you this: What countries are
there helping Maduro? What government or other countries are
helping Maduro, propping him up? Dr. Neumann? You raised your
hand first.
Ms. Neumann. I like to raise my hand.
Well, Russia, Cuba, China, Iran, but all in different ways
and----
Mr. Yoho. And Turkey. I am about out of time. What
countries are there helping the Venezuelan people?
Ms. Neumann. Well----
Mr. Yoho. Let me ask Ms. Pearlstein.
Ms. Neumann. None really. The U.S. has the food at the
border. That is the closest we have come.
Mr. Yoho. Other than Colombia?
Ms. Pearlstein. I am an expert in U.S. Constitutional law,
not international law.
Mr. Yoho. Dr. Chavez, other than Colombia, are there any
other countries helping them, helping the Venezuelan people?
Ms. Chavez. I think that there are 54 countries have
declared their support for Guaido.
Mr. Yoho. Right. But Colombia is the only one, because all
those people are going into Colombia right now.
Ms. Chavez. Well, actually, Colombia is not the only one
country that is----
Mr. Yoho. I will take--it is probably the largest country.
The point is----
Ms. Chavez. Other countries have accepted, for example,
800,000. I mean, I just want to emphasize----
Mr. Yoho. I stand corrected.
Ms. Chavez [continuing]. It is not just Colombia.
Mr. Yoho. And my chairman is gaveling me, so I have to
stop, but I think to pull that AUMF right now is going to
jeopardize the Venezuelan people, and you will see Mr. Guaido
go to prison or worse.
I yield back.
Mr. Cicilline [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. He yields
back. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. I want to start with
you, Ms. Pearlstein, as an expert in this area. I think
actually in your written testimony, you said there is nothing
remarkable--H.R. 1004 is an unremarkable and constitutional
assertion of a congressional power to restrict the introduction
of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.
I would normally maybe not appreciate my legislation being
considered unremarkable, but I think you make a really
important point, that this legislation is really reflecting the
constitutional requirement that before men and women of the
Armed Forces are deployed in hostilities, that it requires
congressional authorization. And the only remarkable thing,
frankly, has been that it has happened so often without
congressional authorization. And that is really the point to
Dr. Neumann's comment about it, you know, being a partisan
divide.
One of the things we can do to the world is continue to act
like a democracy, and let people see real debate and respect
for rule of law, and a Constitution that, by its terms,
requires congressional action. And when a President, not a
dictator, is what we have in America, says he is going to use
force without coming to Congress that we ought to speak out
against that. And so I just wonder if I have gotten that right?
Ms. Pearlstein. I think you have it exactly right, sir. I
would just note, sort of historically, there has been this
perfect catch-22 that Congress has designed to explain its
inaction generally, or its lack of action generally in this
area. And it is in the firsthand, right? Well, it would be
premature to act now because we do not want to tie the
President's hands, which makes sense; but it is invariably
coupled with the second part of the argument, which is, once a
President has acted, Congress regularly says, we do not want to
act now, so as to undermine the initiative of the President, or
undermine and, indeed, endanger our troops overseas.
And the effect of that invariable coupling of rationales
has been inaction, sort of, permanently. The good news is
Congress is capable of sending more than one message at once,
and Congress is equally capable of acting on more than one
occasion as circumstances evolve.
So it seems to me entirely plausible and, indeed, possible,
based on the sort of bipartisan sense of the room, that
Congress may legislate to condemn the actions of their current
leader, to decry the gross violations of human rights that are
going on there, and, at the same time, to make clear that in a
democracy, we are going to follow the rule of law.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And that is why this legislation
is actually bipartisan, I think, for precisely that reason. We
all acknowledge the horrors of what is happening in Venezuela.
I said that during my testimony. The real question before this
committee is whether or not this declaration by Congress that
the use of force is not authorized without congressional action
is helpful or not.
And, Dr. Chavez, I want to ask you, you say in your written
testimony and you said it again in your oral testimony, that we
would squander the goodwill and partnership if we continue to
threaten military action.
Would you speak a little bit about what you mean by that?
Because I have heard from a number of people that we have to be
conscious of our history in the region, and what we have done
to repair America's standing in that region, and what the
repeated threats of military action might do to undermine our
effectiveness as a partner?
Ms. Chavez. Sure. Well, first of all, I do want to
acknowledge and applaud the Administration for the multilateral
work that it is--especially working closely with the Lima Group
and the European Union. But the threats, I think, are
actually--there are a number of reasons that I think they are
counterproductive.
One is the reason that you are referencing, that this
continued saber rattling is going to hinder our ability to act
multilaterally with our allies. It undermines the consensus.
One of the beautiful things that has happened is that there is
consensus. Again, this is unprecedented for such outspoken
consensus in the region with the United States. And the
consensus is that a negotiated solution is the best option.
Things like a tweet that glorifies past military
interventions, in particular, there was a tweet with images of
before and after of Qadhafi. I mean, those I think in the
region--I mean, that is meant, I guess, to kind of keep Maduro
on his toes or off balance, but what that is is, it is seen by
the region as glorifying past U.S. military interventions,
which, in this region, does not go over well. The logic behind
a threat is--like I said, I understand it. It is to keep Maduro
off balance, to, you know, we do not know----
Mr. Cicilline. Can I ask you one question, because my time
is running out. Have you seen any evidence--I have heard from a
number of people about the use of this saber rattling by Maduro
and by the regime as propaganda to kind of rally the country
around him. If you could speak to that.
Ms. Chavez. Yes. Yes, absolutely. I mean, this plays into--
I mean, these are--the tweet, for example, that was a gift to
Maduro. It plays into his narrative about the United States.
And it plays into the message to the entire region. It plays
into his narrative or the message he is trying to convey to the
rest of the region as well.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rooney, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me make one thing clear. There has been a lot of talk
about use of military force, but the question before the table
now is whether or not to keep the option in our quiver, not
whether to use military force right now. It is a major
distinction.
And I would say after the actions of the Attorney General
and the Venezuelan Supreme Court today, if we ever needed to
keep every weapon and tactic in our quiver, we need to do it
right now. We are just fortunate that Mr. Guaido is still
alive.
I would say, third, that thousands of years of human nature
make it pretty clear that to take away an important weapon in a
fight like this will only embolden a person like Maduro and
probably, ironically enough, make it more likely that we have
to use military force someday that we would otherwise not ever
have to use.
Elliott Abrams made it clear that none of our allies in the
Lima Group, et cetera, have any problem with the fact that we
have said we want to keep all options on the table. And the
last thing he said is, there is no plan for military action
now.
With clarifying those record matters, I would like to ask
Dr. Neumann, what do you think our adversaries, like Russia,
China, Iran, et cetera, are going to perceive were we to remove
military force from our quiver of weapons?
Ms. Neumann. Thank you very much. They will see it as a
sign of weakness and an exploitable weakness. So my company is
called Asymmetrica, because one of my other credentials is I
have previously worked with the Asymmetric Warfare Group at DoD
for years, in fact.
And what you do is what we call a vulnerability detection
exercise, which the Russians are also very good at. So it is
important that it be kept on the table. I want to be very
clear, that I agree that the discussion of intervention is
entirely premature.
My concern--and I am not opining on U.S. constitutional
matters. My sole opinion here is that having this debate and
passing this legislation significantly endangers a vast
population, the last vestige of democracy, and greatly
increases the odds that we will have vast terrorist
recruitment, and a larger conflagration in our hemisphere just
a few months from now.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you. Dr. Neumann, one more question, kind
of the obverse of Mrs. Chavez's answer: What message would this
type of legislation and the obvious reflection of divisions
among the Congress send to those military officials who may be
thinking of defecting from Maduro, would like to break with
him, but are either too timid, or too coerced, or their family
is too coerced to do it?
Ms. Neumann. Thank you for the question. Yes. So the
question of military changing their mind. There are a number of
things. As you know, if you have ever worked with off-ramping
armed fighters, which I have, they need to believe that the
exit ramp is credible and that there is a path that will entail
their security, and that their families will not be killed.
That is one of the problems that the military commanders
have in Venezuela is that Cuban officers follow their kids to
school, harass their wives as they leave their chemo
treatments, because they are about the last people who can get
chemo treatments in Venezuela, and other such forms of
harassment. And they will tell them where their relatives are.
So it is the behavior of a cartel, and that is one of the
issues.
Removing the stick off the table, separate from American
constitutional issues, will complicate the transition to a
democracy, which we so desperately need.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Dr. Neumann.
I yield back.
Mr. Cicilline. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. And
I would just remind the gentleman that nothing in the
legislation that we are currently considering takes this
military option off the table. It simply requires engagement
from the Congress of the United States.
So, with that, I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Espaillat, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the panelists because all of your
testimoneys have been compelling, and I think they make us
think about the different perspectives that are out there
regarding Venezuela.
And, in fact, you know, there is not much of a divide here.
I think there is a consensus that Maduro is a dictator. I think
there is a consensus that Venezuela is facing a humanitarian
crisis of unprecedented levels. I think there is a consensus
that we must have free and democratic and transparent elections
in Venezuela, that, in fact, sanctions should be applied and
the Magnitsky Act has been applied to certain people. There is
a consensus, a very large consensus here.
I think the difference here is whether or not military
action should be applied. And I believe that an empty threat is
not a threat at all. So unless you are willing to use military
force, do not use the threat. I think the countries are far too
sophisticated to understand when there is an empty threat or
not and, in fact, some of you have specified during the--
detailed during this panel, the region itself is very sensitive
to dictators, right, first of all, from both sides, from the
left and the right, and also to intervention.
So the region is very sensitive and open to help, because
many of the countries in the regions have been under the boot
of a dictator, and many of the countries in the region have
also been intervened and occupied. So these are two very
sensitive issues.
And so, what I would like to ask is something more
specific. The U.S. is still purchasing oil from Venezuela. Do
you think that we should stop purchasing oil? I know that there
has been a reduction. Do you think that we should stop, totally
stop purchasing oil from Venezuela? First, Ms. Neumann and then
anyone else that would like to.
Ms. Neumann. Yes. I mean, I believe we stop that and any
purchases of money now go into frozen bank accounts that cannot
be controlled by Maduro. So I think that is satisfactory. I
mean, I would have no insight into whether Guaido
administration has access to those bank accounts or not. I have
no way of knowing. But that is good not to hand money to the
dictator who is not there constitutionally, and is causing the
biggest humanitarian crisis in the hemisphere.
Mr. Espaillat. Now, I understand also that there is a rift
between some Chavistas and the Maduro regime. Could you
elaborate a little bit on that? Is there any truth to that,
that some hard-core Chavistas are also not for Maduro?
Ms. Chavez. I think there has historically been tension.
Mr. Espaillat. Please, Ms. Chavez, Dr. Chavez.
Ms. Chavez. There has historically been tension. I mean, I
think you have the Diosdado Cabello, who is always kind of
angling in for a position. I think that there are fissures in
that sense within the government. Would you agree? I mean----
Ms. Neumann. Yes, I would agree. So if Chavez rose--Chavez
rose as a sort of revolutionary hero with the phrase por ahora
in 1992 when he failed in his coup attempt. So once a
putschist, always a putschist maybe. I do not know. But he had
some credibility or backing by the people as being a fighter
for them. There are a lot of people who think that Bolivarian
experiment has gone off course by becoming basically a criminal
organization. And by that, I mean even people who supported the
movement.
The other issue is that Chavez was a revolutionary fighter.
Maduro is not. He is a former bus driver who has basically been
trained in Cuba. So he does not have--and if you have worked
these issues in Africa, they have similar things where, like,
if you were the anticolonialist fighter, it gives you some more
public support, rather than just being viewed as a foreign
puppet, which is what Maduro is.
Mr. Espaillat. Just one last quick question: And so, given
the very fragile condition of Venezuela and the Venezuelan
people are going through hell right now, do any of you believe
that military intervention would exacerbate and maybe spiral
the situation out of control into conditions that we have never
seen in this continent?
Ms. Chavez. Absolutely. As I said in my written testimony,
I go into great detail on this, that this would set the stage
for a prolonged low-intensity conflict. I am as concerned about
a Chavista insurgency as I am about the Venezuelan military.
The number of unarmed groups--I mean, armed groups and
weapons in the country is extraordinary. I think there are 2.7
million illicit arms flowing around the country, second only to
Brazil. You have the Colectivos. You have the Bolivarian
militias. You have the Special Forces, the FAES. All of these
groups--and the FARC and the ELN, as mentioned earlier. All of
these groups have incentives, whether it be ideological or
because their livelihood is tied to Chavez, to continue the
struggle and to enter into a phase of guerilla warfare.
So, I think it would create an extremely messy situation,
and it would be prolonged. It would be ugly. There would be
massive casualties. So I think the picture is very grim.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Zeldin,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And one of the interesting dynamics of this particular
conversation--I do not know any member of this committee--I am
not aware of any member of this committee advocating for
military intervention in Venezuela. I do not know any member of
this committee who believes that Congress does not have an
important Article I responsibility here as it relates to
military intervention with Venezuela.
I would be interested in knowing, are any of you familiar
with the four instruments of national power?
Ms. Neumann. Well, DIME, DIMEFIL, yes.
Mr. Zeldin. Can you explain the DIME principle?
Ms. Neumann. Diplomatic, intell----
Mr. Zeldin. Information.
Ms. Neumann. Diplomatic, information, military--wait,
wait--economic.
Mr. Zeldin. Perfect.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you. And then the FIL is the other
three, yeah.
Mr. Zeldin. All right, gold star. So there are four
instruments of national power, the DIME principle: Diplomacy,
information, military, economics. And what we have seen around
the globe over the course of history with our foreign policy
where the world of our military overlaps with the State
Department. You could talk about the DIME principle in North
Korea, the DIME principle in Iran, where having the M option on
the table in North Korea ends up making the diplomatic effort
for multilateral or bilateral diplomacy or your efforts to ramp
up the economic pressure more effective, because the M is real.
The intelligence on Kim Jong-un is he is known not to be--known
to be homicidal, not suicidal. And where he thought that there
was a possibility that the United States may actually strike
North Korea, that was something that was a dynamic that changed
over the course of 2017.
I think one of the main areas that just really get to the
heart of where there might be a disagreement right now is that
there are many members of this committee who believe that the
diplomatic, information, economic components of the DIME
principle are more effective with the M option on the table.
That does not mean that member is advocating for military
intervention. It does not mean that that member is advocating
against Congress' important Article I powers. But I do believe
that it is very important for the military option to be on the
able, but I do not want to see military--I do not want to see
the military option actually get implemented.
So it is just something--I mean, it is an elephant that is
in the room right now that I just wanted to get to the heart
of. I do believe that this debate is very important for a
future date. It is fine that we are having this conversation
and we are talking about really important issues for Venezuela.
There is a possibility that at some point in the future, that
we might be debating an authorization for the use of military
force or some type of declaration. Maybe it is not--maybe it is
Venezuela, maybe it is some other country. We do not know
exactly what is ahead as it relates to that in the future.
But I would not want any of the points to be taken away
from any members on either side of the aisle, because I think
there is actually a lot more bipartisan agreement here on this
issue than might manifest itself over the course of the
hearing.
Earlier on, there was a discussion of the Venezuelan
Constitution. Article 233 has been interpreted to give Juan
Guaido power in a situation such as this. It is the United
States Government's position to recognize Juan Guaido, and in
the current position that he is in, in charge of the National
Assembly, it is important for us to support Juan Guaido in that
capacity. I fear for his life at this particular moment in
time.
And I think that in this conversation, while we debate what
Congress' appropriate role is here, in this particular moment,
we also should find the bandwidth. We should find the room in
this debate to also talk about what Congress can do to help the
situation as much as possible so that that does not get lost.
So I appreciate the chairman here right now, I guess
Chairman Cicilline for the moment, for him encouraging this
debate on this day, but I just wanted to share some thoughts as
to why--we say we cannot be silent not because we want war, but
because we want to prevent it. And we should never send our
troops into harm's way unless they are set up to succeed. You
send your troops to succeed or you do not send them at all.
There are basic principles I believe that we all would agree
on. But hopefully, the Congress' action as a result of this
hearing is not one that takes the military option off the
table, not because we want war, but because we want the
diplomacy, the information effort, and the economic pressure to
be as effective as possible.
I yield back.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I thank the gentleman from New
York. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Allred, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here today, and thank you for
your testimony. I read through your written testimony. I have
learned a lot from it and, of course, I think it is very
important that we are discussing this right now.
You know, I am a new Member of Congress, and when I was
seeking this office I talked a lot about how things here can
too simply be boiled down into black and white. This issue to
me falls into a gray area. I am a civil rights lawyer, and I am
very sensitive to the constitutional concerns at play with our
war powers exercise and how that has been eroded over time and
how Article I powers have been ignored for too long.
But I am also sensitive to some of the statements that my
colleagues have made here on the other side of the aisle about
sending conflicting signals and trying to make sure that
whatever comes out of the U.S. Congress is a unified message
that we oppose the Maduro regime, that we support the new
government under President Guaido, and that we are not going to
allow this to happen in our region, in our hemisphere. So I
want to try and boil down a little bit and get past kind of the
caricature of, you know, Democrats are trying to do this or
Republicans are trying to do that.
Dr. Chavez, maybe this would be best directed to you first.
What would you recommend that we do in addition to this bill
that is being considered and is being discussed to make sure
that if we do take this action, that we are not sending a
conflicting signal and that we are speaking with a single voice
here?
Ms. Chavez. I think one step would be the formal
recognition of Juan Guaido, bipartisan. I think that would be
one I think that would be relatively easy. I think that there
are other things that we could do, maybe not directly related
to the particular question of military intervention, but one
would be, I mean, to continue to focus on the fact that there
are 3.4 million refugees and migrants flowing out of the
country.
My question, I think an important question we should be
asking is how can we, as the United States, help with this? And
I think there, there are two things that we could do. One is we
could contribute more to the regional response. The U.N.
recently had a study, it was 2019, that says that it is going
to require--and this is just today, and as we know, it has been
referenced so the numbers are going to increase.
There is about $750 million required. The U.S. had, between
fiscal years 2017 and 2019, has said it is about $150 million.
That is a nice start, but it is not near enough. We need to be
giving more. Colombia alone is going to need $315 million. So
more financial assistance to this effort.
The second piece of that, is extending temporary protected
status to Venezuelans. I mean, what is happening now is we are
asking countries of the region--we are acknowledging that they
are overwhelmed. We are acknowledging that not just Colombia
but, as I referenced earlier, Peru, Argentina, Chile, the
islands in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is being
overwhelmed, that we extend temporary protected status to
Venezuela. I think that is something that we can do. We can do
it soon. I heard when Abrams said that that is something that
is being under consideration, I hope it is being considered
very seriously.
Mr. Allred. Thank you. I completely agree with you. And we
have had a bipartisan request from some Senators to extend TPS
protections to Venezuelan refugees, and I would encourage
members of this committee to consider that as well.
My time is running out, so I want to go to you, Professor
Pearlstein, and talk about the constitutional issues here. And
I want to go back to law school a little bit. I am a lawyer and
we can kind of nerd out here a little bit and go back to the
Steel Seizure case, and just ask you if this expression of
Congress, how that would affect the President's ability to act
under Article II, and how that it would interact with that
precedent?
Ms. Pearlstein. Thank you. I am delighted to nerd out on
constitutional law.
So let me begin by responding to that by picking up on the
point that has been made by describing what 1004 is trying to
do is removing authority, or taking something off the table,
right? Currently, the President has no authority under the
Constitution or under any source of authority statutorily to
introduce forces into hostilities in Venezuela. My view is, I
do not believe in a democracy a President can credibly threaten
force that he has no legal authority to use. That is the
current status quo, right? That is the state of affairs if
Congress does absolutely nothing here.
What this does is interject and say, Congress is watching.
We are not taking anything off the table, but we are saying
before you take the next step, we will specifically authorize
funding, right? This is just about the money, right? And this
is simply reiterating you cannot spend money we have not given
you to spend, right? I think that is the critical point here.
This does not change the constitutional dynamic in any
important way, with the exception of the Steel Seizure point,
right?
The Steel Seizure point, Justice Jackson's famous
concurrence says the scope of the President's powers waxes and
wanes as a function of what Congress does. When Congress has
said nothing, right, the President is acting in, effectively, a
constitutional twilight zone. Perhaps the President can claim
power that even though we know what the Constitution says he
does not have, perhaps the President will have an argument
there. It will depend on temporary imponderables, in the words
of the Court.
The President is in a different constitutional position
when Congress has affirmatively said not yet, or no. And that
is the shift, that is the gearshift that this legislation would
make. It would say, whatever arguments you think you have based
on past practice are not available in the moment in which we
have said not yet.
Mr. Allred. Thank you so much.
Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Espaillat [presiding]. I recognize the gentleman from
New Jersey, Mr. Smith, 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimoneys. I would like to ask Dr.
Neumann, if you could--and a lot of my questions have been
answered. So I do have one final question I would like to ask,
and that is on the issue of war crimes, or crimes against
humanity indictments.
I was very involved with the court of Yugoslavia, with
Slobodan Milosevic, and worked very hard on that, held multiple
hearings on it as well. When Rwanda and the atrocities
committed there occurred, I also was very supportive of the
court, which was a regional court. And then David Crane, who
was the chief prosecutor for the court of Sierra Leone, I had
several hearings and he was extraordinarily effective. And
Charles Taylor sits in prison today with a 50-year prison
sentence, former President of Liberia, for his egregious crimes
because of those prosecutions.
What kind of game-changer might it be if Maduro were to be
indicted? There is preliminary work that is being done by the
ICC. I think it is often too slow and not aggressive enough in
gathering facts, but nevertheless, the chief prosecutor, Mrs.
Bensouda, has gotten a referral from six States, beginning with
Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru, and on
February 18th announced that she has opened an independent
impartial review on the number of communications--from the
number of communications and reports documenting alleged crimes
falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
And, of course, this is not a panacea, but I have met with
Bashir; I am one of the few people who met with Bashir. The
first thing he wants lifted from his resume is the fact that he
is an indicted war criminal. He always runs the risk of being
extradited. I remember we tried very hard in the European Union
especially, to get Ankara to do that when he was going to visit
there. China would do it. But that does hang over him as kind
of a sword of Damocles. He is wanted and we prosecuted him.
People like Milosevic never thought that they would face a jury
or a group of, I should say, judges. Of course, he died before
a verdict was rendered in Yugoslavia.
But it seems to me the time has come in addition to--and I
do believe all cards should be on the table. I do not think
intervention by the U.S., that case has been made, but it
might. But I think, as you said, Dr. Neumann, multilateral--I
mean, we do it all the time. We empower African Union
peacekeepers all the time where there is no peace to keep. They
go in more as peacemakers under the guise of peacekeepers. And
I was in Darfur when the first deployment was made there by
peacekeepers and there was no peace, but they were there,
nevertheless, trying to separate the Janjaweed and others from
their victims.
So what would an indictment do to this situation? Do you
have confidence that the ICC might be able to really take this
up aggressively? One of the knocks against them is that most of
the indictments have been against sub-Saharan Africans,
including the President of Kenya. So it seems to me if Maduro
does not fit the bill for someone who is committing atrocities,
I do not know who does. So my hope is one of the messages going
out of this hearing will be ``let's indict Maduro.'' Let's let
the world community bring him to the Hague and to be held
accountable for these egregious crimes that he is committing
every day.
Dr. Neumann, your thoughts.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you very much. Yes, from a Venezuelan
perspective, it is a real game-changer for a number of reasons.
As I explained before, you know, this whole concept of the
Bolivarian Revolution was supposed to bring peace, justice,
include marginalized populations, and a greater enactment of
human rights. The fact that it has gone in precisely the
opposite direction and the OAS--you will forgive me, I do not
have the numbers today, but I believe that--to hand, but it is
the OAS report, which was comprehensive.
I do not know. Over 13,000 extrajudicial killings. It
considered the use of food and privation of food as political
policy as a form of--I do not know, I think they called it a
slow-motion genocide. I am not sure. They definitely called it
a crime against humanity.
And it is a game-changer, because it undermines the
narrative of what these guys are about. It really presents the
opportunity that he will be gone, that there is a possibility
that he will face trial. It acts as a disincentive to those who
support him, that you do not want to be caught up in this. I
mean, you know, you are in it either for the money or either
the ideology first and then the money later, but you want to
change your mind.
And also, quickly, from a Latin American perspective, the
fact that all those other Latin American countries backed the
case before the ICC has never happened before in the
hemisphere. So that is another signal that the countries of the
hemisphere are changing in their relationship to international
institutions, their views of institutional support and
democracy. They want to play on the side of rule of law and be
taken seriously, despite the fact that they have a complicated
history with their own democratic institutions in the past. The
region has been growing up and Venezuela remains a black mark,
and the ICC case is a turning point, both internally and
internationally.
Mr. Smith. Thank you for your indulgence.
Our other distinguished witnesses, should he be indicted,
Maduro?
Ms. Pearlstein. Could Maduro be indicted?
Mr. Smith. Should he be?
Ms. Pearlstein. Should he be? I am a supporter of the role
of international criminal law in this role. I think the ICC is
in a position to play an effective role. I think their role
would be more effective with active U.S. support of
international criminal law in this regard.
Mr. Smith. As you know, both Republicans and Democrats have
not--I mean, President Obama had House and Senate, there was no
ratification. Clinton did sign it, but there has always been
opposition from the Pentagon. But, that said, there could be a
referral from the Security Council. So there is no doubt that
that is one avenue that is open even to us. There is already
enough. Six countries, I think, is enough to get the ball
rolling.
Ms. Pearlstein. Yes.
Mr. Smith. But should he be indicted, in your view?
Ms. Pearlstein. Should the facts----
Mr. Smith. Maduro.
Ms. Pearlstein. Yes. Should the facts support it, I would
absolutely support an indictment.
Mr. Smith. Based on what you know?
Ms. Pearlstein. Based on what I know, certainly.
Mr. Smith. Yes, Dr. Chavez.
Ms. Chavez. So I think that this is a question that is
going to be up to the people of Venezuela. I mean, there are a
lot of questions over amnesty, but there is also talk of
providing Maduro some sort of off-ramp. As repugnant as that
might be, there has been talk about--and I do not think we want
to necessarily take that off the table either.
Mr. Smith. Sometimes an indictment sharpens the mind.
Ms. Chavez. No, no.
Mr. Smith. Mengistu has an off-ramp out of Ethiopia, but
there was a lot--there was a clamor for his prosecution, not at
the ICC, but elsewhere. Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline [presiding]. The gentleman's time has
expired.
I recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me start by saying I like Congressman Smith's idea
of the ICC. One small problem is that my understanding is that
the Administration is currently considering imposing a visa ban
on ICC officials, and sanctioning countries around the world
that support the ICC. And that might be another direct blow to
the solidarity within the region that has built up around
Colombia and Venezuela. And I would hope that we would urge the
Administration not to go in that direction.
Dr. Chavez, I want to come back to the very scary picture
that you painted of potential conflict in Venezuela. Now, you
painted that picture in the context of potential military
intervention. But when you describe a country that contains
millions of people who are armed, that is extremely polarized
and factionalized, where all sides are increasingly desperate,
it sounded to me like you were painting a picture of a
potential conflict or civil war that could very well take place
without any sort of external intervention, and I wanted you to
maybe elaborate on that a little bit.
Ms. Chavez. No. And I do think that something--that--you
are right, and I think that the level of violence is
increasing. The level of desperation of the Venezuelan people
is increasing. And so I think that things could get a lot worse
before they get better, which is why I think the very sad fact
is that there is really no silver bullet, and perhaps that is
why military intervention was considered an option is maybe
that would be something that would be quick. I think we all
want something quick to stem this tide, this tragedy.
I think the issue of peacekeeping came up. I could imagine,
at some point, an international coalition, and the U.S. being
part of this coalition of forces, to deal with the situation in
Venezuela. It is a unilateral U.S. military intervention that I
am opposed to.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, you just anticipated my next
question, and that is precisely whether that kind of State
collapse followed by an outbreak of civil war-type violence in
Venezuela could alter the perceptions of regional countries--
the OAS, Colombia--about the need for some sort of cooperative
multilateral intervention to restore peace and protect civilian
life. And that does get back to the question on the table,
because this resolution does not really differentiate between
various scenarios that might arise in the future.
Now, as everybody has pointed out, the resolution does not,
in fact, take the threat of military intervention off the
table. Legally, it does not do that. It could be perceived,
though, as carrying that message, which is one reason there has
been kind of confused debate about it today. Are we debating
the merits of military intervention, or are we simply debating
the congressional role in a decision with respect to military
intervention?
Is there a risk, because, again, we have to make a decision
as to what is wise here. The resolution is not compelled
legally. We have an absolute legal right to pass this, but we
are not compelled to. So the question is, is it wise? And I
think we all understand that threats of military intervention
are unwise right now. Tweets of the sort you describe,
profoundly unwise.
But convince me that an affirmative vote by the Congress
for a resolution that could be perceived as taking the
possibility of any form of military involvement, including
through peacekeeping, off the table would be wise and necessary
at this point.
Ms. Chavez. So what I can say to that is I am going to
defer to the constitutional law scholar about the type of
military intervention would be permissible, but what I would
say is that I would not want to take a multilateral coalition-
type response to what is going on off the table. Our right to
protect--I mean, I think there are--it might come to that. And
just--and if we--one thing I want to say about this is that the
countries of the region of Latin America, it is often
overlooked that they have great experience and know-how when it
comes to peacekeeping. Uruguay, Chile, Brazil. Mexico is
getting into this game. I mean, I think that if the calculus
changes, that would be the way to go.
As far as the legal constitutional piece, I am not as clear
on.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. My time is up, so it is up to
the chairman. But if you want to address that, sure.
Mr. Cicilline. The gentleman's time has expired, but the
witness is certainly free to answer the question.
Ms. Pearlstein. Certainly. I think the constitutional
question here is straightforward and noncomplicated. The
concern that this might convey a message that Congress is not
intending to convey, right, I think that is beyond my pay grade
as a lawyer. But I want to make clear, right, that this is a
funding restriction, and it says by its terms, we can do this
by specific statutory authorization.
If this bill is coupled with some of the other measures
that Congress is considering, it seems to me entirely plausible
that the message sent will be one of a Congress actually seized
of the issue and determined to engage.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you very much.
The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
the State of California, Mr. Vargas, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, and thank you
for this opportunity. And thank you for bringing H.R. 1004
forward. I think it is important that we have this discussion.
As I read section 2 of it, it says: ``None of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to
the Department of Defense or any other Federal department or
agency may be used to introduce the Armed Forces of the United
States into hostilities with respect to Venezuela except,''--
``except a declaration of war, a specific statutory
authorization described in subsection B, or a national
emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions or the Armed Forces.''
So what we are debating here, this bill is, in my opinion,
what is that balance between the authority that we have as
Congress, and the authority the President has. Arthur
Schlesinger, I believe, was the author, the historian who said
that there is the imperial Presidency now, and that in the last
100 years, the Presidency has grown tremendously and has
usurped in a sense a lot of what Congress should be doing.
So, in my opinion, what we are doing here is debating what
is that balance. And I think, Dr. Pearlstein, you mentioned it
well. I think you mentioned James Madison, quoted him saying
one person, it is not wise to have one person take us to war.
Instead, it should be the community, in the sense the
representatives, that make that decision. I agree with that
wholeheartedly. And I think it is time that we take back that
responsibility.
I think that we, unfortunately, have allowed the Presidency
to grow in a way that is not healthy for our country, and I
think we are seeing that right now in this particular
Presidency, although we have seen it in other Presidencies,
also with Democrats, to be fair.
So I think that this is very appropriate. I certainly will
support it. However, I do think that what has been brought up
here today, the issue of, you know, what message do we send to
Venezuela, because I think we are all in agreement, and I have
listened to all the testimony here today. I mean, it is a
terrible situation. It is a horrible situation. No one
disagrees with that. And that Maduro is a dictator, a thug, and
a horrible human being, no one disagrees with that. I think we
are all in agreement. Just what role do we have to play as
Congress? And I think that that is important. We need to
reestablish our position. And so that is why I certainly
support it.
But I do have some questions, and I do want to follow up a
little bit on this notion of how this will be taken in
Venezuela. And, Dr. Neumann, maybe I will ask you that
specifically. I know you take a little bit harder line than the
other two, but I would like to know how you take this, because
we are not taking anything off the table. We are just simply
saying, you have to jump through these constitutional
necessities first that are important to us, maybe not as
important to Venezuela at this moment, but important to us. But
I would like to know your opinion.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
question. Yes, I am la mujer venezolana on the panel, and I am
thrilled to be on with two other women. For the record, I
wanted to say that.
And, of course, yes, I want to be really clear. I do not
want to opine on the complications of internal domestic U.S.
politics. I am a dual citizen. I am here to discuss the
concerns from the Venezuelan perspective. I have, you know, as
a moral political philosopher, vastly hundreds of pages on the
rule of law.
Mr. Vargas. Doctor, how will this affect the mentality in
Venezuela? That is my question.
Ms. Neumann. The mentality is the mentality of a thug. It
will be misconstrued to understand, to think that President
Trump is hamstrung. Whether that is the intent or not, that is
how it will be understood and represented by a man who has just
called for the slaughter of his people by a multitude of armed
groups.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
Dr. Chavez, will you comment on that? Is that the way that
you think that it will be understood in not only Venezuela, but
Latin America? I know, because we do have allies here that are
working with us.
Ms. Chavez. So I actually think it would be welcomed by
Latin America, the passage of this legislation, because I think
that there have been so many mixed messages. So you have, for
example, the tweets I referred to, or Secretary Pompeo's recent
statement about the reason we are removing officials from our
embassy is because we want to be--we do not want to be
constrained when it comes to policy responses.
I think those sort of--I think having a clear message that
no, that--I mean, not that we are not going to intervene
militarily, but this particular legislation shows that we are
going to think this through really carefully. This is a really
big decision. Congress should play its role in it. So----
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. My time is almost expired. I do want
to say that I think we are out of equilibrium. The Constitution
has these checks and balances, and we need to get back into
that constitutional equilibrium. So I support this motion.
Thank you.
Mr. Trone [presiding]. I recognize Mr. Costa for 5 minutes.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members
of the committee and the witnesses. I think you have done an
excellent job.
The measures before us have as much to do with our own
constitutional authority and the role in which Congress has
abdicated part of that responsibility, as it does about our
policy toward Venezuela. But let me drill down on a couple of
things that have been discussed here already.
The policy of this administration, and I like the notion
that was made a moment ago about consistency and policy. I
think this administration, from my perspective, has had more
difficulty being able to demonstrate consistency on a whole
host of foreign policy initiatives, and I think this is but one
example of that. All administrations wrestle with that, but
this one seems to--when you have foreign policy by tweet, I
think it is a very difficult challenge.
Having said that, they have engaged in a multilateral
effort here. What would the three of you--comment quickly,
because I have a few other questions--as to so far the policy
that has been taken to embrace this multilateral effect, and
what more do you think should we be doing? Dr. Chavez.
Ms. Chavez. So like I said, I applaud that we have taken
this multilateral approach. I think we should continue to,
first and foremost, I think just recognize the importance of
the Lima Group, and what it is doing, and let them take the
front seat in these diplomatic----
Mr. Costa. So what more could we do?
Ms. Chavez. I think we could also give the International
Contact Group a chance. It is relatively new.
Mr. Costa. Do they have a timeline?
Ms. Chavez. So they started in early February, but they
have already begun sort of the shuttle diplomacy effort. I
think it is an important group also, because it is a very
diverse group, with eight European countries, four Latin
American countries. So, again, supporting that.
Mr. Costa. Barrister Pearlstein? You are a barrister, are
you not?
Ms. Pearlstein. Pearlstein. Yes. I would just make the
point that multilateralism in this regard, working with
regional allies, ideally working with international allies,
depending on what is coming down the road, may be necessary
from the point of view of international law to make any
subsequent U.S. cooperation----
Mr. Costa. I think we concur with you, yes.
Ms. Pearlstein [continuing]. Lawful.
Mr. Costa. So what more could we do?
Ms. Pearlstein. What more could we do? I think the
engagement of the ICC, the engagement of the U.N. Security
Council on some sort of resolution, whether or not, indeed, way
before----
Mr. Costa. For the off-ramp on Maduro, does the potential
of an indictment help?
Ms. Pearlstein. So there are a number of range--so there is
a range of views on this peace versus security question.
Mr. Costa. Right. We have different options that we are
discussing right now.
Ms. Pearlstein. Right. And the range of options that are
available, my impression is the credible threat of indictment,
should the facts bear that out, right, can help clarify
thinking well before, right? The ICC process is a long one.
There is an investigation and so forth. And allowing that
process to begin does not foreclose any options.
Mr. Costa. What would you care to add to that question
about the Administration's----
Ms. Neumann. Thank you. The unilateral--the bipartisan
acknowledgement of the Venezuelan Constitution and that Juan
Guaido is the interim president under that Constitution.
Mr. Costa. And we can do that as a Congress.
Ms. Neumann. Supporting a transition.
Mr. Costa. We can do that as a Congress?
Ms. Neumann. As a Congress. There is a Congress. Support
that transition. The calculus on multilateralism is going to
change as the crisis deepens, so continue to develop strategies
to prevent the spillover. And also, I believe supporting the
prosecution of Maduro under RICO. Use RICO to support the
Maduro indictment.
Mr. Costa. You mentioned earlier the Organization of
American States. Do you think that as one of the efforts or
multiple efforts that we are using to force this change that
the organization of American States is being used effectively?
Is there more that could be done?
Ms. Neumann. Let me say that I am not an expert on the OAS,
but, obviously, I have been following it. I think what more
they could do? No.
Mr. Costa. I mean, what if we were to call a meeting for
all of them to come together and to----
Ms. Neumann. To develop a better contingency planning for
the spectacular crisis. That if the refugee crisis was the
second in the world before, it is going to skyrocket. We need
better collaboration on contingency plan.
Mr. Costa. Dr. Chavez, you look like you are anticipating
an answer.
Ms. Chavez. No, sir. I would say the OAS has really stepped
up in a way that----
Mr. Costa. Can they do more?
Ms. Chavez. I think they could do more. I think that there
should be more outreach. I think, for example, for Congress to
more outreach to the OAS. But Luis Almagro has--I mean, he has
been a force of nature.
Mr. Costa. My time has expired, but a number of delegations
are looking at visiting in the region here in the next couple
months. I am with a group that may go to Colombia. What would
you advise us to do for those that are visiting the area?
Ms. Chavez. I would say spend time, go to Cucuta. Spend
time on the border. See the magnitude of the humanitarian--of
the suffering. I think you will also be surprised by--I
mentioned earlier the importance of having a neutral party
deliver humanitarian assistance. There are a lot of small local
NGO's that are already there, and I think when you go to the
border, you will see, whether it be Catholic Relief charities
or local NGO's. And also, I would recommend talking to these
folks to get a better sense of what the real challenges are
when it comes to delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Mr. Costa. Well, we will follow up with all of you. The
three of you have done a very good job. Thank you.
Ms. Neumann. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you.
Mr. Trone. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. I have one
quick question, and we will head out the door. Given the myriad
of problems facing Venezuela, what should we concentrate our
U.S. resources on? Economic pressure? Redoubling humanitarian
aid? Or additional resource to help the IDPs and refugees?
Start on the left, Dr. Chavez, and we will go across the table.
Ms. Chavez. I believe that the priority must be the
delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Ms. Neumann. Yeah. Humanitarian assistance, getting it into
the country, making sure it is not part of some illicit trade
black market, or political repression. Humanitarian aid is No.
1.
Mr. Trone. Ideas on how we get it past the border?
Ms. Neumann. No. I think--no. I think I want to--I want to
defer on that if I were, you know--how we get it past the
border, it is going to take the involvement of multilateral
groups and support from some elements, either of the U.N. or,
OAS.
Unfortunately, Latin America does not have anything like
the African Union. Something like that would be particularly
helpful at a time like this. So forming some form of coalition
and with supervision with the ICRC is really what is needed.
Mr. Trone. Any other ideas? That is the key.
Ms. Chavez. One idea I think is to push the U.N. to--ask
the U.N. to push Maduro to recognize what is going on in his
country, and to accept aid, and for the U.N. to play a greater
role in this particular issue.
Mr. Trone. OK. Thank you all. You guys have been fantastic.
We really appreciate the briefing and look forward to keeping
moving and trying to help Venezuela. Thank you. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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