[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-2
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available:T3http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-360 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Harden, David, Managing Director, Georgetown Strategy Group...... 9
Karlin, Mara, Director of Strategic Studies, School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University................ 20
Sullivan, Jake, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace........................................ 27
Singh, Michael, Senior Fellow and Managing Director, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 35
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 97
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 98
Hearing Attendance............................................... 99
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Amnesty International letter submitted by Representative Ted Lieu 103
Statement for the Record from Representative Gerry Connolly...... 101
U.S. POLICY IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2019
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Engel. The hearing will come to order. Let me
first of all welcome all of our members to our first hearing.
Let me welcome as well our witnesses and members of the public
and members of the press.
We are here this morning to examine U.S. Policy in the
Arabian Peninsula. Before I get to my views and recognize our
ranking member, a bit of housekeeping. Without objection, all
members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and
extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length
limitation in the rules.
One of my goals as chairman of this committee will be to
underscore the importance of American values as part of our
foreign policy. When we are at our best, we put democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law at the center of our conduct
all over the world. It is the right thing to do. It is a
reflection of our country's character, its compassion, and its
generosity; it also makes it easier to advance our interests
and our security.
It is with this idea in mind that I focus our first hearing
on our policy in the Arabian Peninsula. This region has posed
some of the most vexing problems for our top diplomats and it
is a top priority of this committee to help move our policy in
the Gulf toward one that safeguards American interests while
honoring American values. Our Gulf policy should not have to
sacrifice one for the other.
Since the start of the current Yemen conflict in 2015, more
than 10,000 people have died in airstrikes, 85,000 children
have died of malnutrition, 14 million Yemenites are on the
brink of famine, and more than one million suffer from cholera.
The U.N. calls this the world's worst humanitarian crisis and
there is no shortage of bad news. In just the last week ,it was
confirmed that silos holding one quarter of Yemen's wheat
stocks had been destroyed, and eight more civilians were killed
when a bomb struck a center for internally-displaced people.
Yemen was already in crisis before the conflict began, but
the war has made things far worse. I want to be clear: Saudi
Arabia and its partners have very real and urgent security
challenges. The Houthis in Yemen receive support from Iran. The
Houthis are launching missiles into Saudi territory,
threatening Saudi civilians as well as American personnel. In
2016, they launched cruise missiles at a U.S. Navy ship in the
Red Sea.
And our country's strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia,
despite some bumps in the road, has been a valuable one. Saudi
Arabia plays an important role as a counterbalance to Iran and
the region. But neither the threats facing the Saudis nor
America's partnerships with the Kingdom mean that the Saudis
should have a blank check. We cannot look the other way when it
comes to the recklessness with which the Saudi-led coalition
has conducted its operations.
In Yemen, I am not just talking about one tragic screw-up,
though that would be bad enough. Coalition's operations have
been characterized by strike after strike after strike that has
resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. A school bus full
of children, a wedding, a funeral, and these mistakes have been
compounded by a lack of real accountability. At the same time,
both the coalition and the Houthi authorities have prevented
humanitarian assistance from getting to where it is needed
most.
So we need to stay focused on ending the suffering in Yemen
and advancing a political solution. In the long term, I am
hopeful about the U.N. peace process led by Special Envoy
Martin Griffiths and where these negotiations can lead. The war
in Yemen poses significant challenges, but we cannot view the
issues in the Arabian Peninsula solely through that lens.
Our relationship with the Saudis is very different now than
it was even 6 months ago. The heinous murder of journalist
Jamal Khashoggi shocked the world and the administration seemed
content to sweep it under the rug and move on. That is not
acceptable to me. In addition, new reporting suggests that the
weapons the United States and the Saudis sold the Emirates are
now ending up in the hands of al-Qaida terrorists, Houthi
rebels, and Iranian intelligence officials as well. And of
course, the ongoing imprisonment of women activists including,
Loujain al-Hathloul and Hatoon al-Fassi, and other human rights
abuses cannot be ignored.
So it can no longer be business as usual. We need to see a
real change in Saudi behavior. We need to push for
accountability. And we need to understand what has driven our
own administration's policy in this part of the world.
I want to assure everyone listening today that today's
hearing and markup presents the beginning of this committee's
focus on these issues. We will not sweep these questions under
the rug, and we will push for changes that are absolutely
necessary to get the U.S.-Saudi relationship back on track.
I am interested in hearing from our witnesses on how to
grapple with these challenges, but first I would like to
recognize our ranking member, Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas, for any
opening remarks he might have.
Mr. McCaul. I would like to thank my good friend, Mr.
Engel, for calling this important hearing. The United States
has key national-security interests in the Arabian Peninsula,
which is why we spent decades cultivating close partnerships
with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. We have had a long
history of working together to advance our shared strategic
interests.
Even so, each of these partnerships has its own nuances and
complexities. We have often encouraged these partners to make
improvements on areas such as human rights and religious
freedom, such as through our annual State Department reports.
We have also had longstanding concerns about terror-financing
and other support for terror emanating from the Gulf.
We are grateful for the progress that has been made in
recent years, although there is still much work to be done. And
like many, I was heartened to hear about the reforms on the
horizon in Saudi Arabia, such as lifting the ban on women
driving.
In the context of this hope for the Kingdom's future, I was
both appalled and deeply saddened by the news of Jamal
Khashoggi's murder. Jamal's murder was a major setback in our
relationship with Saudi Arabia, a gruesome and disturbing crime
that sadly showed how much further the Saudis need to go.
Nothing like this crime can happen again, and everybody
responsible must be held accountable.
This fall, we heard distressing reports that women's rights
activists had been not only imprisoned but tortured. We need to
see serious changes in the Saudis behavior with respect to
dissidents and ex-patriots to regain our trust. The lesson of
this terrible event needs to be that intimidation and violence
by any government against peaceful dissent will be met with
strong disapproval by responsible nations.
All of our witnesses have distinguished records of U.S.
Government service working on Middle Eastern issues. Amid daily
reports about the fragility of the United Nations Special Envoy
to Yemen's ongoing peace efforts, I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses about what the United States can do to bring
a sustainable, political solution to the conflict that will
help mitigate the urgent humanitarian crisis.
Unfortunately, today's discussion of the Yemen War is
complicated by the markup of what I believe to be an ill-
advised bill. I will say more later, but I am alarmed that we
are abusing a privileged War Powers procedure to address
questions where U.S. forces are not involved in combat. Not
only does it fail to meaningfully address the security
cooperation issues we face in the region, it also creates a
dangerous precedent that could disrupt U.S. security
cooperation with partners all around the world.
With that said, the number of civilian deaths during this
conflict is deeply concerning. Improvements in humanitarian
access are critical to preventing the crisis from worsening.
Every effort must be taken to eliminate civilian casualties
from air strikes. I hope this hearing will contribute to the
conversation about what applicable and appropriate steps the
United States can take to decrease the threat that this
conflict poses to civilians rather than adding fuel to the fire
of an unproductive conversation about War Powers.
I fear that many of the recent discussions regarding the
Yemen conflict have obscured the incredibly damaging role that
the Houthis are playing. Recent reports have documented the
Houthis diversion of vital food aid from people in need and the
brutal torture of detainees.
Iran is also playing an incredibly harmful role in this
conflict by supplying the Houthis with ballistic missiles and
other forms of support. The U.N. itself has reported that Iran
has violated U.N. Security Council resolutions through their
support for the Houthis. I hope our witnesses today will
discuss how the United States and our partners can effectively
respond to Iran's role in this conflict.
We can also not lose sight of the fact that significant
terrorist threats continue to emanate out of Yemen. Director of
National Intelligence, Dan Coats, testified last week that al-
Qaida affiliate in Yemen, AQAP, remains one of the largest and
most capable terrorist groups in the world. We are grateful to
our Gulf partners for their help in countering this threat.
I dealt with AQAP and their external operations for many
years as chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, and I
hope our witnesses can speak to whether our current
counterterrorism strategy in Yemen is as effective as it could
be or whether any changes need to be made. And with that Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses today.
Mr. David Harden, Managing Director of the Georgetown
Strategy Group, Mr. Harden previously served as Assistant USAID
Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance as well as numerous other roles across
nearly two decades at USAID, including directing USAID's
operation in Yemen until last year.
Dr. Mara Karlin, the Director of Strategic Studies of the
Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International
Studies, Dr. Karlin has served in national security roles for
five secretaries of defense, most recently as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development.
Mr. Jake Sullivan of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Mr. Sullivan was National Security Advisor
to Vice President Biden and also the Director of Policy
Planning and Deputy Chief of Staff at the Department of State.
Mr. Mike Singh, Managing Director of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, he was Senior Director for
Middle East affairs at the White House from 2007 to 2008, and a
director on the NSC staff from 2005 to 2007. Earlier, he served
as special assistant to Secretaries of State Powell and Rice,
and at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.
This is a distinguished panel and we are delighted to have
them with us this morning. Thank you very much. I would like to
say for the record that we invited administration witnesses to
be part of this discussion but we were told that the relevant
State Department officials were traveling this week. So we hope
to hear from them soon in the future.
Our witnesses' testimony will be included in the record of
this hearing, and I would now like to recognize our witnesses
for 5 minutes each and we will start with Mr. Harden.
STATEMENT OF DAVID HARDEN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, GEORGETOWN
STRATEGY GROUP
Mr. Harden. Thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member
McCaul, and the distinguished members of this committee. Thank
you for having me today. Last night I just got back from the
Middle East. I was in Tel Aviv, Ramallah, Amman, Riyadh,
Dammam, and Abu Dhabi, so I hope that I have some fresh
perspectives to bring.
My perspective is typically very much focused on the
economics and the humanitarian angles. I will begin with Yemen,
but I want to take a moment to also look at the broader issues
that the Arabian Peninsula will face in the coming decade, and
then I offer one big idea for this committee.
On Yemen, Chairman Engel set out the horrific statistics.
The tragedy is overwhelming. The challenges, though, is that
the political process, political accommodation, is not likely
to succeed in the short term. We have great respect for the
U.N. Envoy, but the Stockholm Agreement is fragile, reversible,
and likely not to hold. There will likely be an attack on
Hodeida sometime this year. There is no military solution.
And so within this context I offer a very bleak, short-term
assessment of Yemen. It is hard to figure out a way forward. I
offer humbly an economic set of policies which are very
detailed and in my statement and I am happy to answer questions
about those during the hearing. But fundamentally, the only
mechanisms that we have available to us right now are to
increase the purchasing power at the household level for
families.
We can do this by improving access and allowing greater,
more robust trade to come in from every direction. Humanitarian
assistance is 5 percent of the total basic commodities that
come into Yemen, 95 percent of it is private sector trade.
Nothing will work unless more trade; more basic commodities
come in faster and at cheaper prices.
Second, the currency needs to be stabilized. The currency
collapse as a result of the splintering of the bank has been
the single driving force for the humanitarian collapse. Third,
more revenue, more income has to come in to individuals and to
households, and that means paying salaries for teachers,
sanitation workers and healthcare providers. If we can get the
economics right, then there is a prospect for creating a bit of
a space to push forward political process and political
accommodation.
The economics alone will not work, it is not sufficient. We
also need a stabilization strategy and at the moment there is
not one. We have to, and when I say ``we,'' I mean the
international community together, collectively, has to envision
a strategy that will give some hope to the people, address
underlying grievances, provide basic services, and jobs and
economic opportunity. Then if we get it right, there could be
some opportunity forward.
But the tragedy of Yemen will stay with us longer than what
we can bear. What worries me though is within the context of
Yemen and its exhaustive State, as well as what is happening in
Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, I deeply worry that the United
States may turn its back on the Middle East and we do so at our
own risk.
There is a rising tide of neo-isolationism. The
opportunities and the broad trends that are facing the Arabian
Peninsula over the next decade are both exciting and represent
inflection points. So clearly we know and we see that there is
a new great game in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Horn of
Africa where China and Iran and Turkey and Russia are seeking
influence, markets, and power.
Second, we know that there will be rapid and impressive
technological changes and changes to capital structures and
capital flows. The United States may be a part of this, but we
also may not be the leader in this. And then last, it is
important not to discount the rising aspirations of the Gulf
States. There is the Saudi 2030 vision of course; the UAE is
setting forth a 50-year plan in just a couple of years. These
rising aspirations provide both opportunity and risks for us.
So with that how do we manage? How do we go forward? How do
we get out of this Middle East purgatory? So I proposed, in my
statement to you, a crisis response core that would allow us to
more effectively, with 21st century technology, agility,
capabilities, bring talent to the most complex crisis and
achieve our overriding goals of a secure Arabian Peninsula and
advancing American security, economic, and political interests.
I turn it back to you, Chairman. Thank you for the time and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harden follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Harden.
Dr. Karlin.
STATEMENT OF MARA KARLIN, Ph.D., DIRECTOR OF
STRATEGIC STUDIES AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Ms. Karlin. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and
members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today. This morning I
will summarize my written remarks which I submit for the
record.
Having examined the Middle East as a national security
policymaker and as a scholar for nearly two decades, I can
confidently say this is a critical time to assess it. Regional
challenges are growing thornier and the opportunity costs of
U.S. involvement are deepening. While we cannot fully extricate
from this region, we must recognize it is less of a priority
than it once was, particularly in contrast to Asian and Europe
which must command more of our attention.
As U.S. policy currently stands, the United States exists
in a kind of purgatory. We are too distracted by regional
crises to pivot to other global priorities, but we are not
invested enough to move the region in a better direction. This
worst of both worlds approach exacts a heavy price particularly
in the Arabian Peninsula. Simply put, today we should focus on
how and in what ways the United States can pursue a more
realistic and sustainable approach toward the region, not
whether we should do so. This rethinking is long overdue.
Looking ahead, U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula must
acknowledge and respond to three key dilemmas. First, how to
ruthlessly prioritize despite terrorism's pull. Recommendations
for a new U.S. approach are often binary. The maximalist
version ignores the rockiness of U.S. efforts to date in places
like Iraq and Libya and dismisses how challenging it would be
to sustain domestic political support for the large, long-term
investments that fundamentally altering this permissive
environment for terrorism and chaos would require.
The minimalist version ignores the comparative advantage
that America's global role has afforded it and underestimates
just how dangerous the power vacuum could be should Washington
withdraw from the region. It is foolhardy to believe we can or
should pursue either approach without substantial costs in
blood, treasure, and time.
In the Arabian Peninsula the United States should focus on
three key issues: Protecting freedom of navigation in the
region's major maritime passages; preventing oil producers or
troublemakers from destabilizing the flow of oil; and
containing actors hostile to Washington, including terrorists.
While terrorism remains a very real challenge, the United
States must approach it in a smarter and more sustainable way.
We must set clear guidelines about when and where we will use
force.
The second dilemma, how do we recognize our friends' value
but also their flaws? Allies and partners are the United
States' global and comparative global advantage. The U.S.
military will always fight alongside allies and partners, yet
some will be more capable than others. We will perennially face
an expectations mismatch between our needs and capabilities and
theirs.
Transforming self-interested and shortsighted regional
partners into reliable long-term allies is wishful thinking, at
least not without incurring enormous costs and long-term
commitments. Therefore we must rethink how we work with
regional partners. We should not just focus on the promise and
ignore the peril of outsourcing U.S. military campaigns
especially in the Arabian Peninsula where our partners come
with overwhelming funding and complicated politics.
This model of by, with, and through that the U.S. military
likes to discuss works only if we recognize this cooperation as
a political not technical exercise, and if the partners on the
ground share our priorities. Success requires setting realistic
goals, clearly and actively communicating our expectations to
our partners, and constantly assessing how well they are
meeting the objectives we seek. While we cannot control
everything our regional partners do, we can control where we
set our own limits in the relationship in the support that we
provide.
The third dilemma is how do we recalibrate U.S. resources
despite the U.S. military's predominance in this region? Since
the September 11th attacks our approach to this region has been
overwhelmingly driven by military tools. Given the nature of
regional threats and the broader security environment, this
approach is both costly and increasingly ineffective. We must
fully adjudicate thorny tradeoffs in this region and today on
key questions of U.S. policy toward the region different parts
of the interagency are completely out of sync.
Our military, diplomatic, and economic tools are often
giving different messages. That is bad for U.S. interests. Most
of this region's challenges will not be fundamentally solved by
military tools, but through active diplomacy and political
agreements. Executing a nuanceD and effective approach requires
substantial and capable staff who have meaningful regional
expertise, but right now the U.S. approach is too much sword
and too little pen. We must recognize there is no such thing as
a purely operational presence in the Middle East.
Let me just wrap up with a few key points. One, Iranian bad
behavior in this region is a serious problem. Two, while a Gulf
security architecture to counter Iran would be helpful, mutual
hatreds and long-simmering tensions over regional competition
make it unlikely to emerge. And third, the astrategic and
ineptly executed Emirates and Saudi military campaign in Yemen
has only benefited Tehran. There is little evidence that U.S.
support to these militaries as they wage their war in Yemen has
made their execution of this conflict meaningfully more
effective.
Thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Karlin follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF JAKE SULLIVAN, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you Chairman Engel, Ranking Member
McCaul, members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you to talk about these important subjects and
especially to appear alongside such talented colleagues on this
panel. And at the outset I would like to make three points to
help frame the discussion.
First, Congress can and must take action to end U.S.
support for the war in Yemen and help pave the way for a
diplomatic solution. The Obama Administration's initial support
for the Saudi-led coalition ultimately turned into the blank
check of current policy and the moral and human costs are
staggering, as both the chairman and the ranking member pointed
out in their comments. U.S. assistance and U.S. policy today is
contributing to the continuation of what is now the world's
worst humanitarian crisis.
Now to be clear, the Saudi-led coalition does not bear all
the responsibility for the violence and suffering in Yemen. The
Houthis have chosen war over diplomacy too and they have
immense blood on their hands and Iran continues to provide them
material support and cheerleading. But as Dr. Karlin just said,
when it comes to countering the Iranian threat our current
approach has done nothing but make things worse. It has
strengthened the Houthis and it has aided Iran. It has also
empowered extremist groups including some who are now in
possession of U.S. weapons and technologies.
The right approach for the United States is to put pressure
on the coalition to curtail its military activities including
by withdrawing U.S. military assistance while increasing
constructive efforts to reduce Iran's support for the Houthis.
Recent congressional pressure has helped rein in some of the
worst instincts of our partners, opening space for diplomatic
negotiations that could build on the Stockholm Agreement. But
Congress should not stop there.
I believe the War Powers Resolution that passed the Senate
last year is worthy of support and that Congress should send
that resolution to the President's desk, and I look forward to
discussing that with the committee today. I also commend
legislative proposals to prohibit logistical support and the
sale and transfer of offensive weapons. The goal should be to
end U.S. assistance for this campaign while encouraging the
administration to take a more active role in diplomacy to reach
a political solution to the conflict.
Second, Congress should reinforce its commitment to
defending the territorial integrity of regional partners in the
face of persistent threats from State and non-State actors.
Iran is continuing to provide assistance to the Houthis, as the
ranking member said, to help them attack Red Sea shipping as
well as firing missiles at land-based targets in Saudi Arabia
and the UAE.
An end to offensive support for the war in Yemen should be
accompanied by an increase in tailored defensive support for
our partners to counter these threats. This could include
increased maritime patrols on the Saudi Red Sea coast and a
renewed push to install more sophisticated missile defense
systems in the Gulf. More broadly, Congress should hold the
administration accountable for failing to produce a coherent
Iran strategy that actually ties available means to realistic
objectives. I hope we can discuss that more today.
Third, this hearing should mark the start of a serious
bipartisan strategic review of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Too
often in Washington talk of Saudi Arabia and the issue of Saudi
Arabia centers around a cartoonish binary, unconditional
support or throwing the relationship away. This is both a silly
and counterproductive way to approach a complex partnership in
a complex time.
If any good can come in the aftermath of the shocking
murder of Jamal Khashoggi it should be a serious conversation
about how we establish a sustainable relationship between our
two countries that advances shared interests while accounting
for rather than ignoring or wishing away actions that undermine
those interests and run contrary to our values.
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia do still share interests
including in countering terrorism and in countering Iran. But
for the U.S. that cannot mean blind deference to the judgment
of regional partners. That approach has only empowered the
leaders in Tehran while undermining American values. There is a
better way.
Instead of continuing to support a strategically disastrous
war in Yemen, the United States should be prioritizing healing
the rift in the Gulf Cooperation Council, considering how to
put pressure on Iranian maritime shipments in support to the
Houthis, pushing for theater missile defense arrangements, and
exercises influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Qatar where there are
natural constituencies for American support.
At the same time, the U.S. should elevate the priority of
reform and human rights in the relationship with Saudi Arabia
especially in light of the recent repressive actions and trends
that we heard about at the outset of this hearing. All of this,
in addition to the continuing need for accountability with
respect to the Khashoggi murder, leads to the inexorable
conclusion as you said, Mr. Chairman, that it cannot be
business as usual in this relationship.
Thank you again for inviting me here today and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Singh.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, SENIOR FELLOW AND MANAGING
DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Singh. Thank you Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul,
and members of the committee. I appreciate the invitation to
speak before you and it is an honor to appear at your first
hearing leading this committee.
The U.S. is undergoing a strategic shift in the world from
a grand strategy focused on counterterrorism to one that is
focused on great power competition and I think there is broad
bipartisan agreement that this is the right trajectory for the
United States.
What is less clear though, is what this implies, what this
means for America's strategy in the Middle East. Some have
suggested it means basically shifting our resources away from
this region and trying to disentangle ourselves from it. I
think there is two big problems though with this concept, with
this idea. One is that we still have very important interests
in this region. Counterterrorism is one of them,
nonproliferation is another, and the list goes on.
Second, is that the Middle East, itself, is and always has
been, frankly, vital to great power competition. For example,
our Asian allies as well as China are highly dependent on the
energy resources coming from this region even if we are not. So
the key question in my mind is how do we continue to secure our
interests in the region and prevent inroads by our rivals while
reallocating our resources elsewhere?
The clearest way to do this, is to work as much as possible
through allies. Of course this is easy to say and it is much
harder in practice as some of my colleagues have noted. Just
stepping back a bit, since the regional turmoil that broke in
this region in 2011 and since the U.S. has started to, let's
say, sort of disengage a bit strategically, we have seen a
complex dynamic emerge in the region.
You have three ad hoc blocks of power in this region which
are jockeying against one another for preeminence. You have a
sort of bloc of conservative powers, the Saudis, the Emirates,
tacitly joined by Israel and in an interesting way the center
of gravity in the Arab world has really shifted in their
direction. You have a more Islamist-oriented bloc consisting of
Turkey and Qatar and they often work together. And then you
have a bloc that is hostile to the United States consisting of
Iran and its partners, Syria, and various proxies like
Hezbollah.
This rivalry, this three-way rivalry combined with the
phenomenon of State actors moving into the region's security
and governance vacuums has prompted an unprecedented burst of
regional interventionism. This just is not Saudi Arabia and the
UAE intervening in Yemen. It is the UAE and Qatar and Libya,
the UAE and Turkey across the Horn of Africa, Iran intervening
in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and so forth. The list goes on, frankly.
And those results, far from advancing our interests have
contributed to instability and set back our interests.
So if we are going to harness our allies' growing
capabilities, their willingness to take the initiative, we are
going to need to overcome a lot of obstacles. And I agree, with
many of my colleagues about those obstacles. It is their
limited military effectiveness. It is the poor coordination and
the disputes we have seen among our allies.
Their human rights deficiencies, I think this is most
egregious in the case of the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi,
but frankly these problems are endemic to the region. It is the
economic problems facing our allies and, frankly, our Gulf
partners all face a common set of economic problems. And it is
the role of spoilers like Iran and the increasing inroads being
made by external powers like Russia and China and in my written
testimony I go into detail about these and some proposed
solutions for overcoming them.
But on a couple of specific topics which you, Mr. Chairman,
and you, Ranking Member McCaul, raised on the topic of
suspending or placing conditions on arms sales or security
assistance, look, in my view, having worked on security
assistance, it should always begin with a common conception of
our shared interests and a shared strategy for tackling a
particular problem.
In the case of a conflict, our support should be
forthcoming only if we think our partners have realistic
objectives and a realistic timetable for accomplishing them.
Conditionality should be built in upfront in the initial
conversations. It should not just be something imposed by
Congress. I think, frankly, we should also expect our partners
to follow international norms of warfare.
But even as we promote human rights, promote reforms; we
need to be careful about tying these issues together because,
frankly, doing so has a poor track record. Our partners tend to
resent the imposition and frankly, our aid is often
insufficient leverage to accomplish the goals that we set for
it. I think it is better to avoid that temptation of tying
everything together, but I think we need to accept that we will
work on those issues separately, some will see faster progress,
some will see slower progress.
In Yemen, we need to bear in mind two big picture points in
Yemen. First, this is not primarily a Saudi-Iranian conflict in
Yemen. It has its roots in the disintegration of the Saleh
regime in 2011 and the ousting of the legitimate transitional
government by the Houthis.
Second, withdrawing our military support is not going to
end the war or ease the problems that Yemen is experiencing.
There are multiple conflicts in Yemen. The Houthis against the
coalition, there is a north-south conflict, there is the
conflict with AQAP and ISIS and so forth, and all of those will
go on if we withdraw.
So rather than walking away from our partners, it is
important that we work with them to craft a strategy for the
next phase of this war, which we and they believe should
primarily be a political phase of the conflict. This means,
first and foremost supporting the U.N.-led mediation, hopefully
building on it. And if those talks falter, as they may, it
means narrowing the scope of the conflict to what really
matters most and that is improving humanitarian access,
countering Iranian proliferation, and deterring missile and
rocket attacks.
A third point, we need to reinvigorate our diplomacy in the
region. In too many Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, you
have too many issues in the hands of too few officials and that
creates a fragility in the relationship. We need to use our
influence not just to shape the Saudi's behavior but to expand
the number of points of contact especially at the working
level. But encouraging our partners, frankly, to delegate means
practicing this discipline ourselves, and so we need to get
officials into place in Saudi Arabia and in Middle East
policymaking positions at State and DoD.
And just a final point, even as we seek to work through
allies, which we will do more and more in this region and maybe
others, we cannot forget that U.S. leadership remains
indispensable in this region. There is certain things that we
can do that our allies cannot, for example, building
international coalitions to counter ISIS or to counter Iran's
problematic behavior. We bring unique capabilities to the table
especially when it comes to countering some emerging threats
like cyber threats, maritime threats, and missile threats.
And to me, our forward-deployed presence is an essential
stabilizing factor in the region. I am a little bit concerned
about the talk that we hear now about bringing the troops home,
because a lot of our deployments in the region are sustainable,
they are low-cost, and, frankly, if we depart especially with
Russia and China coming in, especially with A2/AD technology
spreading, getting back in, will be much more difficult. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Singh.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for some questions.
Earlier this week, CNN reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE
has transferred U.S. weapons to al-Qaida-linked extremist
groups fighting in Yemen. The report also said that American
weapons are being used by the Houthi rebels which means they
have probably also been in the hands of the Iranians.
These reports are very troubling, and the Trump
administration must investigate further and work to prevent
this from happening again. In light of these allegations,
should Congress pursue greater restrictions on offensive
weapons to the Saudi coalition? What benchmarks should they be
required to meet before sales and transfers can continue?
Let me start with you, Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was equally
troubled by these reports which indicate that sophisticated
American weaponry is now finding its way into the hands of al-
Qaida linked extremists as well as the point you made which is
that Iranian intelligence operatives now have the chance to
take some of this weaponry and materiel, pull it apart, and
learn quite a bit about their adversary the United States'
capabilities and capacities.
And this underscores the risk of continuing to provide
offensive military capabilities to a coalition that is using
them in disregard of human rights and civilian casualties, but
is also using them in disregard of effective military action
including cutting all kinds of deals with al-Qaida linked
extremists throughout the country, some to get them to fight
with the coalition, some to pay them off to just go back into
the countryside with all of these weapons and the money to boot
to only buildup more strength to potentially threaten the
United States and its partners.
And so my bottom line view in answer to your question, Mr.
Chairman, is that the time has come for the United States to
cease providing offensive weapons for purposes of use in Yemen
altogether.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Harden, let me ask you this. In a post-conflict
scenario, which is hard to imagine at this point, what should
be the responsibility of the Saudi coalition in rebuilding
critical infrastructure in Yemen? What message should the
United States be sending to ensure that that planning starts
now?
Mr. Harden. Well, I think for sure the Saudis need to be
one of the lead donners and forces in the reconstruction of a
post-conflict Yemen. I do not think it should be limited to
just the Saudis. I think the UAE and the rest of the Gulf
States should contribute, but overwhelmingly it should be the
Saudis.
One additional point I would just add is that rebuilding
alone is not enough. The trading opportunities that Yemen would
have with Saudi and high-end markets are very important and I
would encourage the Saudis to look at that as a means of both
helping to provide economic opportunity to Yemen and
integrating into the world economy better. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Let me ask Dr. Karlin and Mr. Singh if they
would care to comment on any of the questions I asked Mr.
Sullivan and Mr. Harden.
Ms. Karlin. I would just like to add a little bit to that
first question on the possible movement of U.S. materiel to
unsavory actors. The U.S. military has an extremely rigorous
end use monitoring system, so whenever materiel is given to our
partners and allies around the world it is incumbent on them to
keep a close eye on where it is and U.S. embassy officials
regularly will go and check to confirm that materiel is where
it is supposed to be.
This is probably among the most worrisome things I have
heard in our cooperation with these militaries and that is a
pretty high bar given some of the things we have been
discussing so far. Of all things that would make me consider an
immediate halting of our cooperation, this is actually on the
top of the list.
If we cannot trust that the sophisticated materiel we give
our partners and allies sticks with them, then I think we
actually need to rethink the entire relationship. If I were in
your position I would call on a serious investigation by the
Pentagon of what happened here and what went wrong and who will
be held responsible, both on the U.S. Government and with our
partners.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. Well, I agree. I would say that from my point of
view end use monitoring and end use verification, this is
always very difficult in these types of conflict situations. We
saw similar phenomena in Syria and in Iraq where weapons ended
up in the hands of ISIS, oftentimes because they were dropped
on the battlefield by our partners.
I do think that the right response is not to say, well,
let's cutoff all assistance as a result. I think the right
response is to look more carefully into these reports, find out
what is happening, why it is happening and so forth, and then
act appropriately. Work with our partners, if necessary, to
improve end use verification.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
I would now like to recognize the ranking member for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I kind of look at this as sort of a geopolitical interest,
a tricky area of the world for sure. But I see Iran. I see
Saudi. I see Yemen. I see Israel. Iran is in Yemen.
Mr. Singh, can you tell us what Iran is doing in Yemen and
why are they supporting the Houthis?
Mr. Singh. Thank you.
From what I have seen, the Iranians have provided materiel
to the Houthis and it is possible they have also provided some
level of, say, training and even operational assistance for the
systems they provide the Houthis. So, for example, the rockets
and missiles that are fired into Saudi Arabia, the missiles
that have been fired in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait that have
endangered international shipping and the U.S. Navy, we suspect
a lot of that traces back to Iran.
Why is Iran doing this? I think Iran has a national
security strategy in the region which focuses on keeping
potential adversaries destabilized. I think Iran wants to see
instability on the border of Saudi Arabia so that Saudi Arabia
has to focus south and not focus on Iran proper. It is the same
concept that Iran follows in Lebanon keeping pressure on
Israel's northern border as a sort of tool to use leverage
against Israel.
That is why I think that, frankly, the Iranians probably do
not have much interest in the resolution of this conflict in
Yemen.
Mr. McCaul. So they are supporting the Houthis I guess,
presumably, against the Saudis. Does this affect Israel in any
way?
Mr. Singh. I think the Israelis as well as our other allies
in the region are very concerned about Iran's cultivation of
proxies across the region. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, they
are trying to do it Bahrain and probably trying to do it
elsewhere as well, because what we have seen is that there is a
sort of transfer of knowledge, equipment, funding, and so forth
between these proxies.
Hezbollah has boasted about assisting the Houthis.
Hezbollah is active in Iraq. We have seen Bahraini Shia
extremists go and participate in Iraqi Shia militias and so
forth. So it is that network of Iranian proxies across the
region, the transfer of weaponry, technology, funding, and so
forth that is concerning to all of our allies in the region.
Mr. McCaul. OK. So in my briefings, and I had one just
yesterday, our involvement in the region is not one of engaging
in hostilities against the Houthis, but rather a
counterterrorism mission against AQAP, al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula, and ISIS. I was chairman of Homeland Security for 6
years. Every time we have an external plot threat briefing in
the classified space,it was always coming out of AQAP wanting
to hit airliners, bring down airplanes.
Can you tell us--and DNI Coats has testified that AQAP
remains one of the largest and most capable terrorist groups
globally. In your assessment, is our mission limited to
counterterrorism in Yemen and not a broader as some would say
against the Houthis, is that a righteous mission for us to be
there?
Mr. Singh. Oh absolutely, Congressman. I think that
America's direct involvement in Yemen is limited to our actions
against AQAP and other affiliated groups. That mission has
continued throughout this conflict which has obviously posed
big challenges for that mission. But if you look at the record
over the past year or 2 years, in fact, I think we have made
some strides in that mission against AQAP, but it remains a
very serious threat. I think most of our CT personnel agree on
that.
Mr. McCaul. So I would to my colleagues, I would say as we
debate this resolution that we have no involvement. We have no
active engagement of hostilities in Yemen from a military
standpoint. Our only presence in Yemen is a counterterrorism
presence against AQAP al-Qaida under a 2001 authorized use of
military force that was authorized after 9/11 to go after al-
Qaida.
And we have a humanitarian assistance presence. There is no
presence in Yemen to actively engage in hostilities against the
Houthis. Would you agree with that, Mr. Singh?
Mr. Singh. I would agree with it. I think the types of
assistance we are giving to the Saudi-led coalition, whether it
is intelligence sharing, midair refueling, which obviously we
are not doing anymore, to me these would not constitute
engaging in the hostilities. And if we were to consider then
that, it would set, a pretty difficult precedent for our
actions around the world.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, sir.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
I am going to ask him to take the chair for a few minutes.
Mr. Sherman [presiding]. American national security starts
with nonproliferation. The new crown prince MbS has said that
he wants a nuclear program for Saudi Arabia and has hinted that
the reason is so that he can have the same or better nuclear
capacity than Iran when it comes to weapons. The least
expensive way to generate electricity most of the time is to
burn natural gas when the natural gas is very cheap. There is a
lot of natural gas on the Arabian Peninsula where it is
inexpensive or you can go through the highly expensive cost of
liquefying it and exporting it.
So the question here is, is the Saudi nuclear program being
created because it is some efficient way to generate
electricity or is it being created for the purpose of giving
Saudi Arabia an opportunity to learn the nuclear technology and
develop the systems necessary so that they could choose to move
forward with a nuclear weapon?
Does anybody have a response? Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. Congressman, it is a matter of U.S. national
security that we work against nuclear proliferation across the
Middle East starting with blocking Iran's attempts to seek a
nuclear weapon. But very much focused on working with our
partners in the Gulf to choose alternatives to trying to
develop an indigenous enrichment capacity, we have signed a 123
agreement with the UAE, for example, in which the supply of
nuclear technology comes from the outside so there is no
proliferation risk.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. I would point out that Saudi Arabia is
resisting signing the same kind of protection and limitation
agreement that UAE signed and that the only reason for them not
to agree to standards designed to prevent them from having a
nuclear weapon is because they want the capacity to have a
nuclear weapon.
We may differ on what our policy should be in Yemen, but at
a minimum I do not see how we can cooperate with Saudi Arabia
on Yemen or many other things until they agree not to develop
nuclear weapons and that any nuclear program they have would be
subject to the same gold standard that Mr. Sullivan provides.
The Washington Post cited satellite imagery indicating that
Saudi Arabia has secretly built a ballistic missile production
factory.
Do any of you have any information as to which country is
helping them build that factory? I am not sure any of you
would. I will move on to the next question.
Yemen poses a great moral quandary for us because terrible
things are going to happen next year and the year after and
this year in Yemen. And the question morally for us is, are we
morally pure if we can at least say we are not involved?
Saudi Arabia has air power. Whoever uses air power is
subject to a lot of attacks in the press because when it goes
wrong it is obvious and it is big. The Houthis have small arms.
What they do may be just as deadly, their use of child
soldiers, their stealing of aid payments and food has been well
documented. But the Saudis use bombing and they are
occasionally, perhaps more than occasionally, going to hit
civilian targets.
So I think we are in a--but if we do not help them they are
still going to bomb them, they just may be more inaccurate. So
which is the more morally pure position for the United States?
To help Saudi Arabia with its bombing program knowing that even
with our help they are going to hit two school buses this year,
or to wash our hands of the program knowing that they are going
to keep bombing and then without our help they are going to hit
four school buses this year?
So the question for the panel is, would cutting off
targeting assistance, and that is the focus of the question,
targeting assistance, to Saudi Arabia cause them to reduce
their bombing or would they simply reduce the accuracy of the
same number of sorties?
Mr. Harden.
Mr. Harden. So I mean, I think the United States needs to
remain engaged in Yemen and it is hard to disaggregate between
the military component of it and the humanitarian----
Mr. Sherman. I am just focusing on----
Mr. Harden. No, I understand.
Mr. Sherman. I have very limited time.
Mr. Harden. Right. So if we are not involved we are not
going to have influence and we are not going to be able to
affect the outcome in a way that would be constructive for the
Yemeni people.
Mr. Sherman. Does anybody have a very quick answer? Would
the Saudis reduce their bombing or just reduce the accuracy?
Ms. Karlin. Where is the evidence that the U.S. support for
targeting assistance over the last few years has meaningfully
helped the situation?
Mr. Sherman. Well, we cannot count the buses that have not
been hit and we do not know. We simply do not know, but my time
has expired and I will move on to the next witness, next
member.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the
witnesses for being here today.
In December I visited Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling where at
a hangar--and I hope my colleagues go by and visit--it is to me
a shocking display of weapons that were seized in Yemen which
clearly have been provided by Iran. They make it very simple.
Some of the materiel, some of the weapons are in English,
``Made in Iran,'' but really said, one of the centerpieces is
debris from a short-range missile fired by the Houthis in Yemen
at a civilian airport in Saudi Arabia.
So this is not just the conflict within the country, but it
is a direct threat and with the missile capability that is
being provided by Iran, it is a direct threat to the whole
region. And I indeed hope our colleagues go by and see this.
With that in mind, Mr. Singh, how would you describe Iran's
relationship with the Houthis? What kind of financial training
and arms procurement support does Iran provide?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman.
I think that from what I have seen, and I am not privy to
all the information on this, basically the Iranians are
providing the Houthis with the types of weapons that you are
describing, quite recklessly, I agree. And they are also
providing them perhaps with some training to go along with
these weapons. They are also providing them with oil which
constitutes financial assistance, more or less. The Houthis
then tax that oil when distributing it.
Again I think that the Houthis are not exactly an Iranian
proxy. I do not think the Iranians can tell the Houthis what to
do if we ask them go tell them to stop. I think for the
Iranians this is really about destabilizing Saudi Arabia's
border and not about anything aimed at resolving the conflict.
Mr. Wilson. And I want to point out too that it was really
clear of the advanced drone technology of all things that has
been provided to the Houthis which could have far-reaching
consequences.
Mr. Harden, last month Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held
the second Strategic Dialogue in Doha, Qatar which reaffirmed
our partnership with Qatar. The U.S. and Qatar affirmed support
for a strong and unified Gulf Cooperation Council. Sadly, we
have a circumstance of the ongoing dispute between Qatar and
its neighbors which impacts America's security interests. What
can be done to address this?
Mr. Harden. Sorry. I am not, frankly, the best person to
answer how we resolve the Qatar GCC rift. It is extraordinarily
complicated and I am not sure there is an easy path forward. I
am also not sure how much leverage we actually have to make
that happen, but I would defer to others.
Mr. Wilson. And then, in fact, I was going to refer to Mr.
Singh. Do you have any suggestions on how the United States can
help resolve the conflict between Qatar and its neighbors who
we all need to be working with?
Mr. Singh. Well, it is a longstanding rift, Congressman,
and I think that, frankly, our tools are pretty limited to
solve it. We have been trying, I think, to support the Kuwaiti
mediation. I think we should continue to do that but I think
that there is not much we can do directly to solve the problem.
I think, frankly, we can continue to work with both sides
and we should continue to work with both sides and cultivate
good relationships on both sides, frankly, for better or worse.
In this region as well as some other regions we have
experienced working with allies who do not work well together.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate you pointing that out about
Kuwait being involved. This is so important to our country with
Al Udeid Air Base located in Qatar, the significance of our
working with them, the potential for economic investments in
our country. But again I am just so hopeful that Kuwait can
make a difference. I yield back.
Mr. Sherman. The gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I listen to your comments, obviously a political
solution is better than anything else. But how do you get a
political solution when instability is promoted by the Iranians
and they use it as a weapon for their security? So how do you
get some sort of a political solution? I mean the Iranians they
want instability, they do not want a political solution. And if
you do not have Iranians at the table, I do not think there is
a possibility of a political solution.
And I am not saying a military solution is the way to go,
but you know, I think that after the Iranian deal that we
withdrew from I was just wondering are they getting more
aggressive, the Iranians? So.
Mr. Harden. Just in terms of political negotiations and
solutions, this is a multidimensional, multi-actor war. By my
count there is at least five overlapping, interlocking wars and
so a political accommodation would have to resolve all of that.
To the extent that the Yemeni people, themselves, can take the
lead in resolving that, that would be the most useful.
Civil wars that are externally funded and financed do not
extinguish themselves easily at all. The evidence is very clear
about that. So I am not hopeful that we can get to a political
accommodation any time reasonably soon. Even if Martin
Griffiths was able to reach an accommodation that is only one
element of it. That is the Saudi-led coalition against the
Houthis for all intents and purposes. There is four other wars
that are going on. That is not a part of the negotiation.
Just in terms of the Iranian-Houthi element about this, I
would just like to kind of reemphasize one point that Michael
Singh made and that is it costs the Iranians almost nothing to
destabilize Saudi Arabia. It is a very easy way to continue to
poke them and to unsettle them. And I did say in my statement
for the record there was 216 Iranian ballistic missiles that
have been fired into the Saudi space. And in addition, the
Houthis have at times controlled actual territory in Saudi. So
this is an extraordinarily complicated conflict.
Mr. Sullivan. Just a couple points to add to underscore
what Mr. Harden was saying before. In some ways actually
getting to a political accommodation between the Saudis and the
Houthis is easier on the list of difficult conflicts than some
of the other ones that are happening. Now the Iranian element
here remains a very problematic one, but in a way choosing a
strategy vis-a-vis Iran where it is you have to fulfill 17
conditions before we will do anything with you makes it very
difficult to try to do anything with respect to Yemen. Because
we have not essentially adopted an approach that tells the
Iranians that there is kind of no, there is no carrot and stick
related to their activities in Yemen, whatsoever, it is all
connected to a whole series of other broader issues.
And I think that that strategy is unrealistic and until we
hear from the administration how they intend to size and shape
their strategy vis-a-vis Iran to deal with the specific
conflicts, including the conflict in Yemen, we are not going to
make a lot of progress. But the one thing that we can do
practically in the near term is work with our partners on
disrupting and interdicting Iranian shipments both by land and
by sea to the Houthis. And I think the United States should,
and there should be bipartisan support in Congress to press the
administration to develop a strategy to do that.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Singh.
Ms. Karlin. We should also recall that Iranian support to
Hezbollah is meaningfully more substantial and more problematic
for U.S. national security interests and U.S. interests in the
region than its support to the Houthi.
Mr. Sires. Well, that is precisely what I am saying. You
know, you have Yemen. You have Lebanon. You have Syria. They
are all playing the instability game there, so how do you come
to a solution for this?
Mr. Singh. So--I am sorry.
Ms. Karlin. Let me just quickly add. Yes, they are and it
is pretty easy for them to do so and it is pretty cheap
particularly in the case of the Houthis. You know, the
relationship with Hezbollah is decades and decades long has
only deepened in the last few years. You now have a situation
where effectively Hezbollah is taking a number of steps not in
its interests domestically, but because the Iranians have made
them do so. That is not the case with the Houthis. There is a
differentiation between them.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. I think that we do want to see a political
resolution to this conflict. I think our allies want to see a
political resolution to this conflict. Iran does not, want to
see a political resolution to this conflict. The longer it goes
on, the better it is I think for Iran and the more the chance
Iran has to deepen its influence there.
By the way, I will also add that I think for Iran it would
be a major strategic victory if their actions in this conflict
led us to asunder our relationship with our traditional allies
of 70-plus years in the region and so we need to be very
careful about doing so. I think that in Yemen obviously trying
to drive the conflict to a resolution, a political resolution
which the Houthis have resisted is important.
I think across the region denying Iran new opportunities to
meddle is very important as well and I think you do that really
in two big ways. One is by strengthening our allies and the
other is by ensuring that----
Mr. Sires. My time is up. I do not want to keep taking
other people's time.
Mr. Singh. Just to finish this thought very briefly, to
ensure that these marginalized populations around the region
really are embraced by their governments and not marginalized.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Perry, the chart prepared by the committee identifies
you as a member from California and I know that is an honor to
which you aspire, but in the meantime you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.
Mr. Sullivan, can you tell us what they behead people in
Saudi Arabia for? What kind of alleged crimes or accusations
are people beheaded for in Saudi Arabia, if you know?
Mr. Sullivan. I am not an expert on Saudi criminal law, but
they have had a history of beheading people for a range of
crimes relating to crimes against the State, blasphemy, other
things that are somehow an affront either to the Saudi kingdom
or to the religion of the country.
Mr. Perry. Sure, violating the First Amendment as we would
see it in the United States. How about drugs, trafficking in
drugs, narcotics?
Mr. Sullivan. So I do not know if that is a beheading
offense.
Mr. Perry. OK. Well, I do know and it is. And do you know
how many beheadings on an average they have in Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Sullivan. I do not.
Mr. Perry. OK, so The Guardian, not a bastion of
conservatism, reported just last year that 12 per month. Now I
suspect, I do not know but I suspect this has been going on for
a long time, and we have had a long relationship with Saudi
Arabia. I am curious about the newfound outrage--look, what
happened to Khashoggi is horrific.
But the point is, is this is the Saudi Arabian Government
and they do this in their country on a regular basis, on a
daily basis, almost. And I am concerned about it seems the
feeling of the panel, at least some on the panel and some in
our country that we need to now detach ourselves from our
relationship, a longstanding relationship with Saudi Arabia
over this issue alone and put the region and the relationship
and the greater issue in peril. That concerns me and that
confuses me and I find that intriguing that suddenly this is an
issue after all this time.
Now you have said that we should abandon the current policy
and essentially what I think you said is do something more
constructive regarding our posture vis-a-vis Iran. And I just
heard what you talked about interdicting some of the shipments
and so on and so forth, but it almost portends that we should
stop what we are doing now, because what we are doing now is
making it worse, and then and interdict and try more diplomacy.
And it seems to me that if we stop what we are doing now
Iran is not going to be like, well, listen, the Americans
stopped so we are going to take our foot off the gas and we
will take it easy on Yemen now. I do not think they are going
to do that. It seems to me we should continue what we are doing
and add the other components of what you talked about. Is that
something that you could espouse?
Mr. Sullivan. I strongly agree with you that Iran's
reaction to the U.S. deciding to stop supporting the activities
of the Saudi-led coalition is not going to lead them to stop
fueling the conflict. They will not, which is why I am
proposing a two-step process, one in which we stop supporting
something which is deeply ineffective to American interests and
is helping Iran; and then second, we also step up activities
that would be far more effective in curbing Iran's capacity to
aid the Houthi.
Mr. Perry. So helping our ally, albeit flawed, our
relationship is what it is. I am sure you are all familiar with
the petrodollar arrangement with Saudi Arabia over a long time.
They are an imperfect actor in this, but you are saying that
stopping assisting and targeting, their targeting of their
enemy and potentially and substantially our enemy supported by
Iran, is going to help the situation?
Mr. Sullivan. I believe that the current coalition
operations, particularly as they relate to the conflict vis-a-
vis the Houthis, have been counterproductive to Saudi and
Emirate interests and counterproductive to American interests
and helpful to Iranian interests. They have----
Mr. Perry. So the Saudis are working against their own
direct interest right now.
Mr. Sullivan. In this case, I do not think they are doing
it on purpose. They are not waking up in the morning and saying
we want to do that, but the net result of their military
operation is to put them in a worse position strategically vis-
a-vis Iran. And the United States should be able to make a
strategic assessment of that and say let's course-correct.
Let's course-correct in terms of American policy and let's
convince our partners that the best way forward here is not to
continue the coalition operations as they have been carried out
so far.
Mr. Perry. So letting Iran have free rein and free range
over Yemen?
Mr. Sullivan. No, of course not. And that is why I am
arguing for a strategy that says enough with the bombing
campaign which has caused a significant number of human
casualties, has disrupted the provision of humanitarian
assistance, and has driven more people to the Houthi side while
not dislodging the Houthis from Sanaa, by the way, and let's
instead really focus on the threat which is the ballistic
missile threat, the provision of materiel from Iran to the
Houthis.
Let's get focused like a laser beam on that and provide our
partners with the tools and technologies they need to take that
one. That will lead to greater Saudi and Emirate stability.
That will undermine Iran's interests in the region. And I
believe it will also contribute to----
Mr. Perry. Seems to me--thank you, Mr. Sullivan. I do not
want to cut you short but I am out of time here. It seems to me
that applying more pressure as opposed to less on all fronts is
a better strategy than relieving the pressure at one point and
adding it to another and freeing them up completely on the
battlefield.
With that I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sherman. The gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have all said, I
believe, that it is important to enhance our diplomatic
efforts, our political efforts in the region and not walk away
from it. Let me give you an example of concern. It was brought
up by Mr. Wilson when he was asking about Qatar. When the
blockade was there, then Secretary Tillerson did begin
diplomatic efforts. He contacted people in the region. He
contacted our allies in Europe and asked for support and
pressure to make a negotiated effort to resolve that.
At the same time, with one of our allies, the President,
when given that kind of opportunity to say we are with the
U.S., we have talked with Secretary Tillerson on this issue, we
will be with you on negotiations, the President responded,
well, that was Tillerson's opinion, I am with the Saudis. Now
how can the U.S. be effective in negotiating diplomatically
when we are not speaking in one voice? How big of a problem is
that?
How damaging is that first as exerting our influence as a
country itself, and second, trying to work with allies to try
and enhance this diplomatic presence?
Mr. Harden. So I worked most recently in the Yemen Affairs
Unit which is our embassy-in-exile. Yemen and Saudi Arabia, it
is not the first time that the administration or any
administration speaks with mixed messages and conflicting----
Mr. Keating. Yes. If I could interrupt, this was our
Secretary of State and the President of the United States.
Mr. Harden. Yes. No, but you are asking a very specific
question and that is, what is it that we can do.
And, frankly, we--this is an extraordinarily complicated
war. The humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world. We do
not actually have enough people on the ground at the Yemen
Affairs Unit to even begin to do any of the analysis that is
underlying this and to work through some of the challenges.
I mean we cannot be a great power if we do not have people
in place. I mean that is a simple, simple answer to your larger
question, but it is also is necessary----
Mr. Keating. What about the importance--my time is limited,
sorry. What about our importance of our allies and trying to
really bring them together as a coalition, particularly our
European allies and particularly in light of the JCPOA with
what is happening that could cause a great division with our
European allies in that region?
Ms. Karlin. Our allies and partners are our comparative
global advantage. There is no other power in the entire world
that can command so many relationships. When something goes
wrong various countries look to Washington to help figure out
what to do. That is good and I would rather it be us than
Moscow or Beijing.
Things we could do would be, say, having an ambassador in
the UAE or in Saudi or in Qatar, having senior officials at the
State Department who can focus on the Middle East. As Mr.
Harden said, we do not have enough people. I would further that
point. We do not have enough capable people with the right
experience at the right level to actually allow the deft
diplomacy, the carrots and sticks that we really need to exert
in this complicated region.
Mr. Keating. Does anyone else see the danger in not being
able to fully utilize that advantage we have as working as a
coalition when you hear these things and you see the reactions
with the JCPOA in our European allies?
Mr. Sullivan. You know, one of the things that really
concern me about the U.S. approach to the JCPOA is that in
pulling out we would put ourselves at odds with all of the rest
of our partners in NATO, and the Europeans do not have as heavy
either a diplomatic influence or a military presence in the
Middle East, not by a long shot.
But being able to speak with one voice with our European
allies and partners particularly when it comes to applying
pressure to Iran was a useful tool that we previously had that
we have now put back on the shelf to a significant extent. And
we are trying to coerce the Europeans, but they are dragging
their feet and as a result our capacity to influence Iranian
behavior, I believe, is less than it was when we had global
unity around that issue.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. Just a quick question back
and forth, I know it is difficult but we talked about the
actions of the Saudi crown prince. We have talked about what he
has done to repress women who have spoken up, where he has
imprisoned them, where he and there is reports of torture and
sexual harassment even.
Would you call the crown prince a reformer by any stretch
of the imagination, yes or no?
Mr. Singh. Look, Congressman, I agree with what you said
and I think we need to raise the profile of these issues in the
U.S.-Saudi relationship. That said, I think when it comes to
economic reform and some of those other things, you see that a
lot of Saudis, especially young Saudis, do want to see the
types of reforms that the crown prince has talked about, so
there is a bit of a contradiction there.
And the question is can we support the pieces that we think
would actually be good for Saudi Arabia like diversifying its
economy and allowing expanding women's rights and reducing
especially Saudi support for extremism while trying to
influence Saudi behavior on those other areas where, frankly,
their policies are way out of whack with what we would like to
see them be.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. My time is up, but I do agree with
your points that it should not just be a binary relationship,
all or nothing. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on
your first hearing. For the panel, thank you for being here.
I do not need to give anybody a history lesson, you guys
know it. But if I look back with our involvement in Afghanistan
and Iraq, 17 going on 18 years, the trillions of dollars, loss
of life, I look at Russia when they fought in Afghanistan, I
see what is going on in Syria, probably one of the worst, if
not the worst civil war in our history with multiple competing
factions, and then you look at Yemen with what is going on in
there and then we go back in biblical times, it has really been
conflict after conflict after conflict.
I look at the Carter Doctrine that President Carter came up
with to deal with energy, to deal with stability, and keeping
the shipping lanes open there, and we talk about the
humanitarian crisis in Yemen which is terrible, and we talk
about this conflict and that there is not a military solution
to this, that we need to look to diplomacy.
Is there a functioning government in Yemen, for the panel?
Is that a consensus--no, no, no, no, four noe's?
All right. If there is not a functioning government in
Yemen can you have a political solution to this? Anybody? Mr.
Singh?
Mr. Singh. Well, look. I think----
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Harden, you can come next then.
Mr. Singh. We maybe will say the same thing, I am not sure.
But I think the ideal outcome to this from our point of view
and, frankly, from our allies point of view would be some kind
of power sharing arrangement between the different factions. As
my colleagues mentioned there is multiple conflicts going on.
Mr. Yoho. There is.
Mr. Singh. But in Yemen that has typically been how these
types of conflicts end. It is through some kind of political
compromise and power sharing arrangement.
Mr. Yoho. All right, real quickly, Mr. Harden.
Mr. Harden. So in general the Hadi government does not
exercise much control, credibility, or legitimacy. There are
pockets within the government that do and I would look to the
central bank Governor as a good example, which by the way is a
crucial, crucial point. And as Mr. Singh had mentioned, the
Yemenis have typically resolved their conflicts themselves. In
this context, however, with all the external actors that are
involved we should brace ourselves for a war that is going to
go on longer than any of us can bear.
Mr. Yoho. It is. And it is something we just see over and
over again. I mean we look at what we did in Syria we supplied
weapons to the Syrian free rebel fighters that wound up in the
hands of the bad players. We are seeing it play out here as the
chairman brought up with the CNN report. There has to be a
better way.
And then we talk about the U.N. has to get in there and put
some influence on there. Can the U.N. even be effective in that
area on a humanitarian crisis if you do not have a political
solution to this, and if you do not have a functioning
government you cannot have a political solution. And it just
seems like a catch-22 you just go around and around.
It does not mean we do not try. But there has to be
something that we can do outside of the box that we have not
done that--I mean you guys are smart people, ma'am, all of you.
You are all smart. We should be able to bring resources
together in a different way that we have not done in the past.
Any suggestions other than well, we have to do the humanitarian
and have a political solution?
Mr. Harden. I mean the humanitarian is extraordinarily
expensive. It saves lives.
Mr. Yoho. Oh, it is.
Mr. Harden. But it is also insanely expensive.
Mr. Yoho. And it will never end unless we get a solution,
so we are just treating the symptom.
Mr. Harden. But I also just want to hammer home this point.
We do not have enough people that are involved on this----
Mr. Yoho. Enough people where?
Mr. Harden. We do not have enough American Foreign Service
officers in who are tracking Yemen in the Middle East. USAID
has three people. The largest humanitarian crisis on the face
of the earth, in the region, I am not counting all the people
that are back----
Mr. Yoho. All right. So is that an agreement with everybody
that more U.N. people there, USAID----
Mr. Harden. No, U.S. U.S. I am talking about U.S.
Mr. Yoho. Right. I am sorry, U.S. boots on the ground.
Mr. Singh. I mean, I am going to disappoint you on this,
Congressman, because I think there is no out-of-the-box
solution to this. I think actually supporting the U.N.-led
mediation effort as much as we can is probably our best bet
right now. Martin Griffiths, the U.N. Envoy, I think, has made
more progress recently than has been made in the past. I think
there is hope.
Mr. Yoho. Is he dealing with all factions that are fighting
there or just the main one?
Mr. Singh. Well, he is dealing, I think, specifically with
this conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition,
which is important to do. It is not the only conflict in Yemen.
I think we need to support that and then bring our unique
capabilities to bear on some of the other problems we have
talked about, for example interdicting the flow of arms to the
Houthis not just by sea but also by land through Amman and so
forth.
Mr. Yoho. Well, and we know it is coming from Russia,
China, Iran, North Korea, and there is a lot of bad players in
there. I am out of time. It is just a frustrating thing again
and a repeat of kind of a Groundhog Day. And it is too bad for
the people of Yemen. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to followup on two questions. First off, our
colleague Mr. Wilson raises a question of how do we solve this
blockade and this challenge between the Saudis, UAE, Qatar, but
more importantly something that Mr. Keating touched on. And
this may be a little bit in the weeds, but I think we have some
concern and I think this is bipartisan on both sides of the
aisle, the decisionmaking process within the administration.
I will use a very recent example, the decisionmaking
process to withdraw from Syria, I think, is a very big concern
here. I was in the Middle East in December and we had a chance
to have dinner with our Special Envoy Brett McGurk and have a
conversation with him. There was no indication while we were
making progress in the battle against ISIS, there was no
indication that this was near done.
We met with our military commanders outside of Doha and
again their mission was progressing in a positive direction,
but again no indication that we were nearing the end here. You
know, take that to what General Votel said yesterday that he
was not consulted and had no idea that this was coming.
So the following week after we get back from the Middle
East talking to folks, a tweet goes out and says mission's
complete and we are--and I have no idea how that decision was
made. Best I can tell is the President had a conversation with
Erdogan in Turkey and made some decisions. And I think that is
real concerning to this body and should be concerning to all of
us in Congress that there is not that consultative process.
And we do not have to guess if Mr. McGurk was consulted
because he wrote a Washington Post op-ed that said he was not
consulted. This is our Special Envoy who is there who is our
most knowledgeable person who--and that is of deep concern. If
we take that to the blockade I have real concern about how the
decision and what message we are sending to the Saudis.
If you look at the President's relationship and Mr.
Kushner's relationship with the crown prince he had a meeting
here with the crown prince in March 2017. In May 2017, the
President and Mr. Kushner visited Saudi Arabia. The next thing
you know in June, early June, the Saudi blockade to Qatar
started.
Now how can we address these issues if we do not actually
know what the administration's strategy, if we do not know what
is leading to this? And the best I can tell we are told that
National Security Advisor John Bolton has stopped the
interagency decisionmaking process, and again as a body that
has oversight responsibilities, here, I think we are very
concerned about this.
You know, Dr. Karlin, maybe I will start with you. Do you
have any idea what the decisionmaking process within the
administration is?
Ms. Karlin. Everything I have heard echoes your profound
concerns. These are hard issues. There is no easy answer. The
last thing one would want to do is not actually try to
deliberately think through them. And I think that is not only
unhelpful for our policy, but it plays a really problematic
signaling role to our allies, partners, frenemies and
adversaries.
You know, part of the reason those troops in Syria are
helpful is operational, part of it is signaling. If there is
uncertainty as to what is going to happen just based on what
happens in a tweet, it is really, really unhelpful.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. I think there are--every administration, and
I think Mr. Harden made this point, struggles with coordination
in speaking with one voice. But I believe the current
administration has elevated this to a kind of art form, a
disturbing art form. It is not in the same league as previous
administrations in terms of any kind of credible, consistent
policy process that produces results based on the evidence, the
facts, and consultation with the military and civilian experts.
There are four basic consequences of this. The first is
that it confuses and demoralizes our allies who do not know
that they can count on us, the second is that it leaves our
troops in a bad spot. They are out there twisting in the wind
while the President is on again and off again when it comes to,
say, leaving Syria.
The third is that it emboldens our enemies. And finally it
undermines the credibility of the commander-in-chief himself,
but also anyone else who goes out to purportedly speak on
behalf of the United States because no one can trust the word
of an American official. And that has the net result, I think,
of deeply undermining America's national security interests.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. I tend to agree that American unpredictability
is certainly not a stabilizing factor here. I think our allies
in this region and other regions are concerned about American
unpredictability and it leads them into all sorts of hedging
behaviors which tend to be bad for us.
I think that it is the President's right to make a decision
and every administration has a different decisionmaking process
and that balance between deliberating and sort of boldness is a
different balance struck by every administration. But it is
very important I think that when a decision is reached we be
very careful and sort of consider it in the way that we carry
out those decisions. And that is what I would personally like
to see more of.
Mr. Bera. Thank you. I will yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here today. I know we are going to get more into the
discussion of the details of the Saudi War Powers Resolution
but I want to address some of that here.
One of my biggest pet peeves in foreign policy is when
people allow whoever is President to change their foreign
policy view because maybe they either just want to support this
person or oppose this person, and by the way my side did some
of that as well in 2013. When there was an attempt to bomb
Syria for its use of chemical weapons, I had Members of
Congress come up to me and say that they think we should do it
but they are worried that they do not want to give President
Obama the authority to do that. That was a huge pet peeve of
mine.
What else is a huge pet peeve of mine is this newfound kind
of religion on the situation in Yemen and the situation in
Saudi Arabia that has been found by my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle. I would like to make the point that it seems
in this Yemen debate and Yemen policy it always comes back to
somehow it is the United States' and Saudi Arabia's fault for a
humanitarian crisis, even though there is sometimes a caveat
which says, as Mr. Sullivan did in his testimony, ``to be
clear, the coalition does not bear all of the responsibility
for the violence and suffering in Yemen.''
Well, that is true. Because as something that I think is
not discussed very often is that the Houthis overthrew a
legitimate government. The Houthis used food as weapons to
starve innocent civilians. And as terrible as every bomb that
misses its target or it hits an intentional target of innocent
civilians from the Saudis is, I can point to incidences where
the Houthis and backed by the Iranians used weapons to kill
innocent people and to block innocent children from having food
to put into their mouths to live by.
We look at the Houthis that placed war materials among
civilians so that the Saudis bomb it. This is not a new tactic
to us. We have seen it from the beginning of war in the Middle
East. Civilians are actually to be used in the information side
of war so that hopefully the Saudis in the thinking of the
Houthis bomb this facility or something we have, kill
civilians, and then we can go to the international media and
try to turn them against the Saudis. Our assistance for the
Saudis by the way started under a prior administration and it
is only recently that it has become an issue to use as an
attack against President Trump.
While I appreciate having this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I
really do, and I think this is the beginning of the discussion
that Congress should have on this issue, in about 2 hours we
are going to vote to try to take away the President's ability
to be commander-in-chief. We are going to vote probably out of
this committee to take away the President's ability to use
counterterrorism strategies in the Arabian Peninsula to destroy
the enemies of the United States of America.
Most of the members of this committee are new. Most of the
members of this committee have never sat through a classified
briefing about what is really going on in Yemen. We had that
last year. And even though some complained that it was not deep
enough, I agree. Let's do another one with this whole committee
before we go voting on policies that have to do with life and
death.
When we take, if we take our material support away from
Saudi Arabia, it is not like Saudi Arabia is going to quit
executing the war. But what they will quit doing is living to
some extent by the law of armed conflict that we demand they
do. They will to some extent quit living by, when we enforce on
them and show them the legitimate targets in Yemen and now they
will see more illegitimate targets, potentially, of targets
because they do not have the resources that the United States
has.
So while I understand and am concerned and am compassionate
about the humanitarian concerns in Yemen, the reality is if we
act politically on this committee which I think we are poised
to do because we can all go out on TV and say that we are
opposing the Trump administration, because we can all go out on
TV and say that we are fighting for humanitarian rights which
we all want to do, but the impact of that will be far beyond, I
think, what we are even debating now.
So I hope that when we do that and I am going to talk more
about it then that we actually think about maybe having a
classified briefing. Bring Republicans and Democrats in and
talking about what is really at stake.
Mr. Singh, just with the 40 seconds I have left, what
happens if the United States pulls all material support for
Saudi Arabia and the coalition, is it going to save lives or do
you think it might potentially cost more lives?
Mr. Singh. Well, I would say two things, Congressman. One
is the war will go on. I think that it will not cause the
conflict in Yemen to end, the suffering there will continue and
I do worry that we then lose our leverage and influence with
those allies.
But second, I also worry, frankly, about the wider effect
again of considering these types of activities, intelligence
sharing, midair refueling under acquisition and cross-servicing
agreements, to be engaging in hostilities. I mean what does
that mean for the routine types of cooperation we do with
allies around the world? So I think it goes even beyond Yemen.
Mr. Bera [presiding]. Ms. Wild from Pennsylvania.
Ms. Wild. Thank you.
I want to switch gears and ask all of you this, but I am
specifically directing my questions to Dr. Karlin. The Saudi-
led coalition is reportedly recruiting and deploying children
to fight in the Yemen campaign, as I understand it, including a
large number of children from Sudan. And some reports suggest
20 percent of the units are made up of children while others
report 40 percent. Some of these children have been reported as
wearing U.S.-produced uniforms and carrying U.S. weapons. Under
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, the U.S. is
prohibited from providing several types of military assistance
to governments known to use child soldiers.
My question to you is this, and as I said it is to any of
you who can offer information on this. What oversight is
available to determine Saudi compliance with the Child Soldiers
Prevention Act and are we employing those oversight efforts?
And what further what should Congress be asking of the
administration to ensure that the coalition is complying with
this?
Ms. Karlin. I think there are two questions in here.
Question 1 is what effect is our support having? That has come
up in a lot of the questions, right. Are we playing a more
positive role or a more problematic role? The second question
that I think you are walking to is are our partners actually
following U.S. law, whether it is Leahy law, whether it is the
Child Soldiers Prevention Act, and all of that should be
reported by the Departments of State and Defense potentially in
classified hearings, but that is incumbent on them to be able
to say at a minimum whether or not our partners are actually
following our laws. And, frankly, if they are not, then the
first question is almost moot.
Ms. Wild. Does anybody else have anything to add on that?
OK. I want to switch gears then to Mr. Harden. I understand
that you do not believe that humanitarian aid is the only path
forward; in fact it is we need to open up lines of commerce and
so forth.
But I am deeply concerned that despite the huge amount of
aid that has been directed to Yemen, despite the food and
agricultural organization providing crops and vegetable seeds
and fishing gear and poultry production kits and vaccinations
and treatment for livestock, and despite UNICEF treating nearly
230,000 children suffering from severe, acute malnutrition,
this conflict still prevents significant obstacles to reaching
the 12.5 million Yemenis that we have been unable to reach.
So understanding that your position is that humanitarian
aid is not really the direction we need to go in, I think that
is your position, what concrete actions should be taken to
ensure that we do have humanitarian access for the U.N. and
international NGO's?
Mr. Harden. Yes. So humanitarian aid is vital for the most
vulnerable and we should not minimize it. My point is that of
the total amount of basic commodities that go into Yemen, so
food and medicine, 95 percent of it is imported through private
sector channels. And so that really has to be the solution.
This is not a drought famine so it is not that there is not
enough food in the market. There is enough food in Yemen. It is
a pricing and currency collapse issue. The splintering of the
central bank in September 2016 was a unique event in civil
wars. It does not happen in civil wars and this happened here.
And what that caused is an immediate deleveraging of the
economy that made basic commodities out of reach of households.
And so stabilizing--and let me just add one other point. In
my 25 years of engaging in civil wars and complex crises, I
personally have not come across a situation like this with the
central bank basically deleveraging into regional, subregional
banks. And so that crisis is the primary driver for the
inability of people to pay for food. There is a lot that the
Saudis and others could do.
And by the way, to the point, the Houthis could end the
humanitarian crisis tomorrow. They are the only actor that
actually has that capability. I think that that is important.
All the other actors can impact it, but they are the ones that
actually give up Hodeida port and allow food to flow in through
all avenues. I think that the Saudis should open up their land
border crossings in a much more robust way to allow food to
come in and that all ports should be robustly engaged.
And the last point I would just say is the Hadi government
allows for a system of vast corruption that impedes the flow of
basic commodities into the country.
Ms. Wild. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Mast from Florida.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
I just want to start by saying I have thoroughly enjoyed
this debate on both sides and your comments. I think there has
been a lot of insight been given here. And that being said, I
just want to get a kind of overview of your perspective on the
region to help me gauge some of the comments that were made, so
I just have a couple of questions that I think will assist me
in this.
Just No. 1, when we look at this Middle East cold war that
is going on throughout the region, I would love to know, do you
consider it possible or likely that we see open war between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, No. 1. Just we can go down the line. I
do not care which side we start on here.
Mr. Singh. I would say, Congressman, that I do think it is
possible. I think as you see these, as I said, sort of bouts of
regional interventionism, as you see the Iranians looking to
take advantage of destabilized situations, I do not think we
can rule out that that could then lead to more direct conflict
between the powers involved.
Mr. Sullivan. I think it is definitely possible. I would
not today go so far as to say likely, but it could shift from
possible to likely with a trigger just like that.
Mr. Mast. Any further on a trigger that you might----
Mr. Sullivan. Sure. I mean there is a few different things
here. First, as Mr. Singh was saying before, the Iranians
before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action after will always
look for opportunities to escalate their destabilizing
activities across the region. They could overreach someplace
which would cause a reaction from the Saudis or for that matter
from the United States itself.
Second, the Saudis, particularly if they are continued to
give a blank check, could increase their own regional
adventurism vis-a-vis the Iranians. And so I think both of
these could contribute to the, what is now certainly a
possibility of conflict between them, but could move up the
continuum to likely on the basis of each side feeling that they
have the wind at their back to go against the other.
Mr. Mast. Ma'am?
Ms. Karlin. I agree with both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Singh
and have nothing to add.
Mr. Mast. Sir?
Mr. Harden. Then I think we will more likely see proxy
battles than direct conflict, but I would not rule it out. The
other element I would add is I see a realignment between the
Israelis and the Sunni bloc that will deepen over the next
years.
Mr. Mast. I think that is a good lead into my next
question. Give me a good outline of who you see as the should
this occur the Saudi coalition versus the Iranian coalition,
give us a broad perspective of that, whether you want to go
down into militias specifically or just into countries.
Mr. Harden. Let's start with Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. Well, it is a tough question to answer in the
hypothetical. You know, Iran tends in the region to work
through proxies. They have an asymmetric strategy.
So in Lebanon we see Hezbollah. In Syria they are importing
not just Hezbollah from Lebanon but Pakistani and Afghan groups
as well as Iraqi Shia militias. In Yemen they have provided
support to the Houthis and so on and so forth.
Whereas, we have seen the Saudis and Emirates operating
what I would say is a more traditional way, using their own
forces directly and the partnering with the likes of, say, the
Hadi government and sort of allies on the ground there.
Again it is hard to answer in the hypothetical. It would
depend on where the conflict is is it an Israel-Iran conflict
in the Golan Heights? Is it something something that is
erupting in the Gulf? That would really determine sort of who
the players are and how it shapes up.
Mr. Harden. I would just add I am not entirely sure that
the UAE or the Saudis have the power projection to really take
a fight to Iran and would probably pursue a destabilizing proxy
battle like the Iranians are doing in the Yemen, but somewhere
on the Iranian border perhaps with the Kurds or others.
Mr. Mast. Mr. Harden, you keep--go ahead.
Ms. Karlin. Sir, I was just going to add and one big
difference of course is the Iranians have had a whole lot of
practice working with proxies. They are really good at it and
have only gotten better in recent years. And I would not say
that is the case, say, with the Saudis.
Mr. Mast. I agree they have done a great job. I actually
call it colonizing the region. That is what I, in my opinion, I
see them out there doing.
But again you keep leading me into exactly where I want to
ask. You know, when we look at certainly what on the Iranian
side could be considered a Shia coalition what kind of force do
we surmise that they could produce in the region with that kind
of Shia coalition?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, beyond their direct capacities that
they have built up and continue to buildup they have recently
tested ballistic missiles further to attack potential State
targets in Saudi and the UAE. Probably the most sophisticated,
most well-armed militia that has some amount of command and
control coming out of Tehran is Hezbollah which has tens of
thousands of rockets and missiles pointed at Israel. And if I
was to look at the single most proximate threat to a core U.S.
national security interest in the region emanating from Iran,
below Iran getting its hands on weapons of mass destruction and
nuclear weapon, its ability to use Hezbollah to threaten the
State of Israel is at the top of the list.
Mr. Mast. My time is expired. Again I appreciate
everybody's comments today.
Mr. Castro [presiding]. Any other comments on that question
can be submitted for the record. We will go now to Dean
Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to all of our
witnesses.
Mr. Singh, in your opening testimony you refer to the next
phase in Yemen, presumably from a conflict to diplomacy. I have
heard conflicting perspectives outside of this room on whether
that is already underway and even if it is achievable at all. I
would welcome each of your perspectives starting with you, Mr.
Singh, on if there is any evidence that that is already
occurring and, if so, if you can expand on it.
Mr. Singh. Well, I think it is certainly our hope and,
frankly, I have heard from the coalition members directly that
it is their hope that we have now moved into a political phase,
as it were, of the conflict. And I think that that hope rests
upon this current U.N.-led mediation succeeding. We have had
the Stockholm Agreement which was a breakthrough in a sense. It
hasn't been perfectly implemented. We have seen lots of Houthi
violations. But I think the hope is that that will stick and if
it sticks we can then build on it with confidence-building
measures and other steps around Yemen that will start to de-
escalate the conflict.
And of course the question that rises, I am sure, in
everyone's mind is, well, what if it fails, what then happens?
And I go into this in my written testimony. I think that if
that happens we need to encourage our partners and work with
them, frankly, to craft a strategy to address what we consider
the most significant threats emanating from this country.
So that would be as Mr. Sullivan was talking about, the
Iranian arms going into Yemen and then the firing of missiles
and rockets. It would be improving the access for humanitarian
supplies. It would be trying to protect the maritime corridors
there and so on and so forth. That would be, frankly, a
difficult conversation with our partners, but I am not sure
that we are in totally different places from our partners on
those points.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
Others?
Mr. Sullivan. I think the Stockholm Agreement that was
reached in December that Special Envoy Griffiths is trying to
carry forward is deeply fragile right now and could break down
at any time. One of the key markers will be whether this
prisoner exchange that is under negotiation as we speak
actually goes through, and then whether or not the two
conditions that Griffiths has identified as having to hold that
there be no strikes within the cease-fire area and no offensive
efforts to take territory continue.
So and I agree with Mr. Singh that actually the coalition
to a greater extent than the Houthis, in my view, wants to see
this sustained. And I agree with Mr. Harden that the Houthis
have more power to actually cause the provision of humanitarian
assistance to get through Hodeida right now, and I think that
working with the entire national community to bring as much
pressure to bear on ensuring we do move into that next phase is
the most important thing in the days and weeks ahead.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
Dr. Karlin.
Ms. Karlin. It is hard to be sanguine about the situation
in Yemen and how much better it could look a year or 2 years
from now and no matter which phase it goes into. I might
suggest where you really want to focus on is three opportunity
costs. First, obviously the horrific humanitarian situation;
second, the price we pay to try to contain what is coming out
of it; and third, the distraction that it poses both for us and
for our regional partners.
Mr. Harden. I think that while I believe there is no
military solution to this and most of us who follow this
believe that, I think the combatants believe that there is a
military solution. And so the Stockholm Agreement may hold and
it may deepen, but if I were to bet I would say that the
Stockholm Agreement fails and that we have a battle for Hodeida
sometime in the next year.
And I will just point out that the situation has only
gotten worse in the past year. So the humanitarian appeal this
time last year from UNOCHA was three billion dollars. In
February, at the end of February it is going to be four billion
dollars. So I agree it is hard to be sanguine.
Mr. Phillips. All right, thank you all.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
Congressman Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
panel for being here.
There has been a lot of focus on the CT threat coming out
of the region specific to Yemen. Are you seeing any CI and/or
cyber concerns coming out, No. 1, and No. 2, from our domestic
intel community perspective, do you feel the U.S. intelligence
community and all the agencies that are part thereof are
sufficiently on top all the complications in that region? There
is funding concerns. There is recruitment issues as well on our
intel side which are assessment of how on top of the region and
all the complications that exist therein.
Mr. Harden. So I think that the chaos in Yemen, including
the chaos in the southern portion of Yemen because primarily we
have been talking about the north, gives space for terrorists
and that space has probably deepened. I do not think that we
can kill our way out of it and so I agree with the assessment
that AQAP has a very large and sustained base in Yemen.
In terms of cybersecurity threats I would be doubtful that
would originate from Yemen.
Mr. Sullivan. I would just add that just as it has created
greater safe havens and, frankly, weapons and recruitment
opportunities for AQAP, I do think it has some hindrance to our
operational capability to develop the kind of on-the-ground
efforts against AQAP. Not so much the direct operations that
the UAE and others are working, but building the kind of
strategy that we had before the conflict started to try to
weaken AQAP's grip in some of those southern provinces.
With respect to the broader question of resources, I do not
know enough about where things lie in the intelligence
community to answer. But I would say that I am very impressed
with the intelligence community's general development of
knowledge particularly about the counter terrorist threat
coming out of Yemen over the past many years and the
contributions they have made as our partners, the Saudis and
Emirates have made to foil plots that the ranking member was
referring to in his opening statement.
Mr. Singh. So I would just add, I think we have together
with the Emirates especially been able to enjoy some success
against AQAP. There have been several high profile HVTs who
have been taken down in Yemen in the last year or two.
Your larger question about cyber, is a good one for this
region because I think we have seen in this region as this kind
of tripartite conflict or rivalry has developed that I talked
about, seen cyber tools used in a sort of groundbreaking way by
lots of parties in the region. And we have seen the Iranians as
was detailed in the DNI's Worldwide Threat Assessment
increasingly use those tools against the United States in
particular.
I think there is also a growing maritime and missile threat
in the region and I think that that will grow in part because
let's not forget that next year, 2020, the conventional arms
ban on Iran will end under the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear accord.
And so do we have enough resources devoted to this? I am
not sure. I think that is a question that you should be asking
the intelligence community and the administration in general.
But I do worry that especially as we are sort of rebalancing
toward Asia, toward the Russia challenge that it is possible
that we could see a shortfall in resources devoted to these
problems.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
Colin Allred of Texas.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank Chairman Engel for calling, this is our first hearing.
I am deeply concerned with the results of our involvement
in Yemen. I am also cognizant of our regional relationships
there and their importance for us and our mission and our
ongoing mission against AQAP there. I think that we are here
today to discuss this region certainly, but also to talk about
the role of Congress in our foreign policy.
We have seen I think a number of steps by past congresses
to cede some of that authority and I think that it is important
that we exercise our constitutional duties to oversee what is
going on and how U.S. involvement is playing out around the
world. And so that is why I think it is so important that we
are here today.
And Dr. Karlin and Mr. Singh, you have both mentioned in
your statements the trend in our foreign policy away from
counter terrorism and toward greater powers in State actors, so
want to talk about Iran as others have as well. As you note,
Iran has provided support and training in ballistic missiles to
the Houthi rebels despite the blockade that has been in place
since 2015. And heavy weaponry such as long-range missiles have
been used against targets inside Saudi Arabia and against our
own ships.
Dr. Karlin, how can the U.S. help its partners more
effectively interdict these weapons from the shipments from
Iran both at sea and via land?
Ms. Karlin. Thank you. Part of what we can do is work with
our partners together on knitting together cohesive ways both
in the air and by sea to try to counter these weapons. So that
involves things like maritime security exercises, looking at
the sorts of assistance maybe through war gaming or tabletop
exercises, showing our partners the sorts of capabilities that
they need to be able to effectively counter these challenges.
Mr. Allred. Thank you.
And are there any additional sanctions or measures that
could be taken by the Department of Treasury to contain Iran's
ability to use front companies or individuals to traffic arms
to the Houthi rebels and where are the pressure points that we
can assert that pressure with the Houthis? To Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. You know, I tend to think, going back to what
Mr. Harden said about the fact that it is really the Houthis in
control of that Hodeida port through which not just
humanitarian assistance and food and so forth passes, but also
presumably some weapons, we would like to see, I think, much
more international pressure on the Houthis.
So far there has been a lot of conversation about the
Saudis and Emirates. A lot of those concerns are justified and
valid, I think. But we have seen far less conversation about
the role that the Houthis are playing both in sort of the
importation of weapons and the suffering that is taking place.
I would like to see more action on that front.
I think we should be recruiting our allies elsewhere in the
world, especially Europe, to join us in that as well as to join
us in that interdiction mission. And I think I would like to
see the focus of our conversations about Iran with those allies
be that sort of issue rather than, say, the nuclear agreement
and so on and so forth.
Mr. Allred. Mr. Sullivan, you have spoken some about the
steps we need to take to counter Iranian influence. Can you
expand upon that and how we can use our Arab allies in the
region to counter that?
Mr. Sullivan. Sure. I mean one of my concerns which I
express in my written testimony is that the current strategy
seems to be to try to ratchet up pressure generally to no kind
of clearly defined end. It seems like maybe the end is regime
change and we will not stop until we are at that. And my view
is that you buildup pressure against an adversary like Iran in
an effort to convert that pressure into some progress on an
issue that matters to us. We did that with the nuclear deal.
I agree with Mr. Singh we have to look at a broader range
of issues beyond the nuclear deal as well. But my biggest
concern about what the administration is doing right now is
that it seems to just be pressure for pressure's sake, not
pressure to actually try to produce practical change on the
ground in the region.
So, for example, you asked the question about authorities.
I do think that if we dedicated some resources at Treasury to
specifically tracking the means by which these weapons are
transferred and ultimately delivered, Mr. Singh mentioned that
it is not just sea, it is by a land route as well, that we
would be in the position to be able to put some curbs on that
both through intelligence-led operations but also through the
application of financial sanctions.
My concern is that instead we are just taking a very broad-
based approach with the hope of kind of crashing the regime and
I think that is, A, not in keeping with U.S. policy, but B, and
more importantly, it is prohibiting us from focusing on trying
to shape Iran's behavior on more targeted bases like their
support for the Houthis.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, yield back.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Curtis.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Panel, thank you for being here today. I too have enjoyed
this discussion. I have heard the word ``chaos'' a lot today
and I am going to use it again. My experience is no matter
where you go in this world if there is chaos, when you peel
back that curtain you are going to see influences from China
and from Russia. Is that the case here and can you give me a
sense of how much influence is being exerted by those two
countries?
Mr. Singh, let me maybe start with you and others that may
want to comment on that.
Mr. Singh. Are you asking, Congressman, specifically about
Yemen or about the Gulf region in general?
Mr. Curtis. My thought was specifically about Yemen, but I
would be curious to know just the overall influence in the
region.
Mr. Singh. I think what we do see in the overall region is
certainly an increased interest by Russia in becoming involved
in the Middle East and in the Gulf region as well in an effort
to sort of project their own influence and power to blunt
American influence and to do other things like sort of promote
their arms sales and so on and so forth. So they are competing
with us, for example, for arms sales in places like Saudi
Arabia and so forth.
The Chinese to some extent are doing the same thing,
competing that we have seen, for example, a significant
increase in the export of armed drones by China to places like
the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese, I think, are less active
or at least less overtly active in the region than the Russians
are, but I think we will see their involvement increase.
They are involved right now in the development of an Omani
port called Duqm which is sort of at a pivot point between the
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. They have established their
first overseas military base in the Horn of Africa in Djibouti,
where as I mentioned a lot of these States, the UAE, Turkey,
and others are also very active and where of course the U.S. is
very active.
And so I think there is a worry that you do see especially
Russia partnering with Iran, partnering with Iran's proxies. We
see this clearly in Syria in a way which is destabilizing and
potentially threatening to the United States. And I also worry
about the potential for the development of more great power
conflicts in the region especially as China steps up its
activities.
Mr. Curtis. You mentioned just a brief moment ago the need
to call on our allies with the Houthi, to influence the
Houthis, and when you said that it made me wonder who truly
influences them and would that influence be greater by Russia
and is that a possibility and, if so, should we be calling on
Russia for help with humanitarian aid specifically in that
venue?
Mr. Singh. You know, I do not know that the Russians have
direct influence on the Houthis. I do not get that perception.
Where Russia comes into it, I think, is Russia obviously sits
on the U.N. Security Council as a veto-wielding member of that
Council and has the ability to, as they have done time and time
again especially in recent years, protect Iran which is
Russia's main partner in the region and by extension Iran's
proxies.
And so I think where you need the Russians is to allow sort
of the U.N. Security Council to play a bigger role here, and
maybe our Saudi allies or Emirate allies countries where Russia
would like a role of like a relationship, the Israelis can play
a role in putting pressure on Russia to do that.
My point more broadly is I think that there has not been
enough of that international pressure on the Houthis and I
think that is especially important because I am not sure there
is any single external power that can compel the Houthis to the
table or sort of force a solution on them.
Mr. Curtis. OK.
Mr. Harden.
Mr. Harden. I would agree. I mean there is not a lot of
leverage points for the Houthis. Part of their power is the
fact that they are so indigenous and so capable of operating
within their own country. And again I just want to reemphasize
one point. They are not proxies of Iran. They have common
aligned interests and they use those interests to further their
own benefit, but the only leverage points might possibly be the
Omanis.
Back to China and Russia in terms of the chaos in Yemen, I
do not see it, to be quite frank, except for the race for the
ports which would include some Yemeni ports and clearly both
the UAE and China have great port desires. Hodeida is a great
example.
Ms. Karlin. I would just add that we have historic examples
where active and serious U.S. diplomacy has pushed the Russians
out of the Middle East and when you see a lack of it,
unsurprisingly, it is an easy place for them to make problems.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you. I yield my time.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to the panelists for your erudite and excellent
discussion. I want to put you on notice that I am here
representing my 13-year-old daughter Molly who was bat
mitzvahed on December 15th and she wrote her Torah talk on the
unimaginable suffering in Yemen and our complicity in it. So
she will be watching.
My first question is for Dr. Karlin. During the first year
of the Saudi military campaign many of the indiscriminate
attacks on Yemeni civilians, hospitals, markets, schools, were
ascribed to Saudi pilots' inexperience, high altitude aerial
bombardments and other forms of negligence. Over time, however,
Saudi bombings of school buses, cholera treatment centers, and
the use of double-tap strikes suggested that this was a more
intentional strategy. Would you agree with that assessment?
Ms. Karlin. Thank you. You know, the Saudis really do not
have much of a history of using their military. For a very long
time they spent lots and lots of money buying all sorts of
sophisticated capabilities, so Yemen has been kind of their
testing and their operational testing ground, for better or
worse and largely it appears worse.
I think the Obama Administration's view was if they are
going to start to engage let's see how we can be helpful here,
and that is why you saw the support that really started in
2015. As I have said previously, I do not see much evidence
that that support has been helpful and I am not sure whether it
is deliberate or indeliberate. I do not think I am capable of
making that call without access to classified information.
However, it is worrisome that they do not appear to be getting
a whole lot better.
Mr. Levin. All right. Well, under those circumstances what
should the U.S. do? Should we work to try to change the
coalition's behavior or should we try to extricate ourselves
entirely? That is another question for you, Doctor.
Ms. Karlin. Of course. So I would suggest a mix of carrots
and sticks. I would figure out what sort of capabilities we can
help the Saudis acquire, so for example the Terminal High
Altitude Aerial Defense System, the THAAD system, could help
them feel more secure at home. And I think that that is a
pretty decent carrot.
But I would also work on sticks and show them that we are
willing potentially with a national security waiver to have
this body say that their efforts are extremely problematic and
we do not want to support them anymore.
Mr. Levin. Thank you.
I would like to turn to human rights within Saudi Arabia
and ask a question of Mr. Sullivan. Under MbS the Saudi
Government has cracked down on dissidents and human rights
activists. Reports indicate that authorities have arrested and
even tortured activists. Is it fair to say that the U.S. has
leverage to press Saudi leadership to respect human rights?
Mr. Sullivan. You know, it is always a complicated
question, our leverage to get other countries to conform to our
values and our human rights standards. Oftentimes we
overestimate the leverage we have, but a lot of times we turn a
blind eye to bad behavior by close partners to our, the
detriment of our interests and our values.
And I think in the case of Saudi Arabia, and this was true
under Democratic administrations as it has been under
Republican administrations, I think we have too frequently been
willing to say we have to make human rights concerns a fifth,
sixth, or seventh tier priority rather than something on the
plane with other more fundamental interests that we have, and I
think that should change.
Will we be able to get them to fully live up to our
expectations, probably not. But can we do a better job than we
have done, I believe we can.
Mr. Levin. And how has the Trump administration been doing
in using what leverage we do have?
Mr. Sullivan. I think the Trump administration has actually
sent a very clear message not only that they do not really care
about the issue, but even more they are perfectly happy to have
the Saudis crack down on folks within their own country. That
is the Saudi's business as far as Donald Trump is concerned.
Mr. Levin. Thank you. Let me ask you another question about
the Trump administration. The government of Saudi Arabia has
reportedly spent heavily at Trump hotels in Washington and
Chicago and apparently financial relationships between the
President and the Saudis go way back. In October, the Chicago
Tribune reported that Trump's business relationships with the
Saudi Government and rich Saudi business executives go back to
at least the 1990's.
In Trump's hard times the Saudi prince bought a super yacht
and a hotel from him. The Saudi Government has paid him four
and a half million dollars for an apartment near the United
Nations. Is it possible that the President's conflicts of
interest have impacted the administration's actions or lack
thereof when it comes to Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Sullivan. You know, it is amazing that this question
can even be posed with such credible evidence behind it. That
is where we have arrived and it is not just with Saudi Arabia
that the potential that this President's personal interests are
conflicting with the American national interest. That is
certainly possible with Saudi Arabia. It is certainly possible
with a number of other countries, and I do think that this
committee and this Congress should take a hard look at that.
Mr. Levin. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Pence.
Mr. Pence. Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul, I
would like to start by saying how honored I am to serve
alongside you and represent Hoosier values on the Foreign
Affairs Committee. Thank you.
To all the witnesses today, thank you for being here. Your
time and your fascinating testimony educational; Mr. Singh,
specifically, I found your testimony to be particularly
interesting. Specifically, I am interested in your opinion on
the most effective role of Congress with respect to the U.S.
policy in the Arabian Peninsula.
In your written statement you expressed your view that it
would be a mistake to end our partnership with Saudi Arabia and
the other Gulf States. You talked about that today as well. You
continue by saying that this should not prevent us from having
frank conversations with our partners when disagreements arise.
Instead, you suggest, and I quote, the U.S. should concentrate
its efforts in a number of areas. In that spirit you listed
examples such as improving allied military effectiveness,
improving coordination among partners, pressing for democratic
and reform, and reinvigorating regional diplomacy.
In your opinion, what do you think is the most effective
role of Congress to help achieve our strategic objectives while
also promoting and protecting our fundamental American values?
Is there one of these areas that you identified that stands out
where Congress should, as you say, concentrate its efforts?
Mr. Singh. Well, sure, Congressman, and thank you for
taking the time to read my testimony. I do think that when you
are in government working on these issues you have a tendency
to have a hard time looking beyond even the next week. You
know, a situation like Yemen, a situation with Saudi Arabia,
these are fast-moving situations in a region which is a very
turbulent region.
I think what Congress can really do in a way that is hard
for the executive branch to do, besides of course its
constitutional roles of oversight in providing that sort of
that check, is take a longer range view. For example, look at
the systemic risks of arms sales to the regions. You know, you
are asked to approve or disapprove individual arms sales, but
there is no reason you cannot step back and look at the whole
and say is this adding to stability or is this detracting from
stability. Is this advancing or setting back our interests?
When it comes to human rights, which we were just talking
about, again oftentimes I think that even if American officials
care about human rights, want to press them, there tend to be
four or five other issues which are this week's issues which
get in the way. And so I think Congress again can play a very
useful role in ensuring that human rights, and not just human
rights but political reform, economic reform, remain on the
agenda for U.S. policy.
And I do think, frankly, as and I think that we are seeing
this today in Yemen that congressional pressure can play a role
in shaping the actions of our partners. And so we may have a
very close partnership with Saudi Arabia, with Yemen, and when
the CENTCOM commander goes and talks to them he may be talking
to them about operational issues. But when a CODEL comes, when
Congress speaks, I think oftentimes it can put some of that
pressure on especially on those longer term issues in a way
which is tougher for American officials to do.
Mr. Pence. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield my time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much to those presenting
today. I appreciate your time.
I wanted to start with a question for Mr. Singh. General
Votel made comments yesterday talking about the fact that U.S.
military engagement with Saudi Arabia and UAE allows us to has
leverage and influence over their actions in Yemen. And in your
comments today, you made a comment to the effect that we cannot
expect, we should expect our partners to follow human rights
norms, but we cannot tie it together with our engagement. I
would ask if you could expound upon that ever so briefly about
how it is that we can continue our engagement or could continue
our engagement be it with Saudi Arabia, UAE, or any other
country and separate that from the expectation that we have of
how it is that they are engaging.
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congresswoman. And let me just start
by saying thanks for your continued service to the country in
your new role.
I want to be very clear about what I mean when I write
this. I think it is absolutely appropriate for us to tie arms
sales, security assistance programs, training and so forth to
the way that our partners are conducting themselves in war. You
know, to the question that was asked earlier, if we do not
believe that our partners are committed to following the laws
of war and international norms of warfare we should not be
partnering with them.
It is very important for our military that we not be asking
them to compromise themselves, their morals, their values by
working with partners who are not committed to those values.
What I am trying to point out though is when we talk about
those larger issues of politics, of human rights, of social
reform and so forth, I do not think it has been effective to
try to tie those issues to security assistance, to use security
assistance as sort of in a crude way as leverage over unrelated
issues. I think that our track record and I have as a U.S.
official and as an observer have been through so many of these
cases, I think our track record in doing that is poor.
Ms. Spanberger. OK. Thank you for that clarification.
And then my other question and I will open this up to you,
Mr. Sullivan. During your opening statement you made the
distinction between offensive and defensive military support to
Saudi Arabia. And I was wondering if you could expand upon that
briefly, how can we ensure that weapons, intelligence, military
capabilities that we are providing to Saudi Arabia are for
defensive purposes not offensive purposes and where you might
see some of that overlap and challenges in the way that we are
looking at this question?
Mr. Sullivan. It is an especially pertinent question in
light of the recent reports that what we would historically
have classified as a defensive system, like the TOW missile
system, is being used offensively having fallen into the wrong
hands, in the hands of extremist groups and others.
So I concede that a clean distinction between offensive and
defensive systems is not always easy to come by, but I do think
there are some clear cases. And the two cases that I referred
to in my testimony were, one, theater missile defense and
missile defense systems more broadly. Dr. Karlin mentioned the
possibility of THAAD. I think we could pretty well agree that
that is a classically defensive system that cannot be used
readily for offensive purposes. And then, second, that the
United States itself would increase the conduct of maritime
patrols where we control the extent to which we are engaged
defensively as opposed to offensively.
So those are the types of things that I have in mind,
rather than the sorts of things which fall on that line and we
may hope they would be used for defensive purposes but could
easily be converted to offensive purposes.
Ms. Spanberger. OK. And I have one last question that I
would like your input on. As a former intelligence officer
myself, I am sure you are aware that last week it was revealed
that the UAE hired a team of former U.S. intelligence officials
to help with their cybersecurity and electronic surveillance.
What actions should the U.S. Government take, if any, in
your estimation, to prevent former intelligence officers from
using the tradecraft that they learn through their service to
the United States on behalf of a foreign government or a
private company in this way?
Mr. Sullivan. Congresswoman, I read the same reports and
was disturbed by them. There is not currently a legal framework
for tradecraft. There is for obviously the provision of
classified information but not for tradecraft, particularly the
specialized tradecraft that intelligence officers, and you know
this better than anyone, are getting in the United States that
they can then go ply to other countries. I think that is pretty
disturbing.
But I also think that because it is an issue that I do not
think has been much on the mind of policymakers or legislators
of late it requires some real study. And so what I hope this
committee and others will do is take up this question. Should
there be additional legal restrictions on the training and
craft that intelligence officers are getting for use elsewhere?
I would just add that there are some reports that suggest
this tradecraft was turned back on American citizens or
American companies; I think that clearly is against the law.
But even if it is being used just out there in the world not in
relation to U.S. citizens I think we are going to need further
legal parameters around it, but I would defer to a deeper dive
into the issue and the tradeoffs and leave it at that.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Watkins.
Mr. Watkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question is for Mr. Singh. Sir, what tools and
strategies are the U.S. using to help our Gulf partners stop
Iran's smuggling of weapons to the Houthis?
Mr. Singh. So my understanding of what we are doing is
something which is not limited to Yemen, right, because
obviously we are concerned about the Iranian proliferation of
weapons around this region and there is a toolkit that we can
draw on to address it. It starts with intelligence. We have the
best, I think, intelligence. Israel obviously has very good
intelligence as well in terms of detecting the movement of
weapons from Iran to the region.
One of the reasons we are concerned, just as a footnote
about Iran, say, establishing missile factories in, say,
Lebanon or Syria is that that reduces kind of our visibility
into the movement of these weapons and that is something we
should be concerned about potentially in Yemen in the future
not perhaps today as well. So there is the intelligence aspect.
And then there is the partnering aspect with countries in
the region, Oman, countries on the Horn of Africa and the
Arabian Peninsula, to then act on that intelligence to ensure
that weapons can, in fact, be interdicted when they are on
their way. That is something which I would say happens more
rarely. Oftentimes by setting up the right mechanisms you can
deter the movement of weapons in the first place. You do not
often get to that point of actual interdiction.
I think there is a third element to it though and this
element is much harder and that is cost imposition. You know,
part of deterrence is not just erecting barriers to these
actions, it is ensuring that there is a penalty to be paid when
they do succeed. There, I think we have not been as successful
because balancing the risk of escalation with the need to
impose cost is something that every administration has
struggled with. I am concerned though that we are kind of
finding ourselves more on the risk-averse side of that too
often these days.
Mr. Watkins. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by saying that in the last administration I
had the perhaps dubious honor of overseeing some of our effort
to try to leverage our influence with Saudi Arabia to persuade
them to, in effect, bomb better. And I can tell you from that
experience that it was worth trying. We tried very, very hard
over a long period of time and it had absolutely no impact.
It had no impact on their accuracy in part because accuracy
was not the problem. They were very accurate in bombing
markets, schools, bridges. In fact, we gave them a list of
targets they were not to strike and they then proceeded to
accurately strike them and the result is a conflict that as we
have heard has massively impacted the civilian population and
helped Iran.
The question has been raised, what influence would we have
if we stopped? And I wanted to ask you, Dr. Karlin. You know
the full extent of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, how
embedded we truly are. It is much more than just targeting
assistance. And I wanted to ask you if we pulled back entirely,
including on the assistance that we provide for the servicing
of Saudi aircraft, the U.S. Government and contractors and
private companies, how long could the Saudis actually,
practically, sustain significant air operations over Yemen?
Could they go on the offensive for a sustained period of time?
Ms. Karlin. Thank you. While I cannot give you an answer in
terms of time, I can say that U.S. support is critical to the
Saudi effort. Moreover, when you look across the range of U.S.
support to the Saudi military there are a number of different
programs, whether it is with the Saudi navy, the Saudi air
national guard, it is just--excuse me, the Saudi national
guard--there is kind of a plethora of programs that permeate
the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
So when we are talking about pulling back it is important
to think through what do we want to pull back and what do we
actually maintain? And too none of us want to see it in a
binary sense, I think, completely. You know, one of the
challenges we do have here is over the last 2 years we have
seen what the new power center in the crown prince has kind of,
how he has governed, how he has governed Saudi Arabia. And we
have seen just a number of extremely problematic decisions
domestically and across the region that I think have caused a
lot of us to call into question his ability to make the right
choice.
Mr. Malinowski. It has also been suggested that if we were
to pull back in that targeted way the Saudis could go to other
powers, to the Russians, to the Chinese, that they do not
actually need American support.
Mr. Sullivan, if I could ask you to address that and
specifically perhaps tell us could the Saudis service F-16s
with MiG parts, for example?
Mr. Sullivan. It would take--well, the short answer to that
question is no, they could not.
Mr. Malinowski. If Iran were to start interfering with
shipping in the Persian Gulf would the Chinese navy come to
Saudi Arabia's rescue?
Mr. Sullivan. No.
Mr. Malinowski. No. Saudi Arabia has an existential
interest in maintaining a relationship with the United States.
I assume all of you would agree with that.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. And I do not think they can just say,
well, we do not need the U.S. because the Russians and Chinese
will come fill in the gaps. I do not think they will, they can
do that.
Mr. Malinowski. Let me also bring up the Khashoggi case
which we have not really discussed very much here. It has been
suggested accurately that there are a lot of human rights
problems in Saudi Arabia, beheadings, journalists are arrested
and killed, it is absolutely true. I would argue that this is
very different.
It is not a human rights issue in Saudi Arabia. This is an
example of a country reaching across its borders to kill
somebody who had been given protection in the United States in
a democratic country in the Western world. This is not normal.
This does not happen frequently in the world. The Russians did
it to somebody in England recently. There are very few other
examples I can think of.
But would you agree that it is a paramount interest of the
United States as a country who is home to thousands of Jamal
Khashoggis, people who are in exile from their countries, who
are critics of their governments, is it not a paramount
interest of the United States to come down extremely hard when
something like this happens so that it does not become a norm?
Ms. Karlin. We should absolutely be concerned. And what is
sad, to be honest, is that we should not even be that surprised
by what happened with Jamal Khashoggi. You had already seen the
kidnapping, if you will, of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. You
had obviously seen all these actions in Yemen. You have seen
the arrests of a whole bunch of, frankly, the crown prince's
relatives in the Ritz Carlton.
So we have seen kind of example after example, the Qatar
blockade of just making the wrong choice over and over and
unfortunately this has been the most spectacular. What worries
me the most also is that the Saudi leadership still seems
pretty confident. And I think this body has an important role
to say to remind them that we have at least some lines.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. Well said.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest, if you just push the button.
Mr. Guest. I am sorry, thank you.
Mr. Singh, in your written testimony on page 3 you talk
about the fact that there is ongoing disputes between members
of the GCC and that has caused limited cooperation. Has that
limited cooperation, has it, and please tell us how it has
impacted the region as a whole.
Mr. Singh. Sure, thank you, Congressman. I think that the
split in the GCC between Qatar on the one hand and Saudis,
Emirates, Egyptians who are outside the GCC on the other hand,
has been troubling for the United States because I think we had
hoped to forge an alliance between the GCC, other like-minded
States in the region, and ourselves to tackle common threats
like terrorism, the threats posed by Iran and so forth. And
this dispute has undoubtedly distracted from that.
It is also probably, arguably, led the Qataris into closer
relationships with, say, the Iranians, the Chinese and
Russians, and so on and so forth. It is a longstanding dispute
and so we should not be surprised, I think, by it. I think
there is a larger problem though in the region that this is
just one part of and that is just poor coordination overall. We
have seen traditional political groupings like the Arab League
diminish in importance and effectiveness.
This region has the least economic integration of, I think,
any region of the world and so it is the overall integration
not just militarily, but also diplomatically, economically,
which I think limits the effectiveness of, say, these partners
to solve problems within their own region.
Mr. Guest. And, Mr. Singh, you also said in your written
testimony, on page 5 you said in your view it would be a
serious mistake to jettison our partnership with Saudi Arabia
or other Gulf allies. Could you expand on that very briefly?
Mr. Singh. Absolutely. Well I think that there is two
reasons for that. No. 1 is this alliance, these alliances we
have in the region are not just about accomplishing things
through the allies, it is about preventing adverse scenarios,
preventing worse outcomes. We want to influence Saudi
decisionmaking so that they make better decisions. That is
obviously challenging right now. We want to see stability in
these countries. Instability in a place like Saudi Arabia could
be devastating for our interests in the region.
Over time, I think if we are serious about reallocating
resources to other regions of the world about a great power or
competition strategy, we will need to work more through allies
in this region if we are not going to simply put our interests
aside. And so that means that over time we have to turn them
into allies like the Israelis, like the Emirates to some extent
who can act in our stead, in a sense.
And so, look, these are the allies we have in the region.
If it were not for difficult partners in the Middle East we
would not really have any partners, would we? And so turning
these partnerships into better partnerships needs to be our
goal.
Mr. Guest. And if we were to end this relationship with the
Saudis, do you believe that it would damage our ability to
influence them as it relates to improving issues such as human
rights in their country?
Mr. Singh. Absolutely.
Mr. Guest. And then finally a kind of a followup, and I
think you touched on this earlier. On page 7 of your written
testimony you say that the withdrawal of U.S. support to the
GCC coalition or the suspension of U.S. arms sales to Saudi
Arabia or the UAE are unlikely to end the conflict or ease
humanitarian conditions in Yemen. Do you still feel that way?
Mr. Singh. I do, yes. I think it is important to bear in
mind that as we have this conversation about our security
relationship with the Saudis or with the Emirates that is not
the same as talking about a strategy to end the conflict, the
multiple conflicts in Yemen. If we were to withdraw our
support, yes, we might increase the difficulties the Saudis
have in sustaining their operations.
But I do not believe the conflict would end. I do not
believe that the other conflicts in Yemen would improve either,
nor, frankly, do I think we would absolve ourselves of
responsibility for our longstanding involvement in the
conflict.
Mr. Guest. And, Mr. Sullivan, as it relates to Mr. Singh's
answer to the last question, do you agree or disagree with his
assessment?
Mr. Sullivan. I agree to the extent that it would not end
the conflict, of course. I do not agree that it would have no
impact on the conflict. I believe that the threat to reduce or
curtail our aid has over time made the coalition make different
and, in my view, more constructive decisions. At the end of
last year they were more likely to enter the Stockholm
Agreement because of what the Senate did. Earlier, CENTCOM
withheld certain provision of various types of technologies,
minesweepers and other things, and it changed their calculus as
respects Hodeida.
So I do believe the United States deciding to pull back its
offensive support to the coalition would have an impact on
coalition decisionmaking that I believe would be positive. And
even if it didn't, I would argue we have only contributed to a
worse situation by being in and so we should no longer be in.
Mr. Singh. Can I just make one point in response to that
because I do not think we fundamentally disagree, but I think
that having that leverage and achieving those outcomes requires
that there be some possibility that you will continue the
partnership if they take certain actions. If you just cut the
support off then you do not have that leverage.
Mr. Sullivan. And to clarify, I am not saying cutoff the
partnership with Saudi Arabia. I am saying cutoff certain
systems that they are using and certain assistance that they
are using to bomb civilians in Yemen. We have plenty of
leverage through the broader security partnership with Saudi
Arabia that we can bring to bear in a constructive dialog with
them.
Mr. Harden. Yes. I just want to add one point on this. I
mean UAE is actually also quite involved on the Hodeida
operations and so that is an element that I think we are
missing in this conversation as well. So if you cutoff the
relationship with the Saudis, you are also going to cutoff the
relationship with the UAE over Hodeida. I do not think that we
will, or at a minimum we need to discuss it.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Trone.
Mr. Trone. I thank you all for coming here today.
In your written testimony, Mr. Sullivan, you spoke about
actions taken by Saudi Arabia in the last few years and maybe
we could just say versus Saudi Arabia and say the crown prince
regarding destabilization in Yemen; the Ritz, we will call it a
robbery, extortion; the kidnapping in Lebanon of the Prime
Minister; the repression throughout Saudi Arabia, kidnapping,
et cetera; the blockade of Qatar; and of course, Khashoggi.
What is the most effective thing we could do to help combat
and tell the Crown Prince enough is enough; we cannot keep
going down this route item after item after item?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I think it starts by saying that we are
going to need to redefine the terms of this relationship. Not
to throw it overboard, not to just try to punish Saudi Arabia
for the sake of it, but to make sure it aligns better with U.S.
interests. So I think you start there then you work through
each of the issues you just said.
With respect to Yemen, as I have proposed I believe that we
should end support for the offensive operations in Yemen and no
longer be giving the crown prince the support that he has been
getting to carry on an operation that is counterproductive to
our interests.
With respect to the GCC issue and the blockade of Qatar, I
think this is something where the United States is going to
have to be an honest broker on both sides, but we have to tell
the leadership in Saudi Arabia that this is running counter to
U.S. interests as long as it continues.
And then with respect to Khashoggi, I believe there needs
to be an impartial, independent investigation and the Saudi
investigation is not sufficient. And Secretary Pompeo basically
saying it is sufficient, I think, flies in the face of basic
logic. There needs to be an independent investigation and
anyone who was complicit in this decision needs to be held
accountable.
Mr. Trone. In December I was in Israel and we met with all
the various leadership there, and it is certainly crystal clear
that they do not want to run from Saudi Arabia. They think if
we do not continually unconditionally support Saudi Arabia we
do not have the block against Iran. But at the end of the day I
take a little different view, I think, long term.
Crown Prince is 33 years old. We have seen the litany of
things that he has accomplished, none of which are good. And
the question is, if we do not continue to--if we do not stand
up, if we do not draw a marker in the sand at some point in
time and say enough is enough, we are going to have him as the
king for 50 years, so 50 years we are going to enshrine an
individual that is morally bankrupt that has been an ongoing
problem against U.S. interests.
So what can or should we be doing to try and think the long
view for the next 50 years?
Mr. Singh. Can I chime in on this, Congressman? I do not
know if you were directing that question just to Jake, but I
think that the problem we face is that he will be there for 50
years whether we do those things or not.
Mr. Trone. But does he have to be there for 50 years or do
you just want to accept that?
Mr. Singh. And I think that it is a false choice between,
say, walking away from the alliance or uncritically embracing
the leadership in Riyadh. I think the third way, as it were, is
a more intensive form of engagement where we try to influence
the leadership in Saudi Arabia supporting the elements of his
program that we like and there are elements of the program that
we like.
Mr. Trone. Any of those issues I mentioned do you like?
Mr. Singh. What is that?
Mr. Trone. Any of those items I mentioned you like?
Mr. Singh. Well, I think there is things you hinted at that
we do like. We like the fact that they are drawing closer to
allies like Israel. We like the fact that they are stepping
back their support for extremism around the world. Frankly, I
think most American officials would say we agree with the need
to diversify the Saudi economy which is part of his agenda.
What we do not like are a lot of those foreign policy
actions that you saw. But I think again the way to influence
those things is through intensive engagement. We have no
Ambassador in Riyadh. We have no Assistant Secretary of State
for near Eastern Affairs. We need to get these officials in
place, we need to empower them.
And then on the Saudi side we need to try to expand the
points of contact in this relationship so that there is not
that kind of single point of failure that I think we have right
now.
Mr. Trone. But should we just accept, Mr. Sullivan, blindly
for the next 50 years this individual running the key ally in
the Middle East?
Mr. Sullivan. I do not think that we at the end of the day
are going to be able to dictate who the leader of Saudi Arabia
is, but we are going to be able to dictate how we relate to
that person whoever it is. And here, my concern is that the
administration has basically decided that it is unconditional
support. That is the strategy.
And I believe the Congress therefore has a deeply critical
institutional role to play to provide balance in the U.S.-Saudi
relationship. Because at the end of the day, I think where Mr.
Singh and I do very much agree is we are going to have to find
that middle way which is going to have to involve much more
constructive engagement.
And this administration does not seem interested in
providing that and therefore I think the Congress has to come
forward with a variety of measures to shape this relationship
and to send a clear message to the leadership in Saudi Arabia
that we are not going to simply accept any and all activities
that he is undertaking including those things that run contrary
to our interests and values.
Ms. Karlin. We should also just remember this is not an
alliance. It is an insult, frankly, to our European allies, for
example, in NATO or our Asian allies like Japan when we refer
to partnerships as alliances. So I just caution us all. I say
this from having spent a lot of time in the Pentagon where one
thinks a lot about what an alliance is and the
responsibilities, frankly, that it makes incumbent on the
United States.
Mr. Trone. Thank you very much.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you. I caught some of your, you
were talking at one point about your strong voice against anti-
Semitism and I wanted to thank you for that. I represent a lot
of folks that share your views as well as I do on that issue,
so I personally thank you for that.
And I have a couple of small questions. Due to my
seniority, all the questions that I would have asked are
already asked so I will not indulge the committee by asking
them the fourth or fifth time. But I did notice a great deal of
frustration out of the first couple of folks speaking and it
just seemed to me like what the heck are we doing there? I mean
outside of humanitarian interests why are we involved? Is it
oil? Is it--what is it?
If I could maybe just go down the line and you give me like
a two-sentence answer if that is possible. Pretend like all the
cameras are not here and it is just you and your family.
Mr. Harden. I mean with respect to Yemen or the Arabian--
with respect to Yemen, I mean there is an enormous set of
interests in Yemen. Of course there is the humanitarian, but
there is also the Iranian element of this. There is the free
movement of trade and there is just the strategic nature of the
Arabian Peninsula itself.
So I am not, I would not advocate that we abandon the
region or Yemen.
Ms. Karlin. I would agree. We need to think about freedom
of navigation. The U.S. has had a special role in that over
decades and decades across the world. We do need to think about
energy concerns. And then, frankly, we need to think about
containment. Vegas rules unfortunately do not apply to the
Middle East.
Who would have thought that a conflict in Syria would have
resulted in actually throwing apart the integrity of the
European Union? So we need to play a role. However, we need to
recognize the opportunity costs of our involvement in this
region are only getting higher and higher.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I think with respect to Yemen,
specifically, the way the United States got engaged in this
conflict as an indirect participant is because Saudi Arabia and
the UAE and other Arab countries decided that it represented a
direct threat to them and we decided we were going to work with
them to try to respond to that threat. The issue that I have
consistently tried to raise over the course of this hearing is,
I think now with going on 4 years of experience under our belt
in trying to help them, the course that we have taken has made
things worse not better and therefore we should change course.
Mr. Singh. I do not have a lot to add to that, Congressman.
I just want to point to something which has already been said
that of course we also do have a direct engagement in Yemen to
counter al-Qaida and to counter ISIS and I think it is
important we not lose sight of that.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you so much for the opportunity to
speak today. And I agree that I have at this point few
questions to ask that are unique but some to followup on. And I
guess my first followup is a conversation that Representative
Pence started to have, which has to do with what can Congress
do, what are the powers and the authorities of Congress in a
situation like this?
And I guess what I would like to ask, and I think, Dr.
Karlin, based on our conversation so far I think you might be
the first person who can answer this which is if we can go way
back into the Obama Administration and we talk about the
original decision to begin things like refueling and other
sorts of support for the Saudi coalition, what do you think
that that administration saw, what was their thinking or their
mindset at the time that deemed it necessary and appropriate at
that time to go in, in the way that we did without the
authority and the authorization of Congress?
Ms. Karlin. Thank you. While I was not a part of that
discussion, my assumption is the thought process was that the
Saudis are a close partner that are very helpful for a number
of regional concerns, they are getting involved in a conflict,
and we have a lot of experience with these sorts of things so
we should see what effect our help can have.
So I think as Mr. Sullivan has discussed previously I think
it was a good faith effort to see how we could help them really
use their military force for one of the first few times they
had done that in a meaningful way. Where Congress, I think, can
be especially helpful is forcing something that Mr. Singh
suggested earlier, forcing that step back. Forcing that
assessment in saying, OK, it has been a couple years. What
effect have we had, what effect should we have expected to
have, and what are the costs?
Ms. Houlahan. And I agree with you, because his
conversation also talked a little bit about the responsibility
of Congress having a longer term view in making sure that we
are thinking hard about why we are at places that we are and
whether we should stay there. And it just feels as though we
are in this place right now where we have made a decision and
even with your description did not sound like a decision that
was imminent or pressing or needed some sort of a step around
Congress.
Here we are and now we kind of have the opportunity to step
back and look at it. So you do not see that there is anything
now that would continue to require that there not be an
authorization on the part of Congress to continue to be
involved in this area?
Ms. Karlin. I think Congress's involvement is crucial. It
is really hard to step back and assess how well the policy you
are working on is actually working or having the effect you
want.
And I think for this committee, writ large, the U.S., the
executive branch and the military in particular, has focused
largely on this region for the last 18 years. It is going to be
extra hard then for any administration to feel comfortable
stepping back and saying what have we achieved and what have
not we achieved. That is an uncomfortable and awkward and yet
crucial discussion that this committee can really help
facilitate.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And I really do agree. I do not
think it is necessarily about one administration or the other,
but really a question of whether or not this body, this
Congress should also be involved in that decision of whether or
not to appropriate these kinds of resources.
My second question, if I have time, is probably for Mr.
Sullivan. You spoke really eloquently several times about the
fact that we should have a bipartisan and very serious
conversation about a sustainable relationship ongoing. You did
speak about ideas like curtailing logistical support, about
disrupting maritime lines, and you also spoke about finding a
political solution and your hope that there was something
there.
Dr. Karlin, you also spoke about efforts for--that the
military efforts and the diplomatic efforts in many cases are
at odds with one another and acting counter to one another
right now. So here we are years later and whatever we are doing
is not working, so if we end up sort of pulling back one
aspect, maybe the offensive engagement that we have right now,
if you can envision not militarily what the consequences will
be because we talked about that over here, but in terms of
energy, commerce, all the other sorts of implications about our
relationship with Saudi Arabia, what can you imagine or
speculate would happen if ended up offensively pulling out of
our relationship right now?
Mr. Sullivan. Do you mean pulling out altogether saying
sort of breaching the relationship more fundamentally or----
Ms. Houlahan. No.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Just with respect to Yemen?
Ms. Houlahan. Just with respect to Yemen, exactly.
Mr. Sullivan. Look, I believe that we put in a good faith
effort to support and provide assistance to this coalition
effort over an extended period of time and we can make a good
faith case to our partners that we are done because we do not
think it is working and, frankly, it is shocking our conscience
what is happening as a result of this. And I do not believe
that that needs to or would lead to a fundamental breach or
disruption in our relationship and that the positive elements
of that relationship could continue even if the United States
no longer participated in this and that would be the policy I
would aim for.
Ms. Houlahan. OK. I appreciate your time very much and I
yield back the remainder of my time to the chair.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reschenthaler.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Thanks. I thought I had it. Thank you,
Greg. I just want to express my gratitude for being appointed
to this committee and I look forward to working to ensure
America's continued leadership on the world's stage.
So having served in Iraq, I know firsthand the challenges
facing our counterparts in the Middle East and the escalating
sensitivity of the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen is devastated by
violence and human rights atrocities as you have discussed
today. It is estimated that 80 percent of the Yemeni population
needs humanitarian assistance, 17.8 million civilians are food
insecure, and approximately 60,000 people have been killed
since January 2016.
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen must be addressed
immediately. However, continued calls for the United States to
withdraw security assistance from the Arabian Peninsula because
of this crisis would be a serious mistake. Iran, the world's
largest sponsor of terror, has been illegally supplying Houthi
rebels in Yemen with missiles, training, and support in
violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The Houthis use these illegal arms transfer to terrorize
American allies and counterparts, targeting Riyadh, Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, as well as civilian aircraft in the region. Just this
past January, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats
testified that al-Qaida affiliate in Yemen, AQAP, remains one
of the largest and most capable terror groups in the region.
This is why I fully support continued U.S. security
assistance and the administration's goal to create the Middle
East Security Alliance, a regional NATO-like body that will
deepen cooperation on missile defense, military training,
counter terrorism, and strengthening regional and economic
diplomatic ties. I strongly support the U.S. working in
coordination with our counterparts in the Gulf region. However,
cooperation shared goals do not equate to blind allegiance and
obedience.
The assassination of Jamal Khashoggi and detention of
women's rights activists in Saudi Arabia do not align with the
values of the United States and deserve scrutiny. However,
holding others accountable should not come at the expense of
the safety and security of the American people.
Following this hearing, this committee will consider a
resolution directing the removal of U.S. security assistance in
the Arabian Peninsula. This resolution is misguided and based
on a false premise. It does nothing but open the door for rogue
actors like Iran, China, and Russia to gain a stronger foothold
in one of the most turbulent regions in the world and continue
to sow further chaos.
So with that, Mr. Singh, what are the core functions, in
your opinion, of the Saudi-U.S. relationship and what other
interests in the Middle East does this relationship support?
Mr. Singh. Well, thank you, Congressman. I think you made a
lot of excellent points there. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is
one of our major relationships obviously in this part of the
world. It is obviously not the only one, but U.S.-UAE
relationship has been discussed here. We have relations with
the Bahranis, the Kuwaitis, and others who are engaged in some
of these conflicts.
Our interests in the Middle East are, I think, quite
compelling and of concern to ordinary Americans, things like
counter terrorism, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,
ensuring the free flow of energy and commerce, and ensuring
freedom of action for American forces. As you know,
Congressman, our military facilities in the Gulf are used not
just to prosecute conflicts or wars or operations within this
region but elsewhere, to project power outside of this region.
These allies like the Saudis, the Emirates, and so forth
are key partners in all those efforts. Our counter terrorism
relations with the Saudis are good and with the Emirates are
good, and frankly we would suffer if we did not have their
cooperation. They would suffer if they did not have our
cooperation. It is mutually beneficial.
I think that again the question is can we turn these
relationships into something more. And the example of Yemen,
the example of Syria is discouraging and suggests the need for
a lot more work in engagement and maybe a rethinking of how we
are doing our military partnerships, how we are conducting our
military partnerships. And I think it is absolutely appropriate
to explore that, but I think that is very different from saying
let's disengage or walk away or withdraw our assistance.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Mr. Singh, if we did withdraw, who do
you think would fill that power vacuum and how would you see
that playing out?
Mr. Singh. I think as the U.S. steps back, look, there are
other great powers, other external powers, let's say, who have
also interest in this region. The Russians have an interest in
the region. The Chinese have an interest in this region. And
whether they wanted to or not, I think as the U.S. steps back
it increases the incentive for them to increase their
involvement of the region.
Already, for example, the Saudis have a tremendous economic
relationship with the Chinese. I think if the U.S. stepped back
they would need to look to diversify their external
relationships.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield back the rest of
my time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Omar.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. I want to first thank our
distinguished witnesses for coming to testify. Thank you so
much for taking the time.
The Saudi-led coalition has engaged in a military action in
Yemen for a little over 3 years now and the ongoing military
campaign has triggered one of the world's worst humanitarian
crises. In the last three and a half years more than 17,000
people have been killed and another 40,000 wounded. Further,
three million have been internally displaced and according to
USAID, 22.2 million Yemenis or three quarters of the Yemeni
population need humanitarian assistance. Millions are on the
verge of starvation. There is a cholera outbreak that is tied
to the Saudi-led war that has erupted in 21 of Yemen's 22
provinces infecting more, approximately a million Yemenis
making it one of the worst cholera outbreaks in our history.
And I know that we are having a conversation about what our
interests are, but I want us to root this conversation in the
interest of protecting human life and furthering our values of
protecting human life. I agree with my colleague, Mr. Perry,
that we have known for years about Saudi brutality and its
atrocities, its atrocity record of human rights, women's
rights, and religious freedom. Where I strongly disagree is
that we should not have even tolerated this type of behavior
from an ally.
As Chairman Engel noted earlier, there is also evidence
that the coalition is arming the al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula linked fighters in Yemen, directly undercutting our
military's objective there. This is also far from the first
time the Saudis have supported and enabled jihadis. My concern
is about the way our support for the Saudis, in spite of these
clear contradictions with our values and our interests are
affecting our diplomatic credibility in the region. When we see
other members of that region like Iran commit human rights
atrocities or engaging in activities that are destabilizing the
region, we are quick to condemn them and call them out.
So my question is to Mr. Sullivan. In your answer to Mr.
Levin's question earlier, you said human rights needs to be at
a higher priority. Can you explain why that is?
Mr. Sullivan. In a number of our significant relationships
around the world including the U.S.-Saudi relationship we
sometimes have to make decisions about what we are placing
paramount priority on in terms of what we deal with on a day-
to-day basis. And there are instances throughout Democratic and
Republican administrations where human rights take a back seat
to short-term security interest concerns. That has happened in
the Obama Administration, the Bush Administration, the Clinton
Administration. It is happening with much more frequency in the
Trump administration.
The issue I see with Saudi Arabia is that we have allowed
that to become so embedded in our muscle memory in the
relationship that we basically do not really press on human
rights concerns much at all. And particularly with the current
President essentially saying, I do not care about those issues,
do as you please, I think this has reached a point where it is
no longer sustainable for the United States and that we have to
find a way consistent with the complexity of our interests in
the region to elevate the dialog and discourse and urgency of
our demands of our partners that they do better when it comes
to how they treat their citizens.
Ms. Omar. And do you think this double standard is
impacting our diplomatic credibility in the region?
Mr. Sullivan. I think it is a broader issue with U.S.
foreign policy. Any time you are both engaged in power politics
in the world and you are trying to advance values as the United
States does, you are going to have certain instances of
inconsistency and hypocrisy. That is built in to a unique
attribute of American policy, which is we do care about these
issues the way a lot of other countries do not and so
necessarily sometimes there will be inconsistency.
I do not think that has to undermine our credibility, but
it does mean we have to be more forthright and honest about it
and do a better job of making sure that we are not simply
ignoring human rights issues, I think, as we all too often have
done in this relationship, again in a bipartisan way. I am not
trying to use this as a political cudgel just against this
administration.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Omar. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman and the ranking member
for organizing this hearing and thank our witnesses for being
here.
Our Gulf partners have proven invaluable in opposing Iran's
destabilizing agenda, fighting terrorism, and recognizing
Israel's right to exist, and I believe we must continue holding
our allies to a high ethical and humanitarian standard. I
appreciate the opportunity to learn more about U.S. efforts to
prevent civilian casualties and foster respect for human rights
in the Arabian Peninsula.
When Canada's foreign minister criticized egregious human
rights abuses, the Saudi Government expelled the Canadian
ambassador, withdrew its own Ambassador to Canada, and froze
pending trade and investment deals. The Saudis have engaged in
similar disputes with Germany and I believe Sweden also.
Mr. Singh, are Canada, Germany, and Sweden coordinating a
response to the latest diplomatic feud and how can we support
our Canadian partners?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congresswoman. I do not know that
they are coordinating a response, so it is not something I have
heard about. But I do think that the episode you cite is an
example of the kind of, frankly, reckless actions by the Saudis
that are concerning to us, that are troubling to us, because it
was a valid criticism and the Saudi response was, in my view,
totally out of proportion to what the Canadians had done.
I would have liked to see us back up our Canadian allies in
their criticism of the Saudis because I do not think, and this
goes to what Mr. Sullivan was saying, I do not think it is good
for us or, frankly, good for the Saudis that they feel as
though they can kind of intimidate other countries into not
criticizing them.
From my point of view this is not just a matter of values
or morals, though those things are important, when human rights
abuses are allowed to go forward unchecked I think it also
endangers the stability of these countries and it encourages
extremism.
Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
Increasing access to affordable food, fuel, and medicine is
key to restoring stability in Yemen, but Houthi rebels have
disrupted the movement of imports by targeting commercial and
military vessels transiting the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia has
imposed periodic blockades. Dr. Karlin, how can the
international community support freedom of navigation in the
Red Sea and facilitate the movement of necessities to Yemeni
ports?
Ms. Karlin. Thank you for that question. I think the U.S.
military can be helpful as can regional militaries in
facilitating freedom of navigation through these areas whether
it is assisting and transporting, whether it is helping
regional navies through exercising by showing them how they
might responsibly operate in that area, all of which can be
useful.
Mrs. Wagner. Mr. Singh, preventing civilian casualties in
the Yemen conflict is a primary goal of the U.S.-Saudi military
cooperation. Can you describe how the United States is working
with the coalition to end the killing of civilians? How
effective have these efforts been?
Mr. Singh. Well, Congresswoman, obviously this is, I think,
a top concern for our military officials and also our
diplomatic officials who are dealing with this issue. As has
been discussed here a little bit, we have done a number of
things. One is by providing precision munitions to our allies.
We have especially in the wake of particular incidents worked
on the training of pilots, we have tried to help the Saudis in
terms of investigating incidents to determine exactly what
occurred, and we have also worked with them on questions of
intelligence in these sort of do-not-target lists and so forth.
As far as I understand it, and obviously you would want a
full briefing from our military officials, that is what we have
done. I think that my impression is that the--I have not heard
any U.S. officials, let's put it that way, say that they feel
as though the Saudis are deliberately targeting civilians. If
we felt that way I think we would have to end our cooperation
with them.
But I think we need to appreciate that the level of care
and precision that the U.S. military brings to these conflicts
is simply frankly, unmatched almost anywhere else in the world
and that is why these kinds of long-term efforts of bringing up
the abilities and capabilities of our allies is so important.
Mrs. Wagner. Mr. Sullivan, U.S. agencies and international
NGO's are struggling to access areas in desperate need of
humanitarian assistance. How can we work with our allies to do
more to increase access for the U.N. and international NGO's
and any points of leverage that can be used to achieve this
with the Saudis and the Emirates?
Mr. Sullivan. I defer to the expertise of Mr. Harden who I
think has made a couple of really important points today. One
is that a lot of this rests with the Houthis over whom we do
not have influence but who we should be sure to be shining a
spotlight on the extent to which they are blocking access
through Hodeida.
But with the Saudis and Emirates, I do think that we have
influence and leverage both to open corridors across the Saudi
border, as Mr. Harden said earlier, and in respect to the
Stockholm Agreement which is fragile and sort of quasi-holding,
working to restrain the Saudis and Emirates so that more
channels coming out of Hodeida can be opened beyond the
basically the one road that is coming out right now.
So those are available to us, but it is an imperfect set of
tools because so much of this rests on making sure the Houthis
step up to do their part.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Wagner. My time is expired.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to first just followup on
Congresswoman Omar's questioning about where human rights fits
into our foreign policy.
And, Mr. Sullivan, when you said that, you talked about
power politics in advancing values and the need for
inconsistency when using power politics in advancing values,
obviously the suggestion being that there is always or, if not
always, certainly many times where those two things are
inconsistent.
Can I ask--you started talking about the ways that we can
use our leverage. Isn't advancing our values, is not standing
up for human rights, does that not actually give us more power?
Doesn't that when we engage in power politics making clear what
it is that motivates us, strengthens us as we confront the
difficult issues and sometimes difficult challenges in
governments that we deal with?
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to
potentially clarify because it sounds like I may have not made
myself clear. I am not arguing that the United States should
not be standing up in a consistent and resolute way for human
rights. Indeed, I said in my earlier answer to Congresswoman
Omar that there is something unique and special about the
United States in this regard and we need to work desperately to
hold onto that.
What I am saying is that in a complex world where we have a
range of interests with any given country, there are
necessarily going to be times where standing up for human
rights is not going to be the only issue on the agenda. And
just to give an example, when the street protests began in
Bahrain and Bahraini activists came to us and said essentially
support us over a government who is repressing us, we had to
think very hard about the fact that the Fifth Fleet is
headquartered in Manama. That was a factor in our
decisionmaking.
Now I would say at the macro level long term there is
nothing inconsistent between our interests and our values, they
converge. But in the short term there are going to be times
where we do business with countries with whom we radically
disagree, where we have partnerships with countries who do not
share our values. And in that I think we just have to get more,
I think, forthright and honest about the extent to which these
are sometimes difficult circumstances.
And the problem I see in the Saudi relationship is we have
allowed that thinking to go to its extreme to the point where
we really do not treat human rights as a key feature of the
relationship at all. That is my view.
Mr. Deutch. So sticking with the Saudi relationship, when
you say that we may overestimate our leverage, I know there has
been a lot of discussion about weapons sales. What other
leverage do we have and getting back to the power politics and
advancing values, in an instance where a journalist is murdered
and decapitated, how does speaking out forcefully against that
and looking and demanding accountability and looking for ways
to ensure that there is accountability, how does that interfere
with the power politics that are very much in play?
Mr. Sullivan. Well this is a great example of where there
is a vigorous debate and many in the administration are very
much on the other side of this debate, basically saying if we
push too hard on the Khashoggi issue we are going to lose Saudi
Arabia and that will come at a cost to our larger interests in
the world.
Now I happen to radically disagree with that both because I
think we have much more leverage in this relationship than the
Saudis do and because as others have said on the panel, at some
point you reach a breaking point. And the wanton murder of
somebody who was under U.S. protection was a resident of the
United States in a foreign embassy is well past that breaking
point, in my view.
So the argument I am making is that we can--it is not
enough to simply say we stand for human rights and that is
great, it is to problematize the situation. It is to stare it
square in the face. It is to say oftentimes we say that and
then we do not really do it and more and more with respect to
Saudi Arabia we should be doing it.
Mr. Deutch. And so play that out then. So again other than
weapons sales or in addition to weapons sales, what is the
leverage that we should be looking to utilize?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, one thing that we have done so far of
course is under Global Magnitsky we have sanctioned 17 Saudi
nationals who we believe were engaged in this. But I think we
should take an additional step of demanding an independent,
impartial, international investigation and whomever is
determined to have played a role in this or been responsible or
directed this should equally be held accountable under United
States law.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks, Mr. Sullivan. Thanks to all of our
witnesses for being here.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
Getting the U.S. out of Yemen is not and should not be a
partisan issue. I and other Democrats and Republicans in 2015
started criticizing the Obama Administration. We wrote letters.
We did press conferences. We introduced legislation. And it was
not just a humanitarian catastrophe that was happening, one of
the primary drivers was war crimes and as result of the
pressure the Obama Administration, in fact, took action.
So, Mr. Sullivan, it is correct, is not it, that the Obama
Administration actually stopped a shipment of precision guided
munitions to Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, they did and then it was restarted.
Mr. Lieu. Under the Trump administration.
Mr. Sullivan. Right.
Mr. Lieu. Now the reason the Obama Administration stopped
that shipment is they did a review and they figured out it was
not the case that the Saudis were trying to hit some moving
Houthi, missed, and then hit a funeral. What, in fact, happened
is they very precisely intended to hit the targets that they
hit, they struck schools. They struck hospitals. They struck
wedding parties. They struck civilian markets. And then they
struck a funeral that had hundreds, that killed hundreds and
injured hundreds of people, and then the jets came around,
struck the same funeral again.
So the Obama Administration figured out then, in fact,
precision guided munitions were killing more civilians than if
they were not precision guided. And is not that one of the
reasons they decided to stop that shipment, Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Lieu. OK.
So, Mr. Singh, I am going to give you an opportunity to
talk because I disagree with what you said and you did give
testimony that somehow precision guided munitions would cause
less civilian casualties. It looks like it is the opposite.
Especially because if you just look at what happened a few
months ago, the Saudis very precisely struck a school bus
killing over 40 children and then they admitted they intended
to hit that bus. So if you would like to comment, Mr. Singh.
Mr. Singh. Well, Congressman, I cannot--obviously I am not
a military official or privy to the intelligence that you are
privy to. All I can tell you is that when I have asked U.S.
officials these questions they have suggested to me that they
feel the problem is a question of competence and ability as
opposed to the question of intent on the part of our partners.
But I think it is, frankly, Congressman, a question you should
be asking the administration rather than me because I do not
have that information.
Mr. Lieu. I am not asking you. You had made a statement to
a colleague of mine that somehow precision guided munitions
would somehow cause less civilian casualties.
Mr. Singh. It is generally the belief, Congressman.
Mr. Lieu. Right.
Mr. Singh. That is why we use precision guided munitions
because they reduce civilian casualties.
Mr. Lieu. Correct. Right.
Mr. Singh. And if you compare Yemen to Syria, I think you
can see that very clearly. But the specific question as to the
targeting and intent of our allies, I have to refer you to our
military officials.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And so my only point is they reduce
civilian casualties if the civilians were not, in fact,
targeted. So that is a problem, right, the Saudis are, in fact,
targeting civilians. How do we know? They admit it. They
admitted publicly they intended to strike that bus. So I would
suggest that the U.S. officials you are talking to are, in
fact, lying because just based on public Saudi statements. That
is why I wrote a letter to the Department of Defense Inspector
General to investigate whether DoD personnel or other personnel
are complicit in war crimes.
So I am going to ask you, Mr. Sullivan. It is true, right,
that both international law as well as regulations in domestic
law prevents U.S. personnel from engaging in war crimes?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, of course.
Mr. Lieu. Right. And then you cannot actually aid someone
that you know who is committing war crimes as well; is not that
right?
Mr. Sullivan. Correct.
Mr. Lieu. OK. So let me now move to a related but separate
area. A public reporting is that the crown prince had bragged
that Jared Kushner was in his back pocket. We also know that
based on this reporting Jared Kushner made an unannounced trip
to Riyadh catching some intelligence officials off guard. This
was not a trip that he had disclosed to anyone. And then we see
sort of this complete kowtowing to Saudi Arabia by Donald Trump
and the administration.
So, Mr. Sullivan or any other members on the panel, I just
want to get your thoughts on whether you think it is that they
just happen to think Saudi Arabia has a bunch of money and oil,
or is there something more nefarious going on?
Mr. Sullivan. I think there is sufficient legitimate
questions about the potential business interests of both the
Trump organization and Trump family and the Kushner family with
respect to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular that it
demands more investigation. But we cannot jump to conclusions
on that. That is something the Congress could take up.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
And let me thank Chairman Engel for creating a subcommittee
of Oversight on the Foreign Affairs Committee to do exactly
that. And I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Costa.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. And I know, I think I am
the last one so most of the questions have been asked already.
Chairman Engel. Well, actually, Mr. Castro, Mr. Costa came
so I am going to call on him.
Mr. Castro. All right.
Chairman Engel. And then you will truly be the last one.
Mr. Castro. All right.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the
ranking member. It is good to be back on the Foreign Affairs
Committee. We have had a very impressive group of witnesses
testify today. And I apologize, with other committee hearings I
have been in and out of the meeting, so I obviously have not
been able to track all of the questions and your comments but,
and I apologize if this question has been asked already.
But in the event that this resolution that comes up and as
we look at our ability to develop some renewed effort and this
committee has been good at it, generally speaking, on
bipartisan agreements on issues affecting our country off the
water's edge, but what do you think are the likely consequences
of passing this resolution today and the impacts as we go ahead
to try to put some borders in terms of a foreign policy in this
country that has continuity and that reflects a tradition that
has existed through past administrations both Democratic and
Republican that protects and reflects the alliances that have
been crucial post-World War II to the world we live in today?
And I would like in that context to get your thoughts on
because I think obviously there are going to be future
resolutions that we will be acting on that will come to us as
we try to provide some sidewalls, I guess, for a better term in
terms of this zig-zagging or ricocheting of a foreign policy
that many of us perceive as taking place over the last 2 years.
Mr. Sullivan. So I would start by saying that the first
thing that this can do is actually much beyond just Yemen. It
is something that was built into your question which is it is
the assertion of Congress that it has an important bipartisan
role to play in the participation of the United States in
military activities across the Middle East and across the
world. And that is relevant to a series of questions that have
not really been visited by the Congress since the passage of
the resolutions in 2001, to use military force in 2001 and
2002.
So I think it would be a big step forward in terms of the
assertion of this body that it is going to be a fundamental
part of the conversation about the balance of U.S. interest in
the region and where military force and activity is appropriate
and where it is not. I also think it will send a message to the
international community and to the participants in this
conflict that the United States is not simply going to allow
business as usual to continue.
And I think the Senate passing the resolution last year did
have some effect on the calculus of the Saudi-led coalition. I
do not think it will impact the Trump administration. I think
they will conclude that they can continue their activities
uninhibited, but I think it will have its due effect.
Mr. Costa. They may. But I think it certainly provides an
illustration of what we think the importance of a well thought
out foreign policy and not one based on tweets as you said in
your earlier comments today that is unprecedented, I think,
with any previous administrations. The fact is, is that we
should assert ourselves. Congress in recent years has abdicated
its role to a large extent, I think, and clearly there are
other issues. Many of us work with our European allies. They
are very concerned and wondering what our policy is on any
given day.
Would some of the others, would you care to comment?
Mr. Singh. You know, I have to say, Congressman, that I do
not fully agree with Mr. Sullivan on this point. I am a strong
believer in congressional oversight of the executive branch.
Having only worked in the executive branch myself, I think
Congress plays an important role. I do not think though that it
is right to say that the types of support we are offering to
our partners, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, constitute
hostilities if this is the question before the committee.
And I worry about the precedent that would set for our
ability to support partners around the world. We want other
States in general to step forward and take some of the burden
off the United States and we see partners in some parts of the
world doing that. The French are active, for example, in the
Sahel in Africa. In exigencies if there were, for example, a
war between Israel and Iran, we want to be able to provide
certain types of assistance below the level of engaging in
hostilities with our partners.
Mr. Costa. No, of course. But of course it depends upon how
that policy is pursued and its impacts and the effects of it
and whether or not, I mean sometimes we support a policy and it
does not turn out the way we had hoped it would.
Mr. Singh. That is absolutely true. I would just be
careful. I would, actually, I would advise caution on the terms
of the precedent that is being set.
Ms. Karlin. We need to be cognizant. Our partners have some
warts, no doubt. The most effective U.S. policy is one that
blends carrots and sticks. I think what we have seen from this
administration so far has been all carrots vis-a-vis the Saudis
and that is problematic. And Congress can be helpful in shining
a light on many of the warts.
You know, Mr. Sullivan, I think, clearly articulated that
there are a number of times where the U.S. for various reasons
ends up making compromises. It is important that we are sober
and clear-eyed about when we are making those compromises and
it is worth reminding ourselves of course that the Houthis do
not pose a transnational threat to U.S. national security.
If this were a conversation about Hezbollah I would have a
very different response and I suspect many of us would as well.
But a reminder that U.S. assistance comes with some sticks is
crucial and there are various ways one might exert that.
Mr. Harden. So I just want to note that the role of
Congress at the Foreign Service level in embassies and at the
diplomatic exchanges has a very profound impact on how we shape
our conversation and the points that we push, so we should
never minimize that. Second, I would associate myself with Mr.
Singh in the sense that the oversight role of Congress is
extraordinarily important, but the narrow question as to
whether or not these activities constitute hostilities, I
think, may be beyond what the goal is in terms of carving back
actual hostile actions by the administration.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
And now we go to Mr. Castro this time, last but certainly
not least.
Mr. Castro. Thank you. I was going to say earlier that I
had three committee hearings at the same time, so I think most
of the questions have been asked already.
But let me ask you all and whoever wants to answer it
whether you think MbS is a rogue or a reformer based on what
you have seen so far?
Mr. Harden. I do not think--that is too crass of a choice,
I think.
Mr. Castro. No, I know. You said it is non-binary, what is
he?
Mr. Harden. I think he could be a reformer who is also
acting in authoritarian ways that is counterproductive at
times, so both.
Ms. Karlin. We have seen evidence that he has taken steps
in both directions and I think we should recognize those steps.
Yes, he has made progress in terms of opening up Saudi Arabia,
women driving, all of that the economy piece, great. He has
also taken a number of really irresponsible steps as we have
discussed a bit here, whether it is arresting folks in the Ritz
Carlton; the Hariri hostage-taking, if you will, or kidnapping;
obviously the blockade against Qatar; the Jamal Khashoggi
affair; the war in Yemen.
And so he is on one level stumbling in really key and
worrisome ways, on another level he is taking some steps that
are meaningful. When you go to Saudi Arabia it is a little bit
different than it was when you went 10 years ago. So figuring
out how to sort of tame his worst instincts of which I think
they are profound, and I cannot kind of underscore that enough,
while trying to elevate the handful of right steps he is making
is important.
Mr. Castro. And, Dr. Karlin, you mentioned in your last
comment that with respect to the Trump administration it has
been mostly carrots with respect to Saudi Arabia and that there
have been really no sticks. What sticks would you apply to
Saudi Arabia?
Ms. Karlin. I would encourage investigations, so mandating,
say, that there needs to be an investigation into the Khashoggi
affair and an actual independent one, not one that is coming
obviously from the leadership. I would look at tightening the
U.S. security cooperation more broadly with the Saudis.
And I would not underestimate the significance of just
verbal articulation of what is wrong. People hear that, people
know that, and it should start to worry them. If the leadership
in Riyadh is only hearing kind of positive endorsements from
the administration, it is crucial that that gets balanced by
Congress emphasizing that there are things that are right and
things that are wrong.
Mr. Singh. Can I just say I do not really agree with the
characterization of the Trump administration's policy in the
sense that----
Mr. Castro. Which part, that there have been no sticks?
Mr. Singh. That there have been no sticks. I mean we have
seen 17 Saudis sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Act as a
result of the Khashoggi assassination. Sanctioning members of
allied governments is a significant step. I think we need to
acknowledge that. We have also seen the Trump administration
partly, I think, in response to pressure from Congress suspend
the midair refueling for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. And
also I think my understanding is that Secretary Pompeo in his
private meetings with the Saudis has delivered messages on some
of these issues, the women's rights activists, Khashoggi, the
war in Yemen. I think publicly they have been quite supportive.
Mr. Castro. Do you think we have done enough in response to
Khashoggi and the situation in Yemen?
Mr. Singh. I think Congressman, that what we need is much
more engagement with the Saudis at multiple levels. My concern
is that right now this relationship is in the hands of too few
individuals on both sides. I would like to see us have----
Mr. Castro. You mean Jared Kushner?
Mr. Singh. What is that?
Mr. Castro. Jared Kushner?
Mr. Singh. I think on both sides it is in too few hands. We
have no Ambassador in Riyadh, the Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs nomination is held up right now, and I
think this relationship will only be healthier when we are able
to broaden it and diversify it in that way and it will involve
both carrots and sticks. And I think sometimes it is
appropriate that it will involve tough private messages but
some public support.
Mr. Castro. Anything, Jake?
Mr. Sullivan. I think I do not have confidence presently
that there is a huge difference between the private messages we
are sending the Saudis and what we are hearing publicly. I have
not seen evidence of that. I do not see any sense in which the
leadership of Saudi Arabia and the crown prince right now feel
that they are under any meaningful pressure from this
administration. And I do think we need to take further steps in
response to the Khashoggi affair, that it is not sufficient,
the 17.
Mr. Castro. I think part of the difficult part of that is
that the President really sidelines all of his advisors. I do
not think there is anybody that can reliably speak for the
President including the Vice President. Most notably, when he
came to Congress to cut a budget deal and on his way back to
the White House it was undone. I think that makes it even more
difficult because it is hard enough for Americans to read the
President, American politicians; I suspect it is even harder
for folks who are overseas.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
This concludes our hearing. Let me first announce how we
are going to work this. First, I want to thank the witnesses
for outstanding testimony and when you signed up for this I
know you did not think it was going to be this long. But as you
can tell we had very thoughtful members on both sides who
really had a lot of good questions to ask. I know I have
learned a lot and I am sure everybody has as well. So we are
going to give you a couple of minutes to leave and I want to
thank you again.
And then we will conclude--we will begin the markup
immediately after, say, in a minute or two. I want to thank you
very much for coming and thank you for your time.
Mr. Singh. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Engel. What we are going to do is begin our markup
shortly and return after floor votes to conclude the markup.
There is going to be floor votes at what time, now,
momentarily. And so the hearing is now adjourned and in a
minute or so we are going to start the next phase and Mr.
McCaul and I are going to start with our opening statements and
then we are going to have everybody come back to make remarks
after the votes and to vote after the votes.
[Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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