[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2529 Introduced in House (IH)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2529
To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the
expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 7, 2019
Mr. Engel (for himself and Mr. McCaul) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select),
for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case
for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of
the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the
expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O.
Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has
relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of
its national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and
its successor state, the Russian Federation.
(2) The United States nuclear arsenal must remain, safe,
secure, and reliable such that it can effectively ensure the
security of the United States and its allies.
(3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United States has
pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union and Russia to
ensure strategic stability and the protection of the United
States homeland, such as--
(A) the Interim Agreement Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on May 26, 1972
(commonly referred to as SALT I); and
(B) the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed on July 31, 1991
(commonly referred to as START I).
(4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the
United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear
deterrence and strategic arms control to help protect the
United States from nuclear attack.
(5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russia
signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as
``New Start Treaty'').
(6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2,
2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P.
Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin
L. Powell urged the Senate to ratify the Treaty, stating that
it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
(7) During the ratification process, the Treaty garnered
bipartisan support, and the United States Senate approved the
Treaty on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
(8) The Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011,
placing numerical limits on United States and Russian strategic
systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as
well as warheads.
(9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty's central limits on
strategic arms took effect.
(10) Through the Treaty's verification regime, which
includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military bases
and facilities, the United States is able to verify the data
provided by Russia regarding its strategic nuclear arsenal. The
verification regime provides both countries insight into each
other's strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and
facilities, as well as data exchanges to track the status and
makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
(11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on nuclear
deterrence requirements of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Commander of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
General John Hyten voiced his support for the Treaty, saying he
was ``a big supporter of the New START agreement'' and stating,
``The New START treaty'' provides ``insights into the Russians
capabilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.''.
(12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear deterrence
requirements of the House Armed Services Committee, Air Force
General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, also endorsed the New START Treaty, saying the Treaty is
``a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us some degree
of predictability on what our potential adversaries look
like''.
(13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, asserted that the New START Treaty was of ``huge
value'' to United States security.
(14) During a September 2018 hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Policy David Trachtenberg stated that ``the transparency and
verification requirements of the New START Treaty are a
benefit'' to the security of the United States and, in response
to a question regarding missile defense, asserted that the
Treaty had ``no'' effect on limiting United States missile
defense capabilities.
(15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Retired Air
Force General and former commander of United States Strategic
Command Robert Kehler stated, ``I think that we have gotten
tremendous benefit out of those kinds of agreements with the
Russians over the years, provided that the Russians comply,''
regarding the importance of the New START Treaty.
(16) The Department of State confirmed in February 2018
that Russia had met the Treaty's central limits on strategic
arms and stated that ``implementation of the New START Treaty
enhances the safety and security of the United States''.
(17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control
agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and
predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the
risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
(18) The New START Treaty strengthens United States nuclear
security and strategic stability by reducing the number of
strategic systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and provides the
United States with the inspection and monitoring tools
necessary to confidently verify Russian compliance with the
Treaty.
(19) The New START Treaty does not restrict United States
nuclear modernization programs or limit United States missile
defense efforts.
(20) If the New START Treaty is not extended or replaced
before it expires in 2021, the United States runs the risk of
having no legally binding, verifiable limits on Russia's
strategic nuclear arsenal for the first time since 1972.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should seek to
extend the New START Treaty from its initial termination date in
February 2021 to February 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of
the Treaty, unless the President determines and informs the appropriate
congressional committees that--
(1) Russia is in material breach of the Treaty; or
(2) the United States and Russia have entered into a new
arms control agreement to replace the Treaty that provides
equal or greater constraints, transparency, and verification
measures with regard to Russia's nuclear forces.
SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.
(a) Director of National Intelligence.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
an intelligence assessment based on all sources of the national
security and intelligence implications of the expiration of the New
START Treaty without the United States and Russia having entered into a
new arms control agreement to replace the Treaty that provides equal or
greater constraints, transparency, and verification measures with
regard to Russia's nuclear forces. The assessment shall be submitted in
an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, and shall
include the following elements:
(1) A description of the size and posture of Russia's
nuclear forces and strategic delivery vehicles, as well as
predicted force levels through February 2026 under each of the
following potential scenarios:
(A) The Treaty expires in February 2021 without
such a replacement agreement.
(B) The Treaty is extended until February 2026.
(2) An assessment of how strategic stability would be
impacted if the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement
agreement is not concluded.
(3) An assessment of the impact on United States allies if
the limitations on Russia's nuclear forces are dissolved if the
Treaty is not extended or such a replacement agreement is not
concluded.
(4) A description of the intelligence collection benefits
of the Treaty.
(5) An assessment of how the United States intelligence
community's confidence in its assessments of Russia's strategic
nuclear arsenal and future nuclear force levels would be
impacted if the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement
agreement is not concluded.
(6) An assessment of what specific capabilities the United
States intelligence community would have to develop, deploy, or
realign to ensure no loss of collection capability occurs if
the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement agreement is
not concluded.
(b) Secretary of State.--
(1) Relating to nato, nato member countries, and other
united states allies.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a
report, which shall be in an unclassified form, but may contain
a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees that includes an assessment of the
likely reactions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), NATO member countries, and other United States allies
to a United States decision not to extend the New START Treaty
or enter into a new arms control agreement with Russia to
replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints,
transparency, and verification measures with regard to Russia's
nuclear forces.
(2) Relating to other matters.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter until the New START Treaty is extended or expires,
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees that includes the following elements:
(A) A description of any discussions with Russia on
the Treaty or a similar agreement on the reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms at the Assistant
Secretary, Ambassadorial level or higher.
(B) The dates, locations, discussion topics,
agenda, outcomes, and Russian interlocutors involved in
those discussions.
(C) An identification of the United States
Government departments and agencies involved in the
discussions.
(D) The types of systems, both nuclear and
nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such
discussions.
(E) Whether an offer of extension of the Treaty, of
any length of time, has been offered by either side.
SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPIRATION OF NEW START
TREATY.
If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before the United
States and Russia enter into a new arms control agreement to replace
the Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints, transparency,
and verification measures with regard to Russia's nuclear forces, not
later than 30 days after such expiration the President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a justification for why the New START Treaty was
allowed to expire; and
(2) a certification that extending the Treaty was not in
the national security interest of the United States.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(3) New start treaty; treaty.--The terms ``New START
Treaty'' and ``Treaty'' mean the Treaty between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for
the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on
February 5, 2011.
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