[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE STATE OF POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
(115-55)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
33-636 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Vice Chair Columbia
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
BOB GIBBS, Ohio GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JEFF DENHAM, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois Georgia
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
ROB WOODALL, Georgia RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
TODD ROKITA, Indiana DINA TITUS, Nevada
JOHN KATKO, New York SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
BRIAN BABIN, Texas ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut,
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana Vice Ranking Member
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
MIKE BOST, Illinois JARED HUFFMAN, California
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas JULIA BROWNLEY, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
JOHN J. FASO, New York MARK DeSAULNIER, California
A. DREW FERGUSON IV, Georgia STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
JASON LEWIS, Minnesota
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
JEFF DENHAM, California, Chairman
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
TODD ROKITA, Indiana RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
JOHN KATKO, New York ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
BRIAN BABIN, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas MARK DeSAULNIER, California
LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
JOHN J. FASO, New York, Vice Chair PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
JASON LEWIS, Minnesota Officio)
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
WITNESSES
Hon. Ronald L. Batory, Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration:
Oral statement............................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board:
Oral statement............................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S.
Government Accountability Office:
Oral statement............................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Scot Naparstek, Chief Operating Officer, Amtrak:
Oral statement............................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association of American Railroads:
Oral statement............................................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Jeffrey D. Knueppel, P.E., General Manager, Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, on behalf of the
American Public Transportation Association:
Oral statement............................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Stacey Mortensen, Executive Director, San Joaquin Regional Rail
Commission:
Oral statement............................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 46
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Testimony of Floyd Mason, President, Brotherhood of Railroad
Signalmen...................................................... 71
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THE STATE OF POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Denham
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Denham. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
recess at any time. We expect a very lengthy hearing today, but
we also know that there are several other committees meeting,
as well as floor votes today.
Our hearing today focuses on the implementation of Positive
Train Control, PTC, in the United States. It is an especially
important hearing, as yesterday marked the 10th anniversary of
the tragic Chatsworth accident.
This important life-saving technology is one of the most
complex safety mandates ever undertaken by the railroad
industry. PTC is a radio- or GPS-based system designed to
prevent train-to-train collisions, over speed derailments,
incursions into work zones, and the movement of a train through
a switch left in the wrong position.
From its inception a decade ago, Congress and stakeholders
anticipated that the PTC mandate would be a daunting
undertaking. It has never been implemented on such a large
scale, and has never required such a high level of
interoperability.
Since the 2008 mandate was enacted and the 2015 bipartisan
extension was passed, freight, passenger, and commuter
railroads have been working to implement PTC. We have seen a
great deal of progress, from freight rails as well as commuter
rails across the entire country, but we have still seen
challenges. We have still seen accidents. We have had promises
made to us, as a committee, that haven't been met.
And we held a hearing earlier this year. He and I have been
very united on this topic. And we ask the entire industry, if
there is something you need, let us know. If it is funding, if
it is a technical rule, whatever the issue is, because we have
got a very, very large country with very unique circumstances
and different rails across the entire country in different
positions, as far as implementation. We have consulted several
times to ask each other what have the rails come up with. Has
anybody asked for extensions? Is anybody asking for money or
grants?
And so, as you will see in this committee hearing, I would
expect the patience is growing thin on actual PTC
implementation. That is why we called this, to hear from all of
you. So it is a critical issue for our country, especially as
we have continued to see some accidents, for a variety of
different reasons. But most of which would be solved if we had
PTC in place.
With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. I agree with everything the chairman just
said, 100 percent.
I also want to state that, from what I see, there has been
a lot of progress made. So I want to be clear about that. From
what--the way I look at it, there is a few people who are
lagging behind, which actually, I think, proves the point that
there is no reason to be lagging behind, because most everybody
is doing their job.
So I just want to be real clear: for those who are doing
their job, thank you, I appreciate it. A long time coming, and
it is finally happening.
For those of you who are not, understand it is going to be
very difficult to make an argument that for some reason
everybody else could do it except you. It is going to be almost
impossible, as far as I am concerned.
And I do say again that when that time comes, there will be
nobody to point a finger at any more. There will be no more
bottom lines on whether it was worth the money to not do PTC
and possibly risk lives or property. Those days are over.
And again, most of you get it, and I want to be real clear.
Because of that, I--we get upset on occasion, but I also want
to be real clear. Most companies have done it. Most public
entities have done it, or are on the way to doing it. The
handful who are not, I am just saying very clearly, be careful,
because I don't think you are going to find very many, if any,
open minds on this side of the table when you come to say, for
some reason, every other person except us could get their job
done, particularly at this late date.
With that, I am going to yield back.
Mr. Denham. I now recognize the full committee chairman,
Mr. Shuster.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Chairman Denham. Thanks for holding
this hearing. And I just want to echo the concerns that the
chairman and the ranking member have about PTC.
I would like to point out, though, further, we are talking
about who is doing, who is not doing. And I want to say I know
my reports that I have seen is the freight rails are all in
position to deploy, and it is the commuter rails and the other
smaller entities out there that seem to be holding this up.
And, as the chairman said, there have been concerns, we
have reached out, asked what the needs are, and time and time
again it has either been--not got a response back, or
everything is OK. And, as I said, it is concerning when we, in
2015, we unanimously voted to extend it, we did it because we
thought that everybody would step up their game and get to a
point that we would see PTC being deployed.
So again, it is--as the ranking member said, it is not
everybody. What I have seen, again--I will emphasize the
freight rails seem to be doing what they are supposed to be
doing, and need to move forward. And that interoperability is
the piece that doesn't seem to be there, that doesn't--they
can't do what they need to do to fully implement the PTC.
So again, this hearing is important. Safety is absolutely
critical to this committee when it comes to all modes of
transportation. So I look forward to hearing everybody's
testimony today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Denham. I now recognize Mr. DeFazio for any statement
he may have.
Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this
important hearing.
Yes, I hope, like the speakers before me, to hear about how
we are going to meet the statutory deadlines of 2018 and full
utilization by 2020.
You know, I am concerned at some of those at the rear of
the pack. As Ranking Member Capuano mentioned, there is no
feasible excuse that isn't, you know, for this committee, or
for the agency.
I am concerned. Ranking Member Capuano, Congressman Cohen,
and Congressman Cooper and I sent a letter to the FRA after
they exempted the Music City Star a permanent exemption from
PTC, you know, and I understand there is another railroad that
is pending. I hope to hear from Administrator Batory on this.
You know, Congress did not authorize exemptions to PTC. I
find that nowhere in the law. And you know, this causes me
concern that some will look at this, look at the exemption, the
one granted and the one potentially in process, and say,
``Well, there is our out, you know, we are way behind schedule
here.''
So, you know, this is not something that Congress
anticipated. And, you know, I look forward to hearing how FRA
might revise the process in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. DeFazio.
I would like to welcome each of our witnesses here today.
Our panel is comprised of the Honorable Ron Batory,
Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, FRA; the
Honorable Robert Sumwalt, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board, NTSB; Susan Fleming, Director of Physical
Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office; Scot
Naparstek, executive vice president and COO of Amtrak; Ed
Hamberger, president and CEO of the Association of American
Railroads; Jeff Knueppel, general manager, Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, on behalf of the
American Public Transportation Association; and Stacey
Mortensen, executive director of the San Joaquin Regional Rail
Commission.
I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' full statements
be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Since your written statement has been made part of the
record, the subcommittee would request that you limit your
testimony to 5 minutes.
Mr. Batory, you are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF HON. RONALD L. BATORY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION; HON. ROBERT L. SUMWALT III, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; SUSAN A. FLEMING,
DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; SCOT NAPARSTEK, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AMTRAK; EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; JEFFREY D.
KNUEPPEL, P.E., GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION; AND STACEY MORTENSEN, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, SAN JOAQUIN REGIONAL RAIL COMMISSION
Mr. Batory. Thank you, Chairman Denham, Chairman Shuster,
Ranking Member Capuano, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today to discuss Positive Train Control, better known as PTC.
I come to my position as Administrator of the Federal
Railroad Administration with 45 years of experience in the
railroad industry. Through my career I have continually focused
on improving safety performance, and I bring this same
commitment to the FRA.
Secretary Chao and myself have made railroads'
implementation of PTC the top of FRA's agenda. Forty-one
railroads are required to implement PTC systems, and that
includes all 7 Class I freight railroads, 30 commuter and
intercity passenger railroads, including Amtrak, and 4 short
line and terminal switching railroads. This technology is
required to be implemented on approximately 58,000 miles of the
140,000-mile rail network.
While railroads are making progress, FRA expects that most
railroads will need to request an alternative schedule to
complete testing, obtain system certification, and meet
interoperability requirements.
This summer, for the first time in agency history, the FRA
hosted three symposia for the to-be-compliant railroads. Each
of the day-long sessions brought together railroad safety
officials and FRA's PTC experts to ensure that each railroad
subject to the mandate is aware of its obligations and is
equipped to meet the deadline. These meetings discussed
industry questions and lessons learned, requirements for the
December 31, 2018, deadline, along with best practices for
testing and safety plans.
Since April 2016, FRA has tracked individual railroads'
self-reporting implementation. Based on the railroads' most
recent reports, PTC systems are in operation on 66 percent of
the freight railroads' required route mileage. Passenger
railroads have made less progress, with PTC systems in
operation on 24 percent of what is required.
The most recent data also showed a reduction in the number
of railroads FRA considers to be at risk of not qualifying for
an alternative schedule, from 12 railroads in April of 2018 to
9 in August of this year. FRA currently considers any railroad
that has installed less than 90 percent of its system hardware
as of June 30th to be most at risk of failing to qualify for an
alternative schedule. It is important to note that the
installation of all PTC system hardware is only one of six
criteria required to qualify for an alternative schedule to
complete full PTC system implementation after December 31,
2018.
The nine at-risk railroads are the New Mexico Rail Runner,
CapMetro, New Jersey Transit, Altamont Corridor Express, MARC,
Trinity Railway Express, Tri-Rail, Caltrain, and SunRail. FRA
is in frequent communication and providing additional onsite
technical assistance to further assist these railroads.
Over the next several months FRA expects to receive and
review requests for railroads' alternative schedules beyond the
December 31, 2018, deadline. By law, FRA has 90 days to review
and issue a decision to approve or deny the alternative
schedule. FRA expects to receive many of the requests before
the end of the year, and will review the extension request in
January through March of 2019. If a railroad fails to qualify
and receive FRA approval for an alternative schedule, FRA is
authorized to assess monetary penalties.
PTC is designed to provide important risk reduction
protocols to enhance existing safety, but these systems come
with significant costs. Since 2008, FRA has awarded $961
million in grant funding to support railroads' implementation.
More recently, on August 24th of this year, FRA selected 28 PTC
projects, including 13 commuter railroads, to receive $203
million under the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety
Improvement grant program. Of the $203 million announced, $80
million in grants, or 39 percent, was announced for at-risk
railroads. Since 2008, a total of $2.5 billion in grants and
loans has been allocated to the railroads to assist with PTC
implementation.
In an effort to show FRA's continued commitment to PTC
implementation, we reissued a notice of funding opportunity for
the remaining $46 million in grants. Similar to the previous
issued NOFO, this is an expedited solicitation with a 30-day
application period. Applications will be due October 12th.
Looking forward to the rest of this year and into 2019, FRA
will continue to support and facilitate railroads'
implementation of PTC by utilizing the tools afforded by
Congress, and providing extensive technical assistance.
I appreciate the committee's support for our programs, and
look forward to your safety-oriented questions.
[Mr. Batory's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald L. Batory, Administrator, Federal
Railroad Administration
Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the
subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today to discuss positive
train control (PTC). I come to my position as Administrator of the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) with 45 years of experience in
the railroad industry, rising to become the President and Chief
Operating Officer of a significant freight rail carrier in the United
States. Throughout my career, I have been focused on continually
improving safety performance, and I bring this same commitment to my
current position as Administrator of the FRA.
As we approach critical deadlines for railroads' implementation of
PTC systems, myself, and the men and women that serve at FRA remain
committed to working with the railroads and its supply industry to
ensure the full implementation of this important rail-safety technology
in a timely manner.
ptc mandate
Railroads' implementation of PTC systems has been, and remains, at
the top of our agenda. PTC systems represent the most fundamental
change in rail safety technology since the introduction of Automatic
Train Control in the 1920's. As mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 (RSIA), each Class I railroad and entity providing
regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger service must
implement an FRA-certified PTC system on (1) its main lines over which
5 million or more gross tons of annual traffic are transported if the
main line carries poison-or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials,
and (2) its main lines over which intercity or commuter rail passenger
transportation is regularly provided. Under RSIA, railroads were
originally required to complete implementation by December 31, 2015.
Approximately 2 months before that deadline, the House and Senate
overwhelmingly passed, and the President signed, the Positive Train
Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015 (PTCEI Act),
extending the deadline for full PTC system implementation to December
31, 2018.
In addition, under the PTCEI Act, Congress permits a railroad to
request FRA's approval of an ``alternative schedule'' with a deadline
extending beyond December 31, 2018, but no later than December 31,
2020, for full PTC system implementation. The law requires FRA to
approve a railroad's alternative schedule with a deadline that is as
soon as practicable, but not later than December 31, 2020, if a
railroad submits a written request to FRA that demonstrates it has met
the statutory criteria to qualify for such an alternative schedule.
Currently, 41 railroads are required by statute to implement PTC
systems: all 7 Class I freight railroads; 30 commuter and intercity
passenger railroads, including the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak); and 4 short line and terminal railroads. The
technology is required to be implemented on approximately 58,000 route
miles of the 140,000-mile railroad network.
While railroads are making progress, FRA expects that most
railroads will need to request an alternative schedule to complete
testing, obtain PTC System Certification, meet the statutory
interoperability requirements, and fully implement PTC systems on all
main lines required to be governed by PTC systems. FRA continues to
take a proactive approach to help railroads acquire, install, test, and
fully implement certified PTC systems as soon as possible.
At the direction of Secretary Elaine L. Chao, FRA senior leadership
met individually with executives from each of the 41 railroads in
January and February of this year. In May and June, we also held
followup meetings with the 12 railroads identified as at risk, as of
Quarter 1 of 2018, of not meeting the statutory criteria necessary to
qualify for FRA's approval of an alternative schedule. Railroads have
generally been candid in detailing the challenges and obstacles
confronting their properties. During the meetings, we sought to
objectively evaluate each railroad's PTC deployment status, and learn
what remaining steps each railroad needs to take to meet the deadline
or satisfy the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for an
alternative schedule.
During these meetings and throughout our conversations with the
railroads, they commonly conveyed the following ongoing challenges:
There is a competitive yet limited number of PTC system
vendors and suppliers. Unusually weighted demand and supply has
constrained the timely serving of all 41 railroads and their tenant
railroads;
As reliability and stability of PTC systems is still
immature, railroads are experiencing significant technical issues with
both PTC system hardware and PTC system software that often take
considerable time to diagnose and resolve, impacting current
operations;
Host railroads (totaling 36) noted that many tenant
railroads (estimated at 250+) that operate on main lines requiring PTC
system implementation have made variable, and often unknown, progress
equipping locomotives with operational PTC technology, while some
tenant railroads report that their host railroads are not providing
opportunity for testing. FRA is initiating efforts to synchronize the
coordination among the host and tenant railroads;
Railroads have only recently begun testing PTC systems
for interoperability;
Many commuter railroads stated that negotiating legal
agreements with certain vendors and suppliers often took time to
complete, given various insurance, liability, and State law issues;
Absence of consistent leadership at several railroads,
regardless of leadership quality, weakened the ``sense of urgency'' and
the focus on PTC system implementation at some entities subject to the
statutory mandate; and
Railroads noted concern about FRA's review and approval
cycle, given the surge in submissions requiring FRA approval in 2018-
2020.
By law, it is the railroads' responsibility to implement PTC
systems, but FRA is facilitating railroad and supplier collaboration to
hasten, and urge, implementation. We have also met individually with
PTC system component suppliers to learn more about their capacity to
meet the high demand of railroads to achieve timely implementation.
This summer FRA hosted three PTC symposia for the 41 railroads
mandated to implement PTC systems. Each of the day-long sessions
brought together railroad safety officials and FRA's PTC experts to
ensure that each and every railroad subject to the mandate is aware of
its obligations and is equipped to meet the congressionally mandated
deadline. The first symposium discussed industry questions and focused
on requirements for the December 31, 2018, statutory deadline.
The second focused on best practices for testing PTC systems on the
general rail system, including field testing, revenue service
demonstration (RSD), and interoperability testing. The third focused on
lessons learned and best practices for PTC Safety Plans, which are
required for host railroads to obtain PTC System Certification and
achieve full system implementation. As FRA tracks railroads' progress,
additional symposia on PTC may be offered, as new challenges arise.
ptc status update
Since April 1, 2016, FRA has been closely tracking and displaying
on its website individual railroads' self-reported PTC system
implementation status. FRA's PTC Dashboard tracks railroads' progress
toward full implementation on a quarterly basis, including the number
and percentage of locomotives equipped and PTC operable, track segments
completed, radio towers installed, training completed, spectrum
acquisition, route miles in RSD, whether the railroad has obtained PTC
System Certification, route miles in PTC operation, and more recently,
interoperability between host railroads and tenant railroads. In
addition, FRA tracks, on a quarterly basis, the progress each railroad
has made toward meeting the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for
FRA's approval of an alternative schedule.
Based on railroads' most recent Quarter 2 reports (with data
current as of June 30, 2018), PTC systems are in operation on 35,487
route miles, which is approximately 66 percent of the freight
railroads' route miles that are required to be governed by a PTC
system. Passenger railroads have made less progress, with PTC systems
in operation on 975 route miles, which is approximately 24 percent of
the required route miles. Notably, PTC systems are being operated in
RSD on an additional 1,103 freight railroad route miles and an
additional 140 commuter railroad route miles, as of Quarter 2. Fifteen
railroads report they have completed installation of all hardware
necessary for PTC system implementation, and 12 other railroads have
installed between 95 and 99 percent of the PTC system hardware
identified in their PTC Implementation Plans, as of June 30, 2018. All
but one railroad, whose PTC systems use spectrum, reported they have
acquired sufficient spectrum. In addition, 14 railroads have initiated
sufficient RSD or met substitute criteria, which is also one of the six
statutory criteria needed to qualify for an alternative schedule.
The most recent data also showed a reduction in the number of
railroads at risk of not qualifying for an alternative schedule, from
12 railroads as of Quarter 1 of 2018, to nine railroads as Quarter 2.
FRA currently considers any railroad that had installed less than 90
percent of its PTC system hardware as of June 30, 2018, to be most at
risk of failing to qualify for an alternative schedule. Installation of
all PTC system hardware is only an initial phase of implementing a PTC
system and only one of the six statutory criteria required to qualify
for an alternative schedule to complete full PTC system implementation
after December 31, 2018. The nine at-risk railroads are: New Mexico
Rail Runner Express (Rio Metro), Capital Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (CapMetro), New Jersey Transit (NJT), Altamont Corridor
Express (ACE), Maryland Area Regional Commuter (MARC), Trinity Railway
Express (TRE), South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (Tri-
Rail), Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain) and Central
Florida Rail Corridor (SunRail).
In addition to the letters of concern from April and June 2018, on
August 24th, I sent letters to the nine railroads that FRA remains
concerned are at risk of both missing the statutory implementation
deadline, and failing to qualify for an alternative schedule. This
assessment was based on railroads' self-reported progress as of June
30, 2018 (Quarterly PTC Progress Reports for Quarter 2 of 2018). I also
sent similar letters expressing concern to the relevant State
departments of transportation and Governors. FRA is working closely
with all 41 railroads subject to the PTC mandate; for the nine at-risk
railroads, FRA is actively engaging in frequent communication and
providing additional onsite technical assistance. Of course, all
railroads subject to the mandate must pay careful attention to the
requirements for an alternative schedule if they will not achieve full
PTC system implementation by December 31, 2018, and must continue
vigilantly working toward prompt PTC system implementation.
grant funding and financial assistance
PTC technology is designed to provide important safety
improvements, but these systems come with significant costs, both in
terms of immediate acquisition and increased operations and maintenance
costs. Industry estimates PTC acquisition will exceed $14 billion, and
maintenance will cost 10 to 20 percent of annual capital costs. Since
2008, FRA has awarded approximately $961 million in grant funding to
support railroads' implementation of PTC systems. FRA also supported
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) with its evaluation and
selection of approximately $197 million in grant funding awarded to 17
commuter and intercity passenger railroads and State and local
governments for installation of PTC systems, which were announced on
May 31, 2017. More recently, on August 24, FRA selected 28 PTC
projects, including 13 commuter rail projects not usually eligible for
FRA funding, to receive $203.7 million under the Fiscal Year 2018
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) grant
program. Given that applications for this funding were due July 2, I
would note that FRA worked tremendously hard to evaluate the
applications and make selections. Our hard work allowed us to make the
grant announcements 2 months after receipt of the applications. This
process can typically take up to 6 months or longer to complete.
Currently, FRA has two open funding opportunities that can further
aid railroads, States, and other stakeholders with implementing PTC as
well as other important safety and infrastructure needs: $318.4 million
under the broader Fiscal Year 2018 CRISI program, and $46.3 million for
the remaining funding under the PTC-specific Fiscal Year 2018 CRISI
program. And finally, FRA is evaluating applications submitted under
the $65.2 million Fiscal Year 2017 CRISI and $4.8 million Fiscal Year
2017 Restoration & Enhancements grant programs, and will be making
selection announcements in the near future.
In total, the sources of the approximately $1.16 billion in FRA and
FTA grant funding for PTC are:
$475 million from FRA's High-Speed Intercity Passenger
Rail Grant Program;
$197 million in Section 3028 of the Fixing America's
Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) funding;
$204 million in CRISI grant funding;
$0.3 million in a Special Transportation Circumstances
Grant;
$142 million in annual capital grant funding to Amtrak;
$86 million from FRA's Railroad Safety Technology Grant
Program;
$52 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
grant funding to Amtrak; and
$2 million in Research and Development grants.
Additionally, in May 2015, FRA issued a $967.1 million loan to
Metropolitan Transportation Authority for Long Island Rail Road's and
Metro-North Railroad's implementation of PTC systems. And on December
8, 2017, the Build America Bureau closed on a $162 million
Transportation and Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act loan and a
$220 million Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing loan to
be issued to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority for PTC
system implementation.
In sum, thanks to the funding provided by Congress, the Department
has made available over $2.5 billion in grants and loans since 2008.
This amounts to nearly 20 percent of industry estimates for PTC
implementation costs.
enforcement of the ptc implementation mandate
FRA is committed to helping ensure that railroads implement PTC
systems as safely and expeditiously as possible, in accordance with the
congressional mandate. FRA is authorized to assess monetary civil
penalties against any railroad that fails to implement a PTC system by
the applicable statutory deadline (either December 31, 2018, or, if a
railroad has an approved alternative schedule, the applicable date not
later than December 31, 2020). FRA's civil penalty schedule recommends,
as guidance, a $16,000 civil penalty for a failure to timely complete
PTC implementation on a track segment where it is required. For any
violation of a Federal rail safety statute, regulation, or order,
however, the current statutory minimum civil penalty FRA may assess is
$853, and the ordinary statutory maximum is $27,904. FRA may assess a
civil penalty for each day the noncompliance continues, but FRA may
elect to take enforcement action on a one-time basis or each month,
quarter, year, or other interval of time during which the noncompliance
continues. FRA is currently considering all options, within the
framework established by law, to determine what type of enforcement
action will be most effective and appropriate under the circumstances.
Our goal is to ensure any enforcement action compels a railroad to
fully implement its PTC system as efficiently and safely as possible.
Also, I would like to note that in June and July 2018, FRA
initiated enforcement action against each of the 13 railroads that
failed to complete one or more of the end-of-2017 hardware installation
milestones and/or spectrum acquisition milestones the railroad
established in its PTC Implementation Plan. Consistent with FRA's
commitment to ensuring railroads comply with the statutory mandate,
including interim requirements, FRA's Notice of Probable Violation to
each of the 13 railroads proposed the maximum civil penalty for this
type of interim violation--i.e., a one-time civil penalty of $27,904.
Since this Administration took office, railroads have made
significant progress toward installing and implementing PTC systems.
From Quarter 1 of 2017 to Quarter 2 of 2018, railroads increased the
total amount of installed PTC system hardware from 77 percent to 97
percent. As of June 30, 2018, PTC systems are either in RSD or in
operation on approximately 37,705 route miles (i.e., 65 percent) of the
nearly 58,000 route miles that are subject to the statutory mandate.
Moving forward, FRA will continue to support and facilitate
railroads' implementation of PTC technology by utilizing the tools
afforded by Congress and providing extensive technical assistance and
guidance to railroads and suppliers. We remain vigilant in harnessing
and leveraging all the personnel, financial, and other resources
available to help expedite railroads' implementation efforts. We
appreciate the subcommittee's support for our critical programs, and we
welcome your continued partnership to advance rail safety and service.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Sumwalt?
Mr. Sumwalt. Good morning, Chairman Shuster, Chairman
Denham, Ranking Member DeFazio, Ranking Member Capuano, and
members of the subcommittee.
As Chairman Denham indicated, yesterday marked the 10-year
anniversary of the tragedy at Chatsworth. That accident killed
25 people, injured over 100, many with life-altering injuries.
And, of course, in the aftermath of that accident, Congress
mandated PTC through the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008.
Now, here we are, 10 years later, and nearly 3 years after
the original deadline mandated by Congress. And we still do not
have PTC fully implemented in the United States. Is that
acceptable? It is certainly not acceptable to the NTSB.
Since Chatsworth, we have investigated 22 accidents that
could have been prevented by PTC, and these accidents resulted
in 29 deaths, over 500 injuries, and property costs in excess
of $190 million.
The NTSB strongly urges swift implementation of the
congressional PTC mandate.
That said, it is important to note that even after that
mandate is met, significant portions of the Nation's rail
network will not have PTC. According to reports submitted by
the railroads to FRA, only about 40 percent of the Nation's
rail network will have PTC.
And of significant concern as it relates to Amtrak, there
are over 1,400 miles of mainline track that Amtrak currently
operates on that will not have PTC. And if Amtrak continues to
operate on those segments, there will be a diminished level of
safety for those passengers and train crews who are traveling
through communities such as Topeka, Kansas; Grand Junction,
Colorado; Portland, Maine; Memphis, Tennessee; New Orleans; St.
Louis; and many others.
In other cases, under its regulations, the FRA has approved
exemptions to the PTC requirement for other mainline tracks on
which not only freight, but also intercity passenger and
commuter railroads operate. Again, this means there will be a
significant diminished level of safety for passengers traveling
on those railroads.
Earlier this year, an Amtrak passenger train collided with
a standing CSX freight train in Cayce, South Carolina. An
operational PTC system could have prevented that accident. This
is the second accident that we have investigated involving a
train being unexpectedly diverted onto a side track because of
a switch being left in the wrong position in an area of track
under signal suspension due to installation and testing of PTC.
When I testified before this committee in February, in the
aftermath of that Cayce accident, I told you about an urgent
safety recommendation that we had issued that day which called
on the FRA to order railroads to implement operational measures
needed to ensure safety operation in areas where PTC is being
installed and tested.
Now, I want to point out that we only issue urgent safety
recommendations when we determine that the course of action
requires immediate attention to avoid imminent loss. And here
we are, 7 months later, and the FRA has not issued such an
order, and the recommendation is currently classified by the
NTSB as ``Open-Unacceptable Response.'' And I think that the
classification of that recommendation in an unacceptable status
speaks for itself. We are concerned with the lack of action by
the FRA.
The NTSB is also concerned that 10 years after Chatsworth
most railroads are still not ready. And let me spell that out:
for every day that we go without PTC, we are at risk for
another Chatsworth; another Bronx; another Amtrak in
Philadelphia; another DuPont; another Cayce, South Carolina.
Each of these were mass casualty events due to human error,
accidents that could have been prevented by PTC.
And I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Thank
you for holding this hearing. And I look forward to your
questions.
[Mr. Sumwalt's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman, National
Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident and significant incidents
in the United States, as well as significant accidents and incidents in
other modes of transportation--railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline.
We determine the probable cause of these accidents and other
transportation events and issue safety recommendations aimed at
preventing future accidents. In addition, we carry out special studies
concerning transportation safety and coordinate the resources of the
Federal Government and other organizations to assist victims and their
family members who have been impacted by major transportation
disasters.
On November 14, 2016, we announced our Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements for 2017-2018.\1\ This list, based
on safety issues we have identified in our investigations, highlights
the 10 areas in transportation safety where we believe improvements are
most critical. One issue area on this cycle's Most Wanted List is
``Increase Implementation of Collision Avoidance Technologies,'' which
addresses the need for positive train control (PTC) to reduce
accidents, prevent injuries, and save lives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NTSB, 2017-2018 Most Wanted List (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the state of positive train control implementation
Yesterday marked the 10-year anniversary of the tragic accident in
Chatsworth, California, in which a Metrolink commuter train and a Union
Pacific freight train collided head-on, killing 25 people and injuring
102 others.\2\ Our investigation concluded that the Metrolink
engineer's use of a personal electronic device to send text messages
distracted him from his duties and that positive train control (PTC)
could have prevented this accident. In the aftermath of that tragedy
and a number of others that the NTSB investigated, Congress passed the
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), which required the
implementation of a PTC system on each line over which intercity
passenger or commuter service is operated or over which poison-or
toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials were transported, by December
31, 2015.\3\ In October 2015, Congress extended this deadline to
December 31, 2018, and included provisions for railroads to request an
additional 24-month extension to December 31, 2020, if certain criteria
are met.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NTSB, Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train
LOF65-12 Chatsworth, California September 12, 2008, Rpt. No. NTSB/RAR-
10/01 (January 21, 2010).
\3\ Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, Sec.
104 (October 16, 2008).
\4\ Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-73, Sec. 1302 (October 29, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now, 10 years later and nearly 3 years after the original deadline
imposed by Congress, PTC is still not fully implemented in the United
States. The NTSB strongly urges swift implementation of the
congressional PTC mandate. However, it is important to note that even
after that mandate is met, significant portions of the rail network
will not have PTC. According to reports from railroads to the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), only about 40 percent of the rail
network--or 58,000 of 134,000 route miles--will have PTC.
Significantly, Amtrak will have over 1,400 miles of track it currently
operates on that will not have PTC. If Amtrak continues to operate on
these segments, there will be a diminished level of safety for
passengers and train crews traveling communities such as Topeka,
Kansas; Grand Junction, Colorado; Portland, Maine; Memphis, Tennessee;
New Orleans; St. Louis; and many others.
In other cases, under its regulations, the FRA has approved
exceptions to the PTC requirement for other main line tracks on which
not only freight, but also other intercity passenger and commuter
railroads operate. Again, this means that there will a significantly
decreased level of safety for those passengers and train crews that are
traveling on those railroads.
ntsb investigations of ptc-related accidents
Since the enactment of RSIA, there have been 22 accidents we have
investigated or are currently investigating that could have been
prevented by PTC. These accidents resulted in 29 deaths, over 500
injuries, and over $190 million in property damage. These include:
In September 2010, near Two Harbors, Minnesota, human
error and fatigue contributed to the collision of two freight trains.
Five crewmembers were injured.
In May 2011, in Hoboken, New Jersey, human error
contributed to the collision of a train with the bumping post at the
end of the track.
In June 2012, near Goodwell, Oklahoma, human
inattentiveness contributed to the collision of two freight trains.
Three crewmembers were killed.
In May 2013, near Chaffee, Missouri, inattentiveness and
fatigue contributed to the collision of two freight trains. Two
crewmembers were injured and a highway bridge collapsed.
In December 2013, in the Bronx, New York, fatigue
contributed to the derailment of a passenger train. Four passengers
were killed and 61 others were injured.
In May 2015, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, an Amtrak
engineer's acceleration to 106 miles per hour (mph) as he entered a
curve with a 50 mph speed restriction, due to his loss of situational
awareness, led to a derailment. Eight passengers were killed and 185
others were injured.
Two accidents currently under investigation occurred in DuPont,
Washington and Cayce, South Carolina. Each of these accidents happened
on tracks that were unprotected by PTC. While we are still
investigating both, they are each a type of accident that a fully
operational PTC system is designed to prevent--overspeeds and
misaligned switches.
Amtrak 501 Derailment--DuPont, Washington
On the morning of December 18, 2017, on its first regular passenger
service trip, Amtrak passenger train 501 derailed as it traversed a
curve near DuPont, Washington. The lead locomotive, the power car, and
two passenger railcars derailed from an overpass onto Interstate 5. At
the time of the accident, 77 passengers, 5 Amtrak employees, and a
technician from the railcar manufacturer, Talgo Incorporated, were on
the train. Of these individuals, 3 passengers were killed and 62
passengers and crewmembers were injured. Eight individuals in highway
vehicles were also injured. Our investigation is ongoing, but on
January 4, 2018, we issued a preliminary report regarding this
derailment.\5\
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\5\ NTSB, Preliminary Report, RRD18MR001 (January 4, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit), a
public transit agency in the State of Washington, owns the Point
Defiance Bypass tracks where the derailment occurred. Sound Transit
reported that the PTC system on this line was not operational at the
time of the accident. The authorized track speed decreases from 79 mph
to 30 mph as the track approaches the curve. According to the lead
locomotive's event data recorder, the final recorded speed of the
locomotive was 78 mph. In this accident, PTC would have notified the
train engineer about the speed reduction for the curve, and if he did
not take appropriate action to control the train's speed, PTC would
have applied the train brakes to maintain compliance with the speed
restriction and to stop the train.
Amtrak 91 Collision with CSX Train--Cayce, South Carolina
In the early morning of February 4, 2018, an Amtrak passenger train
unexpectedly entered a siding near Cayce, South Carolina, and collided
with a stationary CSX freight train. Two of the crewmembers--the
engineer and the conductor--were killed, and at least 92 passengers and
crewmembers were transported to medical facilities. Our investigation
is ongoing, but on February 28, 2018, we issued a preliminary
report.\6\
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\6\ NTSB, Preliminary Report, RRD18MR003 (February 28, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time of the accident, a signal suspension was in place
through the area, due to signal work being done, including upgrades to
prepare for implementation of PTC. Trains were being directed through
the area by a CSX dispatcher, who would issue warrants, or permissions,
to use the main line.\7\ The crew of the CSX train had completed work
in the area, moved the train to the siding, and released their
authority to use the main line back to the dispatcher. However, the
switch on the main line was left open to the siding and locked. The
Amtrak train, traveling at 57 mph, was diverted into the siding from
the main and struck the CSX train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Signal suspension means train control signals located alongside
the track have been taken out of service, oftentimes for maintenance or
system upgrades. When these signals are taken out of service, train
movements are controlled by means such as absolute blocks or by track
warrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is the second accident that we are investigating involving a
train being unexpectedly diverted onto a side track because of a switch
left in the incorrect position in an area of track under ``signal
suspension'' due to installation and testing of PTC. On December 5,
2017, we issued an accident brief regarding the collision of two Union
Pacific Railroad freight trains that occurred on March 14, 2016, in
Granger, Wyoming. One crewmember received minor injuries. We determined
that the probable cause of the accident was that the employee-in-charge
incorrectly used information from a conversation with the train
dispatcher as authorization to send a train into the signal suspension
territory. Contributing to the accident was the failure of a crewmember
to check the switch position before authorizing the train to enter the
signal suspension territory.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ NTSB, Collision of Two Union Pacific Railroad Freight Trains,
Granger, Wyoming. Rpt. No. NTSB/RAB-17-10 (December 5, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In both the Granger and Cayce accidents, human decisionmaking and
actions likely played key roles. Safe movement of the trains through
the signal suspension depended on proper switch alignment, which, in
turn, relied on error-free manual work. The risk of error was not
safeguarded, either by technology or supervision. The reliance on
error-free human performance for safe train movement creates a single
point-of-failure given the current operating practices and regulations.
We concluded that additional measures are needed, such as restricted
speed, to ensure safe operations during signal suspensions, especially
during the movement of passenger trains, due to the likelihood of harm
to the traveling public.
Therefore, on February 13, 2018, we issued an urgent safety
recommendation to the FRA to issue an emergency order directing
railroads to require that when signal suspensions are in effect and a
switch has been reported relined for a main track, the next train or
locomotive to pass the switch location must approach with a restricted
speed. After verifying the switch position, the train crew would be
required report to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined
for the main track before trains would be permitted to operate at
maximum-authorized speed.\9\ We only issue urgent recommendations when
we determine that the course of action requires immediate attention to
avoid imminent loss due to a similar accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Train Operation During
Signal Suspension. Rec. No. R-18-005 (February 13, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 23, 2018, the FRA published a notice of draft safety
advisory in response to our urgent safety recommendation. The proposed
safety advisory recommends that railroads adopt industry best safety
practices regarding railroad operations under temporary signal
suspensions. Because FRA's proposal would not require adoption of such
practices, as called for by our urgent safety recommendation, the NTSB
has classified this urgent safety recommendation as ``Open--
Unacceptable Response.'' Furthermore, it is noteworthy that FRA has not
even published proposed industry best practices. We believe that the
FRA must act now to prevent accidents like those in Granger or Cayce.
On July 10 and 11, 2018, we held a 2-day investigative hearing to
explore issues involved in the DuPont and Cayce accidents. The purpose
of the hearing was to elicit additional factual information about the
accidents as part of our ongoing investigations. The factors involved
in these accidents are comprehensive and we are examining a multitude
of aspects beyond PTC, including Amtrak operations on host railroads
and safety management systems in passenger rail.
conclusion
The NTSB is gravely concerned that the majority of the Nation's
railroads, particularly passenger railroads, required to install PTC
will not have fully operational systems by the December 31, 2018,
deadline. I appreciate the committee holding another hearing this year
on the importance of PTC, and I am here today to urge implementation of
this lifesaving technology without further delay. For each day that
goes by without PTC, we are at continued risk for another tragic
accident.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look
forward to responding to your questions.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Sumwalt.
Ms. Fleming, you are recognized.
Ms. Fleming. Chairmen Shuster and Denham, Ranking Members
DeFazio and Capuano, and members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss railroads' implementation and
FRA's oversight of PTC, one of the most promising technological
advances in rail safety in decades.
As you know, GAO has been closely tracking and reporting on
railroads' and FRA's PTC efforts since 2010. Although railroads
and FRA have made some progress in certain areas, it has been
slow. And in light of the implementation and other challenges,
we have consistently cautioned that some railroads may not meet
required deadlines.
We are now fast approaching the December 31, 2018, deadline
for railroads to either fully implement PTC or seek an
extension of up to 2 years. My testimony today focuses on two
issues: the progress that railroads required to implement PTC
have made, and FRA's efforts to assist them; and how railroads
and FRA plan to approach the December 2018 and 2020 deadlines.
With respect to railroads' progress, we found that many
railroads remained in the early implementation stages, meaning
equipment installation and initial field testing. Equipment
installation presents a more positive picture. Half of
railroads were still installing equipment on trains and
alongside tracks. However, nearly three-quarters reported being
more than 90 percent done.
Progress varied more widely with respect to testing. All of
the Class I freights and Amtrak had initiated field testing and
entered the latter stage of advanced testing known as revenue
service demonstration, or RSD.
By contrast, 19 commuter railroads and 2 Class II and III
freight railroads had initiated field testing, and only 8
commuter railroads and no Class II or III had initiated RSD.
Initiating RSD is important for two reasons: first, it allows
railroads to test trains operating PTC as part of their regular
operations; second, unless commuter or Class II or III freights
receive FRA approval to use substitute criteria, they must
initiate RSD by year-end to qualify for an extension.
In this regard, FRA's recent clarification about substitute
criteria may lessen concerns, at least in the near term, about
the number of railroads that had yet to initiate RSD. In three
symposia this summer, FRA officials explained that initiating
field testing could potentially qualify as substitute criteria.
Consistent with our recommendation, FRA also clarified other
aspects of its planned approach for reviewing and granting
extensions. Railroad representatives welcomed this information,
though a few wish FRA had shared it much sooner.
Turning to this year's deadline, as of August, eight
railroads anticipate reaching full implementation by December.
The remaining 32 said they plan to apply for an extension. To
date, only one had done so. Sixteen said they intend to use
substitute criteria. For those railroads that fail to meet
either year-end requirement, FRA officials said that the
levying of civil fines is a yet-to-be-made policy decision, and
will take into account specific circumstances.
Given that applying for an extension appears to be the
general approach, rather than the exception, to the upcoming
deadline, much work will need to be accomplished to achieve
full PTC implementation in the final 2-year window. Many
railroads will need to either initiate or complete field
testing. To date, moving from field testing to RSD has taken
railroads, on average, 2 years to complete. And about one-
quarter of the railroads told us that they had encountered
software bugs or other challenges related to the maturity of
the system.
Moreover, interoperability remains a great unknown. Almost
all railroads implementing PTC share track with at least one
other railroad, and therefore, must ensure their PTC systems
operate with each other. This poses a particular challenge for
Class I freight railroads, especially in dense areas, such as
Chicago, where 14 different railroads interoperate.
While Class I's are in the latter stages of implementation,
they cannot begin interoperability testing until their tenant
railroads fully implement PTC. In turn, FRA's already
substantial workload will increase. FRA has re-allocated some
internal resources, and begun reviewing draft documents to help
address the upcoming surge of anticipated submissions.
One of the last documents railroads must submit is their
safety plan. As of July, 34 railroads had yet to do so. FRA
officials estimated that each safety plan would take 6 months
to 1 year to review. Prioritizing resources based on risk will
continue to be key to FRA's ability to manage its workload and
oversight responsibilities.
In conclusion, today, almost a decade after the tragic rail
accident in Chatsworth, California, it remains an open question
whether railroads and FRA are poised to complete the remaining
work and overcome the ongoing challenges facing them to achieve
full PTC implementation by 2020.
Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions you or members of the committee
have.
[Ms. Fleming's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical
Infrastructure, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the
subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work in reviewing
railroads' and the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) efforts to
implement positive train control (PTC). In September 2008--10 years ago
this month--a commuter train and freight train collided in the
Chatsworth neighborhood of Los Angeles, California, resulting in 25
deaths and over 100 injuries. In the wake of this accident, legislation
was enacted requiring certain railroads to implement PTC--a
communications-based system designed to slow or stop a train that is
not being operated safely.\1\ Forty railroads are required to implement
PTC.\2\ These railroads include 28 commuter railroads and Amtrak, which
collectively provide over 500 million passenger trips annually.
Railroads that play a key role in our nation's freight network must
also implement PTC, including the 7 largest Class I and 4 Class II and
III freight railroads.\3\
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\1\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
div. A, 112 Stat. 4848 (2008).
\2\ Specifically, these 40 railroads are currently subject to the
statutory mandate that requires the implementation of a PTC system on
certain main lines.
\3\ Freight railroads are classified by operating revenues. As of
2017, Class I railroads are those carriers with annual operating
revenues of $447.6 million or more. Class II railroads are carriers
with annual operating revenues of less than $447.6 million but in
excess of $35.8 million, and Class III railroads have annual carrier
operating revenues of $35.8 million or less.
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As we have previously reported, PTC implementation is a complex and
lengthy process, which touches almost every part of major rail lines
and almost every aspect of railroads' train operations.\4\ Each
implementing railroad must install more than 20 major components that
will ultimately communicate trains' locations, movements, and speed,
and then slow or stop a train that is not being operated safely. Full
implementation of PTC involves a number of steps, including but not
limited to: planning and system development, equipment installation,
testing, system certification, and achieving interoperability. Since
U.S. railroads often operate some or all of their trains as ``tenants''
on the track of another railroad, known as the ``host,''
interoperability is intended to enable trains that operate on the same
track to be governed by the PTC system and to move seamlessly across
track owned by different railroads.
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\4\ See GAO, Positive Train Control: Additional Authorities Could
Benefit Implementation, GAO-13-720 (Washington, DC, Aug. 16, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When PTC implementation was mandated in 2008, the deadline for
railroads' implementation was December 31, 2015. We reported in
September 2015 that nearly all railroads did not expect to meet this
deadline.\5\ In October 2015, Congress extended the deadline to
December 31, 2018, and established criteria that would enable FRA, the
agency responsible for overseeing PTC implementation, to grant
railroads meeting certain requirements an alternative schedule up to
year-end 2020.\6\ Throughout this statement we refer to the alternative
schedule as the ``extension.'' My testimony today includes work
conducted at the request of Chairman Denham and Ranking Member Capuano
as well as Chairman Bill Shuster and Ranking Member Peter DeFazio of
the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Specifically,
my testimony discusses the efforts of FRA and railroads to implement
PTC as the December 31, 2018, deadline approaches and since we last
testified on PTC in March 2018.\7\ My statement today will address (1)
railroads' implementation progress and the steps that FRA has taken to
assist them and (2) how railroads and FRA plan to approach PTC
implementation to meet the December 2018 and December 2020 deadlines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See GAO, Positive Train Control: Additional Oversight Needed As
Most Railroads Do Not Expect to Meet 2015 Implementation Deadline, GAO-
15-739 (Washington, DC, Sept. 4, 2015).
\6\ The Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-73, Sec. 1302, 129 Stat. 568, 576-582 (2015),
codified at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157.
\7\ GAO, Positive Train Control: Many Commuter Railroads Still Have
Significant Additional Implementation Work and Opportunities Exist to
Provide Federal Assistance, GAO-18-367T (Washington, DC, Mar. 1, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To describe railroads' progress, we analyzed the most recent
available quarterly PTC implementation reports that railroads submitted
to FRA, reports that reflected the progress as of June 30, 2018. We
analyzed the reports to determine the extent that each railroad has
installed PTC hardware and initiated testing. Based on our review of
these data for anomalies, outliers, or missing information and our
previous assessment of such quarterly reports for our March 2018
testimony, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for
our purposes of describing railroads' progress in PTC implementation.
To describe railroads' and FRA's progress and approaches, we
interviewed representatives from 16 passenger and freight railroads,
including the 12 railroads (11 commuters and 1 Class III) that FRA
identified in June 2018 as at risk of not having implemented PTC or
qualifying for an extension by December 31, 2018.
The remaining 4 railroads we interviewed were: Amtrak; 2 Class I
freight railroads, which were selected based on their relationships
with tenant railroads and substantial progress toward PTC
implementation; and a commuter railroad that received approval from FRA
in March 2018 for an exception from PTC system implementation. To
describe how railroads and FRA plan to approach PTC implementation for
the December 2018 and 2020 deadlines, we sent 41 railroads a semi-
structured questionnaire.\8\ The questions we asked were based on the
data collection efforts from our March 2018 testimony. We analyzed
railroads' responses and summarized their plans and challenges into
common categories. To determine the stage of PTC implementation
railroads expected to reach by December 31, 2018, we considered
railroads' responses to our questionnaire, information provided in
interviews, and documents submitted to FRA regarding railroads' planned
implementation approaches, among other information. To describe
railroads' progress and FRA's actions to assist railroads, we
interviewed the industry associations for commuter (American Public
Transportation Association) and freight (Association of American
Railroads) railroads, and two PTC vendors. We also reviewed applicable
laws and FRA regulations, presentations, reports, and guidance and
interviewed FRA officials.
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\8\ We sent the questionnaire to all 40 railroads that are
currently required to install PTC and the one commuter railroad that
was granted a mainline track exception in March 2018. In March 2018, we
reported that 41 railroads were required to implement PTC. However,
since then one commuter railroad received approval from FRA for a main
line track exception, meaning it is no longer required to implement
PTC. FRA can grant main line track exceptions under certain conditions,
such as through limited operations. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1019(c). In
this case, a commuter railroad reduced its regularly scheduled service
by one train on 1 day of the week to 12 regularly scheduled one-way
trains per day.
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We conducted this performance audit from June 2018 to September
2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
PTC systems are required by law to prevent certain types of
accidents or incidents. In particular, a PTC system must be designed to
prevent train-to-train collisions, derailments due to excessive speed,
incursions into work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a
switch left in the wrong position.\9\ While railroads may implement any
PTC system that meets these requirements, the majority of the railroads
are implementing one of four types of systems.\10\ PTC's intended
safety benefits can be fully achieved nationwide when all required
railroads have successfully installed PTC components, tested that these
components work together and the systems function as designed, and are
interoperable with other host and tenant railroads' PTC systems that
share track. Interoperability means the locomotives of any host
railroad and tenant railroad operating over the same track segment will
communicate with and respond to the PTC system, allowing uninterrupted
movements over property boundaries.\11\ Interoperability is critical to
PTC functioning properly given the complexity of the rail network in
the United States. In much of the country, Class I railroads function
as hosts for Amtrak and commuter railroads. For example, one of the
seven major Class I railroads reports that 24 tenant railroads operate
over its PTC-equipped tracks, including freight, Amtrak, and commuter
railroads. A notable exception to this is the Northeast Corridor, which
runs from Washington, DC, to Boston, Massachusetts, which Amtrak
predominantly owns and over which 6 freight and 7 commuter railroads
operate as tenants.
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\9\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
div. A, 122 Stat. 4848 (2008).
\10\ The four types of PTC systems are the Interoperable Electronic
Train Management System (I-ETMS), the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement
System, the Enhanced Automated Train Control (E-ATC), and the
Incremental Train Control System (ITCS).
\11\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157. With certain exceptions, full
implementation requires all controlling locomotives to be equipped with
a fully operative and functioning onboard PTC apparatus, including the
controlling locomotives for each host railroad and each tenant railroad
operating on a PTC-equipped track segment. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1006.
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PTC implementation involves multiple stages to achieve full
implementation, including planning and system development, equipment
installation and testing, system certification, and full deployment,
including interoperability. Each railroad must develop an FRA-approved
PTC implementation plan that includes project schedules and milestones
for certain activities, such as equipment installation.\12\ The
equipment installation stage involves many components, including
communication systems; hardware on locomotives and along the side of
the track (called ``wayside equipment''); and software in centralized
office locations as well as onboard the train and along the track.\13\
Railroads are required to report quarterly and annually to FRA on the
railroad's PTC implementation status relative to the implementation
plan.\14\ A railroad can also revise its implementation plan to reflect
changes to the project, which then must be reviewed and approved by
FRA.
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\12\ The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 required that
railroads submit an implementation plan by April 16, 2010. When the PTC
implementation deadline was extended to 2018 under the PTC Enforcement
and Implementation Act of 2015, railroads were required to submit a
revised implementation plan by January 27, 2016, to outline how and
when each railroad plans to achieve full PTC implementation.
\13\ See GAO-18-367T and GAO-15-739. In this statement, we use the
term locomotive generally to refer to any of the variety of vehicles,
such as cab cars and electric multiple unit trains, that commuter
railroads may need to equip. Wayside equipment includes items such as
communication towers or poles, switch position monitors, wayside
radios, wayside interface units, and base station radios.
\14\ To effectively monitor each railroad's progress implementing
PTC, FRA requires the submission of quarterly progress reports under
its investigative authorities, See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 20107,
20902, 20157(c)(2); 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1009(h). In addition, each
railroad is required to annually report to FRA on PTC implementation
progress in areas such as spectrum acquisition, installation progress,
and the total number of route miles where revenue service demonstration
has been initiated or PTC is in operation. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(c)
(1); 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1009(a)(5).
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In addition, railroads must demonstrate that the PTC system is
deployed safely and meets functional requirements through multiple
stages of testing. Before initiating testing on the general rail
system, railroads must submit a formal test request for FRA approval
that includes, among other things, the specific test procedures, dates
and locations for testing, and the effect the tests will have on
current operations. The multiple stages of PTC testing include:
Laboratory testing: locomotive and wayside equipment
testing in a lab environment to verify that individual components
function as designed.
Field testing: includes several different tests of
individual components and the overall system, such as testing of each
locomotive to verify that it meets functional requirements and field
integration testing--a key implementation milestone to verify that each
PTC component is integrated and functioning safely as designed.
Revenue service demonstration (RSD): an advanced form of
field testing in which the railroad operates PTC-equipped trains in
regular service under specific conditions.\15\ RSD is intended to
validate the performance of the PTC system as a whole and to test the
system under normal, real-world operations.
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\15\ Results and data from RSD testing are also used to support the
safety case outlined in each host railroads' safety plan.
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Interoperability testing: host and tenant railroads that
operate on the same track must work together to test interoperability
to ensure each railroad can operate seamlessly across property
boundaries. Almost all of the 40 railroads currently required to
implement PTC must demonstrate interoperability with at least one other
railroad's PTC system.
Using results from field and RSD testing, combined with other
information, host railroads must then submit a safety plan to FRA for
approval.\16\ We have previously reported that these safety plans are
about 5,000 pages in length.\17\ Once FRA approves a safety plan, the
railroad receives PTC system certification, which is required for full
implementation, and is then authorized to operate the PTC system in
revenue service. According to FRA officials, the FRA may impose
conditions to the PTC safety plan approval as necessary to ensure
safety, resulting in a conditional certification.
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\16\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 236.1015.
\17\ GAO-18-367T.
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Railroads may receive a maximum 2-year extension from FRA past the
December 31, 2018, deadline if they meet six criteria set forth in
statute. Specifically, railroads must demonstrate, to the satisfaction
of FRA, that they have: (1) installed all PTC system hardware
consistent with the total amounts identified in the railroad's
implementation plan; (2) acquired all necessary spectrum consistent
with the implementation plan;\18\ (3) completed required employee
training; (4) included in a revised implementation plan an alternative
schedule and sequence for implementing the PTC system as soon as
practicable but no later than December 31, 2020; (5) certified to FRA
that they will be in full compliance with PTC statutory requirements by
the date provided in the alternative schedule and sequence; and (6) for
Class I railroads and Amtrak, initiated RSD or implemented a PTC system
on more than 50 percent of the track they own or control that is
required to have PTC. For commuter and Class II and III railroads, the
sixth statutory criterion is to have either initiated RSD on at least
one territory required to have operations governed by a PTC system or
``met any other criteria established by the Secretary,'' which FRA
refers to as ``substitute'' criteria.\19\
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\18\ PTC uses radio spectrum to communicate a train's location,
speed restrictions, and movements. Radio frequency spectrum is the
medium for wireless communications and supports a vast array of
commercial and governmental services. Commercial entities also use
radio frequency spectrum to provide a variety of wireless services,
including mobile voice and data.
\19\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(a)(3)(B). FRA defines a ``territory'' as
an entire installation/track segment as identified in a railroad's PTC
implementation plan (e.g., a track segment, territory, subdivision,
district, etc.).
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FRA is responsible for overseeing railroads' implementation of PTC,
and the agency monitors progress and provides direct assistance to
railroads implementing PTC. For example, FRA officials provide
technical assistance to railroads, address questions, and review
railroad-submitted documentation. FRA has a national PTC director,
designated PTC specialists in the eight FRA regions, and a few
additional engineers and test monitors responsible for overseeing
technical and engineering aspects of implementation and reviewing
railroad submissions and requests. In anticipation of the upcoming
implementation deadline, in May 2017, FRA began to send notification
letters to railroads it determined were at risk of both not meeting the
December 31, 2018, implementation deadline and not completing the
requirements necessary to qualify for an extension. FRA identified
``at-risk'' railroads by comparing a railroad's hardware installation
status to the total hardware required for PTC implementation, according
to the railroad's implementation plan. FRA has increased the ``at-
risk'' threshold percentage over time as the deadline approaches. See
table 1.
Table 1: Installation Thresholds Used Over Time by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to Determine
Railroads At-Risk for Missing Positive Train Control (PTC) Implementation Deadlines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Threshold of percent of hardware
Date of railroad's progress from installed relative to railroad's Date of FRA at-risk Number of at-risk
quarterly reports used to implementation plan--below which letters sent to railroads identified
determine whether at-risk railroads considered at-risk railroads by FRA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 31, 2016 50 May 2017 17
December 31, 2017 80 April 2018 15
March 31, 2018 85 June 2018 12
June 30, 2018 90 August 2018 9\\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\ Source: GAO presentation of Federal Railroad Administration information. GAO-18-692T.
FRA has additional oversight tools, which include use of its
general civil penalty enforcement authority for failure to meet certain
statutory PTC requirements.\20\ FRA has used this authority in 2017 and
2018 to assess civil penalties against railroads that failed to comply
with the equipment installation milestones, the spectrum acquisition
milestones, or both, that the railroads had established in their
implementation plans for the end of 2016 and 2017.
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\20\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(e).
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As part of our body of work on PTC, we found that railroads face
numerous PTC implementation challenges and made recommendations to FRA
to improve its oversight of implementation. Specifically, in 2013 and
2015 we found that many railroads were struggling to make progress due
to a number of complex and interrelated challenges, such as developing
system components and identifying and correcting issues discovered
during testing. Most recently, we found in March 2018 that FRA had not
systematically communicated information or used a risk-based approach
to help railroads prepare for the 2018 deadline or to qualify for an
extension.\21\ We also found that many railroads were concerned about
FRA's ability to review submitted documentation in a timely manner,
particularly given the length of some required documentation such as
safety plans and FRA's limited resources for document review. In March
2018, we recommended FRA identify and adopt a method for systematically
communicating information to railroads and use a risk-based approach to
prioritize its resources and workload. FRA agreed with our
recommendations.
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\21\ GAO-18-367T.
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many railroads remain in early stages of ptc implementation and fra has
clarified extension requirements
Railroads Continue to Install and to Test PTC Systems, and
Report Previously Identified Implementation
Challenges
As of June 30, 2018, many railroads reported that they remain in
the equipment installation and field-testing stages, which are early
stages of PTC implementation. However, since we last testified in March
2018, railroads have made progress on equipment installation. Based on
our analysis of the 40 railroads' reported status as of June 30, 2018,
about half of the railroads have completed equipment installation, and
many others are nearing completion of this stage. Specifically, three-
quarters of the 40 railroads reported being more than 90 percent
complete with locomotive equipment installation. Similarly, nearly
three-quarters of railroads that must install wayside equipment
reported being more than 90 percent complete.\22\ The remaining one-
quarter of railroads are among those designated by FRA as at-risk of
both not meeting the end of 2018 implementation deadline and not
completing the requirements necessary to qualify for an extension.
Specifically, in August 2018, FRA identified 9 railroads--all commuter
railroads--as at-risk, fewer than the 12 railroads FRA had previously
designated as at risk in its June 2018 letters to railroads.
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\22\ As of June 30, 2018, seven railroads reported that they were
not required to install wayside equipment because either their hosts
were responsible for installation of wayside equipment, or the PTC
system being installed did not require it. We did not include these
railroads when we analyzed railroads' progress in wayside equipment
installation.
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Since we last testified, most commuter railroads reported slow
progress with testing, especially with RSD, while Class I railroads and
Amtrak have reached later stages of testing. Notably, all 7 Class I
freight railroads and Amtrak reported having initiated field testing
and entering RSD as of June 30, 2018. We reported in 2013 and 2015 that
Class I railroads and Amtrak have been conducting PTC implementation
activities for longer than commuter railroads, which has likely
factored into their advanced progress.\23\ However, commuter railroads
and Class II/III railroads have progressed more slowly. For example:
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\23\ GAO-13-720 and GAO-15-739.
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Laboratory and initial field testing: 19 of 28 commuter
railroads reported having initiated this testing as of June 30, 2018, 6
more commuter railroads than the 13 we previously reported as having
initiated field testing as of September 30, 2017.\24\ Additionally, 2
of 4 Class II/III railroads reported having initiated testing as of
June 30, 2018.
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\24\ See GAO-18-367T. We determined a railroad to have initiated
testing if it met one of the following criteria: (1) at least one track
segment reported as ``testing;'' (2) at least one track segment
reported as ``operational/complete;'' or (3) at least 1 route mile
reported as in testing. Accordingly, ``testing'' in this context
includes a range of testing activities from laboratory testing to on-
track field integration testing. Additionally, because field testing is
a prerequisite for RSD, these counts include some railroads that may
have also initiated RSD.
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RSD testing: 8 of 28 commuter railroads reported
initiating RSD testing as of June 30, 2018, 2 more commuter railroads
than the 6 we previously reported as having entered RSD testing as of
September 30, 2017. No Class II/III railroads reported having initiated
RSD. As noted earlier, unless a commuter or Class II/III railroad
receives approval for using substitute criteria, the railroad must
initiate RSD, a final stage of PTC testing, on at least one territory
by December 31, 2018, to qualify for an extension.
Railroad representatives reported that they continue to face many
of the same challenges we have previously identified. For example, in
response to our questionnaire to all 40 railroads implementing PTC, 14
reported challenges with PTC vendors and contractors, which we
originally reported on in 2015. One railroad noted that, because its
contractor manages PTC projects across the country with the same
deadline and requirements, it can be difficult for all railroads to get
the resources they need from their contractor. We previously reported
that there are a limited number of vendors available to design PTC
systems, provide software and hardware, and conduct testing. For
example, we reported in 2015 that, according to railroad industry
representatives, there were two vendors for the onboard train
management computer and three vendors for the wayside equipment.\25\
Likewise, we previously reported that railroads face software
challenges, and noted that railroads had concerns with the number of
defects identified during software testing, since these take time to
address. In response to our questionnaire, 11 railroads reported
encountering challenges related to maturity of the PTC software
systems, such as working through software bugs or defects during
testing.
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\25\ GAO-15-739.
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FRA Has Recently Clarified Extension Requirements
In June, July, and August 2018, FRA held three PTC symposiums that
were attended by representatives from all 40 railroads and that focused
on the extension process and substitute criteria, PTC testing, and
safety plans, respectively. FRA's June 2018 symposium covered
information consistent with our March 2018 recommendation that the
agency adopt a method for systematically communicating information
related to the requirements and process for an extension to
railroads.\26\ Specifically, FRA presented information on the
procedures for requesting and obtaining FRA's approval for an extension
to implement PTC beyond the December 2018 deadline including FRA's
review process.\27\ FRA also clarified that for railroads eligible to
use substitute criteria, initiating field testing was one approach that
could potentially qualify as substitute criteria, rather than
initiating RSD.\28\
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\26\ GAO-18-367T.
\27\ FRA has 90 days to approve a railroad's alternative schedule
and sequence plan and provide notification to the railroad of its
decision. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20157(a)(3)(C); 49 C.F.R. Sec.
236.1011(a), (c). Within 45 days of receiving notification of a
railroad's alternative schedule and sequence plans, FRA must provide to
the railroad notification of any deficiencies that would prevent FRA
approval and provide an opportunity to correct the deficiencies.
\28\ FRA officials noted that each application for substitute
criteria is different, with different circumstances, and that
applications are evaluated individually on a case-by-case basis by FRA.
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Representatives we interviewed from the railroads that participated
in the symposiums found them to be helpful and some railroads reported
that the information presented led them to adjust their approach to
meeting the December 2018 deadline. For example, one railroad
representative we spoke to said that until the symposium, he was
unaware that using field testing as substitute criteria was a potential
option. Some railroads we met with also told us they are re-evaluating
what activities and documentation need to be revised and submitted to
FRA before the December 2018 deadline based on the information
presented at the symposiums. For example, representatives from one
railroad we met with said that FRA officials encouraged them to update
their PTC implementation plan right away with current equipment
installation totals, to ensure consistency across all required
documentation by the end of 2018. A couple of railroads noted that the
information presented at the symposiums clarified many questions and
would have been beneficial to know a year or two earlier in the
implementation process.
In addition, in recent months FRA has continued to provide
assistance to railroads and has taken a series of steps to better
prepare railroads for the 2018 deadline. These steps include meeting
regularly with individual railroads and developing approaches intended
to help many railroads meet the requirements necessary for a deadline
extension. For example, representatives from one commuter railroad said
agency officials have been willing to share lessons learned, clarify
requirements, and review draft documentation to provide informal
feedback.
railroads and fra are working toward extensions, leaving substantial
work to be completed beyond 2018
Most Railroads Anticipate Needing an Extension, and Many
Plan to Start RSD Testing Beyond 2018
More than three-quarters of railroads (32 of 40) reported to us
that they plan to apply for an extension.\29\ However, FRA officials
noted that with the exception of possibly one or two railroads, they
anticipate that all railroads will likely need an extension. As of
September 2018, most railroads have not submitted their request for an
extension. A railroad must demonstrate that it has met all of the
criteria to qualify before it may formally request an extension, and as
previously discussed, many railroads remain in the early stages of PTC
implementation. Of the eight railroads that anticipate reaching full
implementation by December 31, 2018, five have conditionally certified
safety plans; one has submitted its safety plan for review; one plans
to submit its safety plan to FRA in fall 2018 for certification; and
one did not specify when it would submit its safety plan for
certification.\30\
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\29\ According to FRA officials, tenant-only railroads are not
required to apply for an extension but are covered under extensions
applied for and granted to their host railroad(s). Therefore, we
considered tenant railroads that told us that their hosts would be
applying for an extension on their behalf as part of the 32 railroads
cited here. This total includes two total tenant railroads that told us
that they would require an extension because one or more of their hosts
would not reach full implementation.
\30\ This includes some tenant railroads that are included in their
hosts' conditionally--certified safety plans and that have achieved, or
expect to achieve, full interoperability with those host(s).
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Of the 32 railroads that intend to apply for an extension, half
reported that they plan to use substitute criteria to qualify,
including 12 commuter and 4 Class II and III railroads.\31\ Moreover,
three-quarters of the commuter and Class II and III railroads that plan
to use substitute criteria (12 of 16) intend to apply to use their
initiation of field testing or lab testing as substitute criteria.
Figure 1 depicts the stage of PTC implementation railroads at least
expect to reach by December 31, 2018, to be in compliance, based on
railroads' responses to our July August 2018 questionnaire.
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\31\ As previously mentioned, only commuter and Class II and III
railroads may apply for substitute criteria. According to publicly
available documents, as of September 2018, 6 railroads had submitted
substitute criteria applications to FRA for approval, and FRA had
approved 5.
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Figure 1: Number of Railroads Expected in Each Positive
Train Control (PTC) Implementation Stage by
December 31, 2018
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Note: This graphic is based on railroads' self-reported expectations
and approaches to be in compliance as of December 31, 2018. Railroads
may make more or less progress than expected. For tenant-only
railroads--railroads that only run on hosted track--we considered both
the tenant and the host railroads' reported expectations, including for
extensions, which, according to FRA, are generally applied for and
granted to host railroads but which also cover tenants.
\a\ Railroads that were granted a temporary mainline track exception
may remain in the installation stage. FRA can grant mainline exceptions
under certain conditions, such as through limited operations. 49 C.F.R.
Sec. 236.1019(c).
Although FRA has recently made clear that it is authorized to grant
extensions based on initiating field testing or other FRA-approved
substitute criteria, this approach defers time-intensive RSD testing
into 2019 and beyond. In March 2018, we testified FRA officials told us
that moving from the start of field testing to the start of RSD can
take between 1 and 3 years, and has averaged about 2 years for those
railroads that have completed that stage. We also testified that FRA
officials believe that most railroads underestimate the amount of time
needed for testing.\32\ FRA officials told us that they do not consider
railroads that are approved for an extension under substitute criteria
to be necessarily at a higher risk of not completing PTC implementation
by 2020. However, in light of these time estimates and the unknown
challenges that railroads may face during testing, railroads that are
in the early field-testing stage moving into 2019 could face challenges
completing PTC implementation by the extended December 2020 deadline.
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\32\ GAO-18-367T.
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Railroads further behind in PTC implementation may need to apply
for an extension due to factors such as compressed implementation
schedules, as well as the time needed for FRA approvals. For example,
representatives from one commuter railroad said they hope to reach RSD
before the December 31, 2018, deadline, but that it would be difficult
to meet the extension requirements, apply for, and receive an extension
given the volume of paperwork FRA will be receiving at the end of the
year. Instead, the railroad plans to submit an extension request using
substitute criteria consisting of field testing in order to be in
compliance at the end of the year. Such an approach involves first
applying for and receiving approval for substitute criteria and then
formally requesting an extension and submitting supporting
documentation to FRA before the end of the year. Entering RSD prior to
the deadline could be difficult given that FRA officials told us they
have advised railroads to allow at least a month for FRA's review of
test requests, which must be approved prior to initiating field testing
and RSD.
Additionally, for some railroads further along in PTC
implementation, particularly Class I freight railroads,
interoperability is a key remaining hurdle for full implementation by
the end of 2018, and railroads expect this challenge to persist in the
future. The two Class I railroads we interviewed noted that ensuring
all tenant railroads are PTC-equipped, tested, and interoperable is a
primary reason the railroads plan to request an extension. One of these
host railroads also reported that it has little ability to influence
its tenants' progress with PTC implementation. Across all 40 railroads,
8 reported current or anticipated challenges working with tenant or
host railroads, or both, to plan and conduct testing to ensure
interoperability. Moreover, given that few railroads have reached the
interoperability testing stage, the challenges railroads may face in
this stage remain unclear. For example, some railroads we interviewed
noted it is unknown how much time and effort will be required to work
through interoperability issues during testing to ensure the system's
reliability. One railroad association stated that interoperability is,
and will continue to be, a substantial challenge for metropolitan areas
with dense and complex rail networks with several host-tenant
relationships. For example, according to one commuter railroad, 14
different freight and commuter railroads will need to interoperate in
the Chicago area.
FRA's Substantial Workload Remains a Concern
FRA's already substantial workload is expected to increase as
railroads continue to submit documentation necessary for extensions and
continue PTC implementation activities. FRA is focused on ensuring
railroads are in compliance through the December 2018 deadline--whether
via an extension or by completing implementation. While FRA officials
report that they anticipate almost all railroads will likely request an
extension, only one--a Class I railroad--had submitted an application
for an extension as of early September 2018.\33\ FRA will need to
review and approve all related documentation associated with each
extension request and make a determination within 90 days, meaning if a
railroad were to submit its extension request on December 31, 2018, FRA
would have until the end of March 2019 to approve or deny the
railroad's extension request.\34\ In addition to extension requests and
supporting documentation, many railroads will also be submitting to
FRA: requests for substitute criteria, test requests to initiate field
testing or RSD, revisions to PTC implementation plans, and PTC safety
plans.
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\33\ FRA approved the railroad's revised PTC implementation plan
and alternative schedule and sequence on September 5, 2018.
\34\ FRA officials noted that FRA's decision is based on whether
the railroad has met the statutory criteria for an alternative
schedule, and that if the requesting railroad meets all applicable
statutory criteria, FRA must approve the alternative schedule. 49
U.S.C. Sec. 20157(a)(3)(C). According to FRA officials, while FRA's
decision is pending, the railroad is considered in compliance with PTC
requirements and FRA will not assess civil penalties.
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To help manage the forthcoming influx of documentation, FRA
officials have offered to review draft documentation, such as
substitute criteria requests and test requests, and have advised
railroads to take FRA's review times into account prior to submitting
required documentation. FRA officials told us that in trying to manage
their workload, they initially told railroads they did not have time to
review draft submittals. However, they found that taking the time to
conduct draft reviews ultimately led to higher quality formal
submittals and accelerated the overall review process. In addition, FRA
officials said that their goal is to not delay any railroad that is
ready to move into testing, and that they advised railroads to build
30-45 days for test request reviews into their project schedules.
Despite these efforts, railroads remain concerned about the
agency's ability to manage the PTC workload in the coming months and
beyond 2018. For example, 9 of the 40 railroads identified FRA's
resources and review times as a challenge leading up to the December
2018 deadline. Based on similar concerns, in March 2018, we recommended
FRA develop an approach to prioritize the allocation of resources to
address areas of greatest risk as railroads work to complete PTC
implementation.\35\ FRA has acknowledged the railroads' concern given
the surge of submissions requiring FRA approval in 2018 and has
reported the agency is reallocating existing expertise and expanding
the PTC workforce through training, expanding contracts with existing
support contractors, and initiating one additional contract to provide
technical support. For example, FRA officials told us that they
reallocated resources to shift PTC Specialists' responsibilities to
focus exclusively on testing-related activities because their
involvement is critical for the testing stage.
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\35\ GAO-18-367T.
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Although FRA has taken steps to provide key extension information
to railroads and help ensure railroads' compliance with PTC deadlines,
uncertainty remains, particularly in regard to FRA's enforcement
strategy if railroads are noncompliant with the statute, such as if
railroads were to fail to apply for an extension by the deadline.
Representatives from all railroads implementing PTC we met with told us
that FRA's planned enforcement approach for any railroad that fails to
meet the requirements for an extension beyond 2018 is unclear. FRA
officials told us they have shared the range of applicable civil
penalties with railroads for years,\36\ but that any policy decisions
about how potential fines will be levied for noncompliant railroads is
a policy decision that has not yet been made. In addition, it is also
unclear how the agency would approach enforcement for railroads that
have a host or tenant operating on their tracks that has not completed
implementation or met the requirements necessary for an extension. FRA
officials said that the goal of enforcement is to help bring all
railroads into compliance and that they would have to look at the
specific circumstances for any host-tenant issues before assessing a
fine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ FRA officials noted that the schedule of civil penalties is
provided for in governing regulations. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 236, App. A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, almost all railroads will likely request an
extension beyond 2018, which will require FRA approval and, for many
railroads, substitute criteria requests that may result in
approximately a third of railroads remaining in the early stages of PTC
implementation at the start of 2019. However, given that almost no
railroads have submitted extension requests, it is unlikely we will
know how many railroads will be granted an extension by the December
31, 2018, deadline. Although FRA has reported taking some actions in
response to our March 2018 recommendation that they better prioritize
resources, FRA resources and review times remain a significant concern.
These issues, combined with the ongoing implementation, testing, and
interoperability challenges that a number of railroads reported to us,
raise questions as to the extent FRA and the railroad industry are
poised for full PTC implementation by December 31, 2020.
Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Naparstek?
Mr. Naparstek. Good morning. I wish to thank Chairman
Denham and Ranking Member Capuano for hosting this important
discussion on Positive Train Control. I am Scot Naparstek, and
I am Amtrak's chief operating officer.
I joined Amtrak in 2012, and currently oversee the 17,000
hardworking employees of Amtrak's operating departments. Our
workforce does a great job, and I am proud to represent them
here today.
At this moment, Hurricane Florence is bearing down on the
east coast. And for the safety of our customers and our
employees, we have adjusted our service and are making all
necessary preparations to safeguard them and our infrastructure
as much as possible from the impacts of this storm.
Today I will provide an update on PTC, including its
operation on Amtrak-owned infrastructure, on other hosts'
infrastructure, and our tenants' PTC operations on our
infrastructure.
First, let me discuss our most straightforward scenario:
the Amtrak trains operating over Amtrak infrastructure. In this
case, Amtrak plans to be fully PTC ready and compliant by the
end of this year. We have developed a detailed plan for every
portion of our network, and we are executing an aggressive, yet
realistic plan which will enable the remaining one-third of our
route-miles to be complete by December 31st.
Second, I would like to discuss those places where Amtrak
is a tenant on other hosts' infrastructure, and in fact, 72
percent of our train miles are over tracks owned and maintained
by other railroads. For those tracks we are cooperating with
our freight and commuter host railroads as they work to
complete PTC installations.
We are currently interoperable with five hosts, and we
anticipate several more before the deadline, although this is
dependent on host readiness. In places where the host's PTC
system is not anticipated to be ready for service by year's
end, and if they have accomplished specific criteria, they will
be able to apply for an alternative schedule. We expect this on
37 segments across our network, including all the portions
where PTC is mandated by law, but not ready by the deadline.
Additionally, the FRA permits railroads to seek Mainline
Track Exclusion Addendums if the operation meets certain
criteria. Consistent with our safety management system
methodology, we have been conducting detailed risk assessments
to enable us to develop risk mitigation measures to address
those areas without a functional PTC system.
While this risk analysis process and mitigation plan
development is still underway, let me be clear that Amtrak's
goal is to continue to operate all of our services over all of
our current routes come January 1, 2019. Exactly how we
accomplish this will vary across our network, based on the
specifics of each route. But I want to assure the committee
that, at this time, we believe we will have strategies in place
that will permit continued operation until PTC or PTC
equivalency is achieved everywhere.
Third, there are several freight and commuter railroads
that operate over Amtrak's infrastructure. For those railroads
who may require an FRA extension, Amtrak will work
collaboratively with the FRA and each railroad on a case-by-
case basis, ensuring their continued safe operations.
Amtrak's goal is for all our tenants to have operational
PTC as soon as possible. But we are also mindful of the impacts
that any disruption of commuter service may have, and the
potential resulting safety consequences. Thus, Amtrak is
working with tenants who believe they may be at risk, and the
FRA to explore, through our SMS process, how risk mitigation
strategies could be applied in such situations until they are
fully operable.
Amtrak has worked for years to be ready for the upcoming
PTC deadline. When 2019 arrives, we will have our track,
computer, training, and locomotive PTC work complete, we will
be operating PTC across all the tracks we control, and across
much of the host railroad network.
On January 1, 2019, we anticipate that 90 percent of our
trains will operate with PTC protection along some or all of
their routes. We expect the FRA will have granted the remaining
portions an alternative schedule or an exemption. Given the
difficulty of completing testing with so many freight and
commuter partners, and the potential for technical issues to
arise during testing, Amtrak will be required to submit an
application to the FRA for an alternative schedule to enable us
to continue operating while we finalize testing of our system
and the systems of our hosts and tenants.
This alternative schedule is required due to the FRA's
interpretation of the law that full implementation status
cannot be achieved until all non-Amtrak trains operating on
Amtrak's PTC-equipped lines are also PTC-compliant.
As previously mentioned, we will implement mitigation
measures for all those areas which will not have operational
PTC, due to a host's alternative schedule of PTC exemption.
PTC is not a silver bullet, and railroads alone cannot
solve all the safety issues that face us, such as grade
crossing and trespasser accidents, which require efforts from
local, State, and Federal stakeholders. Still, we are confident
that achieving PTC or PTC-equivalent levels of safety across
our network will be a major safety achievement. In fact, it is
our goal to be the safest passenger railroad in North America.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here before you
today, and I welcome questions.
[Mr. Naparstek's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scot Naparstek, Chief Operating Officer, Amtrak
introduction
Good morning. I wish to thank Chairman Denham and Ranking Member
Capuano for hosting this important discussion on Positive Train Control
(PTC). My name is Scot Naparstek, and I am Amtrak's Chief Operating
Officer. I joined Amtrak in 2012, and currently oversee Amtrak's
operations, including the Transportation, Engineering, and Mechanical
departments, and their nearly 17,000 hardworking operating employees.
Our workforce does a great job and I am proud to represent them here
today, on behalf of our President and Chief Executive Officer Richard
Anderson, who previously testified before this subcommittee in February
of this year.
Amtrak is committed to running the safest intercity passenger rail
system we can for our customers and employees. PTC represents an
essential next step for the rail industry to improve safety of train
operations, and it will make the entire U.S. rail network safer for
passengers, railroad employees, and the cities and towns through which
the national rail network traverses. Thus, we have developed a policy
of network-wide PTC or PTC-equivalency at Amtrak. Simply stated, we
believe that all of our trains and routes should eventually be equipped
with PTC or employ some other suite of technology and operating
practices that addresses the safety risks that PTC helps to mitigate.
Given the tragic incidents Amtrak has experienced since the PTC mandate
was enacted in 2008, particularly relating to over-speed situations
which are a risk regardless of the amounts or types of traffic using a
specific route, we think this is the safest course and the right
standard for the nation's intercity passenger rail carrier.
Amtrak has long been a leader in the installation of PTC, having
already deployed systems on two-thirds of the route-miles where we
control the tracks, including nearly all of the Northeast Corridor
(NEC), the busiest railroad in North America. In fact, Amtrak began PTC
operations almost 20 years ago as part of our introduction of Acela
Express high-speed rail service. The Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement
System, or ACSES, that we first deployed in 2000 is active and in force
on all of our trains operating on Amtrak's tracks anywhere between
Washington and Boston, a deployment that we accomplished by the
original December 31, 2015, PTC deadline.
overview
Today, I will provide an update on PTC, including its operation on
Amtrak-owned infrastructure, Amtrak's PTC operation on other hosts'
infrastructure, and other tenants' PTC operations on Amtrak-owned
infrastructure.
As we have discussed with you before, PTC systems are designed to
provide protection from the following conditions: train-to-train
collisions; operating over misaligned switches; over-speed events; and
work zone incursions. While we acknowledge that PTC is complicated and
difficult to implement, Amtrak has made significant progress
implementing PTC across the routes and equipment we control. As of
September 10, 2018:
88 percent of the minimum number of Amtrak-owned
locomotives required for revenue service are fully equipped and PTC
operable,
122 of 142 installations on 114 State-owned locomotives
and cab cars that Amtrak operates or maintains are complete, and 53 are
also tested, and PTC operable,
8 of 11 installation/track segments completed,
132 of 140 radio towers fully installed and equipped,
100 percent of employees trained as required per the PTC
Implementation Plan to run in revenue service,
607 of 901 route-miles in PTC operation, and
480 route-miles in testing.
We are proud of the work we have accomplished thus far and remain
focused on the work ahead to advance PTC as soon as possible.
amtrak's operations are unique
In many ways, the installation and deployment of PTC reflects the
complicated nature of railway operations in the United States. Multiple
companies and agencies must cooperate closely to ensure the safe,
reliable, timely operation of various types of trains across differing
networks. To integrate PTC into this complex environment has been a
significant undertaking for the industry and its suppliers. Amtrak and
its industry partners remain eager to bring this technology online, but
there is no way around the fact that it is a difficult process and has
required the dedication of significant resources, both in terms of
funding and of our personnel. Over the last few years Amtrak and many
other railroads have worked to develop complicated deployment plans,
and then rethink them, as various limitations became apparent.
At a scale unlike any other carrier in North America, Amtrak
operates over a large and complex network of various host railroads and
is also a host itself to numerous tenants. Our unusual role within the
industry reflects our unique origins, and while this presents a wide
range of challenges, it also creates opportunities for us to serve as a
leader in a number of important ways. For example, earlier this year
Amtrak organized and hosted PTC summits in Seattle, Washington and
Chicago, Illinois, which brought together freight railroads, commuter
railroads, government agencies, and vendors to focus on the challenges
of PTC implementation in those regions. These events have been followed
by an ongoing series of regular calls that have allowed the
participants to learn from one another, to share their latest
developments, to coordinate testing schedules, and to work through all
sorts of unexpected issues.
Amtrak has also worked hard to share our PTC expertise with our
partners. We have done this in ways both large and small, but two quick
examples include: preparing to install and commission PTC equipment on
13 locomotives for the North Carolina Department of Transportation,
ensuring those units will be ready in time for the deadline; and
conducting an engineering survey of the new Siemens Charger locomotives
that belong to the Illinois Department of Transportation, so that they
could fully understand what they need to do to equip that fleet to
become PTC-ready.
Our work across all these fronts and with so many partners has
enabled us to make significant progress, but it has also revealed a
number of limitations and bottlenecks. System federation and the
subsequent interoperability testing of the IETMS PTC system are
complicated tasks. By definition, they depend on coordinating with
external partners who are facing their own time and resource
constraints. As we have worked through these issues, we have learned
much that we expect will streamline the work involved in the remaining
portions.
Another issue that was raised in February's hearing that has
continued to present challenges is the limited number of vendors
available to support the industry. While Amtrak has developed
significant PTC expertise in the last few years, there are still times
when we would appreciate the ability to better utilize additional
vendors to expedite the installation, configuration, and testing of
various PTC components. There is simply not a deep reservoir of
relevant expertise available to the rail industry, which has resulted
in all of the railroads turning to the same small number of vendors
seeking the same resources. To work around this, we have worked hard to
foster the necessary skills inside of Amtrak, and we will continue to
do so, but that is a slow and expensive process.
Looking ahead to the upcoming December 31 deadline, let me address
three important environments so that you can fully understand where
Amtrak stands with its PTC deployment.
amtrak ptc operation on amtrak-owned infrastructure
First, the most straightforward scenario Amtrak faces is when
Amtrak trains operate over Amtrak infrastructure. In this case, Amtrak
plans to be fully PTC ready and compliant by the end of this year.
Where Amtrak owns or operates the infrastructure, Amtrak is
responsible for all elements of the PTC system. These rail lines
include the following: 397 miles of the 457-mile Northeast Corridor
mainline between Washington and Boston; 105 miles between Philadelphia
and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; 232 miles between Porter, Indiana and
Dearborn, Michigan; 94 miles between Schenectady and Poughkeepsie, New
York; and 61 miles between New Haven, Connecticut and Springfield,
Massachusetts. We also own or operate another 12 miles of track near
our terminals, for example, in Chicago and New York. These segments
total 901 route-miles. Currently 605 of them have at least one wayside
PTC system installed and operational. We have developed a detailed plan
for every portion of our network, and we are executing an aggressive
yet realistic plan which will enable the remaining third of the route-
miles to be complete by December 31.
In some places where we host tenant operations over our tracks, at
the freight railroads' request, we are installing the freights'
standard IETMS PTC system on our infrastructure in parallel with either
our ACSES or ITCS system, which will eliminate the requirement for them
to install either ACSES or ITCS PTC equipment on their locomotives.
Locations where this occurs include along the NEC between Washington
and Philadelphia, along the Keystone Line between Frazer and
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the eastern, Michigan-owned portion of
the Michigan Line between Kalamazoo and Dearborn. 345 miles, or roughly
two-fifths, of our 901 route-miles will be equipped with dual PTC
systems.
Amtrak is dedicating significant attention to the segments where
PTC installation is not yet complete, such as the Springfield and
Hudson Lines. We hold regular cross-department meetings to ensure rapid
coordination in our efforts, as we are giving this work the highest
priority. While the timeline for these segments is indeed tight, we are
planning to complete these projects by the December 31 deadline.
For Amtrak locomotives, the process starts with installing the
necessary equipment for one or, in some cases, two different PTC
systems, and then running each unit through the necessary tests to
ensure the proper functioning and integration of the various elements,
which we call ``commissioning.'' Given the need for multiple PTC
systems in individual locomotives, we have added 535 systems to 443
units, and have completed commissioning on 456 of them. Again, we have
developed detailed plans and are confident we will have the
commissioning work done in time for the December 31 deadline.
So much of the discussion around PTC relates to the hardware, that
sometimes we do not properly convey how important training is to the
successful rollout of PTC across our operations. To ensure our
workforce is ready, we will need to provide training to, and ensure the
successful completion of, 5,095 qualifications. All of those
qualifications are complete. As some employees will need to be trained
on multiple systems, the number of qualifications is higher than the
specific number of people being trained. Of the overall total, 70
percent are for the train and engine crews who operate the trains, with
dispatchers, maintenance of way, and mechanical forces making up the
remainder.
amtrak ptc operation on other hosts' infrastructure
The second operating environment I would like to cover is where
Amtrak is a tenant on other entities' infrastructure. Since Amtrak runs
72 percent of its train-miles over tracks owned and maintained by other
railroads, we have spent a great deal of time and effort preparing for
PTC operations on such areas. For the tracks we use but do not own or
control, we are cooperating with our freight and commuter host
railroads as they advance their obligations to complete PTC
installations. In these models, Amtrak is responsible for the
locomotive portion of the PTC system, which I have already addressed.
We are currently interoperable with five hosts and we anticipate
several more before the yearend deadline, although this is dependent on
each host railroad's readiness.
In places where the host's PTC system is not anticipated to be
ready for service by year's end, if they have made sufficient progress
with installation, they will be able to apply for an alternative
schedule. We anticipate this being the case on 37 segments across our
route network. We have stayed in close contact with the various hosts
to keep apprised of the status of their PTC installation work, and the
best information we have now suggests that approved alternative
schedules will be in place for all of the portions of the network where
PTC is mandated by law and is not available on January 1, 2019.
Additionally, the FRA permits railroads to seek Mainline Track
Exclusion Addendums (MTEAs) if the operation meets certain criteria. An
MTEA waives the requirement for a railroad to install PTC.
To prepare for operations where PTC is not in service, we have been
conducting detailed risk assessments to enable us to develop an
appropriate array of risk mitigation measures to address those areas
that are not mitigated by a functional PTC system, consistent with our
Safety Management System methodology. Starting in late spring, our
safety team began a detailed, cross-departmental process of reviewing
every portion of our network falling in one of two categories: places
where an MTEA is present or places where we had reason to believe PTC
is mandated but the railroads will qualify for an alternative schedule.
Members of the safety team lead these assessments, ten of whom are
dedicated to this process.
They work with their Engineering and Transportation colleagues to
develop detailed profiles of each location under review, covering at
least 2,100 miles of track. Each assessment defines the segment under
review, with an emphasis on the physical characteristics of the
territory, including elements such as curves, speed restrictions, and
facing point switches. The assessments also address operational factors
and local traffic volumes and traffic mixes. As the assessment is
conducted, the team quantifies potential risks both in terms of
likelihood of occurrence and the potential severity. The assessment
team then develops operational and technological recommendations to
reduce risk in the near, middle, and long-term, and works with Amtrak
leadership to ensure there is a clear, organization-wide understanding
of the results before any approvals are sought to adopt the
recommendations. These assessments are being worked through as quickly
as possible while ensuring the quality of the work, and those covering
MTEA territory are slated to be complete by the end of October, with
the rest by the end of the year. As this work is all above and beyond
statutory requirements, the timing is driven by our own Safety
Management System approach.
The central value of these assessments will be their role in
determining what mitigations will be necessary to adopt for a given
location over a given period to ensure Amtrak has a high degree of
confidence in our ability to operate the safest possible railroad,
short of the installation of PTC. We envision these potential
mitigations in three tiers or layers.
The first is made up of changes to our operations, which may go
beyond compliance with the host railroads' rulebooks to create a
greater safety margin for our operations. These changes, most of which
could be implemented almost immediately, could include reducing the
maximum speed of our trains, further reducing speed when we approach
facing point switches, or even changing the composition of our crews.
In some cases, these changes may impose delays on our trains, but we
believe that the additional level of safety is justified.
The second level of potential mitigations would be technological in
nature but would take the form of relatively simple infrastructural
changes that could be installed fairly quickly to add additional safety
measures. Examples of such mitigations include warning signs for the
crews, or new switch position indicators, both of which would provide
additional situational awareness for our employees. The idea is to add
these additional layers of mitigation to the system, which may then
allow us to remove or minimize some of the more inconvenient
operational mitigations we initially put in place.
The third and final layer of mitigations consists of more elaborate
technological solutions that would take more time to develop and
deploy. In many cases, we may determine that a full PTC system is the
best long-term solution to strengthening safety on a given route. In
other cases, we believe there may be various technologies, that when
coupled with the other mitigations I have mentioned, could offer what
we term ``PTC equivalency'' once they were ready. Many of the ideas in
this category are in early stages, and still have significant
operational and procedural issues that will need to be resolved.
Nonetheless, we are determined to be open to innovative approaches to
obtaining the benefits of PTC across all of our network.
While this risk analysis process and mitigation plan development is
still underway, let me be clear that Amtrak's goal is to continue to
operate all of our services over all of our current routes come January
1, 2019. Exactly how we accomplish this will vary across our network,
based on the specifics of each route, but I want to assure the
committee that, at this time, we believe we will have strategies in
place that will permit us to continue operations until operational PTC
or PTC-equivalency is achieved for all of our network.
other tenants' ptc operations on amtrak-owned infrastructure
Third, there are several freight and commuter railroads that
operate over Amtrak's infrastructure, and for those railroads who may
require an extension from the FRA, Amtrak is prepared to work
collaboratively with the FRA and each railroad on a case-by-case basis
with the aim of ensuring their continued, safe operations.
These various freight and commuter railroads that operate over our
infrastructure must equip their rolling stock with PTC for use on our
railroad and we are working cooperatively with them to advance these
tasks. This cooperation, where applicable, primarily takes the form of
linking our server system with the server systems of each tenant.
Additionally, we then conduct interoperability field testing to verify
the proper functioning of all the elements to enable both Amtrak and
the tenant to develop confidence that the systems are working as
intended.
Along the NEC, we have ten tenants that will use Amtrak's ACSES PTC
system, and another two tenants that will use the freights' IETMS
system. This is another example of how the PTC tasks facing Amtrak are
complicated by the wide range of rail partners with whom we interface.
Of the corridor, we also have one freight railroad that will operate
over our tracks using both IETMS and ITCS, and three freight railroads
and one commuter railroad that we host that will use IETMS only, so
there are many different integrations that all must be verified for the
whole network to be ready. Presently on the NEC, our tenants
Connecticut DOT, CSX, MBTA, SEPTA, and the Providence & Worcester
Railroad have completed implementation and are currently operating with
fully functioning PTC on our routes. MARC and Norfolk Southern will
both be IETMS ready, but it is not clear yet if everything for PTC
operation will be in place before the deadline. Our sense is that NJ
Transit has significant work facing it before it will be PTC
operational.
Amtrak believes strongly in the value and importance of PTC and our
aim is to ensure that all of our tenants have an operational system as
soon as possible. Having said this, we are mindful of the impacts that
any disruption of commuter service may have on the regions we serve and
the potential safety consequences that could follow. Thus, Amtrak is
continuing to work with any tenants who believe they may be at risk of
not having fully completed the installation and commissioning of PTC
equipment on their trains for use on our tracks. We will work with
these carriers and the FRA to explore, through our Safety Management
System process, the potential of risk mitigation strategies that could
be applied in such situations until full installation and commissioning
is achieved.
next steps
Amtrak has worked for years to be ready for the upcoming PTC
deadline. When 2019 arrives, we will have our track, computer,
training, and locomotive PTC work complete and we will be operating PTC
across all of the tracks we control and across much of the host
railroad network. Already 222 of our 315 daily trains currently operate
with PTC protection along some or all of their routes. On January 1,
2019, we anticipate that this number will climb to 283, or 90 percent,
with only those portions of the network which have been granted an
alternative schedule or an exemption by the FRA being without the
protection of this system for our trains.
Having said that, given the docility of completing testing with so
many freight and commuter partners and the potential for some limited
technical issues to arise during testing of the sort that often
accompany the initial operation of any complex technology, Amtrak will
be required to submit an application to the FRA for an alternative
schedule to enable us to continue operating while we finalize testing
of our system and the systems of our hosts and tenants. This
alternative schedule is required due to the FRA's interpretation of the
law that full implementation status cannot be achieved until all non-
Amtrak trains operating on Amtrak's PTC-equipped lines are also PTC-
compliant. However, to be considered fully implemented requires that
all other railroads operating across any of Amtrak's PTC-equipped lines
must be capable of operating with Amtrak's PTC system. This
interoperability of PTC systems between railroads remains a work in
progress and we are currently working with each railroad to assess this
work, so we can determine the appropriate alternative schedule
durations. In addition, as I mentioned, we will implement mitigation
measures that we develop for all those areas which will not have
operational PTC due to a host's alternative schedule of PTC exemption.
Strengthening safety is a continuous process. Amtrak's
responsibility is to lead safety across our industry and serve as good
stewards of the vital resources that we receive from Congress and the
Administration to help us implement these advancements. Likewise, PTC
is not a silver bullet and railroads alone cannot solve all of the
safety issues that face us, such as grade crossing and trespasser
accidents, which require a broader effort of local, State, and Federal
stakeholders to educate motorists and pedestrians, better equip
vulnerable crossings, limit public access to rights of way, and
strengthen enforcement. Still, we are confident that achieving PTC or
PTC-equivalent levels of safety across our network will be a major
achievement in the safety performance of intercity passenger rail. One
need look no further than our accident history to see the universal
benefits that PTC can bring to Amtrak and our industry. We look forward
to continuing to work with all of our partners to improve safety across
the rail network.
conclusion
I have the highest confidence in Amtrak's dedicated workforce and
the commitment I see across our company to becomes the safest passenger
railroad in North America. While the challenges described today are
defficult, they can, and will, be overcome. At Amtrak, we owe our
customers, and your constituents, nothing less.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
welcome your questions.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Hamberger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hamberger. Chairman Shuster, Chairman Denham, Ranking
Member DeFazio, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the most
important subcommittee in the House of Representatives, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss Positive Train Control and
progress on implementation across the U.S. rail network. My
focus today is specifically on AAR's Class I freight railroad
members, their significant progress to date, and the remaining
technical and operational steps necessary to fully implement
PTC nationwide.
Of course, a big piece of that task is establishing
interoperability with Amtrak, as Mr. Naparstek has just
outlined. I want to assure the committee that all hosts are
working diligently with Amtrak to achieve just that.
Chairman Denham, your opening statement was spot on. This
is a life-saving technology. But it is indeed complex and
daunting. I am pleased to report that, on all fronts, the Class
I railroads have made tremendous progress since this committee
last convened on the topic in February of this year. At the end
of July the vast majority of installation has been completed:
98.2 percent of locomotives; 99.2 percent of wayside interface
units; 99.1 percent of radio towers, all equipped and
installed. And, in addition, 99.8 percent of required employees
have received their training.
Furthermore, by the end of July the Class I railroads
already had in operation more than 37,000 route-miles, or
nearly 70 percent of the 54,000 total required by law. PTC
development has been an immensely complex undertaking from day
one. From the start, railroads focused on developing and
testing technology that would meet the RSIA requirements,
especially nationwide interoperability. This required
developing essential software and hardware. Once developed,
rigorous and repeated testing is the only way to ensure this
system works as intended.
In addition to initial testing in a simulated environment,
these components must be installed and exposed to day-to-day
operations to verify that each individual part, and the system
as a whole, will function properly under real-world conditions.
And as Scot has just pointed out, those real-world conditions
can be very challenging, as we are seeing in the Carolinas
today. The freight rails operating there are working with
emergency responders and the Governors to be ready to move in
and help in the aftermath after Hurricane Florence hits.
In addition, failure of a single PTC component can mean
that the system shuts down a train unexpectedly and
unnecessarily. When that happens it means trains are not able
to operate normally on affected rail lines until the failure is
corrected: a situation railroads are currently facing as PTC is
rolled out.
Additionally, it is common for one railroad's locomotives
to operate on another railroad's tracks. Therefore, PTC systems
must be fully interoperable across all the Nation's major
railroads, adding yet another layer of complexity. Ensuring
this interoperability is the largest step left to full PTC
implementation. Class I railroads are up to the task, making
consistent progress, and continuing to resolve issues as they
arise.
In the future, by the end of 2018, each Class I railroad
will have completed PTC installation. One hundred percent of
wayside, back office, and locomotive hardware will be
installed. One hundred percent of spectrum will be in place,
and 100 percent of required employee training will be complete.
In addition, it is projected by the end of this year 80
percent of Class I route-miles will be in operation under PTC.
This compares to the target established by Congress in 2015 of
50 percent.
While some Class I railroads plan to be fully operational
by the end of the year, all Class I railroads will be 100
percent implemented no time later than some time in 2020.
As Mr. Naparstek has pointed out, even if a railroad will
have PTC fully operational on its network by the end of this
year, FRA will not consider the railroad to be fully
implemented until all railroads, the host, and all of its
tenants are fully interoperable.
The bottom line is that every day, as railroads finalize
the PTC installation and expand PTC operations, the risk of
accidents on the Nation's rail network is reduced, passengers
move more safely, and employees operate in a safer environment.
Thank you.
[Mr. Hamberger's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
On behalf of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), thank you
for the opportunity to discuss positive train control (PTC). AAR
members account for the vast majority of North American freight
railroad mileage, employees, and revenue.
In this testimony, I will review the progress freight railroads
have made in the development and implementation of PTC and what to
expect going forward. My focus will be on Class I freight railroads and
their PTC-related status.
The bottom line is that by December 31, 2018, all Class I's will
have completed PTC hardware installation, trained all employees, and
secured all needed radio bandwidth. Further, by the end of this year,
PTC will be in operation on the vast majority--approximately 80
percent--of Class I PTC route-miles network wide, with some Class I
railroads planning to be fully operational on their networks. Between
2018 and 2020, all Class I railroads will be completing PTC
implementation, consistent with the statute. All railroads will
continue their work on resolving technical operational challenges that
will inevitably rise, which Congress anticipated and specifically
provided flexibility for in its 2015 law. They also will be addressing
the biggest remaining challenge of PTC implementation: interoperability
with each other and with their tenant passenger and shortline
railroads.
what is positive train control?
As members of this committee know, ``positive train control'' (PTC)
describes technologies designed to automatically stop a train before
certain accidents caused by human error occur. Under the Rail Safety
Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), passenger railroads and Class I freight
railroads are required to install PTC on main lines used to transport
passengers or toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) materials.
Specifically, PTC as mandated by the RSIA must be designed to
prevent four major types of train accidents: train-to-train collisions;
derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized incursions by
trains onto sections of track where maintenance activities are taking
place; and the movement of a train through a track switch left in the
wrong position.\1\ The PTC system now being installed to meet this
statutory mandate is an overlay system, and meant to supplement, rather
than replace, existing methods of operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A switch is the infrastructure that controls the path of trains
where two sets of tracks diverge or converge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To work as it should, a PTC system must be able to determine the
precise location, direction, and speed of trains; warn train operators
of potential problems; and take immediate action if the operator fails
to act after a warning is provided by the PTC system. For example, if a
train operator fails to begin stopping a train before a stop signal or
slowing down for a speed-restricted area, the PTC system will override
the operator and apply the brakes automatically before the train passes
the stop signal or enters the speed-restricted area.
A PTC system consists of three main elements that are integrated by
a fourth critical element, the wireless data communications system. An
onboard or locomotive system monitors a train's position and speed and
activates braking as necessary to enforce speed restrictions and
unauthorized train movements; a wayside system monitors railroad track
signals, switches, and track circuits to communicate data on this local
infrastructure needed to permit the onboard system to authorize
movement of a locomotive; and a back office server stores all
information related to the rail network and trains operating across it
(e.g., speed restrictions, movement authorities, train compositions,
etc.) and transmits this information to individual locomotive onboard
enforcement systems. Finally, all of these segments of the PTC system
are integrated by a wireless data communications system that must move
massive amounts of information back and forth between the back-office
servers, the wayside equipment, and the locomotives' on-board
computers.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Such a system requires highly complex technologies able to analyze
and incorporate the huge number of variables that affect train
operations. A simple example: the length of time it takes to stop a
freight train depends on train speed, terrain, the weight and length of
the train, the number and distribution of locomotives and loaded and
empty freight cars on the train, and other factors. During the
operation of a single train over a single operating segment of track
known as a sub-division, the length of time and the distance needed to
stop that train may change 100 or more times due to changes in the
factors mentioned above. A PTC system must be able to take all of these
factors into account automatically, reliably, accurately, and in real
time in order to safely stop the train wherever it may be along its
route.
ptc is an unprecedented technological challenge
PTC development and implementation constitute an unprecedented
technological challenge. Some of the development and installation tasks
associated with the Class I railroads' efforts over the past few years
include:
A complete physical survey and highly precise geo-mapping
of the approximately 54,000 route-miles on which PTC technology will be
installed, including more than 450,000 field assets along the right-of-
way (e.g., mileposts, curves, rail and highway grade crossings,
switches, signals, track vertical profiles and horizontal geometry).
Installing more than 28,000 custom-designed ``wayside
interface units'' (WIU) that provide the mechanism for transmitting
information from signal and switch locations along the right-of-way to
locomotives and railroad facilities.
Installing PTC technology on nearly 16,400 Class I
locomotives.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ As just one example of the magnitude of the PTC implementation
effort, it takes about one person working for about 1 month to install
all of the necessary PTC equipment on a single locomotive. It will take
approximately 1,400 staff-years to install PTC on all of the Class I
locomotives that require it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installing PTC technology on nearly 2,100 switches in
non-signaled territory and completing signal replacement projects,
including upgrades to PTC-compatible signal technology, at some 14,500
locations.
Developing, producing, and deploying a new radio system
specifically designed for the massive data transmission requirements of
PTC at tens of thousands of base stations and trackside locations, and
on nearly 16,400 locomotives.
Developing back office systems and upgrading and
integrating dispatching software to incorporate the data and precision
required for PTC systems.
In all these areas, Class I railroads have already made tremendous
progress. Figure 2 has details on the status of Class I PTC
installations at the end of July 2018.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT[
Additionally, as shown in Figure 3, at the end of July 2018, the
Class I railroads already had in operation more than 37,000 route-
miles, or nearly 70 percent, of the approximately 54,000 route-miles
that will eventually be equipped with PTC. To be clear, each Class I
railroad will install 100 percent of PTC wayside, back office, and
locomotive hardware, and complete all required employee training, by
the end of 2018 and expect to have nearly 80 percent of required PTC
route-miles operational by the end of 2018.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The AAR estimates that, as of today, freight railroads together
have spent more than $10 billion--of their own funds, not taxpayer
funds--on PTC development and deployment, and expect to spend more than
$11 billion by the time PTC is fully operational nationwide. This does
not include the hundreds of millions of additional dollars that will be
needed each year to maintain the railroads' PTC systems once they are
initially installed.
testing and validation is essential for safe operation and full
interoperability
From the outset, railroads' efforts were focused on development and
testing of technology that could meet the requirements of the RSIA,
particularly those related to interoperability, and that could be
scaled to the huge requirements of a nationwide system. Essential
software and hardware for many PTC components had to be developed and
deployed, and then rigorously tested. Only after technology is actually
installed and exposed to the rigors of day-to-day operations can the
task of testing each of the individual parts, and the system as a
whole, be completed under real world conditions.
This task is made particularly complex by the need to ensure that
PTC systems are fully and seamlessly interoperable across all of the
nation's major railroads. It is not unusual for one railroad's
locomotives to operate on another railroad's tracks. When that happens,
the ``tenant'' locomotives must be able to communicate with, and
respond to conditions on, the ``host'' PTC system. Put another way, a
CSX locomotive must behave like a Norfolk Southern locomotive when it
is traveling on NS track; a BNSF locomotive must be compatible with
Union Pacific's PTC system when it is on UP track; and so on. All the
while, each railroad has its own operating rules designed to address
specific conditions on its property, all consistent with FRA
regulations, but further adding to this complexity. Ensuring this
interoperability has been a significant challenge.
It is critical that any and all potential failure points be
identified, isolated, and corrected. By necessity, a mature, well-
functioning PTC system is enormously complex, and it is not realistic
to think it will perform flawlessly day in and day out, especially upon
initial implementation. That is precisely why testing, first in a
simulated environment and then under real-world operating conditions,
is so important. Unfortunately, the failure of a single part within a
complex PTC system can mean that the system--designed to be fail safe--
shuts down a train unexpectedly and unnecessarily. When that happens,
it means that trains are not able to operate normally on affected rail
lines until the failure is corrected, a situation railroads are facing
today as they proceed toward PTC implementation.
Every day, as railroads finalize their PTC installation and expand
PTC operations, the risk of accidents is lowered. However, as other
train control systems implemented in other countries demonstrate, there
is risk in improperly designed, installed, or operated PTC systems.
This is not just a speculative concern. Since 2008, there have been a
number of incidents worldwide in which accidents resulting in deaths
and injuries occurred on rail lines that had PTC-like systems. These
concerns make it essential that a railroad's first priority must be to
implement PTC correctly, and to test and validate it thoroughly.
conclusion
Railroads have devoted enormous human and financial resources to
develop a functioning and reliable PTC system, and progress to date has
been substantial. Class I railroads remain committed to safely
implementing PTC as quickly as possible. By the end of 2018, each Class
I railroad will have PTC fully operational or initiated revenue service
demonstration on, at a minimum, 51 percent of its required PTC route-
miles or subdivisions; have 100 percent of the necessary wayside, back
office, and locomotive hardware installations completed; have all
required spectrum in place; and have all required employee training
completed.
In addition, network-wide approximately 80 percent of required PTC
route-miles are expected to be operational by the end of 2018. While
some Class I railroads plan to be fully operational by the end of this
year, all Class I railroads will be fully implemented no later than
2020. In the meantime, Class I railroads will continue to work with
each other and their tenant passenger and shortline railroad partners
to successfully achieve full interoperability, which is the largest
remaining challenge to a fully implemented national PTC system.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger.
Mr. Knueppel?
Mr. Knueppel. Good morning, Chairman Denham, Chairman
Shuster, Ranking Member Capuano, Ranking Member DeFazio, and
members of the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials. On behalf of the American Public
Transportation Association, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the state of Positive Train Control implementation
in the United States.
My name is Jeffrey Knueppel. I am a professional engineer,
and serve as the general manager of the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, or SEPTA, the Nation's
sixth-largest system, providing more than 1 million daily trips
throughout southeastern Pennsylvania. I am also chair of APTA's
Commuter Rail PTC Subcommittee.
As we sadly recognize the 10th anniversary of the tragic
Chatsworth accident this week, I want to begin by reiterating
APTA's and the commuter rail industry's commitment to
implementing Positive Train Control.
The Nation's commuter railroads have been working
continuously with our freight partners, third-party
contractors, Amtrak, and the FRA to address financial,
technological, and logistical challenges as the industry works
towards a common goal: implementing positive train control and
making an already safe system even safer. And I would like to
note that it is 18 times safer to take the train than drive.
Since APTA last testified before this subcommittee in
February, commuter railroads have continued to make strong
progress. This improvement is reflected in the FRA's second-
quarter PTC progress report, including reducing by two the
number of commuter railroads on FRA's list of at-risk
railroads. And we expect the number of at-risk railroads to
continue to drop.
Although no two PTC experiences are the same, I offer the
SEPTA story as a positive outcome based on a good plan, a
supportive board, and some good circumstances. I kind of break
our PTC efforts down into three stages: the first one was
construction and testing; our plan was to do the work with both
in-house forces, as well as contractors. So our in-house forces
installed automatic train control, while third-party forces
placed the access overlay on top of that system.
We also had a particular situation with CSX, where both
railroads wanted to run their form of PTC, and so we performed
a separation project that was completed over a 6-mile stretch
in August of 2015. And I would like to note that we really
appreciate the TIGER funds that were utilized for that work.
Stage 2 was placing routes and provisional revenue service.
And we began in April of 2016 to start placing our lines in
revenue service, and we did that first on our Warminster line,
which is single-track line. We incrementally rolled out one or
two lines a month in our territory, until January of 2017. At
that point we intensified our field testing efforts on Amtrak,
and ran from January until May of 2017, when we began operation
with PTC on our three Amtrak territory lines.
So since May of 2017, all 13 lines have been continuously
operated with PTC. That is SEPTA vehicles. And that leads to
stage 3, where we are at right now, and that is
interoperability. This significant challenge remains. CSX and
Norfolk Southern are scheduled to be completed by the end of
the year, but this could be a photo finish for one of the
carriers.
It has not been easy, even though our progress appears
strong along the way. Funding was very difficult for SEPTA. The
economic collapse of 2008 and other circumstances put us at our
lowest historical capital funds. Fortunately, in our State, Act
89 was passed, which helped SEPTA through a tough time.
Employee retention and continuity was a challenge. A limited
vendor base. There were countless innovations needed to
overcome technological hurdles at various points, car shortages
during our equipment installation, endless testing, a
formidable training effort. We did experience a very
significant radio interference issue with freight carriers.
There was, obviously, startup inertia and struggles, and poor
on-time performance until schedule changes could be made.
But we persevered through this. We have spent $344 million
on this project, and I am proud of the efforts of our entire
organization.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the challenges
and the successes of implementing this critical safety system,
and I look forward to answering any questions that you may
have.
[Mr. Knueppel's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey D. Knueppel, P.E., General Manager,
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, on behalf of the
American Public Transportation Association
The American Public Transportation Association is a non-profit
international association of more than 1,500 public-and private-sector
member organizations, including public transit systems and high-speed,
intercity, and commuter rail passenger operators; planning, design,
construction, and finance firms; product and service providers;
academic institutions, transit associations and State departments of
transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing
safe, efficient, and economical transit services and products.
introduction
Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, on
behalf of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and its
more than 1,500 public-and private-sector member organizations, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on the state of positive train
control (PTC) implementation in the United States.
My name is Jeffrey D. Knueppel, P.E., and I am the General Manager
of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA).
SEPTA is the nation's six largest transit system, with more than 9,000
employees. We provide more than 1.1 million daily passenger trips
through an extensive network of fixed-route services including bus,
subway, trolley, and Regional Rail, as well as ADA paratransit and
shared ride services that serve Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, and
Montgomery Counties in Pennsylvania. SEPTA's commuter rail system
(Regional Rail) is a network of 13 rail lines with 155 stations that
provides service to and from Center City Philadelphia and the rest of
southeastern Pennsylvania, as well as service into New Jersey and
Delaware. We operate 770 weekday trains and serve more than 34 million
riders each year, and Regional Rail ridership has increased by more
than 50 percent over the last 20 years. I also serve as Chair of APTA's
Commuter Rail PTC Subcommittee.
As we sadly recognize the 10th anniversary of the tragic Chatsworth
accident this week, I want to begin by reiterating APTA's and the
commuter rail industry's long-standing and unwavering commitment to
implementing positive train control.
I am pleased to be working with APTA and representing the industry
in this important effort. Since APTA last testified before this
subcommittee in February, the nation's commuter railroads have
continued to make strong and continuous progress in installing and
implementing positive train control. This progress is reflected in the
Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) recently released second
quarter PTC Progress report, including reducing by two the number of
commuter railroads on FRA's list of at-risk railroads.
The commuter rail industry has been working continuously with
freight partners, third-party contractors, Amtrak, and FRA to implement
PTC and address and correct technical and interoperability challenges.
APTA has also provided a number of forums for collaboration and the
sharing of best practices and lessons learned, including the PTC
Subcommittee, which has been particularly helpful in providing a
cohesive push as the industry works toward a common goal--implementing
PTC and making an already safe system even safer.
We greatly appreciate the subcommittee's focused attention on the
critical issues of rail safety and PTC, and the challenges and
successes that publicly funded commuter railroads have experienced in
procuring, installing, and implementing this complex signaling and
communications technology.
safety is our first priority
For commuter rail operators and the entire public transportation
industry, safety is our first priority. Safety is not simply a value we
share; it is a core operating principle and a promise to our riders.
The men and women responsible for managing and operating public
transportation systems are fully committed to the safety of their
systems, passengers, employees, and the general public.
Moreover, throughout our 136-year history, APTA and its predecessor
associations have been leading advocates for safety improvements. As
APTA President and CEO Paul Skoutelas outlined in his testimony before
the subcommittee in February, APTA and its members have led the way in
creating an effective safety culture over many decades:
creating a Rail Safety Audit Program;
developing Safety Management Program Plans; and
writing more than 270 standards and recommended practices
for public transit, including Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards
(PRESS) for commuter rail cars.
APTA's PRESS standards help improve the safety of public
transportation systems by specifying safety requirements for vehicle
crashworthiness, passenger door systems, emergency lighting and
evacuation, and new benchmarks to improve the safety of vehicle
interiors including seat attachment strength and workstation tables.
With regard to positive train control, APTA publicly supported the
concept of PTC prior to enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of
2008 (RSIA), and we advised Members of Congress and other policymakers
of the need for proven technology, adequate resources, and the expanded
radio spectrum necessary to put PTC into operation. Since enactment of
RSIA, APTA has actively worked to assist the commuter rail industry
with PTC research, development, installation, and implementation,
including by participating in FRA's Rail Safety Advisory Committee
(RSAC); establishing ``user groups'' among different types of commuter
rail operators to share information and encourage coordinated actions;
and conducting PTC conferences, workshops, and summits with commuter
rail Chief Executive Officers, senior engineering staff, FRA senior
staff, and congressional staff.
As a result of this overriding and sustained commitment to safety,
today, public transit is the safest form of surface transportation.
Every year, 30 commuter railroads across America safely carry
passengers on more than 500 million trips. And traveling by commuter
and intercity passenger rail is 18 times safer than traveling by car.
positive train control mandate
Moreover, we are working to make commuter rail even safer by
installing and implementing PTC, a complex signaling and communications
technology that provides a critical safety overlay on top of already
safe commuter rail systems.
In 2015, Congress recognized the implementation challenges that the
Government Accountability Office had outlined since RSIA implementing
regulations went into effect. In enacting the Positive Train Control
Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015, Congress identified
specific installation and implementation milestones. Under current law
(49 U.S.C. 20157), commuter railroads are required to implement PTC by
December 31, 2018, or, alternatively, to meet the following milestones
(as defined in 49 U.S.C. 20157(a)(3)(B)) by that date:
Installed all PTC hardware (wayside and onboard
equipment);
Acquired all necessary spectrum for PTC implementation;
Completed all employee training required under the
applicable PTC system regulations;
Initiated revenue service demonstration (RSD) on at least
one territory subject to the PTC requirement (or other criteria); and
Submitted a plan, schedule, and certification to the
Secretary of Transportation for implementing a PTC system.
Upon reaching these milestones by the end of 2018, the commuter
railroads must implement PTC as soon as practicable, and no later than
December 31, 2020.
APTA supports these statutory deadlines and is committed to
assisting all our commuter railroads in implementing PTC.
ptc: unparalleled technological challenge
As defined in statute, a positive train control system is a
``system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over speed
derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the
movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.''
Implementing PTC requires changes to four main system components--
vehicles, communications, signals, and the back office/control center--
and each has to be fully functioning and integrated with the other
systems.
When RSIA was enacted in 2008, there was no universal off-the-shelf
technology capable of achieving these safety objectives. Although many
commuter railroads have long used collision avoidance systems to help
protect against certain accidents, these systems did not have all of
the required attributes of PTC. Since the enactment of RSIA, APTA and
its member commuter railroads have aggressively pursued both the
funding and technology necessary to implement the PTC mandate by the
statutory deadlines.
PTC is a predictive enforcement system of subsystems overlaid on
existing systems. Although commuter railroads are currently in the
process of installing these systems, a one-size-fits-all approach to
implementation does not exist. Each commuter railroad has its own
unique and complex operating environment and PTC systems must be
tailored to meet those specific operating requirements.
For instance, commuter railroads interoperating with freight
railroads typically use a variant of PTC called I-ETMS. Railroads that
operate on the Northeast Corridor are installing an Amtrak-developed
system known as ACSES. Railroads without extensive freight
interoperability requirements may use a different PTC variant called E-
ATC.\1\ As such, what works for one commuter railroad may not work for
another. Thus, each passenger rail system needs to build its own unique
PTC solution, and it is that absence of a proven, off-the-shelf
technology that creates uncertainty about whether a new solution will
work as intended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ PTC is deployed by commuter railroads in three basic forms:
I-ETMS TM (Interoperable-Electronic Train
Management System): In general, railroads that share track with freight
railroads are installing and implementing a system known as I-ETMS, a
GPS-based technology heavily dependent on the nationwide 220 MHz radio
network. All wayside elements are monitored and reported to the
locomotive. Track conditions and restrictions are delivered to the
locomotive and reported to the operator for action. The system monitors
the action of the operator and reacts if safety is compromised. I-ETMS
supports interoperability with freight railroads. FRA granted type
approval to I-ETMS on February 4, 2015.
ACSES (Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System): In
general, railroads that operate on the Northeast Corridor are
installing and implementing an Amtrak-developed system known as ACSES,
which uses track-mounted transponders to deliver information to the
locomotive. ACSES monitors actions of the train operator and intervenes
if safety is compromised. It facilitates interoperability among
operators on the Northeast Corridor. FRA granted type approvals to
ACSES variants between 2010 and 2013.
E-ATC (Enhanced Automatic Train Control): In general,
small commuter railroads that do not require complex interoperability
with other operators are installing and implementing E-ATC, a track
circuit-based system that is less complex and therefore less expensive
than either I-ETMS or ACSES. FRA granted type approval to E-ATC on
March 11, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In general, the following components are required for
implementation of PTC:
Locomotive Hardware
All locomotives and other operating equipment must be fitted with
onboard computers, radios, display units, and event recorders. Numerous
configurations of commuter rail equipment are in service including
self-propelled cars and push-pull equipment adding to the complexity
and cost of deploying these onboard systems.
Wayside Hardware
The wayside equipment that needs to be installed is also extensive
and includes Wayside Interface Units (WIU), switch monitors, wayside
radios, base stations, and transponders. The status of the components
is transmitted via WIUs to the locomotive to enable the PTC system to
take action as necessary.
Communications (Spectrum and Towers)
PTC implementation typically requires a robust wireless
infrastructure that is used for transmission of data between the
various subsystems including the onboard, wayside, and back office
equipment. The communications architecture includes data radios,
antennas, wayside towers, and spectrum.\2\ After enactment of RSIA,
many commuter railroads chose to adopt the PTC protocol developed for
freight railroads or intercity passenger (Amtrak) operations instead of
investing the time and money to develop their own PTC protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Some commuter railroads' PTC systems do not require spectrum
and use track-based circuits to communicate data between the onboard
and wayside equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back Office
The back office stores millions of rail network data points as
encrypted information (e.g., speed limits, track layouts, speed of
other trains on the system, and train compositions) and transmits the
authorization for individual trains to move into new track segments.
Operating PTC on commuter railroads presents a variety of back office
requirements. Railroads that dispatch trains need to invest in a
complete set of upgraded dispatch systems and Back Office Servers.
Employee Training
All employees who perform dispatch, operations, and signaling, as
well as roadway workers and supervisors, must be trained and are
essential for successful PTC implementation and operation. The commuter
rail industry must train approximately 15,000 employees for full PTC
operations.
ptc implementation progress
Commuter railroads are making strong and continuous progress in
implementing positive train control. These railroads have faced, and
continue to face, a variety of complex challenges in implementing PTC
including financial, technological, and logistical challenges. Some
commuter railroads have overcome these significant hurdles, but other
railroads continue to grapple with PTC implementation issues. Moreover,
these railroads are faced with installing, testing, and implementing
PTC on an enormous and complicated network of interconnected railroads
while still providing daily service to millions of Americans, in and
around many of our nation's most important metropolitan regions.
The commuter rail industry continues to make substantial progress
in implementing PTC according to updated analyses conducted by APTA,
and as of June 30, 2018:
91 percent of spectrum has been acquired;
85 percent of 13,698 pieces of onboard equipment have
been installed on locomotives, cab cars, etc.;
79 percent of 14,083 wayside (on-track equipment)
installations have been completed;
78 percent of back office control systems are ready for
operation;
74 percent of 14,847 employees have been trained in PTC;
and
34 percent of commuter railroads are in testing or
revenue service demonstration; or service is fully operational.
These percentages represent significant increases from the status
of PTC implementation on commuter railroads compared to 6 months ago
(the end of calendar year 2017).
overcoming challenges to ptc implementation
Total Cost--More than $4 Billion
PTC will cost commuter rail operators approximately $4.1 billion to
implement, and an estimated additional $80 million to $130 million each
year to operate and maintain. For publicly funded agencies that rely on
Federal, State, and local funding, as well as passenger fares to
operate their service, these costs are staggering.
Moreover, these costs are in addition to the existing $90 billion
backlog needed to bring the current public transportation system into a
state of good repair, as estimated by the U.S. Department of
Transportation. A recent survey of commuter railroad agencies found
that many commuter railroads have state-of-good-repair needs that far
outweigh their capital budgets, even before including the additional
costs associated with implementing PTC. As a result, to fund PTC,
commuter railroads have had to divert funds from other critical
infrastructure and safety projects, such as replacing bridges (some of
which that are more than 100 years old), rehabilitating outdated
locomotives, and upgrading tracks and safety systems.
Limited Federal Funding
The enactment of RSIA coincided with the 2008 global financial
crisis and a multi-year period of short-term SAFETEA-LU extension acts
and transportation appropriations continuing resolutions making it
difficult for public transit agencies to plan and fund major projects
like PTC. Since Congress mandated PTC, the Federal Government has
directly provided barely one-tenth ($435 million) of the necessary
funding for commuter railroads to implement PTC. Moreover, more than 80
percent of this funding ($360 million) has only been awarded in the
last 16 months (since May 2017). In addition, two commuter rail
operators have also secured Federal loans to help pay for PTC
implementation. While this financing has been helpful, the burden of
repaying these loans still falls on public agencies that are already
under financial pressure.
We urge Congress and the administration to consider these costs and
provide additional funding to enable publicly funded commuter railroads
to quickly implement, operate, and maintain PTC, as well as address the
massive backlog of other deferred critical infrastructure and safety
projects. Additional funding would not only help commuter railroads
continue to achieve the necessary milestones to implement PTC, but it
would also allow them to address critical and costly interoperability
challenges and system-wide reliability improvements after PTC
deployment. As previously noted, the annual ongoing cost of PTC for
publicly funded commuter railroads is estimated to be between $80
million and $130 million.
Limited Vendors and Expertise
PTC is specialized rail signaling and communications equipment and
there are a very limited number of manufacturers of this technology. A
limited number of PTC-qualified vendors are simultaneously in demand by
freight, intercity passenger, and commuter rail operators to develop,
design, and test this complex safety technology, and it has been a
significant challenge for the industry. In addition, the procurement
process employed by public transit agencies is more rigorous and time
intensive, which hindered some agencies' ability to advance contracts.
Moreover, the scale of large freight railroad PTC procurements made it
difficult for commuter railroads, which typically contract for much
smaller procurements, to compete in the limited market.
Installing and commissioning PTC requires highly qualified
signaling, communications, and software engineers. Workforce
development is a critical issue in public transportation generally.
With so many railroads implementing PTC at the same time, worker
retirements and limited available expertise in the specialized
communications and signaling fields, where institutional knowledge is
crucial, has taxed the nationwide implementation effort.
Communications (Spectrum and Towers)
Many commuter railroads have also faced significant issues in
accessing and acquiring the necessary radio spectrum. Railroads often
attempted to secure spectrum on the secondary market, only to encounter
issues such as questions about ownership and legal authority to sell,
unavailability in required geographic areas, and cost-prohibitive
contractual requirements. Some railroads contracted their spectrum
usage to the host railroads on which they operate, which created other
issues that needed to be addressed.
Commuter railroads also may be subject to contractual constraints
imposed by State and local governments. For instance, receiving
government approval to use a sole-source procurement to acquire
spectrum can take a very long period of time.
Finally, after spectrum is acquired, commuter rail PTC systems are
also subject to radio interference from freight railroads operating on
or near commuter rail territory that can overwhelm commuter rail PTC
signals and render the system vulnerable to failure. Complex, and
sometimes costly, solutions must be developed to mitigate this
operational problem.
Equipment Installation and Training
Commuter railroads do not have surplus equipment or personnel, and
the impact of PTC implementation on daily service has been significant.
It is extremely difficult to operate the level of service that our
customers rely upon when railroads must remove railcars and personnel
from service for onboard equipment installation and training and work
on multiple territories simultaneously.
Most locomotives and other operating equipment must be reconfigured
to accommodate the installation of PTC components, which has led to
higher costs and longer schedules to implement PTC than initially
predicted. To provide an example of the level of effort required to
install this hardware, it generally takes one person working for one
complete month to equip one locomotive or similar controlling
equipment. Moreover, this example does not take into account the design
and proof-of-concept work that is needed prior to equipage. Similarly,
many railroads must upgrade track components such as switches and
signals to be reported by the Wayside Interface Units. Commuter
railroads face the same challenges in equipping the wayside components
as private-sector freight railroads, but with far more limited
development and testing resources.
In addition, railroads installing I-ETMS must maintain extensive
back office capability to interact with the overall PTC network.
Recognizing this requirement as a key resource constraint for commuter
railroads, APTA, in conjunction with FRA, worked with suppliers to
develop a cloud-based back office system. In 2015, FRA provided
approximately $5 million for this initiative. The shared back office
provides for efficient operations, software maintenance, communications
software updates, train initialization, and other key features. Several
suppliers now offer this service.
Interoperability
Commuter railroads face different operating environments. Railroads
operate as hosts on tracks they own, as tenants on other railroads
tracks (e.g., freight railroads, Amtrak), or a combination of the two
environments. PTC must have the ability to interface and function with
different operators that share use of a section of track. In
metropolitan areas, several different carriers often operate on one
section of track. For instance, Metra, a Chicago-area commuter rail
operator, has 13 required rail partners for its service area. Moreover,
interoperability requirements are very complex for both testing and
implementation. It continues to be a challenge to ensure compatibility
and requires close coordination and communication between host and
tenant railroads. Commuter railroads continue to diagnose and resolve
software issues and address complex interoperability issues as they
begin testing the system in RSD.
Overall, there are 30 commuter railroads vying for a limited number
of resources related to PTC. As you can imagine, the systems are at
various stages of the process. It is important to note that commuter
railroads must continue to serve their customers during this process.
Each day, systems must delicately balance PTC installation and serving
their customers as they work to continue to safely carry passengers on
more than 500 million trips per year.
septa's experience implementing ptc
Finally, I would like to outline SEPTA's experience implementing
PTC. Despite a period of historically low capital funding at the
Authority, our Board was committed to implementing PTC. The Board's
support, coupled with proactive decisionmaking and planning, and some
good circumstances, combined to drive SEPTA's PTC implementation
efforts. Following our implementation plan, SEPTA received FRA approval
to operate ACSES II PTC provisional revenue service on our Warminster
Line in April 2016, and SEPTA commuter trains have been operating under
PTC on all 13 of its Regional Rail Lines since May 1, 2017.
SEPTA began designing its PTC system in November 2009 without
really knowing how we were going to pay for it, but we were fortunate
to have several circumstances fall into place, and we were positioned
to take action, including:
In 2013, SEPTA received a $10 million U.S. Department of
Transportation TIGER Grant and worked with CSX to physically separate
freight and commuter rail operations to address PTC interoperability in
a congested corridor where SEPTA's West Trenton Line operated over the
freight carrier's Trenton branch.
Counter to industry trends, we had a qualified and highly
skilled in-house team that remained intact throughout implementation;
and
Most importantly, at the end of 2013, Pennsylvania
enacted Act 89--Pennsylvania's landmark multi-modal transportation
funding bill--which gave SEPTA a future, doubling our annual capital
program. The bill provided critical funding to allow SEPTA to begin to
address its $5 billion state-of-good-repair backlog while making it
possible for SEPTA to aggressively finish PTC implementation.
Without Act 89, and the other good circumstances, SEPTA's PTC story
would be very different.
Implementing PTC at SEPTA has required a series of innovative
solutions to myriad challenges--cost, limited Federal funding,
interoperability, radio spectrum, equipment installation and training,
and a limited number of qualified vendors to accommodate the
simultaneous, industry-wide implementation of PTC. SEPTA's in-house
team has distinguished themselves in responding to the complexities of
implementing a new safety system across our extensive network in a
finite period of time and maximizing opportunities to install, test,
and implement our system. But we would not have been able to execute
our plan without close and productive working relationships with
Amtrak, CSX and Norfolk Southern, our third-party contractor Hitachi
(formerly Ansaldo), and the Federal Railroad Administration.
At a total project cost of more than $344 million, completing the
installation of PTC for a system as large and complex as SEPTA was, and
continues to be, a hard and challenging project. After working through
a number of technical and operational challenges, SEPTA continues to
address interoperability with freight tenants operating on various
segments of our territory.
To date, SEPTA has already invested more than $337 million to
implement PTC, following a strategic approach:
successfully separating SEPTA from CSX on the West
Trenton Line;
systematically rolling out PTC on SEPTA territory
beginning in April 2016 and completing PTC implementation on 12
distinct segments by January 2017; and
activating PTC on the three lines that operate on Amtrak-
owned track on May 1, 2017.
SEPTA is proud of its record implementing PTC for our customers and
employees, and yet we still have work to do.
With three major phases completed, and with SEPTA trains operating
with PTC on all 13 Regional Rail Lines, the final major focus is
completing the task of establishing interoperability with the freight
lines--CSX and Norfolk Southern--operating along portions of SEPTA
territory. Working with our freight partners, this phase of the program
is scheduled to be completed by December 2018.
Although we have had success in our implementation efforts, no two
commuter railroads are the same--each has different operating
environments, equipment, host-tenant relationships, and ridership--so
no two PTC experiences are going to be alike. What we do have in
common, though, is a commitment to safety and implementing PTC on our
systems. That commitment is shared by our employees--who embraced
SEPTA's PTC efforts during training and installation and now in revenue
service--and our customers--who experienced schedule adjustments and
service changes during implementation. SEPTA's PTC effort would not be
where it is without their professionalism and patience.
conclusion
Safety is the shared responsibility of every commuter railroad in
the country, and the current nationwide effort to implement positive
train control is a critical initiative that reflects the industry's
commitment to strengthening safety. The nation's commuter railroads are
aggressively working to implement PTC by the statutory deadlines, and
right now, thousands of workers across the country are working
trackside or in back offices to make that happen.
APTA is grateful for the work that this subcommittee has done to
make our nation's railroads safer. We look forward to continuing to
work with you and your staff on this and many other issues that face
public transportation agencies.
Mr. Shuster [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Knueppel.
And now, Ms. Mortensen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Mortensen. Chairmen Shuster and Denham, Ranking Members
DeFazio and Capuano, and members of the subcommittee, thank you
for holding this important hearing and inviting me to testify
about our experience implementing PTC on the smallest commuter
rail service in the country.
First of all, I want to note our sincere appreciation for
our congressional delegation for our service area, especially
the ones who serve on the House T&I Committee. Chairman Denham,
and Representatives DeSaulnier and Garamendi have done a
fantastic job for our constituents, and we are very fortunate
to have them on this committee.
Second, I also want to thank the Class I railroads who are
our hosts for both our ACE service, which I will talk about
today, and the San Joaquins Amtrak service, which we manage.
They have been incredibly collaborative and helpful to us on
the PTC, as well as our goals to expand services out in
northern California.
Just a brief bit about our agency. We operate under a
consolidated staffing model that allows us to be very agile. We
are a very, very small agency, and we manage both the ACE
commuter rail and the Amtrak San Joaquins. And we throw our
heart and soul into both. We have two policy boards that can
take care of the constituents in each of the communities, but
we share one staffing so that we can leverage opportunities,
have very good cost controls and cost efficiencies, and bring
more rail service, regardless of whether it is intercity or
commuter, to the communities that we serve.
The Amtrak San Joaquins run up and down the spine of
California, north and south, and our ACE trains connect that
spine from the Central Valley into the bay area. Our small rail
commission is headquartered in Stockton, in San Joaquin County.
And while we don't have very large budgets, we really make the
most of what we have with our local partners.
Our State just gave us a big vote of confidence in
investing $1 billion in our program of State funds to help us
expand more service up to Sacramento, the State's capital, and
further down into the Central Valley. And we are tasked with
delivering that within the next 3 to 6 years. So we are used to
daunting tasks.
We have just four ACE trains that operate in the commuter
hours between the Central Valley and the Silicon Valley, our
big job market. But on 3 of those 4 trains a day we are
carrying over 1,000 people each way. That is a very congested
train situation, and we realize safety is paramount.
We are also celebrating our 20-year anniversary. So while
we are the smallest, we are not the newest kid on the block.
And we have made do mostly by funding from local transportation
sales taxes in each of our service counties. We have really
found that self help is a necessity when running a regional
rail program.
In addressing the topic of today's hearing, I am here to
represent to you--and I know we are on the list of nine--that
our board and our entire team is more than 150 percent
committed to safety in many ways, including PTC. We have
undertaken all the steps possible for us, and will continue to
take the final steps necessary to fully implement the PTC
program by the deadline.
But I do want to be very direct, and especially in response
to the opening comments. We have had some challenges. Some we
have worked through, some we are continuing to work through.
Some are out of our control, and frustrating, but we continue
to push ahead.
While being the smallest does have its advantages in terms
of agency flexibility and agility, our responsiveness out in
the service territory, and very close access to our customers,
in a national process where we are vying for the attention of a
single vendor and manufacturer of the PTC equipment, we find
ourselves sort of pushed towards the end of the line. We really
have faced a situation of being at the mercy of the
marketplace.
We operate our trains on the host railroads, so our only
requirement for the ACE trains are the PTC implementation on
six locomotives, eight cab cars, and setting up a back-office
server. We also have the responsibility of the crew training,
of course, but we have a somewhat limited role in terms of our
compliance requirements.
Our PTC equipment was ordered in March of 2017, well in
advance of this year's deadline, well in advance of being able
to work with our host railroad partners on the testing. But
because of the many other orders--and important orders--across
the country, the equipment was not delivered until April of
this year, so a year and a month after the order. And it was
difficult for the vendor, as was mentioned before, to establish
a site workforce, given the demands.
This week, 6 of our locomotives--of our total 14 pieces of
equipment--that is 42 percent--will be fully outfitted. That is
as of today. We are on an expedited installation schedule, so
all units will be completed by mid-October. And our test trains
begin field testing on Saturday, October 6th. That will
continue through into RSD through the end of December under
Union Pacific's testing plan.
I would like to give an example of how Union Pacific is
helping us out, since our equipment is not fully installed.
They helped expedite us getting a desktop simulator that will
help get our engineering crews into at least the desktop
training sooner, so that they are already well ahead of the
game, once the equipment is out and field testing.
Our back-office server has been approved by UP, and we are
ready to start configuring all the equipment with the slot 10
cards as soon as the testing units are validated. So we have
been trying to be very forward-moving and very proactive in our
implementation.
And I know your question is why has it taken so long to get
to this point. And I guess it is good news and bad news. Issues
that have arisen for other properties who do have the resources
to do the R&D testing and work out the bugs, those sort of
cascade onto us.
So I will give you an example. The radio antennas, which
are common to everyone, they began to fail due to water
intrusion for other agencies that were using them. And so the
antenna was recalled. So we already had our service kits
ordered with the old antennas with the cabling, and we had
already installed some. So we were unsure about the priority
for us getting the new antennas, since you had operating
systems that were failing.
So, rather than wait for that, we continued with the
installation of the old antennas. They haven't failed yet. And
out in California we are not in a water intrusion situation, so
we just forged ahead with the old antennas. We will replace
them when the new antennas become available to us down the
line, as they will at some point, but it is an example of how
we can be a little bit innovative, and just keep making this
thing work, regardless of what the challenges are.
On the Amtrak San Joaquins side, I am happy our partner
Amtrak has taken the lead. They made a big equipment purchase a
little bit after we did, and I think they sort of got in front
of us, but that lets us have one of our systems out in the
corridors testing already. And I am confident the San Joaquins
will be compliant.
And I guess a benefit of being last in line, we have taken
advantage of the lessons learned. We have taken the resources
that the FRA has offered. Both FRA DC and FRA District 7 have
been great to us throughout the process.
Our operating contractor from Herzog, who has been our
contractor for 20 years, he came from the Northstar property
and has been through the PTC process, so he is helping us
expedite, and he is firm in his commitment to me that the ACE
service will meet the deadline.
We have also had other partner agencies offer us some
equipment if we have some trouble, if anything malfunctions,
and we are thankful for that.
So with everyone rowing the boat this hard, I believe we
will meet the deadline. And we look forward to adding our name
to the list of agencies that are in PTC operation, and we get
off the list of nine.
And I thank you for the opportunity to share our experience
today and look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Mortensen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stacey Mortensen, Executive Director, San Joaquin
Regional Rail Commission
Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and members of the
subcommittee:
Thank you for holding this important hearing and inviting me to
testify about our experience implementing PTC at likely the smallest
commuter rail service in the country.
First of all, I want to note our sincere appreciation for the
congressional delegation in our service area, especially the ones who
serve on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
Chairman Denham, Rep. Garamendi and Rep. DeSaulnier have done
fantastic jobs in Congress representing their constituents and our
humble agency. And we are honored to have them represent us on the
committee. Your leadership in all things transportation has been
integral to our continued success.
Second, I would also want to thank our Class I railroad
stakeholders--Union Pacific and BNSF. They have been incredibly
collaborative in so many ways, and we wouldn't have our successful
services without their cooperation and leadership.
First a bit about our agency. Under a consolidated staffing model
which allows us to be agile, we manage both the ACE commuter service
and the Amtrak San Joaquins. One runs up the central spine of the State
and the other runs east-west from the Central Valley to the Bay Area.
We are headquarted in Stockton in a small valley county and while we
don't have large budgets, we make the most out of what we have. Our
State recently allocated funding for long awaited expansions to
Sacramento and further south in the Central Valley and we are focused
on delivering new service in the next 3 years.
Our four daily ACE trains operate during the commute hours between
California's Central Valley and the Silicon Valley, with connections to
San Francisco. On three of those four weekday trains, ridership is over
1,000 passengers. The ACE Service celebrates a 20-year anniversary on
October 19th and has been funded mostly by local transportation sales
taxes in San Joaquin, Alameda and Santa Clara Counties.
Let me be clear about one thing from the beginning: The Board and
the entire team are 150 percent committed toward safety. We have
undertaken all the steps we could--and will continue to do that--to
fully implement PTC by the deadline. But let me also be very clear and
direct in admitting that we definitely have had some challenges--
challenges we have solved and are continuing to work through. Other
things regrettably, are not directly under our control--yet we push
ahead.
While being the smallest can have its advantages in terms of agency
flexibility, responsiveness and close access to the customers, in a
national process vying for the attention of the single manufacturer of
PTC equipment and software, it has positioned us toward the end of the
line.
We were quite simply at the mercy of the marketplace.
Issues that arise in the implementation and testing for other
agencies before us can have cascading impacts on our program that are
beyond our control. We operate on a host freight railroad, so our only
equipment requirement involves our six locomotives, eight cab cars and
the back-office server.
The ACE PTC equipment was ordered in March of 2017, well in advance
of this year's Federal deadline. Because of the many other orders
across the country, the equipment was not delivered until April of this
year. Further, the vendor couldn't establish a site workforce until
late June. This week, six of our 14 locomotives and cab cars (or 42
percent) will be fully outfitted. All units will be completed prior to
the end of October and test trains will begin operating every Saturday
starting October 6th. Testing will continue through the end of December
under Union Pacific's testing plan.
The back-office server has been approved by Union Pacific and the
consultant is ready to start configuring the equipment with the ``Slot
10'' cards as soon as the first testing unit has been validated. We
have been trying very hard to be forward moving and proactive in our
implementation.
Why has it taken so long to get to this point? While there are
several reasons, one example of the difficult issues we've had to work
through was equipment recalls.
Radio antennas for early implementation agencies began to fail due
to water intrusion, resulting in the product being recalled. We already
had the ACE kits ordered with the ``old'' antennas and several had been
installed along with the cabling. The priority for delivery of new
antennas was focused on systems that were already in operation and
those in the Northern States where water intrusion conditions were more
threatening.
Rather than wait the undetermined amount of time for the new
antennas to be delivered, we continued installation-and will begin
testing with-the old antennas which have not yet failed. We will
replace the ``old'' antennas and cabling after our PTC program is
completed and certified.
On the Amtrak San Joaquin side, Amtrak was able to make a large,
expedited purchase of the onboard equipment within the last year, so
the San Joaquins are already in testing mode. However, this pushed ACE
a little further out. But each experience learned in the San Joaquin
roll out is valuable to ensuring the ACE program meets the deadline.
One benefit of being last in line is taking advantage of the
lessons learned at other agencies. FRA's PTC Summits have been very
helpful and both FRA Washington and our FRA District 7 staff have
offered assistance throughout the process. In addition, the General
Manager of our Herzog O&M contractor has been through the PTC process.
Given his experience with Northstar, we are able to move faster and he
is firm in his commitment that we will meet the PTC deadline. Another
partner agency has also offered us two antenna kits if we experience
any interruption to the installation schedule. In an effort to achieve
compliance, Wabtec has assigned more staff and is utilizing our Herzog
contractor for some tasks such as pulling cable and welding brackets. I
believe that we will meet the deadline.
Another delay that was beyond our control was due to the fact that
ACE trains operate on the Caltrain Corridor for approximately four
miles in the San Jose area. As you may know, Caltrain will be filing
for an Alternative Schedule. We cannot complete work on that stretch
without their cooperation.
We look forward to adding our name to the list of agencies who are
operating the new PTC system.
I thank you for the opportunity to share our experience with you
today and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Denham [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Mortensen. I
appreciate you being here.
When is Caltrain scheduled to upgrade the 4 miles of track
that ACE operates over?
Ms. Mortensen. Caltrain plans to begin testing a segment by
the end of this year. It will not be the segment that is for
the ACE in the Capitol Corridor, down around San Jose. So they
will begin testing, but not in that section. So that is
anticipated, I think, in the second quarter of 2019.
Mr. Denham. So if you are unable to certify that area for
PTC, how does that affect your deadline?
Ms. Mortensen. So we are a tenant on both railroads. So
they will file an alternative schedule for all the tenants--
Amtrak, Capitols, ACE, and UP. And so we will fall under that.
Mr. Denham. So they will file for the extension.
Ms. Mortensen. Correct.
Mr. Denham. You are not required to do so.
Ms. Mortensen. Correct.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Naparstek, in your testimony you talked about 605 of
the 901 Amtrak-owned route-miles have at least one wayside PTC
system installed and operational. What are the biggest risks to
not completing the remaining one-third of Amtrak's routes by
December 31st?
Mr. Naparstek. The largest risk at this time, I would say,
is the interoperability testing, in terms of the time it will
take to run the test trains, to evaluate the test results, to
submit and get approvals.
So--in each of the areas we run--and we cover a lot of
territory. Certainly on the Northeast Corridor, Michigan,
Chicago, et cetera, each one has a little bit of a different
risk pattern. But where we are, based on the fact that--a lot
of what we are looking at now is doing interoperability
testing.
For instance, on the Northeast Corridor--and I think it has
been mentioned--until all our tenants are ready for
interoperability testing, we can't be 100 percent complete. And
we have tenants on various phases. We have Mr. Knueppel's
organization, who I think is much more advanced than certainly
other commuter agencies.
So working through the whole interoperability, I think, is
the biggest risk right now.
Mr. Denham. And how far are you on the Northeast Corridor?
Mr. Naparstek. We plan on having all route-miles where we
control PTC ready and compliant. So we should be ready
ourselves on the corridor, and it will be a matter--we will
file for extensions, we will file for the alternative schedule,
and then we will work with all our tenants to help them become
interoperable.
And in some--I mean in some cases, to be frank, I am
working with the tenants right now, my staff and I, to
understand when they could be ready for testing.
Mr. Denham. You will file for an extension on the Northeast
Corridor, as well?
Mr. Naparstek. Yes.
Mr. Denham. I would say that--I don't want to speak for Mr.
Capuano, but we have shared a number of conversations about the
accidents that we have both seen, together--Philadelphia being
one of those. And in 2015 this committee was promised that the
Northeast Corridor would be 100 percent PTC-compliant by the
end of 2015. It is 2018 now, and we are talking about filing
for an extension because we are still not there yet.
I am going to tell you it is one of the main reasons of
frustration for this committee, when Mr. Sumwalt talks about
the 29 deaths that have happened around the country. Amtrak is
right there on some of those catastrophic accidents--Philly
being one of the most. So it is with a great deal of
frustration that we continue to have this conversation and talk
about extensions, especially when the last hearing that we had
at the beginning of the year we were very explicit about who
was going to need an extension and why.
Mr. Batory, what is your strategy to enforce PTC
implementation compliance after the 2018 deadline?
Mr. Batory. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Denham. I think just pull it closer. I think that one
is----
Mr. Batory. Yes, we are having a technical defect here.
If I didn't know better I would think it was a railroad and
we bad-ordered this thing.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Batory. Very good question. Going into 2019 we will
continue the plan that emerged during first quarter of 2018
with the urgency and intensity that we have applied against
that plan throughout this calendar year so far.
We are already recognizing where there are violations, and
recommending penalties. That is our only, if you will,
mechanism to entice more urgency and more effort towards
bringing PTC to resolve.
But I would much rather see us retain the resolve for PTC
through the constant communication and collaboration that we
have demonstrated as a group of people over the past 6 months.
We have made considerable inroads. This is my observation of
the FRA when I arrived in regards to this particular
initiative. It is a personal opinion, based on the facts that
were put before me.
We definitely lacked, within FRA, a proactive organization
plan with a sense of urgency. We were decentralized in
responsibility and accountability. And I am not just speaking
of recent date; I am talking over the last 10 years, part of it
from my observation from the outside.
Now, was the FRA responsive? Yes. FRA has always been
responsive with this initiative. But it was somewhat ad hoc
because of the decentralization. But we have a plan today, we
started formulating that plan when the Secretary brought me on
as a special advisor back in November of last year. It was
formalized in January of this year. And I am very pleased and
proud of the people that I am working with, both in the
railroad industry, in other agencies, and in FRA itself, of
what has been accomplished. And we are going to do nothing less
than what we have demonstrated thus far.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Batory, I am out of time. But one of the questions that
has come up as we have had PTC hearings throughout the years is
what about the fines that at some point will be levied. I
believe it is up to $27,500 per day. Are you prepared to deal
with any of the rails that have fallen behind or ignored the
mandate with a heavy fine?
Mr. Batory. What I have shared internally among the people
that I work with daily--and actually, the range can be anywhere
from around--I think it is $857 per violation, up to around
$27,000.
At this juncture, when you have an initiative that is 10
years old, and you see the amount of lagging that has taken
place, why would you do anything less than the full amount?
Mr. Denham. Thank you. I would now like to recognize the
ranking member, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To Amtrak, Mr. Naparstek, the--back when we had a hearing
in February, President Anderson said, ``There may be railroads
that operate over our NEC tracks which may not have sufficient
PTC-commissioned rolling stock to operate normal services by
the end of the year. Under the present rules, we cannot permit
noncompliant equipment on our railroad after the deadline.''
But you seem to have said something different. Can you
explain that to me?
Mr. Naparstek. Our----
Mr. DeFazio. Please, close to the microphone, so people----
Mr. Naparstek. Our position is to work very aggressively
with the FRA and with our tenants in order for, at the
deadline, to have each railroad operating services as safely as
possible.
I want to make sure----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, but that--not as--I don't want as safely
as possible. This was pretty definitive. We cannot permit
noncompliant equipment to be used. Does that still stand, or
not?
Mr. Naparstek. We expect every tenant that will operate on
Amtrak--Amtrak will be 100 percent operating trains----
Mr. DeFazio. Got that.
Mr. Naparstek [continuing]. With PTC.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. But these are on your tracks----
Mr. Naparstek. We expect every tenant to be operating
either with PTC or under an extension, under an alternative
schedule.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So the statement should have been
qualified at the time, saying not--so you are saying that
someone has an extension, the equipment is noncompliant, but it
is not noncompliant because they have an extension? OK.
Interesting.
All right, and then he also said, you know, that,
obviously, there will be carriers over which we operate who
appear unlikely to achieve sufficient progress to apply for an
alternative PTC implementation schedule by the year's end. For
any route segment Amtrak will suspend operations. How are we
doing there? Are we going to have suspensions of service in
certain areas? Are we going to have holes in the system?
Mr. Naparstek. At the point--since the statement was made,
there has been a lot of progress made by host railroads. As we
evaluate where our hosts are, our hosts will either be
operational or will qualify for alternative schedules. We are
not anticipating right now that there will be a host that will
not have at least an alternative schedule.
Where we will run over MTEA [Mainline Track Exclusion
Addendum] territory or where we will run over alternative
schedule, we are applying risk mitigation strategies, we are
looking at the territory, and we are saying what additional
risk can we do to close the gap.
The goal, our goal at Amtrak, will be to be running PTC 100
percent everywhere we run. That is not a goal we will be able
to achieve by 12/31, but we are committed to make that goal,
and we will continue. So even over MTEA territories, we will
continue to move towards PTC. In the meantime we will use risk
mitigation to move towards what we are terming as ``PTC
equivalency,'' using other operational and technology means to
close the gap.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Administrator Batory, I guess you are
going to get a flood of extension requests. And, as I
understand, these are rather complicated and lengthy documents.
I mean are you, you know, staffed up to the point where you
are going to be able to process all of these by the first of
next year? Especially if some of them come in, you know, in
December?
Yes. Yes, I think it is--it might be working this time.
Mr. Batory. Can you hear me?
Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
Mr. Batory. We will get it closer. There we go.
Now, we are talking about the acceptance?
Mr. DeFazio. Well, the extensions.
Mr. Batory. The--OK, the----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes. I mean there is--you are going to get
quite--well, you are getting a pile of both, OK?
Mr. Batory. It is--the extensions thus far, for instance,
we have the ability to handle the alternative schedule requests
within a timely period where the--we have a 90-day window. We
have to go back and tell the applicant what the concerns are,
if any, within the first 45 days, and then we have the
remaining 45 days to [inaudible].
Mr. DeFazio. Well, if people submit documents on the first
of December, and you get 45 days to send back concerns, do they
qualify to continue to operate on January 1, even though you
have----
Mr. Batory. Yes. Yes, they do.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, that is probably going to mean you are
going to get a heck of a lot of people filing on whatever the
last business day is in December.
Mr. Batory. You are exactly right, Congressman. And we have
discussed that with the prospective to-be-compliant carriers.
We have talked about it internally.
We are going to be able to be responsive to the alternative
scheduling requests. The one that is concerning that we may
want to discuss later has to do with the certification of the
safety plans.
Mr. DeFazio. OK, all right. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Mr. Shuster, you are recognized.
Mr. Shuster. Yes, Mr. Batory, can you--I don't think I
quite--Mr. DeFazio, I think, has a great question. And I guess
the answer I am looking for is do you have enough staff to meet
those timelines? That is--I am a bit unclear on that.
Mr. Batory. I have a calendar that we have to respect and
recognize.
Mr. Shuster. I am sorry, I can't hear you.
Mr. Sumwalt. I do want you to note that the NTSB does
occasionally help the FRA.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. I see that.
Mr. DeFazio. The room is getting redone next year, and
there will be----
Mr. Batory. I trust----
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. Include a new sound system.
Mr. Batory. I trust that is for the record. OK, OK.
In regards to how we are staffed, we have 30 people that
are assigned full-time to the administrative review of PTC.
When we look at what we have in the way of talent among those
30 people--and that is the key, talent--we have a sufficiency
rate of probably in excess of 80 percent. The other 20 percent
are going through the learning curve.
Now, we are also retaining third-party service providers.
And as far as getting past this calendar year and into next
year, the administrative burden that we are going to see facing
ourselves we feel comfortable with.
I will add one thing, though, that I talked about earlier
about FRA and how it----
Mr. Shuster. Sure.
Mr. Batory [continuing]. Polices itself. Starting early
this year, we instituted a perpetual inventory of all
administrative instruments that entered the FRA, was being
handled within the FRA, and being sent out by the FRA
concerning PTC. We defined timelines for ourselves, as far as
how much time we should give ourselves to respond. That has
helped immensely, because now we really understand what we are
faced with, and we are maturing as every day goes on.
Mr. Shuster. OK, thank you.
Ms. Fleming. Mr. Chairman, could I----
Mr. Shuster. Sure.
Ms. Fleming [continuing]. Add perspective to that?
Mr. Shuster. Sure.
Ms. Fleming. You know, we talk to all the railroads, and
they, quite frankly, do remain concerned about FRA's ability to
manage the influx of documentation.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have 32 out of the
40 railroads that are going to seek an extension. So FRA is
going to have to deal with reviewing and approving all of that
documentation. You have got substitute criteria of requests to
initiate testing, RSD. Safety plan documents could be as long
as 5,000 pages.
There has been some movement of some resources,
particularly with testing, and they have expanded some
technical contracts. But it hasn't amounted to a substantial
increase in resources. So we really think they should implement
our rec, which is to come up with a more strategic, risk-based
approach. It is not about getting to just December, it is not
even about getting to 2020. This is kind of a game-changer for
the railroad operations and industry, so they are going to be
in it for the foreseeable future.
Mr. Shuster. Well, and you mentioned risk-based, and I know
Mr. Batory and I have talked about risk-based and, you know,
this is not the hearing to talk about this. But I think in the
future--I won't be here, but I hope this committee deals with
it, not just the railroads, but industry in general.
When you deploy technology, many--the railroads, this is a
new technology, it has been extremely complicated. But once it
is implemented, I think the technology is going to grow
exponentially. And the FRA has to be working in collaboration
with the freight rails to make sure that we are moving fast,
because I have seen so many times that technology is developed,
and by the time the Government gets around to saying OK, there
is new technology.
So, Mr. Batory, can you respond to that?
Mr. Batory. Yes. Let me also share this. And this was
something that was enlightening to myself. And, you know, it is
one thing to live outside the tent, and it is another thing to
live inside the tent.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Batory. When it comes to PTC--and this is a tribute to
yourselves and all your colleagues in Congress--we have two
statutes, one from 2008 and the one from 2015. The one in 2008
was three sheets of paper. The one in 2015 was six sheets of
paper. We took that, OK, and we formulated regs. And we came up
with 45 pages of regs. And then the rulemakings that percolated
out of that was 190 pages.
Implementation plans, which are things that are already
behind us--now, they have to be maintained, they are living
documents--represent anywhere from 150 to 200 pages, with a lot
of technical substance that has to be maintained, going
forward, forever more.
The one that gives everybody a concern is the safety plan.
And I was astonished. And remember, my railroad in my prior
life had to be PTC-compliant. The typical safety plan,
regardless of the amount of mileage or the size of the
railroad, averages in excess of 5,000 pages of paper. Now, that
might be surprising to some of you.
Now, as a result of these symposia--and that--this is where
I think people get concerned. How do you administer 5,000 pages
of paper? How much of it is substance and how much of it is
fluff? Is it format over substance, or is it substance over
format? So, as a result--and to put 5,000 sheets into
perspective, it is one Xerox box of paper, so it is pretty
heavy, too. And that is what we are struggling with.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
Mr. Batory. And what we have identified is there is a way
in which--to go after the substance and facilitate this process
much faster.
Now, when we had this symposium I just referenced a moment
ago, I had 100 people in the room. The 100 people in the room
were the experts of the railroad industry. I said, ``Has
anybody in this room written their entire safety plan?'' There
was no raising of hands. I said, ``Has anybody in this room
read the entire safety plan?'' There was no raising of hands.
``Has anybody edited the entire safety plan?''
There was no raising of hands, because it has been
syndicated out within their respective companies or out to
third parties, then put together, and then sent to the FRA. And
then, when people see what they are sending to the FRA, they
are astonished, and they say, ``Can the FRA really handle all
this?'' And that is where we have now learned that we are able
to look at these safety plans, give conditional approval.
At this juncture we have given conditional approval to a
total of nine: six of the seven Class I's. The only one that
hasn't gotten conditional approval yet--but we have it--is
Canadian National. We have two commuter railroads--that is
Metrolink and SEPTA--and then we, naturally, have Amtrak.
So that is why I bring this to everybody's attention. Let's
not make something out of perception, let's talk about facts.
Mr. Shuster. Right. Well, I think you have got a great
point. I have run out of time here, so--but I just want to make
one final point. Again, that is a great point. You and I have
had this discussion.
But I just want to say that you really give me great
confidence that a guy who comes from the operating world, comes
to the Government, and I have great confidence you are going to
change things at FRA, and you have demonstrated here, right
here in this committee room, when you had a problem with your
mic, you didn't screw around, you reached over and got another
mic, and solved the problem immediately. And that is what it
takes, I believe. So thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Denham. Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Capuano. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to start
out by recognizing the railroads that have done their jobs,
which is the majority of them. They are at least heading in the
right way, particularly the Class I's. So I want to start
there.
At the same time, as I sit here, you have heard the
chairman say several times we have asked--for years now, people
come and tell us what they need. No one has. No one came and
said we needed extra time. No one came and said we needed extra
money. And the FRA didn't come and say we needed more people.
So I sit here thinking there is no reason that we should have
anybody in this situation.
As I sit here and I look at it, I think it is incredibly
unfair to the railroads who have done their job to allow those
that have not, to escape this.
The permanent exception you gave to somebody is
unacceptable. And I believe, if there is ever an accident on
that line, that permanent exemption will be thrown out by a
court of law, because there was no authority to do it. Simple.
And when that happens, somebody at the FRA is going to be held
to blame. It may not be you; it will be somebody.
And if it happens again, we will get another one coming in
looking for an exemption because they don't have any money.
Every railroad in the country could have made that excuse, yet
they didn't. They came in and said, ``OK, we have money, we
will do this, we will reprioritize our spending.''
And to sit here and say to somebody they have no money,
here is my answer. On line 7 of your written response, Mr.
Batory, you say you imposed the maximum civil fine on 13
railroads of $27,904. Thank you. But you also say it is a one-
time fine. Eleven lines above that you also say you could
assess that fine for every day they are not in compliance--
$27,000 one time is not the maximum fine. It is $27,000 per
day, per railroad, every day. And that money could be then used
to help those, including the ones who are fined, to actually
reprioritize their spending.
I got to tell you I have none--zero--sympathy for the
handful of companies that haven't done anything. None.
And I have said it before and I will say it again. It is
only a matter of time until the next accident happens and
someone dies. We have got NTSB--I believe your numbers were 29
deaths and $190 million. How much is a life worth? Apparently,
it is $190 million.
Well, guess what? That is not near what my wife is worth,
not near what my children are worth. Maybe you don't value your
families as much as I do.
And again, I don't think anybody wants to--it is a business
decision. The FRA has the authority--and if you don't have the
authority, you should come to us, even today, and say, ``We
don't have the authority to do this, we don't have enough
people to do that,'' whatever it is, and we will do our best to
help you. But unless you do that, we have to presume you have
got what you need.
I also have to presume, since you have done it in your
previous life, you know how important this is. There is no
excuse not to do it.
And where is the sympathy coming? How are you supposed to
look at one of the Class I railroads who have done this, spent
millions of dollars doing this? They didn't really want to do
it, but they were told they had to, they finally realized, OK,
we got to do it, let's get over it. How do you turn to them and
say, ``Thank you for doing what you did, thank you for
reprioritizing your spending. But you, over here, Music City,
New Mexico Rail Runner, doesn't matter. You can go right ahead,
keep killing people.'' It is totally unacceptable.
I don't think you are going to find anybody on this side of
the table who is going to accept that responsibility. I don't
think you are going to find anybody--it comes January, the next
rail accident that happens after January, that they are going
to sit here and say, ``Not a big deal.'' And that is fine, if
that is what you want to do.
I also think you got lawsuits coming. You got lots of
lawsuits coming. And maybe my next life, maybe I will go back
to practicing law so I can take one-third of that fee. It is
going to cost a fair amount of money. And you know what? There
isn't a single person that I know of that wants a penny of it.
They don't want to lose their loved ones.
So again, I am going to end where I started. I want to
thank the companies that have done their job. I know it wasn't
easy. I know some of them had to be pushed, kicking and
screaming. And again, I am not trying to be a perfectionist
here. I get there will be some extensions. That is OK, within
reason. But there are a couple of companies that haven't done
anything. And we have been down that rail before, and it is
wrong. And I don't think this Congress is going to accept it
any longer.
I apologize for the rant, but, what the hell, that is what
I do. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Capuano.
Mr. Gallagher?
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to thank all of you for being
here today and taking the time to brief us on this very
important matter.
Mr. Batory, given that PTC connects trains' controls to
wireless networks, is there any instance where a successful
hacker could theoretically gain control of such a system to
disrupt their functionality, and even potentially cause a
derailment?
If so, what measures are being taken to prevent such a
development?
Mr. Batory. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, there are efforts
that have been underway long before PTC. And we are fortunate
that those efforts were underway before the development of PTC,
because we are capitalizing on the results of those efforts.
Imagine our automated train control systems that we had in
place throughout this country, all of our sophisticated
computer systems and networks that we have within the railroad
industry. We have teams of people within the corporations that
work very silent, but effectively, in developing the software
technology that is needed to monitor perspective hacking, as
well as protection of hacking. And that is carrying forward
into the PTC realm, and has to continue to be maintained.
Mr. Gallagher. Just in terms of the overall threat
landscape, do you feel like you are getting the information you
need from the interagency, from all the stakeholders necessary
to understand who might be trying to penetrate systems and
networks?
Mr. Batory. I can only speak for myself, personally. I have
never sought, OK, specifically who is attempting. But there
have been attempts in the other systems, OK, non-PTC. And the
railroad industry individually, as far as companies, as well as
collectively, has been quite successful.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
Mr. Hamberger. Mr. Gallagher, if I could chime in there, it
is a major concern for the industry in general, but for PTC in
particular. I would like to get a more detailed answer for the
record, but I believe the data transmissions are encrypted, and
I believe we have a very reputable contractor, whose name I
don't have at the tip of my tongue, working with us to help
provide that security.
But I would like permission to submit a more detailed
answer for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Without objection.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger. And I would like
to follow up with you. And forgive me for being new to all of
this. You know, the chairman has assigned me a lot of homework
as the newest member of the committee, and I am staying up all
night to do it.
But the FRA and FTA have awarded grants that have
subsidized PTC implementation to the tune of more than $1
billion, correct? So much of this has gone into infrastructure
that the freight railroads use, and has thus helped defray any
investment that the railroads would otherwise have to make
themselves.
Could you just sort of tell us why you think that this
subsidization of a private profitable industry is justified,
and--not to stoke division--but especially when I hear often
from AAR that, for example, trucking doesn't pay its fair
share, and things like that, I just would be interested in your
perspective on that issue.
Mr. Hamberger. I would like to get a little bit better
understanding of that $1 billion. I believe most of it has not
gone to the Class I freight railroads. I believe it has gone to
short lines and to commuter roads, primarily. So I stand by the
AAR position that this industry has spent over $10 billion of
private-sector money, going on--by the end of this year it will
probably be $11 billion not subsidized, not taxpayer money,
private-sector money to meet this safety mandate.
And so, if we are going to transition into the issue of
modal equity, the matter is really how much of the trust fund
comes from user fees and how much of it comes from non-user
fees, and the last----
Mr. Denham. Mr. Hamberger, can I interrupt real quickly
before Mr. Capuano leaves?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Denham. I just want to thank him for his leadership on
this committee. He has been somebody that not only have I
worked very, very well with in a very bipartisan fashion, but I
have learned a lot from him, too. His passion, but his
knowledge is a lot.
And I will tell you. I have even learned that not only can
you buy a cheap shirt, but it is quite--it has got a cooling
effect to it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Denham. He is a fashion statement that we are all
following.
[Applause.]
Mr. Capuano. Thank you.
Mr. Denham. You are a good man, Mike.
Mr. Hamberger?
Mr. Hamberger. I was in the middle of a rant there, Mr.
Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hamberger. But let me just close by saying that in the
past 10 years $43 billion of taxpayer money has gone into the
Highway Trust Fund, not user fees, to subsidize those people
whose infrastructure is funded by the Highway Trust Fund.
Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Chairman, I had a whole line of
questioning related to the utility of short-sleeve, button-down
shirts and them going in and out of style, but I will forgo
that.
I would just respond by making a point that, with freight
in this country expected to increase by 40 percent over the
next 30 years, you know, this is not a zero-sum game between
different modes. There will be room for everyone to grow.
Everyone has to have skin in the game. We need to make a
public, as well as private investment.
And so, I think we need to ask hard questions around what,
you know, everyone has to do. And so--and particularly when it
comes to the cyber vulnerabilities, I will look forward to the
followup.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hamberger. And I will be glad to follow up on the modal
equity issues, as well.
And for the record, I was incorrect. It is $143 billion in
the last 10 years, not $43 billion, $143 billion of non-user-
fee revenue into the trust fund.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start out
with Mr. Batory.
We were talking about the safety plans that had not been
submitted. So looking at the PTC dashboard, it looks like CN
has submitted a plan, but it has not been approved yet. Is that
accurate?
Are you going to prioritize approving plans ahead of
requests for extension, so that those get done more quickly,
and that PTC can be started up on those lines?
Are you going to prioritize approving the submitted plans,
safety plans, over the request for extensions?
Mr. Batory. Yes.
Mr. Lipinski. I just want to make sure you are going to----
Mr. Batory. Yes, yes----
Mr. Lipinski [continuing]. Be able to get done, because----
Mr. Batory. Both efforts are going in tandem. And as far as
the CN one, it is currently being reviewed, and there are some
unique circumstances about that that I would certainly share
with you, in the essence of time----
Mr. Lipinski. OK.
Mr. Batory. But it is positive.
Mr. Lipinski. OK. More general, I just wanted to make
sure--as Mr. Shuster was talking about, we want to make sure
you have the ability to move forward as quickly as you can with
all this, because the requests, as you have said, are going to
come pouring in.
Now, how much grant money does the FRA have still right now
from fiscal year 2017, 2018 for PTC grants? I know some money
went out in late August. How much more is there?
Mr. Batory. If I could, Congressman, let me characterize it
this way.
First of all, we have, out the door, OK, among all the
parties associated with PTC, $2.6 billion so far.
Now, since fiscal year 2017 we had CRISI money of $67.32
million that was noticed during first quarter, and selections
are currently under review. A portion of these funds went to a
PTC project under the special transportation circumstances
program.
We also had the CRISI money that was identified strictly
for PTC, the $250 million. As soon as that hit, we recognized
that we had to do something different, and get that money out
as quickly as possible, without compromising the due diligence
that we have to administer in getting money into responsible
hands. And we were able to get that accomplished within about
75, 90 days.
The part that was interesting about that--and I want to
touch on, and I shared this with staff internally, I shared it
with some of your colleagues--at this juncture it was more
about the calendar than it was the money. But it--we did
webinars, which is nothing new for FRA by a stand-alone, but we
sought APTA, we sought AAR, we sought other associations and
said, ``Get your membership on a webinar. We will help
facilitate it so we can get this money into the responsible
hands.'' It was undersubscribed.
So, as a result, we just issued a NOFO, I believe this
week, to get out the balance that was not taken----
Mr. Lipinski. How long do you expect that to----
Mr. Batory. And we are going to try to get that done within
about 90 days--again, if not less. Because----
Mr. Lipinski. Now, that last one was very impressive.
Mr. Batory. You have to get this money in their hands, so
that they----
Mr. Lipinski. Yes.
Mr. Batory [continuing]. Can get the equipment purchased,
get it delivered, and get it applied.
Mr. Lipinski. A lot of us have been talking about passenger
rail as a big concern here. It is also--but honestly, this is a
tough one, when it comes to--we want to make sure that commuter
rail, especially, is going to get PTC installed as quickly as
possible.
But, you know, a question out there: are we going to be
levying these big fines against commuter railroads who do not--
may not have the money to begin with, and that is why they are
so slow in getting this done? And what will happen next? So,
you know, that, I think, is a question.
Do you have any, you know, comments on that?
Mr. Batory. I certainly do. Let me share a statement of
fact. When we had individual meetings, eyeball-to-eyeball, with
each of the 41 railroads--and at that time I was not yet
confirmed, I was an advisor to the Secretary--I shared with
each of them that I often sat on the other side of that table,
where they were sitting. So I asked for candor and thorough
understanding of where they were with PTC.
And money came up in each of those conversations, and only
in 2 was money an issue among the 41 to-be-compliant railroads.
It was more about the calendar, and can we make the calendar as
far as physical installation and implementation of the
equipment. Those two railroads was the Rail Runner in New
Mexico and Caltrain train in California.
Other than that, there wasn't--now, that is not to say that
there isn't a railroad that wouldn't have taken a check that
day. They all would have taken money. But none of them said
money was an impediment.
Ms. Mortensen. Congressman Lipinski, if I could add to that
as a small commuter rail property, I had to do risk analysis
about funding the PTC program. And what we did instead was--our
State is very supportive in California of getting PTC
installed. And so, through State sources related to safety and
security, we funded our $7 million PTC program.
I worried, just about the timing of Federal grants coming
out, that that would be another one of those issues that is out
of my control that would push when we could make the order of
equipment. And so there are times when there is just the
uncertainty of the grants added on to the uncertainty of all
the rest of the program that--we couldn't bear that risk.
And so, while we--the offer was made, we did go forward
with State funding, just because it had more certainty about
when we would have our hands on it and be able to get it to the
vendor and order the equipment.
Mr. Lipinski. All right, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Denham. Mr. DeSaulnier?
Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I admire your
attire today. For the record, I paid $5.98 at K-Mart for this
shirt, so I realize the wisdom of Mr. Capuano, and I want to
make my comments in the same spirit of Mr. Capuano, but looking
more towards the future.
So, Ms. Mortensen, I have been around long enough to
remember when you started. If memory serves me, there is, like,
175,000 car trips through that corridor right now. We have got
companies like Facebook and Google anxiously wanting to write
checks to improve that. We talked about doing the Dumbarton
Bridge. So you are taking 2,000 people.
So I would like to make this comment--and if you could
specifically add to this and come back to Mr. Batory--this
reminds me of an FDA hearing in another committee. We have got
people who want the FDA to do best practices and make sure they
don't make mistakes. But they want them to get new inventions--
in that instance, in biomedicine--and to saving lives.
In places like the bay area and Philadelphia and urban
areas, we have got this huge demand, mega-trips, people
spending 2 hours going both ways, yet imperiling the growth of
these urban areas where 65 percent of our GDP comes from. So we
want to get it right.
But looking forward, what do we learn from this? We can
expect new technology, we can expect new innovation. But right
now people are struggling with their day-to-day life, and it is
impacting the national income if we don't get this
infrastructure right.
So, Ms. Mortensen, maybe you can--I know about your
instance, because Mr. Denham's constituents come through my
former constituents when I was in the legislature. They are
going out there to buy affordable housing. They are working as
software engineers in some of the biggest companies in the
world. They are taking 2 hours to go. But you are
overprescribed.
So what are things that you look at, your situation? You
could take more of those cars off the Altamont, off 580, and
put them into a real world-class commuter rail system, if we
got our act together here at the Federal level, and knowing
that the State is ramping up, as you said, a $1 billion just
for that corridor.
Ms. Mortensen. Well, I think one observation I have seen
about the Facebook issue--and I have been in transportation 25
years--this is the first time where we have flash mob
population that ends up at one place at one time.
It used to be, when an industry would come in, it would
take some time to develop the plant--you know, a production
plant, a steel plant--you would know how fast it would grow and
how many employees would be there over time. And it followed a
fairly predictable schedule. With the new tech firms in the
Silicon Valley, there can instantly be 19,000 employees in one
location, and that is not a unique situation. It is happening
over and over again. Government has a difficult time responding
so quickly to put the infrastructure together for something
like that.
And so I am aware of the issues on the Dumbarton Bridge, a
very valuable bay crossing that doesn't exist today. And I
think public-private partnerships, where we let the public
sector take the lead and maybe push things through faster than
the Government can, is a way to look at those kind of
situations to solve it faster. We would definitely utilize the
Dumbarton Bridge. But if we do the typical Government study/
design/build process, it will be 35 years.
Hopefully--there is a financial partnership between Plenary
and Facebook that has about $1 billion on the table. And I
think that kind of thing we should support at the Federal,
State, and local levels, because capacity is critical. We have
to solve our own problems within the communities.
And then we have to negotiate with our Class I railroads.
That is a commodity for them. We want our goods, too, not just
people movement. So it is a give-and-take on a lot of different
fronts.
Mr. DeSaulnier. So, Mr. Batory--and I would like to, in the
context of Mr. Sumwalt, who--NTSB came to your rescue there
with a microphone, his quote was, ``Every day that we go
without PTC, we are at risk of a mass casualty event due to
human error.''
So here is the balance. And you said urgency. We have got
these demands of commuters, their lives being affected. We want
to get new--so what have we learned from this experience? How
can we fix this, once and for all, but going forward make sure
we are more nimble about getting new technology in place and
out into the commuter's benefits?
Mr. Batory. Thank you for that question. Just to speak on
PTC first, it has been a 10-year journey. And----
Mr. DeSaulnier. It is too long.
Mr. Batory. Exactly. What did this phone do 10 years ago?
And we are basically trying to put in a platform that we
designed 10 years ago.
So, as a result, I understand that there may be some
frustration and irritation about things that have taken place
that evolve from the past. But I am trying to lead this
initiative looking through the windshield, and not through the
rearview mirror.
And we have to go forward, we have to bring closure to PTC
1.0, as I call it, recognizing the calendar gives us as much
latitude as 2023. But we can't wait that long. And if we get it
done sooner, we can then have a more robust, efficient PTC
system that will be less money to maintain and operate, it will
have more risk reduction, enhancing safety overall.
And when you start doing that you take variability out of
the system. And when you take variability out of the system,
you create capacity. And that allows for additional organic
growth. We see that, both in the passenger side and the freight
sector, but we have got to get this accomplished and quit
worrying about the past.
Mr. DeSaulnier. But the key part--and this is for future
hearings--is what have we learned from this experience, going
forward. So when you put the phone up--this discovery 10 years
ago, we don't want to be here 10 years with some undeveloped,
unknown technology now going through the same experience. There
is a real demand and consequence for everyday people's lives if
we don't get better at this. So that is the point of my
question.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hamberger. If I might be so bold, I think what we have
learned is that a mandate that is so specific is what is
causing the problem. If the mandate had been reduce accidents
by X percent, if the mandate had been reduce fatalities, reduce
accidents per train mile, then the industry, working with
suppliers, would be able to leapfrog technology, move forward.
And I am hoping that that lesson is learned so that, once
this platform is put in place--and it is a heck of a platform--
that there are a lot of people in the Class I's now, sitting
in--you know, smart people--how do we take advantage of this to
go to--what I refer to PTC 2.0--and get additional safety
benefits, additional operational efficiency benefits. But we
are going to need an FRA and a Congress that allows us to do
that, and doesn't impede us from being able to do that.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger.
Mr. Babin?
Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
witnesses for being here. And this will be for Mr. Knueppel. Is
that the way you say it, Knueppel?
Mr. Knueppel. Knueppel.
Dr. Babin. Knueppel, OK. Sorry about that. Can you tell us
about some of the commuters that are on track to meet the
deadline, and what they are doing that is making them
successful in this implementation? Just give me a rundown, if
you don't mind.
Mr. Knueppel. Sure. Obviously, I can give you our own
experience, which I talked a little bit about today.
For a public agency, there are a lot of things that kind of
have to break the right way. For us, we were fortunate in that
we had had an in-house signal construction program already
going. And so we just were able to expand it. The fact that we
were also able to use contractors and find a way to have both
working at the same time was very good.
A lot of people have been retiring in the last 10 years. At
my company I have lost, just generally, 25 percent of my
employees in the last 3 years.
Dr. Babin. Wow.
Mr. Knueppel. And so, keeping your talent and your team
together is usually a big factor in how an agency will do.
We do low bids. Low bids can work out. Low bids cannot work
out. We were very fortunate with Hitachi and formerly Ansaldo,
and they were very motivated and they worked well with us, and
they were based in Pennsylvania, so that helped.
For SEPTA, radio spectrum went very well. When we went to
pursue it, the person was extremely reasonable and actually
owned it, which made it a lot easier.
Relationships are a big deal. With CSX I can tell you that,
you know, we had already separated on one of our territories
with them. So having to separate again, it was just a follow-
on. We did that separation project with them in less than 2
years, start to finish. And the TIGER funds were, as I
mentioned, very helpful.
But we had also a radio interference problem with them, and
it got tough. But the relationships that we had, we ultimately
worked through it. I liken it to the Cuban Missile Crisis, but
we got through it.
Amtrak was very, very instrumental in helping us, and their
engineering group was based out of Philadelphia, so that was
extremely helpful.
And the FRA, you know, I think, has been very, very helpful
to us. And the Administrator has even come to me and sat in my
office and made sure that I had what I needed and answered any
questions, so that, you know, your relationship with the FRA is
important.
Your workforce, you know, your train crews, it is a big
change. And so the agencies that have a positive approach
towards it, and buy-in, that helps.
And for us, you know, I had a very supportive board. We
were at a very, very low time, in terms of our capital funding,
but our board was very, very supportive. And our riders, I
can't thank them enough, because they knew what was going on,
we were telling them, and it did affect them. Our on-time
performance went way down, as we--we run every car we can every
day. They are always asking for more cars on every train. And
we had to take cars out of service to equip them, and they were
patient, and they let us keep going.
Dr. Babin. I want to ask you one more question, though.
Mr. Knueppel. Sure.
Dr. Babin. If you can just go ahead and wrap up----
Mr. Knueppel. I am done, I am done.
Dr. Babin. You are done? OK.
Mr. Knueppel. So those are kind of the positive things that
came out of our experience.
Dr. Babin. OK, thank you. And then, how much money have
commuter railroads invested into PTC, and what is the estimated
total cost?
Mr. Knueppel. $4.1 billion.
Dr. Babin. OK.
Mr. Knueppel. And the funding that has been made available
to us is about one-tenth of that. And 80 percent of that has
really only come since May of 2017.
The problem with having the money come late is with the
requirements of the funding. You often can't use it on
contracts that have already been awarded. So that is what makes
it difficult to have the money--have--in most cases, for
commuters, come later. But we are certainly making use of it
wherever we can.
Dr. Babin. OK, thank you. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Ms. Esty?
Ms. Esty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, salute Mr.
Capuano and his short-sleeved shirts.
I wanted to touch on two topics, as I think the last one
here--no, no, Mr. Weber is joining us.
The first, as somebody who represents Connecticut, I have
to drill down more on the Northeast Corridor and serious
concerns. There has been way too much loss of life. There
continue to be delays on that. And safety is paramount.
And the other is I do want to, before the close of my 5
minutes, return to Mr. Hamberger's point about, basically,
performance standards. And I think if we in America are going
to have a transportation and an infrastructure system that is
state of the art, we have got to figure out how to move much
more nimbly. And I do want to return to that, because we saw
that with NextGen. We are seeing that with this. And we are
losing ground around the world, and we have got to figure out
together how to stop pointing fingers at who is responsible and
saying we have to redo how we get to fast, safe, affordable.
So on the Northeast Corridor, Mr. Naparstek, I know--not
everybody in this room knows, but I know the Connecticut lines
are owned by the MTA, not Amtrak. So when you say how much--
when you are talking about how much of that, of the Northeast
Corridor that everything Amtrak owns is going to be compliant,
what is not going to be compliant? So what lines are--what
portions are not going to be compliant, and how heavily
traveled are those portions?
Mr. Naparstek. [No response.]
Ms. Esty. Because the rails are actually owned--in
Connecticut are owned by Connecticut, are owned by the MTA.
They are not owned by the State of Connecticut. Are those all
going to be compliant with PTC?
Mr. Naparstek. I believe--let me get back to you with
specifics on Connecticut. And I actually have somebody on my
staff who could easily answer that. But I believe they will be
compliant. But I would want to verify that 100 percent, in
terms of Connecticut.
Everywhere we run service in Connecticut should be
compliant by 12/31/2018.
Ms. Esty. All right. Because I have to say it. For many of
us this is like Groundhog Day. I have been on this committee
for almost 6 years, and we have been hearing about we are
close, we are close, just give us a little more time, a little
more time. And frankly, you know, I have to say the folks in my
district are angry and worried and late to work. Like a
combination of all those. That is not a good combination.
So you hear that frustration up here? That is because--and
the chairman of the subcommittee has raised that--people have
not come forward to say, ``This is what we need.'' And to wait
until the eleventh hour, I mean, how is Mr. Batory supposed to
go through on the 31st of December? This is like college, you
know, paper being done all night and asking for an extension
at, you know, 1 minute of midnight. It is not any good way to
instill confidence in the riding public. And it makes it
impossible for us to do our jobs of oversight. And that is
really for everyone. I mean don't wait. Tell us what you need,
and we will try to work with you.
Mr. Batory, I agree with you on those fines. I mean you get
people's attention, people--and the Class I freights have
complied. But if people are not complying--you change the
business calculation if you are facing a big, fat fine. And we
did do that extension in 2015 because we wanted the money to go
to PTC, not to fines. And here we are, 3 years later, and it
didn't work. So I think people say take out the sticks now,
because this is not working. We haven't succeeded in getting
this done.
So again, what is it going to take to get this done as
rapidly as possible? We are not going to performance standards
2.0, we had better go to performance standards. What exactly do
we need to do right now to get this done as fast as possible?
Is it fines?
I mean, Mr. Batory, do you think it is fines? And I want a
fast response. Do you think it is fines to get attention now?
Mr. Batory. That is definitely a tool in the toolbox. And
as I mentioned earlier, I would like not to have to use that
tool. But if that is the one you have to use in combination
with everything else that we have now invoked, OK, I think we
should do nothing less than that, insofar as exercising that.
But the main thing is getting the concentrated, concise,
collaborative communication. And I am going to speak to the
Northeast Corridor, from Boston down to Washington, DC.
When we met with those 41 railroads, Amtrak was one of
them. And even though we have read in the newspapers over the
last 3, 5 years that the Northeast Corridor has PTC in place,
it has pepper spots and stains all over it where there is no
PTC. They have done an excellent job this year in trying to get
rid of those pepper spots and stains where Amtrak is in total
control of itself.
The next thing that became very apparent, we had to
maintain nothing less than a dialogue of once a month on a
macro perspective with Amtrak. We maintain a dialogue with them
daily, tactically, on PTC. But they host a lot of commuter
railroads. So, as a result, it then became apparent that we had
an absence of synchronization between the commuter railroads
and Amtrak. And the only way you are going to get that resolved
is communication, and you can never have too much
communication.
So, as a result, with our monthly meetings now, we have
basically--we don't ask people to come to Washington, but we
allocate whatever amount of time--it is usually about 15 to 20
minutes--for each individual commuter railroad to express on
the monthly call where they see issues with Amtrak, and where
Amtrak sees issues with the commuter railroad, so we can get
them in synch, and get this PTC piece in place. It is a very
densely operated piece of railroad that doesn't lend itself to
absorbing a lot of variability because of its density. And we
have to have this interoperability piece in place sooner,
rather than later.
Ms. Fleming. May I add a perspective? I think one of the
things that we need to think about is that only eight railroads
said they are going to make the December deadline. So 32 are
seeking an extension. Of those 32, 12 would like to use
substitute criteria, particularly initial testing. And that is
in the really early stages. And our analysis has shown that
from initial testing to RSD takes, on average, 2 years. So if
you do the math, we are concerned that some railroads won't
even make 2020.
Mr. Hamberger. As long as people are adding on, let me add
on, if I might, Mr. Chairman, those people who are filing for
an alternative schedule, I would argue, are not filing for an
extension. They are filing for an alternative schedule under
the law, as written.
Several Class I railroads and Amtrak were ready to be
declared fully implemented by the end of 2018. But the FRA
regulations stipulated that no one could be fully implemented
until everyone was fully implemented. Therefore, the host
railroad, whether it was a freight railroad or Amtrak, could
not ask--asked, but was denied being declared fully implemented
because their tenant railroads were not fully implemented. And
I think Mr. Naparstek is being kind to one of his tenants by
not going further down that path.
And--but it is important, I think, for this committee, and,
as I read some of the media outlets, for the media to
understand that there were railroads ready to be fully
implemented 100 percent operational, and were denied that and
were forced to apply under the alternative schedule.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger. Final question to Mr.
Weber.
Mr. Naparstek. If I could--I am sorry, sir, but if I could
answer Congresswoman Esty's original question, so for Amtrak
tracks in Connecticut we will be 100 percent in operation by
12/31. For CTDOT, they will be PTC-operable completely by the
deadline. And Metro-North will be filing for an alternative
schedule.
Mr. Denham. Thank you.
Mr. Weber, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber. Thank you. Gosh, I don't know where to start.
Mr. Batory, quick question for you. I was here earlier, and
had to go to another hearing. You--and I have been on this
committee now--what is this, my second year? So you mentioned
there were two laws, 2008, 2015 in some of your remarks. And
then you went through 2008 was four pages long, and then you
went from there to the number of rules, and from there to the
safety--can you give me those stats again? Do you have them
handy? I will come----
Mr. Batory. Yes, Congressman. And just to give you some
color as to why I sought this, when I heard the safety plans
were 5,000 pages, I was a little taken back. So I said, ``Well,
let's peel the onion back.'' What got us to 5,000 pages?
So I said, well, tell me how thick was the statute that
came out of Congress? In 2008 it was three pages; 2015 it was
six pages. And then the RSAC [Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee] process was engaged to develop the regs, and we came
up with 45 pages of regs. And that percolated 190 pages of
rulemaking, which then drove the implementation plans that are
not that burdensome, but they are living documents and have to
be maintained forevermore--150 to 200 pages. But then you get
to the safety plan, and it is 5,000 pages.
Mr. Weber. OK. So in those rules and all those pages that
you cited, Mr. Hamberger makes a very good point. There was no
provision for tenant rail lines, I guess, railroads. And I am
not quite sure how to provide for that, because, you know, it
is true that Amtrak may be on board, for example, but if you
have got tenants responsible, are they to be held liable for
their tenants under those rules?
Mr. Batory. Here is what evolved. There are three
railroads, and the facts are there, so I feel comfortable in
revealing them.
You have two commuter railroads that are extremely far
ahead of the curve: Metrolink and SEPTA. The two Class I's are
Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Union Pacific, as far as
maturity into PTC. Burlington Northern Santa Fe realized that
they were going to have their entire railroad PTC-equipped,
their locomotives are equipped, OK? So naturally, if you are
working at Burlington Northern you would say, well, I am done,
OK?
But they have thousands of miles on their railroad that
they offer, OK, for use by tenants, some of them utilized by
Class I's. So, as a result, they wanted to be recognized as
fully implemented. And we said you can't get fully implemented,
because you have tenants out there that aren't going to be PTC-
equipped.
And let's talk about Chatsworth. That was a Metrolink train
and a Union Pacific train, a tenant and a host got together. So
if you would have declared that piece of railroad--had PTC been
in effect back then--and said you are fully implemented, but
one of those two weren't equipped, you would have still had the
crash. So that is why it was written that way.
So what we told Burlington Northern Santa Fe, we said, all
right, there is the rule, the reg, the law, but there is also
the spirit and the intent of all that. So that is when we
suggested get all your tenants to file for alternative
schedule, OK, and----
Mr. Weber. Not an extension, but an alternative----
Mr. Batory. Just get the tenants----
Mr. Weber [continuing]. Schedule, as pointed out.
Mr. Batory. Get the tenants to file for alternative
schedule, and then we can recognize you as being fully
implemented, recognizing those tenants are not fully
implemented yet, because they filed for alternative schedule.
They elected not to----
Mr. Weber. Why?
Mr. Batory [continuing]. When we offered. I do--I can't
answer that. Burlington Northern----
Mr. Hamberger. Well, clearly, they had no jurisdiction over
their tenants----
Mr. Batory. I have----
Mr. Weber. Well, that is what I said, you are making them
responsible.
Mr. Batory. But he----
Mr. Naparstek. Well, there is two things.
Mr. Batory. So----
Mr. Naparstek. Jurisdiction, as well as you can't test
interoperability on a tenant that isn't ready to test----
Mr. Weber. That is a little tough.
Mr. Naparstek. We can't prove 100 percent--we are 100
percent ready, but I can't prove on Amtrak's system 100 percent
interoperability without my tenants being ready.
Mr. Weber. That is a little tough.
Mr. Naparstek. Therefore, I need to work with my tenants,
and we will be as aggressive as possible to get them PTC-
operable as quickly as possible.
Mr. Weber. I am running out of time and I am the only thing
that stands between this committee and lunch, so I need to
hurry.
Ms. Fleming, you said something that got my attention. You
said that there were 32 of the 40, but that the others--the 8
were seeking an extension based on--so that they could come up
with, was it substantive criteria? Was that what you said?
Ms. Fleming. Right. So within the statute, FRA has the
ability to allow railroads to apply for--instead of meeting the
current criteria for an extension, substitute criteria.
Mr. Weber. Oh, substitute criteria.
Ms. Fleming. Substitute. So, 16 are going to seek an
extension using substitute; 12 of the 16 want to be able to
have approval for initial field testing, which is really in the
early stages.
And my point was that, for those 12 railroads, we are a
little concerned that they may not even meet 2020, because at
that juncture you are still kind of working through a lot of
bugs, the system may not be mature, and the railroads that are
further along, such as my colleagues at the table, it has taken
an average of 2 years from initial testing to RSD. So we are a
little concerned that some of those railroads--granted,
sometimes extensions--you know, I mean your schedules work out
fine. But sometimes there is, you know, unforeseen
circumstances. So we are a little concerned about those 12
railroads and where they are at this point.
Mr. Weber. OK. Well, I am past my time, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your indulgence, I yield back.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
Mr. Shuster?
Mr. Shuster. Well, I just want to say a final note. Look,
this is an incredibly complicated situation here. Deploying
technology that is not fully developed, and we are going
through the process, we have got some folks that are--
obviously, the freights are ready to go, and you have got
others that aren't. So this is incredibly complex. It should be
a lesson to all of us about technology and going forward, no
matter what the industry is, and how we have to make sure that,
as Mr. Batory said, it has got to be a collaborative effort.
These companies don't want to have dangerous--they don't
want--they want to have the safest possible system they can
have, and I don't believe anybody is trying to cut any corners,
but it is just very complicated. So I just wanted to say that.
But also, I wanted to say to my good friend of 40 years,
Ed, I did the calculation. Forty years I have known Ed
Hamberger. He has been a great friend. He has done an
outstanding job, I believe, at running AAR for the last 20
years.
You have been a great ally at times and have been a
formidable opponent at times, and I appreciate that. And
whoever has to fill your shoes at AAR has got some really,
really big shoes to fill. So--but I wish you the best. And
whoever comes after you, I wish them the best, having to go
after Ed Hamberger.
That being said--I am not done yet, Mr. Chairman--I came
here today because this is an incredibly important hearing. But
I would not miss the final performance of Ed Hamberger.
Now, I went through the--went through, looked at the
testimony, I tried----
Mr. Hamberger. I am delighted to hear that this is my final
performance.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. At least before this committee, I should say.
Mr. Hamberger. Chairman Denham may have different ideas,
but anyway----
Mr. Shuster. Well, at least before this committee, at least
when I am here. Maybe Denham and I won't be here the next time.
So--but I just wanted to say I looked through the record, I
tried to find some way to grill you today, because with a name
like Hamberger, grilling you is absolutely appropriate.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. But I couldn't, because I agree with you, that
the Class I's have done their work, have done their job. And so
we are in a situation here that, as I said, it is complicated.
But again, you have done a great job for the last 40 years.
I appreciate all of you being here. And again, we are going
to continue to work forward. And I know in the able hands of
Chairman Denham, he will make sure that we all come together
and we have a great ending when it all comes together.
Mr. Hamberger. Mr. Chairman, right back at you. Of course,
you have been a great Member of Congress, a good friend, and a
great chair. And whoever follows in your footsteps will have a
great legacy to live up to, as well.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
And if I could ask one more question, Mr. Denham, when I
finish here, please do not recognize Ed Hamberger again,
because he always tries to get in the last word.
Mr. Hamberger. Can he just say, ``Well done, Hamberger''?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. Great job, Ed.
I yield back.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Denham. Last word of this committee is PTC, get it
done.
With that, if there are no further questions, I would like
to ask unanimous consent that today's record of the hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
writing, unanimous consent that the record remain open 15 days
for additional comments and information submitted by members
and witnesses.
Without objection, so ordered.
I would like to thank our witnesses again today.
If there are no other comments, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Testimony of Floyd Mason, President, Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen
Dear Chairman Shuster and Ranking Member DeFazio:
My name is Floyd Mason. I have served as Vice President
East for the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) for many
years, which included the role of chairman on our training
committee. During our recent Convention, I was elected
President of the BRS and assumed the office on October 1, 2018.
Prior to my full-time union assignment, I worked on Class I
railroads as a technical employee, which involved extensive
work on a large signal installation initiative--the
installation of centralized traffic control systems that in
many areas changed operation from a local operator to a remote
centralized control facility. The BRS represents signal
employees who install, maintain and test the signal systems
responsible for the safe movement of trains and protection of
the public, including Positive Train Control (PTC) which
overlays and is governed by the existing signal system.
On September 13, 2018, I was accompanied by BRS Legislative
Representative Leonard Parker while attending the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (Committee) hearing
titled, ``The State of Positive Train Control in the U.S.''
While at the hearing, certain comments and assurances were made
either by the industry or by Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) Administrator Ronald Batory regarding the status of PTC
training for Railroad Signalmen. The theme was Class I
Railroads have completed, or nearly completed, the required and
necessary training of Railroad Signalmen in aspects of PTC.
More specifically, the implication is that the training of
Railroad Signalmen required by the Rail Safety Act of 2008 is
complete, meeting the requirements of the law and FRA
requirements. The indication was that this training provides
Signalmen with what they need to properly perform their duties
and provides for the safety of the public and rail employees
regarding PTC--with these comments I plan to challenge that
notion.
The work of Railroad Signalmen, other front-line rail
workers, the industry, the FRA, and this Committee has been
truly impressive. Without question, the installation of PTC is
the largest application of life-saving and operational-
efficiency technology in the history of railroad signaling. The
process has taken time, arguably too much time, but the scope
and level of technical advancement in railroad signaling is
impressive and remarkable. My comments are limited to the
training of Signalmen on Class I railroads. The Class I
railroads appear to be the yardstick that the T&I Committee is
using for progress, and rightfully so.
The training provided for Railroad Signalmen is inadequate
and will not meet the high-standard necessary to ensure the
safe, proper, and reliable operation of these sophisticated
systems. As an anecdote, at Local meetings where I converse
with Signalmen, I am often met with chuckles or concerns when I
raise the subject of proper training for PTC systems. There has
been a real effort to check off all Signalmen as PTC trained,
unfortunately what is needed and what has occurred are vastly
different. I raised this issue personally and directly with
Administrator Batory at the BRS 52nd Regular Convention in
August where he was a speaker. I sincerely believe he reports
on the progress of this and other PTC related issues based on
reports provided by the industry. It is certainly
understandable that the reports are not verified by field
visits the way that FRA Testing Requirements under 49 CFR Parts
234 and 236 are verified. Generally speaking ``PTC Training''
in some cases is a quick briefing describing what the
technology is and what it is intended to do. Signalmen who must
troubleshoot the system in the middle of the night after the
system fails, replace defective components, test the system for
proper operation, and return the system to normal operation
must be more extensively trained than the generic overview
provided to those who simply need to know what the system is or
its purpose.
I will provide two examples demonstrating that the
necessary training has not occurred, in part due to the
railroads canceling their overall signal training effort. I
will cite two examples: (1) CSX which canceled its very
effective training development program and (2) Norfolk Southern
(NSR) which canceled all training to Journeymen over a dispute
involving expense reimbursement. These two railroads ended the
programs that were working towards the proper training of
Signalmen during the very time that the railroads were
reporting that great strides were being accomplished in this
area.
LExample 1: On CSX, signal training beyond the existing
training, which is extensive, is developed by a joint labor-
management process. This joint process was canceled when Hunter
Harrison came in as CEO and the process has not resumed. The
facility known as the REDI Center, a centralized CSX training
facility, is a ghost town compared with its past vibrancy.
There is no other process or location that has taken the place
of the joint training development process or training facility.
In the previous joint training development process, subject
matter experts mostly made up of Signalmen were sometimes
accompanied by vendors or managers. In this instance,
cooperation from the railroad managers responsible for
standards and instructions, signal management, technical
writers and various experts in visual aid came together and
developed training procedures for new equipment. The procedures
led to testing standards, along with a written manual at an
appropriate technical level for Signalmen, which contained
illustrations and technical requirements. After this effective
program was canceled and no replacement put in its place, all
Signalmen were checked off as qualified on PTC as reported to
FRA and your Committee.
LWe know from implemented training on many previous
examples of new technology that this is simply not possible on
the scale required with the time involved and without the
support of the previous training process or facility. We can
provide real examples of technical training developed for new
signal equipment; and we challenge CSX to provide examples of
technical training for PTC installation, maintenance, and
repair. Your Committee can then compare the products.
LExample 2: Recognizing the need for PTC Training and
other ``Journeyman Training'' the BRS worked jointly with NSR
signal management in 2017 and 2018 to re-develop Journeyman
Training. This effort included the professionals at the
McDonagh Training Center, a NSR training facility near Atlanta,
Georgia. This training, however, did not make it to Signalmen
beyond an initial pilot group; the Pilot was intended to test
its effectiveness of the new program.
LAfter the initial pilot program, a dispute developed
about reimbursement of travel expenses for the Signalmen
attending the facility. We spent time in 2017 and 2018,
resolving those conflicts. We have now developed a 2nd Pilot
Program with an agreed upon plan to reimburse travel expense
for those that attend. The 2nd program is scheduled to begin
the first week of October 2018, for one small class of 16. It
is our hope and intention that we will begin to train more
Signalmen in 2019.
LThe training, which is limited, is an excellent start to
what we should be doing across the nation. It takes a week of
classroom training using simulators and covers important
aspects of PTC. With a class size presently limited to 16, and
with less than 52 available weeks in the year, it will be years
before this effort will reach all 1,300 signalmen. Adding to
the limited availability of training resources is the
requirement to train newly hired employees. The new hire
training process takes 43 weeks, and not all training is
performed at the McDonagh Center, but never-the-less impacts
availability of the facility to train Signalmen on PTC.
LAgain, the Signalmen on NSR have not, and will not be
properly trained on PTC for some time.
I attach to this statement a copy of our Pilot Training
Program on NSR and the proposal that led to it. If you need
supporting documentation pertaining to the training that was
canceled over disputes, that information can be provided.
I will look for verification of the limited or nonexistent
nature of PTC Training on the other remaining Class I railroads
and provide it if you are interested.
This testimony/letter was prompted by the misinformation,
Leonard Parker and I witnessed during the September 13, 2018,
T&I hearing, that is being shared with your Committee.
Additionally, there was a private comment made by a guest, who
I believe was there to support the Association of American
Railroads (AAR)--this guest assured us that PTC training really
was accomplished. We knew better and felt compelled to bring
this to light.
Finally, the work of your Committee and all those involved,
notwithstanding the shortfall on this most important issue, is
to be commended, but it can't be left as fact that Signalmen
are properly trained on PTC Systems when it is not true.
Journeyman/Advanced Training--2018 Pilot Program 5-21-18
There are two available openings for Journeyman Training in
calendar year 2018: August 27 to 31, 2018 and October 1 to 5, 2018. We
have had a series of successful Pilot Programs for the ERN, N&W and
Southern before 2018. The training, particularly the portions that had
to do with radio equipment testing using a watt meter, and the PTC
Initialization using PTC equipment in a trailer were helpful and
informative. A dispute developed with respect to what the proper
expense should be to get signal employees to and from the McDonough
Training Center. Some were reimbursed zero while others were reimbursed
overtime, penalties and expenses.
A second pilot program for dealing with travel time and expense
will be arranged for volunteers in the two available weeks for 2018,
using existing rules and training to the extent possible. This second
Pilot Program is outlined below:
Reduce training program to fit within Tuesday, Wednesday
and Thursday of each week.
Focus on PTC related training and new training modules
Longer term, look for ways to take more conventional
modules, for example switch machines and put them into either a CBT
module, a module for remote video, or train the trainer delivery method
All Signalmen (including those currently assigned four
ten-hour days) attending training will be converted to a 5-day 40-hour
schedule Monday through Friday for the week of training
Travel will occur on Monday and Friday. NSR will pick the
mode of travel from among: company vehicle, private automobile, or
airline. If private vehicle, mileage will be reimbursed, if airline,
NSR will provide ticket.
Transportation to and from airport will be either
company vehicle, or private auto with mileage reimbursement.
Transportation from airport to Training Center will
either be arranged by NSR or reimbursed as actual necessary expense.
Hotels will be provided, and meals will be reimbursed
at the standard per diem rate.
Transportation from the hotel to the Training Center
will be provided by NSR.
Consistent with travel arrangements, briefings may be
held on Monday afternoon or Friday morning, schedules permitting.
This second Pilot Program will be voluntary, for
examining the scheduling and expense reimbursement aspects of training,
while concentrating on several key topics related to PTC or timely
changes in railroad signaling.
Next step review potential for schedule with McDonough Training
Center, Joe Lee, for feasibility to develop schedule before August.
(based on conversation it is feasible) Review transportation for
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday classes. (arranged by Signal for past
classes) Exit survey of volunteers and instructors for suggested
changes to arrangements with the goal of keeping travel expense and
time away from home manageable. The results of the second pilot will be
informative for future training including FRA parts 243 and 236
training.
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