[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DOE MODERNIZATION: LEGISLATION ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-132
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
FRED UPTON, Michigan BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GENE GREEN, Texas
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey DORIS O. MATSUI, California
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky KATHY CASTOR, Florida
PETE OLSON, Texas JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia JERRY McNERNEY, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois PETER WELCH, Vermont
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida PAUL TONKO, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
BILLY LONG, Missouri DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL FLORES, Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma TONY CARDENAS, California
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina RAUL RUIZ, California
CHRIS COLLINS, New York SCOTT H. PETERS, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
TIM WALBERG, Michigan
MIMI WALTERS, California
RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
Subcommittee on Energy
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
PETE OLSON, Texas BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
JOE BARTON, Texas JERRY McNERNEY, California
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois SCOTT H. PETERS, California
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio GENE GREEN, Texas
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia KATHY CASTOR, Florida
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio PAUL TONKO, New York
BILLY LONG, Missouri DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL FLORES, Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma Massachusetts
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
TIM WALBERG, Michigan officio)
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon, opening statement...................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Witnesses
Brent Park, Ph.D., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Proliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Answers to submitted questions............................... 176
Edward G. McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy........................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Answers to submitted questions............................... 189
Jeffrey S. Merrifield, Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman,
LLP, and Senior Advisor, ClearPath Action...................... 52
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Answers to submitted questions............................... 202
Melissa C. Mann, President, URENCO USA, Inc., and Member, United
States Nuclear Industry Council................................ 62
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Answers to submitted questions............................... 206
James Nicholas Irvin, Director, Research and Development,
Strategy, Advanced Nuclear, and Crosscutting Technology,
Southern Company, and Member, Advanced Reactor Working Group,
Nuclear Energy Institute....................................... 74
Prepared statement........................................... 76
Edwin Lyman, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Global Security Program,
Union of Concerned Scientists.................................. 92
Prepared statement........................................... 94
Submitted Material
H.R. 1320, the Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act,
submitted by Mr. Upton......................................... 126
Discussion Draft, a Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
submitted by Mr. Upton......................................... 146
Discussion Draft, the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act,
submitted by Mr. Upton......................................... 154
Discussion Draft, a Report on Pilot Program for Micro-Reactors,
submitted by Mr. Upton......................................... 159
Issue Brief of March 2018, ``US Nuclear-Power Leadership and the
Chinese and Russian Challenge,'' by Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr.,
Atlantic Council, submitted by Mr. Upton....................... 164
Letter of May 21, 2018, from John Hopkins, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, NuScale Power, LLC, to Mr. Upton and Mr.
Rush, submitted by Mr. Shimkus................................. 171
Speech, ``The Nuclear Power Plant in Astrava, Belarus,'' by Mr.
Shimkus, submitted by Mr. Shimkus.............................. 172
DOE MODERNIZATION: LEGISLATION ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Barton, Shimkus,
Latta, Harper, McKinley, Kinzinger, Griffith, Johnson, Long,
Bucshon, Flores, Mullin, Hudson, Walberg, Duncan, Walden (ex
officio), Rush, McNerney, Peters, Green, Doyle, Castor, Welch,
Tonko, Loebsack, Schrader, Kennedy, and Pallone (ex officio).
Staff present: Mike Bloomquist, Staff Director; Samantha
Bopp, Staff Assistant; Daniel Butler, Staff Assistant; Kelly
Collins, Legislative Clerk, Energy/Environment; Margaret Tucker
Fogarty, Staff Assistant; Adam Fromm, Director of Outreach and
Coalitions; Jordan Haverly, Policy Coordinator, Environment;
Milly Lothian, Press Assistant and Digital Coordinator; Mary
Martin, Chief Counsel, Energy/Environment; Drew McDowell,
Executive Assistant; Brandon Mooney, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Energy; Mark Ratner, Policy Coordinator; Peter Spencer, Senior
Professional Staff Member, Energy; Austin Stonebraker, Press
Assistant; Hamlin Wade, Special Advisor for External Affairs;
Everett Winnick, Director of Information Technology; Andy Zach,
Senior Professional Staff Member, Environment; Priscilla
Barbour, Minority Energy Fellow; Jeff Carroll, Minority Staff
Director; Rick Kessler, Minority Senior Advisor and Staff
Director, Energy and Environment; John Marshall, Minority
Policy Coordinator; Alexander Ratner, Minority Policy Analyst;
Andrew Souvall, Minority Director of Communications, Member
Services, and Outreach; Tuley Wright, Minority Energy and
Environment Policy Advisor; and C.J. Young, Minority Press
Secretary.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Good morning, everybody. Sorry I am a few
minutes late. Good morning. And welcome to our hearing to
discuss four very important legislative proposals to address
and advance our Nation's nuclear energy policy.
You know, as we have heard throughout Congress, our
Nation's international nuclear leadership is eroding. Last
week, a report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance found that
nearly a quarter of our Nation's fleet of nuclear power
reactors are at risk of early closure in the next couple of
years.
These 24 at-risk reactors total over 6 percent of the total
electricity generated in the U.S., about how much electricity
is consumed in Michigan and Illinois combined. And if we are
going to get serious about an all-of-the-above energy strategy
and the value of a diverse, clean energy portfolio, the
implications of this threat cannot be ignored.
The decision to close a nuclear power plant is
irreversible. We know that. Reactors cannot be re-licensed to
produce power once they cease operation. And if the projected
retirement of nuclear energy is realized, the fleet's
significant loss will lead to a ripple effect throughout the
nuclear supply chain.
Fuel cycle facilities that underpin both commercial and
national security needs lose critical capacity. And technology
services that provide world-class simulation to modernize and
maximize nuclear safety will look to other global markets that
have growth potential. The next generation of nuclear
engineering and scientists would dry up as educational
institutions can no longer continue to support the necessary
facilities and programs. International leaders in the nuclear
field made clear, made clear to this subcommittee a couple
months ago that these cumulative repercussions will weaken our
national security standing and, if it continues, would require
a generation of sustained Federal commitment to rebuild.
I don't cede that the outcome is inevitable. The thoughtful
proposals that we are going to examine today provide directed
solutions to address these multifaceted challenges.
H.R. 1320, sponsored by Representatives Kinzinger and
Doyle, brings budgetary discipline to the NRC and improves
transparency and predictability for civilian nuclear companies.
Under current statutory requirements, the NRC recovers about 90
percent of its total budget from NRC licensees. As a result, my
Southwest Michigan ratepayers help fund the NRC to regulate,
license, and oversee the commercial nuclear industry. The
Kinzinger-Doyle bill also lays out basic expectations that
align with the NRC's established tradition of adhering to the
organization's Principles of Good Regulation.
Congressman Johnson's discussion draft discusses the global
competitive challenges for the nuclear supplier community. When
provided a level playing field, I am confident American know-
how and technological leadership is the best in the world.
However, nuclear companies backed by foreign governments, which
don't necessarily share our values, artificially subsidize our
competition. The motivation behind these actions is clear. Mr.
Johnson's bill will improve the ability of our companies to
compete, and win, in international markets.
Imagine designing a new car that is cheaper, safer, and
gets triple the fuel mileage from anything that we see on the
road today, but when the vehicle is ready to hit the road,
there is just no gas to fill up the tank. Nuclear innovators
face just that challenge.
Advanced nuclear technologies offer a wealth of promising
benefits. However, for these designs to become reality, a
certain amount of advanced nuclear fuel must be available for
the first movers. Congressman Flores' legislation helps address
this obstacle by directing DOE to undertake specific actions to
provide what is known as high-assay low-enriched uranium. The
time to begin addressing this problem is now in order to have
the advanced fuel available when it is needed.
The fourth bill, bipartisan legislation from Congressmen
Hudson, Peters, Wilson, and Norcross, directs the Secretary of
Energy to identify the key components for a pilot program that
could capture the energy security benefits of future nuclear
technologies to support critical national security
infrastructure.
This morning we are going to hear from the Department
Energy on the first panel, including the Office of Nuclear
Energy and NNSA. We are also going to hear several expert
perspectives on the second panel.
I look forward to that discussion, and at this point would
yield to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rush from
Illinois.
[The proposed legislation appears at the conclusion of the
hearing.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton
Good morning and welcome to our hearing to discuss four
important legislative proposals to address and advance our
Nation's nuclear energy policy.
As we have heard throughout Congress, our Nation's
international nuclear leadership is eroding. Just last week, a
report by Bloomberg New Energy Finance found that nearly a
quarter of our Nation's fleet of nuclear power reactors are at
risk of early closure in the next few years.
These 24 at-risk reactors total over 6 percent of the total
electricity generated in the United States, about how much
electricity is consumed in Michigan and Illinois combined. If
we are serious about an all-of-the-above energy strategy and
the value of a diverse, clean energy portfolio, the
implications of this threat cannot be ignored.
The decision to close a nuclear power plant is
irreversible. Reactors cannot be relicensed to produce power
once they cease operation. If the projected retirement of
nuclear energy is realized, the fleet's significant loss will
lead to a ripple effect throughout the nuclear supply chain.
Fuel cycle facilities, that underpin both commercial and
national security needs, lose critical capacity. Technology
services that provide world-class simulation to maximize
nuclear safety will look to other global markets that have
growth potential. The next generation of nuclear engineering
and scientists would dry up as educational institutions can no
longer continue to support the necessary facilities and
programs. International leaders in the nuclear field made clear
to this subcommittee in February, these cumulative
repercussions will weaken our national security standing and,
if it continues, would require a generation of sustained
Federal commitment to rebuild.
But I do not yet cede that outcome as inevitable. The
thoughtful proposals we will examine today provide directed
solutions to address these multifaceted challenges.
H.R. 1320, sponsored by Representatives Kinzinger and
Doyle, brings budgetary discipline to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and improves transparency and predictability
for civilian nuclear companies. Under current statutory
requirements, the NRC recovers about 90 percent of its total
budget from NRC licensees. As a result, my Southwestern
Michigan ratepayers help fund NRC to regulate, license, and
oversee the commercial nuclear industry. The Kinzinger-Doyle
bill also lays out basic expectations that align with NRC's
established tradition of adhering to the organization's
Principles of Good Regulation.
Congressman Johnson's discussion draft addresses the global
competitive challenges for the nuclear supplier community. When
provided a level playing field, I am confident American know-
how and technological leadership is the best in the world.
However, nuclear companies backed by foreign governments, which
don't necessarily share our American values, artificially
subsidize our competition. The motivation behind these actions
is clear. Our adversaries seek to establish 50-year, or longer,
geostrategic relationships. Mr. Johnson's bill will improve the
ability of our companies to compete, and win, in international
markets.
Imagine designing a new car that is cheaper, safer, and
gets triple the fuel mileage from anything we see on the road
today. But when the vehicle is ready to hit the road, there is
no gas to fill up the tank. Nuclear innovators face just that
challenge.
Advanced nuclear technologies offer a wealth of promising
benefits. However, for these designs to become reality, a
certain amount of advanced nuclear fuel must be available for
the first movers. Congressman Flores' legislation helps address
this obstacle by directing DOE to undertake specific actions to
provide what is known as high-assay low-enriched uranium. The
time to begin addressing this problem is now in order to have
the advanced fuel available when needed.
The fourth bill, the bipartisan legislation from
Congressmen Hudson, Peters, Wilson, and Norcross, directs the
Secretary of Energy to identify the key components for a pilot
program that could capture the energy security benefits of
future nuclear technologies to support critical national
security infrastructure.
This morning we will here from the Department of Energy on
the first panel, including from the office of Nuclear Energy
and the NNSA. We will also hear several expert perspectives on
the second panel. I look forward to the discussion and working
with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to advance these
important bipartisan bills.
I look forward to the feedback the two panels of expert
witnesses will provide this morning, as well as working with my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to advance these
important bipartisan bills.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Rush. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
thank you so much for holding this important hearing today on
legislation addressing the development, regulation, and
competitiveness of advanced nuclear technologies.
As I have said many times before, Mr. Chairman, I subscribe
to an all-of-the-above energy portfolio, even as we move
towards a low carbon energy economy. I have also stated on many
occasions that I believe nuclear energy must play a vital role
as a source of safe, reliable, low carbon power that can help
us meet the energy and environmental needs of the 21st Century.
I look forward to working with the majority as we proceed
through regular order. And I believe that we may be able to
come to a strong, bipartisan agreement on most, if not all of
these bills.
Today, Mr. Chairman, I support the discussion draft offered
by Mr. Flores of Texas which would simply direct the Secretary
of Energy to establish a program to support the availability of
high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HA-LEU, for commercial use.
We have learned that there are several companies looking to
design and license advanced nuclear reactor technologies
utilizing uranium-235 isotopes enriched at levels greater than
5 percent and less than 20 percent. Some of these companies
identified significant challenges associated with assessing HA-
LEU.
And I believe Mr. Flores' discussion draft will address
some of these concerns and make HA-LEU more accessible with the
right safeguards. Also, I support, Mr. Chairman, that the
discussion draft offered by a group of bipartisan Members,
including two from this subcommittee, Mr. Hudson of North
Carolina, and Mr. Peters of California. This bill would require
the Secretary of Energy to develop a report on a pilot program
to site, construct, and operate microreactors at critical
national security locations.
Mr. Chairman, I am also inclined to support some of the
objectives of H.R. 1320, which will amend the NRC fee recovery
process associated with the advanced reactor regulatory
framework, while also limiting internal funds available for
corporate support costs and capping fees on operating reactors.
However, Mr. Chairman, I do have some concerns regarding
the bill's provisions essentially repealing licensing
assistance to foreign governments. Also want to better
understand verification of repealing requirements for mandatory
hearing while also implementing specific time lines to review
environmental impact statements and how these changes might
impact public input.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I also look forward to engaging
today's witnesses on the discussion draft sponsored by Mr.
Johnson of Ohio. This bill would, among other things, revise
DOE's review of Part 810 process by expediting procedures for
transferring civilian nuclear technology, including to foreign
powers. Mr. Chairman, this proposal comes against the
background of the current administration's decision to renege
on the U.S. commitment in the Iran deal while also moving
forward on potential talks with North Korea's volatile dictator
on denuclearization issues.
So I look forward to hearing today's distinguished panel on
both the timing and the necessity of this legislation, as well
as identifying possible unintended consequences.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rush follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Bobby L. Rush
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing today on legislation addressing the
development, regulation, and competitiveness of advanced
nuclear technologies.
Mr. Chairman, as I have stated many times before, I
subscribe to an all-of-the-above energy portfolio, even as we
move towards a low-carbon energy economy.
I have also stated on many occasions that I believe nuclear
energy must play a vital role as a source of safe, reliable,
low-carbon power that can help us meet both the energy and
environmental needs of the 21st Century.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with the majority
as we proceed through regular order and I believe we may be
able to come to a strong bipartisan agreement on most, if not
all of those bills.
Today, I support the discussion draft, authored by Rep.
Flores of Texas, which would simply direct the Secretary of
Energy to establish a program to support the availability of
high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HA-LEU, for commercial use.
We have learned that there are several companies looking to
design and license advanced nuclear reactor technologies
utilizing uranium-235 isotopes enriched at levels greater than
5 percent and less than 20 percent.
Some of these companies identified significant challenges
associated with accessing HA-LEU and I believe Mr. Flores'
discussion draft would address some of these concerns and make
HA-LEU more accessible with the right safeguards.
I also support the discussion draft authored by a group of
bipartisan Members, including two from this subcommittee, Mr.
Hudson of North Carolina and Mr. Peters of California.
This bill would require the Secretary of Energy to develop
a report on a pilot program to site, construct, and operate
microreactors at critical national security locations.
Mr. Chairman, I am also inclined to support some of the
objectives of HR 1320, which would amend the NRC's fee recovery
process associated with the advanced reactor regulatory
framework, while also limiting the total funds available for
corporate support costs, and capping fees on operating
reactors.
However, I have some concerns regarding the bills'
provision potentially repealing licensing restrictions to
foreign governments.
I also want to better understand the implications of
repealing requirements for mandatory hearings, while also
implementing specific timelines to review final environmental
impact statements and how that might impact public input.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I also look forward to engaging
today's witnesses on the discussion draft sponsored by Mr.
Johnson of Ohio.
This bill would, among other things, revise DOE's review of
the Part 810 process by expediting procedures for transferring
civilian nuclear technology, including to foreign powers.
Mr. Chairman, this proposal comes against the backdrop of
the current administration's decision to renege on the U.S.
commitment in the Iran Deal, while also moving forward on
potential talks with North Korea's volatile dictator on
denuclearization issues.
So, I look forward to engaging today's distinguished
panelists on both the timing and necessity of this legislation,
as well as identifying possible unintended consequences.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Upton. The Chair recognizes for an opening statement
the chair of the full committee, the gentleman from Oregon.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Walden. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
this hearing. This really represents an important component of
our Department of Energy effort at modernization.
The bills we will examine today provide key ingredients to
enhance a core national security and energy security mission
for the Department, and of the Nation: promoting the safe and
peaceful use of nuclear technology. It is really important.
Congress first authorized the commercial application of
atomic energy in 1954, when it declared the, and I quote,
``development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free
competition in private enterprise.'' That policy remains as
relevant today and as important as ever.
By any measure, atomic energy has already brought
tremendous benefits to the Nation; it has provided a baseload,
emissions-free source of electricity that has powered homes and
industry over the last half a century. It has provided an
infrastructure for our national and international security,
from the technologies and fuels for our nuclear navy to the
safety and security for civilian nuclear power the world over.
However, as everyone on this panel knows well, a confluence
of factors--abundant natural gas, power market designs,
economic and regulatory burdens--have inhibited the Nation's
nuclear energy over the past decade. The challenge confronting
policymakers is how to preserve the beneficial use of atomic
energy for future generations. Thoughtful, targeted legislative
proposals today I think are a really good start.
The bipartisan bill from Representatives Kinzinger and
Doyle establishes reasonable and predictable time frames for
regulatory decisions so companies like Oregon-based Nuscale
Power can develop business plans to commercialize new nuclear
technologies, while also protecting future consumers from high
regulatory costs.
The many regulatory requirements imposed by the Federal
Government on special nuclear material are understandable due
to the risk associated with unsecured radioactive sources, but
this presents barriers to new market entrants, too. Congressman
Flores' discussion draft will spur innovation by providing a
solution to advanced nuclear fuel needs.
And the bipartisan discussion draft from E&C members Hudson
and Peters and two members of the Armed Services Committee,
Congressmen Wilson and Norcross, will help identify specific
national security applications to capture the benefits of
transformational nuclear reactor designs. For example, Idaho
National Laboratory's remote location and critical defense
programs may be an ideal location to construct and operate a
resilient nuclear reactor.
And lastly, Congressman Johnson's discussion draft will
help reduce barriers to competition facing our domestic
manufacturing, vendors, and nuclear service companies. This is
a critical conversation for this subcommittee and one we must
not shy away from.
This morning's witnesses bring both extensive experience in
public service and business acumen. And we thank you both for
being here.
I want to welcome Dr. Brent Park, the recently confirmed
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nonproliferation at the
National Nuclear Security Administration. Dr. Park is
responsible for critical national security programs that keep
America safe. Dr. Park is joined on the first panel by Ed
McGinnis from DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy. So we appreciate
your being here.
And the second panel this morning includes Melissa Mann,
the president of URENCO, USA. URENCO is the only domestically
located, NRC-licensed facility to enrich uranium for commercial
use. Ms. Mann brings a wealth of insight to this discussion on
behalf of the U.S. nuclear supply chain industry.
And Southern Nuclear has assumed the leadership mantle on
behalf of utilities to assess and develop advanced nuclear
reactor designs. Nick Irvin leads those efforts for Southern
Company and offers a hands-on testimonial of the rigorous
process underway across the country to seek regulatory approval
for promising first-of-its-kind technologies.
I also want to welcome back Jeff Merrifield, who has
testified in this room many times, going back to his tenure as
an NRC Commissioner. He is now practicing law with a focus on
advanced nuclear reactors and strategic counsel to energy
companies. Jeff provides an abundance of experience to inform
today's discussions.
There remains tremendous promise for America's nuclear
technology. And we can ensure that promise through legislative
reforms reflective of our committee priorities to put consumers
first, advance innovation, protect national security, and spur
competition. I believe the four bills today align with those
priorities.
So I look forward to and thank our Members on both sides of
the aisle for coming together for these initiatives. And I
would be remiss if I didn't also thank the committee, and
especially Mr. Shimkus, for the effort to get a permanent and
interim nuclear waste storage facility up and running. He and I
won the pool on the vote count in the House. We both
independently predicted 340 votes would be achieved, and that
was the number. Now we just need, you know, 100 in the Senate.
Maybe 98 would do.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, we remain committed to moving
forward on this energy front. And I return the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Greg Walden
Today's Energy Subcommittee legislative hearing represents
an important component of our DOE modernization efforts.
The bills we will examine provide key ingredients to
enhance a core national security and energy security mission of
the Department, and of the Nation: promoting the safe and
peaceful use of nuclear technology.
When Congress first authorized the commercial application
of atomic energy in 1954, it declared: the ``development, use,
and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote
world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard
of living, and strengthen free competition in private
enterprise.''
That policy remains as relevant today and as important as
ever.
By any measure, atomic energy has already brought
tremendous benefits to the Nation; it has provided a baseload,
emissions-free source of electricity that has powered homes and
industry over the past half-century. It has provided an
infrastructure for our national and international security--
from the technologies and fuels for our nuclear navy to the
safety and security for civilian nuclear power.
However, as everybody on this panel knows well, a
confluence of factors--abundant natural gas, power market
designs, economic and regulatory burdens- have inhibited the
Nation's nuclear industry over the past decade.
The challenge confronting policymakers is how to preserve
the beneficial use of atomic energy for future generations.
Today's thoughtful, targeted legislative proposals are a good
start.
The bipartisan bill from Representatives Kinzinger and
Doyle establishes reasonable and predictable timeframes for
regulatory decisions so companies like Oregon-based Nuscale
Power can develop business plans to commercialize new nuclear
technologies, while also protecting future consumers from
unnecessarily high regulatory costs.
The many regulatory requirements imposed by the Federal
Government on special nuclear material are understandable due
to the risk associated with unsecure radioactive sources, but
these regulations present barriers to new market entrants.
Congressman Flores' discussion draft will spur innovation by
providing a solution to advanced nuclear fuel needs.
The bipartisan discussion draft from committee members
Hudson and Peters and two members of the Armed Services
Committee, Congressmen Wilson andNorcross, will help identify
specific national security applications to capture the benefits
of transformational nuclear reactor designs. For example, Idaho
National Laboratory's remote location and critical defense
programs may be an ideal location to construct and operate a
resilient nuclear reactor.
And lastly, Congressman Johnson's discussion draft will
help reduce barriers to competition facing our domestic
manufacturing, vendors, and nuclear service companies. This is
a critical conversation for this subcommittee, and one we must
not shy away from.
This morning's witnesses bring both extensive experience in
public service and business acumen.
I welcome Dr. Brent Park, the recently confirmed Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nonproliferation at the National
Nuclear Security Administration. Dr. Park is responsible for
overseeing critical national security programs that keep
America safe. Dr. Park is joined on the first panel by Ed
McGinnis from DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy.
The second panel this morning includes Melissa Mann, the
president of Urenco, USA. Urenco is the only domestically
located, NRC-licensed facility to enrich uranium for commercial
use. Ms. Mann brings a wealth of insight to this discussion on
behalf of the U.S. nuclear supply chain industry.
Southern Nuclear has assumed the leadership mantle on
behalf of utilities to assess and develop advanced nuclear
reactor designs. Nick Irvin leads those efforts for Southern
Company and offers a hands-on testimonial of the rigorous
process underway across the country to seek regulatory approval
for promising first-of-a-kind technologies.
I also welcome back Jeff Merrifield, who has testified in
this room many times going back to his tenure as an NRC
Commissioner. He is now practicing law with a focus on advanced
nuclear reactors and strategic counsel to energy companies.
Jeff provides an abundance of experience to inform today's
discussion.
There remains tremendous promise for American nuclear
technology; and we can ensure that promise through legislative
reforms, reflective of our committee priorities to put
consumers first, advance innovation, protect national security,
and spur competition. The four bills today align with those
priorities.
I appreciate the bipartisan leadership from Members on this
topic and look forward to moving these important bills forward.
Mr. Upton. The Chair would recognize the ranking member of
the full committee, Mr. Pallone, for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing will examine four bills addressing a range
of topics relating to advanced nuclear energy technology. H.R.
1320, the Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act, introduced
by Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle, builds upon a
discussion draft that this subcommittee reviewed in 2016.
H.R. 1320 makes several major changes to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's budgeting process and fee structure.
The bill caps corporate support costs at the Commission and
puts a ceiling on the fee charged to each nuclear reactor. I
appreciate the financial strain the nuclear industry is facing
and the carbon free energy it provides, however, I am concerned
that these budgetary changes could arbitrarily limit the
resources the NRC needs and adversely affect its ability to do
its job.
I also have questions about Section 7 of the bill which
sets up an expedited time line for review of nuclear reactors
at the NRC. The bill provides 24 months to complete a draft
environmental impact statement and 42 months to complete the
technical review process. Inflexible deadlines could jeopardize
the environmental and safety review process for more complex
applications.
And I am also concerned with the provision in the section
that requires NRC issue a construction permit to a nuclear
facility even if an entity has filed a formal request for a
hearing objecting to the project. Stakeholders should have the
chance to voice their concerns publicly before a project permit
is issued.
But despite my issues with those sections of the bill, I am
supportive of setting a deadline for the NRC to finish its
decommissioning rulemaking and removing advanced nuclear
reactor work at NRC from the fee recovery requirement. I look
forward to work with my colleagues on this bill as we move
forward in the process.
The committee will also review a discussion draft from
Representative Johnson that makes changes to the process by
which the Secretary of Energy authorizes the transfer of
unclassified nuclear energy technology and assistance to
foreign countries. This is known as the Part 810 process. I
appreciate that this process must function well for the U.S. to
remain competitive in the commercial nuclear space, but the
bill establishes a 30-day time frame for the Secretary to
approve the transfer of certain low proliferation risk nuclear
technologies to countries that are not nuclear weapon states.
Unfortunately, President Trump has put us on the path to
upend the current dynamic of nuclear weapons proliferation
across the globe. The President has walked away from the Iran
deal. And now Saudi Arabia has said that if Iran restarts its
nuclear program Saudi Arabia will itself pursue building
nuclear weapons. And I am uncomfortable with expediting the
review process of Part 810 at a time when there is so much
global uncertainty on nuclear proliferation. This is not the
right time to address this issue.
Next, the committee will consider a discussion draft from
Representative Flores to accelerate the availability of high-
assay low-enriched uranium. This is the fuel needed for most
advanced nuclear reactor designs. It is not commercially
available today. In order to ensure the fuel is available for
advanced reactors once they are licensed and ready to begin
producing electricity, the Federal Government will need to
coordinate efforts within agencies and with the commercial
nuclear sector. This is a worthy effort, and I look forward to
working with the majority on this proposal.
And last, we have a discussion draft that directs the
Departments of Energy and Defense to develop a report
evaluating the resiliency benefits of siting microreactors at
critical DOE and DoD infrastructure sites. I believe this
report will provide the committee with valuable information,
and commend Representatives Peters and Hudson, as well as my
New Jersey colleague, Representative Norcross, for taking up
this important issue.
But finally, I want to thank, I do want to thank Priscilla
Barbour, who has provided invaluable support over the last year
as an energy fellow on the minority committee staff. Priscilla
is finishing her fellowship tomorrow, and I wish her well on
her future endeavors.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Today's hearing will examine four bills addressing a range
of topics relating to advanced nuclear energy technologies.
H.R. 1320, the Nuclear Utilization of Keynote Energy Act,
introduced by Representatives Kinzinger and Doyle, builds upon
a discussion draft that this subcommittee reviewed in 2016.
H.R. 1320 makes several major changes to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) budgeting process and fee structure. The
bill caps corporate support costs at the Commission and puts a
ceiling on the fee charged to each nuclear reactor. I
appreciate the financial strain the nuclear industry is facing
and the carbon-free energy it provides. However, I am concerned
that these budgetary changes could arbitrarily limit the
resources the NRC needs and adversely affect its ability to do
its job.
I also have questions about section 7 of the bill, which
sets up an expedited timeline for review of nuclear reactors at
the NRC. The bill provides 24 months to complete a draft
environmental impact statement and 42 months to complete the
technical review process. Inflexible deadlines could jeopardize
the environmental and safety review process for more complex
applications. I am also concerned with a provision in this
section that requires NRC to issue a construction permit for a
nuclear facility even if an entity has filed a formal request
for a hearing objecting to the project. Stakeholders should
have the chance to voice their concerns publicly before a
project permit is issued.
Despite my issues with those sections of the bill, I am
supportive of setting a deadline for the NRC to finish its
decommissioning rulemaking and removing advanced nuclear
reactor work at NRC from the fee recovery requirement. I look
forward to working with my colleagues on this bill as we move
forward in the process.
The committee will also review a discussion draft from Rep.
Johnson that makes changes to the process by which the
Secretary of Energy authorizes the transfer of unclassified
nuclear energy technology and assistance to foreign countries.
This is known as the Part 810 process. I appreciate that this
process must function well for the U.S. to remain competitive
in the commercial nuclear space. But, the bill establishes a
30-day time frame for the Secretary to approve the transfer of
certain ``low proliferation risk'' nuclear technologies to
countries that are not nuclear weapons states.
Unfortunately, President Trump has put us on the path to
upend the current dynamic of nuclear weapons proliferation
across the globe. The President has walked away from the Iran
deal, and now Saudi Arabia has said that if Iran restarts its
nuclear program, Saudi Arabia will itself pursue building
nuclear weapons. I am uncomfortable with expediting the review
process for Part 810 at a time when there is so much global
uncertainty on nuclear proliferation. This is not the right
time to address this issue.
Next, the committee will consider a discussion draft from
Rep. Flores to accelerate the availability of high-assay low-
enriched uranium. This is the fuel needed for most advanced
nuclear reactor designs. It is not commercially available
today. In order to ensure the fuel is available for advanced
reactors once they are licensed and ready to begin producing
electricity, the Federal Government will need to coordinate
efforts within agencies, and with the commercial nuclear
sector. This is a worthy effort, and I look forward to working
with the majority on this proposal.
Last, we have a discussion draft that directs the
Departments of Energy and Defense to develop a report
evaluating the resiliency benefits of siting microreactors at
critical DOE and DOD infrastructure sites. I believe this
report will provide the committee with valuable information,
and commend Representatives Peters and Hudson, as well as my
New Jersey colleague, Rep. Norcross for taking up this
important issue.
Finally, I want to thank Priscilla Barbour, who has
provided invaluable support over the last year as an energy
fellow on the minority committee staff. Priscilla is finishing
her fellowship tomorrow.
Mr. Pallone. And then I would like to yield my minute to
Mr. Doyle.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Pallone. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss nuclear energy, which is a critical
component of our Nation's energy portfolio.
Nuclear energy provides nearly 40 percent of Pennsylvania's
electricity, and employs thousands of skilled workers in
Pennsylvania. This carbon-free, reliable baseload power is also
an important factor in meeting our climate goals, which is why
it is necessary to work collaboratively to address the issues
confronting the nuclear industry.
I want to thank my colleague, Congressman Adam Kinzinger,
for his leadership introducing H.R. 1320, the NUKE Act. This
bipartisan legislation would take important steps to modernize
the NRC's fee structure, study new opportunities for additional
regulatory certainty, and look to future reforms that will
ensure the NRC can continue to effectively protect public
health and safety.
I would note that this legislation was originally entitled
the NUKEPA Act, so I appreciate that the name has evolved so
that it no longer poses a threat to the State of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Chairman, with that, I thank you and yield back.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired. We are now
ready to start our distinguished panel's testimony. We welcome
Brent Park, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation at the NNSA; and Ed McGinnis, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for the Office of Nuclear Energy at DOE.
So, welcome to both. And each, thank you for submitting
your testimony in advance. It will be made part of the record
in its entirety. And we would like you to spend 5 minutes each,
no longer than that, to discuss the summary, at which point we
will go to questions.
Dr. Park, we will welcome you first.
STATEMENTS OF BRENT PARK, PH.D., DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND EDWARD G. MCGINNIS,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
STATEMENT OF BRENT PARK
Dr. Park. Good morning, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member
Rush, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide views on behalf of the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration on the
proposed pieces of legislation. I appreciate the ongoing
bipartisan efforts to address our Nation's energy challenges.
First I would like to discuss the potential for DOE to
establish a program to support the availability of high-assay
low-enriched uranium, so-called HA-LEU. NNSA fully agrees with
the committee that availability of HA-LEU is important, and
recognizes the need that industry has expressed for researching
and developing HA-LEU fuels.
Enriched uranium is required at various levels of
enrichment and forms for national security and nonproliferation
missions, as well as an equalizer for production. Since the
United States no longer has a uranium enrichment capability for
these missions, the Nation relies on inventory of highly
enriched uranium material that is unblended to meet the
enriched uranium requirements identified above. However, our
supply is finite, and at present irreplaceable. Moreover, our
current stores of HA-LEU will run out in the early 2040s.
To meet industry needs, NNSA will evaluate any specific
requests from industry for this material alongside NNSA's
ongoing needs for enriched uranium for defense and nondefense
purposes.
NNSA supports the language in the bill regarding the
development of a transportation package for HA-LEU, and
exploring options to establish a domestic HA-LEU enrichment and
production capability. NNSA strongly supports such an
enrichment capability which we believe is essential in assuring
a long-term supply of HA-LEU to meet the needs of the
commercial industry, research reactors, and medical isotope
products.
A second bill with NNSA components for discussion today
pertains to DOE's authority under 10 C.F.R. Part 810 to
regulate exports of U.S. civil nuclear technology and
assistance for peaceful purposes. Overall, this draft
legislation will deliver useful and practical improvements of
the regulatory process that is important to the Nation's
security and economic prosperity.
We appreciate the opportunity to come before you today as
well as continue the discussion with your staff on any issues
that may arise. The Department seeks to ensure the highest
nonproliferation standards are applied globally in such a way
as to facilitate U.S. exports. The burgeoning international
nuclear energy market provides a significant commercial
opportunity for the U.S. nuclear industry, and the export of
U.S. nuclear technology plays a large part in making sure U.S.
industry remains an active player in this market.
In response to feedback from the U.S. industry and other
stakeholders, we have taken a number of steps to simplify and
update the Part 810 regulation, and have implemented
significant improvements in the process for reviewing export
applications. In addition to the Department's recent
implementation of the e810 electronic application system, the
committee's legislation will further streamline the review
process in general, while maintaining strong nonproliferation
controls on U.S. nuclear technology.
We agree that this legislation will empower the Secretary
of Energy to authorize technology and systems exports in a more
expeditious manner. I look forward to additional discussion
with the committee.
In our view, this legislation will reduce processing times
for applications involving certain reactor technologies and
destinations that present a low risk of nuclear proliferation,
and will provide the Department with flexibility to recommend
the Secretary to delegate some application approvals to a lower
level.
Another advantage the bill provides is the requirement for
DOE offices to review Part 810 applications at the same time
that they are being reviewed by the interagency whether they
are performing these reviews expressly. We are happy to report
that the Department has already begun this process, and we are
confident this is yet another step in the right direction.
NNSA recognizes that the effective implementation of our
mission is to strengthen our strong partnerships with industry.
NNSA needs these strong energy partners to resolve the critical
national security issues that we face.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
And I, with my staff, look forward to future discussions of
this draft bill. I stand ready to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Park follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Upton. Thank you so much.
Mr. McGinnis.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD G. MCGINNIS
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much, Chairman Upton, Ranking
Member Rush, and other members of the subcommittee. I am very
pleased to appear before you today to discuss legislation
addressing advanced nuclear energy technologies, including
high-assay low-enriched uranium, which I will refer to in
shorthand during my testimony as high-assay LEU.
Although the administration is still evaluating your bills
and has not taken an official position at this time, the
Department greatly appreciates the committee's interest in
these topics and recognizes the potentially very important role
high-assay LEU may well play in meeting our Nation's energy and
national security needs.
Over the last seven decades, the nuclear energy
capabilities pioneered by the United States have served and
supported our Nation's energy security and, in turn, national
security. In recognition of this vital role, the White House-
led review of U.S. nuclear energy policy is underway, and we
are already beginning to take steps to revitalize and expand
our civil nuclear energy sector. The outcomes of the civil
nuclear review will inform our approach to revitalizing this
critical sector.
While our Nation's nuclear infrastructure, supply chain,
and manufacturing base have been significantly degraded, the
United States still leads the world in other key areas of
nuclear energy. In fact, we believe the most mature advanced
U.S. designs could potentially be deployed as early as the mid
to late 2020s by the private industry. This is where the need
for high-assay LEU arises.
Nearly all U.S. advanced nonlight-water reactors under
development will require high-assay LEU, including advanced
microreactors. The advanced reactor community has stressed the
near-term need and importance of high-assay LEU for advanced
nuclear fuel, qualification testing, and for potential
demonstration reactors.
No commercial enricher currently provides high-assay LEU.
While current enrichment plants could be modified to produce
high-assay LEU, it is unlikely that a commercial capability
would be pursued without further indication of progress towards
deployment by advanced reactor vendors. The Department
recognizes the industry's concerns regarding high-assay LEU
fuel, and we are taking a number of actions to support the
development of high-assay LEU in the near and longer term.
First, the Department is working with industry to refine
its near-term R&D needs for fuel development and qualification,
particularly how much material is needed, when, and in what
form, and also to understand more about projections for longer-
term needs.
Second, we are leveraging our expertise in support of the
technical aspects of commercial high-assay LEU infrastructure.
The Department is aware that high-assay LEU may be needed in
various fuel forms by different vendors. On the transportation
side there are no large scale shipments of uranium enriched
above 5 percent. And the transportation packages currently used
for these smaller shipments may not support commercial-scale
operations.
Third, the Department is reviewing materials across the DOE
complex with an eye toward materials and processing options
that may support some near-term industry R&D needs. Once
industry needs in terms of quantities, forms, tolerances for
impurities, and timing are known, the Department can then
evaluate specific requests from industry for material,
alongside our ongoing needs for research, reactor fuel, and
medical isotope production. Current Department mission needs
are supplied from our finite and diminishing supply of high-
enriched uranium.
In conclusion, the Department is working closely with U.S.
nuclear innovators to define the challenges to bringing the
next generation of advanced nuclear reactors and power into the
marketplace, and are embarking on a number of actions to
support the development of a commercial fuel cycle for high-
assay LEU.
We look forward to working with Congress, including in
particular the subcommittee here, industry, and our partners
across the Department on defining and exploring high-assay LEU
issues now and in the future.
And, finally, I would just like to say that we greatly
appreciate the work and focus of this subcommittee on such
important matters to our Nation's energy and national security.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGinnis follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you both. And appreciate your kind
words. And we do work, try to work in a bipartisan way in
potentially all the things that we move through this
subcommittee. And we look forward to working with you.
I would say as we talk about these bills, and the sponsors
are here, we intend to move these bills. And there is a
legislative process. We want your input. I know that you have
not taken a formal stand with staff on any of these, but we
would like your technical assistance, but also your continued
input as these bills begin to move through the process. So if
you can take that back to your department heads, that would be
great.
Quick, couple of quick questions from my vantage point. You
know, we know that, according to the EIA and World Nuclear
Association data, there are presently about 50 nuclear reactors
under construction around the world, mostly in Asia. There are
about 150 to 160 reactors on order or planned, and upwards of
300 that have been proposed. Almost all of that growth is in
Asia, the Middle East, with a little bit in Russia.
Not a lot here in the U.S., I think primarily because of
the cheap natural gas. We're seeing big advancements there in
terms of new permitting. I've got a facility in my district
that looks to break ground a little bit later this fall. And I
have got a nuclear plant, it is like a plant that is looking to
phase out now over the next couple years, the Palisades plant.
And more power will have to be generated by other sources,
whether it be renewable, gas, that type of thing.
So as the U.S. companies are competing primarily with
China, Russia, France, South Korea, if we are unable to
successfully compete and are excluded from those emerging
markets, including the Middle East, will the dominance of
China, Russia in these markets be beneficial to international
nuclear security, nonproliferation, and nuclear safety? How
will that all fit as we lose probably our leading role as we
see the number of domestic facilities here in the U.S. actually
be reduced without any real plans to finish construction.
The new plants won't make up for the ones that are being
taken offline. How does that work with what is happening
internationally?
Dr. Park. Thank you. First of all, I agree with your
assessment that the U.S. needs to reclaim the leadership
clearly. There is no question in your statement. And how we go
about doing that is what is on the table for us to discuss.
I think we are taking your leadership and guidance from
this committee to make sure we streamline many of these
approval processes and so on. But we need to do better. I
acknowledge that. And in terms of actually not playing in the
theaters that you just talked about, many dozens of nuclear
reactors being built and being designed and so on, we need to
get into that world as quickly as possible and work closely
with any other sectors to make sure we have a competitive edge.
Again, our--as a nuclear physicist I am happy to share with
you we actually have the edge on the nuclear technologies on
the science and technology side, we just need to better
transfer these proven technologies in a safe, secure--in a
safeguarded format. We are doing our very best at the moment.
Mr. Upton. Mr. McGinnis, do you have anything?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. I would say that the
implications to the United States trending out of its nuclear
leadership role, which most of the DNA still today around the
world in nuclear technologies is from the United States and
some great innovators, if we continue with this trend and if we
don't find a way to re-vector into a sustainable growth
potential, it goes far beyond electricity. Resiliency is really
important. But when it comes to the global, competitive,
strategic state of play in nuclear with Russia and China, the
implications go directly into our national security interests
and not just our energy security interests.
So it is vital that we begin building again. We have had an
extraordinary run of our fleet, which is by far the most
efficiently run in the world. And we still lead as the greatest
innovators. We know how to disrupt and innovate like other
industries we are witnessing in aerospace and others in the
United States. Frankly, our competitors are hoping that we
don't find and tap that innovation in this moment for nuclear.
I strongly believe we are at that point where we are in the
process of disrupting the market, innovating right now. And so
we have a great opportunity, and I want to say in large part
because of the really unprecedented, I would say in my career,
bipartisan support from Congress, including such as is
reflected in this subcommittee. So thank you.
Mr. Upton. And before I yield there to my friend Mr. Rush,
I want to insert into the record a report from the Atlantic
Council titled ``U.S. Nuclear-Power Leadership and the Chinese
and Russian Challenge.'' And without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Upton. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from
Illinois, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Park, you noted Secretary Perry's December 2017 letter
to this subcommittee detailing the agency's commitment to
reducing processing time for application on the Part 810. You
stated that DOE and NNSA have already made significant progress
in improving efficiency and transparency on the Part 810
regulatory regime by implementing the Part 810 process
improvement plan.
These improvements help to reduce the average processing
time for a request under Part 810 from a high of more than 18
months to approximately 12 months. In light of this process
improvement plan do you see a need for legislation such as the
discussion draft that is before us today that will amend the
Atomic Energy Act to improve the process for authorizing the
transfer of civilian nuclear commerce, technology, and
assistance. And does this bill overlap with aspects of the
improvement plan?
Dr. Park. First of all, I did a really detailed analysis of
the committee's help and guidance, by the way. That is in
concert with this committee that we have been developing PIP,
performance improvement plan. We actually had implemented many
of your guidance in our planning, by the way.
For example, as we are developing e810 for example, your
example, we actually, I think we shared with your staff that
the internal processing--this is only an example by the way--
instead of waiting for State Department to do--to wait for
official assurance on operation requirements we actually do a
parallel process, number one.
Number two, as it turns out that many of the things that we
used to do in paper form, the industry partners did not know
what kind of progress they were making with us, through e810,
for example. If they are able to have a transparency into where
are their packages and, you know, ask us how to speed things
along and so on, there are a lot of improvements that we have
made. We still need to do more.
But, again, there are enough of positive signs. Yesterday I
asked my staff to give me statistics on what kind of uses we
have for e810. I am happy to report to the committee that the
improvement of the usage has gone up substantially from last
year to this year on month-by-month rollout. Compared to 2017,
2018 usage of e810 is 50 percent higher. It is too early to
tell whether this will really seal the deal in terms of
expediting the approval process and so on and so forth.
But so far, indicators are that we are making a positive
difference and we are training the interested partners so they
know how to work with us. So this is all being realized.
Mr. Rush. Right. So on the proposed legislation, will that
enhance your ability or will that retract from your ability?
Dr. Park. So, I don't think I could comment on whether that
would help or whatever. But I appreciate the fact that there
are many, many useful guidelines out of this committee. So we
will look for ways to work with the committee.
Mr. Rush. Thank you. I am going to ask you another
question.
In your written statement, you say that the Avanced Nuclear
Fuel Availability Act, as written, may be redundant to existing
requirements and initiatives currently being conducted at the
agency. You also note that ``allowing a consortium that
includes industry members to determine who can purchase HA-LEU
from the Department may present conflicts of interest or an
unfair advantage to certain players in the emerging market.''
Can you briefly discuss both the redundancies that are found in
this bill with regards to your current practice?
Also, what recommendation will you suggest to help avoid
the occurrence of conflict of interest or unfair advantage for
industry members helping to decide who can purchase HA-LEU?
Dr. Park. So, appreciate your thoughtful question.
As it turns out, I would not look at the word
``redundancy'' as a negative word. The fact that we actually
have been working with your staff of this committee for quite
some time we then implemented the redundancy of the word would
come in the form of, we heard you already. If the bill actually
incorporates these guidelines, we are happy to absorb, follow
the guidelines. But we have been doing quite a bit already in
the form of, we are actually working with any and other parts
within DOE to collectively promise from industry partners.
We have some rough numbers that we got. But, again, we are
actually incorporating that into our projections, as I shared
with you in my oral testimony. Our supply would run out in
early 2040s, so we are required to update our projections as we
collect information from industry partners or other players.
So, to that extent, ``redundancy'' is not a bad word, number
one, if that helps you.
Mr. Rush. I get your point.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have too many
questions.
My primary question is about the discussion draft by
Congressmen Hudson, Wilson, Norcross, and Peters about these
microreactors at Department of Energy--I mean Department of
Defense facilities. I'm not real sure what a microreactor is.
So I want a definition. And I also want to know who would have
jurisdiction. Would it be the Defense Department or would it be
the Energy Department?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much for that question.
Microreactors, depending on who you talk to, define it by the
power level. And one conventional range is 1 to up to 10
megawatts electric. Some companies are defining it 1 to 30,
even in the kilowatt range.
But it is smaller, lower level than what is a conventional
small modular reactor, number one.
Number two, this is a very interesting emerging technical
sector that I am witnessing, we are witnessing right now in the
United States with regards to microreactors. There are a number
of exciting designs and companies in different parts of the
United States, some of which we are working with at the
Department of Energy on supporting an appropriate technical
role early stage on supporting the proving out of these
microreactors.
In fact, we have an MOU with one such microreactor where
they are targeting 2021 to have the first demonstration built
at Idaho National Lab, just to give you a sense of how fast
this is moving. These microreactors, the key--I know about this
from the fuel supply--is they all, virtually all, require high-
assay LEU, maybe smaller amounts, but if they prove out the
business line they are going to, they will be selling many of
them.
Now, on the question of the Department of Defense and
Department of Energy, what I can say is that we are certainly
working with the Department of Defense. We are in
communications with them. We are sharing our information and
know-how on microreactors with the Department of Defense, more
than one part of the Department of Defense. We are sharing
information with them from the infrastructure side, the
Assistant Secretary as well as from Army. And we see, frankly,
great potential, significant potential with regards to the role
and value of microreactors.
And I think, frankly, this could be one of those surprise
disruptive, very positively disruptive sectors that may, may
catch a lot of us by surprise in a very good way. And I am
excited about it.
Mr. Barton. I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate having
this hearing today.
Nuclear energy technology is an important part of
increasing our zero mission energy sources. We need this energy
generation and the clean air standards it can help us achieve.
And for these reasons, and many more, I supported research and
development in next generation energy technologies,
particularly advanced nuclear development in small modular
reactors.
And I am one of the, with Mr. Hudson, one of the lead
sponsors of the draft bill before us today. And I appreciate
his work on that.
My bill would--our bill would--direct the Department of
Defense and Department of Energy to work together in analyzing
how microreactors can bolster energy resiliency for national
security.
In my home district in San Diego and in the nearby region,
we have piloted microgrids at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar.
We have tested battery generation rucksacks at Camp Pendleton,
and performed other energy development project partnerships
between the Navy and the University of California at San Diego.
DoD has been a willing and helpful partner in testing clean and
innovative energy sources. It is not because they are tree
huggers or doctrinaire environmentalists, but from their
perspective energy resilience is a life and death question.
For instance, the fewer batteries that Marines have to
carry, the more ammunition they can take in their pack; and
that could be what saves their life in a firefight in a faraway
country. It is a stark reminder of how energy resilience is
critical. I think the partnership in this bill makes sense and
I hope to see it advance quickly.
To Mr. McGinnis, I had a question about research funding. I
am an advocate for early stage innovation and research support
from the Federal Government. I wanted to just give you an
opportunity to say if you think we are missing any areas of
nuclear research and innovation, where we need to bolster that
investment.
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much.
There, as indicated, we are in the process of revitalizing
our nuclear energy sector. We made it clear that we have
experienced great degradation, frankly, including in our test
capabilities, whether it is not having fast neutrons for a fast
spectrum reactor to be able to test those key components for
the next class of reactors coming in, or advanced fuels, or
whether it is other technical capabilities that we need as a
key element of our nuclear sector.
So I can say, first of all, that the authorization language
that we have seen today, and also the appropriations has been
very important to support our efforts to revitalize. We don't
just rely on Idaho National Lab, although Idaho National Lab is
a flagship lab for nuclear energy, we are relying on Oak Ridge,
we are relying on many of the others, and Lawrence Livermore
and other labs. But if we are going to get back in the game we
have got to get our fuel cycle R&D test capabilities back to
where it belongs, back in a robust area.
We are on a good trajectory now. And all I can say is
strong support is greatly appreciated as we work with a
private/public posture where we are finding that sweet spot to
support and dispatch the technical challenges that with our
labs and our capabilities that our U.S. industry can most
benefit from.
So, thank you very much for the support. And we stand ready
to follow additional laws that may come in that you are moving
through.
Mr. Peters. Maybe I will just explore a bit more kind of
what, what areas you might see us investing in, what particular
areas in nuclear that you think offer promise?
Mr. McGinnis. One is, of course, the fast test capability
is very important, having testing capabilities for the new
class of reactors. We are experience--we are seeing a lot
through our new industry funding opportunity mechanisms where
it also becomes an opportunity to hear from industry where they
most need us. Whether it is testing, whether it is benchmarking
data, simulation modeling and simulation, even supporting the
NRC with our modeling and simulation and supporting their
development of advanced guidelines, frankly, industry needs us
to support them in the data and benchmarking as they go through
certification. That is one of the biggest challenges for our
new innovators.
But also, having the testing capabilities, just continuing
to support our reinvestment in establishing our test capability
for both the front and back end and for reactors, fuels. And
also, very important, if not most important, is our efforts to
support the continued life and longevity of the fleet of
reactors operating in this country now.
Mr. Peters. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McGinnis, I have a lot to go through so let's be
efficient with our time if we can. Are you aware of an
enrichment facility located in Eunice, New Mexico?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Shimkus. Is that enrichment facility licensed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Shimkus. In order to meet future demand for high-assay
low-enrichment uranium, is that facility capable of making the
material for commercial use? If the facility secures the
appropriate modification to its NRC licensing basis?
Mr. McGinnis. I believe yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Are you aware of a recent GAO report that
found DOE's cost estimate to develop new enrichment options
lacked credibility because it was not well documented or
accurate?
Mr. McGinnis. I am aware of the GAO report in general.
Mr. Shimkus. And have made no judgment on being aware of
the GAO report as far as accuracy?
Mr. McGinnis. I would have to get back with you on the
specifics on my view on that.
Mr. Shimkus. It is just important because as you go forward
if GAO's analysis is not accurate then we don't want to do our
basis of decision making on that fact.
Based on the availability of U.S. enrichment capabilities
for commercial use would you agree that the U.S. Government
does not need to spend billions of dollars of nondefense money
to subsidize Government-backed competition to an existing
operational facility?
Mr. McGinnis. I certainly don't support subsidies. But I
think it is premature to say whether there would be a need for
a second supply for enrichment. I can tell you that some
companies have come to me strongly encouraging the support of
at least two suppliers to have good, robust competition and
pricing. Notwithstanding, though, we are very fortunate and
very thankful for having that top world class facility in New
Mexico in the form of LES.
But the question is whether--and I am just basing it on
what we are hearing from certain industry--whether that is the
final end state if they end up establishing a cascade for high-
assay LEU, or do you want to get to the point where you have a
couple of suppliers, such as in the fuel fabrication business
where you have pretty strong competition because--and pretty
good pricing because of that competition.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, you know, other pricing debates that we
have in the other realm of fuel. So, also we want, we really
want to be cautious about in this time of fiscal constraints. I
do believe in competition. I do believe that that drives that
through. But we have dealt with Government subsidization of
helping infrastructure to move to markets that weren't
existing. Not saying that they needed competition, but there
was no business plan or model for that.
So, again, I am just raising some concerns.
Dr. Park, if the United States funds a Government-sponsored
facility to support both defense and nondefense purposes would
you be concerned that this could send conflicting messages to
the international community about developing dual-purpose fuel
cycle facilities?
Dr. Park. So U.S. segment has made a commitment to
international partners. For example, when they downgrade from
HA-LEU to lower level LEU, we would provide the fuels because,
actually, it's going to be the right thing for us to do to
minimize the risks of HA-LEU falling into the wrong hands. So
we need to follow through on those commitments. And we also
follow through on the medical isotope production efforts and so
on.
The first example that I used is high performance reactors
that require the use of HA-LEU and so on. So there are
different examples. But to answer your question, it actually
depends on case by case. We need to actually analyze the
benefits and risks and then make appropriate recommendations.
So I don't think that we could provide some general, overall,
you know, response that this is what we are going to do. It
really depends on who the players are, who are partners are,
and so on, and other considerations that we need to fold in.
Mr. Shimkus. Yes, and I was listening carefully to my
colleague Scott Peters from California. And when he was asking
really Mr. McGinnis what other things, you know, he was trying
to reach what other things should we be looking at? My point
would be we need to look at the front end here to address the
international concerns and the commitments, but also the
Government being involved in an area where we may not need to
be involved, and how much of those nondefense dollars which are
always, we are scrambling for, goes to that when there is an
available, looks like there will be an available commercial
production facility already in place.
So those are my concerns. We have aired them out now
publicly. And with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back
my time.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back. The Chair would
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just last week Mr. Flores approached me and asked me if I
would support his bill on HA-LEU. And I think it is a good
bill. I am glad to do that. But I do have a concern about
proliferation. I think that is something that we all are
worried about.
The world has changed in the last few months, and I am
worried about where we are going with additional capabilities,
especially if it is in the commercial sector. Could you address
that, Mr. Park?
Dr. Park. Your concern is to certify everybody in this room
and throughout the Government system. But, again, we have not
relaxed reviews and assessments of how we share our nuclear
technologies with our partners, international partners and so
on.
Mr. McNerney. Were you to have more commercial control of
that information?
Dr. Park. From my perspective, and obviously Ed McGinnis
actually should chime in, but again as the person responsible
for issuing the safeguards aspect of sharing the nuclear
technologies, we first have to evaluate the whole big picture.
It is a balancing act. Cannot delay forever.
Mr. McNerney. Right.
Dr. Park. We cannot expedite without actually doing the
right analysis so we know what the risks are and we need to
mitigate those. And as far as country partnership and the--what
we are actually concerned about is more of with the
technologies that we share with country A could be sent to
somewhere else without our knowing. So safeguards is not one-
to-one, it's actually one of many that we have to worry about.
So that is where my guys come in to do a very careful
analysis working with the State Department and other
interagency partners.
Mr. McNerney. Mr. McGinnis, do you see SMRs and
microreactors becoming prominent in the next decade or two?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, very possibly I do. And they offer many
attributes that one does not see in the current class of
reactors, from far more passive safety aspects. Some of these
reactors will--are designed to safely shut down even in the
event of a complete loss of power indefinitely, or a complete
loss of coolant.
Some of these reactors, micro and others, reactors are
smaller source term, more manageable. Some of these have life
of core where you do not need refueling such as every 18 months
for a fuel reactor, so, or a large reactor.
But with respect to international I would just like to make
one thing very clear in my view. I have worked international as
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 11 years. There is no other
country on this planet that has a higher standard, more
stringent standard on nonproliferation and safety than us. I
can assure you the Russians, the Chinese, and the others, they
do not insist on the level of nonpro and safety, even in our
current 123 and our Part 810 process and the others. We are
very proud of it. And I think you will hear the U.S. industry
continue to say that is a key aspect of our product, that we
bring the safest products and with the highest levels of
nonproliferation.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I think the SMR promise is good. And I
am looking forward to seeing that realized in our country. And
I recognize, along with everyone here I think, that the
industry is struggling at the moment. But how do we make it
easier for the industry to prosper without harming the NRC's
ability to regulate effectively?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed, that is the question. We, in my
view, we want the most efficient process for the regulatory
reviews. And we want the least costly but in a manner that does
not compromise in any way, shape, or form the current standard
of safety. That is our objective.
The Department of Energy is ready. We made it clear with
the NRC and we continue to do it, make all of our capabilities,
model, in simulation and testing, available to help them and
help the vendors go through this process.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Mr. McKinley.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Not long ago the Defense Science Board put out a report
that said our grid system, our national grid system is fragile,
vulnerable, and near its capacity. And as a result of that, or
perhaps influenced by that, DoD has been expressing more and
more of an interest in using small nuclear reactors, and much
like maybe Barton was talking about, the microreactors on plant
or on bases so that they could be islands of independence from
the grid, a fascinating concept with that.
Do you, do either of you agree with the Defense Science
Board, with their conclusion? Because we have been having quite
a few hearings about this grid reliability, about reliability
and resilience, do you agree with their, their findings that
there are problems with the--with reliability and resilience?
Mr. McGinnis. I agree that resiliency is a huge issue. And
it is only going to get more challenging if we don't get new
baseload plants coming in, including nuclear.
I would also say there is still no other energy source on
the planet that compares to the attributes of nuclear power:
clean baseload, no refueling for at least 18 months. The new
SMRs coming in they could possibly go 4 years or longer.
With regards to resiliency and microreactors and the 2016
Defense Science Board, we think it certainly, while we see that
it is driving the Department of Defense in evaluating their
options with microreactors now for that very purpose of
resiliency. Obviously, resiliency----
Mr. McKinley. If I could on that, I might disagree slightly
with you on that, and that is your own department there--excuse
me, DOE, has come out with its own report saying that actually
to improve reliability and resilience it is nuclear and coal
because of the storage, the capabilities of onsite storage and
the lack of interruption of supply.
So you are saying you share that concern?
Mr. McGinnis. Oh yes, indeed.
Mr. McKinley. Let me go to the next issue that is a little
bit more sensitive to this. Because I am fascinated with the
nuclear industry. We don't have any plants in West Virginia but
we did have a shipping port that was not very far from where I
live and in my district.
But not long ago, it was just last October, The Hill came
out with a report that talked about how Russia's Putin was
trying to influence and get involved and take more influence,
control over our atomic energy business in the United States.
And he was using, according to the article, there was
litigation over bribery, kickbacks, extortion, and money
laundering, all that took place in and around sale of Uranium
One and how we--how CFIUS apparently dropped the ball and
allowed us to lose a lot of control of our uranium.
So with this issue of nuclear energy as much, how do we,
how do we restore the confidence that we are not, we are not
allowing a foreign entity like Russia to influence our nuclear
energy field, given that the history. And I am curious, what
has taken place internally to reverse the damage that was done
under the previous administration as a result of this?
Mr. McGinnis. I would say first of all it is very important
to have a diversity of supply. In the United States there is
about 5 percent of the uranium that comes from U.S. uranium
mining miners. That is an historic low.
For enrichment, apart from LES, again which we appreciate
for an enricher in the United States, but the fact is we have
zero American-owned enrichers.
With regards to supply, between 17 and 20 percent of all
the enrichment that comes into our Nation's 99 reactors comes
from Russia. There is a suspension agreement that limits them
to go where they cannot supply more than 20 percent. That
suspension agreement is slated to end in 2020. The Department
of Commerce is following that very closely.
I can't speak to the details of what you said, but I can
say that it is very important for us to have a balanced and
diverse supply, including strong supply capability for the
front end, as was mentioned, for fuel supply in this country.
Mr. McKinley. And my time has expired. So I just going to
ask you if you could please, could you stop by my office? I
would like to have more of a conversation about this, how we--
what are the next steps that need to be done.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rush,
for holding this hearing.
We are discussing these four important bills that deal with
various aspects of domestic nuclear energy. As a fuel source,
nuclear energy generates 20 percent of our domestic power and
constitutes over 60 percent of the country's clean energy.
While renewables have grown by leaps and bounds in recent
years, I think it is important to remember that nuclear
generation is the original environmental friendly source of
power generation.
While most of our fleet is under strain from economic
factors, the legislation we are discussing today has the
potential to reshape our focus and bring our nuclear fleet into
the 21st Century. I particularly want to thank my friend
Congressman Doyle for working on language to address the burden
that our NRC fee structure places on plants.
Mr. Park, Mr. McGinnis thank you for being here today. I
would like to talk about my friend Mr. Flores' bill, the
Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act. This legislation is
aimed at addressing many of the challenges faced by the high-
assay low-enriched uranium fuel, HA-LEU, or HA-LOW. I don't
know how, in my Texas accent.
Mr. Park, would you talk about how the enriching process is
different compared to the typical uranium?
Dr. Park. If you are talking about HA-LEU or H-A-L-E-U,
right now the only way we can do it is by downblending from the
aging stockpile that we have. Right now we can only enrich up
to 5 percent. The HA-LEU is over 5 percent, below 20. So you
need more work to get to HA-LEU, yes.
Mr. Green. In 2016, the Office of Defense Programs began
working to establish domestic uranium enrichment capability in
time to establish a supply of need for tritium production. What
is the current domestic capacity for this production? And what
do you expect the DOE capacity to be going forward when it
comes to HA-LEU?
Dr. Park. So, right now our current projection is we will
run out of tritium production capacity in about 20 years or so
from today. 2038 is the projected time line. So we are actually
in the Office of Defense Programs at NNSA is in the process of
looking at the options to see if we can actually produce our
own enrichment enriched uranium for tritium production. And
what we are looking for is industry partners working with Ed
McGinnis and others to actually share with us their
requirements.
It might be possible for us to fold in that requirement on
top of DOE. We are actually very anxious to look for purpose of
opportunity with the industry partners. And so it is in
progress.
Mr. Green. What are the challenges that transportation of
this highly enriched uranium lead to in comparison with the
typical levels of enrichment?
Dr. Park. So, obviously the 5 percent is the LEU. When you
go to higher level of enrichment it requires totally different
containers, transportation methods, and so on and so forth. And
the quantity--and this is worth pointing out, and I'm going to
hand it over to Ed to talk about this--quantity we are
potentially facing is much larger than we ever faced. It
requires a different look at the--a bit of R&D on top of
everything.
Mr. Green. Mr. McGinnis?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed. In fact, transportation is key.
I would like to express appreciation for this subcommittee and
the bill to address the issue of transportation. I think it is
time, very timely to look at it now. We need to plan in advance
to support, hopefully, a successful advanced reactor fleet
coming in through the pipeline with new high-assay LEU fuel.
As Dr. Park said, right now we are relying on a limited and
ever-decreasing supply of high-enriched uranium. Ultimately
there are a couple of additional pathways one can secure that
supply. And the most traditional way is through enrichment.
And as Dr. Park said, the Department of--well, the NNSA
side of the Department of Energy is looking at it from defense
requirements primarily in tritium production. So that time line
I would suggest--and this is part of the challenge--we may have
a much earlier time line in the commercial sector, maybe as
soon, as I indicated, mid-2020s where the commercial sector
will need high-assay LEU. When you get that, you also not just
need enrichment cascades, but you are going to need conversion,
you are going to need fabrication, you are going to need
actually new NRC license packages, transportation packages. So
there is quite a lot to be done.
Mr. Green. One last question. Do you think----
Mr. Shimkus [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Green [continuing]. The legislation addresses these
challenges?
Mr. McGinnis. I would say that I appreciate the focus. We
do believe that it addresses the challenges. And we stand ready
to work with the subcommittee.
Mr. Green. Appreciate the chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. Pretty sneaky getting that last question in
there.
The chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois,
and one of the authors of this legislation, Mr. Kinzinger, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for your
leadership on this issue as well. And thanks for holding
today's hearing.
As many of you know, my district is home to four nuclear
power plants. And I continue to be deeply concerned that we are
ceding U.S. global leadership in the nuclear space. I
introduced H.R. 1320, the NUKE Act, with Congressman Doyle to
make common sense reforms in the NRC recovery structure, fee
recovery structure. And I am pleased to see it included.
I still like NUKEPA, but in the spirit of our Founding
Fathers and compromise, I was happy to relent on that.
Section 2 of Congressman Johnson's bill requires the
Secretary of Energy to report on all legal, regulatory, and
commercial barriers imposed on our domestic nuclear industry.
Compare those to our foreign--compared to our foreign
competitors and recommend ways to improve our global
competitiveness.
Dr. Park, as part of your confirmation process you stated
that you would continue to work with American companies so that
they may engage in civil nuclear commerce around the world.
Based on your previous experience, as well as your initial
impressions leading NNSA's Defense Nuclear Proliferation
Office, have you identified some of the actions that inhibit
competitiveness at the U.S. nuclear industry?
Dr. Park. So the standard practice asked me that. As I
mentioned earlier, we look at the big picture and we do the
best we can. And now the challenge is that the world is
evolving so fast, as it was stated, in the last four months
alone the world changed. And that there are new actors coming
in to have more nuclear power and so on and so forth. And I
need to recognize the fact that our policies, and procedures,
and processes are a little bit behind time at times, and that
we need to find a way to accelerate it and make it more
meaningful so that we can apply the latest standards.
So I would not necessarily call them deficiencies. That is
how our system works. But at the same time, I appreciate your
involvement and the committee's engagement so we can actually
better implement the guidelines you might give to us.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
Mr. McGinnis, you have heard me speak about the DOE's
Nuclear Energy International Program. Could you offer some
preliminary observations about how our foreign competition,
specifically the Russians and the Chinese, use state-backed
resources to strategically use their civilian nuclear programs
and undercut our interests?
Mr. McGinnis. Indeed they do. And they use the full breadth
of resources that they can draw on from their respective
governments. I have seen it firsthand with Rosatom in Russia
and the Big 3 utilities in China.
The competition, one cannot overstate how foreboding and
how challenging it is for American companies to compete against
states. That is the fact. They bring financing. They bring
deep, deep offers for training, for resources. In many other
areas we are working really hard to try and support in our
own--let me back up and say what we don't want to do is try and
compete and be seen like a Russian company, like a Chinese
company. We believe we are far more innovative, far more
appealing. We bring our systems, our safety and security. So we
do believe we can compete and win.
But it takes strong Government support and advocacy from
the United States. And it takes--and I think we need to all be,
you know, just always continue to say we need to try and do
better, in our efficiency for our regulatory reviews, for our
license reviews. We need to continuously try and maintain the
high level of safety while making it as easy as possible for
these companies that are already in a formidable position to be
able to complete and win.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let me ask you, and I am sorry to do this,
but put yourself in the sick and twisted mind of Vladimir
Putin. What would be the reason you would want government
support for the nuclear industry? What is your 10- or 20-year
goal in that? What do you want to see a world that looks like
X?
Mr. McGinnis. Well, in just my own opinion, again having
worked with Rosatom employees for quite some time in a
competitive way, first of all they want to dominate the nuclear
sector. I don't think, at least my colleagues, I have had
difficulty with my Russian company colleagues seeing the virtue
of competition. It is more of a monopoly objective.
Mr. Kinzinger. And let me ask you more specifically, do you
think Vladimir Putin looks at this as an economic benefit to
his country or a national security benefit and ability to
spread influence of Russia?
Mr. McGinnis. Oh, so my first point was economically or
sectoral-wise dominating as much as possible, but strategically
nuclear energy goes well beyond, certainly in foreign
countries, well beyond just electricity on the grid. So when
one wins a commercial nuclear deal for a reactor, it is a 100-
year relationship. It is a unique leverage point one has with
those foreign countries. And it is, frankly, coveted by our
competitors from a strategic perspective.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. And thanks, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Park, I appreciate the Department's commitment to
streamlining the processing times to export nuclear-related
goods under the Part 810 process. International markets
represent a critical opportunity for domestic nuclear companies
and their suppliers. And the ability to export these products
remains important for U.S. companies. These opportunities can
mean hundreds, even thousands of jobs, for hardworking
Americans.
My question is, how is the NNSA working with other agencies
to ensure that this trade can continue to support American jobs
without violating the NDAA review requirements and without
posing a threat to national security? And more specifically,
can you provide more information on the agency's overall
strategy with regards to exports to China?
Dr. Park. So, when it comes to China, there is a very
specific requirement under NDAA 2016 that requires OD&I review.
And it gets very difficult. So I would be more than happy to
provide additional information.
When it comes to NNSA doing its job to help accelerate the
appropriate sharing, peaceful use of nuclear technologies and
so on, I think that with this committee's help and assistance
and guidance I think we have got the right frame of mind in
terms of what we can do. For example, as I stated earlier,
there is parallel processing. In other words, we don't wait for
State Department to achieve, to get the country assurance on
safeguards. We actually do the processing as if it is a done
deal and we converge at the end.
So instead of doing things in serial or the sequential
manner, we do things in parallel at the same time. This new
e810 process that we have adopted that you encouraged us to
pursue is putting more what I call a transparency to all the
users. They know what the package is. It is actually worth
repeating a couple more times because instead of--in the past
they didn't know where their package was in the approval
process. But now they can actually call us.
You know, some of the stories that my staff have been
sharing with me, for example. You know, a couple of them got to
know how to use the e810 system. It took them a while, but now
they are thinking, the program managers are sitting in the back
or they help because they can actually move things along much
faster than ever before. And these are repeat users that we are
talking about. And I am happy to report to you, again, roughly
15 percent of the users from the commercial sector using our
e810, I think that number would grow.
And so there are some really good signs with the e810
process. And, again, I need to caution all of us, you know,
much of the delay does not come from our side. But, again, we
have to wait for country assurances through the State
Department, and sometimes that takes a year or more.
Mr. Doyle. I would appreciate you corresponding with our
office. We'd like to get a better sense of the strategy with
regards to China. And I would appreciate that.
Dr. Park. Yes.
Mr. Doyle. Mr. McGinnis, I am glad to see your department's
commitment to nuclear energy. We all know that investments in
research and advanced nuclear technology are important, and in
addition to supporting our existing fleet. I am concerned,
though, that the President's fiscal year 2019 budget has
proposed to reduce funding for nuclear energy by cutting $259
million below the FY 2017 enacted level.
Do you think that reforming the NRC fee structure could
reduce the downward pressure on nuclear plant operators?
Mr. McGinnis. With regards to the--thank you very much for
the question. I respectfully would need to defer to the NRC as
an independent agency on the fee structure. But I will say
overall, obviously as indicated earlier, the fees are a
significant factor in many U.S. companies attempting to get
their technologies licensed and their operation license
received. So it is a very significant factor.
And so we certainly support the most efficient, least
costly pathway with the highest standards of safety that makes
us world-class products that we have to provide.
Mr. Doyle. Let me ask you this, too. I do think that energy
markets currently consider carbon, the carbon-free attributes
of nuclear energy. And we have seen State policies that take
these attributes into account. And I want to--do you support
States' ability to properly account for these attributes?
Mr. McGinnis. Certainly respect the States' decisions to
do, to decide how to do that. That is the States' rights. And
so we approach it from a resiliency perspective, trying to
address the structural issues that, frankly, at times don't
price, or don't price the value of resiliency.
But with regards to States, certainly we respect that
approach to support their electricity sources.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton [presiding]. Mr. Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McGinnis and Dr. Park, I have got a question for both
of you. Dr. Lyman's testimony suggests that any country that
has access to light-water reactor technology is just a step
away from becoming a nuclear weapons state. However, his
testimony neglects to mention the International Atomic Energy
Agency and international safeguards that are in place in
addition to the U.S.'s capability to monitor nuclear fuel cycle
programs around the world.
Would you please describe the respective roles of NNSA and
the Office of Nuclear Energy in supporting the IAEA program?
Dr. Park. So, yes. NNSA does work closely with IAEA. In
fact, we provide much of the technologies to IAEA and train
them, and in terms of light-water reactor and so on and so
forth.
Any nuclear technology that actually produces plutonium we
care about, we worry about. And there are no exceptions. As I
stated earlier, we actually look for who these partners are and
how they actually protect the materials, spent fuels, or
whatnots, to make a determination as to what kind of
arrangement we could have. But, again, there is no one-size-
fits-all approach that we have.
But, again, the light-water reactor, the fuel does have
plutonium built in, so we need to worry about the results. We
cannot ignore that aspect.
Mr. Long. Mr. McGinnis?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes. The Office of Nuclear Energy also works
closely with the IAEA and also the NNSA. And we do commit a
significant amount of funds for that work, including for
safeguards, and security, and safety ultimately, both directly
and indirectly.
I would say one other point. And this is my view, it is
just reality. We have these large state-owned suppliers. They
are going to provide the choice if we don't provide an option
to foreign countries that are considering nuclear energy. If we
just say no, then they will very likely still proceed. And they
will just proceed with another supplier with a lower level of
safety and security. And we will also have lost a great number
of other benefits, including a 100-year relationship with the
highest standards of safety and security.
Mr. Long. Again for both of you, can you briefly describe
the U.S. programs to track and identify emerging international
nuclear programs?
Dr. Park. So, obviously, there is open literature. And we
actually do track, you know, the progress being made throughout
the world. And we have avenues, as well, that I am more than
happy to brief you at appropriate locations.
Mr. McGinnis. And we do participate in the materials
tracking within the Department, with NNSA playing a lead role.
Mr. Long. Well, would you agree with Mr. Lyman's assertion
that any country that has access to nuclear energy can easily
develop a nuclear weapons program, presumably without the
international community's knowledge?
Mr. Park. So, as a physicist, is it a possibility? Yes. Is
it likely? It is very difficult. Especially at what we call the
production scale, I hope our monitoring technologies, and our
partnerships with IAEA, and our international partners we
should be able to do a good job on who these actors might be.
And should I be concerned? Of course. But, again, we have
adequate technologies to help us to monitor the situation
globally. And, again, I am more than happy to provide you with
additional information.
Mr. Long. Yes, well that is what I would hope. And that is,
that is what I would think. But I just wanted your opinion.
Mr. McGinnis, do you care to weigh in?
Mr. McGinnis. I do not believe it would be easy.
Mr. Long. OK, thank you.
For you, Mr. McGinnis. In your testimony you mentioned the
advancements around nuclear reactor design that are currently
underway. Can you talk a little bit about these technologies
and, if proven to work, how they can help revolutionize or
revitalize, excuse me, revitalize our nuclear energy sector?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. Yes, we are in my view
at the precipice of an entirely new, innovative phase in the
U.S. nuclear energy sector. I don't say that lightly. We are
seeing it happen right now.
The advance reactors such as the advanced SMR for the first
time going through the NRC, receiving the first phase approval,
including passive safety features, validates that they do not
need any electric pumps or motors in order to be able to safely
shut down because of the passive safety system. This is just
one example of many of the advanced reactor designs that are
coming out of the United States' nuclear innovation community
that offers a step change, step change improvement on what is
already strong safety in our reactors, number one.
Number two is their versatility. We are witnessing reactors
being designed that are unlike anything we have seen. We have
reactors, advanced reactors that are designed to be able to go
from 0 to 100 percent power in 60 minutes. That is load
following. We haven't seen that with large reactors.
We have finance ability for the advanced reactors unlike
what we have seen. Instead of $8 billion per unit, not
including financing, we are talking maybe a billion, maybe a
billion and a half for a substantial generating capacity.
We also have distributed opportunity where we have the
opportunity now to place smaller reactors, modular scaled-up
reactors in locations we never could do with a large reactor.
So, product choice, versatility in application, desalinization
or hydrogen production, this is an entirely new class of
disruptive reactors, and that is why we are so excited about
this.
Mr. Long. This is a very important hearing we are having
here today. And I want to thank both of you for taking the time
to be here and sharing your knowledge with us.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Tonko.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you,
gentlemen, for joining us and for your insights on these bills.
Administrator Park, Dr. Park, I have a few questions on the
discussion draft that addresses the Part 810 process. It is my
understanding that Section 3 would expedite the review process
for, and I quote, ``low proliferation risk reactor
technologies.'' However, I do not believe that these
technologies are defined in the draft.
Can you offer us a sense of what types of technologies
would be captured by these low proliferation risk reactor
technologies?
Dr. Park. Yes. So, obviously this is interagency effort.
DOE does have a lead on determining what would go in the
category, but at the same time we need to coordinate that
review process with the other agencies, including State, for
example. Again, it's to a large extent a case-by-case. But
there is no single category that says if it falls in the
category, it's free for all. It doesn't work that way.
Really because one agency appreciates or gives us
flexibility at the same time as different challenges. But what
is in the middle is country assurance. And that actually
changes the calculation by the way. If it is a country that we
have a 123 agreement with, it is straightforward. But, again,
if it is not one of those countries, or China, India, or other
countries it is very difficult. So we need to look at it from
what I call a totality or big picture perspective.
So to that extent you can actually categorize as light-
water, low-risk, et cetera, but it really depends on who the
recipients are.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Currently, would those Part 810
reviews qualify as low proliferation risks?
Dr. Park. I need to get back to you. I don't, basically
don't have specifics on.
Mr. Tonko. OK, thank you. Does the Part 810 process look
just at the technology or also the conditions within the
potential partner country? That is to say is the current review
process the same for each potential partner country?
Mr. Park. I also need to get back to you because it is
quite different from, you know, case to case. So maybe it might
be more appropriate for us to give you solid data with a
sample, with great examples as to what we are doing for several
countries so you have appreciation for the challenges that we
have.
Mr. Tonko. OK. And you will forward that to us?
Dr. Park. Yes.
Mr. Tonko. Your testimony mentions that currently the
lengthiest part of the review is the time it takes partner
countries to provide the required governmental nonproliferation
assurances. Can you give us some examples of these assurances?
Dr. Park. So, we actually apply conditions so that they can
actually enjoy U.S.-developed technologies. But these
conditions require that they do not share with the third
parties, and they do not actually modify without conditions and
so on. It goes on and on and on.
Oftentimes the host countries or the recipient countries
when I think about this because there are obviously
ramifications for they sign up for some things without fully
understanding. But so it's along that line that satisfies.
Mr. Tonko. But are these assurances different for each
export partner country?
Dr. Park. To a large extent. There is variation, obviously.
As, for example, countries that we have a 123 agreements went
through the review process with us at the highest level, so
they know the what I call boundary conditions as to how to
receive our U.S.-developed technologies.
But, again, when you leave that small group of countries,
which is 20-some-odd countries, the rest of the world still
needs to go through the category process, how they respond to
our requests and so on. We do a lot of hand holding but there
is a limit as to how much we can do. We cannot speak for their
countries.
Mr. Tonko. My understanding is that the discussion draft
would allow DOE to continue the review while it waits for the
State Department to secure the assurances. Would this bill
reduce or limit the time it takes for the State Department to
secure those given assurances?
Dr. Park. It is a separate process, somewhat decoupled. At
the same time because of our experience working with our
international partners and our industry partners who are
actually trying to export the technologies, I think we can
actually give them the right answers. It is up to them whether
to take them or not. But, again, we can actually show them what
steps they need to take. And, again, this is open to test, if I
can use that phrase.
Mr. Tonko. But do you think there should be limitations on
how long the State Department might have to obtain these
assurances?
Dr. Park. So, it also depends on whether we have agreement
with a country. I would stress, as was stated, that it really
depends on what kind of assurance they provide us to safeguard
our technologies.
The biggest fear I personally have is our technologies go
into wrong hands and we don't have any assurance that we know
what they do with that technology that we have transferred.
Safeguards concerns are monumental in what we do, even in the
e810 process.
Mr. Tonko. So those limitations are--could be critical.
Dr. Park. Yes.
Mr. Tonko. With that, Mr. Chair, I thank you and yield
back.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back.
Dr. Bucshon.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Department of Energy's public/private partnership with
Nuscale Power which followed a similar effort that led to the
licensing and construction of Southern Company's new nuclear
reactors has proven to be a successful model to address a
costly regulatory approval process for new nuclear
technologies. Congressman Flores' legislation builds on that
model with a public/private partnership for advanced nuclear
fuel needs.
Mr. McGinnis, DOE's Isotope Program includes an industry
consortium to help meet specific needs, material needs of
californium-252, which is used for an assortment of industrial
applications. This consortium could be a model for the
consortium in Mr. Flores' bill.
Has your office discussed how the Isotope Consortium could
apply to an advanced fuel program?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. Isotope production is
very important. There are certainly applications for advanced
reactor technologies. But with regards to the lead for isotope
production, that is both within the Office of Science and also
NNSA. So if you don't mind, respectfully I may ask Dr. Park. I
don't know if you have any refer--anything you want to say on
the isotope production.
Dr. Park. If it is appropriate we will get back to you
because it involves yet another member within the DOE family,
and they do more of that work. And isotope production that we
are responsible for is really just purifications for medical
isotopes or in R&D.
Mr. Bucshon. Yes, if you can get a response back to the
committee, that would be great. I would appreciate it.
I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague.
I just wanted to follow up on Adam Kinzinger's comments
about the international aspect of this. I deal a lot with the
Baltic countries, Eastern European issues, so I focus a lot on
the Astravets plant being constructed on the border between
Lithuania and Belarus. And I just want to highlight a couple
issues on this.
The International Atomic Energy Commission recommended a
six-step process to review building of nuclear power plants to
prevent disasters like Chernobyl and also, recently, Fukushima.
Belarus has chosen to skip four of the six steps. That already
identifies a concern.
When asked why they want to build this plant, the President
of Belarus said, ``This is a,'' and I quote, ``a fishbone in
the throat of the European Union and the Baltic States.'' So it
is not a power plant being constructed for energy security,
energy efficiency, it is really economic warfare against
Eastern European countries.
Nuclear power plants in sensitive areas should be discussed
within the Espoo Convention, which this is not. Nearly all of
Lithuania is 300 kilometers of the plant, which means that if a
disaster were to strike, long-term food consumption in the
country could be affected, the drinking water could be
affected.
But there is also concerns, again highlighting what Adam
was trying to raise on the national security aspects of this.
Incidents occurring and cast on Belarus' commitment to working
with neighbors and ensuring the plant's safety. In 2016, six
serious incidents occurred, and Belarus has failed to be up
front with Lithuania about any of them. A 330-ton nuclear
reactor shell was allegedly dropped from about 13 feet. This
was two summers ago now, not last summer. Belarus did not
reveal anything about the incident until independent media
reported it, and then downplayed it.
Earlier, a structural frame at the site collapsed after
workers, apparently under time pressure, filled it too quickly.
So, and this is all based upon a statement in the record I
did for the Congressional Record on the floor just raising this
issue. So the international concern, state-sponsored actors
versus competitive marketplace do bring a point of needed
discussion to this debate. So I appreciate that. I just wanted
to be additive to what Congressman Kinzinger has stated.
With that, I want to thank my colleague from Indiana and
yield back to him.
Mr. Bucshon. Yes, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
We now recognize the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Castor.
Ms. Castor. Thank you very much. And thank you, Dr. Park
and Mr. McGinnis, for being here today.
I am very passionate about the United States remaining a
leader in technology and innovation, especially in nuclear
energy. I believe the commercialization of nuclear technology
can be positive in that expanding and exporting this technology
can be beneficial to businesses here on our economy and on
international security.
But I have concerns about the discussion draft that makes
changes to DOE's Part 810 process. I believe the Secretary of
Energy should have more discretion when reviewing
authorization. But I question whether or not the legislation as
drafted is as precise as it should be, actually providing a
firm definition of low proliferation risk.
And then I am also concerned that the application time line
for low proliferation risk reactor technology will be untenable
in the long run.
Dr. Park, can you share with us how DOE currently defines
low proliferation risk?
Dr. Park. So with the--because of the many different
parameters in reviewing the applications, for example, again
the biggest factor is the recipient country risk. It is not a
simple formula that actually would work for us. So only as they
fit in the certain categories, for example, as I stated
earlier, if we already have established a relationship through
123 agreements we can go through a 5-week expedited process. It
is not a big deal. We actually have done that before.
But, again, if you don't belong in that category it becomes
much more difficult. We need to actually work with them so they
know what we are looking for and they can provide responses
that we need to have to make sure that our technologies aren't
shared in a manner that is not appropriate.
So I do appreciate the fact that we need to find a way to
expedite the processes. Again, we are somewhat limited in what
we can do in terms of whether they already have an agreement
with us or not. So, to that extent I would like to look for
ways to work in these countries as best as we can so we can
minimize, we can actually manage the risks in sharing U.S.
technologies with these countries.
I do apologize for giving you a roundabout answer, but it
really depends on who the host countries are.
Ms. Castor. Mr. McGinnis, do you have a comment on that?
Mr. McGinnis. Just to say, obviously the Office of Nuclear
Energy, its mission, the U.S. nuclear industry greatly relies
upon this very important Part 810 process, as well as the two
other export control authorities at the Department of Commerce
and also NRC, as well as the 123. So this is a process, I
think, that we are all collectively always trying to improve.
Ms. Castor. Maybe you can rally those folks to look at
that, that portion of and definition.
Mr. McGinnis. Yes.
Ms. Castor. That would be helpful.
Mr. McGinnis. Will do.
Ms. Castor. Dr. Park, do you foresee any challenges with
the draft legislation that could hinder the U.S. as a producer
of commercialized nuclear technology?
Dr. Park. I don't see any showstoppers. If I can give you
that as a response. The fact that the committee is very
involved with us and asking our technical assistance and
interpretations, we welcome it. We look forward to continue the
relationship. I think it is a positive step where we see many
positive signs.
Ms. Castor. How about national security risk? I know you
can't go into detail, great detail there, but are there any
national security risks that could develop as a result of the
changes made in the discussion draft?
Dr. Park. There are always possibilities and potentials.
And I think we are comfortable, we are confident that we can
actually mitigate some of those risks along the way. And again,
the minimizing and managing risks is what we do on NNSA's side.
And so far I think that we have a pretty good handle on how to
move forward with this whole situation and as far as the
process of technology sharing and so on and so forth.
But again, there are some things that just take time. And
we appreciate your patience on it.
Ms. Castor. Sometimes time is important when we are talking
about national security. But I, I believe that the U.S. has to
remain the leader in nuclear technology. And as I mentioned
before, there are many benefits associated with reforming Part
810, but there could also be unintended consequences. And
that's what we need to focus on.
I want to ensure, I want to ensure that we are proactive
and efficient, as you said, when it comes to the
commercialization of the nuclear technology. But we are
counting on you and the experts out there to help poke and prod
at this piece of legislation to make sure there are not
unintended consequences.
Dr. Park. We will. And we will work with you.
Ms. Castor. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Johnson. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
Dr. Park, I understand that for many years the Department
allowed the Secretary to delegate signature authority on Part
810 authorizations. And it was only recently that DOE's general
counsel revised its previous interpretation to disallow this
delegation.
Section 3 of my discussion draft simply clarifies in the
Atomic Energy Act that the previous process was acceptable. So
do you know if there were any delegations to your knowledge
that involved unacceptable proliferation risk or created an
unacceptable lack of visibility by the Secretary's office over
the proposed exports?
Dr. Park. So, my understanding is that there was not a
delegation because of interpretation of the law, the way our
general counsel read the law. And it is not because of lack of
the appreciation for our technical staff.
But again, we actually welcome this opportunity to delegate
some of these ``routine'' things, although there is nothing
routine about sharing nuclear technologies. But again, we
appreciate it.
Mr. Johnson. But I mean back when they were, because it was
previously delegation was allowed. So when delegation was
allowed are you aware of any delegations that, that involved
any unacceptable proliferation risks?
Dr. Park. I don't think there was any delegation in the
past. That's my understanding.
I am more than happy to correct myself after this hearing
and get back to you.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Well, based on your understanding of the
decision, was the legal interpretation made in any way because
staff weren't qualified or able to appropriately consider the
impacts of the specific application?
Dr. Park. Not at all. I think there is the highest
confidence from the beginning of all the secretaries we have
had on the technical qualifications and their judgment. It is a
matter of how one read the law, and it is as simple as that.
Mr. Johnson. Back to that first question. Would you, would
you go back and take a look at that? Would you look and see if
there were any delegations? Because it was my understanding
that we used to do it that way and that there were. So I would
like to clear that one up.
Dr. Park. We will get back to you.
Mr. Johnson. OK, thank you.
Based on NNSA's review of the process, would enactment of
this bill to revert to the previous delegation process have the
practical effect of shortening the review process with minimal
proliferation risk? Do you think it is a smart thing to do?
Dr. Park. One-word answer: Yes. And obviously, as a
physicist I will give you a 10-minute answer which you don't
need right now. But, again, I think there are enough good
qualities in the proposed legislation, and we will work with
you. I think this is a positive sign. So, there are many things
that we know how to fix. And this legislation will certainly
help us to achieve that goal.
Mr. Johnson. OK. All right.
Dr. Park, continuing on, could reverting to the pre-2005
process by which DOE can review an authorization in a
concurrent process as the State Department's required process,
would that help reduce the overall time frame, approval time
frame?
Dr. Park. Yes. The biggest challenge, again, is waiting for
our partner countries to provide assurances. And there is just
no simple way to get the answers.
At the same time, one of the things that we have been doing
is that we actually give ``credit'' for these countries having
123 agreements with us. So there are some exceptions that allow
us to accelerate the sharing the technologies. But, again,
there are just a few dozen countries that we have a
relationship with.
Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. And would this change to the
approvable process in any way reduce information that is
reviewed, weaken the rigor of such reviews, or alter the
various agencies that concur, or consult on the authorization
in a manner that could undermine our national security
interests?
Dr. Park. So when I look at the positive side of this
legislation it might actually help us because, for example,
this online system would allow all the reviewers to actually
look at each others' comments, for example, in real time. So I
see potential positive changes that this system, this
legislation will produce. But, also, we will look for
unintended consequences along the way. You don't want to hurry
up too fast, too much on some of the review processes.
But, again, there are enough positive signs that we are
really embracing this legislation.
Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. Well, I will yield back my
total of 21 seconds. And with that I think we have no
colleagues on the left that want to ask questions.
Mr. Flores, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flores. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the witnesses also for joining us today. This is an important
discussion. Nuclear power is the ultimate admissions-free,
green-power source, particularly when it comes to the
generation of baseload electricity. And so it is important for
our country moving forward, not only for economic opportunity,
national security, and also for the environment.
Earlier this year I asked both Under Secretary Menezes and
you, Mr. McGinnis, about collaborating to develop a policy to
provide high-assay LEU. NNSA officials also testified at both
of these hearings. Thus far DOE and NNSA's input in this
discussion draft has been limited.
Dr. Park's testimony notes that there are efforts underway
relating to high-assay LEU, and I hope to increase our
collaboration as we work towards formally introducing this
legislation.
Let's turn to a few questions. One provision in my
discussion draft relates to the need to develop what is known
as criticality benchmark data. This data is important to
develop the underlying information to establish the necessary
safe regulatory framework for the provision of nuclear fuels.
Mr. McGinnis, can you succinctly describe the nature of this
criticality information, why it is necessary, and what
Government or non-Government facilities will be able to gather
this type of data?
Mr. McGinnis. Thank you very much. The benchmarking data is
very important for a number of reasons, including
transportation and packaging. This, in part, is because the
criticality issues where you have a higher level of enrichment,
and so whether it is needing new NRC licensed transportation
systems to be able to transport in the U.S. enriched fuel above
5 percent, much of the fuel that is anticipated to be needed
will be as high as 17, 18, or 19 percent.
Mr. Flores. Right.
Mr. McGinnis. So the configuration, the way the materials
is packaged. But a lot of this also is driven by what we are
waiting on. And that is waiting to get a better sense, even
though we want to get as much data as possible, who are the
first movers? And what are the types of reactors--are we
talking metal or are we talking oxide fuel? And different
reactors designs have different types of fuels.
Then there are other options for transportation as well,
including in gas form.
Mr. Flores. Can we move to the next part of the question,
that is, what Government or non-Government facilities are
available to gather this type of data?
Mr. McGinnis. Well, the Department of Energy--first of all
let me, again, recognize that the front end enrichment capacity
is addressed, is being addressed fairly well in the U.S.,
particular by--in particular by LES for the enrichment
services. And I would say that the industry is poised to
respond to additional needs, including high-assay LEU when they
see the market coming and the customers coming in at a
sufficient volume. So, in the meantime the Department of Energy
does stand ready to make available its facilities to be able to
do that data benchmarking, and other testing.
We are doing some now. We are working with industry now in
order to get as much of a clear understanding of what types of
fuels are going to be needed when.
Mr. Flores. OK. Dr. Park, you indicate in your testimony
that you agree that advanced reactors will require HA-LEU. You
note further that you will evaluate that need alongside the
needs for our Nation's defense programs. The question is are
these two programs on the same time frame or different time
frames?
According to your testimony there is ample fuel for weapons
use available today. But it is unclear that there will be ample
fuel for advanced civilian reactor use over the next 10 years.
Is it appropriate to suggest that DOE's civilian nuclear
program should focus on the near term commercial needs while
your office can look at the longer term defense enrichment
requirements?
Dr. Park. So, as it turns out, even for the self-absorption
program tritium production requirement that we need to start
the work today because of the long lead time it takes to get
the production up and running. So time is appropriate for us to
collect the requirements from industry partners.
It doesn't necessarily mean we will incorporate the
commercial sectors we find through our DOE. Our commitment is
to review all possibilities and make sure we stretch every
dollar that we have to produce the enriched uranium. But,
again, at the earliest moment we can collect and incorporate
the requirements we will have a better idea as to what actions
are available. If indeed we start with the enriched uranium
enrichment then later it will stretch out into much longer and
that will give us more options in terms of entertaining
possibilities of supporting commercial sectors.
So it really depends on the requirements within----
Mr. Flores. It is possible our bill could help you in terms
of our Nation's defense needs, as well as taking care of HA-LEU
for advanced, for the advanced sector.
OK, we have run out of time. I will submit additional
questions for the record. I appreciate those responses.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Johnson. The gentleman yields back. And I want to,
seeing that there are--I am sorry, I didn't see Mr. Griffith
walk in. Mr. Griffith is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much.
Mr. McGinnis, nearly a year ago President Trump announced
the administration was going to conduct a complete review of
the Nation's civil nuclear policy. Following your appearance
before this committee in early February you were asked to
provide information for the record regarding this ongoing
review. Nearly three months after those questions were
submitted to you, we have not yet received a response from you
or your team.
So, I would like to ask a few questions about this ongoing
civil nuclear review, and I would request that you please
answer yes or no so we have time to get to all of them.
As a principal on the National Security Council is the
Secretary of Energy providing direct input into this ongoing
review? Yes or no?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes.
Mr. Griffith. Are you aware if the review is engaging with
other governmental agencies such as the Department of Commerce
and the Department of State?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes.
Mr. Griffith. Are you aware if this review is receiving
input from non-Government stakeholders?
Mr. McGinnis. I cannot say yes or no on that one. I do not
know.
Mr. Griffith. OK, thank you.
Are you aware if the review intends to seek input from
Congress to inform the review?
Mr. McGinnis. Again, I can't speak for the White House on
whether they, when they plan, if they plan to give input.
Mr. Griffith. But input's a good thing from Congress,
wouldn't you agree? Yes or no?
Mr. McGinnis. It's a good thing.
Mr. Griffith. All right. To the best of your understanding,
and obviously this can't be yes or no, to the best of your
understanding when do you expect the review to be completed?
Mr. McGinnis. I do not know the answer to that, other than
the fact that I can tell you that we have attended quite a few
meetings, very substantive. We have made significant progress.
And I can also say that our charge at the Department was
not to wait for any completion to be able to do things that we
can do now, whether it is loan guarantees, whether it is notice
of proposed rulemaking, whether it is industry quotas or
supporting the revitalization.
Mr. Griffith. And I appreciate that. And I hope included in
that would be recommendations that you need legislative
support. And that was the last of my series of questions as to
the best of your understanding where the review makes specific
legislative recommendations for Congress to consider. And I
would hope that even if it is not finished, if you find one let
us know, because we cannot operate on those suggestions if you
don't give them to us.
Mr. McGinnis. And, respectfully, I would like to apologize
for not getting those answers to you. I am fully aware of them.
I have been part of that process giving the answers. But,
unfortunately, it is taking longer than we had hoped for to get
them back to you. We will get them back to you.
Mr. Griffith. Well, I appreciate that. I am glad we were
able to clear this up a little bit today.
As this morning's hearing clearly indicates, as well as the
dozens of other Energy and Commerce Committee hearings in this
Congress there is a strong bipartisan support to address key
challenges confronting our Nation's nuclear sector. And I hope
the administration will commit to working with us as we go
forward.
Mr. McGinnis. Absolutely.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much. And I yield back.
Mr. Johnson. The gentleman yields back.
We are now pleased to recognize the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first thank
Chairman Upton and Ranking Member Rush for holding this very
important hearing. Thank both our witnesses for being here and
taking so much time with us.
A number of studies have identified the potential benefits
of applying advanced nuclear reactor designs to fill specific
national security needs. Mr. McGinnis, you have talked a lot
about the microreactors and sort of what you see in the future.
I represent Fort Bragg, the largest military base in America.
This is an issue that I am very interested in.
I believe it is critical that we have your input on how we
can improve the safety and security of our soldiers in the
field on military installations, as well as critical DOE sites
around the country. Mr. McGinnis, I asked for information
regarding ongoing DOE and Department of Defense discussions on
this topic back in February after a subcommittee hearing. And I
am disappointed that I haven't gotten any response. I really
wanted to get some of this feedback as we were developing my
discussion draft.
I hope you will carry this message back to the Department's
senior leadership that this committee expects more timely and
coordinated response in advance on our agenda because, again,
we value your input and think it will improve the process.
Mr. McGinnis. Again I apologize. But I would like to
reinforce the importance of microreactors as a key aspect
potentially for resiliency and also, of course, security,
establishing a secure energy supply chain by having indigenous
generation on site. So there is tremendous potential value to
having a microreactor potentially on site supplying power for a
base or other Federal or non-Federal facility.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that.
And I want to thank Mr. Peters for working with me on the
discussion draft. Our discussion draft asks a number of
questions to help identify key components of how a pilot
program might be developed. Briefly, Mr. McGinnis, are the
topics in this bipartisan bill the right questions to ask for
Congress to make a fully informed decision on the framework of
this pilot program?
Mr. McGinnis. Yes, indeed. In fact, I have been meaning to
say how timely and how appropriate and, frankly, how important
the issues that have been addressed, are addressed in these
four pieces of legislation, are incredibly important. We are in
a key moment in time to revitalize, and the support as we are
seeing in this legislation, the issues that are going to be
vital if we are to succeed.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you for that.
Are there any additional issues that we should be aware of
relative to, particularly, my discussion draft?
Mr. McGinnis. Just to say, again, we are in a key moment in
time. Industry needs all the help we can give them in the
appropriate way to get back on a revitalized footing to be able
to not only supply resilient power in the United States but to
be globally very, very competitive. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that.
Dr. Park, Congressman Johnson's discussion draft includes a
section that creates an expedited process or procedures for low
proliferation risk technologies. Will you please describe how
you envision the development and implementation of that
process?
Dr. Park. As we have been building up the cases where we
were able to, we are able to transfer technologies we would
like to be able to copy that over as much as possible. But,
again, there are challenges related to who the host countries
are. So we still need to juggle both ends to make sure we
actually provide safeguard assurances at the same time we do
expedited process and approval. So it's a balancing act.
Mr. Hudson. Appreciate that.
Like the other sections of this discussion draft, these
procedures will help enable our domestic suppliers to more
effectively compete in the world market, as has been mentioned
by my colleagues, while not impacting our national security
interests, and allowing NNSA to focus on the applications that
truly present national security risks. Do you believe this
section will have that intended effect? Do you think we strike
the right balance?
Dr. Park. I think it is on the right path.
Mr. Hudson. Great. I appreciate that. And with that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Johnson. The gentleman yields back.
And now seeing that there are no further Members wishing to
ask questions I would like to thank our panelists, our
witnesses for joining us here today. You are excused.
We will call up our second panel, if they would take their
seats. These include Jeffrey S. Merrifield, partner at
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman; and Melissa Mann, president of
URENCO; Nick Irvin, Director, Research and Development for
Strategy in Advanced Nuclear Technology, Southern Company; and
Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union
of Concerned Scientists.
And as soon as our second panel takes their seat, just for
Members' understanding and information, we will get through as
many of these introductory or the witness testimonies as
possible before we have to break for an anticipated vote
sometime in the next 10, 15 minutes or so.
So, with that, Mr. Merrifield, would recognize you for 5
minutes.
STATEMENTS OF JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, PARTNER, PILLSBURY
WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, AND SENIOR ADVISOR, CLEARPATH
ACTION; MELISSA C. MANN, PRESIDENT, URENCO USA, INC., AND
MEMBER, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR INDUSTRY COUNCIL; JAMES NICHOLAS
IRVIN, DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, ADVANCED
NUCLEAR, AND CROSSCUTTING TECHNOLOGY, SOUTHERN COMPANY, AND
MEMBER, ADVANCED REACTOR WORKING GROUP, NUCLEAR ENERGY
INSTITUTE; AND EDWIN LYMAN, PH.D., SENIOR SCIENTIST, GLOBAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD
Mr. Merrifield. Thank you. Chairman, Ranking Member Rush,
and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to testify
before a committee that I had the opportunity to be in front of
when I was an NRC Commissioner. I am here today as a senior
advisor to ClearPath Action, although I am a full-time partner
in Pillsbury Law.
Founded by businessman Jay Faison, ClearPath Action's
mission is to accelerate conservative clean energy solutions.
To advance the mission, ClearPath Action develops cutting-edge
policy and messaging and works with policymakers and industry.
During my time at the NRC and in positions I have held
since then, I have had the opportunity to visit all 99 nuclear
power plants in the United States, and over half of the 450
nuclear power plants around the world. I have been impressed by
the commitment to excellence in nuclear power operations that I
have seen at all the plants I have visited.
I would first like to turn to the matter of advanced
nuclear reactors. These designs, which utilize high temperature
gas, molten salt, and liquid metal, among other designs, range
from microreactors of a few megawatts to large gigawatt-size
reactors. While they represent a diversity of sizes and cooling
methods, they generally possess enhanced safety features as
well as improved economics when compared to existing reactors.
In a report issued by ClearPath in the Nuclear Industry
Council in February, Pillsbury identified that of the over 50
advanced reactor designs in North America the vast majority of
these are planning to use higher enrichments of fuel, typically
between 8 and 19.75 percent. And some of these designs could
come to the U.S. market by the mid to late 2020s.
As the development of a fuel supply and regulatory approval
can take multiple years, work must begin immediately to ensure
a sufficient supply of this high-assay low-enriched uranium.
Unfortunately, the Department of Energy, which has been a
traditional supplier of these enriched levels of material, does
not currently possess the high-assay enriched uranium or
enrichment capabilities that are needed for advanced reactors
as the current inventory is dedicated to other needs such as
research reactors and the Navy propulsion program.
The draft legislation sponsored by Representative Flores is
a positive step in the right direction to address the need for
DOE to create an inventory of HA-LEU material, the need for
criticality information to develop and license transportation
packages, and the need for the NRC to develop an appropriate
and timely licensing framework.
In addition to strongly supporting this legislation,
ClearPath Action's written comments provide specific
suggestions for improving this legislation.
We also support the draft legislation offered by
Congressman Wilson to require the DOE to prepare a report on
the potential deployment of privately developed microreactors
at DoD and DOE facilities. ClearPath's written testimony also
includes a recommendation for strengthening this legislation.
The NRC has continued to make commendable progress in
rightsizing its workforce and budget. ClearPath Action believes
the Commission can and should take further steps to streamline
its services consistent with the mission to protect public
health, safety, and the environment.
The legislation sponsored by Congressman Kinzinger and
Congressman Doyle appears to be a common sense step to provide
the agency with a funding mechanism that aligns its mission and
costs. We applaud the provision that excludes fees for the
development of the regulatory infrastructure for advanced
reactor technologies. We believe this exclusion will allow the
NRC to be appropriately prepared to review these technologies,
yet avoid placing the cost burden for these preparations on the
nascent developers of these promising designs.
As it relates to the provision in the bill to require a
study about the elimination of the Foreign Licensing
Restrictions of Section 103(d) and 104(d) of the Atomic Energy
Act, while I would prefer the outright elimination of the
ownership requirement, I understand the rationale for
commissioning a study and support it.
Recently, the U.S. has had several perfectly good nuclear
reactors shut down for economic reasons. Previously, Pillsbury
was previously approached by several European utilities who
were interested in purchasing U.S. nuclear reactors but were
prohibited from doing so. Eliminating this requirement could
provide an opportunity to save these vital clean energy
facilities through investment by friendly foreign utilities.
I would note that in 2008, British Energy's nuclear fleet
faced similar financial hardships, and a decision to permit EDF
to purchase these units allowed the continued operation of
these clean UK energy assets.
We have reviewed the draft submitted by Congressman Johnson
to facilitate the process by which DOE authorizes export of
civilian nuclear technologies. We believe this legis--we
support this legislation and believe it makes an important step
to further streamline the process for some applications
submitted under 10 C.F.R. Part 50.10. That said, we remain
concerned that the legislation only targets a limited portion
of the nuclear technology export approvals process. We have
submitted some specific suggestions for improvement in our
written testimony.
Thank you. And we thank you for allowing me to testify on
this important topic.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Merrifield follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Merrifield.
Ms. Mann, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MELISSA C. MANN
Ms. Mann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rush, and
members of the subcommittee. We appreciate your leadership on
nuclear energy issues. And it is a privilege to speak with you
today about means of increasing the competitiveness of the
nuclear fleet and advancing advanced technologies and
infrastructure.
I am Melissa Mann, president of URENCO USA and the owner of
the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the United
States. But I am also here today as a member of the U.S.
Nuclear Industry Council, whose 82 members represent the full
breadth of the nuclear supply chain.
On behalf of the Council we salute the full committee and
this subcommittee's laser focus on sustaining the current fleet
and pushing forward advanced technologies. And we salute the
multifaceted initiatives that are covered by the four bills
under discussion today. I would like to focus specifically on
Mr. Flores' discussion draft on what we now know we call HA-
LEU, or high-assay low-enriched uranium.
The current nuclear fleet relies on a uranium fuel enriched
to just under 5 percent in the uranium-235 isotope. And we have
a fuel cycle that is able to process that material. But a
comparable fuel cycle does not exist for many advanced designs
because they require higher enrichment at levels above 5 but
just below 20 percent.
There is a broad community of users who would benefit from
HA-LEU supply. They include research and test reactors,
including those currently fueled by the Department of Energy,
both here and abroad.
It includes many advanced reactor designs and advanced
fuels, including accident tolerant fuels.
It includes producers of targets for medical isotope
production, and even existing light-water reactors who are
seeking certain fuel reliability and cost performance
enhancers.
A complete and sustainable HA-LEU fuel cycle would
necessarily include three components: an enrichment facility; a
conversion facility to take that material to the form of metal
or oxide; and one or more fabrication facilities to manufacture
the full type of fuel forms required.
And there is a strong potential to develop the HA-LEU fuel
cycle in the United States. The New Mexico enrichment plant,
the technology that it uses is already capable of producing at
the full gamut of HA-LEU enrichments. And only an NRC license
amendment is required to bring that capacity to bear.
Two fabrication facilities supporting NNSA missions already
operate at much higher enrichment levels, demonstrating both
the viability of licensing and operating at these greater
enrichments.
There is several, three in particular, critical fleet
conditions that need to be met before we can move forward:
First, it is imperative that you license and develop the
enrichment, conversion, and fabrication capabilities
concurrently, otherwise you will have critical gaps.
Secondly, we need a predictable and streamlined licensing
framework, and the regulator needs the appropriate resources to
manage timely and contemporaneous reviews.
And we have talked a little bit about nuclear criticality
benchmarks. We need those both for the fixed facilities and for
transportation packages. We are also seeking clear NRC guidance
on physical protection, security, and material control and
accountability.
And, finally, those companies that are making investments
in HA-LEU facilities need to be assured of a reasonable return
on investment. A consortium-based approach in cooperation with
DOE, as envisioned by this discussion draft, is a good step in
that direction.
I am speaking about these recommendations not just as a
member of the fuel cycle. My company is also a designer of a
small microreactor, 10-megawatt, thermal, high-temperature,
gas-cooled design that itself relies on HA-LEU. What we know is
that without fuel, reactors don't run. And that is perhaps the
most significant aspect of the discussion draft, that it
recognizes the need for collaboration, because unless the users
of this material, the fuel cycle itself, the Department, and
the NRC effectively hold hands and jump forward together, we
won't be able to reap the benefit of these designs.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mann follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Johnson. Ms. Mann yields back. Mr. Irvin, you are now
recognized for 5 minutes. And if I could remind our witnesses
votes have just been called. We are going to get through both
of your testimonies. Don't want to cut you short but we will
not hold it against you if you speak fast.
STATEMENT OF JAMES NICHOLAS IRVIN
Mr. Irvin. Shouldn't be a problem as I am from Alabama,
sir. We speak pretty fast in the south.
Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, thank you,
Member Rush, to appear before you about this very important
topic of advanced nuclear technology. My name is Nick Irvin. I
am the Director of R&D at Southern Company. And I have
responsibility for developing advanced reactor technology, as
well as supporting our efforts to modernize the licensing
framework for those technologies.
At Southern Company we talk a lot about providing our
customers with clean, safe, reliable, and affordable energy.
And for me personally that is a very important concept in that
I believe that access to energy is foundational to maintaining
a high quality of life for every human on this planet.
In addition, I was raised in a home where continuous
learning is--was a requirement, and not only to be a continuous
learner but to also put that learning to good use. And so, to
work at a company like Southern Company that provides energy
but also provides a strong focus on innovation makes me one of
the lucky ones.
When it comes to innovation, a very important component of
innovation is collaboration. And a very important collaboration
that we have maintained for the entirety of our history in R&D
is a strong relationship with the Department of Energy through
public/private partnerships. We believe public/private
partnerships are essential to help manage the transition of new
technology, particularly in the energy space, from concept to
deployment and where the technology and financial risks become
married in that process.
To that end, we currently operate as a contractor to the
Department of Energy, developing an advanced reactor in
collaboration with a company called TerraPower where we are in
year two, approaching year three, of a 5-year agreement to
advance that technology towards deployment in the mid-2030s. We
believe it is an important technology that has a potential to
not only advance the components of the advanced reactors that
we think about, nominally safety, baseload electricity, but
also do so in a very cost competitive way, which is important,
again, to protect the interests of our customers.
Additionally, we are working in partnership with the
Department of Energy on a project called a licensing
modernization project. It is an effort to reflect the
differences in the nature of these advanced reactors and how
the regulatory approach needs to be modified so that we can be
efficient and effective in regulating those to the same
standards as we currently regulate the light-water reactor
fleet.
As we look at the four bills that were presented from the
subcommittee, we feel like they are all very supportive and
aligned with our mission goals and our activities at Southern
Company. Specifically, this idea of an efficient and effective
regulator is a critically important component to maintaining
the competitiveness of nuclear reactor technology in the
nuclear industry, both domestically and globally. We do see
nuclear energy as a global market. And as a consumer of nuclear
technology, we see the vital importance of having a healthy
supply chain in order to maintain access to those, those
components and technologies here domestically.
And given that the market domestically is challenged, the
international markets may maintain that foundation from which
we need to build advanced reactors.
Given the prior comment about a global market, we can't
miss the opportunity to take advantage of near-term
opportunities such as the ones identified in the bill
discussing microreactors as it relates to resiliency with the
Department of Defense. We think these microreactors can be
deployed in the near term, and do provide a great opportunity
to, for lack of a better term, pilot the entire, the entire
concepts necessary to deploy advanced reactors in a very
measurable way, given their size and scale.
And then as was previously mentioned, none of these
machines operate without fuel. And so, access to HA-LEU is a
critically important component that I do believe it is time to
begin working towards if we want to support early or mid-next
decade either deployment of microreactors, or demonstration
reactors, or some other technologies.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments and
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Irvin follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Irvin.
Dr. Lyman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF EDWIN LYMAN
Dr. Lyman. Thank you. On behalf of the Union of Concerned
Scientists I would like to thank the chairman, ranking member,
and other members of the committee for the opportunity to
testify today.
UCS supports DOE investment in nuclear energy research and
development, but with a focus on increasing safety and security
of the once-through cycle.
In the near term we see promise in projects such as
developing accident tolerant fuels for current light-water
reactors. But our analysis to date has not identified any
advanced reactor design that offers clear safety and security
improvements over today's light-water reactors.
So, it is in that spirit that I would like to comment on
the four bills today.
We support the discussion draft on advanced nuclear fuel
availability. We think it makes sense for an assessment to be
made of the availability or the likely availability of HA-LEU.
And that will help to assess the viability of advanced reactor
declining in mid-term. But the acquisition of HA-LEU should be
closely tied to realistic projections of the need for the
material.
A couple of additions. We think that the study shouldn't
evaluate the larger nonproliferation implications of the
production of HA-LEU. Even though HA-LEU is low-enriched
uranium and cannot be directly used in nuclear weapons, the
material does pose proliferation security concerns and if there
is going to be expanded production and use of that material, as
well as the potential for exports of reactors that would use
it, and foreign customers, we think that that is not--that
evaluation has not been made yet, and it should be.
On H.R. 1320, we oppose most aspects of the bill because we
do not support so-called streamlining of licensing that might
lead to shortcuts in the approval of advanced reactors without
fully resolving the safety and security concerns that are
unique to these new designs.
On the nuclear energy competitiveness discussion draft we
share a lot of the concerns that we have heard today about the
definition of lost proliferation risk technology, and how that
must be evaluated within the context of any export, especially
today.
And I would just like to clarify the record. My testimony
did not say that it is easy for a country to misuse a light-
water reactor to produce plutonium for weapons, however, it is
not out of the question. In fact, the technology for processing
has been available now publicly for many decades. So you can't
discount that. And you need to consider the risk of breakout--
that is, throwing the IAEA inspectors out and using the
facilities you have to make weapons rapidly--in any export
consideration.
Finally, on the issue of microreactors, we do not share the
optimism about the promise of these facilities, especially for
Department of Defense sites and energy resilience. We think
that the military should cast a skeptical eye on the stories
that they are being told about how these reactors are going to
be so safe and secure they can't melt down, and especially how
they can provide resilience. In fact, any nuclear reactor
really requires electrical power to operate safely, and the
only way these reactors could provide power and disconnect it
from the grid is in what is called island mode, which is not
well established in any designs.
So, I would urge that the study include an assessment of
the safety and security, and the potential applications for the
safety of U.S. military personnel and usability of military
facilities if there were a safety, or security, or sabotage
incident that would lead to large-array large release.
I hope these observations are useful. I welcome your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lyman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Dr. Lyman.
The committee will now stand in recess until after votes.
And we will reconvene and begin our rounds of questions. Thank
you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Johnson. The hearing will come to order. And the Chair
will now recognize himself for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Merrifield, your testimony notes that the discussion
draft's expedited process for low proliferation risk
technologies could be improved. How can the legislation find
the right balance between having a defined set of technologies
that would clearly be directed under the new process while
still providing flexibility going forward that future
innovations are not limited?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, there are a
couple aspects that we would focus on. One is obviously how you
define low proliferation technologies. And we, it is our view
that defining that, those technologies, commercial nuclear
reactors other than those which are designed to utilize mixed
oxide fuel would be a common sense way of doing that.
We have a, you know, obviously, very stringent process with
the NNSA here in the United States, as well as IAEA, which
looks very closely at countries that operate those, those
reactors. That is a solid and common sense framework that
provides I think an appropriate level of protection.
As it relates to the U.S. Governmental process, I think one
of the issues that really drags these things out right now is
the interagency process. That, combined with the assurance
processes is, as it is currently put in place, has really
caused many U.S. companies which are exporting these
technologies to really be put at disadvantage and they are
having their applications really dragged out far longer than
they need to be.
So, simplifying that process for obtaining those assurances
potentially by having more standardized form of assurances we
think makes a whole lot of sense. At the end of the day if we
make it too hard to export U.S. technologies, people will go
elsewhere to countries that don't have those concerns.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Well, thank you.
Ms. Mann, the legislation that I am proposing to reform
DOE's Part 810 review process is meant to provide the U.S.
nuclear industry at least a level playing field in the global
nuclear marketplace, as in some countries, the suppliers are
primarily, if not exclusively, government-owned vendors.
In your experience can you tell me how has, how has your
experience been working with DOE on 810 applications? What have
you experienced?
Ms. Mann. Thank you. So because our, our activity involves
uranium enrichment we are absolutely caught entirely by the 810
system, and at the very highest level of the licensing
restrictions for everything we do. You know, that process is
not necessarily fun or painless, but we have found that the
Department of Energy has been incredibly professional in
working with us.
Now, do those approvals take longer than they need to? In
many cases they do. That is partly due to the problem we have
been talking about, getting the foreign government assurances.
But we see that many of the reforms that have been made to date
with electronic licensing, increased transparency, and
accountability have been incredibly helpful.
But I do think that your draft makes some very useful
recommendations: the delegation of authority, and looking at
ways that you can improve what falls into the general license
category, will definitely support American users.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Well, what further needs to be done to
ensure that regulatory requirements don't have a chilling
impact on U.S. exports of nuclear technology and assistance to
those countries requesting it?
Ms. Mann. The balance between promotion and protection is
always a tricky one. And as a company that does deal with very
sensitive technology, that is the balance that we are always
looking to have in place.
I think that, again, the transparency and the
accountability in the process go far towards supporting that
process. The recommendation that Commissioner Merrifield is
making about a more standardized form of assurance helps. And
whatever you can do to get those time frames down.
But I also note that the 810 system does something for the
U.S. that we don't see our competitors having an advantage of,
and that is the general license system. So, to the extent that
we can improve that further, we will get better, you know,
better gains.
Mr. Johnson. OK.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson. Did you want to comment?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I was just going to say one thing I
forgot to mention in our suggestion is also the notion of
reducing the number of agencies that need to concur. The DOE
and NNSA are perfectly capable of doing the vast bulk of these.
We ought to let them go ahead and do it and not necessarily
need some of the others in the process.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Nuclear power plants last a long time. And
I would think U.S. engagement with those reactors around the
world can help ensure many years of economic cooperation and
peace. According to the EIA, almost 200 gigawatts of new
nuclear energy capacity are projected to be added throughout
the world by 2050. These plants are going to be built.
Mr. Merrifield, in your testimony you mention that today
the U.S. is but one of many highly competitive countries vying
for a role in supporting the development of, development of
operations of nuclear power plants overseas. Can you describe
the type of competition U.S. suppliers face and the benefits of
U.S. engagement in these opportunities around the world?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, it is----
Mr. Johnson. And I am already out of time. So if you can
make it a quick answer I would appreciate it.
Mr. Merrifield. Yes. It is very strong competition. You
have got China and Russia, which are often very competitive
technologies with a lot of financing behind them. You have
Korea, which has a demonstrated technology which is going to
deploy four units in the UAE, which is a very aggressive
competitor. And France has been very successful in a variety of
other countries.
The U.S. has strong competition. We don't have the same
economic tools behind us. We really do need all of the effort
of the U.S. Government if we are to increase these U.S., these
vital U.S. technologies.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I yield----
Mr. Merrifield. Oh, I was going to say these are 100-year
relationships. That is what our competitors know and that is
what we need to focus on.
Mr. Johnson. The long term.
I yield back the balance of my time, which I have none, and
I recognize Mr. McNerney for 5 minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I thank the Chair. And I thank the
witnesses. I apologize for missing your testimony. I was in
another committee.
I am going to start with Mr. Lyman. What are the costs
associated with fabricating HA-LEU through downblending of
excessive highly enriched uranium stocks as opposed to using
conventional or alternative fabrication methods?
Dr. Lyman. Well, I think until--it is hard to talk about
the cost of the alternative until the scope of the program has
been established, as well as what it would take not only to--
what it would take really to support Ms. Mann's effort to
acquire a capability to reconfigure plants and license them for
producing HA-LEU.
So until that scope is recognized, there are a factors on
the costs, so I couldn't say. But clearly if existing HA-LEU
stocks are available, that downblending, depending on the
quality of the source material, could be, you know, a
competitive option I would think since----
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. What about the nonproliferation
comments, could you expand on that a little bit?
Dr. Lyman. Yes. Well, in general HA-LEU, even though it is
below the 20 percent enrichment threshold, it is only if you
look at a material that is right below that threshold it only
takes about one-tenth of the separated work to produce weapons
grade uranium over 90 percent as it does for natural uranium.
So, having a stock of that moderately enriched uranium does
give a leg up to a nation that might want to start producing
high-enriched uranium for weapons. And that is our point now,
that is why Iran, there was so much concern about Iran
stockpiling this material.
In addition, that material could be used for radiological
weapons which has been their study in the past.
So it is important to examine those issues if you do
develop a new demand and production capacity for this material,
start exporting, other countries may be kind of interested in
similar designs, want to start producing HA-LEU themselves. I
think that warrants further exploration.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. Mr. Irvin, where does the Southern
Company see small modular reactors fitting into their business
model?
Mr. Irvin. That is a good question and it is an interesting
one. We view SMRs as being a critical component of the
maintaining the supply chain as we go forward for advanced
reactors. We are always looking at our customers' needs and
evaluating what they are telling us with regards to their price
and performance requirements.
I believe that SMRs have a critical challenge with respect
to being competitive against natural gas combined cycle in the
U.S. That doesn't mean that that future is not bright. And
certainly there is a significant opportunity for SMRs, but I do
think it is challenged.
We, we see advanced reactors as providing a potential to
drive down the costs low enough to be competitive with the
natural gas combined cycle. And so really the core component of
SMR is providing a bridge to that future.
Mr. McNerney. Good segue.
Mr. Merrifield, how do you, how do we help jump start the
industry without hampering the NRC's capability to do their
job?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I think, I think, you know, a number
of pieces of legislation that you have before you today would
be, would be helpful. In terms of the NRC's process, I think
the agency's made a lot of, a lot of progress on right-sizing
itself. I think putting in specific deadlines for reviewing
applications, reviewing environmental reviews, I think that is
certainly appropriate and I certainly would support that.
Overall, in the part of the advanced reactor community, I
think having appropriate funding through other committees of
Congress is going to be important to your technologies which
have great promise. They are certainly deployable in the late
2020s, and the U.S. is ahead in this technology. Certainly want
to take advantage of that for export purposes.
Mr. McNerney. So in honor of the sitting chairman, what
about the nuclear waste issue? Do you see a resolution of that
in the works or what are your feeling about that?
Mr. Merrifield. Is that directed toward me?
Mr. McNerney. Yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I have a specific prohibition against
lobbying Congress on Yucca Mountain related issues. So, with
that caveat I think that there are common-sensical ways to
address the material. There are several proposals for interim
storage facilities, both in Texas and New Mexico, which provide
I think common sense ways of dealing with this in the interim.
At the end of the day, my personal view as an American is
Yucca Mountain is a perfectly safe place to put that fuel.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields
back his time.
It is great to have you here. It is great to be in the
chair for the Energy Subcommittee. So let me go with my round
of questions, kind of similar to what I did with the first
panel. I want to go to Ms. Mann.
Your testimony notes that your NRC-licensed facility is
capable of producing high-assay LEU or low-enrichment uranium
for advanced nuclear fuels. I would like a brief clarification.
Are there any technical, regulatory, or other legal
restrictions from your enrichment plant to make high-assay LEU
for commercial purposes?
Ms. Mann. Certainly the technology is fully capable now of
doing that. The site that we have we think is certainly
suitable. We do need a nuclear NRC license amendment to build a
HA-LEU enrichment module. But there are no other restrictions
on that technology or that proposal other than, of course,
having a market that we can serve.
Mr. Shimkus. Markets are important as you directly put.
Are you aware--and you were in here for the first panel, so
this is a similar question--are you aware of the GAO report
that recently analyzed the NNSA's preliminary cost estimates
and mission statement regarding future enrichment needs for
American defense purposes?
Ms. Mann. I am generally familiar.
Mr. Shimkus. Based on your experience in building and
operating the only enrichment plant in the United States, what
is your perspective on GAO's conclusions on NNSA's cost
estimates?
Ms. Mann. There are certainly two very different things. We
built a greenfield commercial enrichment facility in New
Mexico, taking it from what was a effectively a square mile of
scrub brush and coyotes in 2006, and turning it into a high
class enrichment facility. And investment to date is about $5
billion.
I think that is very different than the cost range that was
envisioned for a much smaller footprint of capacity for the DOE
domestic uranium program.
Two comments on that. One, I do believe there is strictly a
clear delineation between civil and military programs. I can
also tell you that the cost estimates that are in that GAO
report are unsustainable, whether it be for the commercial
fleet or for an emerging advanced reactor community.
Mr. Shimkus. So you were, again, here during the first
panel. And what do you respond--and he could have stayed, too--
Mr. McGinnis' comments on the similar question?
Ms. Mann. I certainly appreciate that the Department has
other missions it needs to fulfill. And I understand that they
may be looking to merge some of those. But what we are looking
at is the near-term need for HA-LEU fuel for commercial
reactors, on a relatively small demand, even if you aggregate
all of those small pieces from different users.
If you try to put the defense program on that backs of
that, you will break it.
Mr. Shimkus. And Mr. McGinnis' comment which, you know, I
fleshed out a little bit but not enough, he seemed to be making
the debate of competitive marketplace and having two production
facilities. How would you comment on that?
Ms. Mann. We certainly support competition. And I can tell
you we are very much aware of the competition that we see, both
in the enrichment market and other parts of the fuel cycle. And
that's really up to the market to bear.
We know that utilities, like Southern here, like a very
diverse range of supplier. I think the question is until we
know what the full demand profile is, how many advanced
designs, advanced fuel types move forward I am not sure what
that industry is capable of sustaining in the earliest years.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, I think that's been my point, too,
because I would concur that we would like to have multiple
sources, like to have competition. We want lower costs and more
efficiencies.
But I am also concerned about the Government overbuilding
on a projected market which may not be there immediately to
fulfill the production needs and desires, and you will have
stranded costs there in producing fuel that you may not need to
do.
Ms. Mann. I will just tell you quickly that the existing
fuel cycle is under quite duress due to the falling demand, to
the significant amount of inventories, to state-sponsored
competition. We are trying to sustain that. And if you look at
trying to add additional pressures on top of that, it's not
sustainable.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, and I follow it very closely because I
have the Honeywell facility. And I have talked with DOE quite a
bit about the multiple individual markets that don't produce
it, but then the repurposing of, in essence, Government-
subsidized ability to purchase and buy and then also create
fuel waste. It makes it hard for a corporate entity to be able
to provide that certainty.
So, I am going to yield back my time. And thank you for
answering those questions. And then yield to Mr. Green for 5
minutes, from Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses
for waiting here today.
Mr. Merrifield, based on your vast experience in the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission I would like to ask you a few
questions on the NRC's fee and Mr. Kinzinger and Mr. Doyle's
bill.
Section 3(b) of the bill would provide an exclusion of fees
for those costs associated with the development of regulatory
infrastructure for advanced nuclear reactor technology. Can you
talk a little bit about why this provision is so important to
this new industry and how our current NRC fee structure stifles
growth in the sector?
Mr. Merrifield. Yes. Thank you very much, Congressman, for
that question.
A couple of things. First, I think if you look
historically, with the current fee in nuclear reactors they did
not have to pay those kind of fees when those reactors were
developed in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. So concurrently I
think that is one issue.
The second one is these are nascent technologies. These are
not large companies that are developing these technologies.
They are smaller. They are innovative. And they are currently
in the market seeking funding to bring those designs forward.
Placing on top of all of that effort the costs of the NRC,
building its regulatory infrastructure would be, would be
potentially crushing. And that's really a role and
responsibility that is more appropriately left to the U.S.
Government. And so I believe, and ClearPath Action believes
that the language is appropriate.
Mr. Green. As more and more nuclear plants go offline
across the country, the fee burden is felt more heavily by
those who remain. Do you feel the current NRC structure is
sustainable? And if not, is there a tipping point that you
expect to come?
Mr. Merrifield. I think that is, I think that is a great
question. And I agree with the direction from which it comes.
Yes, I do think Congress is going to have to continue to
take a look at the number of reactors and adjust the amount of
fees that are put on licensees as a result of it. The NRC has
certain breadth of work that they have to do. But there will
become a point at which I think there will need to be increased
general revenues dedicated to that to make sure that that fee
structure isn't overly burdensome to U.S. utilities.
Mr. Green. So, do you have a year. I mean, because some of
this legislation needs, sometimes it takes years to get
something passed. Do you have any idea when that may be,
looking into the future?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I think, I think this is something
that this committee should be thinking about and Congress
should be thinking about right now. I mean the discussion is as
many of a quarter of the reactors could potentially go offline.
I think, you know, changing the current ration that previously
was 90:10, I think taking it to a different ratio makes sense
currently right now.
Mr. Green. Do you feel the draft legislation adequately
addresses these challenges?
Mr. Merrifield. I think the legislation is a great step in
the right direction.
Mr. Green. While I made clear before that I am not fond of
DOE's recent notice of public review that proposed subsidizing
certain industries, I do think we face a challenge that needs
to be addressed. We have heard from many witnesses on multiple
pieces of legislation.
What else should Congress be looking at to shore up the
domestic nuclear energy production in the coming year other
than these legislations?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I think having, having the fast
reactor capability out in Idaho is going to be important for
the testing of the various rules that will be used for these
reactors. So I think that is an important one.
I think the actions that Congress has made to make sure the
DOE loan guarantee program stays in place is important.
I think the Ex-Im Bank is an important tool for the export
of these reactors, so I would certainly recommend continuation
and, frankly, some strengthening of their nuclear capabilities.
Those are among some of the things I think Congress ought
to look at.
Mr. Green. Well, hopefully next time we reauthorize Ex-Im
Bank it won't take such a battle as we had last time.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time. And thank you for
my earlier extra 20 seconds.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. And the
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Irvin, your testimony focuses a lot on the research and
development of advanced nuclear reactors. What are the long-
term benefits your customers will see after Southern Company
invests in these new technologies?
Mr. Irvin. So, the industry at large, we talked a lot today
about the nuclear industry being in the crossroads, but I think
the industry at large is at a crossroads as well. We have seen
the influx of lots of new technologies being disruptive across
the board. And so as we look forward, we believe investing in
technology that is, I am going to use the phrase, options
positive. So I want to create options. Knowing that I am
believing that the future is uncertain I want to create
technologies that provide multiple options for my customers.
So, the first and foremost for me is the technology, does
it have a potential to drive down the cost of energy? I believe
advanced reactors do have that potential.
But further than that, does the technology have the
potential to serve more than just electricity needs? Does it
have options for a multitude of product slates? And these
advanced reactors and the nature in which they operate creates
opportunities for nuclear energy to be transitioned into the
industrial sector, into the transportation sector, but
certainly providing low cost electrons.
And so, we see the opportunity for this long-term, stable
energy supply to be pervasive across the entire energy economy.
Mr. Long. What does Congress or the Department of Energy
need to do to help companies like Southern Company and other
companies streamline the development of these advanced
reactors?
Mr. Irvin. Well, I think the one of the most important
things there, and it is something I have seen out of the
Department over the last 5 years do more and more is really
seek out industry's input and partner with industry in a
collaborative way, and take that feedback from industry as to
where we need to move the technologies to. I think industry, in
partnership with the Department, can accelerate. And we need
that collaboration with the Department on things like
fundamental science, testing capabilities such as the advanced
reactor, fast test reactor that was mentioned earlier.
But then, ultimately, as that collaboration matures we need
the Department and Federal Government to allow industry to then
move forward and commercialize and take advantage of the
investment that has been put in before it.
Mr. Long. OK. This next question is for everyone. We will
just start Merrifield, Mann, Irvin, and Lyman down the line if
we can.
But for all of you, I have seen some of your testimonies
reference the--in reference to China starting to load fuel into
new nuclear power, a new nuclear power plant, and India,
Russia, and Korea leading the United States in deploying large
nuclear reactors over 1,000 megawatt units. Is the United
States falling behind these countries in the field of nuclear
energy and nuclear technology in your opinion, Mr. Merrifield?
Mr. Merrifield. That is--I have got a mixed answer to that.
Frankly, the reactor that is being built in China is a
Westinghouse technology. The United States continues to possess
the most modern nuclear design out there in that particular
technology, so we are leading in that regard.
In terms of construction, obviously Southern Company has
two of those reactors that continue to be built. It is
unfortunate that the cost of natural gas is what it is, which
is hindering utilities like Southern, more and more of those.
But certainly there is a robust export market. And certainly
the United States should be a leader in that, in that regard.
Mr. Long. OK. Ms. Mann, is the United States falling behind
these other countries in the field of nuclear energy, nuclear
technology in your opinion?
Ms. Mann. Mr. Long, my specialty is on the nuclear fuel
cycle. And in that regard the answer is clearly no.
But in order to be able to supply into China we need to
have an open market. And that is one of the things we are
concerned about is to make sure that they are able to continue
to receive the output of American technology in their home.
Mr. Long. Mr. Irvin?
Mr. Irvin. Personally, I think the race is a little too
close to call right now. But I think the reference to natural
gas being low, by the way it is a good thing for Southern
Company if natural gas prices are low, but it is a clear
indication that when the U.S., when we put U.S. innovation to
work through collaboration with the Federal Government, like we
did with learning how to frack, and finding shale gas, then we
can clearly stay ahead and put ourselves further ahead than the
rest of the world. And so that is the reason why we are so
focused on innovation.
Mr. Long. Dr. Lyman?
Dr. Lyman. Well, I would say the answer is no. From our
perspective safety and security are paramount. And I do agree
with Mr. McGinnis when he said that the U.S. as far as its
safety and security infrastructure for nuclear power is
probably the best in the world.
So we would like to see those concepts, you know, exported.
We don't want to see a race to the bottom where the U.S. has to
compromise on its own principles just to compete with China on
nuclear safety concerns. So we think that that is the best
selling point of U.S. technology is that backbone of safety and
security.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner Merrifield, welcome back. I want to thank you
for taking the time to speak to the committee on nuclear energy
issues and the NUKE Act. The NUKE Act made several changes from
the discussion draft that was under consideration when you last
testified before the committee. These changes include
significantly longer time lines for major license applications,
milestones for new plants, and the removal of deemed approved
language.
Under the current version of the NUKE Act, if the NRC does
not meet the time lines that are laid out in the bill will that
have any effect on an operator's application?
Mr. Merrifield. Yes, I would have to go back and look at
the explicit detail, but I think it does provide an opportunity
for that process to continue. So I don't think it has a
hindrance. But I will certainly look at that and give you some
comments.
Mr. Doyle. Now, do you think the current language gives the
NRC sufficient flexibility?
Mr. Merrifield. I do. I do.
Mr. Doyle. Do you think the current NRC fee structure is
able to appropriately adjust to reflect current market and
future changes to our national energy portfolio without
congressional action?
Mr. Merrifield. As I indicated--great question--as I
indicated in the questions earlier, I believe there needs to be
additional revisions to that fee structure, part of which is
envisioned by the legislation we have been talking about today.
I think that is going to be a continually evolving issue if
there are additional U.S. reactors that go into decommissioning
prematurely.
Mr. Doyle. Can you speak to the current budgetary burden
that is placed on remaining nuclear reactors when a plant
retires? I mean, how do you anticipate this is going to affect
our nuclear fleet if it is not addressed?
And do you see the changes that are proposed in the NUKE
Act as helping to address this problem?
Mr. Merrifield. Well, I will start with, I will start with
the second question first. I do think they are helpful. But
there is no question there are certain fixed assets that the
agency has that it needs in order to be an effective regulator.
At some point that will become large enough that the burden
placed on the individual reactor operators will become larger
and larger. And that is troublesome and problematic because it
makes even more complicated the likelihood that some of those
reactors will be shut down. And I don't think that is a good
thing.
Those are important, carbon-free, clean-generating assets
for our country. I think there are some that have shut down
that have been, frankly, a real shame.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
would now like to recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Kinzinger, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here today. I very much appreciate it.
Mr. Merrifield, Section 7 of H.R. 1320 sets time lines and
goals for the NRC to issue environmental impact statements and
safety evaluation reports for several NRC licensing actions
such as early site permits, construction or operating permits,
and combining operating licenses. Are the time lines in Section
7 generally reasonable to expect based on historical processing
times?
Mr. Merrifield. I believe so.
Mr. Kinzinger. And in your view would instituting such time
lines in any way weaken the underlying stringency of the
established reasonable assurance regulatory requirements?
Mr. Merrifield. I do not believe so. And frankly, you know,
we looked, and as I mentioned in prior testimony before this
committee, I led a task force that looked at some of these very
same issues when I was on the Commission. We felt at that time
there was really a need to streamline some of those processes,
and it didn't really happen. I think the language that you all
have put into that draft will be very--would be a very welcome
change and would give the discipline necessary for you just to
go ahead and do that without sacrificing their mission of
protecting public health, safety, and the environment.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
Ms. Mann, your enrichment facility holds an NRC license and
is subject to NRC's fee recovery. My bill, or our bill creates
reasonable and predictable expectations for NRC's fee recovery
process. I understand the number of licensees who fund NRC fuel
cycle activities has decreased recently without a reduction in
overall NRC staffing.
Will you discuss recent trends associated with NRC fuel
cycle facilities?
Ms. Mann. Certainly. What we are seeing on the fuel cycle
in many way echoes what we have just talked about with regard
to the reactors. The first I would note is that since our
enrichment plant started operation in 2010, we have seen on
average a 12-percent-a-year increase across the board. And even
though the amount of work that is being done at our facility
has slightly gone down now, we are fully operational.
As the number of fuel cycle facilities that are licensed
has dropped, the fees, the total fees that they are trying to
collect have not gone down. And we are, in fact, spreading
those fees across a fewer number of licensees. And so, by that
logic, if we were to perhaps be the last one standing we would
be bearing the full $25-million-a-year burden.
What I think is also notable, and we touched on it a little
bit, is there are things that have to be paid for at the NRC
that have nothing to do with the operation of an individual
facility. And right now what we are looking at is that 74
percent of our fees go to those nondirect services rather than
directly to licensing our site. And we certainly understand the
need to share that burden, but that burden is becoming
prohibitively high.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. And how does this embed cost in
the nuclear fuel cycle that you have touched on, business, and
ultimately impact the commercial nuclear industry and
electricity rates that my constituents pay?
Ms. Mann. Well, I can tell you sitting next here to one of
the utilities is that it is highly unlikely we would be able to
pass those additional costs along to any of our utility
customers. They have other choices and they have other
suppliers who don't bear the burden of those fees. So we need
to be careful.
And, likewise, we understand why Nick couldn't do that, he
can't pass it on to his customers. So the question is what is a
more rational way to spread those total fees across, and then
also reflect the individual licensing work being done at each
of our sites.
Mr. Kinzinger. And that, by definition, would skew the
whole energy mix anyway, which is something that we are
obviously very concerned with. And so, would enacting this
legislation help control those costs in your mind?
Ms. Mann. Yes, it would.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
Mr. Lyman, H.R. 1320 contains substantially similar
language regarding NRC's fee structure as the Nuclear Energy
Innovation and Modernization Act sponsored by the Senate EPW
Chairman Barrasso. With respect to that, though, your
organization said the bill balanced reforms to the licensing
process while allowing the NRC flexibility to regulate in the
public interest and the Union of Concerned Scientists took a
neutral position on the bill. Does that position also apply to
the same language fee that is included in my legislation?
Dr. Lyman. Yes, it does. And as you see in my testimony
with regard to the fee cap and the corporate support costs, we
also, you see that we take a neutral position because we think
there is language in there that provides enough flexibility. We
just don't want to see Congress mandate an arbitrary cap that
would force the NRC to curtail important safety and security
work and needs some flexibility. And I think the way the
language is written now they would have that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back. At this time the
Chair recognizes the ranking member of the Environment
Subcommittee, Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tonko. We have the environment team here and----
Mr. Shimkus. They are taking over.
Mr. Tonko [continuing]. The energy team. So only kidding.
Welcome to our witnesses, and thank you for your input. Mr.
Merrifield, H.R. 1320 would exempt a number of activities from
NRC's fee structure. Can you give us the sense of what those
activities would include?
Mr. Merrifield. I don't have, I don't have the list in
front of me right now. The one that we focused on is an
exclusion for costs associated with developing a regulatory
infrastructure for regulation on advanced reactors. We think
that that, that particular language makes a lot of sense. It is
important the NRC put that structure in place. It is working
very hard to do so right now.
There are upfront costs that are associated with that kind
of activity. And certainly we think that should be borne by the
general revenues rather than individual developers.
One of the elements I included in my written testimony is
the suggestion that you may wish to increase that to allow some
degree of regulatory research as part of that advanced reactor
program so the NRC had the tools looking forward to
appropriately regulate those, including an appropriate balance
of risk-informed regulation in that part. So that, we certainly
think that that is a very good element of that program.
Mr. Tonko. So the NRC currently recovers approximately 90
percent of its budget from license fees?
Mr. Merrifield. Yes.
Mr. Tonko. Are any activities exempted under this bill
currently recoverable by NRC?
Mr. Merrifield. I would have to look at, I would have to
look at the individual elements of the legislation that go past
it. And there are certainly some areas where there may be an
overlap, but I would have to confirm that.
Mr. Tonko. OK, thank you.
And do you have any estimates, and if not, Mr. Chair, maybe
we could ask NRC, of how this bill might change that 90:10 cost
recovery, if enacted?
Mr. Merrifield. I do not have an estimate of that. And I do
think you are quite correct, directing that to the NRC would be
more appropriate.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. The bill also places a cap on the
fees that NRC can charge an operating reactor. Mr. Merrifield
or Mr. Irvin, do you know the current average annual fees
assessed on operating reactors?
Mr. Merrifield. I am going to pass that one to Mr. Irvin.
Mr. Irvin. Unfortunately, I don't, I don't know that. I am
in the R&D sector, not the operations side, so.
Mr. Tonko. OK, thank you.
Dr. Lyman, you expressed concerns about the expedited
review process in Section 7 of H.R. 1320, which would require
the draft environmental impact statement within 24 months and a
42-month deadline for technical review process and final
environmental impact statement. Can you explain your concerns
with the time line for these reviews?
Dr. Lyman. Yes. As a policy matter we don't support the
micromanagement by Congress of regulatory agencies to that
extent that they should be given these strict time lines to
conduct environmental reviews. Often during the review new
issues will arise that simply take time to resolve. And I do
not think that it is appropriate to try to force resolution of
those where they are right.
So that is why we don't think, unless there was more
discretion to the agency to be able to exempt those time lines,
we don't think it is appropriate.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And, Dr. Lyman, again, and let's
switch to Part 810, it seems you believe we should err on the
side of caution for nuclear technology transfers. What role
should the State Department play in assessing proliferation
threats?
Mr. Irvin. I think the State Department has a critical role
and brings its own expertise to these reviews. And in
particular by taking a broader view that we did hear about this
morning, that any technology export has to be seen in context.
So, even a light-water reactor without any fuel cycle
technology could potentially pose undue risk if it goes to,
let's say, a region of the world like the Middle East or Saudi
Arabia where the countries are stating its desire to acquire
fuel cycle technology possibly from somewhere else.
So if, if we give them cover to be able to acquire that
technology, possibly for eventual misuse for nuclear weapons, I
think that would be a dangerous development.
Mr. Tonko. And is it important to be able to reassess those
risks in real time?
Mr. Irvin. Yes. One would hope getting information and
making decisions is always based on the best available
information at the time, but also by looking ahead. And
understanding we heard earlier a nuclear reactor, you know,
could be a 60- or a 100-year proposition. Well, that cuts both
ways. Governments often don't last that long. So you have to
look forward and make conservative projections about what may
happen in the future with that technology.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you to all of you. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
panel for being here.
Ms. Mann, your testimony notes that there is a need to
address packaging and transportation needs. But you also note
that we already transport nuclear fuel to meet the needs of the
commercial fleet. Additionally, we currently ship HA-LEU for
research reactors and other purposes.
Can you please provide a bit more context on what is
different about the needs and designs for transportation
packages for HA-LEU on a larger scale?
And, second, why are the existing packages not adequate for
widespread commercial use for uranium enriched at higher
levels?
Ms. Mann. Certainly. Thank you.
One of the things that we, that we know is that the HA-LEU
is at a higher enrichment level than the commercial industry.
And when we look at the HA-LEU fuel cycle, the first piece of
that, the enrichment piece, will come out in the form of what
we call uranium hexafluoride. There are no current commercial
packages that are suitable for HA-LEU enrichments of uranium
hexafluoride.
Moreover, existing NRC regulations require additional
performance requirements for such packages. So what we need to
do is to develop that, that capability. Similarly, we don't
have packages for higher enrichments of oxides in most cases.
We do for some metals. And we have used the research reactor
fuel that is in metallic form. However, there is only a handful
of I think six to ten packages in total that would not serve
the full breadth of the industry.
So what we are looking to do is develop that capability.
Or, alternatively, is one of the things we suggest in our
written testimony is you could obviate some of that need by
collocating one or more of those HA-LEU fuel cycle steps on a
single facility, thus avoiding public transportation.
Mr. Walberg. Is that in the works?
Ms. Mann. Certainly we would be happy to find a dance
partner if there were somebody who wanted to collocate with us
in New Mexico. That makes a lot of sense as well from an
economic standpoint, as well as from a regulator standpoint,
because these existing licensed sites are known to the NRC,
they are well characterized. We could take advantage of
existing infrastructure, security, manpower.
Mr. Walberg. You also note that the design, development,
testing, and NRC certification for transportation packages
typically take between 4 to 7 years. Would the program required
by the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability Act help move the
time frame earlier through a public/private partnership for the
design and the DOE efforts to develop criticality benchmark
data?
Ms. Mann. It would in two important ways. First, it
recognizes that there is a transportation challenge. And I
think that has been lower on the priority list, as much of the
focus has appropriately been on the reactor design.
But, secondly, we talked a little bit in the earlier
session about the need for nuclear criticality benchmarks. And
this is a sort of data analysis to see how will these nuclear
materials perform. And to the extent that we can come up with a
common set of those benchmark codes that we can use in our
enrichment facility, that converters and fabricators can use,
and that are also used in transportation packages, gives us a
single set of data to focus our attention on and to allow the
NRC to focus on that, rather than reviewing multiple different
sets of submissions.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Irvin, I understand that a research reactor in Norway,
known as the Halden Reactor, is currently shut down for
maintenance. And the Norwegian Government is discussing the
future of the reactor. My question is, what sort of
capabilities does that reactor provide for American research
needs? And what are the implications for the advanced nuclear
community if the reactor is shut down?
Mr. Irvin. So, my understanding is that reactor is a
boiling water reactor. And if I am not mistaken, much of the
interest in that reactor has to do with evaluating something
called accident tolerant fuels which would be used in the
existing fleet.
Certainly, in general, access to research and testing
capabilities for the existing fleet as well as for the future
fleet is of critical importance. There has been some talk today
about a fast neutron source. I am not intimately familiar with
the level that the industry is relying on that reactor right
now, so I can't comment really any further than that.
Mr. Merrifield. Congressman, if I may?
Mr. Walberg. Yes.
Mr. Merrifield. I had the opportunity to visit the Halden
Reactor when I was a member of the NRC. The NRC actually
contributes money toward that program. There are a variety of
countries around the world that are members of their research
programs there. It is a critical research facility. It is one
that has some of the longest fuels in there for some of the
longest periods of time in the world. It would be a real loss
to the international nuclear community if Norway were to make
the choice not to----
Mr. Walberg. So there is a potential role for the U.S. in
that?
Mr. Merrifield. I would, I would say certainly. There
certainly is a role. If we don't have--right now we don't have
the ability to do a lot of research that we need to do in U.S.
fuels. We use the hindsight mind, who I support, if we can't
get it done here in the U.S. you have got to look to Russia,
you have got to look to China, you have to look elsewhere, and
we really shouldn't be in that position.
We, as a country, are the world's inventor, and innovator,
and leader in nuclear technologies. We should not lose that
leadership. And certainly we are at risk of doing so.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rush,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Merrifield, in your written testimony you state that
eliminating the foreign ownership provision, as Section 4 of
H.R. 1320 proposes, there could be essentially provide an
opportunity to save the messy nuclear facility fuel investment
by friendly foreign utility partners. Can you briefly discuss
how that would work?
Also, do you have any concern about unintentional
consequences that are listed in this provision might cause? And
I would like to invite anybody in the panel who would want to
have some input. So, Mr. Merrifield, will you answer the
question?
Mr. Merrifield. Thank you very much, Congressman.
So, I will start off with the second half of that first,
and that is regarding the concerns. As currently written in
statute, the foreign ownership provision really has two
elements to it, one of which is an absolute prohibition on the
foreign entity owning a majority of the U.S. nuclear power
plant.
The second half of that requirement is one that imposes a
inimicality test where a determination is made whether the
own--whether ownership in whole or in part would be inimical to
the interests of the United States.
I have testified many times before this committee and
before the Congress dating back to when I was on the Commission
where we said, as a member of the Commission, we really felt
the first half of that question is unnecessary. And the
inimicality test, if left in place, would give an appropriate
tool to make a determination about whether that ownership was
against the interests of the United States.
I used in both my written and my verbal testimony an
example where the decision of the United Kingdom to allow
Electricite de France to purchase U.K. nuclear units had the
beneficial aspect of allowing those reactors to continue to
operate. And they have done so effectively and safely since the
late 2000s.
In terms of the potential in the United States, I can't, I
would be--it would be inaccurate for me to say I have got a
list of foreign utilities that today wish to purchase U.S.
nuclear power plants. What I was suggesting in my testimony is
there are past examples of utilities that I am aware of that
have expressed an interest in purchasing U.S. nuclear plants
but made the determination not to do so when they found out
they couldn't purchase the plants in their totality because
they were prohibited from that under U.S. law.
So the suggestion is that perhaps if that provision were to
be taken out of law, there may be the emergence of companies
currently not on the market who may be interested in owning
U.S. generating assets in the nuclear arena.
Mr. Rush. Does anybody else want to weigh in on that? Mr.
Lyman?
Dr. Lyman. Just briefly. I think I may sound like a hawk
here, but from the national security perspective I think
removing these requirements and allowing a foreign nation to
own, exert control over dominant U.S. nuclear facilities would
be an irresponsible move. So we certainly oppose. We opposed
that provision in the Senate version. We oppose, we don't think
there is any point in reviewing it in the study that is
proposed in this committee.
Mr. Rush. Mr. Lyman, you think a study in this proposal
would be dangerous?
Dr. Lyman. I am sorry, could you repeat the question?
Mr. Rush. You point out concerns with Section 4 and 5.
Dr. Lyman. Yes.
Mr. Rush. Which involved the GAO study on implication of
repealing restriction on ownership, control, and domination by
a foreign entity of nuclear facilities here in the U.S. And you
are not in favor of the study?
Dr. Lyman. Oh, I am sorry, in the Senate there is a bill,
Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act. In the
original version of that bill, it had a provision to strike the
restrictions on foreign ownership, control, and domination. So
we opposed that provision in that bill that ended up being
stricken from the final version that was passed by the
committee.
Mr. Rush. I am concerned about this GAO study. Is there
anything in your opinion that you are opposed to GAO conducting
a study on foreign ownership?
Dr. Lyman. Yes, the draft or the H.R. 1320 calls for a
review and calls for a study on elimination of foreign
licensing restrictions done by the Comptroller General in
consultation with the Secretary of Energy. As we say, you know,
generally we don't oppose a study as long as it is done
properly, because studies always bring more information. So we
wouldn't oppose the study. But we think that the results of
that study would probably support strongly the conclusion that
those restrictions should be maintained.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is far expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina for 5 minutes. We
thank him for being very patient.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for
being here and being very patient. It will all be over soon; I
am last.
Mr. Merrifield, you talked a lot about the benefits of
nuclear energy. And I agree with you, I have long been a
proponent of the industry. And being from South Carolina you
have talked today about VC Summer and what happened there. I
also heard the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, talk about
China, and Russia, and others that are leading the United
States in nuclear technology, and research and development.
So I have got to ask you, have we lost the ability here in
the United States to do big things in the nuclear power sector?
Mr. Merrifield. I don't think so. I mean, I think what we
had is we had some first-of-the-kind activities for the United
States that we hadn't done in 20 or 30 years. Although it is
unfortunate that there was a decision made to, hopefully,
temporarily shut down the VC Summer construction, I certainly
give credit to Southern Company for moving forward with those
AP1000 reactors at the Vogtle site and fully expect to help
them celebrate those going online years down the road.
Mr. Duncan. So we all know that there is a lot of
Government bureaucracy, and the regulatory environment seems to
be getting tougher and tougher for these type projects. What
steps could be considered potentially for a cumbersome and
inflexible regulatory regime from inhibiting new nuclear
development. Do you think the gentleman from Illinois Mr.
Kinzinger's legislation will help with that?
Mr. Merrifield. I do. I think there is a couple of things
here. One is I do think it is appropriate to have time lines
for the agency to conduct review of various activities. I think
there is nothing wrong with that. We did those kind of things
when I was a Commissioner.
I think as well making sure that the agency is the right
size and has the appropriate mix of people and dollars is
important. They have reduced to a certain extent. I think there
is more than can be done in the areas of the agency, frankly,
having gotten the focus it probably should have.
So, I think between the two, the legislation, and then
things that NRC can do on its own are going to be important in
getting there.
Mr. Duncan. And to Mr. Irvin, I am glad to see that Vogtle
is moving on there for Southern Company, given what happened in
South Carolina.
One of my biggest concerns is continuing private sector
investment. I mean if the tens of billions of dollars that are
required to build new nuclear reactors in this country and the
long regulatory framework that takes place before construction,
then starts the long construction period as we see with Vogtle
and VC Summer, and then 7 years into the project the
construction side of it the rug gets pulled out from under the
project and those investors lose that money or the ratepayers
are on the hook for something possibly in South Carolina, how
are we as a nation going to get the investors and attract the
investors to invest in these type projects going forward?
And that has got to be a question Southern is asking
itself.
Mr. Irvin. This is a question I get asked often in terms of
our need to try and get more investment in developing
technology. I think, I think the answer, maybe because I am an
R&D guy, is innovation.
If you look at the work we are doing on advanced reactors,
as I said earlier, we believe they have the potential to drive
down that cost. And they drive down that cost in multiple ways.
But in a very notable way it is shortening construction time
lines, it is simplifying plants, it is making the time from
concept to delivery much more effective and efficient for the
resources.
Mr. Duncan. That is a good point. We want to reinvent the
wheel every time we do a new nuclear project when we have got
proven reactor technology out there, and then design. But we
are spending all this money to reinvent.
Mr. Irvin. Certainly I think one of the reasons we are
having to spend time to reinvent the technology space is that
the rest of the industry has moved forward. So, if you look at
15 years ago relative to natural gas combined cycle, the
technology we have right now, we have today to deploy, we are
highly competitive. And with the innovation that happened in
that sector, they no longer are.
And so, I think we, as a nuclear industry, are challenged
to not reinvent for reinventing's sake, but to seek those
technologies that provide the right level of benefit to our
customers that can also be deployed in a timely manner and in
the right characteristics.
Mr. Merrifield. I was going to say just on that score, I
mean these new technologies provide also some different
avenues. You know, the traditional technologies, AP1000, 1,000
megawatt baseload power; some of the molten salt reactors, high
temperature gas reactors are smaller. They can be used in
different ways. They can be used for desalinization. They can
be used in remote locations in some circumstances. And they can
be used for process technologies to provide very high
temperature heat for chemical and industrial processes.
So, in that regard although we are doing something
different, it is meeting a series of demands that currently are
met.
Mr. Duncan. My time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, at any given time we have got over 100 small
reactors floating around the seas of the world in the United
States Navy. So, I didn't hear small modular reactor technology
enough from this group. I don't hear thorium and molten salt
technology.
I hope the industry is looking at that because they are
safer, they are easier. SMRs may be the future for the cities
across America and also, you know, improving the quality of
lives of folks on other continents, possibly.
So, thanks for the hearing. Thanks, guys. And I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. Seeing
there are no further Members wishing to ask questions, I would
like to thank all the witnesses for being here today and being
very patient as we had to go to vote.
Before we conclude, I would like to ask unanimous consent
to submit the following documents for the record: A letter from
NuScale Power; an awesome floor speech by Mr. Shimkus on March
28th, 2017, regarding the nuclear power plant in Belarus. You
are not objecting to that, are you? Maybe it wasn't that
awesome.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Shimkus. And pursuant to committee rules, I remind
Members that they have 10 business days to submit additional
questions for the record. And I ask that witnesses submit their
response within 10 business days upon receipt of the questions.
Without objection.
The subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you for being here.
[Whereupon, at 2:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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