[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NEW NAMES, SAME PROBLEMS: THE VA MEDICAL SURGICAL PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-40
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee, Chairman
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida, Vice- TIM WALZ, Minnesota, Ranking
Chairman Member
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado MARK TAKANO, California
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio JULIA BROWNLEY, California
AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, American ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
Samoa BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MIKE BOST, Illinois KATHLEEN RICE, New York
BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine J. LUIS CORREA, California
NEAL DUNN, Florida KILILI SABLAN, Northern Mariana
JODEY ARRINGTON, Texas Islands
JOHN RUTHERFORD, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana SCOTT PETERS, California
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
JIM BANKS, Indiana
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, Puerto
Rico
Jon Towers, Staff Director
Ray Kelley, Democratic Staff Director
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs are also
published in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process
of converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
further refined.
C O N T E N T S
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Thursday, December 7, 2017
Page
Overcoming PTSD: Assessing VA's Efforts To Promote Wellness And
Healing........................................................ 1
OPENING STATEMENTS
Honorable David P. Roe, Chairman................................. 1
Honorable Timothy J. Walz, Ranking Member........................ 3
WITNESSES
Mr. Ricky Lemmon, Acting Chief, Procurement and Logistics
Officer, Veterans Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs............................................... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 32
Accompanied by:
Mr. Phillip Christy, Acting Executive Director, Office of
Acquisition Operations, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs
Ms. Shelby Oakley, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
Prepared Statement........................................... 34
Mr. Roger Waldron, President, The Coalition for Government
Procurement.................................................... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 41
STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD
AdvaMed.......................................................... 57
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR FOR THE RECORD
GAO Powerpoint Chart............................................. 60
NEW NAMES, SAME PROBLEMS: THE VA MEDICAL SURGICAL PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM
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Thursday, December 7, 2017
Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
U. S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 334, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. David P. Roe
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Roe, Bilirakis, Coffman, Wenstrup,
Bost, Poliquin, Dunn, Arrington, Higgins, Bergman, Banks, Walz,
Takano, Kuster, Correa, Sablan, Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF DAVID P. ROE, CHAIRMAN
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. I want to welcome everyone today to the hearing
examining VA's Medical Surgical Prime Vendor, or MSPV Program.
And before we get started, I want to just take a moment and
remember what happened 76 years ago today at Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii, where 2,403 Americans were killed, 1,178 were wounded
during the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. And I had family
that--in my family that served there and Hawaii immediately
after that. So it is what brought America into World War II. So
I just wanted to take a moment and remember that, those lost
Americans. And I am sure many of you visited the memorial there
and it is really a very moving experience to do that.
I will continue now. Our MSPV is a system of contracts
consisting of suppliers and what are called prime vendors that
VA has used for over a decade to purchase and distribute
medical and surgical supplies in a just-in-time inventory
system. The prime vendors handle all logistics in their
assigned regions to get supplies to the medical center door.
The suppliers provide the items selected by VA to the prime
vendors.
Many of you may remember our earlier hearing on the issue
in September of 2016. At that time, VA was about to launch the
MSPV Next Generation or NG Program. Whereas the older version
of MSPV had never sought to limit the medical and surgical
supplies that could be purchased, it never saved very much
money either. NG is an aggressive attempt to simplify the
supply chain and establish a medical surgical formulary
containing a vastly reduced universe of products, initially
600,000, now roughly 10,000.
The goal was to leverage VA's buying power with fewer
suppliers and items to achieve maximize savings. It was and
remains a worthy goal, but the medical surgical formulary
represents a huge clinical cultural and operational shift.
Last September, we expressed our reservations that the
formulary and its underlying supplier contracts were far from
ready. The timeline seemed like a stretch, clinical involvement
seemed tentative and belated at best, and only a handful of
competitive contracts were in place. Nonetheless, VA launched
MSPV NG last December and that launch was rocky. The formulary
omitted many necessary products and at the same time included
more than a few erroneous items. VA recognized this and decided
to keep the old MSPV program in place alongside NG through
April.
Since then, physicians, surgeons, and nurses have been put
on teams and tasked to review the formulary, which was created
with little clinical input. At one point, a group of clinicians
was essentially put in a room for a week to concentrate on the
task, but the formulary remains troubled. It seems the early
decision to concentrate on every group of medical and surgical
supply at one time continues to poison the effort.
Meanwhile, a large number of sole-source supplier contracts
were put in place to launch the formulary. They were intended
to be short-term and replaced with competitive contracts. The
competitive contracts remained elusive and VA finds itself
continuously awarding new sole-source contracts to replace the
old ones as they expire. The prices remain high and the
contracting officer's time is consumed by nonproductive
activities.
In the midst of these problems with NG, VA recently
unveiled a new concept called MSPV 2.0. It entails outsourcing
everything, including developing a formulary for every VHA
veterans facility to one all-powerful prime vendor. While I
absolutely believe there are many functions the private sector
is best suited to perform, the 2.0 model as it has been
described does not seem to exist in the commercial market. Some
things like deciding which medical surgical products it will
buy are inherently the responsibility of a health care
organization. I am also skeptical that given VA's difficulty in
coordinating formulary decisions among all its practitioners an
external company would have a better experience.
MSPV has created nervousness and frustration among VA
employees, and many of the prime vendors and suppliers for
years now, but the volume of complaints has lately become
overwhelming.
At the Committee's request, GAO completed a wide-ranging
report after reviewing the program for roughly a year, finding
continual missteps and difficulties. The Coalition for
Government Procurement has also submitted a white paper to VA
with recommendations.
I hope through our discussion today we can identify a
viable path forward and make MSPV work and stop repeating the
same mistakes. Whether we call it MSPV Next Generation, 2.0 or
whatever, it has to make operational sense, work for
clinicians, and be timely and safe for veterans.
I now yield to Ranking Member Walz for his opening
comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF TIM WALZ, RANKING MEMBER
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I concur with much
of the Chairman's statement. I would also like to thank him for
pointing out today Pearl Harbor. My favorite great uncle,
Morris Ryeman [ph], was a fireman in the Navy in Pearl Harbor
and it was a source of pride and family oral history about what
he did there. So, thank you for that.
Some of you have heard me, those who have been here for a
long time, for the last 11 years I had a saying that I am the
VA's great advocate, but when need be, I will be their harshest
critic. I will be in the harshest critic mode today.
This program was set up for failure from the very beginning
due to a lack of commitment and prioritization by senior VA
leadership. It appears to be nearly incompetent in how it was
done. If I were a conspiracy theorist, I would believe this is
an intentional way to undermine the VA to force outsourcing and
privatization. It looks that bad, especially when other
hospital systems have been able to do it. VA knew about the
best practices and chose to ignore them. And I want to be very
clear about that: it appears that the choices were made to
ignore what needed to be done.
VA's Medical Surgical Prime Vendor Program is clearly worse
than it was 2 years ago. I don't know how VA leadership at its
highest levels thought an approach to managing this program
would be successful.
As the Chairman said, the previous formulary allowed
forwarding hundreds of thousands of items by Federal supply,
now the formulary contains 10,000 items. That in itself might
not be a note of concern, but what the Chairman also said was
they don't meet the needs of the providers at the medical
centers. They weren't asked. This has forced medical centers to
buy supplies with purchase cards through emergency contracts at
added cost to taxpayers.
And this afternoon we will talk to the Secretary about
needing more money for the VA; that conversation cannot happen
in a vacuum. Clinicians and medical centers know their supply
needs. Large hospital systems have done this for decades. When
you think about the program this way, it is simple in
comparison to requiring something more complex like an
electronic medical record.
Think about that. We are going to be asked to spend $16
billion over nearly a decade on the Electronic Health Record
Modernization Program. A project of this size with a
requirement like that to be interoperable with other health
care systems like DoD and community providers has never been
done. I certainly support that decision, I have advocated for
it for years, but VA's failure to successfully implement the
medical supply acquisition programs is simple in comparison to
what we are going to be up against. It does not give me a whole
lot of confidence that the VA is capable of successfully
undertaking that complex acquisition of size and scope.
This all points to a leadership failure. VA's contracting
and logistics organizations do not have permanent leadership.
The MSPV Program Office lacks a leader, it is only half-
staffed. President Trump's hiring freeze prevented an acting
director from filling in.
I want to be clear, there were years here that every single
VA person who sat there was responsible and was grilled on
everything that the President of the United States did. We have
not taken that mode. We have taken a collaborative mode to
getting things done, but I will have to tell you, that
honeymoon is nearly over. The logistics contract program
officers do not communicate and coordinate their efforts or
work with stakeholders. The program has never had a strategic
plan.
This program was set up to fail and I want to hear today
why that is not the case. VA has the potential to save at least
$150 million, if it is done right. VA has enormous buying power
it can leverage to negotiate lower prices by buying in bulk.
Instead, it has caused more of a burden for providers.
Contracting and logistics staff made it difficult for suppliers
to do business with VA.
VA could have done this properly by getting buy-in from its
doctors, nurses, and clinical staff, the employees who provide
care to veterans. Instead, VA cut corners and incorrectly
assumed that orders of previous supply purchases met the needs.
Medical centers were left in the dark about the formulary
rollout and suppliers chose not to participate because doing
business with VA was vastly different from how the medical
supply industry does under industry standards. VA had to cancel
the rest of the contract solicitations because of low supplier
participation.
VA knows what practices and best practices of their
hospital systems follow. Instead, it overestimated its ability
to successfully implement the program, and did not provide the
leadership, staffing, and resources needed to make the
formulary a success. Without Government's leadership and buy-in
from the stakeholders, VA's programs will continue to fail.
I want a commitment today from VA that it will take
immediate action to turn this program around. This program
needs bold leadership. A lot of work will need to be done to
get provider buy-in. The same old way of managing won't work.
I would suggest this: how about start small? Find one
category of supplies and use it as a beta test through your
process to developing the formulary. Involve the providers and
medical centers, solicit feedback from suppliers, include other
stakeholders, apply lessons learned to the next category of
supplies, and work to build the formulary right. This is
Project Management 101 and it is also what DoD told you to do.
This Committee is committed to ensuring VA is capable of
providing world-class care to veterans and we are committing to
helping VA get this effort right. And I want to thank the
Chairman for once again being dogged on this issue, continuing
to follow up, and making it clear that anything less than
world-class won't be accepted.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would now like to welcome our panel who are seated at the
witness table. On our panel we have Mr. Ricky Lemmon, the
Acting Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer for the Veterans
Health Administration. Welcome. He is accompanied by Mr.
Phillip Christy, Acting Executive Director of the Office of
Acquisition Operations. Welcome.
Finally, we have Mr. Roger Waldron, President of the
Coalition for Government Procurement. And we also have Ms.
Shelby Oakley, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management
at GAO.
If you would, I will ask the witnesses to stand and raise
your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
The Chairman. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Lemmon, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICKY LEMMON
Mr. Lemmon. Good morning, Chairman Roe, Ranking Member
Walz, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss VA's Medical Surgical Prime Vendor
Program and the related Government Accountability Office
report.
I am accompanied by Mr. Phillip Christy, Associate
Executive Director of the Strategic Acquisition Center.
VA is committed to providing our veterans the best care
available, while being good stewards of taxpayers' dollars.
Part of meeting these commitments is making sure that our
medical centers have the right supplies and equipment to
deliver the care our veterans need.
In the mid-1990s, VA eliminated its in-house depot system
and converted to a commercially-sourced med-surge prime vendor
program to provide medical and surgical supplies.
The primary source of supplies for previous generations of
MSPV contracts were the Federal Supply Schedules. This approach
resulted in our hospitals having access to a clinically viable
selection of supplies, but this operational model did not
facilitate clinical product decisions on a national level that
would allow VHA to leverage its purchasing power. Adoption of
clinically-driven strategic sourcing is VA's objective under
the existing med-surge prime vendor contract and any future
med-surge prime vendor contracts.
The current MSPV contract was conceived in part to leverage
VA enterprise-wide purchase volume in order to drive lower
prices and improve product quality through the development and
use of a national catalog of products. While VA is committed to
providing our veterans the best care available, we must do so
while also being good stewards of taxpayers' dollars. To
achieve this, we must ensure that our medical centers have the
right supplies and equipment to deliver the care our veterans
need.
In 2016, VA announced the award of four MSPV contracts.
Product prices were primarily established by negotiated blanket
purchase agreements against FSS contracts, VA national
indefinite delivery contracts, and local contracts to support
veterans integrated service networks. VA has decided to move
forward with either modifying the current contracts or
development of replacement contracts to rectify many of the
issues identified by the GAO report.
An acquisition plan has not yet been finalized for
replacement of MSPV. VA is exploring a different approach to
MSPV where potential prime vendors can propose a full catalog
of medical and surgical products. This would depart from the
current approach where individual contracts are negotiated with
each supplier.
The potential benefits of MSPV replacement, known as 2.0,
would be a more robust catalog of items than we have today and
lower prices. Additionally, the administrative resources and
time required to negotiate hundreds of individual contracts
would be reduced if VA only negotiated with the prime vendors.
There have been multiple meetings with industry leaders to
obtain feedback regarding this approach to MSPV 2.0 and that
feedback is currently being considered. Feedback will also be
obtained from VA clinicians before any final decisions are
made.
This is why our efforts to make the current MSPV contracts
more robust are important. We want to make sure the needs of
our medical centers are met while we develop a better approach
to MSPV. In GAO's recently released report, they made ten
recommendations concerning our current MSPV management
processes and VA has already begun to institute each of them.
VA seeks to continue to provide our veterans with the
timely care they have earned and deserved, at the same time we
are seeking new and innovative ways to be more responsible
stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. We are grateful to GAO for
their report and to the Committee for their commitment to
helping the Department improve.
I look forward to responding to any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lemmon appears in the
Appendix]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Oakley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SHELBY OAKLEY
Ms. Oakley. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Walz, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for having me
here today to discuss VA's implementation of its Medical
Surgical Prime Vendor Next Generation Program, which I will
call NG.
NG is VA's primary means for purchasing the supplies to
meet the needs of its 170 medical centers that serve almost 7
million veterans. Some of the goals of NG are to standardize
requirements for greater clinical consistency, leverage VA's
substantial buying power to achieve cost avoidance, and provide
greater efficiency in supply chain management.
Effective supply chain management is an essential element
of delivering quality care to veterans. Recently, the VA IG
found supply management issues at the D.C. VA Medical Center
that posed risks to patient care. Our past work suggests that
VA's confusing and outdated procurement framework compounds
issues like these and leaves the department without a sound
basis for effective and efficient procurement activities to
support patient care.
As the Chairman mentioned, we released a report a few days
ago on NG. We found that VA underestimated the significance of
the change and lacked an overarching strategy, stable
leadership and the workforce capacity that, if in place, could
have facilitated buy-in for the change. These shortcomings,
among others, have kept VA from achieving the goals of the
program to date.
Today, I will discuss three topics from that report: first,
the challenges that VA faced in setting up NG; second, the
effect these challenges had on the medical centers' use of the
program; and, third, VA's efforts to address shortcomings in
its future plans.
First, I would like to point to a graphic that you might
have seen in our report. It identifies practices that leading
hospital networks follow in managing their supply chains which
have resulted in significant cost savings and improved patient
care. These practices include prioritizing categories of
supplies based upon the likelihood of cost savings, working
closely with medical staff to identify the right supplies to
buy, and awarding competitive contracts to achieve the best
prices.
VA did not follow these same practices when implementing
NG. It did not prioritize which categories of supplies to focus
on first or work closely enough with medical staff. For
example, VA developed its formulary based almost exclusively on
flawed data on prior purchases and not on input from medical
staff. This flawed approach for determining what items to buy
led VA to take actions directly in conflict with the goals of
the program and the practices of leading hospitals. For
example, VA resorted to noncompetitive agreements for 79
percent of the items on the formulary to meet its December 2016
date to get NG up and running.
Given how far VA strayed from leading practices in setting
up the formulary, it should come as no surprise that the items
on the formulary did not meet the needs of the medical centers
or enable the Department to leverage its significant buying
power.
VA has taken some steps to address the shortcomings with
the rollout of NG, but continues to struggle with
implementation. Specifically, VA included medical staff in its
second round of requirements development. However, it relied on
just a small group of medical staff to review more than 4,000
products in 1 weeks' time representing almost half of the
formulary. This approach limited their ability to standardize
requirements for the formulary.
VA is likely changing its approach to MSPV yet again. It is
considering hiring a prime contractor not only to provide
distribution services, as they do now, but also to develop and
manage the formulary. Many details remain unclear with VA's new
approach, but it wouldn't be safe for VA to assume that simply
changing its approach will solve the challenges it encountered
thus far.
We recommended several steps that VA could take to overcome
some of these challenges such as developing and communicating a
consistent strategy for NG, prioritizing efforts by supply
category, involving medical staff every step along the way, and
ensuring stable leadership at all levels of the effort. NG
could save both money and enhance services to veterans, but
only if VA can get the execution right. Until VA takes steps to
address some of the challenges we identified in our report, it
will continue to struggle with implementation.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Walz, this concludes my
remarks. I am happy to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Oakley appears in the
Appendix]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Oakley.
Mr. Waldron, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROGER WALDRON
Mr. Waldron. Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and
Committee Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
The Coalition is a non-profit association of small, medium
and large business concerns representing more than $145 billion
in annual Government sales, including more than $12 billion in
medical surgical products and pharmaceuticals supporting
veterans' health care. Today my remarks summarize my written
testimony, which I ask be included in the record.
The Prime Vendor Program serves as the brains of the VA's
logistic operations because it touches essentially all critical
VA health care operations and contractors. It is responsible
for developing and communicating the med-surge formulary and
thus serves as a bridge connecting requirements holders, the
VISNs, hospitals, and health care providers serving veterans,
and the VA procurement professionals and contractors.
Given this critical role, it is imperative that the Prime
Vendor Office be led and managed by clinicians. A clinical-led
program office is a fundamental commercial best practice and it
is our understanding that the MSPV Program is the only medical
supply chain in the VA and DoD that currently is not led by
either clinicians or medical supply chain experts.
This structure has contributed increased inefficiencies and
generated medical care concerns. Our members are seeing an
incomplete formulary, which causes supply shortages, leaving
facilities with no choice but to purchase items on the open
market, often at sub-optimal prices.
Clinical leadership will result in well-defined
requirements, thereby avoiding these problems and supporting
delivery of best-value health care. Without this leadership,
many of the challenges of the Prime Vendor Program will
continue into the next generation with strategies and decisions
that too often are driven primarily by acquisition process
needs rather than veterans' health care needs.
Turning to the next iteration, the MSPV 2.0 essentially
envisions outsourcing the program to a single super prime
vendor that would determine what the agency buys and how the
items sought will be sourced. The super prime vendor would
develop the formulary, manage and distribute items, administer
subcontracts, and ensure quality control. Nationwide electronic
ordering and invoicing would be facilitated using the super
prime vendor's e-commerce platform. Coalition members report no
comparable commercial model that delivers the extensive scope
of management services and med-surge items contemplated by 2.0.
Although our members support improving the Prime Vendor
Program, the 2.0 initiative has generated significant
confusion. With the needs of more than 9 million veterans in
the balance, the Coalition believes that prior to any decision
to shift to a new commercially untested platform, the VA should
undertake a thoroughly vetted and methodical approach with
ongoing evaluations over time to ensure success.
We also note that the 2.0 vision would give rise to an
inherent business conflict as one company would be responsible
for both developing the formulary and delivering the items
listed on it. The Coalition is concerned that this structure
risks incentivizing contractor formulary decisions based on
vendor financial incentives rather than best interest of
patients.
Similarly, the current proposal stipulates that cost
savings will be a significant objective for the 2.0 program. If
this objective translates into low cost technically acceptable
veterans' care, however, it would be inconsistent with the VA's
mission, the expectation of our veterans, and the interests of
the American people. For this reason, Coalition members also
believe that the VA must clearly assert that value, not low
price, is the objective when acquiring medical equipment and
supplies for our Nation's veterans.
Finally, we are concerned that by focusing on a single-
vendor approach, the 2.0 proposal fails to adequately leverage
competition necessary to bring innovation to our veterans'
health care. Further, 2.0 places no discernible checks on the
super prime vendor; rather, it cedes inherently governmental
discretion and authority to a private entity. From a program
perspective, vesting a single contractor with too much
authority has negative implications for Government and industry
regarding market power, the Government's ability to replace a
non-performing prime vendor, and the ability of the private
sector, including service-disabled veteran-owned firms, to
either contract with the VA directly or be subcontractors to
the super prime vendor.
The Coalition believes that there is a path to success
here, starting with assuring that the Prime Vendor Program
Office is led and managed by clinicians; that inherently
governmental decisions are not outsourced to a super prime
vendor; that conflicts of interest are avoided; and that market
competition is leveraged appropriately to access innovation for
veterans.
Chairman Roe and Ranking Member Walz, thank you again for
the opportunity to address the Committee, and I look forward to
answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Waldron appears in the
Appendix]
The Chairman. Thank you, all of you all, and for remaining
within the 5-minute timeframe. I will try to do the same and I
will start the questioning.
And just sort of open that large medical centers do this
all the time. This is not putting the Voyager III up. This is
how we as clinicians are able to practice every day. The
vendors and the hospital provides the products and tools
necessary for us to provide care and do our jobs.
Just the first question, Mr. Lemmon, has the VA had cases,
surgical cases cancel because of a lack of needed equipment?
Mr. Lemmon. I probably have to take that question for the
record. I do believe there has been a very small number, but I
would want to research that and get back with you.
The Chairman. That's fair enough. I know we have heard that
there have been cases cancelled.
In my 31 years of practice, I was trying to remember as you
all were testifying, I don't ever remember a case being
cancelled because I didn't have the supplies I needed to do the
case. We knew ahead of time, unless it is an emergency, and
those cases were scheduled a week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, a month
ahead. The surgical team and the hospital team went right ahead
and made sure I had every bit of equipment. I have had the
surgical nurses call me and say, Dr. Roe, do you need this,
this, and this before this procedure, and we would go over that
ahead of time.
And that is why clinicians have to be involved in this,
because they are the only ones that know when they are in those
situations what tools they need. And I don't expect someone
else to know that, but I do expect them to ask me, so that they
can--that you in the supply chain can provide it for me.
I think that the other question I have, the second question
I have is, who decided--and I am not necessarily saying this is
bad, but who decided to go with a program that has never been
done with an organization that doesn't exist?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, that decision, it has not been made.
The Chairman. So, the 2.0 is not--I mean, I am not saying
it is bad, I am just asking the question.
Mr. Lemmon. Yeah, it is a concept that is being explored,
but there has not been any decision to go forward with 2.0.
The Chairman. Okay. So during this exploration, what
exactly is VA doing to--because this is critical for patient
care, there is no question, and I know there is a lot of work
that goes on behind the scenes before I show up gowned and
gloved in an operating room, getting ready to make an incision.
So is the system that we have gone to, we have gone from
500,000 different items on there to 10,000 or so items on
there, are the clinicians, the nurses, the providers being
given in a timely fashion the tools they need to do their job?
Mr. Lemmon. Generally, the answer is yes, but because of
the limited formulary it is not being done nearly as
efficiently as it could be. So, there is an imperative on the
part of our office working with clinicians and the strategic
acquisition center to make the formulary more robust.
The Chairman. I know how--and, Ms. Oakley, I want to ask
you this question, because my time is running out, can you
explain how the formulary was developed and ultimately who
makes the decision about who is on there? That is Ms. Oakley.
Ms. Oakley. Sure. As I understand it, VA began the
formulary development effort by running what is called a spend
analysis on purchase data, supply purchase data. And
documentation that I have seen indicates that this was deemed
sufficient to have clinical input, because the physicians and
clinicians voted with their dollars by making prior purchases.
Unfortunately, what wasn't recognized was that this data wasn't
the best data to use and it didn't reflect all the things that
the medical centers needed to use on a daily basis.
And so that provided the basis of the initial formulary and
the logistics office began writing requirements based upon that
spend analysis with limited input from clinicians. And what
resulted was more manufacturer-specific requirements than
general requirements that more than one manufacturer could
meet.
The Chairman. So this was basically built from the top
down--
Ms. Oakley. From the top down.
The Chairman [continued]. --not the bottom up?
Ms. Oakley. From the very beginning, the faulty process
from the very beginning kind of flowed down throughout all of
the subsequent actions that impacted how useful the formulary
was.
The Chairman. This would have taken some time, but if I had
been building that model, I would have done it just the
opposite. I would have gotten that information, but I would
gone down to my clinicians and said, what do you need to do
your job? On the nursing floor and whatever. And then I would
have built it up this way medical-center-by-medical-center and
then seen how that data meshed.
Would that seem reasonable?
Ms. Oakley. That is in fact what we found when we talked to
leading hospital networks is that the basis of all of their
efforts is involving clinicians and including them from the
very beginning as a part of the process.
The Chairman. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Walz?
Mr. Walz. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to associate myself with the Chairman's
question about have there been delays, affected patient
outcomes, cancelled medical procedures, or other issues to
patient access. So if you would take questions too, I would
like both of us to be addressed by this.
For all the members who are new here, again, this
Committee, we have addressed this before. And we said in here
and I listened to the testimony a year and a half, 2 years ago,
and the abject failure of President Obama and Secretary
McDonald to fix this program, we were going to do something
about it. Here we sat, it is right here.
Now, keep in mind that the suggestion to be made is to
allow the private sector to fix it. There is no one in the
private sector to do this.
So, this is our responsibility, these are questions that
have been brought up before, this is--as I said in my opening
statements, there is an abject failure in leadership to get
this right. We are going to get responses back that there were
adverse impacts on veterans, so I fully would expect the
outrage to be equally strong as it was 2 years ago when we
talked about this as it is today. And at this point in time, I
think what is different is, we are going to look for some
answers on how to fix that.
So, if it is a lack of leadership, how come we don't have
anybody in leadership positions in the Procurement and
Logistics Office, Medical Surgical Prime Vendor Program office,
and, more importantly, the Chief Acquisition Officer; how come
that is not filled, Mr. Lemmon?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, the Chief Acquisition Officer, that was
filled by Greg Giddens was Acting, he just retired at the end
of November. With the Chief Procurement and Logistics Office
position, I know that leadership is looking at that.
I think part of the modernization effort in determining how
those functions would be aligned within the Department has kept
from making a decision to permanently fill that position or
recruit it, but it does need to happen. I have been acting for
some time.
We also are recruiting the program manager for our health
care team that will oversee Prime Vendor, that announcement is
on the street. We have had prior attempts that were
unsuccessful to hire that position. We have also had some
hiring freezes that we have dealt with, but--
Mr. Walz. So what exactly does that mean? We are not
getting supplies to people, we have veterans waiting. Did you
just tell me one of the potential reasons is because we have a
hiring freeze that does not allow us to fill those positions?
Mr. Lemmon. Within our program executive office structure
where those positions that will do this work, we have been
impacted by a hiring freeze at the headquarters level with
those key positions. We have attempted to recruit the Health
Care Commodities Program Manager and that position is now being
advertised again.
Mr. Walz. Well, that is pretty disconcerting and I would
hope there would be a concerted effort by this Committee to get
to the bottom of that and to address that. It is simply not
good enough to say we are going to cut Government freeze
positions and get rid of them. When that initially came out, we
had to start backing away from it. Oh, yeah, we will get the
doctors. And then we said, well, what about the emergency room
nurses? Oh, yeah, we will get the emergency room nurses. And
then we said, what about the people who wash the sheets? Oh,
yeah, we will take them off the freeze. You fall into that
chain too. Everybody plays a role in this.
So this lack of leadership position, I would go back, Ms.
Oakley, with my remaining time, you said that this new approach
won't solve the problems. We are piloting this, you heard that,
it is not on the street yet. Is there a retool to this or is
this the wrong approach in general of what is being described
with the Prime Vendor, the 2.0? Or should we retool and go back
again, as I think the Chairman clearly and I think adequately
said we are building at the wrong direction?
Ms. Oakley. I think fundamentally the concept of MSPV NG as
it stands now is solid, it was the execution that fell down. So
I am not necessarily convinced that a complete reboot of the
approach is necessary, especially given that some of the steps
that VA could have taken to better implement the program are,
you know, fairly common steps: include the clinician,
communicate a strategy, make sure everybody understands their
role in implementing this change.
And I think, just to comment on the leadership, this is a
huge shift for VA to an NG program and when you are talking
about leadership vacancies from the CAO on down to the program
office in the height of the transition to this new program, it
is no wonder that there wasn't a captain steering the ship at
this point--
Mr. Walz. Yes.
Ms. Oakley [continued]. --and it went a little off course.
Mr. Walz. Yes, very well said.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. [Presiding.] Yes, I recognize Dr. Dunn for 5
minutes. Thank you.
Mr. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start out by saying that I share the outrage that
Mr. Walz has expressed. I am a surgeon and I have worked in a
lot of hospitals, a lot of different systems, there are so many
errors in judgment in the implementation of this that it takes
your breath away.
I want to start with a concept. The concept I want to start
with is, you may delegate authority, but you may not delegate
responsibility. Now, that is true in the military, it is also
true in business, and it is certainly true in surgery. You
know, the surgeon is the captain of the ship, he can authorize
people to help him do different things in the operation and
around the room, but he takes responsibility for it. And that
certainly is true in any system of business and the VA
included.
So, remember, please remember that when we start talking
about these super prime vendors and prime vendors and we are
pretending like they are the ones whose responsibility it is to
make this system work, it is your responsibility to make it
work, and they are set up for failure. And they also set up and
inveigled to do things that I think were certainly odious and
bad behavior, but maybe illegal, and I want to ask you
specifically about that.
It was said that some prime vendors improperly, improperly
substituted their own products for products that were offered
by the contracted suppliers. In this context, does improper
mean illegal, or does it just mean odious and wrong and bad
behavior? Certainly there is a tort there; is there a crime?
Mr. Waldron, maybe you can answer that best.
Mr. Waldron. That is a tough question. I think it would go
back and depend on the nature of the transaction, and the
agreement between the prime vendor and the hospital and what
was actually ordered. If items are substituted for a brand name
that was specifically ordered, then that would be an issue and
that would be a problem under that particular contract.
Mr. Dunn. Yeah, we can't litigate it here, but you--
Mr. Waldron. Right.
Mr. Dunn [continued]. --get the sense, this is wrong. I
mean, it is very wrong behavior. And to then turn around and
suggest that what we do is to concentrate all of this power in
one of these super, super prime vendors is an appalling idea.
Ms. Oakley has said she thought that the MSPV Next Gen, I
guess, is a good idea, but failed in execution. Do you agree
with that, Mr. Waldron?
Mr. Waldron. I do believe that the prime vendor program is
foundationally a solid approach. DHS and DLA are successfully
managing prime vendor programs right now. On the pharmaceutical
side, the VA has run a very successful prime vendor program. It
goes back to execution and it goes back to people. You can't
underestimate the importance of people.
And the last thing I would just make that is kind of
interesting. When I read the GAO report, one thing that struck
me that just is the terminology used, for example, to identify
the program office responsible for the formulary, it was the
Health Care Commodity Executive Program Office. That term
``commodity'' I think again sends a message that these things
are all interchangeable, that it is like pens and paper.
Mr. Dunn. Well, we know as clinicians that they aren't
interchangeable.
Mr. Waldron. Right.
Mr. Dunn. There are very, very subtle, but important
differences in many of the different medicines and tools we
use.
Is the VA capable of implementing another prime vendor
program, this one that would work, your opinion, Mr. Waldron?
Mr. Waldron. They have a long way to go. They need to put
in place a clinician-led program office with medical supply
chain experts to execute this, that is first and foremost. It
boils down to requirements development: if you don't have sound
requirements development, you can't support the health care
providers who are serving our veterans. They need to put the
people in place.
I think the jury is out. We have spent--our members have
spent the last two years, you know, trying to execute--
Mr. Dunn. But the timeline on this is years, it is always
years and years, and veterans are dying and being injured by us
in each of those years. I mean, we can't be measuring time in
years.
And I want to ask you one more in the few seconds left to
me. We are all familiar with group purchasing organizations; in
what way is this very different from a GPO, the MSPV?
Mr. Waldron. In a certain sense, it is similar with their
idea of they are trying to leverage their requirements across
hospitals and get better pricing, and consistency and tiered
pricing. In that sense it is very similar, from my perspective;
it again goes back to the execution. I think there is a way
forward, we do believe there is a way of forward, but it starts
with putting clinicians in place to manage the formulary--
Mr. Dunn. Well, thank you for ending it, because my time is
expired, ending with the clinicians, though. And, please, I beg
you, go back and talk to your doctors, I mean, you have to do
that.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Dr. Dunn.
Mr. Takano, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Takano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lemmon, the GAO report highlighted challenges with
staffing and I want to associate myself with Ranking Member
Walz's comments about the hiring freeze. As we know, President
Trump's hiring freeze did not exempt acquisition and logistics
personnel. And I want to just drill down into how this hiring
freeze affected staffing at the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor
Program Office, and staffing in the Procurement and Logistics
Office, and in key logistics and leadership positions at the
facility and network level.
What actions--I want to get into this--what actions have
been taken to fill the 16 unfilled positions at the MSPV
Office, Program Office?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, many of the positions we have received
exemptions where we can recruit those positions and are working
to do that. At the network level in the field--
Mr. Takano. How many of those positions have you received
waivers to fill, waivers from the hiring freeze out of the 16?
Mr. Lemmon. I would have to get back to you.
Mr. Takano. So you don't know that number, you will get
back to us on that. Thank you.
And how many of those positions have been filled of the 16?
Mr. Lemmon. I would have to get with you with that number.
Mr. Takano. Okay. And can you tell me, is there a timeline
on when these positions will be filled, is there a goal? And
how many of them would we intend to fill? Well, you don't know
how many have been exempted, so you really can't answer that,
right?
Mr. Lemmon. I can't answer it today.
Mr. Takano. Okay. I want to clarify, did the hiring freeze
adversely affect patient care, in this particular instance?
Mr. Lemmon. You know, having an inefficient supply chain
does impact logistics in the hospitals as far as their ability
to order the products efficiently. Certainly, they do have ways
to do purchases outside of the Med-Surge Prime Vendor, but I
won't say there has not been any negative impact to veteran
care, because this does touch veterans' care.
Mr. Takano. So at the very least it could have
significantly affected veterans, patient care of our veterans.
Now, I want to expand upon, I mean, I appreciate Dr. Dunn's
question, I wish he hadn't used the acronyms, because what I
think he was asking is can you compare the VA's Pharmacy Prime
Vendor Program, I think he used the acronym, to its Medical
Surgical Prime Vendor Program? So these two programs, one is
the vaunted pharmacy program. And we know the VA has the
ability to negotiate, unlike Medicare, I mean, this huge
volume, the VA is able to negotiate with the pharmaceuticals,
unlike other Government programs, right?
So the question was, is there a comparison between the two,
because we are obviously purchasing medical surgical supplies
through also a similar situation? Can best practices from the
pharmacy prime vendor program be applied to the MSPV Program?
Mr. Lemmon. We believe they can, particularly in the area
of program management and developing the requirements area.
Pharmaceuticals are different in some respects than med-surge
items, but there are certainly lessons that we can learn from
our prime vendor program.
Mr. Takano. Well, is the development of a medical surgical
supply formulary potentially more complex, is it more complex
than a pharmacy procurement?
Mr. Lemmon. I believe that it is.
Mr. Takano. Therefore, it would mean that we would have to
have very good managers, very good personnel, and these are the
vacancies that I am alluding to. If it is more complex, even
more important to have people staffing the program.
Mr. Lemmon. I agree with that.
Mr. Takano. I am puzzled as to why it has not been a bigger
priority, especially when we talk about surgical supplies and
the timeliness of acquiring them, you know, impacting on when
these surgeries can be scheduled. And it would seem to me that
this is kind of an all-hands-on-deck emergency situation, that
these positions should be filled and they should have been
filled a long time ago.
All right, that is all the questions I have, sir. I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
General Bergman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will get to the point very quickly and I will keep my
questions short, you keep your answers short. How's that?
Mr. Lemmon, does a strategy document exist for developing
the Med-Surge Prime Vendor Program?
Mr. Lemmon. The--
Mr. Bergman. Does the document exist? Do you have a
strategy? Did somebody within the VA develop a strategic plan,
with a mission statement and the strategy that follows?
Mr. Lemmon. There were documents--
Mr. Bergman. Is there a document that exists that you are
working from today? Yes or no?
Mr. Lemmon. Is there one document that lays out
succinctly--
Mr. Bergman. Is anybody in charge--
Mr. Lemmon. Yes.
Mr. Bergman [continued]. --of this over there? Who?
Mr. Lemmon. We do have--
Mr. Bergman. Who?
Mr. Lemmon. We do have acting people in charge.
Mr. Bergman. If you are acting, you are still in charge.
Mr. Lemmon. Right.
Mr. Bergman. Are you in charge?
Mr. Lemmon. I am.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Does a document exist that you use on
your desk, a reference when you are making sure those under
your charge who you are leading and making progress in this
programs, that there is a reference document that guides you in
your decisions in your leadership role?
Mr. Lemmon. We do have a supply chain transformation
document that touches multiple areas, but if you are talking
about MSPV--
Mr. Bergman. We are talking about a specific program here
that does not exist, because it hasn't been developed. Is there
a document?
Mr. Lemmon. I am not going to say there is a specific
document--
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Well, I would suggest maybe you consider
it if you are going to be successful in creating one. All
right?
Now, I am going to give you an example. By the way, in a
former life before Congress--is this uncomfortable? It is,
isn't it? It is uncomfortable for me too. It is uncomfortable
for all of us here, because there are a lot of veterans in the
room who potentially could suffer the consequences of bad
decisions at the administrative and deliverables level. Okay?
We have great clinicians doing the job, we are not backing them
up on the business side of it, not the clinical side. All
right? So that is, if you sense a little edge on my part, your
sense is correct.
Let me just give you an example. Okay? Because a lot of
things are near and dear to my heart, and I just a couple of
weeks ago was up at Walter Reed for a, you know, procedure that
gentlemen and ladies of my age are recommended to get. Okay?
And it is a little uncomfortable at times. You know, in the
medical business, we look for new products. I was in the
medical products business for a long time and have dealt with
the VA. But, for example, there is a product available that is
used throughout the industry for colon-rectal screening, VA
doesn't use it. It makes things simpler.
Can you give me an idea for new products, without
guidelines driven by clinicians and validated through the
industry through others that are already using the products
outside the VA system, so any other hospital, have we created a
barrier to introducing quality products that are going to allow
our veterans to get better care?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, we certainly have to have a more robust
involvement with clinicians, so they can inform our decisions
on what products would be on a formulary and available for ease
of purchase in the hospitals. Certainly at the hospital level
there are ways to procure items that any doctor may feel like
they would like to have.
So, you know, I wouldn't say we have a barrier, but we can
certainly--
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Do you have a sense of urgency?
Mr. Lemmon. We do.
Mr. Bergman. When are we going to see it?
Mr. Lemmon. We are developing a plan.
Mr. Bergman. Is anybody in the hierarchy, the wire
diagram--and I know my time is running out here--in the wire
diagram who has been responsible for developing this new
program, has anybody in that, again, wire diagram been paid a
bonus?
Mr. Lemmon. I don't know.
Mr. Bergman. I would like to find--I would like to know.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank you the gentleman for yielding back.
Ms. Kuster, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
panel for being with us today.
With my colleague General Bergman, who is the chair of the
Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, I am the Ranking
Member, you can imagine that we take this role very seriously.
I am sorry that you are the person in the hot seat today, but I
do have to remind you that you are under oath and these
questions are very serious for us.
We are here to represent the balance of the well-being of
our veterans and the well-being of our taxpayers, and we
constantly are faced with this dilemma. But I have to say,
joining the comments on both sides of the aisle from our
colleagues, that we swung and missed in a big way on this
project, because not only have we put veterans' care at risk,
which is our first and foremost goal, it sounds to me as though
we have also cost the taxpayers. And you have talked about
these purchase cards that are used. I know for a fact that that
is not the most efficient, effective, or frugal way to go about
making these decisions.
So my concern--and you have had a lot of people ask you if
veteran care was compromised--in my view, I want you to include
when you come back with that answer to this Committee veteran
care that was delayed was likely compromised, because treatment
that is delayed is treatment that may be denied, and I think
that is our concern. And you can tell it is not partisan, but
this is simply unacceptable.
And what I want to focus in on is the impact of the hiring
freeze, because this may be the first time that this Committee
has heard that veterans' care is compromised, the quality of
care, the timeliness of care, based on that hiring freeze. So
could you just state for the record how the hiring freeze has
affected staffing at the MSPV Program Office, staffing in the
Procurement and Logistics Office, and in key logistics and
leadership positions at the facility. And once, for the record,
could you state has patient care been compromised due to a
hiring freeze?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, certainly over the past year there have
been delays in hiring because of the freeze. Certainly we don't
have as an efficient of a supply chain as we need right now and
not having key leadership positions or a more robust staff has
impacted that.
I do believe that hospitals have ways to get the products
they need, we need to make it easier for them to get the
products and assure taxpayers are getting good value when
those--
Ms. Kuster. And would you agree--and I am sorry to
interrupt, I want to hear the rest of your answer, but would
you agree that using these purchase cards is not the most
effective, efficient, and frugal way to go about making those
purchases?
Mr. Lemmon. I completely agree with that. It is really more
of a last-resort approach. We need a very robust catalog of
products that can be efficiently ordered by an ordering officer
at a hospital and delivered through the prime vendor program
for med-surge supplies.
Ms. Kuster. So, Mr. Lemmon, can I ask you, what is the next
step for dealing with this hiring freeze? And I would like to
work with our Committee chair, I am asking our Committee chair
to work with the Trump administration, how are we going to
guarantee that our veterans receive the highest quality of care
in the timely manner that they deserve and how are we going to
get around this hiring freeze to make sure that that gets
accomplished?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, we do have a process to request waivers,
which we have done and we have received--
Ms. Kuster. Would it take legislation for you to--I mean,
the waiver doesn't seem to be an effective process here. I am
trying to look at how we could make sure that this procurement
is included--or excluded from the hiring freeze. This is
important; this is the quality of care that our veterans
receive and it is being compromised. Would that take
legislation?
Mr. Lemmon. I don't believe so. I believe that those
positions can be approved for hire.
Ms. Kuster. My time is up. I would direct that question to
the chair, if I could, for a response going forward on how we
get around this problem.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I will try to get that response to you by
tomorrow. How's that?
Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
Mr. Banks, you are recognized.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Oakley, the GAO report mentions a, quote, ``lack of
leadership stability,'' end quote, at the VHA program office,
but no mention of what actual qualifications VHA leaders need
to possess in order to be able to effectively lead a medical
surgical program office. So what is your vision on the
qualifications and experience for the MSPV director that was
recommended in the report?
Ms. Oakley. I think you need someone that has both clinical
experience as well as acquisition and procurement experience.
One of the things that we found during the course of our
review is, you know, this effort requires collaboration across
a number of different types of offices--procurement, logistics,
clinicians--and they all speak different languages. So getting
somebody in there that has experience on both sides that would
be able to bridge that gap and translate, would be an ideal
person to put in place. But frankly, at the very minimum,
getting somebody in there for the long term. Getting somebody
who is going to be there and be able to establish relationships
all across VA to be able to implement this big change is what
should be the priority.
Mr. Banks. Okay, that is very helpful.
Now, Mr. Lemmon, now that I gave you a break, back to you
for a moment. It was brought to our attention at a recent
roundtable that you participated in that the Department was in
the final stages of determining a, quote, ``way forward,'' as
you called it, to address the backlog by implementing business
process reforms in Section 8123 of Title 38 through
administrative means via a rulemaking.
Can you provide us with a more specific update of the
status of this effort and a better understanding why the
potential exists for a rulemaking? It would seem that you
already have the authority for this and it would likely be
better if this was done administratively.
So what is the timing for such a decision and when do you
think it would be implemented if we have to do it
administratively? If it has to be done via a rulemaking, as you
said, what authority do you need from the Committee to do that?
Mr. Lemmon. Okay. The question you posed is in regards to
prosthetic implants, which is covered by the special authority
VA has under 8123. A business process has been drafted, it is
being circulated amongst the Department for concurrence. At
that time, once that is finalized, our Office of General
Counsel will determine whether we can implement
administratively or go through rulemaking. And that decision
has not been made yet, but we anticipate that that will happen
quickly, probably within the next 30 to 60 days we will have a
decision on that.
Mr. Banks. Okay. We will follow up with you in the next 30
to 60 days.
On another note, how is the new process for purchasing the
surgical implants different from the existing prosthetics and
sensory aids services process?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, the proposed process really, essentially
relies on having a national contracts where we have leveraged
our spend, but the contracts are with the major suppliers. The
portion where we have to depend on the authority in 8123 is
really the timing of the orders, because a physician would
actually choose exactly what they are going to use in the
surgery, we would issue those orders after the products are
consumed, and that is where we need the authority that is
outside of the FAR.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Oakley, since I have a minute left, the GAO report
stated that the recent reforms did not meet the needs of
medical centers and as the end user in caring for the patient.
It would seem that for the arrows in determining the formulary
items are more likely not points up from the clinical needs
perspective and instead down to the physician or surgeon, do
you see any of this--if that makes sense--do you see any of
this changing in the 2.0 effort?
Ms. Oakley. I think that VA has come to the recognition
that having a clinically-driven program is vital to success. I
think it was a late recognition and I think that they are, at
least on paper and what I have seen, indicating that this would
be the way forward. And so I find that as a positive
development; again, though, it all comes back to execution.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Coffman, you are recognized.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Lemmon, can you tell me, Ms. Stella
Fiotes, what position does she have right now?
Mr. Lemmon. I believe that she is the Acting Chief
Acquisition Officer after Greg Giddens retired.
Mr. Coffman. So she is in charge right now, temporarily,
until a decision can be made. That is interesting, because she
was in charge, she was one of those in charge of the--she was
the Office of Construction Projects, Office of--and so under
the Office of Acquisition Logistics and Construction. And so we
had a project in the State of Colorado that she was in a
leadership on that was supposed to cost $600 million, a little
over $600 million, it cost 1.67 billion, is where we are right
now, because it was so badly mismanaged, and yet she has been
promoted in terms of the hierarchy at the VA. And so you can
guess why there is not a change. This Administration made so
many promises about how they were going to clean up the VA, but
if they are keeping people like this around, they are obviously
not that interested in cleaning up the VA.
So one of the problems that we had before when we had a
briefing, I think it was probably a couple years ago, on
procurement, a year or 2 years ago--last September, was that
they were--and, Ms. Oakley, maybe this is to you--they were
taking the purchase cards to get around the contracting process
and just adding them all up. So just to--but part of the
problem was is that patient safety was compromised, because
they were able to get around all the procurement rules and with
some of those regarding patient safety, particularly in the
purchase of tissues and things like that, human tissues.
And so could you comment on that?
Ms. Oakley. I can't directly comment on patient safety, but
I would say that purchase cards were definitely seen as the way
to meet the needs of the medical centers because of the limited
formulary and the formulary that didn't meet their needs. And
so VA has seen an increase in purchase card purchases, you
know, during the course of the past year with the rollout of
MSPV-NG.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Anybody else? Mr. Lemmon?
Mr. Lemmon. Certainly the greater use of purchase cards has
not been good for VHA.
Mr. Coffman. Well, how can you--I mean, so we have known
this problem for so long, we have identified it, and identified
it that people are using it to get around procurement rules,
get around contracting rules, because that is much more
involved and, you know, they want to take a shortcut. And that
is not good for the taxpayers and that is not good for the VA
patients, but yet you continue to do it, I mean, your
organization continues to do that. Can you tell me why?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, the reason they are doing it at the field
is because we haven't provided a robust enough prime vendor
program for med-surge supplies to meet their needs, quite
frankly, and that is what has to be corrected to reduce the
purchase card spend.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Well, I can say I am very disappointed,
I don't see changes from the last Administration to this
Administration in the VA and that is very disappointing.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Dr. Wenstrup, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Dr. Roe.
Mr. Lemmon, who is the MSPV Program leader at this time?
Mr. Lemmon. Currently, we have Dan Harris, and he is
supported by John Miller in our office.
Mr. Wenstrup. Can I ask what their qualifications are? Do
they have any clinical background, you know, RN, MD, where they
fit in that?
Mr. Lemmon. They have logistics background, they are not
doctors or nurses.
Mr. Wenstrup. So who at VHA is the clinical leader overall?
Mr. Lemmon. My boss is Tammy Czarnecki and she is certainly
involved in the program, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for
Health, for Operations and Management, and she has a nursing
background.
Mr. Wenstrup. Okay. VHA has said they plan to utilize about
130 clinical program offices to provide clinical input going
forward, which makes sense. Can you tell me how this will work
and give me some specifics?
Mr. Lemmon. We have developed a very structured,
clinically-driven sourcing program that is being routed for
concurrence at this juncture, but it does involve the program
leaders and clinical leaders, and they would identify those
clinicians in the field and actually take responsibility for
the product areas that falls under their responsibility.
It is recognized, I think, across VHA how important having
a very robust and in-depth clinical program is to support our
med-surge program, and that is what we are trying to build.
One of the weaknesses or failures in our prior attempt at
this is that we didn't have the structure behind it that we
needed. So it was always a challenge to the clinicians and get
the input. And it has been recognized within the Department
that to fix this, we have to have a very structured,
clinically-driven sourcing program where these department heads
fully understand their responsibilities and obtain the services
of the clinical experts in the field to bring to bear to the
decisions on our formulary.
Mr. Wenstrup. Yeah, I am just curious how far down the line
you go. If you have one person who is in a certain field and
maybe they have some input, that may be fine.
And I can tell you how big the VA is, but I can tell you at
every hospital I worked, every year, every hearing when it
comes to budgeting and planning and everything else, every
individual surgeon would get asked, is there anything that you
need? Is there something now out there that you need to do your
job better?
How far down do you take this? I know Ms. Oakley talked
about execution, right? How are we executing his?
And this pertains a lot to the retention of those that we
are trying to recruit, because if you come in and you want to
take care of veterans, but your hands are tied because you
can't get the things you need to take care of them the best way
that you know how, and they say, well, that is the system or we
can't do that, guess what? You leave, because your name is on
the line. And that doesn't mean you get everything you want
whenever you ask for it, you know, but you have to have a
process all the way down to each and every individual, in my
opinion.
So I would like some comment on that, and maybe some advice
from Ms. Oakley as well.
Mr. Lemmon. Well, I completely agree with you, and that is
why at the hospitals we have clinical product review committees
that can actually push requirements up, in addition to trying
to establish this clinically-driven source of--
Mr. Wenstrup. So that is at a committee level, but I am
asking, are you getting down to the nitty-gritty to those that
are actually doing the work, currently?
Mr. Lemmon. We definitely need to do a better job of that--
Mr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Mr. Lemmon [continued]. --there is no question.
Mr. Wenstrup. Ms. Oakley?
Ms. Oakley. That was one of the things that we found in our
review is that VA didn't really outline a process for how to
get something onto the formulary that would meet the needs of a
physician-identified need. And so one of the things we
recommended, because the formulary is a living, breathing
thing, right, I mean, it is going to be changing all the time,
is laying out how does one, how does one working-level
physician go about getting something on the formulary, so that
they can actually have the things that they need in their day-
to-day life.
And so that is right in line with one of our
recommendations in saying that they should lay out this process
and communicate it through all levels of VA.
Mr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Poliquin, you are recognized.
Mr. Poliquin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
appreciate it.
I am a little taken aback here, to be very blunt with you,
so let me just get right to it. You folks over at the VA have
about 170 veteran's medical centers around the country, right?
Is that right, Mr. Lemmon? Okay, about 170. About 40,000
doctors, practitioners, and 170 medical centers around the
country. And you are taking care of about 7 million of our
veterans, our veterans who stood up for this country and fought
for our country and gave us our freedom, is that right? Okay.
Now, you would think with that kind of horsepower you folks
would be able to get your act together, use the volume that you
folks represent, and go out to these different folks that
manufacture catheters and stethoscopes and scalpels and buy
this stuff in volume, such that the folks up at Togus, Maine,
when they need to operate on one of our heroes, they will have
the stuff that they need. And now we are hearing from Mr.
Bergman a minute ago, you said you don't even have a plan to
execute this process.
Number two, I just heard a minute ago that because you
folks are unable to get the equipment that we need in our
operating rooms or what have you, you folks are using credit
cards or some sort of Government credit card to get what you
need before they go in the OR and take care of one of our
veterans.
And you know what I think? I think you have had 12 years to
do this. The last time I asked my staffer, she said, yeah, this
process started in 1995. This is 2017 on December 7, Pearl
Harbor Day, it is almost 2018. This is the third time you guys
have tried to do this.
I don't know. Neal and I are new here, along with Jodey and
Clay, and Jim and Jim--and Jack and Jim. I will tell you, if I
am here 12 years from now, I don't want to hear you folks come
in and say, well, this is our sixth time trying this, we can't
quite get it right. I don't think you guys are competent.
You have 340,000, 345,000 employees, your budget has gone
from 120 billion a year to 190 billion a year over eight years.
You have got plenty of dough, plenty of people, and you are
saying you can't find the people to run this. Give me one day,
I will go over there, I will find you someone to run this.
So I don't want to be around for the next few years having
you folks come back in saying, well, we couldn't quite get it
right.
Mrs. Oakley, you are involved in the part of the Government
that is supposed to oversee these folks and analyze if they can
do it, right? Okay. Have you ever heard of this outfit over at
the DoD called the Defense Logistics Agency?
Ms. Oakley. I have.
Mr. Poliquin. Okay, good. And they have a similar process,
right? They are trying to do what you guys are trying to do,
which is to buy in bulk to make sure the folks that are
providing health care for our heroes can do it cheaply and save
the taxpayers money, right? How are they doing?
Ms. Oakley. As far as I know, the DLA has a fairly
successful program.
Mr. Poliquin. Good. How are we doing over at the VA?
Poorly, right?
Ms. Oakley. Yes.
Mr. Poliquin. Good. I am trying to save you some breath
here.
Have you saved any money, Mr. Lemmon, over the last 12
years trying to do this? Have you saved any money?
Mr. Lemmon. Well, we have saved--
Mr. Poliquin. How much have you saved?
Mr. Lemmon. Under the supply chain initiatives, it was
approximately $300 million.
Mr. Poliquin. What percent have you saved?
Mr. Lemmon. What--
Mr. Poliquin. What percent have you saved? You are buying a
scalpel, you are buying a thousand of them instead of two of
them on a credit card, you would think you would be able to
save a little bit of money.
Mr. Lemmon. You would. I don't know what the--
Mr. Poliquin. Okay, fine.
For the record, I have a couple questions for Mr. Lemmon.
Number one, you talk about distribution-of-pricing agreements.
They are different from contracts, right?
Mr. Lemmon. They are.
Mr. Poliquin. Are the prices binding in a distribution-of-
pricing agreement? Yes or no?
Mr. Lemmon. I don't believe they are.
Mr. Poliquin. Okay, so that is a no?
Mr. Lemmon. No.
Mr. Poliquin. That is a no. Okay, thank you, Mr. Lemmon. Is
there any competition when you are dealing with a distribution-
of-pricing agreement?
Mr. Lemmon. Not normally.
Mr. Poliquin. Oh, okay. So it is sole source, right? Okay.
Let's see. How about any conflicts of interest? Ms. Oakley,
have you seen any potential conflicts of interest? These folks
have been trying to do this for 12 years, now they have the
third try, they are coming back to us, they are trying to do
this? Any potential conflicts of interest in what they are
trying to do, which I have no confidence they are going to be
able to do?
Ms. Oakley. I didn't see any apparent conflicts of interest
in our work.
Mr. Poliquin. Good.
Mr. Chairman, I have 30 seconds, I have to do this, but I
am going to yield back the 30 seconds, so I can give Mr. Lemmon
break here.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Poliquin. Thank you.
The Chairman. I may have the big one here that Mr. Poliquin
yielded back some time, that is amazing. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Arrington, you are recognized.
Mr. Arrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think there is enough outrage on this Committee,
quite frankly, with what we hear day in and day out. The last
Oversight Committee that I sat under the leadership of Chairman
Bergman was about a GAO report that basically said that the VHA
is not investigating bad doctors, they are not disciplining bad
doctors, and they are not reporting bad doctors to a database,
so that those bad doctors can't continue to practice in the VHA
and in other places, and it was just astonishing. And so I want
to associate myself with the indignation of Ranking Member Walz
and of my colleague Bruce Poliquin.
I don't even know where to begin. I think I would first say
for the record, thank God our veterans have a choice now. And
we can't do enough, Mr. Chairman, to give them more choice and
flexibility to get out of this broken Government-run, single-
payor health care system that they are trapped in, and it is
shameful that we do that. And so we need to do everything we
can to continue to enhance that Choice Program.
Ms. Oakley, I appreciate your clarity and your
definitiveness in your answers. You seem very confident, so I
am going to start with you. And I appreciate that; that is
sincere.
You said there is an execution problem; that the model is a
good model, but that we are not executing. Is that because
there is not enough staff, there is not the right staff, there
is not continuity in staff? Is it leadership? Is it poor
planning? Break that down for me, if you would.
Ms. Oakley. Okay. Well, the short answer is, it is all of
the above.
Mr. Arrington. Okay.
Ms. Oakley. I think any--
Mr. Arrington. Rank order the top two or three for me.
Ms. Oakley. Well, if you look at organizational
transformation-leading practices, the bottom line is it all
starts with solid leadership and tone from the top.
Mr. Arrington. Can I stop you just right there? Because it
is my understanding we invited some of the medical leadership
from the VHA to come and testify today; are you aware of that?
Ms. Oakley. I am not.
Mr. Arrington. Mr. Lemmon, are you aware of that?
Mr. Lemmon. I heard that earlier today.
Mr. Arrington. Yeah, we asked your bosses to come and they
decided to send you all. And it tells me that there is a
leadership problem; they ought to be here. I can't think of
anything more important to veteran patient care than what you
are doing and they refused to come. I don't know the reason,
maybe there is a good reason.
So, leadership, tell me the chain of command. Give me the
three or four layers up. Start with the top and work your way
to yourself.
Ms. Oakley. It is actually complicated within VA, right?
Mr. Arrington. Well, there is problem number one.
Ms. Oakley. Yeah, which we have reported on before, within
the organization. And so, you know, the Chief Acquisition
Officer is a key role in all of this. It is the person that is
advising the Secretary of VA on how to accomplish VA's mission
through its acquisition management function, and it has been
somebody in an acting position and has turned over multiple
times since at least 2009.
Mr. Arrington. So I have heard a lot about hiring freezes
from my colleagues today. Were there vacancy problems before
the hiring freeze?
Ms. Oakley. There were.
Mr. Arrington. So the continuity in leadership existed or
preexisted--
Ms. Oakley. Yes.
Mr. Arrington [continued]. --this hiring freeze?
Ms. Oakley. Yeah, absolutely.
Mr. Arrington. And by the way, I am for hiring freezes, I
am for cutting this Government, I think you could cut a third
of it and we could continue to provide--it is about cutting the
right parts of it, and being smart and strategic about it.
And I am willing to work with the Ranking Member and anyone
else to send a letter to the leadership, whether it is the
Secretary or if it is Ms. Clancy or Czarnecki, and express our
serious concern that they aren't here at this hearing to
explain why this program is not working for our veterans, and
to tell them that they need to get in gear in hiring people and
getting their operation fully functioning.
Ms. Oakley. Absolutely.
Mr. Arrington. But that is something that I would be
willing to do, Mr. Ranking Member, and anyone else. But, again,
this seems to pre--this continuity or lack thereof seems to
preexist this hiring freeze--
Ms. Oakley. Absolutely.
Mr. Arrington [continued]. --is that accurate?
Ms. Oakley. Yeah, and at all levels, from the CAO on down
to key logistics positions within the medical centers. They are
not easy positions to fill. So it is not necessarily, you know,
that you would be able to hire somebody off the street. And
competition from private hospitals, as I understand it, is
pretty fierce for skilled, experienced logistics individuals,
as well as the acquisition workforce related to contracting
skills.
So these kind of vacancies and lack of skill sets are
pervasive throughout VA and also other agencies.
Mr. Arrington. Thank you, Ms. Oakley. My time has expired.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Peters, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, we co-
hosted a roundtable with Mr. Banks, which brought together the
VA and stakeholders from the medical device community who could
participate in the program to discuss what is occurring and
what we could do to make it better, and I appreciate the
Chairman having the hearing today.
We also had the GAO and Coalition for Government
Procurement in attendance, we also had the Chairman, and I am
very interested in continuing to work to improve this program.
At this time, though, I have not been able to attend most
of the hearings. I am going to yield my time, remaining time to
the Ranking Member, Mr. Walz.
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Mr. Peters.
And I would just like to say--and I appreciate the
gentleman's willingness to work together on this--I would like
to say, though, using a fully-functional VA is a choice, it is
a choice that 94 percent of VFW members who were surveyed would
like to make. So as I said in my opening statements, should I
be a conspiracy theorist on this, continuing to undermine the
VA's capacity to do what it is going to do under the guise of
then you will have to go to the private sector is not providing
a full range of choices. Those of us who use VA services and
find it quite adequate are very frustrated when the reason we
are not getting that care is, is because we haven't filled the
positions.
And I don't disagree that may have extended before, but I
want to be very clear, under oath, a VA person said the hiring
freeze has precluded us from filling these positions and it has
adversely affected veterans' care. That should sink in to all
of us that we do have a responsibility to get that together, we
do have a responsibility to find this.
And I would like to say, Mr. Lemmon, I think the questions
were right about asking other folks to attend here, because the
buck does stop somewhere. And again, for years I heard it, it
stops with the President and it stops with the Secretary.
I want to be thankful for you, your honesty and candor, and
I also want to make it clear in a public setting, should there
be any retaliation for stating factually what you see, that
will pay with a heavy price in this Committee. This idea of
making sure VA employees are able to come up here, speak
candidly about what is going to improve our veterans' care, I
am appreciative of that. I know you are taking a lot of this,
it is systemwide. GAO is here to help us do that. There are
certainly things out there.
There aren't necessarily, as we heard, if you send this
over to the private sector, who is going to do it? Who can do
it?
And as the Chairman and I were talking about here, the
Defense Logistics Agency might not be the best example of how
everything is supposed to work, and the F-35 certainly comes to
mind and other things, that these are complex issues trying to
get care. But if we are looking for the easy fix or we are
looking to pass the buck on this, that is simply unacceptable.
I am with--the Chairman said it right, we are not trying to
launch Voyager III here, we are trying to order surgical
supplies that they had, the suggestion is made and this is why
this Committee is so strong. These physicians speak with
experience, they speak with let them into that. GAO put out a
chart we have been up here referencing and looking at that said
follow this and you will get this right.
And so I thank the gentleman for yielding his time. I want
to be clear that I am a supporter of Choice, I was there when
Choice was created, I was part of that, as was Mr. Takano and
Mr. Roe, but part of the Choice is a fully functional. And
again, if it is hyperbole that it is a Government--no, it is
our responsibility. And we have said this, you give them that
card and tell them go somewhere, what hearing are we going to
have with hospital executives from the private sector who get
to do it the way they want to? These are the only people that
we can capture, bring in here, swear under oath, and get some
results.
This should not be that difficult. This is not the fight of
privatization, Choice, community-based care or whatever, this
is basic logistics of functioning of a medical institution that
is being accomplished. I represent the Mayo Clinic, they have
to order a lot of supplies for their institutions and they are
able to do that.
So I have full confidence we can do this. We just need to
again--now I have come full circle and been back here from that
11 years ago starting and I have been convinced of this, almost
every single problem can be fixed by proper leadership, by
accountability and what is there, and this is no different.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
There are many private sector systems, HCA comes to mind.
It is a large system, about the size of VA as far as number of
hospitals, and they don't have these problems.
Mr. Higgins, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, this hearing is
reflective of exactly the type of exasperation that we the
people, we just don't get it, so we shake our head. Any
attempted savings for money from bulk purchasing is certainly
wasted on bureaucracy. I don't have confidence in this entire
MSPV system.
VA operates I believe 1233 medical facilities, including
hospitals and CBOCs, we are spending a billion dollars a year,
that would be about 4 million per facility. There are
distinguished doctors and surgeons on this panel. I have
certainly had my surgeries based upon traumatic injury,
including my entire right eye socket to be reassembled, but I
just presumed that the surgeons and doctors and surgical staff
had the tools and the facilities that they needed in order to
perform that surgery. And I would expect that we can do a
better job by allowing the money to follow the veteran.
I think that the money we are spending on this program is
wasted. We already have oversight over the command and control
and chain of command over every VA facility and the directors
thereof. I think the doctors and surgeons and medical
professionals that work within the VA and the VHA should be
able to order what they feel they need.
And I think that the Members of this panel that are
testifying today are quite courageous to have appeared, you
know, because it is virtually indefensible the waste of the
people's treasure to accomplish nothing.
I represent the LAC group in Louisiana. They operate in 26
states, they have 13,000 employees and 60 hospitals. They don't
have this problem, but they don't have the bureaucracy that we
deal with in this town.
With the Chairman's permission, I would like to yield my
remaining time to my friend and colleague Dr. Dunn, an
accomplished surgeon.
The Chairman. Two minutes, Dr. Dunn.
Mr. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Congressman Higgins.
I am a bit of a supply site kind of guy, I want to turn to
the suppliers. There is a great sense of dissatisfaction among
the suppliers to this program and I want to ask Mr. Waldron if
you would characterize that dissatisfaction briefly.
Mr. Waldron. Our members have been frustrated with the
rollout of the Prime Vendor Next Generation. We have seen, you
know, RFPs and solicitations that have not accurately described
products that to be acquired--
Mr. Dunn. We have information that some of them are
actually considering just not dealing with the VA, it is just
not worth their trouble; is that accurate?
Mr. Waldron. I think there is bid fatigue out there right
now, because we have had a cycle, so to speak, where
solicitations were put out, then they were cancelled, now the
VA is attempting to put them back out again. And all this bid-
and-proposal costs are part of the business when you are
dealing with the Government and those funds are not unlimited
for a private entity.
Mr. Dunn. That is right. So these are businesses, I just
want to underscore this for everybody, these are businesses
that literally exist to make and sell products, and the VA is
making it so painful to do business with them that they will
walk away from the business. That really is just a huge
statement against the process that they are faced with.
One more question I want to bring up, because this one also
is a little frightening from a clinician's point of view, and
that is the gray market items that we see. These are really
dangerous for patients, because a lot of the things that we use
have to be handled very carefully, very sterile, and I see that
the gray market has somehow entered into the VA purchasing
system. Can anybody make sense out of that for me? Tell me how
that happens or that it won't happen anymore? Give me some
comfort. Gray market items being bought by our Government.
Mr. Lemmon?
Mr. Lemmon. I have heard of a few examples of that. I don't
think we generally have that problem on any scale, but, again,
I think it goes back to our supply chain system. When we don't
have the breadth of products we should have available that is
on national contract with reputable manufacturers and--
Mr. Dunn. My time has expired, but I would like you to
assure us, in fact I am going to ask you to get back to our
Committee, send something back that says what are you doing to
address this problem so that it doesn't continue to be a
problem.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
And I thank the witnesses today for being here and sharing
your testimony. I know this has been a difficult hearing today.
And I will see if Mr. Walz has any closing comments.
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here and helping. And in lieu of a
closing statement, I would like to yield 30 seconds to Mr.
Takano.
Mr. Takano. Thank you, Ranking Member Walz.
I just want to make sure that we don't rush to a conclusion
or make a wrong conclusion from today's testimony that the
answer is to put everyone into the private sector or that the
Choice program is somehow going to alleviate what is going on
here. What I heard today is we have a lot of unfilled
positions, and those positions have been vacant and possibly
attributed to an unwise hiring freeze.
Second, I was also at that Oversight hearing and my line of
questioning focused on whether or not private sector health
organizations were just as guilty or just as lax in terms of
their reporting about practitioners, and the questioners were
either unable to answer that question or were actually saying
that they probably weren't any better than the VA.
So the answer is not necessarily that the private sector
health medicine is a panacea or an answer to the challenges we
have at the VA. And I would say that we have to do our best to
make sure that the positions we have at the VA are filled, that
we staff the 40, the 45,000 unfilled positions in the health
arena here at the VA, that these are some of the things that we
need to focus on just as much, rather than rush to the
conclusion that people are trapped, so-called trapped in this
system, rather than making the VA the very best VA that it can
be.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I will point out that in my 9 years finishing up this month
on the VA, I looked at the first budget that I showed up on in
2009, it was 93.5 billion and about 250,000 employees, and now
VA has a budget that we are trying to work to, it is $186.5
billion. And I do want to point out to people that because of
the Budget Control Act in 2011, essentially, until we changed
the caps this year, those numbers were almost level.
So we got that money from the military, from education,
from other programs and put it in the VA, because this
Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, felt that was
important. And I think when it is not being spent wisely, it is
frustrating to us here and to those other people that we took
the money from. Basically, that is what we did.
And just to make it very clear, it is not a money problem.
It is not a hiring freeze that is doing this, I can tell you
right now it is not. It is leadership and that is absolutely
what it is.
And so when you good leaders in places--I got a letter that
I wish I had time to read on here, from a veteran in
Albuquerque, New Mexico that six years ago wouldn't go to the
VA there, and he walked through every bit of his visit and then
he wrote me a letter--I called the guy yesterday--he wrote me a
letter about how much better it is. So he walked me through his
next visit, which was absolutely a great visit to the health
care.
So things are not all doom and gloom. I want to make sure
that is out there. There's a lot of good things going on at the
VA. Right now this is not one of them, though, I will have to
say. And it has got to get corrected.
Because, Mr. Takano, in my career I don't remember having
to go out and walk and tell a patient's family I don't have the
equipment and tools to do the operation on your wife today,
that never happened. I have worked in VA hospitals, I have
worked in private not-for-profit hospitals, I have worked in
for-profits, I worked the whole gamut, it has never happened to
me before, but it is happening in VA because of this
procurement problem.
And, as Ms. Kuster said, this ultimately will affect
quality of care. Putting the hernia off for a day or a week,
that doesn't matter. Putting a bypass off or a stent or
something that really matters, or a cancer operation might
really matter.
And I know our witnesses today, many of you in the audience
also, none of the MSPV trials and travails are just not news to
you, but you work with the program every day. And I get the
impression that when many of the decisions that we have
discussed were made causing problems that we are still
grappling with today, some of you probably felt that they were
questionable. For example, setting a 6,000-item formulary when
the industry standard is 30 to 50,000 items, trying to
establish the formulary all at once in a little more than a
year, initially. They are not insisting on clinical leadership
involvement or deliberately sidelining them. You are
professionals and I believe these decisions must have made you
uneasy.
I ask that you use this GAO report and this hearing as a
catalyst to take a hard look at the situation and decide what
really makes sense. What kind of MSPV Program, whatever you
want to call it, I don't care, are you truly prepared to live
with for years in the future. This is critically important to
providing quality health care for people. What is best for our
veterans?
Unfortunately, it seems the desire to gloss over
difficulties and declare victory and move on may have
contributed to MSPV's problems in the past. If it takes longer
to get it right, so be it, get it right.
I appreciate your participation today and I ask unanimous
consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and
extend their remarks and include extraneous material.
Without objection, so ordered.
I do before I finish want to thank the Committee, both
sides of the aisle, for a very, very productive year from this
Committee and what we have accomplished for our Nation's
veterans, many times we don't--the Accountability and
Whistleblower Act, the Choice Act we have done, the Forever GI
Bill, the claims appeal, and we are going to continue. This
Committee is going to continue to work to try to get things
right and provide, as Mr. Takano said, the best quality care
for our Nation's heroes.
And I again want to wish everyone here in the audience and
on this Committee a very, very merry Christmas with your
family, and a happy holiday season for all of you.
Mr. Takano. Mr. Chairman, as a point of personal privilege,
I just want to acknowledge that our colleague Ms. Brownley is
not with us today because she is in her home district because
of the fires in California. And I appreciate your holiday
wishes and I take them to heart, and I too enjoyed this year of
productivity.
The Chairman. Thank you all very much. And with nothing
further, the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statement of Ricky L. Lemmon
Good morning Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz and Members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss VA's Medical/
Surgical Prime Vendor (MSPV) program and the related Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report. I am accompanied by Mr.
Philip Christy, Associate Executive Director, Strategic Acquisition
Center.
Introduction and History of MSPV
VA is committed to providing our Veterans the best care available
while being good stewards of taxpayers' dollars. Part of meeting these
commitments is making sure that our medical centers have the right
supplies and equipment to deliver the care our Veterans need.
The Department once relied on its own procurement, storage and
transportation system to distribute relatively low cost and frequently
demanded medical and surgical supplies until the mid-1990s. VA then did
away with this in-house system and converted to a commercially sourced
MSPV program to provide this capability. Since then, the MSPV program
has been the primary method used to provide our medical centers these
kinds of supplies.
The primary source of supplies for previous generations of MSPV
contracts was the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Use of FSS, when
combined with local and regional contracts, resulted in our hospitals
having access to a clinically viable selection of supplies. However,
this operational model did not facilitate clinical product decisions on
a national level that would allow VHA to leverage its purchasing power.
Adoption of clinically driven strategic sourcing was, and continues
to be, envisioned to leverage VA enterprise-wide purchase volume in
order to drive lower prices and improve product quality. The MSPV-Next
Generation (MSPV-NG) contract was conceived, in part, to address these
issues through the development and use of a mandated national catalog
or formulary.
Current Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor
In 2016, the Office of Acquisition Operations, Strategic
Acquisition Center, in partnership with VHA, announced the award of
four Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts in
support of MSPV-NG. The program was mandatory for all VA medical
centers. Medical centers pay prime vendors a distribution fee plus the
product price. Product prices were primarily established by negotiated
blanket purchase agreements against FSS contracts, VA national
indefinite delivery contracts, and local contracts to support Veterans
Integrated Service Networks. The distribution fee was a markup to the
product prices intended to cover prime vendor costs for managing
customer inventories and ensuring the timely delivery of needed
products to customers. As documented in the GAO report, this contract
has not been as successful as we would have liked, due to the time
required to solicit and award enough medical and surgical products to
meet the needs of our medical centers. Accordingly, VHA has decided to
move forward with modifying the current contracts or developing
replacement contracts to rectify the issues identified in the GAO
audit. In determining how to potentially improve the availability of
items under the current MSPV contract, we are considering the
contracting process used by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to
efficiently establish pricing agreements that enable over 100,000
medical and surgical items to be available through DLA's MSPV contract.
An acquisition plan has not been finalized for replacement of MSPV.
VA is exploring a different approach to MSPV, where potential prime
vendors can propose a full catalog of medical and surgical products.
This would depart from the current approach to MSPV where individual
contracts are negotiated with each supplier to form a book of contracts
that MSPVs can distribute against. The potential benefits of MSPV 2.0
would be a more robust catalog of items than we have today that could
be available from the beginning of the contract and lower prices. VA is
conducting market research to identify the best commercial solutions to
meet its mission needs in this area. Additionally, the administrative
resources and time required to negotiate thousands of individual
contracts would be reduced if VA only negotiated with the prime vendors
for both medical and surgical products and distribution services. There
have been multiple meetings with industry leaders to obtain feedback
regarding the proposed approach to MSPV 2.0 and that feedback is
currently being considered. Feedback will also be obtained from VA
clinicians before VA makes any final decisions regarding a new MSPV.
This is why our efforts to make the current MSPV contracts more robust
are important. We want to make sure the needs of our medical centers
are met while we develop a better approach to MSPV.
GAO Report
GAO recently released the report, ``Veterans Affairs Contracting:
Improvements in Buying Medical and Surgical Supplies Could Yield Cost
Savings and Efficiency.'' GAO made 10 recommendations concerning our
current MSPV management processes, and VA has already begun to
institute each of them:
VHA is developing an implementation plan that clearly
articulates our strategy for the MSPV program. The plan will include
how to prioritize categories of supplies for future requirement
development and contracting. This document will also serve as a
communication tool for all stakeholders involved in MSPV. We expect the
first draft to be completed by the end of calendar year (CY) 2017.
Hiring a permanent program office director for MSPV is a
high priority. We expect a vacancy announcement to be posted by the end
of CY 2017.
VA acknowledges that the role of Chief Acquisition
Officer should be assigned to a non-career employee, per the third GAO
recommendation, but our flexibility is limited by restrictions on non-
career positions within the Department.
To ensure we are providing complete guidance for matching
equivalent supply items, VHA has replaced the MSPV Item Conversion
Tracker Tool with the Medical Product Data Bank eZSave program, which
collects product information from over 80 government and private
sources. We will conduct a review by the end of this CY to measure our
success.
Similarly, we are developing a communication plan to
ensure frequent and effective outreach to the medical centers
concerning the criteria and processes for changing items of the
formulary. We fully expect that several modes of communication will be
in use by the end of this CY.
VHA is developing a new metric for MSPV cost avoidance.
The implementation of this metric is contingent upon the completion of
a separate data standardization project, but we anticipate this new
metric will take effect by June 2018.
VHA plans to replace or modify the current MSPV contract
and formulary process with a contract which will facilitate greater
access to a wider variety of products, using best commercial and
government practices. This plan includes providing improved service
until the current contract is modified or replaced.
VHA will emphasize the importance of clinical program
offices' involvement in MSPV requirements development and
standardization efforts. Proposed guidance is being finalized, enabling
clinical program offices to directly manage the selection of items in
the formulary related to their clinical expertise. By the end of CY
2018, clinical program offices will prioritize their requirements and
will emphasize standardization where clinically acceptable.
VHA is formalizing guidance for contracting offices, the
Supply Chain Data and Informatics Office, and medical centers to ensure
they work together to identify opportunities for strategically
obtaining goods and services on an emergency basis. The target
completion date is June 2018.
VHA will establish a process to identify commodities and
supplies that are frequently purchased using emergency procurement
methods. These items will be evaluated for inclusion in the MSPV
formulary, if appropriate, by June 2018.
Conclusion
VA seeks to continue to provide our Veterans with the timely care
they have earned and deserve. At the same time, we are seeking new and
innovative ways to be more responsible stewards of the taxpayers'
dollars. We are grateful to GAO for their report and to the Committee
for their commitment to helping the Department improve. I look forward
to responding to any questions you may have.
Prepared Statement of Shelby S. Oakley
VETERANS AFFAIRS CONTRACTING
Improvements in Buying Medical and Surgical Supplies Could Yield Cost
Savings and Efficiency
Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee:
In December 2016, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) launched
the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program as
its primary means for purchasing supplies, such as bandages and
scalpels, for 170 VA medical centers. These supplies are intended to
meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. In fiscal year
2015, VA obligated $465 million for these types of supplies, and, in
2016, it stated that it planned to achieve $150 million in cost
avoidance through a supply chain transformation effort, which includes
MSPV-NG. This transition represents a significant change to how medical
and surgical supplies are purchased, which has raised questions about
whether MSPV-NG will appropriately balance medical needs with
logistical efficiency, and whether VA can achieve its planned cost
avoidance. Effective supply chain management is an essential part of
delivering quality health care to veterans-for instance, an April 2017
interim report issued by the VA Inspector General detailed supply
management issues at the District of Columbia VA Medical Center that
posed risks to patient care. \1\
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\1\ Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General,
Interim Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2017).
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My remarks today are based on our recently issued report on the
MSPV-NG program, and I will summarize a few key findings from that
report. \2\ Specifically, I will address the extent to which VA's
implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Veterans Affairs Contracting: Improvements in Buying
Medical and Surgical Supplies Could Yield Cost Savings and Efficiency,
GAO 18 34 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2017).
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As part of our work for our November 2017 report, we reviewed VA
policy, communications, briefings, and other documents, prior GAO
reports on best practices for organizational transformation, and
internal control standards. \3\ We interviewed Veterans Health
Administration (VHA)- and VA-wide procurement leaders, program office
managers, and members of three integrated product teams who helped
develop the product descriptions for supply items (known as
requirements). We also interviewed supply chain managers from four
leading hospital networks regarding their medical supply management
practices and compared them to those used by VA when implementing the
MSPV-NG program. \4\ To assess VA's MSPV-NG contracting process, we
analyzed the contents of the formulary (a list of specific items that
medical centers are allowed to purchase) to determine what acquisition
instrument was used to add the items. We determined that the MSPV-NG
formulary data were sufficiently reliable by tracing data to a sample
of source documents, among other steps. We selected three VHA regional
networks based on those with the highest total contract obligations in
fiscal years 2014 through 2016, geographic diversity, and other
factors. We conducted site visits to six medical centers within these
three regional networks, interviewing contracting and clinical
officials. Finally, we obtained and analyzed data on VA's metrics for
the program and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our
purpose of measuring utilization by interviewing officials responsible
for maintaining the data and other measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO 14 704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2014).
\4\ We selected these hospital networks because they were
identified by an industry study as having leading supply chain
practices. See Gartner, Inc., The Healthcare Supply Chain Top 25 for
2015 (Nov. 18, 2015).
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More detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology
for our work can be found in our November 9, 2017 report. \5\ We
conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See GAO 18 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
MSPV-NG Program
For over a decade, each of VA's 170 medical centers used VHA's
legacy MSPV program to order medical supplies, such as bandages and
scalpels. Many of those items were purchased using the Federal Supply
Schedules, which provided medical centers with a great deal of
flexibility. \6\ However, as we reported in 2016, this legacy program
prevented VHA from standardizing items used across its medical centers
and affected its ability to leverage its buying power to achieve
greater cost avoidance. \7\ Standardization is a process of narrowing
the range of items purchased to meet a given need, such as buying 10
varieties of bandages instead of 100, in order to improve buying power,
simplify supply chain management, and provide clinical consistency. In
part because of the legacy MSPV program's limited standardization, VHA
decided to transition to a new iteration, called MSPV-NG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Federal Supply Schedules program, managed by the General
Services Administration, provides federal agencies a simplified method
of purchasing commercial products and services at prices associated
with volume buying. The General Services Administration has delegated
authority to VA to manage health-care-related supplies and services.
For more details on the legacy MSPV program, see GAO, Veterans Affairs
Contracting: Improvements in Policies and Processes Could Yield Cost
Savings and Efficiency, GAO 16 810 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2016).
\7\ See GAO 16 810.
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The transition to MSPV-NG has been a major effort, involving the
MSPV-NG program office, stakeholders from the VHA's Procurement and
Logistics Office and VA's Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC)-a VA-wide
contracting organization-and logistics and clinical personnel at every
medical center. The program also includes hundreds of new contracts
with individual supply vendors and a new set of prime vendor contracts
to distribute the supplies.
VA's goals for the MSPV-NG program include (1) standardizing
requirements for supply items for greater clinical consistency; (2)
demonstrating cost avoidance by leveraging VA's substantial buying
power when making competitive awards; (3) achieving greater efficiency
in ordering and supply chain management, including a metric of ordering
40 percent of medical centers' supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary; and
(4) involving clinicians in requirements development to ensure uniform
clinical review of medical supplies.
VHA launched the MSPV-NG program in December 2016, but allowed a 4-
month transition period. After April 2017, medical centers could no
longer use the legacy program. MSPV-NG now restricts ordering to a
narrow formulary. VHA policy requires medical centers to use MSPV-NG-as
opposed to other means such as open market purchase card transactions-
when purchasing items that are available in the formulary.
Supply Chain Practices Identified by Selected Leading Hospital Networks
Leading hospital networks we spoke with have similar goals to VA in
managing their supply chains, including clinical standardization and
reduced costs. These hospital networks reported they analyze their
spending to identify items purchased most frequently, and which ones
would be the best candidates to standardize first to yield cost
savings. The hospitals' supply chain managers reported establishing
consensus with clinicians through early and frequent collaboration,
understanding that clinician involvement is critical to the success of
any effort to standardize their medical supply chain. By following
these practices, these hospital networks have reported they have
achieved significant cost savings in some cases, and the potential for
improved patient care, while maintaining buy-in from their clinicians.
VHA's Implementation of MSPV-NG Program Has Not Yet Achieved Its Goals
VHA's implementation of the MSPV-NG program-from its initial work
to identify a list of supply requirements in early 2015, through its
roll-out of the formulary to medical centers in December 2016-was not
executed in line with leading practices. Specifically, VHA lacked a
documented program strategy, leadership stability, and workforce
capacity for the transition that, if in place, could have facilitated
buy-in for the change throughout the organization. Further, the initial
requirements development process and tight timeframes contributed to
ineffective contracting processes. As a result, VHA developed an
initial formulary that did not meet the needs of the medical centers
and has yet to achieve utilization and cost avoidance goals. VA made
some changes in the second phase of requirements development to address
deficiencies identified in the initial roll out. Key among these was to
increase the level of clinical involvement, that is, to obtain input
from the doctors and nurses at VA's individual medical facilities.
Despite changes aimed at improving implementation, the agency continues
to face challenges that prevent the program from fully achieving its
goals.
VA's Lack of an Overarching Strategy and Leadership Instability Were
Obstacles to Effective Implementation of MSPV-NG
VA did not document a clear overall strategy for the MSPV-NG
program at the start and has not done so to date. About 6 months after
our initial requests for a strategy or plan, a VHA official provided us
with an October 2015 plan focusing on the mechanics of establishing the
MSPV-NG formulary. However, this plan was used only within the VHA
Procurement and Logistics Office and had not been approved by VHA or VA
leadership. Leading practices for organizational transformation state
that agencies must have well-documented plans and strategies for major
initiatives (such as MSPV-NG) and communicate them clearly and
consistently to all involved-which included VHA headquarters, the SAC,
and all 170 medical centers. \8\ Without such a strategy, VA could not
reasonably ensure that all stakeholders understood VHA's approach for
MSPV-NG and worked together in a coordinated manner to achieve program
goals. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of
the MSPV-NG program office should, with input from SAC, develop,
document, and communicate to stakeholders an overarching strategy for
the program, including how the program office will prioritize
categories of supplies for future phases of requirement development and
contracting. VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would
have a strategy in place by December 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Organizational Transformation: A Framework for Assessing
and Improving Enterprise Architecture Management, GAO 10 846G
(Washington, D.C.: August 2010); and Results-Oriented Cultures:
Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational
Transformations, GAO 03 669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leadership instability and workforce challenges also made it
difficult for VA to execute its transition to MSPV-NG. Our work has
shown that leadership buy-in is necessary to ensure that major programs
like MSPV-NG have the resources and support they need to execute their
missions. \9\ Due to a combination of budget and hiring constraints,
and lack of prioritization within VA, the MSPV-NG program office has
never been fully staffed and has experienced instability in its
leadership. As of January 2017, 24 of the office's 40 positions were
filled, and program office officials stated that this lack of staff
affected their ability to implement certain aspects of the program
within the planned timeframes. In addition, since the inception of
MSPV-NG, the program office has had four directors, two of whom were
acting and two of whom were fulfilling the director position while
performing other collateral duties. For instance, one of the acting
MSPV-NG program office directors was on detail from a regional health
network to fulfill the position, but had to abruptly leave and return
to her prior position due to a federal hiring freeze. In our November
2017 report, we recommended that VHA prioritize the hiring of a MSPV-NG
program director on a permanent basis. VA agreed with this
recommendation and indicated a vacancy announcement will be posted by
the end of 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO 15 290 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 11, 2015).
The MSPV-NG Initial Requirements Development Process Had Limited
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clinician Involvement and Did Not Prioritize Categories of Supplies
The MSPV-NG program office initially developed requirements for
items to be included in the formulary based almost exclusively on prior
supply purchases, with limited clinician involvement. The program
office concluded in its October 2015 formulary plan that relying on
data from previous clinician purchases would be a good representation
of medical centers' needs and that clinician input would not be
required for identifying which items to include in the initial
formulary. \10\ Further, rather than standardizing purchases of
specific categories of supplies-such as bandages or scalpels-program
officials told us they identified medical and surgical items on which
VA had spent $16,000 or more annually and ordered at least 12 times per
year, and made those items the basis for the formulary. Officials said
this analysis initially yielded a list of about 18,000 items, which the
program office further refined to about 6,000 items by removing
duplicate items or those that were not considered consumable
commodities, such as medical equipment. This approach to requirements
development stood in sharp contrast to those of the leading hospital
networks we met with, which rely heavily on clinician input to help
drive the standardization process and focus on individual categories of
supplies that provide the best opportunities for cost savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The fiscal year 2014 data on historical purchasing by medical
centers came from the Medical Product Data Bank database, jointly
funded by VA and the Department of Defense, and was the principal
source for identifying potential items to include on the initial
version of the MSPV-NG formulary.
Requirements Development and Tight Time Frames Contributed to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ineffective Contracting Practices for Initial Formulary
Based on the requirements developed by the program office, SAC
began to issue competitive solicitations for the 6,000 items on the
initial formulary in June 2015. Medical supply companies had responded
to about 30 percent of the solicitations as of January 2016. As a
result, according to SAC officials, they conducted outreach and some of
these companies responded that VHA's requirements did not appear to be
based on clinical input and instead consisted of manufacturer-specific
requirements that favored particular products instead of broader
descriptions. Furthermore, SAC did not solicit large groups of related
items, but rather issued separate solicitations for small groups of
supply items-consisting of three or fewer items. This is contrary to
industry practices of soliciting large groups of related supplies
together. Therefore, according to SAC officials, some medical supply
companies told them that submitting responses to SAC's solicitations
required more time and resources than they were willing to commit.
By its April 2016 deadline for having 6,000 items on the formulary,
SAC had been working on the effort for over a year and had established
competitive agreements for about 200 items, representing about 3
percent of the planned items. Without contracts for the items on the
formulary in place, VA delayed the launch of the MSPV-NG program until
December 2016 and SAC began establishing non-competitive agreements in
the last few months before the launch of MSPV-NG. As shown in figure 1,
these non-competitive agreements accounted for approximately 79 percent
of the items on the January 2017 version of the formulary. While this
approach enabled the MSPV-NG program office to establish the formulary
more quickly, it did so at the expense of one of the primary goals of
the MSPV-NG program-leveraging VA's buying power to obtain cost
avoidance through competition.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1432.001
Initial Formulary Did Not Meet Medical Center Needs, Resulting in Low
Utilization of MSPV-NG and a Missed Opportunity to Leverage VA's
Large Buying Power
Once VA's MSPV-NG initial formulary was established in December
2016, each medical center was charged with implementing it. According
to logistics officials we spoke with at selected medical centers, they
had varying levels of success due, in part, to incomplete guidance from
the program office. Without clear guidance, many medical centers
reported they were unable to find direct matches or substitutes on the
MSPV-NG formulary for a substantial number of items they routinely
used, which negatively impacted utilization rates for the initial
formulary. In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the
Director of the MSPV-NG program office provide complete guidance to
medical centers for matching equivalent supply items. VA agreed with
this recommendation and indicated it would provide this guidance to
medical centers by December 2017.
According to SAC, as of June 2017, only about a third of the items
on the initial version of the formulary were being ordered in any
significant quantity by medical centers, indicating that many items on
the formulary were not those that are needed by medical centers. Senior
VHA acquisition officials attributed this mismatch to shortcomings in
their initial requirements development process as well as with VA's
purchase data.
VA had set a target that medical centers would order 40 percent of
their supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary, but utilization rates were
below this target with a nationwide average utilization rate across
medical centers of about 24 percent as of May 2017. Specifically, Chief
Supply Chain Officers-who are responsible for managing the ordering and
stocking of medical supplies at six selected medical centers-told us
that many items they needed were not included in the MSPV-NG formulary.
As such, we found that these six medical centers generally fell below
VA's stated utilization target. As shown in figure 2, among the six
selected medical centers we reviewed, one met the target, while the
remaining five were below 25 percent utilization. \11\
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\11\ The one facility that met the target, Hampton VA Medical
Center, is categorized by VA as a smaller, less complex facility, and
had fewer items to match, which could contribute to its higher
utilization.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1432.002
Instead of fully using MSPV-NG, the selected medical centers are
purchasing many items through other means, such as purchase cards or
new contracts awarded by their local contracting office, in part,
because they said the formulary does not meet their needs. These
approaches run counter to the goals of the MSPV-NG program and
contribute to VA not making the best use of taxpayer dollars.
Greater utilization of MSPV-NG is essential to VA achieving the
cost avoidance goal of $150 million for its supply chain transformation
effort. Under the legacy MSPV program, the National Acquisition Center
tracked cost avoidance achieved by comparing prices for competitively-
awarded MSPV supply contracts with prices available elsewhere. However,
VHA officials stated that they are not currently tracking cost
avoidance related specifically to MSPV-NG. In our November 2017 report,
we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer, in
coordination with SAC, should calculate cost avoidance achieved by
MSPV-NG on an ongoing basis. VA agreed with this recommendation and
reported it would develop a new metric to measure cost avoidance by
June 2018.
VA Continues to Encounter Requirements Development and Contracting
Challenges as It Works to Address MSPV-NG Shortcomings
In Phase 2 of MSPV-NG, the program office has taken some steps to
incorporate greater clinical involvement in subsequent requirements
development, but both its requirements development and SAC's
contracting efforts have been hampered by staffing and schedule
constraints. \12\ In the fall of 2016, the program office began to
establish panels of clinicians to serve on MSPV-NG integrated product
teams (IPT) assigned to the task of developing updated requirements for
the second phase of the formulary. Program officials said they had
difficulty recruiting clinicians to participate. We found that slightly
more than half (20 of the 38) of the IPTs had begun their work to
review items and develop updated requirements by the time the MSPV-NG
program launched in December 2016. Staff on the IPTs had to complete
their responsibilities by the end of March 2017 while simultaneously
managing their regular workload as physicians, surgeons, or nurses.
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\12\ Work on Phase 2 began while medical centers were implementing
Phase 1 and beginning to order from the MSPV-NG formulary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By early March 2017, the IPTs still had about 4,200 items to
review. Faced with meeting this unrealistic timeframe, the MSPV-NG
program office had 9 IPT members travel to one location-with an
additional 10 members participating virtually-to meet for 5 days to
review the remaining items. Members told us that this time pressure
limited the extent to which they were able to pursue the goal of
standardizing supplies, and that their review ended up being more of a
data validation exercise than a standardization review. VHA ultimately
met this compressed timeline, but in a rushed manner that limited the
impact of clinician involvement.
In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief
Procurement and Logistics Officer use input from national clinical
program offices to prioritize its requirements development and
standardization efforts beyond Phase 2 to focus on supply categories
that offer the best opportunity for standardization and cost avoidance.
VA agreed with this recommendation and stated it is in the process of
finalizing guidance that will detail the importance of involving the
national clinical program offices in MSPV-NG requirements development
and standardization efforts.
The SAC plans to replace the existing Phase 1 non-competitive
agreements with competitive awards based on the Phase 2 requirements
generated by the IPTs, but it may not be able to keep up with expiring
agreements due to an unrealistic schedule. \13\ Because they were made
on a non-competitive basis, the Phase 1 agreements were established for
a period of 1 year. In order to keep the full formulary available, the
SAC director said the staff must award 200 to 250 contracts before the
Phase 1 agreements expire later this year. SAC officials acknowledged
that it is unlikely that they will be able to award the contracts by
the time the existing agreements expire. According to SAC officials,
they are in the process of hiring more staff to deal with the increased
workload. Further, the SAC division director told us that they canceled
all outstanding Phase 2 solicitations in September 2017 due to low
response rates, protests from service-disabled veteran-owned small
businesses, and changes in overall MSPV-NG strategy.
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\13\ According to VA, the agency plans to use indefinite delivery/
indefinite quantity contracts in addition to blanket purchase
agreements for Phase 2.
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In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the MSPV-NG
program office and SAC should establish a plan for how to mitigate the
potential risk of gaps in contract coverage while SAC is still working
to make competitive Phase 2 awards, which could include prioritizing
supply categories that are most likely to yield cost avoidance. VA
agreed with this recommendation and indicated it has developed a plan
to mitigate the risk of gaps in contract coverage with short- and mid-
term procurement strategies to ensure continued provision of medical
and surgical supplies to VHA facilities. The department also stated
that it plans to replace the current MSPV-NG contract and formulary
process with a new approach where the prime vendor would develop the
formulary. However, VA will likely face challenges in this new approach
until it fully addresses the existing shortcomings in the MSPV-NG
program.
Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee,
this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to
any questions that you may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
If you or your staff have any questions about this statement,
please contact Shelby S. Oakley at 202-512-4841 or [email protected]. In
addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement.
Individuals who made key contributions to the report on which this
testimony is based are Lisa Gardner, Assistant Director; Emily Bond;
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Prepared Statement of Roger D. Waldron
Good Morning Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz and Members of the
House Committee on Veterans Affairs. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you to address the VA Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor
(MSPV) program, including its ``Next Generation'' and ``2.0''
iterations.
The Coalition for Government Procurement (The Coalition) is a non-
profit association of firms selling commercial services and products to
the Federal Government. Our members collectively account for more than
$145 billion dollars of the sales generated annually through government
contracts including the GSA Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) program, VA
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), the Government-wide Acquisition
Contracts (GWACs), and agency-specific multiple award contracts (MACs).
Coalition members include small, medium, and large business concerns
that provide more than $12 billion worth of medical/surgical products
and pharmaceuticals to support the health care needs of veterans. The
Coalition is proud to have worked with Government officials for more
than 38 years towards the mutual goals of common sense acquisition and
to support our veterans.
As you know, the VA uses several strategies to acquire medical/
surgical equipment and supplies including national contracts, federal
supply schedules and the Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor (MSPV) program.
It is critical that these programs work together consistently and
effectively to create a high value acquisition and distribution system.
The VA faces numerous challenges associated with the management of its
hospitals and supply chain. Studies, reports, and analyses have been
published about these challenges and possible solutions. In September
2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) made 10
recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of VA
acquisitions. \1\ On Monday GAO released a new report, GAO -18-34,
``Veterans Affairs Contracting: Improvements in Buying Medical and
Surgical Supplies Could Yield Cost Saving and Efficiency'' which
documents many of the challenges and impacts the of the MSPV-NG on the
VHA customer and the VA's industry partners over the last two years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO-16-810, Improvements in Policies and Processes Could Yield
Cost Savings and Efficiency, September 2016
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier this year, the Coalition was pleased to have submitted
recommendations to the VA to reform its procurement operations in
connection with the VA modernization program. Attachment 1 to this
statement contains our detailed recommendations for:
1. Establishing Clinician Leadership/Program Management
2. Centralizing VA Procurement Operations
3. Streamlining Unnecessary and Duplicative Regulations
4. Improving IT Systems
5. Reorganizing Pharmacy Benefits Program
6. Reforming the Role of the VA Office of the Inspector General in
Contracting
The Coalition also has been privileged to prepare comments in
response to the VA's proposed MSPV 2.0. The MSPV program seeks to
deliver a national strategic sourcing solution that combines a
formulary approach with electronic cataloging and ordering to support
the Veterans Administration Medical Centers. VA's version 2.0 would
outsource the program to a single commercial contractor. The contractor
would determine what the agency would buy, and how the items would be
sourced, managed and distributed; administer contracts; and ensure
quality control. Nationwide electronic ordering and invoicing would be
facilitated using the commercial contractor's e-commerce platform.
Coalition members support VA's objectives related to aligning the
acquisition of medical/surgical products more with commercial best
practices and increased efficiency. The current MSPV 2.0 proposal,
however, leaves so many questions unanswered that, at this time, we are
unable to make a realistic evaluation of its impact on veteran's
health, VA suppliers or the contracting process. Our questions and
areas of concern are described in detail in Attachment 4 to this
statement.
The Coalition has several fundamental concerns that our members
believe must be addressed to ensure the success of the MSPV program
and/or any future VA program for the application of medical/surgical
equipment and supplies. Specifically, we believe that the VA needs to:
1.Establish a strong program office, led and managed by clinicians
2.Be clear that best value for the veteran, not price, will drive
program requirements
3.Maximize alignment with commercial practice
4.Leverage competition to benefit the prime vendor program
A Clinically Led and Managed Program Management Office
Our members continue to emphasize that a program office led and
managed by clinicians is a commercial best practice and is critical to
implementation of a successful prime vendor program that supports
President Lincoln's promise ``To care for him who shall have borne the
battle, and for his widow, and his orphan''. The foundation for an
effective and efficient VA medical supply program, focused squarely on
the needs of veterans, is a VHA program office that is led by health
care professionals with both clinical and medical supply chain
expertise. A clinically led program office possesses the breadth of
skills and experience to make effective and efficient evaluation of
medical devices and overall product decisions that result in optimal
outcomes and best value for patients and practitioners across the VA
health care system. Our experience with MSPV-NG has shown that without
clinical program leadership and management, VA is destined to have MSPV
strategies and decisions that are focused on, and driven by, the
government ``procurement process,'' potentially compromising the health
care needs of veterans.
The lack of clinician and medical supply chain experience within
the VHA medical/surgical Program Office has led what appears to be the
view that medical and surgical products are simple and interchangeable
commodities. This view simply is not the case; these acquisitions cover
highly regulated and complex medical products with unique
characteristics that directly impact patient outcomes in VA facilities.
Under the current program, there have been several issues which seem to
be contract-driven, rather than clinician-driven. For example, the
practice of awarding a limited number of line items, rather than the
standard commercial practice of awarding contracts for coordinated
suites of products. This practice:
1.Leads to inefficiencies at VA facilities. The unavailability of
certain products can impact the ability to perform medical procedures,
often resulting in cancellations, and it consumes valuable nursing time
to find and source products;
2.Challenges industry in the solicitation process to recognize
individual product codes that may be buried in unfamiliar groupings,
increasing the potential misalignment of expectations and performance;
and
3.Raises concerns for the practice of medical care by end-users.
Awarding different medical products within a suite of products may
require additional training for VA medical staff to ensure appropriate
use, increasing time pressures on already stressed medical staff, and
potentially introducing safety risks through the expansion of product
variation.
The proposed MSPV 2.0 does not address the imperative of a
clinically-led, successful program office. In fact, MSPV 2.0, as we
understand the vision, likely will exacerbate the clinician vacuum by
vesting in a commercial entity, the responsibility and authority to
develop, determine and manage what products are included on the MSPV
formulary and how such products are sourced. Coalition members have
raised questions as to how the VA will ensure that this ``super'' prime
vendor will ensure an appropriate clinical role when making formulary
decisions that prioritize patient outcomes for our nation's veterans.
Moreover, they are concerned that there is no assurance that formulary
items are NOT selected by the MSPV 2.0 contractor based on competing
business interests/decisions rather than the health care needs of
veterans. The establishment of a program office with strong leadership
by clinicians who have medical supply chain expertise is necessary to
assure well-developed technical requirements that address these
concerns. Best value outcomes start with sound, effective and clear
customer requirements in this regard.
Coalition members continue to report a lack of clinician input in
developing technical requirements. For example, in connection with
MSPV-NG, the Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC) establishes IDIQs and
BPAs based on requirements developed in consultation with the
procurement and logistics arm of the VHA. Clinicians apparently provide
input in some instances, though there is a lack of transparency
regarding these decisions. Under these circumstances, members are
concerned that award decisions are based on price and not best value
for veterans' health care. It is their experience that a lack of
clinical input has led to an incomplete formulary, which causes supply
shortages and may require facilities to purchase items via the open
market, often at a high cost, on government purchase cards. Robust
clinical leadership during the requirements development process would
avoid such problems. It is not enough to formalize the current
``clinical input'' process (the VHA's Integrated Product Teams) being
utilized under MSPV-NG for the future 2.0 program. See Attachment 2
providing additional background and recommendations on creating a
clinician led program office.
Best Value
Veterans cannot be relegated to ``low price technically
acceptable'' health care, and for this reason, the VA must clearly
assert that value, i.e., the facilitation of the most positive health
care outcomes for veterans, not raw low price, is the objective when
acquiring medical equipment and supplies for our nation's veterans.
Value drives positive health care outcomes for veterans. Coalition
members understand that a significant objective for the MSPV 2.0 is
cost savings. The MSPV 2.0 vision, to date, however, provides little-
to-no detail regarding how cost savings will be measured and considered
in the context of medical outcomes, supply chain efficiencies, or the
like. Further, there is no detail as to whether the responsibility for
making these important decisions will rest with the MSPV 2.0 contractor
or the government. Without a clear articulation of a VA position that
value, not price is the driving force, there is little incentive for a
contractor to offer the latest innovative, but perhaps more expensive
new, life-saving technology for our veterans. Given this lack of
clarity, coupled with the abense of a clinician led and managed program
office, the Coalition members are concerned that financial incentives,
rather than a focus on patient outcomes, will drive the program.
Clinical expertise is essential to making best value selections of
medical and surgical products.
Attachment 3 includes a letter from the Coalition to the VAC SAC
regarding low price technically acceptable evaluation methodology for
medical/surgical items.
Commercial Practice
To assure streamlined processes and reasonable prices, we strongly
urge the VA to align with best commercial practices. In issuing the RFI
for MSPV 2.0, VA stated that alignment with commercial practice was a
key objective. Paragraph 2.0 of the Scope section of the RFI, however,
provides that one contractor will be responsible for ``developing a
medical surgical supply and equipment formulary for each facility in
the VA.., [and will] provide strategic sourcing, life cycle management,
distribution, inventory management and analysis services, quality
control/quality assurance support services, and warranty management
services for materials they are responsible for providing.'' This
approach is inconsistent with commercial practice. Indeed, Coalition
members report that there is no comparable commercial model that
provides for a super prime vendor essentially responsible for
developing, designing, and managing a formulary while at the same time
distributing, delivering, and managing all the products listed on that
formulary.
In particular, as noted in Attachments 2 and 4, the RFI's approach
does not reflect the complexity associated with establishing,
competing, and managing the requirements for a medical/surgical prime
vendor catalog world-wide. As currently constructed, the RFI proposes
the execution of a competition within a few months. For comparison, our
members have explained to the VA that pursuant to the commercial model,
which represents 98-99% of the US market for medical devices, a
commercial organization, with a clinically led program office,
typically takes approximately four years to successfully compete such a
catalogue.
In addition, our experience with MSPV-NG has shown that the VA does
not utilize the established medical product categories that are used in
the commercial market. Although VHA has attempted to create product
categories, an improvement upon the current line item competitions,
these categories are government-unique and not recognized by industry.
Following product categories that are well known in the commercial
market increases the likelihood of developing a comprehensive scope of
formulary products that meet the needs of clinicians in the VA medical
system. To do otherwise risks suffering significant gaps in the
availability of medical and surgical products on the Formulary, similar
to the experience under the current MSPV-NG contracts
Further, MSPV 2.0 should allow companies to distribute their
products to the VA as they do for commercial hospitals. Specifically,
although many medical products are available through medical/surgical
distributers, a considerable number of medical devices are only
available through direct acquisition from manufacturers. Direct
ordering from manufacturers for certain products is a standard
commercial practice typically driven by medical safety requirements and
the corresponding chain of custody tracking to ensure traceability of
product. In these circumstances it is neither appropriate nor efficient
to stock these through distributors. Thus, the VA should look to other
alternatives such as separate IDIQ contracts of the Schedules program,
as appropriate.
In sum, prior to launching MSPV 2.0, the Coalition recommends that
the VA take the time to identify commercial best practices for the
medical supply chain and align the VA's purchasing strategy
accordingly.
Competition
Finally, VA's proposal for MSPV 2.0 in the RFI assigns one
commercial entity responsibility for making critical decisions that,
generally are reserved to the government, specifically, what to buy,
how to buy, and contract administration. The Coalition cannot emphasize
enough its recommendations that the VA establish the MSPV 2.0
formulary, based on requirements developed by a clinically led program
office, rather than outsourcing this function to a contractor. The
establishment of the formulary for veterans is an inherently
governmental function that should be conducted by the government and
not a private entity. It is the VA's responsibility to identify the
medical and surgical products that meet the health care needs of
veterans at best value to taxpayers, as the VA possesses unparalleled
expertise and intimate understanding of the panoply of needs of this
client base. A private entity does not, and thus to allow that private
entity to do so would risk formulary decisions being made based on an
individual contractor's business and financial incentives, rather than
the best interest of veterans. It is also a direct business conflict of
interest for a single contractor to both manage and perform the
requirement. Here, the contractor would be responsible for the overall
development/management of the formulary and delivery of all the items
listed on that formulary
The VA's proposal also would allow a single 2.0 prime vendor to
have total control over the program, without any readily discernible
checks, and it assumes that further consolidation of the MSPV program
is desirable. The Coalition believes that this approach is flawed
because it fails to recognize the is the value to competition and
having multiple prime vendors to supply VA health care facilities
world-wide. For instance, distribution is a commercial activity, with
many competent players at a regional or sub-regional level. Rather than
leverage competition among those players, VA's MSPV 2.0 vision cedes
disproportionate market power to one firm. Over time, vesting too much
authority into a single contractor is not good for government or its
supplier base because it enables the contractor to control not only the
federal market, but also federal suppliers in ways that may be
detrimental to the government and the ultimate customer, veterans. By
way of example, this disproportionate market power can affect:
VA's ability to replace a non-performing prime vendor
A supplier's ability to access VA procurement through a
single point of entry
Continual performance improvement over the life of the
contract due to competition
The ability of small/small disabled veteran businesses to
either contract with VA directly as prime contractors or successfully
participate in the prime vendor program.
VA is still in the process of creating its vision for MSPV 2.0.
Program development and implementation will likely occur over an
extended period of time. Given the millions of veterans impacted by the
program, the Coalition strongly urges VA to stabilize the current
program while it takes the time to explore future options.
We recommend that VA immediately launch a clinician led management
program office that will lead initiatives to both shore up the current
MSPV-NG program, and help build future programs. The program office
should have a clinical leader and clinical staff, mixed with
experienced medical supply chain professionals. We also recommend that
VA reinvigorate use of the VA Federal Supply Schedule contracts
(Schedules) to help stabilize the current program and streamline
procedures at the VA National Acquisition Center to support the MSPV-NG
program. In the past the VA and its prime vendors relied heavily on
Schedules to supply medical/surgical equipment and supplies. The
Schedules feature:
Established contract relationships with major suppliers;
A broad representation of small and large contractors;
Extensive choices among commercial products; and
Streamlined ordering that allows VA to leverage its
volume.
With an anticipated rise in the micro-purchase threshold, the
Schedules should become easier to use than they are now. The Coalition
has submitted to VA a number of recommendations to streamline the
Schedules contracting process and enhance the government's ability to
add new and innovative products and services. We have attached those
recommendations to this statement.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement. I will be
happy to answer questions.
Attachment 1
August 2, 2017
Mr. Greg Giddens
Modernization Lead
Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20420
Subject: Department of Veterans Affairs Modernization
Dear Mr. Giddens,
The Coalition for Government Procurement (Coalition) appreciates
the opportunity to submit comments regarding the reorganization and
modernization efforts at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
The Coalition for Government Procurement (The Coalition) is a non-
profit association of firms selling commercial services and products to
the Federal Government. Our members collectively account for more than
$145 billion dollars of the sales generated through government
contracts including the GSA Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) program, VA
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), the Government-wide Acquisition
Contracts (GWAC), and agency-specific multiple award contracts (MAC).
Coalition members include small, medium, and large business concerns
that provide more than $12 billion worth of pharmaceuticals and
medical/surgical products to support health care needs of our nation's
veterans. The Coalition is proud to have worked with Government
officials for more than 38 years towards the mutual goals of common
sense acquisition and support for our veterans.
The Coalition is submitting these comments on behalf of our members
in response to the ``Executive Order on a Comprehensive Plan for
Reorganizing the Executive Branch,'' directing agencies to enhance
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability by reorganizing and
eliminating unnecessary agencies, components, and programs. The
Coalition sincerely appreciates the opportunity to provide input
regarding opportunities to increase efficiencies in VA's acquisition
functions. If there are any questions I may be reached at (202) 331-
0975 or [email protected].
Sincerely,
Roger Waldron
President
VA Modernization Recommendations
In Fiscal Year 2016, the VA obligated more than $23.2 billion to
prime contractors-more than a third of the VA's total discretionary
budget. Contractors are essential to the VA's mission, providing
pharmaceuticals, services, and medical supplies and equipment that are
required for the care for our Nation's veterans. The VA faces numerous
challenges associated with the management of its hospitals and supply
chain. Studies, reports, and analyses have been published about these
challenges and possible solutions. Instead of duplicating this work,
the Coalition's comments solely focus on recommendations for reforming
the VA's procurement operations in order to maximize quality health
care services for veterans. The Coalition recommends:
1.Increasing Clinician Input
2.Centralizing VA Procurement Operations
3.Streamlining Unnecessary and Duplicative Regulations
4.Improving IT Systems
5.Reorganizing Pharmacy Benefits Program
6.Reforming the Role of the VA Office of the Inspector General in
Contracting
1. Increasing Clinician Input
Coalition members report that there is a lack of clinician input in
the VA procurement process. For example, for MSPV-NG, the Strategic
Acquisition Center (SAC) establishes IDIQs and BPAs based on
requirements developed in consultation with the procurement and
logistics arm of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). Clinicians
apparently provide input in some instances, though there is a lack of
transparency regarding these decisions and members are concerned that
the awards are primarily based on price, rather than best value for
veterans' health care. A lack of clinical input will lead to an
incomplete formulary, which causes supply shortages and may require
facilities to directly purchase items. Likewise, input by clinicians
into the selection of drugs and biologics for the National Formulary is
not transparent and there are impediments to drug company
representatives providing information to VA medical professionals
regarding clinical aspects of non-formulary drugs. By comparison, as
discussed below, the Department of Defense (DoD) has a process for
formulary decision-making that includes input from manufacturers and
representatives of Tricare beneficiaries and publication of the basis
for the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee recommendations.
Additionally, there is no visibility into the process for transitioning
care from DoD to the VA, including integration with DoD clinicians, to
ensure the VA is providing access to products based on their
effectiveness and appropriateness and not just low cost.
Recommendations:
Create an office (similar in function to Pharmacy
Benefits Management (PBM) and Prosthetics and Sensory Aids Service)
which is responsible for providing clinician input to the MSPV-NG
Streamline the VHA procurement bureaucracy to allow
clinicians to have more input in ordering-including, as suggested
below, streamlining and merging the acquisition functions of the VHA
and OALC.
Provide greater transparency in clinician's product
recommendations similar to the PBM
2. Centralizing VA Procurement Operations
The decentralized nature of the VA's procurement operations at the
VA headquarters level and within the Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) leads to significant inefficiencies and delays in the delivery of
health care products and services to veterans compared to the
commercial market.
VA procurement offices, like the Strategic Acquisition Center and
National Acquisition Center, report to different management offices at
VA headquarters leading to duplication, and a lack of coordination and
consistency in how health care products and services are purchased by
the VA. Currently, many VA suppliers invest in contracting with the VA
through both the Federal Supply Schedules (FSS) program and the
Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor (MSPV) program for the same products.
Consolidating the operations and leadership of these programs would
lead to greater consistency and drive process improvements that would
reduce costs for contractors. Reduced operational costs will allow for
increased health care services for veterans.
Recommendations:
Streamline and centralize the VA's acquisition
operations--move the NAC and the SAC into the same organization.
Additionally, the VA should merge the acquisition functions of the OALC
and the VHA in order to streamline the procurement process. Coalition
members remain concerned that clinician input (which comes from VHA) is
divorced from contracting decisions made by the NAC and the SAC.
Develop standard operating procedures for the MSPV-NG and
VAFSS programs with the goal of reducing acquisition lead times,
developing greater consistency in requirements and interpretations of
policies/procedures, adding new products to contract, streamlining
solicitations and awards
Increase transparency and communications by:
Improving coordination and shared internal and external
communications from the NAC and SAC
Establishing an Industry Liaison or ombudsman within each
program to respond to general questions, refer contractors to
appropriate VA resources, raise issues of concern with leadership
Establish standard processing times for the completion of
modifications
Update the Priority for Use of Government Supply Sources
to provide greater clarity to both VA purchasers and contractors
Extend VAFSS contract term to 5-year contracts with three
5-year option periods consistent with GSA Schedules to streamline
processes for government and industry
Additionally, the VA's should establish additional
national contracts with Ordering Officer Delegation (OOD). Currently,
only two national contracts have OOD; the lack of this capability
forces contracting to a local level resulting in a slow process.
3. Streamlining Unnecessary and Duplicative Regulations
The current VA regulatory environment for procurement is overly
burdensome and complex. Coalition members report that contract actions
on the VA Schedules can take as much as three times longer than
comparable actions on the GSA Schedules. While these regulations and
long delays represent a significant burden for industry (including
Veteran-Owned Small Businesses), the VA's contracting workforce must
also devote significant resources to compliance with certain regulatory
requirements. Most importantly lack of a streamlined process fails to
ensure that high quality products and services are available to
veterans as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Recommendations:
Eliminate the Price Reductions Clause (PRC). While the
Coalition has consistently advocated for the removal of the PRC from
the Schedules program, the need to remove the PRCis particularly
evident for Schedule 65 I B Drugs, Pharmaceuticals, & Hematology
Related Products, since the Veterans Health Care Act already controls
the price of covered drugs. Ultimately, the PRC's only one regulation
which is unnecessary and duplicative. The VA Regulatory Reform Officer,
in compliance with Executive Order 13777 ``Enforcing the Regulatory
Reform Agenda,'' should be given the appropriate resources,
particularly staff, to complete a thorough review to identify other
unnecessary practices to eliminate and/or reform.
Create a FSS Program Office housed within GSA which would
include VA acquisition professionals on detail. The office would ensure
the alignment of GSA and VA/MAS policies, increase productivity, and
reduce cycle time. The FSS Program Office would also be responsible for
resolving differences between the VA and GSA on key regulatory and
policy matters. The Coalition has identified several areas where the VA
and GSA have different policy interpretations including: (i)
negotiating for lowest price, considering terms and conditions, (ii)
negotiating for products versus product lines, and (iii) the approach
to resellers.
4. Improving IT Systems
There has been significant attention given to the VA's electronic
health records, but there are other IT systems which are in dire need
of updates to support a better health care system for veterans. For
example, the VA needs updates to its IT systems that handle basic
business functions such as billing, claims, payment, and contract
administration. An IT system that collects information on the VA's
supply chain utilization is also essential to identifying what the VA
is purchasing, and how improvements can be made over time. Outdated IT
systems and manual processes lead to unnecessary delays and
inefficiencies in the VA health care system.
Recommendations:
For the FSS program, leverage existing resources of the
GSA such as e-offer and e-mod, which will reduce contracting time at
the NAC. When administering the VA Schedules, the VA should focus on
health care for veterans and leave FSS administrative matters to GSA.
The VA should establish an integrated IT system to
support supply chain management. This system would be essential to
resolving issues such as late payments and product shortages and better
inform the VA about purchasing trends and behaviors.
5. Reorganizing the Pharmacy Benefits Program
DoD, in managing its pharmaceutical benefits program, permits
clinical input from industry and beneficiaries during a transparent
decision-making process that considers clinical and cost effectiveness
of products. Ultimately, decisions focus on clinical/therapeutic
attributes, as well as price. Additionally, DoD posts the basis for its
decisions on a public website. Further, a Beneficiary Advisory Panel
holds public meetings to comment on formulary recommendations before
they are finalized including the effect on patients if prescribed
medication will no longer be as accessible, for example if conditions
are imposed on their use. New drugs are considered for formulary
placement within a set time after coming on the market to ensure
products are timely reviewed and those available through military
treatment facilities are purchased. Additionally, DoD manages blanket
purchase agreements (BPA) for pharmaceutical agents on its formulary
through a class review process in order to leverage market forces.
Coalition members remain concerned about the VA's formulary process,
which less structured than in DoD. The VA's process could be
strengthened by implementing a similar process, while increasing
clinician input and improving outcomes for veterans. Finally, veterans
receiving care remotely may not be able to easily travel to a VA
facility to receive a prescription. Integrating retail pharmacies would
resolve this issue and provide a better outcome for veterans.
Recommendations:
The VA should modify their formulary process by creating
an effective, efficient, and integrated pharmacy benefits program
modeled after the DoD program (see 31 CFR 199.21).
Additionally, the VA should allow for manufacturer input and engage in
frequent and effective communication with industry-for example DoD
allows for manufacturer input in the decision- making process, will
post the minutes from its meetings on their website, and has defined
decision-making criteria.
Another important aspect of DoD's process for procuring
pharmaceuticals is that they will compete BPAs for agents that are
added to the formulary, thereby taking advantage of volume discounts
and market forces. The VA should adopt this model and issue a class
deviation on the Multiple Award Schedule ordering procedures in
FAR8.405-3 to streamline the process for creating single award BPAs for
pharmaceutical agents on the formulary. The Coalition raised this issue
in 2011 when the MAS ordering procedures were proposed, and we believe
that the VAwould benefit from revisiting it.
New drugs should be reviewed for addition to the
formulary within six months after they are available commercially.
Veterans receiving care remotely should not have to
obtain their initial prescriptions from a VA facility, which could be
many miles away, or through mail order, which could take two weeks.
Allowing retail pharmacies to dispense initial prescriptions of 30-days
while requiring refills of maintenance drugs through mail order.
VAshould implement a process that complies with Veterans Choice and
ensures immediate access to needed medication without overburdening the
beneficiary.
6. Reforming the Role of the VA Office of the Inspector General in
Contracting
The VAOIGplays a crucial role in detecting waste, fraud, abuse
within the VA and is essential to protecting the interests of veterans
in the VA's care. However, the OIG's role in contracting is overly
expansive, which, ultimately, leads to significant delays. Veterans may
wait months in order to receive innovative products and
pharmaceuticals. This is particularly true in the case of mandatory
pre-award audits, which often must be repeated. GSA, which administers
the Schedules program, does not require pre-award audits.
Recommendations:
Eliminate the OIG's pre-award and post-award audit
functions for the VAFederal Supply Schedules (FSS). The administrative
and pricing review functions can be completed by the contracting
officer. The OIG should focus its efforts on investigating cases of
suspected fraud related to the VAsupply chain. Additionally, this would
eliminate any potential conflicts of interest.
Transfer pricing support staff to the National
Acquisition Center (NAC). Members report that contract award and
modification times at the NACare at an all-time high-preventing
veterans from accessing new and innovative products and discouraging
veteran-owned companies from participating in the FSS. Transferring
these staff to the NACand removing the OIG's audits function will
significantly speed up the process
Attachment 2
The Core Issue: VHA needs a Clinically Led and Managed VHA Program
Office
Background:
Medical devices are highly regulated and frequently very
complex devices, which lead to specific medical outcomes in the hands
of the surgeon or clinicians and often have variations in cost of use.
Commercial hospital systems recognize these complexities, and create
oversight organizations that are permanently staffed with individuals
with both clinical and medical supply chain expertise to evaluate
medical devices and make product decisions that result in optimal
outcomes and best value for their patients and clinicians across their
hospital system
Industry supports and encourages VHA to follow the
commercial models which represents 98-99% of the US market vs 1-2% for
VHA, and make enterprise level decisions through their Program Office
for medical devices to improve efficiencies for both VA and industry,
however the overwhelming concern of the medical device industry as well
as VAMCs is that the VHA Program Office is neither clinically led nor
staffed with experienced medical supply professionals. It is roughly
the equivalent of trying to fly an airplane with individuals who are
not pilots
Problems that the current VHA Program Office creates:
The absence of relevant expertise to lead the program has
led to many challenging issues:
The NG-MSPV program was created without proper leadership
from VHA, and instead was created by individuals unfamiliar with
medical devices. It has been recognized as a total failure and costly
to VA. Examples include:
Naive to sheer size and effort of task: VHA did not
recognize the level of complexity and the challenge of competing
requirements for a med-surg PV catalog. A process that a commercial
organization (like the GPO Premier) with all the key experienced
clinical staff in place, would take four years to execute, was
approached by VHA to complete in only a few months
Poor procurement strategy by VHA: VHA Program Office was
unfamiliar with established medical product categories, and elected to
compete individual line items rather than recognized product category
suites, resulting in significant product suite gaps and confusing
product mixes that did not meet the needs of VHA clinicians. When VHA
later attempted to create product categories, they developed ones that
were hospital departments (Exam Rooms, OR Supplies, Central Supplies,
etc) rather than product categories industry would recognize and
respond to
Unrealistic goal to restrict medical products to only
highest volume products: VHA decided to severely restrict the number of
lines on formulary that did not adequately support clinical care,
eliminating critical product sizes needed by clinicians
Low price approach: VA used a single award based on
lowest price for most of the MSPV awards, resulting in products that
were not acceptable to clinical users and also awards that did not take
into consideration other factors such as:
Award for medical disposables that were lowest price but
did not function with existing medical equipment at VAMCs
Award for medical disposables that did not factor that
VAMCs would incur additional costs as other disposable products would
need to be used with the awarded product, resulting in higher cost in
use for VA
Award for medical product that did not factor total costs
to VAMCs, such as construction costs for the change
Lack basic understanding of medical supply chain: VHA was
unaware of very basic medical supply chain structure that while many
medical products are available through med-surg distributors, there is
a significant number of medical devices that are only available direct
from manufacturers, which led to VA SAC spending significant
contracting time, dollars, and effort to create solicitations for the
direct only products that manufacturers would not respond to as it was
inconsistent with the commercial model. VA also created unrealistic
goals for procurement through MSPV based on this lack of knowledge that
VAMCs could never meet
Confused by medical products: Many solicitations were
posted that reflected that medical products confuse VHA, such as an ENT
catheters posted in a Urology Supply solicitation.
Negative Impact to VA and Industry
VHA clinician satisfaction: Clinicians at VAMCs are very
unhappy with current product availability and access, as it impacts the
ability to perform medical procedures, often resulting in
cancellations, and also consumes valuable VHA nursing time trying to
find and source products. This impacts veteran access and satisfaction
with VA Medical Centers, and physician/nurse retention
VAMCs opinion of the VHA Program Office and their
decisions is very low: VAMCs are very aware and vocal that the VHA
Program Office lacks the clinical and medical supply chain experience,
which they view as being less than exists at their own VAMCs, and
consequently ignore many of the decisions from Program Office as it
fails to meet their needs
Purchase card use: VAMCs are using government purchase
cards at an increasing rate as needed products are no longer available
from the MSPV, increasing costs but also increasing the very real risk
of gray market and/or counterfeit medical device purchases outside of
the secure medical supply chain (MSPV), and ongoing problem for VHA for
a number of years
Industry opinion of VHA: Industry is experiencing ``bid
fatigue'', and has occurred significant costs in trying to respond to
solicitations that are poorly developed and then cancelled. Industry
extremely concerned about lack of resolve from VHA leadership to
correct and lead the program
The Solution
Create an Effective VHA Program Office: An effective VHA
Program Office would be staffed in similar fashion to other federal
agencies that manage medical products: have a clinical leader and
clinical staff, mixed with experienced medical supply chain
professionals, and preferably all these individuals would have
experience working within the VA system and have knowledge of the
unique processes. Models to replicate would be DHA MedLog, which is the
med-surg equivalent for DoD and is led by a critical care nurse, and
staffed with seasoned medical logisticians and nurses who have actually
worked in Military Treatment Facilities. The VA PBM is a good VA
example of what a program office should look like, led by a pharmacist
and staffed with clinicians who have experience working in VAMCs.
Common elements of a good federal medical program office:
Leader is a clinician (RN, pharmacist, or MD) who has
also worked in a VA/DoD medical center and familiar with VA/DoD medical
supply chains
Staffed full-time with other clinicians and medical
supply chain professionals (logisticians), who have also worked in a
VA/DoD medical center
VHA needs to create career paths for medical supply
professionals to insure VHA has a bench of qualified individuals to
work at the national Program Office level, similar to how DoD develops
medical supply professionals
Attachment 3
August 8, 2017
Phil Christy
Acting Executive Director, Office of
Acquisition Operations
Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Ave NW
Washington, DC 20420
Subject: Solicitation for MSPV- Next Generation
Dear Mr. Christy,
The Coalition for Government Procurement appreciates the Strategic
Acquisition Center (SAC) publication of draft solicitations for the
Next Generation Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor (MPSV) program and the
opportunity for industry to provide feedback in response. We would like
to submit the following comments on the MSPV solicitations on behalf of
our member companies.
The Coalition for Government Procurement (The Coalition) is a non-
profit association of firms selling commercial services and products to
the Federal Government. Our members collectively account for more than
$145 billion dollars of the sales generated through government
contracts including the GSA Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) program, VA
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), the Government-wide Acquisition
Contracts (GWAC), and agency-specific multiple award contracts (MAC).
Coalition members include small, medium, and large business concerns
that provide more than $12 billion worth of pharmaceuticals and
medical/surgical products to support health care needs of our nation's
warfighter and veterans. The Coalition is proud to have worked with
Government officials for more than 38 years towards the mutual goals of
common sense acquisition and support for our veterans.
Based on our member companies extensive experience with medical
device supply chains in both the government and commercial sectors, and
also consistent with feedback member companies have heard from VA
Medical Centers, many believe the current MSPV-NG program formulary is
being driven through a process that may actually result in
significantly less use of the MSPV. Rather than the VA developing a
program designed to meet the clinical end-users needs which creates
efficiencies and reduces VA system costs, the NG-MSPV program is being
driven by government contracting goals that do not reflect the reality
of effectively managing medical devices. Our concerns include the
following:
Lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source
selection
A lack of consistent and effective clinician input
Risks associated with grey market items
We appreciate your attention to these matters impacting the
efficiency and effectiveness of the medical and surgical supply chain
and the quality of health care for veterans.
Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Source Selection
The MSPV program seeks to deliver a national strategic sourcing
solution that combines a formulary approach with electronic cataloging
and ordering to support the Veterans Administration Medical Centers.
The program relies on four Prime Vendor Contracts and supporting
Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts with
suppliers. Additionally, Section E.14 of the Request for Proposals
(RFP) notes that the contract award for the IDIQ's will be determined
in accordance with FAR 15.101-2, LPTA Source Selection Process. LPTA
source selection procedures are being used in the RFP's for Patient
Care Products, Urology, Respiratory Products, Medical Imaging Products,
and many other hospital department level groupings.
Given the nature of these procurements, a LPTA source selection
raises significant concerns. LPTA source selections are most effective
in situations where unsuccessful contractor performance is minimal and
where there is little value or need to pay for higher performance.
Those criteria are not met in this situation. The SAC is procuring
products that will be used in the care and treatment of our Nation's
veterans-these are situations where the quality of the products is
integral to the health care outcomes for our veterans. As such, an LPTA
source selection is inappropriate. Further, products within these
categories may be complex devices with unique features that
differentiate them from a clinical perspective, or that reduce overall
cost of care, making comparative clinical and cost effectiveness a more
appropriate standard.
Section E.14 of the RFP's for Patient Care Products, Urology,
Respiratory Products, and Medical Imaging Products also directs
offerors to provide tiered pricing information based on unit volume.
Additionally, offerors may be subject to a Unit of Measure adjustment
(calculated at 4.4%) based on the Unit of Issue. This pricing approach
ignores commercial practices where vendors usually sell products as
packages or cases, rather than individual units.
We recommend that the VA reconsider its use of LPTA selection
criteria for these and future MSPV solicitations, and instead focus on
a program that is based on best value decisions with clinician input.
Clinician Input in the MSPV
Coalition members remain concerned about the level of clinician
input in the MSPV program. There have been several issues which seem to
be contract-driven, rather than clinician-driven.
The practice of awarding by line item rather than the standard
commercial practice of awarding contracts by a coordinated suite of
products 1) leads to inefficiencies with VA and industry contracting,
2) challenges industry with the basic recognition of the solicitations
as individual product codes are buried in unfamiliar groupings, and
most important, 3) concerns for the practice of medical care by end-
users. Awarding different medical products within a suite of products
may require additional training for VA medical staff for each product
code to ensure appropriate use, increasing time on already stressed
medical staff and potentially increasing safety risks by increasing
variation. Robust clinical oversight during the requirements
development would correct this issue and be aligned with the best
practice of contracting by a coordinated suite of products.
Many products that are proprietary were posted under the Brand Name
or Equal solicitations, even though there are no equivalents. These
will include a number of products that are disposable components for
capital equipment located at VAMCs, and using other disposables will
typically not work with that equipment, may invalidate the equipment
warrantee, or could cause patient harm. We believe that these items, if
there was robust clinical input, would have been place in the Brand
Name Only designation.
Additionally, products are being placed under improper categories.
For example, a Coalition member identified an ear, nose, and throat
product was posted under the urology category. Although this issue has
been rectified, the Coalition remains concerned that the products and
categories of the contract are not properly aligned. Duplicate product
codes are also being uncovered in totally different solicitations
(example: same product code listed in Medical Imaging and also in OR
Supplies). This would be resolved if contracted by coordinated suites
and product categories, rather than line item by hospital department.
We recommend that the SAC immediately incorporate clinician input
into their contracting process, including individuals with robust
medical supply chain experience. A model that the SAC could emulate is
the Department of Defense (DoD) pharmaceutical formulary process (see
31 CFR 199.21). The DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee
assures that the selection of agents for the formulary is based on
broadly representative professional expertise concerning clinical and
cost effectiveness of products within the pharmaceutical agent class.
The Committee's decisions and minutes are posted publicly, and industry
is given the chance to provide their input and feedback to the
Committee. This process ensures sufficient clinical input for the DoD
formulary in assessing clinical differentiators and cost tradeoffs as
well as identifying errors in category assignments. There should be a
permanent organization in the VA responsible for ensuring clinician
input, which is crucial to the MSPV's success.
Grey Market Items
The Coalition supports the SAC's efforts to prohibit grey market
items from being sold through the MSPV-NG via unauthorized resellers.
The MSPV solicitations include a definition of grey market goods that
we recommend be modified consistent with commercial practice. Section B
of the solicitation defines a grey market good as, ``genuine branded
goods sold outside of an authorized sales-territory (or by non-
authorized dealers in an authorized territory) at prices lower than
being charged in authorized sales territories [emphasis added] (or by
authorized dealers).'' Instead, we recommend the following:
The Contractor shall provide only new equipment and new parts for
the required products described herein. ABSOLUTELY NO ``GREY MARKET
GOODS'' shall be provided under any Delivery Order. Grey Market Goods
are defined as genuine branded goods sold outside of the manufacturer's
authorized. Grey market goods purchased from unauthorized sources have
left the authorized supply chain and may not be stored in conditions
that meet the manufacturer's specifications, and medical devices could
be counterfeit or adulterated which pose a threat to patient safety.
Grey market items will typically invalidate a manufacturer's warranty.
All Equipment must be covered by the manufacturer's warranty.
We recommend that the ``grey market good'' definition be modified
to remove the reference to price and to provide some rationale as to
why grey market items are prohibited for delivery orders. Grey market
items may have a lower price or a higher price than the price of items
sold within the authorized medical supply chain. Unauthorized resellers
could purchase the product from an authorized distributor and then
resell to the government at a higher price. The price of an item does
not relate to whether it is a grey market good or not. The revised
``grey market goods'' definition above also emphasizes the risk to
patient safety of purchasing outside of an authorized distributor
network and potential invalidation of the manufacturer's warranty.
In summary, the Coalition recommends that the SAC:
1)Reconsider use of LPTA source selection criteria for the MPSV
RFP's. Instead we recommend a program based on best value decisions and
clinician input.
2)Incorporate more clinician review into the MSPV RFP's. The
Coalition has identified several aspects of the RFP's including the
unit of measure adjustment and the groups that may not be supported by
clinicians.
3)Host a meeting between the SAC, VHA, and industry, so that
stakeholders can discuss the process for clinician input and identify
solutions.
4)Create a permanent office that is responsible for delivering
clinician input. This process could be modeled on DoD's pharmaceutical
formulary process.
5)Revise the definition of grey market items as proposed.
Thank you for considering the Coalition's comments concerning the
Next Generation MSPV. If there are any questions, please contact me at
(202) 331-0975 or [email protected].
Sincerely,
Roger Waldron
President
Attachment 4
November 9, 2017
Brian C. Love
Contracting Officer, MSPV 2.0
Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC)
Department of Veterans Affairs
10300 Spotsylvania Ave, Suite 400
Fredericksburg, VA 22408
Dear Mr. Love,
The Coalition for Government Procurement appreciates the
opportunity to respond to the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA)
October 19, 2017, Request for Information and Statement of Objectives
(SOO) seeking information about the capability, capacity, and viability
of US businesses that provide product supply chain end-to-end
management. VA is considering options for the next iteration of its
current Prime Vendor program for medical surgical supplies and
equipment.
The Coalition for Government Procurement (The Coalition) is a non-
profit association of firms selling commercial services and products to
the Federal Government. Our members collectively account for more than
$145 billion dollars of the sales generated through government
contracts including the GSA Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) program, VA
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), the Government-wide Acquisition
Contracts (GWAC), and agency-specific multiple award contracts (MAC).
Coalition members include small, medium, and large business concerns
that provide more than $12 billion worth of pharmaceuticals and
medical/surgical products to support health care needs of our nation's
warfighters and veterans. The Coalition is proud to have worked with
Government officials for more than 38 years towards the mutual goals of
common sense acquisition and support for our veterans.
VA would like to improve the quality, effectiveness and efficiency
of its medical/surgical prime vendor program by using best commercial
practices and technology. To achieve these objectives, the Department
is examining the possibility of a single contractor that would provide
VA worldwide, a turn- key solution, for a one-stop-shop acquisition
platform for medical supplies, equipment, and related products. As we
read the notice, VA is anticipating that the potential contractor
would:
A.Determine what the agency would buy
i.''.be responsible for developing a medical surgical supply and
equipment formulary for each facility in VA .''
B.Acquire the items
i.''.provide strategic sourcing...''
C.Manage and distribute the items
i.'' .life cycle management, distribution, inventory management.''
D.Administer contracts and assure quality control
i.''.analysis services, quality control/quality assurance support
services, warranty management services, and
E.Provide for electronic ordering, invoicing, and real-time status.
These services would be provided using an e-commerce platform that
incorporates best business practices.
Coalition members support VA's objectives related to aligning the
acquisition of medical/surgical products more with commercial best
practices and increased efficiency. Before, however, we can
realistically assess MSPV 2.0, there are a number of important
questions that VA must address. Those questions are set forth below.
Without answers to these questions, Coalition members are concerned
that VA's vision could negatively impact the ability of government
suppliers to adequately respond to the health care needs of veterans.
The Coalition values opportunities for continued discussion with VA on
these questions.
1. Is the MSPV 2.0 vision based on a viable commercial model?
Despite the expansive involvement of our member companies in the
market for commercial items, our members question whether there is an
existing commercial provider that can deliver the extensive scope of
services described in the FBO notice for medical supplies and
equipment.
VA's current prime vendor program supports more than 9 million
veterans. An initiative that moves to a new, commercially untested e-
commerce platform should be undertaken only in increments, after a
series of periodic evaluations, over a period to time. To do otherwise
risks failing the health care needs of veterans.
Prior to launching MSPV 2.0, the Coalition recommends that the SAC:
a.Identify through what channels the medical and surgical products
considered for the program are purchased in the commercial market
(recognizing that they are bought through different pathways, not just
one)
b.Align the VA's purchasing strategy with these commercial
practices
c.Coordinate with the program offices that are already contracting
for these products, ensuring that there is no duplication of effort
We also recommend that the VA consider following the VHA's
pharmacy/prosthetics/logistics working group as a model, which
determines the responsibility and management for specific products. A
MSPV/equipment/direct working group could be established to coordinate
the efforts between the responsible program offices.
2. Does the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) have a clinically led
and managed program office that will determine which products will
be acquired through MSPV 2.0?
Coalition members note particularly that there is a lack of
clinician involvement in determining what products are included on the
current MSPV-NG formulary and how such products are sourced. To date,
VHA has not taken responsibility for its medical supply chain by
establishing a clinician led and managed MSPV program office. Under the
proposed model, how would the VA ensure that the prime vendor has the
appropriate clinical staff to make formulary decisions that prioritize
patient outcomes? How would the VA ensure that formulary items are NOT
being selected by business people based on business decisions?
The Coalition is concerned that under the current proposal,
financial incentives rather than a focus on patient outcomes will drive
the program. There is also concern that without the program being led
and managed by clinicians at VHA, many of the same challenges with the
current MSPV program will continue into the next iteration.
3. Should ``medical equipment'' items be excluded from the
formulary given that, commercially, they are sold direct from
manufacturers and not through distributors?
VA mentions that medical equipment items will be included in the
Formulary. These types of products are typically purchased direct from
manufacturers and not sold through distributors in the commercial
market. Many equipment items such as Ventilators have various software
options and accessories that are purchased with the equipment in a
customized manner. Meaning that each particular end user customer could
ask for a unique configuration of software options and accessory items.
In addition, the VA has a Non-Expendable Medical Equipment program that
would seem to conflict with including equipment items in a MSPV
formulary.
4. Are some of the functions contemplated for the contract,
inherently governmental?
The United States has been the long-standing policy that inherently
governmental functions shall not be performed by a contractor. FAR 7.5
lists examples of functions that have been considered as inherently
governmental. Those examples include processes that VA appears to
contemplate contracting out, specifically:
Determining what supplies or services are to be acquired
by the Government
Approving any contractual documents, to include documents
defining requirements, incentive plans, and evaluation criteria
Awarding contracts
Administering contracts
Determining whether contract costs are reasonable,
allocable, and allowable
VA should examine its proposal and statement of objectives to
assure that it will not outsource inherently government functions to a
contractor.
5. Does the VA proposal establish an organizational conflict of
interest that cannot be mitigated?
FAR 9.502 states that ``[a]n organizational conflict of interest
may result when factors create an actual or potential conflict of
interest on an instant contract, or when the nature of the work to be
performed on the instant contract creates an actual or potential
conflict of interest on a future acquisition'.
The vision for MSPV 2.0 assigns one entity responsibility for
decisions on what to buy, how to buy and contract administration. As
described, the entity has total control over the system without any
readily discernible checks. What prevents for example, a contractor
from selecting products for formulary based on its commercial
relationships?
The MSPV 2.0 approach presumes that further consolidation of the
MSPV program is desirable. There is some thought that this approach is
flawed. There is value to competition. Distribution is a commercial
activity and there are many competent players at a regional or sub-
regional level. Rather than leverage that competition, VA's MSPV 2.0
vision cedes disproportionate market power to one firm. If that
contractor has difficulty performing, it would be very difficult to
terminate and bring in a new provider. Fewer choices is not in the
interest of the VA facilities.
Over time, vesting too much authority into a single contractor is
not good for government or its supplier base. The downside of
consolidating that much authority into one entity is that it enables
the contractor to control not only the federal market, but also to
leverage federal suppliers in ways that may be detrimental. Will
bargaining power between the suppliers and prime vendor be so distorted
that the prime vendor will be able to influence not only federal but
commercial business? For example, will the supplier fees be consistent
with the 3% rate in the commercial market for medical devices?
6. Will MSPV 2.0 address compliance with underlying procurement
policy?
The SOO does not offer guidance as to how fundamental procurement
policies will be addressed. For example, must suppliers comply with the
requirements of the Trade Agreement and Buy American Acts and who will
determine compliance? Must prices be determined fair and reasonable and
if so who will do so - VA or the Prime vendor? Will the small business
``Rule of Two'' be adequately considered?
Would it be the PV's responsibility to comply and how would they do
so?
7. How will disputes between suppliers and the prime vendor be
resolved?
Our members are concerned that conflict of interest concerns may
drive disputes with the prime vendor both in selecting items for
formulary and handling future orders. Will a supplier have any ability
to challenge these issues or others arising in the acquisition process?
Is the agreement between the supplier and prime vendor a federal or
a commercial contract? Does VA envision such matters to be totally
between the commercial parties or will the Government have a role?
8. Does the e-commerce platform adequately protect government and
contractor data?
The draft SOO includes a requirement for a metrics dashboard and
the ability to provide analytics to assess performance, supply chain
costs, and forecast market expectations. Who would own the data
generated in the electronic system? Will the prime vendor be required
to provide sales tracings to suppliers consistent with commercial
practices for medical devices? How will this data be protected?
Is the contractor able to also sell product through the program?
Can they use/access this data to gain an unfair advantage in the
government or commercial marketplace?
9. Is a ``requirements'' type contract appropriate in this instance?
The SOO (section 5.2.1) states the government intends to issue a
single requirements contract using FAR parts 15 and 16. A requirements
contract would obligate VA to filling all actual purchase requirements
of the government during a specified contract period from one
contractor. VA estimates that there will be 86.4 million patient care
events in 2018. Given the broad scope of potential users of this
acquisition platform, it would seem very difficult for VA to adequately
police it users to ensure all orders go to the contractor. ``Leakage''
from the contract could result in significant liability to the
government.
10. Has VA considered the impact of its cost objectives on innovation?
A significant objective for the MSPV 2.0 is cost savings. How will
cost savings be measured - lowest price or best value (medical
outcomes, supply chain efficiencies, etc.)? Will the contractor or
government be responsible for measuring such savings?
There is a potential for the contractor to limit innovation because
the innovative product may be more expensive than current technology.
Without sufficient clinician input, what incentive does a contractor
have to offer more expensive new technology?
11. What does the goal of a 95% usage rate for the ``one-stop-
shop'' acquisition of consumable medical and related commodities
described in 5.1.1 mean?
VA has a goal for 95% of medical disposables to come through MSPV
program. This goal may be unrealistic depending on what medical
products are considered within scope, as a significant portion of these
products are available commercially only directly from manufacturers.
It is unlikely that those manufacturers are going to change their
commercial models for a customer that only represents 1-2% of US sales.
12. Would the VA consider establishing separate contracts for direct
only products?
Again, the draft SOO states that there would be a 95% usage goal
for the acquisition of consumable medical and related commodities. Much
of this industry is direct only. It is not cost effective or efficient
to stock them through distributors. VA should follow commercial model
of establishing separate contracts. VA could use an Electronic Medical
Catalogue (ECAT) like that used by the Department of Defense to
facilitate ordering.
13. What will be the drop shipping policy under MSVP 2.0?
Will VA align more with the commercial market and establish
contracts with manufacturers for direct- only products.
14. Will prosthetics be excluded from MSPV 2.0?
The variety of products and nature of procedures does not translate
to MSPV purchase or delivery infrastructure. Although most cases are
templated prior to surgery, the case often requires a change on the
spot. As such, multiple sizes and types are made available to the
surgeon during each case. This flexibility cannot be achieved by
warehousing implants and having a single size/type delivered to the
hospital on the date of surgery.
15. The VA SAC would like access to the latest technologies under the
formulary. What will the process be to add new products?
Again, more clarification is needed as to how formulary decisions
will be made. Members report challenges with the process to add new
products under the existing MSPV-NG. What criteria will be used by
clinicians to determine which products to add to ensure that veterans
have access to the latest technologies?
16. The draft SOO proposes a Period of Performance that could extend 12
to 15 years. What is the rationale for this timeframe?
A performance period of 12 to 15 years far exceeds FAR limitations.
Under FAR 17.204(e) the total period of base plus options ``shall not
exceed 5 years'' in the case of services. For supplies, the base plus
option quantities shall not exceed 5 years. These limitations do not
apply to IT contracts. However, other statutes may further limit the
contract term.
The performance period for the Pharmacy Prime Vendor contract is 8
years. Members would like to better understand the SAC's rationale for
a potential performance period of 12 to 15 years for MSPV 2.0.
17. Would the VA further explain Performance Objective 5.1.6, which
states, ``Allow maximum physician choice in consumable medical
commodities, consistent with patient safety and enterprise-wide
interoperability and standardization goals, used while maximizing
cost saving possibilities?''
Based on this statement, it appears that the VA program office and/
or contracting personnel may view many technical medical devices as
being commodities without recognizing the differences in brands that
can impact patient outcomes. In addition, allowing maximum physician
choice and having standardization goals appear to be two completely
different initiatives. Further clarification on these points would be
helpful.
18. What are the implications of section 6.4 of the SOO that
states, ``Only FDA approved Medical/surgical supplies that are
compliant with Global Standard 1 (GS1), Health Industry Business
Communications Council (HIBCC), and/or International Society for Blood
Transfusion (ISBT) 28 standards will be available to VHA facilities
through the MSPV program?''
It is unclear whether the VA intends to exclude products from the
formulary that do not meet these criteria/standards.
Again, the Coalition for Government Procurement sincerely
appreciates the SAC's efforts to collect industry's input on the
proposed next generation of the Prime Vendor program. We support better
aligning the program with commercial best practices and ensuring that
it is led and managed by clinicians at the Veterans Health
Administration. Significant progress in achieving both objectives will
result in more efficiencies and cost savings in the delivery of best
value medical and surgical supplies to VA facilities worldwide.
Thank you for considering industry's input in designing MSPV 2.0.
We look forward to working with the VA as it continues to explore
options for building the next iteration of the Prime Vendor program.
Sincerely,
Roger Waldron
President
Statements For The Record
ADVAMED
AdvaMed is the leading trade association representing medical
technology manufacturers and suppliers that operate in the United
States. Our members range from the largest to the smallest medical
technology innovators and companies. Collectively, we are committed to
ensuring patient access to life-saving and life-enhancing devices and
other advanced medical technologies.
The sacrifice our nation's veterans and their families make on our
behalf cannot be understated. We all have an obligation to ensure they
receive the highest quality care and have access to the best medical
technology available. In particular, AdvaMed and its member companies
believe strongly in our collective relationship with the U.S.
Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) and share the Department's goal of
providing our veterans with the highest quality health care possible.
There are approximately 8 million U.S. veterans of the armed
services accessing the VA health care system, with another nearly 2.3
million currently serving in the military on active duty that may do so
in the future. These Americans can experience unique health care
challenges, both in terms of battlefield injuries and the after-effects
of their time spent in service. Through earlier diagnosis and
intervention, less invasive procedures and more effective treatments,
medical technology is revolutionizing health care across the continuum
of service and enhancing the lives of America's troops in the field and
beyond. Technologies include: spinal cord stimulation; joint/limb
replacements; wound care products; neurological devices; cardiac
technologies; and many others. Through these technologies, our
companies can help provide the standard of care reflective of the
respect and commitment we owe to our nation's veterans.
However, recent changes in the VA's procurement of these critical
medical technologies have created new barriers within the veteran
health care system. The transition from the VA's National Acquisition
Center (NAC) procurement process to a new national procurement system
for medical devices through the Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC),
along with the pre-authorization for certain surgical implants, has
resulted in significant inefficiencies in veterans obtaining access to
care, a reduction in the quality of health care accessible to veterans,
and risks pushing high caliber providers and suppliers of innovative
products out of the VA system.
We believe that the VA's effort to reduce catalog items from
475,000 items is appropriate. However, the lack of clinicians in all
aspects of this reform and the award process is problematic because it
threatens the quality of patients care and also restricts the VA's
ability to retain and recruit high quality health care providers. The
benefit of providing choice with complex medical-surgical products will
improve outcomes. Many VA physicians and providers also practice at the
107 affiliated academic health systems and/or the private sector.
Clinicians should have access to a responsible number of highly
technical tools available to them at a teaching hospital/private
facility in the morning as well as at the VA facility down the street
in the afternoon. More broadly, the product catalog should be
determined according to a thoughtful and detailed process and not
simply reduced to meet a ``savings'' goal independent of any patient
outcome consideration.
While the VA has engaged with industry to break down these barriers
as they arise, the approaches taken do not consistently result in
positive outcomes or solutions. Concerns remain, including:
The absence of a dedicated, clinically-led and -managed
program office for device procurement at the VA has resulted in a
significant void in clinical understanding in the contracting process.
This gap in expertise means decisions are made without a basic
understanding of the medical supply chain and often on a bottom-dollar
basis without thoughtful consideration of provider and patient need.
The Next Generation - Medical Surgery Prime Vendor (NG-
MSPV) distribution program has reduced access to the vast majority of
medical products currently available while also adding additional costs
to the system.
The overall experience with the migration to this new
system is confusing, burdensome and inconsistent with historical
contract management practices and efficient medical care.
The VA is assigning contracts and making procurement
decisions based solely on price rather than measuring value as defined
by patient outcomes. There is also little to no clinician input.
The pre-authorization process for certain technologies
(such as surgical implants like stents, total joints, spine implants,
pacemakers, and others) is increasing the backlog and amount of unpaid
purchase orders, creating challenges for vendors who are trying to
support VA health care. More critically, these payment delays have
impacted veteran access to care, with delayed procedures and inadequate
supplies.
The NG-MSPV program lacks a mechanism for the timely
consideration and addition of new technologies to the program.
The overarching concern is that, collectively, these problems have
restricted veterans' timely access to critical technologies and quality
care, as well as impacted the ability of the VA to attract and retain
medical professionals. The Commission on Care, established under the
Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, raised many of
these same concerns in its July 2016 report. In particular, the
Commission noted that the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA's)
supply chain for clinical supplies, medical devices, and related
services is:
``inadequate compared to.best practices in leading hospital
systems. Its contracting processes are bureaucratic and slow, which can
delay veterans' access to care. Purchasing processes are cumbersome,
which has driven VHA staff to work arounds.''
The recently released Statement of Objectives (SOO) for MSPV
version 2.0 appears to outsource the management of the program to a
single commercial contractor and shifts significant responsibility from
the VA to this contractor. While we applaud the VA for seeking to
increase commercial practices, we question whether there is a
commercial entity that has the extensive medical background to perform
the expansive responsibilities, including: determining what items would
be on the formulary; administering the contracts between it and the
manufacturers; managing the procurement process; and distributing the
actual medical supplies. It is unclear if such a model exists or who
can provide such a service.
Our companies strongly encourage the VHA to follow best practice
commercial models and make enterprise level decisions through a program
office for medical devices, which will improve efficiencies for both
the VA and industry. The overwhelming concern of the medical device
industry as well as the VA medical centers is that the VHA Program
Office is neither clinically led nor staffed with experienced medical
supply professionals. It is roughly the equivalent of trying to fly an
airplane with individuals who are not pilots.
An effective VHA Program Office would be staffed in similar fashion
to other federal agencies that manage medical products: have a clinical
leader and clinical staff, mixed with experienced medical supply chain
professionals, and preferably all these individuals would have
experience working within the VA system and have knowledge of the
unique processes. Models to replicate would be the Defense Health
Agency (DHA)'s Medical Logistics (MedLog) division, which is the
equivalent operation for the Defense Department. DHA MedLog is led by a
critical care nurse, and staffed with seasoned medical logisticians and
nurses who have actually worked in military treatment facilities.
Within the VA, the VA pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) is a good example
of what a program office should look like, led by a pharmacist and
staffed with clinicians who have experience working in the VHA system.
Meanwhile, delays in resolving purchase orders and eliminating
payment backlogs also continue to impact our industry's ability to
serve the VHA and our veterans. For current backlogs, the recent move
by the VA to initiate a ratification clean-up process provided some
relief, but problems persist and a precise schedule for completing work
to resolve these issues is needed. More importantly, the VA has yet to
issue any guidance to address future concerns or otherwise demonstrate
how the Department will prevent these problems from developing again.
Without a real prompt pay requirement, such as 30 days from date of
procedure, purchase order issues will continue to persist.
We welcome today's hearing as another opportunity to understand on
how the VA, Congress, and industry can take a solutions-oriented
approach to these issues and work together on the most effective
resolution. We support efforts to ensure the VA, Congress, and industry
to work together to review and seek ways to better implement processes
and to ensure that all procurement policies evaluate technologies based
on the value to patients. Ultimately, the most important measure of the
success of the VA's new procurement policies is whether the veterans
that they serve are getting access to the best medical care in a cost-
effective manner.
Again, we are grateful for the Committee's leadership on this issue
and appreciate the work of Reps. Banks and Peters in particular. Thank
you for holding this hearing and we look forward to continuing to work
with Congress and the VA to provide access to high-quality, cost
effective medical technology that meets the needs of our nation's
veterans.
Material Submitted For The Record
GAO Power Point Chart
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