[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2018
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
31-388 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma Cochairman
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
STEVE DAINES, Montana RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TED LIEU, California
GARY PETERS, Michigan
ANGUS KING, Maine
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, To Be Appointed
Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
Elyse B. Anderson, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Statement From the Chairs.................................... 1
Introduction................................................. 3
Overview..................................................... 7
Recommendations to Congress and the Administration........... 13
Political Prisoner Cases of Concern.......................... 19
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 22
Specific Findings and Recommendations........................ 25
II. Human Rights................................................. 66
Freedom of Expression........................................ 66
Worker Rights................................................ 86
Criminal Justice............................................. 101
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 121
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 137
Population Control........................................... 143
Special Topic: Forced Evictions in Beijing Municipality...... 158
Status of Women.............................................. 169
Human Trafficking............................................ 178
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 191
Public Health................................................ 197
The Environment.............................................. 205
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 214
Civil Society................................................ 214
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 225
Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights...................... 244
Access to Justice............................................ 260
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 273
V. Tibet......................................................... 292
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 308
I. Executive Summary
Statement From the Chairs
When the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Commission) was established in 2000, the prevailing wisdom
underpinning U.S.-China relations maintained that increased
trade and economic interconnectivity, as well as diplomacy and
robust cultural exchange, would lead to greater openness and
political liberalization within China.
In the years that followed, the Chinese economy grew
dramatically, while the Chinese Communist Party became even
more deeply entrenched in the political power structure and
deeply committed to preserving its monopoly on power through
state-sponsored repression, surveillance, and indoctrination.
In the aftermath of the violent suppression of the 1989
Tiananmen protests and the fall of the Berlin Wall later that
same year, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping articulated a
foreign policy strategy in which China would not try to assume
a leadership role in international affairs, but rather ``hide
its capabilities and bide its time'' (taoguang yanghui). Now,
under the leadership of current Chinese President and Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping, however, we see an ascendant and
increasingly aggressive China, seeking to take center stage in
the world, and in so doing, determined to shape new global
norms on development, trade, the internet, and even human
rights. All the while, the fundamental authoritarian character
of China's political system remains the same.
The Chinese government's disregard for human rights and the
rule of law most directly affects the Chinese people--as
evidenced by the more than 1,300 active cases of political and
religious prisoners contained in the Commission's far from
exhaustive Political Prisoner Database. The Commission's Annual
Report painstakingly documents rights violations in ethnic
minority regions, religious freedom violations, harassment of
rights defenders and lawyers, suppression of free speech,
large-scale forced evictions, onerous restrictions on civil
society and more--all of which are the markings of a
repressive, one-party state.
The report that follows highlights the dire human rights
situation inside China and the continued downward trajectory,
by virtually every measure, since Xi Jinping became Communist
Party General Secretary in 2012 and President in 2013--the
latter post likely to be his beyond 2023. Of particular concern
is the mass, arbitrary, internment of as many as 1 million or
more Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities in ``political
reeducation'' camps in western China. Reports indicate that
this may be the largest incarceration of an ethnic minority
population since World War II, and that it may constitute
crimes against humanity. Local officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) have used alarming political rhetoric
to describe the purpose of this government policy, including
``eradicating tumors'' and ``spray[ing] chemicals'' on crops to
kill the ``weeds.'' In response to these developments, an
international expert described the XUAR as ``a police state to
rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of
South African apartheid.'' \1\
China's authoritarianism at home directly threatens our
freedoms as well as our most deeply held values and national
interests. Inside China, American citizens are targeted with
exit bans preventing them from leaving China, often in order to
resolve business disputes or pressure their family members or
colleagues to cooperate with Chinese courts; American citizens
are detained or deported for sending private electronic
messages critical of the Chinese government; American
journalists are harassed and intimidated; and American business
interests are threatened by rampant intellectual property theft
and forced technology transfers.
Additionally, the ``long arm'' of the Chinese Communist
Party extends beyond China's borders and is increasingly
pervasive and multifaceted under the direction of an enhanced
United Front Work Department, a Party institution used to
influence Chinese individuals at home and abroad to neutralize
possible challenges to its ideological and policy agenda. The
Party's efforts to export its authoritarianism abroad takes a
multitude of forms, including but not limited to the following:
interference in multilateral institutions; threatening and
intimidating rights defenders and their families; imposing
censorship mechanisms on foreign publishers and social media
companies; asserting ``cyber-sovereignty'' and ``national
internets''; influencing academic institutions and critical
analysis of China's past history and present policies; and
threatening American companies who do not conform with China's
narrative on ``sensitive topics'' like Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan. So, too, Chinese government foreign investment and
development, which will likely reach record levels with its
ambitious and far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative, is
accompanied by a robust non-democratic political agenda as are
other manifestations of what some experts are calling Chinese
``sharp power.'' The Chinese government is actively seeking to
leverage its economic power to extend the influence of its
political model.
The ever-expanding scope of domestic repression documented
in the pages that follow directly affects an increasing number
of Chinese citizens, stirring resentment, dissent, and even
activism in unlikely places. As American policymakers revisit
the assumptions that previously informed U.S.-China relations,
and seek to chart a new path forward, it is vital that our
foreign policy prioritizes the promotion of universal human
rights and the protection of basic human dignity, principles
the Chinese Communist Party is actively trying to redefine.
Such pursuits have merit on their own accord, and they are also
inextricably linked to vital U.S. national interests, including
regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, the future of young and
emerging democracies in our hemisphere, and the strength of our
own civic institutions domestically. It is in this context that
we, as Chairman and Cochairman of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, submit the Commission's 2018 Annual
Report.
Senator Marco Rubio Representative Chris Smith
Chair Cochair
Introduction
In recent years the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China (Commission) has reported on Chinese President and
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's consolidation
and personalization of political power--a trend which reached
new heights at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party in October 2017, and the March 2018 meetings
(Two Sessions) of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing.
The political sensitivity of these events was underscored by
the control and censorship of news and online discussion, and
the implementation of ``stability maintenance'' activities to
quash citizen advocacy and petitioning. No clear successor for
Party General Secretary emerged during the 19th Party Congress
in October, an omission that presaged the passage of amendments
to the Party constitution confirming Xi Jinping's paramount
authority. The March 2018 amendments enshrining the principle
of ``Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era'' in China's Constitution and
removing the two-term limit on the presidency signaled Xi's
intention to retain leadership of China beyond the end of his
second term as president in 2023, a distinct break with China's
decades-long model of authoritarian governance grounded in
``collective leadership'' and orderly succession.
Another key development at the Two Sessions was the
establishment of an anticorruption agency, the National
Supervisory Commission (NSC). The investigatory and supervisory
functions of the NSC appear to extend Xi Jinping's signature
anticorruption campaign against Party officials to a much
broader swath of public sector personnel of over 100 million
people, including state-owned enterprise employees, public
hospital staff, and public educators. Moreover, the NSC is
authorized to use ``confinement'' (liuzhi), a new form of
extrajudicial detention, for at least three months without a
guarantee of access to counsel. The NSC is also authorized to
place any private citizen, regardless of their profession or
party membership status, under liuzhi if they are suspected of
involvement in official misconduct. The structure of the NSC
further blurs the line between the Party and government, as
does the far-reaching reorganization of Party and government
agencies approved at the Two Sessions.
These developments effectively remove many of the
protections put in place in the late 1970s and during the 1980s
in the wake of the violent and chaotic Cultural Revolution.
Deng Xiaoping and Party leadership at that time established
these institutional measures, warning China to protect against
``the excessive concentration of power . . . particularly the
first secretary, who takes command and sets the tune for
everything . . ..'' \2\ As Xi emerged this year with near total
policymaking authority, many experts drew comparisons to the
cult-of-personality era of former Party Chairman Mao Zedong.
One commentator deemed it the ``end of China's 40-year-long
reform era.'' \3\
While Xi consolidated his political power at central and
sub-national levels, the Party and government further tightened
the space for civil society and rights advocacy. Many
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) submitted
reports in advance of the November 2018 session of the UN Human
Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese
government's compliance with international human rights
standards. The NGOs documented multiple violations of
international legal standards and worsening conditions for
civil society, rights defense, religious freedom, ethnic
minority rights, and freedom of expression. Several submissions
also highlighted the July 2017 death in custody of writer and
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo for whom authorities
failed to provide adequate medical care. Rights groups also
censured the Chinese government for the illegal home
confinement of his widow Liu Xia for eight years, despite the
absence of any criminal charge or judicial proceeding against
her. She was finally released and permitted to travel to
Germany in July 2018, mere days before the one-year anniversary
of her husband's death in state custody.
Authorities maintained tight restrictions in many spheres
of civil society advocacy, often giving priority to the
suppression of grassroots mobilization and the sharing of
information online. Chinese authorities continued to severely
restrict the ability of civil society organizations to work on
labor issues, in keeping with a national crackdown on labor
NGOs that began in 2015. Strikes continued, however, with the
vast majority of strikes this reporting year relating to non-
payment of wages. Additionally, the Commission observed
continuing restrictions on individuals and groups working on
women's rights, the environment, and public health advocacy.
Civil society groups' social media accounts were censored or
shut down this past year, reflecting the government's awareness
of the power of online communications. Moreover, in a related
regulatory development, administrators of social media groups
(e.g., WeChat, QQ, and other group messaging platforms) may now
be held liable for the views expressed by members of their
respective chat groups.
Authorities continued to harass, abuse, and detain
individuals by means including extralegal ``black jails,''
forced psychiatric commitment of individuals without mental
illness, and ``political reeducation'' centers, the latter
specifically used to detain members of ethnic minority groups
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Authorities
apply broadly defined provisions in the PRC Criminal Law, such
as crimes of ``endangering state security'' and ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble,'' for a range of activities
that are protected under international human rights standards.
The government violated detainees' rights under the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law, including through what appeared to be
coerced confessions in the cases of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai
and Taiwan NGO volunteer Lee Ming-cheh. Reports showed that
authorities continued to deny or failed to provide adequate
medical care to detainees, a violation of international human
rights standards that may amount to torture. There were also
reports of detainees being forced to ingest unknown
``medications.'' The sudden and unexpected death in February
2018 of prominent human rights lawyer Li Baiguang, just weeks
after he visited Washington, D.C., led some observers to claim
that he was the latest victim in Xi's sweeping crackdown on
rights lawyers and advocates. In the more than three years
since the July 2015 crackdown on human rights lawyers and
defenders, which has affected over 300 individuals and led to
14 criminal convictions, authorities continued to target
prominent rights defenders and lawyers with torture (Yu
Wensheng), imprisonment (Wu Gan, Jiang Tianyong), cancellation
of law licenses (Li Heping, Xie Yanyi) and other forms of
harassment. Authorities stopped Li Wenzu, the wife of detained
lawyer Wang Quanzhang, from completing a 100-kilometer walk
from her home in Beijing municipality to Tianjin municipality,
where Wang reportedly is being held, to mark Wang's 1,000th day
in incommunicado detention.
The Chinese government remained one of the worst jailers of
journalists, with estimates of individuals in detention or
imprisoned in connection with their reporting ranging from 41
to more than 50, including the founders of human rights
monitoring websites and citizen journalists. Lu Yuyu, founder
of an initiative to track labor protests and strikes called
``Not-the-News,'' is serving a four-year sentence in Yunnan
province. The cases of Liu Feiyue, founder of the human rights
monitoring website Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch; Huang Qi,
founder of another rights monitoring website, 64 Tianwang; and
Zhen Jianghua, executive director of Human Rights Campaign in
China, an online platform that campaigns for human rights
advocates and victims of rights abuses, are pending. According
to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China's 2017 survey,
working conditions for foreign reporters in China deteriorated
in 2017, demonstrated by accounts of official harassment of
reporters, news assistants, and sources; attempts to interfere
with coverage of issues that authorities deemed ``sensitive'';
restrictions on travel to areas along China's borders and
ethnic minority regions; and visa renewal delays and denials.
The Party and government continued implementing repressive
policies in Tibetan autonomous areas, including extensive and
intrusive surveillance, strict regulations and rules to
restrict Tibetans' religious and cultural rights, and pervasive
displays of police and military force. The Chinese government
persists in regarding Tibetans' spiritual leader, the 83-year
old Dalai Lama, as a ``mastermind'' of ``separatist forces''
and maintains that only it has the right to decide the Dalai
Lama's successor, attempting to exert state control over a
venerated and sacred religious process. In a case that drew
widespread international condemnation, in May 2018, Chinese
authorities in Qinghai province sentenced Tashi Wangchug to
five years in prison for ``inciting separatism'' in connection
with his interview with the New York Times about his Tibetan
language advocacy. In August, the Qinghai High People's Court
rejected Tashi Wangchug's appeal.
Official control and scrutiny over religious activity
increased as revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs
took effect in February 2018, national state-sanctioned
religious organizations announced major plans to ``sinicize''
religion in China, and the Party's United Front Work Department
took over responsibility for direct oversight of religious
affairs. In Henan province, authorities reportedly banned at
least 100 Protestant churches from meeting after the revised
regulations went into effect in February, and also destroyed
religious iconography in believers' homes. In September, set
against the backdrop of a broader crackdown on Chinese
Christians, reports emerged that a deal was imminent between
the Holy See and the Chinese government. Under the reported
deal, the Holy See would recognize seven ``illegitimate
bishops'' approved by the government, and Chinese authorities
would nominate future Chinese bishops that the Holy See would
be able to veto. Both sides reportedly agreed not to publish
the agreement after its signing. As of mid-September the deal
was not yet finalized, but Chinese Catholics had expressed
concerns in reaction to earlier reports of an impending
agreement that the Holy See would make concessions that would
weaken and further divide the Chinese Catholic community.
Official repression of Hui Muslim believers also intensified,
with local governments in some areas removing ``Arabic style''
architecture, banning children and youth from participating in
religious activities, and prohibiting calls to prayer and the
sale of the Quran. Authorities also persisted in their
crackdown on Falun Gong practitioners, subjecting them to
abusive treatment, especially when in custody.
Chinese authorities continued to implement coercive
population control policies that violate international
standards, despite the shift to a ``universal two-child
policy.'' Now in its third consecutive year, the new policy has
not been effective in spurring population growth, reportedly
prompting the government to commission research on removing
birth restrictions completely. Decades of coercive population
control policies have exacerbated China's demographic
challenges, which include a rapidly aging population, shrinking
workforce, and sex ratio imbalance. A lack of economic
opportunity and China's sex ratio imbalance contributed to the
risk of individuals in Southeast Asian countries being
trafficked into China for forced labor and forced marriage. In
addition, the Chinese government continued to treat North
Korean refugees as illegal economic migrants and maintained a
policy of repatriating undocumented North Koreans, leaving the
refugees vulnerable to human trafficking within China and
imprisonment, torture, or death upon return to North Korea.
The long-term viability of Hong Kong's ``one country, two
systems'' framework remained tenuous given the continued
erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy, as guaranteed under the ``one
country, two systems'' policy enshrined in Hong Kong's Basic
Law. The ``political screening'' and ultimate disqualification
prior to the March 2018 by-election of several prospective
candidates for the Legislative Council based on their political
beliefs, marked a significant setback for pro-democracy forces
and called into question their ability to effectively use the
existing political system to secure democratic reforms.
Mainland officials used threats and intimidation against
individuals based on their political association and beliefs;
members of pro-democracy group Demosisto were reportedly
detained and extensively questioned when they attempted to
leave the mainland and return to Hong Kong. Also, this past
year, Hong Kong and mainland officials continued negotiations
and finalized ``co-location'' plans for the Hong Kong section
of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link.
Activists, politicians, and lawyers criticized the co-location
plan, which permits mainland law enforcement to operate in a
designated ``Mainland Port Area'' in the Hong Kong train
station, in apparent violation of Hong Kong's Basic Law.
The subsequent chapters of this report document these and
other human rights and rule of law developments in China during
the Commission's 2018 reporting year that spans, roughly,
September 2017 through September 2018. General themes and key
developments covered in the body of this report are outlined
below.
Overview
Over the Commission's 2018 reporting year, the following
general themes and key developments emerged:
1. Unprecedented Repression of Ethnic Minorities in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
2. Party Control Over Government, Society, and Business
Dramatically Increases
3. Increasing Use of Technology as a Tool of Repression
Unprecedented Repression of Ethnic Minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the area in
western China that Chinese officials have promoted as an
important hub for Belt and Road Initiative development
projects, witnessed a severe deterioration with respect to
human rights. Authorities have targeted members of the region's
predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations, including
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Hui, with reports of mass
internment in harsh ``political reeducation'' centers or camps
and restrictions on religious practice and ethnic cultural and
linguistic traditions. Several leading experts characterized
the region as a ``digital police'' or ``surveillance'' state,
and a potential incubator for high-tech social controls that
the government may soon employ more broadly.
Since Chen Quanguo's appointment as XUAR Party Secretary in
August 2016, reports have documented the escalation of rights
abuses against local ethnic minority populations. Chen
previously served in the same position in the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR), where he imposed similarly onerous restrictions.
This past year the mass surveillance and securitization of the
XUAR was starkly illustrated by the extrajudicial detention of
1 million or more individuals in ``political reeducation''
centers or camps--making it the largest mass internment of an
ethnic minority population in the world today. Individuals may
be detained for a number of reasons, including frequency of
prayer, expression of ``politically incorrect'' views, history
of travel abroad, and connections with people outside of China.
Detentions appear to be indefinite in most cases. Regional
government authorities reportedly ordered officials in some
XUAR jurisdictions to meet detention quotas, and local
orphanages were reportedly overcrowded due to the number of
children requiring care while both parents are held in the
camps. A May 2018 Associated Press report documented
propagandistic slogans that detainees were required to chant--
``Thank the Party! Thank the Motherland! Thank President
Xi!''--before being permitted to eat.\4\ The ``political
reeducation'' centers are reportedly fortified with barbed
wire, reinforced doors, and bombproof surfaces. Security
personnel have subjected detainees to torture (including the
use of interrogation chairs called ``tiger chairs''), medical
neglect and maltreatment, solitary confinement, sleep
deprivation, lack of adequate clothing in cold temperatures,
and other forms of abuse. Reports have also emerged of a number
of deaths in the camps. Reports in May 2018 indicated that
Chinese authorities were soliciting public bids for the
construction of more camps and additional security features for
existing ones. In addition to those detained in ``political
reeducation'' centers, rights groups reported that as of June
2018, authorities may have forced an additional 2.2 million
XUAR residents to attend day or evening ``education sessions.''
Analysis of Chinese government data published by the
organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) in July 2018
showed that 21 percent of all criminal arrests in China in 2017
took place in the XUAR, which has 1.5 percent of China's
population. These figures do not include detentions in
``reeducation'' camps, which are carried out extrajudicially,
though authorities reportedly transferred some ``reeducation''
camp detainees to prison after a period of time. It remained
difficult for foreign journalists, NGO representatives, or
senior diplomats to travel or work freely in the region, making
precise reporting on the numbers of those detained in the camps
difficult to ascertain. Figures ranged anywhere from hundreds
of thousands to upwards of a million, according to rights
groups, scholars, and media organizations. Authorities in the
XUAR show no indication of slowing or halting the detentions,
and in fact government procurement documents indicate plans to
build additional detention facilities, underscoring the ongoing
nature of the crisis.
Those not subject to ``transformation through education''
in detention still faced daily intrusions in their home life,
including compulsory homestays whereby Communist Party
officials are sent to live with local Uyghur and Kazakh
families, including families with no adult male present because
the men in the family have been detained in ``reeducation''
camps. Families are required to provide information regarding
their daily prayer habits and political views and are subjected
to ``political education'' administered by the live-in Party
official.
The data-driven surveillance in the XUAR is facilitated by
iris and body scanners, voice pattern analyzers, DNA
sequencers, and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on
roads, and in train stations. Two large Chinese firms,
Hikvision and Dahua Technology, have profited greatly from the
surge in security spending, reportedly winning upwards of
US$1.2 billion in government contracts for large-scale
surveillance projects in the XUAR. Authorities employ hand-held
devices to search smart phones for encrypted chat applications
(apps) and require residents to install monitoring apps on
their cell phones. More traditional security measures are also
employed, including extensive police checkpoints. The rise in
security personnel has accompanied the proliferation of
``convenience police stations,'' a dense network of street
corner, village, and neighborhood police stations that enhance
authorities' ability to closely surveil and police local
communities.
Developments in the XUAR had a direct impact on U.S.
interests, most notably the detention of dozens of family
members of at least six U.S.-based Uyghur journalists employed
by Radio Free Asia, as well as the detention of dozens of
family members of prominent U.S.-based Uyghur rights activist,
Rebiya Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the Chinese government
to silence effective reporting on human rights conditions in
the XUAR and Uyghur rights advocacy. Additionally, reports
emerged of Chinese authorities attempting to influence,
intimidate, and otherwise harass other Uyghurs living abroad,
including in the United States, to get them to return to China,
or monitor and silence them while abroad.
Party Control Over Government, Society, and Business Dramatically
Increases
This past year, the purview of the Party continued to
expand into many sectors of public life, eliminating the
tenuous separation that previously existed between the Party
and government agencies. In previous decades, the Party had
allowed experimentation and varying degrees of autonomy in
local- and provincial-level implementation of central policy
decisions. Under Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, that
modicum of autonomy continues to shrink with the Party
apparatus reasserting itself over the government. In September
2017, senior Party officials began a process of amending
China's Constitution, which was finalized in the March 2018
meeting of the National People's Congress. A new sentence was
added to Article 1 in China's Constitution after ``[t]he
socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic
of China'' that reads, ``The defining feature of socialism with
Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist
Party of China.'' More significantly for Xi Jinping's
personalization of power, ``Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' was added to both
the Party Constitution and China's Constitution, joining Mao
Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as the three principles
guiding Chinese political life. Central to the doctrine, and
Xi's aspirational promise of the ``Chinese dream,'' is the
supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party and one-party rule.
In another major move to elevate and consolidate the
Party's control over government work, at the end of March, the
Party Central Committee issued a massive restructuring plan for
Party and government agencies to be completed by the end of
2018. This process has been described by expert Carl Minzner as
the ``re-Partyization of the bureaucracy.'' One of the key
changes in this sweeping reorganization plan was the rise of
the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a Party institution
used to influence and neutralize possible challenges to its
ideological and policy agenda. The functions of the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), which previously
oversaw religious affairs, are now subsumed by the UFWD. Some
commentators noted that the change was evidence that the Party
views control of religious affairs as central to maintaining
its power. The stated rationale for the restructuring of SARA
was to unify and strengthen the Party's control over
``religious work.'' In addition to religious affairs work, the
UFWD has also taken over management of ethnic affairs,
including the management of regions with sizeable ethnic
minority populations like the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
and Tibet Autonomous Region--consistent with Xi Jinping's
emphasis on the importance of ``sinicizing'' ethnic and
religious minorities. The UFWD also absorbed the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Office, giving the Party much clearer authority
to monitor and manage the affairs of Chinese citizens who are
living outside of China. One analyst voiced concern that this
was an ``unprecedented extension of Party influence abroad.''
The reorganization plan also restructured authority and
managerial responsibilities of Party entities and Chinese
government agencies in the area of the press and media. The
plan positioned the Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
in a ``leadership'' role with direct management
responsibilities for news media, publishing, and film. While
the CPD and its lower level bureaus have long coordinated
ideological messaging, the CPD's enhanced managerial role
reportedly reflects Party efforts to rein in increasingly
complex digital news, communications, and entertainment
platforms and ensure dissemination of a unified message about
China within and outside of China. Among the key provisions
addressing managerial structures and authority was the merger
of three major broadcast entities--China Central Television,
China National Radio, and China Radio International--into China
Media Group domestically and Voice of China internationally.
Official explanations of the broadcasting agency's global name
of Voice of China emphasize its role in ``telling China's story
well'' to an international audience in polished and innovative
ways.
The Party also sought to expand its role in commercial
enterprises. In October 2017, the Party amended its
constitution to stipulate that Party committees play a
``leading role'' in the decisionmaking of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Multiple SOEs also reportedly proposed
granting internal Party groups a greater decisionmaking role in
joint ventures with foreign companies. The government is also
reportedly exploring purchasing stakes in major technology
firms including Alibaba and Tencent.
Increasing Use of Technology as a Tool of Repression
This reporting year, consistent with the trend regarding
the Party's expanding reach, the Commission observed the Party
and government re-inserting itself into the private lives of
Chinese citizens through expanded collection of biometric data,
growing surveillance networks, and continued development of the
social credit system. Reports show that social and political
management of the Chinese people was aided by smart technology
and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) in new ways this
past year, including efforts to create ``a pervasive system of
algorithmic surveillance.'' \5\ The Chinese government
continued to expand its video surveillance system this past
year, with the primary aim of ``maintaining social stability.''
Also known as Skynet, the system included over 27 million
surveillance cameras nationwide as of September 2017. The
effort was buttressed by the creation of biometric databases to
contain information gathered from saliva and blood samples from
individuals, in some cases collected without their informed
consent, amplifying privacy concerns. As of December 2017, the
government had also reportedly spent 3.1 billion yuan
(approximately US$500 million) on ``Sharp Eyes,'' considered
the rural version of China's Skynet surveillance project. By
2020, China aims to complete a nationwide facial recognition
and surveillance network, with ``100 percent surveillance and
facial recognition coverage and total unification of its
existing databases across the country.'' \6\
Chinese companies like Alibaba (and its affiliate Ant
Financial) and Tencent (which owns the popular messaging
platform WeChat) can be required to hand over data on Chinese
citizens. Ant Financial, which has pioneered the commercial
credit rating product Sesame Credit, has indicated its
intention to ``share information collected on trustworthiness
and untrustworthiness with the State Credit Information-Sharing
Platform in a timely manner.'' \7\ The PRC Cybersecurity Law,
which took effect in June 2017, requires companies to store
user data inside mainland China, resulting in growing privacy
concerns. American companies, including Apple, which
transferred operations of iCloud services for mainland Chinese
accounts to a state-owned firm in February 2018, will likely be
compelled to disclose users' information to authorities, a
particular concern for users who may be targeted because they
are perceived as a threat to the Party.
As of March 31, 2018, access to non-licensed virtual
private networks (or VPNs)--previously used to send secure
emails or data or to access websites blocked by Chinese
authorities--is no longer permitted. While most analyses of
this development centered around the far-reaching censorship
implications, a secondary impact is the strengthening of the
state's surveillance apparatus as it relates to foreign
companies whose electronic communications and data
transmissions are increasingly vulnerable.
The government continued to work with Chinese companies to
develop and implement a social credit system based on the
governing principle, ``once untrustworthy, always restricted.''
\8\ Pilot projects of the nascent social credit system have
begun to aggregate vast amounts of data on citizens, with a
view toward shaping and even engineering citizens' behavior.
The social credit system is grounded in a broader political
control framework known as ``social management'' or ``social
governance,'' which the Party views as vital to maintaining
power. The system does not simply rate financial activities,
rather it aims to reward or punish a variety of actions
pertaining to economic as well as social and political
conduct.\9\ According to media reports, at least 9 million
Chinese have been banned from travelling domestically in
connection to the social credit system, though the system is
still in its pilot stages. One observer described the Party's
plans for the social credit system as ``Orwellian'' and ``a
preemptive way of shaping the way people think and shaping the
way people act.'' \10\
Notes to Section I--Executive Summary
\1\ Rian Thum, ``What Really Happens in China's `Re-Education'
Camps,'' New York Times, 15 May 18.
\2\ Evan Osnos, ``Xi Jinping May Be President for Life. What Will
Happen to China?'' New Yorker, 26 February 18.
\3\ James Doubek, ``China Removes Presidential Term Limits,
Enabling Xi Jinping To Rule Indefinitely,'' NPR, 11 March 18.
\4\ Gerry Shih, ``China's Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural
Revolution,'' Associated Press, 18 May 18.
\5\ Anna Mitchell and Larry Diamond, ``China's Surveillance State
Should Scare Everyone,'' Atlantic, 2 February 18.
\6\ ``China Aims for Near-Total Surveillance, Including in People's
Homes,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 March 18.
\7\ National Development and Reform Commission, ``Commission Signs
Memorandum of Understanding on Rewards and Punishments With Ant
Financial Services Group'' [Wowei yu mayi jinrong fuwu jituan lianhe
jiangcheng beiwanglu], 3 August 16.
\8\ Jamie Fullerton, ``China's `Social Credit' System Bans Millions
From Travelling,'' Telegraph, 24 March 18.
\9\ Shazeda Ahmed, ``Who's Really Responsible for Digital Privacy
in China?'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 30 May 18.
\10\ Simina Mistreanu, ``Life Inside China's Social Credit
Laboratory,'' Foreign Policy, 3 April 18.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Recommendations to Congress and the Administration
As mentioned earlier in the Executive Summary, there is a
growing consensus that U.S.-China policy is in need of a
readjustment. In December 2017, the Administration released the
``National Security Strategy of the United States of America''
(NSS), which identified the current Chinese government as a
``revisionist power'' seeking to ``shape a world antithetical
to U.S. values and interests'' and engaged in efforts to
``repress'' its society. There has long been the temptation to
view human rights and the rule of law as tangential issues in
bilateral relations, sidelined from economic and security
interests, but the NSS concluded by saying that the U.S.
Government must ``raise our competitive game'' and employ all
of the ``tools of national power'' to deal with the challenges
coming from illiberal and authoritarian states, including
China. In this vein, the Commission makes the following
recommendations for consideration by Congress and the
Administration, recognizing that, since the end of World War
II, a shared commitment to universal principles and the rule of
law are the foundation upon which cooperative alliances and
security partnerships, multilateral consultative mechanisms,
and the free flow of trade and investment depend. Any effort to
rethink U.S. Government approaches to the current Chinese
government should recognize that pressing for adherence to
universal standards and insistence on greater reciprocity
advance American economic and security interests and the
interests of Chinese citizens eager for peace, rights
protections, and genuine political reform.
Advocate for Political Prisoners. In meetings with
Chinese government officials, Administration officials at the
highest levels and Members of Congress should raise cases of
human rights abuse and publicly articulate why China's
continued detention of political and religious prisoners harms
U.S.-China relations. Experience demonstrates that raising
individual prisoner cases, publicly and privately, can result
in improved treatment, lighter sentences or, in some cases,
release from custody, detention, or imprisonment. As
demonstrated by the case of Liu Xia, who left China in July
2018 and is now living in Germany, sustained and consistent
international advocacy on behalf of prisoners can bring
results. The Administration should consider creating a Special
Advisor for Religious and Political Prisoners to coordinate
interagency efforts on behalf of political and religious
prisoners in China and globally. Members of Congress are
encouraged to ``adopt'' individual prisoners and advocate on
their behalf, including through the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission's ``Defending Freedoms Project'' or the Commission's
#FreeChinasHeroes initiative.
Embed Human Rights Throughout Bilateral Relations.
The Administration should develop a comprehensive strategy to
advance human rights through other issues on the U.S.-China
agenda. Working with Congress, the Administration should
develop an action plan and implementation guidelines to embed
human rights, rule of law, and democratic accountability goals
into the critical mission strategies of all U.S. Government
entities interacting with the Chinese government. Isolating
human rights discussions only to State Department-led bilateral
human rights dialogue implies that human rights concerns are
unconnected to other bilateral interests. The Administration
should consider creating an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC)
to coordinate human rights policy on China throughout the U.S.
Government.
Prioritize Reciprocity. The Administration should
seek a rules-of-the-road agreement that will correct long-
standing diplomatic, trade, investment, media, and cultural and
academic exchange imbalances in U.S.-China relations. The
Administration should take appropriate actions to ensure that
U.S.-based news and social media outlets and academic and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have the same freedom to
operate, publish, and broadcast afforded to a growing number of
Chinese government-sponsored and funded think tanks, academic
institutions, and media entities in the United States. The
Administration should take steps to limit the growth of Chinese
government-funded Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms
on U.S. college campuses and in primary and secondary schools,
and seek greater transparency and faculty oversight over those
that continue to operate as part of U.S. academic institutions.
Focus on Commercial Rule of Law. Working with
Congress, the Administration should press the Chinese
government to discontinue harmful practices and policies that
have the effect of restricting or limiting U.S. trade and
investment in China to address the lack of reciprocity between
the United States and China and strengthen existing laws and
regulations to scrutinize Chinese investments in various U.S.
business sectors, including by bolstering the capacity of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as
required by the John McCain National Defense Authorization Act
(Public Law No. 115-232). The Administration should publish
information collected from U.S. businesses about requests from
the Chinese government regarding censorship, data and forced
technology transfers, and surveillance, and work with like-
minded World Trade Organization members to pursue negotiations
on restriction of cross-border data transfers and to develop
meaningful rules to address restrictions on digital trade.
Hold Officials Accountable for Abuses. The
Administration should use the powers granted in Executive Order
13818 to hold accountable individuals complicit in ``serious
human rights abuse and corruption'' in China and also use the
list-based sanctions available in the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act (Global Magnitsky) (Public Law No.
114-328), the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22
U.S.C. 6401 et seq.) and the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106-113) to levy financial
sanctions or deny U.S. entry visas to Chinese officials
complicit in torture and arbitrary detentions; severe religious
freedom restrictions; and forced abortions, sterilizations, or
human trafficking, including human trafficking for the purpose
of organ removal.
Condition Law Enforcement Cooperation. The U.S.
Government should stop all cooperation on the extradition of
Chinese nationals who have fled to avoid pending corruption
charges until a law enforcement agreement can be signed that
guarantees verifiable due process protections and an end to
torture in detention and all forms of arbitrary detention,
including the Chinese Communist Party's and National
Supervisory Commission's extrajudicial forms of detention
called shuanggui and liuzhi, respectively, and Chinese public
security officials' use of ``residential surveillance at a
designated location.''
Promote Internet Freedom and Counter Foreign
Disinformation. The Administration should view ideological
competition as a critical strategic challenge as the Chinese
government has intensified the use of disinformation,
propaganda, economic intimidation, and political influence
operations to weaken commitments to universal human rights and
promote the Chinese political-economic model globally. The
Administration should develop a comprehensive interagency
action plan to counter disinformation emanating from
authoritarian countries, including by actively opposing the
Chinese government's efforts to establish a new international
norm in ``internet sovereignty,'' expanding digital security
training for civil society advocates, and prioritizing a robust
internet freedom agenda that transparently uses
congressionally-appropriated funds to circumvent China's
``Great Firewall'' and other ``smart technologies'' through the
funding and wide distribution of effective technologies that
provide the greatest possible access to the internet in China
and globally. The Senate should move swiftly to consider the
Administration's choice as CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global
Media (formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors or BBG) and
to work with the nominee to strengthen U.S. public diplomacy
efforts.
Expand Vital Global Alliances. International
responses to gross violations of human rights have the greatest
impact when the United States exercises leadership. The
Administration should develop a multilateral strategy on China
with other countries, as the Chinese government has used
multilateral institutions to undermine human rights norms and
close off discussion of its failures to uphold its
international obligations. The Administration should also
continue coordination with businesses and NGOs to develop
unified messages about unfair industrial policies, digital
protectionism, and about the harm to U.S. and global interests
from legislation such as the PRC Law on the Management of
Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland
China, the PRC Cybersecurity Law, and the recently revised
Regulations on Religious Affairs.
Help Address the ``Missing Girl'' Problem. The
Administration should integrate the provisions of the Girls
Count Act (Public Law No. 114-24) into foreign assistance
programs to help address the social and economic issues created
by the Chinese government's population control policies. In
addition, Congress should continue to link U.S. contributions
to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) for use in China with the end
of all birth limitation and coercive population control
policies in China.
Prioritize Religious Freedom Diplomacy. Religious
groups continue to be the largest segment of China's civil
society and there is academic research that shows that
countries respecting and protecting religious freedom are often
more politically stable, prosperous, and suffer from fewer
incidents of domestic terrorism. Therefore, the U.S. and China
share mutual interests in advancing this fundamental freedom.
The Administration should issue a presidential policy directive
to implement a global strategy on international religious
freedom reflecting the priority placed on this issue in the
``National Security Strategy of the United States of America.''
The Administration should use all the tools available in the
International Religious Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.)
and the Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public
Law No. 114-281) to make targeted responses to escalating
religious freedom abuses in China and hold officials
accountable for abuses.
Address Abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). In addition to employing Global Magnitsky
sanctions targeting officials responsible for or complicit in
the mass detentions, severe religious restrictions, and
intrusive surveillance targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic
minority Muslims in the XUAR, the Administration should
consider initiating a joint statement with other nations at the
UN Human Rights Council or, if appropriate, consider requesting
an open debate or briefing at the UN Security Council. The
Administration should calibrate the nature and scope of its
counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation and, through
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the
Justice Department, create guidelines for such cooperation to
ensure that the United States does not condone or assist in
Chinese authorities' crackdown on domestic political dissent or
restrictions on the freedoms of expression or religion.
Revamp Export Controls. The Administration should
consider restarting an interagency process to determine if new
technologies should be added to the United States Munitions
List (USML) at the State Department's Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC), because of their ability to enhance
surveillance and the ability of security forces to repress
universally recognized human rights. Additionally, the End-User
Review Committee (ERC), composed of representatives of the
Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy and, where
appropriate, the Treasury, should add XUAR police and
government entities to the ``Entity List'' of prohibited end-
users and the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and
Security should increase scrutiny of any purchase of technology
or equipment that may expand efforts to deny the right to life,
liberty, or the security of person of ethnic minority
populations in the XUAR.
Reiterate U.S. Interest in Hong Kong's Autonomy.
The Administration should continue to issue annually the report
outlined in Section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act of 1992 (Public Law No. 102-383), subject to congressional
directives, and provide clear assessments of the overall
trajectory in Hong Kong, as understanding threats to the city's
autonomy and the rule of law are critical for appraising
whether the special status granted to Hong Kong under U.S. law
is warranted. Members of the Administration and Congress should
express through public statements, official visits, and
resolutions the important connection between a free press, a
vibrant civil society, an independent judiciary, and expanded
democratic governance in Hong Kong and the mutual interests
shared by the United States and China in maintaining Hong Kong
as a center of business and finance in Asia.
Expand Mandate of Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA). The Administration and Congress should work together to
expand the mandate of FARA to encompass individuals working for
foreign state-owned media and government-backed or Party-
affiliated think tanks or non-profit organizations operating in
the United States. Congress should consider legislation that
increases reporting requirements for universities and other
NGOs that receive financial or in-kind contributions from
entities affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party or
government.
Protect Civil Society From Political Influence
Operations. The Administration should work with U.S.
businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academic
institutions to formulate a code of conduct for interacting
with Chinese government-affiliated entities to counter
influence operations that are manipulative, coercive, or
corrupting of democratic institutions, and to help protect
human rights and academic freedom. In addition, the State
Department should collect and disseminate information about
best practices for monitoring and controlling foreign influence
operations and provide information about the Chinese
ministries, entities, and individuals engaged in foreign
influence operations and their connections with agencies of the
Chinese Communist Party or government. As the Administration
develops new strategies to deal with existing threats, new
messaging and policies should also be created to avoid
fostering an atmosphere of suspicion of Chinese Americans and
Chinese nationals living and studying in the United States, as
they are potentially victims and targets of influence
operations.
Promote Dialogue Regarding Tibet. The
Administration and Congress should work together to press for
unrestricted access to Tibetan autonomous areas in China,
facilitate the full implementation of the Tibetan Policy Act of
2002 (Public Law No. 107-228), and urge renewed dialogue
between Chinese government officials and the Dalai Lama's
representatives. Administration officials, including the
President, should meet with the Dalai Lama in his capacity as a
spiritual leader, and with the leaders of the Central Tibetan
Administration.
Congressional Action To ``Raise Our Competitive
Game.'' As part of the Administration's efforts to ``raise our
competitive game'' in the face of challenges by a growing
global authoritarianism, the Congress should be seeking to
provide new authorities, resources, and ideas to counter
China's mercantilist economic policies and Belt and Road
Initiative; harden America's abilities to counter
disinformation and political subversion; prioritize internet
freedom, digital security, and circumvention of China's ``Great
Firewall''; and place reciprocity at the core of U.S.
diplomatic engagement with China, including by considering
passage of the Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act (S. 2826/
H.R. 6001, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess.); the National Economic
Security Strategy Act of 2018 (S. 2757, 115th Cong., 2nd
Sess.); the Countering the Chinese Government and Communist
Party's Political Influence Operations Act (H.R. 6010/S. 3171,
115th Cong., 2nd Sess.); the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act of 2017 (S. 417/H.R. 3856, 115th Cong., 1st
Sess.); the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (S. 821/H.R.1872,
115th Cong., 1st Sess.); and the Stop Higher Education
Espionage and Theft Act (S. 2903, 115th Cong., 2nd Sess.).
------------------------
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, legal
determinations, and recommendations, does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the
policies of the Administration.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 15 to
0.
Voted to adopt: Senators Rubio, Lankford, Cotton, Daines,
Young, Feinstein, Merkley, Peters, and King; Representatives Smith,
Pittenger, Hultgren, Kaptur, Walz, and Lieu.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http://
ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a
prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner's
database record for more detailed information about the
prisoner's case, including his or her alleged crime,
specific human rights that officials have violated,
stage in the legal process, and location of detention
or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations traveling to
China to present Chinese officials with lists of
political and religious prisoners compiled from
database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and private
citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city
relationships with China to explore the database, and
to advocate for the release of political and religious
prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's 2018 Annual Report provides information
about Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the
context of specific human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many
of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party and
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare
summaries of information about political and religious
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific
Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual
Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at http://
ppdcecc.gov. (Information about the PPD is available at https:/
/www.cecc.gov/resources/political-prisoner-database.)
The PPD received approximately 502,900 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31,
2018--a change of approximately 27.96 percent over the 393,000
requests reported in the Commission's 2017 Annual Report for
the 12-month period ending July 31, 2017.\2\ During the 12-
month period ending in July 2018, the United States remained
the country of origin for the largest share of requests for
information, with approximately 23.7 percent of such requests.
India was in the second position, with approximately 5.9
percent of such requests, followed by France (3.3 percent),
Brazil (3.0 percent), China (2.8 percent), Japan (2.8 percent),
the Philippines (2.7 percent), Italy (2.6 percent), Germany
(2.6 percent), the United Kingdom (2.1 percent), and Hong Kong
(2.0 percent).
Internet Protocol addresses that do not provide information
about the name of the registrant or the type of domain were the
source of the largest share of online requests for information
during the Commission's 2018 reporting year, accounting for
approximately 37.0 percent of the 502,900 requests for
information in the 12-month period ending in July 2018. The
approximate number of requests from other sources are as
follows: Domains ending in .net were second, with 15.5 percent
of requests for PPD information. Domains ending in .com were
third, with 15.4 percent of online requests for information,
followed by Brazil (.br) with 2.7 percent, then by domains for
Italy (.it), India (.in), and Japan (.jp) with 2.2 percent
each, for Germany (.de) with 1.9 percent, for France (.fr) with
1.5 percent, for Poland (.pl) with 1.1 percent, for the
European Union (.eu) with 1.0 percent, and Australia (.au) with
0.9 percent. U.S. Government (.gov) domains accounted for 0.7
percent of requests for information, educational domains ending
in .edu with 0.2 percent, and domains ending in .org with 0.1
percent of requests. Domains for China (.cn) accounted for 0.1
percent of such requests.
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the
staff member's area of expertise. Staff seek to provide
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners,
and about events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of September 1, 2018, the PPD contained information on
9,345 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,392 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
7,953 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or
soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that
there are considerably more than 1,392 cases of current
political and religious imprisonment in China. Commission staff
work on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and
religious imprisonment to the PPD.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational
institutions, and individuals who research political and
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly
leveraged the capacity of the Commission's information and
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and
advocacy.
In 2015, the Commission enhanced the functionality of the
PPD to empower the Commission, the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, and individuals to
strengthen reporting on political and religious imprisonment in
China and advocacy undertaken on behalf of Chinese political
prisoners. The upgrade allows the PPD full text search and the
basic search both to provide an option to return only records
that either include or do not include an image of the prisoner.
In addition, the 2015 enhancement allowed PPD record short
summaries to accommodate more text as well as greater capacity
to link to external websites.
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to handle the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These types include violations of the right to
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government
policy or government officials.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
Notes to Section I--Political Prisoner Database
\1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the
freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change, and to
criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is
illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were
detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to
them by China's Constitution and law, or by international law, or both.
Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to
distract attention from the political or religious nature of
imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner
under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases,
defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce
confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of
evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone
to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel
adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access
to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a
defense.
\2\ CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 63.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Specific Findings and Recommendations
A summary of specific findings follows below for each
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
Freedom of Expression
Findings
In March 2018, the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee issued a large-scale plan to
restructure the functional authority and managerial
responsibilities of Party entities and Chinese
government agencies, provisions of which reinforced the
Party's ideological control by assigning to the Party
Central Propaganda Department functional control of the
press, publishing, and film. The plan also brought
together China's three major broadcast news entities--
China Central Television, China National Radio, and
China Radio International--under a newly formed
``mega'' agency called China Media Group, to be known
as Voice of China internationally.
International press freedom advocacy
organizations again ranked China as among the most
restrictive for press freedoms throughout the world.
The Chinese government continued to be one of the worst
jailers of journalists in the world, with estimates of
individuals in detention or imprisoned ranging from 41
to more than 50. Authorities detained and held a closed
trial for Zhen Jianghua, the executive director of
human rights monitoring website Human Rights Campaign
in China. Other citizen journalists in detention
included Huang Qi, Jiang Chengfen, Wang Jing, Chen
Tianmao, and Yang Xiuqiong of the website 64 Tianwang,
and Liu Feiyue and Ding Lingjie of the website Civil
Rights & Livelihood Watch.
Working conditions for foreign reporters in
China generally deteriorated in 2017, according to the
Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC). An FCCC
survey noted official harassment of foreign reporters,
news assistants, and sources; attempts to interfere
with the coverage of issues that authorities deemed
``sensitive''; restrictions on travel to areas along
China's border and ethnic minority autonomous regions;
and visa renewal delays and denials. Chinese officials
rejected the FCCC survey findings, with one who
questioned the legitimacy of the FCCC by alleging it is
an ``unregistered, illegal organization.''
This past year, authorities continued to
formulate new regulations to control and censor online
news and media outlets, technology companies, and users
of social media, and in the process, operationalize the
PRC Cybersecurity Law.
The Commission observed reports about
censorship of topics relating to areas with large
ethnic minority populations, such as the Tibet
Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region; Taiwan and Hong Kong; the spiritual movement
Falun Gong; and anniversaries of past events and
persons. Censorship of the news and social media
commentary on the news was particularly intense this
reporting year in connection with two major political
events--the 19th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party in October 2017 and the annual meetings
of the National People's Congress and its advisory
body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, in March 2018.
Despite heavy and pervasive censorship, social
media platforms continued to be an everyday channel of
expression for Chinese citizens to discuss concerns
about a range of news events and public interest
issues. This past year, these concerns included sexual
harassment on Chinese university campuses; racism on
television; the forced eviction of thousands of non-
local residents from Beijing municipality; and the
removal of presidential term limits from China's
Constitution, with many posts in protest of Chinese
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's
consolidation of power.
The Commission observed a wide range of cases
that illustrated the Chinese government and Communist
Party's violations of international human rights
standards and provisions in China's Constitution on the
right to freedom of expression, such as preventing
author Jia Pingwa from traveling to an international
literary scholarship conference in New York City in
January 2018; detentions--and arrest in the case of Guo
Qingjun--of administrators of a social media group who
provided humanitarian assistance to the families of
political prisoners; the announcement of a five-year
prison sentence for Tibetan language rights advocate
Tashi Wangchug; and the death of writer and democracy
advocate Yang Tongyan (pen name Yang Tianshui) while on
medical parole. Although the Chinese government
permitted Liu Xia, the widow of writer and Nobel Peace
Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, to travel to Germany in July
2018 after holding her in arbitrary detention for
nearly eight years, rights advocates raised concerns
that her freedom of speech would be compromised since
the Chinese government did not allow her brother Liu
Hui to leave China with her.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Give greater public expression, including at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and
detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the
denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign
journalists; and the censoring or blockage of foreign
media websites. Consistently link press freedoms to
U.S. interests, noting how censorship and restrictions
on journalists and media websites prevent the free flow
of information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, food safety
problems, and corruption, and act as a trade barrier
for foreign media and companies attempting to access
the Chinese market. Raise these issues with Chinese
officials during bilateral dialogues. Assess the extent
to which China's treatment of foreign journalists
contravenes its World Trade Organization or other
obligations.
Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that
develop and widely distribute technologies that will
assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society
organizations in circumventing internet restrictions,
in order to access and share content protected under
international human rights standards. Continue to
maintain internet freedom programs for China at the
U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for Global
Media (formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors) to
provide digital security training and capacity-building
efforts for bloggers, journalists, civil society
organizations, and human rights and internet freedom
advocates in China.
Raise with Chinese officials, during all appropriate
bilateral discussions, the costs to U.S.-China
relations and to the Chinese public's confidence in
government institutions that are incurred when the
Chinese government restricts political debate, advocacy
for democracy or human rights, and other forms of
peaceful political expression. Emphasize that such
restrictions violate international standards for the
restrictions on free expression, particularly those
contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Emphasize that
such restrictions erode confidence in media and
government institutions. Submit questions for China's
next UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review
in November 2018, asking China to explain what steps it
will take to ensure its restrictions on free expression
conform to international standards.
Urge Chinese officials to end unlawful detention and
official harassment of Chinese rights advocates,
lawyers, and journalists subject to reprisal for
exercising their right to freedom of expression. Call
on officials to release or confirm the release of
individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising
freedom of expression, such as Zhen Jianghua, Liu
Feiyue, Huang Qi, Ding Lingjie, Jiang Chengfen, Wang
Jing, Chen Tianmao, Yang Xiuqiong, Guo Qingjun, Tashi
Wangchug, and other political prisoners raised in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database. Raise this issue in bilateral dialogues as
well as through multilateral institutions, such as at
China's UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic
Review scheduled to take place in November 2018, and at
the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention.
Worker Rights
Findings
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization
permitted under Chinese law. In January 2018, the
state-run news agency Xinhua reported that the ACFTU
had 303 million members in 2017. The U.S. Government
and international observers noted that the ACFTU
typically prioritized Chinese Communist Party interests
over the interests of workers and did not effectively
represent workers.
Workers' right to collective bargaining
remained limited in law and in practice. Observers
noted the need for workers to establish trade unions
that are truly independent from government and
enterprise interests. In addition to curbing effective
union representation, authorities have also restricted
the ability of Chinese labor non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to train workers in collective
bargaining.
During this reporting year, Chinese
authorities continued to severely restrict the ability
of civil society organizations to work on labor issues,
including domestic organizations that received foreign
funding and international civil society organizations.
The situation for civil society organizations has not
improved since a crackdown on labor NGOs began in
December 2015, and has deteriorated further during the
first year of implementation of the PRC Law on the
Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities in Mainland
China.
The Chinese government did not publicly report
on the number of worker strikes and protests, and NGOs
and citizen journalists continued to face difficulties
in obtaining comprehensive information on worker
actions. The Hong Kong-based NGO China Labour Bulletin
(CLB), which compiles data on worker actions collected
from traditional news and social media, recorded 1,257
strikes in 2017. The CLB communications director
estimated that CLB was able to document between 5 and
10 percent of the total number of worker actions in
China between 2013 and 2017.
Major worker actions were reported, including
in March 2018, when an estimated 3,000 sanitation
workers protested wage cuts in Changning district,
Shanghai municipality. Also in March 2018, 6,000
workers from five factories in Zhuhai municipality,
Guangdong province, protested a plan to sell the
factories. In April 2018, crane operators went on
strike across 19 provinces in China to protest low pay.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing, and in
some sectors worsening, problem of wage arrears this
past year, central authorities reiterated goals from
2016 to resolve the problem of migrant worker wage
arrears. In December 2017, the State Council General
Office released new measures on wage arrears,
reiterating the goal of a 2016 State Council opinion to
resolve the issue.
During this reporting year, government data
showed a continued decline in workplace deaths, though
the Commission continued to observe reports of lax
enforcement of work safety laws and regulations.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, in 2017, a total of 37,852 people died in
workplace accidents, down from 43,062 deaths in 2016,
and 66,182 deaths in 2015. Coal mine deaths have
reportedly declined steadily and significantly over the
past fifteen years, down to 375 in 2017, compared to
7,000 in 2002.
In March 2018, as part of a sweeping
government restructuring plan, central authorities
announced plans to dismantle the State Administration
of Work Safety, transferring responsibility for work
safety to a new Ministry of Emergency Management. CLB
criticized the bureaucratic changes as highlighting how
``the Chinese government is more concerned with
disaster management and control rather than in
preventing workplace accidents in the first place.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Press the Chinese government to immediately release
labor advocates who are in prison or detention for the
exercise of their lawful rights. Specifically raise the
cases of Lu Yuyu and Fu Tianbo.
Call on the Chinese government to respect
internationally recognized rights to freedom of
association and collective bargaining, and allow
workers to organize and establish independent labor
unions. Raise concern in all appropriate trade
negotiations and bilateral and multilateral dialogues
about the Chinese Communist Party's role in collective
bargaining and elections of trade union
representatives, emphasizing that in a market economy
wage rates should be determined by free bargaining
between labor and management.
Promote and support bilateral and multilateral
exchanges among government officials, academics, legal
experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor
issues such as freedom of expression, collective
bargaining, employment discrimination, and occupational
health and safety. Seek opportunities to support
capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor
and legal aid organizations involved in defending the
rights of workers.
When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society
participation into bilateral and multilateral
dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite
international unions and labor NGOs as well as domestic
civil society groups from all participating countries
to observe relevant government-to-government dialogues.
Support China's increased engagement and cooperation
with the International Labour Organization (ILO)
through funding for ILO technical cooperation projects
with China. Request that the ILO increase its work with
China on observing core labor standards, including
freedom of association and the right to organize.
Criminal Justice
Findings
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year,
authorities continued to use various forms of arbitrary
detention--such as extralegal ``black jails'' and
forced psychiatric commitment of individuals without
mental illness--to deprive individuals of their
liberty, contravening international human rights
standards. Authorities also continued to use
administrative forms of detention that circumvented
judicial oversight and protections for detainees'
rights under the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL).
In March 2018, the National People's Congress
passed the PRC Supervision Law, authorizing the
National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to investigate
suspected official misconduct using methods including
``confinement'' (liuzhi), an extrajudicial form of
detention that allows NSC officials to hold individuals
without a guarantee of access to counsel. In May 2018,
the first reported death in ``confinement'' occurred,
that of Chen Yong. Chen's body reportedly showed signs
of abuse, and officials said Chen ``collapsed'' during
interrogation but did not specify a cause of death.
Authorities continued to detain individuals
under broad provisions in the PRC Criminal Law--such as
crimes of ``endangering state security'' and ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble''--to suppress rights
advocacy and other activities protected under
international human rights standards.
Authorities continued to abuse detainees'
rights under the CPL. Some detainees gave what appeared
to be scripted, coerced confessions, in some cases on
camera. For example, Swedish citizen Gui Minhai gave a
televised confession for allegedly cooperating with
Swedish authorities to attempt to leave China, after
Chinese authorities detained him as he traveled to
Beijing municipality with Swedish diplomats for a
medical exam. In another case, Taiwan college employee
and non-governmental organization (NGO) volunteer Lee
Ming-cheh gave what appeared to be a coerced confession
in court for ``subversion of state power.'' Officials
denied some detainees access to counsel, such as human
rights website editor Ding Lingjie and internet
commentator Chen Jieren.
Authorities held some rights advocates,
lawyers, petitioners, and others in prolonged pretrial
detention, including under ``residential surveillance
at a designated location'' (RSDL), a form of
incommunicado detention that can last up to six months,
restricts access to counsel, and places detainees at
risk of abuse by authorities. Observers reportedly were
unable to contact rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang since
authorities detained him on July 10, 2015. Wang's wife
reported in July 2018 that another lawyer reported
seeing Wang in a Tianjin municipality detention center.
Authorities reportedly postponed the June 20, 2018,
trial of 64 Tianwang website founder Huang Qi, whom
authorities detained on November 28, 2016. According to
an August 18, 2018, Radio Free Asia report, authorities
had not set a new trial date. Authorities also placed
rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and environmental petitioner
Ji Shulong under RSDL.
Authorities continued to torture and otherwise
abuse detainees in some cases. Officials in Shenyang
municipality, Liaoning province, reportedly detained
rights lawyer Li Yuhan and allowed other detainees to
throw her food on the floor, urinate on her food, and
throw cold water on her. Officials in Yu county,
Zhangjiakou municipality, Hebei province, reportedly
placed a hood over lawyer Wu Quan; took him to a
basement; bound him to an interrogation chair for 48
hours; and deprived him of water, sleep, and sufficient
clothing for the first 24 hours.
Authorities continued to develop technology-
based means to help public security officials track
persons of interest--based in part on large-scale,
sometimes involuntary collection of personal data--
raising concerns about privacy and public security
officials' capacity to crack down on rights advocates
and other targeted persons. The manner in which
authorities collected personal data, including
biometric data, appeared to violate privacy protections
in international human rights instruments, and the
Commission did not observe any efforts by the Chinese
government to bring the collection or use of such
information in line with international standards.
The Chinese government continued to claim that
it reserved the death penalty for a small number of
crimes and only the most serious offenders, while
Amnesty International estimated that China carried out
more executions than all other countries combined.
China continued to classify statistics on its use of
the death penalty as a state secret, and the Commission
did not observe official reports on overall death
penalty numbers. In December 2017, authorities in
Lufeng city, Shanwei municipality, Guangdong province,
sentenced to death 10 people variously for murder,
robbery, and drug-related crimes--in a public trial in
a stadium--and then immediately executed them. This
past year, the Commission did not observe any
rulemaking efforts to ban harvesting organs from
executed prisoners. At a trafficking conference at the
Vatican in 2018, the head of the China Organ Transplant
Response System reported that authorities made 220
arrests over the previous 10 years in connection to
illegal organ transplants and noted that authorities
continued to combat the practice.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to publicly commit to
a specific timetable for ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not
yet ratified.
Include discussion of rights protections for
government critics and rights advocates in a wide range
of bilateral and multilateral discussions with Chinese
officials. Stress to the Chinese government the
importance of procedural compliance and effective legal
representation in criminal cases in relation to the
goal of rule-based governance. Publicly convey support
for human rights advocates whom officials have deprived
of liberty on unsubstantiated criminal charges and for
apparent political or religious reasons.
Urge Chinese officials to end all forms of arbitrary
detention, as well as forms of extrajudicial detention
that are imposed without meeting the standards for a
fair trial as set forth in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and other international
human rights instruments.
Consult with Chinese officials regarding progress
toward adopting the recommendations made in February
2016 by the UN Committee against Torture in relation to
China's compliance with the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, such as the call to repeal the provisions
in Chinese law allowing for ``residential surveillance
at a designated location.'' Further, encourage Chinese
officials to extend invitations to all UN special
rapporteurs and other special procedures that have
requested visits to China.
Urge Chinese officials to adopt a legal and
regulatory framework for information technology-based
policing practices that meets international human
rights standards. Such a framework should include, for
example, privacy protections, restrictions on police
authority to collect personal information without
consent, and protections against discriminatory
practices, including profiling of ethnic and religious
minorities. Encourage Chinese officials to require
police who use information technology to complete
appropriate human rights training, and impose strict
penalties for officials who authorize or carry out
preemptive detentions.
Stress to the Chinese government the need for greater
transparency on the number and circumstances of
executions, and urge Chinese officials to further limit
the crimes for which the death penalty is applicable.
Urge the Chinese government to ban explicitly in
national legislation the harvesting of organs from
executed prisoners.
Continue and, where appropriate, expand support for
programs involving U.S. entities engaging with reform-
minded Chinese organizations and individuals (both
within and outside the government) that draw on
comparative experience to improve the criminal justice
process. For example, the experience of the United
States and other jurisdictions can inform China as it
charts a path toward reducing reliance on confessions,
enhancing the role of witnesses at trials, and creating
more reliable procedures for reviewing death penalty
cases.
Freedom of Religion
Findings
Both Chinese and international law provide
guarantees of religious freedom. Despite these
guarantees, the Commission continued to observe
widespread and systematic violation of the principles
of religious freedom, as Chinese authorities exercised
broad discretion over the religious practice of Chinese
citizens.
The importance of ``religious work'' to the
Chinese Communist Party agenda has undergone an
``unprecedented increase'' with ``major innovations''
under Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Party and
government officials continued to emphasize several key
policy principles in religious affairs during this
reporting year. These included ``guiding'' religious
groups to support Party leadership and the political
system; shaping religious practice in China to promote
and assimilate to a Chinese cultural identity
(``sinicization''); and using Chinese religious groups
to facilitate connections with other countries,
particularly those hosting Belt and Road Initiative
projects.
In March 2018, the Party's sweeping
reorganization plan for Party and government
institutions included a provision directing the Party's
United Front Work Department (UFWD) to take over the
government agency responsible for religious affairs at
the national level, making the national-level UFWD
directly responsible for administering policies
pertaining to religion in China.
The Chinese government's regulatory framework
for religion imposed increased restrictions on
religious freedom after revisions to the Regulations on
Religious Affairs took effect on February 1, 2018. The
revisions increased official control and scrutiny over
religious activity. The revisions also established new
legal responsibilities and penalties for violations of
the regulations. Religious believers and academic
experts predicted that the restrictions would increase
official pressure on religious groups, particularly
those not registered with the government. Many groups
refuse to register because registration requires
submitting to the direction of a state-sanctioned
patriotic religious association. Other laws and Party
policies also continued to restrict citizens' freedom
to hold religious beliefs and practice religion.
While government and Party officials rarely
targeted Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities with
direct suppression, they nonetheless continued to
subject these religions to extensive regulation and
control. Official regulation also included restrictions
aimed at stemming the perception of commercialization
of Buddhist and Taoist religious practices.
The government maintained measures that impede
the freedom of Chinese Catholic congregations to be led
by clergy who are selected and who conduct their
ministry according to the standards called for by
Catholic religious beliefs. The government also
continued to harass, detain, or hold incommunicado
certain leading Catholic clergy. In May 2018, the
national religious organizations for Catholics passed a
five-year plan for the ``sinicization'' of Catholicism
in China.
Party and government officials maintained
restrictions on the religious activities of Chinese
Protestants, with some believers facing harassment,
surveillance, detention, imprisonment, and other abuse
because of their religious activities. A U.S.-based
organization that advocates for religious freedom,
ChinaAid Association, reported that both instances of
official persecution and the number of believers
affected had increased in 2017 from the prior year.
Academic experts on Chinese religion and society stated
that the continued escalation of repression was due in
part to Party officials' concern that Christian
communities pose a challenge to the Party's monopoly on
political power. In several instances, authorities
detained house church members on the charge of
``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law'' under Article 300 of the
PRC Criminal Law.
The Commission noted reports of continued
repression of Falun Gong practitioners, by means of
harassment, arbitrary detention, and prosecution.
International organizations continued to express
concern over reports that organs of detained prisoners
have been used in numerous organ transplant operations
in China, including those of Falun Gong practitioners.
Medical professionals and international advocacy
organizations disputed Chinese health officials' claims
that organ procurement systems have been reformed in
compliance with international standards, citing ethical
concerns about organ sourcing raised by short wait
times for organ transplants and discrepancies in data
on organ transplants.
During this reporting year, official
restrictions on the religious freedom of Hui Muslim
believers increased. The local government in Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region, a region in which Hui Muslims
are concentrated, launched a ``rectification campaign''
that included the removal of ``Arabic style'' domes and
decor from mosques and other buildings, prohibitions on
calls to prayer, removal of the Quran and books on
Islam from retail shops, and the closure of schools
teaching Arabic. Hui Muslim believers in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region have also been sentenced for
``cult'' or other offenses for ``privately preaching
the Quran.''
Religious communities outside of the five
religions that are the main objects of official
regulation continued to exist in China, with some
continuing to enjoy tacit recognition and support,
while others faced suppression from authorities.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all
citizens freedom of religion in accordance with its
international human rights obligations. Stress to
Chinese authorities that freedom of religion includes
the right to freely adopt beliefs and practice
religious activities without government interference,
particularly those based on political goals.
Stress to the Chinese government that the right to
freedom of religion includes: the right of Buddhists
and Taoists to carry out activities in temples and
select monastic teachers independent of state controls;
the right of Catholics to be led by clergy who are
selected and who conduct their ministry according to
the standard called for by Catholic religious beliefs;
the right of Falun Gong practitioners to freely
practice Falun Gong inside China; the right of Muslims
to freely preach, undertake overseas pilgrimage, select
and train religious leaders, and wear clothing with
religious significance; the right of Protestants to
exercise their faith free from state controls over
doctrine and worship, and free from harassment,
detention, and other abuses for public and private
manifestations of their faith, including the display of
crosses; and the right of members of other religious
communities to be free from state control and
harassment.
Call for the release of persons confined, detained,
or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their religious
beliefs, as well as those confined, detained, or
imprisoned in connection to their association with
them. The Administration should use existing laws to
hold accountable Chinese government officials and
others complicit in severe religious freedom
restrictions, including by using the sanctions
available in the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328) and the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Ensure
that conditions related to religious freedom are taken
into account when negotiating any applicable trade
agreement as mandated by the Bipartisan Congressional
Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (Public
Law No. 114-26).
Publicly and privately advocate on behalf of persons
whom Chinese authorities continue to severely harass or
have detained for exercising their freedom of religion
or belief. Some of the many cases in need of legal,
humanitarian, and other forms of advocacy include
Catholic clergy pressured by Chinese authorities to
join the Catholic Patriotic Association, such as
Coadjutor Bishop Augustine Cui Tai of Xuanhua district,
Zhangjiakou municipality, Hebei province; Bishop James
Su Zhimin of Baoding municipality, Hebei province;
Father Lu Danhua of Qingtian county, Zhejiang province;
and Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin of Shanghai municipality,
whose movement reportedly remains restricted within
Sheshan Seminary in Shanghai. A number of leaders of
officially sanctioned Protestant groups have been
prosecuted and sentenced after protesting official
measures against their churches in recent years,
including Zhang Shaojie of Nanle county, Puyang
municipality, Henan province, as well as Bao Guohua and
Xing Wenxiang, both of Jinhua municipality, Zhejiang
province. Members of unofficial Protestant groups
(``house churches''), including 27 Protestant believers
across six different localities within Yunnan province,
have received criminal sentences for ``organizing and
using a cult to undermine implementation of the law''
under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law. The U.S.-
based non-governmental organization Dui Hua Foundation
reportedly found 800 official records of persons
sentenced in 2017 under Article 300 in Chinese judicial
databases, a majority of whom apparently are Falun Gong
practitioners. Representative cases of Falun Gong
practitioners in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database include Deng Cuiping of Yuxi municipality,
Yunnan, who is currently serving a six-year prison
sentence; Bian Lichao of Tangshan municipality, Hebei,
who is serving a 12-year prison sentence; and Zhang
Ming and Li Quanchen of Dandong municipality, Liaoning
province. Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to consult the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database for information on
political and religious prisoners.
Encourage U.S. political leaders to visit religious
sites in China to raise awareness of and promote
freedom of religion.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
At the March 2018 meetings of the National
People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference in Beijing (Two Sessions),
Chinese Communist Party and government authorities
changed the mechanisms they use to implement policies
toward ethnic minorities, as the Party's United Front
Work Department (UFWD) assumed control of the work of
the government departments overseeing ethnic affairs
(the State Ethnic Affairs Commission) and religion (the
State Administration for Religious Affairs). A number
of observers expressed the view that the UFWD's newly
expanded powers represented an official move toward
tighter Party control over ethnic affairs and policies
promoting ethnic assimilation over ethnic pluralism.
Authorities targeted ethnic Hui communities
with policies and restrictions limiting Hui Muslims'
religious practices. During the Two Sessions, Yang
Faming, Chairman of the China Islamic Association,
stressed that Muslims in China should incorporate
Chinese characteristics into Islamic religious rituals,
culture, and architecture, avoid the expansion of the
concept of ``halal'' into secular life, and adhere to
``socialist core values.'' According to an American
historian, Yang's speech reflected a formal declaration
of a policy trend that officials had begun implementing
in regions with significant Hui populations beginning
in fall 2016.
Government and Party officials implemented
policies limiting ethnic minorities' freedom to engage
in cultural practices and speak or learn their
languages. In December 2017, international media and
rights advocates reported that in a policy implemented
in September, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
education authorities had ended the use of Mongolian as
a language of instruction in elementary and lower
middle schools in Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol
Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR.
Mongol herders in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR) demonstrated and petitioned
authorities over the government's role in the loss of
their traditional grazing lands, the harmful ecological
effect of state development on grassland and livestock,
and the government's failure to provide herders with
adequate compensation for their land. As in past
reporting years, authorities detained some of the
Mongol herders who peacefully protested.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to build the capacity of Mongol, Uyghur, and
Tibetan groups working to advance human rights,
environmental protection, economic development, and
rule of law in China through U.S. foreign assistance
funding and by encouraging additional support from both
UN and non-governmental sources.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance of
respecting and protecting ethnic minority cultures and
languages. Urge Chinese officials to provide ethnic
minority students and parents a choice of what language
or languages of instruction should be used at schools
they attend in accordance with the PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law and the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities. Call on Chinese officials to
establish mechanisms that preserve and expand existing
instruction in ethnic minority languages from preschool
through the university level.
Call on the Chinese government to allow Mongol
herders to exercise their fundamental rights of freedom
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as
well as the right to be free from arbitrary detention.
Convey to Chinese officials the importance of
consulting with ethnic minority communities regarding
the impact of proposed development on their traditional
grazing lands.
Urge Chinese authorities to allow Hui and other
predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations to
freely engage in Islamic religious rituals, as a matter
of the right of religious freedom, and in accordance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as well as China's Constitution, which prohibits
discrimination based on religion.
Population Control
Findings
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year,
Chinese government authorities continued to promote and
implement coercive population control policies that
violate international standards, including the 1995
Beijing Declaration, the 1994 Programme of Action of
the Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development, and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. The amended PRC Population and Family
Planning Law and provincial-level regulations limit
couples' freedom to build their families as they see
fit.
The Chinese Communist Party and government
implemented the ``universal two-child policy'' for a
third consecutive year in 2018, and government
statistics showed that the policy was not effective in
spurring population growth. The National Bureau of
Statistics of China (NBS) reported that the number of
total births in 2017 was 17.23 million, 630,000 less
than the 2016 NBS figure. The National Health and
Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) had predicted in
2016 that the universal two-child policy would result
in 3 million additional births per year.
During this reporting year, central Party and
government officials pledged to strengthen supporting
policies that facilitate implementation of family
planning policies. Some local governments introduced
supporting policies--including longer paid maternity
leave, financial incentives and subsidies, and other
benefits--to encourage couples to have a second child.
During this reporting year, central
authorities issued a plan to restructure Party and
government agencies, including merging the NHFPC and
several other agencies to create a new National Health
Commission (NHC) under the State Council. The NHC will
assume oversight of responsibilities related to family
planning management and services, in addition to
managing an aging population and other health-related
matters. Some observers saw the restructuring plan as
an indication that authorities plan to eventually
eliminate birth limit policies. Experts from academic
institutions affiliated with the Party and government,
as well as a provincial government report on population
development, called for ending the birth limit
policies. The NHC reportedly stated that authorities
were considering ending the two-child birth limit.
According to a May 2018 Bloomberg News report,
central government authorities reportedly were
considering and may have reached a decision to end
birth limit policies due to demographic concerns, such
as the declining birth rate, aging population, and
shrinking workforce. The report also cited
international criticism of the policies as a factor in
the decision.
The amended PRC Population and Family Planning
Law contains provisions that prohibit officials from
infringing upon the ``legitimate rights and interests''
of citizens while implementing family planning
policies. Some provincial population planning
regulations and local government authorities, however,
continued to explicitly instruct officials to carry out
abortions, often referred to as ``remedial measures,''
for illegal pregnancies. Local authorities continued to
promote the implementation of harsh and invasive family
planning measures. Officials imposed or threatened
various punishments to enforce family planning
policies, including heavy fines, job termination,
detention, and abortion.
Decades of population control policies have
exacerbated China's demographic challenges, which
include a rapidly aging population, shrinking
workforce, and sex ratio imbalance. China's total
fertility rate has dropped from approximately 3 births
per woman in the late 1970s to an estimated 1.6 births
per woman in 2017, below the replacement rate of 2.1
births per woman necessary to maintain a stable
population. The National Bureau of Statistics of China
reported that from 2016 to 2017, China's working-age
population (persons between the ages of 16 and 59)
declined by 5.48 million people to 901.99 million,
while the elderly population (persons aged 60 or older)
increased by 10.04 million in 2017 to 240.90 million
people, or 17.3 percent of the total population. The
overall sex ratio in 2017 was 104.81 males to 100
females, and there were approximately 32.66 million
more males than females in China.
International media reports continued to
suggest a link between China's sex ratio imbalance and
the trafficking of foreign women into China for forced
marriage or commercial sexual exploitation. Reports
also indicated that decades of birth limits under
China's population control policies combined with a
traditional preference for sons may have encouraged a
black market for illegal adoptions.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Press Chinese government officials to bring the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law into conformance
with international standards set forth in international
agreements, including the 1995 Beijing Declaration, the
1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
Highlight the looming demographic challenges
currently facing China in bilateral meetings with
Chinese government officials--including a rapidly aging
population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio
imbalance. As the universal two-child policy may not
adequately address these demographic challenges, urge
the Chinese government to heed the recommendations of
domestic and international demographic experts by
ending, as soon as possible, all birth restrictions on
families and abolishing ``social compensation fees.''
Use authorities provided in the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2000 (Public Law No. 106-113) and
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(Public Law No. 114-328) to deny entry into the United
States of and impose sanctions against Chinese
officials who have been directly involved in the
formulation, implementation, or enforcement of China's
coercive family planning policies, including those who
have forced men and women to undergo sterilizations and
abortions.
Call on China's central and local governments to
vigorously enforce provisions of Chinese laws that
provide for punishment of officials and other
individuals who engage in these abuses.
Publicly link, with supporting evidence, the sex
ratio imbalance exacerbated by China's population
control policies with potential regional humanitarian
and security concerns--human trafficking, crime,
increased internal and external migration, and other
possible serious social, economic, and political
problems--and discuss and address these issues in
bilateral and multilateral dialogues.
Special Topic: Forced Evictions in Beijing Municipality
Findings
In November 2017, Beijing municipal
authorities responded to a fire in a migrant
neighborhood with a campaign of forced evictions. On
November 18, a fire broke out in an apartment building,
killing 19 people. Of the 19 victims, 17 were migrants,
meaning they were registered in localities outside of
Beijing under the Chinese government's household
registration (hukou) system.
Following the fire, the Beijing government
launched a campaign to inspect buildings for fire
hazards, which resulted in large-scale forced evictions
and demolitions in migrant neighborhoods across
Beijing. Some affected residents reported being forced
to leave their homes within three days, with some given
a few hours' notice or less. The Commission did not
observe official reports on the number of people
evicted in Beijing, but international media estimated
that tens of thousands were affected. The number of
migrants in Beijing reportedly fell by 132,000 from the
end of 2016 to the end of 2017.
As events unfolded, some migrants and locals
attempted to confront government officials over their
evictions. Non-governmental organizations, companies,
and individuals offered assistance to displaced
migrants. Internet users engaged in online debates and
criticized the eviction campaign as videos showing
evictions, demolitions, and displaced migrant workers
spread quickly on Chinese social media.
The government responded by restricting
domestic reporting on the evictions, and censoring
online discussion and civil society groups. Authorities
also detained an artist for sharing videos of the
evictions and detained six others, reportedly for
helping the artist flee. Authorities released the seven
on bail and forced the artist to leave Beijing and
return to his hometown in another province.
Some observers viewed the eviction campaign
that began in November 2017 as part of the Beijing
government's long-term plan to limit the population of
Beijing. In September 2017, central authorities
approved Beijing municipal authorities' plan to cap
Beijing's population at 23 million by 2020. In December
2017, central authorities also approved a plan to cap
Shanghai's population at 25 million by 2035.
Actions taken by Chinese government officials
enforcing the eviction campaign in Beijing contravene
both international standards and Chinese law, and
restrictions arising from the hukou system contravene
international human rights standards guaranteeing
freedom of residence.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on Chinese authorities to end forced evictions
across China, and to follow both international and
Chinese law in providing adequate notice, compensation,
and assistance to residents when public safety requires
demolishing dangerous structures.
Encourage the Chinese government to expand both the
rights of migrant workers in China, and the space for
civil society organizations that provide social
services and legal assistance to migrant workers,
rather than cracking down on such organizations. Note
that improving the rights of migrant workers and
expanding their access to social services is likely to
lower the chances of spontaneous, large-scale protests,
while large-scale forced evictions could increase the
likelihood of such protests.
Call on Chinese authorities to accelerate reforms to
the hukou system, including lowering restrictions on
migration to major cities and centers of economic
opportunity; equalizing the level and quality of public
benefits and services tied to local hukou and residence
permits; and implementing laws and regulations to
provide equal treatment for all Chinese citizens,
regardless of place of birth, residence, or hukou
status.
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with
Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged
in research and outreach to migrants, in order to
advance legal and anti-discrimination assistance for
migrants and their families, and to encourage policy
debates aimed at eliminating inequality and
discrimination connected to residence policies,
including the hukou system.
Status of Women
Findings
Employment discrimination against women
continued to be a serious problem this past year.
Employers routinely discriminate against women in
hiring, wages, and promotion. Discriminatory and
sexualized views of women were pervasive in job
recruitment advertisements. Gender inequality in
employment has increased during the period of market
liberalization, and much of the disparity is attributed
to the shifting of responsibility for child care from
the state system (via publicly funded maternity leave
and nursery schools) to the private sector, with the
resulting burden falling disproportionately to
individual women and employer-funded maternity leave.
Employers viewed women as more costly than male
employees, and such discrimination has worsened with
the implementation of the ``universal two-child
policy.''
Women in China continued to face challenges
with domestic and sexual violence. While there were
improvements in implementation of the PRC Anti-Domestic
Violence Law evidenced by increased awareness and the
publishing of local implementing regulations, other
challenges remained. Chinese courts maintained an
evidentiary standard for proving domestic violence that
was difficult for victims to meet, and victims escaping
abusive domestic situations received inadequate support
in seeking shelters.
Women in China continued to lack secure rights
to property due to a combination of discriminatory
policy implementation and adherence to patriarchal
cultural values. Officials suggested a number of
proposals aimed at addressing these issues during the
upcoming round of agricultural policy reforms.
Authorities maintained tight restrictions on
the political environment for engaging in women's
rights advocacy--a continuation of the official
repression of women's rights advocacy beginning in
2015. In January 2018, Chinese students, alumni, and
faculty initiated a series of independent campaigns to
prevent sexual harassment on college campuses. These
included public allegations of misconduct by individual
professors, petitions calling on universities to
institute policies to prevent sexual harassment, and
public requests for information about university
actions in past sexual assault cases. While some
actions taken by university and government authorities
were supportive of the issues raised by the campaigns,
official responses nonetheless prioritized suppressing
grassroots mobilization. Reports of sexual harassment
in other sectors such as manufacturing, journalism,
civil society, the state-sanctioned Buddhist community,
and the Protestant community in Hong Kong also drew
public attention.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Publicly and privately urge the Chinese government to
respect the freedom of expression and assembly of all
rights advocates, and in particular to refrain from
harassing and intimidating independent women's rights
advocates seeking to increase awareness about sexual
harassment in public areas.
Urge the Chinese government to publicly expand its
commitment to gender equality through measures such as
increasing the number of women in the highest levels of
political leadership, instituting gender equality and
anti-harassment trainings in government workplaces, and
challenging discriminatory attitudes based on gender
through public education.
Commend the Chinese government for recent legal
developments aimed at promoting the welfare of women
and gender equality. These include the passage of the
PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law and the inclusion of a
gender discrimination case among the Supreme People's
Court's guiding cases. Encourage the government to
strengthen formal support services for implementation--
for example, by increasing funding for health services
or shelters for women experiencing violence, providing
funding and support for attorneys for legal services,
and allowing independent lawyers and advocates to
assist with the promotion and implementation of laws
related to gender equality through lawsuits and public
campaigns.
Support international exchanges among academics,
legal advocates, non-governmental organizations, and
others that focus on the implementation and enforcement
of recently adopted laws promoting gender equity. In
particular, facilitate and support technical assistance
programs that would help both men and women working in
law enforcement and the judiciary to implement the PRC
Anti-Domestic Violence Law effectively and challenge
discriminatory attitudes based on gender. As the first
point of contact, law enforcement in particular should
be trained in addressing reports of violence in a way
that does not undermine victims' concerns or safety.
Facilitate and support technical assistance programs
that would help the development of gender equality
education in schools and communities.
Encourage the collection and analysis of data on
gender-based disparities in economic and social life so
as to monitor changes.
Human Trafficking
Findings
As a State Party to the UN Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), China
is obligated to enact legislation criminalizing human
trafficking as defined by the UN TIP Protocol. The
definition of human trafficking in Chinese law,
however, remains inconsistent with UN TIP Protocol
standards, contributing to the difficulty of assessing
the scale of human trafficking in China.
The Commission observed reports of human
trafficking from Southeast Asian countries to China for
forced marriage and forced labor, as well as
trafficking of Chinese nationals to the United States
for forced labor and sexual exploitation.
The Chinese government continued to subject
individuals to forced labor during pretrial detention
and in administrative detention centers. Local
authorities in Hotan prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, reportedly required some Uyghur
women and children to perform forced labor.
This past year, Chinese workers migrating
within China were at risk of human trafficking, and
government restrictions on worker rights exacerbated
this risk. A lack of economic opportunity in Southeast
Asian countries contributed to human trafficking
vulnerability in that region. China's sex ratio
imbalance has created a demand for marriageable women
that may contribute to human trafficking for forced
marriage. In addition, the Chinese government continued
to treat North Korean refugees as economic migrants and
maintained a policy of repatriating undocumented North
Koreans, leaving the refugees vulnerable to
trafficking.
The government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) reportedly continued to
generate revenue by sending DPRK nationals to work in
China under conditions that may constitute forced
labor. Reports from October 2017 indicated that many
workers had been or would be sent back to North Korea
due to the Chinese government's enforcement of UN
sanctions; however, the DPRK reportedly began sending
workers to China again in March 2018, possibly in
violation of UN sanctions.
Hong Kong remained a destination for human
trafficking, with migrant domestic workers particularly
at risk of exploitation for forced labor. The Hong Kong
government maintained that comprehensive anti-
trafficking legislation was unnecessary and that human
trafficking in Hong Kong was rare.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
commitments under the UN TIP Protocol to bring anti-
trafficking legislation into alignment with
international standards, specifically with regard to
China's legal definition of human trafficking.
Emphasize that this would facilitate better data
collection and cross-border comparisons, which in turn
would better inform domestic and multilateral anti-
trafficking policies. Call on the Chinese government to
extend coverage of the UN TIP Protocol to include Hong
Kong.
Support U.S. Government efforts to improve human
trafficking data collection. Work with regional
governments, multilateral institutions, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to encourage and
support the collection of more accurate data in order
to better assess the scale and root causes of human
trafficking in Asia and monitor the effectiveness of
anti-trafficking measures. Urge the Chinese government
to collect and publish relevant law enforcement data.
Discuss in appropriate bilateral and multilateral
meetings the importance of protecting worker rights as
a means of combating human trafficking for the purpose
of forced labor. Stress that when workers are able to
organize and advocate for their rights, they are less
vulnerable to all forms of exploitation, including
forced labor. Highlight the September 2016 report of
Maina Kiai, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association, which stated that the failure to protect
workers' right to freedom of association ``directly
contributes to problems such as human trafficking and
slavery.''
Encourage and engage in continued regional
cooperation to combat human trafficking through
multilateral agreements and forums such as the
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against
Trafficking, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the
East Asia Summit. Such regional cooperation should
address migration and the flow of refugees, poverty,
sex ratio imbalances, and other risk factors that
contribute to human trafficking.
Pursue cooperation on anti-trafficking efforts
through the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law
Enforcement Cooperation. Support the work of the U.S.
Department of State's International Law Enforcement
Academy Program in Bangkok, Thailand, to build regional
law enforcement capacity.
Facilitate international exchanges among civil
society groups and industry associations to raise
awareness of best practices for identifying and
combating human trafficking in supply chains. Support
NGOs working on anti-trafficking research, education,
prevention, and victims' services throughout Asia.
Incorporate language into bilateral and multilateral
economic agreements requiring member countries to
improve data collection on human trafficking and to
take concrete steps toward eliminating human
trafficking within their borders.
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year,
the Chinese government's policy of detaining North
Korean refugees and repatriating them to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remained in place, in
violation of its obligations under international human
rights and refugee law.
Heightened security measures along the China-
North Korea and China-Southeast Asia borders increased
the risks North Korean refugees face, and may be
limiting the outflow of refugees from the DPRK. South
Korean Ministry of Unification data indicated that
1,127 North Korean refugees reached South Korea in
2017, continuing a trend of significant decline since
2009 when the yearly number of refugees entering South
Korea peaked at 2,914.
After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's March
2018 visit to China, Chinese authorities reportedly
increased the monetary reward for reporting North
Korean refugees hiding inside China. As a result,
Chinese authorities reportedly caught and detained many
North Korean refugees.
Chinese authorities appeared to have
intensified crackdowns on organizations and individuals
in China, particularly South Korean Christian
missionaries and churches, that have played a crucial
role in assisting and facilitating the movement of
North Korean refugees outside the DPRK.
North Korean women who enter China illegally
remain particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.
The majority of North Korean refugees leaving the DPRK
are women, many of whom are trafficked from the DPRK
into, or within, China for the purposes of forced
marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.
Many children born to Chinese fathers and
North Korean mothers remain deprived of basic rights to
education and other public services owing to a lack of
legal resident status in China, which constitutes a
violation of international law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to recognize North
Koreans in China as refugees, especially as refugees
sur place who fear persecution upon return to their
country of origin, regardless of their reason for
leaving the DPRK; immediately halt the repatriation of
North Korean refugees; adopt asylum or refugee
legislation and incorporate the principle of non-
refoulment into domestic legislation; establish a
responsible government institution and mechanism to
determine asylee or refugee status for North Koreans
seeking international protection in China, in
cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;
and allow North Korean refugees safe passage to another
country, including to the Republic of Korea.
Consider using the suite of sanctions that are
available, where appropriate, against Chinese
government agencies and individuals involved in the
repatriation of North Korean refugees; and press for
increased international monitoring of and
accountability for the Chinese government's treatment
of refugees. Urge Chinese authorities to recognize the
legal status of North Korean women who marry or have
children with Chinese citizens, and ensure that all
such children are granted resident status and access to
education and other public services in accordance with
Chinese law and international standards.
Appoint and confirm the U.S. Special Envoy on North
Korean Human Rights Issues, and encourage the Special
Envoy to work with South Korean counterparts to
coordinate efforts related to humanitarian assistance
and human rights promotion for North Korean refugees in
China, in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights
Reauthorization Act (Public Law No. 115-198).
Public Health
Findings
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year,
the Chinese government and Communist Party implemented
institutional reforms to support evolving public health
priorities and engaged in international exchanges
focused on public health issues.
Health-based discrimination in employment and
education continued, and universities continued to
experience shortcomings with accessible facilities for
disabled students. To increase school completion rates,
authorities in different localities issued guidance
implementing a July 2017 State Council General Office
circular that included a focus on disabled students.
Authorities continued to suppress public
health information in sensitive cases. For three months
in 2017, authorities in Hunan province did not
acknowledge publicly a tuberculosis outbreak at a high
school in Taojiang county, Yiyang municipality, Hunan,
that resulted in 29 confirmed cases.
This past year, authorities continued efforts
and took new approaches to prevent the spread of HIV/
AIDS, but social stigma and authorities' efforts to
suppress HIV/AIDS rights advocacy continued.
People with mental illness--many of whom
suffer from additional disadvantages--remained at risk
of discrimination and faced inadequate access to
medical care. Authorities continued to forcibly commit
individuals without mental illness to psychiatric
facilities to punish rights advocacy. In February 2018,
the Supreme People's Procuratorate reportedly released
provisions clarifying the procuratorate's role in
supervising procedures that include psychiatric
treatment and assessment in criminal cases, but the
actual effect remained unclear.
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) compelled residents to submit to the
large-scale collection of biometric data intended for
dual use by public health and public security
authorities. These efforts coincided with broader
efforts by public security authorities to collect and
integrate personal information to predict perceived
threats to public security, as part of efforts to
maintain ``stability'' or ``harmony.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to support technical assistance and exchange
programs in public health. Require that U.S.-China
cooperative programs include the participation of U.S.
and Chinese non-governmental organizations and a focus
on human rights. Introduce human rights as an area of
focus in the U.S.-China Social and Cultural Dialogue.
Urge Chinese officials--including officials in the
newly formed National Health Commission--to focus on
effective implementation of laws and regulations that
prohibit health-based discrimination in employment and
education. Encourage Chinese officials to highlight
improvements to standards at the subnational level,
such as the amendment of discriminatory provisions for
hiring teachers in Fujian province discussed in this
section. Where appropriate, share the United States'
ongoing experience with and efforts in promoting the
rights of persons with disabilities in education and
employment, through non-governmental advocacy and
services, and legal and regulatory means.
Call attention to Chinese authorities' efforts to
suppress public health information and health-related
rights advocacy. Raise individual cases in meetings
with Chinese officials, such as the case of HIV/AIDS
rights advocate Sun Ya and medical doctor Tan Qindong.
Urge the Chinese government to establish panels of
legal, medical, social work, and security professionals
from within and outside the government to monitor and
report on implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law
(MHL) and initiatives under the National Mental Health
Work Plan (2015-2020) to ensure that local
implementation consistently meets standards of care and
rights protection stipulated in the MHL, the PRC Law on
the Protection of the Rights of Persons With
Disabilities, and international standards.
The Environment
Findings
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year,
despite top Chinese Communist Party and government
leaders highlighting the importance of protecting the
environment, environmental pollution remained a major
challenge. Chinese authorities' top-down approach to
environmental issues limited the role of civil society
and the public. In October 2017, at the 19th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President and
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping avowed the
importance of China's top-down approach to
environmental protection in ``ensuring harmony between
humans and nature.''
In March 2018, central authorities established
a new Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) to
replace the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and a
new Ministry of Natural Resources to replace the
Ministry of Land and Resources. According to a number
of environmental experts, the MEE may strengthen
environmental protection by consolidating environmental
oversight and improving bureaucratic efficiency.
In early 2018, authorities reported achieving
the government's five-year (2013-2017) targets for
improving air quality, but implementation of the plan
resulted in significant hardships. In order to meet the
air quality targets, authorities shut down thousands of
factories and mandated that millions of Chinese stop
using coal for heat during the winter, even though no
replacement was available. An international advocacy
group collected 5,822 posts to Weibo, China's Twitter-
like microblogging platform, in November and December
2017, to document citizens' complaints about the lack
of heat, and international media reported that millions
may have lacked proper heating in subfreezing
temperatures. The government's top environmental
official acknowledged that some local governments had
even closed enterprises that were in compliance with
emissions rules.
During this reporting year, state-run and
other official media reported on multiple incidents in
which Chinese officials attempted to manipulate
environmental monitoring data or failed to investigate
reports of serious pollution. In January 2018, the
Beijing Times reported that Shizuishan municipality
officials in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region
attempted to spray water near the building that housed
the monitoring equipment to improve air quality
readings, but instead turned the building into an ``ice
sculpture'' after the spray froze. Shortcomings in
environmental transparency, including access to
credible official environmental data, continued to be a
long-term obstacle to assessing environmental quality
and the efficacy of pollution control efforts.
Although some non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have standing as plaintiffs in public interest
lawsuits, most ``public interest'' litigation continued
to be brought by the government. Cases in which NGOs
initiated public interest lawsuits this past year
included litigation against a hydroelectric power
company in Yunnan province over damage to the
rainforest, and litigation against local governments in
Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province, for illegally
moving culturally significant trees.
Chinese citizens continued to raise their
concerns about health issues related to the environment
through street-level protests and other forms of public
advocacy. Chinese environmental advocates were detained
during this reporting year for protesting land
reclamation, illegal quarrying, and mining.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of
environmental advocates and follow international
standards on freedom of speech, association, and
assembly, including those contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and China's
Constitution. Raise the detention of environmental
advocates Karma and Chen Wuquan in meetings with
Chinese officials.
Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working to
expand awareness of citizens' environmental rights in
China and the protection of those rights.
Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen the rule of
law and transparency in the environmental and climate
sectors. Raise questions with Chinese officials about
the manipulation of environmental data and censorship
of environmental news reporting. U.S. officials should
also raise questions about the lack of transparency
regarding public disclosure of emissions data from key
polluting enterprises.
Continue to support U.S.-China technical and legal
collaboration on environmental protection and energy
efficiency. U.S.-China cooperation should focus on
programs aimed at increasing media freedom and public
participation; improving transparency and the rule of
law; reducing air, water, and soil contamination; and
improving government accountability.
Civil Society
Findings
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year,
the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
view civil society's primary role as ``cooperating
with'' (xietong) the Party's agenda for social
governance under one-party rule. At the 19th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Party General
Secretary and President Xi Jinping reiterated the role
of Chinese civil society in the context of Party and
government leadership: ``Party committees exercise
leadership, government assumes responsibility, non-
governmental actors provide assistance, and the public
get involved.'' Ever since Xi's ascendance to the
Party's top leadership role in late 2012, advocacy
organizations operating in previously tolerated ``gray
areas'' have experienced what experts describe as a
``chilling effect.''
This past year, the government continued to
suppress the rights of Chinese human rights defenders
and political groups working on human rights advocacy.
These advocates, among others, included Zhen Jianghua
from Human Rights Campaign in China; Guo Qingjun and
other members of the National Tourism Chat Group that
provided support for families of political prisoners;
and Xu Qin, Qin Yongmin, and Zhao Suli, affiliated with
the China Human Rights Watch group.
The government continued to implement the PRC
Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China, which took
effect in January 2017. While some international NGOs
have successfully registered representative offices in
China, including philanthropic organizations that had
relationships with local governments, at least four
organizations that have long worked on training
lawyers, the protection of women, and LGBT rights
reported that they were unable to register or obtain
temporary activity permits. Other organizations that
work in human rights and rule of law chose to suspend
their operations or leave China.
Chinese authorities continued to detain and
prosecuted Taiwan human rights NGO volunteer Lee Ming-
cheh this past year. After authorities detained Lee in
March 2017, the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office
subsequently confirmed that Chinese authorities were
investigating Lee for ``endangering state security''
and had formally arrested Lee on suspicion of
``subversion of state power'' in May 2017. On September
11, 2017, the Yueyang Municipal Intermediate People's
Court in Hunan province tried Lee on the charge of
``subversion of state power''--to which he pleaded
guilty and for which he expressed remorse--and on
November 28, sentenced him to five years in prison.
Observers from international human rights organizations
suspected that authorities coerced Lee into confessing,
calling the trial ``outrageous'' and ``politically
motivated.''
This past year, the government focused on
cracking down on ``illegal social organizations,''
targeting those that ``threaten state security and
social stability.'' In January 2018, the Ministry of
Civil Affairs issued the Measures for Social
Organizations Credit Information Management, which
authorize the government to create an official list for
organizations that are ``severely illegal [and] not
trustworthy.''
Two years after the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(MCA) released draft revisions to the three major
regulations for civil society organizations, the MCA
released new draft regulations for public comment in
early August 2018, combining the three regulations that
form the core of the regulatory system for domestic
social service organizations, foundations, and social
associations into one document.
The National People's Congress approved State
Council reform plans, which provide for the
establishment of a new International Development
Cooperation Agency that will integrate foreign aid and
development assistance efforts, including the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI). In November 2017, the Director
of the International Department of the Party Central
Committee--a key Party department charged with
extending the Party's influence and advancing its
interests overseas--opened the first Silk Road NGO
Cooperation Network Forum designed to strengthen
cooperation between NGOs among participating BRI
countries.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to hasten the enactment
of legal provisions pertaining to civil society that
are consistent with China's Constitution as well as
China's international obligations. Call on China to
ratify the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
Urge the Chinese government to revise or repeal the
PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities
in Mainland China and revise the PRC Charity Law to
reflect the principles of the ICCPR, especially with
regard to the rights to freedom of association,
assembly, and expression.
Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of
civil society advocates and NGOs and provide adequate
procedural due process for those individuals subject to
criminal investigations and trials.
Integrate civil society issues into bilateral
discussions and agreements with Chinese officials to
promote reciprocity in the approach and implementation
of civil society exchanges between the United States
and China.
Continue to fund, monitor, and evaluate foreign
assistance programs in China that support democracy
promotion, rule of law, and human rights advocacy.
Promote a rules-based international development model
that encompasses human rights protections for
developing countries instead of an alternative model of
development aid that delinks human rights and rule of
law considerations.
Take measures to facilitate the participation of
Chinese civil society advocates in relevant
international conferences and forums, and support
international training to build their leadership
capacity in non-profit management, public policy
advocacy, and media relations.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and
President Xi Jinping demanded that all sectors of
society obey the Party, which increasingly came under
Xi's personal leadership. The Party's constitution was
amended to recognize Xi as the core leader, and the
country's constitution was amended to remove the
existing term limits on the presidency, potentially
allowing Xi to remain president indefinitely. Although
official news media touted wide public support of the
amendment, authorities reportedly suppressed dissenting
voices by means of censorship and detention.
Xi Jinping further undermined previous limited
attempts to develop intraparty democracy when he
decided to handpick the candidates for China's power
center--the Communist Party Central Committee Political
Bureau (Politburo) and its standing committee--which
marks a departure from the existing practice of having
a group of senior Party officials nominate candidates.
Several developments this past year signified
regression from international standards of democratic
governance. The political structure underwent
significant reorganization, tightening the Party's
control over the state and society. For example, the
Central Party School merged with the Chinese Academy
for Governance, a state entity, to ensure government
officials' ideological conformity. Moreover, the Party
assumed managerial functions over the press and the
media, and took on policymaking authority over
religious and ethnic minority matters.
The National People's Congress created a new
government agency, the National Supervisory Commission
(NSC). The NSC is responsible for investigating cases
of corruption and official misconduct, and in practice
is an extension of the Party's Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection (CCDI). While the CCDI deals with
cases concerning Party members, the NSC has
jurisdiction over the entire public sector and has
authority to extrajudicially detain anyone suspected of
being complicit in corruption or official misconduct,
potentially affecting private and foreign citizens.
As corruption remained a significant problem
in China, reports continued to emerge this past year
highlighting the political nature of the anticorruption
campaign, with the former CCDI head identifying
political corruption, referring to activities that
dilute the Party's centralized power, as the worst form
of corruption.
The Commission observed no progress in
expanding the scope of elections and saw reports of
officials suppressing meaningful participation in or
speech regarding elections. In terms of public
participation in the rulemaking process, the State
Council amended two sets of regulations requiring the
rulemaking body to solicit public comments. The
amendments, however, did not provide for a mechanism to
ensure consideration of public comments. The amendments
added language requiring compliance with the Party's
policies and decisions.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support U.S. research programs that document and
analyze the governing institutions and ideological
campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as
its influence over companies, government agencies,
legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Employ a ``whole-of-government'' approach to
encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and release individuals detained or imprisoned for
exercising their rights to freedom of speech,
association, and assembly. These individuals include
those mentioned in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database, such as Yu Qiyong, Liu
Feiyue, and Qin Yongmin.
Support joint U.S.-China cooperative programs to
develop independent village committee and people's
congress election monitoring systems. Encourage central
and local Party and government leaders to implement
free and fair elections across China. Continue to fund,
monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of democracy
promotion and rule of law programs in China.
Support organizations working in China that seek to
work with local governments and NGOs to improve
transparency, especially with regard to efforts to
expand and improve China's open government information
initiatives. Urge Party officials to further increase
the transparency of Party affairs.
Call on the Chinese government to improve procedures
through which citizens may hold their officials
accountable outside of the internal Party-led
anticorruption campaign. Urge Party and government
officials to establish and improve public participation
in government affairs. Encourage top-level officials to
reform governing institutions to promote an authentic
multi-party system with protections for freedom of
speech, association, and assembly.
Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights
Findings
Since China's accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the Chinese government has made
progress toward meeting requirements for improving
transparency of trade-
related laws, yet still falls short in some areas such
as publishing local regulations and translating trade-
related documents. Although the government publishes
many trade-related laws and administrative regulations,
the government has in many cases failed to publish
local regulations and other legal documents such as
opinions, circulars, and subsidy measures.
The Commission observed reports of improved
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in
some areas, though concerns remained about IPR
infringement, including forced technology transfers. A
March 2018 report from the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) found that the Chinese government
uses restrictions on foreign ownership in certain
sectors of the economy to force technology transfers
through the establishment of joint ventures with
Chinese firms, and that authorities often demand
technology transfers orally or informally to avoid the
appearance of violating international trade
obligations.
The Chinese government took some steps toward
meeting the WTO requirement for equal treatment of
domestic and foreign companies, though 75 percent of
U.S. companies surveyed by the American Chamber of
Commerce in China reported feeling ``less welcome in
China than before.'' Reports continued to emerge this
past year of favorable treatment of domestic firms over
foreign firms through the blocking of foreign websites
and other formal restrictions on foreign firms. The
Commission further observed reports of other forms of
preferential treatment, both of domestic firms and of
government- or Party-connected firms.
The Chinese Communist Party and government
maintain a role in most enterprises that operate in
mainland China, whether they are state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), domestic private firms, foreign
firms, or joint ventures. According to government data,
as of the end of 2016, 93.2 percent of SOEs and 67.9
percent of private enterprises had Party groups, as did
70 percent of foreign-invested enterprises. Reports
from this past year indicate that the Party and
government are attempting to expand their roles in
commercial enterprises.
Companies provided a wide range of equipment
and services to the government in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), despite reports of the
regional government's severe repression of religious
freedom and the detention of hundreds of thousands of
individuals belonging to Muslim ethnic minority groups
in a network of extrajudicial ``political reeducation''
centers. For example, the international security
services company Frontier Services Group reportedly
partnered with the state-owned enterprise CITIC Group
to invest in a Beijing municipality-based security
training school that is building a branch in the XUAR
to train military and police personnel.
Human rights groups warned that Chinese laws
allow for collection of personal data from commercial
firms without adequately protecting individuals' right
to privacy as provided for in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Despite these privacy concerns,
international companies stored Chinese user data in
mainland China to comply with domestic law. Chinese
companies also collect large amounts of data from their
users. It is unclear how much data these companies
share with authorities, but reports indicate that
domestic technology firms work closely with police and
other government authorities.
Government and companies' large-scale
collection of data in China includes the collection of
biometric data such as faces, voice samples, and DNA.
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
continued to work with Chinese companies to develop and
implement a social credit system that aims to aggregate
and monitor data that the government and companies
collect, which some observers warned could increase the
government's capacity for social control. Chinese
security authorities are also working with companies to
integrate improved technology into China's expanding
network of surveillance cameras, despite concerns over
the government's use of surveillance to target rights
advocates and ethnic minorities.
The Chinese government continued to restrict
freedom of expression online by blocking and censoring
content. Chinese authorities require companies to
monitor content on their websites and applications
(apps), and in several cases this past year,
authorities threatened or punished companies for online
content. Faced with the possibility of lost revenue and
other forms of punishment, both domestic and
international companies engaged in self-censorship. In
March 2018, one media scholar described how film
industry executives outside mainland China have invited
Chinese content regulators to speak at conferences to
provide guidance on how to create content that Chinese
censors will allow. In the summer of 2018, dozens of
international airline companies reportedly changed
their international websites to comply with Chinese
government demands to remove references to Taiwan as a
country.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Work with allies and governments of other market-
oriented economies to voice concerns over the unequal
treatment of foreign companies in China and the
increasing role of the Chinese Communist Party in
Chinese state-owned enterprises, in joint ventures with
foreign companies, and in private companies operating
within mainland China.
Encourage the Chinese government to continue to
improve enforcement of intellectual property rights,
noting that as indigenous innovation increases in
China, stronger enforcement of intellectual property
rights will be beneficial to both the United States and
China. In public and private meetings with Chinese
government counterparts, U.S. officials should
highlight the concerns of international businesses
regarding continued infringement of intellectual
property rights, including through forced technology
transfers.
In meetings with constituents engaged in business
ventures in China, encourage business leaders to adhere
to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights by developing internal policies to assess and
mitigate the risk of complicity in the Chinese
government's ongoing abuses of human rights,
particularly in regions with egregious human rights
violations, such as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.
USTR should, under WTO rules, request detailed
information from the Chinese government on internet
restrictions that result in the blocking of the
websites of U.S. companies. If warranted, a WTO dispute
should be considered. In meetings with Chinese
officials, urge the Chinese government to provide
reciprocal access for and stop blocking Chinese
internet users' access to U.S. media and technology
companies in China.
Encourage U.S. companies that receive censorship
requests from Chinese authorities to comply with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the
Global Network Initiative's Principles on Freedom of
Expression and, where possible, disclose such requests
to the public.
Access to Justice
Findings
Despite reported improvements in the judiciary
system's bureaucratic efficiency, increasing political
control and continued persecution of rights lawyers
undermine citizens' confidence and ability to seek and
obtain justice. Zhou Qiang, a senior Party member and
the Supreme People's Court President, advocated for
absolute loyalty and obedience to the Chinese Communist
Party. Zhou said it was the judiciary's imperative to
participate in a political campaign called ``eliminate
darkness and evil,'' which some commentators compared
to earlier anti-crime campaigns, such as ``Strike
Hard'' and ``Strike Black,'' in terms of the potential
for serious human rights abuses.
Chinese authorities continued to criminally
prosecute rights lawyers and advocates for political
reasons, lodging ``endangering state security'' charges
against them. For example, a court sentenced rights
advocate Wu Gan to eight years in prison, and public
security officials held rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang
under de facto incommunicado pretrial detention for
over 1,000 days. Authorities also criminally detained
rights lawyers including Li Yuhan and Yu Wensheng for
their advocacy work in human rights and democracy.
Authorities targeted law firms that engaged in
rights defense work and harassed them by employing
intrusive measures such as stationing officials in the
office. Individual lawyers also reported that they
experienced harassment in the form of revocation and
suspension of licenses, delay in the annual license
renewal process, exclusion from courthouses,
restriction of movement, and physical assault.
The Supreme People's Court President Zhou
Qiang reported that judicial reform efforts continued
to move forward. The Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress deliberated draft legislation that
would implement a merit-based process in selecting
judges. Political alignment, however, remained a
selection criterion. Legislation concerning the
people's assessors system may increase citizen
participation and improve evidence-based adjudication,
but its actual effect has yet to be seen.
The legal aid system remained a state-
controlled institution. The government took steps to
further expand legal aid programs, but it tightened the
space for legal aid services not administered by the
government. In January 2018, the All China Lawyers
Association issued a set of trial regulations
prohibiting lawyers from accepting cases at discounted
rates or without fees, except for legal aid cases,
which could potentially prevent lawyers from providing
pro bono legal services to disadvantaged individuals in
cases of social significance.
The Chinese government continued to streamline
the petitioning system, a mechanism outside of the
formal legal system for citizens to present their
grievances to authorities. The government agency
responsible for the petitioning system reported that a
substantial percentage of petitions were referred to
the administrative and judicial system for resolution.
Nevertheless, citizens continued to employ the
petitioning system, and some of them faced retaliation,
including administrative punishment and criminal
prosecution.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to unconditionally
exonerate and lift any restrictions of liberty or
eligibility to practice law on rights lawyers and
advocates, including Wang Quanzhang, Li Yuhan, Yu
Wensheng, Wu Gan, and Jiang Tianyong.
Urge the Chinese government to protect the
fundamental civil and professional rights of China's
lawyers, to investigate all allegations of abuse
against them, and to ensure that those responsible are
brought to justice. Urge the Chinese government to end
all forms of harassment or persecution against the
family members of human rights lawyers and advocates,
including surveillance and restrictions on their
freedom of movement.
Urge the Chinese government to stop all forms of
persecution or prosecution of petitioners who use the
petitioning system to seek redress for their
grievances.
Urge leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and
government to grant the judiciary true independence and
warn them of the negative impact on the rule of law of
involving the judiciary in political campaigns.
Increase support for programs that promote dialogue
between U.S. and Chinese legal experts regarding how
China can structure and implement legal reforms.
Concomitantly increase support for collaboration
between U.S. and Chinese academic and non-governmental
entities to help develop programs that enhance the
Chinese legal system's capacity for protecting
citizens' rights.
Xinjiang
Findings
During the reporting year, authorities in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) reportedly
arbitrarily detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and
others from predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups
in extrajudicial facilities known as ``political
reeducation'' centers or camps. Reports from
international rights groups, scholars, and media
organizations indicated that as many as 800,000 to 1.1
million individuals had been or remained detained at
these facilities since around April 2017, after the
XUAR People's Congress adopted the region's first anti-
extremism regulations. U.S.-based scholar Rian Thum
noted in August 2018 that initial estimates of over 1
million detainees were based on information observers
obtained in early 2018, but Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and
others ``have continued to disappear,'' and officials
have continued to plan the construction of additional
``political reeducation'' facilities, making current
figures potentially higher. Security personnel at these
facilities reportedly subjected detainees to torture,
medical neglect and maltreatment, and other forms of
physical and psychological abuse.
Security personnel reportedly detained people,
in most cases indefinitely, in ``political
reeducation'' centers based on factors such as praying
in a certain way; engaging in ``religious extremism'';
having ``politically incorrect'' views; wanting to
travel abroad; or having foreign connections, such as
previous travel abroad or relatives living in another
country. Regional government authorities reportedly
ordered officials in some XUAR jurisdictions to meet
quotas to detain a certain percentage or number of the
local population in ``political reeducation'' camps.
Elderly people, minors, and ill individuals were
reportedly among those detained in the centers, and a
number of detainees died due to ill health and poor
conditions in the centers. XUAR authorities placed the
children of individuals detained in ``political
reeducation'' centers in orphanages in some
jurisdictions in such high numbers that the orphanages
became overcrowded, and in some instances officials
responded by sending some children to facilities in
provinces outside of the XUAR.
In addition to ``reeducation'' facilities
detaining inmates 24 hours a day, reports from rights
groups and media documented other types of
``reeducation'' facilities and programs. In August
2018, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reported
the findings of a survey it conducted with the
organization Equal Rights Initiative (ERI) on
``reeducation'' programs in the XUAR, including
information on both detention and forced attendance of
``education sessions'' during the day or evening.
According to the report, county or municipal
authorities administered ``reeducation'' camps, and
township or village government officials administered
day and evening ``study sessions'' or ``open camps.''
CHRD and ERI estimated that as of June 2018,
authorities may have forced around 2.2 million XUAR
residents to attend day or evening ``education
sessions.''
A Western researcher and rights advocate
presented a case that the severity and extent of
``political reeducation'' detentions and other rights
abuses in the XUAR are consistent with ``crimes against
humanity,'' as defined by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. In a CNN opinion piece,
the researcher argued that the situation in the XUAR
``fits the textbook definition of crimes against
humanity.'' Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides a
list of 11 acts that may constitute ``crimes against
humanity,'' ``when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.''
XUAR authorities detained dozens of XUAR-based
family members of six U.S.-based Uyghur Radio Free Asia
(RFA) journalists in ``political reeducation'' centers
and other locations. In written testimony submitted at
a July 2018 Commission hearing, RFA journalist
Gulchehra Hoja stated, ``more than two dozen of my
relatives in China are missing.'' XUAR authorities
reportedly also detained dozens of family members of
U.S.-based rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer, including her
children and grandchildren.
Analysis of Chinese government data that was
published by CHRD in July 2018 showed that 21 percent
of all criminal arrests in China in 2017 took place in
the XUAR, which is home to only 1.5 percent of China's
population. CHRD reported that, according to the
research it conducted with ERI, the number of criminal
arrests in the XUAR increased by 731 percent in 2017
over 2016, coinciding with policies implemented by XUAR
Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to enhance regional
security following his appointment to the XUAR in
August 2016. These figures do not include detentions in
``reeducation'' camps, which are carried out
extrajudicially, though authorities reportedly
transferred some ``reeducation'' camp detainees to
prison after a period of time.
Central and regional government authorities
implemented intense security measures throughout the
XUAR, using security personnel, surveillance
technology, mass detentions, and other methods to
tighten state control over predominantly Muslim ethnic
minority groups in the XUAR. Regional authorities
reportedly increased their spending on security
measures by nearly 93 percent in 2017 compared to 2016;
a sample of 18 Chinese provinces and regions saw an
average increase of just under 12 percent in 2017.
XUAR authorities oversaw the mass, involuntary
collection of DNA and other biometric information from
XUAR residents; conducted widespread and frequent
checks of residents' cell phones and required residents
to install monitoring applications on their cell
phones; maintained checkpoints and facial recognition
cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train
stations; operated ``convenience police stations,'' a
form of street-level management that enhances
authorities' ability to closely surveil and police
local communities; and installed cameras in and around
mosques and homes, in order to monitor residents'
religious and private activities. XUAR authorities
reportedly use a centralized system called the
``Integrated Joint Operations Platform'' to gather and
analyze data from closed-circuit cameras, computers,
smartphones, license plates, and identification cards,
as well as individuals' family planning, banking, and
travel records. Authorities used such data to identify
individuals they would later investigate and detain,
including in ``political reeducation'' centers.
Authorities in the XUAR imposed restrictions
on the Quran, including through confiscation and
prohibition on the study of the Quran. In early 2018,
local officials in one township reportedly asked
residents to sign a pledge stating that neither they
nor their family members would study the Quran or learn
Arabic. In September 2017, officials in locations
throughout the XUAR reportedly confiscated Qurans,
prayer mats, and other items of Islamic significance
from local Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz residents.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to end the mass,
arbitrary detention of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui,
and others in ``political reeducation'' centers, and
release those currently detained. Call on Chinese
officials to allow U.S. officials, diplomatic
representatives of other countries, UN officials,
humanitarian organizations, and international
journalists to visit the XUAR and investigate reports
of arbitrary detention. Coordinate with other
governments and international non-governmental
organizations to compile relevant information regarding
specific XUAR officials responsible for the arbitrary
mass detention and abuse of individuals in ``political
reeducation'' centers, in preparation for possible
sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328).
Call on the Chinese government to end the detention
and persecution of the XUAR-based family members of
U.S.-based Uyghur Radio Free Asia journalists and U.S.-
based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer. Prioritize
these cases in interactions with senior Chinese
government and Communist Party officials, seek clarity
as to the whereabouts and well-being of these
individuals, and press for their release.
Urge U.S. companies selling products, providing
services, conducting business, or investing in
development initiatives in the XUAR to ensure their
products, services, and investment funds do not provide
support for XUAR officials' arbitrary detention of
ethnic minority individuals or XUAR authorities' use of
technology to otherwise repress and control XUAR
residents, rather than for legitimate law enforcement
activities. Urge the Bureau of Industry and Security at
the U.S. Department of Commerce to track the sale of
equipment and technology used by Chinese security
agencies and U.S. companies' sale of surveillance and
crime control technology to XUAR officials, and
investigate the legality of such sales according to
existing U.S. Export Administration Regulations.
Call on the Chinese government to adhere to domestic
laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of religious
belief as well as international standards guaranteeing
religious practice free from state restrictions.
Support efforts to raise greater public awareness of
human rights conditions in the XUAR, support
initiatives to protect Uyghur culture, increase avenues
for Uyghurs to protect their human rights, and
undertake more frequent human rights-focused visits to
the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to consult with non-
Han Chinese parents, teachers, and students regarding
which language or languages of instruction should be
used in XUAR schools, from the preschool to the
university level. Call on Chinese officials to provide
parents and students a choice of instruction in the
Uyghur language and other non-Chinese languages
prevalent in the XUAR, as mandated in Article 4 of
China's Constitution and Article 10 of the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law.
Tibet
Findings
There has been no formal dialogue between the
Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese Communist
Party and government officials since the ninth round of
dialogue was held in January 2010. On November 23,
2017, the Dalai Lama reaffirmed the Middle Way
Approach, stating that the Tibetan people ``are not
seeking independence'' and that they ``want to stay
with China.'' The Chinese government continues to
regard the Dalai Lama as a leader of ``separatist
forces.''
The Chinese government maintains that only it
has the right to decide the Dalai Lama's successor. The
current Dalai Lama reiterated his position on his
reincarnation and underscored that it is not a matter
for the Chinese government or Party to decide, but
rather a matter reserved for himself, Tibetan Buddhist
leaders, and the Tibetan people.
The Party and government continued
implementing repressive policies in Tibetan autonomous
areas through the use of extensive and intrusive
surveillance, strict regulations and rules to restrict
Tibetans' fundamental rights, and pervasive displays of
police and military force. Domestic security spending
in the Tibet Autonomous Region grew 404 percent between
2007 and 2016, while domestic security spending in two
Tibetan prefectures in Sichuan province increased
nearly 300 percent over the same time period.
The Party and government continued to violate
the right of religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhist
monastics and laypersons through a system of pervasive
controls and restrictions on religious practice. This
past year, for example, the Chinese government imposed
Party administration on the Larung Gar Buddhist
Institute, the site of massive demolitions and
expulsions that started in 2016. In submissions to the
UN Human Rights Council for China's upcoming Universal
Periodic Review, advocacy groups have documented
increasing security and militarization of Tibet in the
name of countering ``terrorism'' and ``separatism.''
Self-immolations by Tibetans reportedly
focusing on political and religious issues continued
during this past year. As of August 13, 2018, there
were three known self-immolations in Tibetan autonomous
areas of China during the Commission's 2018 reporting
year, all of which were confirmed to be fatal, bringing
the total number of such self-immolations by Tibetans
living in China to 147 since 2009. As in the past, the
self-immolators publicly called for the long life of
the Dalai Lama, his return from exile, and freedom for
Tibet.
A court in Yushu (Yulshul) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture, Qinghai province, convicted Tibetan
language rights advocate Tashi Wangchug (Tashi
Wangchuk) of ``inciting separatism'' and sentenced him
to five years in prison on May 22, 2018. Tashi Wangchug
stood trial on January 4, 2018, nearly two years after
the New York Times interviewed him and published a
short film about his advocacy for Tibetan language
education.
The restriction of information about a
February 2018 fire at the 1,300-year-old Jokhang Temple
in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, has
caused many Tibetans to fear that the damage is far
worse than has been reported.
Filmmaker Dondrub Wangchen (Dhondup Wangchen),
who was kept under strict surveillance after his
release from prison in June 2014, escaped from China in
fall 2017 and reunited with his family in the United
States.
Chinese authorities released four political
prisoners, among them writer Drukar Gyal (pen name
Shogjang) on March 19, 2018, and popular singer Gonpo
Tenzin around August 2. All four political prisoners
had been detained in contravention of international
standards of freedom of expression.
Environmental regulations, infrastructure
projects, and tourism have displaced Tibetan nomads and
contribute to the Chinese government's control of
Tibetan areas.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Encourage the Chinese government and Communist Party
to respect, as a matter of the right of religious
freedom and as recognized under Chinese and
international law, that the decision regarding the
Dalai Lama's succession or reincarnation must be
reserved for the current Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhist
leaders, and the Tibetan people.
Urge the Chinese government to recognize the role of
restrictive Party policies and government measures, and
the increasing securitization of Tibetan autonomous
areas of China, in Tibetan self-immolations and
protests. Urge the Chinese government to cease treating
the Dalai Lama as a security threat, and stress to the
government the importance of respecting and protecting
Tibetan culture and language--policy changes that would
promote and protect social stability in Tibetan areas.
Encourage the Chinese government to respect the right
of Tibetans to travel domestically as well as
internationally, and to allow access to the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China to international journalists,
representatives of the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations, U.S. Government officials,
and members of the Tibetan diaspora living around the
world.
Urge the Chinese government to withdraw the charges
against Tibetan language rights advocate Tashi Wangchug
and stress that peacefully advocating for genuine
bilingual education--a right recognized under Chinese
and international law--is not a crime.
In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the
release of Tibetan political prisoners currently
detained or imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of
their human rights. The records of detained Tibetans in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database--albeit an
incomplete picture of the extent of Tibetan detentions
and disappearances--provides a useful resource for such
interactions with Chinese officials. Urge the Chinese
government and its security forces to cease using
arbitrary detention, disappearance, beatings, torture,
and intimidation to suppress and punish Tibetans'
peaceful exercise of their rights.
Urge the Chinese government to take fully into
account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
planning infrastructure, natural resource development,
settlement or resettlement projects, and tourist
attractions in the Tibetan areas of China.
Continue to request that the Chinese government
invite an independent representative of an
international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi
Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, whom the Dalai Lama
recognized in 1995, and who has been held
incommunicado, along with his parents, since May 17,
1995.
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Findings
During its 2018 reporting year, the Commission
observed a continued erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy,
as guaranteed under the ``one country, two systems''
policy enshrined in the Basic Law in accordance with
the principles of the 1984 Sino-British Joint
Declaration.
In March 2018, a Legislative Council (LegCo)
by-election was held to replace legislative seats
vacated by four out of six disqualified pro-democracy
legislators. Candidates from both the pro-democracy and
pro-establishment camps won two seats each. After the
March by-election, the pro-democracy camp held a total
of 16 seats in geographical constituencies, which is
not enough to veto bills, while the pro-establishment
camp maintained a majority of 17 seats. During the
nomination period preceding the March by-election, the
government of Hong Kong carried out what observers
called ``political screening'' of prospective election
candidates for the LegCo based on their political party
or political beliefs.
The Hong Kong government continued to pursue
cases brought by the Hong Kong government against
leaders and participants of the 2014 pro-democracy
protests and activists from the political opposition.
As of April 2018, the government reportedly brought a
total of 40 court cases against 26 pro-democracy
leaders since 2014, resulting in 13 convictions among
the 22 concluded cases.
In October 2017, authorities released on bail
democracy activists and Nobel Peace Prize nominees
Joshua Wong Chi-fung, Nathan Law Kwun-chung, and Alex
Chow Yong-kang, after their imprisonment in August
2017, to appeal their prison sentences of six to eight
months ordered by the Court of Appeal on charges
related to ``unlawful assembly.'' In February 2018, the
Court of Final Appeal overturned Wong, Law, and Chow's
sentences.
Hong Kong and mainland Chinese officials moved
forward on ``co-location'' plans for the Hong Kong
section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express
Rail Link in West Kowloon despite opposition from
activists, politicians, and lawyers. The plan allows
the enforcement of mainland Chinese law by mainland
officials in a designated ``Mainland Port Area'' within
the West Kowloon Station. The Hong Kong Bar Association
criticized the central government's approval of the co-
location plan as a serious violation of the Basic Law,
asserting that it undermines the rule of law and the
``one country, two systems'' framework in Hong Kong.
The Commission observed reports of
restrictions on the freedom of expression and
association in Hong Kong against academics and
politicians who hold views the government deems
unfavorable, including Chin Wan-kan, Johannes Chan,
Benny Tai, Cheng Chung-tai, and Andy Chan. In advance
of the UN Human Rights Council's review of China's
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), 53 Hong Kong non-governmental
organizations raised concerns about the narrowing space
for lawful dissent and expression in Hong Kong and the
future of democratic development.
Chinese authorities first released and then
detained Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, one of the five
Hong Kong booksellers abducted and brought to mainland
China in late 2015. In October 2017, authorities
reportedly released Gui from custody after two years of
detention for an alleged ``traffic offense.'' In
January 2018, Gui was forcibly detained by plainclothes
Chinese authorities while he was traveling with two
Swedish diplomats to Beijing municipality, reportedly
to seek medical examination for neurological symptoms.
Gui has appeared in at least three televised
confessions on mainland and Hong Kong news media
outlets, which the international NGO Safeguard
Defenders believes are typically extracted through
threats and torture, and used for both domestic and
overseas propaganda.
The Commission did not observe progress in
Macau toward ``an electoral system based on universal
and equal suffrage '' in line with the ICCPR, as
recommended by the UN Human Rights Committee. This past
year, proposed legislative amendments, the suspension
of a pro-democracy legislator, and the denial of entry
to Macau of political figures and writers raised
concerns regarding Macau's autonomy and rule of law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Consider enacting the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act (S. 417/H.R. 3856, 115th Cong., 1st
Sess.) to monitor the state of Hong Kong's autonomy
from mainland China and reaffirm U.S. support for
democratization in Hong Kong.
Emphasize in meetings with Chinese and Hong Kong
officials that the continued erosion of Hong Kong's
autonomy under the ``one country, two systems''
principle, and as guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law, threatens the
underpinnings of U.S. policy toward Hong Kong,
particularly Hong Kong's separate treatment under U.S.
law.
Urge the Chinese and Hong Kong governments to restart
the electoral reform process and work toward
implementing Chief Executive and Legislative Council
elections by universal suffrage, in accordance with
Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law and Article 25 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).
Call on the Chinese and Macau governments to set a
timeline for implementing elections in Macau for Chief
Executive and the Legislative Assembly by universal
suffrage, as required under Article 25 of the ICCPR and
repeatedly urged by the UN Human Rights Committee.
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
International Standards on Freedom of Expression
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
restrict expression in contravention of international human
rights standards, including Article 19 of the International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 19
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\1\ According to
the ICCPR--which China signed \2\ but has not ratified \3\--and
as reiterated in 2011 by the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, countries may impose certain restrictions or
limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions are
provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of respecting
the ``rights or reputations of others'' or protecting national
security, public order, public health, or morals.\4\ An October
2009 UN Human Rights Council resolution declared restrictions
on the ``discussion of government policies and political
debate,'' ``peaceful demonstrations or political activities,
including for peace or democracy,'' and ``expression of opinion
and dissent'' are inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the
ICCPR.\5\ The UN Human Rights Committee specified in a 2011
General Comment that restrictions on freedom of expression
specified in Article 19(3) should be interpreted narrowly and
that the restrictions ``may not put in jeopardy the right
itself.'' \6\
Reinforcing Party Control Over the Media
INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
In March 2018, the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee issued a large-scale plan to restructure the
functional authority and managerial responsibilities of Party
entities and Chinese government agencies,\7\ provisions of
which reinforced the Party's ideological control of the press
(including radio, television, and online platforms),
publishing, and film.\8\ The plan, titled the ``Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies'' (Plan),
placed the Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) in a
``leadership'' role with direct management responsibilities for
news media, publishing, and film.\9\ While the CPD and its
lower level bureaus have long coordinated ideological messaging
through media censorship and control,\10\ the CPD's enhanced
managerial role breaks with the ``guiding hand'' role that
emerged in the post-Mao era during which the CPD was not to
``engage in practical or administrative tasks.'' \11\ This
break reflects Party efforts to rein in increasingly complex
digital news, communications, and entertainment platforms \12\
and its goals to disseminate a unified message about China
within and outside of China,\13\ as well as to reduce
bureaucratic barriers in the way of Party control.\14\ [For
more information on the sweeping reorganization of Party and
government institutions, see Section III--Institutions of
Democratic Governance.] The Plan requires central-level
institutional changes to be completed by the end of 2018,\15\
including the following items that concern freedom of
expression: \16\
Disbanding the State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film and Television, the government
agency that had been in charge of managing the press,
film, and television.\17\ With the CPD's direct
management of press, publication, and film via two
newly named entities located within the CPD, the
National News and Publishing Administration (also known
as the National Copyright Office) and National Film
Bureau, the Plan also established a functionally leaner
agency to manage radio and television, the State
Administration of Radio and Television; \18\
Bringing together the three major broadcast
news entities--China Central Television, China National
Radio, and China Radio International--under a newly
formed ``mega'' agency called China Media Group,\19\ to
be known as Voice of China internationally.\20\ The
merged broadcast agency will be classified as a
``public institution'' (shiye danwei) under the State
Council and directly subordinate to CPD ``leadership'';
\21\ and
Elevating the Party's Central Cybersecurity
and Informatization Leading Small Group to
``Committee'' status.\22\ According to experts
associated with New America's DigiChina project, the
upgrade represents an increase in power for this Party
entity by adjusting a short-term policy mechanism (the
leading small group) to a longer term ``bureaucratic
solution'' (the committee) with centralized resources
and authority over cyberspace and the digital
economy.\23\ The change may also serve to strengthen
the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)--the
government agency with oversight of cyberspace
governance, including control of online news
content.\24\
MEDIA AS MOUTHPIECE: THE PARTY'S ``VOICE''
The Party has historically ascribed a ``mouthpiece'' role
to Chinese media,\25\ and high-level official publications
highlighted this obligation during the Commission's 2018
reporting year. In June 2018, the Central Propaganda Department
issued the first collection of President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping's talks about news media over the past
five years,\26\ including his February 2016 speech to state and
Party news outlets that the media in China ``are surnamed
Party.'' \27\ The Plan to restructure Party and government
agencies issued in March 2018 specified that the State
Administration of Radio and Television shall ``fully use
broadcast news as the Party's mouthpiece'' \28\ and the
combined broadcasting agency will ``propagate the theories,
political line, and policies of the Party.'' \29\ The official
explanation for the new broadcasting agency's international
name of Voice of China emphasized ``telling China's story
well'' to international audiences.\30\ International news
reports juxtaposed the name Voice of China (Zhongguo zhi sheng)
with the U.S. Government-funded broadcaster Voice of America
(Meiguo zhi yin),\31\ though an unnamed source told Radio Free
Asia that Voice of China likely is modeled on Russia's
government-funded global broadcast platform RT in its
authoritarian ambitions.\32\ The April 2018 appointment of Tuo
Zhen, a Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department,
as editor-in-chief of the Party ``mouthpiece'' People's Daily
\33\ recalled a January 2013 incident in which Tuo substituted
an editorial that extolled the Party for a reform-oriented one
at Southern Weekend,\34\ one of the leading investigative
newspapers in China at the time.\35\ Positive coverage of Xi
Jinping saturated domestic news this past year,\36\ but a
series of three editorials from July 2018 in People's Daily
censured ``boastful'' news reporting,\37\ which some experts
linked to incipient criticism \38\ in China of the
nationalistic rhetoric associated with Xi Jinping \39\ amid
growing concerns about U.S.-China trade issues.\40\
Freedom of the Press
Reporters Without Borders continued to rank China among the
five worst countries in the world for press freedom in its
annual Press Freedom Index.\41\ Press freedom assessments this
past year from Freedom House,\42\ the International Federation
of Journalists,\43\ and the Committee to Protect Journalists
\44\ similarly criticized the lack of press freedom in China.
In a 2018 survey, Hong Kong journalists identified the Chinese
central government as a major reason for a decline in press
freedom in Hong Kong.\45\ Although freedom of speech and the
press are guaranteed in China's Constitution,\46\ the legal
parameters for the protection of the news media in gathering
and reporting the news are not clearly defined in the absence
of a national press law.\47\ Yet complex regulatory provisions
allow officials to exert arbitrary control over journalists and
news coverage in China.\48\
Reports on adverse events, including accidents and
disasters, are not out of bounds for official media, but as a
commentator has noted, ``selected party news outlets or
government organs are deftly using state-controlled and social
media tools to take the lead in shaping the Chinese
government's own version of these events.'' \49\ The government
and Party often suppress critical reporting while ``advancing a
positive narrative'' to broaden public support for official
policies.\50\ For example, this past year, censorship
instructions limited the manner and scope of media reports on a
November 2017 fatal fire in Beijing municipality,\51\ framing
the subsequent forced evictions of thousands of non-local
residents and large-scale building demolition \52\ as public
health and fire safety measures.\53\ To mark the 10th
anniversary of the earthquake in Wenchuan county, Aba (Ngaba)
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province,
state media praised the government's rebuilding efforts and
generosity to promote the Wenchuan government's announcement of
a day of ``thanksgiving'' rather than a day of mourning for the
tens of thousands who died.\54\ On the other hand, authorities
have used official media as a ``weapon'' against government and
Party critics, according to the international non-governmental
organization Safeguard Defenders.\55\ Safeguard Defenders
highlighted the ``active participation'' of Chinese and Hong
Kong media outlets involved in the broadcasts of televised--and
likely coerced--``confessions'' of wrongdoing by rights
defenders, journalists, and Uyghurs, among others, which were
aired between July 2013 and February 2018.\56\
Ideological pressures, organizational changes, and
financial concerns at news media outlets this past year
contributed to the ongoing decline of Chinese investigative
journalism.\57\ A December 2017 academic survey on
investigative journalism in China \58\ reported a 58-percent
fall in the number of domestic investigative journalists from
2011 to 2017, and a decrease in the number of media outlets
with journalists doing front-line reporting from 74 in 2011 to
44 in 2017.\59\ Journalism experts have attributed the decline
to multiple factors, including regulatory and legal
obstacles,\60\ low wages,\61\ market competition from new
digital platforms,\62\ and alleged corruption and ethical
lapses.\63\ In one incident reported this past year, some 40
editors and journalists from Legal Evening News reportedly quit
in connection with organizational changes at the newspaper,
including the closure of the paper's well-known investigative
unit.\64\ In a different incident, in July 2018, officials in
Hunan province detained freelance journalist Chen Jieren and
several of his family members and associates on suspicion of
extortion and illegal business activity apparently in
connection with Chen's criticism of a local official.\65\ Three
official media outlets subsequently denounced Chen's online
work as spurious ``supervision by public opinion,'' \66\ a term
Chinese authorities previously have used to signify the
functions of ``watchdog'' or investigative journalism.\67\
HARASSMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS
The Chinese government continued to be one of the worst
jailers of journalists in the world, with estimates of
individuals in detention or imprisoned ranging from 41 \68\ to
more than 50.\69\ Among the journalists detained or imprisoned
in China are citizen journalists and volunteers who worked
outside of mainstream state or official media, many of whom are
of Uyghur ethnicity.\70\ Citizen journalism \71\ in China
provides information on local news and incidents that the
government restricts or censors in most media, such as
information on labor protests,\72\ migrants' concerns,\73\
petitioning the government for redress of grievances,\74\ and
rights defense activities.\75\ A PEN America report on social
media censorship observed that the government's prohibition on
mainstream journalists from publishing ``unverified'' reports
on social media highlights the government's awareness that it
is not fully able to control content posted by citizen
journalists.\76\
Ongoing harassment and detention of citizen journalists
continued this past year,\77\ and is contemporaneous with the
suppression of civil society groups and human rights lawyers
and defenders.\78\ On September 1, 2017, for example, public
security authorities from Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong
province, detained Zhen Jianghua, executive director of the
website Human Rights Campaign in China \79\ that is known for
monitoring human rights violations, including the harassment
and criminal prosecution of rights defenders.\80\ Authorities
formally arrested Zhen on March 30, 2018, on the charge of
``inciting subversion of state power.'' \81\ On August 10,
2018, the Zhuhai Intermediate People's Court reportedly tried
Zhen without informing either Zhen's defense lawyers or his
family members.\82\ Authorities also continued to detain Liu
Feiyue and Huang Qi, founders of the websites Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch and 64 Tianwang, respectively, as part of the
crackdown on rights monitoring websites and their founders and
volunteers.\83\ Liu's case went to court on August 7, 2018,
without an immediate court decision,\84\ whereas authorities
have postponed Huang's trial and refused him medical parole
despite his deteriorating health.\85\ Staff and volunteers from
those two websites also remained in detention during this
reporting year, including Ding Lingjie,\86\ Jiang Chengfen,\87\
Wang Jing,\88\ Chen Tianmao,\89\ and Yang Xiuqiong.\90\
This past year, the Commission observed reports of
censorship, disciplinary measures, dismissal, and detentions of
mainstream journalists who covered financial or political
issues, or whose reporting implied a lack of government action.
Official media covered incidents of threats and a physical
attack on reporters covering environmental pollution \91\ and
an attack against another while reporting on hospital
malfeasance.\92\ In February 2018, Southern Weekend, a market-
driven newspaper based in Guangdong province, reportedly
withdrew from publication two investigative reports about
Hainan Airlines (HNA) Group--a private company with large
debts, which the central government has placed under strict
economic controls \93\--and removed the magazine's editor-in-
chief in connection to those reports.\94\ On February 25, 2018,
the English-language branch of state-run media agency Xinhua
prematurely released the news about the proposed constitutional
amendment to eliminate presidential term limits,\95\ a change
that effectively permits Xi Jinping to hold his leadership
positions for life.\96\ Senior officials reportedly considered
the early announcement a ``serious political error,'' resulting
in disciplinary measures for Xinhua staff.\97\ Professional
ramifications were not reported for the journalist whose
unscripted ``epic eye-roll'' \98\ in reaction to a lengthy
question posed at a National People's Congress press conference
in March 2018 received domestic and international coverage.\99\
The Commission also observed reports of detentions of two
journalists who reported on an absent dairy company executive
\100\ and a reporter who wrote about dozens of missing
university students in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.\101\
HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN MEDIA OUTLETS AND JOURNALISTS
According to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China
(FCCC) 2017 survey, working conditions for foreign reporters in
China generally deteriorated in 2017. The FCCC supported this
claim with accounts of official harassment of reporters, news
assistants, and sources; attempts to interfere with the
coverage of issues that authorities deemed ``sensitive'';
restrictions on travel to areas along China's border and ethnic
minority autonomous regions; and visa renewal delays and
denials.\102\ At two press conferences following the release of
the FCCC survey results,\103\ however, a Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokesperson rejected the FCCC's findings.\104\
Additionally, in a July 2018 statement in response to Swedish
media coverage of the case of Hong Kong bookseller Gui Minhai,
the Chinese ambassador to Sweden referred to the ``so called''
FCCC as an ``unregistered illegal organization'' and stated
that it ``lacks all legitimacy . . . and the reports it
released are totally unreliable.'' \105\ [For more information
on Gui Minhai, see text box titled ``Hong Kong Bookseller Gui
Minhai Detained Again'' in Section VI--Developments in Hong
Kong and Macau.]
Additional instances of official harassment against foreign
journalists continued in 2018, with reports of temporary
detentions,\106\ physical assaults,\107\ and cancelling \108\
or refusing to issue visas.\109\ The government continued to
block selected foreign media outlets' websites,\110\ and to
obstruct some foreign media outlets from opening an office in
China.\111\ Chinese officials abroad reportedly visited
headquarters of foreign media outlets to reprimand these
outlets for reporting they deemed to be unfavorable to
China.\112\ Chinese authorities also detained China-based
family members of journalists who report on China from abroad,
acts that an American journalist described as aiming to ``mute
criticism of China across the world . . ..'' \113\ In September
2017, authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong
province, reportedly took into custody Li Huaiping, wife of
Chen Xiaoping--the editor-in-chief of a Chinese-language media
outlet in New York--allegedly in connection with Chen's
interviews with businessman Guo Wengui.\114\ Authorities in
China also targeted six U.S.-based journalists who work for the
Uyghur Service of Radio Free Asia (RFA), a news outlet in
Washington, D.C., with the detention of more than two dozen of
their family members who reside in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR).\115\ International advocacy groups
and RFA linked the detentions in the XUAR to RFA Uyghur Service
coverage of intensifying political control in the region.\116\
[For additional information on these detentions, see Section
IV--Xinjiang.]
Sharpening Cyberspace Goals, Regulating Online News and Expression
Official statistics reported 772 million internet users in
China as of December 2017, 97.5 percent of whom access the
internet from mobile devices \117\ and use social media
applications for communications, e-commerce, gaming, and video-
streaming, among other functions.\118\ Senior government and
Party officials linked control of cyberspace to social
stability, national security, economic development, and global
power ambitions.\119\ U.S.-based experts emphasized ``the
systems being put in place, . . . should be seen as a long-term
effort to ensure that no online domain remains free from
oversight.'' \120\ This past year, authorities continued to
formulate new regulations \121\ to control and censor online
news and media outlets, technology companies, and users of
social media,\122\ and in the process, operationalize the PRC
Cybersecurity Law.\123\ A media expert in Hong Kong observed
that new regulations to consolidate Party power over cyberspace
and expand control over individual users of social media are
``one of the most specific indications we have yet of the
Party's atomization and personalization of censorship, of the
way the relationship between propaganda and the public is being
transformed by digital communications.'' \124\ Examples from
these regulatory measures include the following:
Under Article 4 of the Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Public Account Information
Services, both social media companies and individual
users are responsible for a ``correct orientation,
promot[ing] socialist core values, actively
cultivat[ing] healthy internet culture, and
safeguard[ing] a wholesome internet environment.''
\125\
The Provisions on the Administration of
Internet Group Information Services stipulate in
Article 9 that administrators and creators of social
media groups are responsible for managing the group
chat, particularly the content expressed by members of
their respective chat groups.\126\ [For information on
``legal education classes'' about these provisions held
at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, see Section V--Tibet.]
The Measures for the Administration of Content
Management Practitioners Working for Internet News
Information Service Providers require 40 hours of
government-run training on ``socialist values,'' with
at least 10 hours of company-run training on ``Marxist
news values.'' \127\
Censored Content
Chinese authorities continued to censor a broad range of
news, academic and other publications, and social media
discussion of topics which the government and Party deem to be
politically ``sensitive.'' \128\ The Commission observed
reports about censorship of topics relating to the ethnic
minority autonomous areas of Tibet \129\ and Xinjiang; \130\
Taiwan \131\ and Hong Kong; \132\ the spiritual movement Falun
Gong; \133\ and anniversaries of past events and persons.\134\
In November 2017, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported on censorship
directives instructing local media to first seek permission
from provincial-level propaganda bureaus before publishing
reports on topics such as elder care, healthcare, housing
issues, education, and the stock market.\135\ Political
perspectives that veered from the Party's ideological
mainstream also were subject to censorship.\136\ In May 2018,
authorities shut down Utopia, a website that espoused political
positions aligned with Maoist or extreme ``leftist''
nationalism.\137\ Similarly, in July 2018, authorities ordered
the closure of liberal think tank Unirule's office in Beijing
municipality,\138\ and early in 2017 had shut down several
websites and social media accounts linked to Unirule.\139\
Nevertheless, an essay written by a Tsinghua University
professor that not only criticized Xi Jinping but also urged
rectification of the 1989 Tiananmen protests was posted in late
July to Unirule Perspectives, a Unirule website only available
through circumvention tools.\140\
Censorship of the news and social media commentary on the
news was particularly intense this reporting year in connection
with two major political events--the 19th National Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party (19th Party Congress) in October
2017 \141\ and the annual meetings (Two Sessions) of the
National People's Congress and its advisory body, the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, in March 2018.\142\
Official censorship of both events restricted coverage of a
wide range of political issues concerning policy, personnel
changes in senior Party and government leadership, and
constitutional amendments.\143\ The lack of in-depth domestic
coverage or government transparency in China led one foreign
journalist to proclaim the impossibility of ``know[ing]
anything about high-level Chinese politics.'' \144\ China
Digital Times (CDT), a U.S.-based Web portal which provides
translations of leaked censorship directives from the Central
Propaganda Department and other government entities, observed a
decrease in the number of directives it received from contacts
within China in 2017.\145\ One factor of the decline, according
to CDT, was the potential jeopardy media professionals with
access to such information might encounter.\146\
Citizens' Free Expression
PUBLIC OPINION PUSHES BACK
Social media platforms continued to be an everyday channel
of expression for Chinese citizens, particularly a more
socially and technically engaged younger generation,\147\ to
discuss concerns about a range of news events and public
interest issues.\148\ As China law scholar Eva Pils has argued,
the Party's emphasis on control of expression through
``persuasion, coercion and intimidation'' \149\ reflects, in
part, the realization that it cannot entirely control public
opinion.\150\ This past year, social media users raised a broad
range of concerns, such as sexual harassment on Chinese
university campuses; \151\ racism on television; \152\ and the
forced eviction of thousands of non-local residents from
Beijing municipality.\153\ Social media users objected to the
removal of presidential term limits from China's Constitution,
with many posts in protest of President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping's consolidation of power.\154\ In April
2018, Sina Weibo, a Twitter-like messaging platform, rescinded
a plan \155\ to censor LGBT content as part of an online
``clean-up'' campaign after drawing considerable public
criticism online.\156\ In contrast, following official censure
of the humor shared among its users,\157\ the technology
company ByteDance shut down its popular application Neihan
Duanzi,\158\ and pledged to adhere to ideological values and
regulatory standards.\159\ [For more information on technology
companies' compliance with censorship controls, see Section
III--Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights.]
PUNISHING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The Commission observed a wide range of cases that
illustrated the Chinese government and Communist Party's
violations of international human rights standards and
provisions in China's Constitution on the right to freedom of
expression discussed earlier in this section. In addition to
freedom of speech concerns, the following cases intersect,
respectively, with violations of the right to freedom of
movement; \160\ the right to freedom of association, including
online association; \161\ the right to enjoy the use of one's
own ethnic minority language; \162\ and--in connection to yet
another case in which a Chinese advocate died while
``released'' on medical parole \163\--the right to medical
treatment while in detention.\164\
Restricted overseas travel. Authorities
reportedly prevented novelist Jia Pingwa from traveling
to New York City in January 2018 to attend the Modern
Language Association's (MLA) annual conference.\165\ An
interview with Jia and a conference panel featuring his
literary work in translation, including his previously
banned novel ``Ruined City,'' had been scheduled for
the MLA conference.\166\
Detentions. In April 2018, public security
authorities from multiple locations in China criminally
detained 8 administrators of the National Tourism Chat
Group--a group of more than 100 members hosted on
social media platform WeChat that reportedly organized
humanitarian support for family members of political
prisoners.\167\ As of June 2018, authorities had
formally arrested Guo Qingjun, one of the WeChat
group's administrators.\168\
Criminal sentence. In May 2018, the Yushu
(Yulshul) Intermediate People's Court in Yushu
(Kyegudo) municipality, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture, Qinghai province, sentenced Tashi Wangchug,
a Tibetan language rights advocate, to five years in
prison on the charge of ``inciting separatism.'' \169\
A New York Times video from November 2015 that
portrayed his advocacy efforts reportedly was used in
trial as evidence against him.\170\ The Qinghai High
People's Court in Xining municipality reportedly
rejected Tashi Wangchug's appeal on August 13,
2018.\171\
Death while on medical parole. Yang Tongyan
(pen name: Yang Tianshui) died on November 5, 2017, of
brain cancer while on medical parole.\172\ At the time
of his death, Yang was nearing completion of a 12-year
prison sentence on the charge of ``subversion of state
power'' in connection to his writing and democracy
activities.\173\ Yang reportedly did not receive
adequate medical care during his years in
detention.\174\ Like Liu Xiaobo,\175\ authorities
cremated Yang's body and buried him at sea.\176\
DETENTIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF LIU XIAOBO'S DEATH
The July 2017 death of writer and Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Liu Xiaobo--while serving an 11-year prison sentence
\177\--continued to reverberate in the detentions of his widow
Liu Xia and persons who attempted to honor his life. Liu Xia,
an artist and poet, remained under forced confinement at home
\178\ until July 10, 2018, when she left China and traveled to
Germany.\179\ Numerous reports documented the worsening of Liu
Xia's physical and emotional health \180\ during the nearly
eight years authorities held her in arbitrary, extrajudicial
detention.\181\ While welcoming her release, rights advocates
nevertheless expressed concern that Liu's freedom of speech
outside of China might be compromised because the Chinese
government did not allow her brother Liu Hui to leave China
with her.\182\ In the months after Liu Xiaobo's death,
authorities detained at least 14 persons who participated in
``sea memorials'' in memory of Liu Xiaobo \183\ in
Guangdong,\184\ Fujian,\185\ and Liaoning provinces.\186\
Authorities also detained others who paid tribute to Liu
Xiaobo, including poet Wu Mingliang \187\ and his associate
Peng Heping; \188\ songwriters Xu Lin and Liu Sifang; \189\ and
artist and French citizen Hu Jiamin.\190\
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on
10 December 48, art. 19.
\2\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), last
visited 13 July 18. China signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1998.
\3\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan (2016-2020),'' 29 September 16, sec. V; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, last visited 13 July 18.
\4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, 16 May
11, para. 24.
\5\ Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/
RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i).
\6\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19,
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para.
21.
\7\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18.
\8\ Chris Buckley, ``China Gives Communist Party More Control Over
Policy and Media,'' New York Times, 21 March 18; Pei Li and Christian
Shepherd, ``China Tightens Grip on Media With Regulator Reshuffle,''
Reuters, 21 March 18; ``China's Communist Party Takes (Even More)
Control of the Media,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 11 April 18.
\9\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 1(11)-(12); ``Major Reshuffle at SAPPRFT,
Tight Unification Under Central Propaganda Department'' [Zhongguo
guangbo dianshi da xipai zhongxuanbu yanmi da yitong], Radio Free Asia,
21 March 18; David Bandurski, ``When Reform Means Tighter Controls,''
University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media
Project, 22 March 18.
\10\ Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and
Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2008), 13-15, 19, 24-25; David Shambaugh, ``China's Propaganda System:
Institutions, Processes and Efficiency,'' China Journal, No. 57
(January 2007), 25, 28-29.
\11\ Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and
Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2008), 14-16.
\12\ ``China's Communist Party Takes (Even More) Control of the
Media,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 11 April 18.
\13\ Ibid. See also Xia Kangjian, ``Three Outlets Merging Into One
Consistent With Broadcasting Trends'' [San tai hebing shunying chuanbo
guilu], People's Daily, Central Kitchen, 27 March 18.
\14\ ``Major Reshuffle at SAPPRFT, Tight Unification Under Central
Propaganda Department'' [Zhongguo guangbo dianshi da xipai zhongxuanbu
yanmi da yitong], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18; Rogier Creemers et al.,
``China's Cyberspace Authorities Set To Gain Clout in Reorganization,''
New America, DigiChina (blog), 26 March 18.
\15\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 8.
\16\ Bill Ide and Brian Kopczynski, ``China's Communist Party
Tightens Grip on Media, Message,'' Voice of America, 29 March 18;
``China's Communist Party Takes (Even More) Control of the Media,''
Asia Society, ChinaFile, 11 April 18.
\17\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(35).
\18\ Ibid.; ``Major Reshuffle at SAPPRFT, Tight Unification Under
Central Propaganda Department'' [Zhongguo guangbo dianshi da xipai
zhongxuanbu yanmi da yitong], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18.
\19\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(36); ``Actually, `Central Radio and
Television Network's' Official English Name Is This!'' [Yuanlai,
``zhongyang guangbo dianshi zongtai'' de guanfang yingwen ming shi
zhege!], 16 April 18; ``Major Reshuffle at SAPPRFT, Tight Unification
Under Central Propaganda Department'' [Zhongguo guangbo dianshi da
xipai zhongxuanbu yanmi da yitong], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18;
``Creation of Comprehensive Central Broadcast Agency, Removing Central
TV and Radio Organizational Structures'' [Zujian zhongyang guangbo
dianshi zongtai, chexiao yangshi, yangguang deng jianzhi], Xinhua,
reprinted in The Paper, 21 March 18.
\20\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(36); ``China Creates World's Largest
Propaganda Apparatus `Voice of China' '' [Zhongguo dazao quanqiu zui da
xuanchuan jiqi ``zhongguo zhi sheng''], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18;
Keith Zhai, ``China Approves Giant Propaganda Machine To Improve Global
Image,'' Bloomberg, 20 March 18; Emily Feng, ``China To Create Global
Broadcast Champion,'' Financial Times, 21 March 18.
\21\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(36).
\22\ Ibid., sec. 1(4); Zheng Yanzhi, `` `Small Groups' Become
`Commissions,' It's Transcendence as Much as Status Elevation!''
[``Xiaozu'' bian ``weiyuanhui,'' jishi shengge, gengshi shenghua!],
People's Daily, 29 March 18.
\23\ Rogier Creemers et al., ``China's Cyberspace Authorities Set
To Gain Clout in Reorganization: `Leading Group' for Cybersecurity and
Informatization Upgraded to `Commission,'' New America, DigiChina
(blog), 26 March 18. See also Paul Triolo et al., ``Xi Jinping Puts
`Indigenous Innovation' and `Core Technologies' at the Center of
Development Priorities,'' New America, DigiChina (blog), 1 May 18.
\24\ Rogier Creemers et al., ``China's Cyberspace Authorities Set
To Gain Clout in Reorganization: `Leading Group' for Cybersecurity and
Informatization Upgraded to `Commission,' '' New America, DigiChina
(blog), 26 March 18. For more information about the Cyberspace
Administration of China, see CECC, Annual Report 2016, 6 October 16,
66-67.
\25\ ``Party Media Is Surnamed Party and Politicians Run
Newspapers, Xi Jinping's News Thought Fully Baked'' [Dangmei xing dang
yu zhengzhijia banbao xi jinping xinwen sixiang chulu], Duowei, 14 June
18; David Bandurski, ``Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,'' University of Hong
Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 22
February 16; Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and
Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2008), 46. According to Bandurski, former Chinese Communist Party
leaders' pronouncements, such as Mao Zedong's injunction that
``politicians run the newspapers,'' Jiang Zemin's ``guidance of public
opinion,'' and Hu Jintao's ``channeling of public opinion,'' illustrate
the Party's expectation that the media serve as its ``mouthpiece'' and
shaper of public opinion. Brady, moreover, notes that in the wake of
the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, newly appointed
Central Propaganda Department head Li Ruihuan repeated the mandate that
``politicians run newspapers.'' See also Luwei Rose Luqiu, ``How To Be
a Journalist in China: A Personal Reflection,'' University of
Nottingham, Asia Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, 2 May 17.
\26\ `` `Xi Jinping's Talks on the Media (2018 Edition)' Published
and Released'' [``Xi jinping xinwen sixiang jiangyi (2018 nian ban)''
chuban faxing], Xinhua, 14 June 18.
\27\ ``Party Media Surnamed Party and Politicians Run Newspapers,
Xi Jinping's News Thought Fully Baked'' [Dangmei xing dang yu
zhengzhijia banbao xi jinping xinwen sixiang chulu], Duowei, 14 June
18. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 61.
\28\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(35).
\29\ Ibid., sec. 3(36). For an unofficial translation of the media-
related items, see David Bandurski, ``When Reform Means Tighter
Controls,'' University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre,
China Media Project, 22 March 18.
\30\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(36); Zhang Tianpei, ``Three Platforms
Combine Into One, Emitting an Even Stronger `Voice of China' '' [San
tai heyi, fachu geng qiang ``zhongguo zhi sheng''], People's Daily, 2
April 18.
\31\ ``China Creates World's Largest Propaganda Apparatus `Voice of
China' '' [Zhongguo dazao quanqiu zui da xuanchuan jiqi ``zhongguo zhi
sheng''], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18; Keith Zhai, ``China Approves
Giant Propaganda Machine To Improve Global Image,'' Bloomberg, 20 March
18; Emily Feng, ``China To Create Global Broadcast Champion,''
Financial Times, 21 March 18.
\32\ ``China Creates World's Largest Propaganda Apparatus `Voice of
China' '' [Zhongguo dazao quanqiu zui da xuanchuan jiqi ``zhongguo zhi
sheng''], Radio Free Asia, 21 March 18.
\33\ `` `News Tyrant' Tuo Zhen Appointed `People's Daily' Editor-in
Chief'' [``Meiti baojun'' tuo zhen shengren ``renmin ribao'' zongbian],
Radio Free Asia, 4 April 18; ``Tuo Zhen: New People's Daily Editor-in-
Chief Made His Name by Rectifying the Media'' [Tuo zhen: yi zhengdun
meiti wenming de renmin ribao xin zongbian], BBC, 4 April 18.
\34\ Freedom House, ``Special Feature: The `Southern Weekly'
Controversy,'' 18 January 13; Maria Repnikova and Kecheng Fang,
``Behind the Fall of China's Greatest Newspaper,'' Foreign Policy, Tea
Leaf Nation (blog), 29 January 15; Gloria Wong, ``Censorship Meets Rare
Defiance as Journalists Strike in China,'' Global Voices, 8 January 13.
\35\ Helen Gao, ``The Demise of Watchdog Journalism in China,'' New
York Times, 27 April 18.
\36\ Graeme Smith, ``The Thought and Messaging of Xi Jinping,''
Lowy Institute, The Interpreter, 8 August 17; Zheping Huang, ``Today's
Front Pages in China Are All the Same,'' Quartz, 26 October 17;
``Discourse Climate Report: April 2018,'' University of Hong Kong,
Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 2 May 18; David
Bandurski, ``Discourse Climate Report: June 2018,'' University of Hong
Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 24 July
18. See also Qian Gang, ``Qian Gang Exclusive: Report on Discourse in
2017, Part 1: The System of `Xi's Discourse' Is Established'' [Qian
gang zhuanwen: 2017 yuxiang baogao yi ``xi yu'' tixi queli], Storm
Media, 6 January 18.
\37\ Lin Feng, ``People's Daily Three Critiques of Hyperbolic and
Boastful Writing, Number 1: Don't You Know How To Write an Essay?''
[Renmin wang san ping fukua zida wenfeng zhi yi: wenzhang buhui xie le
ma?], People's Daily, 2 July 18; You Guan, ``People's Daily Three
Critiques of Hyperbolic and Boastful Writing, Number 2: Do the Chinese
Lack Self-Confidence?'' [Renmin wang san ping fukua zida wenfeng zhi
er: zhongguo ren bu zixin le ma?], People's Daily, 3 July 18; Ai Wu,
``People's Daily Three Critiques of Hyperbolic and Boastful Writing,
Number 3: Is Style a Trivial Matter?'' [Renmin wang san ping fukua zida
wenfeng zhi san: wenfeng shi xiao shi ma?], People's Daily, 4 July 18.
For unofficial translations of and commentary on the three People's
Daily articles, see Geremie R. Barme ``Mendacious, Hyperbolic &
Fatuous--An Ill Wind From People's Daily,'' China Heritage, Watching
China Watching, 10 July 18.
\38\ Chris Buckley, ``As China's Woes Mount, Xi Jinping Faces Rare
Rebuke at Home,'' New York Times, 31 July 18; Nectar Gan, ``China Names
Former Internet Tsar Xu Lin as New International Propaganda Chief,''
South China Morning Post, 21 August 18.
\39\ Chris Buckley, ``China Enshrines `Xi Jinping Thought,'
Elevating Leader to Mao-Like Status,'' New York Times, 24 October 17.
\40\ Geremie R. Barme, ``Mendacious, Hyperbolic & Fatuous--An Ill
Wind From People's Daily,'' China Heritage, Watching China Watching, 10
July 18; Nectar Gan, ``China Names Former Internet Tsar Xu Lin as New
International Propaganda Chief,'' South China Morning Post, 21 August
18.
\41\ Reporters Without Borders, ``World Press Freedom Index,'' last
visited 26 April 18, Index details--China; Reporters Without Borders,
``RSF Index 2018: Asia-Pacific Democracies Threatened by China's Media
Control Model,'' 25 April 18.
\42\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last
visited 14 July 18, sec. D1.
\43\ International Federation of Journalists, ``China Press Freedom
Report 2017 Ten-Year Edition: A Decade of Decline,'' February 2018.
\44\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``41 Journalists Imprisoned
in China in 2017,'' last visited 26 April 18.
\45\ Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Public Evaluation of Hong
Kong Press Freedom Drops to New Low,'' 11 April 18. The survey was
conducted in January and February 2018.
\46\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 35.
\47\ Zhang Jingjing, ``Why Don't We Have a `National Press Law'?--
Thoughts on China's News Broadcasting Legislative Research'' [Women wei
shenme mei you ``xinwen fa''?--fansi woguo xinwen chuanbo lifa yanjiu],
Shandong Institute of Politics and Law, Journal of Political Science
and Law, No. 1 (2014).
\48\ Luwei Rose Luqiu, ``How To Be a Journalist in China: A
Personal Reflection,'' University of Nottingham, Asia Research
Institute, Asia Dialogue, 2 May 17.
\49\ Verna Yu, ``China's New Media Strategy: The Case of Liu
Xiaobo,'' The Diplomat, 28 July 17; Matt Schrader, ``Pre-suasion: How
the PRC Controls the Message on a Sino-US Trade War,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 6, 9 April 18, 1-3. See also UN
Human Rights Council (HRC), Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten
Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade, Addendum to
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, 25
March 10, art. 1(a). In the UN HRC's Tenth Anniversary Joint
Declaration on freedom of expression, international experts cautioned
that media serving ``as government mouthpieces instead of as
independent bodies operating in the public interest'' are a major
challenge to free expression.
\50\ Matt Schrader, ``Pre-suasion: How the PRC Controls the Message
on a Sino-US Trade War,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 6, 9 April 18, 1.
\51\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Control Coverage, Commentary
on Evictions,'' 28 November 17; ``China Cracks Down on Reporting of
Mass Evictions in Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 November 17.
\52\ Tom Phillips, ``The Gentrification of Beijing: Razing of
Migrant Villages Spells End of China Dream,'' Guardian, 7 December 17;
Chris Buckley, ``Why Parts of Beijing Look Like a Devastated War
Zone,'' New York Times, 30 November 17.
\53\ Jiang Chenglong and Cui Jia, ``Beijing Continues Its Safety
Crackdown in Wake of Fire,'' China Daily, 27 November 17; ``The Making
of the `Low-End Population,' '' University of Hong Kong, Media &
Journalism Studies Centre, China Media Project, 30 November 17.
\54\ Tiffany May, ``10 Years Ago in Sichuan, a Quake Killed 69,000,
Should China Be Thankful?'' New York Times, 10 May 18. See also China
Digital Times, ``Phrase of the Week: Tearfully Urge,'' 10 May 18;
Christian Sorace, ``Be Grateful to the Party! How To Behave in the
Aftermath of a Disaster,'' Made in China, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January-March
2018), 52-55; Luwei Rose Luqiu, ``How To Be a Journalist in China: A
Personal Reflection,'' University of Nottingham, Asia Research
Institute, Asia Dialogue, 2 May 17.
\55\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes
of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 10, 15. According to
Safeguard Defenders, ``They are people whom the CCP typically perceives
as its enemies or critics and are usually charged with national
security crimes . . . or social order violations . . ..'' See also
Verna Yu, ``China's New Media Strategy: The Case of Liu Xiaobo,'' The
Diplomat, 28 July 17.
\56\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes
of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 4-5, 11.
\57\ Helen Gao, ``The Demise of Watchdog Journalism in China,'' New
York Times, 27 April 18; Graeme Smith, ``The Thought and Messaging of
Xi Jinping,'' Lowy Institute, The Interpreter, 8 August 17.
\58\ Helen Gao, ``The Demise of Watchdog Journalism in China,'' New
York Times, 27 April 18; ``Too Much Government Interference, China's
Investigative Journalists' Predicament That Both Advancing and
Retreating Are Difficult'' [Zhengfu ganyu tai duo zhongguo diaocha
jizhe jintui liang nan], Radio Free Asia, 4 December 17.
\59\ ``Initial Release of `Chinese News Professionals' Annual
Observers' Report for 2017'' [``Zhongguo xinwenye niandu guancha baogao
2017'' shoufa], NetEase Journalism Institute, 26 November 17; ``Too
Much Government Interference, China's Investigative Journalists'
Predicament That Both Advancing and Retreating Are Difficult'' [Zhengfu
ganyu tai duo zhongguo diaocha jizhe jintui liang nan], Radio Free
Asia, 4 December 17.
\60\ Helen Gao, ``The Demise of Watchdog Journalism in China,'' New
York Times, 27 April 18; ``Too Much Government Interference, China's
Investigative Journalists' Predicament That Both Advancing and
Retreating Are Difficult'' [Zhengfu ganyu tai duo zhongguo diaocha
jizhe jintui liang nan], Radio Free Asia, 4 December 17.
\61\ Zheng Jiawen, ``China's Young Journalists Are Giving Up Before
They Even Begin,'' Sixth Tone, 22 January 18.
\62\ ``Mainland `Legal Evening News' Investigative Unit Faces
Disbanding, Many Journalists Quit'' [Dalu ``fazhi wangbao'' shendu bu
chuan zao caiche dapi jizhe lizhi], Duowei, 28 May 18; Graeme Smith,
``The Thought and Messaging of Xi Jinping,'' Lowy Institute, The
Interpreter, 8 August 17.
\63\ See, e.g., ``Mainland `Legal Evening News' Investigative Unit
Faces Disbanding, Many Journalists Quit'' [Dalu ``fazhi wangbao''
shendu bu chuan zao caiche dapi jizhe lizhi], Duowei, 28 May 18; Austin
Ramzy, ``Ex-News Executive in China Gets 4-Year Sentence for
Extortion,'' New York Times, 24 December 15; Hu Yong, `` `A Power
Capable of Making Us Weep': Journalism Under Attack,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, 20 October 14.
\64\ ``Mainland `Legal Evening News' Investigative Unit Faces
Disbanding, Many Journalists Quit'' [Dalu ``fazhi wangbao'' shendu bu
chuan zao caiche dapi jizhe lizhi], Duowei, 28 May 18; ``China Spikes
In-Depth Section of Top Legal Newspaper,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 May 18.
\65\ ``Current Affairs Commentator Chen Jieren's Articles Blew
Whistle on Officials, Subsequently Six Detained, Including Family and
Friends'' [Shiping ren chen jieren zhuanwen jubao guanyuan zhulian
qinyou liu ren bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 11 July 18. For more
information on Chen Jieren and several cases associated with his
detention, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2018-00318 on Chen Jieren, 2018-00319 on Deng Jiangxiu, 2018-00320 on
Chen Weiren, and 2018-00321 on Chen Minren.
\66\ ``Detained Journo Confesses He's `Internet Pest' That
Exaggerated Government's Problems,'' Global Times, 16 August 18; ``From
`Internet Big V' to `Internet Pest'--Examination of Case of Chen
Jieren, Suspected of Extortion and Illegal Business Activities'' [Cong
``wangluo da V'' dao ``wangluo haichong''--chen jieren shexian qiaozha
lesuo, feifa jingying zui anjian toushi], Xinhua, 16 August 18;
``Maliciously Hyping and Provoking Trouble, Frenzied Profiteering
Through Extortion'' [E'yi chaozuo zishi fengkuang qiaozha liancai],
People's Daily, 17 August 18. For an English translation of the
People's Daily article with commentary on Chen Jieren's case, see David
Bandurski, ``Trial By Invective,'' University of Hong Kong, Journalism
& Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 18 August 18.
\67\ David Bandurski, ``Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,'' University of
Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 22
February 16; Li-Fung Cho, ``The Emergence of China's Watchdog
Reporting,'' in Investigative Journalism in China: Eight Cases in
Chinese Watchdog Journalism, eds. David Bandurski and Martin Hala (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 165-67. See also CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 62-63.
\68\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``41 Journalists Imprisoned
in China in 2017,'' last visited 26 April 18.
\69\ Ibid.; Reporters Without Borders, ``RSF Index 2018: Asia-
Pacific Democracies Threatened by China's Media Control Model,'' 25
April 18.
\70\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``41 Journalists Imprisoned
in China in 2017,'' last visited 26 April 18. The Committee to Protect
Journalists identified 14 ethnic Uyghurs in its list of 41 detained or
imprisoned journalists in China.
\71\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19,
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para.
44. The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that, ``Journalism is a
function shared by a wide range of actors, including professional full-
time reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers and others who engage
in forms of self-publication in print, on the internet or elsewhere . .
..''
\72\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu, the Activists
Who Put Non News in the News,'' 18 August 17. For examples of labor
protests reportedly censored during the Commission's 2018 reporting
year, see, e.g., Mimi Lau and He Huifeng, ``Why Protests by China's
Truck Drivers Could Put the Brakes on the Economy,'' South China
Morning Post, 24 June 18; China Labour Bulletin, ``Teachers Protest in
Anhui Focuses Attention on Long-standing Inequalities,'' 31 May 18.
\73\ Rights Defense Network, ``Beijing Artist Hua Yong on the Run
in China `Only for Doing What Journalists Should Do but Dare Not Do' ''
[Beijing huajia hua yong ``zhi yin ganle jizhe yinggai gan er bugan gan
de huo'' er congcong taowang zai zuguo de dadi shang], 9 December 17.
\74\ ``Year-End Report: Over Past Year, China Severely Cracked Down
on Rights Defenders' Websites and Online Speech'' [Nianzhong baodao:
zhongguo guoqu yi nian yanli fengsha weiquan wangzhan ji wangyan],
Voice of America, 11 December 17.
\75\ Ibid.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My
Human Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 22.
\76\ PEN America, ``Forbidden Feeds: Government Controls on Social
Media in China,'' 13 March 18, 50.
\77\ ``Enmeshed in the `December 25 Case Group,' Huang Yongxiang of
Guangdong Formally Criminally Detained'' [Juanru ``1225 zhuan'an''
guangdong huang yongxiang bei zhengshi xingju], Radio Free Asia, 11 May
18; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xi Jinping's `Cyber Sovereignty'
Fast Eroding Space for Free Expression,'' 19 April 18.
\78\ ``Enmeshed in the `December 25 Case Group,' Huang Yongxiang of
Guangdong Formally Criminally Detained'' [Juanru ``1225 zhuan'an''
guangdong huang yongxiang bei zhengshi xingju], Radio Free Asia, 11 May
18; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human Rights
Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017.
\79\ ``Zhen Jianghua Not Released 37 Days After Criminal Detention,
Many Rights Defenders Subjected to Stability Maintenance Measures Due
to 19th Party Congress'' [Zhen jianghua xingju 37 tian qiman wei huoshi
duo wei weiquan renshi yin shijiu da bei weiwen], China Free Press, 9
October 17; Human Rights Campaign in China, ``In Case Concerning Zhen
Jianghua, Whom Zhuhai Government Detained on Inciting Subversion of
State Power Charge, Sister Summoned by Jiangmen PSB, State Security
Officials Warned Her, Saying Her Article Affected Police Efforts To
Gather Evidence'' [Bei zhuhai dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui jiya de zhen jianghua qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong'anju
chuanxun guobao jinggao shuo ta wenzhang yingxiang jingfang souzheng],
29 September 17. For more information on Zhen Jianghua, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00360.
\80\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Anti-Censorship Activist,''
2 April 18.
\81\ Ibid.
\82\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Authorities Secretly Tried
Zhen Jianghua, Netizens Say It Shows [Authorities'] Guilty Mind''
[Dangju mimi shenpan zhen jianghua wangyou zhihu xinxu], 5 September
18.
\83\ Catherine Lai, ``How China's Multi-pronged Crackdown on
Dissent Took Aim at Citizen Journalists and Rights Defence Websites,''
Hong Kong Free Press, 16 February 18. For more information, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2004-04053 on Huang Qi
and 2016-00460 on Liu Feiyue.
\84\ Rights Defense Network, ``CRLW Founder Liu Feiyue's Case Goes
to Court Today, Many Citizens Who Came To Watch Were Seized and Sent
Back'' [Minsheng guancha chuangban ren liu feiyue jin kaiting zhong
gongmin qianwang weiguan zao kouya qianfan], 7 August 18.
\85\ Rights Defense Network, ``Huang Qi Trial Continues To Be
Postponed, Suffering Life-Threatening Illness Without Medical Parole,
His Mother Pu Wenqing Again Faces Probe by Original Work Unit, Calls
Out That She Wants To Live To See Son'' [Huang qi an jiutuo bushen huan
zhiming jibing wufa baowai muqin pu wenqing you zao yuan danwei tancha
yu yao huozhe jian dao erzi], 18 August 18.
\86\ ``Ding Lingjie Incommunicado for Nearly 1 Month, Lawyer
Attempts To Meet With Her and Is Refused'' [Ding lingjie shilian jiejin
1 ge yue lushi xunqiu huijian bei ju], Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17;
Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Editor of `Civil Rights and
Livelihood' Ding Lingjie Finally Able To Meet With Lawyer'' [Bei jiya
de ``mingsheng guangcha'' wangbian ding lingjie zhong huo huijian
lushi], 9 November 17. For more information about Ding Lingjie, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00328.
\87\ Rights Defense Network, ``64 Tianwang Volunteer and Rights
Defender From Ya'an, Sichuan, Jiang Chengfen, Accused of Picking
Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, Sentenced to 2 Years and 6 Months''
[Liusi tianwang yigong, sichuan ya'an weiquan renshi jiang chengfen bei
kong xunxin zishi huoxing 2 nian 6 ge yue], 20 June 18. For more
information on Jiang Chengfen, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00314.
\88\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wang Jing,'' 6 December 17.
For more information about Wang Jing, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2014-00104.
\89\ Rights Defense Network, ``Case of 3 Persons--Huang Qi, Chen
Tianmao, and Yang Xiuqiong--on Suspicion of `Illegally Providing State
Secrets Overseas' Postponed'' [Huang qi, chen tianmao, yang xiuqiong 3
ren shexian ``feifa wei jingwai tigong guojia mimi zui'' an zao yanqi],
16 June 18. For more information about Chen Tianmao, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00063.
\90\Ibid. For more information about Yang Xiuqiong, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00464.
\91\ ``CCTV Journalist `Detained' During Undercover Interview! This
Evening, the Evildoing of a Company With 4.5 Billion [Yuan] in Assets
Is Clear to the World'' [Yangshi jizhe anfang zao ``kouya''! jinye, yi
ge 45 yi zichan de da gongsi e'xing anran tianxia], CCTV 2, 18 April
18; David Bandurski, ``Will China's President Be Informed?'' University
of Hong Kong, Media & Journalism Studies Centre, China Media Project, 3
March 18; Ma Diming, ``Journalists on Undercover Investigation Are
Beaten, Supervision by Public Opinion Harmed'' [Anfang jizhe zao da
yulun jiandu shoushang], Beijing News, 2 February 18.
\92\ Wang Yu, ``Shaanxi Journalist on Assignment Surrounded and
Beaten, Locked Up in Mortuary'' [Shaanxi jizhe caifang zao wei'ou bei
suo taipingjian], Beijing News, 6 December 17; Chen Huidong, ``Xi'an
Journalist Beaten While Investigating Hospital's `Sky-High Mortuary
Fee,' Hospital Director Suspended and Six Staff in Custody'' [Xi'an
jizhe caifang yiyuan ``tianjia ting shi fei'' zao ouda: yuanzhang bei
tingzhi liu ren bei ju], Jiemian News, 5 December 17.
\93\ Anjani Trivedi and Julie Steinberg, ``How China's Acquisitive
HNA Group Fell From Favor,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 November 17; Keith
Bradsher and Alexandra Stevenson, ``Beijing Takes Over Anbang, Insurer
That Owns Waldorf Astoria,'' New York Times, 22 February 18.
\94\ `` `Southern Weekend' Immediately Withdraws Special Coverage
of HNA, Exposing Financial Crisis, Author Posted Article Online''
[``Nanzhou'' haihang zhuanti zao linshi chegao jie caiwu weiji zuozhe
wangshang kandeng ren zhuanzai], Ming Pao, 9 February 18; International
Federation of Journalists, ``Southern Weekly Magazine Suspected of
Self-Censorship,'' 15 February 18.
\95\ Wang Xiangwei, ``Why China's Silence on Xi's Term Limits Move
Portends Trouble,'' South China Morning Post, 12 March 18; ``English
News Brief on Presidential Term Change Angers Leaders,'' University of
Hong Kong, Media & Journalism Studies Centre, China Media Project, 1
March 18; ``Proposed Removal of Chinese Leader's Term Limit Meets With
Public Resistance,'' China Change, 28 February 18.
\96\ Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, Brookings Institution, ``China's
Constitutional Conundrum,'' 28 February 18; Deng Yuwen, ``With an End
to Term Limits, Xi Can Realise His Chinese Dream--But Will the Price
for China Be Too High?'' South China Morning Post, 6 March 18.
\97\ Wang Xiangwei, ``Why China's Silence on Xi's Term Limits Move
Portends Trouble,'' South China Morning Post, 12 March 18; ``English
News Brief on Presidential Term Change Angers Leaders,'' University of
Hong Kong, Media & Journalism Studies Centre, China Media Project, 1
March 18.
\98\ Victor Mair, ``Epic Eye-Roll,'' Language Log (blog), 15 March
18.
\99\ Te-Ping Chen and Chun Han Wong, ``One Woman Rolls Her Eyes and
Captivates a Nation,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 March 18; China Digital
Times, ``What's in an Eye-roll?'' 22 March 18; China Digital Times,
``Minitrue: Do Not Hype Two Sessions Reporter's Eyeroll,'' 13 March 18.
\100\ Wang Heyan, ``Police Detain Six in `Case of Pan Gang's
Disappearance,' Yili Accuses Blackhand'' [Jingfang yin ``pan gang
shilian an'' yi zhua liu ren yili zhi you heishou], Caixin, 5 April 18;
Zhuang Pinghui, ``China's Top Dairy Firm Says CEO Too Ill To Attend
Asia's Davos, Squashes Rumours of Police Probe,'' South China Morning
Post, 8 April 18; Zhang Qin, ``Person Spreading Rumor That `Yili
Chairman Is Being Investigated' Has Been Detained'' [Wangshang zaoyao
``yili dongshizhang bei diaocha'' zhe bei zhuahuo], Beijing Youth
Daily, 30 March 18. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00158 on Zou Guangxiang and
2018-00159 on Liu Chengkun.
\101\ Rights Defense Network, ``Journalist Wang Tao, Detained for
Reporting on Cases of Missing Wuhan University Students, Released and
Returned Home'' [Baodao wuhan daxuesheng shizong an er zao juya de
jizhe wang tao yi shifang huijia], 4 November 17; Feng Guodong,
``Internet User Detained for Spreading Rumor That `Over 30 Wuhan
University Students Mysteriously Disappeared' '' [Wangmin sanbu ``30
duo ming wuhan daxuesheng shenmi shizong'' yaoyan bei juliu], Xinhua,
28 September 17; Huang Xiaojing, ``Did Dozens of College Students
Mysteriously Go Missing? Internet Writer Detained for 10 Days'' [Shu
shi daxuesheng shenmi shizong? wangwen zuozhe bei ju 10 tian], Beijing
Youth Daily, 29 September 17; ``Chinese Police Detain Journalist Who
Wrote About Missing Wuhan Students,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 September 17.
For more information on Wang Tao, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00391.
\102\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Access Denied:
Surveillance, Harassment and Intimidation as Reporting Conditions in
China Deteriorate,'' January 2018, 1-3, 7.
\103\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January 30, 2018,'' 30
January 18; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on February 1,
2018,'' 1 February 18; David Bandurski, ``Journalism Denied: How China
Views the News,'' University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies
Centre, China Media Project, 1 February 18.
\104\ Fang Tian, ``China's Foreign Ministry Refutes FCCC
Allegations Again,'' People's Daily, 2 February 18. See also China
Digital Times, ``Journalists Respond to FCCC Survey's Dismissal,'' 2
February 18; David Bandurski, ``Journalism Denied: How China Views the
News,'' University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre,
China Media Project, 1 February 18.
\105\ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of
Sweden, ``Chinese Embassy Spokesperson's Remarks on Expressen's Article
About China,'' 3 July 18; Magnus Fiskesjo, ``Further Escalation of the
Gui Minhai Case,'' Ohio State University, Modern Chinese Literature and
Culture (blog), 7 July 18. See also International Federation of
Journalists, ``Sweden: Chinese Embassy Attacks Journalist,'' 10 July
18. For more information on Gui Minhai, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2016-00090.
\106\ See, e.g., Jennifer Creery, ``Video: `Journalism Is Not a
Crime'--China Press Club Condemns Detention of Voice of America
Reporters,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 15 August 18; Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China (fccchina), Twitter post, 14 August 18,
3:26 a.m. Authorities in Shandong province reportedly detained one
Voice of America (VOA) reporter and a VOA contractor for more than six
hours in connection to an interview with a retired professor who had
been detained. Steven Lee Myers, ``A Dance for Tibetan New Year, Then
17 Hours in Custody,'' New York Times, 18 February 18. Local
authorities reportedly detained a New York Times journalist and
accompanying photographer for 17 hours. Gu Li, ``RFI Journalist Schmidt
Temporarily Detained While Interviewing People on Beijing Street About
Constitution Revision'' [Faguang jizhe shimite beijing jietou caifang
xiuxian yiti zao duanzan juliu], Radio France Internationale, 9 March
18; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Authorities Briefly
Detain RFI Correspondent in Beijing,'' 16 March 18. Beijing authorities
reportedly held a Radio France Internationale (RFI) journalist and news
assistant for about one hour.
\107\ See, e.g., Naomi Ng, ``Hong Kong i-Cable TV Journalist
Reporting on 10th Anniversary of Sichuan Earthquake Kicked and Beaten
by Two Men,'' South China Morning Post, 12 May 18; Tiffany May, ``Hong
Kong Journalist Is Roughed Up and Detained by Police in Beijing,'' New
York Times, 16 May 18; International Federation of Journalists, ``Hong
Kong Journalists Attacked in Beijing,'' 16 May 18.
\108\ ``China Expels German Student Who Researched Rights
Lawyers,'' Associated Press, 13 August 18; ``German Student David
Missal Expelled From China After Making Human Rights Film,'' Deutsche
Welle, 12 August 18.
\109\ Michael McGowan, ``China Denies Visas to Australian
Journalists Due to `Frosty' Diplomatic Relations,'' Guardian, 4 June
18.
\110\ ``List of Websites and Apps Blocked in China [Updated June
2018],'' Startupliving (blog), last visited 19 June 18; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular
Press Conference on February 1, 2018,'' 1 February 18.
\111\ ``China's Curbs on Foreign Press Should Be Eased, Says German
Foreign Ministry State Secretary Andreas Michaelis,'' Reuters,
reprinted in South China Morning Post, 8 May 18.
\112\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Access Denied:
Surveillance, Harassment and Intimidation as Reporting Conditions in
China Deteriorate,'' January 2018, 4, 6.
\113\ John Pomfret, ``China's Thought Police Are Extending Their
Reach,'' Washington Post, 19 January 18. Chinese authorities also have
harassed China-based family members of foreign journalists, a news
assistant for a foreign media outlet, and Chinese journalists living
abroad in prior years. See, e.g., Chang Ping, ``Chang Ping: My
Statement About the Open Letter to Xi Jinping Demanding His
Resignation,'' China Change, 27 March 16; Casey Michel, ``China's War
Against One American Journalist,'' Slate, 9 July 15; Eric Fish, `` `I
Don't Want To Think About Activating Change': NYT's David Barboza on
Reporting in China,'' Asia Society, Asia Blog, 28 January 16; Human
Rights Watch, `` `You Will Be Harassed and Detained' China Media
Freedoms Under Assault Ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games,'' August 2007,
24-25.
\114\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Wife of Critical Chinese-
American Journalist Disappears in China,'' 18 January 18; John Pomfret,
``China's Thought Police Are Extending Their Reach,'' Washington Post,
19 January 18.
\115\ ``The Families Left Behind: RFA's Uyghur Reporters Tell the
Stories of Their Family Members' Detentions,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 April
18; Amnesty International, ``Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist's
Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,'' 16 March 18; Simon
Denyer, ``China Detains Relatives of U.S. Reporters in Apparent
Punishment for Xinjiang Coverage,'' Washington Post, 28 February 18;
Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``China: End Intimidation of Radio Free
Asia Uyghur Service Journalists,'' 2 May 18; Committee to Protect
Journalists, ``China Detains Relatives of RFA Uighur Service
Journalists,'' 28 February 18.
\116\ Amnesty International, ``Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist's
Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,'' 16 March 18;
Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China Detains Relatives of RFA
Uighur Service Journalists,'' 28 February 18; Uyghur Human Rights
Project, ``China: End Intimidation of Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service
Journalists,'' 2 May 18.
\117\ China Internet Network Information Center, ``Statistical
Report on Internet Development in China'' [Zhongguo hulian wangluo
fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], January 2018, 1.
\118\ Ibid., 35-36.
\119\ ``Progress Report of the National People's Congress Standing
Committee Enforcement Inspection Group Regarding Inspection of the `PRC
Cybersecurity Law' and `National People's Congress Standing Committee
Decision Concerning Strengthening the Protection of Online Information'
'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui zhifa jiancha zu
guanyu jiancha ``zhonghua renmin gonghe guo wangluo anquan fa'',
``quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu jiachang
wangluo xinxi baohu de jueding'' shishi qingkuang de baogao], National
People's Congress Net, 25 December 17; ``Xi Jinping: Advancing the
Construction of a Strong Cyber Power Through Indigenous Innovation''
[Xi jinping: zizhu chuangxin tuijin wangluo qiangguo jianshe], Xinhua,
21 April 18. See also Paul Mozur, ``China's Top Ideologue Calls for
Tight Control of Internet,'' New York Times, 3 December 17; ``China's
Xi Says Internet Control Key to Stability,'' Reuters, 21 April 18;
Rogier Creemers et al., ``Lexicon: Wangluo Qiangguo,'' New America,
DigiChina (blog), 31 May 18.
\120\ Samm Sacks and Paul Triolo, ``Shrinking Anonymity in Chinese
Cyberspace,'' Lawfare (blog), 25 September 17.
\121\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services
[Hulianwang yonghu gongzhong zhanghao xinxi fuwu guangli guiding],
issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17; Cyberspace
Administration of China, Provisions on the Administration of Internet
Group Information Services [Hulianwang qunzu xinxi fuwu guanli
guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17; Cyberspace
Administration of China, Measures for the Administration of Content
Management Practitioners Working for Internet News Information Service
Providers [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu danwei neirong guanli congye
renyuan guanli banfa], issued 30 October 17, effective 1 December 17.
\122\ David Bandurski, ``The Great Hive of Propaganda,'' University
of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project,
16 September 17; Rongbin Han, ``New (and Not So New) Trends in China's
Online Censorship,'' University of Nottingham, Asia Research Institute,
Asia Dialogue, 7 November 17; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xi
Jinping's `Cyber Sovereignty' Fast Eroding Space for Free Expression,''
19 April 18.
\123\ Samm Sacks and Paul Triolo, ``Shrinking Anonymity in Chinese
Cyberspace,'' Lawfare (blog), 25 September 17; Simon Denyer, ``The
Walls Are Closing In: China Finds New Ways To Tighten Internet
Controls,'' Washington Post, 27 September 17.
\124\ David Bandurski, ``The Great Hive of Propaganda,'' University
of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project,
16 September 17. See also Samm Sacks and Paul Triolo, ``Shrinking
Anonymity in Chinese Cyberspace,'' Lawfare (blog), 25 September 17.
\125\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Public Account Information Services
[Hulianwang yonghu gongzhong zhanghao xinxi fuwu guangli guiding],
issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October 17, art. 4.
\126\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Group Information Services [Hulianwang qunzu
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October
17, art. 9.
\127\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Measures for the
Administration of Content Management Practitioners Working for Internet
News Information Service Providers [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu danwei
neirong guanliyuan guanli banfa], issued 30 October 17, effective 1
December 17, art. 11; Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ``Chinese Internet
Regulators Target Social Media Use,'' Wall Street Journal, 30 October
17. For an explanation of the ``Marxist view of journalism,'' see Wen
Hua, ``Clearly Seeing the Essence of the Western Concept of
Journalism'' [Kanqing xifang xinwen guan de benzhi], Seeking Truth, 31
December 17. For an unofficial translation of the article in Seeking
Truth, see David Bandurski, ``Journalism Denied: How China Views the
News,'' University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre,
China Media Project, 1 February 18.
\128\ See, e.g., King-wa Fu et al., ``Weibo Whack-a-Mole,'' Asia
Society, ChinaFile, 8 March 18.
\129\ See, e.g., Francoise Robin, ``Guest Post: `The Silence of the
State: The Jokhang Fire and the Response of the Chinese Government,' ''
High Peaks Pure Earth (blog), 21 March 18; China Digital Times, ``
`Almost Total Suppression of Information' After Tibet Temple Fire,'' 20
February 18; Javier C. Hernandez, ``Leading Western Publisher Bows to
Chinese Censorship,'' New York Times, 1 November 17.
\130\ See, e.g., Ian Johnson, ``Cambridge University Press Removes
Academic Articles on Chinese Site,'' New York Times, 18 August 17.
\131\ See, e.g., Javier C. Hernandez, ``Leading Western Publisher
Bows to Chinese Censorship,'' New York Times, 1 November 17; Ian
Johnson, ``Cambridge University Press Removes Academic Articles on
Chinese Site,'' New York Times, 18 August 17.
\132\ See, e.g., Tim Pringle, ``Partnerships Need To Be Carefully
Constructed by All Those Involved To Guard Against Disguised
Motivations With the Capacity To Trump the Seeking of Truth,'' Times
Higher Education, 4 January 18.
\133\ See, e.g., Annie Wu, ``Chinese Citizens Detained for Posts on
Social Media Platform WeChat,'' Epoch Times, 12 March 18.
\134\ See, e.g., Louisa Lim, ``Censorship Is Superfluous in Xi's
`New Era,' '' Lowy Institute, The Interpreter, 1 November 17; Mandy
Zuo, ``Controversy Over Chinese Textbook's Cultural Revolution Chapter
as State Publisher Denies Censorship,'' South China Morning Post, 11
January 18; David Bandurski, ``On Weibo, Deleting the Past,''
University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media
Project, 10 January 18; Ian Johnson, ``Who Killed More: Hitler, Stalin,
or Mao?'' New York Review of Books, NYR Daily (blog), 5 February 18.
\135\ ``Anhui Province Issues `Extremely Urgent' Stability
Maintenance Notice, News Reports Must Be Approved for Types of
Controlled Topics'' [Anhui sheng xia ``teji'' weiwen tongzhi baodao
jiandu lei xinwen xu baopi], Radio Free Asia, 21 November 17.
\136\ David Bandurski, ``China's Closing of Top Leftist Website
Signals Party's Determination To Enforce Ideological Unity,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 2 June 18.
\137\ ``[Era of Xi's Power] `Utopia's' WeChat Permanently Closed,
Is the Game of Extreme Leftist Speech Over?'' [[Xiquan shidai] ``wuyou
zhi xiang'' weixin yongjiu fengjin jizuo yanlun zhendi wanwang?], Apple
Daily, 19 May 18; ``China Shutters Maoist `Utopia' Website, Social
Media Account,'' Radio Free Asia, 21 May 18.
\138\ Chris Buckley, ``In Beijing, Doors Shut on a Bastion of
Independent Ideas,'' New York Times, 11 July 18.
\139\ Ibid.; Wendy Wu and Jane Cai, ``Beijing Internet Censors
Close Websites of Liberal Economic Think Tank,'' South China Morning
Post, 22 January 18.
\140\ Xu Zhangrun, ``Our Immediate Fears and Hopes'' [Women dangxia
de kongju yu qidai], Unirule Perspectives, 24 July 18. For an English
translation of Xu's essay, together with commentary, see Geremie R.
Barme, ``Our Imminent Fears and Immediate Hopes--A Beijing Jeremiad,''
China Heritage, 1 August 18. See also Chris Buckley, ``As China's Woes
Mount, Xi Jinping Faces Rare Rebuke at Home,'' New York Times, 31 July
18; Jerome A. Cohen, ``Xi Jinping Sees Some Pushback Against His Iron-
fisted Rule,'' Washington Post, 2 August 18.
\141\ ``19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Convenes
in Beijing, Xi Jinping Delivers Work Report on Behalf of the 18th
Central Committee, Presided Over by Li Keqiang'' [Zhongguo gongchandang
di shijiu ci quanguo daibiao dahui zai jing kaimu xi jinping daibiao di
shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui xiang dahui zuo baogao li keqiang zhuchi
dahui], Xinhua, 18 October 17.
\142\ Nectar Gan and Sarah Zheng, ``What To Watch for at China's
Two Sessions,'' South China Morning Post, 4 March 18.
\143\ On the 19th Party Congress, see, e.g., Hongwei Bao, ``China's
`Media War' Before and During the 19th Party Congress,'' University of
Nottingham, Asia Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, 24 October 17;
Sarah Cook, ``China's Thought Police Are Giving a Master Class in
Censorship,'' Washington Post, 14 September 17; Masashi Crete-Nishihata
et al., ``Managing the Message: What You Can't Say About the 19th
National Communist Party Congress on WeChat,'' University of Toronto,
Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 6 November 17. On the Two
Sessions, see, e.g., China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: How To Report on
the NPC,'' 12 March 18; China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: How To Report
on the NPC (Etc.), Part 2,'' 13 March 18; China Digital Times,
``Minitrue: How To Report on the NPC (Etc), Part 3,'' 14 March 18; Ben
Blanchard and Michael Martina, ``China Pushes Back Against Criticism of
Plan for Xi To Stay in Power,'' Reuters, 25 February 18.
\144\ James Palmer, ``Nobody Knows Anything About China,'' Foreign
Policy, 21 March 18.
\145\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue 2017: July--Directive Leaks
Slow to a Halt,'' 21 December 17. China Digital Times aggregates and
summarizes English and Chinese language media and tracks a broad range
of political and social developments, in addition to providing
translation of leaked censorship directives.
\146\ Ibid. See also Paul Mozur, ``Internet Users in China Expect
To Be Tracked. Now, They Want Privacy,'' New York Times, 4 January 18;
Ellen Tannam, ``Privacy Worries Increasing Among Internet Users in
China,'' Silicon Republic, 8 January 18.
\147\ Mimi Lau, ``China's Communist Rulers Ban Online Jokes App,
but Comedy Community Says the Joke's on Them,'' South China Morning
Post, 15 April 18; Hillary McLauchlin, ``We(Chat) The People:
Technology and Social Control in China,'' Harvard Political Review, 31
December 17.
\148\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Repression & Resilience:
Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China
(2017),'' February 2018, 14; King-wa Fu et al., ``Weibo Whack-a-Mole,''
Asia Society, ChinaFile, 8 March 18.
\149\ Eva Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford, MA: Polity Press,
2018), 97-98.
\150\ Ibid., 78, 92-94.
\151\ Lily Kuo, ``#Metoo in China: Fledgling Movement in
Universities Fights Censorship,'' Guardian, 17 April 18.
\152\ Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: China
State TV Celebrates New Year--With Racism,'' 16 February 18; Manya
Koetse, ``About the CCTV Spring Festival Gala's `Racist' Africa Comedy
Sketch,'' What's on Weibo, 16 February 18.
\153\ King-wa Fu et al., ``Weibo Whack-a-Mole,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, 8 March 18.
\154\ See, e.g., ``Police Detained WeChat User for Calling Xi
Jinping `Emperor Xi,' People's Daily Article `Don't Forget To Resist
Cult of Personality' Deleted'' [Wangmin weixin cheng ``xi huang'' bei
jing ju renminwang ``buwang fan geren chongbai'' wen bei shan], Radio
Free Asia, 12 April 18; ``Chinese Police Jail Two Women Over `Vehicle
Reversing' Video Clip,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 March 18.
\155\ Allyson Chiu, ``Sina Weibo, China's Social Media Giant,
Reverses Ban on Gay Content After Weekend of Protests,'' Washington
Post, 16 April 18; ``China's Weibo Site Backtracks on Gay Censorship
After Outcry,'' Associated Press, reprinted in NY Daily News, 16 April
18.
\156\ Javier C. Hernandez and Zoe Mou, `` `I Am Gay, Not a
Pervert': Furor Erupts in China as Sina Weibo Bans Gay Content,'' New
York Times, 15 April 18; ``The Victory of #IamGay: Have We Really
Won?'' Elephant Room (blog), last visited 19 April 18.
\157\ Raymond Zhong, ``It Built an Empire of GIFs, Buzzy News and
Jokes. China Isn't Amused,'' New York Times, 11 April 18.
\158\ Mimi Lau, ``China's Communist Rulers Ban Online Jokes App,
but Comedy Community Says the Joke's on Them,'' South China Morning
Post, 15 April 18; Raymond Zhong, ``It Built an Empire of GIFs, Buzzy
News and Jokes. China Isn't Amused,'' New York Times, 11 April 18; Josh
Chin, ``New Target for China's Censors: Content Driven by Artificial
Intelligence,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 April 18.
\159\ David Bandurski, ``Tech Shame in the `New Era,' '' University
of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project,
11 April 18. See also Raymond Zhong, ``It Built an Empire of GIFs,
Buzzy News and Jokes. China Isn't Amused,'' New York Times, 11 April
18; Josh Chin, ``New Target for China's Censors: Content Driven by
Artificial Intelligence,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 April 18.
\160\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12.
\161\ Ibid., art. 22; UN Human Rights Council, The Rights to
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, A/HRC/RES/24/5, 8 October
13, items 2-6.
\162\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992,
art. 2(1)-(2).
\163\ ``Prominent Chinese Political Prisoner Yang Tianshui Released
on Medical Parole, Dies Two Months Later'' [Zhongguo zhuming
zhengzhifan yang tianshui baowai jiuyi liang yue hou bingshi], Voice of
America, 8 November 17. Regarding Cao Shunli's case, see Human Rights
in China, ``Rights Defender Cao Shunli Died in Hospital in Beijing,
Lawyer Barred From Viewing Body,'' 14 March 14; Verna Yu, ``Inquiry
Into Activist Cao Shunli's Death Sought,'' South China Morning Post, 21
March 14. For additional information on Cao Shunli's case, see
``Inadequate Medical Care for Cao Shunli Before Her Death Contradicts
International Law,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2
April 14. Regarding Liu Xiaobo's case, see Chris Buckley, ``Liu Xiaobo,
Chinese Dissident Who Won Nobel While Jailed, Dies at 61,'' New York
Times, 13 July 17; ``Questions Raised About Liu Xiaobo's Prison Medical
Treatment,'' Associated Press, 27 June 17. For additional information
on Liu Xiaobo's case, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 19-
20, 66.
\164\ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic and
Social Council resolutions 663C (XXIV) of 31 July 57 and 2076 (LXII) of
13 May 77, arts. 22, 24-26; Body of Principles for the Protection of
All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution A/RES/43/173, 9 December 88, principle 24;
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E.
Mendez, A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 13, paras. 20, 22; Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84,
entry into force 26 June 87.
\165\ Jia Pingwa, ``The Plight of Writing'' [Xiezuo de kunjing], LA
Review of Books, China Channel, 21 December 17. For an unofficial
English translation, see Jia Pingwa and Nick Stember, ``The Plight of
Writing: An Undelivered Speech by Jia Pingwa,'' LA Review of Books,
China Channel, 24 January 18.
\166\ Jia Pingwa, ``The Plight of Writing'' [Xiezuo de kunjing], LA
Review of Books, China Channel, 21 December 17. For an unofficial
English translation, see Jia Pingwa and Nick Stember, ``The Plight of
Writing: An Undelivered Speech by Jia Pingwa,'' LA Review of Books,
China Channel, 24 January 18. Chinese censors reportedly banned
``Ruined City'' for 17 years.
\167\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guo Qingjun, Citizen of Changchun
Municipality, Jilin Province, Is Criminally Detained by Ganzhou
Municipality, Jiangxi PSB'' [Jilin sheng changchun shi gongmin guo
qingjun bei jiangxi ganzhou shi gong'anju xingshi liu], 13 April 18;
``Many Volunteers From Group That `Sent Food' to Family Members of
Prisoners of Conscience Were Detained'' [Wei liangxinfan jiashu
``songfan'' yigong qunti duo ren bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 13 April
18; ``WeChat Group That Aided Prisoners of Conscience Disbanded, Group
Leaders Guo Qingjun, Among Others, Criminally Detained'' [Jiuzhu
liangxinfan weixin qun bei jiesan qunzhu guo qingjun deng bei xingshi
juliu], Radio Free Asia, 14 April 18; ``Eight Detained for Organizing
Humanitarian Assistance for Political Prisoners and Their Families,''
China Change, 15 April 18. Authorities also reportedly forced the
WeChat group to disband.
\168\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Jilin's Guo Qingjun
Arrested on Suspicion of `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' ''
[Jilin guo qingjun bei yi shexian ``xunxin zishi'' pibu], 19 May 18;
Rights Defense Network, ``RDN: Monthly Report on Detained Mainland
Chinese Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience (5/31/2018) No.
32 (Total 761 Persons) (Part 2)'' [Weiquanwang: zhongguo dalu zaiya
zhengzhifan, liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2018 nian 5 yue 31 ri) di 32 qi
(gong 761 ren) (di 2 bufen), 31 May 18. For more information on Guo
Qingjun, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-
00165.
\169\ ``Tibetan Language Education Advocate's Sentencing Brings
International Condemnation'' [Zangyu jiaoyu changdaozhe bei panxing zao
guoji qianze], Radio Free Asia, 22 May 18; Christopher Bodeen, ``China
Sentences Tibetan Activist to 5 Years for Separatism,'' Associated
Press, 22 May 18. For more information on Tashi Wangchug, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00077.
\170\ Jonah M. Kessel, ``How China Used a Times Documentary as
Evidence Against Its Subject,'' New York Times, 10 January 18.
\171\ Liang Xiaojun (liangxiaojun), Twitter post, 22 August 18,
8:15 p.m.; Tenzin Dharpo, ``Tibetan Activist's Appeal Against 5-year
Sentence Rejected,'' Phayul, 24 August 18.
\172\ Rights Defense Network, ``Prominent Democracy Activist, Mr.
Yang Tianshui, Forcibly Given `Sea Burial' by CCP Authorities, Family
Members Under Extreme Pressure and Banned From Speaking Out'' [Zhuming
minyun renshi yang tianshui xiansheng zao zhonggong dangju qiangzhi
``haizang'' jiaren zao juda yali bei jinyan], 20 December 17; PEN
America, ``Death of Imprisoned Chinese Writer and Activist Yang Tongyan
a Further Blow for Free Expression,'' 7 November 17. See also Dui Hua
Foundation, ``Liu Xiaobo Granted Medical Parole,'' 26 June 17. Dui Hua
Foundation clarified that, ``It is not correct to say that the prisoner
granted medical parole is `free,' nor is it correct to say that the
prisoner has been `released.' The prisoner is still serving his/or her
sentence, albeit in a location other than the prison itself.'' For more
information about Yang Tongyan (Yang Tianshui), see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05189.
\173\ Zhenjiang Municipal Intermediate People's Court, Criminal
Judgment [Jiangsu sheng zhenjiang shi renmin fayuan xingshi panjue
shu], (2006) Zhen Xing Yi Chu Zi No. 12, 17 May 06, reprinted in
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 23 August 06.
\174\ Reporters Without Borders, ``After Lack of Medical Care in
Prison, Chinese Blogger Dies,'' 9 November 17; ``Tang Jingling Detained
for Again Trying To Inquire in Shaoyang About Li Wangyang; Yang
Tianshui Ailing in Prison Goes on Hunger Strike'' [Tang jingling wei li
wangyang zai fang shaoyang bei kou yang tianshui yuzhong jibing
chanshen jueshi kangzheng], Radio Free Asia, 11 September 12. See also
Rights Defense Network, ``Nanjing Dissident Yang Tianshui Has Been
Imprisoned for 17 Years, Suffers From Multiple Chronic Illnesses''
[Nanjing yijian renshi yang tianshui leiji bei qiu 17 nian, bingmo
chanshen], 10 September 12.
\175\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``Ailing Dissident's Case Fits a Pattern
in Chinese Prisons, Critics Say,'' New York Times, 10 July 17; Stuart
Lau and Shirley Zhao, ``China Stages `Hasty' Cremation of Liu Xiaobo
and Has His Ashes Scattered at Sea,'' South China Morning Post, 17 July
17.
\176\ Rights Defense Network, ``Prominent Democracy Activist, Mr.
Yang Tianshui, Forcibly Given `Sea Burial' by CCP Authorities, Family
Members Under Extreme Pressure and Banned From Speaking Out'' [Zhuming
mingyun renshi yang tianshui xiansheng zao zhonggong dangju qiangzhi
``haizang'' jiaren zao juda yali bei jinyan], 20 December 17.
\177\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Democratic Voice Liu Xiaobo Dies
in Custody,'' 13 July 17; Josh Chin, ``Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo, Who
Fought for Democracy in China, Dies in Police Custody,'' Wall Street
Journal, 13 July 17. See also CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17,
66.
\178\ Chris Buckley and Melissa Eddy, ``Liu Xia, in Call From
China, Tells of the Agony of Endless Captivity,'' New York Times, 4 May
18. For more information on Liu Xia, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2010-00629.
\179\ Jane Perlez, ``Liu Xia, Detained Widow of Nobel Peace
Laureate, Leaves China,'' New York Times, 10 July 18; Christian
Shepherd and Riham Alkousaa, ``Widow of Chinese Dissident Liu Xiaobo
Arrives in Germany,'' Reuters, 10 July 18.
\180\ See, e.g., ``China Change Exclusive: Liu Xia Cries Out for
Help in a Phone Call With Liao Yiwu on April 8, 2018,'' China Change, 2
May 18; ``Liu Xia Undergoes Surgery for Uterine Fibroids, Severely
Depressed, Outside World Urges Permission for Her To Leave China as
Soon as Possible'' [Liu xia yi zuo zigong jiliu shoushu yiyuzheng
yanzhong waijie yu jinzao yun qi chuguo], Radio Free Asia, 19 November
17; ``Rare Phone Call From House Arrest Sparks Fears for Liu Xia's
Well-Being,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 February 17; Desmond M. Tutu and Jared
Genser, ``The Ordeal of China's Liu Xia,'' Wall Street Journal, 30
March 14; China Digital Times, ``Friends Say Liu Xia Suffering From
Depression,'' 2 December 13.
\181\ Lily Kuo and Philip Oltermann, ``Liu Xia: Free At Last but a
Hostage-in-Exile to Beijing's Crackdown,'' Guardian, 15 July 18. See
also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, A/HRC/WGAD/2011/16, 27 February 12, paras. 17-20, 22. In May
2011, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared the Chinese
government's detention of Liu Xia to be in violation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
\182\ Catherine Lai, ``NGOs, Activists React as Liu Xia Leaves
China, but Fears Remain for Brother in Beijing,'' Hong Kong Free Press,
10 July 18.
\183\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Repression & Resilience:
Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China
(2017),'' February 2018, 18, 23; Rights Defense Network, ``Yu Qiyuan's
Statement Prior Detention: I Firmly Believe, That in the Near Future,
This Land That Gave Birth to Me and Raised Me, Must Bid Farewell to
More Than 4,000 Years of Authoritarian Rule, With a New Nation of
Freedom and Democracy Becoming a Part of World Civilization!'' [Yu
qiyuan bei bu qian shengming: wo jianxin, bujiu de jianglai, zhe pian
sheng wo yang wo de tudi, bijiang gaobie si qian duo nian de zhuanzhi
tongzhi, yi ge ziyou minzhu de xin guojia jiang mairu shijie wenming
zhi lin!], 25 May 18.
\184\ For more information on these cases, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2015-00315 on Huang Yongxiang,
2015-00316 on Wei Xiaobing, 2017-00317 on He Lin, 2017-00318 on Liu
Guangxiao, 2017-00319 on Li Shujia, 2017-00320 on Qin Mingxin, 2017-
00321 on Wang Meiju, 2017-00322 on Ma Qiang, 2017-00327 on Zhuo Yuzhen,
2018-00010 on Li Xuewen, 2018-00012 on Zhan Huidong, 2018-00389 on Yu
Qiyuan, and 2018-00390 on Li Zhaoqiang.
\185\ Rights Defense Network, ``Sichuan Rights Defender Li Yu
Detained After Seaside Memorial for Liu Xiaobo in Fujian, Still in
Detention'' [Sichuan weiquan renshi li yu zai fujian haiji liu xiaobo
bei zhuabu xian reng bei jiya], 27 July 17.
\186\ ``Two Dalian Mourners at Liu Xiaobo's Sea Memorial Released,
Liu Xia's Whereabouts Still Unknown'' [Dalian liang ming liu xiaobo
daonianzhe huoshi liu xia yiran xialuo buming], Voice of America, 31
July 17.
\187\ ``Guangdong Poet Langzi and Peng Heping Released'' [Guangdong
shiren langzi ji peng heping huo shi], Radio Free Asia, 23 September
17; ``Guangzhou Poet Langzi Criminally Detained on Suspicion of
Commemorating Liu Xiaobo'' [Guangzhou shiren langzi she jinian liu
xiaobo shiji bei xingju], Radio Free Asia, 22 August 17; Yaxue Cao,
``From Sea to a Sea of Words: Poet Ensnared as China Shuts Down
Commemoration of Liu Xiaobo,'' China Change, 14 September 17. For more
information on Wu Mingliang (legal name of poet Langzi), see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00314.
\188\ ``Guangdong Poet Langzi and Peng Heping Released'' [Guangdong
shiren langzi ji peng heping huo shi], Radio Free Asia, 23 September
17; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``For Help in Introducing Poet
Langzi to Printing Plant, Guangzhou Peng Heping Criminally Detained''
[Yin bang shiren langzi jieshao yinshua chang guangzhou peng heping bei
xingju], 2 September 17. For more information on Peng Heping, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00315.
\189\ ``Chinese Songwriter Formally Arrested for Song About Late
Liu Xiaobo,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 November 17. For more information,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00310 on
Xu Lin and 2017-00311 on Liu Sifang.
\190\ ``France Couple in China Unreachable After Liu Xiaobo
Tribute,'' BBC, 22 December 17; ``Artist Held in China Over Tribute to
Nobel Winner Liu Xiaobo Is Released,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted
in Japan Times, 25 December 17.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Trade Unions
China's laws and practices continue to contravene
international worker rights standards and violate rights
provided for in China's Constitution, including the right to
create or join independent trade unions.\1\ The All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union
organization permitted under Chinese law.\2\ In January 2018,
the state-run news agency Xinhua reported that the ACFTU had
303 million members in 2017, of whom 140 million were
agricultural members.\3\ The U.S. Government and international
observers noted that the ACFTU typically prioritized Chinese
Communist Party interests over the interests of workers and did
not effectively represent workers.\4\ During the Commission's
2018 reporting year, the ACFTU's top official held concurrent
positions in the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist
Party.\5\ In March 2018, the ACFTU Executive Committee selected
Wang Dongming--a member of the 19th Party Central Committee
\6\--to be ACFTU Chairman,\7\ and the National People's
Congress (NPC) selected Wang as Vice Chairman of the NPC
Standing Committee.\8\ At the enterprise level, union
representatives often side with management interests.\9\
Restrictions on workers' rights to freely establish and join
independent trade unions violate international standards set
forth by the International Labour Organization (ILO),\10\
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,\11\ International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\12\ and International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\13\
Collective Bargaining
This past year, workers' right to collective bargaining
remained limited in law and in practice. Provisions in the PRC
Labor Law, PRC Labor Contract Law, and PRC Trade Union Law
provide a legal framework for negotiating collective
contracts,\14\ but these laws designate the Party-controlled
ACFTU as responsible for negotiating with employers and signing
collective contracts on behalf of workers.\15\ In addition to
curbing union representation,\16\
authorities have also restricted the ability of Chinese labor
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to train workers in
collective bargaining.\17\ As a member of the ILO, China is
obligated to respect workers' right to collective
bargaining.\18\
Civil Society
Chinese authorities continued to severely restrict the
ability of civil society organizations to work on labor issues,
including domestic organizations that received foreign funding
and international civil society organizations. Labor NGOs have
existed in China since the early 1990s,\19\ offering legal aid,
helping workers seek redress for workplace injuries and unpaid
wages, educating workers about their legal rights, and
providing a variety of social services to workers.\20\ Some
labor NGOs have also trained workers in collective
bargaining.\21\ The situation for labor advocates and NGOs,
however, has not improved since a crackdown on labor NGOs began
in December 2015,\22\ and deteriorated further with the
implementation of the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas
Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China
that took effect in January 2017.\23\ Chinese labor NGOs have
long relied on overseas funding.\24\ Two labor scholars at
Australian National University observed that NGOs have
responded to the shrinking space for their work by downsizing
or working as individuals instead of in groups, cooperating
less with other NGOs that continue to work on labor rights
issues, and doing work perceived to be less politically
sensitive, such as promoting cultural activities.\25\ Under Xi
Jinping, the scholars concluded, Chinese authorities have
dismissed the contributions of labor NGOs and made it more
difficult for them to operate, noting that these repressive
developments ``threaten the very existence of labor NGOs in
China.'' \26\ The government's suspicion of foreign NGOs
working on labor issues, moreover, appears to have intensified
in recent years, as highlighted by the content of an April 2018
cartoon jointly disseminated by several Chinese government
agencies.\27\ The cartoon featured a foreign NGO worker who
apparently cooperates with a local Chinese partner to hold
trainings on how to defend worker rights, organize a union, and
go on strike.\28\ One of the agencies that released the cartoon
reportedly said the cartoon is ``meant to teach workers how to
detect and report foreign spies and espionage activities, and
raise their awareness of State security.'' \29\
Many of the labor advocates whom authorities detained in
the 2015 crackdown remain under restrictions imposed by the
suspended sentences they received, including Zeng Feiyang, Zhu
Xiaomei, and Tang Jian.\30\ Therefore, while they are not
physically held at detention centers or prisons, they are at
risk of having to serve their sentences in full if they resume
their advocacy work.\31\ [For more information on civil society
in China, see Section II--Civil Society.]
Worker Strikes and Protests
The Chinese government did not publicly report on the
number of worker strikes and protests, and NGOs and citizen
journalists continued to face difficulties in obtaining
comprehensive information on worker actions.\32\ The Hong Kong-
based NGO China Labour Bulletin (CLB), which compiles data on
worker actions collected from traditional news sources and
social media,\33\ documented 1,257 strikes in 2017.\34\
According to CLB, the overall number of strikes in 2017 was
likely comparable to that of 2016, although they documented
fewer strikes than in 2016 and 2015 due to changes in their
collection methods and a decrease in independent reporting.\35\
The CLB communications director estimated that CLB was able to
document between 5 and 10 percent of the total number of worker
actions in China between 2013 and 2017.\36\ The case of blogger
and citizen journalist Lu Yuyu highlights the dangers that
citizens face in circulating independent information on worker
actions.\37\ In connection with his work documenting labor
strikes across China, Lu continued to serve a four-year prison
sentence on the charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble.'' \38\ The Dali Municipal Intermediate People's Court
in Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province, upheld this
sentence on appeal in September 2017.\39\
Percentage of Worker Strikes and Protests by Sector \40\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Number
Year Manufacturing Construction Transportation Services Other Reported
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 19.7% 38.1% 8.6% 15.2% 10.8% 1,257
(267) (518) (117) (207) (148)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 23.0% 40.6% 12.4% 11.0% 13.1% 2,664
(612) (1,081) (330) (292) (349)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 32.1% 35.9% 9.8% 8.2% 14.1% 2,774
(891) (995) (271) (227) (390)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 41.0% 19.1% 18.9% 8.2% 12.7% 1,358
(557) (259) (257) (112) (173)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: China Labour Bulletin. Note that the percentages indicate the percentage of total worker actions
documented that year.
In 2017, CLB documented a higher percentage of strikes in
private companies compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
although there were also major strikes at SOEs reportedly
centering around lower pay for those employed through
subcontracting agencies compared to formal employees.\41\ CLB
also highlighted a trend in which strikes appeared to be
increasing in inland provinces such as Shaanxi, Henan, and
Anhui, with a decreasing number of strikes in Guangdong
province.\42\ Chinese law does not protect workers' right to
strike,\43\ contravening the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which China has signed
and ratified.\44\
Examples of worker actions this past year included the
following:
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong. From March
5 to 13, 2018, approximately 1,000 workers,
predominantly women, went on strike at a Chinese
factory of Simone Holdings, a South Korean conglomerate
that reportedly manufactures 30 percent of the luxury
handbags sold in the United States, including the
Michael Kors label.\45\ The workers protested the
company's failure to provide legally required benefits,
including social security contributions and housing
funds.\46\ On March 14, the workers reportedly returned
to work after Simone Holdings agreed to their
demands.\47\
Changning district, Shanghai municipality.
Beginning on March 26, 2018, an estimated 3,000
sanitation workers went on strike to protest cuts to
their wages and benefits.\48\ On March 1, 2018,
Shanghai municipal authorities reportedly increased the
minimum monthly salary from 2,300 yuan (approximately
US$370) to 2,420 yuan (approximately US$390) per
month.\49\ After the new minimum salary went into
effect, however, the sanitation companies in Changning
responded by cutting benefits by approximately an
equivalent amount to the increase in pay.\50\ Although
the strike reportedly disrupted trash collection for
hundreds of thousands of Shanghai residents and images
were widely shared on social media, internet censors
reportedly quickly deleted strike-related content.\51\
The strike reportedly ended after authorities detained
and subsequently released some of the protesting
workers and the sanitation companies restored some of
the benefits.\52\
Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong. Beginning on
March 29, 2018, 6,000 workers at five factories of a
Chinese subsidiary of Flex Ltd. reportedly protested
for three weeks over a plan to sell the factories.\53\
According to CLB, the workers were not only concerned
that they would lose their jobs, but also that the
company would not pay workers' severance compensation
and social insurance benefits as required by law.\54\
During the protests, local union officials reportedly
did not assist the protesters, but instead focused on
``maintaining social stability.'' \55\ The workers
reportedly returned to work without any of their
concerns addressed.\56\
Nationwide. In April 2018, crane operators in
at least 27 cities in 19 provinces across China
reportedly staged demonstrations over low pay and
hazardous working conditions.\57\ According to a
Chinese labor scholar, ``This is the first instance of
such a large-scale, nationwide, collective action by
industrial workers in China, and may in fact be the
first instance of its kind ever.'' \58\ Subsequently,
in June 2018, truck drivers in at least 12 provinces in
China protested low pay, high fuel costs, and other
industry-wide concerns.\59\ CLB reported in June that
since late April 2018, food delivery workers and van
drivers protested in a number of different
locations.\60\
Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong. In July
2018, after workers at the Jasic Technology Company
factory in Shenzhen, Guangdong, were laid off for
trying to form an independent trade union, their
supporters organized protests at the factory.\61\ On
July 27, authorities reportedly detained 30 protesters,
and held them under suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.'' \62\ According to a Financial
Times report based on CLB data, this was the largest
detention of labor advocates since the December 2015
crackdown in Guangzhou,\63\ and students from 11
universities reportedly circulated petitions with over
1,600 signatures calling for the release of the
detained individuals.\64\
Wage Arrears
Against the backdrop of the ongoing, and in some sectors
worsening, problem of wage arrears, this past year, central
authorities reiterated goals from 2016 to resolve the problem
of migrant worker wage arrears. Between January and November
2017, Chinese authorities reportedly participated in the
settlement process in 128,000 cases, a year-on-year decrease of
38 percent, involving 22.4 billion yuan (approximately US$3.6
billion) in wage arrears for 2.81 million workers.\65\ In
December 2017, the State Council General Office released new
measures on wage arrears,\66\ reiterating the goal of a 2016
State Council opinion to resolve the problem of migrant worker
wage arrears.\67\ In December 2017, the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) announced that companies
that did not pay wages would be placed on a national
blacklist,\68\ and in January 2018, new MOHRSS measures on a
wage arrears blacklist took effect.\69\ In March 2018, Supreme
People's Court President Zhou Qiang highlighted the role of
courts in 2017 in helping recover 29.4 billion yuan
(approximately US$4.7 billion) in wage arrears for migrant
workers.\70\ As an example of detentions related to wage
arrears protests, in January 2018, public security authorities
detained Zhang Chengyi and 12 other migrant construction
workers who were petitioning over 1.2 million yuan
(approximately US$190,000) in wage arrears in Guanghe county,
Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province.\71\ In
February 2018, the international NGO Rights Defense Network
reported that the workers were no longer in detention and had
received their wages.\72\
Social Insurance
During this reporting year, workers' rates of social
insurance coverage showed some improvement, but overall
remained low.\73\ According to the PRC Social Insurance Law,
workers are entitled to five forms of social insurance: basic
pension insurance, health insurance, work-related injury
insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity insurance.\74\
Under the law, employers and workers are required to contribute
to basic pension, health, and unemployment insurance; in
addition, employers are required to contribute to work-related
injury and maternity insurance on workers' behalf.\75\
According to MOHRSS and the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, from 2016 to 2017, the work-related injury insurance
coverage rates increased slightly overall from 28.2 to 29.3
percent,\76\ and also increased slightly for migrant workers
from 26.7 to 27.3 percent.\77\ Employment-based pension
insurance coverage rates increased from 48.9 to 51.9 percent
for all workers,\78\ and increased from 21.1 to 21.6 percent
for migrant workers.\79\ In 2017, employer-based health
insurance coverage rates remained below 40 percent for all
workers.\80\ Unemployment and maternity insurance coverage
remained below 25 percent for all workers.\81\ Many migrant
workers continued to face bureaucratic obstacles when
transferring their social insurance benefits to new
jurisdictions, because local governments manage insurance
funds.\82\ On December 18, 2017, MOHRSS and the Ministry of
Finance issued Measures for Enterprise Annuities, a new pension
scheme that may help to supplement pension payments to
retirees.\83\
Employment Relationships
This past year, several categories of workers were unable
to benefit fully from the protections provided under Chinese
law. The PRC Labor Law and PRC Labor Contract Law only apply to
workers who have an ``employment relationship'' (laodong
guanxi) with their employers.\84\
DISPATCH LABOR
The Commission continued to observe reports of dispatch
labor (laowu paiqian) abuses during this reporting year, in
violation of domestic laws and regulations.\85\ Firms,
including state-owned enterprises, have long used dispatch
labor--workers hired through subcontracting agencies--to cut
costs.\86\ The PRC Labor Contract Law stipulates that dispatch
workers shall be paid the same as full-time workers doing
similar work, and may only perform work on a temporary,
auxiliary, or substitute basis.\87\
In November 2016, several hundreds of the more than 3,000
dispatch workers at a joint-venture FAW-Volkswagen automobile
manufacturing plant filed a complaint with the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions for equal compensation as provided
for in the PRC Labor Contract Law.\88\ Over 1,000 workers
participated in legal action, many of whom also demonstrated
outside the factory.\89\ The dispatch workers, however, were
unable to reach an agreement with management, and in May 2017,
public security officials detained three worker
representatives, Fu Tianbo, Wang Shuai, and Ai Zhenyu.\90\ In
August 2017, Volkswagen issued two statements: one claiming the
company ``is making every effort to find a mutually acceptable
solution,'' \91\ and another noting it was a minority
shareholder in the joint-venture and therefore had ``limited
responsibility in the dispute.'' \92\ As of January 2018, Fu
remained in detention without trial, although Wang and Ai were
released on bail seven days after detention.\93\
INTERN LABOR
During this reporting year, reports continued to emerge of
labor abuses involving vocational school students working at
school-arranged internships.\94\ In November 2017, the
Financial Times reported that a group of 3,000 vocational
school students were being forced by their school to work up to
11 hours per day for three months at a Foxconn factory in
Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province, that manufactures Apple
phones.\95\ In January 2018, Sixth Tone, a Chinese state-funded
media publication, reported that Liaocheng University in
Shandong province had ended its internship program after
hundreds of students complained that they were being forced to
work long hours for low pay in order to graduate.\96\ The
students, some of whom claimed that they were being forced by
their school to complete the internship, performed overtime
work in violation of national regulations.\97\ Existing
regulations prohibit interns from working overtime and require
internships to be relevant to students' plans of study.\98\
WORKERS ABOVE THE RETIREMENT AGE
During this reporting year, Chinese workers above the legal
retirement age continued to lack certain legal protections
afforded to other workers under Chinese law. China's working
age population has reportedly declined since 2012,\99\ and the
United Nations has estimated that the portion of population
over 65 in China will increase from approximately 9.7 percent
in 2015 to 26.3 percent in 2050.\100\ Chinese academics have
developed a number of policy proposals to raise China's
retirement age,\101\ but during this reporting year, China's
retirement ages in general for female employees remained
between 50 and 55 years old, depending on the type of
employment, and 60 years old for male employees.\102\ According
to the PRC Labor Contract Law and the law's implementing
regulations, once workers reach retirement age or receive
pensions, their labor contracts are terminated by operation of
law.\103\ The inability of workers over the retirement age to
establish a formal employment relationship with their employers
leaves them without the protections provided for in Chinese
labor laws in case of work-related injuries, unpaid overtime,
or other labor issues.\104\
Child Labor
While the Chinese government did not publish statistics on
child labor and did not share data on child labor with the
International Labour Organization (ILO),\105\ the Commission
continued to observe reports on the use of child labor in
China.\106\ In January 2018, internet users in China widely
shared an image of a seven-year-old who was delivering packages
by himself.\107\ In January 2018, the Worker's Daily reported
on litigation against an enterprise filed by the father of a
child laborer after his son was injured during illegal
employment.\108\ This case illustrates that the ``problem of
the illegal use of child labor still exists,'' according to Shi
Fumao, the executive director of Beijing Zhicheng Migrant
Workers' Legal Aid and Research Center.\109\ Following passage
of a duty of vigilance law in France, in January 2018, two
French NGOs sued Samsung in France over alleged child labor and
other labor abuses in China.\110\ Domestic Chinese laws
generally prohibit the employment of minors under 16,\111\ and
China has ratified the two fundamental ILO conventions on the
elimination of child labor.\112\
Work Safety and Occupational Health
During this reporting year, government data showed a
continued decline in workplace deaths. According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), a total of 37,852
people died in workplace accidents in 2017,\113\ compared to
43,062 deaths in 2016 \114\ and 66,182 deaths in 2015.\115\ In
2016, the NBS, however, began excluding ``non-production
accidents'' from their totals, and in 2018 China Labour
Bulletin (CLB) described the calculation method as ``opaque.''
\116\ According to CLB, coal mine deaths have declined steadily
and significantly over the past 15 years, down to 375 in 2017,
compared to 7,000 in 2002.\117\ Coal mines continued to be
dangerous: In August 2018, for example, 13 workers at a coal
mine in Guizhou province died as a result of an explosion.\118\
Despite the decline in the total number of workplace accidents
in China, according to CLB, the number of accidents for workers
in the service industry is increasing, especially for delivery
drivers.\119\ Many delivery drivers do not have a formal
employment relationship and lack workers' compensation
insurance.\120\
During the reporting year, CLB raised concerns about
changes in the government institution overseeing work safety
issues. In March 2018, as part of a sweeping reorganization of
Party and government institutions,\121\ central authorities
announced plans to dismantle the State Administration of Work
Safety, transferring responsibility for work safety to a new
Ministry of Emergency Management.\122\ CLB criticized the
bureaucratic changes as highlighting how ``the Chinese
government is more concerned with disaster management and
control rather than in preventing workplace accidents in the
first place.'' \123\
The government reported an increase in cases of
occupational disease, and labor investigators continued to
document hazardous conditions in Chinese factories. In December
2017, the former National Health and Family Planning Commission
reported that there were 31,789 cases of occupational disease
recorded in 2016, up from 29,180 cases of occupational disease
in 2015.\124\ Of the total, 28,088 cases were pneumoconiosis
and other respiratory diseases; 1,276 were ear, nose, throat,
and oral diseases; 1,212 were chemical poisonings; and 1,213
were other diseases.\125\ Many pneumoconiosis victims
reportedly face significant difficulties in obtaining official
recognition that their illness is work related, and thus are
ineligible for compensation.\126\ In March 2018, a National
People's Congress delegate reportedly recommended that access
to pneumoconiosis treatment be improved.\127\ In June 2018,
domestic and international media, however, reported that
authorities in Guizhou province had detained three doctors for
over seven months, after the doctors had allegedly misdiagnosed
several hundred people with pneumoconiosis who did not actually
have the disease, resulting in a loss of 30 million yuan
(approximately US$4.4 million) in public funds for
compensation.\128\ Three hundred of the doctors' colleagues
signed a petition requesting that authorities ``respect science
and respect medicine, and safeguard doctors' legal rights'' and
release the detained doctors.\129\ The legal department
director of the Chinese Medical Doctor Association also
reportedly warned that ``[i]f the accusation that they have
cost the medical insurance fund money is upheld, every
pneumoconiosis doctor in the county is likely to be found to
have committed a crime.'' \130\
The U.S.-based NGO China Labor Watch (CLW) published
investigative reports in November 2017, January 2018, and June
2018 documenting the hazardous conditions in some Chinese
factories.
Toy factories. In November 2017, CLW published
a report on the hazardous working conditions at four
toy factories in China, finding that, ``For workers who
are exposed to toxic chemicals, the factory does not
provide them with adequate protective equipment.''
\131\
Electronics Factories. After identifying in
2014 many labor violations at Catcher Technology--a
supplier to IBM, HP, Dell, Sony, and Apple--in January
2018, CLW published a separate investigation on the
continuing hazardous conditions at three of Catcher's
factories in Suqian municipality, Jiangsu
province.\132\ CLW's investigator reported developing
respiratory problems and also suffered eye injuries
while working at the factory for four weeks.\133\ In
June 2018, CLW published a report on a Foxconn factory
in Hengyang municipality, Hunan province, that makes
products for Amazon, including the Kindle and Echo Dot,
which documented a lack of protective equipment, fire
safety concerns, and inadequate safety training.\134\
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22(1); United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 13 July 18. China has signed but not
ratified the ICCPR. See also UN General Assembly, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association, Maina Kiai,
A/71/385, 14 September 16, para. 55; PRC Constitution, issued 4
December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March
04, 11 March 18, art. 35; International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, ``China's Status as a Non-Market Economy,'' A-
570-053, 26 October 17, 20-22; European Commission, ``Commission Staff
Working Document: On Significant Distortions in the Economy of the
People's Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence
Investigations,'' 20 December 17, 332-35; Eli Friedman, ``Collective
Bargaining in China Is Dead: The Situation Is Excellent,'' in Made in
China Yearbook 2017: Gilded Age, eds. Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas
Loubere (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 56.
\2\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed 3 April 92, amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 9-11;
International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce,
``China's Status as a Non-Market Economy,'' A-570-053, 26 October 17,
20-22; European Commission, ``Commission Staff Working Document: On
Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People's Republic of
China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations,'' 20 December
17, 333; Eli Friedman, ``Collective Bargaining in China Is Dead: The
Situation Is Excellent,'' in Made in China Yearbook 2017: Gilded Age,
eds. Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere (Canberra: Australian
National University Press, 2018), 56.
\3\ Fan Xi, ``ACFTU: Total Number of Employees in China Reaches 391
Million'' [Quanzong: woguo zhigong zongshu da 3.91 yi ren], Xinhua, 17
January 18. See also Chen Xiaoyan, ``Increasing Use of Big Data To
Strengthen the Work of Trade Unions'' [Tigao yunyong da shuju nengli
gaijin gonghui gongzuo], Workers' Daily, 12 June 18.
\4\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 20 April 18; International
Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, ``China's Status as
a Non-Market Economy,'' A-570-053, 26 October 17, 20-22; Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to Congress on China's WTO
Compliance,'' January 2018, 147; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World
2018--China,'' last visited 21 April 18; China Labour Bulletin,
``China's Trade Unions Need To Stop Making Excuses and Start Looking
for Solutions,'' 23 October 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``Construction
Site Accident Highlights Need for Effective Trade Union Presence in the
Workplace,'' 10 October 17; Patricia Chen and Mary Gallagher,
``Mobilization Without Movement: How the Chinese State `Fixed' Labor
Insurgency,'' ILR Review, 20 February 18, 6.
\5\ ``Wang Dongming Elected China's Trade Union Chief,'' Xinhua, 23
March 18; International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, ``China's Status as a Non-Market Economy,'' A-570-053, 26
October 17, 21.
\6\ ``Introduction to Vice-Chairpersons, Secretary-General of 13th
NPC Standing Committee,'' Xinhua, 18 March 18.
\7\ ``Wang Dongming Elected China's Trade Union Chief,'' Xinhua, 23
March 18.
\8\ ``Introduction to Vice-Chairpersons, Secretary-General of 13th
NPC Standing Committee,'' Xinhua, 18 March 18.
\9\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Relations FAQ,'' last visited
20 May 18. See also Wang Jiangsong, ``A Six-Day Strike in Shanghai
Caused by a $110 Pay Cut--Collective Action by Sanitation Workers in
China's `New Era' of Stability Maintenance,'' China Change, 13 April
18.
\10\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87)
Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right To
Organise, 4 July 50, arts. 2, 3, 5. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16,
paras. 3, 16-17, 54, 57.
\11\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
23(4).
\12\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22(1); United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 13 July 18. China has signed but not
ratified the ICCPR. See also UN General Assembly, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16, para. 55.
\13\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 13 July 18. China
has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16,
para. 55; China Labour Bulletin, ``China Trade Unions Need To Stop
Making Excuses and Start Looking for Solutions,'' 23 October 17.
\14\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, amended and effective 27 August 09, arts. 16-35; PRC Labor
Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29
June 07, amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, arts. 51-56; PRC
Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], passed 3 April
92, amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 6, 20.
\15\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, amended and effective 27 August 09, art. 33; PRC Labor
Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29
June 07, amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, arts. 6, 51, 56;
PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], passed 3
April 92, amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 6, 20; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Relations FAQ,'' last visited 20 May 18.
Article 33 of the PRC Labor Law notes that ``In an enterprise that has
not yet set up a trade union, such contracts shall be signed by and
between representatives recommended by workers and the enterprise.''
\16\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Relations FAQ,'' last visited
20 May 18; China Labour Bulletin, ``Release Worker Representative Fu
Tianbo and Resume Collective Bargaining at FAW-Volkswagen,'' 13
November 17.
\17\ Eli Friedman, ``Collective Bargaining in China Is Dead: The
Situation Is Excellent,'' in Made in China Yearbook 2017: Gilded Age,
eds. Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere (Canberra: Australian
National University Press, 2018), 57. See also Anita Chan, ``The
Relationship Between Labour NGOs and Chinese Workers in an
Authoritarian Regime,'' Global Labour Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (January
2018), 9, 12.
\18\ International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up, 18 June
98, art. 2(a). Article 2 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work states that ``all Members, even if they
have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining . . ..'' International Labour Organization, ``China,''
NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards, last
visited 13 July 18. China became a member of the ILO in 1919.
\19\ See, e.g., Jude Howell, ``Shall We Dance? Welfarist
Incorporation and the Politics of State-Labor NGO Relations,'' China
Quarterly, Vol. 223 (September 2015), 709; Anthony J. Spires et al.,
``Societal Support for China's Grass-Roots NGOs: Evidence From Yunnan,
Guangdong and Beijing,'' China Journal, Vol. 71 (2014), 66-67. Spires
et al. note that grassroots NGOs have ``emerged largely only over the
past decade.''
\20\ Anita Chan, ``The Relationship Between Labour NGOs and Chinese
Workers in an Authoritarian Regime,'' Global Labour Journal, Vol. 9,
Issue 1 (January 2018), 2, 15; Anita Chan et al., ``Interpreting
Chinese Labour: Informalisation or Empowerment? '' in Made in China
Yearbook 2016: Disturbances in Heaven, eds. Ivan Franceschini et al.
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, February 2017), 37;
Diana Fu, ``Disguised Collective Action in China,'' Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (March 2017), 506-07; Tim Pringle,
``What Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, Asia
Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, 17 October 16.
\21\ Anita Chan, ``The Relationship Between Labour NGOs and Chinese
Workers in an Authoritarian Regime,'' Global Labour Journal, Vol. 9,
Issue 1 (January 2018), 9, 12; Eli Friedman, ``Collective Bargaining in
China Is Dead: The Situation Is Excellent,'' in Made in China Yearbook
2017: Gilded Age, eds. Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 57.
\22\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last
visited 21 April 18, sec. E3; Ivan Franceschini and Elisa Nesossi,
``State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs: A Chilling Effect,'' China
Journal, No. 80 (July 2018), 121.
\23\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17; Anita Chan, ``The Relationship Between
Labour NGOs and Chinese Workers in an Authoritarian Regime,'' Global
Labour Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (January 2018), 2.
\24\ Anita Chan, ``The Relationship Between Labour NGOs and Chinese
Workers in an Authoritarian Regime,'' Global Labour Journal, Vol. 9,
Issue 1 (January 2018), 3-5, 7, 8, 15; ] Ivan Franceschini and Elisa
Nesossi, ``State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs: A Chilling Effect,''
China Journal, No. 80 (July 2018), 115. See also Kenneth Roth, ``The
Great Civil Society Choke-Out,'' Foreign Policy, 27 January 16.
\25\ Ivan Franceschini and Elisa Nesossi, ``State Repression of
Chinese Labor NGOs: A Chilling Effect,'' China Journal, No. 80 (July
2018), 127.
\26\ Ibid., 119.
\27\ Zhao Yusha, ``China Urges Workers in Defense-Related Field To
Watch Out for Foreign Spies,'' Global Times, 15 April 18; ``Government
Cartoon Portrays `Foreign NGOs' as National Security Concern,'' Asia
Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 18 April 18.
\28\ Zhao Yusha, ``China Urges Workers in Defense-Related Field To
Watch Out for Foreign Spies,'' Global Times, 15 April 18; ``Government
Cartoon Portrays `Foreign NGOs' as National Security Concern,'' Asia
Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 18 April 18.
\29\ Zhao Yusha, ``China Urges Workers in Defense-Related Field To
Watch Out for Foreign Spies,'' Global Times, 15 April 18.
\30\ Ivan Franceschini and Elisa Nesossi, ``State Repression of
Chinese Labor NGOs: A Chilling Effect,'' China Journal, No. 80 (July
2018), 121; ``Zeng Feiyang One of 3 Labor Figures Released With
Suspended Sentences'' [Zeng feiyang deng 3 laogong renshi bei pan
huanxing huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 26 September 16. See also
``Guangdong Authorities Arrest Labor Rights Advocates,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 21 January 16. For more information, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00026 on Meng
Han, 2015-00427 on Zeng Feiyang, 2015-00428 on Zhu Xiaomei, and 2016-
00017 on Tang Jian.
\31\ Ivan Franceschini and Elisa Nesossi, ``State Repression of
Chinese Labor NGOs: A Chilling Effect,'' China Journal, No. 80 (July
2018), 121; ``Zeng Feiyang One of 3 Labor Figures Released With
Suspended Sentences'' [Zeng feiyang deng 3 laogong renshi bei pan
huanxing huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 26 September 16.
\32\ Manfred Elfstrom, ``Counting Contention,'' in Made in China
Yearbook 2017: Gilded Age, eds. Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 64-67; Freedom
House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last visited 21 April 18,
sec. E3.
\33\ China Labour Bulletin changed their methodology beginning in
2017. China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map Applies New Fixed Sampling
Method in 2017,'' 17 February 17. For information on China Labour
Bulletin's methodology through the end of 2016, see China Labour
Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin's Strike Map,'' 29
March 16.
\34\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 13
July 18; China Labour Bulletin, ``Economic Recovery Means More Bad Jobs
for China's Workers,'' 18 January 18. See also Harvey Thomlison,
``China's Communist Party Is Abandoning Workers,'' New York Times, 2
April 18.
\35\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Economic Recovery Means More Bad Jobs
for China's Workers,'' 18 January 18; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the
World 2018--China,'' last visited 21 April 18, sec. E3. Freedom House
noted that ``Lu Yuyu, the blogger and researcher sentenced in August,
had worked with his partner Li Tingyu to contribute strike data to the
China Labour Bulletin until their detention in June 2016.''
\36\ Geoffrey Crothall, ``China's Labour Movement in Transition,''
Made in China Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (April-June 2018), 28, 94.
Crothall is CLB's Communications Director.
\37\ Catherine Lai, ``How China's Multi-Pronged Crackdown on
Dissent Took Aim at Citizen Journalists and Rights Defence Websites,''
Hong Kong Free Press, 16 February 18. See also Wu Qiang, ``What Do Lu
Yuyu's Statistics of Protest Tell Us About the Chinese Society Today?
'' China Change, 6 July 16; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 70,
86-87. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2016-00177 on Lu Yuyu and 2016-00190 on Li Tingyu.
\38\ ``Award-Winning Chinese Civil Rights Blogger Handed 4 Years in
Jail for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble,' '' Agence France-
Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 5 August 17.
\39\ Catherine Lai, ``Chinese Court Upholds 4-Year Jail Term for
Press Freedom Prize Winner Lu Yuyu,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 28
September 17.
\40\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 13
July 18.
\41\ Ibid.; China Labour Bulletin, ``Economic Recovery Means More
Bad Jobs for China's Workers,'' 18 January 18.
\42\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 13
July 18. China Labour Bulletin, ``Economic Recovery Means More Bad Jobs
for China's Workers,'' 18 January 18.
\43\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Relations FAQ,'' last visited
20 May 18; International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, ``China's Status as a Non-Market Economy,'' A-570-053, 26
October 17, 5.
\44\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1(d); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 13 July 18. China
has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16,
paras. 54, 56-57.
\45\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Guangdong Workers Show Once Again How
Collective Bargaining Should Be Done,'' 14 March 18; Jane Li, ``Eight-
Day Strike at China Factory Making Michael Kors Bags Ends as Workers'
Pension and Wage Demands Met,'' South China Morning Post, 18 March 18.
\46\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Guangdong Workers Show Once Again How
Collective Bargaining Should Be Done,'' 14 March 18; Jane Li, ``Eight-
Day Strike at China Factory Making Michael Kors Bags Ends as Workers'
Pension and Wage Demands Met,'' South China Morning Post, 18 March 18.
\47\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Guangdong Workers Show Once Again How
Collective Bargaining Should Be Done,'' 14 March 18. See also Jane Li,
``Eight-Day Strike at China Factory Making Michael Kors Bags Ends as
Workers' Pension and Wage Demands Met,'' South China Morning Post, 18
March 18.
\48\ Wang Jiangsong, ``A Six-Day Strike in Shanghai Caused by a
$110 Pay Cut--Collective Action by Sanitation Workers in China's `New
Era' of Stability Maintenance,'' China Change, 13 April 18; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Sanitation Workers Are Out on Strike Again in
China,'' 6 April 18; Mandy Zuo, ``A Rare Protest in China's Financial
Hub,'' Inkstone, 3 April 18.
\49\ Wang Jiangsong, ``A Six-Day Strike in Shanghai Caused by a
$110 Pay Cut--Collective Action by Sanitation Workers in China's `New
Era' of Stability Maintenance,'' China Change, 13 April 18.
\50\ Ibid.
\51\ Ibid.; China Labour Bulletin, ``Sanitation Workers Are Out on
Strike Again in China,'' 6 April 18; Mandy Zuo, ``A Rare Protest in
China's Financial Hub,'' Inkstone, 3 April 18.
\52\ Wang Jiangsong, ``A Six-Day Strike in Shanghai Caused by a
$110 Pay Cut--Collective Action by Sanitation Workers in China's `New
Era' of Stability Maintenance,'' China Change, 13 April 18; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Sanitation Workers Are Out on Strike Again in
China,'' 6 April 18. The sanitation companies had reportedly initially
planned to reduce certain shift allowances by 560 yuan, but later
decided to reduce the shift allowances by 260 yuan.
\53\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Three-Week Strike at Flex Ends After
Zhuhai Trade Union Puts Stability First,'' 19 April 18; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Workers at Flex in Zhuhai Enter Third Week of Strike Over
Ownership Change,'' 12 April 18.
\54\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Three-Week Strike at Flex Ends After
Zhuhai Trade Union Puts Stability First,'' 19 April 18; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Workers at Flex in Zhuhai Enter Third Week of Strike Over
Ownership Change,'' 12 April 18.
\55\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Three-Week Strike at Flex Ends After
Zhuhai Trade Union Puts Stability First,'' 19 April 18; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Workers at Flex in Zhuhai Enter Third Week of Strike Over
Ownership Change,'' 12 April 18.
\56\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Three-Week Strike at Flex Ends After
Zhuhai Trade Union Puts Stability First,'' 19 April 18; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Workers at Flex in Zhuhai Enter Third Week of Strike Over
Ownership Change,'' 12 April 18.
\57\ Wang Jiangsong, ``The Significance of Crane Operators Across
China Going on Strike,'' China Change, 7 May 18; China Labour Bulletin,
``Wave of Nationwide Worker Protests Highlights the Need for Effective
Worker Representation,'' 17 May 18.
\58\ Wang Jiangsong, ``The Significance of Crane Operators Across
China Going on Strike,'' China Change, 7 May 18; China Labour Bulletin,
``Wave of Nationwide Worker Protests Highlights the Need for Effective
Worker Representation,'' 17 May 18.
\59\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Truck Drivers Strike Over
Stagnant Pay, High Fuel Costs and Arbitrary Fines,'' 11 June 18;
``China's Truck Drivers Stage Strike Over Rising Costs, Low Fees,''
Radio Free Asia, 11 June 18; Mimi Lau, ``Chinese Truck Drivers,
Activists Warn of More Protests Over Fuel, Fines, and Cutthroat
Rates,'' South China Morning Post, 15 June 18; Tan Jiangying,
``Truckers on Strike and the Structural Contradictions of China's
Logistics Industry,'' China Change, 15 June 18. See also China Digital
Times, ``Minitrue: Delete News on Truck Drivers' Strike,'' 12 June 18.
\60\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Truck Drivers Strike Over
Stagnant Pay, High Fuel Costs and Arbitrary Fines,'' 11 June 18. See
also China Labour Bulletin, ``Wave of Nationwide Worker Protests
Highlights the Need for Effective Worker Representation,'' 17 May 18.
\61\ Sue-Lin Wong and Christian Shepherd, ``China's Student
Activists Cast Rare Light on Brewing Labor Unrest,'' Reuters, 14 August
18; Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, ``JASIC Workers' Struggle
for Freedom of Association--The Development of a Nationwide Support,''
2 August 18; China Labor Watch, ``Shenzhen Jasic Workers Who
Established a Union Have Been Arrested for `Disorderly Behavior,' '' 30
July 18.
\62\ Human Rights in China, ``30 Shenzhen Workers and Supporters
Detained for Demanding To Form Labor Union,'' 30 July 18. See also
Shenzhen Pingshan Public Security Bureau (Shenzhen pingshan gong'an),
Weibo post, 30 July 18, 9:36 p.m.; ``Dozens Detained Amid Maoist-Led
Rights Campaign at Chinese Factory,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 July 18.
\63\ Yuan Yang, ``China Students Challenge Curbs on Trade
Unionists,'' Financial Times, 2 August 18.
\64\ Ibid. See also Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions,
``JASIC Workers' Struggle for Freedom of Association--The Development
of a Nationwide Support,'' 2 August 18.
\65\ Li Lei, ``Wage Defaulters Face Punishment,'' China Daily, 14
December 17. See also Ye Haoming, ``MOHRSS Demands Every Local
Government's Construction Projects Pay Any Wages in Arrears by End of
Year'' [Renshebu yaoqiu gedi zhengfu zai 2017 niandi qian qingchang
gongcheng kuan tuoqian], Xinhua, 7 December 17.
\66\ State Council General Office, Measures on Assessment of Work
To Ensure the Payment of Migrant Workers' Wages [Baozhang nongmingong
gongzi zhifu gongzuo kaohe banfa], issued and effective 6 December 17.
\67\ Ibid., art. 1; State Council General Office, Opinion on
Comprehensively Managing the Problem of Migrant Worker Wage Arrears
[Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu quanmian zhili tuoqian nongmingong gongzi
wenti de yijian], issued 17 January 16, 1(2).
\68\ Li Lei, ``Wage Defaulters Face Punishment,'' China Daily, 14
December 17. See also Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security,
``Important: Companies Will Be Blacklisted for Failing To Pay Migrant
Workers, MOHRSS Issues Measures To Make Clear!'' [Zhongyao: tuoqian
nongmingong gongzi jiang bei lie ru ``hei mingdan,'' ren she bu fawen
mingque le!], WeChat post, reprinted in State Council General Office,
11 October 17; Xie Xiaozhen, ``Qingdao Publishes List of Ten Labor and
Social Insurance Violators Haifeng and Other Placed on Blacklist''
[Qingdao gongshi 10 qi laodong baozhang weifa xingwei haifeng deng
shang hei bang], Qingdao News, 11 December 17.
\69\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Interim
Measures on Managing Migrant Worker Wage Arrears ``Blacklist'' [Tuoqian
nongmingong gongzi ``hei mingdan'' guanli zhanxing banfa], issued 25
September 17, effective 1 January 18.
\70\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 12 March 18.
\71\ Rights Defense Network, ``Latest News on Gansu Linxia Migrant
Worker Arrears Case: Zhang Chengyi Released on Bail'' [Gansu linxia
nongmingong taoxin an zuixin xiaoxi: zhang chengyi qubao huoshi], 8
February 18; ``Back Pay 1.2 Million Yuan, Gansu Migrant Workers
Detained Over Wage Arrears Dispute'' [Qian xin 120 wan gansu
nongmingong taoxin fan bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18. See
also China Labour Bulletin, ``As Wage Arrears Escalate in the Run Up to
the Lunar New Year, the Trade Union Needs To Act,'' 21 November 17. For
more information on Zhang Chengyi, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00062.
\72\ Rights Defense Network, ``Latest News on Gansu Linxia Migrant
Worker Arrears Case: Zhang Chengyi Released on Bail'' [Gansu linxia
nongmingong taoxin an zuixin xiaoxi: zhang chengyi qubao huoshi], 8
February 18.
\73\ For information on workers' low levels of social insurance
coverage in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 90; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 81-82; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 87-88; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9
October 14, 75.
\74\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui
baoxian fa], passed 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, art. 2.
\75\ Ibid., arts. 10, 23, 33, 44, 53. See also China Labour
Bulletin, ``China's Social Security System,'' last visited 15 June 18.
\76\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2017 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1-2; Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, ``2016 Annual Statistics Bulletin on
Human Resources and Social Security Developments'' [2016 niandu renli
ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao], 31 May 17,
secs. 1-2.
\77\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2017 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1-2; Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, ``2016 Annual Statistics Bulletin on
Human Resources and Social Security Developments'' [2016 niandu renli
ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao], 31 May 17,
secs. 1-2.
\78\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2017 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1-2; Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, ``2016 Annual Statistics Bulletin on
Human Resources and Social Security Developments'' [2016 niandu renli
ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao], 31 May 17,
secs. 1-2.
\79\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2017 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1-2; Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, ``2016 Annual Statistics Bulletin on
Human Resources and Social Security Developments'' [2016 niandu renli
ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao], 31 May 17,
secs. 1-2.
\80\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2017 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1-2; Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security, ``2016 Annual Statistics Bulletin on
Human Resources and Social Security Developments'' [2016 niandu renli
ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao], 31 May 17,
secs. 1-2.
\81\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2017 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1-2.]
\82\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Social Security System,''
last visited 15 June 18.
\83\ Ministry of Human Resouces and Social Security and Ministry of
Finance, Enterprise Annuity Measures [Qiye nianjin banfa], issued 18
December 17, effective 1 February 18, arts. 1-2; ``National Government
Issues New Enterprise Annuity Rules,'' Baker McKenzie FenXun, China
Employment Law Update, February 2018.
\84\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 2; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07,
amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 2.
\85\ China Labour Bulletin, ``A Decade On, China's Labour Contract
Law Has Failed To Deliver,'' 28 December 17. See also Ronald C. Brown,
``Up and Down the Multinational Corporations' Global Labor Supply
Chains: Making Remedies That Work in China,'' Pacific Basin Law
Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2017), 118-23.
\86\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``Economic Recovery Means
More Bad Jobs for China's Workers,'' 18 January 18; China Labor Watch,
``Amazon Profits From Secretly Oppressing Its Supplier's Workers: An
Investigative Report on Henyang Foxconn,'' 10 June 18, 3-4. See also
Ronald C. Brown, ``Up and Down the Multinational Corporations' Global
Labor Supply Chains: Making Remedies That Work in China,'' Pacific
Basin Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2017), 118-23. For information on
contract or dispatch labor from previous reporting years, see CECC,
2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 90-91; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 86; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 92; CECC, 2014
Annual Report, 9 October 14, 75-76; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10
October 13, 71-72.
\87\ PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong
hetong fa], passed 29 June 07, amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July
13, arts. 63, 66.
\88\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Chinese Volkswagen Workers Call on
German Parent Company To Assume Responsibility for Violations,'' 13
July 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``One Year On, the Struggle Continues
for Volkswagen Workers in Changchun,'' 8 November 17; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Release Worker Representative Fu Tianbo and Resume
Collective Bargaining at FAW-Volkswagen,'' 13 November 17; Xia Nu,
``Has the Workers' Protest at FAW-VW Ended? '' Gongchao, 15 January 18.
\89\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Chinese Volkswagen Workers Call on
German Parent Company To Assume Responsibility for Violations,'' 13
July 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``One Year On, the Struggle Continues
for Volkswagen Workers in Changchun,'' 8 November 17; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Release Worker Representative Fu Tianbo and Resume
Collective Bargaining at FAW-Volkswagen,'' 13 November 17; Xia Nu,
``Has the Workers' Protest at FAW-VW Ended? '' Gongchao, 15 January 18.
\90\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Chinese Volkswagen Workers Call on
German Parent Company To Assume Responsibility for Violations,'' 13
July 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``Release Worker Representative Fu
Tianbo and Resume Collective Bargaining at FAW-Volkswagen,'' 13
November 17; Xia Nu, ``Has the Workers' Protest at FAW-VW Ended? ''
Gongchao, 15 January 18. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2017-00362 on Fu Tianbo, 2017-00363
on Wang Shuai, and 2017-00364 on Ai Zhenyu.
\91\ Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, ``Volkswagen Response
to Allegations on Labour Issues at Changchun FAW-Volkswagen,'' 7 August
17.
\92\ China Labour Bulletin, ``One Year On, the Struggle Continues
for Volkswagen Workers in Changchun,'' 8 November 17.
\93\ Xia Nu, ``Has the Workers' Protest at FAW-VW Ended? ''
Gongchao, 15 January 18; China Labour Bulletin, ``Release Worker
Representative Fu Tianbo and Resume Collective Bargaining at FAW-
Volkswagen,'' 13 November 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``FAW-Volkswagen
Agency Workers Issue Letter in German Calling for Accountability and
Solidarity,'' 19 July 17.
\94\ Sheng Yulei, ``Interns Are Not Cheap Labor (People's Daily
Commentary)'' [Shixi sheng bushi lianjia laodongli (renmin shiping)],
People's Daily, 25 January 18; ``Foxconn Stops Interns' Illegal
Overtime at iPhone X Factory,'' BBC, 23 November 17. See also Jenny
Chan, ``#islaveat10,'' in Made in China Yearbook 2017: Gilded Age, eds.
Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere (Canberra: Australian National
University Press, 2018), 104. For information on the abuse of student
labor in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 91; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 86-87; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 87; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9
October 14, 77.
\95\ Yuan Yang, ``Apple's iPhone X Assembled by Illegal Student
Labour,'' Financial Times, 21 November 17.
\96\ Cai Yiwen, ``Students Fight Back Against Forced Factory
Labor,'' Sixth Tone, 25 January 18.
\97\ Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Measures on
Managing Secondary Vocational School Student Internships [Zhongdeng
zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi guanli banfa], issued and effective 26
June 07, art. 5; Cai Yiwen, ``Students Fight Back Against Forced
Factory Labor,'' Sixth Tone, 25 January 18.
\98\ Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Measures on
Managing Secondary Vocational School Student Internships [Zhongdeng
zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi guanli banfa], issued and effective 26
June 07, art. 5.
\99\ Chi Dehua, ``China's Working-Age Population Continues To
Shrink,'' Global Times, 1 March 18.
\100\ Population Division, UN Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, ``World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Volume 1:
Comprehensive Tables,'' ST/ESA/SER.A/399, 2017, 238-39. See also Qiushi
Feng et al., ``Age of Retirement and Human Capital in an Aging China,
2015-2050,'' European Journal of Population, 13 February 18, Table 2.
\101\ Qiushi Feng et al., ``Age of Retirement and Human Capital in
an Aging China, 2015-2050,'' European Journal of Population (13
February 18), Table 2.
\102\ Qiushi Feng et al., ``Age of Retirement and Human Capital in
an Aging China, 2015-2050,'' European Journal of Population (13
February 18); Chen Weihua, ``Time for a Change to One-Size-Fits-All
Retirement Policy,'' China Daily, 11 March 17. See also Wang Yong,
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``Raising the Legal
Retirement Age Is an Inevitable Trend'' [Tigao fading tuixiu nianling
shi biran qushi], 25 July 16.
\103\ State Council, PRC Labor Contract Law Implementing
Regulations [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa shishi
tiaoli], issued and effective 18 September 08, art. 21; PRC Labor
Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29
June 07, amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 44(2). The
PRC Labor Contract Law stipulates that if a worker receives a pension,
his or her labor contract terminates (zhongzhi), but the implementing
regulations require that contracts be terminated for all workers upon
reaching the legal retirement age.
\104\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``Work Safety,'' January
2018; Yang Zhaokui, ``What Is the Cause of the Frequent Rights and
Interests Problems for Over-Age Migrant Workers? '' [Chaoling
nongmingong quanyi wenti pin fa yuanyin hezai?], Worker's Daily, 17 May
18; ``Guangdong High Court's Recent Labour Disputes Explanation,'' Luo
Ai, King & Wood Mallesons, 29 September 17.
\105\ International Labour Organization, ``Child Labour in China
and Mongolia,'' last visited 15 June 18.
\106\ For information on child labor from previous reporting years,
see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 87-88; CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, 6 October 16, 85-86; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15,
86.
\107\ Xie Chunjiao, ``Child Courier Sparks Online Concern,'' China
Daily, 16 January 18; George Pierpoint and Kerry Allen, ``Seven-Year-
Old Delivery Boy Causes Outrage in China,'' BBC, 16 January 18.
\108\ Yang Zhaokui, ``Child Laborer Injured, Enterprise Performed
`Clandestine Swap' To Avoid Paying Compensation'' [Tonggong shoushang
qiye shangyan ``diaobao ji'' taobi peichang], Workers' Daily, 11
January 18.
\109\ Ibid.
\110\ ``French NGOs Sue Samsung Over Alleged Child Labour in
China,'' Radio France Internationale, 11 January 18. See also European
Coalition for Corporate Justice, ``French Corporate Duty of Vigilance
Law--Frequently Asked Questions,'' 24 March 17, 1.
\111\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 15; PRC Law on the Protection
of Minors [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wei chengnian ren baohu fa],
passed 4 September 91, amended 29 December 06, effective 1 June 07,
art. 38. Article 15 of the PRC Labor Law prohibits the employment of
minors under 16, with exceptions for literature and the arts, sports,
and special handicrafts, provided the employer undergoes inspection and
approval and guarantees the child's right to compulsory education.
\112\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 138)
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, adopted 26 June 73,
entry into force 19 June 76; International Labour Organization, ILO
Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, adopted 17 June
99, entry into force 19 November 00; International Labour Organization,
``Ratifications of C138--Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138),'' last
visited 13 July 18; International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications
of C182--Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182),'' last
visited 13 July 18.
\113\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2017 National
Economic and Social Development,'' 28 February 18, sec. XII.
\114\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2016 National
Economic and Social Development,'' 28 February 17, sec. XII.
\115\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical
Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2015 National
Economic and Social Development,'' 29 February 16, sec. XII.
\116\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Work Safety,'' January 2018. See
also National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Statistical Communique
of the People's Republic of China on the 2016 National Economic and
Social Development,'' 28 February 17, endnote 59. According to the NBS,
``The State Administration of Work Safety reformed on work accidents
statistics in 2016. As non-production accidents were excluded, the
statistical coverage was changed. The year-on-year data was calculated
on a comparable basis.''
\117\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Work Safety,'' January 2018.
\118\ Muyu Xu and Aizhu Chen, ``Coal Mine Blast Kills Four in
Southern China, Another Nine Missing--Xinhua,'' Reuters, 6 August 18;
Ou Dongqu, ``Death Toll From China Mine Accident Rises to 13,'' Xinhua,
9 August 18. According to Reuters, local officials had reportedly
conducted a safety inspection of the mine in late April and found a
number of safety issues. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Southwest
China Remains a Blackspot for Coal Mine Safety,'' 8 August 18.
\119\ China Labour Bulletin, ``How China Outsourced Work-Related
Accidents and Deaths,'' 16 January 18.
\120\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Work Safety,'' January 2018; China
Labour Bulletin, ``How China Outsourced Work-Related Accidents and
Deaths,'' 16 January 18.
\121\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies [Zhonggong zhongyang
guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jueding], Xinhua, 4 March
18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18; State Council, Institutional Reform Plan
[Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18; ``State Council
Institutional Reform Plan Passed at First Session of the 13th National
People's Congress'' [Shisan jie quanguo renda yici huiyi pizhun
guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], Xinhua, 17 March 18.
\122\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 30; State Council, Institutional Reform Plan
[Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(7).
\123\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China Proposes Abolition of Work
Safety Body,'' 13 March 18.
\124\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``2015-2016
Report on Occupational Illness Nationwide'' [2015-2016 nian quanguo
zhiye bing baogao qingkuang], 28 December 17, 1, 3-4.
\125\ Ibid., 3.
\126\ ``Close to 100 Pneumoconiosis Sufferers and Their Families
Defending Rights at Shenzhen Municipal Government for Days'' [Jin bai
wei chenfei bing huanzhe ji yishu lianri zai shenzhen shi zhengfu
weiquan], Radio Free Asia, 16 January 18; China Labour Bulletin, ``Work
Safety,'' 16 January 18.
\127\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Call To Lift Rules on Lung Disease,'' China
Daily, 12 March 18.
\128\ ``The First Pneumoconiosis Doctor Criminal Case in China:
Differences in Reading X-ray Slides Considered Seriously Irresponsible
and a Crime,'' [Quanguo shouli chen feibing yisheng xingshi an: du pian
chayi bei shiwei yanzhong bu fuze er dingzui], Observer, 20 June 18;
Alice Yan, ``Chinese Doctors Accused of Wrongly Diagnosing Hundreds of
Workers With Black Lung Disease,'' South China Morning Post, 23 June
18; China Labour Bulletin, ``Three Doctors Detained for Allegedly
Misdiagnosing Occupational Diseases,'' 21 June 18.
\129\ Alice Yan, ``Chinese Doctors Accused of Wrongly Diagnosing
Hundreds of Workers With Black Lung Disease,'' South China Morning
Post, 23 June 18. See also ``The First Pneumoconiosis Doctor Criminal
Case in China: Differences in Reading X-ray Slides Considered Seriously
Irresponsible and a Crime,'' [Quanguo shouli chen feibing yisheng
xingshi an: du pian chayi bei shiwei yanzhong bu fuze er dingzui],
Observer, 20 June 18.
\130\ Alice Yan, ``Chinese Doctors Accused of Wrongly Diagnosing
Hundreds of Workers With Black Lung Disease,'' South China Morning
Post, 23 June 18. See also ``The First Pneumoconiosis Doctor Criminal
Case in China: Differences in Reading X-ray Slides Considered Serious
Irresponsibility and a Crime,'' [Quanguo shouli chen feibing yisheng
xingshi an: du pian chayi bei shiwei yanzhong bu fuze er dingzui],
Observer, 20 June 18.
\131\ China Labor Watch, ``The Dark Side of the Toy World:
Investigation Into the Sweatshops of Disney, Mattel, Hasbro, and
Walmart,'' 27 November 17, 2-3, 25, 48, 64, 79.
\132\ China Labor Watch, ``Apple's Failed CSR Audit: A Report on
Catcher Technology Polluting the Environment and Harming the Health of
Workers,'' 16 January 18, 3, 6, 8-9, 15, 36.
\133\ Ibid., 8, 36.
\134\ China Labor Watch, ``Amazon Profits From Secretly Oppressing
Its Supplier's Workers: An Investigative Report on Hengyang Foxconn,''
10 June 18, 3.
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Criminal Justice
Arbitrary Detention
Authorities continued to use various forms of arbitrary
detention to deprive individuals of their liberty, contravening
international human rights standards.\1\ The UN Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention classifies detention as ``arbitrary''
when there is no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty,
when detention results from the exercise of certain fundamental
rights, or when non-observance of international fair trial
norms is particularly serious.\2\ Descriptions of selected
forms of arbitrary detention follow. [For information on
arbitrary detention in ``political reeducation'' centers, see
Section IV--Xinjiang.]
BLACK JAILS
Authorities continued to hold individuals in ``black
jails,'' extralegal detention sites that operate outside of
China's judicial and administrative detention systems.\3\ In
some cases, authorities held petitioners (those who use the
petitioning system, or xinfang, to report grievances to
authorities) in ``black jails'' in connection to ``stability
maintenance'' efforts during or near the 19th National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017 and annual
meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference in March 2018.\4\ Examples
include petitioners Wei Qin, held in Chongming district,
Shanghai municipality; \5\ Cai Xiaomin,\6\ held in Pudong
district, Shanghai;\7\ Liu Yu,\8\ held in Qionglai city,
Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province; \9\ and at least 14
petitioners in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province.\10\
Authorities reportedly beat Cai and Liu.\11\
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES
Authorities continued to forcibly commit individuals
without mental illness to psychiatric facilities--a practice
known as ``bei jingshenbing''--to punish rights advocacy,
despite protections in the PRC Mental Health Law \12\ and
related regulations.\13\ [For more information, see Section
II--Public Health.] For example, in February 2018, friends of
rights advocate Zhang Qi found her--reportedly without signs of
mental illness--forcibly committed at a psychiatric facility in
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, after authorities
held her incommunicado for months.\14\ In another case, in
January 2018, a friend of petitioner Ma Shengfen \15\ confirmed
authorities forcibly committed Ma to a psychiatric hospital in
Tongren municipality, Guizhou province, in late 2016, after
authorities detained her in connection to petitioning.\16\
EDUCATIONAL PLACEMENT
In March 2018, the Dui Hua Foundation reported that it
found the first known case of ``educational placement'' (anzhi
jiaoyu), an indefinite form of arbitrary detention for
terrorism and extremism cases that can extend beyond completion
of a criminal sentence.\17\ The PRC Counterterrorism Law gives
intermediate people's courts authority to approve the transfer
of a prisoner into educational placement upon completion of a
criminal sentence, as well as approve release from educational
placement, based on official evaluations of the individual's
``danger to society.'' \18\ In August 2017, the Urumqi
Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Urumqi municipality,
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, reportedly approved
educational placement for Uyghur Ismaili Rozi (Yisimayili Ruze)
less than a month before he would have completed a 10-year
sentence for ``inciting separatism,'' \19\ raising concerns
about the timespan for educational placement, application
beyond cases of terrorism and extremism, evaluation process,
and ethnic minorities'--including Uyghurs'--heightened
likelihood of serving educational placement.\20\
Administrative Detention
Authorities continued to use extrajudicial, administrative
forms of detention, granting officials discretion in the
treatment of detainees without judicial oversight or
protections for detainees' rights under the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law (CPL). For example, authorities continued to
operate compulsory drug detoxification centers \21\ where
officials can hold detainees for up to two years.\22\ As of
January 31, 2018, authorities reportedly held Falun Gong
practitioner Zhu Xuemei in a drug detoxification center in
Guizhou province, after she refused to renounce her belief in
Falun Gong.\23\ This past year, Zhu Zhengfu--a member of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and Vice
President of the All China Lawyers Association--called for the
abolition of ``custody and education'' (shourong jiaoyu),\24\
in which public security officials can detain those accused of
prostitution and their clients for six months to two years
without judicial oversight.\25\ Zhu compared the practice to
reeducation through labor--abolished in 2013 \26\--for allowing
administrative authorities to impose lengthy deprivation of
liberty.\27\ The Commission did not observe reports detailing
specific cases of ``custody and education'' this past year, but
international observers expressed concerns about crackdowns on
prostitution, abuse of authority by ``custody and education''
center officials, emphasis on punishment over rehabilitation,
and high recidivism rates among ``custody and education''
detainees.\28\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Confinement'' (Liuzhi) Under the PRC Supervision Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2018, the National People's Congress passed the PRC
Supervision Law (Supervision Law),\29\ authorizing the newly
established National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to investigate
suspected official misconduct \30\ using methods including
``confinement'' (liuzhi),\31\ an extrajudicial form of detention that
allows NSC officials to hold individuals without a guarantee of access
to counsel.\32\ A March 2018 amendment to China's Constitution \33\
gives the NSC parallel status to that of the Supreme People's Court and
Supreme People's Procuratorate,\34\ and NSC officials may place
individuals in ``confinement'' (liuzhi) when ``the circumstances are
particularly grave or complex'' or authorities deem the detainee at
risk of flight, suicide, tampering with evidence, or otherwise
obstructing the investigation.\35\ According to experts, the
Supervision Law appears to allow the NSC to place in ``confinement''
anyone suspected of involvement in bribery or official misconduct,\36\
which exceeds its general supervisory jurisdiction.\37\ The Supervision
Law also grants exceptions to the requirement that authorities notify
the employment unit and family of those in ``confinement,'' when
certain factors could possibly obstruct an investigation.\38\
``Confinement'' can last up to three months, and in ``special
circumstances''--which the Supervision Law does not define--may be
extended by an additional three months with NSC approval.\39\
Official sources stated that ``confinement'' would replace ``double
designation'' (shuanggui) \40\--an extrajudicial investigative process
for Communist Party members \41\--and observers expressed concern that
``confinement'' would perpetuate abuses that reportedly have occurred
under ``double designation,'' such as torture, coerced confessions, and
denial of access to counsel, and extend the use of such methods beyond
Party members.\42\
On May 5, 2018, supervisory authorities in Jianyang district, Nanping
municipality, Fujian province, notified the family of Chen Yong--the
former driver for a local official--that Chen died during
``confinement,'' reportedly the first such case.\43\ Chen's body
reportedly showed signs of abuse.\44\ Authorities reportedly told
Chen's family that he ``collapsed'' during interrogation but did not
specify a cause of death.\45\ NSC officials also reportedly refused
Chen's family access to interrogation recordings.\46\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Use of Criminal Law To Punish Rights Advocates
This past year, authorities continued to detain individuals
under broad provisions in the PRC Criminal Law to suppress
rights advocacy and other activities protected under
international human rights standards.\47\ Selected examples
follow.
Inciting subversion of state power. The PRC
Criminal Law classifies certain actions as ``crimes of
endangering state security,'' which can carry multi-
year sentences or the death penalty.\48\ On November
21, 2017, the Changsha Municipal Intermediate People's
Court in Hunan province sentenced Jiang Tianyong \49\--
a lawyer disbarred in 2009 \50\--to two years in prison
for ``inciting subversion of state power'' \51\ in
apparent connection to his human rights work.\52\
Associates of Jiang said he confessed under duress,\53\
and UN experts expressed concern that Jiang was at risk
of torture while in custody.\54\ On April 17, 2018, the
Tianjin Municipal High People's Court upheld on appeal
an eight-year sentence for Wu Gan \55\ for activities
including ``inciting subversion of state power'' \56\
in connection to posting ``subversive'' language online
and accepting interviews with foreign media.\57\ On
September 2, 2017, public security officials from
Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province, criminally
detained human rights non-governmental organization
executive director Zhen Jianghua \58\ on suspicion of
inciting subversion.\59\ On August 10, 2018, the Zhuhai
Intermediate People's Court reportedly tried Zhen
without informing either Zhen's defense lawyers or his
family members.\60\
Picking quarrels and provoking trouble. In
October 2017, public security officials in Xuancheng
municipality, Anhui province, reportedly detained
driver Wu Kemu \61\ on suspicion of ``picking quarrels
and provoking trouble.'' \62\ Associates of Wu
reportedly did not know the reason for his detention,
although authorities reportedly detained Wu twice
previously after he posted online videos about official
misconduct.\63\ Authorities in Xiqing district, Tianjin
municipality, reportedly criminally detained petitioner
Yao Lijuan \64\ on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble'' after--while under home
confinement--she filmed officials in or near her home
and uploaded the video to the social media platform
WeChat.\65\ Other examples of authorities detaining
individuals on this charge include petitioner Peng
Miaolin,\66\ rights advocate Xu Qin,\67\ and rights
lawyer Li Yuhan,\68\ whose case is discussed below.
Using a cult organization to undermine
implementation of the law. Authorities continued to
charge members of religious communities and spiritual
movements, including Falun Gong, with ``using a cult
organization to undermine implementation of the law''
(Article 300).\69\ The Dui Hua Foundation reported
finding approximately 800 new cases of Article 300
convictions in 2017 from official sources--and 900 from
unofficial sources--including cases of Falun Gong
practitioners, followers of the Church of Almighty God
sect, and others.\70\ On January 5, 2018, the Shenzhen
Intermediate People's Court, in Shenzhen municipality,
Guangdong province, upheld the sentences on appeal of
Miew Cheu Siang \71\ (one year and six months)--a
Malaysian citizen--and his wife Yu Linglan \72\ (five
years) under Article 300 in connection to possession
and distribution of Falun Gong materials.\73\ [For more
information, see Section II--Freedom of Religion.]
Other criminal law provisions. Authorities
accused rights advocates and others of other criminal
offenses, including ``illegal business activity,'' \74\
``gathering a crowd to disturb traffic order,'' \75\
``gathering a crowd to disturb public order,'' \76\ and
``extortion and blackmail.'' \77\
Ongoing Challenges in the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law
This past year, authorities took steps to change
legislation affecting the rights of prisoners and detainees. In
addition, the Commission continued to observe reports of
authorities violating the rights of detainees, despite
protections in the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) \78\ and
international human rights standards.\79\ Selected issues and
examples are described below.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Authorities took steps to change national legislation
affecting the rights of prisoners and detainees. In April 2018,
a draft CPL amendment was submitted to the National People's
Congress Standing Committee for deliberation.\80\ The draft
amendment specifies procedures for transferring cases for
prosecution from the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to
procuratorial authorities, as well as transferring individuals
in ``confinement'' (liuzhi) to procuratorial authorities for
detention.\81\ If implemented as written, the amendment would
allow courts to try defendants in absentia in corruption
cases,\82\ violating international fair trial standards.\83\ It
would also allow for lenient sentencing if the defendant admits
to a crime, does not dispute the facts of the case, and
willingly accepts punishment.\84\ Further, it would allow for
expedited sentencing when a defendant facing a maximum three-
year sentence in a basic people's court has confessed and
accepted punishment,\85\ raising concerns about the reliance on
confessions--sometimes coerced--in China's criminal justice
system.\86\
COERCED CONFESSIONS
Authorities continued to coerce detainees to confess guilt
to crimes, in violation of the CPL,\87\ in some cases coercing
detainees to recite apparently scripted remarks in court or on
camera.\88\ For example, in February 2018, Swedish citizen Gui
Minhai \89\--co-owner of a company that sold books critical of
Chinese leaders, and whom authorities detained in January 2018
as he was en route to Beijing municipality with Swedish
diplomats for a medical exam \90\--gave a televised confession
for allegedly cooperating with Swedish authorities to attempt
to leave China.\91\ This reportedly was his third televised
confession in custody.\92\ In another case, on September 11,
2017, Taiwan college employee and non-governmental organization
volunteer Lee Ming-cheh \93\ reportedly confessed in court to
``subversion of state power.'' \94\ A Chinese Human Rights
Defenders researcher reportedly said that Lee ``had already
`confessed' before the trial . . .. There is a strong
likelihood that he was tortured to force a confession.'' \95\
Before the trial, Lee's wife indicated he would only confess
involuntarily.\96\
PROLONGED PRETRIAL DETENTION
Authorities in some cases held suspects in pretrial
detention beyond limits allowed in the CPL \97\ and
international human rights standards.\98\ For example,
observers reportedly were unable to contact rights lawyer Wang
Quanzhang \99\ since authorities detained him on July 10, 2015,
amid a widespread crackdown on rights lawyers and
advocates.\100\ On July 13, 2018, Wang's wife reported that a
friend told her another lawyer reported seeing Wang at the
Tianjin No. 1 Municipal Detention Center.\101\ On February 14,
2017, the Tianjin No. 2 Municipal People's Procuratorate
reportedly indicted Wang for subversion,\102\ but the
Commission did not observe reports of Wang's case reaching
trial. In another case, authorities reportedly postponed the
June 20, 2018, trial of 64 Tianwang website founder Huang
Qi,\103\ whom authorities detained on November 28, 2016,\104\
and approved his arrest on the charge of ``illegally providing
state secrets and intelligence for overseas entities.'' \105\
According to an August 18, 2018, Radio Free Asia report,
authorities had not set a new trial date.\106\
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Authorities continued to deny some criminal suspects
meetings with their lawyers, particularly in cases involving
rights advocates. Chinese law grants suspects and defendants
the right to hire \107\ and meet with defense counsel,\108\ but
it restricts meetings in cases of endangering state security,
terrorism, or significant bribes,\109\ as well in cases of
residential surveillance,\110\ contravening international
standards.\111\ On or after October 17, 2017, public security
officials in Shijingshan district, Beijing municipality, denied
defense lawyer Ren Quanniu's request for a meeting with his
client, human rights website editor Ding Lingjie,\112\ whom
authorities detained in September 2017 in likely connection to
the detention of the website's founder, Liu Feiyue.\113\ In
another case, in July 2018, public security officials from
Chenzhou municipality, Hunan province, placed internet
commentator Chen Jieren \114\ under ``residential surveillance
at a designated location'' on suspicion of ``extortion'' and
``illegal business activity'' after he posted online about
alleged official misconduct--also detaining Chen's wife, two
brothers, and two assistants.\115\ NSC officials reportedly
instructed public security officials to deny Chen meetings with
his lawyer.\116\
In early 2018, Ministry of Justice (MOJ) officials
indicated authorities would expand a pilot program, established
jointly with the Supreme People's Court in October 2017 in
select locations, to increase access to criminal defense
counsel.\117\ According to an MOJ official, the percentage of
legal aid cases involving a defense lawyer in three
municipalities in Zhejiang province increased after the pilot
program began.\118\ The effect of the planned expansion
remained unclear, and authorities' continuing efforts to punish
human rights lawyers for their work appeared at odds with the
program's stated goals.\119\ [For more information on access to
counsel and the harassment and prosecution of rights lawyers,
see Section III--Access to Justice.]
RESIDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE AT A DESIGNATED LOCATION
Authorities continued to place some criminal suspects in
``residential surveillance at a designated location''
(RSDL),\120\ a form of incommunicado detention that can last up
to six months,\121\ restricts access to counsel,\122\ and
places detainees at risk of abuse by authorities.\123\ In
January 2018, public security officials in Tongshan district,
Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, placed lawyer Yu
Wensheng \124\ under RSDL on suspicion of inciting subversion
in connection to comments he posted on Twitter advocating for
constitutional reform.\125\ In October 2017, public security
officials in Fengtai district, Beijing municipality, reportedly
placed environmental petitioner Ji Shulong \126\ under RSDL in
connection to the 19th Party Congress.\127\
Torture and Abuse in Custody
Authorities continued to torture and abuse detainees in
some cases,\128\ violating protections in the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law \129\ and international standards.\130\ For
example, officials at the Shenyang No. 1 Municipal Public
Security Bureau (PSB) Detention Center in Shenyang
municipality, Liaoning province, reportedly abused rights
lawyer Li Yuhan,\131\ whom authorities detained on October 9,
2017, in apparent connection to the 19th Party Congress and
Li's previous representation of rights lawyer Wang Yu.\132\
Public security officials reportedly instructed other detainees
to harass and abuse Li, including by throwing her food on the
bathroom floor, urinating on her food, and throwing cold water
on her and then allowing her to shiver until she lost
consciousness.\133\ In another case, public security officials
in Yu county, Zhangjiakou municipality, Hebei province,
reportedly took lawyer Wu Quan \134\ into custody on December
16, 2017, in connection to his reporting of alleged corruption
by a local official.\135\ Authorities reportedly placed a hood
over him and took him to a basement; bound him to an
interrogation chair for 48 hours; and deprived him of water,
sleep, and sufficient clothing for the first 24 hours.\136\
Medical Care in Custody
Authorities continued to deny or fail to provide adequate
medical care to some detainees,\137\ which violates
international human rights standards \138\ and may amount to
torture.\139\ For example, 60-year-old Li Yuhan--discussed
above--suffers from conditions including heart disease,
hypertension, and hyperthyroidism; \140\ staff at the Shenyang
No. 1 PSB Detention Center reportedly refused to give her
medication other than aspirin unless she cooperated with
authorities.\141\ In another case, in August 2017, authorities
criminally detained petitioner Li Yanxiang \142\ at the Qingdao
No. 2 Municipal PSB Detention Center, in Shandong province, in
connection to her petitioning.\143\ While detained, Li
reportedly experienced vomiting, loss of appetite, abdominal
pain, and insomnia, but was unable to receive medical treatment
because detainees were required to pay for their own medical
expenses,\144\ violating international standards.\145\ In
another case, in February 2018, citizen journalist Sun Lin
reported that authorities at the Nanjing Municipal PSB
Detention Center, in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province,
made him take medicine against his will during his
detention.\146\ In June 2018, the wife of Jiang Tianyong, whose
case is discussed above, reported that authorities force-fed
him medication daily, and that his memory had deteriorated
severely.\147\ Authorities also denied requests for medical
parole to some prisoners, in some cases repeat requests.\148\
Examples include Huang Qi--discussed above \149\--and Pastor Li
Guozhi.\150\
Wrongful Conviction
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, authorities
drew high-level attention to the issue of wrongful
convictions,\151\ with some Chinese legal experts expressing
concern about abusive practices that facilitated wrongful
convictions, such as illegal collection of evidence and coerced
confessions.\152\ A February 2018 Xinhua report stated that,
over the previous five years, authorities overturned 39 ``major
cases'' of wrongful convictions involving 78 people
nationwide.\153\
The Commission observed reports of wrongful convictions
overturned this year, some of which highlighted the challenge
of lengthy waiting periods. For example, in April 2018, the
Jilin Province High People's Court found Liu Zhonglin--who had
already completed a 25-year sentence for murder--not guilty,
due to ``unclear facts'' and ``insufficient evidence'' in the
original trial in 1994.\154\ In another case, in May 2018, the
Supreme People's Court found business executive Zhang
Wenzhong--whose conviction of various financial crimes was
upheld on appeal by the Hebei Province High People's Court in
2009--not guilty.\155\
Policing
This past year, authorities continued to develop
technology-based means to help public security officials track
persons of interest--based in part on large-scale, sometimes
involuntary collection of personal data--raising concerns about
privacy and public security officials' capacity to crack down
on rights advocates and other targeted persons.\156\ Collection
of personal information, including biometric data, appeared to
violate privacy protections in international human rights
instruments,\157\ and the Commission did not observe efforts by
authorities to bring the collection or use of such information
in line with international standards.\158\ Examples of such
technology include ``smart'' glasses that could scan facial
features or vehicle license plates for comparison against a
``blacklist'' in a centralized database,\159\ security cameras
with scanning capabilities,\160\ devices that could forcibly
collect information from mobile phones and other network
devices,\161\ and voice recognition technology.\162\
Authorities reportedly could connect voice samples to
information on individuals' ``ethnicity, home address, and . .
. hotel records.'' \163\ While such technologies could aid
criminal investigations, some official sources noted their
potential applications in contexts of ``stability maintenance''
and surveillance of ``key persons'' (zhongdian renyuan, i.e.,
persons of ``key'' interest to security authorities).\164\
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
implemented large-scale--sometimes involuntary--collection of
residents' personal information to predict perceived threats to
public security.\165\ In some cases, officials visited local
households to collect personal information, including
indications of political or cultural views deemed
threatening.\166\ Such efforts coincided with authorities'
collection of DNA samples and other biometric data from XUAR
residents, presented to participants as a free public health
program.\167\ [For more information, see Section II--Public
Health.] Authorities reportedly used the Integrated Joint
Operations Platform (IJOP) to integrate various forms of
information collected, including, for example, unpaid bills,
religious activity, and foreign travel activity.\168\ The
Commission did not observe reports linking specific detentions
to the IJOP, but current and former XUAR residents reportedly
claimed the IJOP contributed to arbitrary, preemptive
detentions in ``political reeducation'' centers, facilities in
the XUAR used to carry out arbitrary mass detentions.\169\ [For
more information, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Death Penalty
The Chinese government continued to claim that it reserved
the death penalty for a small number of crimes and only the
most serious offenders,\170\ while Amnesty International
estimated that China carried out more executions than all other
countries combined.\171\ The Chinese government continued to
classify statistics on its use of the death penalty as a state
secret,\172\ and the Commission did not observe official
reports on overall death penalty numbers. Legal experts noted
that defense lawyers continued to face hurdles to effective
representation in death penalty cases, and that the joint
Ministry of Justice and Supreme People's Court criminal defense
pilot project described above did not provide for the right to
legal representation in death penalty review cases.\173\
In December 2017, authorities in Lufeng city, Shanwei
municipality, Guangdong province, sentenced to death 10 people
variously for murder, robbery, and drug-related crimes--in a
public trial in a stadium--and then immediately executed
them.\174\ The Lufeng Municipal People's Court and Shanwei
Intermediate People's Court issued a notice inviting the public
to attend the public sentencing.\175\ Chinese law prohibits
public executions,\176\ and the Commission did not observe
reports that the defendants had the opportunity to appeal or
that the ruling was sent to a higher court for review, as
required by law.\177\ In another case, in March 2018, the
Linfen Municipal Intermediate People's Court in Shanxi province
sentenced a former vice mayor of Luliang municipality, Shanxi,
to death for accepting large sums of bribes.\178\ A South China
Morning Post report noted the sentence was ``unusually harsh''
for an economic crime, even in the context of President and
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's crackdown on
corruption.\179\
This year, the Commission did not observe any rulemaking
efforts to ban harvesting organs from executed prisoners.\180\
At a trafficking conference at the Vatican in 2018, Wang Haibo,
head of the China Organ Transplant Response System,\181\
reported that authorities made 220 arrests over the previous 10
years in connection to illegal organ transplants and noted that
authorities continued to combat the practice.\182\
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
\1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 9(1). China has signed and stated its
intent to ratify the ICCPR. See United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, last visited 23 July 18. China signed the ICCPR on October 5,
1998; State Council Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human
Rights in 2012,'' reprinted in State Council, May 2013; Permanent
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, ``Aide Memoire,''
reprinted in United Nations, 13 April 06; State Council, European
Council, Prime Minister's Office of Sweden, and European Commission,
``Joint Statement of the 12th China-EU Summit,'' reprinted in Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 09. Upon presenting its candidacy for
the 2013 UN Human Rights Council elections, China reportedly promised
to ``further protect civil and political rights,'' although it did not
specifically state intent to ratify the ICCPR. UN General Assembly,
Note Verbale Dated 5 June 2013 from the Permanent Mission of China to
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General Assembly,
6 June 13, A/68/90.
\2\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV(B).
\3\ Harry Wu and Cole Goodrich, ``A Jail by Any Other Name: Labor
Camp Abolition in the Context of Arbitrary Detention in China,'' Human
Rights Brief, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Winter 2014), 3-4; Amnesty
International, ``China: Submission to the United Nations Committee
against Torture 56th Session, 9 November-9 December 2015,'' October
2015, 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `We Can Beat You to Death
With Impunity': Secret Detention and Abuse of Women in China's `Black
Jails,' '' October 2014, 6. See also ``Guo Gai and Wang Jianfen:
Details of Black Jails in Wuxi: Rescue and Torture Reenactment'' [Guo
gai, wang jianfen: wuxi hei jianyu shimo: yingjiu he kuxing yanshi],
Charter 08 (blog), 23 December 15.
\4\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Police Detain, `Disappear' Dozens of
Rights Activists, Petitioners,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 October 17;
Christian Shepherd and Ben Blanchard, ``Leaving Nothing to Chance,
China Increases Security, Social Control Before Congress,'' Reuters, 28
September 17; Tom Phillips, ``China's `Stability Maintenance' Agents
Move To Silence Critics Before Party Congress,'' Guardian, 16 October
17; ``On First Day of Party's `Two Sessions,' Petitioners Squeeze Into
State Bureau for Letters and Calls'' [Zhonggong ``lianghui'' shouri,
fangmin jibao guojia xinfang ju], Renmin Bao, 11 March 18.
\5\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Black Jail Case No. 9:
Shanghai Rights Defender Exposes Black Jail and Calls for an `End to
One-Party Dictatorship' '' [Shanghai hei jianyu anli zhi jiu: shanghai
weiquan renshi wei qin jielu hei jianyu bing huhan ``zhongjie yi dang
zhuanzheng''], 13 November 17.
\6\ For more information on Cai Xiaomin, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00280.
\7\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Black Jail Case No. 16:
Shanghai Rights Advocate Cai Xiaomin Reveals Black Jail'' [Shanghai hei
jianyu anli zhi 16: shanghai weiquan renshi cai xiaomin jielu hei
jianyu], 31 March 18.
\8\ For more information on Liu Yu, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00281.
\9\ Rights Defense Network, ``The Accusations of Sichuan Petitioner
Liu Yu, Held in a Black Jail for 32 Days Because of the `Two Sessions'
in Beijing'' [Yin beijing ``lianghui'' bei guan hei jianyu 32 tian de
sichuan fangmin liu yu de kongsu], 5 April 18.
\10\ ``China Overrun With Black Jails, Over Ten Petitioners
Illegally Held Captive in Wuhan'' [Zhongguo hei jianyu fanlan, wuhan
shi duo fangmin bei feifa qiujin], Radio Free Asia, 12 April 18. For
more information on the 14 petitioners, see the following records in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2016-00481 on Peng Min,
2018-00283 on Zou Guilan, 2018-00285 on Yang Mingzhu, 2018-00286 on Liu
Moxiang, 2018-00287 on Ren Chunhua, 2018-00289 on Cai Miao, 2018-00291
on Wan Shaohua, and 2018-00292 on Liu Yunfei.
\11\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Black Jail Case No. 16:
Shanghai Rights Advocate Cai Xiaomin Reveals Black Jail'' [Shanghai hei
jianyu anli zhi 16: shanghai weiquan renshi cai xiaomin jielu hei
jianyu], 31 March 18; Rights Defense Network, ``The Accusations of
Sichuan Petitioner Liu Yu, Held in a Black Jail for 32 Days Because of
the `Two Sessions' in Beijing'' [Yin beijing ``lianghui'' bei guan hei
jianyu 32 tian de sichuan fangmin liu yu de kongsu], 5 April 18.
\12\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13, arts. 27, 30,
75(5), 78(1).
\13\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, Measures on Implementation of
Compulsory Medical Treatment (Trial) [Renmin jianchayuan qiangzhi
yiliao zhixing jiancha banfa (shixing)], issued 13 May 16, effective 2
June 16, arts. 9, 12.
\14\ ``Liang Songji: The Aggrieved Zhang Qi of Guangzhou Treated as
Mental Patient, Forcibly Detained in Baiyun District Mental Health
Rehabilitation Hospital'' [Liang songji: guangzhou yuanmin zhang qi bei
dangzuo jingshenbing ren qiangzhi guanya zai baiyun qu jingshenbing
kangfu yiyuan], Radio Free Asia, 15 February 18; ``Activist in China's
Guangdong Confined in Psychiatric Hospital With `No Sign of Illness,''
' Radio Free Asia, 19 February 18. For more information on Zhang Qi,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00293.
\15\ For more information on Ma Shengfen, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00078.
\16\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Friend Scouts Around
Everywhere, Learns Ma Shengfen Forcibly Committed to Psychiatric
Hospital'' [Youren duofang datan dezhi ma shengfen bei guan
jingshenbing yuan], 9 February 18.
\17\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Uncovering the Obscurity of `Educational
Placement,' '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 12 March 18; PRC
Counterterrorism Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa],
passed 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, amended 27 April 18,
art. 30; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV(B).
\18\ PRC Counterterrorism Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu
zhuyi fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, amended 27
April 18, art. 30.
\19\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Uncovering the Obscurity of `Educational
Placement,' '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 12 March 18; PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 103.
\20\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Uncovering the Obscurity of `Educational
Placement,' '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 12 March 18; PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 103.
\21\ See, e.g., Qinghai Province Detoxification Administration,
``Provincial Justice Department Head Liu Tianhai Arrives at the Golmud
Compulsory Drug Detoxification Center To Inspect the Center's Safety
and Stability Work'' [Sheng sifa ting liu tianhai tingzhang dao ge'ermu
qiangzhi jiedu suo jiancha changsuo anquan wending gongzuo], 9 April
18; Wang Jian, ``Visiting the Shaanxi Women's Compulsory Isolation Drug
Detoxification Center: Women Constitute 80 Percent of Police, Say They
Are `Tough as Cement' '' [Tanfang shaanxi nu qiangzhi geli jiedu suo:
nu ganjing zhan ba cheng, zicheng ``shuini'' zuo de], The Paper, 8
March 18; ``Walking Into Yunnan Province Women's Compulsory Isolation
Drug Detoxification Center'' [Zoujin yunnan sheng nuzi qiangzhi geli
jiedu suo], Xinhua, 7 March 18. See also State Council, Regulations on
Drug Detoxification [Jiedu tiaoli], issued and effective 22 June 11,
art. 4; Ministry of Public Security, Measures on the Management of
Public Security Organ Compulsory Isolation and Drug Detoxification
Centers [Gong'an jiguan qiangzhi geli jiedu suo guanli banfa], issued
and effective 19 September 11, arts. 1-2.
\22\ PRC Drug Prohibition Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jindu fa],
issued 27 December 07, effective 1 June 08, art. 47; State Council,
Regulations on Drug Detoxification [Jiedu tiaoli], issued and effective
22 June 11, art. 27.
\23\ Rights Defense Network, ``Monthly Report on People Detained
and Not Sentenced or Forcibly Disappeared in Mainland China (January
31, 2018) No. 28 (298 People) (Part Two)'' [Zhongguo dalu jiya wei pan
ji qiangpo shizong renyuan yuedu baogao (2018 nian 1 yue 31 ri) di
ershiba qi (gong 298 ren) (xia)], 31 January 18.
\24\ Wang Xiuzhong, ``Exclusive! CPPCC Delegate Zhu Zhengfu
Recommends Constitutional Review of Compulsory Custody and Education
for [Crime of] Prostitution'' [Dujia! Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan zhu
zhengfu jianyi dui maiyin piaochang qiangzhi shourong jiaoyu jinxing
hexianxing shencha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 25 February 18; Gao
Yuyang et al., ``Three Lawyers' Key Words for the Two Sessions'' [San
wei lushi de lianghui guanjianci], Beijing Youth Daily, 10 March 18.
\25\ State Council, Measures on Custody and Education for Sex
Workers and Their Clients [Maiyin piaochang renyuan shourong jiaoyu
banfa], issued and effective 4 September 93, amended 8 January 11,
arts. 2, 3, 9. For more information on ``custody and education,'' see
Tingting Shen and Joanna Csete, ``HIV, Sex Work, and Law Enforcement in
China,'' Health and Human Rights Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 (December
2017); Asia Catalyst, `` `Custody and Education': Arbitrary Detention
for Female Sex Workers in China,'' December 2013.
\26\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Abolishing Reeducation Through Labor Regulations [Quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu feizhi youguan laodong jiaoyang
falu guiding de jueding], issued and effective 28 December 13.
\27\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Exclusive! Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference Member Zhu Zhengfu Recommends Constitutional
Review of Compulsory Custody and Education for [Crime of]
Prostitution'' [Dujia! Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan zhu zhengfu jianyi dui
maiyin piaochang qiangzhi shourong jiaoyu jinxing hexianxing shencha],
Southern Metropolitan Daily, 25 February 18.
\28\ See, e.g., Tingting Shen and Joanna Csete, ``HIV, Sex Work,
and Law Enforcement in China,'' Health and Human Rights Journal, Vol.
19, No. 2 (December 2017); Dui Hua Foundation, ``Call for
Constitutional Review of Custody and Education,'' Dui Hua Human Rights
Journal, 4 April 18. See also Asia Catalyst, `` `Custody and
Education': Arbitrary Detention for Female Sex Workers in China,''
December 2013.
\29\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed and effective 20 March 18.
\30\ Ibid., art. 3.
\31\ Ibid., art. 22. Some sources translate liuzhi as ``detention
in place'' or ``retention in custody.'' See, e.g., Jeremy Daum,
``Unsupervised--Initial Thoughts on the Supervision Law,'' China Law
Translate (blog), 9 November 17; Nicholas Bequelin, Amnesty
International, ``China: New Supervision Law a Systemic Threat to Human
Rights,'' 20 March 18; Mercy A. Kuo, ``China's Detention Law: CCP Curbs
Courts,'' The Diplomat, 21 February 18.
\32\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed and effective 20 March 18. See also Jamie P. Horsley, ``What's
So Controversial About China's New Anti-Corruption Body? '' The
Diplomat, 30 May 18.
\33\ ``Amendment to the People's Republic of China Constitution
Passed'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng'an tongguo],
People's Daily, 11 March 18; Amendment to the PRC Constitution
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua, 11 March 18;
Lin Xiaowei et al., ``Comprehensive News: Bringing the New Era, Apt
Time To Amend Constitution--International Community Watches Closely as
National People's Congress Passes Amendment to the Constitution''
[Zonghe xiaoxi: huhang xinshidai xiuxian zhengdangshi--guoji shehui
guanzhu quanguo renda tongguo xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua, 11 March 18.
\34\ ``Supervisory Commissions Listed as State Organ in China's
Constitution,'' Xinhua, 12 March 18.
\35\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed and effective 20 March 18, art. 22.
\36\ Ibid., art. 22; Ma Shaomeng, ``Investigating Both Giving and
Receipt of Bribe Requires Replacing `Double Designation (Lianggui)'
With Confinement (Liuzhi)'' [Shouhui xinghui yiqi cha biran yaoqiu yong
liuzhi qudai ``lianggui'' cuoshi], Chinese Social Sciences Net, 14
March 18; Mercator Institute for China Studies, ``China's National
Supervision Commission,'' last visited on 21 August 18.
\37\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed and effective 20 March 18, art. 15.
\38\ Ibid., art. 44.
\39\ Ibid., art. 43.
\40\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17; Zhu Jichai and Qi Leijie, ``What Does It Mean for
Confinement To Replace `Double Designation'?--Decoding the State
Supervision System Reform'' [Yong liuzhi qudai ``lianggui'' yiweizhe
shenme?--jiedu guojia jiancha tizhi gaige], Xinhua, 23 October 17. The
Commission did not observe any reports confirming that authorities
officially abolished ``double designation'' (shuanggui).
\41\ Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, Provisions for Investigative Work of Cases by Disciplinary
Investigation Agencies [Zhongguo gongchandang jilu jiancha jiguan
anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli], issued 25 March 94, effective 1 May 94,
art. 28. Article 28 of the 1994 provisions requires any person or
organization having information about a case under investigation to
comply with the ``double designation'' process. Chinese Communist Party
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Opinion on Strengthening
the Coordination Mechanisms in Case Investigation and on Further
Regulating the Measure of ``Double Designation'' [Zhongyang jiwei
guanyu wanshan cha ban anjian xietiao jizhi jinyibu gaijin he guifan
``lianggui'' cuoshi de yijian], issued 20 January 05, item 2(1). See
also Human Rights Watch, `` `Special Measures': Detention and Torture
in the Chinese Communist Party's Shuanggui System,'' 6 December 16.
\42\ See, e.g., Christian Shepherd, ``China To Revise Criminal Law
To Accommodate Powerful Anti-Graft Commission,'' Reuters, 12 March 18;
Mercy A. Kuo, ``China's Detention Law: CCP Curbs Courts,'' The
Diplomat, 21 February 18; Jun Mai, ``How China's New Anti-Graft Super
Body Will Work, and Why Calling a Lawyer Won't Be an Option,'' South
China Morning Post, 17 November 17; Jeremy Daum, ``Unsupervised--
Initial Thoughts on the Supervision Law,'' China Law Translate (blog),
9 November 17; ``China Releases Draft Law To Expand Power of New Anti-
Graft Body,'' Reuters, 6 November 17.
\43\ ``Man From Nanping, Fujian, Dies During Confinement, Family
Claims Multiple Bruises on Body'' [Fujian nanping yi nanzi bei liuzhi
qijian siwang, jiashu cheng shenti duo chu yuqing], Caixin, reprinted
in Terminus, 8 May 18; ``Driver of Vice District Head Suspected of
Corruption Is Investigated, Dies During Confinement, Becoming First
Case'' [Fu quzhang shetan huoyan siji shoucha, liuzhi qijian siwang
cheng shou zong anli], Radio Free Asia, 9 May 18.
\44\ ``Man From Nanping, Fujian, Dies During Confinement, Family
Claims Multiple Bruises on Body'' [Fujian nanping yi nanzi bei liuzhi
qijian siwang, jiashu cheng shenti duo chu yuqing], Caixin, reprinted
in Terminus, 8 May 18; ``Driver of Vice District Head Suspected of
Corruption Is Investigated, Dies During Confinement, Becoming First
Case'' [Fu quzhang she tanhuoyan siji shoucha, liuzhi qijian siwang
cheng shou zong anli], Radio Free Asia, 9 May 18.
\45\ ``Driver of Vice District Head Suspected of Corruption Is
Investigated, Dies During Confinement, Becoming First Case'' [Fu
quzhang shetan huoyan siji shoucha liuzhi qijian siwang cheng shou zong
anli], Radio Free Asia, 9 May 18.
\46\ Ibid.
\47\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76.
\48\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, arts. 102-105, 107-112.
\49\ For more information on Jiang Tianyong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00179.
\50\ Amnesty International, ``Human Rights Lawyers Disbarred in
China,'' 15 July 09; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Free Jiang
Tianyong & End Suppression on Lawyers,'' 21 November 17; Chris Buckley,
``Activist Confesses to Subversion in Chinese Show Trial,'' New York
Times, 22 August 17.
\51\ Cai Changchun, ``Judgment Announced in Open Court by Changsha
Intermediate Court in Trial of First Instance for Jiang Tianyong
Subversion of State Power Case'' [Jiang tianyong shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan an zai changsha zhong yuan yishen gongkai xuanpan], Legal
Daily, 21 November 17; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing
fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97,
amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02,
28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August
15, 4 November 17, art. 105.
\52\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN
Experts Urge China To Investigate Disappearance of Human Rights Lawyer
Jiang Tianyong,'' 6 December 16.
\53\ ``Chinese Rights Lawyer Makes Videotaped Confession in Court
as Wife Slams `Show Trial,' '' Radio Free Asia, 22 August 17.
\54\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN
Experts Urge China To Investigate Disappearance of Human Rights Lawyer
Jiang Tianyong,'' 6 December 16.
\55\ For more information on Wu Gan, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2010-00348.
\56\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Butcher Wu Gan `Subversion
Case' Announces Upholding of Original Judgment on Appeal'' [Tufu wu gan
``dianfu an'' ershen xuanbu weichi yuanpan], 18 April 18; Rights
Defense Network, ``Urgent: Rights Defender Butcher (Wu Gan) Detained
Outside Entrance to Jiangxi High Court'' [Jinji guanzhu: weiquan renshi
tufu (wu gan) zai jiangxi gaoyuan menkou bei zhua], 19 May 15.
\57\ Tianjin No. 2 Municipal Intermediate People's Court, Criminal
Judgment [Xingshi panjue shu], (2016) Jin 02 Xing Chu No. 146, 21
December 17, reprinted in China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, 10
January 18.
\58\ For more information on Zhen Jianghua, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00360.
\59\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Family of Zhen Jianghua
Receives Criminal Detention Notice, Charged on Suspicion of Inciting
Subversion of State Power'' [Zhen jianghua jiaren shoudao xingshi juliu
tongzhishu, zuiming shexian shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan], 7
September 17; Human Rights Campaign in China, ``In Case Concerning Zhen
Jianghua, Whom Zhuhai Government Detained on Inciting Subversion of
State Power Charge, Sister Summoned by Jiangmen PSB, State Security
Officials Warned Her, Saying Her Article Affected Police Efforts To
Gather Evidence'' [Bei zhuhai dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui jiya de zhen jianghua, qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong'an ju
chuanxun, guobao jinggao shuo ta wenzhang yingxiang jingfang souzheng],
29 September 17; ``Zhen Jianghua Not Released 37 Days After Criminal
Detention, Many Rights Defenders Subjected to Stability Maintenance
Measures Due to 19th Party Congress'' [Zhen jianghua xingju 37 tian
qiman wei huoshi, duo wei weiquan renshi yin shijiu da bei weiwen],
China Free Press (blog), 9 October 17.
\60\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Authorities Secretly Tried
Zhen Jianghua, Netizens Say It Shows [Authorities'] Guilty Mind''
[Dangju mimi shenpan zhen jianghua wangyou zhihu xinxu], 5 September
18.
\61\ For more information on Wu Kemu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00089.
\62\ Rights Defense Network, ``Citizen Wu Kemu of Xuancheng, Anhui
Province, Criminally Detained for Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Trouble as 19th Party Congress Approaches'' [Linjin shijiu da anhui
sheng xuancheng gongmin wu kemu bei yi xunxin zishi zui xingju], 15
October 17; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15,
4 November 17, art. 293.
\63\ Rights Defense Network, ``Citizen Wu Kemu of Xuancheng, Anhui
Province, Criminally Detained for Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Trouble as 19th Party Congress Approaches'' [Linjin shijiu da anhui
sheng xuancheng gongmin wu kemu bei yi xunxin zishi zui xingju], 15
October 17.
\64\ For more information on Yao Lijuan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00018.
\65\ Rights Defense Network, ``19th Party Congress Stability
Maintenance: Tianjin Cancer Petitioner Yao Lijuan Criminally Detained
for Filming Video and Uploading It to WeChat'' [19 da weiwen, tianjin
aizheng fangman yao lijuan yin paishe shipin shangchuan weixin jing zao
xingshi juliu], 10 October 17.
\66\ ``Shanghai Petitioner Peng Miaolin Secretly Sentenced to One-
and-a-Half Years'' [Shanghai fangmin peng miaolin bei mimi panxing yi
nian ban], Radio Free Asia, 19 February 18. For more information on
Peng Miaolin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2018-00188.
\67\ ``Police in China's Jiangsu Criminally Detain `Outspoken'
Human Rights Activist,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February 18. For more
information on Xu Qin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2016-00015.
\68\ ``Chinese Rights Lawyer Arrested, Observers Suspect
Intentional Retribution'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi bei daibu waijie
zhiyi xuyi baofu], Voice of America, 16 November 17. For more
information on Li Yuhan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2017-00361.
\69\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 300. For more information on the use of Article 300,
see Dui Hua Foundation, ``NGO Submission for the Universal Periodic
Review of the People's Republic of China,'' March 2018, paras. 14, 15.
For the Commission's reporting on the issue, see, e.g., CECC, 2017
Annual Report, 5 October 17, 133; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October
14, 97-98; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 93-94; CECC, 2012
Annual Report, 10 October 12, 85; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October
10, 110-11.
\70\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``NGO Submission for the Universal
Periodic Review of the People's Republic of China,'' March 2018, para
14.
\71\ For more information on Miew Cheu Siang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00295.
\72\ For more information on Yu Linglan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00294.
\73\ China Anti-Cult Net, ``Young Husband and Wife in Shenzhen
Distribute Cult Propaganda, Sentenced'' [Xiao fuqi zai shenzhen sanfa
xiejiao xuanchuanpin huoxing], 1 March 18.
\74\ ``Netizen Offers Service To Scale Great Firewall, Receives
Heavy Sentence of Five and a Half Years, Rights Defenders Indicate
Authorities Made an Example of Him'' [Wangmin tigong fanqiang fuwu bei
zhongpan wu nian ban, weiquan renshi zhi dangju sha yi jing bai], Radio
Free Asia, 21 December 17. For more information on Wu Xiangyang, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00004.
\75\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hua Yong Visits Six Criminally
Detained Villagers From Xinjian Village, Beijing; Calls for People From
Various Sectors To Take Notice and Offer Legal Assistance'' [Hua yong
tanfang beijing xinjian cun, 6 ming zao xingju cunmin, hu gejie guanzhu
bing yu falu jiuyuan], 24 December 17; ``After Being Released on Bail
After Two Days' Criminal Detention, Hua Yong Flies to Chengdu To Spend
Daughter's Birthday With Her'' [Hua yong bei xingju liang ri hou qubao,
feidi chengdu peitong nu'er guo shengri], Radio Free Asia, 18 December
17. For more information on Hua Yong, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00054. For more information on the six
criminally detained villagers whom Hua Yong filmed, see the following
records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00042 on
Gu Tianjin, 2018-00043 on Hu Dehua, 2018-00044 on Hu Fuqiang, 2018-
00045 on Liu Jinying, 2018-00046 on Shen Deli, and 2018-00047 on Zhang
Shudong.
\76\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhan Huidong (Online Name:
Principal), Criminally Detained in Case of Liu Xiaobo Seaside Memorial,
Released on Bail Today'' [Yin haiji liu xiaobo an zao xingju de zhan
huidong (wang ming xiaozhang) jin qubao huoshi], 24 January 18. For
more information on Zhan Huidong, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00012.
\77\ Wang Zhenjiang (Shandong xingshi lushi wang zhenjiang),
``Before Completion of Handling Violation, Complainant Is Criminally
Detained'' [Weifa shangwei chuli wanbi, jubaozhe que yijing bei
xingju], Weibo post, 9 January 18, 8:46 p.m. For more information, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00013 on Zou
Xinsi and 2018-00014 on Sun Ruizhu.
\78\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13.
\79\ See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955,
approved by the Economic and Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of
31 July 57 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 77; Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/43/173, 9 December 88.
\80\ Xie Wenying, ``Draft Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law
Brought to National People's Congress Standing Committee for
Deliberation'' [Xingsufa xiuzheng cao'an tiqing quanguo renda
changweihui shenyi], Procuratorial Daily, 26 April 18; Liu Yizhan et
al., ``Establish a System for Criminal Trial in Absentia, Link Up With
the Supervision Law, Leniency in Guilty Pleas--Focus on Aspects of the
Draft Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law'' [Jianli xingshi quexi
shenpan zhidu, yu jiancha fa xianjie, renzuirenfa congkuan--jujiao
xingshi susong fa xiuzheng cao'an kandian], Xinhua, 25 April 18.
\81\ National People's Congress, ``Important: Criminal Procedure
Law (Draft Amendment) for Comment (Draft Full Text and Explanation
Attached)'' [Zhongbang: xingsufa (xiuzheng cao'an) zhengqiu yijian (fu
cao'an quanwen ji shuoming)], reprinted in Guangdong Provincial
Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision, 10 May 18, item
12; Amnesty International, ``China: Draft Criminal Procedure Law
Amendments Would Mean Further Deprivation of Right to Fair Trial Before
Court,'' 7 June 18.
\82\ National People's Congress, ``Important: Criminal Procedure
Law (Draft Amendment) for Comment (Draft Full Text and Explanation
Attached)'' [Zhongbang: xingsufa (xiuzheng cao'an) zhengqiu yijian (fu
cao'an quanwen ji shuoming)], reprinted in Guangdong Provincial
Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision, 10 May 18, item
24. See also Xie Wenying, ``Draft Amendment to the Criminal Procedure
Law Brought to National People's Congress Standing Committee for
Deliberation'' [Xingsufa xiuzheng cao'an tiqing quanguo renda
changweihui shenyi], Procuratorial Daily, 25 April 18; Liu Yizhan et
al., ``Establish a System for Trial in Absentia, Link Up With the
Supervision Law, Leniency in Guilty Pleas--Focus on Aspects of the
Draft Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law'' [Jianli xingshi quexi
shenpan zhidu, yu jiancha fa xianjie, renzuirenfa congkuan--jujiao
xingshi susong fa xiuzheng cao'an kandian], Xinhua, 25 April 18;
Amnesty International, ``China: Draft Criminal Procedure Law Amendments
Would Mean Further Deprivation of Right to Fair Trial Before Court,'' 7
June 18.
\83\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 14(3)(d). See also Amnesty International,
``China: Draft Criminal Procedure Law Amendments Would Mean Further
Deprivation of Right to Fair Trial Before Court,'' 7 June 18.
\84\ National People's Congress, ``Important: Criminal Procedure
Law (Draft Amendment) for Comment (Draft Full Text and Explanation
Attached)'' [Zhongbang: xingsufa (xiuzheng cao'an) zhengqiu yijian (fu
cao'an quanwen ji shuoming)], reprinted in Guangdong Provincial
Administration of Quality and Technology Supervision, 10 May 18, items
1, 9, 11, 14-17, 19, 20.
\85\ Ibid., item 21; Xie Wenying, ``Draft Amendment to the Criminal
Procedure Law Brought to National People's Congress Standing Committee
for Deliberation'' [Xingsufa xiuzheng cao'an tiqing quanguo renda
changweihui shenyi], Procuratorial Daily, 25 April 18; Liu Yizhan et
al., ``Establish a System for Trial in Absentia, Link Up With the
Supervision Law, Leniency in Guilty Pleas--Focus on Aspects of the
Draft Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law'' [Jianli xingshi quexi
shenpan zhidu, yu jiancha fa xianjie, renzuirenfa congkuan--jujiao
xingshi susong fa xiuzheng cao'an kandian], Xinhua, 25 April 18.
\86\ See, e.g., Amnesty International, ``China: Draft Criminal
Procedure Law Amendments Would Mean Further Deprivation of Right to
Fair Trial Before Court,'' 7 June 18; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Mixed
Signals in Reports of `Zero Confession' Executions,'' Dui Hua Human
Rights Journal, 6 June 18.
\87\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 50, 54.
\88\ For more information on filmed coerced confessions, see
Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes of
China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018.
\89\ For more information on Gui Minhai, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00090.
\90\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Police Seize Publisher From Train in
Front of Diplomats,'' New York Times, 22 January 18.
\91\ Bai Yunyi, ``HK Bookseller Confesses to Truth About So-Called
`Disappearance,' Says Sweden `Manipulated' Him,'' Global Times, 10
February 18; Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the
Scenes of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 38, 87.
\92\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes
of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 87.
\93\ For more information on Lee Ming-cheh, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00248.
\94\ Da Yang, ``Sentenced to Five Years for `Subversion of State
Power,' Li Mingzhe Admits Guilt and Does Not Appeal'' [``Dianfu
zhengquan'' pan wu nian, li mingzhe renzui bu shangsu], Deutsche Welle,
28 November 17; Ben Dooley and Joanna Chiu, ``Taiwanese Activist Pleads
Guilty to Chinese Subversion Charges,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted
in Yahoo! News, 11 September 17; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1
October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28
December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February
11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 105.
\95\ Ben Dooley and Joanna Chiu, ``Taiwanese Activist Pleads Guilty
to Chinese Subversion Charges,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in
Yahoo! News, 11 September 17.
\96\ ``Wife of Lee Ming-cheh: If He Confesses, It Was Coerced'' [Li
mingzhe qi: ruo renzui shi bei po], Deutsche Welle, 9 September 17.
\97\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 154-57.
\98\ See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 9(3)-(4), 14(3)(c).
\99\ For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.
\100\ ``Wang Quanzhang and Others Must Be Released,'' Voice of
America, 22 April 18; ``Wife of Detained Chinese Rights Lawyer Says She
Is Under House Arrest,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China
Morning Post, 12 April 18; ``Biographies of Lawyers, Staffers and
Activists Detained or Disappeared in the July 10 Nationwide Raid
Against Rights Lawyers,'' China Change, 23 July 15.
\101\ ``Detained Chinese Rights Lawyer Wang Quanzhang `Appears
Well,' Wife Told,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 July 18.
\102\ Rights Defense Network, ``709 Case Bulletin: Lawyer Wang
Quanzhang Indicted on Subversion of State Power Charges'' [709 an
tongbao: wang quanzhang lushi bei yi dianfu guojia zhengquan zui qisu],
15 February 17.
\103\ ``Huang Qi's Mother Reveals Authorities Cooked Up `Top
Secret' Document To Frame Huang Qi'' [Huang qi muqin jielu dangju
luozhi ``juemi'' wenjian xianhai huang qi], Radio Free Asia, 26 June
18; Christopher Bodeen, ``Critic's Jailing Shows Hushed Dissent Since
`08 China Quake,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Chicago Tribune, 14
May 18; ``Chinese Rights Activist Huang Qi `Could Die in Detention
Center': Mother,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 April 18. For more information
on Huang Qi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2004-04053.
\104\ `` `64 Tianwang' Founder Huang Qi Has His Home Searched by
Police, Is Detained'' [``Liusi tianwang'' chuangbanren huangqi zao
jingfang chaojia jiya], Radio Free Asia, 29 November 16.
\105\ Rights Defense Network, ``Head of Mainland NGO `64 Tianwang'
Huang Qi Arrested by Authorities'' [Dalu NGO ``liusi tianwang'' fuzeren
huang qi yi bei dangju zhixing daibu], 20 December 16; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 111.
\106\ Rights Defense Network, ``Huang Qi Trial Continues To Be
Postponed [as He] Suffers Life-Threatening Illness Without Medical
Parole, Mother Again Faces Probe by Original Work Unit, Calls Out That
She Wants To Live To See Son'' [Huang qi an jiu tuo bu shen, huan
zhiming jibing wufa baowai, muqin pu wenqing you zao yuan danwei
tancha, yu yao huozhe jian dao erzi], 18 August 18.
\107\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 32.
\108\ Ibid., art. 37.
\109\ Ibid.
\110\ Ibid.
\111\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 14(3)(b), (3)(d).
\112\ For more information on Ding Lingjie, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00328.
\113\ ``Ding Lingjie Incommunicado for Nearly 1 Month, Lawyer
Attempts To Meet With Her and Is Refused'' [Ding lingjie shilian jin yi
ge yue, lushi xunqiu huijian bei ju], Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17;
Nomaan Merchant, ``China Detains Editor of Human Rights Website for
Subversion,'' Associated Press, 25 November 16. For more information on
Liu Feiyue, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2016-00460.
\114\ For more information on Chen Jieren, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00318.
\115\ Criminal Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Public Security,
``Criminal Suspect Chen Jieren Placed Under Criminal Compulsory
Measures by Public Security Bureaus According to Law'' [Fanzui xianyi
ren chen jieren bei gong'an jiguan yifa caiqu xingshi qiangzhi cuoshi],
Weibo post, 7 July 18, 4:46 p.m; ``Current Affairs Commentator Chen
Jieren's Article Blew Whistle on Official, Six Implicated and Detained,
Including Family and Friends'' [Shiping ren chen jieren zhuanwen jubao
guanyuan, zhulian qinyou liu ren bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 11 July
18; ``Having Reported Official Using Real Name, Media Personality Chen
Jieren Taken Away for Investigation'' [Shiming jubao guanyuan, meiti
ren chen jieren bei daizou diaocha], Radio Free Asia, 6 July 18; ``Chen
Jieren's Criminal Detention Means Grudge With Xi Jinping'' [Chen jieren
bei xingju shi yu xi jinping jiexia le liangzi], Boxun, 9 July 18. For
more information on Chen's wife, brothers, and assistants, see the
following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database:
2018-00319 on Deng Jiangxiu, 2018-00320 on Chen Weiren, and 2018-00321
on Chen Minren.
\116\ ``Investigation Launched Against Family of Famous Hunan Media
Personality Chen Jieren'' [Hunan zhiming meiti ren chen jieren jiashu
zao li'an diaocha], Radio Free Asia, 16 July 18.
\117\ Ministry of Justice, ``Xiong Xuanguo: Advance the
Establishment of a System for Adjusting the Development of the Scope
and Standards of Legal Aid'' [Xiong xuanguo: tuidong jianli falu
yuanzhu fanwei he biaozhun dongtai tiaozheng jizhi], 9 March 18; Zhang
Yan, ``Ministry of Justice: Proactively Advance the Work of Complete
Coverage of Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, Uphold Judicial
Justice'' [Sifa bu: jiji tuijin xingshi anjian lushi bianhu quan fugai
gongzuo, weihu sifa gongzheng], China Daily, 19 January 18; Supreme
People's Court and Ministry of Justice, Measures Regarding Launching
the Pilot Work of Complete Coverage of Defense Counsel in Criminal
Cases [Guanyu kaizhan xingshi anjian lushi bianhu quan fugai shidian
gongzuo de banfa], issued and effective 11 October 17.
\118\ Zhang Yan, ``Ministry of Justice: Proactively Advance the
Work of Complete Coverage of Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, Uphold
Judicial Justice'' [Sifa bu: jiji tuijin xingshi anjian lushi bianhu
quan fugai gongzuo, weihu sifa gongzheng], China Daily, 19 January 18.
\119\ See, e.g., Emily Rauhala and Simon Denyer, ``China Jails Yet
Another Human Rights Lawyer in Ongoing Crackdown on Dissent,''
Washington Post, 21 November 17; Cai Changchun, ``Verdict Announced by
Changsha Intermediate Court in Trial of First Instance for Jiang
Tianyong Inciting Subversion of State Power Case'' [Jiang tianyong
shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan an zai changsha zhong yuan yishen
gongkai xuanpan], Legal Daily, 21 November 17; ``Wang Quanzhang and
Others Must Be Released,'' Voice of America, 22 April 18; ``Wife of
Detained Chinese Rights Lawyer Says She Is Under House Arrest,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 12 April 18; ``Yu
Wensheng: China Human Rights Lawyer Arrested on School Run,'' BBC, 19
January 18.
\120\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 73.
\121\ Ibid., art. 77.
\122\ Ibid., arts. 37, 75(2).
\123\ See, e.g., UN Committee against Torture, Concluding
Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the
Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/
CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16, para. 14; Steven Lee Myers, ``In China, the
Brutality of `House Arrest,' '' New York Times, 25 November 17; Front
Line Defenders, ``UPR Submission--China 2018,'' 7 April 18, para. 7.
See also Chieu Luu and Matt Rivers, ``The Disappeared: Accounts From
Inside China's Secret Prisons,'' CNN, 3 December 17.
\124\ For more information on Yu Wensheng, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00387.
\125\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan: Legal Issues
in the Case of Lawyer Yu Wensheng'' [Liu xiaoyuan lushi: yu wensheng
lushi an zhong suo sheji de falu wenti], 29 January 18; Steven Lee
Myers, ``China Rights Lawyer Detained After Posting Pro-Democracy
Appeal,'' New York Times, 19 January 18; Yu Wensheng (yuwensheng), ``A
Citizen's Proposal for Constitutional Reform: Yu Wensheng's Open Letter
to the Second Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China
Central Committee'' [Guanyu xiuxian de gongmin jianyi, yu wensheng zhi
zhonggong shijiuda er zhong quanhui de gongkai xin], Twitter post, 17
January 18, 10:50 a.m.
\126\ For more information on Ji Shulong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00354.
\127\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangsu Environmentalist Ji
Shulong, Detained Before the 19th Party Congress, Ordered To Serve
Residential Surveillance on `Suspicion of Picking Quarrels and
Provoking Trouble' '' [Shijiu da qian zao zhuabu de jiangsu huanbao
weishi ji shulong bei yi ``shexian xunxin zishi'' zhiding jianshi
juzhu], 3 November 17; ``Trump Concludes Visit to China and Leaves,
Some People Deprived of Their Liberty Regain Freedom'' [Telangpu jieshu
fang hua likai, bufen bei xianzhi renshi huifu ziyou], Radio Free Asia,
10 November 17.
\128\ CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 107-108. For other
sample cases, see Rights Defense Network, ``Imprisoned Hubei Internet
Big V Luo Lanqing Finally Gets Meeting With Father, Who Suspects
Torture and Beatings'' [Yu zhong hubei wangluo da V luo lanqing zhong
huo he fuqin huijian, yi zao kuxing ouda], 22 December 17; Tibetan
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Village Leader Among 31
Tibetans Detained for Opposing Mining at Sacred Mountain,'' 14 May 18.
\129\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 50, 54.
\130\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87;
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the
First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic and
Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 57 and 2076 (LXII)
of 13 May 77, principles 31, 32; Body of Principles for the Protection
of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/43/173 9 December 88, principle 6.
\131\ Rights Defense Network, ``Sixty-Plus-Year-Old Lawyer Li Yuhan
Continues To Be Abused and Tormented at Shenyang Municipal No. 1
Detention Center'' [60 duo sui li yuhan lushi zai shenyang shi di yi
kanshousuo chixu zaoshou nuedai zhemo], 6 December 17; ``Lawyer Meets
With Li Yuhan and Reveals the Abuse She Has Suffered in Detention''
[Lushi huijian jie li yuhan yuzhong zao nuedai], Radio Free Asia, 1
December 17; ``Chinese Rights Lawyer Arrested, Observers Suspect
Intentional Retribution'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi bei daibu, waijie
zhiyi xuyi baofu], Voice of America, 16 November 17. For more
information on Li Yuhan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2017-00361.
\132\ ``Chinese Rights Lawyer Arrested, Observers Suspect
Intentional Retribution'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi bei daibu, waijie
zhiyi xuyi baofu], Voice of America, 16 November 17. For more
information on Wang Yu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00252.
\133\ Rights Defense Network, ``Sixty-Plus-Year-Old Lawyer Li Yuhan
Continues To Be Abused and Tormented at Shenyang Municipal No. 1
Detention Center'' [60 duo sui li yuhan lushi zai shenyang shi di yi
kanshousuo chixu zaoshou nuedai zhemo], 6 December 17; ``Lawyer Meets
With Li Yuhan and Reveals the Abuse She Has Suffered in Detention''
[Lushi huijian jie li yuhan yuzhong zao nuedai], Radio Free Asia, 1
December 17.
\134\ For more information on Wu Quan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00003.
\135\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Huang Hanzhong: An Account
of My Meeting With Lawyer Wu Quan'' [Huang hanzhong lushi: wu quan
lushi huijian jianji], 25 December 17; ``Hebei Lawyer Wu Quan Uses Real
Name To Report Corrupt Official, Is Detained'' [Hebei lushi wu quan
shiming jubao tanguan, bei jubu], Radio Free Asia, 20 December 17.
\136\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Huang Hanzhong: An Account
of My Meeting With Lawyer Wu Quan'' [Huang hanzhong lushi: wu quan
lushi huijian jianji], 25 December 17.
\137\ For other sample cases, see Sun Tingting, Qiangwailou, ``I Am
Sun Tingting, and I Want To Come Forward'' [Wo shi sun tingting, wo yao
zhan chulai], 18 January 18; Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Medical
Situation of Li Xiaoling, Detained by Zhuhai Public Security for
Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble Because She Evaded Zhuhai
Authorities' Stability Maintenance, Worsens, Police Refuse Bail on
Grounds That `Granting Bail Would Be Dangerous to Society' '' [Yin
taobi zhuhai dangju weiwen, zao zhuhai gong'an ju yi xunxin zishi zui
jiya de li xiaoling bingqing jiazhong, jingfang yi ``caiqu qubao
houshen you shehui weihai xing'' wei you jujue dui qi qubao], 6
November 17; ``Gao Zhisheng Missing for Over Two Months With No
Correspondence, Li Fawang Released on Bail With Serious Illness'' [Gao
zhisheng shizong liang ge duo yue wu yinxun, li fawang bing zhong qubao
houshen], Radio Free Asia, 27 October 17. See also Front Line
Defenders, ``UPR Submission--China 2018,'' 29 March 18, para. 22. For
more information on Sun Tingting, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00041. For more information on Li
Xiaoling, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-
00355. For more information on Li Fawang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00326.
\138\ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic and
Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 57 and 2076 (LXII)
of 13 May 77, arts. 22-26; Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution A/RES/43/173 9 December 88, principle 24.
\139\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Juan E. Mendez, A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 13, paras. 17-22; Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10
December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art. 1.
\140\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Lawyer Li Yuhan, Detained
by the Heping Branch of the Shenyang Municipal Public Security Bureau
for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, Abused by Police Handling
the Case'' [Bei shenyang shi gong'an ju heping fenju yi xunxin zishi
zui jiya de li yuhan lushi, zao ban'an jingcha nuedai], 10 November 17;
``Chinese Rights Lawyer Arrested, Observers Suspect Intentional
Retribution'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi bei daibu, waijie zhiyi xuyi
baofu], Voice of America, 16 November 17.
\141\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Lawyer Li Yuhan, Detained
by the Heping Branch of the Shenyang Municipal Public Security Bureau
for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, Abused by Police Handling
the Case'' [Bei shenyang shi gong'an ju heping fenju yi xunxin zishi
zui jiya de li yuhan lushi, zao ban'an jingcha nuedai], 10 November 17.
\142\ For more information on Li Yanxiang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00034.
\143\ Voice of Petitioners, ``Shandong Petitioner Li Yanxiang
Transferred to Criminal Detention, Li Zongying and Sun Shu Released
After Each Was Detained for 10 Days'' [Shandong fangmin li yanxiang bei
zhuan xingju, li zongying, sun shu ge ju 10 tian huoshi], 27 August 17.
\144\ Rights Defense Network, ``Song Yusheng: Report on the
Situation From Meeting With Li Yanxiang at Qingdao No. 2 Municipal
Detention Center'' [Song yusheng: qingdao shi di er kanshousuo huijian
li yanxiang qingkuang tongbao], 28 November 17.
\145\ Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution A/RES/43/173 9 December 88, principle 24.
\146\ ``Citizen Journalist Sun Lin Reveals He Was Force-Fed
`Medicine' '' [Gongmin jizhe sun lin pilu bei qiangzhi wei ``yao''],
Radio Free Asia, 8 February 18. For more information on Sun Lin, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00617.
\147\ ``Jiang Tianyong Force-Fed Medication in Prison, Memory
Deteriorated Severely'' [Jiang tianyong yuzhong bei qiangpo wei yao
jiyili yanzhong shuaitui], Radio Free Asia, 27 June 18.
\148\ Front Line Defenders, ``UPR Submission--China 2018,'' 29
March 18, para. 22.
\149\ Rights Defense Network, ``Huang Qi Trial Continues To Be
Postponed, Suffering Life-Threatening Illness Without Medical Parole,
[as He] Suffers Life-Threatening Illness Without Medical Parole, Mother
Again Faces Probe by Original Work Unit, Calls Out That She Wants To
Live To See Son'' [Huang qi an jiu tuo bu shen, huan zhiming jibing
wufa baowai, muqin pu wenqing you zao yuan danwei tancha, yu yao huozhe
jian dao erzi], 18 August 18; Jun Mai, ``Jailed Founder of China's
Underground Human Rights Site in Poor Health as State Secrets Trial
Looms,'' South China Morning Post, 25 May 18; ``Chinese Rights Activist
Huang Qi `Could Die in Detention Center': Mother,'' Radio Free Asia, 23
April 18. For information about rights advocacy groups that have called
for medical parole for Huang Qi, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch,
``China: Release Gravely Ill Critics,'' 17 November 17; Committee to
Protect Journalists, ``CPJ Urges Chinese President Xi Jinping To
Release Jailed Journalist Huang Qi,'' 9 August 17.
\150\ ChinaAid, ``Guiyang Living Stone Church Pastor Yang Hua's
Health Less Than Perfect in Prison'' [Guiyang huoshi jiaohui mushi yang
hua, yu zhong jiankang qianjia], 4 April 18. For more information on Li
Guozhi (Yang Hua), see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2016-00001.
\151\ See, e.g., State Council Information Office, White Paper on
``New Developments in Rule of Law Guarantees for Human Rights in
China'' [``Zhongguo renquan fazhihua baozhang de xin jinzhan''
baipishu], December 2017, sec. 3; Shan Yuxiao et al., ``Xi Jinping
Discusses Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: Righting Wrongs Is Better
Late Than Never'' [Xi jinping tan jiuzheng yuanjia cuo'an: jiu cuo jiu
shi wang yang bu lao], Caixin, 25 August 17; ``Supreme Court: China
`Basically' Has No Wrongful Convictions'' [Zuigao fayuan: zhongguo
``jibenshang'' wu yuanjia cuo'an], Radio Free Asia, 9 March 18.
\152\ See, e.g., Zheng Zhi, ``Deputy Li Zongsheng: Strictly Exclude
Illegal Evidence and Eliminate Wrongful Convictions'' [Li zongsheng
daibiao: yange paichu feifa zhengju dujue yuanjia cuo'an],
Procuratorial Daily, 16 March 18; Hua Xuan, ``With Trials as the
Center: Hearings Do Not Just Go Through the Motions'' [Yi shenpan wei
zhongxin: tingshen bu zou guochang], Southern Weekend, 25 October 17.
\153\ Luo Sha and Ding Xiaoxi, ``Courts Nationwide Rectify 39 Major
Cases of Wrongful Conviction Involving 78 People Over Past Five Years''
[Quanguo fayuan wu nian lai jiuzheng zhongda yuanjia cuo'anjian 39 jian
78 ren], Xinhua, 5 February 18.
\154\ Song Jiangxuan, ``Verdict Changed to Not Guilty in Liu
Zhonglin `Intentional Homicide' Case: Imprisoned for 25 Years, 6-Year
Retrial'' [Liu zhonglin ``guyi sha ren an'' gaipan wuzui: jiya 25 nian
zaishen lishi 6 nian], The Paper, 20 April 18; Wang Lianzhang, ``Man
Exonerated After Longest-Ever Wrongfully Served Term,'' Sixth Tone, 20
April 18.
\155\ Qin Shuo, ``Zhang Wenzhong Case: A New Start for `No
Injustice on Earth' '' [Zhang wenzhong an: ``tianxia wuyuan'' de xin
qidian], Yicai, 4 June 18; Cao Yin, ``Wumart Tycoon's Conviction Thrown
Out,'' China Daily, 1 June 18.
\156\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric Collection
Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Police
`Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,'' 19 November 17;
Pei Li and Cate Cadell, ``China Eyes `Black Tech' To Boost Security as
Parliament Meets,'' Reuters, 10 March 18.
\157\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 17.
\158\ For additional discussion of concerns about privacy in this
context, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric
Collection Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Police `Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,''
19 November 17; Paul Mozur, ``Internet Users in China Expect To Be
Tracked. Now, They Want Privacy,'' New York Times, 4 January 18.
\159\ Pei Li and Cate Cadell, ``China Eyes `Black Tech' To Boost
Security as Parliament Meets,'' Reuters, 10 March 18. See also Shannon
Liao, ``Chinese Police Are Expanding Facial Recognition Sunglasses
Program,'' The Verge, 12 March 18.
\160\ Pei Li and Cate Cadell, ``China Eyes `Black Tech' To Boost
Security as Parliament Meets,'' Reuters, 10 March 18.
\161\ Ibid.; Charles Rollet, ``In China's Far West, Companies Cash
in on Surveillance Program That Targets Muslims,'' Foreign Policy, 13
June 18.
\162\ ``Voice Recognition Technology Helps the Establishment of
China's Network Identity Recognition'' [Shengwen renzheng jishu zhuli
woguo wangluo shenfen renzheng jianshe], Xinhua, 19 March 18; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy,''
22 October 17.
\163\ ``Voice Recognition Technology Helps the Establishment of
China's Network Identity Recognition'' [Shengwen renzheng jishu zhuli
woguo wangluo shenfen renzheng jianshe], Xinhua, 19 March 18; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy,''
22 October 17.
\164\ Jilin Province Public Security Bureau, ``Jilin Public
Security Smart Voice Strategy Cooperative Agreement Signing Ceremony
Held at Provincial Public Security Bureau, Hu Jiafu Attends Signing
Ceremony and Delivers Remarks'' [Jilin gong'an zhineng yuyin zhanlue
hezuo xieyi qianyue yishi zai sheng gong'an ting juxing, hu jiafu chuxi
qianyue yishi bing jianghua], 21 August 17; Nanling Judicial Bureau,
``Nanling Judicial Bureau `Audio-Visual Integration' Strengthens
Technological Supervision'' [Nanling sifa suo ``shengxiang jiehe''
qianghua keji jianguan], reprinted in Fujian Provincial Leading Small
Group on Governing the Province in Accordance With the Law, 2 May 18.
\165\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in
Minority Region,'' 26 February 18; Josh Chin, ``About To Break the Law?
Chinese Police Are Already on to You,'' Wall Street Journal, 27
February 18.
\166\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes
in Muslim Region,'' 13 May 18; ``China Sets Up `Big Data' System for
Preventive Policing in Xinjiang: Report,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 February
18.
\167\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA
From Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\168\ Josh Chin, ``About To Break the Law? Chinese Police Are
Already on to You,'' Wall Street Journal, 27 February 18.
\169\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in
Minority Region,'' 26 February 18; Josh Chin, ``About To Break the Law?
Chinese Police Are Already on to You,'' Wall Street Journal, 27
February 18; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec.
IV(B).
\170\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 9 March 18. See also PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1
October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28
December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February
11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 48.
\171\ Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and Executions
2017,'' 2018, 20.
\172\ Ibid. See also Dui Hua Foundation, ``How Transparency in
Death Penalty Cases Can Reduce Wrongful Convictions,'' Dui Hua Human
Rights Journal, 22 August 17.
\173\ Moulin Xiong and Michelle Miao, ``Miscarriages of Justice in
Chinese Capital Cases,'' Hastings International and Comparative Law
Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 2018), 279; Liu Renwen, ``Can Lawyers Be
Directly Notified of the Results of Death Penalty Reviews? '' [Sixing
fuhe jieguo kefou zhijie tongzhi lushi], Southern Weekend, 9 September
17; Xu Lanting and Yang Tuo, ``The Significance of Complete Coverage of
Criminal Defense Lawyers Is Great, Its Influence Far-Reaching and
Profound'' [Xingshi lushi bianhu quanfugai yiyi zhongda, yingxiang
shenyuan], Legal Daily, 17 October 17; Supreme People's Court and
Ministry of Justice, Measures Regarding Launching the Pilot Work of
Complete Coverage of Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases [Guanyu kaizhan
xingshi anjian lushi bianhu quan fugai shidian gongzuo de banfa],
issued and effective 11 October 17.
\174\ Alice Yan, ``10 People Sentenced to Death for Drug Crimes in
Southern China,'' South China Morning Post, 5 January 18; Benjamin
Haas, ``Public Death Sentences for 10 People Show China's
Desperation,'' Guardian, 19 December 17.
\175\ Zhuang An, ``Lufeng, Guangdong Convenes Sentencing Gathering:
10 People Sentenced to Death, Taken to Execution Ground for Execution
After Sentencing'' [Guangdong lufeng zhaokai xuanpan dahui: 10 ren bei
pan sixing, xuanpan hou ya fu xingchang zhixing], The Paper, 17
December 17.
\176\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 252. See also Supreme People's Court,
Supreme People's Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security,
Circular Regarding the Civilized Management of Criminals Held in
Detention Centers According to Law [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin
jianchayuan gong'an bu guanyu yifa wenming guanli kanshousuo zaiya
renfan de tongzhi], 14 November 92, para. 5.
\177\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 235, 236.
\178\ ``Verdict Announced in Linfen Intermediate Court Trial of
First Instance in Zhang Zhongsheng Case Involving Bribery and Large
Sums of Money From Unidentified Source, Defendant Sentenced to Death
and Has All Personal Assets Confiscated'' [Zhang zhongsheng shouhui,
ju'e caichan laiyuan buming an zai linfen zhongyuan yishen xuanpan,
beigaoren bei panchu sixing, bingchu moshou geren quanbu caichan],
Xinhua, 28 March 18; Jane Cai, ``Death Penalty for `Godfather' of
Chinese Coal Mining Town Over US$160 Million in Bribes,'' South China
Morning Post, 29 March 18.
\179\ Jane Cai, ``Death Penalty for `Godfather' of Chinese Coal
Mining Town Over US$160 Million in Bribes,'' South China Morning Post,
29 March 18.
\180\ Although the Chinese government has promulgated rules to
regulate the sourcing of organs, it has not outlawed sourcing organs
from executed prisoners. PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October
97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December
02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29
August 15, 4 November 17, art. 234-1. The PRC Criminal Law prohibits
organized trading of organs, the removal of organs without consent, and
the inducement of another to donate organs by fraud or coercion. State
Council, Regulations on Human Organ Transplants [Renti qiguan yizhi
tiaoli], issued 31 March 07, effective 1 May 07, arts. 7, 21. The State
Council's Regulations on Human Organ Transplants prohibit medical
facilities from charging a fee for the transplanted organ. Ministry of
Health, Certain Provisions on Standardizing Live Organ Transplantation
[Weishengbu guanyu guifan huoti qiguan yizhi de ruogan guiding], issued
and effective 28 December 09. In general, the Ministry of Health's
Certain Provisions on Standardizing Live Organ Transplantation
implement the State Council's Regulations on Human Organ Transplants.
National Health and Family Planning Commission, Regulations on
Administering Procurement and Distribution of Human Organ Donations
(Trial) [Renti juanxian qiguan huoqu yu fenpei guanli guiding
(shixing)], issued 13 August 13, effective 1 September 13, arts. 5, 6.
The trial Regulations on Administering Procurement and Distribution of
Human Organ Donations create organ procurement organizations in every
provincial-level administrative jurisdiction and require them to
register procured organs in a national registry. For background
information on organ harvesting from executed prisoners and organ
harvesting in China generally, see China Organ Harvest Research Center,
``Transplant Abuse in China Continues Despite Claims of Reform,'' July
2018.
\181\ `` `Chinese Model' for Managing Organ Transplants Receives
Approval'' [Qiguan yizhi guanli ``zhongguo moshi'' huo kending],
Xinhua, 15 March 18.
\182\ ``China Saved 100 Organ Trafficking Victims During Crackdown,
Vatican Conference Is Told,'' Associated Press, reprinted in South
China Morning Post, 15 March 18.
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of Religion
International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom
Both Chinese and international law provide guarantees of
religious freedom. Despite these guarantees, the Commission
continued to observe widespread and systematic violation of the
principles of religious freedom during the 2018 reporting year,
as Chinese authorities exercised broad discretion over
religious practice.
Under international law, freedom of religion or belief
encompasses both the right to form, hold, and change
convictions, beliefs, and religions--which cannot be
restricted--and the right to outwardly manifest those beliefs--
which can be limited for certain, specific justifications.\1\
These principles are codified in various international
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).\2\ China has signed \3\ and stated its intent
to ratify \4\ the ICCPR, which obligates China to refrain in
good faith from acts that would defeat the treaty's purpose.\5\
Article 36 of China's Constitution guarantees citizens
``freedom of religious belief'' and protection for ``normal
religious activities.'' \6\ With essential terms such as
``normal'' undefined, it is unclear whether China's
Constitution protects the same range of belief and outward
manifestation that is recognized under international law.\7\ In
other ways, however, China's Constitution and other legal
provisions \8\ join the ICCPR in prohibiting discrimination
based on religion \9\ and loosely parallel the ICCPR's
prohibition on coercion \10\ by forbidding state agencies,
social organizations, and individuals from compelling citizens
to believe or not believe in any religion.\11\
China's Constitution prohibits ``making use of religion to
engage in activities that disrupt social order, impair the
health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of
the State.'' \12\ The ICCPR does allow State Parties to
restrict outward manifestations of religion or belief, but such
restrictions must be ``prescribed by law and . . . necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.'' \13\
Policies and Regulations Pertaining to Religious Freedom
The importance of ``religious work'' \14\ to the Chinese
Communist Party agenda has undergone an ``unprecedented
increase'' with ``major innovations'' under Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping, according to an article published a few
weeks before the October 2017 19th Party Congress \15\ in the
major Party journal Seeking Truth (Qiushi). Party and
government officials emphasized several key policy principles
in religious affairs during this past year:
``Actively guiding religions to adapt to
socialist society.'' \16\ As explained by Party and
government sources, this means ``guiding'' religious
groups to support Party leadership and the political
system.\17\ The State Council Information Office stated
in an April 2018 white paper that this principle also
includes ensuring that religious believers are
``subordinate to and serve the overall interests of the
nation and the Chinese people.'' \18\
``Sinicization.'' Party and government
officials continued to develop and promote policies
aimed at shaping religious practice in China to promote
and assimilate to a Chinese cultural identity.\19\ One
policy document from the State Administration for
Religious Affairs called for interpreting religious
teachings and doctrines in ways that conform to
``China's outstanding traditional culture,'' promoting
patriotic education and activities within religious
communities, and impelling the religious communities to
exhibit Chinese ``characteristics'' and ``style'' in
religious thinking, institutions, rituals, behavior,
and architecture, among other aspects.\20\ Party and
government officials also continued to develop policies
to resist the perceived threat of foreign forces that
use religion to ``infiltrate'' Chinese society.\21\
According to international experts on Chinese religion,
officials view Christianity, Islam, and Tibetan
Buddhism as retaining undue foreign influence while
considering Chinese Buddhism and Taoism to be
integrated with Chinese culture.\22\ Official
pronouncements also identified ``extremism'' as a
particular problem that officials should address within
Islam.\23\
Promoting religion as an instrument for
implementing official policy objectives. Party and
government policy encouraged use of religious groups to
facilitate communication and connection with other
countries, particularly those hosting Belt and Road
Initiative projects.\24\ Policy plans included
cooperation with Russia and Central Asian countries on
``anti-extremism'' efforts.\25\ In addition, Party and
government policy documents directed officials to
encourage religious groups to provide social services
to complement central government poverty alleviation
efforts.\26\
The increased attention to religious affairs under Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping is part of a ``hardline turn'' in
the Party's ``united front work,'' according to an Australian
scholar specializing in Chinese political institutions.\27\ Led
through the Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD),
``united front work'' involves bringing elements of society
outside of the Party under its control with the aim of
preventing the independent organization of civil society.\28\
The Party under Xi has viewed ``united front work'' with
renewed urgency given the increased complexity of society and
the growth of new groups such as religious communities \29\ in
the decades since China's economic marketization.\30\ A Hong
Kong-based scholar notes, for example, that Party officials
have concerns about the growing number of Christian believers
in China and the level of organization within the
community.\31\
In March 2018, the Party's sweeping reorganization plan for
Party and government institutions included a provision
directing the Party's UFWD to take over the government agency
responsible for religious affairs at the national level, making
the national-level UFWD directly responsible for administering
policies pertaining to religion in China.\32\ The UFWD would
continue to use the government agency's name--the State
Administration for Religious Affairs--when interacting with
outside entities.\33\ The stated rationale for the
restructuring was to unify and strengthen the Party's control
over ``religious work.'' \34\ Even prior to the change, the
UFWD, under the Party's Central Committee, had been responsible
for developing Party policies on religion and connecting with
religious groups and leaders on behalf of the Party.\35\ At a
July 2018 meeting involving key leaders of the UFWD and state-
sanctioned religious groups, the latter issued a proposal for
religious venues to fly the Chinese flag and organize
activities involving the flag to encourage religious believers
to ``strengthen their identification with the Party and the
nation in politics, thought, and feeling.'' \36\
As of September 2018, the Commission did not observe
reports of changes in responsibility for religious affairs
administration at the local level, where local government
bureaus have been responsible for managing religious
affairs.\37\ These religious affairs agencies have effective
authority over the state-sanctioned ``patriotic'' religious
associations that act as liaisons between the government and
practitioners of the five ``main'' religions in China,\38\
while the UFWD vets the association leaders.\39\ Public
security bureaus are generally responsible for enforcement of
laws against religious activity authorities deem illegal.\40\
The Chinese government's regulatory framework for religion
imposed increased restrictions on religious freedom after
revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs took effect
on February 1, 2018.\41\ The revisions increased official
control and scrutiny over religious activity, including newly
explicit prohibitions on groups, schools, and venues from
engaging in or hosting religious activities unless they have
been officially designated as religious (Article 41) and on
clergy acting as religious professionals without official
certification (Article 36).\42\ The revisions also established
new legal responsibilities and penalties for violations of the
regulations, including fining those who ``provide the
conditions'' for unauthorized religious activities (Article
71).\43\ Religious believers \44\ and academic experts \45\
predicted that the restrictions would increase official
pressure on religious groups, particularly those not registered
with the government--many groups refuse to register because
registration requires submitting to the direction of a state-
sanctioned patriotic religious association.\46\ In contrast,
some registered religious groups may be able to operate more
independently of patriotic religious associations due to the
revisions allowing registered religious groups to apply for
status as legal persons, according to one U.S.-based scholar of
Chinese religion and society--without separate legal
identities, registered groups have relied on their affiliated
patriotic religious association to open bank accounts and sign
contracts on their behalf.\47\ In addition, one expert on
Chinese religion opined about the potential for increased
control over the religious gatherings of non-Chinese citizens
in China after the State Administration for Religious Affairs
released a draft revision to the provisions regulating such
activities in May 2018.\48\ The proposed revisions would
restrict foreign citizens' religious freedom by, for example,
requiring their religious activities to be approved and
facilitated by state-sanctioned religious organizations and
registered with local religious affairs administrators if they
involve more than 50 people; the revisions would also prohibit
Chinese citizens from participating excepting those chosen by
state-sanctioned religious organizations to jointly administer
such activities.\49\
Other laws and Party policies also continued to restrict
citizens' freedom to hold religious beliefs and practice
religion. For example, Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law
criminalizes ``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,'' \50\ and the PRC National Security
Law prohibits ``the use of religion to conduct illegal criminal
activities that threaten state security.'' \51\ The latter also
contains mandates to ``maintain the order of normal religious
activities,'' ``oppose the interference of foreign influence
into domestic religious affairs,'' and ``suppress cult
organizations.'' \52\ State media declared the importance of
adhering to the long-standing \53\ ban on religious belief for
Party members,\54\ warning that religious beliefs had been
implicated in many Party discipline cases in recent years.\55\
Local-level Party organizations issued notices warning Party
members and their families that they would face sanctions for
participating in any event related to Christmas Eve or other
activities associated with ``Western religions,'' \56\ with
prohibitions reportedly extending to state-owned enterprise
employees.\57\ One international law expert has noted that
because Party membership to a large degree determines the
extent to which citizens may participate in public life, the
ban constitutes discrimination against religious believers and
a violation of freedom of religious belief.\58\
Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism
Government and Party officials rarely targeted Chinese
Buddhist and Taoist communities with direct suppression--both
are considered to be relatively compliant with Party and
government leadership, and compatible with the official
promotion of traditional Chinese culture.\59\ A large number of
Chinese citizens engage in Buddhist and Taoist practices, with
estimates of around 244 million Buddhists as of 2010,\60\ and
173 million citizens engaging in some Taoist practices as of
2007.\61\ [For information on Tibetan Buddhism, see Section V--
Tibet.] Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities are subject to
extensive regulation and control by officials: government
authorities connected with local religious affairs bureaus are
involved with the administration of officially sanctioned
temples; all candidates for the clergy must obtain the approval
of the local patriotic association and religious affairs bureau
for ordination; \62\ and Buddhist ordinations themselves are
restricted by the state-run patriotic associations.\63\ The
head of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), the national-
level patriotic association for Buddhists, Shi Xuecheng,
resigned in August 2018 after two female supervisory
chancellors released a report documenting claims that he had
sexually harassed female disciples.\64\ The State
Administration for Religious Affairs directed the BAC to
subject Xuecheng to severe disciplinary sanctions after
verifying some of the harassment claims and announced that
local authorities would continue to investigate other
allegations of illegal building construction, mismanagement of
funds, and sexual assault.\65\ International media reported
that official control over ordinations and resources for
religious institutions has created disparities between
different Buddhist traditions driven by official political
priorities, noting that Theravada Buddhist temples and schools
in particular are under-resourced and lacking in clergy.\66\
Official regulations also included restrictions that may
violate state neutrality with regard to religion--in November
2017, the State Administration for Religious Affairs and 11
other central Party and government departments issued a joint
opinion on combating commercialization in Buddhism and Taoism
to avoid negative effects on ``the healthy development of [the
two religions'] dissemination.'' \67\ The opinion outlined a
series of measures such as prohibitions on commercial
investment in religious venues, construction of large outdoor
statues, and local government promotion of religious sites for
tourism and economic development purposes.\68\ Overseas
observers noted that the campaign against commercialization in
religion demonstrates shifting government priorities under Xi
Jinping away from economic development \69\ and toward
bolstering the credibility of Buddhism and Taoism so that
indigenous religions embodying Chinese culture and values may
serve as a bulwark against ``infiltration'' of other values via
religions perceived as foreign.\70\ One human rights expert has
noted that when a state distinguishes between proper and
improper conduct in order to uphold religious standards or to
enhance the legitimacy of particular religions as against
others, it violates the state neutrality necessary to maintain
the free exercise of religious freedom.\71\
Christianity--Catholicism
The number of Catholics is estimated to be around 10.5
million,\72\ with the State Council Information Office
reporting in 2018 that
6 million Catholics were part of officially sanctioned
congregations.\73\ Chinese officials impede the freedom under
international standards \74\ for Chinese Catholic congregations
to be led by clergy who are selected and who conduct their
ministry as called for by Catholic religious beliefs. Officials
continued to insist that bishops be ``self-selected and self-
ordained'' \75\--that is, selected through patriotic religious
organizations in consultation with government and Party
officials, and then ordained by Chinese bishops.\76\ Many
Chinese Catholics, sometimes known as ``underground
Catholics,'' avoid the ministry of such bishops because they
believe legitimate ecclesiastical authority can be conferred
only by the Pope's mandate,\77\ and they also object to
affiliation with the patriotic religious association for
Chinese Catholics, the Catholic Patriotic Association
(CPA).\78\ The Holy See has declared the CPA ``incompatible
with Catholic doctrine'' because it claims authority over
Chinese bishops and their church communities while being backed
by the Chinese government and maintaining independence from the
Holy See.\79\ Foreign media reported that local officials
pressured underground Catholic leaders to join the CPA in
Fujian, Gansu, Hebei, and Zhejiang provinces, in some cases by
holding bishops in official custody for periods ranging from
one to seven months.\80\
The Chinese government and the Holy See continued \81\
negotiations regarding control over the system of bishop
appointments. In September 2018, the Wall Street Journal
reported that an agreement was imminent.\82\ Under the deal,
Chinese authorities would nominate future Chinese bishops that
the Holy See would be able to veto.\83\ The Holy See would also
recognize seven ``illegitimate bishops'' approved by the state;
\84\ the Holy See had directed two underground bishops to step
down to make way for two of these state-backed bishops in
December 2017.\85\ Both sides reportedly agreed not to publish
the agreement after its signing.\86\ As of mid-September the
deal was not yet finalized, but Chinese Catholics had expressed
concerns in reaction to earlier reports of an impending
agreement that the Holy See would make concessions that would
weaken and further divide the Chinese Catholic community.\87\
Authorities in some locales took repressive actions against
state-sanctioned Catholic communities. In June 2018, religious
affairs officials recommended that the diocese for Shijiazhuang
municipality, Hebei province, disqualify a priest for leading a
pilgrimage, citing the government's ``sinicization'' campaign
and the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs' prohibition
on ``unauthorized religious activities.'' \88\ In June through
August, officials dismantled a popular pilgrimage site in Henan
province \89\ and demolished two Catholic churches in Jinan
municipality, Shandong province.\90\ At the national level, the
two state-sanctioned national religious organizations for
Catholics issued instructions to all local dioceses under their
purview to report on local plans for implementation of the
five-year plan passed in May 2018 to ``sinicize'' Catholicism
in China.\91\ The ``sinicization'' of Catholicism has been
described by one top government official as adapting
interpretations of Catholic doctrine to what is required by
Chinese development and traditional culture.\92\
Christianity--Protestantism
Party and government officials maintained restrictions on
the religious activities of Chinese Protestants, estimated to
number around 60 to 80 million,\93\ with some believers facing
harassment, surveillance, detention, imprisonment, and other
abuse because of their religious activities. A U.S.-based
organization that advocates for religious freedom, ChinaAid
Association, reported that both instances of official
persecution and the number of believers affected had increased
in 2017 from the prior year.\94\ Academic experts on Chinese
religion and society stated that the continued escalation of
repression was due in part to concern by Party officials that
Christian communities pose a challenge to the Party's monopoly
on political power.\95\
Under the ``sinicization'' campaign promoted by Chinese
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, officials have
sought to bring Protestant communities into alignment with
Party interests and ideology by tightening control over
registered, state-sanctioned Protestant groups and using harsh
measures to pressure unregistered groups into submitting to
government scrutiny and regulation. Measures implemented that
have increased official control over officially sanctioned
Protestant churches in some local areas included the
installation of surveillance cameras,\96\ ordering cross
removals from church buildings,\97\ and the establishment of
official village-level groups to monitor religious
activities.\98\ Under Xi's leadership, officials planned to
extend further influence over religious affairs and activities
of registered Protestant communities.\99\ In March 2018, for
example, the two state-sanctioned national religious
organizations for Protestants released a joint five-year plan
to promote the ``sinicization'' of Protestantism that included
developing theological interpretations of the Bible compatible
with the Chinese political system and training ``politically
reliable'' and ``morally convincing'' religious leaders.\100\
In a move affecting both Catholic and Protestant Christian
believers, Chinese officials reportedly issued a notification
to large online retailers prohibiting sales of the Bible
beginning March 30, 2018.\101\ A number of leaders of
officially sanctioned Protestant groups who had been prosecuted
and sentenced after protesting official measures against their
churches in the past remained in prison.\102\
Unregistered church communities (commonly referred to as
``house churches'') faced additional persecution as officials
sought to pressure them into registering under the auspices of
a patriotic religious association.\103\ As in previous
years,\104\ Protestant house churches continued to face raids
during church gatherings \105\ and eviction from meeting
spaces.\106\ In January 2018, authorities in Shanxi province
demolished the Golden Lampstand Church, with a congregation of
50,000.\107\ In Henan province, authorities reportedly banned
at least 100 house churches from meeting after the revised
Regulations on Religious Affairs went into effect in February
2018, and also destroyed religious iconography in believers'
homes.\108\ In July 2018, the Beijing municipal government
reportedly issued an order for lower-level governments to
conduct investigations of Protestant churches with the
cooperation of local public security officials.\109\
Authorities also reportedly subjected some believers to
harassment \110\ and detention.\111\ Also in July, officials in
Xinyu municipality, Jiangxi province, reportedly ordered house
churches to remove crosses and hang the national flag or
portraits of Xi Jinping within their buildings, while also
banning minors from attending church.\112\ In one major
incident in May 2018, local authorities detained more than 200
members of Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu municipality,
Sichuan province, prior to a planned memorial service for the
victims of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Wenchuan county, Aba
(Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan.\113\
In several instances, authorities in Yunnan province
continued \114\ to detain and prosecute house church members on
charges of ``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,'' under Article 300 of the PRC
Criminal Law. Since October 2016, around 200 people reportedly
have been detained, six of whom were sentenced in December
2017.\115\ In a report directed at the Yunnan province-level
group responsible for Party discipline inspection, one county-
level Party committee described cult prevention activities as
one of several measures aimed at ``rectifying the inadequate
implementation of the ideological work responsibility system.''
\116\ Other measures in the same category included a ``clean-up
campaign aimed at foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and foundations.'' \117\ In May 2018, the provincial state-
sanctioned religious organizations for Protestants in Zhejiang
province issued a statement banning one house church for
promoting an ``illegal'' religion.\118\
Falun Gong
As in previous years, authorities continued to detain Falun
Gong practitioners and subject them to harsh treatment.\119\
Due to government suppression, it is difficult to determine the
number of Falun Gong practitioners in China.\120\ Authorities
commonly prosecute Falun Gong practitioners under Article 300
of the PRC Criminal Law; the U.S.-based NGO Dui Hua Foundation
noted that Falun Gong practitioners made up the majority of the
800 people convicted under the provision in cases from 2017
available in judicial databases.\121\ Human rights
organizations \122\ and Falun Gong practitioners documented
coercive and violent practices against practitioners during
custody, including physical violence,\123\ forced drug
administration,\124\ sleep deprivation,\125\ and other forms of
torture.\126\ In December 2017, the Epoch Times, a U.S.-based
news organization affiliated with Falun Gong, reported 29
confirmed deaths of Falun Gong practitioners in 2017 due to
abuse by officials.\127\
Several international organizations expressed concern over
reports that numerous organ transplants in China have used the
organs of detained prisoners, including Falun Gong
practitioners.\128\ Medical professionals and international
advocacy organizations disputed Chinese health officials'
claims that organ procurement systems have been reformed in
compliance with international standards, citing ethical
concerns about organ sourcing raised by short wait times for
organ transplants and discrepancies in data on organ
transplants.\129\
Islam
This past year, official restrictions on the religious
freedom of the 10.5 million \130\ Hui Muslim believers
increased.\131\ In a speech before the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, the head of the China
Islamic Association (IAC),\132\ the patriotic religious
association for Chinese Muslims,\133\ stressed the importance
of ``sinicizing'' Islam, which he described as adapting Islamic
religious practice to support patriotism and the realization of
the ``great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization'' and the
``Chinese dream'' while rejecting extremism.\134\ In Yinchuan
municipality, the capital of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, a
region with a high concentration of Hui Muslim believers, the
local government reportedly launched a ``rectification
campaign'' that has included the removal of ``Arabic style''
domes and decor from mosques and other buildings, prohibitions
on calls to prayer, removal of the Quran and books on Islam
from retail shops, and the closure of schools teaching
Arabic.\135\ In Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu
province, local officials signed a pledge to prevent
individuals or groups that would otherwise ``support, permit,
organise or guide minors towards entering mosques for Koranic
study or religious activities''; local Hui Muslim believers
expressed distress that their religious traditions might not be
passed on to future generations because of the
prohibition.\136\ A local county government in Gansu also
banned children in a heavily Muslim area from attending
religious events, reading scripture in classes, or entering
religious venues over the winter holiday, and instructed
students and teachers to ``strengthen political ideology and
propaganda.'' \137\ The Dui Hua Foundation reported in March
2018 that 14 online judgments it had discovered showed that Hui
Muslim believers in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region had
been sentenced for ``cult'' or other offenses for ``privately
preaching the Quran.'' \138\ [For more information on Uyghur,
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Hui, and other Muslim believers, see Section
IV--Xinjiang. For more information on Hui Muslim believers, see
Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights.]
Ongoing policies included measures requiring Islamic
religious leaders and lay believers to demonstrate their
political reliability. To be officially certified, imams and
other religious personnel must be educated at one of 10 state-
sanctioned Islamic schools or otherwise obtain equivalent
education,\139\ and be vetted by the local religious affairs
bureau and the IAC.\140\ After certification, religious leaders
are required to continue attending political training
sessions.\141\ An official media outlet reported in August 2018
that Chinese Muslims seeking to carry out the Hajj pilgrimage
would take patriotic education classes required by Chinese
regulations in order to ``enhance their awareness about
safeguarding national unity and resisting separatism and
religious extremism.'' \142\ According to an official media
report, around 11,500 Chinese Muslim believers made the Hajj
pilgrimage in 2018, of whom around 3,300 participants received
GPS tracking devices as part of a pilot program allowing IAC
organizers to monitor their location in real time throughout
the pilgrimage.\143\ According to the manufacturer, the device
was jointly designed by the State Administration for Religious
Affairs and the IAC.\144\
Other Religious Communities
Religious communities outside of the five religions that
are the main objects of official regulation \145\ continued to
exist in China, with some continuing to enjoy tacit recognition
and support. For example, the government acknowledged in a 2018
report on freedom of religious belief that ``large numbers'' of
Chinese citizens hold folk beliefs,\146\ and some local
governments have taken measures to recognize folk religious
sites.\147\ Eastern Orthodox Christian communities have also
been recognized to varying degrees at the local government
level.\148\ Other religious groups, such as The Church of the
Almighty God, faced suppression from authorities--in July 2018,
a local court in Heilongjiang province tried an unknown number
of believers from this group for ``organizing and using a cult
to undermine implementation of the law.'' \149\
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
\1\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
19, 24, 203-04.
\2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR
upholds a person's right to ``have or adopt a religion or belief'' and
the freedom to manifest that religion or belief ``in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.'' Article 18 also prohibits coercion
that impairs an individual's freedom to freely hold or adopt a religion
or belief. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81.
\3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76; United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, last visited 29 June 18. China has signed but not ratified the
ICCPR.
\4\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 5. The Chinese government
stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR in its 2016-2020 National Human
Rights Action Plan. See also State Council Information Office,
``Progress in China's Human Rights in 2012,'' May 2013, chap. VI;
People's Republic of China and European Union, ``Joint Statement of the
12th China-EU Summit,'' reprinted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30
November 09, para. 8.
\5\ United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 23 May 69, entry into force
27 January 80, arts. 18, 26.
\6\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 36.
\7\ Ibid.; Liu Peng, ``Crisis of Faith,'' China Security, Vol. 4,
No. 4 (Autumn 2008), 30.
\8\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 36; State
Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, amended 14 June 17, effective 1 February 18,
art. 2; PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 12.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 26.
\10\ Ibid., art. 18(2).
\11\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 36; State
Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, amended 14 June 17, effective 1 February 18,
art. 2.
\12\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 36.
\13\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 18; UN Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or
Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 93, para. 8.
\14\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17. See also Ray Wang and Gerry Groot, ``Who Represents? Xi
Jinping's Grand United Front Work, Legitimation, Participation and
Consultative Democracy,'' Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, Issue
112 (2018). The term ``religious work'' refers to the Communist Party's
united front work targeting religious groups. ``United front work'' is
the Party's term for activities aimed at facilitating the controlled
participation of different social groups to promote Party goals.
\15\ ``Enthusiastic Congratulations to the Chinese Communist Party
for the Victorious Commencement of the 19th Party Congress'' [Relie
zhuhe zhonggong shijiuda shengli zhaokai], People's Daily, 20 October
17.
\16\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17; State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 3 April 18, sec.
I.
\17\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17; State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 3 April 18.
\18\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 3 April 18.
\19\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17; State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18. See also
Yao Songshu, ``China Religious Studies Expert Professor Zhang Zhigang
Discusses: The Three Questions of Sinicization of Religion'' [Zhongguo
zongjiaoxue zhuanjia zhang zhigang jiaoshou tan: zongjiao zhongguohua
de san ge wenti], Christian Times, 6 November 17; Gerry Groot, ``The
Rise and Rise of the United Front Work Department Under Xi,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 7, 24 April 18.
\20\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18.
\21\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17; State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18.
\22\ Cyrille Pluyette, ``En Chine, le Pouvoir Renforce son Controle
sur les Religions,'' Le Figaro, updated 12 December 17, translated in
Marc Alves, ``In China's Crackdown on Religions, Buddhism Gets a
Pass,'' Worldcrunch, 5 February 18; Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign
Relations, ``Religion in China,'' 15 March 18.
\23\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18; ``CPPCC
Member Yang Faming: Maintain China's Sinicization of Islam'' [Yang
faming weiyuan: jianchi woguo zhongguohua fangxiang], Xinhua, 10 March
18.
\24\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17; State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18.
\25\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18.
\26\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17; State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18.
\27\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department Under Xi,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 7, 24 April 18.
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ Ian Johnson, ``How the Top-Heavy Catholic Church Is Losing the
Ground Game in China,'' America, 18 September 17; Eleanor Albert,
Council on Foreign Relations, ``Religion in China,'' updated 15 March
18.
\30\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department Under Xi,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 7, 24 April 18.
\31\ Cyrille Pluyette, ``En Chine, le Pouvoir Renforce son Controle
sur les Religions,'' Le Figaro, updated 12 December 17, translated in
Marc Alves, ``In China's Crackdown on Religions, Buddhism Gets a
Pass,'' Worldcrunch, 5 February 18.
\32\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 1(14).
\33\ Ibid.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 2016, 38-39; Carsten T.
Vala, ``Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian
China,'' China Perspectives, No. 2012/3, 1 October 12, 46.
\36\ United Front Work Department, ``National Religious
Organizations Jointly Propose Raising the National Flag at Religious
Venues'' [Quanguoxing zongjiao tuanti gongtong changyi zai zong jiao
huodong changsuo shenggua guoqi], 31 July 18.
\37\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 2016, 38-39.
\38\ Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question
in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 153-54,
330. The ``patriotic'' religious associations are state-controlled
institutions that represent the five ``main'' religions of China: the
Buddhist Association of China, the China Islamic Association, the China
Taoist Association, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the
National Conference of Bishops (an organization led by Catholic
clergy), the Three-Self (for ``self-governing, self-financing, and
self-expanding'') Patriotic Movement, and the Chinese Christian Council
(the latter two organizations have overlapping membership and represent
Protestants). According to Goossaert and Palmer, although ``nominally
independent,'' the ``patriotic'' religious associations are effectively
under the authority of the State Council's agency for religious
affairs.
\39\ Ibid., 154.
\40\ Jessica Batke, ``PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the
CCP,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution, China Leadership
Monitor, No. 52 (Winter 2017), 14 February 17, 3; Vincent Goossaert and
David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 330.
\41\ ``Li Keqiang Signs State Council Order Issuing Revised
`Regulations on Religious Affairs' '' [Li keqiang qianshu guowuyuan
ling gongbu xiuding hou de ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli''], Xinhua, 7
September 17.
\42\ State Council, Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, amended 14 June 17, effective 1
February 18, arts. 36, 41.
\43\ Ibid., art. 71.
\44\ Brent Fulton, ``New Religion Regulations To Take Effect in
February,'' ChinaSource Blog, 13 September 17; ``Regulation on
Religious Affairs To Be Implemented Next Month; Religious Freedom
Further Restricted'' [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli xiayue shishi zongjiao
ziyou jinyibu shou zhai], Radio Free Asia, 9 January 18; Wang Lude,
``Some Perspectives and Analysis From Several Religious Scholars and
House Church Pastors on the `Draft Revisions to the Regulations on
Religious Affairs (Deliberation Draft)' '' [Guanyu ``zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)'' laizi jiwei zongjiao xuezhe yu
jiating jiaohui muzhe de guandian yu fenxi], Christian Times, 23
September 16.
\45\ Wesley Rahn, ``In Xi We Trust--Is China Cracking Down on
Christianity? '' Deutsche Welle, 19 January 18; ``As China Tightens
Rules on Religion, Unregistered Churches Wince,'' Economist, 17 March
18; Viola Zhou, ``China's Underground Churches Head for Cover as
Crackdown Closes In,'' South China Morning Post, 11 September 17.
\46\ Viola Zhou, ``China's Underground Churches Head for Cover as
Crackdown Closes In,'' South China Morning Post, 11 September 17;
Huoshi (Living Stone) Church Members, ``The Huoshi Church Case--The
Typical Pattern of Government Suppression of House Churches,''
reprinted in ChinaAid, 13 June 17; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The
Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and
Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 53.
\47\ Zheng Leguo, ``The New Religious Affairs Regulations and the
New Challenges for Christianity,'' Chinese Law & Religion Monitor, Vol.
10, No. 1 (January-June 2018), 80-81.
\48\ ``State Administration for Religious Affairs Drafts Provisions
on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners; Ying Fuk
Tsang: Departure From Actual Circumstances'' [Zongjiao shiwu ju niding
waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli banfa; xing fuzeng: yu xianshi
qingkuang tuojie], Christian Times, 10 May 18; State Administration for
Religious Affairs, Circular Soliciting Public Comment for ``Measures on
the Management of the Group Religious Activities of Foreigners in the
People's Republic of China (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)''
[Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei
waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)'' gongkai
zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi], 7 May 18.
\49\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the
Management of the Group Religious Activities of Foreigners in the
People's Republic of China (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguo ren jiti zongjiao huodong
guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], 7 May 18, arts. 2, 6, 16.
\50\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 300.
\51\ PRC National Security Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guojia
anquan fa], passed and effective 1 July 15, art. 27.
\52\ Ibid.
\53\ Zhu Weiqun, ``Communist Party Members Cannot Believe in
Religion'' [Gongchandang yuan buneng xinyang zongjiao], Seeking Truth,
15 December 11.
\54\ Chen Xi, ``Must Use Exceptional Political Standards To
Cultivate Top Cadres'' [Peiyang xuanba ganbu bixu tuchu zhengzhi
biaozhun], People's Daily, 16 November 17.
\55\ Yu Qingchu, ``How Can One Worship Ghosts and Spirits While
Believing in Marxism-Leninism? '' [Xin malie qi neng bai guishen],
People's Daily, 12 October 17.
\56\ Hengyang Municipality Commission for Discipline Inspection,
``Notice on the Strict Prohibition of Party Members and Cadres on
Participating in Christmas Eve or Christmas Holiday Gatherings and
Parties'' [Guanyu yanjin dangyuan ganbu canjia ping'an ye shengdan jie
juhui kuanghuan de tongzhi], 11 December 17, reprinted in China Digital
Times, 20 December 17; Xiao Yu, ``No Doing as One Pleases on Christmas
Eve; CCP Members Strictly Prohibited From Celebrating `Western
Holidays' '' [Ping'an ye bude renxing, zhonggong dangyuan yanjin guo
``yang jie''], Voice of America, 21 December 17.
\57\ Xiao Yu, ``No Doing as One Pleases on Christmas Eve; CCP
Members Strictly Prohibited From Celebrating `Western Holidays' ''
[Ping'an ye bude renxing, zhong gong dang yuan yanjin guo ``yang
jie''], Voice of America, 21 December 17.
\58\ Carolyn M. Evans, ``Chinese Law and the International
Protection of Religious Freedom,'' University of Melbourne Faculty of
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 36 (2002), 20.
\59\ Cyrille Pluyette, ``En Chine, le Pouvoir Renforce son Controle
sur les Religions,'' Le Figaro, updated 12 December 17, translated in
Marc Alves, ``In China's Crackdown on Religions, Buddhism Gets a
Pass,'' Worldcrunch, 5 February 18; Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign
Relations, ``Religion in China,'' 15 March 18. See also Andre
Laliberte, ``Buddhist Revival Under State Watch,'' Journal of Current
Chinese Affairs, 2011, 11-12.
\60\ Pew Research Center, ``Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures
Project--China,'' last visited 4 September 18. See also Zhe Ji,
``Chinese Buddhism as a Social Force: Reality and Potential of Thirty
Years of Revival,'' Chinese Sociological Review, Vol. 45, No. 2
(January 2012), 10-12. Quantitative assessments for the total number of
Buddhists are difficult because Buddhist religious identity does not
need to be formalized within a particular institution and may overlap
with other religious practices.
\61\ Katharina Wenzel-Teuber, ``2015 Statistical Update on
Religions and Churches in the People's Republic of China,'' China
Heute, No. 1 (2016), translated in Religions & Christianity in Today's
China, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2016), 25.
\62\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, National Measures
for Regulating Chinese Buddhist Temples and Monasteries [Quanguo
hanchuan fojiao siyuan guanli banfa], 20 December 10. See also Zi Yang,
``The Soft Power Limits of Chinese Theravada Buddhism,'' The Diplomat,
15 August 17; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's
Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi
Jinping,'' February 2017, 32-33; Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer,
The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2011), 332-33.
\63\ Buddhist Association of China, Measures for the Management of
Monastic Vows in National Chinese Buddhist Monasteries [Quanguo
hanchuan fojiao siyuan chuanshou santan dajie guanli banfa], issued 15
September 00, amended 3 November 11, 20 September 16.
\64\ Echo Huang, ``The Most Influential Man Taken Down by China's
#MeToo Movement So Far Is a Monk,'' Quartz, 15 August 18; Mandy Zuo,
``Top Chinese Buddhist Monk Xuecheng Faces Police Investigation After
#MeToo Sexual Harassment Claims Upheld,'' South China Morning Post, 23
August 18.
\65\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Regarding the
Status of the Investigation Verifying Reports of Problems Concerning
Xuecheng and Beijing Longquan Temple'' [Guanyu dui jubao xuecheng he
beijing longquan si youguan wenti de diaocha heshi qingkuang], 23
August 18.
\66\ Zi Yang, ``The Soft Power Limits of Chinese Theravada
Buddhism,'' The Diplomat, 15 August 17.
\67\ State Administration for Religious Affairs et al., ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs Among 12 Departments To Jointly
Issue Document To Resolve Question of Commercialization of Buddhism and
Taoism'' [Guojiao zongjiao shiwu ju deng 12 bumen fa wen zhili fojiao
daojiao shangyehua wenti], 23 November 17.
\68\ Ibid.
\69\ Lori Qingyuan Yue et al., ``The Price of Faith: Political
Determinants of the Commercialization of Buddhist Temples in China,''
Academy of Management Proceedings, 30 November 17, Vol. 2016, No. 1 (30
November 17), 2.
\70\ ``China's Holy Sites List on the Stockmarket,'' Economist, 26
April 18; China Digital Times, ``Party vs Profit in Tug of War Over
Chinese Buddhism,'' 27 April 18.
\71\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
69.
\72\ Ian Johnson, ``How the Top-Heavy Catholic Church Is Losing the
Ground Game in China,'' America, 18 September 17; Anthony Lam Sui-ky,
``The Decline of China's Catholic Population and Its Impact on the
Church,'' AsiaNews, 23 August 16; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The
Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and
Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 45. Freedom House
previously estimated there were around 12 million Catholics in China.
\73\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 3 April 18.
\74\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81, art. 6(g).
\75\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2018 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2018 nian gongzuo yaodian], 14 February 18; Li Zhao,
``China Commemorates `Self-Selection, Self-Ordination' of Bishops for
60 Years in the `Independent' Church'' [Zhongguo jiang jinian ``duli''
jiaohui de ``zixuan zisheng'' zhujiao liushi zhounian], AsiaNews, 10
February 18.
\76\ China Catholic Patriotic Association and Bishops' Conference
of the Catholic Church, Provisions for Selecting and Ordaining Bishops
[Zhujiao tuan guanyu xuan sheng zhujiao de guiding], 8 April 13; Li
Zhao, ``China Commemorates `Self-Selection, Self-Ordination' of Bishops
for 60 Years in the `Independent' Church'' [Zhongguo jiang jinian
``duli'' jiaohui de ``zixuan zisheng'' zhujiao liushi zhounian],
AsiaNews, 10 February 18.
\77\ Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The Division of the Roman Catholic
Church in Mainland China: History and Challenges,'' Religions, Vol. 8,
No. 3 (March 2017), 1, 3, 6-7.
\78\ Eva Dou, ``For China's Catholics, State-Controlled Church Is
`Like a Tree With No Roots,' '' Wall Street Journal, 14 February 18;
Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The Division of the Roman Catholic Church in
Mainland China: History and Challenges,'' Religions, Vol. 8, No. 3
(March 2017), 7; Ilaria Maria Sala and Isabella Steger, ``Some
Catholics Are Deeply Disturbed That the Vatican Is Cozying Up to
China's Repressive Regime,'' Quartz, 25 August 16.
\79\ Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops,
Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in
the People's Republic of China, 27 May 07; Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The
Division of the Roman Catholic Church in Mainland China: History and
Challenges,'' Religions, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 2017), 7-8.
\80\ Eva Dou, ``For China's Catholics, State-Controlled Church Is
`Like a Tree With No Roots,' '' Wall Street Journal, 14 February 18;
``Msgr. Peter Shao Zhumin of Wenzhou Freed After 7 Months,'' AsiaNews,
1 April 18; Karen Cheung, ``Hong Kong's Cardinal Zen Calls for Release
of Underground Hebei Bishop Cui Tai,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 31 May 18.
\81\ Lisa Jucca and Benjamin Kang Lim, ``Exclusive: Vatican and
China in Final Push for Elusive Deal on Bishops,'' Reuters, 20 October
16.
\82\ Francis X. Rocca and Eva Dou, ``China and Vatican To Sign
Landmark Deal Over Bishops,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 September 18.
\83\ Ibid.
\84\ Ibid.; Philip Pullella, ``Exclusive: China-Vatican Deal on
Bishops Ready for Signing--Source,'' Reuters, 1 February 18.
\85\ Ian Johnson, ``Vatican, Eager for China Ties, Asks
`Underground' Bishops To Step Aside,'' New York Times, 29 January 18;
John Baptist Lin, ``The Vatican Asks Legitimate Bishops To Step Aside
in Favour of Illegitimate Ones,'' AsiaNews, 22 January 18.
\86\ Francis X. Rocca and Eva Dou, ``China and Vatican To Sign
Landmark Deal Over Bishops,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 September 18.
\87\ Mimi Lau, ``Betrayed and Abandoned: Why China's Underground
Catholics Feel Like Jesus on Good Friday,'' South China Morning Post,
30 March 18.
\88\ ``Authorities Seek To Disqualify Chinese Priest,'' Union of
Catholic Asian News, 11 July 18.
\89\ ``Government Officials Destroy Way of the Cross in China's
Henan Province,'' Catholic News Agency, 8 June 18.
\90\ ``Second Shandong Church Demolished `For Urban Reasons,' ''
AsiaNews, 16 August 18.
\91\ ``China Catholic Bishops' Association and Catholic Patriotic
Association Issue Orders To Implement Five-Year-Plan To Sinicize
Catholicism'' [``Yihui yituan'' xiang quanguo jiaoqu xiada luoshi
tianzhujiao zhongguo hua wu nian gongzuo guihua], Union of Catholic
Asian News, 17 July 18; ``Sinicization of China Church: The Plan in
Full,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 31 July 18. See also State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Second Session of 9th China
Catholic Bishops' Association Standing Committee Convenes in Beijing''
[Zhongguo tianzhujiao yihui yituan jiu jie er ci changwei hui zai jing
zhaokai], 18 December 17.
\92\ Viola Zhou, ``Can the Catholic Faith Serve Politics? That's
What China Wants,'' South China Morning Post, 21 July 17.
\93\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 9.
\94\ ChinaAid, ``2017 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution
of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February 18, 36-37.
\95\ See, e.g., Verna Yu, ``Children Banned From Mass in China's
Henan Province,'' America, 1 May 18; Kate Shellnutt, ``China Tells
Christians To Replace Images of Jesus With Communist President,''
Christianity Today, 17 November 17; Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign
Relations, ``Christianity in China,'' 9 March 18.
\96\ See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Christmas Severely
Restricted in Many Areas Across China; Surveillance Posted Outside
Churches and Christmas Trees Toppled'' [Zhongguo duo di shengdan jie
zao yanli xianzhi jiaotang wai tantou jianshi shengdan shu bei tuidao],
23 December 17.
\97\ See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Henan Persecution Targets Both Official
and Underground Churches,'' 3 June 18.
\98\ See, e.g., ``Church Cross Facing Forcible Removal in Yichuan
County, Henan; Anyang Municipality Registers All `Religious Believers'
'' [Henan yichuan jiaotang shizi jia mianlin qiangchai anyang shi
quanmian dengji ``xinyang renyuan''], Radio Free Asia, 6 April 18.
\99\ Party Organization, Theory Study Center Group, State
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Innovations in Religious Work
Theory and Practice Since the 18th Party Congress'' [Dang de shibada
yilai zongjiao gongzuo lilun he shijian chuangxin], Seeking Truth, 15
September 17.
\100\ China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement,
``Outline of Five-Year Work Plan for Advancing Sinicization of
Protestantism in China'' [Tuijin woguo jidu jiao zhongguo hua wu nian
gongzuo guihua gangyao], 14 December 17.
\101\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``China Issues Total Ban on Selling the
Bible; Already Taken Offline by Online Retailers; Henan Requires
Protestant Believers To Adhere to `Nine Prohibitions' '' [Zhongguo
quanmian jinshou ``shengjing'' wangdian yi xiajia henan dui jidutu ti
yaoqiu ``jiu ge buzhun''], 3 April 18.
\102\ For more information on some of these individuals, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-0126 on Zhang
Shaojie, 2016-00088 on Bao Guohua, and 2016-00089 on Xing Wenxiang.
\103\ See, e.g., ``China Escalates Nationwide Crackdown on
Protestant Churches,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 May 18; Viola Zhou,
``China's Underground Churches Head for Cover as Crackdown Closes In,''
South China Morning Post, 11 September 17. See also Sarah Cook, Freedom
House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression,
and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 42, 46-47.
\104\ CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 132-33; CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 127-28; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8
October 15, 126-28; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 95-98;
CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 91-94.
\105\ See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Police Question 13 Christians for
Holding Church Services,'' 17 November 17; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid,
``Xuzhou, Jiangsu Seminary Raided by Police'' [Jiangsu xuzhou--
shenxueyuan zao jingfang chongji], 23 May 18. See also ChinaAid, ``2017
Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and
Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February 18, 36.
\106\ See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Yizhuang Branch of Zion
Church in Beijing Locked Out, Prohibited From Meeting'' [Beijing xi'an
jiaohui yizhuang fentang bei suomen jin juhui], 9 July 18; Qiao Nong,
ChinaAid, ``Seminary in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, Raided by Police'' [Jiangsu
xuzhou yi shenxueyuan zao jingfang chongji], 23 May 18.
\107\ Russell Goldman, ``Chinese Police Dynamite Christian
Megachurch,'' New York Times, 12 January 18.
\108\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Ningling, Henan Forcibly Demolishes
Cross; More Than 100 House Churches Banned From Meeting'' [Henan
ningling qiang chai shizijia yu bai jiating jiaohui bei jin juhui], 29
May 18.
\109\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Beijing Government Issues Notice To
Deal With Protestant Churches; Guangzhou Laywer Prohibited From
Representing Religious Cases'' [Beijing zhengfu xiawen zhuanxiang
zhengzhi jidujiao guangzhou lushi bei jinzhi daili jiao'an], 9 July 18.
\110\ See, e.g., ``China Escalates Nationwide Crackdown on
Protestant Churches,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 May 18.
\111\ See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Police Question 13 Christians for
Holding Church Services,'' 17 November 17; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid,
``Seminary in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, Raided by Police'' [Jiangsu xuzhou
yishenxueyuan zao jingfang chongji], 23 May 18. See also ChinaAid,
``2017 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and
Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February 18, 36-37.
\112\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Churches in Jiangxi [Province] Xinyu
[Municipality] Receive Government Warnings; Cross Removals and Portrait
Hangings of Xi Jinping Met With Resistance'' [Jiangxi xinyu duo ge
jiaohui jie zhengfu jinggao chai shizijia gua xi jinping xiang zao
dizhi], 16 July 18.
\113\ Chris Buckley, ``China Blocks a Memorial Service to Sichuan
Earthquake Victims,'' New York Times, 12 May 18.
\114\ ChinaAid, ``Nine Unlawfully Detained Christians Released,'' 6
February 17; ``Protestant Church Member Prosecuted for Involvement in
`Evil Cult,' '' Radio Free Asia, 9 February 17; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 300. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2017-00144 on Tu Yan and 2017-00145 on Su Min.
\115\ ``China Jails Six Protestants in Yunnan Amid Massive
Crackdown on `Evil Cult,' '' Radio Free Asia, 18 January 18; ChinaAid,
``Yunnan Christians Receive Lengthy Sentences for Falsified Cult
Involvement Charge,'' 16 January 18. For more information, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00134 on Ju
Dianhong, 2018-00189 on Liang Qin, 2018-00190 on Zhang Hongyan, 2018-
00191 on Yang Shunxiang, 2018-00192 on Zi Huimei, and 2018-00193 on
Zhang Shaocai.
\116\ Shizong County Communist Party Committee, ``Report on Status
of Rectifications Pertaining to Inspection'' [Shizong xianwei guanyu
xunshi zhengai qingkuang de tongbao], reprinted in Qujing Municipal
Discipline Inspection Commission, 12 March 18, item 1(5). For an
English translation of the county report, see ``County in Yunnan
`Cleans Up' Foreign NGOs and Foundations,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile,
China NGO Project, 20 March 18.
\117\ Shizong County Communist Party Committee, ``Report on Status
of Rectifications Pertaining to Inspection'' [Shizong xianwei guanyu
xunshi zhengai qingkuang de tongbao], reprinted in Qujing Municipal
Discipline Inspection Commission, 12 March 18, item 1(5).
\118\ ``China's Policy Tightened Again; Another Church in Zhejiang
Is Banned'' [Zhongguo zongjiao zhengce zai shoujing zhejiang you yi
jiaohui bei jin], Radio Free Asia, 22 May 18.
\119\ For information on suppression of Falun Gong practitioners
from previous years, see, e.g., CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17,
134; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 125-27; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 123-25. See also ``Communist Party Calls for
Increased Efforts To `Transform' Falun Gong Practitioners as Part of
Three-Year Campaign,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22
March 11.
\120\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 113.
\121\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``NGO Submission for the Universal
Periodic Review of the People's Republic of China,'' March 2018, para.
14; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July
79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December
99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29
June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17.
\122\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2018,'' 2018,
146; Amnesty International, ``Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The
State of the World's Human Rights,'' 2018, 128; Christian Solidarity
Worldwide, ``People's Republic of China: Stakeholder Submission to the
Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session,'' 6 April 18, para. 39.
\123\ See, e.g., ``Beaten and Drugged, Woman Recounts Torture in
Chinese Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, 8 April 18; ``Former Chief Urologist
Tortured and Almost Killed After Mass Arrest,'' Clear Wisdom, 8 April
18.
\124\ See, e.g., ``Beaten and Drugged, Woman Recounts Torture in
Chinese Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, 8 April 18.
\125\ Ibid.; ``Former Chief Urologist Tortured and Almost Killed
After Mass Arrest,'' Clear Wisdom, 8 April 18.
\126\ See, e.g., ``Beaten and Drugged, Woman Recounts Torture in
Chinese Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, 8 April 18; ``Former Chief Urologist
Tortured and Almost Killed After Mass Arrest,'' Clear Wisdom, 8 April
18; ``Doctor Warns That Man Shackled to Hospital Bed May Go Into Shock
at Any Time,'' Clear Wisdom, 14 April 18.
\127\ Frank Fang, ``At Least 29 Falun Gong Practitioners Have Died
in 2017 Under the Chinese Regime's Ongoing Persecution,'' Epoch Times,
21 December 17.
\128\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Public Statement by the Uyghur
Human Rights Project (UHRP) on Forced Organ Harvesting in China,''
reprinted in International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China,
22 April 18; Human Rights Law Foundation, ``Public Statement by the
Human Rights Law Foundation on Abusive Organ Transplantation Practices
in the PRC,'' reprinted in International Coalition to End Transplant
Abuse in China, February 2018; Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human
Rights, ``Public Statement on Forced Organ Harvesting in China,''
reprinted in International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China,
January 2018; Letter from International Coalition to End Transplant
Abuse in China et al. to Bishop Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, Chancellor,
Pontifical Academy of Sciences, reprinted in International Coalition to
End Transplant Abuse in China, 18 March 18. See also Benedict Rogers,
``Organ Harvesting in China: `A Crime Against Humanity,' '' La Croix,
26 December 17; Matthew Robertson, ``Investigative Report: A Hospital
Built for Murder,'' Epoch Times, 4 February 16; Matthew Robertson, ``At
Congressional Hearing, China's Organ Harvesting Seen Through Rose-
Colored Glasses,'' Epoch Times, 29 June 16.
\129\ Letter from Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting to the
California State Senate, reprinted in Doctors Against Forced Organ
Harvesting, 5 September 17; Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting,
``International Transplant Community Continues To Be Misled by Chinese
Officials,'' 21 January 18; Letter from International Coalition to End
Transplant Abuse in China et al. to Bishop Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo,
Chancellor, Pontifical Academy of Sciences, reprinted in International
Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China, 18 March 18; Christian
Solidarity Worldwide, ``People's Republic of China: Stakeholder
Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session,'' 6 April
18, para. 40.
\130\ Alice Y. Su, ``The Separation Between Mosque and State,''
Asia Society, ChinaFile, 21 October 16; Sarah Cook, Freedom House,
``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and
Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 68-69. See also Ian
Johnson, ``Shariah With Chinese Characteristics: A Scholar Looks at the
Muslim Hui,'' New York Times, 6 September 16. Experts on Chinese
religion have noted that most statistics on Muslim believers in China
make broad assumptions about religious identity based on ethnicity--for
example, presuming that all people of Hui ethnicity are Muslim
believers, and that no people of Han, Tibetan, or other ethnicities are
Muslim.
\131\ Michael Martina, ``China's Hui Muslims Fearful Chinese New
Year Education Ban a Sign of Curbs To Come,'' Reuters, 17 February 18.
\132\ ``Yang Faming: Rooted in the Fertile Soil of Chinese
Civilization: Uphold the Sinicization of Our Country's Islam'' [Yang
faming: zhagen zhonghua wenhua wotu jianchi woguo yisilan jiao zhongguo
hua fangxiang], Xinhua, 10 March 18.
\133\ China Islamic Association, ``China Islamic Association,''
last visited 18 July 18.
\134\ Yu Xiaojie and Shi Jingnan, ``CPPCC Member Yang Faming:
Uphold the Sinicization of Islam in China'' [Yang faming weiyuan:
jianchi woguo yisilan jiao zhongguo hua fangxiang], Xinhua, 10 March
18.
\135\ Nectar Gan, ``How China Is Trying To Impose Islam With
Chinese Characteristics in the Hui Muslim Heartland,'' South China
Morning Post, 14 May 18.
\136\ Becky Davis, `` `We're Scared, Very Scared'--Muslims in
China's `Little Mecca' Fear Eradication of Islam,'' Agence France-
Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 16 July 18.
\137\ Christian Shepherd, ``Muslim County in China Bans Children
From Religious Events Over Break,'' Reuters, 17 January 18.
\138\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``NGO Submission for the Universal
Periodic Review of the People's Republic of China,'' March 2018.
\139\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 4 April 18.
\140\ China Islamic Association, Measures for Confirming the
Credentials of Islamic Professional Religious Personnel [Yisilan jiao
jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], issued and effective 7 August 06,
art. 3; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 76.
\141\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 76.
\142\ Li Ruohan, ``Chinese Muslims Say They Feel a Stronger Sense
of National Identity During Pilgrimage to Mecca,'' Global Times, 2
August 18.
\143\ Li Ruohan, ``GPS Cards Aid Chinese Muslims on Hajj
Pilgrimage,'' Global Times, 31 July 18.
\144\ Eva Dou, ``Chinese Surveillance Expands to Muslims Making
Mecca Pilgrimage,'' Wall Street Journal, 31 July 18.
\145\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 4 April 18. The
central government has referred to the five religions as China's
``major religions,'' stating that the religions citizens ``mainly''
follow are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism.
See, e.g., Henan Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Henan
Province Regulations on Religious Affairs [Henan sheng zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 July 05, effective 1 January 06, art. 2; Shaanxi
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Shaanxi Province
Regulations on Religious Affairs [Shaanxi sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 23 September 00, amended 30 July 08, effective 1 October 08,
art. 2. Some local regulations on religious affairs define ``religion''
to mean only these five religions.
\146\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Policies and
Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,'' 4 April 18.
\147\ Ibid. See, e.g., Zhejiang Province Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Committee, Zhejiang Province Measures for the Management of
Registration of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Zhejiang sheng minjian
xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao guanli banfa], issued 19
October 14, effective 1 January 15; Taizhou Municipal Ethnic and
Religious Affairs Bureau, Circular Concerning the 2016 Launch of
Registration Work for Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Guanyu kaizhan
2016 minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao gongzuo de
tongzhi], issued 13 April 16; Hunan Province People's Government, Hunan
Province Measures for the Management of Registration of Venues for Folk
Belief Activity [Hunan sheng minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji
guanli banfa], issued and effective 24 August 09; Shaoxing Municipal
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Shaoxing Municipal Implementing
Plan for Registration of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Shaoxing shi
minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao gongzuo shishi
fang'an], issued 14 May 15.
\148\ See, e.g., Harbin Municipal Measures for the Management of
Venues for Religious Activity [Ha'erbin shi zongjiao huodong changsuo
guanli banfa], issued 30 July 09, effective 10 September 09, reprinted
in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 5 April 17, art. 2;
State Council Information Office, ``The Situation of Religious Freedom
in Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang],
reprinted in Xinhua, 2 June 16, secs. 1, 3.
\149\ ``Harmful Religious Doctrines Poison, Harm Society--Exposing
the Truth Behind the `Church of the Almighty God' '' [Xieshuo guhuo
qianghai shehui--jiekai ``quanneng shen'' xiejiao zhen mianmu], Xinhua,
12 August 18.
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority Rights
Introduction
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, Chinese
Communist Party and government authorities promoted policies
and regulations restricting rights guaranteed to ethnic
minority groups under Chinese and international law.\1\ The UN
Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues requested to visit China
multiple times beginning in 2009, but as of August 20, 2018,
the Chinese government had not allowed the visit.\2\ The
Chinese government has acceded to the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD), which prohibits racial discrimination and guarantees
the right of everyone to equal treatment before the law,
including ``freedom of thought, conscience and religion.'' \3\
International human rights organizations submitted statements
\4\ for consideration at an August 2018 review of China's
compliance with ICERD by the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination that raised concerns over issues such as
arbitrary detentions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR); \5\ religious repression in the Tibet Autonomous
Region; \6\ and the resettlement of Mongol nomads in the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR).\7\
State Minority Policy
At the March 2018 meetings of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference in Beijing (Two Sessions), Party and government
authorities changed the mechanisms they use to implement
policies toward ethnic minorities, as the Party's United Front
Work Department (UFWD) assumed control of the work of the
government departments overseeing ethnic affairs (the State
Ethnic Affairs Commission) and religion (the State
Administration for Religious Affairs).\8\ A number of observers
expressed the view that the UFWD's newly expanded powers
represented an official move toward tighter Party control over
ethnic affairs and policies promoting ethnic assimilation over
ethnic pluralism.\9\ In line with such policies, the government
and Party under President and Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping continued to emphasize the importance of ``sinicizing''
ethnic and religious minorities.\10\ [See Section II--Freedom
of Religion for additional information on the ``sinicization''
of religious minorities.]
Policies Affecting Hui Islamic Communities
Policies and restrictions that targeted Hui communities and
restricted Hui Muslims' religious practices this past year
illustrate ways in which authorities have promoted the
``sinicization'' of ethnic and religious minorities. Chinese
officials have historically allowed Hui Muslims more freedom to
engage in religious practices than Uyghur Muslims, but in
recent years authorities have reportedly increased religious
controls among Hui communities.\11\ During the Two Sessions in
2018, Yang Faming, Chairman of the China Islamic Association,
stressed that Muslims in China should incorporate Chinese
characteristics into Islamic religious rituals, culture, and
architecture, avoid the expansion of the concept of ``halal''
into secular life, and adhere to ``socialist core values.''
\12\ According to an American historian, Yang's speech
reflected a formal declaration of a policy trend that officials
had begun implementing in regions with significant Hui
populations beginning in fall 2016, and it gave ``a
justification for what, until March [2018], had been informal
and patchwork implementation of restrictions on mosque
construction, mosque design, private or semi-official Islamic
schooling, and `Islamic' customs among the Hui.'' \13\ In an
interview with the Party-run media outlet Global Times that was
conducted during the Two Sessions, Yang Yuanzhong, the Party
Secretary of Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture (HAP), Gansu
province, also warned against the expansion of the concept of
``halal,'' linking this effort to the promotion of ethnic unity
and social stability.\14\ In January, education officials in
Guanghe county, Linxia city, and Linxia county, all located
within Linxia HAP, issued notices restricting local school-age
children from entering religious buildings during their winter
break and other similar measures.\15\ Hui residents of Linxia
city and Guanghe county reportedly expressed apprehension over
the impact tightened government restrictions could have on
their lives.\16\ [For more information on freedom of religion
for Muslims in China, see Section II--Freedom of Religion.]
Language Policy
During this reporting year, government and Party officials
implemented policies limiting ethnic minorities' freedom to
engage in cultural practices and speak or learn their
languages.\17\ In a report published in January 2018, the Dui
Hua Foundation documented how authorities in some prisons
located in provinces with large ethnic minority populations
restricted the use of ethnic minority languages, including
during family visits.\18\ In December 2017, international media
and rights advocates reported that under a policy implemented
in September, XUAR education authorities had ended the use of
Mongolian as a language of instruction in elementary and lower
middle schools in Bayangol (Bayinguoleng) Mongol Autonomous
Prefecture, XUAR.\19\ Local Mongol parents reportedly protested
the change on social media, in connection with the
corresponding end of the use of a Mongolian-centered curriculum
at the last secondary school in the prefecture to offer such a
course of study.\20\ Authorities and educators in the XUAR and
Tibetan autonomous areas continued to promote a Mandarin-
centered curriculum at the expense of Uyghur, Tibetan, and
other languages spoken by ethnic minority groups, as part of
what is officially referred to as ``bilingual education.'' \21\
[For additional information on language policy and education in
these areas, see Section IV--Xinjiang and Section V--Tibet.]
Grassland Protests in Inner Mongolia
During this reporting year, Mongol herders in the IMAR
demonstrated and petitioned authorities over the government's
role in the loss of their traditional grazing lands, the
harmful ecological effect of state development on grassland and
livestock,\22\ and the government's failure to provide herders
with adequate compensation for their land.\23\ As in past
reporting years,\24\ authorities detained some of the Mongol
herders who peacefully protested.\25\
Representative examples of protests by Mongol herders
included the following:
Beginning on December 24, 2017, in Ongniud
(Wengniute) Banner, Chifeng municipality, IMAR, around
200 herders protested against Ongniud Banner
authorities over the state-owned COFCO pig farm's
pollution of their grazing lands and the continued
detention of two fellow herders beginning seven months
earlier.\26\ Security personnel reportedly beat some of
the herders and detained eight of the herders
overnight.\27\ On December 25, more than 200 herders in
Damao Banner, Baotou municipality, IMAR, also protested
against COFCO's pollution of their grazing lands, and
asked for compensation from officials for the loss of
grazing lands and the demolition of their homes.\28\
In February 2018, before and after the lunar
New Year holiday, Bao Yu, a herder from Urad (Wulate)
Middle Banner, Bayannur (Bayannao'er) municipality,
IMAR, traveled to Hohhot municipality, IMAR, the
regional capital, to protest against the air and water
pollution in her village caused by a gold mining
company.\29\ Bao said local residents had repeatedly
called upon government officials to take action over
the pollution, but officials had not acted.\30\
THIRTY-FIVE HERDERS SENTENCED AT JOINT TRIAL
On December 27, 2017, the Zaruud (Zalute) Banner People's
Court in Zaruud Banner, Tongliao municipality, IMAR, reportedly
sentenced 35 Mongol herders to prison terms on charges of
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' and ``assembling
crowds to attack state agencies,'' in what local herders
described as an unjust trial.\31\ Nine of the herders received
sentences of between one and five years in prison.\32\ The
court sentenced the other 26 to six months in prison, releasing
them for time served while in detention.\33\ Authorities
alleged that the defendants took part in events in May 2017,
including blocking traffic during a protest and staging an
illegal demonstration in front of a police dispatch
station.\34\ In a written statement they sent to a U.S.-based
rights organization, local herders reportedly said they had
protested against a construction company belonging to a Han
Chinese family that had ``illegally occupied'' their grazing
lands.\35\ Relatives of the nine imprisoned herders reportedly
said authorities had not permitted them to visit the herders,
whose whereabouts were unknown.\36\
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
\1\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended
28 February 01. For protections related to languages, religious
beliefs, and customs, see Articles 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, and 53.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 27. The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs
of these ``nationalities,'' in addition to a system of regional
autonomy in designated areas. Article 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed and declared an
intention to ratify, contains safeguards for the rights of ``ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities'' within a state.
\2\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Country
Visits,'' last visited 20 August 18; Human Rights in China, ``Country
Visits by Special Procedures,'' last visited 20 August 18; Human Rights
Watch, ``The Costs of International Advocacy: China's Interference in
United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,'' September 2017.
\3\ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature and
ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December
65, entry into force 4 January 69, in accordance with Article 19, art.
5(a), (d)(vii); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human
Rights International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, last visited 19 July 18. The Chinese government
acceded to the Convention on December 29, 1981.
\4\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
``Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Discusses
Situation in Latvia and China With Civil Society,'' 7 August 18.
\5\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``Submission to the CERD Review
of China,'' 21 June 18.
\6\ See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, ``Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Consideration of the
State Report by the People's Republic of China,'' August 2018, 4, 6,
11-13.
\7\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) for the Consideration of the Review of the
People's Republic of China During the 96th Session,'' 4 July 18, 6-8,
14.
\8\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department Under Xi,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 7, 24 April 18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
Issues `Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' ''
[Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige
fang'an''], Xinhua, 21 March 18.
\9\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department Under Xi,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 7, 24 April 18; Teddy Ng and Mimi Lau, ``Fears About Chinese
Influence Grow as More Powers Given to Shadowy Agency,'' South China
Morning Post, 22 March 18; ``CCP's United Front Work Department Expands
Its Powers, Overseas Infiltration Leads to Concerns of Outside World,''
Voice of America, 22 March 18.
\10\ Cristina Maza, ``Communist China President Xi Jinping Now
Wants To Control Religion Too,'' Newsweek, 24 October 17; ``Xi Jinping:
Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society
in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism With
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi jinping: juesheng quanmian
jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi
weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27 October 17; Gerry Groot,
``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work Department Under Xi,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 7, 24 April 18;
Olivia Enos, ``Growing Religious Persecution in China a Symptom of Xi's
Consolidation of Power,'' Forbes, 28 March 18; Sandra Jolley and Tenzin
Dorjee, ``President Trump: Support Religious Freedom in China,'' The
Diplomat, 1 November 17; ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve
Religious Work Standards Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping:
quanmian tigao xin xingshi xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23
April 16; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 129.
\11\ See, e.g., Michael Martina, ``China's Hui Muslims Fearful
Chinese New Year Education Ban a Sign of Curbs To Come,'' Reuters, 16
February 18; Viola Zhou, ``Why China's Hui Muslims Fear They're Next To
Face Crackdown on Religion,'' South China Morning Post, 11 March 17;
Kiyo Dorrer, ``The Hui--China's Preferred Muslims?'' Deutsche Welle, 9
December 16.
\12\ ``Yang Faming: Rooted in the Fertile Soil of Chinese
Civilization: Uphold the Sinicization of Our Country's Islam'' [Yang
faming: zhagen zhonghua wenhua wotu jianchi woguo yisilan jiao
zhongguohua fangxiang], Xinhua, 10 March 18. See also the following
unofficial translation: Yang Faming, ``Rooted in the Fertile Soil of
Chinese Civilization: Uphold the Chinafication of Our Country's
Islam,'' 10 March 18, translated in Academia.edu, last visited 27 July
18, 2-3; Liu Caiyu, ``Muslims Must Practice Islam With Chinese
Characteristics To Avoid Societal Division,'' Global Times, 11 March
18; ``Chinese Official Warns Against Creeping Islamisation,'' Reuters,
10 March 18; Yu Xiaojie and Shi Jingnan, ``Committee Member Yang
Faming: Uphold the Sinicization of Islam in China'' [Yang faming
weiyuan: jianchi woguo yisilan jiao zhongguohua fangxiang], Xinhua, 10
March 18. See also Nectar Gan, ``How China Is Trying To Impose Islam
With Chinese Characteristics in the Hui Muslim Heartland,'' South China
Morning Post, 14 May 18.
\13\ ``Yang Faming: Rooted in the Fertile Soil of Chinese
Civilization: Uphold the Sinicization of Our Country's Islam'' [Yang
faming: zhagen zhonghua wenhua wotu jianchi woguo yisilan jiao
zhongguohua fangxiang], Xinhua, 10 March 18. See also the following
unofficial translation: Yang Faming, ``Rooted in the Fertile Soil of
Chinese Civilization: Uphold the Chinafication of Our Country's
Islam,'' 10 March 18, translated in Academia.edu, last visited 27 July
18, 1.
\14\ Li Ruohan, ``Linxia Vows To Fight Against Pan-Halal Tendency
To Safeguard Ethnic Unity,'' Global Times, 7 March 18.
\15\ Michael Martina, ``China's Hui Muslims Fearful Chinese New
Year Education Ban a Sign of Curbs To Come,'' Reuters, 16 February 18;
Christian Shepherd, ``Muslim County in China Bans Children From
Religious Events Over Break,'' Reuters, 17 January 18; ``Guanghe,
Gansu, Issues Prohibition on Students Entering Religious Venues During
Winter Break'' [Gansu guanghe fawen yaoqiu jinzhi xuesheng hanjia jinru
zongjiao changsuo], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 18. The majority of the
residents in Linxia HAP are ethnic Hui. Li Ruohan, ``Linxia Vows To
Fight Against Pan-Halal Tendency To Safeguard Ethnic Unity,'' Global
Times, 7 March 18.
\16\ Michael Martina, ``China's Hui Muslims Fearful Chinese New
Year Education Ban a Sign of Curbs To Come,'' Reuters, 16 February 18.
\17\ See, e.g., Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization and
Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Submission to the
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the
Consideration of the 3rd Universal Periodic Review of the People's
Republic of China During the 31st Session,'' 29 March 18; UN Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: UN Experts Denounce
the Criminalization of Linguistic and Cultural Rights Advocacy,'' 21
February 18; ChinaAid, ``[Authorities in] Ili, Hotan, and Other
Locations in Xinjiang Seize Ethnic Minority-Language Textbooks''
[Xinjiang yili, hetian deng di shoujiao minzu yuyan jiaoke shu], 2
April 18.
\18\ Dui Hua Foundation, `` `Mandarin Only' Visitation Rules,'' Dui
Hua Human Rights Journal,10 January 18.
\19\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Language Banned in Schools, Internet Posts Removed,'' 22
December 17; ``China Ends Mongolian-Medium Teaching in Xinjiang High
School,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 December 17; ``Xinjiang Bayinguoleng
Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Mongol School's Name Revoked, Eliciting
Protest From Mongolians at Home and Abroad'' [Xinjiang bazhou menggu zu
xuexiao bei zhaipai yinfa hai nei wai menggu ren kangyi], Radio Free
Asia, 16 January 18.
\20\ ``China Ends Mongolian-Medium Teaching in Xinjiang High
School,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 December 17; Southern Mongolian Human
Rights Information Center, ``Mongolian Language Banned in Schools,
Internet Posts Removed,'' 22 December 17; ``Xinjiang Bayinguoleng
Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Mongol School's Name Revoked, Eliciting
Protest From Mongolians at Home and Abroad'' [Xinjiang bazhou menggu zu
xuexiao bei zhaipai yinfa hai nei wai menggu ren kangyi], Radio Free
Asia, 16 January 18.
\21\ Gerry Groot, ``The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work
Department Under Xi,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 7, 24 April 18; Nikhil Sonnad, ``Taiwan's Laws on Language Are
Showing China What It Means To Be a Modern, Inclusive Country,''
Quartz, 9 May 18; Cao Siqi, ``Xinjiang University Calls for Promoting
Putonghua,'' Global Times, 9 October 17; Jiang Fu'er, ``Xinjiang:
Expanding Inclusive Kindergarten Coverage This Year'' [Xinjiang:
jinnian jiang kuoda puhui xing you'eryuan fugaimian], China Education
Daily, 2 April 18.
\22\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Herders' Land Grabbed, Livestock Robbed,'' 4 December 17;
``Inner Mongolian Herders Petition for Grasslands Compensation, New
Overseas Book Reveals Genocide of Inner Mongolians'' [Neimeng mumin
qingyuan taoyao caochang butie haiwai xinshu jie neimeng zhongzu
miejue], Radio Free Asia, 11 December 17; ``Ethnic Mongolian Herder
Protests Mining Pollution of Grasslands,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February
18.
\23\ ``Inner Mongolian Herders Petition for Grasslands
Compensation, New Overseas Book Reveals Genocide of Inner Mongolians''
[Neimeng mumin qingyuan taoyao caochang butie haiwai xinshu jie neimeng
zhongzu miejue], Radio Free Asia, 11 December 17; Southern Mongolian
Human Rights Information Center, ``Testimonies of Mongolian Victims of
Chinese Land Grab (1): Cases of Four Jailed Herders,'' 9 March 18;
``China Detains Ethnic Mongolian Herders Who Petitioned in Beijing,''
Radio Free Asia, 29 March 18; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization and Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
Submission to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
for the Consideration of the 3rd Universal Periodic Review of the
People's Republic of China During the 31st Session,'' 29 March 18.
\24\ See, e.g., CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 148-49;
CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 143-44.
\25\ See, e.g., ``Two Mongol Female Herders in Inner Mongolia
Detained for Petitioning'' [Nei menggu liang menggu zu nu mumin
qingyuan bei ju], Radio Free Asia, 8 December 17; ``Hundreds of Herders
Petition in Ongniud and Damao Banners in Inner Mongolia, Many Are
Detained'' [Nei menggu wengniute ji damaoqi shu bai mumin qingyuan
duoren bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 26 December 17.
\26\ ``Hundreds of Herders Petition in Ongniud and Damao Banners in
Inner Mongolia, Many Are Detained'' [Nei menggu wengniute ji damaoqi
shu bai mumin qingyuan duoren bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 26 December
17.
\27\ Ibid. COFCO is the acronym for China National Cereals, Oils
and Foodstuffs Corporation.
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Herder Protests Mining Pollution of
Grasslands,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February 18; ``Herders From Urad
Middle Banner Petition in Hohhot After Lunar New Year,'' [Nei menggu
wulate zhongqi mumin nongli nian hou hu shi shangfang], Radio Free
Asia, 22 February 18.
\30\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Herder Protests Mining Pollution of
Grasslands,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February 18; ``Herders From Urad
Middle Banner Petition in Hohhot After Lunar New Year,'' [Nei menggu
wulate zhongqi mumin nongli nian hou hu shi shangfang], Radio Free
Asia, 22 February 18.
\31\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``35
Mongolian Herders Tried, Long Sentences Handed Down,'' 24 January 18;
``35 Ethnic Mongol Herders Who Protested Han People's Occupation of
Their Grassland Sentenced'' [35 ming kangyi caochang bei hanren qinzhan
de menggu zu mumin bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
\32\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``35
Mongolian Herders Tried, Long Sentences Handed Down,'' 24 January 18;
``35 Ethnic Mongol Herders Who Protested Han People's Occupation of
Their Grassland Sentenced'' [35 ming kangyi caochang bei hanren qinzhan
de menggu zu mumin bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
\33\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``35
Mongolian Herders Tried, Long Sentences Handed Down,'' 24 January 18;
``35 Ethnic Mongol Herders Who Protested Han People's Occupation of
Their Grassland Sentenced'' [35 ming kangyi caochang bei hanren qinzhan
de menggu zu mumin bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
\34\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``35
Mongolian Herders Tried, Long Sentences Handed Down,'' 24 January 18;
``35 Ethnic Mongol Herders Who Protested Han People's Occupation of
Their Grassland Sentenced'' [35 ming kangyi caochang bei hanren qinzhan
de menggu zu mumin bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
\35\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``35
Mongolian Herders Tried, Long Sentences Handed Down,'' 24 January 18;
``35 Ethnic Mongol Herders Who Protested Han People's Occupation of
Their Grassland Sentenced'' [35 ming kangyi caochang bei hanren qinzhan
de menggu zu mumin bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
\36\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``35
Mongolian Herders Tried, Long Sentences Handed Down,'' 24 January 18;
``35 Ethnic Mongol Herders Who Protested Han People's Occupation of
Their Grassland Sentenced'' [35 ming kangyi caochang bei hanren qinzhan
de menggu zu mumin bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
Population
Control
Population
Control
Population Control
International Standards and China's Coercive Population Policies
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, Chinese
authorities continued to implement coercive population control
policies that violate international standards. The Chinese
Communist Party and government authorities implemented for the
third year in 2018 the ``universal two-child policy'' that
allows all married couples to have two children.\1\ The amended
PRC Population and Family Planning Law and provincial-level
regulations continued to limit couples' freedom to build their
families as they see fit, and include provisions that require
couples to be married to have children and limit them to
bearing two children.\2\ Exceptions allowing for additional
children exist for couples who meet certain criteria, which
vary by province, including some exceptions for ethnic
minorities,\3\ remarried couples, and couples who have children
with disabilities.\4\ Officials reportedly continued to enforce
compliance with family planning policies using methods
including heavy fines,\5\ job termination,\6\ detention,\7\ and
abortion.\8\
Coercive controls imposed on Chinese women and their
families, and additional abuses engendered by China's
population and family planning system, violate standards set
forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development.\9\ China was a state
participant in the negotiation and adoption of both.\10\ Acts
of official coercion committed in the implementation of
population control policies contravene provisions of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,\11\ which China has
ratified.\12\
Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy and Institutional
Developments
The Chinese Communist Party and government implemented the
``universal two-child policy'' for a third consecutive year in
2018,\13\ and government statistics showed that the policy was
not effective in spurring population growth. In 2016, the
National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC)
predicted that the universal two-child policy would result in
population growth,\14\ with an additional 3 million children
born per year \15\ and an estimated total of 17.5 to 21 million
children born per year during the 13th Five-Year Plan period
(2016-2020).\16\ According to data released by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) in January 2018, the number
of total births in 2017 was 17.23 million, showing a decline of
630,000 births in comparison to the 2016 figure of 17.86
million.\17\
Population experts warned that the decline in births would
continue and expected a 300,000 to 800,000 annual drop in the
newborn population over the next 10 years,\18\ a trend that
could pose a long-term threat to China's development and may
generate a heavier burden on social services due to an aging
population and shrinking workforce.\19\ Some experts attributed
the decline in births to the shrinking number of women of
childbearing age and the reluctance on the part of many married
couples to have children.\20\ Concerns that discouraged couples
from having children reportedly included the high cost of
rearing a child,\21\ lack of adequate child care and education
options,\22\ lack of time and energy to look after
children,\23\ and disruption to career development.\24\
Population experts and National People's Congress delegates
urged the Chinese government to further relax the existing
policy by adopting a three-child policy or ending all birth
restrictions, abolish ``social compensation fees,'' and offer
incentives or supporting policies, such as tax breaks and
subsidies, to encourage couples to have more children.\25\
During this reporting year, central Party and government
officials pledged to strengthen supporting policies that
facilitate implementation of family planning policies, and
stressed the need for research into population development and
evaluation of the universal two-child policy. At the 19th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in
October 2017, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping promoted the
``dovetailing of family planning policies with relevant
economic and social supporting policies'' and ``strengthening
strategic research into population development.'' \26\ Xi also
emphasized in his speech the need to ``proactively deal with
the aging population.'' \27\ In a detailed January 2018
response to Xi's speech, Li Bin, then director of the National
Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), pledged to
``improve population policies to promote balanced population
development . . .. Continue to implement well the universal
two-child policy to achieve [its] policy effectiveness . . ..
Dovetail family planning policies with social and economic
supporting policies in taxation, housing, employment, . . .
[and] childcare services . . .. Strengthen strategic research
into population development by conducting fertility surveys and
evaluation of the universal two-child policy, in order to
scientifically judge the demographic situation.'' \28\ This
past year, some local governments introduced supporting
policies--including longer paid maternity leave, financial
incentives and subsidies, and other benefits--to encourage
couples to have a second child.\29\
At the annual meetings of the National People's Congress
(NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC) in March 2018, central authorities issued a plan to
restructure Party and government agencies, including merging
the NHFPC and several other agencies to create a new National
Health Commission (NHC) under the State Council.\30\ According
to the restructuring plan, the NHC will assume oversight of
responsibilities related to family planning management and
services, in addition to managing an aging population and other
health-related matters.\31\ Some observers suggested that the
restructuring plan indicates the central authorities have
deemphasized birth control in favor of actively tackling the
demographic issue of an aging population.\32\ Other observers
saw it as an indication that authorities plan to eventually
eliminate birth limit policies.\33\ This past year, domestic
and international news media reported that experts from
academic institutions affiliated with the Party and government,
as well as a Shaanxi provincial government report on population
development, have called for ending the birth limit
policies.\34\ The NHC reportedly stated that authorities were
considering ending the two-child birth limit.\35\
According to a May 2018 Bloomberg News report, central
government authorities were considering and may have reached a
decision to end birth limit policies due to demographic
concerns of a declining birth rate, an aging population, and a
shrinking workforce.\36\ The report also cited international
criticism of the policies as a factor in the decision.\37\
Chinese authorities reportedly may replace the existing birth
limit policies with one of ``independent fertility,'' allowing
couples to decide for themselves the number of children to
have.\38\ According to the report, a decision may be announced
toward the end of 2018 or in 2019.\39\ Demographic experts and
other observers, however, commented that a decision to lift all
birth limits comes too late and would do little to reverse
demographic trends that could have adverse effects on China's
economic development.\40\ One American human rights advocate
expressed concern that authorities could still coerce unwed
mothers to pay large fines or undergo abortions, even if the
birth limit policies are abolished.\41\ [For more information
on the demographic consequences of China's population control
policies, see Demographic Consequences of Population Control
Policies later in this section.]
Coercive Implementation
Abuses committed during the implementation of family
planning policies continued during the Commission's 2018
reporting year. The amended PRC Population and Family Planning
Law contains provisions that prohibit officials from infringing
upon the ``legitimate rights and interests'' of citizens while
implementing family planning policies.\42\ Some provincial-
level population planning regulations and local government
authorities, however, continued to explicitly instruct
officials to carry out abortions, often referred to as
``remedial measures'' (bujiu cuoshi), for illegal
pregnancies.\43\
OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS
During this reporting year, official speeches and
government reports from provinces across China--including
Anhui,\44\ Fujian,\45\ Guangdong,\46\ Hubei,\47\ Hunan,\48\ and
Sichuan \49\--continued to promote implementation of harsh and
invasive family planning measures. Some local government
authorities placed an emphasis on birth limits and adherence to
family planning as a ``basic national policy'' \50\ and
stressed the need to ``maintain a low birth level.'' \51\ Other
official reports emphasized the need to strictly control and
punish illegal births \52\ and implement ``remedial measures''
to address illegal pregnancies.\53\ Some local authorities
imposed targets,\54\ instructed family planning officials to
carry out the invasive ``three inspections'' (intrauterine
device (IUD), pregnancy, and health inspections) \55\ and
``four procedures'' (IUD insertion, first-trimester abortion,
mid- to late-term abortion, and sterilization),\56\ and
demanded the collection of ``social compensation fees'' (shehui
fuyang fei).\57\ In one example, a government report from
Longhui county, Shaoyang municipality, Hunan, indicated that as
of December 6, 2017, county authorities had carried out 290
``birth-control'' operations during the winter of 2017--204 IUD
insertions, 19 sterilizations, and 67 abortions.\58\ County
authorities also collected nearly 2.76 million yuan
(approximately US$437,000) in ``social compensation fees.''
\59\
PUNISHMENT FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of
punishment to enforce citizens' compliance with population
planning policies. In accordance with national-level legal
provisions,\60\ local regulations and governments have directed
officials to punish noncompliance through heavy fines, termed
``social compensation fees,'' which reportedly compel women to
choose between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring a
fine \61\ often much greater than the average annual income in
localities across China.\62\ This past year, Chinese citizens
continued to file administrative lawsuits against family
planning agencies pertaining to the collection of ``social
compensation fees'' from married couples who gave birth to a
second child in violation of previous family planning policies
and birth limits.\63\ In recent years, population experts and
observers have repeatedly called on government authorities to
abolish ``social compensation fees.'' \64\
In addition to fines, officials imposed or threatened other
punishments for family planning violations. These punishments
included job termination,\65\ detention,\66\ and forced
abortion.\67\ The PRC Population and Family Planning Law
prohibits, and provides punishments for, officials'
infringement on citizens' personal, property, and other rights
while implementing family planning policies.\68\
Population
Control
Population
Control
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases of Coercion
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). According to two
February 2018 ChinaAid Association (ChinaAid) reports, on January 5,
2018, family planning authorities in Burultoqay (Fuhai) county, Altay
(Aletai) district, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR,
detained ethnic Kazakh woman Kuliziya Mogudong for bearing a child in
excess of birth quotas and forced her to undergo an abortion at a local
hospital.\69\ Authorities subsequently released Mogudong after the
procedure and confiscated her passport and other legal documents.\70\ A
week later, Mogudong returned to the hospital due to physical weakness
and nervousness.\71\ After about 10 days, Mogudong asked to be
released, but authorities denied her request, saying she had
tuberculosis.\72\ According to a May 2018 ChinaAid report, Mogudong
remained in ``soft detention'' at her home until May 8, when
authorities permitted Mogudong to leave for Kazakhstan to reunite with
her husband Oman Anshakhan.\73\ Local public security officials also
detained Mogudong's two older brothers--including Tursun, a local imam,
on January 27--at unknown locations.\74\ As of May 2018, Mogudong's
brothers remained in detention.\75\ Anshakhan, a naturalized citizen of
Kazakhstan, said he and Mogudang had not violated China's family
planning policies.\76\
Guangdong province. According to December 2017 reports by state-
funded news media The Paper and Party-run media Global Times,
authorities in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong, determined that a
local government official surnamed Xiong had violated family planning
policies and threatened to expel him from the Chinese Communist Party
and terminate his job.\77\ In November 2015, Xiong's wife gave birth to
their second child in the United States, before the universal two-child
policy became effective in January 2016.\78\ The couple reported the
birth of the second child to their respective employers after they had
returned to China in 2016.\79\ Xiong's employer referred the case to
the Guangzhou Municipal Health and Family Planning Commission, which
determined in January and September 2017 that the second child was born
in violation of family planning laws and policies.\80\ The Guangzhou
Municipal Discipline Inspection Commission further determined that
Xiong should be expelled from the Party and be dismissed from his job,
in accordance with national and provincial provisions.\81\ As of
December 11, 2017, Xiong was still waiting for a final decision to be
issued regarding this case.\82\ In response to concerns that some local
provisions mandating job termination for excess births violated
national laws, the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National
People's Congress Standing Committee issued a statement in September
2017 urging seven provinces, including Guangdong, to amend their local
family planning regulations.\83\ As of April 2018, some provincial
authorities had amended their family planning regulations accordingly,
while others indicated that they had plans to do so.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population
Control
Population
Control
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases of Coercion--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hebei province. According to an April 2018 Wall Street Journal
report, in or around March 2018, a high school teacher surnamed Sun--
who had discovered that she was pregnant with a third child in March--
in Tangshan municipality, Hebei, contacted the local family planning
agency to inquire whether a third child was allowed in light of the
central Party and government authorities' March 2018 restructuring plan
to create the new National Health Commission.\85\ The local family
planning agency reportedly indicated that a third child was still not
allowed, and as a government worker, Sun would be fined and probably be
dismissed from her job for violating family planning policies.\86\ A
few days after the phone call, Sun reportedly terminated the pregnancy
by swallowing a pill.\87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demographic Consequences of Population Control Policies
Decades of population control policies have exacerbated
China's demographic challenges, which include a rapidly aging
population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio imbalance.
Affected in recent decades by government restrictions on the
number of births per couple, China's total fertility rate has
dropped from approximately 3 births per woman in the late 1970s
\88\ to an estimated 1.6 births per woman in 2017, below the
replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman necessary to maintain
a stable population.\89\ A U.S.-based Chinese demographer
estimated that the 2017 fertility rate may have been as low as
1.24 births per woman.\90\ The fertility rate is even lower in
some major cities, such as Shanghai municipality, which has had
a fertility rate of approximately 0.7 births per woman for
several years, reportedly one of the lowest in the world.\91\
China's low fertility rate has contributed to a rapidly
aging population and a shrinking workforce. According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), from 2016 to
2017, China's working-age population (persons between the ages
of 16 and 59) declined by 5.48 million people to 901.99
million, continuing a downward trend for a sixth consecutive
year.\92\ During the same period, the elderly population
(persons aged 60 or older) increased by 10.04 million in 2017
to 240.90 million people, or 17.3 percent of the total
population.\93\ According to the State Council National
Population Development Plan (2016-2030), China's working-age
population is expected to decline rapidly from 2021 to 2030,
while the elderly population will increase markedly during the
same period and is predicted to reach a quarter of the
population by 2030.\94\ Some observers suggested that the
elderly population would account for approximately one-third of
China's total population by 2050.\95\ These demographic trends
reportedly may burden China's health care, social services, and
pension systems,\96\ and weaken China's economy.\97\
The Chinese government's restrictive family planning
policies also have exacerbated China's sex ratio imbalance.
Although Chinese authorities continued to implement a ban on
``non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective
abortion,'' \98\ some people reportedly continued the practice
in keeping with a traditional cultural preference for sons.\99\
According to a January 2018 NBS report, China's overall sex
ratio in 2017 was 104.81 males to 100 females, and there were
approximately 32.66 million more males than females in China
(711.37 million males to 678.71 million females).\100\ The NBS
reported that the sex ratio at birth (SRB) in 2015 was 113.51
males to 100 females,\101\ but it did not provide statistics on
the SRB for 2016 and 2017 during which the universal two-child
policy was implemented.\102\ Demographic experts have expressed
concerns that the sex ratio imbalance in China could lead to
``violent crime,'' \103\ ``sex crimes,'' ``trafficking of
women,'' \104\ and ``social instability.'' \105\ This past
year, international media reports continued to suggest a link
between China's sex ratio imbalance and the trafficking of
foreign women--from countries including Burma (Myanmar),\106\
Cambodia,\107\ North Korea,\108\ and Vietnam \109\--into China
for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation. [For
more information on cross-border trafficking, see Section II--
Human Trafficking.]
Reports also indicate that decades of birth limits under
China's population control policies combined with a traditional
preference for sons may have encouraged a black market for
illegal adoptions.\110\ In January 2018, the Maoming Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong province sentenced 18
people for ``child trafficking'' and 8 others for ``buying a
trafficked child.'' \111\ According to reports, the trafficking
ring acquired infants in Funing county, Wenshan Zhuang and Miao
Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province, and other locations,
and sold them for 73,000 yuan to 98,000 yuan (approximately
US$11,600 to $15,555).\112\ Despite government efforts to
combat ``child trafficking,'' illegal adoptions reportedly
continued to occur, and the problem appeared to have worsened
in recent years.\113\ [For inconsistencies in the definition of
``child trafficking'' between Chinese law and international
standards, see Section II--Human Trafficking.]
Population
Control
Population
Control
Notes to Section II--Population Control
\1\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``December 12,
2016, National Health and Family Planning Commission Regular Press
Conference Text Record'' [2016 nian 12 yue 12 ri guojia weisheng
jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 12 December 16; PRC
Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15,
effective 1 January 16, art. 18.
\2\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 18. Article 18 of the
Population and Family Planning Law provides that, ``the state advocates
two children per married couple.'' For provincial population
regulations that require couples be married to have children and limit
them to bearing two children, see, e.g., Fujian Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Province Population and Family
Planning Regulations [Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli],
issued 29 April 88, amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18 November 00,
26 July 02, 14 December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16, 24 November
17, arts. 8, 12; Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region People's Congress
Standing Committee, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Guangxi zhuang zu zizhiqu renkou he jihua
shengyu tiaoli], issued 23 March 12, amended 13 January 14, 15 January
16, art. 13.
\3\ See, e.g., Fujian Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 29 April 88,
amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18 November 00, 26 July 02, 14
December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16, 24 November 17, art. 9(4)-
(5); Heilongjiang Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Heilongjiang Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Heilongjiang sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 18 October
02, amended 13 December 13, 22 April 14, 17 April 15, 21 April 16, art.
13.
\4\ For provincial population planning provisions that allow these
exceptions for having an additional child, see, e.g., Fujian Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 29 April 88, amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18
November 00, 26 July 02, 14 December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16,
24 November 17, art. 9(1)-(3); Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Guangxi zhuang zu zizhiqu
renkou he jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 23 March 12, amended 13 January
14, 15 January 16, art. 14(1)-(5); Jiangxi Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 16
June 90, amended 30 June 95, 20 June 97, 29 July 02, 27 March 09, 16
January 14, 20 January 16, reprinted in People's Daily, 2 February 16,
art. 9(2)-(3).
\5\ See, e.g., Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and Family Planning
Bureau, ``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family Planning Quality
Service Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018 niandu jihua
shengyu dong chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha tongbao], reprinted
in Longhui News, 19 December 17; Qichun County People's Government,
``Qingshi Township 2018 Government Work Report'' [Qingshi zhen 2018
nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 19 January 18.
\6\ See, e.g., Yin Han, ``Experts Call for Official Leniency Toward
Parents of Illegal Second Child,'' Global Times, 12 December 17; Zhao
Meng, ``Worker in Guizhou Fired Last Month for Having a Child in Excess
of Birth Quotas 3 Years Ago, One Week Later `Excess Child Job
Termination' Provision Abolished'' [Guizhou yi zhigong 3 nian qian
chaosheng shang yue bei kai, yi zhou hou ``chaosheng kaichu'' tiaokuan
feizhi], The Paper, 4 April 18.
\7\ See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in
Xinjiang Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam,
Detained as Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai
gege ahong bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18.
\8\ See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in
Xinjiang Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam,
Detained as Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai
gege ahong bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18. See also Liyan Qi and
Fanfan Wang, ``A Limit to China's Economic Rise: Not Enough Babies,''
Wall Street Journal, 29 April 18.
\9\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the
Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 95, and endorsed by UN
General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 22 December 95, Annex I, paras.
9, 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments which
participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their
commitment to ``[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of
women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;'' (Annex I, para. 9)
and ``[t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all
women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own
fertility, is basic to their empowerment (Annex I, para. 17). Programme
of Action adopted by the Cairo International Conference on Population
and Development, 13 September 94, paras. 7.2, 8.25. Paragraph 7.2
states, ``Reproductive health therefore implies that people . . . have
the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how
often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men
and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective,
affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice .
. ..'' Paragraph 8.25 states, ``In no case should abortion be promoted
as a method of family planning.'' For coercive controls imposed on
Chinese women and their families, see, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid,
``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang Underwent Forced Abortion, Her
Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin
yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February
18; Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and Family Planning Bureau,
``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family Planning Quality Service
Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018 niandu jihua shengyu dong
chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha tongbao], reprinted in Longhui
News, 19 December 17.
\10\ United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, 15 September 95, chap. II, para. 3; chap.
VI, para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the Fourth
World Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action. United Nations Population Information Network,
Report of the International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD), A/CONF.171/13, 18 October 94, chap. II, sec. C; chap. VI, sec.
1. China was one of the participating States at the ICPD, which reached
a general agreement on the Programme of Action. The Programme of Action
is provided as an annex to the above ICPD report.
\11\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art.
1; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 51. In 2016, the UN Committee against Torture noted its concern
regarding ``reports of coerced sterilization and forced abortions, and
. . . the lack of information on the number of investigations into such
allegations . . . [and] the lack of information regarding redress
provided to victims of past violations.'' For acts of coercion
committed in the implementation of population planning policies, see,
e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang
Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as
Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong
bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18.
\12\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, last visited 12 July 18. China signed the
Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\13\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 18.
\14\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of Director Li Bin and Others Answering Journalists' Questions
Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy' '' [Li
bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce'' da jizhe wen
wenzi shilu], 8 March 16.
\15\ ``Three Million Additional Births Per Year With the Universal
Two-Child Policy, Chinese Officials Say'' [Zhongguo guanfang shuo,
kaifang ertai mei nian duo sheng sanbai wan ren], Radio Free Asia, 10
November 15.
\16\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Department
of Community Family Planning Official Answers Questions From Health
News and China Population Daily Journalists Regarding the Number of
Births in 2015'' [Zhidaosi fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da
jiankang bao, zhongguo renkou bao jizhe wen], 20 January 16.
\17\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``The Economy Was
Stable in 2017, and Exceeded Expectations'' [2017 nian jingji yunxing
wen zhong xiang hao, hao yu yuqi], 18 January 18; Ma Danmeng and Han
Wei, ``Couples Not Delivering on Beijing's Push for Two Babies,''
Caixin, 18 January 18. For the total number of births in 2016, see
National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy Achieved a
Good Start for the `13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016'' [2016 nian
guomin jingji shixian ``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20 January 17.
\18\ Ma Danmeng and Han Wei, ``Couples Not Delivering on Beijing's
Push for Two Babies,'' Caixin, 18 January 18; Liang Jianzhang and Huang
Wenzheng, ``Birth Population Avalanche, Need To Cut Taxes and Provide
Subsidies To Encourage Having More Children'' [Chusheng renkou xuebeng
wei yao haizi jianshui he butie], Caixin, 18 January 18; ``China's
Declining Birth Rate Requires Policy Change,'' Xinhua, 25 January 18.
\19\ ``China Sounds Population Alarm: It Is Imperative To End Birth
Restrictions'' [Zhongguo laxiang renkou jingbao: quanmian fangkai
shengyu shizai bixing], Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18; Issaku Harada,
``China's Falling Births Expose Limits of `Two-Child Policy,' '' Nikkei
Asian Review, 23 January 18.
\20\ ``China Sounds Population Alarm: It Is Imperative To End Birth
Restrictions'' [Zhongguo laxiang renkou jingbao: quanmian fangkai
shengyu shizai bixing], Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18; ``China's
Declining Birth Rate Requires Policy Change,'' Xinhua, 25 January 18;
He Keyao, ``Chinese Youth Say No to Having Kids on the Grounds of
Financial Pressure, Happiness and Career Development,'' Global Times, 6
February 18.
\21\ ``China Sounds Population Alarm: It Is Imperative To End Birth
Restrictions'' [Zhongguo laxiang renkou jingbao: quanmian fangkai
shengyu shizai bixing], Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18; ``China's
Declining Birth Rate Requires Policy Change,'' Xinhua, 25 January 18;
Feng Xixi, ``Anxiety Over Having Two Children? 75% of Those Surveyed
Believe the Pressure Can Be Controlled'' [Sheng er hai hen jiaolu? 75%
shoufang zhe renwei yali kekong], Jinyang Net, 22 February 18.
\22\ Feng Xixi, ``Anxiety Over Having Two Children? 75% of Those
Surveyed Believe the Pressure Can Be Controlled'' [Sheng er hai hen
jiaolu? 75% shoufang zhe renwei yali kekong], Jinyang Net, 22 February
18; ``China's Declining Birth Rate Requires Policy Change,'' Xinhua, 25
January 18; Issaku Harada, ``China's Falling Births Expose Limits of
`Two-Child Policy,' '' Nikkei Asian Review, 23 January 18.
\23\ Leta Hong Fincher, ``China Dropped Its One-Child Policy. So
Why Aren't Chinese Women Having More Babies? '' New York Times, 20
February 18.
\24\ He Keyao, ``Chinese Youth Say No to Having Kids on the Grounds
of Financial Pressure, Happiness and Career Development,'' Global
Times, 6 February 18; ``China's Declining Birth Rate Requires Policy
Change,'' Xinhua, 25 January 18.
\25\ ``China Sounds Population Alarm: It Is Imperative To End Birth
Restrictions'' [Zhongguo laxiang renkou jingbao: quanmian fangkai
shengyu shizai bixing], Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18; Zhang Hui,
``Latest Population Data Prompts Call for China's Family Planning
Policy To Be Abolished,'' Global Times, 20 March 18; Paul Yip, ``Does
China Actually Need More Children To Replace Its Declining Working-Age
Population? '' South China Morning Post, 28 January 18; Zhang Hui,
``Lawmaker Urges Lower Income Tax for Two-Child Families,'' Global
Times, 16 March 18.
\26\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xinshidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 8(5).
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ Li Bin, ``Implement the Healthy China Strategy (Earnestly
Study, Promote, and Implement the Spirit of the Party's Nineteenth
Party Congress)'' [Shishi jiankang zhongguo zhanlue (renzhen xuexi
xuanchuan guanche dang de shijiuda jingshen)], People's Daily, 12
January 18.
\29\ ``Couples Are Being Offered Benefits To Have a Second Child,''
China Internet Information Center, 19 July 18; ``China Provinces Offer
Incentives To Raise Birth Rate,'' CGTN, 19 July 18; Peng Xunwen, ``Let
People Dare and Be Willing To Have a `Second Child' '' [Rang renmen gan
sheng yuan sheng ``er hai''], People's Daily, 6 August 18; Wang Jun,
``Many Localities Nationwide Successively Introduced Policies To
`Promote Birth' of a Second Child: Subsidies Given for Childbirth, Baby
Formula, Etc.'' [Quanguo duo di xiangji chutai ``cui sheng'' er hai
zhengce: fa fenmian, naifen deng butie], The Paper, 18 July 18.
\30\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(28); State Council, Institutional Reform
Plan [Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(5).
\31\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(28); State Council, Institutional Reform
Plan'' [Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(5).
\32\ Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``China's Notorious Family Planning
Agency Fades Into History,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 March 18; `` `An
Old Official' Ma Xiaowei at the Helm of the National Health Commission,
What Changes Can [He] Bring? '' [``Lao jiang'' ma xiaowei zhangduo
guojia weisheng jiankang weiyuanhui, neng dailai shenme gaibian?],
Pharmacodia, 20 March 18; Goh Sui Noi, ``NPC 2018: China Proposes
Sweeping Reorganisation of Cabinet,'' Straits Times, 13 March 18;
``China Establishes New National Health Commission, Dismantles NHFPC''
[Zhonguo xin she guojia weisheng jiankang weiyuanhui chexiao weijiwei],
Duowei News, 13 March 18. See also ``Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Issues `Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and Government
Agencies' '' [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou
gaige fang'an''], Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(28); State Council,
Institutional Reform Plan [Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18,
sec. 1(5).
\33\ Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``China's Notorious Family Planning
Agency Fades Into History,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 March 18; Zhang
Hui, ``China To Dismantle Family Planning Commission,'' Global Times,
13 March 18; Zhang Hui, ``Latest Population Data Prompts Call for
China's Family Planning Policy To Be Abolished,'' Global Times, 20
March 18.
\34\ Wang Jun, ``China Human Resources and Social Security Magazine
Article: Time To End Birth Limit Policies Without Delay'' [``Zhongguo
renli ziyuan shehui baozhang'' zazhi kanwen: quanmian fangkai shengyu
kebu ronghuan], The Paper, 21 July 18; Wang Jun, ``Shaanxi Issues 2017
Population Development Report, Suggests Ending Birth Limit Policy at an
Appropriate Time'' [Shaanxi 2017 nian renkou fazhan baogao fabu, jianyi
shishi quanmian fangkai jihua shengyu], The Paper, 21 July 18; Xi Yue,
``Chinese Province Suggests Ending Birth Restrictions,'' Sixth Tone, 23
July 18; ``China State Researcher Predicts End to Child Birth
Restrictions,'' Bloomberg News, 10 August 18.
\35\ Steven Lee Myers and Olivia Mitchell Ryan, ``Burying `One
Child' Limits, China Pushes Women To Have More Babies,'' New York
Times, 11 August 18.
\36\ ``China Considers Ending Birth Limits as Soon as This Year,''
Bloomberg, 21 May 18. See also Alexa Lardieri, ``China To Eliminate 2-
Child Policy,'' U.S. News & World Report, 21 May 18; Lily Kuo, ``China
Shows Little Appetite for Lifting of Family Size Limit,'' Guardian, 26
May 18.
\37\ ``China Considers Ending Birth Limits as Soon as This Year,''
Bloomberg, 21 May 18. See also Alexa Lardieri, ``China to Eliminate 2-
Child Policy,'' U.S. News & World Report, 21 May 18.
\38\ ``China Considers Ending Birth Limits as Soon as This Year,''
Bloomberg, 21 May 18.
\39\ Ibid.
\40\ Ibid.; Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``A Limit to China's Economic
Rise: Not Enough Babies,'' Wall Street Journal, 29 April 18; Alexa
Lardieri, ``China To Eliminate 2-Child Policy,'' U.S. News & World
Report, 21 May 18; Michelle La Rosa, ``China May Lift Its Two-Child
Policy--Here's What That Could Mean,'' Catholic News Agency, 23 May 18;
Gina Heeb, ``China Is Thinking About Scrapping Birth Limits--But That
Won't Have the Impact It's Hoping For,'' Business Insider Australia, 23
May 18.
\41\ Michelle La Rosa, ``China May Lift Its Two-Child Policy--
Here's What That Could Mean,'' Catholic News Agency, 23 May 18.
\42\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 39.
\43\ He Yafu, ``Deng Chao and Zhao Ruirui Who Were Almost Aborted''
[Cha dian bei duotai de deng chao he zhao ruirui], CNPOP, 9 February
14. For examples of provincial-level population planning regulations
instructing officials to carry out abortions, see Jiangxi Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 16 June 90, amended 30 June 95, 20 June 97, 29 July 02,
27 March 09, 16 January 14, 20 January 16, art. 15; Hubei Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08, 30 July 10, 27
March 14, 13 January 16, art. 12. For examples of local authorities
instructing officials to carry out abortions, see Dongshan County Grain
Bureau, ``Dongshan County Grain Bureau Circular Regarding Issuing 2018
Family Planning Work Assignments to Subsidiary Units'' [Dongshan xian
liangshi ju guanyu xiada suo shu danwei 2018 nian jihua shengyu gongzuo
zerenshu de tongzhi], 3 April 18; Baiyun District People's Government,
``Working Guidelines for Migrant Population To Apply for Family
Planning Related Certificates in Baiyun District'' [Baiyun liudong
renkou shen ling jisheng xiangguan zhengming banshi zhinan], 30
November 17; Mianning County Health and Family Planning Bureau,
``Mianning County Carries Out the First Seasonal `IUD and Pregnancy
Monitoring' Inspection Work'' [Mianning xian kaizhan di yi jidu ``huan
yun qing jiance'' ducha gongzuo], 3 April 18; Chen Tong, Huigou
Township Health and Family Planning Office Information Office, ``New
Conceptional Path for Family Planning Development in Huigou Township,
Lingbi County'' [Lingbi xian huigou zhen xinxing jihua shengyu fazhan
gouxiang zhi lu], 7 March 18. Illegal pregnancies are often referred to
as ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies (jihua wai huaiyun) or ``out-of-policy''
pregnancies (zhengce wai huaiyun).
\44\ Chen Tong, Huigou Township Health and Family Planning Office
Information Office, ``New Conceptional Path for Family Planning
Development in Huigou Township, Lingbi County'' [Lingbi xian huigou
zhen xinxing jihua shengyu fazhan gouxiang zhi lu], 7 March 18.
\45\ Dongshan County Grain Bureau, ``Dongshan County Grain Bureau
Circular Regarding Issuing 2018 Family Planning Work Assignments to
Subsidiary Units'' [Dongshan xian liangshi ju guanyu xiada suo shu
danwei 2018 nian jihua shengyu gongzuo zerenshu de tongzhi], 3 April
18.
\46\ Baiyun District People's Government, ``Working Guidelines for
Migrant Population To Apply for Family Planning Related Certificates in
Baiyun District'' [Baiyun liudong renkou shen ling jisheng xiangguan
zhengming banshi zhinan], 30 November 17.
\47\ Qichun County People's Government, ``Qingshi Township 2018
Government Work Report'' [Qingshi zhen 2018 nian zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 19 January 18.
\48\ Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and Family Planning Bureau,
``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family Planning Quality Service
Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018 niandu jihua shengyu dong
chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha tongbao], reprinted in Longhui
News, 19 December 17; Songbo Ethnic Yao Township Health and Family
Planning Office, ``Songbo Ethnic Yao Township 2017 Family Planning Work
Summary and 2018 Work Plan'' [Songbo yaozu xiang 2017 nian jisheng
gongzuo zongjie he 2018 nian gongzuo jihua], reprinted in Jiangyong
County People's Government, 20 December 17.
\49\ Mianning County Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``Mianning
County Carries Out the First Seasonal `IUD and Pregnancy Monitoring'
Inspection Work'' [Mianning xian kaizhan di yi jidu ``huan yun qing
jiance'' ducha gongzuo], 3 April 18.
\50\ See, e.g., Zhao Jingjing, ``Lengshuijiang City Convenes Spring
Family Planning Turning Up Heat and Increasing Pressure Work
Conference'' [Lengshuijiang shi zhaokai chunji jihua shengyu shengwen
jiaya gongzuo huiyi], Lengshuijiang News Net, 2 April 18; Dongshan
County Grain Bureau, ``Dongshan County Grain Bureau Circular Regarding
Issuing 2018 Family Planning Work Assignments to Subsidiary Units''
[Dongshan xian liangshi ju guanyu xiada suo shu danwei 2018 nian jihua
shengyu gongzuo zerenshu de tongzhi], 3 April 18; Hengshui Municipality
Health and Family Planning Comprehensive Supervision and Enforcement
Bureau, ``Shenzhou City Convenes Special Rectification Mobilization
Meeting for Collection of Social Compensation Fees'' [Shenzhou shi
zhaokai shehui fuyang fei zhengshou zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong
dongyuan huiyi], 27 November 17.
\51\ See, e.g., Liannan County People's Government, ``Liannan
County Convenes 2017 Population and Family Planning Work Meeting''
[Liannan zhaokai 2017 nian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi], 6
November 17; Xu Siyuan, ``Zhouwang Township Makes Arrangements To Carry
Out 2018 Health and Family Planning Work'' [Zhouwang zhen anpai bushu
2018 nian weisheng jisheng gongzuo], 29 March 18.
\52\ See, e.g., Liannan County People's Government, ``Liannan
County Convenes 2017 Population and Family Planning Work Meeting''
[Liannan zhaokai 2017 nian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi], 6
November 17; Helan County Xigang Street Office, ``Interpretation of the
`Two-Child' Policy'' [``Quanmian lianghai'' zhengce jiedu], 15 March
18; Hengshui Municipality Health and Family Planning Comprehensive
Supervision and Enforcement Bureau, ``Shenzhou City Convenes Special
Rectification Mobilization Meeting for Collection of Social
Compensation Fees'' [Shenzhou shi zhaokai shehui fuyang fei zhengshou
zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong dongyuan huiyi], 27 November 17.
\53\ See, e.g., Mianning County Health and Family Planning Bureau,
``Mianning County Carries Out the First Seasonal `IUD and Pregnancy
Monitoring' Inspection Work'' [Mianning xian kaizhan di yi jidu ``huan
yun qing jiance'' ducha gongzuo], 3 April 18; Chen Tong, Huigou
Township Health and Family Planning Office Information Office, ``New
Conceptional Path for Family Planning Development in Huigou Township,
Lingbi County'' [Lingbi xian huigou zhen xinxing jihua shengyu fazhan
gouxiang zhi lu], 7 March 18; Dongshan County Grain Bureau, ``Dongshan
County Grain Bureau Circular Regarding Issuing 2018 Family Planning
Work Assignments to Subsidiary Units'' [Dongshan xian liangshi ju
guanyu xiada suo shu danwei 2018 nian jihua shengyu gongzuo zerenshu de
tongzhi], 3 April 18. Illegal pregnancies are often referred to as
``out-of-plan'' pregnancies (jihua wai huaiyun) or ``out-of-policy''
pregnancies (zhengce wai huaiyun).
\54\ See, e.g., Zhao Jingjing, ``Lengshuijiang City Convenes Spring
Family Planning Turning Up Heat and Increasing Pressure Work
Conference'' [Lengshuijiang shi zhaokai chunji jihua shengyu shengwen
jiaya gongzuo huiyi], Lengshuijiang News Net, 2 April 18; Dongshan
County Grain Bureau, ``Dongshan County Grain Bureau Circular Regarding
Issuing 2018 Family Planning Work Assignments to Subsidiary Units''
[Dongshan xian liangshi ju guanyu xiada suo shu danwei 2018 nian jihua
shengyu gongzuo zerenshu de tongzhi], 3 April 18.
\55\ See, e.g., Longguang Township People's Government, ``Longguang
Township March Work Updates'' [Longguang zhen 3 yue gongzuo dongtai],
reprinted in Lingshui County People's Government, 4 April 18; Mianning
County Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``The Fourth Family Planning
`Three Inspections' Successfully Completed in Chengxiang Township,
Mianning County'' [Mianning xian chengxiang zhen jisheng di si ci ``san
cha'' shunli jieshu], 8 December 17. See also Ma Jian, Women's Rights
in China, ``Investigation Into the `Three Inspections' of Rural Family
Planning'' [Nongcun jihua shengyu zhong de ``san cha'' qingkuang
diaocha], reprinted in Boxun, 15 April 09.
\56\ See, e.g., Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and Family
Planning Bureau, ``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family
Planning Quality Service Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018
niandu jihua shengyu dong chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha
tongbao], reprinted in Longhui News, 19 December 17; Songbo Ethnic Yao
Township Health and Family Planning Office, ``Songbo Ethnic Yao
Township 2017 Family Planning Work Summary and 2018 Work Plan'' [Songbo
yaozu xiang 2017 nian jisheng gongzuo zongjie he 2018 nian gongzuo
jihua], reprinted in Jiangyong County People's Government, 20 December
17; Qichun County People's Government, ``Qingshi Township 2018
Government Work Report'' [Qingshi zhen 2018 nian zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 19 January 18. See also Yu Han, ``Chinese People Suffer From
Family Planning [Policy's] Forced Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua
shengyu qiangzhi jiezha renliu hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15
June 12.
\57\ See, e.g., Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and Family
Planning Bureau, ``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family
Planning Quality Service Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018
niandu jihua shengyu dong chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha
tongbao], reprinted in Longhui News, 19 December 17; Songbo Ethnic Yao
Township Health and Family Planning Office, ``Songbo Ethnic Yao
Township 2017 Family Planning Work Summary and 2018 Work Plan'' [Songbo
yaozu xiang 2017 nian jisheng gongzuo zongjie he 2018 nian gongzuo
jihua], reprinted in Jiangyong County People's Government, 20 December
17; Qichun County People's Government, ``Qingshi Township 2018
Government Work Report'' [Qingshi zhen 2018 nian zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 19 January 18. ``Social compensation fees'' are also known as
``social maintenance fees.''
\58\ Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and Family Planning Bureau,
``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family Planning Quality Service
Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018 niandu jihua shengyu dong
chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha tongbao], reprinted in Longhui
News, 19 December 17.
\59\ Ibid.
\60\ State Council, Measures for Administration of Collection of
Social Compensation Fees [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli banfa],
issued 2 August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7. See also PRC
Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15,
effective 1 January 16, arts. 18, 41.
\61\ See, e.g., Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``A Limit to China's
Economic Rise: Not Enough Babies,'' Wall Street Journal, 29 April 18.
\62\ For a list of provincial-level regulations that mandate
collection of ``social compensation fees,'' see ``2018 Social
Compensation Fee Collection Standards and Newest Regulations'' [2018
nian shehui fuyang fei zhengshou biaozhun yu zui xin guiding], Shebao
Chaxun Wang, 15 January 18. For examples of local governments that
collected or demanded collection of ``social compensation fees'' during
this reporting year, see, e.g., Chen Hong, Longhui County Health and
Family Planning Bureau, ``Inspection Report for the 2018 Annual Family
Planning Quality Service Activities During Winter and Spring'' [2018
niandu jihua shengyu dong chun ji youzhi fuwu huodong de ducha
tongbao], reprinted in Longhui News, 19 December 17; Qichun County
People's Government, ``Qingshi Township 2018 Government Work Report''
[Qingshi zhen 2018 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 19 January 18; Gao
Yong, Tengzhou City People's Government, ``Nanshahe Township Writes a
New Chapter for Health and Family Planning Work'' [Nanshahe zhen puxie
weisheng jisheng gongzuo xin pianzhang], 16 November 17; Tian Hongxiu,
``Heyuan Municipality Health and Family Planning Bureau Director Yuan
Chengzhang Discusses the Study and Implementation of the Nineteenth
Party Congress Spirit'' [Wo ju juzhang yuan chengzhang tan xuexi
guanche dang de shijiuda jingshen], Heyuan Daily, reprinted in Heyuan
Municipality Health and Family Planning Bureau, 28 December 17.
\63\ See, e.g., Wang Lianzhang, ``High Court Accepts Appeal Against
Family Planning Fine,'' Sixth Tone, 22 November 17; Zhao Meng, ``Should
`Having a Second Child Before the [Two-Child] Policy' Be Punished
Retroactively? Another Jiangsu Couple Successfully Files Petition for
Appeal'' [``Zhengce qian er hai'' shifou gai bei zhui fa? you yi dui
jiangsu fufu shenqing zai shen huo li'an], The Paper, 21 November 17.
\64\ See, e.g., ``China Sounds Population Alarm: It Is Imperative
To End Birth Restrictions'' [Zhongguo laxiang renkou jingbao: quanmian
fangkai shengyu shizai bixing], Radio Free Asia, 26 January 18; Sha
Xueliang, ``Huang Xihua: Birth Rate Dropped, Recommendation To Rescind
Collection of Social Compensation Fees'' [Huang xihua: renkou chusheng
lu xiajiang jianyi quxiao zhengshou shehui fuyang fei], Beijing News,
reprinted in Sina, 12 March 18; Wang Ling, ``More `Rush To Give Birth
to Second Child' Cases Nationwide, Need To Clarify Whether To Keep or
Abolish Social Compensation Fees'' [Quanguo ``qiang sheng erhai''
anjian zengduo shehui fuyang fei cun fei dai mingque], Yicai, 24 March
17; Wang Ling, ``NHFPC: Administrative Lawsuits Related to Social
Compensation Fees Increase in Some Areas'' [Weijiwei: bufen diqu shehui
fuyang fei xiangguan xingzheng susong anjian zengjia], Chinese Business
Network, 4 March 17.
\65\ See, e.g., Yin Han, ``Experts Call for Official Leniency
Toward Parents of Illegal Second Child,'' Global Times, 12 December 17;
Zhao Meng, ``Worker in Guizhou Fired Last Month for Having a Child in
Excess of Birth Quotas 3 Years Ago, One Week Later `Excess Child Job
Termination' Provision Abolished'' [Guizhou yi zhigong 3 nian qian
chaosheng shang yue bei kai, yi zhou hou ``chaosheng kaichu'' tiaokuan
feizhi], The Paper, 4 April 18.
\66\ See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in
Xinjiang Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam,
Detained as Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai
gege ahong bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18.
\67\ Ibid.
\68\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 39(1)-(2). Article 4
of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law states that officials
``shall perform their family planning work duties strictly in
accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and
they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of
citizens.'' Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal
or administrative punishment if he ``infringe[s] on a citizen's
personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and
interests'' or ``abuse[s] his power, neglect[s] his duty, or engage[s]
in malpractice for personal gain'' in the implementation of family
planning policies.
\69\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang
Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as
Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong
bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18; ChinaAid, ``Muslim Woman Forced
Into Abortion,'' 5 February 18. For more information on Kuliziya
Mogudong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-
00105.
\70\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang
Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as
Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong
bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18; ChinaAid, ``Muslim Woman Forced
Into Abortion,'' 5 February 18.
\71\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang
Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as
Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong
bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18; ChinaAid, ``Muslim Woman Forced
Into Abortion,'' 5 February 18.
\72\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang
Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as
Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong
bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18; ChinaAid, ``Muslim Woman Forced
Into Abortion,'' 5 February 18.
\73\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``[Ethnic] Kazakh Woman Underwent Forced
Abortion, [She Was] Permitted To Leave After Several Months in Soft
Detention'' [Hasakesitan funu bei qiangzhi duotai ruanjin shuyue zhong
huo likai], 14 May 18.
\74\ Ibid.; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in
Xinjiang Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam,
Detained as Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai
gege ahong bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18; ChinaAid, ``Muslim Woman
Forced Into Abortion,'' 5 February 18. For more information on Tursun,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00108.
\75\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``[Ethnic] Kazakh Woman Underwent Forced
Abortion, [She Was] Permitted To Leave After Several Months in Soft
Detention'' [Hasakesitan funu bei qiangzhi duotai ruanjin shuyue zhong
huo likai], 14 May 18.
\76\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pregnant Muslim Woman in Xinjiang
Underwent Forced Abortion, Her Brother, a Muslim Imam, Detained as
Retaliation'' [Xinjiang musilin yunfu bei qiangzhi duotai gege ahong
bei baofuxing jubu], 4 February 18; ChinaAid, ``Muslim Woman Forced
Into Abortion,'' 5 February 18.
\77\ Zhao Meng, ``Guangzhou Deputy Director-Level Cadre Had Second
Child Before Family Planning Policy [Change], Faces Termination After
Being Deemed Illegal by Municipal Health and Family Planning
Commission'' [Guangzhou fu chu ji ganbu shengyu zhengce qian er hai,
bei shi weijiwei rending weifa mianlin kaichu], The Paper, 12 December
17; Yin Han, ``Experts Call for Official Leniency Toward Parents of
Illegal Second Child,'' Global Times, 12 December 17.
\78\ Zhao Meng, ``Guangzhou Deputy Director-Level Cadre Had Second
Child Before Family Planning Policy [Change], Faces Termination After
Being Deemed Illegal by Municipal Health and Family Planning
Commission'' [Guangzhou fu chu ji ganbu shengyu zhengce qian er hai,
bei shi weijiwei rending weifa mianlin kaichu], The Paper, 12 December
17; Yin Han, ``Experts Call for Official Leniency Toward Parents of
Illegal Second Child,'' Global Times, 12 December 17.
\79\ Zhao Meng, ``Guangzhou Deputy Director-Level Cadre Had Second
Child Before Family Planning Policy [Change], Faces Termination After
Being Deemed Illegal by Municipal Health and Family Planning
Commission'' [Guangzhou fu chu ji ganbu shengyu zhengce qian er hai,
bei shi weijiwei rending weifa mianlin kaichu], The Paper, 12 December
17.
\80\ Ibid.
\81\ Ibid. See also PRC Population and Family Planning Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29
December 01, amended 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 42;
Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing Committee, ``Guangdong
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations'' [Guangdong sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2 February 80, amended 17 May
86, 28 November 92, 1 December 97, 18 September 98, 21 May 99, 25 July
02, 28 November 08, 27 March 14, 30 December 15, 29 September 16, art.
40.
\82\ Zhao Meng, ``Guangzhou Deputy Director-Level Cadre Had Second
Child Before Family Planning Policy [Change], Faces Termination After
Being Deemed Illegal by Municipal Health and Family Planning
Commission'' [Guangzhou fu chu ji ganbu shengyu zhengce qian er hai,
bei shi weijiwei rending weifa mianlin kaichu], The Paper, 12 December
17.
\83\ Zhao Yu, ``There Are Still 7 Provinces That Haven't Revised
the `Extra Births Job Termination' Provisions' '' [``Chaosheng ji
citui'' fagui hai you zhe 7 ge shengfen wei xiugai], Red Star News,
reprinted in China Youth Net, 26 December 17. See also Zhao Meng,
``Worker in Guizhou Fired Last Month for Having a Child in Excess of
Birth Quotas 3 Years Ago, One Week Later `Excess Child Job Termination'
Provision Abolished'' [Guizhou yi zhigong 3 nian qian chaosheng shang
yue bei kai, yi zhou hou ``chaosheng kaichu'' tiaokuan feizhi], The
Paper, 4 April 18.
\84\ Zhao Meng, ``Worker in Guizhou Fired Last Month for Having a
Child in Excess of Birth Quotas 3 Years Ago, One Week Later `Excess
Child Job Termination' Provision Abolished'' [Guizhou yi zhigong 3 nian
qian chaosheng shang yue bei kai, yi zhou hou ``chaosheng kaichu''
tiaokuan feizhi], The Paper, 4 April 18.
\85\ Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``A Limit to China's Economic Rise:
Not Enough Babies,'' Wall Street Journal, 29 April 18. For more
information on the reorganization of Party and government institutions,
including the creation of the new National Health Commission, see
``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for Deepening
Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa
``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''], Xinhua, 21 March 18;
State Council, Institutional Reform Plan [Guowuyuan jigou gaige
fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(5).
\86\ Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``A Limit to China's Economic Rise:
Not Enough Babies,'' Wall Street Journal, 29 April 18.
\87\ Ibid.
\88\ World Bank, ``Fertility Rate, Total (Births Per Woman),'' last
visited 16 July 18.
\89\ Serenitie Wang, ``Recovering From One Child: China's Growing
Fertility Problem,'' CNN, 7 May 18; Central Intelligence Agency,
``World Factbook: China,'' last visited 15 May 18.
\90\ Lily Kuo, ``China Shows Little Appetite for Lifting of Family
Size Limit,'' Guardian, 26 May 18; Liyan Qi and Fanfan Wang, ``A Limit
to China's Economic Rise: Not Enough Babies,'' Wall Street Journal, 29
April 18.
\91\ Dexter Roberts, ``What Happened to China's Baby Bump? ''
Bloomberg Businessweek, 13 February 18; Paul Yip, ``Does China Actually
Need More Children To Replace Its Declining Working-Age Population? ''
South China Morning Post, 28 January 18; Hua'erjie Laoye, ``Ren Dapao:
Is China's Real Estate Market Really China's `Ticking Time Bomb? ' ''
[Ren dapao: zhongguo loushi zhen de shi zhongguo jingji de ``dingshi
zhadan'' ma?], Sina, 14 March 17.
\92\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``The Economy Was
Stable in 2017, and Exceeded Expectations'' [2017 nian jingji yunxing
wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi], 18 January 18; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``National Economy Achieved a Good Start for the
`13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016'' [2016 nian guomin jingji shixian
``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20 January 17; Chi Dehua, ``China's
Working-Age Population Continues To Shrink,'' GBTIMES, 1 March 18.
\93\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``The Economy Was
Stable in 2017, and Exceeded Expectations'' [2017 nian jingji yunxing
wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi], 18 January 18; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``National Economy Achieved a Good Start for the
`13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016'' [2016 nian guomin jingji shixian
``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20 January 17.
\94\ State Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-
2030) [Guojia renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30
December 16.
\95\ Chong Koh Ping, ``China's Elderly: Old and Left Behind,''
Straits Times, 28 October 17; Shi Jia, ``Dealing With China's Aging
Population,'' Shanghai Daily, 19 December 17; Yue Wang, ``No One in
China Wants To Get Married Anymore, and It's Making Beijing Nervous,''
Forbes, 17 October 17.
\96\ Chong Koh Ping, ``China's Elderly: Old and Left Behind,''
Straits Times, 28 October 17; ``China Sounds Population Alarm: It Is
Imperative To End Birth Restrictions'' [Zhongguo laxiang renkou
jingbao: quanmian fangkai shengyu shizai bixing], Radio Free Asia, 26
January 18; Issaku Harada, ``China's Social Security Shortfall Nears
$100bn,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 8 February 18; Sidney Leng and Mimi Lau,
``Greying China Looks at Dropping All Limits on Birth Control,'' South
China Morning Post, 23 October 17.
\97\ Elias Glenn and Stella Qiu, ``China Working-Age Population
Shrinks, Presenting Pitfall for Pension Plans,'' Reuters, 28 February
18; Chong Koh Ping, ``China's Elderly: Old and Left Behind,'' Straits
Times, 28 October 17; Peter Wood, ``Greying China Strains Social Safety
Net, Healthcare System,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 2, 13 February 18, 2-3.
\98\ For national laws and regulations prohibiting the practices of
non-medically necessary gender determination testing and sex-selective
abortion, see PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 35; National Health and
Family Planning Commission et al., Regulations on Prohibiting Non-
Medically Necessary Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion
[Jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de tai'er xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie
rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 28 March 16, effective 1
May 16. For provincial regulations that ban non-medically necessary sex
determination and sex-selective abortion, see, e.g., Hubei Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08, 30 July 10, 27
March 14, 13 January 16, art. 31; Sichuan Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, Sichuan Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2
July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17 October 97, 26 September 02, 24
September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January 16, art. 23.
\99\ See, e.g., Yang Yang, ``Chinese Couples Want Boys--Trust Me,
I'm a Fertility Doctor,'' Sixth Tone, 14 April 18; Linyi Municipality
Lingang Economic Development Area, ``Interview With District Health and
Family Planning Director Wang Leqian: Concentrate and Forge Ahead,
Write a New Chapter for Health and Family Planning Work'' [Qu weisheng
he jihua shengyu ju juzhang wang leqian fangtan: ningxin juli kaituo
jinqu puxie weisheng jisheng gongzuo xin pianzhang], 24 November 17; Su
Jianfeng and Lin Sufang, ``Houlong Township Carries Out Treasure the
Girls Campaign To Crack Down on `Two Unnecessaries' '' [Houlong zhen
kaizhan guan'ai nuhai daji ``liang fei'' xuanchuan huodong], Fujian
Health and Family Planning News, 10 April 18.
\100\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``The Economy Was
Stable in 2017, and Exceeded Expectations'' [2017 nian jingji yunxing
wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi], 18 January 18.
\101\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Moved in the Direction of Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16.
\102\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Achieved a Good Start for the `13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016''
[2016 nian guomin jingji shixian ``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20
January 17; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``The Economy Was
Stable in 2017, and Exceeded Expectations'' [2017 nian jingji yunxing
wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi], 18 January 18; PRC Population and
Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu
fa], passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15, effective 1 January
16, art. 18. On December 27, 2015, the 12th National People's Congress
Standing Committee amended the Population and Family Planning Law,
which became effective on January 1, 2016, allowing all married couples
to have two children.
\103\ Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, Monkey Cage
(blog), 30 April 14. See also Xuan Li, ``China's `Bare Branches':
Unmarried Men Stuck Between Tradition and Capitalism,'' Scroll.in, 29
January 17.
\104\ Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, Monkey Cage
(blog), 30 April 14; Peng Xunwen, ``Who Will Marry the 30 Million
`Surplus Men' '' [3000 wan ``shengnan'' gen shui jiehun], People's
Daily, 13 February 17; Xiao Shan, ``2030: 30 Million Bare Branches in
China, Concerns About Crime'' [2030 nian: zhongguo guanggun da jun 3000
wan you fanzui yinyou], Radio France Internationale, 13 February 17.
\105\ Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, Monkey Cage
(blog), 30 April 14; Peng Xunwen, ``Who Will Marry the 30 Million
`Surplus Men' '' [3000 wan ``shengnan'' gen shui jiehun], People's
Daily, 13 February 17; ``Millions of Chinese Males Face Difficulty
Finding a Partner,'' CGTN, 11 March 17.
\106\ See, e.g., Marcus Roberts, ``Bride Trafficking to China:
Courtesy of the One Child Policy,'' MercatorNet, 26 October 17;
``Myanmar Police Bust Over 200 Human Trafficking Cases in 2017,''
Coconuts Yangon, 11 December 17.
\107\ See, e.g., Hong Tuyet, ``Vietnam Police Rescue 6 Trafficked
Cambodian Women en Route to China,'' VnExpress International, 1 May 18;
Cristina Maza, ``They Risked Everything To Escape Poverty. Then They
Had To Escape Forced Marriage.,'' Huffington Post, 30 October 17.
\108\ See, e.g., Thomas Maresca, ``Why the Overwhelming Majority of
North Korean Defectors Are Women,'' USA Today, 10 December 17; Matthew
Little, ``Many North Korean Women Face Forced Marriage in China, or
Rape in North Korean Prisons,'' Epoch Times, 14 December 17.
\109\ See, e.g., ``Vietnamese Bride Village, Youth Trafficked''
[Yuenan xinniang cun bei guaimai de qingchun], World Journal, 8
February 18; Hong Tuyet, ``Vietnam Police Rescue 6 Trafficked Cambodian
Women en Route to China,'' VnExpress International, 1 May 18.
\110\ See, e.g., Jun Mai, ``How a Chinese Tourist Hotspot Is
Helping To Trace China's Abducted Children,'' South China Morning Post,
23 February 18; ``Tearful Reunion Highlights Plight of China's Missing
Children,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Asia One, 5 April 18;
Christina Capatides, ``Family Reunites With Long-Lost Daughter After
24-Year Search,'' CBS News, 5 April 18.
\111\ Mao Yizhu and Zhan Yijia, ``Guangdong: A Very Large Child
Trafficking Case, 26 People Sentenced in First Instance Judgment''
[Guangdong: yi qi te da guaimai ertong an yi shen xuanpan 26 ren bei
panxing], Xinhua, 1 February 18; ``Child Trafficking Becoming More
Serious, Parents Who Lost Their Children Blame Authorities for
Dereliction of Duty and Expect Them To Severely Punish Kidnappers''
[Guaimai ertong ri jian yanzhong shi hai jiazhang ze dangju shizhi pan
yancheng bangfei], Radio Free Asia, 1 February 18; Jinri Maoming
(jinrimaoming), ``A Very Large Child Trafficking Case in Maoming, Some
Sentenced to Death in First Instance Judgment! Satisfying to
Everyone!'' [Maoming te da guaimai ertong an, yi shen you ren bei
panchu sixing! da kuai ren xin!], Weibo Post, 30 January 18, 5:13 p.m.
\112\ Mao Yizhu and Zhan Yijia, ``Guangdong: A Very Large Child
Trafficking Case, 26 People Sentenced in First Instance Judgment''
[Guangdong: yi qi te da guaimai ertong an yi shen xuanpan 26 ren bei
panxing], Xinhua, 1 February 18; ``Child Trafficking Becoming More
Serious, Parents Who Lost Their Children Blame Authorities for
Dereliction of Duty and Expect Them To Severely Punish Kidnappers''
[Guaimai ertong ri jian yanzhong shi hai jiazhang ze dangju shizhi pan
yancheng bangfei], Radio Free Asia, 1 February 18.
\113\ ``Child Trafficking Becoming More Serious, Parents Who Lost
Their Children Blame Authorities for Dereliction of Duty and Expect
Them To Severely Punish Kidnappers'' [Guaimai ertong ri jian yanzhong
shi hai jiazhang ze dangju shizhi pan yancheng bangfei], Radio Free
Asia, 1 February 18.
Special Topic:
Forced
Evictions in
Beijing
Municipality
Special Topic:
Forced
Evictions in
Beijing
Municipality
Special Topic: Forced Evictions in Beijing Municipality \1\
Authorities Carry Out Mass Evictions Following Deadly Fire
In November 2017, authorities in Beijing municipality
responded to a fire in a migrant neighborhood with a campaign
of forced evictions. On November 18, 2017, a fire broke out in
an apartment building in Xinjian No. 2 village, Xihongmen
township, Daxing district, Beijing, killing 19 people.\2\ Of
the 19 victims, 17 were migrants, meaning they were registered
in localities outside of Beijing under the Chinese government's
household registration (hukou) system.\3\ On November 20, the
Beijing government officially launched a 40-day campaign of
``major inspections, major sweeps, and major rectifications,''
\4\ which resulted in large-scale forced evictions and
demolitions in migrant neighborhoods across Beijing.\5\ Videos
posted online showed blocks of demolished buildings as well as
police kicking in doors, smashing store windows, and destroying
evictees' belongings.\6\ Affected residents reported being
forced to leave their homes within three days,\7\ with some
given a few hours' notice or less.\8\ Authorities reportedly
cut water and electricity to force residents out of their
homes,\9\ actions in contravention of the PRC Administrative
Enforcement Law, which requires authorities carrying out
evictions to provide time for residents to apply for legal
redress, and forbids authorities from cutting access to
utilities.\10\ Although the Commission did not observe official
reports on the number of people evicted during the campaign,
international media estimated that the evictions affected tens
of thousands, most of whom were migrants from outside
Beijing.\11\ In addition, according to government statistics,
there were 132,000 fewer migrants in Beijing at the end of 2017
compared to 2016.\12\
Reports of migrant evictions continued to emerge from
Beijing and other localities after November 2017. Radio Free
Asia (RFA) reported another deadly fire in the Chaoyang
district of Beijing on December 13, which was followed by
additional forced evictions.\13\ In late December, officials in
Yanjiao township, Sanhe city, Langfang municipality, Hebei
province, which neighbors Beijing, evicted residents from
several apartment buildings housing migrants, with police
reportedly injuring some residents in the process.\14\ On
January 1, 2018, RFA reported that authorities in Beijing and
Hebei continued to conduct forced evictions.\15\ On January 24,
Beijing municipal officials announced plans to demolish an
additional 40 square kilometers of ``illegal structures'' in
2018.\16\ In the summer of 2018, Beijing authorities reportedly
closed or demolished garment factories and wholesale markets
where many migrants worked.\17\
Migrants, Locals, and the Public Respond
Some migrants and locals attempted to confront local
officials over the evictions.\18\ In one protest in Feijia
village in Chaoyang district, a large group gathered outside a
government office chanting: ``Violent evictions violate human
rights.'' \19\ In addition, RFA reported that over 100 Beijing
hukou-holding residents of Xinjian village blocked a road to
protest the eviction campaign, which they asserted had left
them homeless.\20\
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),\21\ companies,\22\
and individuals \23\ offered assistance to displaced migrants.
For example, one report posted to social media described a
local group of cycling enthusiasts who, after helping one of
their evicted members move, posted a message on social media
offering to help others.\24\ One group member described being
inundated with phone calls, both from evictees requesting help
and individuals offering assistance.\25\ He noted that he also
received calls from across China thanking him for helping
evicted migrants.\26\
Internet users engaged in online debates and criticized the
eviction campaign on Chinese social media. According to Chinese
and international media, internet users widely shared images
and videos of the migrant worker evictions on Chinese social
media.\27\ Internet users reportedly criticized the evictions
and the harsh tactics government officials employed,\28\ and
social media users shared personal stories as well as social
and legal analyses.\29\ Internet users also criticized as
derogatory the use of the term ``low-end population'' (diduan
renkou) in local government documents to describe the
migrants.\30\ Groups of scholars, lawyers, and others organized
and circulated online several open letters criticizing the
evictions.\31\
Party and Government Response Features Censorship and Repression
On November 27, 2017, Beijing Communist Party Secretary Cai
Qi convened a meeting of district-level committee secretaries
to discuss public safety concerns in Beijing, stating that
local governments should ``pay attention to means and methods''
while carrying out the eviction campaign and avoid
``simplification'' and ``impatience.'' \32\ On December 12, Cai
met with a group of service workers, noting that many migrants
worked in service industries and had made contributions to
Beijing's development.\33\
Beyond its public statements, the government also responded
by restricting domestic reporting on the evictions and
censoring online discussion.\34\ China Digital Times published
a leaked censorship directive instructing Web portals and news
media not to repost articles or independently report on the
evictions.\35\ The microblog site Weibo blocked searches for
``low-end population,'' and the social media platform WeChat
deleted posts using the term.\36\ Authorities also censored
open letters \37\ and other articles posted online discussing
the evictions,\38\ as well as some of the messages civil
society groups posted offering assistance to evicted
migrants.\39\
Authorities detained an artist for sharing videos of the
evictions and also detained six others, reportedly for helping
the artist flee. The Beijing-based artist Hua Yong filmed
demolished neighborhoods,\40\ his interviews with evictees,\41\
and local Beijing hukou-holders' disputes with local
officials,\42\ posting the footage to social media.\43\ After
local officials attempted to stop Hua from filming a meeting,
residents helped Hua flee the area.\44\ On or around December
10, authorities detained at least six residents who had helped
Hua leave,\45\ and on December 15, authorities detained Hua in
Tianjin municipality.\46\ Authorities reportedly released all
seven on bail \47\ and forced Hua to leave Beijing and return
to his hometown in another province.\48\ Authorities reportedly
detained Hua again in July 2018 in connection with the
arbitrary detention of a woman who protested against President
and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.\49\
Context: The Hukou System and Urbanization Policies
The hukou system, established in 1958,\50\ classified
Chinese citizens as being urban or rural and effectively tied
them to a locality.\51\ According to the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, in 2017, 291 million people in China did
not live in their hukou location.\52\ Yet the provision of
certain government services, such as education, remains tied to
one's hukou location, which is, in general, inherited from
one's parents.\53\ In 2014, the government began to reform the
hukou system to gradually eliminate the urban-rural distinction
and allow some migrants to obtain hukou in smaller cities.\54\
Chinese sociologist Sun Liping \55\ has noted, however, that
due to uneven development across different regions in China,
``resources and opportunities are mainly concentrated in a few
large cities.'' \56\
The Chinese government continues to use the hukou system to
restrict internal migration,\57\ and obtaining hukou in large
cities such as Beijing remains difficult.\58\ In April 2018,
the Beijing municipal government issued rules governing
applications for Beijing hukou that awards points to applicants
based on criteria such as education level and home
ownership.\59\ In order to apply, residents must have
contributed to social insurance in Beijing for seven
consecutive years.\60\ Thus, migrants working in industries
that often fail to provide social insurance in accordance with
the PRC Social Insurance Law,\61\ like construction \62\ and
courier services,\63\ will be ineligible to apply for a Beijing
hukou.\64\ [For more information on social insurance, see
Section II--Worker Rights.]
Some observers viewed the eviction campaign that began in
November 2017 as part of the Beijing government's long-term
plan to limit the population of Beijing.\65\ In September 2017,
central authorities approved Beijing municipal authorities'
Beijing General City Plan (2016-2035),\66\ which sets a cap for
Beijing's population at 23 million by 2020.\67\ Chinese media
noted that the fire seemed to have accelerated existing
demolition plans.\68\ In the months leading up to the fire,
Beijing authorities had reportedly demolished schools for
migrant children \69\ and markets and shops where many migrants
worked.\70\ Although the Beijing government issued a draft
opinion in May 2018 calling for the expansion of dormitories
for migrant workers, the draft opinion specifies that the
addition of these rental units must conform to the general city
plan.\71\
Beijing is not the only large city in China to set
population limits, despite reports of worker shortages in major
cities in some sectors.\72\ For example, in December 2017,
central authorities approved a plan from Shanghai municipality
to cap that city's population at approximately 25 million by
2035.\73\ In January 2018, officials at a State Council
Standing Committee meeting discussed encouraging migrant
workers to return to the countryside to start businesses as
part of the government's development strategy for rural
areas.\74\ According to government statistics, the populations
of both Beijing and Shanghai declined in 2017,\75\ with one
expert attributing the decline in part to efforts in both
cities to evict migrants.\76\
Chinese authorities have a history of carrying out forced
evictions in the name of urban development.\77\ International
rights organizations documented widespread forced evictions
prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Expo 2010 in Shanghai
municipality.\78\ In 2014, the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights urged China ``to ensure that any relocation
necessary for city renewal is carried out after prior
consultation with the affected individuals . . ..'' \79\
International Human Rights Standards and Domestic Law
Actions taken by Chinese government officials enforcing the
eviction campaign in Beijing contravene both international
standards \80\ and Chinese law.\81\ In addition, the reported
censorship and restrictions on the press and civil society
during the eviction campaign violate international human rights
standards guaranteeing freedom of expression \82\ and
association.\83\ Restrictions on movement and discrimination
arising from the hukou system contravene international human
rights standards guaranteeing freedom of residence.\84\
Special Topic:
Forced
Evictions in
Beijing
Municipality
Special Topic:
Forced
Evictions in
Beijing
Municipality
Notes to Section II--Special Topic: Forced Evictions in Beijing
Municipality
\1\ For more in-depth analysis of this topic, see ``Campaign of
Forced Evictions in Beijing Contravenes International Human Rights
Standards,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 March 18.
\2\ ``List of Victims of Fire in Daxing, Beijing, Made Public,
Police Criminally Detain 18'' [Beijing daxing huozai yu'nanzhe mingdan
gongbu jingfang xingju 18 ren], People's Daily, 20 November 17;
``Citywide Launch of Major Inspections, Major Sweeps, and Major
Rectifications of Safety Risks'' [Quanshi kaizhan anquan yinhuan da
paicha da qingli da zhengzhi], Beijing News, 20 November 17; Jiang
Chenglong and Cui Jia, ``Beijing Continues Its Safety Crackdown in Wake
of Fire,'' China Daily, 27 November 17; Zheping Huang, ``What You Need
To Know About Beijing's Crackdown on Its `Low-End Population,' ''
Quartz, 27 November 17; Benjamin Haas, ``China: `Ruthless' Campaign To
Evict Beijing's Migrant Workers Condemned,'' Guardian, 26 November 17.
\3\ ``List of Victims of Fire in Daxing, Beijing Announced, Police
Criminally Detain 18'' [Beijing daxing huozai yunanzhe mingdan gongbu
jingfang xingju 18 ren], People's Daily, 20 November 17; Benjamin Haas,
``China: `Ruthless' Campaign To Evict Beijing's Migrant Workers
Condemned,'' Guardian, 26 November 17. For more information on migrant
workers and China's hukou system, see, e.g., China Labour Bulletin,
``Migrant Workers and Their Children,'' last visited 20 June 18; Mary
Gallagher, Authoritarian Legality in China: Law, Workers, and the State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2-4, 7-8, 12-13; Cara
Wallis, ``Hukou Reform and China's Migrant Workers,'' University of
Nottingham, Asia Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, 10 October 16.
\4\ Beijing Administration of Work Safety Committee Circular on
Launch of Special Campaign of Major Investigations, Major Cleanup, and
Major Rectification of Safety Risks [Beijing shi anquan shengchan
weiyuanhui guanyu kaizhan anquan yinhuan da paicha da qingli da
zhengzhi zhuanxiang xingdong de tongzhi], issued 19 November 17, sec.
4.
\5\ See, e.g., ``Thousands of Migrant Workers in Beijing Forcibly
Evicted, Resistance Mounted in at Least One Location,'' China Change,
29 November 17; Matt Rivers and Serenitie Wang, ``Beijing Forces
Migrant Workers From Their Homes in `Savage' Demolitions,'' CNN, 9
December 17; China Digital Times, ``Sensitive Word of the Week: Low-End
Population,'' 30 November 17.
\6\ See, e.g., Boxun Watch, `` `Chinese Exclusion' Inside China,
Beijing Violently Drives Out `Low-End Population' '' [Jingnei ``pai
hua'' beijing baoli qugan ``diduan renkou''] [Video file], YouTube, 24
November 17; Boxun Watch, `` `Chinese Exclusion' Inside China, Beijing
Violently Evicts `Low-End Population' (2)'' [Jingnei ``pai hua''
beijing baoli qugan ``diduan renkou'' (2)] [Video file], YouTube, 26
November 17; RFA Chinese, ``Beijing's Low-End Population: We Are Also
Chinese, Why Do They Treat Us Like This? '' [Beijing diduan renkou:
women ye shi zhongguo ren, weishenme yao zheme duidai women?] [Video
file], YouTube, 28 November 17. See also videos posted to Beijing-based
artist Hua Yong's YouTube account on November 29 and 30, 2017, e.g.,
Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire (14)'' [Da huo zhihou (14)] [Video
file], YouTube, 29 November 17.
\7\ Wang Shan, ``Investigation--Outsiders After the Major Fire:
Where Should We Go? '' [Diaocha--da huo zhihou de yixiang ren: women
gai dao nali qu?], Sanlian Life Week, 27 November 17; Huang Ziyi and Li
Rongde, ``Thousands Evicted in Beijing Crackdown After Fatal Fire,''
Caixin, 24 November 17; Matt Rivers and Serenitie Wang, ``Beijing
Forces Migrant Workers From Their Homes in `Savage' Demolitions,'' CNN,
9 December 17.
\8\ Emily Wang and Yi-Ling Liu, ``Beijing Evictions of Migrant
Workers Stir Widespread Anger,'' Associated Press, 29 November 17; Jun
Mai, `` `They Came Banging and Kicking': Beijing Airport Workers Swept
Up in Fire Safety Crackdown,'' South China Morning Post, 29 November
17; Benjamin Haas, ``China: `Ruthless' Campaign To Evict Beijing's
Migrant Workers Condemned,'' Guardian, 26 November 17.
\9\ Huang Ziyi and Li Rongde, ``Thousands Evicted in Beijing
Crackdown After Fatal Fire,'' Caixin, 24 November 17; Li Rongde and
Yuan Suwen, ``In Rare Move, State Media Publishes Veiled Disapproval of
Beijing's Fire Safety Campaign,'' Caixin, 27 November 17; Haowai Zhi
Wai (wangjxclub), ``In Dreams I Did Not Know I Was a Visitor--Swan
Rescue Team and People in the Cold Night'' [Meng li bu zhi shen shi
ke--tian'e jiuyuan dui yu han ye li de ren], WeChat post, 28 November
17.
\10\ PRC Administrative Enforcement Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xingzheng qiangzhi fa], passed 30 June 11, effective 1 January 12,
arts. 43-44.
\11\ ``Ripples From Major Beijing Fire, 100 Thousand Migrants
Expelled From the City'' [Beijing da huo yubo dangyang quanshi 10 wan
waidi ren bei zhu], Radio Free Asia, 23 November 17; Chris Buckley,
``Why Parts of Beijing Look Like a Devastated War Zone,'' New York
Times, 30 November 17; Lucy Hornby and Archie Zhang, ``Beijing's
Migrant Expulsion Prompts Civic Outcry,'' Financial Times, 28 November
17; ``Thousands of Migrant Workers in Beijing Forcibly Evicted,
Resistance Mounted in at Least One Location,'' China Change, 29
November 17. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Worker Families
Face Eviction After 19 Die in Beijing Fire,'' 23 November 17.
\12\ Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics and Survey Office of
the National Bureau of Statistics in Beijing, ``Beijing Municipality
2016 Citizen Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin''
[Beijing shi 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao],
25 February 17, sec. 1; Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics and
Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Beijing,
``Beijing Municipality 2017 Citizen Economic and Social Development
Statistical Bulletin'' [Beijing shi 2017 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 27 February 18, sec. 1.
\13\ ``After Fire in Beijing's Shibalidian Township, More Violent
Evictions of the `Low-End Population,' Citizens Jointly Sign Letter
Urging Cai Qi To Resign'' [Beijing shibalidian xiang huozai hou
``diduan renkou'' zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu cai qi
cizhi], Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17.
\14\ Shen Fan and Li Rongde, ``Beijing's Migrant Eviction Frenzy
Spills Over to Hebei,'' Caixin, 27 December 17; ``Beijing `Low-End'
Campaign Spreads, Outsiders Violently Driven Out of Sanhe, Hebei''
[Beijing ``diduan renkou'' xingdong manyan hebei sanhe baoli qugan
wailai renkou], Radio Free Asia, 30 December 17.
\15\ ``Chinese Artist Who Filmed Beijing's Mass Evictions Now Faces
Eviction Himself,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 January 18.
\16\ Wu Mengda and Ji Xiaobo, ``Beijing: Plans To Demolish 40
Square Kilometers of Illegal Structures, Return 1600 Hectares to
Natural Space in 2018'' [Beijing: 2018 nian jihua chai wei 4000 wan
pingfang mi huan lu 1600 gongqing], Xinhua, 24 January 18; ``Beijing To
Demolish Thousands of `Illegal Structures,' '' BBC, 24 January 18.
\17\ ``Beijing Residents Fight Back Over Renewed Forced Evictions,
Demolitions,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 July 18; Liu Caiyu, ``Wholesale
Markets in Beijing Close, Vendors Leave in `Non-Capital Industry'
Reshuffle,'' Global Times, 6 August 18.
\18\ Chris Buckley, ``Why Parts of Beijing Look Like a Devastated
War Zone,'' New York Times, 30 November 17; Austin Ramzy, ``Artist
Flees Beijing After Filming Devastation of Mass Evictions,'' New York
Times, 12 December 17; ``Hunted After Reporting on Daxing, Beijing,
Fire, Artist Hua Yong Escapes Beijing'' [Baodao beijing daxing huozai
zao soubu yishujia hua yong taoli beijing], Radio Free Asia, 9 December
17.
\19\ Eva Dou, ``Rare Protests in Beijing Condemn Forced
Evictions,'' Wall Street Journal, 10 December 17; Tom Phillips,
``Hundreds Take Part in Rare Protest in Beijing Over Migrant
Crackdown,'' Guardian, 10 December 17.
\20\ ``Hunted After Reporting on Daxing, Beijing, Fire, Artist Hua
Yong Escapes Beijing'' [Baodao beijing daxing huozai zao soubu yishujia
hua yong taoli beijing], Radio Free Asia, 9 December 17. For more
information on the economic relationship between local hukou holders
and migrant workers in China's cities, see commentary by David
Bandurski in ``The Beijing Migrants Crackdown: A ChinaFile
Conversation,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 30 November 17.
\21\ Ye Bing, ``Chinese Intellectuals Jointly Demand Beijing End
Evictions of Migrants'' [Zhongguo zhishifenzi lianming yaoqiu beijing
tingzhi qugan wailai renkou], Voice of America, 28 November 17; Hai
Yan, ``Civil Society in Beijing Spontaneously Offer Assistance to `Low-
End Population,' Officials Not Pleased'' [Minjian zifa jiuzhu beijing
``diduan renkou'' guan bu yue], Voice of America, 27 November 17; Simon
Denyer and Luna Lin, ``Mass Evictions in Freezing Beijing Winter Sparks
Public Outrage but Little Official Remorse,'' Washington Post, 27
November 17.
\22\ Hai Yan, ``Civil Society in Beijing Spontaneously Offer
Assistance to `Low-End Population,' Officials Not Pleased'' [Minjian
zifa jiuzhu beijing ``diduan renkou'' guan bu yue], Voice of America,
27 November 17; Zheping Huang, ``What You Need To Know About Beijing's
Crackdown on Its `Low-End Population,' '' Quartz, 27 November 17.
\23\ Haowai Zhi Wai (wangjxclub), ``In Dreams I Did Not Know I Was
a Visitor--Swan Rescue Team and People in the Cold Night'' [Meng li bu
zhi shen shi ke--tian'e jiuyuan dui yu han ye li de ren], WeChat post,
28 November 17; Ye Bing, ``Chinese Intellectuals Jointly Demand Beijing
End Evictions of Migrants'' [Zhongguo zhishifenzi lianming yaoqiu
beijing tingzhi qugan wailai renkou], Voice of America, 28 November 17.
\24\ Haowai Zhi Wai (wangjxclub), ``In Dreams I Did Not Know I Was
a Visitor--Swan Rescue Team and People in the Cold Night'' [Meng li bu
zhi shen shi ke--tian'e jiuyuan dui yu han ye li de ren], WeChat post,
28 November 17.
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ Ibid.
\27\ Freedom House, ``China Media Bulletin: Holiday Crackdown,
Beijing Netizen Outcries, Skype App Removal (Issue No. 124),'' 9
December 17; Li Rongde and Yuan Suwen, ``In Rare Move, State Media
Publishes Veiled Disapproval of Beijing's Fire Safety Campaign,''
Caixin, 27 November 17; Lucy Hornby and Archie Zhang, ``Beijing's
Migrant Expulsion Prompts Civic Outcry,'' Financial Times, 28 November
17; Ye Bing, ``Chinese Intellectuals Jointly Demand Beijing End
Evictions of Migrants'' [Zhongguo zhishifenzi lianming yaoqiu beijing
tingzhi qugan wailai renkou], Voice of America, 28 November 17.
Although the government has deleted many of the original social media
posts, videos of the evictions can still be found on websites outside
China. See, e.g., Boxun Watch, `` `Chinese Exclusion' Inside China,
Beijing Violently Evicts `Low-End Population' '' [Jingnei ``pai hua''
beijing baoli qugan ``diduan renkou''] [Video file], YouTube, 24
November 17; Boxun Watch, `` `Chinese Exclusion' Inside China, Beijing
Violently Evicts `Low-End Population' (2)'' [Jingnei ``pai hua''
beijing baoli qugan ``diduan renkou'' (2)] [Video file], YouTube, 26
November 17; RFA Chinese, ``Beijing's `Low-End Population': `We Are
Also Chinese, Why Do They Treat Us Like This? ' '' [Beijing ``diduan
renkou'': ``women ye shi zhongguoren, weishenme yao zheme duidai women?
''] [Video file], YouTube, 28 November 17. See also videos posted to
Beijing-based artist Hua Yong's Twitter account (@Huayong798) on
November 29 and 30, 2017.
\28\ ``Safety Remediation After Major Fire in Daxing, Beijing,
State Media Denies Using the Opportunity To Clean Out `Low-End
Population' '' [Beijing daxing da huo hou anquan zhengzhi guan mei
fouren jie ji qingli ``diduan renkou''], BBC, 24 November 17; Freedom
House, ``China Media Bulletin: Holiday Crackdown, Beijing Netizen
Outcries, Skype App Removal (Issue No. 124),'' 9 December 17; ``The
Class Allegiance of China's De Facto Voters,'' Chublic Opinion (blog),
10 January 18.
\29\ See, e.g., Haowai Zhi Wai (wangjxclub), ``In Dreams I Did Not
Know I Was a Visitor--Swan Rescue Team and People in the Cold Night''
[Meng li bu zhi shen shi ke--tian'e jiuyuan dui yu han ye li de ren],
WeChat post, 28 November 17; Sun Liping (Sun liping shehui guancha),
``Sun Liping: It Was a Tragedy, but Not a Reason for Clearing the
Population'' [Sun liping: na jian shi shi beiju, dan bing bushi qingli
renkou de liyou], WeChat post, 21 November 17; Wang Liuyi, ``Analyzing
the Legality of Beijing's `Winter Cleanup Campaign' '' [Beijing shi
``dongji qingli xingdong'' de hefaxing fenxi], WeChat post, reprinted
in China Digital Times, 28 November 17. For additional analyses of
online discussion of the mass evictions, see ``The Class Allegiance of
China's De Facto Voters,'' Chublic Opinion (blog), 10 January 18; China
Digital Times, ``Sensitive Word of the Week: Low-End Population,'' 30
November 17; Oiwan Lam, ``After Authorities Evict Beijing's `Low-End'
Residents, Chinese Ask: Where Is the Humanity? '' Global Voices, 29
November 17.
\30\ ``The Class Allegiance of China's De Facto Voters,'' Chublic
Opinion (blog), 10 January 18; Freedom House, ``China Media Bulletin:
Holiday Crackdown, Beijing Netizen Outcries, Skype App Removal (Issue
No. 124),'' 9 December 17. See also ``The Making of the `Low-End
Population,' '' University of Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies
Centre, China Media Project, 30 November 17.
\31\ ``Letter From Intellectuals to Central Committee of the
Communist Party, NPC, State Council, and NPPCC on Recent Large Scale
Evictions of the `Outsider Population' in Beijing'' [Zhishijie renshi
jiu jinri beijing da guimo qugan ``wailai renkou'' shijian zhi
zhonggong zhongyang, quanguo renda, guowuyuan, quanguo zhengxie xin],
reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 25 November 17; ``[Show]
Understanding, Kindness, Tolerance, and Care for Them! An Appeal for
Immediately Ending Violent Evictions of `Low-End Groups,' Immediately
Opening Relief Centers'' [Lijie, shandai, kuanrong, guan'ai tamen!----
guanyu liji tingzhi cubao qugan ``diduan renqun'', liji kaifang jiuzhu
zhongxin de huyu], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 25 November 17;
``Letter Urging Beijing Communist Party Secretary Mr. Cai Qi To
Resign'' [Duncu beijing shiwei shuji cai qi xiansheng cizhi shu], 13
December 17, reprinted in China Banned Book News, 15 December 17. See
also Ye Bing, ``Chinese Intellectuals Jointly Demand Beijing End
Evictions of Migrants'' [Zhongguo zhishifenzi lianming yaoqiu beijing
tingzhi qugan wailai renkou], Voice of America, 28 November 17; ``After
Fire in Beijing's Shibalidian Township, More Violent Evictions of the
`Low-End Population,' Citizens Jointly Sign Letter Urging Cai Qi To
Resign'' [Beijing shibalidian xiang huozai hou ``diduan renkou'' zai
zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu cai qi cizhi], Radio Free Asia,
14 December 17; ``Full Text of Request From Jiang Ping, He Weifang, and
Other Scholars and Lawyers to the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress for a Review of the Constitutionality of the Beijing
Government's Campaign To Expel Nonresidents and Relevant Administrative
Documents'' [Jiang ping, he weifang deng xuezhe lushi dui beijing shi
zhengfu qugan wailai jumin de xingdong ji qi yiju de xingzheng wenjian
xiang quanguo rendahui changweihui tiqing hexianxing shencha de
quanwen], 19 December 17, reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 24
December 17.
\32\ Xu Feipeng, ``At Meeting of District Committee Secretaries,
Cai Qi Stresses Defending the Nation, Guaranteeing Peace'' [Cai qi zai
quwei shuji hui shang qiangdiao jianchi shoutu jinze bao yifang
ping'an], Qianlong, 27 November 17.
\33\ Wang Hao and Wu Hongli, ``Cai Qi Greets Service Workers,
Emphasizes Our City Can't Operate Without Ordinary Laborers, Chen
Jining Also Greets [Them]'' [Cai qi kanwang weiwen shenghuoxing fuwu ye
laodongzhe shi qiangdiao women zhe zuo chengshi libukai putong
laodongzhe chen jining yitong weiwen], Qianlong, 12 December 17.
\34\ For more information on the censorship of online discussion of
the migrant worker evictions in Beijing, see Zheping Huang, ``China's
Evicting Mentions of Its `Low-End' Migrants From Cyberspace,'' Quartz,
30 November 17; Freedom House, ``China Media Bulletin: Holiday
Crackdown, Beijing Netizen Outcries, Skype App Removal (Issue No.
124),'' 9 December 17.
\35\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Beijing Municipality Campaign
To Rectify [and] Clean Up Illegal Structures'' [Zhenli bu: beijing shi
zhengzhi qingtui wei jian xingdong], 28 November 17; China Digital
Times, ``Minitrue: Control Coverage, Commentary on Evictions,'' 28
November 17.
\36\ China Digital Times, ``Sensitive Word of the Week: Low-End
Population,'' 30 November 17; ``After Fire in Beijing's Shibalidian
Township, More Violent Evictions of the `Low-End Population,' Citizens
Jointly Sign Letter Urging Cai Qi To Resign'' [Beijing shibalidian
xiang huozai hou `diduan renkou' zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu
duncu cai qi cizhi], Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17.
\37\ Eva Dou and Dominique Fong, ``Homeward Bound: Beijing Boots
Migrant Workers To Trim Its Population,'' Wall Street Journal, 29
November 17; ``After Fire in Beijing's Shibalidian Township, More
Violent Evictions of the `Low-End Population,' Citizens Jointly Sign
Letter Urging Cai Qi To Resign'' [Beijing shibalidian xiang huozai hou
``diduan renkou'' zai zao baoli quzhu gongmin lianshu duncu cai qi
cizhi], Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17; ``The Class Allegiance of
China's De Facto Voters,'' Chublic Opinion (blog), 10 January 18.
\38\ The U.S.-based website China Digital Times collects and
republishes censored articles. See, e.g., ``Zhang Zanbo--A
Disheartening Day: Recording the Expulsion of the `Low-End Population'
'' [Zhang zanbo--ling ren jusang de yi tian: jilu qugan ``diduan
renkou''], Weibo post, reprinted in China Digital Times, 2 December 17;
Wang Liuyi, ``Analyzing the Legality of Beijing's `Winter Cleanup
Campaign' '' [Beijing shi ``dongji qingli xingdong'' de hefaxing
fenxi], WeChat post, reprinted in China Digital Times, 28 November 17;
Xiong Pingping, ``After Clearing Out, Local Beijing Residents Getting
Anxious: Villages Emptied, Rental Income Gone'' [Qingtui hou bentu
beijing ren kaishi jiaolu: cunzi kongle zujin meile], Caijing, 25
December 17, reprinted in China Digital Times, 7 January 18.
\39\ Ye Bing, ``Chinese Intellectuals Jointly Demand Beijing End
Evictions of Migrants'' [Zhongguo zhishifenzi lianming yaoqiu beijing
tingzhi qugan wailai renkou], Voice of America, 28 November 17; Nectar
Gan, ``Welcome to Beijing: Where Helping the Homeless Can Get You
Evicted,'' South China Morning Post, 27 November 17.
\40\ Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire (14)'' [Da huo zhihou (14)]
[Video file], YouTube, 29 November 17; Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire
(15A)'' [Da huo zhihou (15A)] [Video file], YouTube, 29 November 17;
Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire (16)'' [Da huo zhihou (16)] [Video
file], YouTube, 30 November 17.
\41\ Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire (10)'' [Da huo zhihou (10)]
[Video file], YouTube, 29 November 17; Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire
(11 Part 1)'' [Da huo zhihou (11 shang)] [Video file], YouTube, 29
November 17.
\42\ Hua Yong, ``After the Major Fire 2017-12-04 (2)'' [Da huo
zhihou 2017-12-04 (2)] [Video file], YouTube, 4 December 17; Hua Yong,
``2017-12-07 Hua Yong at the Scene (18)'' [2017-12-07 hua yong zai
xianchang (18)] [Video file], YouTube, 7 December 17.
\43\ Videos can be found at Hua Yong's YouTube account and Twitter
account. See also Austin Ramzy, ``Artist Flees Beijing After Filming
Devastation of Mass Evictions,'' New York Times, 12 December 17.
\44\ Austin Ramzy, ``Artist Flees Beijing After Filming Devastation
of Mass Evictions,'' New York Times, 12 December 17; Rights Defense
Network, ``Five Who Helped Hua Yong Escape From Xinjian Village,
Beijing, Detained, Hua Yong Calls for [Their] Rescue'' [Beijing xinjian
cun 5 ming husong hua yong de cunmin bei zhuabu hua yong yu guanzhu
jiuyuan], 12 December 17. The following videos show an official
attempting to remove Hua and local Beijing residents helping Hua to
flee the area: Hua Yong, ``2017-12-07 Hua Yong at the Scene (18)''
[2017-12-07 hua yong zai xianchang (18)] [Video file], YouTube, 7
December 17; Hua Yong, ``2017-12-07 Hua Yong at the Scene (19)'' [2017-
12-07 hua yong zai xianchang (19)] [Video file], YouTube, 7 December
17; Hua Yong, ``2017-12-07 Hua Yong at the Scene (20)'' [2017-12-07 hua
yong zai xianchang (20)] [Video file], YouTube, 7 December 17.
\45\ Rights Defense Network, ``Five Who Helped Hua Yong Escape From
Xinjian Village, Beijing, Detained, Hua Yong Calls for [Their] Rescue''
[Beijing xinjian cun 5 ming husong hua yong de cunmin bei zhuabu hua
yong yu guanzhu jiuyuan], 12 December 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Hua
Yong Visits 6 Criminally Detained Villagers From Xinjian Village,
Beijing, Calls on Everyone To Follow [the Case] and Provide Legal Aid''
[Hua yong tanfang beijing xinjian cun 6 ming zao xingju cunmin yu gejie
guanzhu bing yu falu jiuyuan], 24 December 17. For more information,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00042 for
Gu Tianjin, 2018-00043 for Hu Dehua, 2018-00044 for Hu Fuqiang, 2018-
00045 for Liu Jinying, 2018-00046 for Shen Deli, and 2018-00047 for
Zhang Shudong.
\46\ ``Hua Yong Filmed `Low-End Population' Evictions, Is Detained,
Citizens Protest in Solidarity'' [Hua yong paishe ``diduan renkou'' bei
quzhu shipin zao zhuabu gongmin shangjie ju pai shengyuan], Radio Free
Asia, 17 December 17. For more information on Hua Yong, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00054. Hua
recorded a series of videos in Tianjin prior to his detention. See,
e.g., Hua Yong (huayong798), Twitter post, 15 December 17, 6:33 a.m.;
Hua Yong (huayong798), Twitter post, 15 December 17, 6:55 a.m.; Hua
Yong (huayong798), Twitter post, 15 December 17, 7:07 a.m.
\47\ By releasing the seven individuals on bail (qubao houshen or
``guarantee pending further investigation''), authorities may continue
to restrict their freedom of movement, summon them for further
questioning, and monitor them for up to 12 months. For a description of
bail (qubao houshen), also translated as ``guarantee pending further
investigation,'' under Chinese legal provisions, see Human Rights in
China, ``HRIC Law Note: Five Detained Women Released on `Guarantee
Pending Further Investigation,' '' 13 April 15. For relevant Chinese
legal provisions, see PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14
March 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 65-72, 77; Ministry of Public
Security, Public Security Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal
Cases [Gong'an jiguan banli xingshi anjian chengxu guiding], issued 13
December 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 77, 85-86, 89.
\48\ ``After Two Days' Criminal Detention, Hua Yong Released on
Bail, Flew to Chengdu To Celebrate Daughter's Birthday'' [Hua yong bei
xingju liang ri hou qubao feidi chengdu peitong nu'er guo shengri],
Radio Free Asia, 18 December 17; LifeTime Horizons (lifetimeusa),
Twitter post, 18 December 17, 5:28 a.m.; Rights Defense Network,
``Monthly Report of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience
Detained in Mainland China'' [Zhongguo dalu zai ya zhengzhi fan,
liangxin fan yuedu baogao], 31 May 18; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Artist Hua Yong Driven Away for Social Stability, Forced To Leave
Beijing'' [Huajia hua yong zao weiwen qugan bei po banli beijing], 2
April 18.
\49\ ``Beijing Artist Under House Arrest in Remote Corner of
China's Yunnan,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 August 18. For more information on
the woman, Dong Yaoqiong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00343.
\50\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Regulations
on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji
tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.
\51\ See, e.g., Hongbin Li et al., ``Human Capital and China's
Future Growth,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 1
(Winter 2017), 28; Yang Song, ``Hukou-Based Labour Market
Discrimination and Ownership Structure in Urban China,'' Urban Studies,
Vol. 53(8) (2016), 1658; Spencer Sheehan, ``China's Hukou Reforms and
the Urbanization Challenge,'' The Diplomat, 22 February 17. For more
information on China's hukou system, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 169-70.
\52\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``The Economy Was
Stable in 2017, and Exceeded Expectations'' [2017 nian jingji yunxing
wenzhong xianghao, hao yu yuqi], 18 January 18.
\53\ See, e.g., Hongbin Li et al., ``Human Capital and China's
Future Growth,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 1
(Winter 2017), 28; Yang Song, ``Hukou-Based Labour Market
Discrimination and Ownership Structure in Urban China,'' Urban Studies,
Vol. 53(8) (2016), 1658; China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and
Their Children,'' last visited 2 February 18; Eli Friedman, Insurgency
Trap: Labor and Politics in Postsocialist China (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2014), 14.
\54\ State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out Reform of the
Household Registration System [Guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu tuijin huji
zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 30 July 14, paras. 4-9; ``China To Help
100m Settle in Cities,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 30 July 14;
State Council General Office, ``Plan Promoting 100 Million Individuals
in Cities Without Household Registration To Obtain Hukou'' [Tuidong 1
yi fei huji renkou zai chengshi luohu fang'an], issued 30 September 16,
paras. 4-6; China Digital Times, ``Beijing To Scrap Urban-Rural
Residency Distinction,'' 21 September 16.
\55\ China Digital Times, ``Person of the Week: Sun Liping,'' 8
June 17.
\56\ Sun Liping (Sun liping shehui guancha), ``Sun Liping: It Was a
Tragedy, but Not a Reason for Clearing the Population'' [Sun liping: na
jian shi shi beiju, dan bing bushi qingli renkou de liyou], WeChat
post, 21 November 17.
\57\ ``About On the Road,'' University of Chicago, Paulson
Institute, MacroPolo, last visited 16 July 18; State Council, Opinion
on Further Carrying Out Reform of the Household Registration System
[Guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de yijian], issued
30 July 14, paras. 6-7.
\58\ ``Hukou Difficulty Index,'' University of Chicago, Paulson
Institute, MacroPolo, last visited 16 July 18; Tianyu M. Fang, ``Job
Not Open to Beijing Natives? Alibaba's Online Supermarket Apologizes
for Discrimination,'' SupChina, 9 July 17; State Council General
Office, ``Plan Promoting 100 Million Individuals in Cities Without
Household Registration To Obtain Hukou'' [Tuidong 1 yi fei huji renkou
zai chengshi luohu fang'an], issued 30 September 16, paras. 4-6;
``Ministry of Public Security: Urban Areas With Under 3 Million
Permanent Residents May Not Implement Points Systems for Obtaining
Hukou'' [Gong'anbu: chengqu changzhu renkou 300 wan yixia chengshi bude
shishi jifen luohu], Caixin, 9 February 17.
\59\ Beijing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau
et al., Rules on Operations and Management of Beijing Municipality
Points-Based Household Registration (Trial) [Beijing shi jifen luohu
caozuo guanli xize (shixing)], issued and effective 11 April 18, art.
13(2)-(3); Wang Su and Li Rongde, ``Chart: Beijing Residency System No
Longer `Pointless,' '' Caixin, 12 April 18; Wu Wei, ``Beijing's First
Batch of Points-Based Hukou Applications Launches Next Monday''
[Beijing shou pi jifen luohu shenbao xia zhouyi qidong], Beijing News,
12 April 18.
\60\ Beijing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau
et al., Rules on Operations and Management of Beijing Municipality
Points-Based Household Registration (Trial) [Beijing shi jifen luohu
caozuo guanli xize (shixing)], issued and effective 11 April 18, art.
12(3); Wang Su and Li Rongde, ``Chart: Beijing Residency System No
Longer `Pointless,' '' Caixin, 12 April 18; Wu Wei, ``Beijing's First
Batch of Points-Based Hukou Applications Launches Next Monday''
[Beijing shou pi jifen luohu shenbao xia zhouyi qidong], Beijing News,
12 April 18.
\61\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui
baoxian fa], passed 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, arts. 1-4.
\62\ Yu Dingzhang, ``Aging Construction Workers Face Unstable
Retirement,'' Sixth Tone, 23 October 17; ``Chinese Crane Operators
Stage Nationwide Strike Ahead of Labor Day,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 May
18.
\63\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China Faces Shortage of Express
Delivery Workers in the New Year,'' 8 March 18. See also Ryan McMorrow,
``For Couriers, China's E-Commerce Boom Can Be a Tough Road,'' New York
Times, 31 January 17.
\64\ Beijing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau
et al., Rules on Operations and Management of Beijing Municipality
Points-Based Household Registration (Trial) [Beijing shi jifen luohu
caozuo guanli xize (shixing)], issued and effective 11 April 18, art.
12(3); Wang Su and Li Rongde, ``Chart: Beijing Residency System No
Longer `Pointless,' '' Caixin, 12 April 18; Wu Wei, ``Beijing's First
Batch of Points-Based Hukou Applications Launches Next Monday''
[Beijing shou pi jifen luohu shenbao xia zhouyi qidong], Beijing News,
12 April 18. For more information on the low social insurance coverage
rates of migrant workers, see Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, ``2017 Annual Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and
Social Security Employment Developments'' [2017 niandu renli ziyuan he
shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao], 21 May 18, secs. 1, 2(1,
3, 4); China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,''
last visited 6 June 18.
\65\ See, e.g., Eva Dou and Dominique Fong, ``Homeward Bound:
Beijing Boots Migrant Workers To Trim Its Population,'' Wall Street
Journal, 29 November 17; Bai Xin, ``Bai Xin: Those Beijing Evicted Are
a New Migrant Class That Threatens Political Security'' [Bai xin:
beijing qiechu de, shi weixie zhengzhi anquan de xin liumin jieji],
Initium, 28 November 17; Eli Friedman, ``Evicting the Underclass,''
Jacobin, 6 December 17; Tom Phillips, ``The Gentrification of Beijing:
Razing of Migrant Villages Spells End of China Dream,'' Guardian, 7
December 17.
\66\ Beijing Municipal Planning and Land and Resources Management
Committee, Beijing Municipal People's Government, ``Beijing General
City Plan (2016-2035)'' [Beijing chengshi zongti guihua (2016 nian-2035
nian], 29 September 17; ``China Focus: China Sets Population,
Construction Limits in Beijing City Planning,'' Xinhua, 27 September
17.
\67\ Beijing Municipal Planning and Land and Resources Management
Committee, Beijing Municipal People's Government, ``Beijing General
City Plan (2016-2035)'' [Beijing chengshi zongti guihua (2016 nian-2035
nian], 29 September 17, art. 14.
\68\ Wang Shan, ``Investigation--Outsiders After Major Fire: Where
Should We Go? '' [Diaocha--da huo zhihou de yixiangren: women gai dao
nali qu?], Life Week, 27 November 17; Yuan Suwen et al., ``Dislocated
Migrant Workers Left in Cold and Confusion in Beijing,'' Caixin, 25
November 17. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Another Tragedy Unfolds
in Beijing's Migrant Worker Shanty Towns,'' 20 November 17.
\69\ Emily Feng, ``Beijing Begins Migrant School Demolition in
Depopulation Drive,'' Financial Times, 19 July 17; Fan Shuo and Li
Rongde, ``School for Migrant Children in Beijing Fights Forced
Closure,'' Caixin, 2 November 17.
\70\ Steven Lee Myers, ``A Cleanup of `Holes in the Wall' in
China's Capital,'' New York Times, 17 July 17; Liu Caiyu, ``Demolition
of 1000's of Illegal Stores Leaves Beijing Migrants With Unsure
Future,'' Global Times, 25 April 17; ``Hundreds of Police Occupy
Beijing Market Amid Anger Over Closures,'' Radio Free Asia, 20
September 17.
\71\ Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development et al., Opinion on Developing Rental of Collective Worker
Dormitories (Provisional) (Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Guanyu
fazhan zulinxing zhigong jiti sushe de yijian (shixing) (zhengqiu
yijian gao)], 23 May 18, secs. 1-2. See also A Ruhan, ``Beijing
Promotes Rental of Collective Worker Dormitories'' [Beijing tui
zulinxing zhigong jiti sushe], Beijing Business Today, 23 May 18.
\72\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China Faces Shortage of Express
Delivery Workers in the New Year,'' 8 March 18; Jie Li, ``Nanny
Shortage: Housekeeping Industry Pulling People From Impoverished
Regions'' [Baomu jinque: jiazheng ye pinkun xian wa ren], Beijing Youth
Daily, 20 May 18.
\73\ Shanghai Municipal People's Government, `` `Shanghai
Municipality General City Plan (2017-2035)' Issued, Shanghai Will
Become a City of Innovation, Culture, and Ecology'' [``Shanghai shi
chengshi zongti guihua (2017-2035 nian)'' fabu shanghai jiang chengwei
chuangxin zhi cheng, renwen zhi cheng, shengtai zhi cheng], 5 January
18; Shanghai Municipal People's Government, ``Municipal Government
Introduces Information Relating to `Shanghai Municipality General City
Plan (2017-2035)' at Press Conference'' [Shi zhengfu xinwen fabuhui
jieshao ``shanghai shi chengshi zongti guihua (2017-2035 nian)''
xiangguan qingkuang], 4 January 18. See also Benjamin Haas, ``China's
Shanghai Sets Population at 25 Million To Avoid `Big City Disease,' ''
Guardian, 26 December 17.
\74\ ``Li Keqiang Chairs Meeting of State Council Standing
Committee'' [Li keqiang zhuchi zhaokai guowuyuan changwu huiyi],
Xinhua, 17 January 18; An Delie, ``Li Keqiang Mobilizing Migrant
Workers To Return to Rural Hometowns and Start Businesses Seen as Xi
Jinping's Version of Being Sent Down to the Countryside'' [Li keqiang
dongyuan nongmingong fan xiang chuangye bei zhi xi jinping ban
shangshan xiaxiang], Radio France Internationale, 18 January 18.
\75\ Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics and Survey Office of
the National Bureau of Statistics in Beijing, ``Beijing Municipality
2017 Citizen Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin''
[Beijing shi 2017 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao],
27 February 18, sec. 1; Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics and
Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in Shanghai, ``2017
Shanghai Municipality Citizen Economic Operations Situation'' [2017
nian shanghai shi guomin jingji yunxing qingkuang], 19 January 18, sec.
8.
\76\ Bai Tiantian, ``Beijing, Shanghai Record First Population
Decline in 40 Years,'' Global Times, 23 January 18.
\77\ See, e.g., Amnesty International, ``Standing Their Ground:
Thousands Face Violent Eviction in China,'' 2012, 11-23; Human Rights
Watch, ``Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants' Rights Movement
in China,'' 24 March 04, 6-11.
\78\ Amnesty International, ``Standing Their Ground: Thousands Face
Violent Eviction in China,'' 2012, 11-12, 31-32; Centre on Housing
Rights and Evictions, ``One World, Whose Dream? Housing Rights
Violations and the Beijing Olympic Games,'' July 2008, 7-8, 12-14; UN
Watch, ``38 Rights Groups Urge U.N. To Investigate Shanghai Expo
Eviction of 18,000 Families,'' 14 July 10.
\79\ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China,
Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee
at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June 14, para.
30.
\80\ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR
General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the
Covenant), E/1992/23, 13 December 91, para. 8(a). Note that this
finding is reaffirmed in UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art.
11.1): Forced Evictions, E/1998/2, 20 May 97, para. 1; UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 4: The
Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), E/1992/23, 13
December 91, para. 18; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art.
11(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last
visited 13 February 18. China has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See
also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced
Evictions, E/1998/2, 20 May 97, para 15; UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to
Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, E/1998/2, 20 May 97,
para. 16; Eva Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford: Polity Press,
2018), 105-07.
\81\ PRC Administrative Enforcement Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xingzheng qiangzhi fa], passed 30 June 11, effective 1 January 12,
arts. 43-44. For analyses of the legality of the evictions in Beijing
under Chinese law, see ``Full Text of Request From Jiang Ping, He
Weifang, and Other Scholars and Lawyers to the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress for a Review of the Constitutionality of
the Beijing Government's Campaign To Expel Nonresidents and Relevant
Administrative Documents'' [Jiang ping, he weifang deng xuezhe lushi
dui beijing shi zhengfu qugan wailai jumin de xingdong ji qi yiju de
xingzheng wenjian xiang quanguo rendahui changweihui tiqing hexianxing
shencha de quanwen], 19 December 17, reprinted in Rights Defense
Network, 24 December 17; Wang Liuyi, ``Analyzing the Legality of
Beijing's `Winter Cleanup Campaign' '' [Beijing shi ``dongji qingli
xingdong'' de hefaxing fenxi], WeChat post, reprinted in China Digital
Times, 28 November 17.
\82\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on
10 December 48, art. 19. For more information on restrictions on
freedom of expression in China, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October
17, 66-83.
\83\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
20(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 22. For more information on international
standards and civil society in China, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 223-28.
\84\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General
Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1); UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, Including Hong
Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 40th
Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June 14, para. 15; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2,
28 March 17, paras. 27-28. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``From Forced Evictions of Migrant Workers to Abused Children:
Violations of Social & Economic Rights in China Refute the `China
Development Model,' '' 7 December 17.
Status of Women
Status of Women
Status of Women
Public Participation
POLITICAL DECISIONMAKING
The Chinese government is obligated under its international
commitments to ensure gender equality in political
participation; \1\ Chinese domestic law also stipulates the
importance of women's political participation.\2\ Women's
representation at upper and lower levels of political
leadership nonetheless continued to fall short of the 30
percent target recommended by the UN Commission on the Status
of Women.\3\ Scholars and overseas media note that barriers to
women's participation in political leadership at higher levels
include lack of access to the male-dominated relationship
networks critical to leadership appointments,\4\ earlier
retirement ages for female civil servants,\5\ and
marginalization to leadership positions with less political
influence,\6\ in addition to the pressures that make it
difficult for women to participate in public life more
generally, such as gender discrimination and unequal
distribution of childcare and domestic labor.\7\
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ADVOCACY
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, Chinese
citizens continued to advocate on behalf of women's issues
while Chinese officials maintained restrictions by censoring
online discussion and harassing and threatening individual
citizens engaging in advocacy. These restrictions are a
continuation of official repression of women's rights advocacy
beginning in 2015.\8\
Women's rights advocates reported that the freedom to
organize activities remained limited as officials continued to
impose pressure on participants in the form of harassment,
threats, and censorship. Due to such pressure, some advocates
reported that they no longer performed direct actions in public
spaces and had shifted their focus to awareness-raising and
organizing online.\9\ Online advocacy has been subject to
continued \10\ censorship: online posts were censored,\11\
hashtags used for advocacy on women's issues were blocked on
social media platforms,\12\ and social media accounts
advocating women's rights were shut down.\13\ Although advocacy
and discussion of women's rights were previously tolerated,\14\
one advocate reported that the topic ``has been politicized and
stigmatized'' in recent years \15\ as authorities continued
\16\ to link their advocacy to hostile foreign
interference.\17\ [For more information on censorship, see
Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Campaigns Against Sexual Harassment on University Campuses
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2018, Chinese students, alumni, and faculty initiated a
series of independent campaigns to prevent sexual harassment on college
campuses. These included public allegations of misconduct by individual
professors, petitions calling on universities to institute policies to
prevent sexual harassment, and public requests for information about
university actions in past sexual assault cases. Reports of sexual
harassment in other sectors such as manufacturing,\18\ journalism,\19\
civil society,\20\ the state-sanctioned Buddhist community,\21\ and the
Protestant community in Hong Kong \22\ also drew public attention.
Among the most prominent were allegations posted by Luo Xixi, currently
residing in the United States, who detailed the sexual harassment of
her former PhD advisor, Chen Xiaowu of Beihang University in Beijing
municipality.\23\ Inspired by the #MeToo movement in the United
States,\24\ Luo published these allegations in January 2018,\25\
drawing significant attention and sparking a social media campaign in
China that drew millions of views to related hashtags before it was
censored.\26\ Chen's teaching qualifications were revoked \27\ and the
Ministry of Education announced that it would form a group to study the
implementation of policies to prevent sexual harassment.\28\ After one
allegation against a professor at Renmin University in Beijing, a group
of more than 70 students gathered outside his classroom, refusing to
leave until the university agreed to investigate the claims.\29\ There
were a number of other allegations against professors at other
universities, some of which led to dismissals.\30\
Other actions directed at universities followed. Students, alumni, and
faculty circulated petitions calling on their respective institutions
to implement policies to prevent sexual harassment, reportedly with
more than 8,000 people participating at 74 colleges and universities
\31\ before being censored.\32\ Students at Peking University in
Beijing called on the school to release information about its actions
dealing with a case involving a professor's sexual assault of a student
20 years earlier.\33\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Campaigns Against Sexual Harassment on University Campuses--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some actions taken by university and government authorities were
supportive of the issues raised by the campaigns, official responses
nonetheless prioritized suppressing grassroots mobilization. In
addition to the investigation and dismissal of some of the professors
accused of misconduct, supportive actions included lawmakers'
submission of legislative proposals to address sexual harassment during
the legislative session after lobbying by women's rights advocates \34\
and the recognition of sexual harassment as a serious issue by some
state and Party media.\35\ Official actions aimed at suppressing
discussion and collective action included online censorship \36\ and
increased surveillance,\37\ while university officials pressured
students to cease campaigning \38\ by questioning them about their
organizing,\39\ harassing their family members,\40\ and in at least one
instance threatening to prevent a student from graduating.\41\ When a
student at Peking University drew significant attention and support
after describing the extent of her harassment by school officials,\42\
authorities subsequently released instructions to censor all reporting
regarding the incident.\43\ A January 2018 commentary published in the
Global Times, a Party-run media outlet, stated that ``[m]ore efforts
should be put into establishing and perfecting laws and regulations so
as to deter potential sexual violence'' while cautioning that
``[s]ocial movements can only play a limited role in reducing sexual
harassment.'' \44\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gender-Based Discrimination
EMPLOYMENT
Women in China continued to face a variety of barriers to
equal employment, which the Chinese government is obligated to
address under its international commitments \45\ and domestic
laws.\46\ A study of Chinese job recruitment advertisements
conducted by international non-governmental organization (NGO)
Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that discriminatory and
sexualized views of women were pervasive: recruitment
advertisements reflected assumptions that women are less
qualified for work requiring strength, intelligence, or mental
fitness; \47\ that the thinking and behavior of women is
inherently inferior; \48\ and that it is acceptable for
employers to use the physical attractiveness of female
employees as a condition of employment even when unrelated to
job performance,\49\ or as an inducement for recruiting male
employees.\50\ The study found discriminatory recruitment in
both the private and public sectors, with 19 percent of
postings for the national civil service jobs in 2018 listing a
requirement or preference for males, up from 13 percent in
2017.\51\ The World Economic Forum's 2017 Global Gender Gap
Report found that discrimination in China also continued to
manifest in the underrepresentation of women in management
positions \52\ and disparities in pay, with women earning on
average 62 percent of what men earn.\53\
A 2015 study by the International Labour Organization
attributed most of the wage differential to discrimination,\54\
noting that such disparities have increased over the period of
economic reform that began in 1978,\55\ accelerating during the
2000s with the intensification of market liberalization.\56\
The HRW study attributed the lack of women in leadership roles
and the increasing wage gap in part to individual employers'
discriminatory views of women and their increased discretion
over employment decisions beginning in the reform period.\57\
Another significant factor identified by scholars has been the
shifting of responsibility for child care from the government
system (via publicly funded maternity leave and nursery
schools) to the private sector, with the resulting burden
falling disproportionately to individual women.\58\ National
law guarantees 98 days of paid maternity leave and no paternity
leave,\59\ making employers reluctant to hire female employees
because they are seen as more costly and a pregnancy ``risk.''
\60\ Experts said that such discrimination had been exacerbated
by the ``universal two-child policy'' implemented in January
2016.\61\ [For more information on the ``universal two-child
policy,'' see Section II--Population Control.]
International observers reported that employer
discrimination in China has not been checked by prohibitions
against gender discrimination in existing laws \62\ because
enforcement has been rare and negligible.\63\ Chinese laws do
not themselves give a clear definition of gender
discrimination,\64\ and women reported being reluctant to
initiate complaints because of the time, cost, and risk to
future employment.\65\ The local bureaus responsible for
enforcing laws against discrimination in hiring have rarely
initiated their own investigations and have seldom taken
punitive action in response to complaints.\66\ In addition,
some laws continued to discriminate against women by barring
them from performing certain jobs--in some cases based on
whether they are menstruating, pregnant, or breastfeeding.\67\
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Women in China continued to lack secure rights to property
due to a combination of discriminatory policy implementation
and adherence to patriarchal cultural values. Many rural women
were deprived of land rights--guaranteed under national law--
due to village-level policies and customs that deny women
rights to collectively owned land if they marry outside of the
village, divorce, become widowed, or remain unmarried above a
certain age.\68\ Legal advocates say that enforcement
mechanisms for guaranteeing women's land rights are
lacking.\69\ Women's property rights assigned at the household
level are also marginalized by a lack of decisionmaking power
within households; according to a sample survey conducted by
the state-run Research Center for Rural Economy, 30.4 percent
and 80.2 percent of rural women were not registered on any
commercial land rights certificates and residential property
certificates, respectively.\70\ Officials suggested a number of
proposals aimed at addressing these issues during the upcoming
round of agricultural policy reforms.\71\
Violence Against Women
Women in China continued to face challenges with domestic
and sexual violence as officials continued to develop a legal
and institutional infrastructure to prevent such abuse. By the
end of October 2017, the courts had issued a total of 1,830
protection orders under the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law,\72\
in effect since March 2016.\73\ A 2017 Chinese NGO report found
that while there were improvements in implementation of the
law, such as increased awareness and the publishing of local
implementing regulations, other challenges remained.\74\
Chinese courts maintained an evidentiary standard for proving
domestic violence that was difficult for victims to meet, and
victims escaping abusive domestic situations received
inadequate support in seeking shelters, with only 149
admissions to roughly 2,000 shelters for victims nationwide in
2016.\75\
Status of Women
Status of Women
Notes to Section II--Status of Women
\1\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180
of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, arts. 7, 24. Under
Article 7(b) of CEDAW, China, as a State Party, is obligated to
``ensure to women, on equal terms with men,'' the right ``[t]o
participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public
functions at all levels of government . . ..'' United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited 27 July 18.
China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on
November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and
obligations contained in these articles.
\2\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92,
amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral
Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji
renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December
82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, 29
August 15, art. 6. Both of these laws stipulate that an ``appropriate
number'' of female deputies should serve at all levels of people's
congresses.
\3\ ``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to Women by 1995--
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women,'' UN Chronicle, Vol.
27, No. 2, June 1990, reprinted in Popline. The target of 30-percent
female representation in leadership positions by 1995 was recommended
by the UN Commission on the Status of Women at its 34th session in
1990. ``China Political Leaders'' [Zhongguo zhengyao], Chinese
Communist Party News, People's Daily, last visited 13 April 18.
``China's National Legislature Starts Annual Session in Beijing,''
Xinhua, 5 March 18; ``Reality Check: Does China's Communist Party Have
a Woman Problem?,'' BBC, 25 October 17. Upon the convening of the 19th
Party Congress in October 2017, women represented 1 out of 25 members
of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee
(Politburo) and there remained no women among the 7 members of the
Politburo Standing Committee--the most powerful governing body in
China. The 13th National People's Congress (NPC) was seated in March
2018 with 24.9 percent female delegates, a slight increase from the
23.4 percent in the 12th NPC. Under the State Council, 1 of the 26
national-level ministerial positions was filled by a woman. No women
were appointed as Party secretaries at the provincial level, while
women were selected for 3 of 31 provincial-level governorships--
compared with 2 out of 31 in the previous government.
\4\ ``Reality Check: Does China's Communist Party Have a Woman
Problem?,'' BBC, 25 October 17.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ Sarah O'Meara, ``How to Be More Than a Token Woman in Chinese
Politics,'' Sixth Tone, 26 December 16.
\7\ Yu Mengtong, ``The Hard-To-Smash Glass Ceiling: Looking at the
Predicament of Women's Political Participation from the NPC Delegate
Statistics'' [Nan da po de boli tianhuaban: cong renda shuju kan
zhongguo nuxing congzheng kunjing], Voice of America, 8 March 18.
\8\ See, e.g., Rebecca E. Karl et al., ``Dark Days for Women in
China? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 18 March 15; Maya Wang, ``China's
Chilling Message to Women,'' CNN, 7 April 15. See also CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 172-73; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 178-79; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 176-85.
\9\ Lin Lin, ``China's Women's Rights Movement: How Far Can They
Go? '' [Zhongguo nuquan yundong: tamen hai neng zou duo yuan?], BBC, 26
September 17.
\10\ CECC, 2017 Annual Report, October 5, 2017, 176-77.
\11\ Javier C. Hernandez and Zoe Mou, `` `Me Too,' Chinese Women
Say. Not So Fast, Say the Censors,'' New York Times, 28 January 18;
Kemeng Fan, ``China's #MeToo Movement Started on College Campuses. It
May End There,'' Los Angeles Times, 7 February 18; China Digital Times,
``Minitrue: Do Not Report on PKU Open Letter,'' 25 April 18; ``Women
Excluded From Highest Echelons of Power in China, as Men Embroiled in
Sex-for-Favours Scandals,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Hong
Kong Free Press, 23 October 17.
\12\ Grace Tsoi and Viola Zhou, ``Feminist Campaign Gets Blocked in
China on International Women's Day,'' Inkstone, 8 March 18; ``#MeToo in
China: The Story Beyond Censorship,'' Elephant Room (blog), 13 February
18.
\13\ Aaron Halegua et al., ``What Is the Significance of China's
#MeToo Movement? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 20 March 18; ``Muzzled
China Feminist Group To Sue Over Online Censorship,'' Agence France-
Presse, reprinted in SinoDaily, 24 March 18; China Digital Times,
``Chili Pepper Tribe: China's Only Dedicated Information Platform for
Female Workers Blocked on Weibo'' [Jianjiao buluo: zhongguo weiyi
nugong zhuanshu zixun pingtai zao weibo fengsha], 13 July 18.
\14\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 6.
\15\ Lin Lin, ``China's Women's Rights Movement: How Far Can They
Go? '' [Zhongguo nuquan yundong: tamen hai neng zou duo yuan?], BBC, 26
September 17.
\16\ Song Xiuyan, ``Run a Thread of Political Discussion Through
the Whole Process of ACWF Reform and Work'' [Ba jiang zhengzhi guanchan
yu fulian gaige he gongzuo quan guocheng], China Women's News, 19 May
17; Er Guang, ``From Silencing on Weibo to `Halal Goddess,' How is
Chinese Feminism Being Encircled and Annihilated Both Inside and
Outside the System? '' [Cong weibo jin yan dao ``qingzhen shengmu'',
tizhi nei wai ruhe weijiao zhongguo nuquan?], Initium, 31 March 17.
\17\ Yang Zhichu, ``Combatting Sexual Harassment: #MeToo in China?
'' [Fanji xing saorao: #MeToo zai zhongguo?], Voice of America, 13
January 18; Javier C. Hernandez and Zoe Mou, `` `Me Too,' Chinese Women
Say. Not So Fast, Say the Censors,'' New York Times, 28 January 18;
Jiayang Fan, ``China's #MeToo Moment,'' New Yorker, 1 February 18;
Jiayun Feng, ``Peking University Student to School: Stop Trying To Gag
Me on Rape Case!,'' SupChina, 23 April 18.
\18\ Jiayun Feng, `` `I Am a Woman Worker at Foxconn, and I Demand
a System That Opposes Sexual Harassment: A Translated Essay,' ''
SupChina, 26 January 18.
\19\ Catherine Lai, ``No #MeToo in China? Female Journalists Face
Sexual Harassment, but Remain Silent,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 5
December 17; Aaron Halegua et al., ``What Is the Significance of
China's #MeToo Movement? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 20 March 18;
Jiayun Feng, ``#MeToo in China Reaches the Nonprofit and Media
Worlds,'' SupChina, 26 July 18.
\20\ Jiayun Feng, ``#MeToo in China Reaches the Nonprofit and Media
Worlds,'' SupChina, 26 July 18.
\21\ Jiayun Feng, ``Abbot of Beijing Longquan Temple Denies Sexual
Abuse Allegations,'' SupChina, 1 August 18.
\22\ ``#MeToo Complaints Rife in Hong Kong's Protestant Churches,
as Victims Come Forward,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 June 18.
\23\ Wesley Rahn and Fang Wan, ``#MeToo Movement Meets China's
Firewall,'' Deutsche Welle, 7 March 18.
\24\ Jiayang Fan, ``China's #MeToo Moment,'' New Yorker, 1 February
18.
\25\ Wesley Rahn and Fang Wan, ``#MeToo Movement Meets China's
Firewall,'' Deutsche Welle, 7 March 18.
\26\ ``#MeToo in China: The Story Beyond Censorship,'' Elephant
Room (blog), 13 February 18.
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ Han Xiaotong, ``Ministry of Education Revokes Chen Xiaowu's
`Yangtze River Scholar' Title, Halts Payment and Requires Return of
Stipend'' [Jiaoyu bu jueding chexiao chen xiaowu ``chang jiang xuezhe''
chenghao, tingfa bing zhuihui yifa jiangjin], The Paper, 14 January 18.
\29\ Te-Ping Chen, ``#MeToo Meets China's Censors and Students
Learn a Tough Lesson,'' Wall Street Journal, 23 April 18.
\30\ Fan Yiying, ``University Fires Teacher Who Traded Grades for
Sex,'' Sixth Tone, 5 January 18; Wang Yiwei, ``Nanchang University
Dismisses Deans Over Alleged Rape,'' Sixth Tone, 21 December 17; Yanan
Wang, ``Chinese Vice-Dean Accused of `Inappropriate' Behavior,''
Associated Press, 26 April 18; Te-Ping Chen, ``#MeToo Meets China's
Censors and Students Learn a Tough Lesson,'' Wall Street Journal, 23
April 18.
\31\ Xiao Meili and Zheng Churan, `` `I Am a Troublemaker, Not a
Helpful Cog in the Machine': The Voice of China's Feminist Activism''
[``Wo shi daodangui, bu shi luosiding'': zhongguo nuquan xingdongpai de
shengyin], Initium, 12 February 18, translated in Zheng Churan, Free
Chinese Feminists, ``The Success of China's Anti-Sexual Harassment
Campaign,'' reprinted in Facebook, 18 April 18; Jiayun Feng, ``Chinese
University Instructors Sign Anti-Sexual Harassment Manifesto,''
SupChina, 22 January 18.
\32\ Kemeng Fan, ``China's #MeToo Movement Started on College
Campuses. It May End There,'' Los Angeles Times, 7 February 18.
\33\ Javier C. Hernandez and Iris Zhao, ``Students Defiant as
Chinese University Warns #MeToo Activist,'' New York Times, 24 April
18.
\34\ Mimi Lau, ``After #MeToo Success, Chinese Rights Activists
Urge Lawmakers To Join the Fight Against Sexual Harassment,'' South
China Morning Post, 8 March 18.
\35\ ``Chinese Professor Removed From Post Following Sexual
Harassment Allegation,'' Xinhua, 12 January 18; Chen Jinhong, ``Don't
Cover Up Sexual Harassment in Higher Education Any Longer'' [Gaoxiao
xing saorao, bie zai wu gaizi le], Qianjiang Evening News, reprinted in
People's Daily, 16 January 18; Renmin Ribao Pinglun (rmrbpl),
``Beihang-Gate's Sexual Harassment: Bravery Is Your Finest Pose''
[Beihang xing saorao men: yonggan shi ni zui haokan de zitai], WeChat
post, 5 January 18.
\36\ ``#MeToo in China: The Story Beyond Censorship,'' Elephant
Room (blog), 13 February 18.
\37\ Jiayun Feng, ``Yue Xin Back at School, Surveillance Cameras up
on Peking University Campus,'' SupChina, 26 April 18.
\38\ Lily Kuo, ``#Metoo in China: Fledgling Movement in
Universities Fights Censorship,'' Guardian, 17 April 18; Christian
Shepherd, ``China's #MeToo Movement in Colleges Initially Encouraged by
Authorities, Then Frustrated,'' Reuters, 30 January 18.
\39\ Te-Ping Chen, ``#MeToo Meets China's Censors and Students
Learn a Tough Lesson,'' Wall Street Journal, 23 April 18.
\40\ Lily Kuo, ``#Metoo in China: Fledgling Movement in
Universities Fights Censorship,'' Guardian, 17 April 18; Javier C.
Hernandez and Iris Zhao, ``Students Defiant as Chinese University Warns
#MeToo Activist,'' New York Times, 24 April 18.
\41\ China Digital Times, ``Translation: Open Letter on PKU #MeToo
Case,'' 23 April 18.
\42\ Jiayun Feng, ``Yue Xin Back at School, Surveillance Cameras up
on Peking University Campus,'' SupChina, 26 April 18.
\43\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Peking University Open Letter
Incident'' [Zhenli bu: beijing daxue gongkai xin shijian], 25 April 18.
\44\ Liu Lulu, ``Addressing Sexual Harassment Needs More Than
#MeToo,'' Global Times, 4 January 18.
\45\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 11.1; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
17 July 18. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified
it on November 4, 1980. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last
visited 17 July 18. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and
ratified it on March 27, 2001.
\46\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 48; PRC Labor
Law [Zhongghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5 July 94,
effective 1 January 95, art. 13; PRC Law on the Protection of Women's
Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang
fa], passed 3 April 92, amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05,
art. 2.
\47\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 2.
\48\ Ibid., 19-20.
\49\ Ibid., 30.
\50\ Ibid., 33.
\51\ Ibid., 6, 22-23.
\52\ World Economic Forum, ``The Global Gender Gap Report 2017,'' 2
November 17, 120-21. According to the World Economic Forum report, in
2017 women remained underrepresented in management positions, with 20.1
percent of firms including women in top-level management.
\53\ Ibid.
\54\ Sukti Dasgupta et al., International Labour Organization,
``Women in the Labour Market in China,'' ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper
Series, May 2015, 18-19. See also World Economic Forum, ``The Global
Gender Gap Report 2017,'' 2 November 17, 120-21.
\55\ Sukti Dasgupta et al., International Labour Organization,
``Women in the Labour Market in China,'' ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper
Series, May 2015, 2.
\56\ Ibid., 8.
\57\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 10.
\58\ Yingchun Ji and Shuangshuang Yang, ``A Gendered Reading of
China's Two-Child Policy,'' University of Nottingham, Asia Research
Institute, Asia Dialogue, 19 September 17.
\59\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92,
amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 27; Dezan Shira &
Associates, ``Expecting in China: Employee Maternity Leave and
Allowances,'' China Briefing, 6 April 18; Dezan Shira & Associates,
``Paternity Leave in China: Regional Policies and Differences,'' China
Briefing, last visited 18 July 18.
\60\ Fu Yang, ``New Discrimination Dilemmas for Female Employment:
From `Married With Child' to `Two Children' '' [Xin qishi kunrao nuxing
jiuye cong ``yihun yiyu'' dao ``yisheng ertai''], Beijing Daily, 20
December 17.
\61\ Ibid.; Yang Yue, ``CPPCC Member Li Shouzhen: Seventy Percent
of Women Worry That Second Child Will Affect Career Development,
Recommend Extending Maternity Leave for Second Child'' [Li shouzhen
weiyuan: qicheng nuxing danxin er hai yingxiang zhiye fazhan jianyi
yanchang er hai chanjia], China Youth Net, 8 March 18.
\62\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 12-13. Gender-based
discrimination against employees or applicants for employment is
prohibited under Articles 12 and 13 of the PRC Labor Law. See also
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Provisions on
Employment Services and Employment Management [Jiuye fuwu yu jiuye
guanli guiding], issued 5 November 07, amended 23 December 14,
effective 1 February 15, arts. 20, 58(2); PRC Constitution, issued 4
December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March
04, 11 March 18, art. 48.
\63\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last
visited 23 April 18; Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 3-4.
\64\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 3-4.
\65\ Fu Yang, ``New Discrimination Dilemmas for Female Employment:
From `Married With Child' to `Two Children' '' [Xin qishi kunrao nuxing
jiuye cong ``yihun yiyu'' dao ``yisheng ertai''], Beijing Daily, 20
December 17.
\66\ Human Rights Watch, ``Only Men Need Apply: Gender
Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China,'' April 2018, 43-44.
\67\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 59-61, 63; State Council,
Special Provisions for the Protection of Female Employees' Labor [Nu
zhigong laodong baohu tebie guiding], issued and effective 28 April 12,
Appendix, para. 1 (labor restrictions for all women), para. 2 (labor
restrictions during menstruation), para. 3 (labor restrictions during
pregnancy), para. 4 (labor restrictions while breastfeeding).
\68\ ``New Issues Related to Women's Land Rights Amid Rural Reforms
and the Way To Overcome Them'' [Nongcun bianqian zhong funu tudi quanyi
xin wenti ji pojie zhidao], China Women's News, reprinted in All-China
Women's Federation, 19 December 17; Qianqian Law Firm, ``Beijing
Municipality Qianqian Law Firm Recommendations for Amending the `Rural
Land Contract Law (Draft)' '' [Beijing shi qianqian lushi shiwusuo
guanyu ``nongcun tudi chengbao fa (cao'an)'' de xiugai yijian], 26
December 17.
\69\ Qianqian Law Firm, ``Beijing Municipality Qianqian Law Firm
Recommendations for Amending the `Rural Land Contract Law (Draft)' ''
[Beijing shi qianqian lushi shiwusuo guanyu ``nongcun tudi chengbao fa
(cao'an)'' de xiugai yijian], 26 December 17; Mao Xiaoya and Li Lulu,
``NPC Representative Declares: Let Rural Women Benefit From Equal Land
Rights'' [Daibiao weiyuan jianyan: rangnongcun funu pingdeng xiangyou
tudi quanyi], Farmers' Daily, 14 March 18.
\70\ Tian Shanlei, ``Protecting Women's Land Rights While
Intensifying Rural Reform'' [Zai shenhua nongcun gaige zhong weihu funu
tudi quanyi], China Women's News, 5 March 18.
\71\ Wu Xu, ``Recommendations for Protecting Women's Rural Land
Rights'' [Guanyu baozhang nongcun funu tudi quanyi de jianyi], People's
Court Daily, 28 April 18; ``ACWF Gives Proposal to CPPCC's 13th
Meeting: Protecting Women's Rights While Intensifying Rural Land
Reforms'' [Quanguo fulian xiang quanguo zhengxie shisan jie yi ci huiyi
tijiao ti'an: zai shenhua nongcun gaige zhong weihu funu tudi quanyi],
China Women's News, reprinted in All-China Women's Federation, 5 March
18.
\72\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, chap.
4.
\73\ Fu Danni et al., ``Two Years Under Anti-Domestic Violence Law,
Effectiveness of Protection Orders Awaits Reinforcement'' [Fan jiabao
fa shishi liang zhou nian, renshen anquan baohu ling shishi xiaoli
rendai jiaqiang], The Paper, 1 March 18. See also CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, 6 October 16, 180.
\74\ Equality, ``Monitoring Report on Implementation of the `PRC
Anti-Domestic Violence Law' '' [``Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fandui
jiating baoli fa'' shishi jiance baogao], 15 December 17.
\75\ Ibid.
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Human Trafficking
Defining Human Trafficking
As a State Party to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (UN TIP Protocol),\1\ China is obligated to enact
legislation criminalizing human trafficking as defined by the
UN TIP Protocol.\2\ The definition of human trafficking under
the PRC Criminal Law,\3\ however, remains inconsistent with UN
TIP Protocol standards.\4\ The UN TIP Protocol definition of
human trafficking involves three components: the action of
recruiting, transporting, harboring, or receiving persons; the
means of coercion, deception, or control; \5\ and ``the purpose
of exploitation,'' including sexual exploitation or forced
labor.\6\ Chinese law focuses on the act of selling a woman or
child,\7\ rather than the purpose of exploitation.\8\ The
definition of trafficking in the PRC Criminal Law does not
clearly cover all forms of trafficking in the UN TIP
Protocol,\9\ including certain types of non-physical coercion;
\10\ offenses against male victims; \11\ and forced labor,\12\
though forced labor is illegal under a separate provision of
the law.\13\ In addition, the Chinese legal definition of
trafficking includes the purchase or abduction of children for
subsequent sale without specifying the purpose of these
actions.\14\ Under the UN TIP Protocol, illegal adoptions
constitute trafficking only if the purpose is exploitation.\15\
Human trafficking experts note a dearth of reliable statistics
on the scale of human trafficking in Asia in general; \16\ in
China, inconsistencies between domestic law and international
standards further contribute to the difficulty of assessing the
scale of human trafficking.\17\
Trends and Developments
CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING
China remains \18\ a destination country for human
trafficking, particularly of women and children from Southeast
Asia,\19\ and a source country for trafficking to the United
States and Europe.\20\ This past year, the Commission observed
regional and international news media reports of the
trafficking of women and girls to China for forced marriage
from Burma (Myanmar),\21\ Cambodia,\22\ Laos,\23\ and Vietnam;
\24\ and the trafficking of individuals to China from Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam for the purpose of forced
labor.\25\ Chinese nationals were trafficked this past year to
the United States for the purposes of sexual exploitation and
forced labor.\26\ In addition, in March 2018, the U.S.
Department of Labor finalized settlements requiring four China-
based companies operating in the U.S. territory of Saipan,
Northern Mariana Islands, to pay nearly US$14 million in wages
and compensation to thousands of Chinese workers.\27\ The
China-based companies, including the state-owned enterprise MCC
International, brought the Chinese construction workers to
Saipan to build a casino under conditions one expert called a
``classic trafficking and forced labor scenario.'' \28\
DOMESTIC TRAFFICKING
According to UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking
in Persons (UN-ACT) and the U.S. Department of State, men,
women, and children were trafficked within China's borders for
forced labor, forced begging, and sexual exploitation.\29\
During this reporting year, the Commission observed multiple
cases of trafficking for the purpose of forced labor, including
one case in which traffickers kidnapped homeless men and forced
them to work in a factory,\30\ and another in which traffickers
abducted men with intellectual disabilities for the purpose of
forced begging.\31\ Moreover, many of China's workers in
construction and other industries reportedly worked in
conditions that may constitute forced labor, facing frequent
non-payment of wages.\32\ [For more information on the problem
of wage arrears, see Section II--Worker Rights.]
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR
This past year, the Chinese government continued \33\ to
subject individuals to forced labor during pretrial detention
and in administrative detention centers. The International
Labour Organization's (ILO) definition of forced labor makes an
exception for labor performed ``as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law . . .,'' \34\ yet the Commission
observed reports this past year of individuals in China
performing forced labor in detention before trial.\35\
Moreover, authorities continued \36\ to detain suspected drug
users without trial or conviction and reportedly required them
to perform labor in a form of administrative detention known as
compulsory drug detoxification.\37\ As the government does not
convict compulsory detoxification detainees in court, the
requirement to perform labor constitutes human trafficking
under the UN TIP Protocol \38\ for the purpose of forced labor
as defined by the ILO.\39\ Detention in compulsory drug
detoxification centers is similar to reeducation through labor
(RTL),\40\ an administrative punishment in which detainees were
subjected to forced labor \41\ without judicial process.\42\
After abolishing RTL in 2013,\43\ authorities reportedly
converted most RTL facilities to compulsory drug detoxification
centers.\44\ Authorities have continued \45\ to detain
individuals accused of prostitution for up to two years without
due process and require them to perform labor in a form of
administrative detention known as ``custody and education.''
\46\ In February and March 2018, several delegates to the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference noted
similarities between RTL and ``custody and education'' and
called for abolishing or reforming the system.\47\
Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported in October 2017 that
authorities in Hotan prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), required some Uyghur women and children to
perform forced labor.\48\ An anonymous police officer told RFA
that the local government sent hundreds of Uyghur women and
children to labor in neighboring Aksu prefecture, XUAR.\49\
Authorities had reportedly detained the Uyghurs' male relatives
in ``political reeducation'' centers.\50\ According to RFA, the
police officer stated that if the women and children refused to
perform labor, they could be sent to ``political reeducation''
centers.\51\ [For more information on ``political reeducation''
centers, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Risk Factors
This past year, Chinese workers migrating within China were
at risk of human trafficking, and government restrictions on
worker rights exacerbated this risk. Despite reforms,\52\ the
government continues to use the household registration (hukou)
system to restrict internal migration.\53\ Migrants have
limited access to housing and government benefits \54\ and are
more likely to work in informal employment.\55\ The hukou
system reportedly exacerbates these migrants' vulnerability to
trafficking for the purpose of forced labor.\56\ The Chinese
government limits workers' right to freedom of association by
restricting independent unions.\57\ A September 2016 UN report
noted that the failure to enforce workers' fundamental right to
freedom of association ``directly contributes'' to human
trafficking.\58\ [For more information on restrictions on
worker rights in China, see Section II--Worker Rights.]
In addition to domestic human trafficking, individuals from
other Asian countries face the risk of human trafficking in
China. A lack of economic opportunity in Southeast Asian
countries contributes to human trafficking from that
region.\59\ Women and girls in these countries are particularly
at risk of trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage.\60\
The Chinese government continued to treat North Korean refugees
as economic migrants and maintained a policy of repatriating
undocumented North Koreans,\61\ leaving the refugees, who are
predominantly women, vulnerable to trafficking for forced
marriage.\62\ [For more information, see Section II--North
Korean Refugees in China.]
Decades of government-imposed birth limits combined with a
traditional preference for sons has led to a sex ratio
imbalance in China.\63\ In rural areas, this imbalance is more
pronounced as many women have migrated to cities for work.\64\
The sex ratio imbalance has created a demand for marriageable
women that may contribute to human trafficking for forced
marriage.\65\ [For more information on China's population
policies, see Section II--Population Control.]
The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) reportedly continued \66\ to generate revenue by sending
DPRK nationals to work in China under conditions that may
constitute forced labor.\67\ Reporting from this past year
indicated that DPRK security personnel accompanied the workers
to China, subjecting workers to constant monitoring.\68\ The
DPRK government reportedly withheld, on average, 70 percent of
the workers' earnings.\69\ While reports from October 2017
indicated that many of these workers had been or would be sent
back to North Korea due to the Chinese government's enforcement
of UN sanctions,\70\ the DPRK reportedly began sending workers
to China again in March 2018, possibly in violation of UN
sanctions.\71\
Anti-Trafficking Efforts
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, government
figures indicated a decline in the number of criminal human
trafficking cases opened by public security officials.
According to the 2017 China Law Yearbook, public security
officials opened 7,121 criminal cases involving the trafficking
of women and children in 2016.\72\ This was 22 percent fewer
cases than the 9,150 cases opened in 2015.\73\ The National
Bureau of Statistics of China further reported that in 2016,
authorities uncovered 618 cases of child trafficking,\74\ down
from 756 cases in 2015.\75\ All figures likely include cases of
illegal adoptions,\76\ while excluding other cases such as
offenses against male victims \77\ and forced labor.\78\
The Chinese government continued \79\ to participate in
multilateral anti-trafficking events and engaged in bilateral
cooperation with neighboring countries to combat human
trafficking. The Chinese government's involvement in
multilateral efforts included participation in a September 2017
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking
\80\ event to develop new guidelines for fair recruitment
practices,\81\ and a March 2018 research seminar jointly
organized by the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's
Procuratorate, and the International Organization for
Migration.\82\ Additionally, regional media reported that the
Chinese government expanded cooperation with the governments of
Burma, Cambodia, and Laos to combat cross-border human
trafficking.\83\
Hong Kong
Hong Kong remained \84\ a destination for human
trafficking, with migrant domestic workers (MDWs) particularly
at risk of exploitation for forced labor. The Hong Kong Census
and Statistics Department's 2017 annual digest reported that in
2016, there were over 350,000 MDWs working for households in
Hong Kong, the majority of whom came from the Philippines and
Indonesia.\85\ Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
advocates, and MDWs themselves reported that MDWs continue to
face exploitative working conditions, including inadequate
living conditions, little time off, restrictions on movement,
and in some cases physical and emotional abuse.\86\ Local NGOs
report that MDWs are often in debt due to excessive fees paid
to employment agencies both in their countries of origin and in
Hong Kong.\87\ Two regulations--requiring MDWs to live with
their employers (live-in rule) \88\ and to leave Hong Kong
within two weeks of termination of a contract \89\--reportedly
contribute to MDWs' risk of exploitation for forced labor.\90\
In February 2018, the High Court of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (High Court) ruled against an MDW who
sought judicial review of the live-in rule.\91\ The judge
opined that MDWs who dislike the live-in rule could choose to
terminate their employment.\92\ An NGO representing migrant
workers in Hong Kong argued the High Court was ``complicit in
maintaining the slave-like conditions of MDWs.'' \93\ In
addition to facing abuse in Hong Kong, local media reported in
November 2017 that Hong Kong employment agencies in recent
years may have trafficked Filipino MDWs to other countries for
the purpose of forced labor.\94\
The Hong Kong government maintained that comprehensive
anti-trafficking legislation was unnecessary and that human
trafficking in Hong Kong was rare. The definition of human
trafficking in Hong Kong's Crimes Ordinance covers only the
cross-border movement of persons ``for the purpose of
prostitution'' and not other forms of trafficking such as
forced labor or trafficking that occurs solely within Hong
Kong.\95\ In December 2016, the High Court ruled that the Hong
Kong government had an obligation under the Bill of Rights
Ordinance ``to enact measures to ensure the prohibition of
forced or compulsory labour.'' \96\ The government argued in
its appeal that current Hong Kong laws and policies were
sufficient to protect potential victims of trafficking.\97\ In
March 2018, the government claimed that human trafficking ``is
neither widespread nor prevalent in Hong Kong,'' and noted a
new action plan aimed at improving protections for MDWs through
increasing victim screening mechanisms and other administrative
measures.\98\ Advocates welcomed the plan, but argued that Hong
Kong needed anti-trafficking legislation in order to
effectively combat human trafficking.\99\ In August 2018, the
Court of Appeal ruled that the Bill of Rights Ordinance did not
cover human trafficking and thus the Hong Kong government did
not have an obligation to enact criminal legislation
prohibiting human trafficking.\100\ While China acceded to the
UN TIP Protocol in 2010, the Chinese central government has not
extended the Protocol to apply to Hong Kong.\101\
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
\1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters,
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, last visited 14 May
18.
\2\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03, art. 5.1. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro,
A/HRC/35/37, 28 March 17, para. 14.
\3\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 240. For a discussion of the human trafficking
related provisions of the PRC Criminal Law, see Laney Zhang, Library of
Congress, ``Training Related to Combating Human Trafficking: China,''
February 2016.
\4\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03. Topics that need to be addressed in domestic
legislation to bring it into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol
include the addition of non-physical forms of coercion into the legal
definition of trafficking (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)), the
trafficking of men (covered under the definition of ``trafficking in
persons'' in Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol), and providing the
``purpose of exploitation'' (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)). For an
examination of the ways in which Chinese laws are inconsistent with the
UN TIP Protocol, see Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China:
Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-
Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016),
148-77.
\5\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a), (c), (d). Note
that for children younger than 18 years old, the means described in
Article 3(a) are not required for an action to constitute human
trafficking.
\6\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What Is Human Trafficking?''
last visited 14 May 18; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a), (c), (d). For
information on how international standards regarding forced labor fit
into the framework of the UN TIP Protocol, see International Labour
Office, International Labour Organization, ``Human Trafficking and
Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidelines for Legislation and Law
Enforcement,'' 2005, 7-15; International Labour Office, International
Labour Organization, ``Hard To See, Harder To Count: Survey Guidelines
To Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children,'' Second Edition,
2012, 12, 19; International Labour Organization, ``Questions and
Answers on Forced Labour,'' 1 June 12.
\7\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as
``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, receiving, sending, or
transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling [the
victim].''
\8\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 159.
\9\ Ibid., 151, 166; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October
97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December
02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29
August 15, 4 November 17, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03,
art. 3(a). See also UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What Is Human
Trafficking?'' last visited 14 May 18.
\10\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 159; PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 240; Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25
December 03, art. 3(a).
\11\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 160, 166; PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 240;
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00,
entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). The PRC Criminal Law
defines trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in,
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose
of selling [the victim].'' See also Supreme People's Court Information
Center and Judicial Cases Research Institute, ``Judicial Big Data
Special Report on Crimes Involving Trafficking'' [Sifa da shuju zhuanti
baogao she guai fanzui], 22 December 16, 11.
\12\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 159; PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 240; Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25
December 03, art. 3(a).
\13\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 244. See also Laney Zhang, Library of Congress,
``Training Related to Combating Human Trafficking: China,'' February
2016.
\14\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2018, 139;
Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic
Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human
Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 166-67, 170-71; PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 240;
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00,
entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). The PRC Criminal Law
defines trafficking as ``swindling, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in,
receiving, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose
of selling [the victim].'' In contrast, the purpose of exploitation is
a key element of the UN TIP Protocol definition of human trafficking.
For reports from the 2018 reporting year that describe the sale of
children as human trafficking without specifying the purpose of the
sale, see, e.g., Zhao Junxi, ``China Intensifies Crackdown on Child
Trafficking,'' Global Times, 27 October 17; Mao Yizhu and Zhan Yijia,
``Guangdong: First-Instance Judgment Issued, 26 Criminally Sentenced in
Major Child Trafficking Case'' [Guangdong: yi qi teda guaimai ertong an
yishen xuanpan 26 ren bei panxing], Xinhua, 1 February 18.
\15\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a), (c). The
purpose of exploitation is one of the required elements of a
trafficking case under Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol. See also UN
General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of
a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its
First to Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the
Official Records (Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto, A/55/383/Add.1, 3 November 00, para. 66; Bonny Ling,
``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation
and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law,
Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 171.
\16\ Heidi Stockl et al., ``Trafficking of Vietnamese Women and
Girls for Marriage in China,'' Global Health Research and Policy, Vol.
2, No. 28 (9 October 17); Mi Ki Kyaw Myint, ``Can Myanmar's Libraries
Help Combat Human Trafficking?'' Asia Foundation, 28 March 18; Jay
Song, ``Labour Migration as Complementary Pathways for Refugees in the
Asia-Pacific,'' Lowy Institute for International Policy, Migration and
Border Policy Project Working Paper Number 9, April 2018, 2.
\17\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2018, 139;
Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic
Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human
Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 177.
\18\ For information on cross-border trafficking to and from China
in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October
17, 186; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 186; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 184.
\19\ See, e.g., ``Crackdown on Human Traffickers Reveals
`Vietnamese Bride' Trade,'' Global Times, 19 February 18; Nick Baker,
``The Child Bride Trade Is Booming in Myanmar as the Gender Gap Bites
in China,'' ABC, 7 October 17; Liberty Asia, ``ASEAN & ACTIP: Using a
Regional Legal Framework To Fight a Global Crime,'' September 2017, 26,
134.
\20\ See, e.g., Katherine Fung, `` `Sisters' Help Women Sex
Trafficked From China Flee U.S. Massage Parlors,'' Reuters, 12 March
18; EU-China Dialogue on Migration and Mobility Support Project,
International Organization for Migration and International Labour
Organization, ``Seminar for Facilitating Network Building Among Anti-
Trafficking Criminal Investigation Experts, 16-17 January 2018, Sanya,
Summary Report,'' last visited 14 May 18, 2, 4; Suzanne L. J. Kragten-
Heerdink et al., ``More Than Just `Pushing and Pulling':
Conceptualizing Identified Human Trafficking in the Netherlands,''
Crime & Delinquency, 5 September 17.
\21\ Nick Baker, ``The Child Bride Trade Is Booming in Myanmar as
the Gender Gap Bites in China,'' ABC, 7 October 17; Su Myat Mon,
``Women Targeted by Rampant Human Trafficking in Kachin,'' Frontier
Myanmar, 11 December 17; Nay Myo Win, ``61 Human Trafficking Cases
Recorded in Three Months,'' Eleven, 8 April 18.
\22\ Niem Chheng and Daphne Chen, ``Woman Gets 7 Years for China
Bride Scam,'' Phnom Penh Post, 8 January 18. See also Liberty Asia,
``ASEAN & ACTIP: Using a Regional Legal Framework To Fight a Global
Crime,'' September 2017.
\23\ Ron Corben, ``UN Expert Calls on Laos To Boost Support for
Child Sex Abuse Victims, Voice of America, 27 November 17; `` `Do Not
Marry for Money,' '' Radio Free Asia, 17 April 18.
\24\ ``Crackdown on Human Traffickers Reveals `Vietnamese Bride'
Trade,'' Global Times, 19 February 18; ``Demand for Wives in China
Endangers Women Who Live on Its Borders,'' Economist, 4 November 17;
``Human Traffickers Sentenced, Vietnamese Mail-Order Brides Rescued,''
Global Times, 22 November 17. See also Heidi Stockl et al.,
``Trafficking of Vietnamese Women and Girls for Marriage in China,''
Global Health Research and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 28 (9 October 17).
\25\ Zarni Mann, ``Two Men Arrested in Mandalay Over Foiled Attempt
To Send 52 Illegal Workers to China,'' Irrawaddy, 23 February 18;
``Myanmar Steps Up Combating Human Trafficking,'' Xinhua, 8 December
17; ``Police Uncover Alleged Human Trafficking of Indonesians Into
China,'' Jakarta Post, 24 November 17. See also Liberty Asia, ``ASEAN &
ACTIP: Using a Regional Legal Framework To Fight a Global Crime,''
September 2017, 26, 134.
\26\ Katherine Fung, `` `Sisters' Help Women Sex Trafficked From
China Flee U.S. Massage Parlors,'' Reuters, 12 March 18; Kristin Hoppa
and Tommy Witherspoon, ``Authorities Raid Vegas Buffet in Labor
Trafficking Investigation,'' Waco Tribune-Herald, 1 June 18.
\27\ U.S. Department of Labor, ``U.S. Department of Labor
Investigation Finds $13.9 Million Due to Thousands of Chinese Employees
Working on Saipan Casino and Hotel,'' 5 March 18.
\28\ Sophia Yan, ``Chinese Workers Tricked Into Illegal Work on
Saipan,'' Associated Press, 15 March 18. See also Liu Ruili, China
Metallurgical Group Corporation and Metallurgical Corporation of China
Ltd., ``MCC Group Forms MCC International Engineering Group Ltd. and
Announces Leadership Appointments'' [Zhongye jituan zujian zhongye
guoji gongcheng jituan youxian gongsi bing xuanbu lingdao banzi renming
jueding], 25 March 13; China Metallurgical Group Corporation and
Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd., ``About Us,'' last visited 30
May 18.
\29\ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``China,'' last visited 14 May 18; Office To Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in
Persons Report,'' June 2018, 141.
\30\ Guo Shuhe and Liu Zhuoqun, ``Capturing the Homeless To Labor
for Free, Four in Shandong Sentenced for Forcing Others Into Labor''
[Zhua liulanghan zuo mianfei laodongli shandong si ren yin qiangpo
taren laodong huo xing], Procuratorial Daily, 26 February 18.
\31\ Yujing Liu, ``Chinese Father and Son Accused of Enslaving
Mentally Ill Men and Forcing Them To Work as Beggars,'' South China
Morning Post, 5 April 18.
\32\ Peter Bengsten, ``Hidden in Plain Sight: Forced Labour
Constructing China,'' openDemocracy, 22 March 18; ``Tis the Season for
Protests Over Unpaid Wages in China,'' Economist, 14 December 17; China
Labour Bulletin, ``As Wage Arrears Escalate in the Run Up to the Lunar
New Year, the Trade Union Needs To Act,'' 21 November 17; International
Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on Forced Labour,'' 1 June
12. The International Labour Organization lists ``withholding of
wages'' as an indicator of forced labor.
\33\ For information from previous years on forced labor in
pretrial and administrative detention, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 187; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 187; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 186.
\34\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30, art. 2.1, 2.2(c);
International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications of CO29--Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),'' last visited 10 July 18. Article
2.1 defines forced or compulsory labor as ``all work or service which
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'' China has
not ratified this convention.
\35\ Xu Yingyan et al., ``SPP Launches Special Activities To
Supervise and Protect Detainees' Legal Rights and Interests''
[Zuigaojian bushu kaizhan jiandu weihu zaiya renyuan hefa quanyi
zhuanxiang huodong], Procuratorial Daily, 27 April 18; ``Fushun
Municipality Detention Center'' [Fushun shi kanshousuo], Clear Wisdom,
25 June 18. See also PRC Public Security Bureau Detention Center
Regulations [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kanshousuo tiaoli], issued and
effective 17 March 90, arts. 2, 33, 34; ``Zhang Lin: Communist China's
Detention Center System--Extorting Confessions Through Torture'' [Zhang
lin: zhonggong guo kanshousuo zhidu--xingxun bigong], Epoch Times, 1
May 18; Zhang Peihong, ``100 Facts About China's Detention Centers
(Full Version)'' [Zhongguo kanshousuo bai tai (wanzheng ban)], Weibo,
reprinted in Ifeng, 16 November 17.
\36\ For information on compulsory drug detoxification centers from
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17,
187; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 187; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 186.
\37\ Beijing Municipality Drug Detoxification Management Bureau,
Regulations on Management of Compulsory Drug Detainees' Production
[Beijing shi jiedu guanli ju qiangzhi geli jiedu renyuan shengchan
laodong guanli guiding], issued 1 February 18, effective 1 March 18;
Jinhua Municipal Bureau of Justice, ``Inspector Chen Zhong Visits
Jiaxing Municipality Compulsory Drug Detoxification Center'' [Chen
zhong xunshiyuan dao jiaxing shi qiangzhi geli jiedu suo], 26 January
18; Wang Jian, ``Visiting Shaanxi Women's Compulsory Drug
Detoxification Center: 80 Percent of Guards Are Female, Say They Are
Made of `Cement' '' [Tanfang shaanxi nu qiangzhi geli jiedu suo'' nu
ganjing zhan ba cheng, zi cheng ``shuini'' zuo de], The Paper, 8 March
18. For relevant legal provisions, see PRC Narcotics Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo jindu fa], passed 29 December 07, effective 1 June 08,
arts. 38, 41, 43, 47; State Council, Drug Detoxification Regulations
[Jiedu tiaoli], issued 26 June 11; Ministry of Justice, Judicial and
Administrative Bureaus Compulsory Drug Detoxification Work Regulations
[Sifa xingzheng jiguan qiangzhi geli jiedu gongzuo guiding], issued 3
April 13, effective 1 June 13, art. 34. See also Human Rights Watch, ``
`Where Darkness Knows No Limits': Incarceration, Ill-Treatment, and
Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,'' January 2010, 27-31.
\38\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03, art. 3(a). Compulsory drug detoxification center
detainee labor can be viewed as constituting trafficking under Article
3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol, as authorities engage in the
``harbouring'' and ``receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force . . . for the purpose of exploitation.'' According to Article
3(a), exploitation includes ``forced labour.'' See also Office To
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State,
``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2017, 126, 128.
\39\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30, art. 2. See also
Patrick Tibke, International Drug Policy Consortium, ``Drug Dependence
Treatment in China: A Policy Analysis,'' February 2017, 8; Human Rights
Watch, `` `Where Darkness Knows No Limits': Incarceration, Ill-
Treatment, and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,'' January
2010, 27-31.
\40\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17
December 13, 9.
\41\ Ibid., 17-18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish Re-
Education Through Labor,'' 8 January 13; State Council, Decision on the
Issue of Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang
wenti de jueding], issued 3 August 57, item 2.
\42\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17
December 13, 5; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish Re-Education
Through Labor,'' 8 January 13; State Council, Decision on the Issue of
Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang wenti de
jueding], issued 3 August 57, item 3; State Council, Supplementary
Provisions on Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong
jiaoyang de buchong guiding], issued 29 November 79, items 1-2.
\43\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Abolishing Legal Provisions Regarding Reeducation Through Labor
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu feizhi youguan
laodong jiaoyang falu guiding de jueding], issued and effective, 28
December 13; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 130.
\44\ Sun Ying, ``Ministry of Justice: Vast Majority of Nation's
Former Reeducation Through Labor Centers Have Been Turned Into
Compulsory Drug Detoxification Centers'' [Sifabu: quanguo jueda duoshu
yuan laojiao changsuo zhuan wei qiangzhi geli jiedu changsuo], China
National Radio, 5 November 14.
\45\ For information on compulsory drug detoxification centers from
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
187; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 186.
\46\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Call for Constitutional Review of
Custody and Education,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 4 April 18; Gao
Yuyang et al., ``Three Lawyers' Key Words for the Two Sessions'' [San
wei lushi lianghui guanjianci], Beijing Youth Daily, 10 March 18; Wang
Xiuzhong, ``Exclusive! CPPCC Delegate Zhu Zhengfu Recommends
Constitutional Review of Compulsory Custody and Education for [Crime
of] Prostitution'' [Dujia! Quanguozhengxie weiyuan zhu zhengfu jianyi
dui maiyin piaochang qiangzhi shourong jiaoyu jinxing hexianxing
shencha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 25 February 18. For relevant
legal provisions, see State Council, Measures on Custody and Education
of Prostitutes [Maiyin piaochang renyuan shourong jiaoyu banfa], issued
4 September 93, amended 8 January 11, arts. 2, 6, 13. See also Asia
Catalyst, `` `Custody and Education': Arbitrary Detention for Female
Sex Workers in China,'' December 2013, 8, 25-27.
\47\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Call for Constitutional Review of
Custody and Education,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 4 April 18; Gao
Yuyang et al., ``Three Lawyers' Key Words for the Two Sessions'' [San
wei lushi lianghui guanjianci], Beijing Youth Daily, 10 March 18; Wang
Xiuzhong, ``Exclusive! CPPCC Delegate Zhu Zhengfu Recommends
Constitutional Review of Compulsory Custody and Education for [Crime
of] Prostitution'' [Dujia! Quanguozhengxie weiyuan zhu zhengfu jianyi
dui maiyin piaochang qiangzhi shourong jiaoyu jinxing hexianxing
shencha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 25 February 18.
\48\ ``Uyghur Women and Children Endure Heavy Labor Amid Detentions
in Xinjiang's Hotan,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 October 17.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ Ibid.
\51\ Ibid.
\52\ State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out Reform of the
Household Registration System [Guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu tuijin huji
zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 24 July 14; ``China To Help 100m Settle
in Cities,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 30 July 14; State
Council General Office, ``Plan Promoting 100 Million Individuals in
Cities Without Household Registration To Obtain Hukou'' [Tuidong 1 yi
fei huji renkou zai chengshi luohu fang'an], issued 30 September 16,
paras. 4-6; China Digital Times, ``Beijing To Scrap Urban-Rural
Residency Distinction,'' 21 September 16.
\53\ State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out Reform of the
Household Registration System [Guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu tuijin huji
zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 30 July 14, paras. 6-7; Bingqin Li,
``China Going Nowhere on Hukou Reform,'' East Asia Forum, 19 May 17;
Priyanka Juneja, ``China's Hukou System: An Interview With Fei-Ling
Wang,'' The Diplomat, 14 July 17.
\54\ Hongbin Li et al., ``Human Capital and China's Future
Growth,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter
2017), 28; China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their
Children,'' last visited 2 February 18; ``Chinese Cities Should Stop
Expelling Chinese Migrants,'' Economist, 30 November 17.
\55\ ``Chinese Cities Should Stop Expelling Chinese Migrants,''
Economist, 30 November 17; Chris Smith and Pun Ngai, ``Class and
Precarity in China: A Contested Relationship,'' Chinoiresie, 14
February 18.
\56\ Peter Bengsten, ``Hidden in Plain Sight: Forced Labour
Constructing in China,'' openDemocracy, 16 February 18; Genevieve
LeBaron et al., ``Confronting the Root Causes of Forced Labour:
Restrictive Mobility Regimes,'' openDemocracy, 10 January 18; Office To
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State,
``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2018, 140-41.
\57\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed 3 April 92, amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 9-11;
Wang Jiangsong, ``A Six-Day Strike in Shanghai Caused by a $110 Pay
Cut--Collective Action by Sanitation Workers in China's `New Era' of
Stability Maintenance,'' China Change, 13 April 18; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Labour Relations FAQ,'' September 2017. See also UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, including Hong
Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 40th
Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June 14, para. 23. For
relevant international standards regarding the right to freely form and
join independent unions, see International Labour Organization, ILO
Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right To Organise, 4 July 50, arts. 2, 3, 5; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly
resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 23(4); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76,
art. 22.1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1.
\58\ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai,
A/71/385, 14 September 16, paras. 2, 4, 11, 74.
\59\ Nick Baker, ``The Child Bride Trade Is Booming in Myanmar as
the Gender Gap Bites in China,'' ABC, 7 October 17; Liberty Asia,
``ASEAN & ACTIP: Using a Regional Legal Framework To Fight a Global
Crime,'' September 2017, 26, 134; Zarni Mann, ``Two Men Arrested in
Mandalay Over Foiled Attempt To Send 52 Illegal Workers to China,''
Irawaddy, 23 February 18.
\60\ Nick Baker, ``The Child Bride Trade Is Booming in Myanmar as
the Gender Gap Bites in China,'' ABC, 7 October 17; ``Demand for Wives
in China Endangers Women Who Live on Its Borders,'' Economist, 4
November 17; Liberty Asia, ``ASEAN & ACTIP: Using a Regional Legal
Framework To Fight a Global Crime,'' September 2017, 26, 134; Heidi
Stockl et al., ``Trafficking of Vietnamese Women and Girls for Marriage
in China,'' Global Health and Research Policy, Vol. 2, No. 28 (9
October 17).
\61\ Hyun-Joo Lim, ``A Terrible Fate Awaits North Korean Women Who
Escape to China,'' The Conversation, 2 October 17; Brian Padden,
``North Korean Defector Speaks Out After China Repatriates Family,''
Voice of America, 16 January 18.
\62\ ``Demand for Wives in China Endangers Women Who Live on Its
Borders,'' Economist, 4 November 17; Hyun-Joo Lim, ``A Terrible Fate
Awaits North Korean Women Who Escape to China,'' The Conversation, 2
October 17; Erik Ortiz, ``Two Decades After Being Sold as Bride, North
Korean Woman Finds Salvation in Seoul,'' NBC, 22 February 18.
\63\ Heidi Stockl et al., ``Trafficking of Vietnamese Women and
Girls for Marriage in China,'' Global Health and Research Policy, Vol.
2, No. 28 (9 October 17); ``Demand for Wives in China Endangers Women
Who Live on Its Borders,'' Economist, 4 November 17.
\64\ ``Demand for Wives in China Endangers Women Who Live on Its
Borders,'' Economist, 4 November 17; Heidi Stockl et al., ``Trafficking
of Vietnamese Women and Girls for Marriage in China,'' Global Health
and Research Policy, Vol. 2, No. 28 (9 October 17).
\65\ ``Demand for Wives in China Endangers Women Who Live on Its
Borders,'' Economist, 4 November 17; Heidi Stockl et al., ``Trafficking
of Vietnamese Women and Girls for Marriage in China,'' Global Health
and Research Policy, Vol. 2, No. 28 (9 October 17).
\66\ For information on North Korean workers in China from previous
reporting years, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 188; CECC,
2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 186-87.
\67\ Jason Arterburn, C4ADS, ``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced
Labor in North Korea's Proliferation Finance System,'' 2 August 18, 7,
9, 27-36; ``North Korean Overseas Laborers Give 70% of Wages to
State,'' Daily NK, 10 October 17; Tim Sullivan, ``Americans May Eat
Seafood Processed by North Korean Workers,'' Associated Press, 5
October 17.
\68\ Jason Arterburn, C4ADS, ``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced
Labor in North Korea's Proliferation Finance System,'' 2 August 18, 7,
27; ``North Korean Overseas Laborers Give 70% of Wages to State,''
Daily NK, 10 October 17; Tim Sullivan, ``Americans May Eat Seafood
Processed by North Korean Workers,'' Associated Press, 5 October 17.
\69\ ``North Korean Overseas Laborers Give 70% of Wages to State,''
Daily NK, 10 October 17; Tim Sullivan, ``Americans May Eat Seafood
Processed by North Korean Workers,'' Associated Press, 5 October 17;
Jason Arterburn, C4ADS, ``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced Labor in
North Korea's Proliferation Finance System,'' 2 August 18, 7. According
to the International Labour Organization, restrictions on workers'
freedom of movement and withholding wages are indicators of forced
labor. International Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on
Forced Labour,'' 1 June 12.
\70\ Yu Bokun, ``North Korean Businesses in China Start Countdown
as Deadline for Closure Looms,'' Caixin, 27 October 17; Kim Chung Yeol,
``More North Korean Factory Workers in Dandong Repatriated,'' Daily NK,
9 October 17.
\71\ ``North Korean Workers Return to China in Defiance of UN
Restrictions,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 April 18; Takuya Hiraga, ``North
Koreans Turn Again to China for Work Despite Sanctions,'' Asahi
Shimbun, 26 April 18; Jenna McLaughlin, ``US Cracks Down on North
Korea's Army of Overseas Workers,'' CNN, 25 June 18; Jason Arterburn,
C4ADS, ``Dispatched: Mapping Overseas Forced Labor in North Korea's
Proliferation Finance System,'' 2 August 18, 8-9.
\72\ 2017 China Law Yearbook [2017 zhongguo falu nianjian]
(Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 2017), 1168, table 1.
\73\ 2016 China Law Yearbook [2016 zhongguo falu nianjian]
(Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 2016), 1305, table 1.
\74\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2016 `Chinese
Children's Development Summary (2011-2020)' Statistical Monitoring
Report'' [2016 nian ``zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao (2011-2020 nian)''
tongji jiance baogao], 27 October 17, 1(5)2.
\75\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, `` `Chinese Children's
Development Summary (2011-2020)' Midterm Statistical Monitoring
Report'' [``Zhongguo ertong fazhan gangyao (2011-2020 nian)'' zhongqi
tongji jiance baogao], 3 November 16, 1(5)2.
\76\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). The PRC
Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting, kidnapping, buying,
trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child,
for the purpose of selling [the victim].'' The illegal sale of children
for adoption thus can be considered trafficking under Chinese law. In
contrast, under the UN TIP Protocol, illegal adoptions constitute
trafficking only if the purpose is exploitation. UN General Assembly,
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to
Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the Official
Records (Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto, A/55/383/Add.1, 3 November 00, para. 66. See also
Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of
State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2018, 139; Bonny Ling,
``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation
and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law,
Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 166-67, 170-71.
\77\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). See also Bonny
Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic
Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human
Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 160, 166-70.
\78\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). See also Bonny
Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic
Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human
Rights and the Law, Vol. 17, Issue 1 (2016), 159, 170, 175.
\79\ For information on Chinese government involvement in
multilateral anti-trafficking efforts in previous reporting years, see
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 189; CECC, 2016 Annual Report,
6 October 16, 188; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 185.
\80\ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region, signed 29
October 04, reprinted in UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking
in Persons (UN-ACT), last visited 17 May 18. The six signatories to the
MOU were Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and
Vietnam.
\81\ United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in
Persons (UN-ACT), ``COMMIT Guidelines for Fair Recruitment Developed,''
20 October 17.
\82\ Zhao Junfu, `` `Two Supremes' and International Organization
for Migration Jointly Hold Research Seminar on Prosecution and
Adjudication of Human Trafficking Cases'' [``Liang gao'' yu guoji yimin
zuzhi hezuo juban renkou fanyun anjian qisu yu shenli yantao hui],
Chinacourt.org, 27 March 18.
\83\ ``Myanmar-China Border Liaison Office Opened in Myitkyina,''
Eleven Myanmar, 8 March 18; Mom Kunthear, ``China Agrees on Anti-Human
Trafficking Cooperation,'' Khmer Times, 14 May 18; ``China, Laos To
Intensify Efforts To Crack Down Cross-Border Crimes,'' Xinhua, 14 May
18.
\84\ For information on human trafficking in Hong Kong from
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17,
189-90; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 189-90; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 187-88.
\85\ Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, ``Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics''
[Xianggang tongji niankan], October 2017, 43, Table 2.12. The Hong Kong
government refers to migrant domestic workers as ``foreign domestic
helpers.'' For general information on migrant domestic workers, see
International Labour Organization, ``Who Are Domestic Workers'' last
visited 18 May 18; International Labour Organization, ``Migrant
Domestic Workers,'' last visited 18 May 18.
\86\ Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Judge Quashes Domestic Helper's
Bid for Change to `Live-in' Rule in Hong Kong,'' South China Morning
Post, 14 February 18; Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Hong Kong's Domestic
Workers Share Stories of Ill-Treatment, Poor Living Conditions and
Rights Abuses,'' South China Morning Post, 15 February 18; Centre for
Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong et
al., ``Joint Submission of NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review (3rd
Cycle) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) China,'' March
2018, paras. 44-45, 48, 50; Holmes Chan, ``NGO Task Force Identifies 63
Victims of Human Trafficking in Hong Kong Using New Toolkit,'' Hong
Kong Free Press, 31 July 18. For examples of employers abusing migrant
domestic workers that emerged this past year, see, e.g., Clifford Lo,
`` `I Really Want To Kill You': Hong Kong Woman Arrested After Video
Shows Employer Hitting Indonesian Domestic Helper,'' South China
Morning Post, 2 March 18; Jasmine Siu, ``Hong Kong Woman Jailed for
Torturing Domestic Helper Erwiana Ordered To Pay Damages to Second
Victim,'' South China Morning Post, 26 February 18.
\87\ Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Hong Kong et al., ``Joint Submission of NGOs for the
Universal Periodic Review (3rd Cycle) Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) China,'' March 2018, paras. 47-48, endnote 16; Harminder
Singh, ``Hong Kong Domestic Helpers March To Demand Stronger Legal
Protection Against Abuse,'' South China Morning Post, 18 December 17;
Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Judge Quashes Domestic Helper's Bid for
Change to `Live-in' Rule in Hong Kong,'' South China Morning Post, 14
February 18.
\88\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Visa/Extension of Stay Application Form for
Domestic Helper From Abroad [Cong waiguo shoupin lai gang jiating
yonggong qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao], last visited
18 May 18, 6(ii); Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Employment Contract for a Domestic Helper
Recruited From Outside Hong Kong, last visited 18 May 18, item 3; Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Immigration Department,
``Foreign Domestic Helpers,'' last visited 18 May 18, Q30.
\89\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Visa/Extension of Stay Application Form for
Domestic Helper From Abroad [Cong waiguo shoupin lai gang jiating
yonggong qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao], last visited
18 May 18, 6(vi); Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, ``Conditions of Employment for Foreign Domestic
Helpers: A General Guide to the Helper,'' last visited 18 May 18, item
3; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Immigration
Department, ``Foreign Domestic Helpers,'' last visited 18 May 18, Q33,
Q44.
\90\ Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Hong Kong et al., ``Joint Submission of NGOs for the
Universal Periodic Review (3rd Cycle) Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR) China,'' March 2018, paras. 45-46, 48, 50. See also
Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Judge Quashes Domestic Helper's Bid for
Change to `Live-in' Rule in Hong Kong,'' South China Morning Post, 14
February 18; Harminder Singh, ``Hong Kong Domestic Helpers March To
Demand Stronger Legal Protection Against Abuse,'' South China Morning
Post, 18 December 17.
\91\ Karen Cheung, ``Hong Kong Domestic Worker Loses Legal Bid To
Overturn Compulsory Live-in Rule,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 14 February
18; Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Judge Quashes Domestic Helper's Bid
for Change to `Live-in' Rule in Hong Kong,'' South China Morning Post,
14 February 18.
\92\ Karen Cheung, ``Hong Kong Domestic Worker Loses Legal Bid To
Overturn Compulsory Live-in Rule,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 14 February
18; Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Judge Quashes Domestic Helper's Bid
for Change to `Live-in' Rule in Hong Kong,'' South China Morning Post,
14 February 18.
\93\ Karen Cheung, ``Hong Kong Domestic Worker Loses Legal Bid To
Overturn Compulsory Live-in Rule,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 14 February
18. See also Jasmine Siu and Chris Lau, ``Judge Quashes Domestic
Helper's Bid for Change to `Live-in' Rule in Hong Kong,'' South China
Morning Post, 14 February 18. For more information on the Asian
Migrants Coordinating Body, see the group's Facebook page at https://
www.facebook.com/groups/amcb.hk/.
\94\ Jeffie Lam and Harminder Singh, ``Funnel Foreign Domestic
Workers Overseas Illegally and Face Full Force of Law, Carrie Lam Warns
Hong Kong Employment Agencies,'' South China Morning Post, 14 November
17; Billy SK Wong, ``Hong Kong, Singapore Key Centres of Trafficking
Ring Sending Thousands of Filipino Helpers to Russia,'' South China
Morning Post, 16 November 17; Billy SK Wong, ``Swindled by Hong Kong
Agencies, Filipino Helpers Face Debt, Fear and Broken Dreams in
Russia,'' South China Morning Post, 20 November 17.
\95\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) [Di 200 zhang xingshi zuixing
tiaoli], issued 31 December 72, amended 16 November 17, sec. 129(1);
Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Hong Kong et al., ``Joint Submission of NGOs for the Universal Periodic
Review (3rd Cycle) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
China,'' March 2018, para. 49.
\96\ In the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List, No
15 of 2015, HCAL 15/2015, 23 December 16, paras. 351, 355-57, 366-67.
For a discussion of the legal issues under consideration in the case,
see paragraphs 162 and 163. See also Adam Severson, ``Reviewing Hong
Kong's Human Trafficking Case,'' Justice Centre Hong Kong (blog), 15
January 16; Eddie Lee, ``South Asian in Judicial Review Had To Return
to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages, High Court Hears,'' South China Morning
Post, 15 January 16; Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383)
[Di 383 zhang xianggang renquan fa'an tiaoli], issued 8 June 91,
amended 15 February 17, sec. 8, art. 4.
\97\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, ``LCQ5:
Combating Trafficking in Persons,'' 21 March 18; Raquel Carvalho,
``Forced Labour Must Be Criminalised in Hong Kong To Protect Thousands
of `Invisible' Victims, Raza Husain QC Tells High Court,'' South China
Morning Post, 10 May 18; Raquel Carvalho, ``Hong Kong Under No
Obligation To Introduce Specific Criminal Legislation Against Forced
Labour, David Pannick QC, Defending Government, Tells High Court,''
South China Morning Post, 9 May 18. The draft bill was reportedly based
on the United Kingdom's Modern Slavery Act.
\98\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, ``LCQ5:
Combating Trafficking in Persons,'' 21 March 18; Patricia Ho and
Manisha Wijesinghe, Daly, Ho & Associates, ``Hong Kong's New Human
Trafficking Action Plan--A Rhetorical Manoeuvre or Reason for Hope? ''
Hong Kong Free Press, 22 March 18.
\99\ Patricia Ho and Manisha Wijesinghe, Daly, Ho & Associates,
``Hong Kong's New Human Trafficking Action Plan--A Rhetorical Manoeuvre
or Reason for Hope?'' Hong Kong Free Press, 22 March 18; Christy Leung
and Raquel Carvalho, ``Hong Kong Launches Action Plan on Human
Trafficking but Critics Say More Must Be Done,'' South China Morning
Post, 21 March 18; Raquel Carvalho, ``Legislator and Lawyers Push for
Bill Against Human Trafficking in Hong Kong,'' South China Morning
Post, 8 April 18.
\100\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No 14 of 2017 (On Appeal From HCAL
15/2015), CACV 14/2017, [2018] HKCA 473, 2 August 18, paras. 132, 187.
\101\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal
Matters, 12.a., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, last visited
3 July 18. See also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and
Eighth Periodic Reports of China, adopted by the Committee at its 59th
Session (20 October-7 November 2014), CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8, 14 November
14, para. 56.
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean Refugees in China
Introduction
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, the Chinese
government's policy of detaining North Korean refugees and
repatriating them to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) remained in place, despite substantial evidence that
repatriated persons face torture, imprisonment, forced labor,
execution, and other inhuman treatment.\1\ The Chinese
government regards North Korean refugees in China as illegal
economic migrants \2\ and maintains a policy of forcible
repatriation based on a 1998 border protocol with the DPRK.\3\
China's repatriation of North Korean refugees contravenes its
international obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to which China
has acceded.\4\ China is also obligated under the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment to refrain from repatriating persons if there are
``substantial grounds for believing that [they] would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.'' \5\
Repatriation of Refugees and Border Conditions
This past year, heightened security measures along the
China-North Korea and China-Southeast Asia borders increased
the risks North Korean refugees face, and may be limiting the
outflow of refugees from the DPRK. South Korean Ministry of
Unification data indicated that 1,127 North Korean refugees
reached South Korea in 2017, continuing a trend of significant
decline since 2009 when the yearly number of refugees entering
South Korea peaked at 2,914.\6\ The North Korean government's
imprisonment and torture of repatriated North Koreans render
North Koreans in China refugees sur place who fear persecution
upon return to their country of origin, regardless of their
reason for leaving the DPRK.\7\ The Chinese government,
however, has refused to recognize them as such, insisting that
the refugees are illegal economic migrants.\8\ According to
South Korea-based news media Daily NK, after North Korean
leader Kim Jong-un's March 2018 visit to China, Chinese
authorities increased the monetary reward for reporting North
Korean refugees hiding inside China.\9\ As a result, Chinese
authorities reportedly caught and detained many North Korean
refugees.\10\
Throughout the 2018 reporting year, Chinese authorities
reportedly detained, and in some cases, repatriated North
Korean refugees to the DPRK:
September 2017. Chinese authorities reportedly
detained a group of eight North Korean refugees near
the China-Laos border.\11\
November 2017. Chinese authorities reportedly
detained a group of 10 North Korean refugees--which
included a young boy, his mother, and a nuclear
scientist--in Shenyang municipality, Liaoning
province.\12\ Authorities later repatriated the group
to the DPRK, after which the nuclear scientist
reportedly committed suicide in detention.\13\
According to an April 2018 Telegraph report, in a rare
event, North Korean authorities released the mother and
the boy, possibly as a result of an ``improvement in
inter-Korean relations'' and ``pressure from the
international community.''\14\
March 2018. Prior to North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un's visit to China in late March, Chinese
authorities reportedly detained seven North Korean
refugees in the following two locations: a railway
station in Shenyang and an unknown location in Kunming
municipality, Yunnan province, near the China-Laos
border.\15\ Chinese authorities reportedly detained an
additional 30 North Korean refugees during and after
Kim's visit to China.\16\ The South Korean government
reportedly considered stepping up efforts to prevent
repatriation of North Korean refugees in China
following the detention of the 30 refugees.\17\
According to reports, Chinese authorities released the
30 refugees due to international pressure.\18\
July to August 2018. Chinese authorities
reportedly detained a married North Korean couple at an
unknown location in early July, after which the wife
committed suicide in detention.\19\ Chinese authorities
repatriated the husband and the wife's body to the DPRK
in August.\20\
Crackdown on Foreign Missionaries
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities appeared to
have intensified crackdowns on organizations and individuals,
particularly South Korean Christian missionaries and churches,
that have played a crucial role in assisting and facilitating
the movement of North Korean refugees outside the DPRK.
December 2017 to January 2018. According to
international media reports, Chinese authorities
deported 32 South Korean missionaries who had been
based in Yanji city, Yanbian Korean Autonomous
Prefecture (KAP), Jilin province.\21\ Some of the
missionaries reportedly had been assisting North Korean
refugees.\22\
February 2018. According to international
media reports, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs confirmed that Chinese authorities had detained
several South Korean missionaries in Yanbian KAP,
including a missionary surnamed Kim who was detained
for violating immigration law.\23\ Chinese authorities
also reportedly detained four Christian missionaries in
Yanji, including two Chinese citizens and a Korean
American.\24\
Furthermore, according to South Korean and international
media reports, Chinese authorities in the three northeastern
provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning have expelled
hundreds of South Korean missionaries since late 2016.\25\ The
expulsion of South Korean missionaries reportedly has resulted
in the closure of many South Korean-run churches in the
region.\26\ Approximately 1,000 South Korean missionaries
reportedly had been working in China, mostly in the northeast
region.\27\ Many of these missionaries have assisted North
Korean refugees in fleeing to South Korea and other
countries.\28\ Sources also indicate that the expulsion of
South Korean missionaries may be connected to Chinese
authorities' crackdown on ``illicit religious activities.''
\29\
Trafficking of North Korean Women
North Korean women who enter China illegally remain
particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. The demand for
North Korean women has been linked to a sex ratio imbalance in
China exacerbated by the Chinese government's population
planning policies.\30\ Sources indicate that the majority of
North Korean refugees leaving the DPRK are women,\31\ many of
whom are trafficked by force or deception from the DPRK into or
within China for the purposes of forced marriage and commercial
sexual exploitation.\32\ The Chinese government's refusal to
recognize these women as refugees denies them legal protection
and may encourage the trafficking of North Korean women and
girls within China.\33\ China is obligated under the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, to take measures to
safeguard trafficking victims and suppress all forms of
trafficking of women.\34\ [For more information on the sex
ratio imbalance and the trafficking of women in China, see
Section II--Population Control and Section II--Human
Trafficking.]
Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents
Many children born to Chinese fathers and North Korean
mothers remain deprived of basic rights to education and other
public services, owing to the children's lack of legal resident
status in China. According to some estimates, the population of
children born in China to North Korean women ranges between
20,000 and 30,000.\35\ The PRC Nationality Law provides that
all children born in China are entitled to Chinese nationality
if either parent is a Chinese citizen.\36\ Chinese authorities
reportedly continue to largely deprive these children of their
rights to birth registration and nationality.\37\ Without proof
of resident status, these children are unable to access
education and other public services.\38\ The denial of
nationality rights and access to education for these children
contravenes China's obligations under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.\39\
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
\1\ See, e.g., ``Fear of Forced Repatriation Rising Among Defectors
in China,'' Daily NK, 12 October 17; ``North Korean Defector Speaks Out
After China Repatriates Family,'' Voice of America, 16 January 18; UN
Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 46. In November 2015, in its Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, the UN Committee against Torture noted that
``over 100 testimonies received by United Nations sources . . . in
which nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicate
that persons forcibly repatriated to the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea have been systematically subjected to torture and ill-
treatment.''
\2\ Human Rights Watch, ``Human Rights in North Korea,'' 5 June 18;
``North Korean Defector Speaks Out After China Repatriates Family,''
Voice of America, 16 January 18; ``Experts Urge Pressure China To Stop
Repatriating Defectors,'' Daily NK, 15 November 17.
\3\ Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State
Security and People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security,
Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National
Security and Social Order in the Border Areas, signed 8 July 98,
effective 28 August 98, arts. 4, 9. The protocol commits each side to
treat as illegal those border crossers who do not have proper visa
certificates, except in cases of ``calamity or unavoidable factors.''
\4\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28
July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly
resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, entry into force 22 April 54,
arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by
the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, ``owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country . . ..'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that,
``No Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, last
visited 16 April 18. China acceded to the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees on September 24, 1982. Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 2198 (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 4 October 67;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless
Persons, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, last visited 16
April 18. China acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees on September 24, 1982. See also Human Rights Watch, ``Human
Rights in North Korea,'' 5 June 18; Evan Jones, ``North Koreans Can't
Escape Human Rights Abuses, Even When They Flee,'' Huffington Post, 25
January 18.
\5\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art.
3. Article 3 states that, ``No State Party shall expel, return
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV,
Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, last visited 16 April 18. China
signed the Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October
4, 1988. UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 46. In February 2016, in its Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China's compliance with the Convention, the UN
Committee against Torture stated its concerns about China's lack of
``national asylum legislation and administrative procedures'' for
determining refugee status, as well as China's ``rigorous policy of
forcibly repatriating all nationals of the [DPRK] on the ground that
they have illegally crossed the border solely for economic reasons.''
See also Evan Jones, ``North Koreans Can't Escape Human Rights Abuses,
Even When They Flee,'' Huffington Post, 25 January 18.
\6\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North
Korean Defectors,'' last visited 10 July 18; ``No. of Defections by
North Koreans Falls 21 Pct in 2017: Data,'' Yonhap News Agency, 5
January 18; ``North Korean Defector Numbers Slump as Controls
Tighten,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post,
5 January 18.
\7\ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Protection and
International Migration, 17 January 07, paras. 20-21; Human Rights
Watch, ``Human Rights in North Korea,'' 5 June 18; Ariana King, ``North
Korean Defector Describes Horrors Following Chinese Repatriation,''
Nikkei Asian Review, 12 December 17.
\8\ Human Rights Watch, ``Human Rights in North Korea,'' 5 June 18;
``North Korean Defector Speaks Out After China Repatriates Family,''
Voice of America, 16 January 18; ``Antonio Guterres To Be Next UN
Secretary-General,'' Dong-a Ilbo, 7 October 16.
\9\ ``Chinese Authorities Raise Reward Money for North Korean
Defectors,'' Daily NK, 24 April 18.
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ ``North Korean Authorities Resort to All Tactics To Catch
Defectors,'' Daily NK, 27 October 17.
\12\ Sofia Lotto Persio, ``North Korean Defector Numbers Fall to
Lowest Level Since Kim Jong Un Took Power,'' Newsweek, 5 January 18;
``North Korean Nuclear Scientist Commits Suicide on Forced Return From
China,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 December 17; Taehoon Lee and Joshua
Berlinger, ``Defector's Family Returned to North Korea After Being
Caught in China,'' CNN, 29 November 17.
\13\ Sofia Lotto Persio, ``North Korean Defector Numbers Fall to
Lowest Level Since Kim Jong Un Took Power,'' Newsweek, 5 January 18;
``North Korean Nuclear Scientist Commits Suicide on Forced Return From
China,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 December 17.
\14\ Nicola Smith, ``North Korea Releases Young Mother Caught
Trying To Defect, in Unusual Move Amid Diplomatic Thaw,'' Telegraph, 9
April 18.
\15\ Kim Myong-song, ``7 N. Korean Defectors Arrested in China,''
Chosun Ilbo, 30 March 18.
\16\ ``Yielding to International Pressure, China Releases 30 North
Korean Defectors'' [Qufu yu guoji yali zhongguo shifang 30 ming
tuobeizhe], Liberty Times Net, 17 April 18; Dagyum Ji, ``Seoul May Send
Staff to China-DPRK Border To Prevent Defector Repatriations: MOU,'' NK
News, 6 April 18.
\17\ Dagyum Ji, ``Seoul May Send Staff to China-DPRK Border To
Prevent Defector Repatriations: MOU,'' NK News, 6 April 18.
\18\ ``Bowing to International Pressure? China's Rare Release of 30
North Korean Defectors'' [Xiang guoji yali ditou? zhongguo hanjian fu
shifang 30 ming tuobeizhe], Apple Daily, 17 April 18; Lee Kil-seong,
``China Frees 30 N. Korean Defectors,'' Chosun Ilbo, 18 April 18;
``Yielding to International Pressure, China Releases 30 North Korean
Defectors'' [Qufu yu guoji yali zhongguo shifang 30 ming tuobeizhe],
Liberty Times Net, 17 April 18.
\19\ Kim Yoo Jin, ``Defectors Choose Suicide Over Arrest and
Repatriation,'' Daily NK, 16 August 18.
\20\ Ibid.
\21\ Chen Jianyu, ``To Counter THAAD, Mainland China Expelled 32
South Korean Missionaries'' [Fanzhi sade lu quzhu 32 ming nanhan
chuanjiaoshi], China Times, 12 February 17; ``Many South Korean
Christian Missionaries Detained in China and Expelled'' [Duo ming
nanhan de jidujiao chuanjiaoshi zai zhongguo bei daibu he quzhu],
AsiaNews, 2 November 17.
\22\ ``Many South Korean Christian Missionaries Detained in China
and Expelled'' [Duo ming nanhan de jidujiao chuanjiaoshi zai zhongguo
bei daibu he quzhu], AsiaNews, 2 November 17.
\23\ Ibid.; Chen Jianyu, ``To Counter THAAD, Mainland China
Expelled 32 South Korean Missionaries'' [Fanzhi sade lu quzhu 32 ming
nanhan chuanjiaoshi], China Times, 12 February 17.
\24\ ``Many South Korean Christian Missionaries Detained in China
and Expelled'' [Duo ming nanhan de jidujiao chuanjiaoshi zai zhongguo
bei daibu he quzhu], AsiaNews, 2 November 17; Chen Jianyu, ``To Counter
THAAD, Mainland China Expelled 32 South Korean Missionaries'' [Fanzhi
sade lu quzhu 32 ming nanhan chuanjiaoshi], China Times, 12 February
17.
\25\ ``China Expells Hundreds of South Korean Christians,''
BosNewsLife, 10 December 17; Zhuang Ruimeng, ``Missionaries Expelled by
China for Assisting North Korean Defectors'' [Xiezhu tuobeizhe
xuanjiaoshi zao zhongguo quzhu], Awakening News Networks, 9 November
17; Jon Rogers, ``China Deports Christians for Supporting North Korea
Defectors,'' Express, 31 October 17.
\26\ ``China Expells Hundreds of South Korean Christians,''
BosNewsLife, 10 December 17; Zhuang Ruimeng, ``Missionaries Expelled by
China for Assisting North Korean Defectors'' [Xiezhu tuobeizhe
xuanjiaoshi zao zhongguo quzhu], Awakening News Networks, 9 November
17; Jon Rogers, ``China Deports Christians for Supporting North Korea
Defectors,'' Express, 31 October 17.
\27\ Chen Jianyu, ``To Counter THAAD, Mainland China Expelled 32
South Korean Missionaries'' [Fanzhi sade lu quzhu 32 ming nanhan
chuanjiaoshi], China Times, 12 February 17; Zhuang Ruimeng,
``Missionaries Expelled by China for Assisting North Korean Defectors''
[Xiezhu tuobeizhe xuanjiaoshi zao zhongguo quzhu], Awakening News
Networks, 9 November 17; Jon Rogers, ``China Deports Christians for
Supporting North Korea Defectors,'' Express, 31 October 17.
\28\ Chen Jianyu, ``To Counter THAAD, Mainland China Expelled 32
South Korean Missionaries'' [Fanzhi sade lu quzhu 32 ming nanhan
chuanjiaoshi], China Times, 12 February 17; Zhuang Ruimeng,
``Missionaries Expelled by China for Assisting North Korean Defectors''
[Xiezhu tuobeizhe xuanjiaoshi zao zhongguo quzhu], Awakening News
Networks, 9 November 17; Jon Rogers, ``China Deports Christians for
Supporting North Korea Defectors,'' Express, 31 October 17.
\29\ Zhuang Ruimeng, ``Missionaries Expelled by China for Assisting
North Korean Defectors'' [Xiezhu tuobeizhe xuanjiaoshi zao zhongguo
quzhu], Awakening News Networks, 9 November 17; Chen Jianyu, ``To
Counter THAAD, Mainland China Expelled 32 South Korean Missionaries''
[Fanzhi sade lu quzhu 32 ming nanhan chuanjiaoshi], China Times, 12
February 17; ``China Expells [sic] Hundreds of South Korean
Christians,'' BosNewsLife, 10 December 17.
\30\ See, e.g., Steven W. Mosher, ``North Korea Exports Women to
China,'' Fox News, 12 December 17; Matthew Little, ``Many North Korean
Women Face Forced Marriage in China, or Rape in North Korean Prisons,''
Epoch Times, 14 December 17; Thomas Maresca, ``Why the Overwhelming
Majority of North Korean Defectors Are Women,'' USA Today, 10 December
17.
\31\ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, ``Policy on North
Korean Defectors,'' last visited 10 July 18. South Korean Ministry of
Unification data show that as of July 2018, 83 percent of North Korean
refugees (1,127) who entered South Korea in 2017 were females; and 72
percent of all North Korean refugees (31,827) who entered South Korea
since 1998 were females. See also Erik Ortiz, ``Two Decades After Being
Sold, North Korean Woman Finds Salvation in Seoul,'' NBC News, 23
February 18; Faras Ghani, `` `Father of Defectors' on Life After North
Korea,'' Al Jazeera, 21 February 18.
\32\ Kim Kwang-tae, ``Journey to Freedom by N. Korean Victims of
Human Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 17; Steven W.
Mosher, ``North Korea Exports Women to China,'' Fox News, 12 December
17; Matthew Little, ``Many North Korean Women Face Forced Marriage in
China, or Rape in North Korean Prisons,'' Epoch Times, 14 December 17.
\33\ Kim Kwang-tae, ``Journey to Freedom by N. Korean Victims of
Human Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 17; Matthew
Little, ``Many North Korean Women Face Forced Marriage in China, or
Rape in North Korean Prisons,'' Epoch Times, 14 December 17; Casey
Lartigue, Jr., ``North Korean Defectors' Take on `#MeToo' Campaign,''
Korea Times, 14 February 18.
\34\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 6; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
10 July 18. China signed the Convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified
it on November 4, 1980. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00,
entry into force 25 December 03, arts. 6-9; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, Protocol To Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, last visited 10 July 18. China acceded to the Protocol
on February 8, 2010.
\35\ Kim Kwang-tae, ``Journey to Freedom by N. Korean Victims of
Human Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 17; Rachel Judah,
``On Kim Jong-un's Birthday, Remember the 30,000 Stateless Children He
Has Deprived of Recognition,'' Independent, 7 January 18.
\36\ PRC Nationality Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoji fa],
passed and effective 10 September 80, art. 4. Article 4 of the PRC
Nationality Law provides that, ``Any person born in China whose parents
are both Chinese nationals and one of whose parents is a Chinese
national shall have Chinese nationality.''
\37\ Kim Kwang-tae, ``Journey to Freedom by N. Korean Victims of
Human Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 17; Rachel Judah,
``On Kim Jong-un's Birthday, Remember the 30,000 Stateless Children He
Has Deprived of Recognition,'' Independent, 7 January 18.
\38\ Kim Kwang-tae, ``Journey to Freedom by N. Korean Victims of
Human Trafficking,'' Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 17; Rachel Judah,
``On Kim Jong-un's Birthday, Remember the 30,000 Stateless Children He
Has Deprived of Recognition,'' Independent, 7 January 18.
\39\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, arts. 2, 7, 28(1)(a). Under the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, China is obligated to register children born within the
country immediately after birth and also provide all children with
access to education without discrimination on the basis of nationality.
See also Evan Jones, ``North Koreans Can't Escape Human Rights Abuses,
Even When They Flee,'' Huffington Post, 25 January 18.
Public Health
Public Health
Public Health
Institutional Developments
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party implemented institutional
reforms to support evolving public health priorities.\1\ For
example, in March 2018, authorities announced a plan to
restructure Party and government agencies, including merging
the National Health and Family Planning Commission and other
agencies into a new National Health Commission.\2\ According to
the plan, the new commission will turn its focus away from
treatment of disease to health more broadly, including such
issues as China's aging population.\3\ A July 2018 State
Council General Office guiding opinion further clarified the
new commission's role, and called for implementation of Party
policy and strengthened Party leadership.\4\ Authorities also
engaged in international exchanges focused on public health
issues, in line with recent official public health policy.\5\
For example, the Chinese government hosted an international
symposium on HIV/AIDS in Beijing municipality in November
2017.\6\ The September 2017 inaugural U.S.-China Social and
Cultural Dialogue included health among areas for potential
bilateral cooperation.\7\
Health-Based Discrimination
Health-based discrimination in employment and education
continued,\8\ despite protections in Chinese law.\9\ In one
case reported in August 2017, authorities in Fuzhou
municipality, Fujian province, cited physical examination
results as grounds to deny a teaching job to Lin Chuanhua,
whose right hand is missing and who achieved the top score on
the application examination.\10\ At the time, Fujian provincial
measures disqualified applicants with certain physical
characteristics--including disabilities of the limbs \11\--
violating rights guaranteed in Chinese law.\12\ In May 2018,
the Fujian Provincial Bureau of Education amended the measures,
removing the standards regarding disabilities of the limbs.\13\
In another case, Zhu Mingjian--who has a speech impediment--
observed an advertisement for a desk job with the Zhuhai
Municipal Fire Department, in Guangdong province, that
disqualified disabled applicants.\14\ Zhu reportedly filed a
complaint with the Zhuhai Municipal Bureau of Human Resources
and Social Security,\15\ but the Commission did not observe
further reports on this case. The Commission observed reports
that schools in China continued to experience shortcomings with
accessible facilities for disabled students.\16\ To meet the
government's goal of increased school completion rates,\17\
this year authorities in different localities issued guidance
\18\ implementing a July 2017 State Council General Office
circular that included a focus on disabled students,\19\ such
as prioritizing impoverished disabled students, sending
teachers to the homes of severely disabled students,
prioritizing funding to send disabled students to school, and
developing educational materials for disabled students.\20\
Transparency
Authorities continued to suppress public health information
in sensitive cases.\21\ For example, for three months in 2017--
between August and November--the Hunan Provincial Health and
Family Planning Commission did not acknowledge publicly a
tuberculosis outbreak at a high school in Taojiang county,
Yiyang municipality, Hunan province, that resulted in 29
confirmed cases.\22\ When contacted, a county disease control
official reportedly told a journalist that only Taojiang County
Communist Party Committee propaganda officials were authorized
to provide information about the incident.\23\ Authorities
later dismissed multiple county government and Party officials
in connection to their mishandling of the incident.\24\ In
another case, in January 2018, authorities in Liangcheng
county, Wulanchabu municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, arrested medical doctor Tan Qindong \25\ on suspicion
of ``damaging commodity reputation'' \26\ after he posted a
warning online about the potential negative health effects of a
medicinal wine sold by Inner Mongolia Hongmao National
Pharmaceutical, which officials in Liangcheng planned to
encourage to become a publicly listed company.\27\ Authorities
released Tan on bail in April 2018.\28\
HIV/AIDS
This past year, authorities continued efforts--in some
cases taking new approaches--to prevent the spread of HIV/
AIDS,\29\ but social stigma and authorities' efforts to
suppress HIV/AIDS rights advocacy continued. Authorities
continued an opioid substitution program targeted at those who
injected drugs \30\--formerly the group at highest risk of HIV
transmission--that has reportedly reduced transmission rates in
recent years.\31\ Authorities also took steps to expand sex
education for young people, as lack of knowledge appeared to
contribute to rising HIV/AIDS rates among youth.\32\ The
Commission observed some instances of schools introducing new
forms of sex education and safe sex awareness among
students.\33\ A December 2017 report published the results of a
study conducted by international non-governmental organization
Asia Catalyst, finding that public security officials treated
possession of condoms as grounds to punish individuals accused
of prostitution, discouraging condom use and increasing risk of
HIV transmission.\34\ In late 2017, authorities reportedly
warned HIV/AIDS rights advocate Sun Ya and other advocates not
to demonstrate publicly on World AIDS Day, which is December
1.\35\
Mental Health
People with mental illness--many of whom suffer from
additional disadvantages--remained at risk of discrimination
and faced inadequate access to medical care.\36\ Over half of
the 5.4 million people in China officially registered as
``severely mentally ill'' \37\ reportedly lived in poverty (the
Commission did not observe data for those who were not
registered),\38\ and a 2017 study found a connection between
mental illness and various forms of social exclusion
experienced by domestic rural migrants.\39\
INVOLUNTARY, COMPULSORY, AND FORCED PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT
Authorities continued to forcibly commit individuals
without mental illness to psychiatric facilities--a practice
known as bei jingshenbing--to punish rights advocacy, despite
protections in the PRC Mental Health Law \40\ and related
regulations.\41\ For example, in February 2018, authorities in
Jiulongpo district, Chongqing municipality, reportedly forcibly
committed multiple people protesting forced evictions and
demolitions, including Deng Guangying, Zhang Fen, and Liu
Deying.\42\ In July 2018, authorities in Shanghai municipality
reportedly detained Dong Yaoqiong and transferred her to her
native Hunan province, where officials forcibly committed her
to a psychiatric facility in Zhuzhou municipality, after she
posted online a video of herself defacing an image of President
Xi Jinping.\43\ Officials reportedly detained Dong's father,
Dong Jianbiao, on August 1 after he escaped soft detention and
attempted to visit his daughter.\44\ [For other examples, see
Section II--Criminal Justice.]
In February 2018, the Supreme People's Procuratorate
reportedly released provisions clarifying the procuratorate's
role in supervising procedures that include psychiatric
treatment and assessment in criminal cases,\45\ such as
psychiatric evaluations, court decisions, and transfers from
public security authorities.\46\ At least one procuratorial
official reported that procuratorial officials faced difficulty
ensuring the quality of medical care, due to their lack of
specialized medical knowledge, and that their capabilities were
limited primarily to administration, such as supervising
completion of paperwork.\47\ The provisions reportedly
permitted procuratorial officials to consult expert sources
with psychiatric knowledge,\48\ but the actual effect of the
provisions remained unclear.
Biometric Data Collection in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
This past year, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) compelled residents to submit to the
large-scale collection of biometric data intended for dual use
by public health and public security authorities. The Region-
Wide Accurate Population Registration and Verification Program
\49\ required collection of profile pictures, fingerprints,
iris scans, and blood samples from people between the ages of
12 and 65, as well as from all ``key persons'' (zhongdian
renyuan, i.e., persons of ``key'' interest to security
authorities) and their families regardless of age, for
inclusion in a public security database.\50\ The Yining
(Ghulja) County People's Government, in Ili (Yili) Kazakh
Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, outlined detailed procedures for
the program, specifying that health officials would ``rely on''
medical exams of residents to collect blood type and DNA data,
which health officials would then turn over to public security
authorities.\51\ This program coincided with broader efforts by
public security authorities in the XUAR to collect and
integrate personal information to predict perceived threats to
public security, as part of efforts to maintain ``stability''
or ``harmony.'' \52\ In addition, April and August 2018 reports
from official media Xinhua and the People's Daily indicated
authorities began constructing a genetic database in Qinghai
province and the Tibet Autonomous Region.\53\ [For more
information, see Section II--Criminal Justice, Section IV--
Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet.]
Public Health
Public Health
Notes to Section II--Public Health
\1\ For official descriptions of current public health policy
frameworks, see, e.g., Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and
State Council, ``Outline of the Plan for `Healthy China 2030' ''
[``Jiankang zhongguo 2030'' guihua gangyao], 25 October 16; State
Council Information Office, ``The Development of China's Health and
Progress in Human Rights'' [Zhongguo jiankang shiye de fazhan yu
renquan jinbu], 29 September 17.
\2\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, art. 28; National Health Commission, ``National
Health Commission Convenes Meeting of Leading Cadres'' [Guojia weisheng
jiankang weiyuanhui zhaokai lingdao ganbu huiyi], 23 March 18;
``Reform! State Council Forms National Health Commission, Will Not Keep
National Health and Family Planning Commission'' [Gaige! Guowuyuan
zujian guojia weisheng jiankang weiyuanhui, bu zai baoliu guojia
weijiwei], Med66, reprinted in Sohu, 13 March 18; Grassroots Doctor
Society, ``National Health and Family Planning Commission Removed! New
Ministry's Duties Revealed'' [Guojia weijiwei bei che! xin bumen zhize
puguang le], reprinted in MedSci, 13 March 18. This change occurred in
the context of a broader government restructuring. See, e.g., ``China
Unveils Cabinet Restructuring Plan,'' Xinhua, 13 March 18.
\3\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, art. 28.
\4\ State Council General Office, Guiding Opinion on Reforming and
Improving the System of Overall Supervision of the Healthcare Industry
[Guanyu gaige wanshan yiliao weisheng hangye zonghe jianguan zhidu de
zhidao yijian], issued 18 July 18, sec. 2(4), appendix 1.
\5\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council,
``Outline of the Plan for `Healthy China 2030' '' [``Jiankang zhongguo
2030'' guihua gangyao], 25 October 16, foreword, chap. 26; State
Council Information Office, ``The Development of China's Health and
Progress in Human Rights'' [Zhongguo jiankang shiye de fazhan yu
renquan jinbu], 29 September 17, sec. 7.
\6\ UNAIDS, ``China Focuses on Strengthening HIV Prevention,'' 16
November 17.
\7\ Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, ``U.S.-
China Social and Cultural Dialogue,'' 29 September 17.
\8\ See, e.g., Shi Youxing, ``In Employment Discrimation, the Harm
Goes Beyond Just Self-Esteem'' [Jiuye qishi, shanghai de qizhi shi
zizunxin], Procuratorial Wind and Cloud, 29 November 17; Cao Bin,
``China's `Born Again' HIV Positive Patients,'' Xinhua, 28 November 17;
Bingfeng Han et al., ``The Experience of Discrimination of Individuals
Living With Chronic Hepatitis B in Four Provinces of China,'' PLoS ONE,
Vol. 13(4) (12 April 18); Zhongxuan Lin and Liu Yang, ``Denial of
Disability Discrimination by Disabled People in China,'' China,
Disability & Society, Vol. 33(5) (2018). For more information on
health-based discrimination in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2017
Annual Report, 5 October 17, 205-06; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 205; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 204.
\9\ National laws and regulations that promote equal access to
employment and education and prohibit health-based discrimination
include the following: PRC Law on the Protection of Persons With
Disabilities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canjiren baozhang fa], passed
28 December 90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 30-
40; PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin
fa], passed 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 3, 29, 30;
State Council, Regulations on the Treatment and Control of HIV/AIDS
[Aizibing fangzhi tiaoli], issued 18 January 06, effective 1 March 06,
art. 3; State Council, Regulations on the Employment of Persons With
Disabilities [Canjiren jiuye tiaoli], issued 14 February 07, effective
1 May 07, arts. 3, 4, 13. See also Yanhai Wan, ``AIDS, Human Rights and
Public Security in China,'' University of British Columbia, Peter A.
Allard School of Law, Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project, Working
Paper 16-1, Social Science Research Network, 13 June 16.
\10\ ``Where Did Teacher Physical Exam Standards That Discriminate
Against Disabled People Come From?'' [Qishi canjiren de jiaoshi tijian
biaozhun cong he er lai], Beijing Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 9
August 17; Deng Xueping, ``After Disabled Teacher Who Places First in
Exam Denied Employment, How Many Recruiting and Physical Exam Standards
That May Discriminate in Employment Are Still Out There?'' [Canji
jiaoshi kao touming bei ju luyong, hai you duoshao zhaolu, tijian
biaozhun shexian jiuye qishi], Caixin, 17 August 17.
\11\ ``Where Did Teacher Physical Exam Standards That Discriminate
Against Disabled People Come From?'' [Qishi canjiren de jiaoshi tijian
biaozhun cong he er lai], Beijing Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 9
August 17; Deng Xueping, ``After Disabled Teacher Who Places First in
Exam Denied Employment, How Many Recruiting and Physical Exam Standards
That May Discriminate in Employment Are Still Out There?'' [Canji
jiaoshi kao touming bei ju luyong, hai you duoshao zhaolu, tijian
biaozhun shexian jiuye qishi], Caixin, 17 August 17; Fujian Province
Bureau of Education and Fujian Province Health and Population Planning
Commission, Fujian Province Standards and Measures for Physical
Examinations of Teaching Qualification Applicants [Fujian sheng jiaoshi
zige shenqing renyuan tijian biaozhun ji banfa], issued and effective
2006, art. 12.
\12\ PRC Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canjiren baozhang fa], passed 28 December
90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, art. 38; PRC Employment
Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa], passed 30
August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 29.
\13\ Fujian Province Bureau of Education and Fujian Province Health
and Population Planning Commission, Fujian Province Standards for
Physical Examinations of Teaching Qualification Applicants (Amended
2018) [Fujian sheng jiaoshi zige shenqing renyuan tijian biaozhun (2018
nian xiuding)], issued May 2018, effective 1 September 18.
\14\ ``Disabled Guangdong Man Zhu Mingjian Alerts Authorities,
Alleging Discrimination in Recruitment of Office Staff'' [Guangdong
canzhang renshi zhu mingjian jubao guanfang zhaopin wenyuan she qishi],
Radio Free Asia, 5 December 17.
\15\ Ibid.
\16\ World Bank, ``Policies, Attitudes, and Perceptions Towards
Inclusive Education: Evidence From Selected Counties in Guangdong,
China,'' March 2018, 2; Yao Yao, ``Are China's Universities Prepared To
Welcome Disabled Students?'' [Zhongguo daxue zhunbei hao yingjie
canzhang xuesheng le ma], Beijing News, 22 August 17; Zhang Diyang and
Cui Huiying, ``How Can Schooling for Disabled College Students Become
Barrier-Free?'' [Canji daxuesheng qiuxue zenyang wuzhang'ai], Southern
Weekend, 21 August 17.
\17\ State Council General Office, Circular Regarding Further
Strengthening the Controlling of Dropouts and Student Retention,
Raising Compulsory Education Completion Rates [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang
kongchuo baoxue tigao yiwu jiaoyu gonggu shuiping de tongzhi], issued
28 July 17.
\18\ Zhejiang Province People's Government General Office,
Implementing Opinion Regarding Further Strengthening the Controlling of
Dropouts and Student Retention, Raising Compulsory Education Completion
Rates [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang kongchuo baoxue tigao yiwu jiaoyu gonggu
shuiping de shishi yijian], issued 4 May 18; Sichuan Province People's
Government General Office, Implementing Opinion Regarding Further
Strengthening the Controlling of Dropouts and Student Retention,
Raising Compulsory Education Completion Rates [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang
kongchuo baoxue tigao yiwu jiaoyu gonggu shuiping de shishi yijian],
issued 2 January 18; Tianjin Municipal Education Commission,
Implementing Opinion Regarding Further Strengthening the Controlling of
Dropouts and Student Retention, Raising Compulsory Education Completion
Rates [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang kongchuo baoxue tigao yiwu jiaoyu gonggu
shuiping de shishi yijian], issued 29 December 17.
\19\ State Council General Office, Circular Regarding Further
Strengthening the Controlling of Dropouts and Student Retention,
Raising Compulsory Education Completion Rates [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang
kongchuo baoxue tigao yiwu jiaoyu gonggu shuiping de tongzhi], issued
28 July 17.
\20\ Ibid., paras. 7-9.
\21\ See, e.g., ``Anthrax Outbreak in Two Small Ningxia Towns,
Authorities Quarantine Infected Area and Close Market'' [Ningxia liang
xiao zhen bao tanju yiqing, dangju geli yiqu guanbi shichang], Radio
Free Asia, 17 April 18.
\22\ ``Hunan Health and Family Planning Commission: 29 Cases of
Tuberculosis Confirmed at Taojiang No. 4 High School'' [Hunan weijiwei:
taojiang sizhong yi queren 29 lie feijiehe], Beijing News, 18 November
17; Zhang Yuemeng et al., ``Taojiang No. 4 High School Class 364 in a
Tuberculosis Vortex'' [Feijiehe xuanwo zhong de taojiang sizhong 364
ban], Beijing Youth Daily, 18 November 17; ``Health Officials in
China's Hunan `Kept Quiet' Over Tuberculosis Outbreak,'' Radio Free
Asia, 17 November 17; Fan Liya, ``Tuberculosis Outbreak Shakes Hunan
High School,'' Sixth Tone, 20 November 17; Yu Gui, ``Taojiang, Hunan
Number Four High School Tuberculosis Incident: How Did `Delaying' and
`Covering Up' Become the Position for a Response?'' [Hunan taojiang si
zhong feijiehe shijian: ``tuo'' he ``wu'' heyi cheng le yingdui zishi],
Beijing News, 17 November 17.
\23\ ``Health Officials in China's Hunan `Kept Quiet' Over
Tuberculosis Outbreak,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 November 17.
\24\ ``Taojiang County Handles Relevant Responsible People in Mass
Tuberculosis Public Health Incident'' [Taojiang xian chuli juji xing
feijiehe gonggong weisheng shijian xiangguan zeren ren], China News, 21
November 17; ``Taojiang County, Hunan Has Tuberculosis Outbreak at High
School, Multiple Officials and Principal Sacked'' [Hunan sheng taojiang
xian you zhongxue jiti feilao, duo ming guanyuan ji xiaozhang zao
gezhi], Radio Television Hong Kong, 21 November 17.
\25\ For more information on Tan Qindong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00169.
\26\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4
November 17, art. 221.
\27\ ``Guangzhou Doctor Posts `Hongmao Medicinal Wine Is Poison,'
Detained Across Provinces on Suspicion of Harming Commercial
Reputation'' [Guangzhou yisheng fatie cheng ``hongmao yaojiu shi
duyao,'' she sunhai shangyu bei kuasheng zhuabu], Hongxing News,
reprinted in The Paper, 13 April 18; Liang Zhou, ``Route of Cross-
Provincial Detention of Critical Doctor Revealed: Lawyer Confirms
Someone From Hongmao Medicinal Wine Participated in the Whole Process''
[Kuasheng zhuabu tucao yisheng luxian tu puguang: lushi queren hongmao
yaojiu you ren quancheng canyu], Jiemian, 17 April 18; ``Guangzhou
Doctor Detained Across Provinces Released, Public Calls Into Question
Abuse of Police Authority'' [Zao kuasheng zhuabu guangzhou yisheng
huoshi, jingquan lanyong shou gongzhong zhiyi], Radio Free Asia, 18
April 18; Wang Qian et al., ``The Dirt on Hongmao Medicinal Wine:
Planned Sale Five Years Later for up to 15 Billion, Government `Fully
Supports Listing on the Market as an A Stock' '' [Qidi hongmao yaojiu:
jihua wu nian hou xiaoshou da 150 yi, zhengfu cheng ``quanli zhichi A
gu shangshi''], Sohu, 16 April 18.
\28\ ``Guangzhou Doctor Detained Across Provinces Released, Public
Calls Into Question Abuse of Police Authority'' [Zao kuasheng zhuabu
guangzhou yisheng huoshi, jingquan lanyong shou gongzhong zhiyi], Radio
Free Asia, 18 April 18.
\29\ Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, ``Country
Factsheets: China--2016,'' last visited 25 April 18. The United Nations
estimated that 880,000 people in China lived with HIV as of 2016, the
most recent data available. National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Summary of the Situation of Legally Designated Infectious
Diseases Nationwide in 2017'' [2017 nian quanguo fading chuanran bing
yiqing gaikuang], 26 February 18; National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Summary of the Situation of Legally Designated Infectious
Diseases Nationwide in 2016'' [2016 nian quanguo fading chuanran bing
yiqing gaikuang], 23 February 17; National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Summary of the Situation of Legally Designated Infectious
Diseases Nationwide in 2015'' [2015 nian quanguo fading chuanran bing
yiqing gaikuang], 18 February 16; National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Situation of Legally Designated Infectious Diseases
Nationwide in 2014'' [2014 niandu quanguo fading chuanran bing yiqing
qingkuang], 16 February 15; National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Situation of Legally Designated Infectious Diseases
Nationwide in 2013'' [2013 niandu quanguo fading chuanran bing yiqing
qingkuang], 13 February 14. Among reported cases in government
statistics, deaths from AIDS exceeded deaths from any other recognized
infectious disease since at least 2012.
\30\ UNAIDS, ``China Focuses on Strengthening HIV Prevention,'' 16
November 17.
\31\ Ibid.
\32\ See, e.g., Yang Wanli, ``Sex Education Needed in All Schools,
Experts Say,'' China Daily, 28 November 17; Shanghai Municipal Health
and Family Planning Commission, ``Parents Must Take Children's Sex
Education Seriously'' [Haizi de xing jiaoyu, jiazhang xu zhongshi], 1
December 17; ``Beijing College Students Hold Demonstration Demanding
Sex Education,'' Shanghaiist, 5 May 18; ``China Introduces Surprisingly
Progressive Sex Education Curriculum for Kids, Some Parents Freak
Out,'' Shanghaiist, 5 May 18; Eugene K. Chow, ``China, Let's Talk About
Sex,'' The Diplomat, 14 August 17.
\33\ ``China Introduces Surprisingly Progressive Sex Education
Curriculum for Kids, Some Parents Freak Out,'' Shanghaiist, 5 May 18.
See also Christina Zhou and Bang Xiao, ``Chinese Universities Add HIV
Test Kits to Vending Machines To Tackle Virus' Rise in Taboo Sex
Culture,'' ABC News, 14 April 18.
\34\ Tingting Shen and Joanna Csete, ``HIV, Sex Work, and Law
Enforcement in China,'' Health and Human Rights Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2
(December 2017), 134, 141.
\35\ ``Chinese Activists Warned Off Protests on World AIDS Day,''
Radio Free Asia, 1 December 17.
\36\ See, e.g., Adam Minter, ``Mental-Health IPO Is a Leap Forward
for China,'' Bloomberg, 1 January 18; Wang Xiaodong, ``Incidence of
Mental Illness Rising Nationwide,'' China Daily, 29 November 17; Cai
Yiwen, ``No Country for Disabled Men,'' Sixth Tone, 3 November 17.
\37\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on `The
Development of China's Health and Progress in Human Rights' ''
[``Zhongguo jiankang shiye de fazhan yu renquan jinbu'' baipishu], 29
September 17, sec. 3, para. 7; National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Transcript of the National Health and Family Planning
Commission's Routine April Press Conference'' [Guojia weisheng jisheng
wei 4 yue lixing xinwen fabu hui wenzi shilu], 7 April 17; PRC Mental
Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen weisheng fa], passed 26
October 12, effective 1 May 13, art. 24.
\38\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Transcript
of the National Health and Family Planning Commission's Routine April
Press Conference'' [Guojia weisheng jisheng wei 4 yue lixing xinwen
fabu hui wenzi shilu], 7 April 17.
\39\ Jie Li and Nikolas Rose, ``Urban Social Exclusion and Mental
Health of China's Rural-Urban Migrants--A Review and Call for
Research,'' Health & Place, Vol. 48 (2017), 27.
\40\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13, arts. 27, 30,
75(5), 78(1).
\41\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, Measures on Implementation of
Compulsory Medical Treatment (Trial) [Renmin jianchayuan qiangzhi
yiliao zhixing jiancha banfa (shixing)], issued 13 May 16, effective 2
June 16, arts. 9, 12.
\42\ ``Protesting Evictees in China's Chongqing Locked Up in
Psychiatric Facilities,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 February 18.
\43\ ``Ink-Splashing Girl Dong Yaoqiong Sent to Zhuzhou Psychiatric
Hospital, Various Places Around China Quickly Take Down Portraits of
Xi'' [Po mo nuhai dong yaoqiong bei song zhuzhou jingshenbing yuan
zhongguo gedi ji che xi huaxiang], Voice of America, 23 July 18. For
more information on Dong Yaoqiong, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00343.
\44\ ``Dong Yaoqiong's Father Visits Daughter, Taken Away by Public
Security'' [Dong yaoqiong fuqin tanwang nu'er bei gong'an daizou],
Radio Free Asia, 1 August 18. For more information on Dong Jianbiao,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00413.
\45\ For background on compulsory psychiatric treatment in criminal
cases, see Zhiyuan Guo, ``Deprivation of Liberty Against One's Will in
Mental Health Institutions in Contemporary China,'' in Legal Reforms
and Deprivation of Liberty in Contemporary China, eds. Elisa Nesossi et
al. (London: Routledge, 2016), 62-76.
\46\ The Commisson did not observe the official text of the Supreme
People's Procuratorate Supervisory Work in the Process of Compulsory
Psychiatric Treatment Decisions (Provisions), but an announcement on
the Supreme People's Procuratorate's website highlighted some features
of the Provisions. Supreme People's Procuratorate, ``Supreme People's
Procuratorate Releases `Provisions' To Further Standardize Its Work in
Supervising Decisions of Compulsory Psychiatric Treatment, Insisting on
Preventing and Correcting `Fake Mental Illness' and `Forced Psychiatric
Commitment' '' [Zuigaojian chutai ``guiding'' jinyibu guifan qiangzhi
yiliao jueding jiandu gongzuo, jianjue fangzhi he jiuzheng ``jia
jinshenbing'' ``bei jingshenbing''], 26 February 18.
\47\ Li Chao, ``Who Will Protect the Rights and Interests of Those
Under Compulsory Psychiatric Treatment? Multiple Procuratorial Offices
Call for Legislation'' [Shei lai baohu qiangzhi yiliao zhe de quanyi?
duo ming jianchaguan huyu lifa], China Youth Daily, 24 October 17.
\48\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, ``Supreme People's
Procuratorate Releases `Provisions' To Further Standardize Its Work in
Supervising Decisions of Compulsory Psychiatric Treatment, Insisting on
Preventing and Correcting `Fake Mental Illness' and `Forced Psychiatric
Commitment' '' [Zuigaojian chutai ``guiding'' jinyibu guifan qiangzhi
yiliao jueding jiandu gongzuo, jianjue fangzhi he jiuzheng ``jia
jingshenbing'' ``bei jingshenbing''], 26 February 18.
\49\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA From
Millions,'' 13 December 17. The Commission did not observe the text of
a provincial-level plan directly, although some sub-provincial sources
within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region refer to a provincial-
level plan. See Yining County People's Government, Circular Regarding
the Release of the ``Yining County Population Accurate Registration and
Verification Work Implementation Plan'' [Guanyu yinfa ``yining xian
renkou jingzhun dengji heshi gongzuo shishi fang'an'' de tongzhi], 7
August 17, sec. 1; Tacheng Prefectural Radio and Television, ``On-Site
Meeting for the Work of Prefectural Population Accurate Registration
and Verification and the Management of Standardizing Identification
According to Law Convenes'' [Diqu renkou jingzhun dengji heshi he yifa
guifan shenfenzheng guanli gongzuo xianchang hui zhaokai], reprinted in
Tacheng Prefectural People's Government, 19 December 17; He Wenxiang,
Jinghe County People's Government, ``Jinghe County Convenes Meeting on
the Work of Population Accurate Registration and Verification and the
Management of Standardizing Identification According to Law'' [Jinghe
xian zhaokai renkou jingzhun dengji heshi he yifa guifan shenfenzheng
guanli gongzuo tuijin hui], 24 April 18; Sangong Township People's
Government, ``Sangong Township Plan for the Work of Population Accurate
Registration and Verification and Standardizing Identification
Management According to Law'' [Sangong zhen renkou jingzhun dengji
heshi he yifa guifan shenfenzheng guanli gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in
Changji City People's Government, 20 May 18. Other sub-provincial
sources do not refer directly to the provincial-level plan but use
identical or similar terminology to refer to local biometric data
collection efforts. See Hotan Television, ``Area Launches the Work
Population Accurate Registration and Verification and the Management of
Standardizing Identification According to Law'' [Diqu qidong renkou
jingzhun dengji heshi he yifa guifan shenfenzheng guanli gongzuo],
reprinted in Hotan Municipal People's Government, 30 September 17; Ou
Qin, Qinghe County Public Security Bureau, ``Law Enforcement Brigade
Holds Training Meeting on Population Accurate Registration and
Verification'' [Zhi'an dadui kaizhan renkou jingzhun dengji heshi
peixun hui], reprinted in Qinghe County People's Government, 8 December
17.
\50\ See, e.g., Yining County People's Government, Circular
Regarding the Release of the ``Yining County Population Accurate
Registration and Verification Work Implementation Plan'' [Guanyu yinfa
``yining xian renkou jingzhun dengji heshi gongzuo shishi fang'an'' de
tongzhi], 7 August 17, sec. 1; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority
Region Collects DNA From Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\51\ Yining County People's Government, Circular Regarding the
Release of the ``Yining County Population Accurate Registration and
Verification Work Implementation Plan'' [Guanyu yinfa ``yining xian
renkou jingzhun dengji heshi gongzuo shishi fang'an'' de tongzhi], 7
August 17, sec. 4(2)-(3).
\52\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in
Minority Region,'' 26 February 18; Josh Chin, ``About To Break the Law?
Chinese Police Are Already on to You,'' Wall Street Journal, 27
February 18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Visiting Officials Occupy
Homes in Muslim Region,'' 13 May 18.
\53\ Zhang Dachuan, ``Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau Human Genetic
Resource Specimen Database Begins Construction'' [Qingzang gaoyuan
renlei yichuan ziyuan yangben ku qidong jianshe], Xinhua, 20 April 18;
Xu Juan, ``Advocating for a Green Production Lifestyle (The Path for
Consultation, Democratic Party Research Tour (8))'' [Changdao luse
shengchan shenghuo fangshi (xieshang zhi lu, minzhu dangpai diaoyan
xing (8))], People's Daily, 1 August 18.
The Environment
The Environment
The Environment
Introduction
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, despite top
Chinese Communist Party and government leaders highlighting the
importance of protecting the environment, environmental
pollution remained a major challenge. In October 2017, at the
19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping avowed the
importance of the Party and government's top-down approach to
environmental protection in ``ensuring harmony between humans
and nature.'' \1\ At a major political meeting in March 2018,
Premier Li Keqiang declared that the ecological and
environmental situation in China had gradually improved over
the past five years, noting that days with serious air
pollution in major cities had decreased by half.\2\
Authorities, however, shut down companies that were complying
with emissions rules \3\ and reportedly left millions without
winter heating in order to meet environmental targets,\4\ and
continued to limit the ability of the public and civil society
to participate in environmental protection efforts.\5\
Institutional and Regulatory Developments
The government and Party continued to prioritize
environmental protection policies this past year by making
major institutional changes to strengthen environmental
governance and by promoting legal and regulatory measures. In
March 2018, as part of a sweeping reorganization of Party and
government institutions,\6\ the Party Central Committee issued
a plan that included changes to the administrative agencies
overseeing environmental protection efforts.\7\ [For more
information on the sweeping reorganization of Party and
government institutions, see Section III--Institutions of
Democratic Governance.] The reorganization plan included a new
Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) to replace the
Ministry of Environmental Protection, and a new Ministry of
Natural Resources to replace the Ministry of Land and
Resources.\8\ According to a number of environmental experts,
the MEE may strengthen environmental protection by
consolidating environmental oversight and improving
bureaucratic efficiency.\9\ The MEE also was tasked with
oversight of climate regulation, taking over a function
administered by a formerly more powerful government agency--the
National Reform and Development Commission.\10\ One expert
expressed concern that ``climate action could become the
unintended casualty of this reshuffle.'' \11\
Other significant regulatory and policy developments
included the following:
National Park System. In September 2017, the
Party Central Committee General Office and the State
Council Information Office released the Overall Program
for Construction of a National Park System to
centralize management and strengthen protections for
ecologically important areas of China.\12\ Local
authorities had reportedly allowed excessive commercial
development in some protected areas.\13\
Carbon Trading Market Plan. In December 2017,
the National Development and Reform Commission released
a plan \14\ for what may become the largest carbon
market in the world.\15\ Although authorities will
initially distribute free carbon emission permits to
approximately 1,700 companies in the power sector,\16\
trading is not expected to begin until 2019 or
2020.\17\
PRC Environmental Tax Law. This legislation
became effective on January 1, 2018,\18\ and may
strengthen environmental enforcement due to new
environmental taxes being jointly managed by
environmental and tax authorities.\19\ In February
2018, the State Administration of Taxation reportedly
announced that more than 260,000 companies would be
required to pay the new environmental taxes.\20\
Seeking Air Quality Improvements Over Time
IMPLEMENTING AMBITIOUS GOALS: REPORTED PROGRESS AND COSTS
Chinese authorities reportedly achieved government targets
for improving air quality, but local authorities resorted to
harsh measures in order to meet the targets. In September 2013,
the State Council set major targets for annual average air
quality by 2017,\21\ yet in late 2017, Chinese and
international news media reported that provinces in north China
would likely fail to meet those targets.\22\ In order to
achieve the targets, Chinese authorities shut down thousands of
factories and mandated that millions of citizens stop using
coal for heat, even though government officials failed to
provide or plan for alternate sources of heat during the
winter.\23\ Greenpeace, an international advocacy group,
collected 5,822 posts to Weibo, China's Twitter-like
microblogging platform, in November and December 2017, to
document citizens' complaints about the lack of heat,\24\ and
international media reported that millions may have lacked
winter heating.\25\ Official media also criticized the
implementation of the policy.\26\ In early 2018, after the
targets had reportedly been met, the government's top
environmental official acknowledged that some local governments
had even closed enterprises that were in compliance with
emissions rules.\27\ By March 2018, the government had lifted
many of the temporary shutdowns in Beijing municipality, and
pollution levels reportedly began to increase.\28\ In July
2018, the State Council set new targets for annual average air
quality by 2020 that included targets for more cities than the
2013 targets.\29\
Investigative Reports on Local Environmental Officials' Misconduct
State-run and other official media reported on multiple
incidents in which officials attempted to manipulate
environmental monitoring data or failed to investigate reports
of serious pollution this past year, resulting in cases of
disciplinary actions against local officials. Despite
considerable censorship of negative reporting on the
environment,\30\ the Commission observed some notable
investigative reports on local environmental incidents.
In November 2017, a domestic news media
organization reported that Shaoyang municipal
environmental bureau officials in Hunan province had
used mist cannons near two monitoring stations to
improve air quality readings.\31\ Similarly, in January
2018, the Beijing Times reported that officials in
Shizuishan municipality, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region,
also attempted to spray water near the building that
housed the monitoring equipment to improve air quality
readings, but instead turned the building into an ``ice
sculpture'' after the spray froze.\32\ In March 2018,
the Ministry of Ecology and Environment reported that
officials at nine air quality monitoring stations in
seven cities in six provincial-level localities had
been ``severely punished'' for manipulating monitoring
data.\33\
In December 2017, the Beijing Youth Daily
reported on severe health problems linked to mining in
western Hunan.\34\ After local government officials in
Hunan said the reported pollution and health concerns
had been addressed, seven environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) reportedly issued a
joint response questioning the local government's
actions.\35\
According to April 2018 reports, China Central
Television (CCTV) exposed illegal chemical dumping in
Shanxi province.\36\ The report included footage of an
environmental official who said that his office did not
have the authority to investigate because the matter
arose out of a deal between the polluter and village
officials.\37\ Following the report, local authorities
administratively detained two village officials who had
been featured in the report.\38\
In June 2018, Chinese media reported that Yuci
District People's Court in Jinzhong municipality,
Shanxi province, had sentenced 16 people, including the
former head of the environmental protection bureau in
Linfen municipality, Shanxi, for ``damaging the
computer information system'' after authorities
discovered that six air quality monitors had been
tampered with over 100 times during a one-year
period.\39\ The court reportedly sentenced 5 people to
prison terms ranging from six months to two years, and
an additional 11 people to four to six months'
detention, suspended for eight months to one year.\40\
Environmental Transparency
Shortcomings in environmental transparency, including
access to credible official environmental data, continued to be
a long-term obstacle to assessing environmental quality and the
efficacy of pollution control efforts. The Institute of Public
and Environmental Affairs (IPE), a Beijing-based environmental
NGO, reported in its 2016-2017 Pollution Information
Transparency Index (PITI) that environmental disclosure in
China continued to improve.\41\ IPE and the U.S.-based NGO
Natural Resources Development Council developed PITI in 2008 to
establish a baseline and track improvements in environmental
transparency in China.\42\ In March 2018, however, a team of
researchers published an analysis of the impact of increased
transparency (as measured by PITI) on environmental outcomes
such as air and water pollution and found ``no measurable
effect,'' suggesting that public access to environmental
information without a ``new accountability mechanism . . . does
not affect local government performance.'' \43\
Developments in Public Interest Litigation
Although some NGOs have standing as plaintiffs in public
interest lawsuits, most ``public interest'' litigation
continued to be brought by the government.\44\ In March 2018,
the Supreme People's Court reported that between 2013 and 2017,
procuratorates had filed 1,383 environmental public interest
lawsuits, and that social organizations, primarily NGOs, had
filed 252 environmental public interest lawsuits.\45\ According
to the executive director of the Beijing-based NGO Friends of
Nature (FON), in recent years, courts have allowed more of his
organization's lawsuits to proceed than in the past.\46\ Cases
in which NGOs initiated public interest lawsuits this past year
included the following:
Henan province. In December 2017, the
Zhengzhou Municipal Intermediate People's Court in
Henan issued a judgment fining a local township and
village government in Xinzheng city, Zhengzhou, 3.6
million yuan (approximately US$570,000) after protected
trees, some of which were over 500 years old, died as a
result of the government having illegally moved them in
2014.\47\ An attorney for China Biodiversity
Conservation and Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF),
a Beijing-based NGO that was the plaintiff in the case,
described the case as the first public interest lawsuit
about ``ancient and culturally significant plants,''
but noted that CBCGDF had difficulty during the
litigation process because the local governments
interfered with evidence gathering, and it took several
negotiations before the court agreed to accept the
case.\48\
Yunnan province. In February 2018, FON
commenced litigation in Yuxi Municipal Intermediate
People's Court in Yunnan against a hydroelectric power
company for damaging the rain forest and threatening a
fish migration channel.\49\
Suppression of Environmental Protests and Advocates
Chinese citizens continued to raise their concerns about
health issues related to the environment through street-level
protests and other forms of public advocacy. China's
Constitution provides for freedom of speech, assembly,
association, and demonstration,\50\ as do the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\51\ the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,\52\ and the UN Human Rights
Council Framework Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment.\53\ The following cases illustrate not only common
types of environmental complaints raised by Chinese citizens
but also the ongoing lack of protection for citizens' rights
when they raise environmental concerns:\54\
Land Expropriation. On February 9, 2018,
authorities in Dongshan township, Mazhang district,
Zhanjiang municipality, Guangdong province, detained
Chen Wuquan and six other villagers after they had
protested a land expropriation project that they
claimed was illegal and had damaged the
environment.\55\ In March, authorities arrested Chen
and four others on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.'' \56\
Mining. In February 2018, officials detained
Karma, a village head in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu
(Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, after he
refused to approve a mining operation on a nearby
sacred mountain.\57\ In April, Radio Free Asia reported
that officials had detained and questioned over 30
other Tibetans for protesting the same mining
project.\58\
Illegal Quarrying. In March 2018, authorities
in Xinyi city, Maoming municipality, Guangdong,
detained environmentalist Lei Ping and Pan Donghai from
the NGO China Biodiversity Conservation and Green
Development Foundation after they had reported on an
illegal quarry.\59\ Xinyi authorities released Pan
after 7 hours, but ordered Lei to serve 10 days of
administrative detention for ``spreading rumors and
disturbing public order.'' \60\ Xinyi authorities
agreed to cancel the administrative detention decision
after Lei filed an administrative lawsuit.\61\ Sixth
Tone, an online media outlet under Party supervision,
published an article on the case in which a lawyer
cautioned environmental advocates to ``avoid using
social media for tipoffs, as they could be accused of
disseminating rumors.'' \62\
Corporate Pollution. In July 2018, the Wuzhi
County People's Court in Jiaozuo municipality, Henan
province, reportedly sentenced environmental advocate
Zhang Wenqi to one year and five months' imprisonment
for ``damaging business reputation'' after he had
reported environmental violations by several companies;
\63\ authorities detained Zhang in March 2017.\64\ [For
information on the suppression of herders protesting
environmental pollution in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region, see Section II--Ethnic Minority
Rights.]
The Environment
The Environment
Notes to Section II--The Environment
\1\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 3(1), 3(9); Xi Jinping, ``Secure a Decisive Victory in
Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for
the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,'' 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 3(1), 3(9); Xiong Hui
and Wu Xiao, ``Ensuring Harmony Between Humans and Nature'' [Jianchi
ren yu ziran hexie gongsheng], People's Daily, 9 February 18; Li
Ganjie, ``Ensuring Harmony Between Humans and Nature'' [Jianchi ren yu
ziran hexie gongsheng], Seeking Truth, 15 December 17; Dimitri de Boer,
``Opinion: What Does `Xi's Thought' Mean for the Environment? '' China
Dialogue, 24 November 17. See also ``Xi's Speech Had 89 Mentions of the
`Environment,' Just 70 of the `Economy,' '' Bloomberg News, 18 October
17.
\2\ State Council, ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 5 March 18, sec. 1; ``Li Sets Out China's 2018 Development
Path in Government Work Report,'' CGTN, 5 March 18.
\3\ Chris Davis, ``Raising Bar on Pollution To Lower Readings,''
China Daily, 22 March 18; Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``
`Striking Hard in the Tough Battle To Prevent Pollution' Related
Questions and Answers'' [Huanbaobu ``dahao wuran fangzhi gongjian
zhan'' xiangguan wenti dawen], Xinhua, 17 March 18.
\4\ Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Wins Battle for Blue Skies--But the
Poor Are Paying a Price,'' Washington Post, 13 January 18; Li Jing,
``No Heating at -6C: Poor Bear Brunt of Beijing's Air Cleanup,''
Climate Home News, 4 December 17; China Digital Times, ``When Good
Environmental Policies Go Wrong,'' 18 January 18.
\5\ Hanyuan Guo et al., ``Increasing Public Participation in
China's Environment: Does the Public Have a Say in China's Clean Up
Efforts? '' China Water Risk, 14 February 18; State Council, Decision
of the State Council on Implementing Scientific Outlook on Development
and Strengthening Environmental Protection, 27 December 05, arts. 27,
30; Michael Standaert, ``As It Looks To Go Green, China Keeps a Tight
Lid on Dissent,'' Yale Environment 360, 2 November 17; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Repression and Resilience: Annual Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2017),'' 27 February 18,
20; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last visited
27 April 18, C3. Guo et al. include a list of 15 official documents
that comprise the administrative and legal framework for public
participation in environmental issues. For a broad conceptual
description of the government's support for public participation, see,
e.g., State Council, Decision of the State Council on Implementing
Scientific Outlook on Development and Strengthening Environmental
Protection, 27 December 05, arts. 27, 30. See also ``SEPA Issues
Measures on Open Environmental Information,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 5 May 08.
\6\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies [Zhonggong zhongyang
guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jueding], Xinhua, 4 March
18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18; State Council, Institutional Reform Plan
[Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18; ``State Council
Institutional Reform Plan Passed at First Session of the 13th National
People's Congress'' [Shisan jie quanguo renda yici huiyi pizhun
guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], Xinhua, 17 March 18.
\7\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(15); State Council, Institutional Reform
Plan [Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(1)-(2).
\8\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18; State Council, Institutional Reform Plan
[Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(1)-(2). See also
Barry Naughton, ``Xi's System, Xi's Men: After the March 2018 National
People's Congress,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 56 (Spring 2018), 17 May 18, 6.
\9\ Ma Tianjie and Liu Qin, ``China Reshapes Ministries To Better
Protect Environment,'' China Dialogue, 14 March 18. Ma and Liu explain
that the term ``nine dragons rule the water'' (jiu long zhi shui) had
been used in China to describe the many different government agencies
in charge of environmental oversight. Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher,
``China Unveils Superagencies To Fight Pollution and Other Threats to
Party Rule,'' New York Times, 13 March 18; Li Jing, ``China's New
Environment Ministry Unveiled, With Huge Staff Boost,'' China Dialogue,
19 April 18.
\10\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 3(15); State Council, Institutional Reform
Plan [Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 1(1)-(2); Li
Jing, ``China's New Environment Ministry Unveiled, With Huge Staff
Boost,'' China Dialogue, 19 April 18; Barry Naughton, ``Xi's System,
Xi's Men: After the March 2018 National People's Congress,'' Stanford
University, Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, No. 56
(Spring 2018), 17 May 18, 6.
\11\ Li Jing, ``China's New Environment Ministry Unveiled, With
Huge Staff Boost,'' China Dialogue, 19 April 18.
\12\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committeee General Office and
State Council Information Office, ``Plan on the Establishment of a
National Park System'' [Jianli guojia gongyuan tizhi zongti fang'an],
Xinhua, 26 September 17, art. 2(8), (14); ``China Unveils Overall Plan
for National Park System,'' Xinhua, 26 September 17.
\13\ Liu Qin, ``China Overhauls Its National Parks,'' China
Dialogue, 19 October 17; Zhang Yan, ``16 Detained Over Environmental
Damage in Reserve,'' China Daily, 21 November 17.
\14\ National Development and Reform Commission, ``National Carbon
Emissions Trading Market Construction Plan (Power Generation
Industry)'' [Quanguo tan paifang quan jiaoyi shichang jianshe fang'an
(fadian hangye)], 18 December 17, preamble.
\15\ ``China Launches World's Biggest Carbon-Trading Scheme in
Fight Against Climate Change,'' Associated Press, reprinted in South
China Morning Post, 20 December 17; Keith Bradsher and Lisa Friedman,
``China Unveils an Ambitious Plan To Curb Climate Change Emissions,''
New York Times, 19 December 17.
\16\ ``China Launches World's Biggest Carbon-Trading Scheme in
Fight Against Climate Change,'' Associated Press, reprinted in South
China Morning Post, 20 December 17.
\17\ Emily Feng, ``China Moves Towards Launch of Carbon Trading
Scheme,'' Financial Times, 19 December 17; ``China Launches World's
Biggest Carbon-Trading Scheme in Fight Against Climate Change,''
Associated Press, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 20 December
17.
\18\ PRC Environmental Protection Tax Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo huanjing baohu shui fa], passed 25 December 16, effective 1
January 18, art. 28.
\19\ PRC Environmental Protection Tax Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo huanjing baohu shui fa], passed 25 December 16, effective 1
January 18, arts. 14-15; ``China Details Rules for Environmental Tax
Law Enforcement,'' Xinhua, 30 December 17.
\20\ Chen Qingqing, ``Environment Tax Declaration Begins,'' Global
Times, 1 April 18.
\21\ State Council, ``Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action
Plan'' [Daqi wuran fangzhi xingdong jihua], issued 10 September 13. The
State Council's 2017 targets for reducing fine particulate
concentrations for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze Delta, and Pearl
River Delta regions were 25 percent, 20 percent, and 15 percent,
respectively. The plan set a specific 2017 target for the annual
average fine particulate concentration for Beijing municipality of
approximately 60 micrograms per cubic meter. See also Beijing Municipal
People's Government General Office, ``Beijing Municipality 2013-2017
Clean Air Action Plan Major Task Breakdown'' [Beijing shi 2013-2017
nian qingjie kongqi xingdong jihua zhongdian renwu fenjie], issued 23
August 13, sec. 1.1.
\22\ ``Northern China Hard Pressed To Meet 5-Year Air Quality
Target,'' Global Times, 12 September 17; Charlotte Gao, ``Despite
China's Green Campaign, Air Quality Targets Still Hard To Meet,'' The
Diplomat, 9 October 17; Luo Qianwen, ``Ministry of Environmental
Protection: Depending on the Magnitude of Environmental Problems,
Accountability by the `Top Brass' at Every [Administrative] Level''
[Huanbaobu: huanjing wenti an shuliang zhuji wenze ``yi ba shou''],
Beijing Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 3 September 17. See also Lauri
Myllyvirta, `` `Beautiful China': Beijing Starts the Biggest Shutdown
of Steel Factories in History,'' Greenpeace, Unearthed (blog), 30
October 17.
\23\ Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Wins Battle for Blue Skies--But the
Poor Are Paying a Price,'' Washington Post, 13 January 18; Li Jing,
``No Heating at -6C: Poor Bear Brunt of Beijing's Air Cleanup,''
Climate Home News, 4 December 17; Ma Tianjie, ``2017: A Year When
Environmental Protection Raised Ethical Divides,'' China Dialogue, 29
December 17; Charlotte Gao, ``How Did China's War Against Smog Turn
Into a Ban on Coal-Heating? '' The Diplomat, 6 December 17. See also Li
Jing, ``What Caused China's Squeeze on Natural Gas? '' China Dialogue,
22 December 17.
\24\ Emma Howard, `` `I'm Freezing and Shaking': China's Winter
Heating Crisis, Mapped,'' Greenpeace, Unearthed (blog), 15 January 18.
\25\ Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Wins Battle for Blue Skies--But the
Poor Are Paying a Price,'' Washington Post, 13 January 18; ``China Does
U-Turn on Coal Ban To Avert Heating Crisis,'' BBC, 8 December 17.
\26\ ``How Gas-for-Coal Program Is Carried Out Makes a
Difference,'' China Daily, 5 December 17; ``Shan Renping: Changing Coal
for Gas, It's Not That the Country Will Allow Some of the Masses To
Freeze'' [Shan renping: mei gai qi, guojia bushi yao rang bufen
qunzhong dongzhe], Global Times, 4 December 17.
\27\ Chris Davis, ``Raising Bar on Pollution To Lower Readings,''
China Daily, 22 March 18. See also Ministry of Environmental
Protection, `` `Striking Hard in the Tough Battle To Prevent Pollution'
Related Questions and Answers'' [Huanbaobu ``dahao wuran fangzhi
gongjian zhan'' xiangguan wenti dawen], Xinhua, 17 March 18.
\28\ Ruan Yulin, ``Beijing PM2.5 Concentrations Rose
Nearly 40% in March Compared to Last Year'' [3 yue beijing
PM2.5 nongdu tongbi shangsheng jin si cheng], China News
Service, 13 April 18; ``Smog in Key North China Region Rises 27 Percent
in March: Ministry,'' Reuters, 13 April 18.
\29\ State Council, ``Three-Year Action Plan for Winning the Blue
Sky War,'' [Daying lantian baowei zhan san nian xingdong jihua], issued
3 July 18, sec. 1; Feng Hao, ``China Releases 2020 Action Plan for Air
Pollution,'' China Dialogue, 6 July 18. See also Laney Zhang, Law
Library of Congress, ``China: 2020 Air Pollution Action Plan
Released,'' Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, 16 August 18.
\30\ Michael Standaert, ``Have Chinese Missed the Takeaway From Xi
Jinping's Environmental Message? '' South China Morning Post, 31
December 17; Michael Standaert, ``As It Looks To Go Green, China Keeps
a Tight Lid on Dissent,'' Yale Environment 360, 2 November 17. See also
Sarah Cook and Anne Henochowicz, ``Investigative Journalism in China Is
Struggling To Survive,'' Freedom House, Freedom At Issue Blog, 8
February 18.
\31\ Zhao Xuan and Li Rongde, ``What Bad Air? Hunan Officials Use
Mist Cannons To Fool Pollution Meters,'' Caixin, 2 February 18.
\32\ Liu Qing, ``Environmental Protection Bureau Building Turned
Into Ice Sculpture by Fog Cannon Truck's `Excessive Force,' Official
Statement: Two Environmental and Health Cadres Disciplined'' [Wu pao
che ``yongli guomeng'' huanbao ju dalou bian bingdiao guanfang: liang
ming huanwei ganbu bei chufen], Beijing Times, 20 January 18. See also
Wang Lianzhang, ``Officials Try To Water Down Air Pollution, Freeze
Building,'' Sixth Tone, 22 January 18.
\33\ Hou Liqiang, ``Air Quality Data Faked; Officials Punished,''
China Daily, 30 March 18.
\34\ Qiu Bo, ``Xiangxi Village Sick People: Village Surrounded by
Tailings Ponds'' [Xiangxi bingren: bei wei kuangku baowei de cunzhai],
Beijing Youth Daily, 6 December 17. See also ``The Best Investigative
Stories From China--2017,'' Global Investigative Journalism Network, 4
January 18.
\35\ Du Caicai, ``Xiangxi Huayuan Responded to `Mining Pollution' 7
Environmental Protection Organizations Question Response'' [Xiangxi
huayuan huiying ``caikuang yidu'' 7 jia huanbao zuzhi zhiyi], Caixin,
10 December 17.
\36\ Fan Liya, ``Shanxi Officials Detained for Covering Up Chemical
Dumping,'' Sixth Tone, 18 April 18; ``Three Questions: Who Is the
`Black Protector' Beside the Big Polluters'' [Sanwen: shei cai shi
wuran dahu shenbian de ``hei baohu''?], China News Service, 19 April
18.
\37\ Fan Liya, ``Shanxi Officials Detained for Covering Up Chemical
Dumping,'' Sixth Tone, 18 April 18.
\38\ Shanxi Province Department of Environmental Protection, ``Two
Cadres Featured in [News Report] `The ``Black Protection'' at the Side
of Large Polluters' Placed in Administrative Detention'' [``Wuran dahu
shenbian de `hei baohu' '' 2 ming she'an cun ganbu yi bei xingzheng
juliu], 18 April 18.
\39\ Deng Qi, ``Ministry of Ecology and Environment: Linfen
Environmental Monitoring Case Negative Impact,'' [Huanjing bu: linfen
huanjing jiance zaojia an yingxiang e'lie], Xinhua, 24 June 18; Zou
Shuo, ``China To Get Tough With Environmental Data Manipulation,''
China Daily, 25 June 18.
\40\ Deng Qi, ``Ministry of Ecology and Environment: Linfen
Environmental Monitoring Case Negative Impact'' [Huanjing bu: linfen
huanjing jiance zaojia an yingxiang e'lie], Xinhua, 24 June 18; Zou
Shuo, ``China To Get Tough With Environmental Data Manipulation,''
China Daily, 25 June 18.
\41\ Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs and Natural
Resources Defense Council, ``Closing Longstanding Gaps: 2016-2017
Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI),'' 7 September 17, 1.
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ Deborah Seligsohn et al., ``The Sound of One Hand Clapping:
Transparency Without Accountability,'' Environmental Politics, 2018, 3-
4, 21. See also Alex Wang, ``Explaining Environmental Information
Disclosure in China,'' Ecology Quarterly, Vol. 44, 17 April 18, 883.
\44\ PRC Environmental Protection Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
huanjing baohu fa], passed 26 December 89, amended 24 April 14,
effective 1 January 15, art. 58. See also Supreme People's Court,
Interpretation Regarding Certain Issues Related to Application of the
Law in Environmental Civil Public Interest Litigation [Guanyu shenli
huanjing minshi gongyi susong anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de
jieshi], issued 6 January 15, effective 7 January 15; Quan Jing, ``How
To Promote Public Interest Litigation by Social Organizations'' [Shehui
zuzhi ruhe faqi gongyi susong], Charity Times, reprinted in Xinhua, 21
March 18.
\45\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report (Summary)'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao (zhaiyao)], 10 March 18; Quan Jing, ``How
To Promote Public Interest Litigation by Social Organizations'' [Shehui
zuzhi ruhe faqi gongyi susong], Charity Times, reprinted in Xinhua, 21
March 18. See also Fu Hualing, ``The Procuratorate and Public Interest
Litigation (PIL),'' China Collection (blog), 30 October 17. According
to Fu, ``China is seeking to develop its PIL by taking its own path
that can perhaps be characterized as Chinese authoritarianism, which
marginalizes civil society and relies on state organs to litigate
issues relating to the public interest and collective rights. It
remains to be seen, however, if China can create a culture of rights
without a [sic] support civil society structures and promote public
interest law without concomitant public participation.''
\46\ Liu Chen et al., ``Ask China: Environmental Law Helps NGOs Win
`War on Pollution,' '' CGTN, 9 March 18. See also Stanley Lubman, ``Can
Environmental Lawsuits in China Succeed? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14
December 17.
\47\ Fan Liya, ``Governments Fined $555,000 for Killing 500-Year
Old Trees,'' Sixth Tone, 29 December 17; Zhengzhou Intermediate
People's Court (Zhengzhou zhongyuan), ``Zhengzhou Intermediate People's
Court Announces Judgment in Environmental Civil Public Interest
Lawsuit, Town Killed Jujube Trees After Transplant, Adjudged To Be
Liable by First Instance Court'' [Zhengzhou zhongyuan xuanpan yiqi
huanjing minshi gongyi susong anjian zhen zhengfu yizai zaoshu zhisi,
yishen bei pan dan ze], WeChat post, 28 December 17; Greg Tisher,
``Preserving Culture With EPIL,'' Vermont Law School, U.S.-Asia
Partnerships for Environmental Law, Asia Environmental Governance Blog,
30 January 18.
\48\ Fan Liya, ``Governments Fined $555,000 for Killing 500-Year
Old Trees,'' Sixth Tone, 29 December 17.
\49\ Qi Jianrong, ``Hyodroelectric Power Plant Being Built by
Yunnan Huarun Accused of Destroying Endangered Plants; Yunnan Province
Forestry Department Investigation Confirms Protected Plants Felled''
[Yunnan huarun suo jian dianzhan bei zhi pohuai zhenxi pinwei zhiwu
yunnan sheng linye bumen diaocha queren you baohu zhiwi bei kanfa],
Legal Daily, 24 February 18; Liu Chen et al., ``Ask China:
Environmental Law Helps NGOs Win `War on Pollution,' '' CGTN, 9 March
18; ``China's Yunnan Defends Dam Building as Activists Head to Court,''
Reuters, 12 March 18. See also Zhou Tailai et al., ``Protect Green
Peacocks From Dam, Environmentalists Urge Court,'' Caixin, 15 August
17.
\50\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 35.
\51\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 19, 21, 22; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, last visited 10 July 18; State Council
Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-
2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2016-2020 nian)], 29 September
16, sec. 5. China has signed, and stated its intent to ratify the
ICCPR.
\52\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts.
19, 20.
\53\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox, A/HRC/
37/59, Annex, Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment,
24 January 18, paras. 12-14.
\54\ Eva Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford: Polity Press, 2018),
36, 114-17.
\55\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong Rights Defense Lawyer Chen
Wuquan Criminally Detained on Suspicion of Picking Quarrels and
Provoking Trouble for Protecting His Hometown Beach'' [Guangdong
weiquan lushi chen wuquan yin shouhu jiaxiang haitan bei yi she xunxin
zishi zui xingshi juliu], 11 February 18; ``Suppressed for Protecting
the Sea, Zhanjiang Rights Defense Lawyer Chen Wuquan and Several
Villagers Detained'' [Hu hai zao daya zhanjiang weiquan lushi chen
wuquan ji duo wei cunmin bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 10 February 18;
``From Policeman to Lawyer to Fisherman to `Criminal': The Tortuous
Road of a Human Rights Lawyer,'' China Change, 12 February 18. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2018-00136 on Chen Wuquan, 2018-00137 on Chen Shuai, 2018-00138 on Chen
Longquan, 2018-00139 on Chen Zhenming, 2018-00140 on Chen Chunlin, and
2018-00141 on Chen Weiliang.
\56\ Nftiankong (sftk123), Twitter post, 16 March 18, 9:51 p.m.
\57\ ``Tibetan Man Detained After Villagers Protest Chinese Mine
Plan,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 March 18. For more information on Karma,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00132. See
also Zheng Jinran, ``Inspectors Punish Polluters in Tibet,'' China
Daily, 4 January 18. In January 2018, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection announced the results of an inspection conducted in 2017
that discovered 1,022 cases of pollution, with polluters paying fines
in 748 cases amounting to 28 million yuan, and that 148 officials had
been held accountable. According the inspectors: ``some leaders . . .
[thought] that a little pollution or damage would not have a huge
influence on the vast region . . . leading to unbalanced development of
the economy and ecology.''
\58\ ``Tibetan Villagers Detained, Questioned After News of Mine
Project Leaks,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 April 18.
\59\ Qian Zhecheng, ``Environmental Whistleblower Sues Police for
Unlawful Detention,'' Sixth Tone, 31 March 18; Zhang Nanqian,
``Environmentalist Detained After Exposing Pollution (Continued):
Detention Deferred, Detainee Said No Rumor Despite Lack of Care''
[Huanbao renshi puguang wuran bei ju xu: zhanhuan juliu dangshiren
cheng bu yanjin dan wei zaoyao], Sohu, 23 March 18; ``Detained Chinese
Environmental Worker Released After Public Outcry,'' Radio Free Asia,
19 March 18; ``Environmentalist Who Investigated Guangdong Xinyi
Illegal Wastewater Discharge Detained'' [Huanbao renshi diaoyan
guangdong xinyi feifa kaicai paiwu zao juliu], Radio Free Asia, 19
March 18. For more information on Lei Ping, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00149.
\60\ Qian Zhecheng, ``Environmental Whistleblower Sues Police for
Unlawful Detention,'' Sixth Tone, 31 March 18; Xinyi City Government,
``Xinyi City Lawfully Investigates and Punishes Case of Spreading
Rumors and Disturbing Public Order'' [Xinyi shi yifa chachu yiqi sanbu
yaoyan raoluan gonggong zhixu anjian], 17 March 18.
\61\ Li Xun, ``Developments in the Case of Guangdong Xinyi
Environmentalist Detained for Posting: Authorities Cancel
Administrative Detention, Lawsuit Settled'' [Guangdong xinyi huanbao
zhiyuan zhe fa tie bei juxu: jingfang chexiao xingju chufa, susong
hejie], The Paper, 30 May 18.
\62\ Qian Zhecheng, ``Environmental Whistleblower Sues Police for
Unlawful Detention,'' Sixth Tone, 31 March 18.
\63\ Gao Min, ``Environmental Protector or Conflict of Interest? ''
[Huanbao weishi haishi liyi zhi zheng?], Beijing News, 10 July 18; Fan
Liya, ``Environmental Whistleblower Gets Prison Sentence,'' Sixth Tone,
12 July 18.
\64\ Gao Min, ``Environmental Protector or Conflict of Interest? ''
[Huanbao weishi haishi liyi zhi zheng?], Beijing News, 10 July 18.
Civil Society
Civil Society
III. Development of the Rule of Law
Civil Society
Introduction
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued to view civil
society's primary role as ``cooperating with'' (xietong) the
Party's agenda for social governance under one-party rule.\1\
At the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
Party General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping
reiterated the role of Chinese civil society in the context of
Party and government leadership: ``Party committees exercise
leadership, government assumes responsibility, non-governmental
actors provide assistance, and the public get involved.'' \2\
While Xi's speech made reference to public participation of
``social organizations'' in a ``consultative'' manner,\3\ his
vision for civil society in China continued to be ancillary to
the government's agendas,\4\ such as aiding in service
provision, welfare activities, and development goals in the
areas of poverty alleviation, child education, and the
environment.\5\
Ever since Xi's ascendance to the Party's top leadership
role in late 2012, advocacy organizations operating in
previously tolerated ``gray areas'' experienced what experts
describe as a ``chilling effect.'' \6\ In conjunction with the
continued implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms
passed in 2016 \7\ and the increased role and purview of the
Party over all aspects of Chinese society,\8\ the space in
which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had to carry out
human rights advocacy activities continued to shrink this past
year.\9\ [See Section III--Institutions of Democratic
Governance for more information on the expansion of the Party's
power over government and society.] The International Center
for Not-for-Profit Law called these recent regulatory
developments a ``top-down effort by the party-state to mold
`civil society' in its own image,'' that is, a ``civil
society'' without ``a strong value preference for what the
government perceives as Western-style individual freedoms and
rights.'' \10\ On March 23, 2018, the UN Human Rights Council
adopted a resolution sponsored by the Chinese government that
said NGOs should ``contribute actively'' to ``promote mutually
beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights.'' \11\ The
United States voted against the resolution, calling it an
effort by the Chinese government to weaken the UN human rights
system, while other countries such as Australia, Japan, and
Switzerland said the resolution included vague and ambiguous
language such as ``mutually beneficial cooperation'' and
``community of shared future.'' \12\ International human rights
observers asserted the resolution ``rang hollow'' in the face
of the Chinese government's crackdown on NGOs and rights
advocates in China as well as its harassment of NGOs and
activists at the United Nations.\13\
The number of Chinese NGOs is difficult to determine, in
part because of the complex regulatory framework, the existence
of unregistered NGOs and informal associations, the quick pace
of growth of the non-governmental and non-profit sector, and
the range of different types of such organizations.\14\
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, at the end of 2017,
China had 755,323 registered ``social organizations'' (shehui
zuzhi)--the official term for NGOs \15\--that consisted of
397,000 non-governmental, non-commercial organizations (minban
feiqiye danwei), or what the government now calls social
service organizations (shehui fuwu jigou); 6,323 foundations
(jijinhui); and 352,000 social associations (shehui
tuanti).\16\ Many social associations are government-organized
non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) and therefore have
close ties to the government.\17\ Many grassroots NGOs, with
few or no ties to the government, remain unregistered or are
registered as business entities due to restrictions and
barriers to registration imposed by the government.\18\
NGOs Report on Worsening Conditions for Civil Society Since Last UPR
Many international NGO reports submitted in advance of the
November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government's
human rights record described worsening conditions in China for
civil society since the last UPR in 2013, and indicated the
Chinese government had not implemented any of the
recommendations on civil society it previously accepted.\19\ In
its UPR submission, Human Rights in China noted that ``Xi
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era''--newly enshrined in the Party Constitution during the
19th Party Congress in October 2017 and in China's Constitution
in March 2018--``treats an uncontrolled civil society as a
threat under its all-encompassing approach to national
security'' and stresses ``absolute Party leadership.'' \20\
CIVICUS and the Asian Human Rights Commission jointly reported
that the freedoms of assembly, association, and speech were
severely hindered in China,\21\ violating international
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
\22\ and the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).\23\
Suppression of Grassroots Advocacy
This past year, the government continued to suppress the
rights of Chinese human rights defenders working on human
rights advocacy and to treat certain rights advocates and
political groups as a threat to state security.\24\ These
advocates included the following:
On September 1, 2017, public security
officials from Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province,
took Zhen Jianghua into custody from his home,\25\ and
criminally detained him the next day on suspicion of
``inciting subversion of state power,'' holding him at
the Zhuhai No. 1 Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention
Center.\26\ On August 10, 2018, the Zhuhai Intermediate
People's Court reportedly tried Zhen without informing
either Zhen's defense lawyers or his family
members.\27\ Zhen is the executive director of Human
Rights Campaign in China, which reports on cases
involving rights advocacy and provides aid for people
who are involved in, or have reported on, these
cases.\28\ Zhen has advocated for rights defenders for
over a decade.\29\
In April 2018, authorities detained at least
eight members of a group organized via the social media
platform WeChat called the National Tourism Chat Group,
which provided humanitarian support and funding to
families of political prisoners.\30\ Authorities in
Changchun municipality, Jilin province, detained Guo
Qingjun, one of the administrators of the WeChat group,
on April 11, 2018, after which authorities detained at
least seven more group administrators from other parts
of China, including Liao Yongzhong, Lu Bi, Liu Chunlin,
Dai Xiangnan, Sun Wenke, Li Xiaohong, and He
Meijing.\31\ Prior to the April detentions, Chinese
authorities reportedly interviewed over 100 other
members of the WeChat group.\32\
This past year, Chinese authorities continued
to persecute at least three human rights advocates from
China Human Rights Watch--Xu Qin, Qin Yongmin, and Zhao
Suli. PSB officials in Jiangsu province held Xu in
incommunicado detention at the Yangzhou PSB Detention
Center in Yangzhou municipality, Jiangsu, after
detaining her in February 2018 on suspicion of
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \33\ In
March 2018, authorities changed Xu's charge from
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' to
``inciting subversion of state power,'' reportedly for
articles she had written in connection to another
rights advocacy group and her support of other human
rights advocates.\34\ Authorities from Wuhan
municipality, Hubei province, continued to hold Qin,
founder of China Human Rights Watch who was originally
detained in January 2015, in Wuhan on suspicion of
``inciting subversion of state power.'' \35\ On May 11
and 12, 2018, the Wuhan Intermediate People's Court
tried Qin,\36\ and on July 11, sentenced him to 13
years in prison and 3 years' deprivation of political
rights on the charge of ``subversion of state power.''
\37\ Authorities from Wuhan reportedly released Qin's
wife, Zhao Suli, temporarily in February 2018, after
holding her in an unknown location since her
disappearance in January 2015.\38\ As of July 2018,
however, Zhao is believed to be under residential
surveillance.\39\
The Chinese government also intensified its efforts to
limit and censor the online activities of rights advocacy
organizations on social media platforms, such as Sina Weibo and
WeChat.\40\ [For more information, see Section II--Freedom of
Expression, Worker Rights, Status of Women, and The
Environment.]
Overseas NGOs' Activities Law Implementation
This past year, the government continued to carry out the
PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China (Overseas NGOs'
Activities Law) which took effect in January 2017.\41\ While
some international NGOs (INGOs) have successfully registered
representative offices in China, including philanthropic
organizations that had relationships with local
governments,\42\ at least four organizations that have long
worked on training lawyers and projects to promote the
protection of women and LGBT rights reported that they were
unable to obtain temporary activity permits.\43\ Other
organizations that work on human rights and rule of law chose
to suspend their operations or leave China.\44\ By August 2018,
404 INGOs had successfully registered representative offices in
China and 976 temporary activity permits had been filed,
according to official data posted to the Ministry of Public
Security's Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Service
Platform.\45\ The majority of U.S. NGOs with representative
offices registered to conduct activities in the areas of trade,
poverty alleviation, and health.\46\ From January 2018 through
July 2018, the number of INGO representative offices that
registered in China each month remained mostly steady, at
around 15 per month, based on analysis from the Asia Society's
China NGO Project.\47\ The China NGO Project further
disaggregated official data, finding that, as of August 2018,
INGOs from the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea,
and Germany have the most representative offices in China,
while INGOs from Hong Kong and the United States filed the most
temporary activities between January 2017 and July 2018.\48\
Public data indicate that most INGO representative offices
registrations have taken place in Beijing and Shanghai
municipalities, while the most temporary activity permit
filings have taken place in Beijing and Guangdong, Yunnan,
Sichuan, and Guizhou provinces.\49\
In addition to implementing the Overseas NGOs' Activities
Law, several developments indicated the government viewed
foreign NGOs as potential threats to national security. In
April 2018, several government agencies, including the Ministry
of State Security, jointly published a cartoon on ``National
Security Education Day'' that portrayed a foreign NGO worker
who is implied to be spying and courting Chinese workers to
organize strikes.\50\ In a sign that officials are more broadly
targeting foreign influence, government posters on public
transportation in Beijing warned Chinese citizens against being
tricked into spying for foreign governments, urging them to
report activities to relevant national security
authorities.\51\ A Deutsche Welle article reported that the
government planned to score foreign NGOs based on the model of
the social credit system, which would punish organizations that
conduct activities the government deems unwelcome or that may
damage ``national interests'' or harm ``national security and
peace.'' \52\ In December 2017, the State Council issued
implementing rules \53\ for the 2014 PRC Counterespionage
Law,\54\ which give the government power to punish ``foreign
institutions and organizations'' or ``hostile groups'' it deems
harmful to national security.\55\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Developments in Lee Ming-cheh's Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese authorities continued to detain and prosecute Taiwan human
rights NGO volunteer Lee Ming-cheh this past year. In March 2017,
authorities detained Lee, a manager at Wenshan Community College in
Taipei, Taiwan, while he was traveling to Zhuhai municipality,
Guangdong province, via Macau.\56\ The State Council Taiwan Affairs
Office subsequently confirmed that Chinese authorities were
investigating Lee for ``endangering state security'' \57\ and had
formally arrested him on suspicion of ``subversion of state power'' in
May 2017.\58\ On September 11, 2017, the Yueyang Municipal Intermediate
People's Court in Hunan province tried Lee on the charge of
``subversion of state power'' \59\--to which he pleaded guilty and for
which he expressed remorse \60\--and on November 28, sentenced Lee to
five years in prison.\61\ Observers from international human rights
organizations suspected that authorities coerced Lee into confessing,
calling the trial ``outrageous'' and ``politically motivated.'' \62\
They argued, moreover, that his case served as a warning to pro-
democracy activists in Hong Kong and elsewhere.\63\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Regulatory Environment for Domestic NGOs
This past year, the government focused on cracking down on
``illegal social organizations'' that do not possess proper
government registration or that perform activities outside of
the scope for which they have registered,\64\ targeting those
that ``threaten state security and social stability.'' \65\ A
February 2018 circular stipulated that NGOs conducting illegal
political activities will have their eligibility for tax
exemption canceled.\66\ A Chinese political science professor
expressed concern that the drive to target and identify
``illegal social organizations'' is part of the Chinese
government's concern that giving more space to civil society
could lead to potential democratization.\67\ In January 2018,
the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the Measures for Social
Organizations Credit Information Management (Measures), which
authorizes the government to create an official list of
organizations that are ``severely illegal [and] not
trustworthy.'' \68\ The Measures target organizations for
disciplinary action and potential inclusion in a government
list of organizations deemed as engaging in ``irregular''
activities, such as not submitting annual activity reports to
authorities, failing to establish Party groups within their
organizations, and not operating at the address listed in their
registration.\69\ The Measures were used this past year to levy
punishments against at least one social organization that was
found to be ``untrustworthy.'' \70\ [For more on the Chinese
government's use of social credit through information
technology and surveillance, see Section III--Institutions of
Democratic Governance.]
Two years after the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA)
released draft revisions to the three major regulations for
civil society organizations,\71\ the MCA released new draft
regulations for public comment in early August 2018, combining
the three regulations that form the core of the regulatory
system for domestic social service organizations, foundations,
and social associations into one document.\72\ The new draft
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social
Organizations lower the barriers to registration for four types
of social organizations--business organizations, research
organizations, social welfare providers, and service
organizations--and allow these organizations to directly
register with the MCA or at county-level and higher civil
affairs bureaus without requiring a professional supervisory
unit.\73\ Provisions in the draft regulations stipulate that
Party groups must be established in organizations \74\ and
prohibit certain Chinese individuals from registering or being
the ``legal person'' for social organizations, including
individuals whose political rights were suspended, who had been
criminally detained or served a criminal punishment in the last
five years, or who were listed in the government's
``untrustworthy'' list with regard to their ``social credit''
score.\75\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China Promotes Its Development Model in the International Sphere
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year, as part of reform efforts directed by the Party
Central Committee,\76\ the National People's Congress approved a State
Council reform plan that included the establishment of a new government
agency focused on international development.\77\ The new International
Development Cooperation Agency will integrate foreign aid and
development assistance efforts, including the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI).\78\ In November 2017, the Director of the International
Department of the Party Central Committee--a key Party department
charged with extending the Party's influence and advancing its
interests overseas \79\--opened the first Silk Road NGO Cooperation
Network Forum, a gathering designed to strengthen cooperation between
NGOs among participating BRI countries.\80\ Two hundred delegates in
total from Chinese organizations \81\ and NGOs from more than 50
countries attended the forum.\82\ The forum was organized by the China
NGO Network for International Exchanges, which is headed by Sun
Jiazheng,\83\ Vice Chairman of the 11th Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference,\84\ a body that is connected to the Party's
United Front Work Department.\85\ Scholars observed this past year that
the Chinese government, through its international development efforts,
is offering an alternative global development model favorable to its
political goals.\86\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil Society
Civil Society
Notes to Section III--Civil Society
\1\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 8(6); Xi Jinping, ``Secure a Decisive Victory in
Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for
the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,'' 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 8(6); International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom Monitor: China,'' last
updated 22 February 18, last visited 17 April 18. The official
translation published by Xinhua translates xietong as to ``provide
assistance to,'' but the word is better translated as ``cooperate
with'' or ``collaborate with.''
\2\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 8(6); Xi Jinping, ``Secure a Decisive Victory in
Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for
the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,'' 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 8(6); Jessica Batke,
``Social Organizations and the 19th Party Congress,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 30 November 17.
\3\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 6(3); Xi Jinping, ``Secure a Decisive Victory in
Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for
the Great Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,'' 18 October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, sec. 6(3).
\4\ Matt Schiavenza, ``The Uncertain Future of Civil Society in
China,'' Asia Society, 29 January 18; Narada Foundation, ``The Two
Sessions Came to a Close, What Did Delegates Say About Philanthropy and
the Public Interest? '' [Lianghui luomu, guanyu cishan gongyi, daibiao
weiyuanmen zenme shuo?], 21 March 18.
\5\ Narada Foundation, ``The Two Sessions Ended, What Did Delegates
Say About Philanthropy and the Public Interest? '' [Lianghui luomu,
guanyu cishan gongyi, daibiao weiyuanmen zenme shuo?], 21 March 18. See
also Jessica Batke, ``Social Organizations and the 19th Party
Congress,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 30 November 17.
\6\ Timothy Hildebrandt, Social Organizations and the Authoritarian
State in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58.
Hildebrandt explains use of the term ``chilling effect'' in the context
of civil society as the internalization of the ``fear of a negative
state response'' to the point that civil society ``actors do not
contemplate taking actions that might put them in jeopardy.'' See e.g.,
Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2015--China,'' October 2015; Mimi
Lau, ``Mother of Detained Labour Activist Takes on State Media--And
Forced Into Hardest Decision of Her Life,'' South China Morning Post, 1
May 16; Verna Yu, ``Charity Workers in China Say NGOs Being `Pulled Out
by the Roots,' '' South China Morning Post, 12 June 17; Orville Schell,
``Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,'' New York Review of Books, 21
April 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Repeal Overseas NGO
Law & Protect Freedom of Association,'' 28 April 16; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Repression and Resilience: Annual Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2017),'' 26 February 18,
24-26.
\7\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17; PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September 16. See also
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of
Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu
yijian gao)], 1 August 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Governmental,
Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for Public Comment) [Minban
feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu
yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the
Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May
16.
\8\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies [Zhongggong zhongyang
guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jueding], Xinhua, 4 March
18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18. In March 2018, the National People's Congress and
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference unveiled reforms
of Party and government structures to elevate the role of the Party
over government and society. For similar efforts prior to March 2018
that elevated the Party above government agencies, see Michael Martina,
``Exclusive: In China, the Party's Push for Influence Inside Foreign
Firms Stirs Fears,'' Reuters, 24 August 17; Choi Chi-yuk and Eva Li,
``Lawyers in Chinese Megacity the New Front in Communist Party's Push
for Greater Control,'' South China Morning Post, 18 May 17.
\9\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Repression and Resilience:
Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China
(2017),'' 26 February 18, 2.
\10\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom
Monitor: China,'' last visited 17 April 18.
\11\ UN Human Rights Council, ``[Draft Resolution] Promotion and
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development,'' A/HRC/37/L.36,
19 March 18; UN Human Rights Council, ``Human Rights Council Adopts 10
Texts, Requests a High-Level Panel Discussion on Genocide and a Study
on the Role of Capacity Building in the Promotion of Human Rights,'' 23
March 18; ``UN Rights Body Adopts China-Sponsored Resolution on
Mutually Beneficial Cooperation,'' Xinhua, 24 March 18.
\12\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Human Rights Council Adopts 10
Texts, Requests a High-level Panel Discussion on Genocide and a Study
on the Role of Capacity Building in the Promotion of Human Rights,'' 23
March 18. See also U.S. Department of State, ``Key Outcomes of U.S.
Priorities at the UN Human Rights Council's 37th Session,'' 23 March
18.
\13\ John Fisher, Human Rights Watch, ``China's `Win-Win'
Resolution Is Anything But,'' 5 March 18; Andrea Worden, ``With Its
Latest Human Rights Council Resolution, China Continues Its Assault on
the UN Human Rights Framework,'' China Change, 9 April 18. See also
Human Rights Watch, ``The Costs of International Advocacy: China's
Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,'' 5 September
17, 13-25.
\14\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom
Monitor: China,'' last visited 17 April 18.
\15\ Karla W. Simon and Holly Snape, ``China's Social Organisations
After the Charity Law,'' Made in China, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (January-March
2017), 26-27.
\16\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Social Service Statistics
Quarterly Report (Fourth Quarter of 2017)'' [Shehui fuwu tongji jibao
(2017 nian 4 jidu)], 13 March 18, sec. 3(1).
\17\ Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society: A Model
Analysis of Trends in the NGO Sector,'' in NGO Governance and
Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2016), 48; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law,
``Civic Freedom Monitor: China,'' last visited 17 April 18.
\18\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom
Monitor: China,'' last visited 17 April 18; Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the
Dynamics of Civil Society: A Model Analysis of Trends in the NGO
Sector,'' in NGO Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath
and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 52-53. See also
Isabel Hilton et al., ``The Future of NGOs in China: A ChinaFile
Conversation,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14 May 15.
\19\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``Stakeholder Submission to
the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People's Republic
of China,'' April 2018, item 3; CIVICUS and Asian Human Rights
Commission, ``Stakeholder Submission to the Universal Periodic Review,
31st Session, for the People's Republic of China,'' 29 March 18, item
1.4; Front Line Defenders, ``Stakeholder Submission to the Universal
Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People's Republic of China,'' 29
March 18, items 1-2.
\20\ Zhao Chao and Chen Weiwei, ``Glorious Guide To Building a
Marxist Ruling Party--Story of the Birth of the `Chinese Communist
Party Constitution (Amendment)' '' [Jianshe makesi zhuyi zhizhengdang
de guanghui zhiyin--zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng (xiuzheng'an)''
dansheng ji], Xinhua, 28 October 17; Amendment to the PRC Constitution
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua, 11 March 18,
art. 32; Human Rights in China, ``Stakeholder Submission to the
Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the People's Republic of
China,'' April 2018, item 18.
\21\ CIVICUS and Asian Human Rights Commission, ``Stakeholder
Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 31st Session, for the
People's Republic of China,'' 29 March 18, item 1.4.
\22\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts.
19, 20.
\23\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 19(2), 21, 22.
\24\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Repression and Resilience:
Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China
(2017),'' 27 February 18, 24-26.
\25\ ``Zhen Jianghua Not Released 37 Days After Criminal Detention,
Many Rights Defenders Subjected to Stability Maintenance Measures Due
to 19th Party Congress'' [Zhen jianghua xingju 37 tian qiman wei huoshi
duo wei weiquan renshi yin shijiu da bei weiwen], China Free Press
(blog), 9 October 17. For more information on Zhen Jianghua, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00360.
\26\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``In Case Concerning Zhen
Jianghua, Whom Zhuhai Government Detained on Inciting Subversion of
State Power Charge, Sister Summoned by Jiangmen PSB, State Security
Officials Warned Her, Saying Her Article Affected Police Efforts To
Gather Evidence'' [Bei zhuhai dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui jiya de zhen jianghua qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong'anju
chuanxun guobao jinggao shuo ta wenzhang yingxiang jingfang souzheng],
29 September 17.
\27\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Authorities Secretly Tried
Zhen Jianghua, Netizens Say It Shows [Authorities'] Guilty Mind''
[Dangju mimi shenpan zhen jianghua wangyou zhihu xinxu], 5 September
18.
\28\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``In Case Concerning Zhen
Jianghua, Whom Zhuhai Government Detained on Inciting Subversion of
State Power Charge, Sister Summoned by Jiangmen PSB, State Security
Officials Warned Her, Saying Her Article Affected Police Efforts To
Gather Evidence'' [Bei zhuhai dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui jiya de zhen jianghua qi jiejie zao jiangmen gong'anju
chuanxun guobao jinggao shuo ta wenzhang yingxiang jingfang souzheng],
29 September 17.
\29\ Ibid.
\30\ ``Eight Detained for Organizing Humanitarian Assistance for
Political Prisoners and Their Families,'' China Change, 15 April 18.
\31\ Ibid.; Rights Defense Network, ``RDN: Monthly Report on
Detained Mainland Chinese Political Prisoners and Prisoners of
Conscience (5/31/2018) No. 32 (Total 761 Persons) (Part 2)'' [Weiquan
wang: zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhi fan, liangxin fan yuedu baogao (2018
nian 5 yue 31 ri) di 32 qi (gong 761 ren) (di 2 bufen)], 31 May 18. For
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2018-00165 on Guo Qingjun, 2018-00222 on Liu Chunlin, 2018-
00221 on Dai Xiangnan.
\32\ ``Eight Detained for Organizing Humanitarian Assistance for
Political Prisoners and Their Families,'' China Change, 15 April 18.
\33\ ``Detained Chinese Rights Group Spokeswoman Denied Visit From
Defense Lawyer,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 18; Rights Defense Network,
``Chinese Human Rights Watch Member, Xu Qin, Confirmed To Be Criminally
Detained'' [Zhongguo renquan guancha chengyuan xu qin zhengshi zao
xingshi juliu], 22 February 18. For more information on Xu Qin, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00015.
\34\ ``Chinese Police Charge Prominent Detained Rights Activist
With Subversion,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 March 18.
\35\ Ibid. For more information on Qin Yongmin, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-02138.
\36\ Rights Defense Network, ``The Real Situation of Qin Yongmin's
Trial'' [Qin yongmin an tingshen zhenshi qingkuang], 19 May 18.
\37\ ``Wuhan Dissident Qin Yongmin Heavily Sentenced to 13 Years in
Prison'' [Wuhan yiyi renshi qin yongmin zao zhongpan 13 nian], Radio
Free Asia, 11 July 18.
\38\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhao Suli, Wife of Well-Known
Democracy Movement Figure Qin Yongmin, Returns Home After Over 3 Years
of Forced Disappearance'' [Zhuming minyun renshi qin yongmin furen zhao
suli zao qiangpo shizhong 3 nian duo hou huidao jiazhong], 5 February
18. For more information on Zhao Suli, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2016-00069.
\39\ ``Chinese Police Charge Prominent Detained Rights Activist
With Subversion,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 March 18; Lily Kuo, ``Chinese
Dissident Qin Yongmin Jailed After `Show Trial,' '' Guardian, 11 July
18.
\40\ See, e.g., ``Muzzled China Feminist Group To Sue Over Online
Censorship,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted in Sino Daily, 24 March
18; Grace Tsoi and Viola Zhou, ``Feminist Campaign Gets Blocked in
China on International Women's Day,'' Inkstone, 8 March 18; China
Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Do Not Report on PKU Open Letter,'' 25 April
18.
\41\ 1APRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17. See also CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 225-26.
\42\ See, e.g., Liu Yanling, ``Lines of Trust Blurred for NGOs
Under China's New Law,'' Global Times, 14 December 17; World Resources
Institute, ``World Resources Institute Obtains Overseas NGO
Registration in China,'' 20 November 17; Ministry of Public Security,
Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations Service Platform, ``Open
Information--Public Information'' [Xinxi gongkai--xinxi gongshi], last
visited 17 April 18; ``Registered Foreign NGO Representative Offices
Interactive Map and Filterable Table,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, China
NGO Project, last visited 17 April 18.
\43\ Tom Hancock, ``China Law Puts Foreign NGOs Under Tighter
Control,'' Financial Times, 22 April 18.
\44\ Chongyi Feng, ``The NGO Law in China and Its Impact on
Overseas Funded NGOs,'' Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An
Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2017), 102.
\45\ Ministry of Public Security, Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations Service Platform, ``Open Information--Public
Information'' [Xinxi gongkai--xinxi gongshi], last visited 20 August
18; ``Registered Foreign NGO Representative Offices Interactive Map and
Filterable Table,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, last
visited 20 August 18.
\46\ Ministry of Public Security, Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations Service Platform, ``Open Information--Public
Information'' [Xinxi gongkai--xinxi gongshi], last visited 20 August
18; ``Registered Foreign NGO Representative Offices Interactive Map and
Filterable Table,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO Project, last
visited 17 April 18.
\47\ Jessica Batke, ``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign
NGO Representative Offices and Temporary Activities,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 8 August 18. According to Asia Society's
China NGO Project, two INGO representative offices registered in June
2018, which was significantly fewer than the prior 14 months and the
following month of July 2018. See infographic titled ``Number of
Representative Offices Registered Per Month, January 2017-July 2018.''
\48\ Jessica Batke, ``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign
NGO Representative Offices and Temporary Activities,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, China NGO Project, 8 August 18.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ China Cyber Security, ``Brother Die: No Such Thing as Pie From
the Sky! Don't Make These `Friends' Who Wear Masks'' [Xiong die: meiyou
tianshang diao xianbing de shi'er! zhexie daizhe mianju de zhexie
``pengyou'' zhende bu ke jiao], 14 April 18, reprinted in Doudou
Headlines, 16 April 18; ``Government Cartoon Portrays `Foreign NGOs' as
National Security Concern,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, China NGO
Project, 18 April 18.
\51\ Lily Kuo, ``China's Anti-Spy Campaign: Cash Rewards and
Warnings of `Dangerous Times,' '' Guardian, 10 May 18. See also
Jeremiah Jenne (JeremiahJenne), Twitter post, 23 April 18, 2:46 a.m.
\52\ Wen Mu and Da Yang, ``Scoring System Is Coming, Overseas NGOs
Will Have an Even More Difficult Time'' [Jifen zhi yao lai le jingwai
NGO rizi huojiang geng nanguo], Deutsche Welle, 6 May 18.
\53\ State Council, PRC Counterespionage Law Implementing Rules
[Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo fan jiandie fa shishi xize], 22 November
17. See also ``China Adds Broad New Definitions to Counter-Espionage
Law,'' Reuters, 6 December 17.
\54\ PRC Counterespionage Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiandie fa], passed 1 November 14, effective 1 November 14.
\55\ Ibid.; State Council, PRC Counterespionage Law Implementing
Rules [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo fan jiandie fa shishi xize], 22
November 17, arts. 3, 5, 7-8, 19.
\56\ Amnesty International, ``China: Taiwan NGO Worker Detained on
Vague National Security Charges,'' 29 March 17; Benjamin Haas, ``China
Says It Has Detained Taiwanese Activist Missing Since 19 March,''
Guardian, 29 March 17.
\57\ Benjamin Haas, ``China Says It Has Detained Taiwanese Activist
Missing Since 19 March,'' Guardian, 29 March 17; ``TAO: Lee Ming-cheh
and Zhang Xiangzhong Cases Still Under Investigation'' [Guotaiban: li
mingzhe, zhang xiangzhong shijian ren zai diaocha], Radio Free Asia, 26
April 18.
\58\ ``Taiwan Suspect Arrested on Mainland,'' Xinhua, 26 May 17.
\59\ ``Public Hearing Begins for Peng Yuhua and Lee Ming-cheh Trial
of First Instance in Subversion of State Power Case'' [Peng yuhua, li
mingzhe dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen gongkai kaiting], Xinhua, 11
September 17.
\60\ Ibid.
\61\ ``China Jails Taiwan Activist Lee Ming-che for `Subversion,'
'' BBC, 28 November 17; Mimi Lau, ``Rights Activist Lee Ming-cheh First
Taiwanese To Be Jailed for Subversion on Mainland China,'' South China
Morning Post, 28 November 17.
\62\ ``China Jails Taiwan Activist Lee Ming-che for `Subversion,'
'' BBC, 28 November 17; Benjamin Haas, `` `Serious Damage' to China-
Taiwan Ties as Activist Lee Ming-cheh Jailed,'' Guardian, 28 November
17.
\63\ ``China Jails Taiwan Activist Lee Ming-che for `Subversion,'
'' BBC, 28 November 17; Benjamin Haas, `` `Serious Damage' to China-
Taiwan Ties as Activist Lee Ming-cheh Jailed,'' Guardian, 28 November
17.
\64\ ``Person Responsible for Ministry of Civil Affairs Social
Organizations Management Bureau Answers Questions From This Paper's
Reporter About Governance of Illegal Social Organizations'' [Minzhengbu
shehui zuzhi guanli ju fuze ren jiu zhili feifa shehui zuzhi da ben bao
jizhe wen], China Society News, 9 February 18.
\65\ Ibid.
\66\ Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation,
``Circular on Determining and Managing Issues Related to Nonprofit
Organizations' Tax Exemption Eligibility'' [Guanyu fei yingli zuzhi
mianshui zige rending guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 7
February 18, effective 1 January 18, 6(6).
\67\ ``China's Ministry of Civil Affairs Launched a New Round of
Special Action Attacking `Illegal Social Organizations' '' [Zhongguo
minzhengbu kaizhan xin yi lun daji ``feifa shehui zuzhi'' zhuanxiang
huodong], Radio Free Asia, 17 April 18.
\68\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Measures on the Management of
Social Organizations' Social Credit Information [Shehui zuzhi xinyong
xinxi guanli banfa], issued 30 January 18, arts. 9, 15.
\69\ Ibid., art. 11; ``Measures on the Management of Social
Organizations' Credit Information, Severe Violations of Law and Those
[Who Are] Untrustworthy Will Be Disciplined'' [Shehui zuzhi xinyong
xinxi guanli banfa yanzhong weifa shixin jiang bei chengjie], CCTV, 31
January 18.
\70\ See, e.g., ``MCA Administratively Punishes Western Returned
Scholars Foundation With Three-Month Suspension of Activities''
[Minzhengbu dui oumei tongxue jijinhui zuo chu tingzhi huodong san ge
yue xingzheng chufa], China News Service, 14 March 18.
\71\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial
Enterprises (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Minban
feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zhanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for
Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations
(Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji
guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16. See
also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 228.
\72\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Shehui zuzhi dengji guanli tiaoli (cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 3
August 18, arts. 2, 83; Xie Xiaoxia, NGOCN, ``Reflections and Advice
Regarding the `Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social
Organizations (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)' '' [Guanyu ``shehui
zuzhi dengji guanli tiaoli (cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)'' de sikao yu
jianyi], 6 August 18.
\73\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Shehui zuzhi dengji guanli tiaoli (cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 3
August 18, arts. 8, 10.
\74\ Ibid., art. 7.
\75\ Ibid., art. 13; ``Measures on the Management of Social
Organizations' Credit Information, Severe Violations of Law and Those
[Who Are] Untrustworthy Will Be Disciplined'' [Shehui zuzhi xinyong
xinxi guanli banfa yanzhong weifa shixin jiang bei chengjie], CCTV, 31
January 18.
\76\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, art. 38.
\77\ State Council, Institutional Reform Plan [Guowuyuan jigou
gaige fang'an], 17 March 18, sec. 2(4).
\78\ ``Wang Yong: Establishing a National International Development
Cooperation Agency'' [Wang yong: zujian guojia guoji fazhan hezuo shu],
Xinhua, 13 March 18.
\79\ David Gitter and Leah Fang, ``The Chinese Communist Party
International Department: Overlooked Yet Ever Present,'' The Diplomat,
8 August 16.
\80\ Gong Jie, ``1st Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network Forum Kicks
Off,'' China.org.cn, 21 November 17.
\81\ Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network, ``Member Organizations,''
10 July 18. The Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network includes member
organizations such as the All-China Youth Federation, All-China Women's
Federation, Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign
Countries, Buddhist Association of China, China Catholic Patriotic
Association and Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church, China
Islamic Association, and China Religious Culture Communication
Association, among other government-organized non-governmental
organizations (GONGOs).
\82\ Gong Jie, ``1st Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network Forum Kicks
Off,'' China.org.cn, 21 November 17; Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network,
``Member Organizations,'' 10 July 18.
\83\ China NGO Network for International Exchanges, ``About Us,''
last visited 14 June 18; Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network,
``Introduction of the First Silk Road NGO,'' 24 November 17.
\84\ State Council, ``Sun Jiazheng'' [Sun jiazheng], 14 March 18.
\85\ Gerry Groot, ``The Long Reach of China's United Front Work,''
Lowy Institute, The Interpreter, 6 November 17.
\86\ James A. Millward, ``Is China a Colonial Power? '' New York
Times, 4 May 18; Shanthi Kalathil, ``China in Xi's `New Era':
Redefining Development,'' Journal of Democracy, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (April
2018), 52-55.
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Governance in China's One-Party System
China's one-party authoritarian political system remains
out of compliance with the standards defined in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\1\ which
China has signed and declared an intention to ratify,\2\ and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\3\ These standards
require that citizens be allowed to freely choose their
representatives \4\ and to hold their officials accountable
through fair and impartial elections regardless of political
party membership.\5\ Historic developments in China this past
year signified further regression from these international
standards of democratic governance: \6\ The Chinese Communist
Party tightened its control over the government and society
through a significant restructuring of central Party and
government institutions,\7\ and the Party and government
overturned a key institutional reform of the post-Mao era by
abolishing presidential term limits.\8\ In his report to the
19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (19th
Party Congress) in October 2017, Party General Secretary and
President Xi Jinping asserted that Party building will play a
``decisive role'' in achieving the Party's goal of the ``great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.'' \9\ According to an
expert, the speech implies that ``the Party is the prerequisite
for any success [of the country].'' \10\ As Party leaders
demanded obedience and loyalty from all sectors of society,\11\
the Party itself increasingly came under the personal
leadership of Xi.\12\ Citizens who voiced disagreement with
official policies faced harassment, detention, or criminal
prosecution,\13\ demonstrating Chinese authorities' violation
of citizens' right to participate in public affairs.\14\
Xi Jinping Further Amassed Power
This past year, Party General Secretary and President Xi
Jinping further ``[centralized] authority under his personal
leadership,'' \15\ thereby undermining collective
leadership,\16\ ``[reversing] reform and opening initiated by
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping . . .,'' \17\ and
``destabilizing'' China's political system,\18\ according to
scholars and experts. At the 19th Party Congress,\19\ convened
between October 18 and 24, 2017,\20\ Xi delivered the 18th
Central Committee report in which he reiterated a key goal of
the Party's economic plan \21\ to complete the final phase of
building a ``moderately prosperous society'' by 2020.\22\ Xi
demanded that all sectors of society obey the Party Central
Committee,\23\ and he also further solidified his leadership
over the Party.\24\ On October 24, 2017, members of the 19th
Party Congress voted to amend the Chinese Communist Party
Constitution to recognize Xi as the ``core'' leader of the
Party Central Committee \25\ and to write Xi's name and theory
into the preamble.\26\ According to a U.S.-based scholar, the
amendment ``marks a degree of influence and dominance not
shared by any other leader since Mao [Zedong].'' \27\ An
analysis described Xi's theory, ``Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,'' as ``a
super-nationalistic narrative.'' \28\ In addition, Xi's
references to the importance of ``propaganda and thought work''
(xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo) in his speeches since assuming
power at the 18th Party Congress evoke ``brainwashing and Mao-
style ideological campaigns,'' according to this analysis.\29\
In March 2018, the Central Committee issued a plan to
restructure Party and government organizations and elevated
four leading small groups (lingdao xiaozu) headed by Xi to
committees; the leading small groups were responsible for
reform efforts, cybersecurity, finance, and foreign affairs,
and the redesignation, according to some observers, may enhance
Xi's authority and control over these policy issues.\30\ [For
more information on the restructuring of Party and government
organizations, see Party Expands Power Over Government and
Society below.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's Constitution Amended To Eliminate Presidential Term Limits
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carrying out the Party Central Committee's recommendation,\31\ the
National People's Congress \32\ amended China's Constitution on March
11, 2018, with a vote of 2,958 in favor, 2 against, and 3
abstentions.\33\ In what two experts characterized as ``historically
consequential'' revisions,\34\ the amended Constitution no longer
limits the president to serving two five-year terms.\35\ Former leader
Deng Xiaoping took a leading role in instituting term limits in 1982,
reportedly to avoid over-concentration of political power in one person
\36\ and to establish an ``orderly system of succession.'' \37\
Eliminating term limits potentially would allow Xi Jinping to retain
the presidency indefinitely,\38\ and it signified Xi's repudiation of
the succession system developed by Deng, according to observers.\39\
Chinese and international observers said that the move--even if made
with the intention of improving governance, as an NPC spokesman stated
\40\--could lead to disorder,\41\ and ``revert[s] the country back to
the era of strongman politics and the personality cult.'' \42\
While state and Party news outlets asserted that the constitutional
amendment enjoyed wide public support,\43\ different forms of protest
against the amendment took place outside China.\44\ Authorities
reportedly suppressed dissenting voices by means of censorship,\45\
detention,\46\ and keeping democracy and rights advocates away from
Beijing municipality.\47\ In one example, the Party Committee of
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law removed a university professor
from her teaching position for criticizing the constitutional
amendment.\48\ Outside China, Chinese students studying at over 30
schools around the world reportedly hung posters protesting the removal
of term limits.\49\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EROSION OF INTRAPARTY DEMOCRACY
Xi Jinping further centralized his political power by
handpicking persons to fill top leadership positions.\50\ In
October 2017, the First Plenum of the 19th Central Committee
announced the new members of the Politburo and its Standing
Committee,\51\ the de facto center of political power in
China.\52\ Xi Jinping reportedly handpicked the new members
\53\ through conducting personal interviews.\54\ During the
previous two congresses, the Party experimented with a straw
poll, allowing a group of Party leaders to recommend
candidates,\55\ as a step toward intraparty democracy (dangnei
minzhu; also translated as ``inner-Party democracy'').\56\
Although it is unclear if the straw poll approach had an actual
impact on the ultimate selection, it ``suggested the legitimacy
of the leading cadres of the [Communist Party],'' according to
an expert.\57\ An official news article cited the prevention of
corrupt practices to justify Xi's dismissal of the straw poll
approach.\58\ One observer expressed regrets that the straw
poll approach was outright abandoned rather than improved
upon,\59\ and another observer said that prior ``optimism for
[intraparty democracy] proved short-lived.'' \60\
Party Expands Power Over Government and Society
At the annual meetings of the National People's Congress
(NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in
March 2018 (Two Sessions), central authorities unveiled
sweeping changes to Party and government structures.\61\ Such
reorganization, China's biggest in decades,\62\ gives the Party
and Xi tighter control \63\ in a number of areas as the Party
takes over the responsibility of policy implementation, which
in recent decades had largely been left to the government
bureaucracy.\64\ One scholar observed that these changes also
are likely to erode the space for policy discussions and reduce
checks on the abuse of power.\65\ Examples in which the
restructuring plan grants the Party control over government-
held functions include the following:
The Central Party School and the Chinese
Academy of Governance merged to consolidate the Party's
leadership in training government officials and in
ensuring their ideological conformity.\66\
The Party's United Front Work Department
assumed exclusive policymaking authority over religious
and ethnic minority matters.\67\ [For more information
on the impact on religious freedom, see Section II--
Freedom of Religion.]
The Party's Central Propaganda Department took
over managerial responsibilities for press and film
administration from the State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT),
which was disbanded as a result of the
reorganization.\68\ A newly created State Council
agency called the State Radio and Television
Administration took over SAPPRFT's remaining
responsibility for radio and television administration,
while the Central Propaganda Department will continue
to have a leadership role over the three major official
broadcast entities.\69\ In July 2018, the Propaganda
Department and the Central Organization Department
directed local units such as schools, research
institutions, and enterprises to produce media content,
hold special topic seminars, and implement training
modules aimed at expeditiously cultivating among
intellectuals ``a striving spirit to promote
patriotism,'' and aligning them with the Party and
government's objectives.\70\ A former provincial-level
propaganda department official characterized this as a
brainwashing campaign targeting intellectuals.\71\
Another structural change that further blurs the line
between the Party and the government is the creation of the
National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to direct anticorruption
efforts.\72\ At the Two Sessions, the NPC, acting at the
direction of the Party's Central Committee,\73\ established the
NSC by amending the Constitution \74\ and passing the PRC
Supervision Law.\75\ The Supervision Law grants the NSC similar
status as the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, and
the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP).\76\ The NSC replaces
the Ministry of Supervision and National Bureau of Corruption
Prevention, and takes over certain duties of the SPP involving
the investigation of official misconduct such as bribery and
dereliction of duty.\77\ The NSC shares office space,
personnel, and a website with the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection (CCDI), a Party entity,\78\ and is under
the direct supervision of the Party's Central Committee.\79\
While the CCDI's jurisdiction is limited to Party members,
the new PRC Supervision Law grants the NSC broad supervisory
jurisdiction covering not only Party and government officials,
but also administrators at state-owned enterprises, public
schools and hospitals, as well as village and residence
committees.\80\ Some observers opined that creating the NSC
allowed the Party to extend its extrajudicial disciplinary
reach over the entire public sector,\81\ which is estimated to
be over 100 million people.\82\ In addition, the PRC
Supervision Law grants the NSC authority to confine individuals
under a newly institutionalized disciplinary measure called
``confinement'' (liuzhi) for up to six months without judicial
oversight.\83\ Unlike ``double designation'' (shuanggui), a
coercive measure reserved for Party members only,\84\ experts
have assessed that NSC officials may apply liuzhi to confine
any person suspected of bribery or of participating in crimes
involving official misconduct, which may include civilians and
foreign citizens.\85\ [For more information on arbitrary
detention and on the NSC's authority to confine individuals,
see text box titled Confinement (Liuzhi) Under the PRC
Supervision Law in Section II--Criminal Justice.]
Control Over Citizens
SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM
Party and government leadership continued to build the
social credit system that aims to use surveillance and
artificial intelligence to coerce and incentivize individuals
to participate in ``social management'' to maintain social
order.\86\ In 2014, the State Council issued a plan to complete
by 2020 the regulatory and technical framework for a national
social credit system,\87\ which is designed to measure
citizens' creditworthiness and moral integrity as it relates to
``socialist core values.'' \88\ As a social management tool
currently consisting of ``fragmented initiatives that share a
basic set of objectives [and] operational frameworks,'' \89\
the system takes into account factors beyond financial
transactions to include criminal records, traffic violations,
social media activities, and political activities.\90\ Critics
have raised concerns that the social credit system is part of
the Chinese government's efforts to counter perceived threats
to national security and shape citizens' behavior through
massive data-gathering and surveillance at the expense of
privacy.\91\
As part of its efforts to develop the social credit system,
the Chinese government this past year moved to gain access to
personal information collected by commercial enterprises.\92\
In February 2018, China's central bank, the People's Bank of
China, granted a license to Baihang Credit Scoring (Baihang) to
operate as a credit reporting company, enabling it to collect
and process personal information.\93\ The newly formed Baihang
is owned by eight major private companies in credit-related
businesses \94\ and the National Internet Finance Association
of China (NIFAC), a Party- and state-organized association that
supervises the implementation of government policies in
internet finance.\95\ The eight companies could share among
themselves and with the NIFAC \96\ a wide range of customer
data.\97\ The license was granted despite the Cyberspace
Administration of China having found one of the member
companies to have collected personal information in violation
of the non-binding \98\ government standards for safeguarding
personal information.\99\ Moreover, the manner in which
collected data may be automatically shared among the eight
companies for credit evaluation raised concerns that it could
exceed the scope of customers' consent.\100\ In June 2018,
Baihang partnered with over 120 companies, which would provide
Baihang with personal information of their customers in
exchange for access to Baihang's credit information
database.\101\ One source expressed concern over whether
Baihang's member companies' data sharing would violate China's
privacy laws.\102\
In addition, part of the implementation of the social
credit system in some cases may violate citizens' due process
rights and infringe on their right to freedom of movement.\103\
In March 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) and other state entities issued two opinions prohibiting
certain individuals who have ``lost credit in serious ways''
from taking trains for six months \104\ or airplanes for a
year.\105\ Affected individuals include those blacklisted
because of their failure to satisfy a court judgment.\106\
International NGO Human Rights Watch highlighted two cases in
which a lawyer and a journalist were unable to buy plane
tickets because they were blacklisted as ``untrustworthy,''
respectively, for a court-ordered apology deemed ``insincere''
and a payment submission that a court said it did not
receive.\107\ The NDRC deputy director reported in March that
authorities had restricted 3 million individuals from using
trains and 9 million from using aircraft due to ``lost
credit.'' \108\
AN EXPANDING, PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
The Chinese government continued to expand the existing
video surveillance system (also known as Skynet) \109\ this
past year. In 2005, the Ministry of Public Security initiated a
pilot program to implement video surveillance systems in over
400 localities, and the ministry expanded the program to cover
every prefecture-level city by 2011.\110\ Official news agency
China News Service reported that the surveillance system had a
limited impact on fighting crime and that its primary function
is to ``maintain social stability'' such as preventing protests
and demonstrations.\111\ Between 2012 and 2017, the system grew
to consist of 20 million cameras,\112\ covering over 5,000
local administrative jurisdictions,\113\ with many having
facial recognition capabilities.\114\ In January 2018, the
Party Central Committee and State Council issued an opinion on
``rejuvenating'' villages and expressed the intention to expand
the surveillance system to cover rural areas,\115\ consisting
of about 41 percent of China's population.\116\
In addition, Chinese authorities are building biometric
databases to monitor broad segments of the population.\117\ In
December 2017, the Wall Street Journal reported that public
security officials in various locations in China collected
biometric information such as saliva and blood samples from
individuals, in some cases without their informed consent, who
had expressed views critical of the government or committed
minor infractions.\118\ The police in Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region reportedly wrote that they ``were transforming DNA
technology from simply a criminal investigation tool into an
important initiative for social control and safety keeping.''
\119\ In some localities, authorities gathered biometric
information from migrant workers and coal miners because
officials deemed these groups to be ``a higher risk to social
stability.'' \120\ In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
authorities ``[collected] DNA samples of all residents between
the ages of 12 and 65.'' \121\ China reportedly lacks adequate
privacy protections with respect to the installation of
surveillance cameras and the collection of biometric
information.\122\ [For more information on surveillance in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
CONTINUED CRACKDOWN ON FREE SPEECH, ASSEMBLY, AND ASSOCIATION
Chinese authorities continued to harass, detain, and
imprison advocates who exercised their rights to freedom of
speech, assembly, and association. The UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights has found that the free exercise
of these rights constitutes ``essential conditions'' for
effective political participation.\123\ Representative cases
are as follows:
Authorities harassed individuals around the
29th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests by
means of censorship, questioning, detention, and
enforced disappearance.\124\ For example, on June 4,
2018, police and officials from the local religious
affairs bureau detained over 17 members of the Early
Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu municipality shortly
before a scheduled prayer meeting to commemorate the
anniversary.\125\
Authorities continued to administratively and
criminally detain democracy advocates.\126\ In one
case, on May 21, 2018, police took rights defender Yu
Qiyuan into custody at a train station in Guangzhou
municipality, Guangdong province,\127\ reportedly in
connection with his participation in a sea memorial
held in July 2017 in Guangdong to commemorate the death
of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo.\128\ Yu
tweeted that police located him with facial recognition
technology.\129\
On May 11, 2018, the Wuhan Intermediate
People's Court tried Qin Yongmin, whom authorities
accused of ``subversion of state power'' in connection
to his participation in the banned China Democracy
Party and the domestic NGO China Human Rights
Watch.\130\ The trial took place more than three years
after authorities detained him in January 2015.\131\
According to Qin's sister-in-law, authorities also
forcibly disappeared Qin's wife Zhao Suli at the same
time and placed her under soft detention.\132\ On July
11, 2018, the same court sentenced Qin to 13 years in
prison and 3 years' deprivation of political
rights.\133\
As of May 2018, Liu Feiyue, founder of the
rights monitoring website Civil Rights & Livelihood
Watch, remained in pretrial detention on suspicion of
``inciting subversion of state power,'' since
authorities took him into custody in November
2016.\134\
Citizen Participation
ELECTIONS
The Commission did not observe progress in expanding the
scope of direct elections, which Chinese law limits to people's
congresses of local jurisdictions such as smaller cities,
counties, and townships.\135\ Chinese news media emphasized the
Party's leadership in every step of the local election
process,\136\ and citizens reportedly continued to face
difficulties in running as independent candidates.\137\ Sources
further highlighted instances in which officials suppressed
meaningful participation in or speech regarding elections this
past year,\138\ demonstrating that China's political
institutions do not meet the standards for elections outlined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights \139\ and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\140\ For
example, in January 2018, police in Laizhou city, Yantai
municipality, Shandong province, took Zhang Yuxi into custody
and ordered him to serve eight days' administrative detention
on the charge of ``fabricating facts to disturb public order,''
thereby preventing him from participating in a village
election.\141\ Zhang previously filed complaints about local
officials' corrupt practices and exposed irregularities in a
local election.\142\
RULEMAKING PROCESS
The State Council's December 2017 amendments of two sets of
regulations governing rulemaking processes \143\ have the
potential to curb the arbitrary exercise of power \144\ and
improve public participation, but they included language
emphasizing the Party's control.\145\ The amended regulations
require the State Council to solicit public opinion when
drafting rules that diminish citizens' benefits or increase
their responsibilities.\146\ State Council departments and
local administrative departments are prohibited from making
this type of rule unless expressly authorized by law.\147\ The
amendments also require the rulemaking body to solicit public
comments and permit it to hold public hearings or to appoint
third-party experts with specialized knowledge to draft rules
involving technical matters.\148\ Nevertheless, there is no
mechanism by which the public can ensure that the rulemaking
body has considered public comments.\149\ Moreover, the
amendments added a new requirement for compliance with the
Party's decisions and policies.\150\
Transparency
The Chinese Communist Party issued regulations with the
stated goal of improving transparency in Party affairs, but
their impact likely will be limited. In December 2017, the
Party Central Committee issued trial Regulations on Open Party
Affairs (Open Party Regulations) that require Party entities to
release information to the extent relevant to Party members and
the public.\151\ Unlike the Open Government Information
Regulations,\152\ the Open Party Regulations do not provide for
mechanisms that allow citizens to request disclosure, and
compliance is supervised by the Party itself.\153\ The scope of
disclosure under the Open Party Regulations generally is
limited to policy documents and work progress reports,\154\ and
does not require the release of financial information, which is
reportedly a key element in combating corruption.\155\ The
extent of public oversight on the new National Supervisory
Commission (NSC) remains uncertain because it is unclear which
set of disclosure rules applies--while the NSC reports to the
National People's Congress as a state entity, it also is
characterized as a political body.\156\
Accountability
Central authorities have implemented a years-long
anticorruption campaign with the purported aim of holding
officials accountable, but reports continue to highlight the
campaign's apparent underlying political motivations and note
that corruption remains pervasive in China.\157\ The Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced that
authorities nationwide disciplined a total of 527,000
individuals in 2017; \158\ meanwhile, corruption reportedly
remained a significant problem.\159\ A scholar noted that Xi
Jinping has used the anticorruption campaign to disrupt
``[f]actions organized around political rivals.'' \160\ As the
CCDI underscored in the communique of its second plenary
session, the elimination of individuals disloyal to the Party
is part of the objective of the anticorruption campaign.\161\
Vice President Wang Qishan,\162\ who ran the campaign in his
previous role as the CCDI Secretary,\163\ wrote a commentary in
October 2017 that further underscored the political motivations
of the campaign.\164\ Wang identified political corruption as
the worst form of corruption, which includes stealing power
from the Party and the state by creating interest groups and
undermining the Party's control by organizing factional
activities.\165\ A U.K.-based scholar noted that widespread
corruption persists in China due to the absence of true
accountability and transparency regarding internal affairs and
that Chinese leaders do not display sufficient commitment to
address these challenges.\166\
Authorities in various localities retaliated against
individuals who exposed official misconduct. Examples are as
follows:
In August 2017, the Heyuan Municipal
Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong province
dismissed Liu Yao's \167\ appeal challenging a lower
court's judgment sentencing him to 20 years in prison
and fined him 1.4 million yuan (approximately
US$209,000) for ``extortion,'' ``fraud,'' and
``purchasing a trafficked child.'' \168\ Liu's
detention is reportedly connected to his efforts to
expose corruption, including an official's alleged
involvement in unlawful appropriation of farmland for a
golf course project.\169\
In February 2018, the Huidong County People's
Court in Huizhou municipality, Guangdong, convicted Li
Jianxin on the charge of ``extortion'' and sentenced
him to 11 years in prison.\170\ Li's detention is
reportedly connected to his efforts to expose
corruption by local officials, including a former
deputy mayor of Huizhou.\171\
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
\1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76.
\2\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 13
July 18; State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 5.
\3\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48.
\4\ Ibid., art. 21. Article 21 of the UDHR provides that,
``Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives . . .. The will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.''
\5\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25.
\6\ David Shambaugh, ``Under Xi Jinping, a Return in China to the
Dangers of an All-Powerful Leader,'' South China Morning Post, 1 March
18; Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, Brookings Institution, ``China's
Constitutional Conundrum,'' 28 February 18.
\7\ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``At China's `Two Sessions,' Xi Jinping
Restructures Party-State To Further Consolidate Power,'' Jamestown
Foundation, 26 March 18.
\8\ Alice L. Miller, ``Only Socialism Can Save China; Only Xi
Jinping Can Save Socialism,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution,
China Leadership Monitor, No. 56 (Spring 2018), 16 May 18.
\9\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17; Jessica Batke, ``Party All the Time: Governance and Society
in the New Era,'' China Stanford University, Hoover Institution,
Leadership Monitor, No. 55 (Winter 2018), 23 January 18, 2. See also,
Qian Gang, ``Qian Gang Exclusive: Report on Discourse in 2017 Part 1
The System of `Xi's Discourse' Is Established'' [Qian gang zhuanwen:
2017 yuxiang baogao--``xi yu'' tixi queli], Storm Media, 6 January 18.
\10\ Jessica Batke, ``Party All the Time: Governance and Society in
the New Era,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 55 (Winter 2018), 23 January 18, 2.
\11\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 3. See also Chris Buckley, `` `Orwellian Nonsense'?
China Says That's the Price of Doing Business,'' New York Times, 6 May
18; Jeffrey Wasserstrom, ``Statesman, Strongman, Philosopher, Autocrat:
China's Xi Is a Man Who Contains Multitudes,'' The Conversation, 2
April 18; Tom Phillips, ``Xi Shores Up Power With Demand for Army
Obedience and Foreign Respect,'' Guardian, 1 August 17.
\12\ James M. Lindsay, Council on Foreign Relations, ``Xi's China
Is More Authoritarian at Home and More Assertive Abroad, Argues
Elizabeth Economy in New Book,'' 1 May 18; Gordon G. Chang, ``Xi
Jinping's Great Leap Backward,'' American Conservative, 9 July 18;
Jessica Meyers, ``China's Communist Party Elders Picked Xi Jinping
Because They Thought They Could Control Him. They Were Wrong,'' Los
Angeles Times, 16 October 17; Chris Buckley, ``Xi Jinping Opens China's
Party Congress, His Hold Tighter Than Ever,'' New York Times, 17
October 17; John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett, `` `Xi Jinping
Thought,' '' China Perspective, Vol. 1-2 (2018), 100.
\13\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Wuhan Dissident Qin
Yongmin Heavily Sentenced to 13 Years in Prison'' [Wuhan yiyi renshi
qin yongmin zao zhongpan 13 nian], 11 July 18; Rights Defense Network,
``Monthly Report on Detained Political Prisoners and Prisoners of
Conscience in Mainland China (May 31, 2018) Issue No. 32 (Total 761
Persons) (Part 1)'' [Zhongguo dalu zaiya zhengzhifan, liangxinfan yuedu
baogao (2018 nian 5 yue 31 ri) di 32 qi (gong 761 ren) (di 1 bufen)],
31 May 18; ``Participant of Sea Memorial for Liu Xiaobo Detained by
`Facial Recognition' '' [Canyu liu xiaobo haiji renshi yi bei ``renlian
shibie'' zao zhuabu], Radio Free Asia, 22 May 18; Rights Defense
Network, ``Democracy Rights Advocate Huang Wenxun Continues To Be
Harrassed and Pressured by Authorities Following Release From Prison''
[Minzhu weiquan renshi huang wenxuan chuyu hou reng zao dangju buduan
saorao he daya], 25 May 18.
\14\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25.
\15\ Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution (Oxford: Oxford
University, 2018), 10; James M. Lindsay, Council on Foreign Relations,
``Xi's China Is More Authoritarian at Home and More Assertive Abroad,
Argues Elizabeth Economy in New Book,'' 1 May 18.
\16\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``Carl Minzner on China's Post-Reform Era,''
The Diplomat, 4 April 18; Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution
(Oxford: Oxford University, 2018), 52-53; David Shambaugh, ``Under Xi
Jinping, a Return in China to the Dangers of an All-Powerful Leader,''
South China Morning Post, 1 March 18.
\17\ James M. Lindsay, Council on Foreign Relations, ``Xi's China
Is More Authoritarian at Home and More Assertive Abroad, Argues
Elizabeth Economy in New Book,'' 1 May 18. Elizabeth C. Economy, The
Third Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University, 2018), 53.
\18\ Carl Minzner, ``Reversing Reform,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 8
March 18; Carl Minzner, End of an Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2018), 29, 30, 32, 34.
\19\ Chinese Communist Party Constitution [Zhongguo gongchandang
zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October
92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, 24
October 17, art. 19. The Chinese Communist Party Constitution provides
that a Party Congress is held once every five years and convened by the
Central Committee. ``18th Party Congress Begins, Hu Jintao Presents
Report'' [Shiba da kaimu hu jintao zuo baogao], Xinhua, 8 November 12.
The 18th Party Congress took place in November 2012.
\20\ ``19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Convenes
in Beijing, Xi Jinping Delivers Work Report to Congress on Behalf of
the 18th Central Committee, Presided Over by Li Keqiang'' [Zhongguo
ggongchandang di shijiu ci quanguo daibiao dahui zai jing kaimu xi
jinping daibiao di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui xiang dahui zuo
baogao li keqiang zhuchi dahui], Xinhua, 18 October 17; ``19th Party
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Concludes in Beijing, Xi
Jinping Delivers Important Speech'' [Zhongguo gongchandang di shijiu ci
quanguo daibiao dahui zai jing bimu xi jinping fabiao zhongyao
jianghua], Xinhua, 24 October 17.
\21\ See, e.g., ``Xi Jinping: Keep the Masses' Security and Well-
Being Close to Our Hearts'' [Xi jinping ba qunzhong anwei lengnuan
shike fang zai xinshang], Xinhua, 30 December 12; ``Thirteenth Five-
Year Plan Passed: Average Per Capita Income in 2020 Targeted To Double
Compared to 2010'' [Shisan wu guihua tongguo: 2020 nian renjun shouru
bi 2010 nian fanfan], Beijing Times, reprinted in Xinhua, 30 October
15.
\22\ ``Xi Jinping: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era'' [Xi
jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui duoqu xin shidai
zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli], 18 October 17, Xinhua, 27
October 17, sec. 4.
\23\ Ibid., sec. 3. See also Chris Buckley, `` `Orwellian
Nonsense'? China Says That's the Price of Doing Business,'' New York
Times, 6 May 18; Jeffrey Wasserstrom, ``Statesman, Strongman,
Philosopher, Autocrat: China's Xi Is a Man Who Contains Multitudes,''
The Conversation, 2 April 18; Tom Phillips, ``Xi Shores Up Power With
Demand for Army Obedience and Foreign Respect,'' Guardian, 1 August 17.
\24\ Chinese Communist Party Constitution [Zhongguo gongchandang
zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October
92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, 24
October 17, General Program; James M. Lindsay, Council on Foreign
Relations, ``Xi's China Is More Authoritarian at Home and More
Assertive Abroad, Argues Elizabeth Economy in New Book,'' 1 May 18;
Gordon G. Chang, ``Xi Jinping's Great Leap Backward,'' American
Conservative, 9 July 18; Jessica Meyers, ``China's Communist Party
Elders Picked Xi Jinping Because They Thought They Could Control Him.
They Were Wrong,'' Los Angeles Times, 16 October 17; Chris Buckley,
``Xi Jinping Opens China's Party Congress, His Hold Tighter Than
Ever,'' New York Times, 17 October 17; John Garrick and Yan Chang
Bennett, `` `Xi Jinping Thought,' '' China Perspective, Vol. 1-2
(2018), 100.
\25\ Zhao Chao and Chen Weiwei, ``Glorious Guide To Building a
Marxist Ruling Party--Story of the Birth of the `Chinese Communist
Party Constitution (Amendment)' '' [Jianshe makesi zhuyi zhizhengdang
de guanghui zhiyin--``zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng (xiuzheng'an)''
dansheng ji], Xinhua, 28 October 17.
\26\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Understanding
Through One Picture: Table Illustrating Changes in the `Constitution of
the Chinese Communist Party' '' [Yitu dudong: ``zhongguo gongchandang
zhangcheng'' xiugai duibi yilanbiao], 31 October 17.
\27\ Joseph Fewsmith, ``The 19th Party Congress: Ringing in Xi
Jinping's New Age,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 55 (Winter 2018), 23 January 18, 7-8.
\28\ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``What is Xi Jinping Thought?'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue 12, 21 September 17.
\29\ Ibid.; ``Summary of Xi Jinping's Captivating Speeches on
`Propaganda and Thought Work' Since 18th Party Congress'' [Xi jinping
shibada yilai guanyu ``xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo'' jingcai lunshu
zhaibian], People's Daily, 19 August 14; Zhang Xiaosong and Huang
Xiaoxi, ``Xi Jinping Attends National Propaganda and Thought Work
Conference and Delivers Important Speech'' [Xi jinping chuxi quanguo
xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua], Xinhua,
22 August 18.
\30\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 1(4); Alice L. Miller, ``Only Socialism Can
Save China; Only Xi Jinping Can Save Socialism,'' Stanford University,
Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, No. 56 (Spring 2018), 16
May 18, 7; Jun Mai, ``China Unveils Bold Overhaul To Tighten Communist
Party Control,'' South China Morning Post, 22 March 18; Mai Yanting,
``Reform Leads to `Party-Based Governance,' NPC's Supervisory Function
Significantly Weakened'' [Gaige ling zhonggong ``yi dang zhiguo'' renda
jiandu xiaoneng da xue], Radio France Internationale, 22 March 18. See
also Zheng Yanzhi, `` `Small Groups' Become `Committees,' It's
Transcendence as Much as Status Elevation!'' [``Xiaozu'' bian
``weiyuanhui,'' jishi shengge, gengshi shenghua!], People's Daily, 29
March 18.
\31\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Recommendation
To Amend Portion of the Constitution'' [Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang
weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai xianfa bufen neirong de jianyi], 26 January
18, Xinhua, 25 February 18, item 14.
\32\ The National People's Congress has been described as ``a
rubber-stamp body with no real legislative power.'' Andrew J. Nathan,
``China: Back to the Future,'' New York Review of Books, 10 May 18.
\33\ ``Amendment to the People's Republic of China Constitution
Passed'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng'an tongguo],
People's Daily, 11 March 18; Amendment to the PRC Constitution
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua, 11 March 18,
item 45; Lin Xiaowei et al., ``Collaborative News: Escorting the Convoy
in the New Era, Apt Time To Amend Constitution--International Community
Watches Closely as National People's Congress Passes Constitutional
Amendment'' [Zonghe xiaoxi: huhang xin shidai xiuxian zhengdang shi--
guoji shehui guanzhu quanguo renda tongguo xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua,
11 March 18; Luo Zhengguang and Zhu Jiehai, ``Featured Story: Historic
and Dignified Moment--Reporting Deliberation and Passing of
Constitutional Amendment at the First Plenum of the 13th National
People's Congress'' [Texie: lishixing de zhuangyan shike--ji shisan jie
quanguo renda yici huiyi biaojue tongguo xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua,
12 March 18.
\34\ Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, Brookings Institution, ``China's
Constitutional Conundrum,'' 28 February 18.
\35\ Amendment to the PRC Constitution [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xianfa xiuzheng'an], Xinhua, 11 March 18, item 45.
\36\ Hong Zhenkuai, ``Looking at the Xi-Style Constitutional
Amendment Through the Lens of Term Limit History'' [Cong renqi zhi
lishi kan xi shi xiuxian], New York Times, 22 March 18; PRC
Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93,
15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 79.
\37\ Andrew J. Nathan, ``China: Back to the Future,'' New York
Review of Books, 10 May 18.
\38\ Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, ``China's Legislature
Blesses Xi's Indefinite Rule. It Was 2,958 to 2,'' New York Times, 11
March 18.
\39\ Andrew J. Nathan, ``China: Back to the Future,'' New York
Review of Books, 10 May 18.
\40\ ``China: Abolishing Presidential Term Limits Good for
Governance,'' Al Jazeera, 4 March 18.
\41\ David Bandurski, ``Li Datong's Open Letter,'' University of
Hong Kong, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 28
February 18; Deng Yuwen, ``With an End to Term Limits, Xi Can Realise
His Chinese Dream--But Will the Price for China Be Too High?'' South
China Morning Post, 6 March 18.
\42\ Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, Brookings Institution, ``China's
Constitutional Conundrum,'' 28 February 18.
\43\ Wang Mengran et al., ``Delegate From Jiangsu Sincerely
Supports Passage of Constitutional Amendment'' [Jiangsu daibiao weiyuan
zhongxin yonghu xianfa xiuzheng'an tongguo], Xinhua, 12 March 18;
``Giving Strong Constitutional Protection for Great Revitalization of
the Chinese People'' [Wei zhonghua minzu weida fuxing tigong youli
xianfa baozhang], Legal Daily, 22 March 18. See also ``Chinese NPC
Passes Constitutional Amendment by Large Margin, Xi Jinping Begins To
Rule With Unlimited Term'' [Zhongguo renda gao piao tongguo xiuxian'an
xi jinping kaishi wuxianqi zhizheng], Voice of America, 11 March 18.
\44\ ``Chinese Protest Removal of Presidential Term Limits Outside
China,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 March 18; Frances Mao, ``Xi Jinping: `Not
My President' Posters Emerge Outside China,'' BBC, 12 March 18.
\45\ See, e.g., Echo Huang, ``How China Reacted to the Idea of
Indefinite Rule by Xi, in Memes,'' Quartz, 26 February 18; ``Online
`Blacklist' Initiated, Many WeChat Accounts Closed Down, Zhu Xinxin
`Blacklisted and Censored' for Talking About `Life Tenure' '' [Qidong
wangluo ``hei mingdan'' zhong weixin bei feng zhu xinxin yi
``zhongshenzhi'' zao ``lahei''], Radio Free Asia, 1 March 18;
``Stability Maintenance in Xi Jinping's `New Era': Compressing Space
for Citizens' Freedom Using Advanced Technology'' [Xi jinping ``xin
shidai'' weiwen: gao keji yasuo gongmin ziyou kongjian], Radio Free
Asia, 26 March 18; ``Chongqing Local Lawyers Association and
Lengshuijiang Justice Bureau Prohibit Lawyers From Participating in
Online Discussions About `Constitutional Amendment,' According to Web
Sources'' [Wang chuan chongqing difang lushi xiehui ji lengshuijiang
shi sifaju yaoqiu lushi bude canyu ``xiugai xianfa'' wangluo taolun],
Lawyers' Rights & Interests Concern Net (blog), 27 February 18; China
Digital Times, ``Minitrue: How to Report on the NPC,'' 12 March 18.
\46\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Jiangxi
Dissident Liang Bo Administratively Detained for Five Days for
`Spreading Rumors' '' [Jiangxi yiyi renshi liang bo bei yi ``san yao''
xingju wu tian], 21 March 18; ``Former Procurator Shen Liangqing
Detained Overnight for Questioning, Possibly for Criticizing
Constitutional Amendment Online'' [Yi zai wangshang piping xiuxian qian
jianchaguan shen liangqing bei tongxiao koucha], Radio Free Asia, 7
March 18; ``Detained for Satirizing Constitutional Amendment, Geng
Caiwen and Huang Jingyi Released'' [Wangshang fengci xiuxian bei kou
geng caiwen, huang jingyi huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18. For
more information, see the following records in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database: 2014-00234 on Huang Jingyi, 2015-00336 on
Geng Caiwen, 2018-00316 on Liang Bo, and 2018-00317 on Shen Liangqing.
\47\ ``Sensitive People Forced To Leave Beijing for Stability
Maintenance During Two Sessions, Netizens Detained for Satirizing
Constitutional Amendment'' [Lianghui weiwen min'gan renshi bei po li
jing wangmin feng xiuxian bei ju], Radio Free Asia, 3 March 18.
\48\ Rights Defense Network, ``CCP Tightening Control of Speech in
Higher Education Institutions, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
Female Associate Professor Zhai Jiehong Disciplined for Speech in Class
After Being Reported by Student'' [Zhonggong dangju gaoxiao yanlun
kongzhi riqu yanku zhongnan caijing zhengfa daxue nu fujiaoshou zhai
jiehong yin ketang yanlun zao xuesheng gaomi bei chufen], 21 May 18.
\49\ Qiu Zhongsun, ``Chinese Students Protest in America, Face
Danger at Home,'' Foreign Policy, 28 May 18.
\50\ Susan Shirk et al., ``The 19th Party Congress: A Retrospective
Analysis,'' in Xi Takes Charge: Implications of the 19th Party Congress
for China's Future, University of California at San Diego, School of
Global Policy & Strategy, 21st Century China Center, October 2017, 38.
\51\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Communique of the
First Plenum of the 19th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee''
[Zhongguo gongchandang di shijiu jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di yici
quanti huiyi gongbao], 25 October 17; ``General Secretary Xi Jinping's
Comments to Chinese and Foreign Reporters at the 19th Political Bureau
Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee''
[Xi jinping zongshuji zai shijiu jie zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju
changwei tong zhongwai jizhe jianmian shi de jianghua], Xinhua, 25
October 17.
\52\ Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 90; Wang Xiangwei, ``Analysis: How Xi
Jinping Revived Old Methods by Abandoning Intraparty Democracy,'' South
China Morning Post, 5 November 17.
\53\ ``Xi Jinping in Charge: Key Takeaways From China's 19th
Communist Party Congress,'' Albright Stonebridge Group, 27 October 17,
2; Wang Xiangwei, ``Analysis: How Xi Jinping Revived Old Methods by
Abandoning Intraparty Democracy,'' South China Morning Post, 5 November
17; Zhao Cheng et al., ``Strong Collective Leadership That Leads in the
New Era--Report of the Formation of the Party's New Institution of
Central Leadership'' [Linghang xin shidai de jianqiang lingdao jiti--
dang de xin yi jie zhongyang lingdaojigou chansheng jishi], Xinhua, 26
October 17. See also Alice L. Miller, ``The Road to the 19th Party
Congress,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution, China Leadership
Monitor, No. 51 (Fall 2016), 30 August 16, 9-10.
\54\ Zhao Cheng et al., ``Strong Collective Leadership That Leads
in the New Era--Report of the Formation of the Party's New Institution
of Central Leadership'' [Linghang xin shidai de jianqiang lingdao
jiti--dang de xin yi jie zhongyang lingdaojigou chansheng jishi],
Xinhua, 26 October 17.
\55\ Wang Xiangwei, ``Analysis: How Xi Jinping Revived Old Methods
by Abandoning Intraparty Democracy,'' South China Morning Post, 5
November 17; Li Zhen et al., ``Explained by Party International Liaison
Department's Cartoon: How Does Chinese Communist Party Select Party and
Government Leaders and Cadres'' [Zhonglianbu manhua jiedu: zhonggong
zenyang xuanba dangzheng lingdao ganbu], People's Daily, 10 May 16; Liu
Siyang et al., ``Record of the Formation of a New Party Leadership
Institution'' [Dang de xin yi jie zhongyang lingdao jigou chansheng
jishi], People's Daily, 24 October 07.
\56\ Committee for a Workers' International, ``Xi Jinping: How
Strong Is China's Strongman?'' 17 November 17; Liu Siyang et al.,
``Record of the Formation of a New Party Leadership Institution'' [Dang
de xin yi jie zhongyang lingdao jigou chansheng jishi], People's Daily,
24 October 07; ``Highlights of Report Delivered to the General Assembly
by Comrade Hu Jintao on Behalf of the 16th Central Committee'' [Hu
jintao tongzhi daibiao di shiliu jie zhongyang weiyuanhui xiang dahui
zuo de baogao zhai deng], People's Daily, 18 October 07.
\57\ Joseph Fewsmith, ``The 19th Party Congress: Ringing in Xi
Jinping's New Age,'' Stanford University, Hoover Institution, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 55 (Winter 2018), 23 January 18, 16-17.
\58\ Zhao Cheng et al., ``Strong Collective Leadership That Leads
in the New Era--Report of the Formation of the Party's New Institution
of Central Leadership'' [Linghang xin shidai de jianqiang lingdao
jiti--dang de xin yi jie zhongyang lingdaojigou chansheng jishi],
Xinhua, 26 October 17.
\59\ Lu Bingquan, ``Is Xi Jinping Setting a Precedent or Breaking
the Rules?'' [Xi jinping kaichuang xianhe haishi pohuai guiju?], Ming
Pao, 7 November 17.
\60\ Wang Xiangwei, ``Analysis: How Xi Jinping Revived Old Methods
by Abandoning Intraparty Democracy,'' South China Morning Post, 5
November 17.
\61\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies'' [Zhongggong
zhongyang guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jueding],
Xinhua, 4 March 18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues
`Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' ''
[Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige
fang'an''], Xinhua, 21 March 18; State Council, Institutional Reform
Plan [Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], 17 March 18; ``State Council
Structural Reform Plan Passed at First Session of the 13th National
People's Congress'' [Shisan jie quanguo renda yici huiyi pizhun
guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an], Xinhua, 17 March 18.
\62\ Mercator Institute for China Studies, ``China Update 7/2018:
23 March-12 April 18,'' 12 April 18.
\63\ See, e.g., Keith Bradsher and Chris Buckley, ``China's
Communist Party Centralizes Power Over Finance and Pollution Control,''
New York Times, 12 March 18; Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, ``When
Xi Speaks, Chinese Officials Jump. Maybe Too High,'' New York Times, 16
March 18; Chris Buckley, ``China Gives Communist Party More Control
Over Policy and Media,'' New York Times, 21 March 18; Jun Mai, ``China
Unveils Bold Overhaul To Tighten Communist Party Control,'' South China
Morning Post, 22 March 18; ``China Unveils `Revolutionary' Plan to Give
Communist Party Even More Power,'' Bloomberg, 12 March 18; Willy Wo-Lap
Lam, ``At China's `Two Sessions,' Xi Jinping Restructures Party-State
To Further Consolidate Power,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol.
18, Issue 5, 26 March 18, 1-2.
\64\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``Carl Minzner on China's Post-Reform Era,''
The Diplomat, 4 April 18; Council on Foreign Relations, ``Unrivaled
Power: The Lifting of China's Presidential Term Limits,'' 22 March 18;
Matthias Stepan and Sabine Muscat, ``In Xi's China, the Party Morphs
Into the State,'' Mercator Institute for China Studies, MERICS Blog--
European Voices on China, 7 March 18.
\65\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``Carl Minzner on China's Post-Reform Era,''
The Diplomat, 4 April 18.
\66\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, secs. 1(6), (7); ``Head of Party Organization
Department Chen Xi To Head Chinese Academy of Governance, Tuo Zhen
Becomes Chief Editor of People's Daily'' [Zhongzu buzhang chen xi jian
guojia xingzheng xueyuan yuanzhang tuo zhen ren renmin ribao
zongbianji], Radio Free Asia, 4 April 18.
\67\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, secs. 1(13), (14).
\68\ Ibid., secs. 1(11)-(12), 3(35).
\69\ Ibid., sec. 3(35)-(36); Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing
Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 17.
\70\ ``Central Organization Department and Central Propaganda
Department Issue `Notice on Initiating the `New Era of Promoting
Patriotic Striving Spirit and Contributing Meritorious Service'
Campaign That Deeply Penetrates the Large Number of Intellectuals' ''
[Zhongyang zuzhi bu zhongyang xuanchuan bu yinfa ``guanyu zai guangda
zhishi fenzi zhong shenru kaizhan `hongyang aiguo fendou jingshen,
jiangong liye xin shidai' huodong de tongzhi''], Xinhua, 31 July 18;
``Circular From Central Organization Department and Central Propaganda
Department Regarding Thoroughly Carrying Out the `New Era of Promoting
Patriotic Striving Spirit and Contributing Meritorious Service'
Activities Among a Wide Range of Intellectuals'' [Zhonggong zhongyang
zuzhi bu zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu zai guangda zhishi
fenzi zhong shenru kaizhan ``hongyang aiguo fendou jingshen, jiangong
liye xin shidai'' huodong de tongzhi], Xinhua, 31 July 18, sec. II(2).
\71\ ``Chinese Communist Party Issues Notice, Intellectuals Must Be
Brainwashed and Patriotic'' [Zhonggong fa tongzhi zhishi fenzi xu
xi'nao aiguo], Radio Free Asia, 2 August 18.
\72\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last
visited 27 March 18.
\73\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies [Zhongggong zhongyang
guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jueding], Xinhua, 4 March
18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18.
\74\ Jiang Jie and Zhu Jichai, ``Account of the National
Supervisory Commission's Creation--Move To Build a System To Strengthen
Supervision Over Party and State'' [Jianquan dang he guojia jiandu tixi
de chuangzhi zhi ju--guojia jiancha weiyuanhui chansheng jishi],
Xinhua, 24 March 18; Nectar Gan, ``Xi Jinping Thought--The Communist
Party's Tighter Grip on China in 16 Characters,'' South China Morning
Post, 25 October 17; ``Chinese Communist Party Amends Constitution To
Create Supervisory Commission, Strengthens Anticorruption Detention
Measures'' [Zhonggong xiuxian she jiancha wei qianghua fanfu juya
cuoshi], Radio Free Asia, 27 February 18. The establishment of the
National Supervisory Commission was done pursuant to the Party's
recommendation. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies [Zhongggong zhongyang
guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige de jueding], Xinhua, 4 March
18; ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18.
\75\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed 20 March 18, art. 15.
\76\ Ma Ling, ``Evaluating Institutional Robustness and Soundness
of People's Congress Through the Establishment of the Supervisory
Commission'' [Cong jiancha weiyuanhui de sheli kan renmin daibiao dahui
zhidu de jianquan he wanshan], Journal of Soochow University, No. 4
(2017), reprinted in Research Centre for Constitutional and
Administrative Law, Calaw.cn Net, 1 December 2017.
\77\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18.
\78\ Dimitar Gueorguiev and Jonathan Stromseth, Brookings
Institution, ``New Chinese Agency Could Undercut Other Anti-Corruption
Efforts,'' Order From Chaos (blog), 6 March 18; Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission, ``Why Do the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory
Commission Work Together?'' [Weishenme zhongyang jiwei yu guojia
jiancha weiyuanhui yao heshu bangong?], 5 February 18; Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory
Commission, ``Introduction of CCDI and NSC's Website'' [Zhongyang jiwei
guojia jianwei wangzhan jianjie], 20 March 18.
\79\ Liang Jun, ``Minister of Supervision Yang Xiaodu: National
Supervisory Commission Led by Party and Supervised by NPC'' [Jianchabu
buzhang yang xiaodu: jiancha wei jieshou dang de lingdao he renda de
jiandu], People's Daily, 5 March 18.
\80\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed 20 March 18, art. 15.
\81\ Dimitar Gueorguiev and Jonathan Stromseth, Brookings
Institution, ``New Chinese Agency Could Undercut Other Anti-Corruption
Efforts,'' Order From Chaos (blog), 6 March 18; ``China's Anti-
Corruption Campaign Expands With New Agency,'' BBC, 20 March 18; Gordon
Watts, ``Behind the Face of China's New Anti-Corruption Boss,'' Asia
Times, 26 March 18; Josephine Ma, ``Revealed: The Far-Reaching Powers
of China's New Super Anticorruption Agency,'' South China Morning Post,
13 March 18.
\82\ ``China's Supervisory Commission Director Yang Xiaodu Oversees
More Than 100 Million People'' [Zhongguo jiancha wei zhuren yang xiaodu
jiandu yiyi duo ren], Voice of America, 18 March 18.
\83\ Amnesty International, ``China: New Supervision Law a Systemic
Threat to Human Rights,'' 20 March 18.
\84\ Flora Sapio, ``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,''
China Information, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), 14-15.
\85\ PRC Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiancha fa],
passed 20 March 18, arts. 22, 43; Ma Shaomeng, ``Investigating Both
Giving and Receipt of Bribe Requires Replacing `Double Designation
(Lianggui)' With Confinement (Liuzhi)'' [Shouhui xinghui yiqi cha biran
yaoqiu yong liuzhi qudai ``lianggui'' cuoshi], Chinese Social Sciences
Net, 14 March 18; Mercator Institute for China Studies, ``China's
National Supervision Commission,'' last visited 8 May 18.
\86\ Samantha Hoffman, ``Managing the State: Social Credit,
Surveillance and the CCP's Plan for China,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 17, No. 11, 17 August 17.
\87\ State Council, ``Social Credit System Construction Program
Outline (2014-2020)'' [Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao
(2014-2020 nian)], 14 June 14; ``China Outlines Its First Social Credit
System,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 27 June 14. For an
unofficial English translation, see ``Planning Outline for the
Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020),'' translated in
China Copyright and Media (blog), 25 April 15.
\88\ State Council, ``Social Credit System Construction Program
Outline (2014-2020)'' [Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao
(2014-2020 nian)], 14 June 14; ``China Outlines Its First Social Credit
System,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 27 June 14; Marieke
Ohlberg et al., ``Central Planning, Local Experiment: The Complex
Implementation of China's Social Credit System,'' Mercator Institute
for China Studies, MERICS China Monitor, 12 December 17, 6; Fokke
Obbema et al., ``China Rates Its Own Citizens--Including Online
Behaviour,'' de Volkskrant, 25 April 15; Celia Hatton, ``China `Social
Credit': Beijing Sets Up Huge System,'' BBC, 26 October 15.
\89\ Rogier Creemers, ``China's Social Credit System: An Evolving
Practice of Control,'' Social Science Research Network, 9 May 18.
\90\ Fokke Obbema et al., ``China Rates Its Own Citizens--Including
Online Behaviour,'' de Volkskrant, 25 April 15; Celia Hatton, ``China
`Social Credit': Beijing Sets Up Huge System,'' BBC, 26 October 15;
Klaus Segbers, ``The Chinese Way--Our Model?'' Freie Universitat,
Center of Global Politics, Global Matters, 8 December 17.
\91\ Mirjam Meissner et al., ``Is Big Data Increasing Beijing's
Capacity for Control?'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 12 August 16; Julie
Makinen, ``China Prepares To Rank Its Citizens on `Social Credit,' ''
Los Angeles Times, 22 November 15; Fokke Obbema et al., ``China Rates
Its Own Citizens--Including Online Behaviour,'' de Volkskrant, 25 April
15; Jeremy Daum, ``China Through a Glass, Darkly,'' China Law Translate
(blog), 24 December 17.
\92\ Marianne von Blomberg, ``The Social Credit System's Greatest
Leap Goes Unnoticed,'' Mapping China, 18 April 18.
\93\ People's Bank of China, ``Public Notice: Table of Information
Regarding Entities Granted Permission To Establish Personal Credit
Service'' [Sheli jingying geren zhengxin yewu de jigou xuke xinxi
gongshi biao], 22 February 18; State Council, Credit Reporting Industry
Management Regulations [Zhengxin ye guanli tiaoli], issued 21 January
13, effective 15 March 13, art. 2; People's Bank of China, ``Credit
Reporting Organization Management Measures'' [Zhenxin jigou guanli
banfa], effective 20 December 13, art. 5; Liu Jingfeng, ``Baihang
Credit Service Opens for Business, Pilot Entities Seek Transformation''
[Baihang zhengxin ruchang yuan shidian jigou qiu zhuanxing], Beijing
News, 31 May 18; Luo Ruixin, ``Baihang Opens for Business, Enters the
First Market-Oriented Personal Data Collection Entity'' [Baihang
zhengxin kaiye shoujia shichanghua geren zhengxin jigou ruchang],
Caijing, 23 May 18.
\94\ People's Bank of China, ``Public Notice Regarding Relevant
Status of Baihang Credit Scoring Limited Liability Company
(Preparatory)'' [Guanyu baihang zhengxin youxian gongsi (chou)
xiangguan qingkuang de gongshi], 4 January 18; Marianne von Blomberg,
``The Social Credit System's Greatest Leap Goes Unnoticed,'' Mapping
China, 18 April 18.
\95\ National Internet Finance Association of China, ``Introduction
to the Association'' [Xiehui jianjie], last visited 3 April 18;
People's Bank of China, ``Public Notice Regarding Relevant Status of
Baihang Credit Scoring Limited Liability Company (Preparatory)''
[Guanyu baihang zhengxin youxian gongsi (chou) xiangguan qingkuang de
gongshi], 4 January 18.
\96\ Song Jie, ``How Did Alibaba and Tencent Give Away Data to
`Credit Network?' '' [Ali tengxun ruhe ba shuju gongxian gei ``xin
lian''?], China Economic Weekly, 5 March 18; Manya Koetse, ``Baihang
and the Eight Personal Credit Programmes: A Credit Leap Forward,''
What's on Weibo, 10 June 18.
\97\ Song Jie, ``How Did Alibaba and Tencent Give Away Data to
`Credit Network' '' [Ali tengxun ruhe ba shuju gongxian gei ``xin
lian''?], China Economic Weekly, 5 March 18.
\98\ Zhang Junbin, ``Enabling the Implementation of Law Is the
Biggest Step Forward'' [Rang falu keyi luodi shi zui zhongda de jinbu],
China Youth Daily, 22 May 18; People's Bank of China, ``Public Notice:
Table of Information Regarding Entities Granted Permission To Establish
Personal Credit Service'' [Sheli jingying geren zhengxin yewu de jigou
xuke xinxi gongshi biao], 22 February 18; ``Customers' Information
Selected by Default, Company of `Alipay Annual Statement Incident'
Called in for Interview'' [Moren gouxuan yonghu xinxi ``zhifubao niandu
zhangdan shijian'' dangshi qiye bei yuetan], Xinhua, 10 January 18; PRC
Law of Standardization [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo biaozhun fa], passed
29 December 88, amended 4 November 17, effective 1 January 18, art. 2.
\99\ ``Customers' Information Selected by Default, Company of
`Alipay Annual Statement Incident' Called in for Interview'' [Moren
gouxuan yonghu xinxi ``zhifubao niandu zhangdan shijian'' dangshi qiye
bei yuetan], Xinhua, 10 January 18; Standardization Administration and
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, ``Information Security Technology--Personal Information
Security Specification'' [Xinxi anquan jishu geren xinxi anquan
guifan], issued 29 December 17, effective 1 May 18. According to Samm
Sacks of the Center for Strategic & International Studies, the
Information Security Technology--Personal Information Security
Specification is meant to provide guidelines for implementing the PRC
Cybersecurity Law. Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, ``New China Data Privacy Standard Looks More Far-Reaching Than
GDPR,'' 29 January 18; Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, ``China's Emerging Data Privacy System and GDPR,'' 9 March 18.
\100\ Zhang Junbin et al., `` `Credit Network' Comes Into
Existence, Data Remains a Difficulty'' [``Xinlian'' luodi nandian
haizai shuju], China Youth Daily, 6 March 18.
\101\ Tracey Xiang, ``ChinaFintech--Consumer Credit Reporting
Agency Baihang Signs up 120+ Data Partners,'' China Tech Biz, 30 June
18.
\102\ Manya Koetse, ``Baihang and the Eight Personal Credit
Programmes: A Credit Leap Forward,'' What's on Weibo, 10 June 18. See
also Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic & International Studies, ``New
China Data Privacy Standard Looks More Far-Reaching Than GDPR,'' 29
January 18.
\103\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 9(4), 14(1), 12; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution
217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 10, 13.
\104\ National Development and Reform Commission et al., Opinion on
Appropriately Restricting Persons Specified To Have Lost Credit in
Serious Ways From Taking the Train Within a Certain Time Period and on
Promoting the Construction of a Social Credit System [Guanyu zai yiding
qixian nei shidang xianzhi teding yanzhong shixinren chengzuo huoche
tuidong shehui xinyong tixi jianshe de yijian], issued 2 March 18,
effective 1 May 18, sec. 4(1).
\105\ National Development and Reform Commission et al., Opinion on
Appropriately Restricting Persons Specified To Have Lost Credit in
Serious Ways From Taking Civilian Aircraft Within a Certain Time Period
and on Promoting the Construction of a Social Credit System [Guanyu zai
yiding qixian nei shidang xianzhi teding yanzhong shixinren chengzuo
minyong hangkongqi tuidong shehui xinyong tixi jianshe de yijian],
issued 2 March 18, effective 1 May 18, sec. 4(1).
\106\ National Development and Reform Commission et al., Opinion on
Appropriately Restricting Persons Specified To Have Lost Credit in
Serious Ways From Taking the Train Within a Certain Time Period and on
Promoting the Construction of a Social Credit System [Guanyu zai yiding
qixian nei shidang xianzhi teding yanzhong shixinren chengzuo huoche
tuidong shehui xinyong tixi jianshe de yijian], issued 2 March 18,
effective 1 May 18, sec. 2(5); National Development and Reform
Commission et al., Opinion on Appropriately Restricting Persons
Specified To Have Lost Credit in Serious Ways From Taking Civilian
Aircraft Within a Certain Time Period and on Promoting the Construction
of a Social Credit System [Guanyu zai yiding qixian nei shidang xianzhi
teding yanzhong shixinren chengzuo minyong hangkongqi tuidong shehui
xinyong tixi jianshe de yijian], issued 2 March 18, effective 1 May 18,
sec. 2(5).
\107\ Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``China's Chilling `Social
Credit' Blacklist,' '' 12 December 17.
\108\ Gong Peijia, ``National Development and Reform Commission
Deputy Director Zhang Yong: People Who Lost Credit and Who Are
Untrustworthy Restricted From Taking Planes and Trains'' [Guojia
fagaiwei fuzhuren zhang yong: shixinzhe laolai xianzhi cheng feiji zuo
huoche], China Times, 6 March 18.
\109\ ``Some Worry That China's Skynet Surveillance Might Infringe
Privacy'' [Zhongguo tianwang jiankong bei you huo qinhai geren yinsi],
Voice of America, 26 September 17.
\110\ ``Public Security Surveillance Systems Stride Toward Internet
High Definition'' [Gong'an jiankong xitong xiang wangluo gaoqing hua
maijin], HC360.com, reprinted in Procuratorate Daily, 1 August 12.
\111\ ``Monitoring You With 20 Million Surveillance Cameras, Has
the Skynet Project Infringed on Privacy?'' [2000 wan shexiangtou kanzhe
ni de tianwang gongcheng qinfan yinsi le ma], China News Service,
reprinted in CCTV, 29 September 17. For more information on ``stability
maintenance,'' see Jason Todd, ``China's Rigid Stability--Yu Jianrong
Analyses a Predicament,'' Australian Centre on China in the World,
China Story, 27 January 13.
\112\ ``Some Worry That China's Skynet Surveillance Might Infringe
Privacy'' [Zhongguo tianwang jiankong bei you huo qinhai geren yinsi],
Voice of America, 26 September 17.
\113\ Chen Lei, ``How To Realize Complete Coverage for Public
Safety Video Surveillance'' [Gonggong anquan shipin jiankong ruhe
shixian quan fugai], Legal Daily, 13 February 18.
\114\ Yang Xueyi, `` `Skynet': Installing a Pair of Sensitive
`Magical Eyes' for Security and Defense Institutions'' [``Tianwang'':
gei anfang zhuang le shuang minrui ``fayan''], Worker's Daily, 23 March
18.
\115\ Party Central Committee and State Council, Opinion on
Implementing Strategy To Rejuvenate Villages [Zhonggong zhongyang
guowuyuan guanyu shishi xiangcun zhenxing zhanlue de yijian], 2 January
18, para. 6(5); Chen Lei, ``How To Realize Complete Coverage for Public
Safety Video Surveillance'' [Gonggong anquan shipin jiankong ruhe
shixian quan fugai], Legal Daily, 13 February 18.
\116\ ``Yicai Research: Artificial Intelligence and Sharp Eyes
Projects Moving Forward Together, Development in This Field Is Speeding
Up!'' [Yicai yan xuan: zhinenghua he xueliang gongcheng shuanglun
qudong, zhege hangye zheng jiasu fazhan!], Yicai, 5 March 18.
\117\ Wenxin Fan et al., ``China Snares Innocent and Guilty Alike
To Build World's Biggest DNA Database,'' Wall Street Journal, 26
December 17.
\118\ Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region
Collects DNA From Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\119\ Wenxin Fan et al., ``China Snares Innocent and Guilty Alike
To Build World's Biggest DNA Database,'' Wall Street Journal, 26
December 17.
\120\ Ibid.
\121\ Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects
DNA From Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\122\ ``Readers' Comments'' [Duzhe pinglun], Caijing, 5 February
18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA From
Millions,'' 13 December 17. Commission staff verified that as of May
11, 2018, the draft legislation that proposes to place certain
restrictions on surveillance systems had not been enacted. Ministry of
Public Security, Public Security Video and Image Data System Management
Regulations (Draft for Solicitation of Public Comments) [``Gonggong
anquan shipin tuxiang xinxi xitong guanli tiaoli (zhengqiu yijian
gao)''], 28 November 16, art. 11. Commission staff further notes that
the lack of an effective law protecting privacy in this context
contradicts a claim made in an official news article. ``Facial
Recognition, AI and Big Data Poised To Boost Chinese Public Safety,''
Global Times, reprinted in People's Daily, 17 October 17.
\123\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General
Comment No. 25: The Right To Participate in Public Affairs, Voting
Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.7, 7 December 96, item 12.
\124\ ``Many People Disappeared or Detained in China on `June
Fourth' Sensitive Day, Internet Control Strengthened'' [``Liusi''
min'ganri zhongguo duoren shilian bei zhua wangkong jiaqiang], Radio
Free Asia, 4 June 18; ``Strict Control on June Fourth Anniversary
Successively Lifted, Two Rights Defenders in Guangdong Continued To Be
Out of Contact'' [Liusi zhounian yankong luxu jiejin guangdong er
weiquan renshi reng shilian], Radio Free Asia, 6 June 18; Rights
Defense Network, ``Dissident Shen Liangqing Summoned by Hefei Police on
Day of June Fourth, Xi'an Police Threatened Ma Xiaoming at His Home''
[Liusi dangri yiyi renshi shen liangqing zao hefei jingfang chuanhuan
ma xiaoming zao xi'an jingfang shangmen weixie], 5 June 18; Rights
Defense Network, ``Rights Defenders in Many Places Illegally Detained,
Summoned, and Have Freedom Restricted on the Eve and Day of June
Fourth'' [Liusi qianxi he dangri duodi weiquan renshi bei dang feifa
jiya, chuanhuan huo bei xianzhi ziyou], 5 June 18.
\125\ Rights Defense Network, ``Rights Defenders in Many Places
Illegally Detained, Summoned, and Have Freedom Restricted on the Eve
and Day of June Fourth'' [Liusi qianxi he dangri duodi weiquan renshi
bei dang feifa jiya, chuanhuan huo bei xianzhi ziyou], 5 June 18.
\126\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Stability Maintenance
During 19th Party Congress, Nanjing Democracy Advocate Wang Jian
Detained on Suspicion of `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble'
Because of Speech, Administratively Detained for 15 Days'' [19 da
weiwen nanjing minzhu renshi wang jian yinyan huozui bei shexian
``xunxin zishi'' xingzheng juliu 15 tian], 20 October 17; ``Creators of
Popular Rights Defense Songs, Xu Lin and Liu Sifang, Successively
Detained'' [Chuangzuo weiquan gequ kuaizhi renkou xu lin he liu sifang
xiangji beizhua], Radio Free Asia, 27 September 17; ``Participant in
Sea Memorial for Liu Xiaobo Detained by `Facial Recognition' '' [Canyu
liu xiaobo haiji renshi yi bei ``renlian shibie'' zao zhuabu], Radio
Free Asia, 22 May 18.
\127\ ``Participant in Sea Memorial for Liu Xiaobo Detained by
`Facial Recognition' '' [Canyu liu xiaobo haiji renshi yi bei ``renlian
shibie'' zao zhuabu], Radio Free Asia, 22 May 18.
\128\ Ibid. For more information on Liu Xiaobo, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-03114.
\129\ Ibid.
\130\ Rights Defense Network, ``The Real Situation of Qin Yongmin's
Trial'' [Qin yongmin an tingshen zhenshi qingkuang], 19 May 18; Rights
Defense Network, ``Qin Yongmin's Indictment'' [Qin yongmin qisushu], 2
July 16; ``Tight Security at Qin Yongmin's Trial, Onlooking Citizens
Escorted Away'' [Qin yongmin an kaiting jiebei senyan weiguan gongmin
bei daizou], Radio Free Asia, 11 May 18. For more information on Qin
Yongmin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
02138.
\131\ Rights Defense Network, ``The Real Situation of Qin Yongmin's
Trial'' [Qin yongmin an tingshen zhenshi qingkuang], 19 May 18; Rights
Defense Network, ``Qin Yongmin's Indictment'' [Qin yongmin qisushu], 2
July 16; ``Over Three Years After Qin Yongmin Was Detained, Trial To Be
Held Friday'' [Qin yongmin bei ya chaoguo san nian zhouwu kai shen],
Radio Free Asia, 8 May 18.
\132\ ``Over Three Years After Qin Yongmin Was Detained, Trial To
Be Held on Friday,'' [Qin yongmin bei ya chaoguo san nian zhouwu kai
shen], Radio Free Asia, 8 May 18.
\133\ Rights Defense Network, ``Wuhan Dissident Qin Yongmin Heavily
Sentenced to 13 Years in Prison'' [Wuhan yiyi renshi qin yongmin zao
zhongpan 13 nian], 11 July 18.
\134\ Rights Defense Network, ``Monthly Report on Detained
Political Prisoners and Prisoners of Conscience in Mainland China (May
31, 2018) Issue No. 32 (Total 761 Persons) (Part 1)'' [Zhongguo dalu
zaiya zhengzhifan, liangxinfan yuedu baogao (2018 nian 5 yue 31 ri) di
32 qi (gong 761 ren) (di 1 bufen)], 31 May 18; Nomaan Merchant, ``China
Detains Editor of Human Rights Website for Subversion,'' Associated
Press, 25 November 16.
\135\ PRC Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and Local
People's Congresses [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao
dahui he difang geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04,
14 March 10, 29 August 15, art. 2.
\136\ See, e.g., Qing Zu, ``Renewing the Scene, Renewing the
Vitality'' [Huanchu xin qixiang huanchu xin huoli], Qinghai Daily, 18
January 18; ``Training Held for Elections for New Village-Level `Two
Committees' Across the Province'' [Quansheng cun ``liang wei'' huan jie
xuanju peixunban juban], Shaanxi Daily, 28 January 18; ``Strengthen
Party's Leadership Throughout the Entire Election Process'' [Ba
jiaqiang dang de lingdao guanchuan huan jie gongzuo quan guocheng],
Henan Daily, 2 April 18.
\137\ ``Local People's Congress Elections in China: Independent
Candidates Face Increasing Difficulties'' [Zhongguo jiceng renda
xuanju: duli houxuanren chujing geng jiannan], Deutsche Welle, 1
February 18.
\138\ See, e.g., ``In Village Leader Election in Laizhou, Shandong,
Former Elected Village Head Detained and Was Unable To Participate in
Election'' [Shandong laizhou cun zhuren xuanju qian minxuan cunzhang
bei ju wufa canxuan], Radio Free Asia, 15 January 18; Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch, ``Wan Xiaoyun, From Qianjiang, Hubei, To Be Released
on Bail Soon, but Indicted by Procuratorate'' [Hubei qianjiang wan
xiaoyun qubao qiman jiangzhi que bei jianchayuan qisu], 15 December 17;
Yao Lifa, Rights Defense Network, ``Independent Candidate From Yongqing
County, Gansu Province, Qu Mingxue Interrogated on Eve of `Two
Sessions' in Beijing'' [Gansu sheng yongjing xian duli houxuanren qu
mingxue zai beijing ``lianghui'' qianxi bei xunwen], 1 March 18; Rights
Defense Network, ``Urgent Attention Needed: Lawyer Yu Wensheng Detained
by Beijing Police This Morning'' [Jinji guanzhu: yu wensheng lushi jin
zao bei beijing jingfang zhuabu], 19 January 18; ``Detained for
Promoting Intraparty Election of General Secretary, Zi Su's Retirement
Payment Cut off'' [Changyi dangnei xuanju zongshuji bei kou zi su zao
tingfa tuixiujin], Radio Free Asia, 8 February 18.
\139\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on 10 December
48, art. 21. Article 21 of the UDHR provides that, ``Everyone has the
right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives . . .. The will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures.''
\140\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25.
\141\ ``In Laizhou, Shandong, Village Leader Election, Former
Elected Village Head Detained and Was Unable To Participate in
Election'' [Shandong laizhou cun zhuren xuanju qian minxuan cunzhang
bei ju wufa canxuan], Radio Free Asia, 15 January 18.
\142\ Ibid.
\143\ State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, amended 22 December 17, effective 1 May 18;
State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of Rules
[Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 16 November 01, amended 22
December 17, effective 1 May 18.
\144\ ``Regulating Red-Letterhead Documents, Opening Up the `Last
Mile' of Rule-Based Government'' [Guifan hongtou wenjian, datong fazhi
zhengfu de ``zuihou yi gongli''], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 19
January 18; Zhang Cong, ``Bringing `Red-Letterhead Documents' More in
Line With Regulations'' [Rang ``hongtou wenjian'' gengjia guifan],
People's Daily, 14 February 18; Zhu Hengshun, ``The Original Intention
of Legislation Is To Rein in `Arbitrary Power' '' [Lifa de benyi zai
yueshu quanli ``renxing''], Xinhua, 12 March 15.
\145\ State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, amended 22 December 17, effective 1 May 18,
arts. 3, 9; State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Rules [Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 16 November 01, amended
22 December 17, effective 1 May 18, art. 3. For a comparison with older
versions of the regulations, see Regulations on the Formulation Process
of Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, effective 1 January 02, art. 3; Regulations on
the Formulation Process of Rules [Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, effective 1 January 02, art. 3.
\146\ State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, amended 22 December 17, effective 1 May 18, art.
13. See also National People's Congress, ``Chapter Four: Local Law or
Autonomous Region Regulations, and Separate Regulations or Rules'' [Di
si zhang difangxing fagui, zizhi tiaoli he danxing tiaoli, guizhang], 1
August 01.
\147\ State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, amended 22 December 17, effective 1 May 18, art.
13; State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of Rules
[Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 16 November 01, amended 22
December 17, effective 1 May 18, art. 3. See also National People's
Congress, ``Chapter Three: Administrative Regulations'' [Di san zhang
xingzheng fagui], 1 August 01.
\148\ State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, amended 22 December 17, effective 1 May 18, art.
13; State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of Rules
[Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 16 November 01, amended 22
December 17, effective 1 May 18, art. 15.
\149\ Shen Kui, ``Participatory Rulemaking in China Needs Even More
Effort,'' Regulatory Review, 9 April 18; Jamie P. Horsley, Brookings
Institution, ``China Implements More Participatory Rulemaking Under
Communist Party,'' 15 March 18.
\150\ State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, amended 22 December 17, effective 1 May 18,
arts. 3, 9; State Council, Regulations on the Formulation Process of
Rules [Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 16 November 01, amended
22 December 17, effective 1 May 18, art. 3. For a comparison with older
versions of the regulations, see Regulations on the Formulation Process
of Administrative Regulations [Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, effective 1 January 02, art. 3, 8; Regulations
on the Formulation Process of Rules [Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli],
issued 16 November 01, effective 1 January 02, art. 3.
\151\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Regulations on
Open Party Affairs of the Chinese Communist Party (Trial) [Zhongguo
gongchandang dangwu gongkai tiaoli (shixing)], effective 20 December
17, art. 8.
\152\ State Council, PRC Open Government Information Regulations
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli], issued 5
April 07, effective 1 May 08, art. 13.
\153\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Regulations on
Open Party Affairs of the Chinese Communist Party (Trial) [Zhongguo
gongchandang dangwu gongkai tiaoli (shixing)], effective 20 December
17, arts. 20-23.
\154\ Ibid., arts. 9-11.
\155\ Gao Bo, ``Holding Corruption by the `Throat' '' [E'zhu fubai
de ``yanhou''], People's Daily, 3 March 15; Dimitar Gueorguiev and
Jonathan Stromseth, Brookings Institution, ``New Chinese Agency Could
Undercut Other Anti-Corruption Efforts,'' Order From Chaos (blog), 6
March 18; Dan Hough, ``Why Has China's Anti-Corruption Rating Barely
Budged Despite Thousands of Arrests?'' South China Morning Post, 23
February 18.
\156\ Jamie P. Horsley, ``The Chinese Communist Party's Experiment
With Transparency,'' The Diplomat, 1 February 18.
\157\ See, e.g., Lily Kuo, ``37,000 Chinese Officials Punished for
`Frugality Code' Breaches,'' Guardian, 31 July 18.
\158\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``CCDI Circular
on Status of Disciplinary Inspection by Discipline and Inspection
Offices Nationwide in 2017'' [Zhongyang jiwei tongbao 2017 nian quanguo
jijian jiancha jiguan jilu shencha qingkuang], 11 January 18.
\159\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``The Propaganda I See on My Morning
Commute,'' New York Times, 28 January 18. See also Transparency
International, ``Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,'' 21 February 18.
\160\ David Skidmore, ``Understanding Chinese President Xi's Anti-
Corruption Campaign,'' The Conversation, 27 October 17.
\161\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Communique of
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's Second Plenary Session
During Chinese Communist Party 19th Party Congress'' [Zhongguo
gongchandang dishijiu jie zhongyang jilu jiancha weiyuanhui di'er ci
quanti huiyi gongbao], 13 January 18.
\162\ ``Express News: Wang Qishan Elected To Become Vice President
of the People's Republic of China'' [Kuaixun: wang qishan dangxuan wei
zhonghua renmin gongheguo fu zhuxi], Xinhua, 17 March 18.
\163\ ``Wang Qishan's Resume'' [Wang qishan jianli], Xinhua, 17
March 18; ``Party's 19th Congress First Plenary Session Approves
Candidates for Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Standing Committee
Members as Selected by CCDI's First Plenary Session, Zhao Leji
Appointed as CCDI Secretary'' [Dang de shijiu jie yizhong quanhui
pizhun le zhongyang jiwei diyi ci quanti huiyi xuanju chansheng shuji,
fushuji he changwu weiyuanhui weiyuan renxuan, zhao leji ren zhongyang
jiwei shuji], Xinhua, 25 October 17.
\164\ Wang Qishan, ``Wang Qishan: Launching a New Era, Beginning a
New Journey'' [Wang qishan: kaiqi xin shidai tashang xin zhengchen],
People's Daily, 7 November 17.
\165\ Ibid.; Nectar Gan, ``China's Graft-Busters Told To Zero in on
Political Loyalty and Discipline,'' South China Morning Post, 13
January 18.
\166\ Dan Hough, ``Why Has China's Anti-Corruption Rating Barely
Budged Despite Thousands of Arrests?'' South China Morning Post, 23
February 18.
\167\ For more information on Liu Yao, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00408.
\168\ Human Rights in China, ``Liu Yao & Wife Lai Wei'e Draft Case
Timelines & Procedural Status,'' 19 March 18.
\169\ Human Rights in China, ``Draft Case Summary of Liu Yao Lawyer
and Whistleblower Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for Exposing
Corruption,'' 19 March 18.
\170\ ``Li Jianxin, Anticorruption Hero in Guangdong, Possibly
Framed, Accused of Extortion and Heavily Sentenced to 11 Years''
[Guangdong fantan xia li jianxin jietan yi zao gouxian bei zhi qiaozha
zhongpan 11 nian], Radio Free Asia, 2 February 18. For more information
on Li Jianxin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2016-00498.
\171\ Ibid.; Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Lin Qilei:
Development in the Case of `Huiyang Oubo' Li Jianxin--Investigation and
Indictment Period Expires Soon'' [Lin qilei lushi: ``huiyang oubo'' li
jian xin anqing jinzhan qingkuang--shencha qisu qixian jijiang jieman],
22 November 16; Rights Defense Network, `` `Huizhou Oubo' Li Jianxin
Indicted After Arrest'' [``Huizhou oubo'' li jianxin bei daibu hou yi
bei qisu], 14 December 16; Zhu Yong, ``Professional Complainant in
Huizhou Suffered Chopped Fingers and Acid Attack, Right Eye Blinded
From Being Hacked'' [Huizhou zhiye jubao ren zao duan zhi po liusuan
you yan bei kan shiming], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 9 July 13.
Commercial Rule
of Law and
Human Rights
Commercial Rule
of Law and
Human Rights
Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights
Introduction
When acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001,\1\ the Chinese government agreed to improve the rule of
law vis-a-vis the commercial sector, committing to
transparency, intellectual property rights enforcement, and the
equal treatment of domestic and foreign firms. During the
Commission's 2018 reporting year, concerns remained regarding
the development of rule of law in these areas, particularly
regarding forced technology transfers and unequal treatment of
foreign firms. The commercial environment in China is further
complicated by the role of the Chinese Communist Party and the
government in commercial enterprises, and reports from this
past year indicate that the Party is attempting to expand its
role in the commercial sector. Moreover, amid what
international human rights organizations describe as worsening
government repression in China,\2\ domestic and international
businesses are increasingly at risk of complicity in human
rights abuses, including the repression of minority groups,
mass data collection, surveillance of citizens, and censorship.
Although the Chinese government requires companies to comply
with domestic laws and regulations that infringe on
internationally recognized rights such as the right to privacy
and freedom of expression, the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights state that businesses have a
responsibility to respect human rights and should seek to avoid
``contributing to adverse human rights impacts . . ..'' \3\
Commercial Rule of Law \4\
TRANSPARENCY
Since China's accession to the WTO, the government has made
progress toward meeting requirements for improving transparency
of trade-related laws, yet still falls short in several key
areas.\5\ In acceding to the WTO, the Chinese government made
commitments to improve transparency, including to publish all
trade-related laws and regulations and translate them into one
of the official WTO languages, and to allow for public comments
on all draft trade-related laws and regulations.\6\ According
to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (European Chamber),
and a legal expert, although the government publishes many
trade-related laws and administrative regulations, the
government has in many cases failed to publish local
regulations and other legal documents such as opinions,
circulars, and subsidy measures.\7\ Furthermore, the government
reportedly has failed to publish translations of many trade-
related laws and regulations.\8\ The central government has
largely met its obligation to allow for public comments on
national laws, yet incomplete implementation of the public
comment system for lower level rules and regulations remains a
barrier to citizen participation and an area of non-compliance
with WTO commitments.\9\
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
This past year, the Commission observed reports of improved
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in some
areas, though concerns remained about IPR infringement,
including forced technology transfers. This past year, USTR,
American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China
(AmCham China), the US-China Business Council, and the European
Chamber reported that the Chinese government had made some
progress in IPR enforcement.\10\ Revisions to the PRC Anti-
Unfair Competition Law, which took effect in January 2018,
reportedly may provide improved protections for trade
secrets.\11\ In March and April 2018, government officials
promised the creation of a system for seeking punitive damages
over IPR infringements.\12\ Nevertheless, USTR and business
groups continued to report deficiencies in the government's
protection and enforcement of IPR.\13\ Specific IPR concerns
this past year included online piracy and copyright
infringement,\14\ as well as forced technology transfers.\15\ A
March 2018 USTR report found that the government uses
restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors of the
economy to force technology transfers through the establishment
of joint ventures with Chinese firms, and that authorities
often demand technology transfers orally or informally to avoid
the appearance of violating international trade
obligations.\16\
EQUAL TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW
This past year, the Chinese government took some steps
toward meeting the WTO requirement for equal treatment of
domestic and foreign companies, yet a significant percentage of
U.S. and German companies reported feeling ``less welcome'' in
China. When it joined the WTO, China committed to ensure non-
discrimination against foreign enterprises in the procurement
of goods and services and enforcement of intellectual property
rights.\17\ In October 2017, several central government
agencies jointly issued a provisional document outlining rules
for implementing a fair competition review system, stating that
government agencies should--with some exceptions \18\--review
all new regulations to ensure that they do not limit market
competition.\19\ In June 2018, the government issued new rules
allowing for increased foreign investment in certain financial
sectors and lifting all restrictions on foreign ownership in
those sectors in 2021.\20\ According to surveys of foreign
businesses published by the American and German chambers of
commerce this past year, 75 percent of American businesses
surveyed and 39.1 percent of German businesses surveyed
reported feeling ``less welcome in China than before,'' while
54.7 percent of German businesses surveyed reported the
situation had not changed.\21\
Reports continued to emerge this past year of the favorable
treatment of domestic firms over foreign firms through the
blocking of foreign websites and other formal restrictions on
foreign firms. This past year, the government reportedly
blocked websites including Facebook, Twitter, and many of
Google's services using censorship filters often referred to as
the ``Great Firewall.'' \22\ In November 2017, many application
(app) stores in China reportedly removed Skype for download
from their stores, though Skype itself remained accessible at
that time.\23\ Although some internet users in China--foreign
firms in particular--have relied on virtual private networks
(VPNs) to circumvent government internet restrictions,\24\ in
January 2017, the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology announced that starting March 31, 2018, only
government-approved VPNs would be allowed.\25\ Although app
stores in China removed hundreds of VPNs,\26\ initial reports
following the March 31, 2018, deadline suggested that some
private VPNs remained accessible.\27\ [For more information on
censorship in China, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.] In
addition, the government continued to enforce quotas on foreign
films, and as of July 2018, talks between U.S. and Chinese
officials to raise the quota on U.S. films reportedly had
stalled.\28\
In addition to formal restrictions on foreign firms, the
Commission observed reports of other forms of preferential
treatment, both of domestic firms and of government- or Party-
connected firms. USTR, AmCham China, and the European Chamber
reported that foreign firms face unequal treatment in the
issuing of licenses and enforcement of regulations.\29\ State-
owned enterprises in China reportedly receive favorable
treatment in obtaining loans from government-controlled banks,
which has put both foreign and private domestic firms at a
disadvantage.\30\ According to the international non-
governmental organization Freedom House, regulators and courts
in China treat private firms with informal ties to the
government and Party favorably compared to firms without such
connections.\31\
Role of the Chinese Communist Party and Government in the Commercial
Sector
The Chinese Communist Party and government maintain a role
in most enterprises that operate in mainland China, whether
they are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), domestic private
firms, foreign firms, or joint ventures. The PRC Company Law
and the Chinese Communist Party Constitution require any firm
with three or more Party members to allow the Party to
establish a Party group within that firm.\32\ According to
government data, as of the end of 2016, 93.2 percent of SOEs
and 67.9 percent of private enterprises had Party groups, as
did 70 percent of foreign-invested enterprises.\33\ In addition
to Party groups,\34\ many firms have a branch of the Party-led
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) on site.\35\ [For
more information on the ACFTU, see Section II--Worker Rights.]
Within a typical SOE, company executives are also members of
the SOE's Party committee,\36\ and Party committee members
serve on the board of directors.\37\ Scholar Yasheng Huang \38\
noted that state control in sectors of China's economy such as
finance is another mechanism through which the government can
exert power over the private sector.\39\ Private investors and
firms also invest in SOEs; \40\ Director Xiao Yaqing of the
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
said in April 2018 that over 60 percent of SOEs had mixed
ownership.\41\ Moreover, many executives of private firms in
China are reportedly also members of Party-led organizations or
delegates to China's legislature.\42\ In addition to these
formal ties, Party and government officials have long
maintained informal and often corrupt ties to the private
sector.\43\ [For more information on the relationship between
the Communist Party and the government, see Section III--
Institutions of Democratic Governance.]
Reports from this past year indicate that the Party and
government are attempting to expand their roles in commercial
enterprises. In October 2017, the Party amended its
constitution to stipulate that Party committees play a
``leading role'' in the decisionmaking of SOEs.\44\ This
followed reports of dozens of SOEs amending their articles of
incorporation in the summer of 2017 to strengthen the role of
the Party within their enterprises.\45\ The European Chamber
and international media reported this past year that multiple
SOEs engaged in joint ventures with foreign companies had
proposed granting internal Party groups a greater
decisionmaking role within those joint ventures.\46\ In June
2018, the China Securities Regulatory Commission proposed
revisions to stock market guidelines that would require all
listed companies to establish Party groups.\47\ In addition, in
October 2017, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Chinese
news app Yidian Zixun had allowed the government to purchase
shares in the firm in order to obtain licenses for online
content distribution.\48\ The government is also reportedly
exploring purchasing stakes in major technology firms including
Alibaba and Tencent.\49\
Human Rights and the Commercial Sector
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Role of Commercial Firms in Domestic Security in Xinjiang
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year, companies provided a wide range of equipment and
services to the government in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), despite reports of the suppression of ethnic and religious
minorities. International human rights organizations report that human
rights abuses in the XUAR are widespread, including severe restrictions
on freedom of religion \50\ and the internment of hundreds of thousands
to as many as 1.1 million individuals belonging to Muslim ethnic
minority groups in a network of extrajudicial ``political reeducation''
centers or camps.\51\ In an analysis for the Jamestown Foundation,
scholar Adrian Zenz documented a 92.8 percent increase in domestic
security spending in the XUAR from 2016 to 2017.\52\ The same scholar
analyzed procurement documents from local governments in the XUAR and
found bids for the construction and operation of ``political
reeducation'' camps, including the purchases of surveillance equipment,
furniture, and food delivery services.\53\ In one example, the
government of Hotan (Hetian) city, Hotan prefecture, planned to
purchase 900 specially designed smart phones from the state-owned China
Telecom \54\ for use in ``political reeducation'' centers.\55\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Role of Commercial Firms in Domestic Security in Xinjiang--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a report in Foreign Policy, since 2016, the XUAR
government has awarded contracts worth over US$1 billion to two of the
world's largest security camera manufacturers,\56\ Chinese companies
Hikvision and Dahua Technology for surveillance projects in the
XUAR.\57\ In the spring of 2018, international media reported that the
international security services company Frontier Services Group had
partnered with the state-owned enterprise CITIC Group to invest in the
Beijing municipality-based International Security Defense College.\58\
According to the school's website, it specializes in counterterrorism
and other security training courses for Chinese military, police,
private security firms, and the general public.\59\ The school's
founder told the Washington Post that it was building a branch in the
XUAR to train military and police personnel in the region.\60\ [For
more information on human rights abuses in the XUAR, see Section IV--
Xinjiang.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMERCIAL FIRMS' COMPLIANCE WITH DOMESTIC LAW RAISES PRIVACY CONCERNS
Human rights groups warn that Chinese laws allow for
collection of personal data from commercial firms without
adequately protecting individuals' internationally recognized
right to privacy.\61\ The PRC Cybersecurity Law took effect on
June 1, 2017, requiring companies to store user data inside
mainland China.\62\ The law provides some privacy protections,
such as requiring businesses to obtain user consent before
collecting data,\63\ though the law does not define
consent.\64\ The Information Security Technology--Personal
Information Security Specification,\65\ effective May 1, 2018,
also requires consent to collect individual data,\66\ but
provides eleven exemptions to this requirement,\67\ including
when such information is ``directly relevant to public
security, public health, or significant public interest.'' \68\
The PRC Cybersecurity Law further requires companies to provide
technical support to authorities that are conducting criminal
investigations or ``protecting state security,'' \69\ without
specifying what such technical support entails.\70\ An expert
in Chinese law noted that ``police have broad powers to collect
evidence'' from companies without judicial review,\71\ and
international human rights groups warned that Chinese laws
governing authorities' collection of data do not adequately
protect individuals' privacy rights.\72\ The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provide for the right to
privacy.\73\
Despite these privacy concerns, reports from this past year
indicate that international companies are increasingly storing
Chinese user data inside mainland China to comply with the PRC
Cybersecurity Law. In February 2018, Apple transferred
operations of iCloud services for mainland Chinese accounts to
the state-owned Chinese firm Guizhou-Cloud Big Data.\74\ Apple
notified Chinese users of the change and allowed them to opt
out of using iCloud services.\75\ Amnesty International warned
that ``Chinese authorities now have potentially unfettered
access to all Apple's Chinese customers' iCloud data.'' \76\
Even prior to passage of the Cybersecurity Law, Microsoft,
Amazon, and IBM reportedly had partnered with local Chinese
firms on cloud services in China starting in 2013.\77\ Chinese
companies such as Alibaba and Tencent also collect large
amounts of data from their users.\78\ It is unclear how much
data these companies share with authorities, but reports from
international news media indicate that domestic technology
firms work closely with police and other government
authorities.\79\
In one example of how company data may be used by police, a
November 2017 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report described the
``Police Cloud'' (jing wu yun) system, which the Ministry of
Public Security is developing to collect large amounts of data
in order to surveil targeted individuals or groups of
concern.\80\ Police in one locality reportedly purchased
company data from third parties such as e-commerce
companies,\81\ and police in another locality reportedly plan
to collect usernames, IP addresses, and package delivery
information.\82\ According to HRW, the Police Cloud system will
target groups seen as a threat to stability, including
petitioners seeking redress from the government and ethnic
minority groups,\83\ potentially violating rights to the
presumption of innocence and freedom of association.\84\
ROLE OF COMMERCIAL FIRMS IN THE COLLECTION OF BIOMETRIC DATA
Government and companies' large-scale collection of data in
China includes the collection of biometric data such as faces,
voice samples, and DNA, and raises concerns regarding the
potential targeting of rights advocates and compliance with
international standards protecting the right to privacy. In
October 2017, HRW reported that national police databases
contained over 1 billion faces and over 40 million DNA samples,
and that the Ministry of Public Security began construction of
a national voice recognition database in 2012.\85\ HRW further
reported that police in Anhui province and the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) purchased voice pattern collection
systems from the Anhui province-based technology company
iFLYTEK, which provides speech recognition and text-to-speech
applications (apps) for millions of mobile phones in China,\86\
and XUAR security personnel reportedly procured DNA sequencers
from the U.S.-based firm Thermo Fisher Scientific.\87\ The PRC
Criminal Procedure Law allows police to collect biometric data
including fingerprints, urine, and blood samples from anyone
suspected of committing a crime.\88\ Human rights organizations
reported, however, that the Chinese government has brought
criminal cases against individuals such as lawyers,
journalists, human rights advocates, and religious believers
for exercising their internationally recognized human
rights.\89\ Moreover, reports this past year indicate that DNA
collection is not limited to criminal suspects.\90\ For
example, in the XUAR, authorities have reportedly been
collecting DNA samples and other biometric data from all
residents aged 12 to 65.\91\ According to HRW, the collection
of biometric data should be ``comprehensively regulated'' and
``narrow in scope'' in order to comply with international
standards protecting the right to privacy.\92\
ROLE OF COMMERCIAL FIRMS IN THE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
continued to work with Chinese companies to develop and
implement a social credit system that aims to aggregate and
monitor the data that the government and companies collect,
which some observers warned could increase the government's
capacity for social control. In 2014, the State Council
released an outline for the creation of a national social
credit system by 2020 to measure and improve the credibility of
government agencies, organizations, and individuals.\93\
Scholars describe the social credit system as an ambitious
project that will aggregate and monitor the large amounts of
data that the state and companies collect on citizens in order
to guide citizens' behavior through the use of incentives.\94\
The government has reportedly worked with Chinese companies on
the technology needed to implement the program.\95\ In February
2018, the People's Bank of China formally approved the first
nationwide credit-scoring company, Baihang Credit Scoring,
which is a joint venture between a state- and Party-organized
entity and eight Chinese technology firms.\96\ Although the
social credit system remained in the pilot stage this past
year,\97\ human rights experts and other observers warned the
system could be used to further tighten government control over
citizens.\98\
ROLE OF COMMERCIAL FIRMS IN THE EXPANSION OF SURVEILLANCE NETWORKS
Chinese security authorities are working with companies not
only to collect and monitor individuals' data, but also to
integrate improved technology into China's expanding network of
surveillance cameras, as human rights advocates raised concerns
over the government's use of surveillance to target rights
advocates and ethnic minorities. For example, the Chinese
company Megvii makes software for commercial photo apps while
also providing facial recognition software that the company
claims has helped police make 4,000 arrests since the beginning
of 2016.\99\ Major Chinese technology companies Alibaba and
Tencent also reportedly work with Chinese authorities to equip
Chinese cities with surveillance technology.\100\ The state-
owned technology firm Aebell is developing a nationwide system
called ``Sharp Eyes,'' which would link surveillance cameras
installed in rural areas to individuals' televisions and smart
phones, allowing individuals to assist authorities in
monitoring their villages.\101\ The Party-run news outlet Legal
Daily reported that by the end of 2017, authorities in Sichuan
province had completed Sharp Eyes projects in 14,087 villages,
installing 41,695 new surveillance cameras.\102\ The consulting
firm IHS Markit predicted China would account for 46 percent of
the global video surveillance market in 2018.\103\ Discussing
possible privacy concerns, the Chief Executive Officer of the
Chinese company LLVision--which created glasses that Beijing
police have tested that can match faces to a database of
suspects in real time--told Reuters, ``We trust the
government.'' \104\ Human rights advocates reported, however,
that the government has used surveillance to target political
dissidents and ethnic minority groups.\105\ [For more
information on government surveillance, see Section III--
Institutions of Democratic Governance.]
ROLE OF COMMERCIAL FIRMS IN INTERNET CENSORSHIP
The Chinese government continued to restrict freedom of
expression online by blocking and censoring content. Freedom
House called China ``the world's worst abuser of internet
freedom,'' \106\ and international human rights organizations
have documented ongoing and increasing censorship this past
year, particularly censorship of online content.\107\ The
Chinese government is able to censor online speech both by
preemptively blocking content and by censoring content after it
appears online.\108\ Moreover, the government has detained
social media users, bloggers, and the founders of rights
advocacy websites in connection with their online speech.\109\
[For more information, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
In addition to blocking or censoring content, Chinese
authorities require companies to monitor content on their
websites and apps, and in several cases this past year,
authorities threatened or punished companies over online
content. The PRC Cybersecurity Law requires companies to
monitor content their customers create or share, censor content
that violates laws and regulations, and report such content to
authorities.\110\ For example, in late September 2017, the
Cyberspace Administration of China fined technology companies
Sina, Tencent, and Baidu for violating the Cybersecurity Law
over content its users shared, which reportedly included
political content.\111\ In January 2018, the Shanghai
Cyberspace Administration forced the U.S.-based hotel chain
Marriott to take its websites and apps in China offline for a
week after it sent an email to Chinese customers that listed
Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan as countries.\112\ The
company quickly issued a public apology and an eight-point
``rectification plan.'' \113\ Radio Free Asia reported in March
that the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office would not permit
the screening of Taiwanese films in China if those films
featured actors who had voiced support for Taiwan
independence.\114\ In April, the State Administration of Radio
and Television (SART) criticized a popular news app and a video
app, both owned by the China-based company Bytedance (Jinri
Toutiao), for ``violating social morality''; those apps, and
several other popular news and video apps, temporarily
disappeared from app stores.\115\ SART then ordered Bytedance
to permanently close a popular joke-sharing app, calling the
app ``vulgar.'' \116\ Although the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights--which China has signed and
committed to ratify \117\--allows governments to limit freedom
of expression for the protection of ``morals,'' \118\ the
Chinese government has in the past used campaigns against
pornography and other ``unlawful information'' to restrict the
legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.\119\
Faced with the possibility of lost revenue and other forms
of punishment, both domestic and international companies
engaged in self-censorship. After authorities took disciplinary
action against them, domestic technology companies Kuaishou and
Bytedance reportedly announced plans to expand the number of
employees who monitor and censor content on their
platforms.\120\ In October 2017, the German academic publishing
company Springer Nature agreed to censor its journal articles
in mainland China.\121\ In congressional testimony in March,
one media scholar described how film industry executives
outside mainland China have invited Chinese content regulators
to speak at conferences to provide guidance on how to create
content that Chinese censors will allow.\122\ The Chinese
microblog Weibo announced that in May 2018 it had blocked or
deleted 141,000 posts containing ``harmful information about
current politics.'' \123\ Weibo also closed or limited
functionality for 5,450 accounts for sharing ``harmful''
political information, an increase of 355 percent from
April.\124\ In the summer of 2018, dozens of international
airline companies reportedly changed their international
websites to comply with Chinese government demands to remove
references to Taiwan as a country.\125\ Reports emerged in
August 2018 that Google was developing a censored search app
for the Chinese market.\126\
Commercial Rule
of Law and
Human Rights
Commercial Rule
of Law and
Human Rights
Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights
\1\ World Trade Organization, ``Protocols of Accession for New
Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods and Services,'' last
visited 28 April 18. China became a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001. A list of members and their
dates of membership is available on the WTO website.
\2\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last
visited 16 April 18; Human Rights Watch, ``Submission to the Universal
Periodic Review of China,'' 29 March 18; Amnesty International, ``China
2017/2018,'' last visited 3 September 18.
\3\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations ``Protect, Respect and Remedy'' Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, 16
June 11, principle 13.
\4\ This subsection analyzes the Chinese government's compliance
with its World Trade Organization commitments vis-a-vis the rule of
law. For in-depth analyses of the U.S.-China trade relationship, market
access for U.S. businesses in China, and recent WTO disputes involving
the United States and China, see U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2017 Annual Report, 15 November 17, chap. 1, secs.
1, 3.
\5\ See, e.g., Henry Gao, ``The WTO Transparency Obligations and
China,'' Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (5 March 18), 1,
13, 19-22; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 23-24; European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``European Business in China
Position Paper 2017/2018,'' 19 September 17, 126.
\6\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(C)1-3;
World Trade Organization, ``Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China,'' WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 01, paras. 334-35;
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), 30 October 47, art.
X; U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``World Trade Organization:
Analysis of China's Commitments to Other Members,'' GAO-03-4, October
2002, 31; Henry Gao, ``The WTO Transparency Obligations and China,''
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (5 March 18), 1, 3, 13, 19-
22.
\7\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 23-24; European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``European Business in China
Position Paper 2017/2018,'' 19 September 17, 126; Henry Gao, ``The WTO
Transparency Obligations and China,'' Journal of Comparative Law, Vol.
12, No. 2 (5 March 18), 14-15.
\8\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 138; Henry Gao,
``The WTO Transparency Obligations and China,'' Journal of Comparative
Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (5 March 18), 19-20, 22.
\9\ Henry Gao, ``The WTO Transparency Obligations and China,''
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (5 March 18), 15-18; Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to Congress on China's
WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 24; European Union Chamber of Commerce
in China, ``European Business in China Position Paper 2017/2018,'' 19
September 17, 126.
\10\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 18; American
Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China and Bain &
Company, ``2018 China Business Climate Survey Report,'' January 2018,
46; US-China Business Council, ``2017 Member Survey,'' 6 December 17,
10; European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``European Business in
China Position Paper 2017/2018,'' 19 September 17, 86.
\11\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 16-17. See also PRC
Anti-Unfair Competition Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan buzhengdang
jingzheng fa], passed 2 September 93, amended 4 November 17, effective
1 January 18.
\12\ Mark Cohen, ``Updates March 6-12, 2018,'' China IPR (blog), 14
March 18; ``Interview: China Calls for Better Protection for Chinese
IPR,'' Xinhua, 12 April 18; State Council, ``Government Work Report''
[Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 5 March 18, sec. 3(3).
\13\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 16-17; US-China
Business Council, ``2017 Member Survey,'' 6 December 17, 10; American
Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China and Bain &
Company, ``2018 China Business Climate Survey Report,'' January 2018,
41; European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``European Business in
China Position Paper 2017/2018,'' 19 September 17, 37; German Chamber
of Commerce in China, ``German Business in China: Business Confidence
Survey 2017/18,'' 16 November 17, 20, 22, 24, 33.
\14\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 18; European Union
Chamber of Commerce in China, ``European Business in China Position
Paper 2017/2018,'' 19 September 17, 89-90. For specific examples of
online copyright infringement, see Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, ``2017 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets,''
January 2018, 13-14, 20-22, 24.
\15\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 3; US-China
Business Council, ``2017 Member Survey,'' 6 December 17, 9; Julia
Horowitz, ``Why Tech Secrets, Not Steel, Could Cause the Real Clash
Between the U.S. and China,'' CNN, 21 February 18.
\16\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Findings of the
Investigation Into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,'' 22 March 18, 19-20, 22.
\17\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(A)(2),
3.
\18\ National Development and Reform Commission et al., Fair
Competition Review System Implementing Rules (Provisional) [Gongping
jingzheng shencha zhidu shishi xize (zhanxing)], issued 23 October 17,
art. 18. See also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017
Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 143.
\19\ National Development and Reform Commission et al., Fair
Competition Review System Implementing Rules (Provisional) [Gongping
jingzheng shencha zhidu shishi xize (zhanxing)], issued 23 October 17,
art. 2; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 143.
\20\ National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of
Commerce, Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access
(Negative List) (2018 Edition) [Waishang touzi zhunru tebie guanli
cuoshi (fumian qingdan) (2018 nian ban)], issued 28 June 18, effective
28 July 18, 4; Issaku Harada, ``China To Abolish Foreign Ownership Caps
in Finance in 2021,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 30 June 18; Dorcas Wong,
``How To Read China's 2018 Negative List,'' Dezan Shira & Associates,
China Briefing (blog), 7 July 18.
\21\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China
and Bain & Company, ``2018 China Business Climate Survey Report,''
January 2018, 39; German Chamber of Commerce in China, ``German
Business in China: Business Confidence Survey 2017/18,'' 16 November
17, 17. Note that the AmCham China survey asked only if businesses felt
``more'' or ``less welcome,'' while the German Chamber survey had an
additional option of ``unchanged.''
\22\ Jorg Brunsmann, ``Internet in China--No More Safe Havens? ''
Deutsche Welle, 1 February 18; Paul Mozur, ``Skype Vanishes From App
Stores in China, Including Apple's,'' New York Times, 21 November 17;
Lucy Hornby, ``China's VPN Crackdown Is About Money as Much as
Censorship,'' Financial Times, 22 January 18; Eva Pils, Human Rights in
China (Medford: Polity Press, 2018), 89-90.
\23\ Paul Mozur, ``Skype Vanishes From App Stores in China,
Including Apple's,'' New York Times, 21 November 17; ``Skype Removed
From China Apple and Android App Stores,'' BBC, 22 November 17.
\24\ Josephine Wolff, ``The Internet Censor's Dilemma,'' Slate, 5
March 18; ``China's Great Firewall Is Rising,'' Economist, 4 January
18; Coco Liu, ``Guess What Chinese Travellers Are Bringing Back Home?
VPNs, Lots of Them,'' South China Morning Post, 6 October 17.
\25\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Circular on
Rectifying and Regulating Internet Service Provider Markets [Gongye he
xinxihua bu guanyu qingli guifan hulianwang wangluo jieru fuwu shichang
de tongzhi], issued 22 January 17, preamble, 2(2)4; Jorg Brunsmann,
``Internet in China--No More Safe Havens? '' Deutsche Welle, 1 February
18; Lucy Hornby, ``China's VPN Crackdown Is About Money as Much as
Censorship,'' Financial Times, 22 January 18.
\26\ ``Timeline: Under Xi, Five Years of Tighter Controls Across
Chinese Society,'' Reuters, 16 October 17; Letter from Cynthia C.
Hogan, Vice President for Public Policy, Americas, Apple, to U.S.
Senators Ted Cruz and Patrick Leahy, 21 November 17; Oiwan Lam and Jack
Hu, ``China's Great Firewall Grows Ever-Stronger as Virtual Private
Networks Disappear,'' Global Voices, 27 June 17.
\27\ Asha McLean, ``VPNs Can Still Be Used in China Despite March
31 Ban,'' ZDNet, 5 April 18; Ralph Jennings, ``How To Surf China's
Internet Freely Despite the Latest Ban,'' Forbes, 23 April 18.
\28\ Brent Lang and Patrick Frater, ``China Film Quota Talks Could
Be a Casualty in Trump's Trade War,'' Variety, 29 March 18; Pei Li and
Michael Martina, ``Hollywood's China Dreams Get Tangled in Trade
Talks,'' Reuters, 19 May 18; ``Hollywood Braces for Collateral Damage
From Trade War With China,'' Bloomberg, 19 July 18.
\29\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 19, 142; European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``European Business in China
Position Paper 2017/2018,'' 19 September 17, 168, 373; American Chamber
of Commerce in the People's Republic of China and Bain & Company,
``2018 China Business Climate Survey Report,'' January 2018, 40, 44.
\30\ Eric Ng, ``China Must Shrink State-Owned Enterprises if It
Wants Reforms To Succeed, Says Former WTO Chief,'' South China Morning
Post, 11 April 18; Ke Baili, ``IMF Sounds Warning to China Over Loans
to Unprofitable Firms,'' Caixin, 10 April 18; Benn Steil and Benjamin
Della Rocca, ``China Is Heaping Debt on Its Least Productive
Companies,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Geo-Graphics (blog), 11
January 18.
\31\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last
visited 16 April 18. See also Richard McGregor, ``China Takes On Its
New Tycoons,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 October 17; Minxin Pei, China's
Crony Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016).
\32\ PRC Company Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa], passed
29 December 93, amended 25 December 99, 28 August 04, 27 October 05, 28
December 13, effective 1 March 14, art. 19; Chinese Communist Party
Constitution [Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng], adopted 6 September
82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November
02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, 24 October 17, art. 30. See also AHK
Greater China, ``Press Statement: Increasing Business Challenges--
Delegations of German Industry & Commerce in China Concerned About
Growing Influence of Chinese Communist Party on Foreign Business
Operations,'' 24 November 17.
\33\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, `` `Strengthen
Party Building Work and Comprehensively Enforce Strict Party
Discipline' Full Text of Press Reception'' [``Jiaqiang dangjian gongzuo
he quanmian cong yan zhi dang'' jizhe zhaodai hui quanwen shilu], 19
October 17; ``How To Succeed in China? Communist Party Groups in Your
Company,'' Bloomberg, 19 October 17. Note that foreign-invested
(waishang) enterprises are a subset of private (feigong) enterprises.
For an explanation of the different types of enterprises in China, see
National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Regulations on Statistical
Differentiation of Components of the Economy'' [Guanyu tongji shang
huafen jingji chengfen de guiding], 10 October 01.
\34\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, `` `Strengthen
Party Building Work and Comprehensively Enforce Strict Party
Discipline' Full Text of Press Reception'' [``Jiaqiang dangjian gongzuo
he quanmian cong yan zhi dang'' jizhe zhaodai hui quanwen shilu], 19
October 17; Simon Denyer, ``Command and Control: China's Communist
Party Extends Reach Into Foreign Companies,'' Washington Post, 28
January 18; AHK Greater China, ``Press Statement: Increasing Business
Challenges--Delegations of German Industry & Commerce in China
Concerned About Growing Influence of Chinese Communist Party on Foreign
Business Operations,'' 24 November 17.
\35\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2018, 147; Lucy Hornby,
``Communist Party Asserts Control Over China Inc,'' Financial Times, 3
October 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``Employment and Wages,'' June 2018.
See also Samuel Wrest, ``Evaluating Trade Union Law and Collective
Bargaining in China: Key Considerations for Foreign Firms,'' Dezan
Shira & Associates, China Briefing (blog), 8 March 17. Chinese
Communist Party Constitution [Gongchandang zhangcheng], adopted 6
September 82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14
November 02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, 24 October 17, art. 33. The
Party Constitution states that Party groups shall lead unions within
private enterprises.
\36\ Houze Song, ``State-Owned Enterprise Reforms: Untangling
Ownership, Control, and Corporate Governance,'' University of Chicago,
Paulson Institute, MacroPolo, December 2017.
\37\ Ibid.; Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, ``Will Party Control Reign in
China's Rogue SOEs? '' East Asia Forum, 27 February 18. For information
on the evolution of Chinese Communist Party involvement in state-owned
enterprises in the 1990s and 2000s, see Richard McGregor, ``China Inc.:
The Party and Business,'' in The Party: The Secret World of China's
Communist Rulers (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 34-69.
\38\ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of
Management, ``Faculty & Research--Yasheng Huang,'' last visited 20
April 18.
\39\ Richard McGregor, ``China Takes On Its New Tycoons,'' Wall
Street Journal, 13 October 17.
\40\ ``China's Companies on Notice: State Preparing To Take
Stakes,'' Bloomberg, 17 January 18; Xie Yu, ``Beijing's Rescue Fund To
Shift Investments to Private Companies Now That It's Saved State
Giants,'' South China Morning Post, 20 October 17; Henny Sender,
``China's State-Owned Business Reform a Step in the Wrong Direction,''
Financial Times, 26 September 17.
\41\ Xu Zhao, ``Enterprises' `Going Out' Mergers and Acquisitions
May Not Mean 100 Percent Controlling Shares'' [Qiye ``zou chuqu''
binggou bu yiding 100% kong gu], China Securities Journal, 12 April 18;
Eric Ng, ``China Must Shrink State-Owned Enterprises if It Wants
Reforms To Succeed, Says Former WTO Chief,'' South China Morning Post,
11 April 18.
\42\ Rogier Creemers et al., ``Translation: China Federation of
Internet Societies Launches With Call for Unified Action,'' New
America, DigiChina (blog), 11 May 18; Mara Hvistendahl, ``Inside
China's Vast New Experiment in Social Ranking,'' Wired, 14 December 17;
Richard McGregor, ``China Takes On Its New Tycoons,'' Wall Street
Journal, 13 October 17; Shunsuke Tabeta, ``Internet Executives Well
Represented at China's National Congress,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 7
March 18.
\43\ Sebastian Heilmann, ``How the CCP Embraces and Co-Opts China's
Private Sector,'' Mercator Institute for China Studies, MERICS Blog--
European Voices on China, 21 November 17; Richard McGregor, ``China
Takes On Its New Tycoons,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 October 17. For
more information on the opaque ties between Party and government
officials and the private sector, see Bruce J. Dickson, Wealth Into
Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 22-27; Minxin Pei,
China's Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2016). Pei's book describes the mechanisms
through which the political and business elites in China collude for
personal gain. See in particular pages 21, 78-79, 116-17, 119-122, 126-
28, and 146-47.
\44\ Chinese Communist Party Constitution [Zhongguo gongchandang
zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November 87, 18 October
92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14 November 12, 24
October 17, art. 33; Houze Song, ``State-Owned Enterprise Reforms:
Untangling Ownership, Control, and Corporate Governance,'' University
of Chicago, Paulson Institute, MacroPolo, December 2017.
\45\ Alexandra Stevenson, ``China's Communists Rewrite the Rules
for Foreign Businesses,'' New York Times, 13 April 18; Jennifer Hughes,
``China's Communist Party Writes Itself Into Company Law,'' Financial
Times, 14 August 17.
\46\ European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``Chamber Stance
on the Governance of Joint Ventures and the Role of Party
Organisations,'' 3 November 17; Simon Denyer, ``Command and Control:
China's Communist Party Extends Reach Into Foreign Companies,''
Washington Post, 28 January 18; Alexandra Stevenson, ``China's
Communists Rewrite the Rules for Foreign Businesses,'' New York Times,
13 April 18.
\47\ China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guidelines Governing
Listed Companies (Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shangshi gongsi
zhili zhunze (zhengqiu yijian gao)], 15 June 18, art. 5; ``Proposed
Chinese Rule Change Seen as `Step Backward,' '' Taipei Times, 18 June
18.
\48\ Li Yuan, ``Beijing Pushes for a Direct Hand in China's Big
Tech Firms,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 October 17.
\49\ Ibid.; Richard McGregor, ``China Takes On Its New Tycoons,''
Wall Street Journal, 13 October 17.
\50\ See, e.g., Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--
China,'' last visited 16 April 18; Human Rights in China, ``Stakeholder
Submission by Human Rights in China,'' March 2018, para. 3. See also
``Chinese Police Order Xinjiang's Muslims To Hand in All Copies of the
Quran,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 September 17. For relevant international
standards protecting freedom of religion, see Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution
217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 17
July 18. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR.
\51\ Rian Thum et al., ``How Should the World Respond to
Intensifying Repression in Xinjiang? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 4 June
18; ``Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs `Wanting To Travel Abroad,'
'' Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and
Equal Rights Initiative, ``China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other
Ethnic Minorities Forced Into Re-Education Programs,'' 3 August 18.
\52\ Adrian Zenz, ``China's Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis
of Available Data,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue
4, 12 March 18.
\53\ Adrian Zenz, `` `Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward a Healthy
Heart Attitude'--China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,''
Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 19-25.
\54\ China Telecom, ``Company Overview'' [Gongsi gaikuang], last
visited 7 June 18.
\55\ Adrian Zenz, `` `Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward a Healthy
Heart Attitude'--China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,''
Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 10, 23.
\56\ Charles Rollet, ``In China's Far West, Companies Cash In on
Surveillance Program That Targets Muslims,'' Foreign Policy, 13 June
18; ``Security.World's Top 10 Vertical Leaders ,'' Security.World, last
visited 14 June 18; ``Global Video Surveillance Market Report 2018:
Market Is Expected To Reach an Estimated $39.3 Billion by 2023--
ResearchAndMarkets.com,'' Business Wire, 14 February 18; ``Global Video
Surveillance Market 2017 Analysis, Segmentation, Competitors Analysis,
Product Research, Trends and Forecast by 2022,'' Reuters, 15 June 17;
Ron Alalouff, ``The Spectacular Rise of the Chinese Video Surveillance
Industry,'' IFSEC Global, 7 March 18.
\57\ Charles Rollet, ``In China's Far West, Companies Cash In on
Surveillance Program That Targets Muslims,'' Foreign Policy, 13 June
18; Charles Rollet, ``Dahua and Hikvision Win Over $1 Billion in
Government-Backed Projects in Xinjiang,'' IVPM, 23 April 18.
\58\ Marc Fisher et al., ``Behind Erik Prince's China Venture,''
Washington Post, 4 May 18; Don Weinland and Charles Clover, ``Citic
Boosts Stake in Erik Prince's Security Group Frontier,'' Financial
Times, 5 March 18. See also Frontier Services Group, ``CITIC and China
Taiping Invest in FSG, Supporting the Belt & Road Initiativec [sic],''
8 March 18; Michael Martina, ``Blackwater Founder's FSG Buys Stake in
Chinese Security School,'' Reuters, 30 May 17.
\59\ International Security Defense College, ``Course
Introduction'' [Kecheng jieshao], last visited 8 June 18.
\60\ Marc Fisher et al., ``Behind Erik Prince's China Venture,''
Washington Post, 4 May 18. See also Don Weinland and Charles Clover,
``Citic Boosts Stake in Erik Prince's Security Group Frontier,''
Financial Times, 5 March 18.
\61\ For international standards protecting individuals' right to
privacy, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December
48, art. 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 17; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, last visited 17 July 18. China has signed
but not ratified the ICCPR. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Joseph Cannataci, A/
HRC/37/62, Advance Unedited Version, 28 February 18, para. 4; UN
General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by UN General Assembly on 18
December 13: 68/167. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/RES/68/
167, 21 January 14.
\62\ PRC Cybersecurity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo
anquan fa], passed 7 November 16, effective 1 June 17, arts. 37, 79.
\63\ Ibid., arts. 12, 41, 45; Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, ``China's Emerging Data Privacy System and
GDPR,'' 9 March 18.
\64\ PRC Cybersecurity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo
anquan fa], passed 7 November 16, effective 1 June 17, arts. 12, 41,
45; Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic & International Studies, ``China's
Emerging Data Privacy System and GDPR,'' 9 March 18.
\65\ General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine of the People's Republic of China and Standardization
Administration of the People's Republic of China, Information Security
Technology--Personal Information Security Specification [Xinxi anquan
jishu--geren xinxi anquan guifan], issued 29 December 17, effective 1
May 18, sec. 5.3; Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, ``New China Data Privacy Standard Looks More Far-Reaching Than
GDPR,'' 29 January 18; Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, ``China's Emerging Data Privacy System and GDPR,'' 9 March 18.
According to Samm Sacks of the Center for Strategic & Economic Studies,
the Information Security Technology--Personal Information Security
Specification is meant to provide guidelines for implementing the PRC
Cybersecurity Law.
\66\ General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine of the People's Republic of China and Standardization
Administration of the People's Republic of China, Information Security
Technology--Personal Information Security Specification [Xinxi anquan
jishu--geren xinxi anquan guifan], issued 29 December 17, effective 1
May 18, sec. 5.4.
\67\ Ibid. See also Samm Sacks, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, ``China's Emerging Data Privacy System and
GDPR,'' 9 March 18.
\68\ General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine of the People's Republic of China and Standardization
Administration of the People's Republic of China, Information Security
Technology--Personal Information Security Specification [Xinxi anquan
jishu--geren xinxi anquan guifan], issued 29 December 17, effective 1
May 18, sec. 5.4(b).
\69\ For more information on the Chinese government's use of
``state security'' charges to target rights advocates, see, e.g., Human
Rights Watch, ``China: State Security, Terrorism Convictions Double,''
16 March 16; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 103-04; CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 101-02.
\70\ PRC Cybersecurity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo
anquan fa], passed 7 November 16, effective 1 June 17, art. 28; Amnesty
International, ``When Profits Threaten Privacy--5 Things You Need To
Know About Apple in China,'' 27 February 18; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17.
\71\ Stephen Nellis and Cate Cadell, ``Apple Moves To Store iCloud
Keys in China, Raising Human Rights Fears,'' Reuters, 24 February 18.
See also Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ``China's Tech Giants Have a Second
Job: Helping Beijing Spy on Its People,'' Wall Street Journal, 30
November 17.
\72\ Amnesty International, ``Campaign Targets Apple Over Privacy
Betrayal for Chinese iCloud Users,'' 22 March 18; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Police `Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,''
19 November 17.
\73\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 17; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 17 July 18. China has signed but not
ratified the ICCPR. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, Joseph Cannataci, A/HRC/37/
62, Advance Unedited Version, 28 February 18, para. 4; UN General
Assembly, Resolution Adopted by UN General Assembly on 18 December 13:
68/167. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/RES/68/167, 21
January 14.
\74\ ``Apple: Responsibility for Operations of Domestic Chinese
iCloud Services Will Be Transferred to Domestic Company'' [Pingguo:
zhongguo neidi de icloud fuwu jiang zhuan you guonei gongsi fuze
yunying], People's Daily, 10 January 18; Stephen Nellis and Cate
Cadell, ``Apple Moves To Store iCloud Keys in China, Raising Human
Rights Fears,'' Reuters, 24 February 18; Amnesty International, ``When
Profits Threaten Privacy--5 Things You Need To Know About Apple in
China,'' 27 February 18.
\75\ Stephen Nellis and Cate Cadell, ``Apple Moves To Store iCloud
Keys in China, Raising Human Rights Fears,'' Reuters, 24 February 18;
Josh Horwitz, ``Apple's iCloud Service in China Will Be Managed by a
Data Firm Started by the Government,'' Quartz, 10 January 18; Jon
Russel, ``Apple's China iCloud Data Migration Sweeps Up International
User Accounts,'' TechCrunch, 11 January 18.
\76\ Amnesty International, ``Campaign Targets Apple Over Privacy
Betrayal for Chinese iCloud Users,'' 22 March 18.
\77\ 21Vianet Group, Inc., ``21Vianet and Microsoft Reinforce Long-
term Cooperation on Cloud Services in China,'' reprinted in
GlobeNewswire, 14 March 18; Cate Cadell, ``Amazon Sells Off China Cloud
Assets as Tough New Rules Bite,'' Reuters, 14 November 17; ``Amazon
Cuddles Up to Chinese Public Sector With AWS Rollout,'' Register, 18
December 13; Jack Clark, ``IBM Follows Microsoft, Amazon Into China
With New Cloud Doodad,'' Register, 18 December 13.
\78\ Mara Hvistendahl, ``Inside China's Vast New Experiment in
Social Ranking,'' Wired, 14 December 17; Liza Lin and Josh Chin,
``China's Tech Giants Have a Second Job: Helping Beijing Spy on Its
People,'' Wall Street Journal, 30 November 17.
\79\ Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big
Drive for Total Surveillance,'' Washington Post, 7 January 18; Mara
Hvistendahl, ``Inside China's Vast New Experiment in Social Ranking,''
Wired, 14 December 17; Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ``China's Tech Giants
Have a Second Job: Helping Beijing Spy on Its People,'' Wall Street
Journal, 30 November 17.
\80\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Police `Big Data' Systems Violate
Privacy, Target Dissent,'' 19 November 17.
\81\ Tang Yu, ``Big Data Era, `Internet + Policing' Upgrades Social
Governance Model'' [Da shuju shidai, ``hulianwang+jingwu'' shengji
shehui zhili moshi], Democracy & Law, reprinted in China Big Data
Industrial Observation, 4 January 17; Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Police `Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,'' 19
November 17.
\82\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Police `Big Data' Systems Violate
Privacy, Target Dissent,'' 19 November 17.
\83\ Ibid. For more information on petitioners, see Section III--
Access to Justice. For more information on Uyghurs, see Section IV--
Xinjiang.
\84\ Ibid. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10
December 48, arts. 11(1), 20(1); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts.
14(2), 22(1); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last
visited 17 July 18. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR.
\85\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric Collection
Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17. See also National Citizen
Identification Number Inquiry Service Center, ``Why Won't the Citizen
Identification Verification Service Reveal Individuals' Private
[Information]? '' [Gongmin shenfen xinxi hecha fuwu weishenme bu hui
xielou gongmin yinsi], last visited 8 June 18; Stephen Chen, ``China To
Build Giant Facial Recognition Database To Identify Any Citizen Within
Seconds,'' South China Morning Post, 13 October 17; Human Rights
Watchs, ``China: Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy,'' 15 May 17; Ge
Baichuan et al., ``The Tactics System and Capacity-Building of National
DNA Database'' [DNA shujuku shizhan yingyong zhanfa tixi yu nengli
jianshe yanjiu], Forensic Science and Technology, Vol. 41, No. 4
(2016), 260.
\86\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric Collection
Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17.
\87\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA From
Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\88\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 130. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17.
\89\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--China,'' last
visited 16 April 18; Amnesty International, ``China 2017/2018,'' last
visited 3 September 18; Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Bets on Facial
Recognition in a Big Drive for Total Surveillance,'' Washington Post, 7
January 18.
\90\ Wenxin Fan et al., ``China Snares Innocent and Guilty Alike To
Build World's Biggest DNA Database,'' Wall Street Journal, 26 December
17; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA From
Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\91\ Wenxin Fan et al., ``China Snares Innocent and Guilty Alike To
Build World's Biggest DNA Database,'' Wall Street Journal, 26 December
17; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA From
Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\92\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Voice Biometric Collection
Threatens Privacy,'' 22 October 17. See also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution
217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 12; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 17;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 17
July 18. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. See also UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Privacy, Joseph Cannataci, A/HRC/37/62, Advance Unedited Version, 28
February 18, para. 4; UN General Assembly, The Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age, A/RES/68/167, 21 January 14.
\93\ State Council, ``Social Credit System Construction Program
Outline (2014-2020)'' [Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao
(2014-2020 nian)], 14 June 14. For an unofficial English translation,
see ``Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System
(2014-2020),'' translated in China Copyright and Media (blog), 25 April
15. For more information on the social credit system, see, e.g., Jeremy
Daum, ``China Through a Glass, Darkly,'' China Law Translate (blog), 24
December 17; Mareike Ohlberg et al., Mercator Institute for China
Studies, ``Central Planning, Local Experiments: The Complex
Implementation of China's Social Credit System,'' MERICS China Monitor,
12 December 17; Rogier Creemers, ``China's Social Credit System: An
Evolving Practice of Control,'' Social Science Research Network, 9 May
18.
\94\ Jeremy Daum, ``China Through a Glass, Darkly,'' China Law
Translate (blog), 24 December 17; Mareike Ohlberg et al., Mercator
Institute for China Studies, ``Central Planning, Local Experiments: The
Complex Implementation of China's Social Credit System,'' MERICS China
Monitor, 12 December 17, 2, 4.
\95\ Mareike Ohlberg et al., Mercator Institute for China Studies,
``Central Planning, Local Experiments: The Complex Implementation of
China's Social Credit System,'' MERICS China Monitor, 12 December 17,
2; Mara Hvistendahl, ``Inside China's Vast New Experiment in Social
Ranking,'' Wired, 14 December 17.
\96\ Li Dandan, ``First License Formally Issued for Personal
Credit, Baihang Credit Scoring Received License'' [Shou zhang geren
zhengxin paizhao zhengshi xia fa baihang zhengxin huo pai], Shanghai
Securities News, 24 February 18; Rogier Creemers, ``China's Social
Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control,'' Social Science
Research Network, 9 May 18, 24-25; Chuin-Wei Yap, ``Tencent Calls Off
China-Wide Test of Credit-Scoring System,'' Wall Street Journal, 1
February 18; National Internet Finance Association of China,
``Introduction to the Association'' [Xiehui jianjie], last visited 3
April 18.
\97\ For information on the various pilot programs, see Mareike
Ohlberg et al., Mercator Institute for China Studies, ``Central
Planning, Local Experiments: The Complex Implementation of China's
Social Credit System,'' MERICS China Monitor, 12 December 17, 3, 9-12;
Simina Mistreanu, ``Life Inside China's Social Credit Laboratory,''
Foreign Policy, 3 April 18.
\98\ Mara Hvistendahl, ``A Revered Rocket Scientist Set in Motion
China's Mass Surveillance of Its Citizens,'' Science, 14 March 18; Eva
Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford: Polity Press, 2018), 97; Simina
Mistreanu, ``Life Inside China's Social Credit Laboratory,'' Foreign
Policy, 3 April 18.
\99\ Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big
Drive for Total Surveillance,'' Washington Post, 7 January 18.
\100\ Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ``China's Tech Giants Have a Second
Job: Helping Beijing Spy on Its People,'' Wall Street Journal, 30
November 17.
\101\ ``China Aims for Near-Total Surveillance, Including in
People's Homes,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 March 18; `` `Sharp Eyes Project'
Video Surveillance Totally Covers Countryside, Eyes Include Appliances
and Cell Phones'' [``Xueliang gongcheng'' nongcun quan fugai shipin
jiankong jiadian shouji jun zhang yan], Radio Free Asia, 30 March 18;
Liu Caiyu, ``Villages Gain Public Security Systems,'' Global Times, 2
April 18. See also AEBELL, ``About AEBELL'' [Guanyu meidian bei'er],
last visited 8 June 18; Ministry of Commerce, ``China Commodities--
Guangzhou Aebell Electrical Technology Co., Ltd.,'' last visited 18
July 18.
\102\ Chen Lei, ``How To Realize Total Coverage of Public Security
Surveillance'' [Gonggong anquan shipin jiankong ruhe shixian quan
fugai], Legal Daily, 13 February 18.
\103\ IHS Markit, ``Deep Learning and Privacy Protection Lead Top
Video Surveillance Trends for 2018, IHS Markit Says,'' 10 January 18.
\104\ Pei Li and Cate Cadell, ``China Eyes `Black Tech' To Boost
Security as Parliament Meets,'' Reuters, 10 March 18.
\105\ Simon Denyer, ``Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big
Drive for Total Surveillance,'' Washington Post, 7 January 18; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Police `Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy,
Target Dissent,'' 19 November 17; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World
2018--China,'' last visited 16 April 18.
\106\ Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2017,'' November 2017,
221.
\107\ Freedom House, ``Attacks on the Record: The State of Global
Press Freedom,'' 25 April 18; Amnesty International, ``China 2017/
2018,'' last visited 3 September 18; Human Rights Watch, ``Submission
to the Universal Periodic Review of China,'' 29 March 18.
\108\ See, e.g., Eva Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford: Polity
Press, 2018), 89-90; Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2017,''
November 2017, 221; Xiao Qiang, ``The Rise of China as a Digital
Totalitarian State,'' Washington Post, 21 February 18.
\109\ Freedom House, ``Attacks on the Record: The State of Global
Press Freedom,'' 25 April 18; Amnesty International, ``China 2017/
2018,'' last visited 3 September 18; Human Rights Watch, ``Submission
to the Universal Periodic Review of China,'' 29 March 18.
\110\ PRC Cybersecurity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo
anquan fa], passed 7 November 16, effective 1 June 17, art. 47. See
also Amnesty International, ``China 2017/2018,'' last visited 3
September 18; Chiang Ling Li et al., ``China's New Cybersecurity Law
Brings Enforcement Crackdown,'' Jones Day, October 2017.
\111\ ``China's Weibo Looks To Reward Citizen Censors With iPhones,
Tablets,'' Reuters, 27 September 17; Chiang Ling Li et al., ``China's
New Cybersecurity Law Brings Enforcement Crackdown,'' Jones Day,
October 2017; Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ``China's Tech Giants Have a
Second Job: Helping Beijing Spy on Its People,'' Wall Street Journal,
30 November 17.
\112\ Chen Aiping, ``Shanghai Cyberspace Administration: Marriott
International Group Introduces Eight Rectification Measures'' [Shanghai
wangxinban: wanhao guoji jituan tuichu ba xiang zhenggai cuoshi],
Xinhua, 17 January 18; Catherine Lai, ``Hurt Feelings: How Foreign
Brands Are Proving To Be a Soft Target as China Wields Its Power,''
Hong Kong Free Press, 25 February 18; Abha Bhattarai and Steven Mufson,
``Marriot and Other Firms Bow to China To Protect Business Interests,''
Washington Post, 19 January 18.
\113\ Chen Aiping, ``Shanghai Cyberspace Administration: Marriott
International Group Introduces Eight Rectification Measures'' [Shanghai
wangxinban: wanhao guoji jituan tuichu ba xiang zhenggai cuoshi],
Xinhua, 17 January 18; Catherine Lai, ``Hurt Feelings: How Foreign
Brands Are Proving To Be a Soft Target as China Wields Its Power,''
Hong Kong Free Press, 25 February 18; Abha Bhattarai and Steven Mufson,
``Marriot and Other Firms Bow to China To Protect Business Interests,''
Washington Post, 19 January 18.
\114\ ``Mainland Kills Taiwan Film, Taiwan Affairs Office Prohibits
Artists [Supporting] Taiwan Independence'' [Tai dianying dalu zao
fengsha guotaiban yao jin taidu yiren], Radio Free Asia, 28 March 18.
\115\ State Administration of Radio and Television, ``State
Administration of Radio and Television Severely Deals With the Problem
of Sharing Programs Violating Social Morality on `Jinri Toutiao' [and]
`Kuaishou' '' [Guojia guangbo dianshi zongju yansu chuli ``jinri
toutiao'' ``kuaishou'' chuanbo you wei shehui daode jiemu deng wenti],
4 April 18; Wang Meng, ``Android App Store Takes Down Four Apps:
Toutiao, Netease News, Phoenix News, and Daily Express'' [Anzhuo
yingyong shangdian yi xia jia jinri toutiao, wangyi xinwen, fenghuang
xinwen, tiantian kuaibao si kuan yingyong], Caijing, 9 April 18;
Raymond Zhong, ``It Built an Empire of GIFs, Buzzy News and Jokes.
China Isn't Amused,'' New York Times, 11 April 18.
\116\ State Administration of Radio and Television, ``State
Administration of Radio and Television Orders `Jinri Toutiao' Website
To Permanently Close `Neihan Duanzi' and Other Vulgar Audiovisual
Products'' [Guojia guangbo dianshi zongju zeling ``jinri toutiao''
wangzhan yongjiu guanting ``neihan duanzi'' deng disu shiting chanpin],
10 April 18; ``Bad Humour: China Watchdog Shuts Toutiao Joke App Over
Vulgar Content,'' Reuters, 10 April 18; Raymond Zhong, ``It Built an
Empire of GIFs, Buzzy News and Jokes. China Isn't Amused,'' New York
Times, 11 April 18.
\117\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 15
June 17; State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 5.
\118\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19.
\119\ See, e.g., Roseann Rife, Amnesty International, ``Opinion:
The Chilling Reality of China's Cyberwar on Free Speech,'' CNN, 25
March 15; Rebecca MacKinnon, ``China's Internet Censorship and
Controls: The Context of Google's Approach in China,'' Human Rights in
China, 16 July 10; Henry Sanderson, ``China Targets Google in
Pornography Crackdown,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington
Post, 5 January 09.
\120\ Raymond Zhong, ``It Built an Empire of GIFs, Buzzy News and
Jokes. China Isn't Amused,'' New York Times, 11 April 18; Jinri Toutiao
(Headline--today), ``Apology and Reflection'' [Zhiqian he fansi],
WeChat post, 11 April 18.
\121\ Ben Bland, ``Outcry as Latest Global Publisher Bows to China
Censors,'' Financial Times, 1 November 17.
\122\ U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations,
Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 21 March 18, Testimony
of Aynne Kokas, Fellow, Kissinger Institute on China and the United
States, The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, and
Assistant Professor of Media Studies, University of Virginia.
\123\ Weibo, ``Weibo May 2018 Community Management Work
Announcement'' [Weibo 2018 nian 5 yue shequ guanli gongzuo gonggao], 11
June 18, sec. 1. See also Xu Hailin, ``Sina Weibo Removes 141,000
Harmful Posts on Politics,'' Global Times, 12 June 18.
\124\ Weibo, ``Weibo May 2018 Community Management Work
Announcement'' [Weibo 2018 nian 5 yue shequ guanli gongzuo gonggao], 11
June 18, sec. 1.
\125\ ``U.S. Airlines Say Further Amending Websites To Change
Taiwan References,'' Reuters, 9 August 18; Daniel Shane, ``US Airlines
Give In to China's Demands Over Taiwan,'' CNN, 25 July 18; Bill
Birtles, ``Last Remaining US Airlines Give in to Chinese Pressure on
Taiwan,'' ABC News, 25 July 18.
\126\ Kate Conger and Daisuke Wakabayashi, ``Google Employees
Protest Secret Work on Censored Search Engine for China,'' New York
Times, 16 August 18; Douglas MacMillan, Shan Li, and Liza Lin, ``Google
Woos Partners for Potential China Expansion,'' Wall Street Journal, 12
August 18; Ryan Gallagher, ``Google Plans To Launch Censored Search
Engine in China, Leaked Documents Reveal,'' 1 August 18.
Access to
Justice
Access to
Justice
Access to Justice
Party's Control Over the Judicial Process
Central authorities of the Chinese Communist Party
continued to exert control over the judicial process in
violation of international standards.\1\ Although it is not
formally part of the Party,\2\ the judiciary's first priority
in 2018 was to defend ``the Party's centralized and unified
leadership, with [Party General Secretary] Xi Jinping as the
core leader,'' according to the March 2018 Supreme People's
Court (SPC) work report \3\ delivered by senior Party official
and SPC President Zhou Qiang.\4\ Zhou affirmed that the
adjudication process should be improved through Party
building,\5\ which included ideological conformity,\6\ and
advocated for absolute loyalty and obedience to the Party.\7\
Zhou further saw it as the court's imperative to take part in a
political initiative called ``eliminate darkness and evil''
that aims to ``further strengthen the foundation of the Party's
power.'' \8\ According to announcements by local authorities,
targeted ``dark forces'' included persons involved in organized
crime as well as individuals who ``threaten political
security'' and those who ``have a grip on political power at
the local level.'' \9\ State-run media Xinhua explained that
this campaign ``is primarily aimed at consolidating the
[Communist Party's] ruling foundation,'' \10\ and some
commentators drew comparisons with earlier anti-crime campaigns
such as ``Strike Hard'' and ``Strike Black'' in terms of the
potential for serious human rights abuses.\11\
In February 2018, Xiong Xuanguo, a vice minister at the
Ministry of Justice, urged lawyers to ``conform their thoughts
and actions with the Party's plan'' and to join the ``eliminate
darkness and evil'' campaign.\12\ He also announced that the
All China Lawyers Association had established a ``defense
lawyer guidance committee'' to ``strengthen guidance on cases''
relating to the campaign.\13\ Some lawyers expressed concern
that the unprecedented efforts to coordinate defense lawyers
was actually a ``stability maintenance'' measure and would
undermine lawyers' independence in defending their clients.\14\
Persecution and Harassment of Human Rights Lawyers and Advocates
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Chinese authorities continued to criminally prosecute
rights lawyers and advocates detained during the nationwide,
coordinated crackdown that began in and around July 2015 (July
2015 crackdown),\15\ which affected over 300 individuals and
led to a total of 14 criminal convictions.\16\ This past year,
authorities sentenced three individuals and continued to hold
one person under incommunicado pretrial detention.\17\
International human rights groups, in anticipation of the
November 2018 session of the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government's human
rights record,\18\ expressed in their reports concerns about
persecution of rights lawyers.\19\
On November 21, 2017, a court sentenced
disbarred rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong \20\ to two
years' imprisonment on the charge of ``inciting to
subvert state power.'' \21\ Authorities alleged that
Jiang counseled Xie Yang's wife to fabricate torture
allegations.\22\ Rights lawyer Xie Yang \23\ reportedly
told his lawyers in January 2017 that authorities had
tortured him,\24\ but he later retracted that claim at
trial.\25\ On December 26, 2017, a court convicted Xie
of ``inciting to subvert state power'' and decided not
to impose criminal punishment.\26\ After releasing Xie
from detention, authorities restricted his freedom of
movement \27\ and photocopied his case files, a step
that suggests authorities were preparing to revoke
Xie's law license as retaliation against his resuming
rights defense work, according to his wife.\28\
On December 26, 2017, a court sentenced rights
advocate Wu Gan \29\ to eight years in prison for
``subverting state power.'' \30\ On April 17, 2018, the
court of second instance affirmed the original
sentence.\31\ Shortly before the second instance court
issued the decision, authorities reportedly prevented
citizens from attending the hearing and detained Wu's
father in a hotel located in Guilin municipality,
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.\32\
Authorities took rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang
\33\ into custody around July 2015 and continued to
hold him under incommunicado detention \34\ on the
charge of ``subverting state power.'' \35\ In April
2018, Wang's wife Li Wenzu said authorities never
informed her of Wang's whereabouts, and she started a
symbolic march from her home in Beijing municipality to
Wang's presumed detention location in Tianjin
municipality.\36\ Authorities intercepted Li in
Tianjin, returned her to Beijing, and placed her under
``soft detention'' in her apartment, during which
individuals believed to be working for government
officials blocked and assaulted Li's visitors.\37\
Authorities likewise criminally detained other lawyers
subsequent to the July 2015 crackdown:
In October 2017, authorities detained rights
lawyer Li Yuhan\38\ on the charge of ``picking quarrels
and provoking trouble.'' \39\ Staff at the detention
center reportedly denied her hot water for showers,
denied her medical treatment, and threatened to beat
her to death.\40\ At the age of 60, Li suffered from
health conditions including heart disease,
hypertension, and hyperthyroidism.\41\ Previously, Li
represented lawyer Wang Yu,\42\ whom authorities
detained during the July 2015 crackdown.\43\
In January 2018, authorities detained rights
lawyer Yu Wensheng \44\ and in April formally arrested
him on the charges of ``obstructing official business''
and ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \45\
Earlier, the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau revoked
Yu's law license reportedly because he had represented
rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang.\46\ Yu's detention came
shortly after he made a Twitter post advocating
constitutional reform.\47\ In April, police showed Yu's
defense lawyers a declaration in which Yu allegedly
terminated their representation.\48\ Yu's wife, Xu Yan,
refused to terminate the lawyers because the
declaration contradicted an earlier declaration that Yu
wrote, in which he stated that he would not voluntarily
terminate his lawyers were he to be detained.\49\ In
February, authorities restricted Xu Yan's ability to
travel to Hong Kong and in April pressured her not to
discuss her husband's case.\50\
RESTRICTION, PERSECUTION, AND HARASSMENT OF LAWYERS
Beside criminal prosecution, authorities persecuted,
harassed, and imposed restrictions on rights lawyers by means
including revocation \51\ and suspension \52\ of licenses,
delay in the annual license renewal process,\53\ exclusion from
courthouses,\54\ restriction of movement,\55\ restriction on
speech,\56\ and physical assault.\57\ Authorities also
conducted intrusive ``inspections'' in a number of law
firms.\58\ In September 2017, for example, at least seven law
firms were subjected to inspection, with some on-site
inspections reportedly lasting for days.\59\ Observers said
these inspections targeted law firms that engaged in rights
defense work.\60\
Citizen Petitioning
The petitioning system (xinfang), also known as the
``letters and visits system,'' has been a popular mechanism
outside of the formal legal system for citizens to present
their grievances to authorities, either in writing or in
person.\61\ The petitioning system reportedly has been
ineffective in addressing citizens' grievances due to factors
such as the large number of petitions,\62\ the limited
authority of local xinfang offices,\63\ shortcomings in the
accountability system,\64\ and corruption.\65\
Chinese authorities experimented with measures to
streamline the petitioning system that one scholar said may
produce limited benefits. The State Bureau of Letters and
Visits (the central-level government agency responsible for
overseeing the petitioning system) expanded the online
petitioning platform,\66\ and central and local authorities
formalized the reform of categorizing petition matters for the
purpose of diverting certain cases to administrative or
judicial resolution mechanisms.\67\ One China-based scholar
pointed out, however, that many petitioners from rural areas
are unfamiliar with the online interface, and that adding a way
of submitting petitions does not in itself enhance the
petitioning system's capacity to resolve disputes.\68\ In
addition, the scholar noted that petitioners are not legally
bound to use other methods to seek remedies, particularly when
doing so would require increased cost and time.\69\
During this reporting year, petitioners continued to face
official repression. Authorities detained petitioners, alleging
criminal or administrative offenses including ``disrupting
order in a public place,'' \70\ ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble,'' \71\ and ``obstructing official
business.'' \72\ In addition, authorities reportedly detained
petitioners in the period leading up to and during the 19th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October
2017,\73\ and the annual meetings of the National People's
Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
in March 2018.\74\
Legal Aid
The legal aid system remained a state-controlled
institution. State Council regulations specify that justice
bureaus of local governments appoint legal aid organizations
and administer legal aid programs through them.\75\ Legal aid
organizations may assign eligible applicants to in-house
lawyers or make referrals to law firms, grassroots legal
services, or other social organizations.\76\ Lawyers are
legally obligated to provide legal aid services and may be
disciplined or fined for refusing to do so.\77\
While the government continued to expand the legal aid
system, it further tightened the space for legal aid services
not administered by the government. The Ministry of Justice
spent 2.12 billion yuan (approximately US$320 million) on legal
aid programs during 2016, representing a 12.1 percent annual
increase.\78\ It further stated that the majority of
provincial-level governments lowered the eligibility standard
and expanded the scope of legal aid by covering civil matters,
such as employment, family, food and drugs, education, and
healthcare.\79\ In January 2018, the All China Lawyers
Association (ACLA), which is the national bar association \80\
that works under the Ministry of Justice's direction,\81\
issued a set of trial rules prohibiting lawyers from accepting
cases at discounted rates or without fees, except for legal aid
cases.\82\ A China-based lawyer said he was concerned that the
provision would prevent lawyers from providing pro bono legal
services to disadvantaged individuals in cases of significant
interest to the public.\83\
Judicial Reform Efforts
Government and Party-directed reform efforts \84\ have
focused on improving the judiciary's capacity to process cases,
while requiring that the judiciary remain an instrument of the
Chinese Communist Party. In November 2017, Supreme People's
Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang reported to the National
People's Congress Standing Committee that the judiciary made
progress in completing or setting into motion judicial reform
objectives--such as judicial responsibility and case opening
reforms--laid out by the 18th Central Committee in 2013 and in
the Third and Fourth Plenum Decisions in 2014.\85\ Some legal
experts observed that, rather than removing obstacles to
delivering justice,\86\ judicial reform efforts have focused on
technically improving the efficiency \87\ of the legal system,
which central authorities continue to use as ``a mechanism to
constrain local-level functionaries . . . and repress dissent .
. ..'' \88\
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT AND MANAGEMENT
This past year, Chinese lawmakers deliberated legislative
amendments in an effort to formalize reforms of the judicial
appointment and management system.\89\ The draft amendment of
the PRC Organic Law of People's Courts provides that
appointment of judges is subject to a quota assigned by the SPC
based on the locality's population size, caseload, and other
measurable factors.\90\ Candidates would also undergo a merit-
based selection process to qualify as judges.\91\ The draft
amendment of the PRC Judges Law raises the education threshold
and generally requires prior judicial experience for promotion
to higher courts.\92\ Despite emphasis on merit-based
considerations, ``high political quality'' remained a selection
requirement.\93\
PEOPLE'S ASSESSORS
The National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC)
passed new legislation to improve lay participation in courts
during this reporting year, though some observers said that
pilot versions of this reform had been ineffective. People's
assessors, who do not need to be legally trained, participate
in case adjudication alongside judges.\94\ The previous system
reportedly suffered from problems such as insufficient rotation
of people's assessors and lack of genuine participation, with
one expert referring to people's assessors as ``decoration.''
\95\ In April 2018, the NPCSC passed the PRC People's Assessors
Law,\96\ following nearly three years of pilot programs in 10
jurisdictions.\97\ The new law requires that most people's
assessors be randomly selected, and it expands the current
three-person panels to seven-person panels in certain types of
cases, such as those involving food and drug safety, land
expropriation, and environmental protection.\98\ Some China-
based scholars said that the random selection mechanism was the
right step forward; some observed, however, that the pilot
programs did not improve actual participation by people's
assessors in case adjudication.\99\
USE OF TECHNOLOGY
The judiciary used technology to facilitate court
proceedings and enforcement, which are elements of access to
justice.\100\ In November 2017, Zhou Qiang reported that over
2,200 courts across China established Web-based litigation
services, enabling litigants to complete transactions online,
for example, to open a case, pay fees, examine evidence, and
make court appearances.\101\ In addition, in August 2017, the
Supreme People's Court implemented a Party-
approved plan to establish the first ``internet court'' to
handle litigation entirely online in certain internet-related
disputes.\102\ Zhu Shenyuan, Vice President of the Zhejiang
Province High People's Court, explained that the cross-
jurisdictional and decentralized nature of online transactions
presented challenges to the judicial system.\103\ A scholar
observed that the internet court could help litigants save on
travel expenses and reduce overall litigation costs.\104\ In
July 2018, Zhou Qiang convened a Supreme People's Court
Judicial Reform Leading Small Group meeting during which an
agenda for establishing additional internet courts in Beijing
municipality and Guangdong province was passed.\105\
Zhou Qiang further reported that the judiciary's online
enforcement system was linked to the databases of over 10
government bodies, enabling it to track down judgment debtors'
property for the purpose of enforcement.\106\ According to
Zhou, judgment debtors' information also was shared with the
developing social credit system, which authorities could use to
tighten social control, according to some observers.\107\ [For
more information on potential abuses of the social credit
system, see Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
and Commercial Rule of Law and Human Rights.]
In February 2018, the Supreme People's Court issued
provisions requiring courts, beginning in September, to use a
unified online platform to disclose various stages of the
litigation process, including case opening, process service,
hearing date, and issuance of court documents.\108\ Other
aspects of the Supreme People's Court's efforts to improve
disclosure of information included new online platforms for
judicial documents and status of enforcement.\109\
Access to
Justice
Access to
Justice
Notes to Section III--Access to Justice
\1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 2, 14, 26; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A
(III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7-8; Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held
at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General
Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13
December 1985, arts. 1, 4; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,
Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7
September 1990, preamble.
\2\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, art. 128.
\3\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 9 March 18.
\4\ ``Resume of Supreme People's Court President'' [Zuigao renmin
fayuan yuanzhang jianli], Xinhua, 18 March 18.
\5\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 9 March 18, sec. 8.
\6\ Chen Zhong, ``Thoughts on Strengthening and Improving
Organizational Party Building Work'' [Jiaqiang he gaijin jiguan
dangjian gongzuo de sikao], People's Daily, 26 October 11; Chinese
Communist Party Constitution, adopted 6 September 82, amended 1
November 87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October
07, 14 November 12, 24 October 17, art. 18. Zhou also stated in the
2017 SPC work report the judiciary's submission to the Party's direct
supervision for ideological conformity. ``Supreme People's Court Work
Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao], 9 March 18, sec. 8.
\7\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 9 March 18, sec. 8; Zhang Hao, ``Firmly Upholding
Party's Absolute Leadership Over People's Courts'' [Jianchi dang dui
renmin fayuan de juedui lingdao], Legal Daily, 4 January 18.
\8\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 9 March 18; ``CCP Central Committee and State Council
Issued `Circular on Specialized Struggle To Eliminate Darkness and
Evil' '' [Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan fachu ``guanyu kaizhan saohei
chu'e zhuanxiang douzheng de tongzhi''], Xinhua, 24 January 18.
\9\ See, e.g., Lin Yuanqin and Su Gongxin, ``Jiangsu Acts Upon
Hearing Order To Eliminate Darkness and Evil'' [Saohei chu'e jiangsu
wenling erdong], Xinhua Daily, 15 February 18; Du Yuquan, ``Sichuan
Announced Ten Main Targets in Elimination of Darkness and Evil''
[Sichuan gongbu shi lei saohei chu'e zhongdian daji duixiang], Chengdu
Economic Daily, 14 February 18; ``Political Security Tops List of 12
Targeted Groups in `Elimination of Darkness and Evil' '' [``Dahei
chu'e'' 12 lei zhongdian zhengquan anquan jushou], Radio Free Asia, 21
February 18.
\10\ ``China Focus: Fight Against Organized Crime Reflects Xi's
Governance Thought,'' Xinhua, 27 January 18.
\11\ `` `Elimination of Darkness and Evil' Campaign Well Underway,
Huge Disparity Between Recovered Ill-Gotten Money and Number of People
Detained Raises Suspicion'' [``Sao hei chu e'' yundong ruhuo rutu
zangkuan yu bei bu renshu xuanshu shou zhiyi], Radio Free Asia, 7
February 18; ``New China `Crime' Crackdown Targets Threats to Party
Rule,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Voice of America, 15 March 18;
``Thousands Arrested in Elimination of Darkness and Evil Struggle in
China, Shandong's Order to Local Authorities Raises Controversy''
[Zhongguo saohei chu'e douzheng shuqian ren beibu shandong gei jiceng
xia zhibiao yin zhengyi], BBC, 9 February 18. See also James T. Areddy,
``Xinjiang Arrests Nearly Doubled in '14, Year of `Strike-Hard'
Campaign,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 23
January 15; Sharon LaFraniere and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Crime Crackdown
Adds to Scandal Surrounding Former Chinese Official,'' New York Times,
26 March 12; Philip P. Pan, ``China Strikes Hard at Criminals,
Dissidents,'' Washington Post, 11 May 01.
\12\ Cai Changchun, ``Lawyers Must Actively Participate in Struggle
To Eliminate Darkness and Evil and To Lawfully Commence Defense
Representation Work in Cases Involving Dark Forces'' [Lushi yao jiji
canyu saohei chu'e zhuanxiang douzheng yifa kaizhan shexian hei'e shili
fanzui anjian bianhu daili], Legal Daily, 1 February 18.
\13\ Ibid.
\14\ ``All China Lawyers Association Established Elimination of
Darkness and Evil Committee, Profession Worries Officials Will Control
Defense'' [Quanguo luxie chengli saohei yewu weiyuanhui yejie you
guanfang caokong bianhu], Radio Free Asia, 5 February 18.
\15\ See, e.g., Josh Chin and Te-Ping Chen, ``China Targets Human-
Rights Lawyers in Crackdown,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 July 15; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Secretly Detained Lawyers at Risk of Torture,''
20 July 15; Huang Qingchang and Zou Wei, ``Revealing the Dark Secrets
of `Rights Defense' Incidents'' [Jiekai ``weiquan'' shijian de heimu],
Xinhua, 11 July 15.
\16\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``List of 42 Lawyers
and Citizens Whose Cases Entered Criminal Prosecution Process'' [42 ge
jinru xingshi susong chengxu de lushi ji gongmin liebiao], 21 February
18.
\17\ Ibid.; Lawyers' Rights and Interests Concern Net, ``Lawyers
Xie Yang and Lin Qilei's Request To Meet Wang Quanzhang Denied'' [Xie
yang he lin qilei lushi yaoqiu huijian wang quanzhang bei jujue], 20
April 18.
\18\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Tentative Timetable for the 31st
Session of the UPR Working Group (5-16 November 2018),'' last visited
on 18 May 18.
\19\ See, e.g., Human Rights in China, ``Stakeholder Submission by
Human Rights in China,'' March 2018, para. 3; Lawyers' Rights Watch
Canada, ``Joint Submission to the 31st Session of the Universal
Periodic Review of China,'' March 2018, paras. 12-22; Front Line
Defenders, ``Submission for Universal Periodic Review for the 31st
session (November 2018),'' 1 April 18.
\20\ Guo Baosheng, ``Guo Baosheng: Lawyer Jiang Tianyong as I Know
Him'' [Guo baosheng: wo suo renshi de jiang tianyong lushi], Human
Rights in China Biweekly, No. 205, 17 March 17. For more information on
Jiang Tianyong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2011-00179.
\21\ Cai Changchun, ``Jiang Tianyong Publicly Sentenced at Changsha
Intermediate Court in Inciting Subversion of State Power Case'' [Jiang
tianyong shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan an zai changsha zhong yuan
yishen gongkai xuanpan], Legal Daily, 21 November 17.
\22\ Ibid.
\23\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xie Yang,'' 6 September 16.
For more information on Xie Yang, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.
\24\ Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang
(One)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (yi)], reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 19 January 17; Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting
With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu
(er)], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17.
\25\ Josh Chin, ``China Court Says Lawyer Retracts Torture Charge;
Wife Calls Trial a Farce,'' Wall Street Journal, 8 May 17.
\26\ Zeng Yan, ``Public Announcement of First Instance Trial
Judgment in Case of Inciting To Subvert State Power Charge Against Xie
Yang'' [Xie yang shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen gongkai
xuanpan], People's Court Daily, 27 December 17.
\27\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Xie Yang's Wife Chen Guiqiu:
Reporting to President Xi Jinping--Lawyer Xie Yang Illegally Prevented
From Crossing Border, Hope You Will Give Him Special Help'' [Xie yang
lushi qizi chen guiqiu: xiang xi jinping zhuxi huibao--xie yang lushi
bei feifa bianjing kongzhi qidai nin de tebie bangzhu], 1 May 18.
\28\ ChinaAid, ``Case File Handled by Lawyer Xie Yang Photocopied,
Chen Guiqiu Intends To Establish Hunan Overseas Report Center'' [Lushi
xie yang daili anjuan bei kaobei chen guiqiu ni chengli hunan haiwai
jubao zhongxin], 9 May 18.
\29\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wu Gan,'' 11 March 16. For
more information on Wu Gan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2010-00348.
\30\ Liu Lan, ``Public Announcement of First Instance Judgment in
Case of Inciting To Subvert State Power Charge Against Wu Gan'' [Wu gan
dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen gongkai xuanpan], People's Court
Daily, 27 December 17.
\31\ ``Court of Second Instance in Tufu's Case Upholds Original
Decision of Eight-Year Sentence'' [Tufu ershen weichi banian tuxing
yuanshen caijue], Radio Free Asia, 17 April 18.
\32\ ``Second Instance Hearing on Wu Gan's Case Soon To Be Held,
Father Xu Xiaoshun Placed Under Soft Detention'' [Wu gan an er shen
jiang kaiting fuqin xu xiaoshun bei ruanjin], Radio Free Asia, 16 April
18; ``Court of Second Instance in Tufu's Case Upholds Original Decision
of Eight-Year Sentence'' [Tufu ershen weichi banian tuxing yuanshen
caijue], Radio Free Asia, 17 April 18.
\33\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wang Quanzhang,'' 22 January
16. For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.
\34\ Lawyers' Rights and Interests Concern Net, ``Lawyers Xie Yang
and Lin Qilei's Request To Meet Wang Quanzhang Denied'' [Xie yang he
lin qilei lushi yaoqiu huijian wang quanzhang bei jujue], 20 April 18.
\35\ Rights Defense Network, ``Fengrui Director Lawyer Zhou
Shifeng, Lawyer Wang Quanzhang, and Intern Lawyer Li Shuyun of the 709
Crackdown Arrested on Suspicion of `Subverting State Power' '' [709
dazhuabu shijian zhong fengrui suo zhuren zhou shifeng lushi, wang
quanzhang lushi, shixi lushi li shuyun bei yi shexian ``dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui'' pizhun daibu], 12 January 16.
\36\ Lawyers' Rights and Interests Concern Net, ``Lawyers Xie Yang
and Lin Qilei's Request To Meet Wang Quanzhang Denied'' [Xie yang he
lin qilei lushi yaoqiu huijian wang quanzhang bei jujue], 20 April 18;
Joanna Chiu, ``1,000 Days on, Wife of `Vanished' Chinese Lawyer Wang
Quanzhang Marches 100 km for Answers,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted
in Hong Kong Free Press, 5 April 18; Xiao Shan, ``New Episode in
Stability Maintenance: Chaoyang Aunties Participate in the Stability
Maintenance Surveillance and Confinement of Li Wenzu'' [Weiwen xin
xianxiang: chaoyang dama canyu jiankong weiwen li wenzu], Radio France
Internationale, 11 April 18.
\37\ Xiao Shan, ``New Episode in Stability Maintenance: Chaoyang
Aunties Participate in the Stability Maintenance Surveillance and
Confinement of Li Wenzu'' [Weiwen xin xianxiang: chaoyang dama canyu
jiankong weiwen li wenzu], Radio France Internationale, 11 April 18;
Rights Defense Network, ``Li Wenzu: Situation Bulletin on My Second Day
of Soft Detention (April 11, 2018)'' [Li wenzu: wo zao ruanjin dier
tian qingkuang tongbao (2018 nian 4 yue 11 ri)], 11 April 18.
\38\ For more information on Li Yuhan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00361.
\39\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Li Yuhan,'' 6 December 17.
\40\ ``Arrest for `709 Case' Lawyer Li Yuhan Approved, What on
Earth Is `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble?' '' [``709 an'' lushi
li yuhan bei pibu ``xunxin zishi'' shige shenme gui?], Radio Free Asia,
16 November 17; ``China Rights Lawyer Arrested, Outside World Suspects
Deliberate Retaliation'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi beidaibu waijie zhiyi
xuyi baofu], Voice of America, 16 November 17; Human Rights Campaign in
China, ``Detained for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble by the
Heping Branch of the Shenyang Public Security Bureau, Lawyer Li Yuhan
Tortured by Police Handling the Case'' [Bei shenyang shi gong'anju
heping fenju yi xunxin zishi zui jiya de li yuhan lushi zao ban'an
jingcha nuedai], 10 November 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Li Yuhan's
Lawyers Li Boguang and Lin Qilei File Complaint for Subjecting Her to
Torture and Abuse in Prison'' [Li yuhan daili lushi li boguang lin
qilei jiu bei qi bei xingxun bigong yu zhong nuedai tiqi konggao], 11
December 17.
\41\ ``Arrest for `709 Case' Lawyer Li Yuhan Approved, What on
Earth Is `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble?' '' [``709 an'' lushi
li yuhan bei pibu ``xunxin zishi'' shige shenme gui?], Radio Free Asia,
16 November 17; ``China Rights Lawyer Arrested, Outside World Suspects
Deliberate Retaliation'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi beidaibu waijie zhiyi
xuyi baofu], Voice of America, 16 November 17; Human Rights Campaign in
China, ``Detained for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble by the
Heping Branch of the Shenyang Public Security Bureau, Lawyer Li Yuhan
Tortured by Police Handling the Case'' [Bei shenyang shi gong'anju
heping fenju yi xunxin zishi zui jiya de li yuhan lushi zao ban'an
jingcha nuedai], 10 November 17.
\42\ For more information on Wang Yu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00252.
\43\ ``Fraud Charge Added Against Li Yuhan, Son Criticizes Move as
Attempt To Use Different Ways To Imprison Mother'' [Li yuhan bei
jiakong zhapian zui er pi xiangfang shefa yao mu ruyu], Radio Free
Asia, 15 March 18.
\44\ Ma Xiao, ``Ma Xiao: Investigation on the Lives of Mainland
China Political Prisoners: Human Rights Lawyer Yu Wensheng (1 of 2)''
[Ma xiao: zhongguo dalu zhengzhifan beiqiu shengya jishi diaocha:
renquan lushi yu wensheng (shang)], Minzhu Zhongguo, 27 August 15; Ma
Xiao, ``Ma Xiao: Investigation on the Lives of Mainland China Political
Prisoners: Human Rights Lawyer Yu Wensheng (2 of 2)'' [Ma xiao:
zhongguo dalu zhengzhifan beiqiu shengya jishi diaocha: renquan lushi
yu wensheng (xia)], Minzhu Zhongguo, 6 September 15. For more
information on Yu Wensheng, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2014-00387.
\45\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Beijing Lawyer Yu Wensheng
Formally Criminally Detained Today'' [Beijing lushi yu wensheng jin
zhengshi bei xingshi juliu], 20 January 18; Lawyers' Rights and
Interests Concern Net, ``Police Says Yu Wensheng Terminated
Representation by Two Defense Lawyers Xie Yang and Chang Boyang, Xu Yan
Meets With Yu Wensheng'' [Jingcha chuanchu yu wensheng jiechu xie yang
he chang boyang er wei bianhuren xu yan jianguo yu wensheng], 23 April
18.
\46\ ``Yu Wensheng, Lawyer in `709 Case,' Had License Revoked by
Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau'' [``709 an'' daili lushi yu wensheng
zao beijingshi sifa ju diaoxiao zhizhao], Radio Free Asia, 16 January
18.
\47\ Yu Wensheng (yuwensheng), Twitter post, 17 January 18, 10:50
a.m.
\48\ Lawyers' Rights and Interests Concern Net, ``Police Says Yu
Wensheng Terminated Representation by Two Defense Lawyers Xie Yang and
Chang Boyang, Xu Yan Meets With Yu Wensheng'' [Jingcha chuanchu yu
wensheng jiechu xie yang he chang boyang er wei bianhuren xu yan
jianguo yu wensheng], 23 April 18.
\49\ Lawyers' Rights and Interests Concern Net, ``Police Says Yu
Wensheng Terminated Representation by Two Defense Lawyers Xie Yang and
Chang Boyang, Xu Yan Meets With Yu Wensheng'' [Jingcha chuanchu yu
wensheng jiechu xie yang he chang boyang er wei bianhuren xu yan
jianguo yu wensheng], 23 April 18.
\50\ ``Yu Wensheng's Family Affected by His Matter, Wife Xu Yan
Planned To Visit Hong Kong but Denied Exit'' [Yu wensheng shijian
zhulian jiaren qi xu yan ni dao xianggang zaoju chujing], Radio Free
Asia, 24 February 18; ``Yu Wensheng's Wife Xu Yan Summoned Again on
Grounds of `Inciting Subversion Crime' '' [Yu wensheng qizi xu yan zai
bei yi shexian ``shan dian zui'' chuanhuan], Radio Free Asia, 1 April
18.
\51\ ``Lawyer Zhu Shengwu's License Revoked, Law Firm Faces
Closure'' [Zhu shengwu lushi bei chupai lusuo mianlin guanbi], Radio
Free Asia, 22 November 17; ``Guangdong Justice Bureau Attacks Without
Warning, Rights Lawyer Sui Muqing's License Revoked'' [Guangdong
sifating wu yujing tuxi weiquan lushi sui muqing zao diaozhao], Radio
Free Asia, 23 January 18.
\52\ ``License Revoked, Rights Lawyer Chen Jiahong Not Optimistic
About License Reinstatement'' [Zao tingpai weiquan lushi chen jiahong
dui fupai bu leguan], Radio Free Asia, 30 November 17; Guangxi Lawyers
Association, ``Circular Concerning the Implementation of Administrative
Punishment on Guangxi Baijuming Law Firm and Its Lawyer, Chen Jiahong''
[Guanyu dui guangxi baijuming lushi shiwusuo ji gai suo chen jiahong
lushi shishi xingzheng chufa de qingkuang tongbao], 15 September 17.
\53\ Liu Xiaoyuan, Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan: I
Have Been Unemployed for Over 2 Years Because of the 709 Case'' [Liu
xiaoyuan lushi: yin 709 an wo bei shiye 2 nian duo le!], 8 September
17.
\54\ ``Defense Lawyers Expelled From Shenzhen Courthouse,
`Protecting Lawyers' Rights' Becomes Empty Talk'' [Bianhu lushi zao
zhuchu shenzhen fayuan ``baozhang lushi quanyi'' cheng kongtan], Radio
Free Asia, 21 September 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Ganzhou
Intermediate People's Court in Jiangxi Barred Retained Lawyer Chi
Susheng From Making Appearance in Ming Jingguo Case'' [Jiangxi
ganzhoushi zhongji fayuan jing bu yunxu ming jingguo an weituo lushi
chi susheng chuting], 16 November 17.
\55\ ``Chen Jian'gang Under [Authorities'] Control While in Xiamen
Handling Case, Movement Again Restricted After Release'' [Chen
jian'gang dao xiamen ban'an shoukong huoshi hou xingdong zai shou
zu'nao], Radio Free Asia, 5 September 17; ``Disbarred Lawyer Tang
Jitian Prohibited From Leaving Country En Route to Hong Kong for
Medical Treatment'' [Bei diaoxiao zhizhao lushi tang jitian fu gang
zhibing bei jinzhi chujing], Radio Free Asia, 12 November 17.
\56\ ``Guangdong Lawyers Association Issues New Rule To Restrict
Lawyers' Online Speech'' [Guangdong luxie xin gui xianzhi lushi wangluo
yanlun], Radio Free Asia, 3 August 18.
\57\ Lawyers' Rights and Interests Concern Net, ``Experienced
Female Attorney Assaulted and Injured by Court Police When Handling
Case in Xi'an Court, No Results After Six Months of Rights Defense''
[Zishen nu lushi zai xi'an fayuan luzhi bei fajing dashang weiquan
liuge duo yue wu guo], 21 November 17; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Rights Defense Lawyer Lu Tingge Assaulted by Court Police in Huili
County, Sichuan, Hospitalized'' [Weiquan lushi lu tingge zai sichuan
huili xian zao fajing ouda ruyuan], 17 November 17.
\58\ See, e.g., ``[Prelude to Crackdown?] Law Firm of Well-Known
Rights Lawyer Mo Shaoping Subjected to Thorough PSB-Led Inspection''
[[Daya qianzou?] zhuming weiquan lushi mo shaoping shiwusuo zao gong'an
daidui checha], Apple Daily, 18 September 17; ``Law Firm of Rights
Lawyer Mo Shaoping, Who Previously Represented Liu Xiaobo and Pu
Zhiqiang, Suddenly Subjected to `Special Inspection' '' [Ceng wei liu
xiaobo, pu zhiqiang bianhu weiquan lushi mo shaoping shiwusuo tuzao
``zhuanxiang jiancha''], Stand News, 19 September 17; ``Multiple
Beijing Agencies Formally Station [Themselves] in Daoheng Law Firm To
Conduct Special Inspection'' [Beijing duoge bumen zhengshi jinzhu
daoheng lusuo zhankai zhuanxiang jiancha], Radio Free Asia, 19
September 17.
\59\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Justice Ministry Pressures Law
Firms,'' 19 September 17; ``Many Law Firms in China Inspected, Might Be
Linked to Stability Maintenance for the 19th Party Congress'' [Zhongguo
duojia lusuo bei cha, yi yu 19 da weiwen youguan], Voice of America, 22
September 17; ``Multiple Beijing Agencies Formally Station [Themselves]
in Daoheng Law Firm To Conduct Special Inspection'' [Beijing duoge
bumen zhengshi jinzhu daoheng lusuo zhankai zhuanxiang jiancha], Radio
Free Asia, 19 September 17.
\60\ ``Many Law Firms in China Inspected, Might Be Linked to
Stability Maintenance for the 19th Party Congress'' [Zhongguo duojia
lusuo bei cha, yi yu 19 da weiwen youguan], Voice of America, 22
September 17; ``Multiple Beijing Agencies Formally Station [Themselves]
in Daoheng Law Firm To Conduct Special Inspection'' [Beijing duoge
bumen zhengshi jinzhu daoheng lusuo zhankai zhuanxiang jiancha], Radio
Free Asia, 19 September 17; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Justice
Ministry Pressures Law Firms,'' 19 September 17; ``Law Firms in
Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, and Yunnan Forced To Suspend Operations
Due to Inspections, Rights Defense Lawyers Worry Another Wave of
Suppression'' [Yue gui yu dian lusuo shoucha yao tingye weiquan lushi
you lingyi bo daya], Radio Free Asia, 22 September 17; ``Law Firm of
Well-Known Chinese Rights Lawyer Mo Shaoping Searched Unexpectedly''
[Zhongguo zhiming weiquan lushi mo shaoping shiwusuo tu zao sousuo],
Apple Daily, 18 September 17.
\61\ State Council, Regulations on Letters and Visits [Xinfang
tiaoli], issued 5 January 05, effective 1 May 05; Benjamin L. Liebman,
``A Populist Threat to China's Courts? '' in Chinese Justice: Civil
Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China, eds. Margaret Y.K. Woo and
Mary E. Gallagher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 269-
313; Liang Shibin, ``Resolutely Fight To Win the Battle on Clearing
Backlog of Petitioning Cases'' [Jianjue da ying huajie xinfang ji'an
gong jian zhan], Legal Daily, 27 April 16. Such grievances reportedly
include cases concerning demolition or expropriation of property,
social security, agriculture, land and resources, and environmental
protection.
\62\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Beijing's State
Bureau of Letters and Visits Surrounded by Tens of Thousands of
Petitioners'' [Beijing guojia xinfangju bei shuwan shangfang minzhong
baowei], 26 February 18; ``Over Ten Thousand Temporary Teachers From 29
Provinces and Municipalities Caused Another National Group Petitioning
Movement'' [29 shengshi yu wan ming minban jiaoshi zai xian quanguo
jiti shangfang chao], Radio Free Asia, 19 October 16; ``Two Thousand
Petitioners From Shaanxi Went Petitioning at Provincial Letters and
Visits Bureau, Ask for Release of Rights Defense Representative''
[Shaanxi liangqian min shi sheng xinfangju shangfang yaoqiu shifang
weiquan daibiao], Radio Free Asia, 13 April 17.
\63\ See, e.g., Liu Yuguo, ``Chengdu Establishes a New Platform for
`Sunshine Petitioning' '' [Chengdu dazao ``yangguang xinfang'' xin
pingtai], People's Daily, 4 May 16; Liu Guiying, ``Problems and
Improvements of the Grassroots Petitioning System'' [Jiceng xinfang
zhidu cunzai de wenti ji wanshan], People's Tribune, 23 March 16; Xu
Dandan, ``Discussion of Shortcomings of China's Petitioning System and
Their Solutions'' [Qiantan zhongguo xinfang zhidu de biduan ji qi
jiejue tujing], Feiyang Net, 27 February 16.
\64\ State Bureau of Letters and Visits, ``State Bureau of Letters
and Visits Convenes Press Conference To Explain `Implementing Measures
on Letters and Visits Accountability System' '' [Guojia xinfang ju
zhaokai xinwen tongqi hui jiedu ``xinfang gongzuo zerenzhi shishi
banfa''], 26 October 16.
\65\ See, e.g., ``Recording From Meeting To Maintain Social
Stability Leaked, Identifies Petitioners as `Opposing the Party and
Government' '' [Weiwen huiyi luyin waixie dingxing shangfang shi ``fan
dang fan zhengfu'' xingwei], Radio Free Asia, 15 May 18; ``China's
Ruling Party in Nationwide Operation To Stop People Complaining About
It,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 March 18; Guo Hongmin, ``Record-Deleting
`Money-Hoarding Syndicate' of State Bureau of Letters and Visits''
[Guojia xinfangju de xiaohao ``liancai tuan''], Prosecutorial View, 2
May 17.
\66\ Bai Yang, ``Nationwide Online Petitioning in 2017 Increased by
Nearly 80 Percent in 2017'' [2017 nian quanguo wangshang xinfang tongbi
shangsheng jin 8 cheng], Xinhua, 24 January 18.
\67\ Liang Shibin, ``Handling Petition Matters by Categories
Completely Rolled Out'' [Fenlei chuli xinfang jizhi quanmian luodi],
Legal Daily, 9 January 18; Liang Shibin, ``27 Provinces Issues Rules
for Handling Petitions by Categories'' [27 sheng chutai xinfang suqiu
fenlei chuli guicheng], Legal Daily, 10 September 17; State Bureau of
Letters and Visits, Workflow Procedures for Lawfully Handling Petition
Matters by Categories [Yifa fenlei chuli xinfang suqiu gongzuo guize],
issued and effective 12 July 17.
\68\ Lu Chao, ``Paradox of Reform on Formalizing the Administrative
Petition System'' [Xingzheng xinfang fazhi hua gaige ji qi zhidu
beilun], East China University of Political Science and Law Journal,
No. 2 (2018), 108-09.
\69\ Ibid., 109-10.
\70\ See, e.g., ``Detained After Being Reprimanded Three Times for
Going to Beijing To Petition, Luoyang Zhao Lingzhou Sues Gaoxin Public
Security'' [Fu jing shangfang xunjie sanci bei juliu, luoyang zhao
lingzhou qisu gaoxin gong'an], Boxun, 16 September 17.
\71\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Shandong
Petitioner Li Yanxian Sentenced to Two and a Half Years for `Picking
Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' '' [Shandong fangmin li yanxiang
``xunxin zishi'' panxing liangnian ban], 10 February 18.
\72\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Guo Hongying Detained on
`Obstructing Official Business' Charge for Seeking Justice for Family,
Father Guo Yinqi Has Freedom Restricted After Going to Beijing To File
Complaint'' [Guo hongying ti qinren shenyuan bei ``fanghai gongwu zui''
daibu, fuqin guo yinqi jinjing konggao bei xianzhi renshen ziyou], 5
April 18.
\73\ See, e.g., ``Petitioners in Beijing Face Examination and
Detention Before 19th Party Congress'' [Shijiuda qian zai jing fangmin
zao qingcha zhuabu], Radio Free Asia, 7 September 17; ``Impeccably
Tight Stability Maintenance in Beijing, Thousand Petitioners Detained
in One Night'' [Beijing weiwen dishui bulou yiye zhua qianming
fangmin], Radio Free Asia, 9 October 17; ``High Pressure Stability
Maintenance During 19th Party Congress, Locating and Detaining
Petitioners Using Advanced Technology'' [Shijiu da qijian gaoya weiwen
gaokeji dingwei zhuabu fangmin], Radio Free Asia, 23 October 17.
\74\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on Status of
Rights Defenders From Different Localities Forcibly Disappeared and
Detained During Two Sessions'' [Lianghui qijian gedi weiquan renshi zao
qiangpo shizong, juliu qingkuang tongbao], 18 March 18.
\75\ State Council, Legal Aid Regulations [Falu yuanzhu tiaoli],
issued 16 July 03, effective 1 September 03, arts. 4-5.
\76\ State Council, Regulations on the Procedure of Handling Legal
Aid Cases [Banli falu yuanzhu anjian chengxu guiding], issued 21
February 12, effective 1 July 12, arts. 8, 13, 20.
\77\ PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lushi fa], passed
15 May 96, amended 29 December 01, 28 October 07, 26 October 12, 1
September 17, effective 1 January 18, art. 47(5); State Council, Legal
Aid Regulations [Falu yuanzhu tiaoli], issued 16 July 03, effective 1
September 03, art. 28(1); Xiao Xianfu, ``Thoughts on Our Nation's Legal
Aid System'' [Wo guo falu yuanzhu zhidu yu sikao], Institute of
International Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, last visited 10
July 18.
\78\ Ministry of Justice, ``30 Provinces Cover Civil Matters in
Legal Aid Services'' [30 ge shengfen jiang minsheng shixiang naru fa
yuan fanwei], 28 September 17.
\79\ Ibid.
\80\ PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lushi fa], passed
28 October 07, effective 1 June 08, amended 26 October 12, 1 September
17, effective 1 January 18, art. 43.
\81\ Ibid., art. 4; All China Lawyers Association, ``Introduction
to the Association,'' [Xiehui jieshao], last visited 5 December 17.
\82\ All China Lawyers Association, ``Rules on Lawyer Advertising
(Trial)'' [Zhonghua quanguo lushi xiehui lushi yewu tuiguang xingwei
guize (shixing)], issued 6 January 18, effective 31 January 18, art.
10(8). See also Wang Lei, Nanjing Lawyers Association, ``Comprehensive
Interpretation of Rules on Lawyer Advertising (Trial)'' [``Lushi yewu
tuiguang xingwei guize (shixing)'' quan jiedu], reprinted in All China
Lawyers Association, 9 March 18. The article indicates that the
regulations became effective on January 31, 2018.
\83\ ``New ACLA Regulation: Lawyers May Not Provide Free Legal
Service'' [Quanguo lu xie xin gui lushi bude tigong mianfei falu fuwu],
Radio Free Asia, 12 March 18.
\84\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, sec. 4; ``Xi
Stresses Boosting Public Confidence in Judicial System,'' Xinhua, 25
March 15; Luo Shuzhen, ``Have Strength To Reform and Innovate, Continue
To Improve Judicial Credibility, Allow the People in Each Judicial Case
To Have the Feeling of Fair Justice'' [Yongyu gaige chuangxin buduan
tigao sifa gongxinli rang renmin qunzhong zai mei yi ge sifa anjian
zhong dou ganshou dao gongping zhengyi], China Court Net, 8 May 15;
State Council Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human Rights in
2014,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 8 June 15, sec. IV. Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain Major Issues Regarding
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian
shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 12 November 13
sec. 9(31)-(34); Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the
Country According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin
yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued October 2013, sec.
4(1)-(6). For further discussion on the Party's Third and Fourth Plenum
Decisions, see CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 157-58; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 267-69.
\85\ Zhou Qiang, ``Supreme People's Court's Report on Status of
Comprehensive Deepening of Judicial Reform by People's Court'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan quanmian shenhua sifa gaige
qingkuang de baogao], National People's Congress, 1 November 17;
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several Major
Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According
to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan
zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, sec. 4; Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain Major Issues Regarding
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian
shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 15 November 13
sec. 9(32)-(34); Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the
Country According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin
yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 28 October 13,
sec. 4(1)-(6). For further discussion on the Party's Third and Fourth
Plenum Decisions, see CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 157-158;
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 267-69.
\86\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``The `Hidden Rules' of China's Criminal
Justice System,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 6 July 17; Stanley
Lubman, ``China's `New Achievements' in Legal Reform Exist More in
Policy Than in Practice,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 3 August 17.
\87\ Zheping Huang, ``Xi Jinping Promised Legal Reform in China,
but Forget About Judicial Independence,'' Quartz, 18 January 17.
\88\ Susan Trevaskes, ``China's Party-Led Rule-of-Law Regime,''
East Asia Forum, 2 October 17.
\89\ National People's Congress, ``Authoritative Interpretation:
Perfecting Organization of the `Two Institutions' To Protect Judicial
Justice'' [Quanwei jiedu: wanshan ``liangyuan'' zuzhi tixi, baozhang
sifa gongzheng], 1 September 17, item 4; Ding Xiaoxi and Luo Sha, ``Our
National Plans To Amend Judges Law To Specify Establishment of Judicial
Selection Committees'' [Woguo ni xiugai faguan fa mingque sheli faguan
linxuan weiyuanhui], Xinhua, 22 December 17.
\90\ National People's Congress, ``Authoritative Interpretation:
Perfecting Organization of the `Two Institutions' To Protect Judicial
Justice'' [Quanwei jiedu: wanshan ``liangyuan'' zuzhi tixi, baozhang
sifa gongzheng], 1 September 17, item 4; Supreme People's Court,
``Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts,'' 3 March 16, sec. VIII.
\91\ Supreme People's Court, ``Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts,''
3 March 16.
\92\ Ding Xiaoxi and Luo Sha, ``Our Nation Plans To Amend Judges
Law To Specify Establishment of Judicial Selection Committees'' [Woguo
ni xiugai faguan fa mingque sheli faguan linxuan weiyuanhui], Xinhua,
22 December 17.
\93\ Li Zongcheng, ``Correctly Understanding the Deep Meaning of
Judicial Appointment Quota System Reform'' [Zhunque bawo faguan yuan'e
zhi gaige de shenke neihan], People's Court Daily, 10 April 18.
\94\ PRC People's Assessors Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin
peishenyuan fa], passed and effective 27 April 18, arts. 2, 5; ``China
Plans To Give `People's Assessors' Bigger Role in Court,'' Xinhua, 26
April 18. See also Wendy Zeldin, Law Library of Congress, ``China:
Revisions to Laws on Judges and Prosecutors Proposed,'' Library of
Congress, Global Legal Monitor, 1 January 18.
\95\ Wang Qi and Xiong Feng, ``Our Nation's Highest Legislative
Body Considers for the First Time Draft People's Assessors Law To
Promote Judicial Democracy'' [Woguo zuigao lifa jiguan shouci shenyi
renmin peishenyuan fa cao'an tuijin sifa minzhu], Xinhua, 22 December
17; Centre for Chinese & Comparative Law (RCCL), School of Law, City
University of Hong Kong, ``Lay Participation in the Chinese Courts,''
RCCL Policy Brief Series: No. 1 (January 2017), 1-4.
\96\ PRC People's Assessors Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin
peishenyuan fa], passed and effective 27 April 18. Yang Buguo,
``Legislation on People's Assessors System: Let People's Assessors Go
Beyond Being `Onlooking Assessors' '' [Peishenyuan zhidu lifa: rang
peishen buzhi ``pei zhao shen''], Beijing News, 24 December 17.
\97\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision To
Authorize the Launching of People's Assessors System Reform Pilot
Programs in Certain Localities [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu
weiyuanhui guanyu shouquan zai bufen diqu kaizhan renmin peishenyuan
zhidu gaige shidian gongzuo de jueding], issued 24 April 15; National
People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on Extending the
People's Assessors System Reform Pilot Program [Quanguo renmin daibiao
dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu yanchang renmin peishenyuan zhidu gaige
shidian qixian de jueding], issued 27 April 17.
\98\ Political Department, Supreme People's Court, ``Expanding
Judicial Democracy, Promoting Judicial Justice, Actually Combining
Professional Judgment of Judicial Officers and Straightforward
Understanding of Common People'' [Kuoda sifa minzhu cujin sifa
gongzheng shixian sifa zhuanye panduan yu qunzhong pusu renzhi de youji
tongyi], National People's Congress, 27 December 17. See also Wendy
Zeldin, Law Library of Congress, ``China: Revisions to Laws on Judges
and Prosecutors Proposed,'' Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor,
1 January 18.
\99\ Liu Siwei, ``Lack of Actual Adjudication Participation Still
Needs To Be Solved Two Years After Start of People's Assessors Reform
Pilot Program'' [Peishen zhidu shidian gaige yi liangnian, pei er bu
shen nanti rengjiu dai po], Caijing, 10 November 17.
\100\ Asia-Pacific Rights and Justice Initiative, United Nations
Development Programme, ``Programming for Justice: Access for All,''
2005, 71, 88.
\101\ Zhou Qiang, ``Supreme People's Court's Report on Status of
Comprehensive Deepening of Judicial Reform by People's Court'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan quanmian shenhua sifa gaige
qingkuang de baogao], National People's Congress, 1 November 17. See
also He Xin, ``First Attempt by Beijing Court System, Portable Smart
Platform Enables Handling of Entire Litigation Process Online''
[Beijing fayuan xitong de shouci changshi zhang shang zhihui pingtai
zaixian quan liucheng ban'an], Beijing Morning Post, 11 January 18; Liu
Xian, ``The Entire Litigation Process Can Be Carried Out Online,
Chongqing Court's `Easy Litigation' Platform Goes Online'' [Da guansi
quan liucheng ke wangshang jinxing chongqing fayuan ``yi su'' pingtai
shangxian], China News, 22 January 18; Ding Xiaoxi, ``SPC's `Smart
Court Navigation System' Is Online and Operating'' [Zuigao fa ``zhihui
fayuan daohang xitong'' shangxian yunxing], Xinhua, 5 January 18; Zhang
Yu and Yin Shen, ``Creating `Internet+' Litigation Service,
Informatization Shows Distinguished Results'' [Dazao ``hulianwang+''
susong fuwu xinxihua yingyong xiaoguo zhuozhu], People's Daily, 7
February 18; Lu Junyu, ``Three Trends in Informatization in Chinese
Courts, Smart Court Prototype Completed'' [Zhongguo fayuan xinxihua
jianshe cheng san ge xin taishi zhihui fayuan chubu jiancheng], Xinhua,
7 February 18.
\102\ Xu Juan, ``Internet Court: Litigating `Key to Key' ''
[Hulianwang fayuan: ``jian dui jian'' da guansi], People's Daily, 6
September 17; Zhou Qiang, ``Supreme People's Court's Report on Status
of Comprehensive Deepening of Judicial Reform by People's Court''
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan quanmian shenhua sifa gaige
qingkuang de baogao], National People's Congress, 1 November 17.
\103\ Xu Juan, ``Internet Court: Litigating `Key to Key' ''
[Hulianwang fayuan: ``jian dui jian'' da guansi], People's Daily, 6
September 17.
\104\ Ibid.
\105\ Zhou Bin, ``Conscientiously Perform Preparatory Work for
Adding Beijing and Guangzhou Internet Courts'' [Qieshi zuo hao zengshe
beijing guangzhou hulianwang fayuan gongzuo], Legal Daily, 19 July 18.
\106\ Zhou Qiang, ``Supreme People's Court's Report on Status of
Comprehensive Deepening of Judicial Reform by People's Court'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan quanmian shenhua sifa gaige
qingkuang de baogao], National People's Congress, 1 November 17.
\107\ Ibid.; Mara Hvistendahl, ``A Revered Rocket Scientist Set in
Motion China's Mass Surveillance of Its Citizens,'' Science, 14 March
18; Eva Pils, Human Rights in China (Medford: Polity Press, 2018), 97;
Simina Mistreanu, ``Life Inside China's Social Credit Laboratory,''
Foreign Policy, 3 April 18.
\108\ Supreme People's Court Provisions on People's Courts'
Disclosure of Judicial Process Information on the Internet [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan tongguo hulianwang gongkai shenpan
liucheng xinxi de guiding], issued 12 February 18, effective 1
September 18, arts. 3, 7. See also Laney Zhang, Law Library of
Congress, ``China: Courts Required To Provide Judicial Process
Information Through One Online Platform,'' Library of Congress, Global
Legal Monitor, 31 July 18.
\109\ Yan Shuai and Song Xinrui, ``Liu Guixiang: Expedite
Construction of Smart Courts, Promote Modernization of Adjudication
System and Capabilities'' [Liu guixiang: jiakuai jianshe zhihui fayuan,
chujin shenpan tixi he shenpan nengli xiandaihua], People's Daily, 23
April 18.
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
IV. Xinjiang
Mass Internment in ``Political Reeducation'' Centers
During the Commission's 2018 reporting year, authorities in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) intensified an
integrated state surveillance and security apparatus that
reportedly targeted members of the region's predominantly
Muslim ethnic minority populations, resulting in detention and
severe limits on their freedom of movement,\1\ expression,\2\
and religion.\3\ XUAR officials reportedly arbitrarily detained
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others in extrajudicial
facilities known as ``political reeducation'' centers or
camps.\4\ Reports from international rights groups, scholars,
and media organizations indicated that as many as 800,000 to
1.1 million individuals had been or remained detained at such
facilities since around April 2017,\5\ after the XUAR People's
Congress adopted the region's first anti-extremism
regulations.\6\ U.S.-based scholar Rian Thum noted in August
2018 that initial estimates of over 1 million detainees were
based on information observers obtained in early 2018, but that
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others ``have continued to disappear,''
and officials have continued to plan the construction of
additional ``political reeducation'' facilities, making current
figures potentially higher.\7\ Security personnel reportedly
detained people in ``reeducation'' facilities based on factors
such as praying in a certain way or engaging in ``religious
extremism''; \8\ having ``politically incorrect'' views; \9\
wanting to travel abroad; \10\ or having foreign connections,
such as previous travel abroad or relatives living in another
country.\11\ Security personnel at these facilities reportedly
subjected detainees to political indoctrination and forced
marching; \12\ overcrowding; \13\ poor quality food; \14\ and
torture,\15\ including in the forms of medical neglect and
maltreatment,\16\ waterboarding,\17\ sleep deprivation,\18\
lack of adequate clothing in cold temperatures,\19\ and other
forms of abuse.\20\ Extralegal and extrajudicial forms of
detention violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights \21\ and Article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\22\
In May 2018, Germany-based scholar Adrian Zenz published
research documenting the existence of online information posted
by the Chinese government, including government procurement
documents and construction bids for ``political reeducation''
centers in the XUAR valued at about 680 million yuan
(approximately US$108 million).\23\ Zenz described how the mass
detentions of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz in ``political
reeducation'' centers began soon after Chen Quanguo took office
as XUAR Party Secretary in August 2016, although
``reeducation'' facilities existed in the XUAR beginning in
2014.\24\ The bids are for projects involving both the
construction of new facilities and the addition of security
elements such as walls, fences, barbed wire, watchtowers, and
guard rooms to existing facilities; several planned facilities
were to exceed 10,000 square meters in size.\25\ In August
2018, Zenz estimated that ``up to 1,300'' ``political
reeducation'' centers existed throughout the XUAR.\26\ An
American scholar noted in May 2018 that a bid invitation posted
on the XUAR Development and Reform Commission website on April
27 indicated that additional ``reeducation'' facilities were
being built.\27\ In August, the Wall Street Journal reported it
had analyzed satellite images, with the help of an expert in
satellite imagery analysis, which revealed ongoing construction
of ``reeducation'' facilities in the XUAR, and that one
facility in Turpan municipality had expanded within the
previous month.\28\ A Canada-based law student also analyzed
satellite images that he said showed the existence and
continued construction of ``political reeducation'' camps.\29\
International observers expressed alarm over the scope and
nature of ``political reeducation'' facilities. In written
testimony presented at a July 2018 Commission hearing, U.S.-
based scholar Rian Thum stated that ``[t]he situation of the
Uyghurs and Kazakhs in China is an emergency that calls for
immediate action.'' \30\ At an August review of China's
compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) \31\ by the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
committee member Gay McDougall said Chinese officials had
turned the XUAR into ``something resembling a massive
internment camp, shrouded in secrecy, a sort of no-rights
zone.'' \32\ The Chinese government has publicly denied the
existence of facilities used for arbitrary detention in the
XUAR, with senior Communist Party official Hu Lianhe telling
the committee: ``The argument that 1 million Uighurs are
detained in re-education centres is completely untrue . . .
[t]here are no such things as re-education centers.'' \33\
A Western researcher and rights advocate presented a case
that the severity and extent of ``political reeducation''
detentions and other rights abuses in the XUAR are consistent
with ``crimes against humanity,'' as defined by the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. In a CNN opinion
piece, the researcher argued that the situation in the XUAR
``fits the textbook definition of crimes against humanity.''
\34\ Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides a list of 11 acts
that may constitute ``crimes against humanity,'' ``when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.'' \35\
Regional government authorities reportedly ordered
officials in some XUAR jurisdictions to meet quotas to detain a
certain percentage or number of the local population in
``political reeducation'' camps.\36\ Officials in Qaraqash
(Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture, told Radio Free Asia (RFA)
that they had received orders to detain 40 percent of local
residents in ``political reeducation'' centers, but they were
having difficulties meeting this quota.\37\ XUAR authorities
reportedly placed the children of individuals detained in
``political reeducation'' centers in orphanages in some
jurisdictions in such high numbers that the orphanages became
overcrowded, and in some instances officials responded by
sending some children to facilities in provinces outside of the
XUAR.\38\
In addition to ``reeducation'' facilities detaining inmates
24 hours a day, reports from rights groups and media documented
other types of ``reeducation'' facilities and programs.\39\ In
August 2018, international non-governmental organization (NGO)
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reported the findings of
a survey it conducted with the China-based NGO Equal Rights
Initiative (ERI) on ``reeducation'' programs in the XUAR,
including information on both detentions and forced attendance
of ``education sessions'' during the day or evening.\40\
According to the report, based partly on interviews conducted
with Uyghurs living in rural areas in southern XUAR, county or
municipal authorities administered ``reeducation'' camps, and
township or village government officials administered day and
evening ``study sessions'' or ``open camps.'' \41\ CHRD and ERI
estimated that as of June 2018, authorities may have forced
around 2.2 million XUAR residents to attend day or evening
``education sessions.'' \42\ The groups reported that ``study
session'' attendees consisted mostly of women and elderly
individuals whose family members had been detained or had
traveled abroad.\43\
The Commission observed numerous reports regarding
individuals detained at ``political reeducation'' centers, some
of which are described below.
Detention-related deaths; detentions of the
elderly, minors, and the ill. Elderly people,\44\
minors,\45\ and ill individuals \46\ were reportedly
among those detained in the centers. Renowned Uyghur
Islamic scholar, 82-year-old Muhammad Salih Hajim,
reportedly died in January 2018, either in a
``political reeducation'' camp or another type of
detention facility.\47\ In May, Ayhan Memet, the
elderly mother of World Uyghur Congress president
Dolkun Isa, died in a ``political reeducation'' camp,
following years of official harassment in connection
with her son's rights advocacy.\48\ In November 2017,
88-year-old Uyghur religious scholar Abdulnehed Mehsum
died in a ``political reeducation'' center in Hotan
prefecture.\49\ In June 2018, Radio Free Asia (RFA)
reported that more than two dozen Uyghurs had died in
``political reeducation'' centers in Qaraqash county,
Hotan, most of whom were elderly individuals who had
suffered complications from high blood pressure.\50\
RFA reported that four people died in ``political
reeducation'' centers in Yengisar (Yingjisha) county,
Kashgar prefecture, between August and October 2017,
including 71-year-old Hesen Imin \51\ and Sawut
Raxman,\52\ who was in his 60s.\53\ The four deaths
were reportedly due in part to the ``poor conditions
and psychological pressure'' at the ``political
reeducation'' centers.\54\ Uyghur teenager Yaqupjan
Naman reportedly died in a ``political reeducation''
center in or around late February 2018.\55\ A 34-year-
old Uyghur cook in Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture (KAP), Abdughappar Abdujappar, reportedly
died in a hospital in late 2017 after he became ill
while detained for nearly six months in a ``political
reeducation'' center.\56\ An elderly Uyghur woman
reportedly died in March 2018 due to being ``unable to
cope with the pressure and terrible conditions'' at a
``political reeducation'' center in Ghulja (Yining)
county, Ili KAP, where she was detained in connection
with having relatives living in Egypt.\57\ A 65-year-
old Uyghur businessman from Ghulja (Yining)
municipality, Ili KAP, Abdulreshit Seley Hajim,
reportedly died in or around June 2018 after being
detained for nine months in a ``political reeducation''
center, and his brother told RFA those who saw his body
said ``he was hit with a blunt object on his head.''
\58\ Additional deaths reported to have occurred in or
after detention at ``political reeducation'' camps
included 24-year-old Nurimangul Memet, in Bayangol
(Bayinguoleng) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture,\59\ and
Adalet Teyip, the mother of Canada-based Uyghur
Abdulaziz Sattar.\60\
Detentions of Uyghur officials, their family
members, and other prominent Uyghur individuals. Uyghur
officials and their family members \61\ were among
those whom authorities held in ``political
reeducation'' centers or detained in relation to
``political reeducation'' efforts, as were other
prominent members of Uyghur society. In January 2018,
authorities reportedly detained Pezilet Bekri, the
Party Secretary of a subdistrict committee in Kashgar
prefecture, in a ``political reeducation'' center,
after she had expressed sympathy toward people detained
in the centers.\62\ Bekri's responsibilities as Party
Secretary had included overseeing the detention of
individuals and their transfer to ``political
reeducation'' centers.\63\ In May 2017, authorities
sentenced two officials in Hotan, Omerjan Hesen and
Elijan Ehmet, to 11 years in prison, reportedly in
large part for failing to send Uyghurs to ``political
reeducation'' centers.\64\ In August 2018, the New York
Times reported that Rahile Dawut, a Uyghur scholar well
regarded for her research on traditional Uyghur
culture, had disappeared in December 2017, and her
family and friends expressed the belief that
authorities had detained her in a ``reeducation'' camp
or another type of detention facility.\65\ Authorities
also targeted other prominent Uyghur individuals for
detention in ``political reeducation'' centers,\66\
including Kashgar city-based Uyghur businessmen
Abdujelil Hajim,\67\ Gheni Haji,\68\ Memet Tursun
Haji,\69\ and Imin Hajim \70\ for displaying signs of
``religious extremism''; hotelier Obulkasim Haji, whom
authorities took into custody in December while he was
undergoing treatment at a hospital in Urumqi
municipality; \71\ Urumqi-based Uyghur scholar and poet
Abduqadir Jalalidin; \72\ Uyghur pop singer Ablajan
Ayup; \73\ and Uyghur soccer player Erfan Hezimjan
(also known as Erfan Hezim)--formerly a member of
China's national youth soccer team--reportedly for
``visiting foreign countries,'' after he trained and
competed abroad.\74\
Detentions in the XUAR of family members of
U.S.-based Uyghurs. XUAR authorities detained dozens of
XUAR-based family members of six U.S.-based Uyghur RFA
journalists in ``political reeducation'' camps and
other locations, and otherwise harassed their family
members.\75\ Authorities reportedly sentenced some of
the family members to prison terms; subjected some
elderly and other family members to medical
maltreatment and neglect; and refused to provide
information on the whereabouts and health conditions of
some family members.\76\ In written testimony submitted
at a July 2018 Commission hearing, RFA journalist
Gulchehra Hoja stated that ``more than two dozen of my
relatives in China are missing.'' \77\ XUAR authorities
reportedly also detained dozens of family members of
U.S.-based rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer, including her
children and grandchildren, and possibly detained at
least some of them in ``political reeducation''
centers.\78\ Those detained reportedly included sons
Ablikim and Alim Abdureyim, whom authorities have
previously detained and subjected to torture.\79\ In
addition, U.S.-based Uyghur poet and filmmaker Tahir
Hamut told the Wall Street Journal that Chinese
authorities had detained his brother in the XUAR after
the newspaper published an article in late 2017 that
included comments from Hamut.\80\
Detentions of Kazakh citizens; testimony of an
ethnic Kazakh forced to teach at a ``political
reeducation'' camp. XUAR authorities also detained
Kazakh citizens who had previously held Chinese
citizenship in ``political reeducation'' centers when
they traveled back to the XUAR. In one such case,
authorities detained Kayrat Samarkan from October 2017
to February 2018, during which authorities subjected
him to severe maltreatment.\81\ Samarkan said
authorities forced detainees to study political
subjects, sing Communist songs, and participate in
military-style training.\82\ According to Samarkan,
authorities punished rule-breakers, people who were
late for studies, and others by placing them in
handcuffs and ankle cuffs, subjecting them to
waterboarding, or strapping them into a ``tiger
chair.'' \83\ In another case, authorities detained
Omir Bekali in both a prison and a ``political
reeducation'' center for a total of more than seven
months without charge, initially shackling him to a bed
and refusing to provide him with medication for his
high blood pressure.\84\ In the ``political
reeducation'' center, where he was detained for several
weeks, authorities placed him in solitary confinement
for part of the time, and deprived him of food for 24
hours.\85\ According to Bekali, authorities punished
detainees with ``solitary confinement, beatings and
food deprivation'' for refusing to ``criticize the
people and things they love.'' \86\ Bekali said
authorities also punished some detainees by forcing
them to eat pork in spite of their Muslim faith, and
likewise forced detainees accused of being ``religious
extremists'' to drink alcohol.\87\ In July 2018, a
court in Kazakhstan tried Chinese citizen Sayragul
Sauytbay (also known as Sairagul Sawytbai), an ethnic
Kazakh, on the charge of ``illegally crossing the
border'' after she fled China in April 2018.\88\
Sauytbay told the court that in 2018, Chinese
authorities sent her to work ``in a political
reeducation camp in the mountains,'' which she said
held over 2,500 ethnic Kazakhs.\89\ She also told the
court that Chinese authorities would consider her
public discussion of XUAR ``reeducation'' facilities as
``revealing state secrets,'' and that they would
sentence her to death if Kazakh government officials
deported her to China.\90\ On August 1, the court
released Sauytbay from custody, giving her a six-month
suspended sentence, but lawyers expressed concern that
Chinese officials could still ask the government of
Kazakhstan to extradite her.\91\
Intensified Security Measures
During this reporting year, central and regional government
authorities implemented intense security measures throughout
the XUAR, using security personnel, surveillance technology,
mass detentions, and other methods to tighten state control
over predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in the XUAR.
International observers highlighted the leading role of XUAR
Party Secretary Chen Quanguo in heightening repressive security
measures.\92\ In October 2017, Chen was selected as a member of
the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau
(Politburo),\93\ likely a signal that high-level officials
approved his work in the XUAR and previously in the Tibet
Autonomous Region.\94\
XUAR authorities carried out the mass, involuntary
collection of DNA and other biometric information from XUAR
residents; \95\ conducted widespread and frequent checks of
residents' cell phones and required residents to install
monitoring applications on their cell phones; \96\ maintained
checkpoints and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on
roads, and in train stations; \97\ operated ``convenience
police stations,'' a form of street-level management that
enhances authorities' ability to closely surveil and police
local communities; \98\ and installed cameras in and around
mosques and homes, in order to monitor residents' religious and
private activities.\99\ Rights advocates indicated that
officials appeared to be focused on using much of the
surveillance and data collection to monitor and repress
Uyghurs.\100\ XUAR authorities reportedly use a centralized
system called the ``Integrated Joint Operations Platform''
(IJOP) to gather and analyze data from closed-circuit cameras,
computers, smartphones, license plates, and identification
cards, as well as individuals' family planning, banking, and
travel records.\101\ Authorities used such data to identify
individuals they would later subject to investigation and
detention, including in ``political reeducation'' camps.\102\
[For more information on authorities' use of surveillance
technology in the XUAR, see Section III--Commercial Rule of Law
and Human Rights.]
Both XUAR and central government officials increased
spending on security in the region. According to research into
official data on security expenditures compiled by Germany-
based scholar Adrian Zenz, XUAR authorities increased their
spending on security measures by nearly 93 percent in 2017
compared to 2016; a sample of 18 Chinese provinces and regions
saw an average increase of just under 12 percent in 2017.\103\
Zenz also detailed evidence showing that central government
authorities likely spent billions of yuan to fund the
deployment of People's Armed Police in the XUAR in recent
years.\104\
Analysis of Chinese government data that was published by
international non-governmental organization (NGO) Chinese Human
Rights Defenders (CHRD) in July 2018 showed that 21 percent of
all criminal arrests in China in 2017 took place in the XUAR,
which is home to only 1.5 percent of China's population.\105\
CHRD reported that, according to the research it conducted with
the China-based NGO Equal Rights Initiative, the number of
criminal arrests in the XUAR increased by 731 percent in 2017
over 2016, coinciding with policies implemented by XUAR Party
Secretary Chen Quanguo to enhance regional security following
his appointment to the XUAR in August 2016.\106\ These figures
do not include detentions in ``reeducation'' camps, which are
carried out extrajudicially, though authorities reportedly
transferred some ``reeducation'' camp detainees to prison after
a period of time.\107\
XUAR authorities implemented security measures at the
grassroots level in order to combat ``separatism.'' In January
2018, XUAR government chairperson Shohrat Zakir stated that
continued ``terrorist'' activity and ``an intense struggle
against separatists'' in the XUAR necessitated an extended
security crackdown.\108\ He said authorities would continue to
carry out measures to guarantee security in the XUAR, including
the fang hui ju program, in which officials conduct mandated
visits to rural ethnic minority families, as well as measures
to combat ``double-faced'' people, referring to those who
``pretend to support national unity but secretly spread
separatism and extremism.'' \109\ Under the fang hui ju
program, teams of police officers or officials visit Uyghurs'
homes to compile dossiers of their personal information,
reporting on ``extremist'' behavior such as fasting during
Ramadan or abstaining from alcohol.\110\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intrusive Homestay Programs
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under programs similar to the fang hui ju program, such as ``pairing
relatives'' (jiedui renqin) and ``pairing assistance'' (jiedui bangfu
or jiedui fubang), authorities assign cadres and government workers
(usually of Han ethnicity) to live with ethnic minority families in
their homes for certain periods of time, in part, according to official
rhetoric, to contribute to stability and security in the XUAR.\111\
According to a December 2017 report in the Party-run newspaper Xinjiang
Daily, under one such program, begun in 2017, XUAR officials sent
nearly 1 million cadres and workers to live with local families from
targeted ethnic groups.\112\ In April 2018, international rights NGO
ChinaAid Association reported that authorities had sent male ``working
group personnel'' between the ages of 25 and 45 to live with Kazakh
women and children in the XUAR while officials detained the men in
these families in ``political reeducation'' centers.\113\ According to
an April Agence France-Presse report, authorities sent a ``work team''
comprised of staff members from a university in the XUAR on a similar
program, to a village in Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture.\114\
Officials sent more than 100 people, one-fifth of the village's adult
population, to ``political reeducation'' centers, after compiling
dossiers identifying them as having engaged in ``religious extremism''
or other types of ``untrustworthy'' behavior.\115\ According to a May
Human Rights Watch report, under the ``pairing relatives'' program,
cadres spend at least five days every two months in families' homes,
during which they carry out political indoctrination, make the families
participate in activities such as singing the Chinese national anthem,
and document online the families' domestic activities.\116\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
XUAR authorities undertook additional efforts to collect
residents' information during this reporting year. Officials in
the XUAR, including from the Urumqi Municipal Public Security
Bureau, reportedly issued a registration form requiring
individuals working in Urumqi who were not in possession of an
Urumqi household registration permit (hukou) \117\ to provide
information on their personal details, such as whether they had
visited any of 26 countries officials had linked to
terrorism.\118\ According to one of these forms, which an
exiled Uyghur provided to the Wall Street Journal, certain
sections on the form ask officials to rate individuals on a
six-point scale, and to classify them as ```safe,' `average,'
or `unsafe.' '' \119\ According to Human Rights Watch, one
Urumqi resident said authorities required him to submit a
similar form to the IJOP system in 2017, including information
about travel to the 26 ``sensitive'' countries, how many times
he prayed each day, and the name of his regular mosque.\120\
Freedom of Religion
XUAR officials continued to use measures that narrowed the
scope of Muslim residents' ability to peacefully practice their
religious faith and express their Muslim cultural identity,
including through the following actions:
Restrictions on the Quran. Authorities in the
XUAR imposed restrictions on the Quran, including
through confiscations and prohibitions on the study of
the Quran. In early 2018, in Sa'ertamu township, Qaba
(Habahe) county, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous
Prefecture (KAP), local officials reportedly asked
residents to sign a pledge stating that neither they
nor their family members would study the Quran or learn
Arabic.\121\ In September 2017, officials in locations
throughout the XUAR reportedly confiscated Qurans,
prayer mats, and other items of Islamic significance
from local Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz residents.\122\
In November, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that a
court in Burultokay (Fuhai) county, Altay (Aletai)
prefecture, sentenced ethnic Kazakh Manat Hamit, a
government employee, to 16 years and 6 months in prison
in May 2017 on charges related to ``disseminating
terrorism-related audiovisual material'' and ``inciting
ethnic hatred,'' after authorities found files
containing Quranic recitations on his computer.\123\ In
December, RFA reported that the Ministry of Public
Security had designated the storage of Quranic
audiovisual material on cell phones as ``terrorist'' in
nature.\124\
Targeting religious leaders. Officials
throughout the XUAR detained individuals for violating
laws and regulations regarding religion. According to a
January 2018 RFA report, the number of imams detained
in ``political reeducation'' camps and other locations
was so large that in some locations, no imams were
available to preside over funerals.\125\ In November
2017, public security officials in Sa'ertamu criminally
detained ethnic Kazakh imam Salheti Haribek, allegedly
because he had carried out religious activities without
a required government permit.\126\
Obstructing burial and other religious
practices. In April 2018, RFA reported that authorities
in two counties in Hotan prefecture had set up ``burial
management centers'' that Uyghur exiles believed would
prevent Uyghurs from performing religious funerary
rites.\127\ Reports emerging in recent months also
indicated that officials in the XUAR were building
crematoria in order to eliminate Uyghurs' funerary and
burial traditions.\128\ In February 2018, RFA reported
that officials in Kashgar prefecture had launched a
campaign about two months earlier through local police
stations to urge local Muslim residents not to believe
in religion.\129\
Controlling the observance of Ramadan. As in
previous reporting years,\130\ XUAR officials
reportedly imposed controls on Muslims' observance of
Ramadan. In Ili KAP and Changji Hui Autonomous
Prefecture, authorities reportedly forced restaurants
to stay open and students to eat at school during
Ramadan.\131\ In Peyziwat (Jiashi) county, Kashgar, a
student told RFA that officials at his school had
required all students to sign agreements stating that
they would not fast during the Ramadan period.\132\
Freedom of Expression
MOBILE PHONE AND INTERNET USE
Central and regional officials placed restrictions on
communication tools and implemented strict controls on internet
activity. Officials in multiple XUAR jurisdictions reportedly
continued to order residents to install an application (app)
called ``Web-Cleansing Guard'' (jingwang weishi) on their cell
phones that enables the government to surveil their online
activities, monitoring ``terrorist'' and ``illegal religious''
content.\133\ The app reportedly served as one of the
mechanisms of the integrated surveillance and security network
police operated to monitor residents, with the capacity to send
all of the file names from a mobile device to a government
server.\134\ [For more information on internet restrictions in
China, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
Members of predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in
the XUAR were at risk of detention for sharing or storing
``extremist'' or other types of online content, or for
possessing a certain type of communications device. Security
personnel manning checkpoints reportedly detained Kazakhs,
Uyghurs, and other ethnic minority individuals throughout the
XUAR if they carried an iPhone, holding them in custody for up
to several weeks.\135\ Authorities reportedly detained Uyghurs,
Kazakhs, and others for storing and sharing items on mobile
devices that officials said promoted terrorism or
extremism.\136\ Measures aimed at countering ``extremism'' in
the XUAR in recent years reportedly have often threatened to
criminalize Uyghurs' peaceful practice of religious faith and
other peaceful activities.\137\ In November 2017, state media,
citing official figures, reported that officials in various
locations in the XUAR had detained 15 people, including 9
Uyghurs, a Hui individual, a Kazakh individual, and 4 Han
Chinese individuals, on suspicion of using the internet to
promote, store, and transmit material involving terrorism and
violence, religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and
fabricating rumors.\138\ Among the laws and regulations
authorities said those detained had violated were regulations
the XUAR People's Congress issued in December 2016 that
provided for punishment for residents who spread ``false'' or
``harmful'' information on the internet.\139\ In addition, in
September 2017, a U.S.-based news and commentary website
reported that authorities had sentenced the 25-year-old niece
of imprisoned Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti to 10 years in prison
after security personnel inspecting her cell phone in early
2016 found photographs of Tohti and two RFA articles about
him.\140\
FOREIGN JOURNALISTS OBSTRUCTED IN THE XUAR
Foreign journalists reported facing increased official
restrictions on reporting from the XUAR in 2017. According to a
report published by the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China
(FCCC) in January 2018,\141\ 73 percent of journalists
completing an FCCC survey who traveled to the XUAR in 2017 said
officials and security personnel told them their work was
``prohibited or restricted,'' an increase of 31 percent over
the previous year's responses.\142\ The FCCC report noted the
detention of a Globe and Mail correspondent whom security
officials held for three hours in the XUAR in August 2017,
after he tried to interview residents of a township in Yarkand
(Shache) county, Kashgar prefecture.\143\ The FCCC reported
that XUAR authorities detained an anonymous American journalist
for 11 hours.\144\ [For more information on obstruction of
foreign journalists in China, see Section II--Freedom of
Expression.]
Freedom of Movement
As in past reporting years,\145\ XUAR officials continued
to restrict Uyghurs' and Kazakhs' ability to travel freely, in
violation of Chinese law and international legal
standards.\146\ Beginning in October 2016, authorities in many
locations throughout the XUAR reportedly ordered residents to
turn their passports in to police, with varying deadlines of up
to four months.\147\ In October 2017, authorities reportedly
broadened the passport recall to include Uyghurs living in
areas of China outside the XUAR, requiring them to submit their
passports to the nearest police station or to their
school.\148\ Officials also reportedly required XUAR residents
and those with a household registration permit (hukou)
registered in the XUAR to submit to the collection of their
biometric information prior to applying for passports or
conducting other ``hukou-related business.'' \149\
Labor
According to an October 2017 RFA report, in recent months,
government authorities had sent hundreds of women and children
from Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture, to Aksu
prefecture, to engage in forced agricultural labor and other
heavy labor.\150\ A police officer in Qaraqash reportedly said
authorities had detained the men from these families in
``political reeducation'' centers, and that if the women and
children refused to participate in the forced labor,
authorities could detain some of them in the ``political
reeducation'' centers as well.\151\ Forced labor violates the
International Labour Organization's Convention Concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labour.\152\ [For more information on
forced labor in China, see Section II--Human Trafficking.]
Language Policy and ``Bilingual Education''
XUAR government authorities continued to expand Mandarin-
focused ``bilingual education'' in the region, a policy that
contravenes international law.\153\ Under ``bilingual
education,'' class instruction takes place primarily in
Mandarin, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by
ethnic minority groups.\154\ In October 2017, the Chinese
Communist Party's United Front Work Department reported that
the total number of ethnic minority students at all levels in
the XUAR who had received ``bilingual education'' had increased
from 1.22 million in 2012 to 1.92 million in 2016, and between
2013 and 2016, authorities had invested 6 billion yuan
(approximately US$954.98 million) to build 3,075 rural
``bilingual kindergartens'' in the XUAR.\155\ Official media
reported in April 2018 that XUAR authorities planned to
construct additional kindergartens during the year, in order to
improve students' Mandarin skills.\156\ The plans continued a
regional government initiative to expand ``bilingual
education'' at the preschool level between 2016 and 2020 using
central government funds.\157\ [For more on language policy
toward ethnic minority populations, as well as information on
the United Front Work Department and ethnic policy, see Section
II--Ethnic Minority Rights.]
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
Notes to Section IV--Xinjiang
\1\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs `Wanting To
Travel Abroad,' '' Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18; ``China Expands Recall
of Passports to Uyghurs Outside of Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 8
December 17; Mercy A. Kuo, ``Uyghur Biodata Collection in China,'' The
Diplomat, 28 December 17.
\2\ See, e.g., PEN America, ``Forbidden Feeds: Government Controls
on Social Media in China,'' 13 March 18; ``China Detains Five More
Ethnic Kazakhs Over `Ethnic Hatred,' `Terrorist' Content,'' Radio Free
Asia, 19 December 17; Nithin Coca, ``China's Xinjiang Surveillance Is
the Dystopian Future Nobody Wants,'' Engadget, 22 February 18.
\3\ See, e.g., ``China Detains Five More Ethnic Kazakhs Over
`Ethnic Hatred,' `Terrorist' Content,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 December
17; Joyce Huang, ``Stepped-up Surveillance of Uighurs Sends `Relatives'
Into Homes,'' Voice of America, 26 December 17; ``Chinese Police Order
Xinjiang's Muslims To Hand in All Copies of the Quran,'' Radio Free
Asia, 27 September 17.
\4\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Xinjiang `Political
Education' Detainees,'' 10 September 17; Gerry Shih, ``China's Mass
Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,'' Associated Press, 18
May 18; Adrian Zenz, ``New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education
Campaign in Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 10, 15 May 18; Bruce Pannier, ``Kazakhstan Confronts China Over
Disappearances,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1 June 18. For
examples of the various terms that official and unofficial sources have
used to refer to ``political education'' centers or camps, see, e.g.,
Adrian Zenz, ``New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign
in Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15
May 18 (``anti-extremism education training centers'' (qu jiduanhua
jiaoyu peixun zhongxin) and ``educational training centers'' (jiaoyu
peixun zhongxin)); ``Uyghur Businessman Flees Abroad, Family Members
Suffer Abuse in [Training Center]'' [Weiwu'er shangren tao wang haiwai
jiaren guan ``peixun zhongxin'' canzao nuedai], Radio Free Asia, 19
January 18 (``training centers'' (peixun zhongxin)); Human Rights
Watch, ``China: Free Xinjiang `Political Education' Detainees,'' 10
September 17 (``anti-extremism training classes'' (qu jiduanhua peixun
ban) and ``education and transformation training centers'' (jiaoyu
zhuanhua peixun zhongxin)); ``Ten Ethnic Kazakhs Detained in Karamay,
Xinjiang, Nearly 100 Uyghurs Fined for Refusing To Stop Fasting''
[Xinjiang kelamayi 10 ming hasake zu ren bei bu jin bai weiwu'er zu ren
ju fengzhai bei fakuan], Radio Free Asia, 16 June 17 (``anti-extremism
training schools'' (qu jiduanhua peixun xuexiao)); ``Ethnic Cleansing
in Xinjiang, a Large Number of Uyghurs Are Detained in `Reform Centers'
'' [Xinjiang zhongzu qingxi daliang weizu ren bei guan ``gaizao
zhongxin''], Radio Free Asia, 28 March 18 (``education and reform
centers'' (jiaoyu gaizao zhongxin)); Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Over a
Hundred Ethnic Minority Christians in Xinjiang Sent to `Training
Center' '' [Xinjiang yu bai ming shaoshu minzu jidu tu bei song
``peixun zhongxin''], 3 February 18 (``vocational skills training
centers'' (zhiye jineng peixun zhongxin), ``political study centers''
(zhengzhi xuexi zhongxin), and ``study centers'' (xuexi zhongxin));
Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``90-Year-Old Man Exposes `Training Center'
Torture Beyond Human Imagination'' [Jiu xun laoren pu ``peixun
zhongxin'' kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18 (``wild imam
training centers'' (ye ahong peixun zhongxin)); ``Islamic Imams in
Xinjiang Are Gradually Disappearing, There Is a Lack of Imams To
Preside Over Funerals When Muslims Pass Away'' [Xinjiang yisilan jiao
ahong zhujian xiaoshi musilin qushi que ahong zhuchi zangli], Radio
Free Asia, 6 January 18. (``wild imam education centers'' (ye ahong
jiaoyu zhongxin)). See also Jeremy Daum, ``XJ Education Centers Exist,
but Does Their Legal Basis? '' China Law Translate (blog), 14 August
18.
\5\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs `Wanting To Travel
Abroad,' '' Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18; ``A Summer Vacation in
China's Muslim Gulag,'' Foreign Policy, 28 February 18; Adrian Zenz,
``New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in
Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 10, 15
May 18; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative,
``China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced
Into Re-Education Programs,'' 3 August 18.
\6\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations
[Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qu jiduanhua tiaoli], issued 29 March 17,
effective 1 April 17; ``Xinjiang Rolls Out China's First Law To Purge
Religious Extremism,'' Xinhua, 30 March 17. See also Eva Dou, Jeremy
Page, and Josh Chin, ``China's Uighur Camps Swell as Beijing Widens the
Dragnet,'' Wall Street Journal, 17 August 18. For more information on
the XUAR Anti-Extremism Regulations, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 283, 286.
\7\ Rian Thum, ``China's Mass Internment Camps Have No Clear End in
Sight,'' Foreign Policy, 22 August 18.
\8\ ``New Guidelines on Uyghur `Signs of Extremism' Issued to
Xinjiang Authorities,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 November 17; ``Elderly Among
Thousands of Uyghurs Held in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps,'' Radio Free
Asia, 26 October 17.
\9\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghurs `Wanting To Travel
Abroad,' '' Radio Free Asia, 27 March 18.
\10\ Ibid.
\11\ ``Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education
Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 March 18; Gohar Abbas and Ben Dooley,
``Pakistanis Distressed as Uighur Wives Vanish Into China's Shadowy
Network of `Reeducation Centres,' '' Hong Kong Free Press, 26 March 18;
``Chinese Police Detain Kazakhs With Overseas Ties, Send Them for `Re-
education,' '' Radio Free Asia, 30 October 17.
\12\ ``A Summer Vacation in China's Muslim Gulag,'' Foreign Policy,
28 February 18; ``Interview: `I Lost All Hope of Surviving,' '' Radio
Free Asia, 30 January 18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Xinjiang
`Political Education' Detainees,'' 10 September 17.
\13\ See, e.g., ``Overcrowded Political Re-Education Camps in Hotan
Relocate Hundreds of Uyghur Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 January
18; ``Uyghur Inmates in Xinjiang's Korla City Endure Overcrowded Re-
Education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 January 18; ``Children of
Detained Uyghurs Face `Terrible' Conditions in Overcrowded Xinjiang
Orphanages,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17.
\14\ See, e.g., ``A Summer Vacation in China's Muslim Gulag,''
Foreign Policy, 28 February 18; ChinaAid, ``90-Year-Old Man Exposes
`Training Center' Torture Beyond Human Imagination'' [Jiu xun laoren pu
``peixun zhongxin'' kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18.
\15\ See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``90-Year-Old Man Exposes `Training
Center' Torture Beyond Human Imagination'' [Jiu xun laoren pu ``peixun
zhongxin'' kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18; ``Interview:
`I Lost All Hope of Surviving,' '' Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18.
\16\ See, e.g., ``Uyghur Inmates Suffer Health Complications Due to
Neglect in Xinjiang Detention Centers,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 January
18; ``Interview: `I Lost All Hope of Surviving,' '' Radio Free Asia, 30
January 18; Amnesty International, ``Separated Souls: Uighur
Journalist's Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,'' 16
March 18.
\17\ Emily Rauhala, ``New Evidence Emerges of China Forcing Muslims
Into `Reeducation' Camps,'' Washington Post, 10 August 18.
\18\ See, e.g., ``Interview: `I Lost All Hope of Surviving,' ''
Radio Free Asia, 30 January 18; ChinaAid, ``90-Year-Old Man Exposes
`Training Center' Torture Beyond Human Imagination'' [Jiu xun laoren pu
``peixun zhongxin'' kuxing chaochu renlei xiangxiang], 24 March 18.
\19\ See, e.g., ``Uyghur Inmates in Xinjiang's Korla City Endure
Overcrowded Re-Education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 January 18;
``Uyghur Inmates Suffer Health Complications Due to Neglect in Xinjiang
Detention Centers,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 January 18.
\20\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Xinjiang
`Political Education' Detainees,'' 10 September 17; ``A Summer Vacation
in China's Muslim Gulag,'' Foreign Policy, 28 February 18.
\21\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9.
\22\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9(1). See also CECC, 2014 Annual
Report, 9 October 14, 81; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV,
Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
last visited 17 June 18. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR.
See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principle 4; International
Justice Resource Center, ``Increased Oppression of Chinese Human Rights
Defenders Draws International Criticism,'' 22 February 16.
\23\ Adrian Zenz, ``New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education
Campaign in Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 10, 15 May 18; Adrian Zenz, `` `Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward
a Healthy Heart Attitude'--China's Political Re-Education Campaign in
Xinjiang,'' Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 11.
\24\ Adrian Zenz, ``New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education
Campaign in Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 10, 15 May 18; Adrian Zenz, `` `Thoroughly Reforming Them Toward
a Healthy Heart Attitude'--China's Political Re-Education Campaign in
Xinjiang,'' Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 3, 4, 6.
\25\ Adrian Zenz, ``New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education
Campaign in Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18,
Issue 10, 15 May 18.
\26\ Eva Dou, Jeremy Page, and Josh Chin, ``China's Uighur Camps
Swell as Beijing Widens the Dragnet,'' Wall Street Journal, 17 August
18.
\27\ Rian Thum, ``What Really Happens in China's `Re-Education'
Camps,'' New York Times, 15 May 18.
\28\ Eva Dou, Jeremy Page, and Josh Chin, ``China's Uighur Camps
Swell as Beijing Widens the Dragnet,'' Wall Street Journal, 17 August
18.
\29\ Jessica Batke, ``What Satellite Images Can Show Us About `Re-
education' Camps in Xinjiang: A Q&A With Shawn Zhang,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, 23 August 18; Shawn Zhang, ``List of Re-Education Camps in
Xinjiang,'' Medium (blog), last visited 19 August 18.
\30\ Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's
Human Rights Crisis, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, 26 July 18, Written Statement Submitted by Rian Thum,
Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans, 1.
\31\ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2106
(XX) of 21 December 65, entry into force 4 January 69.
\32\ Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports
That It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps,'' New York Times, 10 August
18. See also UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
``Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Reviews the
Report of China,'' 13 August 18.
\33\ Stephanie Nebehay, ``China Rejects Allegations of Detaining
Million Uighurs in Camps in Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 13 August 18.
According to the Reuters article, Hu described the existence of
``vocational education and employment training centres'' and
``education'' programs for ``criminals,'' telling the committee
``[t]hose deceived by religious extremism . . . shall be assisted by
resettlement and education.'' UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, ``Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Reviews the Report of China,'' 13 August 18.
\34\ Michael Caster, ``China's Crimes Against Humanity You've Never
Heard Of,'' CNN, 26 July 18. See also China Digital Times, `` `Crimes
Against Humanity' in Xinjiang Draw Attention,'' 30 July 18; Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 98, entry
into force 1 July 02, art. 7.
\35\ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July
98, entry into force 1 July 02, art. 7. According to Article 7 of the
Rome Statute, any of the following acts may constitute a ``crime
against humanity'' when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible
transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence
of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act described herein or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; enforced
disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and other inhumane
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. See also
Michael Caster, ``China's Crimes Against Humanity You've Never Heard
Of,'' CNN, 26 July 18; China Digital Times, `` `Crimes Against
Humanity' in Xinjiang Draw Attention,'' 30 July 18.
\36\ ``Nearly 10 Percent of Residents of a Xinjiang Township
Detained by Chinese Authorities,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17;
``Xinjiang Authorities Up Detentions in Uyghur Majority Areas of Ghulja
City,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 March 18; Adrian Zenz, `` `Thoroughly
Reforming Them Toward a Healthy Heart Attitude'--China's Political Re-
Education Campaign in Xinjiang,'' Academia.edu, updated 15 May 18, 6,
15; Rian Thum, ``What Really Happens in China's `Re-Education' Camps,''
New York Times, 15 May 18; Mercy A. Kuo, ``Uyghur Biodata Collection in
China,'' The Diplomat, 28 December 17.
\37\ ``Nearly 10 Percent of Residents of a Xinjiang Township
Detained by Chinese Authorities,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 December 17.
\38\ ``Children of Detained Uyghurs Face `Terrible' Conditions in
Overcrowded Xinjiang Orphanages,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17;
James A. Millward, ``What It's Like To Live in a Surveillance State,''
New York Times, 3 February 18.
\39\ See, e.g., ``Authorities in Xinjiang's Kashgar Detain Uyghurs
at `Open Political Re-Education Camps,' '' Radio Free Asia, 9 May 18.
\40\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative,
``China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced
Into Re-Education Programs,'' 3 August 18.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ Ibid.
\44\ ``Elderly Among Thousands of Uyghurs Held in Xinjiang Re-
Education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 October 17.
\45\ ``Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education
Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 March 18.
\46\ Amnesty International, ``Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist's
Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,'' 16 March 18.
\47\ ``Uyghur Muslim Scholar Dies in Chinese Police Custody,''
Radio Free Asia, 29 January 18; Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Uyghur
Human Rights Project Condemns Death in Custody of Scholar Muhammad
Salih Hajim,'' 29 January 18. For more information on Muhammad Salih
Hajim, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-
00107.
\48\ ``Uyghur Exile Group Leader's Mother Died in Xinjiang
Detention Center,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 July 18; ``Interview: `The Most
Painful Part of Losing My Mother,' '' Radio Free Asia, 13 June 18.
\49\ World Uyghur Congress, ``Press Release: WUC Confirms Death in
Custody of Yet Another Uyghur Religious Scholar Abdulehed Mehsum,'' 29
May 18.
\50\ ``More Than Two Dozen Uyghurs From One Xinjiang County
Perished in Re-Education Camps,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 June 18.
\51\ For more information on Hesen Imin, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00153.
\52\ For more information on Sawut Raxman, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00154.
\53\ ``In Saghan, Yengisar, Reports of 4 Deaths in `Education
Centers' Emerge'' [Yengisar saghanda az degende 4 kishining
``terbiyelesh merkizi'' de olgenliki ashkarilandi], Radio Free Asia, 30
October 17.
\54\ Ibid.
\55\ ``Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education
Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 March 18; ``In Yopurgha, `Education Center'
Death of 17-Year-Old Yaqupjan Naman Confirmed'' [Yopurghida 17 yashliq
yaqupjan namanning ``terbiyilesh merkizi'' deolgenliki ashkarilandi],
Radio Free Asia, 9 March 18. For more information on Yaqupjan Naman,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00267.
\56\ ``Uyghur Father of Two Dies After Falling Ill in Xinjiang Re-
Education Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 April 18. For more information on
Abdughappar Abdujappar, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00175.
\57\ ``Elderly Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang
`Political Re-Education Camp,' '' Radio Free Asia, 24 May 18.
\58\ ``Uyghur Man Buried Amid Strict Security After Latest Xinjiang
Reeducation Camp Death,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 June 18.
\59\ ``24-Year-Old Nurimangul Memet Dies in `Education Center' in
Bugur'' [24 yashliq nuriman'gul memet bugurdiki ``terbiyelesh merkizi''
de olup ketken], Radio Free Asia, 4 June 18. For more information on
Nurimangul Memet, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2018-00395.
\60\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Exporting Persecution: Uyghur Diaspora
Haunted by Anxiety, Guilt as Family Held in Chinese Camps,'' Globe and
Mail, 12 August 18. For more information on Adalet Teyip, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00431.
\61\ See, e.g., ``Interview: `I Thought I Had Completed My Duty as
a Father,' '' Radio Free Asia, 3 January 18. See also ``Families of
Uyghur Police Officers Among Those Detained in Xinjiang's Kashgar,''
Radio Free Asia, 6 November 17.
\62\ ``Uyghur Official Arrested for Sympathizing With Political
`Re-Education Camp' Detainees,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 April 18. For more
information on Pezilet Bekri, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00160.
\63\ Ibid.
\64\ ``Xinjiang Jails Uyghur Civil Servants Over Lack of Enthusiasm
for Anti-Extremist Campaigns,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 May 18. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2018-00264 on Omerjan Hesen and 2018-00265 on Elijan Ehmet.
\65\ Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``Star Scholar Disappears as
Crackdown Engulfs Western China,'' New York Times, 10 August 18. See
also PEN America, ``Disappearance of Uyghur Scholar an Example of
Attempts To Erase Uyghur Culture,'' 10 August 18; Nick Holdstock,
``Where Is Rahile Dawut? '' London Review of Books, LRB Blog, 16 August
18.
\66\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Authorities Jail Four Wealthiest Uyghurs
in Xinjiang's Kashgar in New Purge,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 January 18.
\67\ For more information on Abdujelil Hajim, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00093.
\68\ For more information on Gheni Haji, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00090.
\69\ For more information on Memet Tursun Haji, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00091.
\70\ For more information on Imin Hajim, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00092.
\71\ ``Chinese Authorities Detain Uyghur Hotelier in Xinjiang's
Kashgar City,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 May 18.
\72\ ``Prominent Uyghur Scholar Detained in Xinjiang Capital
Urumqi: Official,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 April 18. For more information
on Abduqadir Jalalidin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00268.
\73\ Rachel Harris and Aziz Isa Elkun, ``Uyghur Pop Star Detained
in China,'' Freemuse, 11 June 18; ``Popular Uyghur Singer's Whereabouts
Unknown, Believed Detained in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,'' Radio Free
Asia, 18 May 18.
\74\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Detain Uyghur Pro Footballer for
`Visiting Foreign Countries,' '' Radio Free Asia, 13 April 18. See also
FIFPro, ``FIFPro Statement: Chinese Player `Detained,' '' 13 June 18.
For more information on Erfan Hezimjan, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00313.
\75\ ``The Families Left Behind: RFA's Uyghur Reporters Tell the
Stories of Their Family Members' Detentions,'' Radio Free Asia, last
visited 15 June 18; Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Beijing Squeezes
Exiles in U.S. by Detaining Family Back Home,'' Wall Street Journal, 30
March 18; Amnesty International, ``Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist's
Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,'' 16 March 18; Ben
Dooley, ``US Journalists Fear China Detained Their Families,'' Agence-
France Presse, 5 March 18; Srinivas Mazumdaru, ``Uighur Journalist
Gulchehra Hoja: `I Have My Own Sad Story To Tell,' '' Deutsche Welle, 5
March 18; Austin Ramzy, ``After U.S.-Based Reporters Exposed Abuses,
China Seized Their Relatives,'' New York Times, 1 March 18; ``Rights
Groups Condemn China's Detention of RFA Reporters' Relatives,'' Radio
Free Asia, 1 March 18; Simon Denyer, ``China Detains Relatives of U.S.
Reporters in Apparent Punishment for Xinjiang Coverage,'' Washington
Post, 28 February 18. For more information on the detained family
members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Gulchehra Hoja, see the
following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database:
2018-00373 on Elshat Abduweli, 2018-00382 on Gheyret Abdurahman, 2018-
00383 on Daniyar Abdukerim, 2018-00384 on Gulpiya Almas, 2018-00385 on
Izhar Almas, 2018-00386 on Madina Mutalip, 2018-00387 on Mirzat
Mutalip, 2018-00388 on Mehray Kahar, 2018-00392 on Kaisar Keyum, 2018-
00393 on Chimangul Zikri, and 2018-00394 on Abduqeyum Hoja. For more
information on the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service
journalist Shohret Hoshur, see the following records in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2015-00471 on Tudaxun Hoshur,
2016-00002 on Shawket Hoshur, 2016-00003 on Rexim Hoshur, 2018-00367 on
Arzigul, 2018-00369 on Ilshat Shawket, 2018-00370 on Ilyar Shawket,
2018-00371 on Tursun, and 2018-00372 on Saniye. For more information on
the detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Jilil
Kashgary, see the following records in the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database: 2018-00352 on Seidiehmet Yunus, 2018-00354 on
Tursunmemet Yunus, 2018-00355 on Kerim Yunus, 2018-00356 on Nurmemet,
2018-00357 on Asiya Yasin, 2018-00358 on Abduhamit Ablet, and 2018-
00359 on Abdurusul Ablet. For more information on the detained brother
of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Kurban Niyaz, see the following record
in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00360 on Hasanjan
Niyaz. For more information on the detained family members of RFA
Uyghur Service journalist Mamatjan Juma, see the following records in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2018-00361 on Abduqadir
Juma and 2018-00362 on Ahmetjan Juma. For more information on the
detained family members of RFA Uyghur Service journalist Eset Sulaiman,
see the following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database: 2018-00363 on Ehet Sulaiman, 2018-00364 on Saadet Kichik, and
2018-00365 on Memteli Sopi.
\76\ ``The Families Left Behind: RFA's Uyghur Reporters Tell the
Stories of Their Family Members' Detentions,'' Radio Free Asia, last
visited 21 May 18; Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Beijing Squeezes
Exiles in U.S. by Detaining Family Back Home,'' Wall Street Journal, 30
March 18; Amnesty International, ``Separated Souls: Uighur Journalist's
Unbreakable Resolve To Help Her Detained Family,'' 16 March 18;
Srinivas Mazumdaru, ``Uighur Journalist Gulchehra Hoja: `I Have My Own
Sad Story To Tell,' '' Deutsche Welle, 5 March 18.
\77\ Surveillance, Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's
Human Rights Crisis, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, 26 July 18, Written Testimony of Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur
Service Journalist, Radio Free Asia, 1.
\78\ `` `More Than 30' Relatives of Uyghur Exile Leader Rebiya
Kadeer Detained in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 October 17; Ben
Blanchard, ``Amnesty Says China Detains 30 Relatives of Exiled Uighur
Leader,'' Reuters, 14 November 17; Amnesty International, ``Urgent
Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained,'' 14
November 17. For more information on the detained family members of
Rebiya Kadeer, see the following records in the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database: 2006-00071 on Alim Abdureyim, 2006-00084 on Ablikim
Abdureyim, 2006-00091 on Kahar Abdureyim, 2018-00028 on Aygul, 2018-
00035 on Aydidar Kahar, 2018-00036 Zulpikar Kahar, and 2018-00037 on
Dildar Kahar.
\79\ `` `More Than 30' Relatives of Uyghur Exile Leader Rebiya
Kadeer Detained in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 October 17; Amnesty
International, ``Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist
Arbitrarily Detained,'' 14 November 17.
\80\ Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Beijing Squeezes Exiles in U.S.
by Detaining Family Back Home,'' Wall Street Journal, 30 March 18. See
also Jonathan Hiskes, Simpson Center for the Humanities, University of
Washington, ``Ethnography of a Surveillance State,'' reprinted in
Medium, 5 June 18; Darren Byler, ``Another Scene in the Fight Against
Islamophobia,'' anthro(dendum) (blog), 14 March 18.
\81\ Bruce Pannier, ``Kazakh Man Recounts `Reeducation' in Western
Chinese Camp,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 April 18. For more
information on Kayrat Samarkan, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2018-00453.
\82\ Simon Denyer, ``Former Inmates of China's Muslim `Reeducation'
Camps Tell of Brainwashing, Torture,'' Washington Post, 17 May 18.
\83\ Ibid.
\84\ ``Interview: `I Lost All Hope of Surviving,' '' Radio Free
Asia, 30 January 18; Gerry Shih, ``China's Mass Indoctrination Camps
Evoke Cultural Revolution,'' Associated Press, 18 May 18. Media
organizations have also rendered Omir Bekali's name as Omurbek Eli. For
more information on Omir Bekali, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00449.
\85\ Gerry Shih, ``China's Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural
Revolution,'' Associated Press, 18 May 18.
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ Simon Denyer, ``Former Inmates of China's Muslim `Reeducation'
Camps Tell of Brainwashing, Torture,'' Washington Post, 17 May 18.
\88\ Almaz Kumenov, ``Ethnic Kazakh's Life in Balance as
Deportation to China Looms,'' Eurasianet, 17 July 18.
\89\ Ibid.
\90\ ``China's `Prison-Like Re-Education Camps' Strain Relations
With Kazakhstan as Woman Asks Kazakh Court Not To Send Her Back,''
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 17 July
18; Almaz Kumenov, ``Ethnic Kazakh's Life in Balance as Deportation to
China Looms,'' Eurasianet, 17 July 18.
\91\ Emily Rauhala, ``New Evidence Emerges of China Forcing Muslims
Into `Reeducation' Camps,'' Washington Post, 10 August 18. See also
Gene A. Bunin, ``Central Asia Struggles With Fallout From China's
Internment of Minorities,'' Foreign Policy, 15 August 18.
\92\ See, e.g., Jessica Batke, ``Central and Regional Leadership
for Xinjiang Policy in Xi's Second Term,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 11
May 18; ``China Has Turned Xinjiang Into a Police State Like No
Other,'' Economist, 31 May 18.
\93\ ``Chen Quanguo--Member of Political Bureau of CPC Central
Committee,'' Xinhua, 25 October 17.
\94\ China Digital Times, ``Qurans, Prayer Mats Confiscated in
Xinjiang,'' 28 September 17; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ``Chen
Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in
Tibet and Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue
12, 21 September 17.
\95\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA From
Millions,'' 13 December 17; Megha Rajagopalan, ``This Is What a 21st-
Century Police State Really Looks Like,'' BuzzFeed, 17 October 17; Josh
Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's
Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,'' Wall Street Journal, 19
December 17; Mercy A. Kuo, ``Uyghur Biodata Collection in China,'' The
Diplomat, 28 December 17.
\96\ Adam Lynn, Open Technology Fund, ``App Targeting Uyghur
Population Censors Content, Lacks Basic Security,'' 9 April 18; Joseph
Cox, ``Chinese Government Forces Residents To Install Surveillance App
With Awful Security,'' Vice, Motherboard, 9 April 18; Roseanne Gerin,
``Report: Uyghurs in China Forced To Install Surveillance App That
Leaves Their Data Unsecured,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 April 18; Nithin
Coca, ``China's Xinjiang Surveillance Is the Dystopian Future Nobody
Wants,'' Engadget, 22 February 18; Josh Chin and Clement Burge,
``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State Overwhelms
Daily Life,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 December 17; Gerry Shih, ``AP
Exclusive: Digital Police State Shackles Chinese Minority,'' Associated
Press, 17 December 17; Emily Feng, ``Security Clampdown Bites in
China's Xinjiang Region,'' Financial Times, 13 November 17.
\97\ ``Uyghurs Left Waiting While Han Chinese Bypass Checkpoints in
Xinjiang's Hotan City,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 October 17; Megha
Rajagopalan, ``This Is What a 21st-Century Police State Really Looks
Like,'' BuzzFeed, 17 October 17; Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve
Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily
Life,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 December 17; James A. Millward, ``What
It's Like to Live in a Surveillance State,'' New York Times, 3 February
18; Josh Chin, ``About To Break the Law? Chinese Police Are Already On
To You,'' Wall Street Journal, 27 February 18.
\98\ Nithin Coca, ``China's Xinjiang Surveillance Is the Dystopian
Future Nobody Wants,'' Engadget, 22 February 18; Josh Chin and Clement
Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State
Overwhelms Daily Life,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 December 17.
\99\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in
Minority Region,'' 26 February 18; Josh Chin and Clement Burge,
``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance State Overwhelms
Daily Life,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 December 17; Simon Denyer,
``Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big Drive for Total
Surveillance,'' Washington Post, 7 January 18; Peter Apps,
``Commentary: China's Muslim Minority Faces a Modern Orwellian
Nightmare,'' Reuters, 14 May 18.
\100\ Josh Chin, ``About To Break the Law? Chinese Police Are
Already On To You,'' Wall Street Journal, 27 February 18; Roseanne
Gerin, ``Report: Uyghurs in China Forced To Install Surveillance App
That Leaves Their Data Unsecured,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 April 18.
\101\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in
Minority Region,'' 26 February 18.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Adrian Zenz, ``China's Domestic Security Spending: An
Analysis of Available Data,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol.
18, Issue 4, 12 March 18. The average increase of 11.9 percent for
security expenditures was based on budgeted figures for 5 provinces or
regions and on actual spending in the other 13 provinces and regions.
See also CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 282.
\104\ Adrian Zenz, ``Corralling the People's Armed Police:
Centralizing Control To Reflect Centralized Budgets,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 7, 24 April 18.
\105\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative,
``China's Counter-Terror Campaign Indiscriminately Targets Ethnic &
Religious Minorities in Xinjiang,'' 25 July 18.
\106\ Ibid.
\107\ Ibid; China Digital Times, ``Xinjiang Arrests Account for 21%
of Total in China in 2017,'' 25 July 18.
\108\ ``Government Work Report--January 22, 2018, First Session of
the Thirteenth People's Congress in the XUAR, Regional Chairman Shohrat
Zakir'' [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao--2018 nian 1 yue 22 ri zai xinjiang
weiwu'er zizhiqu di shisan jie renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi
shang zizhiqu zhuxi xuekelaiti zhake'er], Xinjiang Daily, 28 January
18; ``China Says `Terror' Risks in Xinjiang Remains Serious Despite
Security Push,'' Reuters, 29 January 18; China Digital Times,
``Xinjiang To Continue Terror Crackdown,'' 1 February 18.
\109\ ``Government Work Report--January 22, 2018, First Session of
the Thirteenth People's Congress in the XUAR, Regional Chairman Shohrat
Zakir'' [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao--2018 nian 1 yue 22 ri zai xinjiang
weiwu'er zizhiqu di shisan jie renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi
shang zizhiqu zhuxi xuekelaiti zhake'er], Xinjiang Daily, 28 January
18; ``China Has Turned Xinjiang Into a Police State Like No Other,''
Economist, 31 May 18; Leng Shumei, ``Uyghur Teachers Caught Spreading
Religious Extremism,'' Global Times, 17 April 17. According to the
Party-run media outlet Global Times, which used the term ``two-faced,''
`` `[t]wo-faced' teachers refer to those who pretend to support
national unity but secretly spread separatism and extremism.''
\110\ ``China Has Turned Xinjiang Into a Police State Like No
Other,'' Economist, 31 May 18.
\111\ Zhang Hui, ``Xinjiang Officials Assigned as Relatives to
Uyghur Villagers for Ethnic Unity Campaign,'' Global Times, 11 January
18; Shang Lucun et al., ``The Roots of Tianshan Cedars Link Together,
Ethnic Unity Links Hearts Together, Xinjiang PSB Science and Technology
Corps Links Relatives Together Across Thousands of Miles in Southern
Xinjiang'' [Tianshan xuesong gen lian gen minzu tuanjie xin lian xin
xinjiang gong'an ting kexin zongdui nanjiang qianli jieqin], China News
Agency, 6 July 17; ``China Detains Kazakhs During `Unity Week' in
Troubled Xinjiang Region,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 December 17; Joyce
Huang, ``Stepped-Up Surveillance of Uighurs Sends `Relatives' Into
Homes,'' Voice of America, 26 December 17; ``Xinjiang Towns, Villages
Celebrate Party Spirit on Loudspeaker Systems,'' Global Times, 4
January 18; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Xinjiang Closes Ethnic Minority
Schools, Xinyuan No. 4 High School Changed Into Political Study Base''
[Xinjiang guanbi shaoshu minzu xuexiao xinyuan si zhong biangeng wei
zhengzhi xuexi jidi], 4 April 18.
\112\ ``Bring All Ethnic Groups Together in an Excellent Manner''
[Yi youliang zuofeng ba ge zu qunzhong ningju zai yiqi], Xinjiang
Daily, 31 December 17. See also Zhang Hui, ``Xinjiang Officials
Assigned as Relatives to Uyghur Villagers for Ethnic Unity Campaign,''
Global Times, 11 January 18; ``Taking `Relatives' Some Spiritual
Nourishment'' [Gei qinqi song qu jingshen shiliang], Xinjiang Daily, 12
December 17.
\113\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Xinjiang Closes Ethnic Minority
Schools, Xinyuan No. 4 High School Changed Into Political Study Base''
[Xinjiang guanbi shaoshu minzu xuexiao xinyuan si zhong biangeng wei
zhengzhi xuexi jidi], 4 April 18. See also ChinaAid, ``Family of Child
Bride Imprisoned for Murder,'' 4 April 18.
\114\ Ben Dooley, `` `Eradicate the Tumours': Chinese Civilians
Drive Xinjiang Crackdown,'' Agence-France Presse, 26 April 18.
\115\ Ibid.
\116\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes
in Muslim Region,'' 13 May 18. See also ``China Has Turned Xinjiang
Into a Police State Like No Other,'' Economist, 31 May 18.
\117\ For more information on China's hukou system, see, e.g.,
Priyanka Juneja, ``China's Hukou System,'' The Diplomat, 14 July 17.
\118\ Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How
China's Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,'' Wall Street
Journal, 19 December 17; Rights Defense Network, ``26 Countries Put
Onto an Involved-With-Terrorism List, More Than 10 Muslims Sentenced in
Xinjiang'' [26 guo bei lie she kong mingdan xinjiang 10 duo ming
musilin bei panxing], 10 December 17. The 26 countries reportedly
included Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Pakistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Libya, South Sudan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Russia, and Turkey.
\119\ Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How
China's Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,'' Wall Street
Journal, 19 December 17.
\120\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in
Minority Region,'' 26 February 18.
\121\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Xinjiang Officials Ban the `Quran,'
Habahe County Forces Muslims To Sign Pledge'' [Xinjiang guanfang jin
``gulanjing'' habahe xian po musilin qian chengnuo shu], 3 March 18.
\122\ ``Chinese Police Order Xinjiang's Muslims To Hand in All
Copies of the Quran,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 September 17; ``RFA
Exclusive: Large-Scale Seizure of `Qurans' in Xinjiang, Ban on the Sale
of Goods Related to Kazakhstan'' [RFA dujia: xinjiang da guimo shouyao
``gulanjing'' jin shou she ha shangpin], Radio Free Asia, 27 September
17; ``Xinjiang's Korla City Seizes Qurans, Prayer Mats From Uyghur
Muslims,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17; Uyghur Human Rights Project,
``UHRP Expresses Concern About Reports of Quran Confiscations in East
Turkestan,'' 29 September 17.
\123\ ``China Jails Ethnic Kazakh Man Over Quranic Recitation
Audio,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 November 17. For more information on Manat
Hamit, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-
00176.
\124\ `` `Storing and Sharing Audiovisual Content From the `Quran'
Can Be' `Punished' as Class Three Terrorist Violence'' [``Chucun
fenxiang `gulanjing' yin shi neirong, kebei'' san ji baokong
``lunchu''], Radio Free Asia, 22 November 17.
\125\ ``Islamic Imams in Xinjiang Are Gradually Disappearing, There
Is a Lack of Imams To Preside Over Funerals When Muslims Pass Away''
[Xinjiang yisilan jiao ahong zhujian xiaoshi musilin qushi que ahong
zhuchi zangli], Radio Free Asia, 6 January 18. See also ``China
Detains, Brainwashes `Wild' Imams Who Step Out of Line in Xinjiang,''
Radio Free Asia, 16 October 17.
\126\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Xinjiang Officials Ban the `Quran,'
Habahe County Forces Muslims To Sign Pledge'' [Xinjiang guanfang jin
``gulanjing'' habahe xian po musilin qian chengnuo shu], 3 March 18.
For more information on Salheti Haribek, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2018-00205.
\127\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Use `Burial Management Centers' To
Subvert Uyghur Funeral Traditions,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 April 18.
\128\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Rapidly Building Crematoria To
Extinguish Uyghur Funeral Traditions,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 June 18;
Josh Rogin, ``Ethnic Cleansing Makes a Comeback--In China,'' Washington
Post, 2 August 18.
\129\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Launch Anti-Religion Campaign Through
Local Police Stations,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 February 18.
\130\ For information on official religious restrictions enforced
during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., CECC, 2017
Annual Report, 5 October 17, 287; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October
16, 287; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 126, 286.
\131\ ChinaAid, ``Xinjiang Authorities Force Muslims To Break
Ramadan Fast,'' 23 May 18.
\132\ ``Uyghur Schoolchildren, Parents Forced To Abstain From
Fasting During Ramadan,'' Radio Free Asia, 21 May 18.
\133\ Adam Lynn, Open Technology Fund, ``App Targeting Uyghur
Population Censors Content, Lacks Basic Security,'' 9 April 18; Megha
Rajagopalan, ``China Is Forcing People To Download an App That Tells
Them To Delete `Dangerous' Photos,'' BuzzFeed, 9 April 18; Joseph Cox,
``Chinese Government Forces Residents To Install Surveillance App With
Awful Security,'' Vice, Motherboard, 9 April 18; Roseanne Gerin,
``Report: Uyghurs in China Forced To Install Surveillance App That
Leaves Their Data Unsecured,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 April 18; CECC, 2017
Annual Report, 5 October 17, 288.
\134\ Adam Lynn, Open Technology Fund, ``App Targeting Uyghur
Population Censors Content, Lacks Basic Security,'' 9 April 18. See
also Megha Rajagopalan, ``China Is Forcing People To Download an App
That Tells Them To Delete `Dangerous' Photos,'' BuzzFeed, 9 April 18;
Joseph Cox, ``Chinese Government Forces Residents To Install
Surveillance App With Awful Security,'' Vice, Motherboard, 9 April 18;
Roseanne Gerin, ``Report: Uyghurs in China Forced To Install
Surveillance App That Leaves Their Data Unsecured,'' Radio Free Asia,
10 April 18.
\135\ ``Xinjiang Minorities Using Apple Phones Are Blocked''
[Xinjiang shaoshu minzu shiyong pingguo shouji shouzu], Radio Free
Asia, 18 January 18. See also Pei Li and Cate Cadell, ``At Beijing
Security Fair, an Arms Race for Surveillance Tech,'' Reuters, 30 May
18.
\136\ Darren Byler, ``Perspectives: Navigating Xinjiang's Security
Checkpoints,'' Eurasianet, 30 April 18; ``Xinjiang Minorities Using
Apple Phones Are Blocked'' [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu shiyong pingguo
shouji shouzu], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 18. See also ``China Jails
Ethnic Kazakh Man Over Quranic Recitation Audio,'' Radio Free Asia, 30
November 17.
\137\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Big Data Fuels
Crackdown in Minority Region,'' 26 February 18; Uyghur Human Rights
Project, ``Briefing: China's New Counter-Terrorism Law and Its Human
Rights Implications for the Uyghur People,'' 1 February 16; ``Chinese
Authorities Ban Muslim Names Among Uyghurs in Hotan,'' Radio Free Asia,
24 September 15.
\138\ ``Xinjiang Internet Information Office and Other Relevant
Departments Investigate and Handle Fifteen Model Cases of the
Dissemination of Illegal Information'' [Xinjiang hulian wang xinxi
bangongshi deng youguan bumen chachu shiwu qi chuanbo weifa xinxi
dianxing anli], Tianshan Net, 5 November 17. See also ``11 Uyghurs and
Kazakhs Criminally Detained for Involvement in `Terrorism and Extremist
Religion' '' [11 ming weizu he hazu she ``kong yu jiduan zongjiao'' bei
xingju], Radio Free Asia, 6 November 17; ``China Holds 9 Uyghurs, 2
Others Over `Terrorist, Extremist' Videos,'' Radio Free Asia, 7
November 17.
\139\ ``Xinjiang Internet Information Office and Other Relevant
Departments Investigate and Handle Fifteen Model Cases of the
Dissemination of Illegal Information'' [Xinjiang hulian wang xinxi
bangongshi deng youguan bumen chachu shiwu qi chuanbo weifa xinxi
dianxing anli], Tianshan Net, 5 November 17. For information on the
regulations, see Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress
Standing Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations To
Prevent and Punish the Spread of False Information on the Internet
[Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu fangfan he chengzhi wangluo chuanbo xujia
xinxi tiaoli], issued 1 December 16, effective 10 December 16; Edward
Wong, ``Xinjiang, Tense Chinese Region, Adopts Strict Internet
Controls,'' New York Times, 10 December 16; Christian Shepherd and
Michael Martina, ``China Imposes Hefty Fines for Fake or Harmful News
in Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 8 December 16; ``Xinjiang Passes New
Regulations To Prevent and Punish `False' and `Harmful' Information on
the Internet'' [Xinjiang tongguo fangzhi wangluo ``xujia'' he
``youhai'' xinxi de tiaoli], Radio Free Asia, 12 December 16. See also
CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 289.
\140\ ``News About Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti on the Third
Anniversary of His Sentencing: No News,'' China Change, 22 September
17. See also ``Ilham Tohti's Niece Sentenced to 10 Years for Storing
Picture on Cell Phone, Kazakh Businessman Suddenly Dies After Being
Detained for 7 Months'' [Yilihamu zhinu shouji cun tu mi pan 10 nian
hazu shangren bei bu qi yue hou turan siwang], Radio Free Asia, 25
December 17; ``Rights Groups Demand Uyghur Scholar's Freedom on
Anniversary of Life Sentence,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 September 17. For
more information on Ilham Tohti, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 284; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 284. See also
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2009-00315.
\141\ Steven Butler, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Conditions
Deteriorate for Foreign Press in China, FCCC Finds,'' 31 January 18.
\142\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Access Denied:
Surveillance, Harassment and Intimidation as Reporting Conditions in
China Deteriorate,'' January 2018, 2, 5.
\143\ Ibid., 5, 12; Ann Hui, ``Globe and Mail Journalist Detained
by Chinese Police in Xinjiang Region,'' Globe and Mail, 24 August 17.
\144\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Access Denied:
Surveillance, Harassment and Intimidation as Reporting Conditions in
China Deteriorate,'' January 2018, 6, 12.
\145\ See, e.g., CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17, 289-90;
CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 172, 289.
\146\ See, e.g., PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao
fa], passed 29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, arts. 2, 15;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2); United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, last visited 31 August 18. China has signed but not ratified
the ICCPR.
\147\ Edward Wong, ``Police Confiscate Passports in Parts of
Xinjiang, in Western China,'' New York Times, 1 December 16; ``China
Recalls Passports Across Xinjiang Amid Ongoing Security Crackdown,''
Radio Free Asia, 20 October 16; Yu Mengtong, ``Shihezi, Xinjiang,
Tightens Border Controls Again, Public Security Requires Residents To
Turn in Passports'' [Xinjiang shihezi biankong zai shoujin gong'an yao
jumin shangjiao huzhao], Voice of America, 21 October 16.
\148\ ``China Expands Recall of Passports to Uyghurs Outside of
Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 December 17.
\149\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Minority Region Collects DNA
from Millions,'' 13 December 17.
\150\ ``Uyghur Women and Children Endure Heavy Labor Amid
Detentions in Xinjiang's Hotan,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 October 17.
\151\ Ibid.
\152\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30.
\153\ Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 92, art. 4.
\154\ ``Tongue-Tied: Teaching Uighur Children Mandarin Will Not
Bring Stability to Xinjiang,'' Economist, 27 June 15; Uyghur Human
Rights Project, ``Uyghur Voices on Education: China's Assimilative
`Bilingual Education' Policy in East Turkestan,'' May 2015, 3-4, 10,
12, 16, 18, 21, 26-28. For Commission analysis, see ``Xinjiang
Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual
Education,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
\155\ United Front Work Department, ``(Under the Microscope: Five
Years of Encouragement) Xinjiang's Economic and Social Standards Have
Developed Steadily and Healthily, People's Sense of Achievement Has
Continuously Risen'' [(Weiguan: dili wu nian jian) xinjiang jingji
shehui pingwen jiankang fazhan, renmin qunzhong huode gan buduan
zengqiang], 10 October 17.
\156\ Jiang Fu'er, ``Xinjiang: Expanding Inclusive Kindergarten
Coverage This Year'' [Xinjiang: jinnian jiang kuoda pu hui xing you'er
yuan fugai mian], China Education Daily, 2 April 18; Zhao Yusha,
``Xinjiang To Build More Preschools for Mandarin Fluency,'' Global
Times, 2 April 18.
\157\ ``Xinjiang To Strengthen Preschool Bilingual Education,''
Xinhua, 6 May 16.
Tibet
Tibet
V. Tibet
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama or His Representatives
There has been no formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's
representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government
officials since the ninth round of dialogue was held in January
2010.\1\ In its 2017 Report on Tibet Negotiations, the U.S.
State Department reiterated the policy of the U.S. Government
``to encourage meaningful and direct dialogue between Chinese
authorities and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without
preconditions, to lead to a settlement that resolves
differences.'' \2\ In keeping with the Chinese government's
longstanding policy,\3\ executive deputy head of the Party's
United Front Work Department Zhang Yijiong stated on October
21, 2017, that the Chinese government opposes meetings between
foreign officials and the Dalai Lama, calling him ``a leader of
a separatist group that is engaging in separatist activities.''
\4\ At a November 23, 2017, meeting of the Indian Chamber of
Commerce in Kolkata, the Dalai Lama reaffirmed the Middle Way
Approach of seeking autonomy for Tibet within the People's
Republic of China,\5\ stating that the Tibetan people ``are not
seeking independence'' and that they ``want to stay with
China.'' \6\ On April 3, 2018, Central Tibetan Administration
(CTA) President Lobsang Sangay stated that ``back channel
talks'' continue between the Chinese government and the CTA.\7\
Reincarnation and the 14th Dalai Lama
The Chinese central government maintains that only it has
the right to decide the Dalai Lama's successor,\8\ a policy at
odds with international standards of religious freedom.\9\ The
14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who reached the age of 83 in
July 2018,\10\ has stated that he will ``consult the high Lamas
of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and
other concerned people who follow Tibetan Buddhism, and re-
evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should
continue or not,'' \11\ and has hinted that he may select a
successor while he is still alive.\12\
The Chinese government continues to suppress expression of
devotion to or support for the Dalai Lama. In February 2018,
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Public Security Department
issued a circular encouraging people to report illegal
activities of ``criminal groups connected to the Dalai
clique.'' \13\ Despite these and other measures attempting to
undermine the stature of the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhists
continue to revere him as their spiritual leader and take great
risks to access his teachings, possess an image of him, or
express their devotion in other ways.\14\ For example, on May
8, 2018, public security officials in Chiduo (Trido) township,
Suo (Sog) county, Naqu (Nagchu) municipality, TAR, detained a
father of two for possession of books and audio recordings of
the Dalai Lama.\15\
Chinese authorities also continued to expand the public
profile of their chosen Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, whom
Party and government officials selected as the 11th Panchen
Lama in 1995, shortly after declaring the Dalai Lama's
recognition of then six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima to be
``illegal and invalid.'' \16\ According to observers, Gyaltsen
Norbu is likely to play a significant role in the Party and
government's selection of their endorsed successor to the 14th
Dalai Lama.\17\ Chinese authorities abducted Gedun Choekyi
Nyima and his parents on May 17, 1995, three days after the
Dalai Lama recognized him as the reincarnation of the 10th
Panchen Lama, and have refused to permit an independent expert
to visit him.\18\ The Panchen Lama and his parents' whereabouts
remain unknown.\19\
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists
The Party and government continued to regulate Tibetan
Buddhism and its practices in an effort to strengthen their
control over Tibetan Buddhists.\20\ During Saga Dawa, a month-
long celebration of the Buddha's life and enlightenment that
fell between May 15 and June 15, 2018, TAR authorities set up
``service centers'' \21\ for worshippers and barred current and
retired government employees from participating in religious
activities.\22\ Authorities in Chengguan (Chamdo) township,
Changdu (Chamdo) municipality, TAR, forbade students attending
the Second Kindergarten School, as well as their parents, from
participating in religious activities or visiting monasteries
during Saga Dawa.\23\ [For information on relevant laws
relating to religious freedom in China, see Section II--Freedom
of Religion.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further Clampdown on Larung Gar
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2016, provincial authorities in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, began the process of demolishing
dwellings and expelling monks and nuns at Larung Gar Buddhist Institute
(Larung Gar), in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan.\24\
Government control of Larung Gar continued during the Commission's 2018
reporting year.\25\ An October 2017 report by Free Tibet and Tibet
Watch shows that by the end of May 2017 authorities had leveled at
least 4,725 homes and forced at least 4,828 residents to leave Larung
Gar since July 2016.\26\ Human Rights Watch (HRW) obtained a brochure
that authorities issued in August 2017, which laid out
``standardization'' procedures at Larung Gar in the name of
security.\27\ According to the brochure, the government will install
cadres at every level and section of the monastery, many in top-level
roles, while officials will surveil the monastery as a whole using a
grid management system,\28\ instituting real-name registration for all
visitors and residents, and requiring monks, nuns, and laypeople to
wear colored tags indicating their status within the institute.\29\
According to HRW's January 2018 report, 40 percent of the monastery's
curriculum must include politics and other non-religious subjects.\30\
On October 29, 2017, authorities in Sichuan abruptly cancelled
observance of the prayer festival Dechen Shedrub at Larung Gar for the
second consecutive year, reversing an earlier decision to permit
celebrations.\31\ HRW China Director Sophie Richardson said the
government's actions ``show a pernicious intent to exercise extreme
control over religious practice.'' \32\ According to the International
Campaign for Tibet and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, the expulsions and demolitions at Larung Gar are also driven
by the Chinese government's plans to increase business and tourism in
the area.\33\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Self-Immolations
Self-immolations by Tibetans as a form of protest continued
during this past year,\34\ including three known self-
immolations in Tibetan autonomous areas \35\ of China. All
three were confirmed to be fatal, bringing the total number of
such self-immolations by Tibetans living in China to 147 since
2009, 130 of which were reportedly fatal.\36\ Since 2009, many
Tibetan self-immolators have called for the long life of the
Dalai Lama, his return from exile, and freedom for Tibet.\37\
Tenga, a 63-year-old monk, self-immolated in
Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi TAP, Sichuan, on November
26, 2017, while calling for freedom for Tibet.\38\
Armed police quickly came and confiscated his body.\39\
Authorities cut off telephone lines and social media
services in Ganzi TAP following Tenga's death, while
police were stationed at Tenga's family home.\40\
Konpe, a former monk in his thirties, set
himself on fire on December 23, 2017, near Kirti
Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan.\41\ The police quickly
extinguished the fire and brought Konpe to a hospital
in Maerkang (Barkham) county, Aba T&QAP.\42\ Konpe died
of his injuries on December 24.\43\ Around that time,
authorities detained his father, Gyakyab, on unknown
charges.\44\ According to the International Campaign
for Tibet, 24 current and former Kirti monks have self-
immolated since 2009.\45\
Tsekho Tugchag (Tsekho Tugchak), a former monk
at No. 4 (Namtsoma) village, Mai'erma (Me'uruma)
township, Aba, self-immolated and died on March 7,
2018, in Aba.\46\
Tibetans have also faced detention for sharing information
about self-immolations. For instance, in October 2017,
authorities in Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai province, detained
seven Tibetans \47\ for posting to the messaging service WeChat
a two-year-old video about the lives of self-immolators.\48\
Security, Surveillance, and Party Policy
The government and Party continued implementing repressive
policies in Tibetan autonomous areas of China through the use
of extensive and intrusive surveillance, stringent measures
that restrict Tibetans' fundamental rights, and pervasive
displays of police and military force.\49\ Domestic security
spending in two Tibetan prefectures in Sichuan increased nearly
300 percent between 2007 and 2016, while the TAR's domestic
security spending grew 404 percent over the same time period,
compared to a 215 percent increase nationwide.\50\ Under
Chinese President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, the
Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD)
has assumed the primary role of administering religious and
ethnic affairs, making it the locus of management of Tibetans
within China as well as of relations with overseas
Tibetans.\51\
Security measures markedly increased around the 19th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (19th Party
Congress) in October 2017.\52\ The central government
reportedly banned foreigners from visiting the TAR between
October 18 and 28 \53\ and deployed security forces to the TAR
and other Tibetan areas as the 19th Party Congress began, with
public military drills reported in the TAR and in Guoluo
(Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai
province.\54\ In Shannan (Lhokha) municipality, TAR, ``temple
management cadres'' went to monks' quarters to conduct ``one-
on-one study'' of the ``19th Party Congress spirit.'' \55\
After the congress concluded, reports emerged of mandatory
``patriotic reeducation'' in Tibetan areas, with abbots and
monastery teachers told to organize ``training courses'' on the
``19th Party Congress spirit.'' \56\
In a report submitted for the November 2018 session of the
UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of
the Chinese government's human rights record, the International
Federation for Human Rights and International Campaign for
Tibet warned that ``the human rights situation in the Tibetan
areas of China has significantly worsened'' since the UN Human
Rights Council's last UPR of China in 2013.\57\ The TAR
government has reportedly constructed a ``mass surveillance''
system powered by humans and technology,\58\ posting security
officials to ``convenience police stations'' and Party cadres
to villages and monasteries,\59\ while also incentivizing
Tibetans to police each other. The Naqu (Nagchu) Municipal
Public Security Bureau in Naqu municipality, TAR, issued a
circular on March 13, 2018, promising cash rewards for tips on
a number of alleged offenses, from illegal possession of
firearms to ``the abuse of religion, power, and family
connections to illegally encroach on property.'' \60\ The
circular, reprinted in Radio Free Asia (RFA), indicates that
public security officers will offer 50,000 yuan (US$7,300) for
certain tips, and up to 100,000 yuan (US$14,700) for tips on
``criminal gangs'' advocating for ``separatism,'' \61\ which
RFA reported may implicate the promotion of Tibetan cultural
and religious practices or support for the Dalai Lama's Middle
Way Approach.\62\
Status of Tibetan Culture
China's 2016-2020 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP)
provides both that ``the cultural rights of ethnic minorities
shall be guaranteed'' and that ``[t]he right of ethnic
minorities to learn, use and develop their own spoken and
written languages shall be respected and guaranteed,'' echoing
provisions of China's Constitution, the PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law, and the PRC Education Law.\63\ Tibetan culture
and language face increasing marginalization, however,
particularly as the Chinese government and Party continue to
promote Mandarin Chinese as the main language of instruction in
Tibetan areas.\64\
Nearly two years after the New York Times interviewed him
and published a short film about his advocacy for Tibetan
language education, Tashi Wangchug (Tashi Wangchuk) stood trial
at the Yushu (Yulshul) Prefecture Intermediate People's Court
in Qinghai province on January 4, 2018.\65\ Tashi Wangchug
denied the charge of ``inciting separatism,'' arguing that he
was ``exercising his right as a citizen to criticize'' the
local government concerning the preservation of Tibetan culture
and language.\66\ Authorities permitted only three of his
relatives into the courtroom, and denied entry to diplomats
from the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Canada.\67\ On May 22, the court found Tashi
Wangchug guilty and sentenced him to five years in prison.\68\
The Qinghai High People's Court reportedly rejected his appeal
in August 2018.\69\
Freedom of Expression
This past year, Tenzin Tethong, Tibetan Service Director
for Radio Free Asia, testified before the U.S. Congress that
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) ``ranks among the world's
worst media environments after North Korea.'' \70\ In certain
Tibetan areas, censorship further tightened around the 19th
Party Congress in October 2017,\71\ including a digital
communications blackout imposed by the TAR government during
the Party Congress.\72\
Public security bureaus (PSB) in some Tibetan areas of
China introduced local directives to control and censor social
media groups, operationalizing features of the PRC
Cybersecurity Law as well as the Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Group Information Services, which
took effect on October 8, 2017.\73\ The provisions hold social
group creators and administrators responsible for content
shared among public and private groups.\74\ Selected examples
follow.
In Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province, the Machu County PSB
issued directives forbidding chat group administrators
and WeChat public account owners from sharing nine
different categories of information, from ``state
secrets'' and ``rumors'' to ``other illegal
information,'' noting that violators ``will be dealt
with by the relevant departments in accordance with
relevant laws and regulations.'' \75\
In advance of the 19th Party Congress in
October 2017, PSB officials in Zeku (Zekog) county,
Huangnan TAP, Qinghai province, forced 248 Tibetan
WeChat group administrators to undergo legal training
and write statements of responsibility for group chat
content as part of an effort to resist ``illegal
criminal activity'' and ``harmful information.'' \76\
Authorities reportedly forced monks at Tsang
Monastery in Tongde (Gepasumdo) county, Hainan (Tsolho)
TAP, Qinghai, to attend a March 2018 ``legal
education'' session during which monks received
instruction on the PRC Cybersecurity Law's provisions
against sharing ``illegal content'' online.\77\ On
April 16, 2018, local PSB officials reportedly detained
two of the monks at Tsang Monastery.\78\ Reports only
named one monk, Oechung Gyatso, whom authorities
detained in connection with the unauthorized sharing of
politically ``sensitive'' photos and writings on
WeChat.\79\
The Commission observed one significant case of a high-
profile political prisoner whose detention contravened
international standards of freedom of expression.\80\ On
January 10, 2018, the Haibei Intermediate People's Court in
Haibei (Tsojang) TAP, Qinghai, sentenced Tsegon Gyal \81\ to
three years in prison for ``inciting separatism.'' \82\
According to a February 18 statement by the Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, authorities detained Tsegon Gyal on
December 9, 2016,\83\ apparently in connection to a blog post
he wrote criticizing the Chinese government for failing to
truly support its policy of ``ethnic unity.'' \84\
Authorities released at least four political prisoners
during the reporting year.\85\ On March 19, 2018, popular
Tibetan writer and intellectual Drukar Gyal \86\ (pen name
Shogjang) completed a three-year prison sentence for ``inciting
separatism'' in connection to his writing.\87\ Around August 2,
authorities released popular singer Gonpo Tenzin upon
completing a sentence of three years and six months.\88\
Authorities detained him in 2013, apparently in connection with
his hit song ``How Can We Have New Year's Celebrations in
Tibet? '' which encouraged Tibetans to preserve their culture
and language.\89\ On August 10, Namkha Jam finished a nearly
six-year \90\ sentence for ``inciting separatism.'' \91\ The
Huangnan Intermediate People's Court of Huangnan (Malho) TAP,
Qinghai, convicted him and three other Tibetans in connection
with the sharing of information about self-immolations and
protests with allegedly ``separatist'' Tibetan
organizations.\92\ Authorities also released Gonpo Tseten on
August 13, one year and six months before the end of his 12-
year sentence for ``inciting separatism'' for leading a protest
in Awangcan (Bhelpan) township, Maqu (Machu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province in March 2008.\93\ All four men
still face from two to four years' deprivation of political
rights.\94\
Filmmaker Dondrub Wangchen (Dhondup Wangchen), who had
served six years in prison and three years' deprivation of
political rights \95\ for ``inciting separatism,'' \96\ fled
China in fall 2017 and reunited with his family in San
Francisco on December 25, 2017.\97\ Authorities detained
Dondrub Wangchen in March 2008 for his role in making the
documentary ``Leaving Fear Behind,'' in which ordinary Tibetans
in China shared their feelings about a range of issues,
including the Dalai Lama and the August 2008 Summer Olympics in
Beijing municipality.\98\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Censorship of Social Media and Reporting on Jokhang Fire
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Limited access to information about a fire that broke out at the
Jokhang temple complex in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR), on February 17, 2018, raised concerns among Tibetan communities
and experts about the extent of the damage at the site.\99\ Tibetans
posted distressed messages and video of the fire to the messaging
service WeChat, including some messages questioning why the fire
department did not immediately arrive.\100\ Within hours, the TAR
government reportedly imposed a ban on discussion of the fire on social
media,\101\ while the state-run media outlet Xinhua reported that the
fire had been extinguished.\102\ A leaked document later revealed that
the authorities took 30 minutes to respond, even though in December
2017 China reported to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Committee that the temple had a
fire brigade stationed on premises ``for the safety and protection of
cultural relics.'' \103\ The temple remained open on February 18, but
drapes covered the site of the central Jowo Shakyamuni statue,\104\ the
namesake of the temple and one of the most sacred statues in Tibetan
Buddhism.\105\ The State Administration of Cultural Heritage reported
that the fire did not damage the Jowo Shakyumuni statue.\106\
According to scholar Robert Barnett, ``almost total suppression of
information'' \107\ quickly followed the fire at the 1,300-year-old
Jokhang temple complex,\108\ which is a sacred site for Tibetans,
Mongolians, and other Buddhists in the Himalayas and Central Asia.\109\
Barnett indicated that the restriction of information about the fire
caused many Tibetans to fear that the damage was far worse than had
been reported.\110\ In June, the advocacy organization Free Tibet
published satellite images showing damage to the Jowo Rinpoche Chapel,
which houses the Jowo Shakyamuni statue.\111\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Movement
The Chinese government severely restricts the ability of
Tibetans to travel abroad, often in relation to religious
pilgrimage.\112\ For example, this past year Radio Free Asia
reported that Chinese authorities threatened the families of
Tibetans traveling to attend the Dalai Lama's teachings in Bodh
Gaya, India, and that Chinese immigration authorities destroyed
some of their passports upon their return to China and failed
to reissue new passports.\113\ According to international
advocacy organization Free Tibet, in March 2018, Chinese
authorities detained 60 Tibetans upon their return from
pilgrimage to India and Nepal, and reportedly sent them to a
``reeducation'' program.\114\
Authorities also continued to restrict movement of Tibetans
within Tibetan areas of China. This past year, Tibetans making
pilgrimage to Lhasa on foot reportedly faced a fine of 3,000
yuan (US$440) per day.\115\ In April 2018, plainclothes
officers in Dali (Darlag) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai
province, detained and interrogated a 60-year-old pilgrim on
her way to Lhasa.\116\ The pilgrim, Lhamo Drolma (Lhamo
Dolkar), from Bora village, Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, remained missing as of April 13,
2018.\117\
Chinese officials increasingly seek to restrict the freedom
of movement of Tibetans in neighboring Nepal with the
cooperation of Nepalese authorities. The Chinese government has
stationed Chinese police on the Nepali side of the border to
capture Tibetan refugees.\118\ The Chinese government
reportedly provided funding for a new training academy for the
Nepal Armed Police Force, which allegedly plays an important
role in preventing Tibetan refugees from entering Nepal.\119\
Nepal has hosted Tibetan refugees since the 1950s \120\ and
currently has a population of around 20,000 Tibetans.\121\
Economy, Environment, and Development
The Commission observed no evidence during its 2018
reporting year that the Party or government solicited
systematic or representative input from the Tibetan population
on economic development in Tibetan autonomous areas of
China.\122\ Chinese officials reportedly used environmental
protection regulations to restrict the land use of Tibetan
herders \123\ and in one instance detained at least 30 people
who protested a mining project located on a mountain considered
a sacred site, while one protester went missing.\124\ Other
infrastructure projects may threaten environmental damage and
the livelihood and safety of Tibetans.\125\
On November 27, 2017, Chinese authorities announced that
only security and other authorized officials would have access
to the Hoh Xil Nature Reserve, which spans Qinghai province,
the TAR, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR);
Qiangtang (Chang Tang) National Nature Reserve in the TAR; and
Altun Shan Nature Reserve in the XUAR.\126\ UNESCO approved the
nomination of Hoh Xil as a World Heritage site in July
2017,\127\ the highest and largest plateau in the world \128\
and China's largest World Heritage site at 3.74 million
hectares (14,423.35 square miles), with a buffer zone of 2.29
million hectares (8,845.23 square miles).\129\ The Chinese
government estimated that 50,000 people herd in the reserve's
buffer zone,\130\ and stated that it would ``fully respect the
will of the local herders and their traditional culture,
religious beliefs, and lifestyle.'' \131\ A white paper
released by the State Council Information Office in June 2018,
however, claimed that Hoh Xil is ``free of human activity.''
\132\
Infrastructure projects in the TAR could further impact the
local people and the environment, as well as communities beyond
the TAR. For example, a proposed 1,000-kilometer (621.37-mile)
water tunnel from the TAR to the XUAR \133\ would divert the
Yarlung Tsangpo River, which becomes the Brahmaputra downstream
in Bangladesh and India.\134\ Some observers fear this is a
sign that the Chinese government is attempting to expand its
influence over neighboring countries.\135\ Fan Xiao, a senior
engineer at the Sichuan Bureau of Geological Exploration,\136\
warned that the scheme willfully ignores the environmental,
social, and cultural costs of diverting a major water source,
including flooding and displacement of local residents.\137\
This past year, TAR officials continued to promote tourism,
efforts allegedly connected to the demolition of Tibetan
religious and cultural centers.\138\ According to the state-run
Xinhua news agency, the TAR received 1.2 million tourists
during the National Day holiday in October 2017, up 16.5
percent from the previous year, in part as the result of the
opening of a new highway connecting Lhasa municipality and
Linzhi (Nyingchi) municipality.\139\ In May 2018, about 60
Tibetan nomad families in the village of Lhadul in Nimu (Nyemo)
county, Lhasa, TAR, made a video that circulated online
appealing to officials beyond their township to regain access
to pastureland which Chinese authorities had designated for
tourism.\140\
Tibet
Tibet
Notes to Section V--Tibet
\1\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Tibet
Negotiations, Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017,
Improvements Act P.L. 115-94, Sec. 13,'' attached to letter from Mary
K. Waters, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, to House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21
May 18, 1; U.S. Department of State, ``Report on Tibet Negotiations,
P.L. 107-228 Section 613(b), of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of Fiscal Year 2003,'' attached to letter from Julia Frifield,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 16, 1.
\2\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report to Congress on Tibet
Negotiations, Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017,
Improvements Act P.L. 115-94, Sec. 13,'' attached to letter from Mary
K. Waters, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, to House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21
May 18, 1. See also International Campaign for Tibet, ``Trump
Administration's First Tibet Negotiations Report to Congress Reflects
the Absence of a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues,'' 6 June 18.
\3\ Cui Jia, ``China Strongly Opposes Any Meeting With Dalai
Lama,'' China Daily, 21 October 17. See also ``China Reiterates
Opposition to Dalai Lama's Botswana Visit Next Month,'' Tibetan Review,
16 July 17; Robert J. Barnett and Deborah Jerome, ``U.S.-China: Dalai
Lama Drama,'' Council on Foreign Relations (blog), 17 February 10.
\4\ Stuart Lau, ``Senior Chinese Official Attacks Foreign Leaders
for Meeting Dalai Lama as He Promises To Crack Down on Religious
Separatists,'' South China Morning Post, 21 October 17; Bhuchung K.
Tsering, ``Analyzing Chinese Official Zhang Yijiong's Remarks on Dalai
Lama and Tibet,'' International Campaign for Tibet (blog), 26 October
17.
\5\ Central Tibetan Administration, ``The Middle-Way Policy,'' last
visited 14 July 18; ``Tibet Wants To Stay With China, Says Dalai
Lama,'' Times of India, 24 November 17; `` `Past Is Past': Dalai Lama
Says Tibet Wants To Stay With China, Wants Development,'' Hindustan
Times, 23 November 17.
\6\ `` `Past Is Past': Dalai Lama Says Tibet Wants To Stay With
China, Wants Development,'' Hindustan Times, 23 November 17; ``Tibet
Wants To Stay With China, Seeks Development, Says Spiritual Leader
Dalai Lama,'' Indian Express, 23 November 17.
\7\ Tenzin Dharpo, ``No Official Communication With Beijing but
`Back Channel Talks' Happen, Says CTA President,'' Phayul, 4 April 18;
Aishwarya Kumar, ``No Official Communication, but Back Channel Talks On
With China, Says Tibetan Govt-in-Exile,'' News18, 3 April 18.
\8\ Takeshi Narabe, ``Discussions on Dalai Lama's Succession Could
Begin This Year,'' Asahi Shimbun, 16 March 18; Matthew Gindin, ``US
Senate Backs Tibet in Battle Over the Dalai Lama's Reincarnation,''
Tricycle, 11 May 18. See also CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5 October 17,
299; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189; ``Special Topic
Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
22 October 09, 38-39.
\9\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81, art. 6(g). Article 6(g) of
the Declaration includes the right to ``train, appoint, elect or
designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the
requirements and standards of any religion or belief.''
\10\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Brief Biography,''
last visited 14 July 18. According to biographical information on the
Dalai Lama's official website, he was born on July 6, 1935.
\11\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Reincarnation,'' 24
September 11.
\12\ Takeshi Narabe, ``Discussions on Dalai Lama's Succession Could
Begin This Year,'' Asahi Shimbun, 16 March 18; Ellen Barry, ``Dalai
Lama's Journey Provokes China, and Hints at His Heir,'' New York Times,
6 April 17.
\13\ Tibetan Autonomous Region Public Security Department,
``Bulletin on Reporting Leads on Crimes and Violations of Evil Forces''
[Guanyu jubao hei'e shili weifa fanzui xiansuo de tonggao], issued 12
February 18, sec. 1(2); ``CCP Cracks Down on Tibet--Preservation of
Mother Tongue Called `Reactionary Ideology' '' [Zhonggong yu xizang
kaizhan yanda--baohu muyu chengwei ``fandong sixiang''], Voice of
Tibet, 12 February 18; Liu Caiyu, ``Police Asks Tibetans for Dalai Lama
Tips,'' Global Times, 11 February 18; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Chinese Police Circular Urges Public To Report on Loyalty to `Evil
Forces' of Dalai Lama,'' 13 February 18.
\14\ See, e.g., ``Two Tibetans Arrested for Keeping Dalai Lama
Photos,'' Tibetan Journal, 28 June 18; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy, ``Annual Report 2017: Human Rights Situation in Tibet,''
7 May 18, 49; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--Tibet,'' last
visited 3 September 18.
\15\ Free Tibet, ``China Arbitrarily Arrests Elderly Tibetan Man,''
18 May 18; ``Tibetan Detained, Disappears in Suo (Sog) County, Naqu
(Nagchu) Prefecture, TAR'' [Xizang naqu suo xian yi zangren bei bu
shizong], Radio Free Asia, 21 May 18. For more information on Ganggye,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner database record 2018-00279.
\16\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``International Religious Freedom Report for 2017--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 29 May 18, 47; Guo Xin, ``It
Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama To Universally Identify
the Reincarnated Soul Boy of the Panchen Lama,'' People's Daily, 1
December 95 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 December 95);
``China's Panchen Lama Calls for Patriotism, Says Greed Taints Tibetan
Buddhism,'' Reuters, 14 March 17; ``Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party
`Brazen Meddling' in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3. See also Lilit
Mohan, ``Tibetans Decry Disappearance of 11th Panchen Lama,'' Tribune,
18 May 18; Yangchen Dolma, ``Tibetans and Tibet Support Groups Urge
World Leaders To Act Over Missing Panchen Lama,'' Tibet Post
International, 18 May 18.
\17\ Greg C. Bruno, Blessings From Beijing: Inside China's Soft-
Power War on Tibet (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2018), 92; John Powers, The
Buddha Party: How the People's Republic of China Works To Define and
Control Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017),
125. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301-02. For more
information on the Panchen Lama and China's likely model for selecting
the next Dalai Lama, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189.
\18\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``International Religious Freedom Report for 2017--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 29 May 18, 42; Tibetan Centre
for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China: Allow Independent
International Bodies To Verify Fate of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th
Panchen Lama of Tibet,'' 17 May 18.
\19\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 20 April 18, 76; ``Tibet's
Exile Community Observes the 23rd-Year Anniversary of the Panchen
Lama's Disappearance'' [Xizang liuwang shequ jinian banchan lama
shizong ershisan nian], Voice of Tibet, 17 May 18. For more information
on Gedun Choekyi Nyima, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
database record 2004-00835.
\20\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Annual Report
2017: Human Rights Situation in Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 52-53; Tshering
Chonzom, ``Tibet, the 19th Party Congress and China's United Front
Work,'' Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, ICS Delhi Blog, 1 November
17. See also Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's
Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi
Jinping,'' February 2017, 86-101; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October
16, 300-04.
\21\ ``Tibetans in Lhasa Celebrate Holy Month of Saga Dawa,''
Xinhua, 16 May 18; Liu Xuanzun, ``Tibet Celebrates Saga Dawa Festival,
Stresses Social Order,'' Global Times, 24 May 18.
\22\ ``Tibetan Officials Warned Against Participating in Religious
Activities During Holy Month,'' Phayul, 31 May 18.
\23\ Free Tibet, ``Schoolchildren Blocked From Joining Buddhist
Festivities,'' 16 May 18.
\24\ Roseanne Gerin, ``Report Details Destruction at Sichuan's
Larung Gar Buddhist Academy,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 October 17. For more
information on the demolitions and expulsions at Larung Gar that took
place during the previous reporting year, see CECC, 2017 Annual Report,
5 October 17, 303-04.
\25\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Controls on Tibetan
Monastery,'' 24 January 18; U.S. Policy Toward Tibet: Access, Religious
Freedom, and Human Rights, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 6
December 17, Testimony of Tenzin Tethong, Director of the Tibetan
Service, Radio Free Asia, 3.
\26\ Free Tibet and Tibet Watch, ``Destroying Heaven: China's
Campaign of Destruction at Larung Gar'' 20 October 17, 11.
\27\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Controls on Tibetan
Monastery,'' 24 January 18.
\28\ Ibid. ``Grid-style social management''--a central government
``securitization'' policy first deployed in the Tibet Autonomous Region
in 2012--divides urban and rural areas into smaller units for the
purpose of intensifying surveillance, policing, and control at the
community level. See Human Rights Watch, ``China: Alarming New
Surveillance, Security in Tibet,'' 20 March 13; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, ``Annual Report 2017: Human Rights
Situation in Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 8; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold,
``Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy
in Tibet and Xinjiang,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 17
Issue 12, 21 September 17. See also ``Grid Locked,'' Economist, 22 June
13.
\29\ According to the official brochure, released in Chinese and
Tibetan, monks must now wear red tags, nuns yellow tags, and laypeople
green tags. Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Controls on Tibetan
Monastery,'' 24 January 18.
\30\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Controls on Tibetan
Monastery,'' 24 January 18.
\31\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Major Religious Festival
Cancelled and New Police Checkpoints at Larung Gar,'' 3 November 17;
``China Bans Major Prayer Festival at Larung Gar,'' Radio Free Asia, 1
November 17.
\32\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Controls on Tibetan
Monastery,'' 24 January 18.
\33\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Annual Report
2017: Human Rights Situation in Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 55; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Major Religious Festival Cancelled and New Police
Checkpoints at Larung Gar,'' 3 November 17.
\34\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolations by
Tibetans,'' last visited 13 August 18; Free Tibet, ``Self-Immolation
Protests,'' last visited 13 August 18; Tibet Centre for Human Rights
and Democracy, ``2017 Annual Report on Human Rights Situation in
Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 24-26.
\35\ For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China,
see ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 October 09, 22-24.
\36\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Man Dies After
Self-Immolation; Oppressive Measures Intensified in March 10
Anniversary Week,'' 7 March 18; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Young Tibetan Man Dies After Self-Immolation in Ngaba,'' 27 December
17; ``Tibetan Monk Burns to Death in Sichuan Calling for Tibetan
Freedom,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 November 17; CECC, 2017 Annual Report, 5
October 17, 301-02.
\37\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``2017 Annual
Report on Human Rights Situation in Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 24-26.
\38\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Respected Tibetan Monk
Sets Fire to Himself in Eastern Tibet,'' 30 November 17; ``Tibetan Monk
Burns to Death in Sichuan Calling for Tibetan Freedom,'' Radio Free
Asia, 29 November 17.
\39\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Respected Tibetan Monk
Sets Fire to Himself in Eastern Tibet,'' 30 November 17.
\40\ ``Tibetan Monk Burns to Death in Sichuan Calling for Tibetan
Freedom,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 November 17.
\41\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young Tibetan Man Dies
After Self-Immolation in Ngaba,'' 27 December 17.
\42\ ``Tibetan Self-Immolator, a Former Kirti Monk, Dies of His
Burns,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 December 17.
\43\ Jamphel Shonu, ``Update: Latest Self-immolator Konpe Passed
Away,'' Central Tibetan Administration, 26 December 17; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Young Tibetan Man Dies After Self-Immolation in
Ngaba,'' 27 December 17.
\44\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chinese
Authorities Detain Father of Tibetan Man Who Died of Self-Immolation
Protest on Christmas Eve,'' 26 December 17; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Young Tibetan Man Dies After Self-Immolation in Ngaba,'' 27
December 17. For more information on Gyakyab, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00029.
\45\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Self-Immolations by
Tibetans,'' 7 March 18.
\46\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Man Dies After
Self-Immolation; Oppressive Measures Intensified in March 10
Anniversary Week,'' 7 March 18. The source spells Tsekho Tugchag's name
``Tsekho Tugchak.'' See also ``Tibetan Dies Wednesday in Self-
Immolation Protest in Tibetan Region of China'' [Zhongguo zangqu zhou
san fasheng zangren zifen kangyi shenwang shijian] Radio Free Asia, 7
March 18.
\47\ For more information on the seven cases, see the following
records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2017-00335 on
Tashi Dradul, 2017-00336 on Kalsang Gyatso, 2017-00337 on Tsering
Choephel, 2017-00338 on Tenzin Namgyal, 2017-00339 on Choephel, 2017-
00340 on Tsering Norbu, and 2017-00341 on Tsegyam.
\48\ ``China Detains Seven Tibetans in Yushul Over Self-Immolation
Videos,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 October 17.
\49\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``2017 Annual
Report on Human Rights Situation in Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 8-13; Freedom
House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--Tibet,'' last visited 3 September
18; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibet Brief--Edition 61,''
October-November 2017, 2. See also Adrian Zenz, ``China's Domestic
Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 12 March 18.
\50\ Adrian Zenz, ``China's Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis
of Available Data,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue
4, 12 March 18.
\51\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Issues `Plan for
Deepening Reform of Party and Government Agencies' '' [Zhonggong
zhongyang yinfa ``shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an''],
Xinhua, 21 March 18, sec. 1(13)-(14). The United Front Work Department
will lead the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and manage religious
affairs. See also Tshering Chonzom, ``Tibet, the 19th Party Congress
and China's United Front Work,'' Institute of Chinese Studies, ICS
Delhi (blog), 1 November 17; ``October 21 Press Conference on `Party's
United Front Work and Party's Foreign Exchange' '' [10 yue 21 ri ``dang
de tongyi zhanxian he dang de duiwai jiaowang'' jizhe zhaodaihui],
People's Daily, 21 October 17.
\52\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Inside Tibet: New
Crackdown on `Hostile Forces' in Tibet in Buildup to Party Congress,''
11 August 17; International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Developments in
China's Tibet Policy as Communist Party's 19th Congress Begins,'' 17
October 17.
\53\ Christian Shepherd and Ben Blanchard, ``Leaving Nothing to
Chance, China Increases Security, Social Control Before Congress,''
Reuters, 28 September 17.
\54\ ``Chinese Police Make Show of Force in Tibetan Areas as Party
Congress Opens,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 October 17.
\55\ Duan Min, ``All Levels and Departments of Shannan Municipality
Seriously Study, Publicize, and Implement the Spirit of the 19th Party
Congress'' [Shannan shi ge ji ge bumen renzhen xuexi xuanchuan guanche
shijiuda jingshen], Tibet News, 28 October 17.
\56\ See, e.g., Molly Lortie, ``CPC Starts Mandatory Training on
19th Congress Party in Tibet,'' Tibet Post, 28 November 17; Liu Caiyu,
``Tibetan Buddhist Monks Study 19th Party Congress,'' Global Times, 28
November 17.
\57\ International Federation for Human Rights and International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Universal Periodic Review of the People's
Republic of China, United Nations Human Rights Council, November 2018,
Joint Submission,'' 29 March 18, item 2. See also Human Rights in
China, ``Stakeholder Submission,'' March 2018, item 3.
\58\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``2017 Annual
Report on Human Rights Situation in Tibet,'' 7 May 18, 8.
\59\ Ibid., 8-9.
\60\ ``Police in Tibet Offer Cash Rewards for Tips on Crime,
Disloyal Behavior,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 April 18; Zhen Dan, ``Nagchu
Authorities Restrict Tibetans' International Communications'' [Naqu
dangju yanjin zangren yu jingwai lianxi], Radio Free Asia, 3 April 18.
\61\ ``Police in Tibet Offer Cash Rewards for Tips on Crime,
Disloyal Behavior,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 April 18.
\62\ Ibid.
\63\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua,
29 September 16, sec. III(1); Clemence Henry, ``The Chinese Education
System as a Source of Conflict in Tibetan Areas,'' in Ethnic Conflict
and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West, eds. Ben
Hillman and Gray Tuttle (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016),
100; PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 11 March 18, arts. 4, 121; PRC
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu
zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, amended and effective 28 February 01,
arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Implementing the
``PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law'' [Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua
renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa'' ruogan guiding], passed 19 May
05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22; PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo jiaoyu fa], passed 18 March 95, amended 27 August 09, 27
December 15, effective 1 June 16, art. 12. China's Constitution and the
PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use
of minority languages. The State Council Provisions on Implementing the
PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to use and develop
minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by
promoting ``bilingual'' education and bilingual teaching staff.
\64\ Nikhil Sonnad, ``Taiwan's Laws on Language Are Showing China
What It Means To Be a Modern, Inclusive Country,'' Quartz, 9 May 18;
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017--China (Includes
Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),'' 20 April 18, 90.
\65\ Chris Buckley, ``A Tibetan Tried To Save His Language. China
Handed Him 5 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, 22 May 18; Amnesty
International, ``China: Sham Trial Exposes Absurd Charge Against
Tibetan Activist,'' 4 January 18. For more information on Tashi
Wangchug, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-
00077.
\66\ Chris Buckley, ``Tibetan Businessman Battles Separatism
Charges in Chinese Court,'' New York Times, 4 January 18.
\67\ Ibid.
\68\ Chris Buckley, ``A Tibetan Tried To Save His Language. China
Handed Him 5 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, 22 May 18; Lucas
Niewenhuis, ``China Sentences Tibetan Language Activist to Five Years
in Prison,'' SupChina, 22 May 18.
\69\ ``Group: China Denies Tibet Activist's Appeal of Jail
Sentence,'' Associated Press, 23 August 18; Voice of Tibet
(VOT_Tibetan), Twitter post, 22 August 18, 10:52 p.m.; Tenzin Dharpo,
``Tibetan Language Rights Advocate Tashi Wangchuk Appeals Against 5-
Year Prison Term,'' Phayul, 20 June 18; Free Tibet, ``Tashi Wangchuk in
Good Health and Appealing His Prison Sentence,'' 19 June 18.
\70\ U.S. Policy Toward Tibet: Access, Religious Freedom, and Human
Rights, Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House
Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 December 17, Testimony of Tenzin Tethong,
Director of the Tibetan Service, Radio Free Asia, 1.
\71\ ``248 WeChat Group Organizers Forced To Go Through Trainings
in Zeku County, Qinghai'' [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming weixin qunzhu bei
qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17; Freedom House,
``Freedom in the World 2018--Tibet,'' last visited 3 September 18.
\72\ Masashi Crete-Nishihata et al., ``Managing the Message: What
You Can't Say About the 19th National Communist Party Congress on
WeChat,'' University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen
Lab, 6 November 17; ``248 WeChat Group Administrators Forced To Go
Through Trainings in Zeku County, Qinghai'' [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming
weixin qunzhu bei qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October
17; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--Tibet,'' last visited 3
September 18.
\73\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Issues
Vague and Overbroad Rules on Internet Censorship in Tibet,'' 17
November 17; Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Group Information Services [Hulianwang qunzu
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October
17.
\74\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Provisions on the
Administration of Internet Group Information Services [Hulianwang qunzu
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 7 September 17, effective 8 October
17, art. 11; Lulu Yilun Chen and Keith Zhai, ``China's Latest Crackdown
on Message Groups Chills WeChat Users,'' Bloomberg, 12 September 17.
\75\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Issues
Vague and Overbroad Rules on Internet Censorship in Tibet,'' 17
November 17; Tenzin Monlam, ``China Issues Localized Internet
Censorship Rules in Tibet,'' Phayul, 18 November 17.
\76\ ``248 WeChat Group Administrators Forced To Go Through
Trainings in Zeku County, Qinghai'' [Qinghai zeku xian 248 ming weixin
qunzhu bei qiangzhi jieshou jiaoyu], Radio Free Asia, 2 October 17.
\77\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chinese
Authorities Detain Two Tibetan Monks for Sharing `Illegal' Contents on
Social Media,'' 18 April 18; ``Two Monks From Tongde County, Qinghai's
Tsang Monastery Detained'' [Qinghai tongde xian shizang si liang seng
bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 18; ``Tsang Monastery Monk Oechung
Gyatso Detained by Chinese [Authorities]'' [Gtsang dgon-pa'i dge-`dun
pa `od-chung rgya-mtsho rgya-nag gis `dzin-bzung byas-`dug], Radio Free
Asia, 18 April 18.
\78\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chinese
Authorities Detain Two Tibetan Monks for Sharing `Illegal' Contents on
Social Media,'' 18 April 18; ``Two Monks From Tongde County, Qinghai's
Tsang Monastery Detained'' [Qinghai tongde xian shizang si liang seng
bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 18; ``Tsang Monastery Monk Oechung
Gyatso Detained by Chinese [Authorities]'' [Gtsang dgon-pa'i dge-`dun
pa `od-chung rgya-mtsho rgya-nag gis `dzin-bzung byas-`dug], Radio Free
Asia, 18 April 18.
\79\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Chinese
Authorities Detain Two Tibetan Monks for Sharing `Illegal' Contents on
Social Media,'' 18 April 18; ``Two Monks From Tongde County, Qinghai's
Tsang Monastery Detained'' [Qinghai tongde xian shizang si liang seng
bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 18; ``Tsang Monastery Monk Oechung
Gyatso Detained by Chinese [Authorities]'' [Gtsang dgon-pa'i dge-`dun
pa `od-chung rgya-mtsho rgya-nag gis `dzin-bzung byas-`dug], Radio Free
Asia, 18 April 18. For more information on Oechung Gyatso, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2018-00167.
\80\ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2). Article 19 of
the ICCPR holds that freedom of expression includes ``freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice.''
\81\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Opinion No. 4/2017 on Tsegon Gyal (China), A/HRC/WGAD/2017/4, 11 August
17. For more information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2004-01163.
\82\ ``Tibetan Writer Handed Three-Year Prison Term for `Inciting
Separatism,' '' Radio Free Asia, 20 February 18.
\83\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Charged of
Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon
Gyal on `Silent Protest,' '' 29 December 16.
\84\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Prominent
Former Political Prisoner Tsegon Gyal Sentenced to Three Years on
Charge of `Inciting Separatism,' '' 18 February 18. For more
information on Tsegon Gyal, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2004-01163.
\85\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19(2). Article 19 of the ICCPR
holds that freedom of expression includes ``freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
any other media of his choice.''
\86\ Tenzin Dharpo, ``Noted Writer Shogjang Released After Three
Years in Chinese Prison,'' Phayul, 20 March 18; PEN America, ``Shokjang
(Druklo),'' last visited 2 July 18. For more information on Drukar Gyal
(pen name Shogjang; also known as Druglo), see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00153.
\87\ PEN America, ``Shokjang (Druklo),'' last visited 16 July 18;
Independent Chinese PEN Center, ``218: Shogjang'' [218: Xuejiang], 21
March 18; ``Tibetan Author Druglo Sentenced to Three Years'' [Zangren
zuojia zhuluo panjian 3 nian], Radio Free Asia, 20 February 16;
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Popular Tibetan Blogger Asserts His
Innocence in Letter From Prison,'' 4 April 16; Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy, ``Revoke Discriminatory, Unjust Verdict Against
Tibetan Writer Shokjang,'' 7 April 16.
\88\ ``Tibetan Protest Singer Freed After Serving More Than Three
Years in Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 August 18; For more information
on Gonpo Tenzin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
record 2014-00012.
\89\ Ibid.; ``China Detains Two Tibetan Singers from Driru,'' Radio
Free Asia, 16 December 13; ``China Arrests Tibetan Monk in Tawu,
Sentences Popular Singer from Driru,'' Voice of America, 21 May 15.
\90\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Dui Hua Digest, March 2016,'' 16 March
16. According to the US-based Dui Hua Foundation, in December 2015, the
Huangnan Intermediate People's Court commuted Namkha Jam's sentence
from six years to five years and eight months.
\91\ ``Tibetan Freed After Serving Six Years on `Separatism'
Charge,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 August 18; ``Tibetan in Qinghai Leaves
Prison After Finishing Sentence for Observing Self-Immolations''
[Guanzhu zifen huozui qinghai zangren xingman chuyu], Radio Free Asia,
16 August 18; Free Tibet, ``Tibetan Political Prisoner Released After
Completing a Six Year Prison Term,'' 14 August 18. For more information
on Namkha Jam, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2013-00141.
\92\ Richard Finney, ``Chinese Court Jails Four Tibetans on
`Separatism' Charge,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 April 13; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, ``Two Tibetans Convicted for `Inciting
Separatism' Released After Serving Long Prison Terms,'' 17 August 18.
For more information on the three other men detained at the same time
as Namkha Jam, see the Commission's Political Prisoner database records
2013-00139 on Choepa Gyal, 2013-00142 on Chagthar, and 2013-00143 on
Gonpo.
\93\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Two Tibetans
Convicted for `Inciting Separatism' Released After Serving Long Prison
Terms,'' 17 August 18; Free Tibet, ``Tibetan Political Prisoner
Released After 10 Years,'' 17 August 18.
\94\ Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany,
``Statement by Human Rights Commissioner Kofler on Shokjang's
Release,'' 21 March 18; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Tibetan Singer Sentenced to Prison After Prolonged Secret
Detention,'' 21 May 15; ``Tibetan Freed After Serving Six Years on
`Separatism' Charge,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 August 18; Free Tibet,
``Tibetan Political Prisoner Released After 10 Years,'' 17 August 18;
PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, 4 November 17, art. 55.
Drukar Gyal's sentence included two years of deprivation of political
rights; Gonpo Tenzin's included four; and Namkha Jam's, three. The
sources available to the Commission state that Gonpo Tseten faces an
unknown amount of time under deprivation of political rights; Article
55 of the PRC Criminal Law stipulates that the term can last from one
to five years.
\95\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Dui Hua Welcomes Arrival of Dhondup
Wangchen in the United States,'' 27 December 17.
\96\ Dondrub Wangchen, ``Putting Tibet Back on the Agenda,''
Project Syndicate, 15 May 18; Tibet ``From All Angles'': Protecting
Human Rights, Defending Strategic Access, and Challenging China's
Export of Censorship Globally, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 14 February 18, Testimony of Dhondup Wangchen,
Tibetan filmmaker and recently escaped political prisoner. For more
information on Dondrub Wangchen's case, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2008-00586.
\97\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``International Campaign for
Tibet Welcomes Former Political Prisoner Dhondup Wangchen to Freedom
and Safety,'' 27 December 17.
\98\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 225-26.
\99\ Tom Phillips, ``Jokhang Temple: Fire Engulfs Ancient `Heart'
of Tibetan Buddhism,'' Guardian, 17 February 18; Francoise Robin,
``Guest Post: `The Silence of the State: The Jokhang Fire and the
Response of the Chinese Government,' '' High Peaks Pure Earth (blog),
21 March 18; China Digital Times, `` `Almost Total Suppression of
Information' After Tibet Fire,'' 20 February 18.
\100\ Francoise Robin, ``Guest Post: `The Silence of the State: The
Jokhang Fire and the Response of the Chinese Government,' '' High Peaks
Pure Earth (blog), 21 March 18.
\101\ Ibid.
\102\ ``Fire Put Out in Jokhang Temple in China's Tibet,'' Xinhua,
17 February 18.
\103\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Fears for Historic
Structure of Jokhang Temple After Major Fire, as China Covers up Extent
of Damage,'' 12 March 18.
\104\ ``Tibet's Jokhang Temple Closes for Three Days, Raising
Concerns Over Damage,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 February 18.
\105\ Francoise Robin, ``Guest Post: `The Silence of the State: The
Jokhang Fire and the Response of the Chinese Government,' '' High Peaks
Pure Earth (blog), 21 March 18; International Campaign for Tibet, ``New
Fears for Historic Structure of Jokhang Temple After Major Fire, as
China Covers Up Extent of Damage,'' 12 March 18; Jonathan Kaiman, ``A
Fire May Have Damaged Precious Relics at Tibet's Holiest Temple. China
Says No--But Experts Aren't Sure,'' Los Angeles Times, 22 February 18;
``China Rules Out Arson in Fire at Tibetan Buddhism's Holiest Temple,
as Authorities Accused of Cover-up,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted
in Hong Kong Free Press, 22 February 18.
\106\ State Administration of Cultural Heritage, ``World Heritage:
Historic Ensemble of the Potala Palace, Lhasa (C 707) State of
Conservation 2017--Appendix: Report on the Local Fire Accident
Happening to Jokhang Monastery, Lhasa Presented by the People's
Government of Tibet Autonomous Region,'' November 2017, 5. The report
does not state when the appendix was added.
\107\ Tom Phillips, ``Jokhang Temple: Fire Engulfs Ancient `Heart'
of Tibetan Buddhism,'' Guardian, 17 February 18.
\108\ Francoise Robin, ``Guest Post: `The Silence of the State: The
Jokhang Fire and the Response of the Chinese Government,' '' High Peaks
Pure Earth (blog), 21 March 18. The Jokhang is the central chapel of
the Tsuglakhang temple complex. The term ``Jokhang temple'' refers to
Tsuglakhang, not the Jokhang chapel.
\109\ Ibid.
\110\ Tom Phillips, ``Jokhang Temple: Fire Engulfs Ancient `Heart'
of Tibetan Buddhism,'' Guardian, 17 February 18.
\111\ Free Tibet, ``The Jokhang Fire Four Months On,'' 22 June 18.
\112\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--Tibet,'' last
visited 3 September 18; Human Rights Watch, ``Submission to the CERD
Review of China,'' 21 June 18.
\113\ ``Authorities in China's Qinghai Province Block Tibetans From
Travel Amid Dalai Lama Teachings,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 January 18.
\114\ Free Tibet, ``China Detains Tibetan Pilgrims,'' 22 March 18.
The source does not specify the nature of the reeducation program the
Tibetans were believed to be undergoing.
\115\ Ibid.
\116\ ``Tibetan Pilgrim Disappears After Chinese Police
Interrogation on Her Way to Lhasa,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 April 18.
\117\ Ibid. The source gives the pilgrim's name as Lhamo Dolkar,
while the Commission's Political Prisoner Database lists her under the
name Lhamo Drolma. Her detention is reportedly connected to her visit
to an imprisoned Tibetan monk, Sanggyal Gyatso. For information about
these cases, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2018-00168 on Lhamo Drolma and 2012-00127 on Sanggyal Gyatso.
\118\ Brad Adams, ``An Election in Nepal, Decades in the Making,''
Foreign Affairs, 7 December 17.
\119\ Debasish Roy Chowdhury, ``Driven by India Into China's Arms,
Is Nepal the New Sri Lanka? '' South China Morning Post, 25 February
18.
\120\ Sapana Phuyal, ``Helping People on the Move,'' Kathmandu
Post, 8 April 18.
\121\ Sudha Ramachandran, ``Sino-Nepali Relations: Scaling New
Heights,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 18, Issue 6, 9 April
18.
\122\ See, e.g., Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization,
``New UPR Report Gives Damning Indictment on Chinese Treatment of Tibet
Civil Society,'' 4 April 18.
\123\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Ban on Access to Nature
Reserves in Tibet Raises Concern About Tibetan Nomads at UNESCO Site,''
11 December 17. See also Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2018--
Tibet,'' last visited 3 September 18.
\124\ ``30 Tibetans Detained for Mining Protest, One Missing,''
Phayul, 15 May 18. For information on some of the detained protesters,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2018-00132 on
Karma, 2018-00197 on Khyenrab, 2018-00198 on Rinchen Namdrol, 2018-
00199 on Tsultrim Gonpo, 2018-00200 on Jangchub Ngodrub, 2018-00201 on
Dongye, 2018-00202 on Sogru Abu, and 2018-00203 on Namse.
\125\ ``Tibetan Villagers Tear-Gassed, Beaten for Mine Protest,''
Radio Free Asia, 11 July 18; International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT
Inside Tibet: Safety Fears Over Tibet Railway Raised Amid Concern Over
Mega-Projects,'' 21 November 17; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Ban on Access to Nature Reserves in Tibet Raises Concern About
Tibetan Nomads at UNESCO Site,'' 11 December 17.
\126\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Ban on Access to Nature
Reserves in Tibet Raises Concern About Tibetan Nomads at UNESCO Site,''
11 December 17.
\127\ UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World
Heritage Convention, ``World Heritage Committee Inscribes Three Natural
Sites and One Extension on UNESCO's World Heritage List,'' 7 July 17.
\128\ UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World
Heritage Convention, ``Qinghai Hoh Xil,'' last visited 1 June 18.
\129\ Ibid.
\130\ ``Unesco Heritage Listing Sparks Tibetan Resettlement
Fears,'' BBC, 10 July 17.
\131\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``UNESCO Approves
Controversial World Heritage Tibet Nomination Despite Concerns,'' 7
July 17.
\132\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on ``Ecological
Progress on the Qinghai Tibet Plateau,'' July 2018, sec. VI;
International Union for Conservation of Nature, ``Qinghai Hoh Xil--
Wilderness in the Heights,'' last visited 24 July 18. Section VI of the
White Paper states, ``In its assessment report, the World Conservation
Union took note of Hol Xil's expansive natural beauty--free of human
activity--describing it as `an amazing scene to behold.' '' The World
Conservation Union, which is also called the International Union for
Conservation of Nature, stated that the ``World Heritage listing
unequivocally supports the rights of the Tibetan pastoralists in the
area,'' thus acknowledging human activity there.
\133\ Stephen Chen, ``Chinese Engineers Plan 1,000km Tunnel To Make
Xinjiang Desert Bloom,'' South China Morning Post, 30 October 17.
\134\ Yarlung Tsangpo, ``An Ongoing `Quake Lake' Scare in India
(With Images From Planet Labs),'' American Geophysical Union, Landslide
Blog, 2 January 18; ``China Says Earthquake Behind Turbidity of
Brahmaputra Waters,'' Indo-Asian News Service, reprinted in New Indian
Express, 2 January 18; Fan Xiao, ``Opinion: The Madcap Scheme To Divert
the Brahmaputra,'' China Dialogue (blog), 17 January 18.
\135\ Stephen Chen, ``Chinese Engineers Plan 1,000km Tunnel To Make
Xinjiang Desert Bloom,'' South China Morning Post, 30 October 17; Atul
Aneja, ``China Bets on Mega Projects in Tibet,'' Hindu, 25 November 17.
\136\ ``Author: Fan Xiao,'' China Dialogue (blog), last visited 6
July 18.
\137\ Fan Xiao, ``Opinion: The Madcap Scheme To Divert the
Brahmaputra,'' China Dialogue (blog), 17 January 18.
\138\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: Safety
Fears Over Tibet Railway Raised Amid Concern Over Mega-Projects,'' 21
November 17.
\139\ ``Tibet Receives 1.2 Mln Tourists During Holiday,'' Xinhua, 9
October 17.
\140\ ``Tibetan Nomads Appeal for Return of Land Seized for Tourist
Project,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 May 18.
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Hong Kong
During its 2018 reporting year, the Commission observed a
continued erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy,\1\ as guaranteed
under the ``one country, two systems'' policy enshrined in the
Basic Law in accordance with the principles of the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration.\2\ Reports showed diminishing space
for political action by pro-democracy groups and individuals in
Hong Kong's democratic institutions.\3\ Observers also
expressed concerns regarding the erosion of universal human
rights protected by international instruments applicable under
the Hong Kong Basic Law.\4\
CHINESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG
At the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party in October 2017, Party General Secretary and Chinese
President Xi Jinping reiterated that the central government
must maintain ``overall'' or ``comprehensive'' jurisdiction
over Hong Kong and Macau while ensuring a ``high degree of
autonomy.'' \5\ Government officials emphasized the importance
of Hong Kong's economic integration with mainland China and
joint cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative.\6\
After a meeting with Party General Secretary Xi in December
2017, Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor said
that it is the Hong Kong government's responsibility to create
a ``suitable environment'' for enacting a national security law
as obligated by Article 23 of the Basic Law, emphasizing that
every person who ``loves [the] nation and loves Hong Kong''
should protect national security.\7\ At the annual meetings of
the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference in March 2018, top Party officials
warned that the central government has ``zero tolerance'' for
calls for Hong Kong independence.\8\ The University of Hong
Kong surveyed 500 Hong Kong residents and found that 70.6
percent of young people (aged 18 to 35) in Hong Kong felt that
``democracy is equally or more important than economic
development.'' \9\
MARCH 2018 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL BY-ELECTION SUBJECTED TO ``POLITICAL
SCREENING''
In March 2018, a Legislative Council (LegCo) by-election
was held to replace legislative seats vacated by four out of
six disqualified pro-democracy legislators.\10\ The Hong Kong
High Court disqualified six legislators in 2016 and 2017,\11\
citing the interpretation on oath-taking issued by the National
People's Congress Standing Committee in November 2016 \12\ and
deeming the legislators' oaths invalid.\13\ Candidates from
both the pro-democracy and pro-establishment camps won two
seats each.\14\ The LegCo consists of 70 total seats--35 of
which are elected by functional constituencies representing
different professional sectors, while the other 35 are directly
elected by Hong Kong geographical constituencies.\15\ After the
March by-election, the pro-democracy camp held a total of 16
seats in geographical constituencies, which is not enough to
veto bills, while the pro-establishment camp maintained a
majority of 17 seats.\16\
During the nomination period preceding the March by-
elections, the government of Hong Kong carried out what
observers called ``political screening'' of prospective
election candidates for the LegCo based on their political
party or political beliefs.\17\ Government officials from the
Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC) who review nomination
applications (``returning officers'') \18\ rejected the
nomination of several candidates,\19\ including Demosisto Party
candidate Agnes Chow on grounds that her affiliated party's
platform promoting ``self-determination'' contradicts the Basic
Law.\20\ The EAC also rejected the nominations of ``localist''
candidates Ventus Lau Wing-hong and James Chan Kwok-keung who
previously voiced support for Hong Kong independence.\21\ Hong
Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam defended the rejection of
Chow, saying that ``self-determination,'' similar to ``Hong
Kong independence'' and ``self-autonomy,'' is not consistent
with the Basic Law and ``deviates from the important principle
of `one country, two systems.' '' \22\ In February 2018, the
Hong Kong High Court ruled in the election petition of Andy
Chan Ho-tin, an advocate of Hong Kong independence whose
nomination for candidacy in the September 2016 LegCo General
Election was rejected, that ``returning officers'' have the
power to bar candidates based on the candidates' political
views.\23\
The U.K. government and the European Union expressed
concern that the rejection of Chow based on her political
beliefs constituted a violation of the right to stand for
election enshrined in Hong Kong's Basic Law, Hong Kong's Bill
of Rights Ordinance, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).\24\ The Hong Kong Bar Association
criticized the court ruling against Chan as ``an introduction
of a political screening process for any prospective
candidate,'' which lacks ``fair, open, and clear procedure to
regulate this process'' and relies on a civil servant's
interpretation of the unspecified requirement of ``upholding
the Basic Law.'' \25\
GOVERNMENT LEGAL ACTION AGAINST POLITICAL OPPOSITION
This past year, the Hong Kong government continued to
pursue cases against leaders and participants of the 2014 pro-
democracy protests (Occupy Central) and activists from the
political opposition. As of April 2018, the government
reportedly brought a total of 40 court cases against 26 pro-
democracy leaders since 2014, resulting in 13 convictions among
22 concluded cases.\26\ In October 2017, a Hong Kong court
found 9 people guilty of criminal contempt for refusing to
leave when a court ordered the clearance of protest sites in
November 2014; 11 others who also had refused to leave the
protest site pleaded guilty to contempt of court.\27\ As of
February 2018, nine democracy protest leaders faced pending
charges of ``inciting people to incite others to create a
public nuisance'' and ``inciting others to incite more people
to create a public nuisance,'' with Occupy Central protest
leaders Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming facing an
additional charge of ``conspiring to create a public
nuisance.'' \28\ In June 2018, the Hong Kong High Court
sentenced localist Edward Leung Tin-kei to six years in prison
on the charges of ``assaulting a police officer,'' which he
pleaded guilty to, and ``rioting'' for a February 2016 clash
with the police sparked by a crackdown on unregistered local
street food stands in Mong Kok.\29\ Foreign observers such as
Chris Patten, former governor of Hong Kong under British
colonial rule, criticized the charges under the Public Order
Ordinance \30\ as ``vague,'' ``open to abuse,'' and used to
``place extreme sentences on the pan-democrats and other
activists.'' \31\ International lawyers and Hong Kong judges
reportedly expressed concerns about the impact of political
pressure exerted by the central government on the
judiciary.\32\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases of Democracy Activists Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2017, authorities released on bail democracy activists and
Nobel Peace Prize nominees \33\ Joshua Wong Chi-fung, Nathan Law Kwun-
chung, and Alex Chow Yong-kang, after their imprisonment in August
2017,\34\ allowing them to appeal their prison sentences of six to
eight months ordered by the Court of Appeal on charges related to
``unlawful assembly.'' \35\ A lower court had previously sentenced Wong
and Law to community service, which the two had completed, and had
ordered Chow to serve a suspended sentence.\36\ In February 2018, the
Court of Final Appeal overturned the sentences of imprisonment for
Wong, Law, and Chow, holding that the original sentences imposed by the
magistrate were ``not manifestly inadequate,'' \37\ while recognizing
that the Court of Appeal appropriately issued sentence guidelines for
future cases of unlawful assemblies involving violence.\38\ Wong
criticized the judgment as endorsing ``a very narrow definition of non-
violent civil disobedience actions'' for future cases.\39\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``CO-LOCATION'' OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL STATION IN WEST KOWLOON
This past year, Hong Kong and mainland Chinese officials
continued negotiations and finalized ``co-location'' plans for
the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong
Express Rail Link in West Kowloon.\40\ In November 2017,
Guangdong provincial governor Ma Xingrui and Hong Kong's Chief
Executive Carrie Lam signed a cooperation agreement to allow
the enforcement of mainland Chinese law by mainland officials
in a designated ``Mainland Port Area'' within the West Kowloon
railway station.\41\ The National People's Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) approved the ``co-location'' plan in
December,\42\ which was projected for completion in the third
quarter of 2018.\43\ In January 2018, the Hong Kong government
introduced the co-location bill in LegCo,\44\ which passed in
June despite opposition from pro-democracy LegCo members and
supporters.\45\ The Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) criticized
the NPCSC approval of the co-location plan as a serious
violation of the Basic Law, asserting that it undermines the
rule of law and the ``one country, two systems'' framework in
Hong Kong.\46\ The HKBA argued that the arrangement constitutes
``the most retrograde step to date in the implementation of the
Basic Law'' and that it ``severely undermines public confidence
in `one country, two systems.' '' \47\
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION
This past year, the Commission observed reports of
restrictions on the freedom of expression and association in
Hong Kong against academics and politicians who hold views the
government deems unfavorable. In a report released in January
2018, the human rights monitoring organization Hong Kong Watch
highlighted the government's political considerations in the
removal from post and obstruction of promotions of several
academic figures since 2015, including pro-democracy professors
Chin Wan-kan, Johannes Chan, Benny Tai, and Cheng Chung-
tai.\48\ The study noted that while academic freedom in Hong
Kong remained relatively free compared to mainland China,
``elements of academic control'' in mainland China are
``gradually being incorporated into the Hong Kong system.''
\49\ Pro-democracy scholars and activists also said that the
environment for academic freedom is deteriorating in Hong
Kong.\50\ In March 2018, Benny Tai, one of the conveners of the
pro-democracy protests in 2014, attended an academic forum in
Taiwan, during which he hypothesized future political options
for Hong Kong, including independence if the mainland were to
become democratic.\51\ The Hong Kong government subsequently
issued a statement that ``strongly condemned'' Tai's
remarks.\52\ Civil society groups and pro-democracy politicians
condemned the government's statement as breaching the right to
freedom of expression.\53\ In July 2017, the government of Hong
Kong began considering banning a political party that advocates
for independence,\54\ and subsequently opposed an August event
hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Hong Kong
featuring the party's founder, Andy Chan.\55\ The U.K.
government issued a statement of concern showing support for
Hong Kong's ``rights and freedoms'' under the Basic Law and
Hong Kong Bill of Rights and ``its way of life.'' \56\ A Hong
Kong Journalists Association survey from April 2018 cited
pressure from the Chinese central government as a key
obstruction to press freedom in Hong Kong in connection with
self-censorship of criticisms of the central government.\57\ In
advance of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic
Review of the Chinese government's human rights record,
including compliance with the ICCPR, 53 Hong Kong non-
governmental organizations raised concerns about the narrowing
space for lawful dissent and expression in Hong Kong and the
future of democratic development.\58\
Chinese authorities reportedly used intimidation tactics
against members of a pro-democracy group and played a role in
barring a foreign rights advocate's entry into Hong Kong. In
August 2018, pro-democracy group Demosisto reported that
mainland officials detained and extensively questioned two of
its members on their political associations and activities in
Hong Kong when they attempted to return to Hong Kong from
mainland China.\59\ In October 2017, Hong Kong authorities
barred British human rights advocate Benedict Rogers from
entering Hong Kong after the Chinese embassy in London
reportedly warned against his visit.\60\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hong Kong Bookseller Gui Minhai Detained Again
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year, Chinese authorities first released and then detained
Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, one of the five Hong Kong booksellers
abducted and brought to mainland China in late 2015.\61\ In October
2017, authorities reportedly released Gui from custody after two years
of detention for an alleged ``traffic offense'' \62\ and placed him
under surveillance at a rented home in Ningbo municipality, Zhejiang
province.\63\ In January 2018, Gui was forcibly detained by
plainclothes Chinese authorities while he was traveling with two
Swedish diplomats to Beijing municipality, reportedly to seek a medical
examination for neurological symptoms.\64\ The Swedish foreign minister
condemned the Chinese government's acts as a ``brutal intervention''
against a Swedish citizen,\65\ while the European Union condemned
China's actions as violations of international rules on consular
support and protections against deprivation of liberty.\66\ Chinese
authorities confirmed that Gui was detained and facing additional
criminal charges \67\ for ``endangering state security,'' which
included allegations of ``illegally providing national secrets and
intelligence to overseas groups.'' \68\
On February 10, Gui appeared in an interview with the South China
Morning Post (SCMP), among other news media outlets, reportedly
arranged by the Ministry of Public Security,\69\ during which he said
Sweden was ``hyping up'' his case for political reasons and using him
as a ``chess piece.'' \70\ Gui has appeared in at least three televised
confessions in mainland and Hong Kong media outlets,\71\ which the
international NGO Safeguard Defenders believes are typically extracted
through threats and torture, and used for both domestic and overseas
propaganda.\72\ Journalists \73\ and advocates \74\--including Gui
Minhai's daughter Angela Gui \75\--questioned the journalistic
integrity of SCMP, which Safeguard Defenders called ``the first English-
language, non-state media that collaborated with the Chinese police to
circulate a televised confession.'' \76\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Macau
Macau's Basic Law does not provide for elections by
``universal suffrage,'' \77\ though its provisions ensure the
applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in Macau \78\ and guarantee Macau a
``high degree of autonomy'' within China.\79\ During its 2018
reporting year, the Commission did not observe progress in
Macau toward ``an electoral system based on universal and equal
suffrage'' in line with the ICCPR,\80\ as recommended by the UN
Human Rights Committee.\81\ In advance of the November 2018
session of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic
Review (UPR) of China, pro-democracy group New Macau
Association submitted a report calling for direct elections for
the Chief Executive, Legislative Assembly, and members of a
newly proposed municipal administration body that would replace
the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau.\82\
This past year, proposed legislative amendments raised
concerns regarding Macau's autonomy and rule of law. In March
2018, the government completed a draft law amending Macau's
Judicial Framework Law to bar foreign judges from hearing
national security and defense cases.\83\ Portuguese lawyers
were alarmed by the proposal and feared that it may violate
Macau's Basic Law and further erode the independence of the
city's judiciary.\84\ In December 2017, the government
completed a draft cybersecurity law and released the draft for
public comment.\85\ While the government reportedly stated that
the draft law would not compromise freedom of expression,\86\
cyber analysts said that based on the low level of cyber
attacks in Macau the legislation is not warranted, raising
concerns from cyber industries about the interpretation and
impact of the law.\87\
In December 2017, Macau's legislature suspended 26-year-old
legislator Sulu Sou Ka Hou \88\--one of four pro-democracy
legislators elected in September 2017 to the Macau Legislative
Assembly (AL), a body composed of 33 total seats, 14 of which
are directly elected.\89\ The AL voted by secret ballot to
suspend Sou 48 days after he took office, a move that lifted
his immunity from being prosecuted in court under the charge of
``aggravated disobedience'' for his role in a 2016 protest \90\
and stripped him of his right to legislate.\91\ This marked the
first time that a legislator has been suspended from his duties
since Macau's 1999 handover from Portugal to China.\92\ In May
2018, a Macau court found Sou guilty of organizing an unlawful
protest and fined him 40,800 patacas (US$5,100); \93\ Sou
appealed the sentence in June,\94\ which he later withdrew in
order to have his suspension at the AL lifted.\95\
Access and travel to Macau were reportedly limited for
certain events and individuals this past year. In March 2018,
the China Liaison Office in Macau reportedly warned organizers
of a literary festival in Macau that the government could not
guarantee entry to several book authors,\96\ including U.K.-
based writer and Mao Zedong biographer Jung Chang.\97\ In a
March 2018 statement, PEN Hong Kong, an international advocacy
organization for freedom of expression, said that the lack of
assurance for the entry of authors ``infringes directly on the
right of freedom of expression'' in Macau.\98\ Immigration
authorities denied pro-democracy and centrist Hong Kong
politicians entry to Macau this past year, citing concerns over
their participation in activities ``which may jeopardize the
public security . . . of the Macao SAR.'' \99\ In response to
an inquiry about the denial of Hong Kong politician Casper Wong
Chun-long from entry, a Macau official cited the prevention of
``chaos'' for the city.\100\
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
Notes to Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
\1\ See, e.g., Hong Kong Watch, ``Major EU Parliament Report
Condemns Chinese Interference in Hong Kong's Internal Affairs,'' 16
December 17; Hong Kong Watch, ``Hong Kong 20 Years On: Freedom, Human
Rights and Autonomy Under Fire,'' 15 January 18, 4.
\2\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97,
art. 2; Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, adopted 19 December 84,
item 3.
\3\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017--China
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)--Hong Kong,'' 20 April 18, 109.
See, e.g., Benjamin Haas, ``Enemy of the State? Agnes Chow, the 21-
Year-Old Activist Who Has China Worried,'' Guardian, 3 February 18;
Venus Wu, ``Hong Kong Lawyers Say Court Affirms `Political Screening'
in Elections,'' Reuters, 14 February 18.
\4\ Hong Kong Watch, ``Hong Kong 20 Years On: Freedom, Human Rights
and Autonomy Under Fire,'' 15 January 18; Freedom House, ``Freedom in
the World 2018--Hong Kong,'' last visited 18 July 18, secs. D-E; Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, arts. 25-39.
Articles 25 to 38 of the Basic Law list specific protected rights.
Article 39 says that the provisions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and international labor conventions shall
remain in force in Hong Kong.
\5\ Xi Jinping, ``Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a
Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,'' 18
October 17, Xinhua, 3 November 17, 21; Suzanne Pepper, ``Hong Kong's
Future in the Words of Xi Jinping,'' Hong Kong Focus (blog), 23 October
17.
\6\ State Council, ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 5 March 18; Chen Lijun, `` `Integrating With National
Development Situation' Is the Road That Hong Kong Development Must
Take'' [``Rongru guojia fazhan daju'' shi xianggang fazhan de biyou zhi
lu], Overseas Net, 6 March 18; Office of the Commissioner, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, ``A New Model of `Mainland Plus Hong Kong Plus
X' and a New Platform for Belt and Road Cooperation,'' 31 August 17.
\7\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``Full Text of Chief
Executive's Interview With Media in Beijing (Part Two)'' [Xingzheng
zhangguan zai beijing huijian chuanmei tanhua quanwen (er)], 15
December 17.
\8\ Charlotte Gao, ``Beijing Sets a Harsh Tone for Hong Kong in Two
Sessions,'' The Diplomat, 9 March 18.
\9\ ``Future Directions in Hong Kong's Governance: Youth
Perspectives,'' University of Hong Kong, Center for Comparative and
Public Law, April 2018, 1, 3, 7.
\10\ Electoral Affairs Commission, ``By-Election Brief,'' 8 March
18; ``Contentious By-Elections Disappoint Hong Kong's Democrats,''
Economist, 12 March 18; Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, ``Changes in Membership of the Sixth Legislative
Council (2016-2020),'' 21 March 18.
\11\ Joyce Ng et al., ``Barred Hong Kong Localists Vow To Keep
Fighting After High Court Decision,'' South China Morning Post, 16
November 16; Elson Tong, ``4 More Elected Pro-Democracy Lawmakers To Be
Ousted Following Hong Kong Court Ruling,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 14
July 17.
\12\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Interpretation
of Article 104 of the ``Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China'' [Quanguo
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa'' di yibailingsi tiao
de jieshi], issued 7 November 16.
\13\ In the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List, No
185 of 2016, HCAL 185/2016 and Miscellaneous Proceedings, No 2819 of
2016, HCMP 2819/2016, 15 November 16, paras. 19, 108; In the High Court
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Court of First
Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List, No 223 of 2016,
HCAL 223-26/2016, and Miscellaneous Proceedings, No 3378-79 and 3381-82
of 2016, HCMP 3378-79/2016, 3381-82/2016, 14 July 17, paras. 19, 22,
34, 95-96, 113, 141-42, 165, 182-83, 229.
\14\ Laignee Barron, ``Hong Kong's Democracy Movement Suffers a
Blow as Pro-Beijing Rivals Gain Ground in Election,'' Time, 12 March
18.
\15\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, ``Composition of the Legislative Council,'' last visited 6 June
18. See also Secretariat Education Service Team, Legislative Council of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ``Composition of the
Legislative Council,'' March 2017; Cal Wong, ``What Exactly Is Hong
Kong's Legislative Council? '' The Diplomat, 6 September 16.
\16\ Jeffie Lam, ``What Happened to the Disqualifications Backlash?
Five Takeaways From Hong Kong's Legco By-Election,'' South China
Morning Post, 12 March 18.
\17\ Hong Kong Bar Association, ``Statement of the Hong Kong Bar
Association on Disqualification,'' 14 February 18; Hong Kong Watch, ``
`Political Screening in Hong Kong': The Disqualification of Candidates
and Lawmakers Ahead of the March By-Elections,'' 8 March 18, 5.
\18\ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
``Transcript of Media Session by Secretary for Justice,'' 29 January
18.
\19\ Benjamin Haas, ``Enemy of the State? Agnes Chow, the 21-Year-
Old Activist Who Has China Worried,'' Guardian, 3 February 18; ``(LegCo
By-Election) Another Candidate Barred From Running,'' The Standard, 1
February 18; Jeffie Lam, ``Why Is Hong Kong Having Its Quietest
Election Ever?'' South China Morning Post, 8 March 18.
\20\ Benjamin Haas, ``Enemy of the State? Agnes Chow, the 21-Year-
Old Activist Who Has China Worried,'' Guardian, 3 February 18; Tony
Cheung, ``Demosisto Party Candidate Agnes Chow Launches High Court Bid
To Have Hong Kong Election Ban Overturned on Bill of Rights Grounds,''
South China Morning Post, 8 May 18.
\21\ Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Hong Kong's Great Leap
Backward on Political Rights,'' 1 February 18; Kris Cheng, ``James Chan
Third Citizen To Be Barred From Election by Hong Kong Gov't Over
Political Beliefs,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 1 February 18.
\22\ Kimmy Chung and Tony Cheung, ``Political Storm in Hong Kong as
Activist Agnes Chow Banned From By-Election Over Party's Call for
City's `Self Determination,' '' South China Morning Post, 28 January
18. See also Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
``Transcript of Media Session by Secretary for Justice,'' 29 January
18.
\23\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law
List, No 162 of 2016, HCAL 162/2016, 13 February 18, sec. 118; Venus Wu
and Pak Yiu, ``Hong Kong Court Rules Pro-Independence Stance Must Bar
Standing for Election,'' Reuters, 13 February 18.
\24\ European Union Office to Hong Kong and Macao, ``Statement by
the Spokesperson on the Decision To Bar Agnes Chow from Running for a
Legislative Council By-Election,'' 29 January 18; United Kingdom
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, ``FCO Statement on Forthcoming
Legislative Council By-Election in Hong Kong,'' 31 January 18.
\25\ Hong Kong Bar Association, ``Statement of the Hong Kong Bar
Association on Disqualification,'' 14 February 18; Ernest Kao and Tony
Cheung, ``Hong Kong Bar Association Laments `Political Screening' of
Election Candidates,'' South China Morning Post, 14 February 18; Venus
Wu, ``Hong Kong Lawyers Say Court Affirms `Political Screening' in
Elections,'' Reuters, 14 February 18.
\26\ Kong Tsung-gan, ``Overview of Prosecutions and Lawsuits
Brought by the Hong Kong Government Against Pro-Democracy Leaders,''
Medium, 13 April 18.
\27\ Chris Lau, ``Hong Kong Student Leaders Joshua Wong, Lester
Shum and Five Others Admit to Contempt of Court in Occupy Case,'' South
China Morning Post, 6 July 17; Chris Lau, ``20 Hong Kong Protestors To
Face Punishment for Contempt of Court in Occupy Case,'' South China
Morning Post, 13 October 17.
\28\ Ellie Ng, ``Defence Says Hong Kong Democracy Activists Face
`Unconstitutional, Unnecessary' Charges in Umbrella Movement Trial,''
Hong Kong Free Press, 9 January 18; Kris Cheng, ``Hong Kong Umbrella
Movement Trial: Court Refuses To Scrap `Inciting Others To Incite
Public Nuisance' Charge,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 13 February 18.
\29\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Court of First Instance, High Court Criminal Case No 408 of
2016 [Xianggang tebie xingzheng qu, gaodeng fayuan yuan song fating
gaoyuan xingshi anjian 2016 nian di 408 hao], HCCC 408/2016, 11 June
18, secs. 69-71; Austin Ramzy, ``Hong Kong Activist Edward Leung Given
6 Years for Police Clash,'' New York Times, 11 June 18; Ben Westcott
and Divya Gopalan, ``Hong Kong Independence Activist Edward Leung
Jailed for Six Years,'' CNN, 11 June 18; ``Hong Kong Jails Independence
Leader Edward Leung for Six Years,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in
Guardian, 10 June 18. See also Jeffie Lam, ``Edward Leung Riot
Sentence: Too Harsh, or Necessary as Deterrent? Legal Scholars,
Politicians Split Over Jail Term for Hong Kong Independence Activist,''
South China Morning Post, 26 June 18.
\30\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245) [Di 245 zhang gong'an
tiaoli], issued 17 November 67, amended 29 June 17. See also UN Human
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report
of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at its 107th Session (11-
28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3, 29 April 13, para. 10. The UN
Human Rights Committee noted in its 2013 review of the Hong Kong
government's compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights that provisions within the Public Order Ordinance
``may facilitate excessive restriction to the Covenant rights.''
\31\ Hong Kong Watch, ``Lord Patten Criticises Public Order
Ordinance Following Sentencing of Edward Leung,'' 11 June 18.
\32\ Hong Kong Watch, ``Twelve Top International Lawyers Warn of
Grave Threats to Rule of Law, Judicial Independence and Human Rights in
Hong Kong,'' 16 October 17; Greg Torode and James Pomfret, ``Hong
Kong's Judges Voice Fears Over China Influence in Judiciary,'' Reuters,
15 March 18. See also Karen Cheung, ``UK Watchdog Urges Fair Trials for
Hong Kong Activists; Suggests Stripping Justice Sec. of Prosecution
Power,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 1 March 18.
\33\ See, e.g., ``Nobel Peace Prize Nomination for Hong Kong
Protest Leaders Angers Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 February 18; Venus
Wu, ``U.S. Congress Members Nominate Hong Kong's Joshua Wong for Nobel
Peace Prize,'' Reuters, 1 February 18; Tom Phillips, ``Nobel Peace
Prize: US Lawmakers Nominate Hong Kong Protesters,'' Guardian, 1
February 18; Eli Meixler, ``Hong Kong's `Umbrella Movement' Has Been
Nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize,'' Time, 1 February 18. See also
``Chairs Release 2017 Annual Report--Announce New Initiatives on Hong
Kong & Commemoration of Liu Xiaobo,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 5 October 17. At the release of the Commission's
2017 Annual Report, Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Chris Smith,
the Commission's Chair and Cochair, respectively, announced their
intention to nominate Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow and the
entire Umbrella Movement for the Nobel Peace Prize. The Chairs, along
with 10 other members of the U.S. Congress, subsequently made the
nomination in February 2018 to the Nobel Peace Prize Committee.
\34\ ``Hong Kong Activist Joshua Wong Jailed for Six Months,'' BBC,
17 August 17; Alan Wong, ``Hong Kong Protest Leaders Are Freed on Bail
To Pursue Appeal,'' New York Times, 24 October 17.
\35\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Court of Appeal, Criminal Jurisdiction, Application for Review
No. 4 of 2016 (On Appeal From ESCC No. 2791 of 2015) [Xianggang tebie
xingzheng qu, gaodeng fayuan shangsu fating, xingshi sifa guanxia quan,
fuhe shenqing, fuhe shenqing anjian 2016 nian di 4 hao (yuan dongqu
caipan fayuan xingshi anjian 2015 nian di 2791 hao), CAAR 4/2016, 17
August 17, paras. 7, 19-21, 174; Jasmine Siu, ``Joshua Wong and Other
Jailed Hong Kong Student Leaders See Political Careers Halted,'' South
China Morning Post, 18 August 17. See also Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Public Order Ordinance (Cap.
245) [Di 245 zhang gong'an tiaoli], issued 17 November 67, amended 29
June 17, sec. 18.
\36\ James Griffiths, ``Joshua Wong and Two Other Umbrella Movement
Leaders Jailed in Hong Kong,'' CNN, 17 August 17; Jasmine Siu, ``Joshua
Wong and Other Jailed Hong Kong Student Leaders See Political Careers
Halted,'' South China Morning Post, 18 August 17.
\37\ In the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Final Appeal No. 8 of 2017 (Criminal) (On Appeal
From CAAR No. 4 of 2016), FACC 9/2017, 6 February 18, paras. 105, 120,
126.
\38\ Ibid.
\39\ Karen Cheung, ``Hong Kong Democracy Activists Joshua Wong,
Alex Chow, Nathan Law Free To Go After Occupy Sentence Appeal,'' Hong
Kong Free Press, 6 February 18.
\40\ Legislative Council, Bills Committee on Guangzhou-Shenzhen-
Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Co-location) Bill, ``Background Brief
Prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat,'' 9 February 18, last
updated 24 April 18, items 6-13.
\41\ ``Cooperation Plan for Mainland and Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Regarding the Implementation of `Co-Location' at
the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong High Speed Rail West Kowloon Station''
[Neidi yu xianggang tebie xingzhengqu guanyu zai guangshengang gaotie
jiulong zhan sheli kou'an shishi ``yidi liangjian'' de hezuo anpai], 18
November 17, reprinted in National People's Congress, 28 December 17.
\42\ Shadow Li and Cao Yin, ``Top Legislature Endorses Joint
Checkpoint for Express Rail Linking HK and Mainland,'' China Daily, 28
December 17. See also Shi Longhong, ``National's People's Congress
Standing Committee Approved `Regarding the Implementation of `Co-
Location' at the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong High Speed Rail West
Kowloon Station' '' [Quanguo renda changweihui pizhun ``neidi yu
xianggang tebie xingzhengqu guanyu zai guangshengang gaotie xi jiulong
zhan sheli kou'an shishi `yidi liangjian' de hezuo anpai''], Xinhua, 27
December 17.
\43\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, ``Customs,
Immigration and Quarantine Arrangements of the Hong Kong Section of the
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link,'' 3.
\44\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Bills Committee on Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail
Link (Co-location) Bill, ``Background Brief Prepared by the Legislative
Council Secretariat,'' 9 February 18, last updated 24 April 18, items
11-13; Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong
Express Rail Link (Co-Location) Bill, 26 January 18.
\45\ ``Co-Location Bill Passed,'' Hong Kong Government News, 14
June 18; Kimmy Chung et al., ``Hong Kong's Controversial China Rail
Checkpoint Bill Finally Passed by Lawmakers Amid Protests, Delays and
Expulsions,'' South China Morning Post, 14 June 18.
\46\ Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Association on the Decision of
the NPCSC of 27 December 2017 on the Co-operation Agreement Between the
Mainland and the HKSAR on the Establishment of the Port at the West
Kowloon Station of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link
for Implementing Co-location Arrangement,'' 28 December 17, items 5, 6,
11. See also Elizabeth Cheung, ``Hong Kong Bar Association `Appalled'
by Approval of Joint Checkpoint Plan, Saying It `Irreparably' Breaches
Basic Law,'' South China Morning Post, 29 December 17.
\47\ Hong Kong Bar Association, ``Statement of the Hong Kong Bar
Association on the Decision of the NPCSC of 27 December 2017 on the Co-
operation Agreement Between the Mainland and the HKSAR on the
Establishment of the Port at the West Kowloon Station of the Guangzhou-
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link for Implementing Co-location
Arrangement,'' 28 December 17, item 7.
\48\ Kevin Carrico, Hong Kong Watch, ``Academic Freedom in Hong
Kong Since 2015: Between Two Systems,'' January 2018, 1, 3-6.
\49\ Ibid., 4.
\50\ Jeffie Lam, ``Why Beijing Came Down So Hard on Pro-democracy
Academic Benny Tai Over Hong Kong Independence Comments,'' South China
Morning Post, 13 April 18; Kevin Carrico, Hong Kong Watch, ``Academic
Freedom in Hong Kong Since 2015: Between Two Systems,'' January 2018,
4.
\51\ ``Dismissal Call Piles Pressure on Hong Kong Academic Over
Independence Remarks,'' Reuters, 3 April 18; ``Row Over Law Scholar's
Independence Remarks Sparks Concern in Hong Kong,'' Radio Free Asia, 5
April 18. See also Liu Lulu, ``Hong Kong Must Enact Basic Law Article
23 To Rein In Secession,'' Global Times, 2 April 18.
\52\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, ``Response
by HKSAR Government to Media Enquiries,'' 30 March 18; ``Row Over Law
Scholar's Independence Remarks Sparks Concern in Hong Kong,'' Radio
Free Asia, 5 April 18.
\53\ ``Row Over Law Scholar's Independence Remarks Sparks Concern
in Hong Kong,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 April 18; International Federation
of Journalists, ``Hong Kong Independence Comments Lead to Freedom of
Speech Row,'' 4 June 18; Kris Cheng, ``Attacks Against Academic Benny
Tai May Be Paving Way for Controversial National Security Law, Scholars
Warn,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 6 April 18.
\54\ Austin Ramzy, ``Hong Kong May Ban Political Party That Seeks
Independence From China,'' New York Times, 17 July 18.
\55\ Austin Ramzy, ``As Hong Kong Clamps Down, a Tiny Political
Party Finds Itself in the Spotlight,'' New York Times, 6 August 18.
\56\ U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, ``FCO Statement on the
Hong Kong National Party,'' 17 July 18.
\57\ Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Public Evaluation of Hong
Kong Press Freedom Drops to New Low,'' 11 April 18.
\58\ Centre for Comparative and Public Law, University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, Hong Kong Union, et al., ``Joint
Submission of NGOs for the Universal Periodic Review (3rd Cycle): Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) China,'' March 2018, item
12.
\59\ Demosisto, ``Statement To Condemn the Ministry of State
Security's Decision To Detain Demosisto Members,'' 27 August 18, 1-2.
\60\ Tom Phillips and Benjamin Haas, ``British Conservative Party
Activist Barred From Entering Hong Kong,'' Guardian, 11 October 17. See
also Benedict Rogers, ``Why the World Must Wake Up to China's Threat to
Freedom in Hong Kong,'' Guardian, 12 October 17.
\61\ Te-Ping Chen, ``China Defends Detention of Swedish Bookseller
Gui Minhai,'' Wall Street Journal, 25 February 18; Tom Phillips, `` `A
Very Scary Movie': How China Snatched Gui Minhai on the 11.10 Train to
Beijing,'' Guardian, 21 February 18. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report,
6 October 16, 329-31. For more information on Gui Minhai, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00090.
\62\ Danny Lee and Phila Siu, ``Missing Hong Kong Bookseller Gui
Minhai `Released,' but Family Cannot Find Him,'' South China Morning
Post, 24 October 17; Austin Ramzy, ``China Is Said To Free Hong Kong
Bookseller, but Family Says He's Missing,'' New York Times, 24 October
17; ``Sweden Demands Immediate Release of Citizen Detained in China,''
Reuters, 23 January 18.
\63\ Tom Phillips, `` `A Very Scary Movie': How China Snatched Gui
Minhai on the 11.10 Train to Beijing,'' Guardian, 21 February 18; Mu
Xuequan, ``China Focus: Gui Minhai Detained Over Allegedly Endangering
State Security,'' Xinhua, 10 February 18; Phila Siu, ``Transcript of
Gui Minhai's Government-Arranged Interview: `Swedish Government Used
Me,' '' South China Morning Post, 10 February 18.
\64\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Police Seize Publisher From Train in
Front of Diplomats,'' New York Times, 22 January 18; ``Sweden Condemns
China's `Brutal' Seizure of Bookseller Gui Minhai,'' Agence France-
Presse, reprinted in The Local, 6 February 18.
\65\ Government Offices of Sweden, ``Statement by Margot Wallstrom
Regarding the Detention of Swedish Citizen Gui Minhai,'' 5 February 18;
``Sweden Condemns China's `Brutal' Seizure of Bookseller Gui Minhai,''
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in The Local, 6 February 18. See also
Government Offices of Sweden, ``Statement on Swedish Citizen Gui
Minhai,'' 8 March 18; Government Offices of Sweden, ``Statement in
Connection With the Detention of Swedish Citizen Gui Minhai,'' 23
January 18.
\66\ European Union, ``Statement by High Representative/Vice-
President Federica Mogherini on the Continued Detention of Gui Minhai
in China,'' 15 February 18.
\67\ Mu Xuequan, ``China Focus: Gui Minhai Detained Over Allegedly
Endangering State Security,'' Xinhua, 10 February 18; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular
Press Conference on February 12, 2018,'' 12 February 18; ``China
Confirms Arrest of Bookseller Gui Minhai,'' Al Jazeera, 6 February 18.
\68\ Bai Yunyi, ``HK Bookseller Confesses to Truth About So-called
`Disappearance,' Says Sweden `Manipulated' Him,'' Global Times, 10
February 18.
\69\ Phila Siu, ``Transcript of Gui Minhai's Government-Arranged
Interview: `Swedish Government Used Me,' '' South China Morning Post,
10 February 18. See also Javier C. Hernandez, ``A Hong Kong Newspaper
on a Mission To Promote China's Soft Power,'' New York Times, 31 March
18.
\70\ Phila Siu, ``Transcript of Gui Minhai's Government-Arranged
Interview: `Swedish Government Used Me' '' South China Morning Post, 10
February 18; ``Detained Bookseller Gui Minhai Slams Sweden for `Hyping
Up Case' for Political Reasons,'' People's Daily, 11 February 18; Te-
Ping Chen, ``Bookseller Detained in China Says Sweden Is Using Him as a
`Chess Piece' '' Wall Street Journal, 11 February 18.
\71\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes
of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 25-27.
\72\ Ibid., 4-5.
\73\ China Digital Times, ``SCMP Confronted Over Forced Confession
Coverage,'' 18 April 18.
\74\ Ibid. See also Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged:
Behind the Scenes of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' April 2018, 71.
\75\ ``An Exchange Between Gui Minhai's Daughter and the Post's
Editor-in-Chief,'' South China Morning Post, 18 April 18. See also the
Long Arm of China: Global Efforts To Silence Critics from Tiananmen to
Today, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 24
May 16, Testimony of Angela Gui, Daughter of Gui Minhai.
\76\ Safeguard Defenders, ``Scripted and Staged: Behind the Scenes
of China's Forced TV Confessions,'' 10 April 18, 71.
\77\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen tebie
xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99,
arts. 47, 68 and annexes I, II.
\78\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen tebie
xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99,
art. 40.
\79\ Ibid., arts. 12, 16, 22.
\80\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25(b). Article 25(b) of the
ICCPR guarantees the right ``to vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . .
..''
\81\ UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the
Initial Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 107th
session (11-28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/1, 29 April 13, para. 7;
UN Human Rights Committee, Report on Follow-up to the Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/112/2, 8 December
14, 23.
\82\ New Macau Association, ``Submission of the New Macau
Association to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 31st
Session of Universal Periodic Review on Macau, China,'' 28 March 18, 1-
3. See also Nelson Moura, ``Municipal Body Public Consultation Report
Without Clear Data on Opposing Views,'' Macau News Agency, 2 March 18.
\83\ Farah Master, ``Macau Move To Curtail Foreign Judges Sparks
Concerns Over China's Growing Control,'' Reuters, 7 March 18.
\84\ Ibid.
\85\ ``Public Consultation on Cyber Security Law Runs Until Jan
24,'' Macau Daily Times, 12 December 17.
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ Cross-Border Chinese Q&A, Culture & Media Education
Foundation, ``What Is the Macau Government's `Cybersecurity Law' Aimed
At?'' [Aomen zhengfu de ``wangluo anquan fa'' jian zhi hefang?], In
Media HK, 24 January 18.
\88\ ``Person of the Year: Sulu Sou: An Inconvenient Voice,'' Macau
Daily Times, 29 December 17.
\89\ Kris Cheng, ``Macau Election: Pro-Democracy Camp Maintains 4
of 33 Seats, With Youngest Ever Lawmaker Elected at 26,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 18 September 17; Kelvin Chan, ``Young Democracy Activist
Among Macau Election Winners,'' Associated Press, 18 September 17.
\90\ ``Person of the Year: Sulu Sou: An Inconvenient Voice,'' Macau
Daily Times, 29 December 17.
\91\ Kris Cheng, ``Macau's Youngest Ever Pro-Democracy Lawmaker
Suspended Over `Aggravated Disobedience' Charge,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, 4 December 17.
\92\ Raquel Carvalho, ``Macau's Youngest Lawmaker Sulu Sou,
Suspended From Office and Found Guilty Over 2016 Protest, Hopes To
Retake His Seat,'' South China Morning Post, 2 June 18.
\93\ Ibid.; Macau Special Administrative Region Court of First
Instance, Fourth Criminal Court, Independent Court Basic Law Criminal
Case No. CR4-17-0194-PCS, Judgment [Aomen tebie xingzheng qu chuji
fayuan, di si xingshi fating, duren ting putong xingshi an di CR4-17-
0194-PCS hao, panjue shu], 29 May 18.
\94\ Sheyla Zandonai, ``Sulu Sou Confirms Appeal of Sentence For
Illegal Protest,'' Macau News Agency, 26 June 18.
\95\ Cecilia U, ``Breaking News: Sulu Sou Withdraws Appeal To Cease
Suspension,'' Macau News Agency, 27 June 18.
\96\ ``The Central Government's Liaison Office in Macau Suggests
Cancelation of Writer's Presence in the Macau Literary Festival,''
Macau News, 12 March 18; ``Writer Jung Chang Entry in Macau Not
Guaranteed by Authorities,'' Macau News, 5 March 18.
\97\ ``The Central Government's Liaison Office in Macau Suggests
Cancelation of Writer's Presence in the Macau Literary Festival,''
Macau News, 12 March 18.
\98\ PEN Hong Kong, ``Statement on International Authors Being
Denied Access to Macau,'' 7 March 18.
\99\ See e.g., Kris Cheng, ``Macau Denies Entry to Member of
Centrist Hong Kong Party, Citing `Intention' To Jeopardise Public
Security,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 19 December 17; Ng Kang-chung, ``Hong
Kong Politician Barred From Macau Ahead of 18th Handover Anniversary
Over Security Concerns,'' South China Morning Post, 20 December 17;
Karen Cheung, ``Macau Denies Entry to Pro-democracy District
Councillor, Citing `Intention' To Jeopardise Public Security,'' Hong
Kong Free Press, 4 September 17.
\100\ ``Macau Denied People's Entry To Avoid Chaos,'' Macau Daily
Times, 22 December 17.