[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SURVEILLANCE, SUPPRESSION, AND MASS DETENTION: XINJIANG'S HUMAN RIGHTS
CRISIS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2018
__________
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey,
TOM COTTON, Arkansas Cochairman
STEVE DAINES, Montana ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIM WALZ, Minnesota
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TED LIEU, California
GARY PETERS, Michigan
ANGUS KING, Maine
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Not yet appointed
Elyse B. Anderson, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Statements
Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator from
Florida; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1
Christino III, Anthony, Director of the Foreign Policy Division,
Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of
Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce............. 4
Currie, Ambassador Kelley E., Representative of the United States
on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations,
United States Mission to the United Nations.................... 6
Smith, Hon. Christopher, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey;
Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China........ 11
Hoja, Gulchehra, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia...... 25
Thum, Rian, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans... 26
Batke, Jessica, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former research
analyst at the Department of State............................. 27
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Christino III, Anthony........................................... 43
Currie, Kelley E................................................. 44
Hoja, Gulchehra.................................................. 48
Thum, Rian....................................................... 50
Batke, Jessica................................................... 56
Rubio, Hon. Marco................................................ 64
Smith, Hon. Christopher.......................................... 65
Submissions for the Record
Article entitled ``New Evidence for China's Political Re-
education Campaign in Xinjiang,'' submitted by Senator Rubio... 68
Article entitled ``Apartheid with Chinese Characteristics,''
submitted by Senator King...................................... 74
Article entitled ``What Really Happens in China's Re-education
Camps,'' submitted by Rian Thum................................ 80
Letter to Secretary Pompeo, submitted by Senator Rubio........... 82
Witness Biographies.............................................. 84
(iii)
SURVEILLANCE, SUPPRESSION, AND MASS DETENTION: XINJIANG'S HUMAN RIGHTS
CRISIS
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2018
Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:07
a.m., in room 124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator
Marco Rubio, Chairman, presiding.
Present: Representative Smith, Cochairman, Senator King,
Representative Lieu, Senator Cotton, and Senator Daines.
Also Present: Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative
of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations;
Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division,
Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of
Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce;
Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia;
Rian Thum, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans;
and Jessica Batke, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former research
analyst at the Department of State.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chairman Rubio. Good morning. This hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China will come to order.
The title of this hearing is ``Surveillance, Suppression, and
Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis.''
We have two panels testifying today. The first panel will
feature Ambassador Kelley Currie, the Representative of the
United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations; and
Anthony Christino III who is the Director of the Foreign Policy
Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance,
Bureau of Industry and Security at the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
We'll have a second panel--Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service
journalist, Radio Free Asia; Rian Thum, an associate professor
at Loyola University New Orleans; and Jessica Batke, Senior
Editor at ChinaFile and a former research analyst at the U.S.
Department of State.
I want to thank you for being here. I know one of our
initial panel witnesses is delayed, as happens in this great
city that we call our nation's capital. But we are going to
begin, and we will accommodate that accordingly.
I want to begin by noting that this hearing is set against
the backdrop this week of Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador for
International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback convening the
first-ever State Department Ministerial to Advance
International Religious Freedom, an event which has brought
together senior representatives from more than 70 governments
around the world to discuss areas of collaboration and
partnership in the cause of religious freedom globally.
Secretary Pompeo penned an opinion piece in USA Today
earlier this week highlighting the Ministerial and the
importance of advancing religious freedom globally. Of note, he
specifically mentioned Ms. Gulchehra and family.
While the Chinese government and the Communist Party are
equal opportunity oppressors targeting unregistered and
registered Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong
practitioners, and others with harassment, detention,
imprisonment and more, the current human rights crisis
unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region targeting
Muslim minority groups is arguably among the worst, if not the
most severe, instances in the world today of an authoritarian
government brutally and systematically targeting a minority
faith community. This is an issue that the Commission has been
dealing with for some time.
In April, we wrote U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad
urging him to prioritize this crackdown in his interactions
with the Chinese government and to begin collecting information
to make the case for possible application of Global Magnitsky
sanctions against senior government and Party officials in the
region, including Chen Quanguo, the current Xinjiang Communist
Party Secretary.
The Commission's forthcoming Annual Report, set to be
released this October, will prominently feature the grave and
deteriorating situation we will cover here today.
While our expert witnesses will discuss the situation in
greater detail, I want to take a few minutes to paint a picture
of life in Xinjiang.
For months now, there have been credible estimates of
between 800,000 and 1 million people from this region being
held at political reeducation centers or camps which are
fortified with barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced
doors, and guard rooms. Security personnel at these facilities,
at these camps, have subjected detainees to torture, to medical
neglect and maltreatment, to solitary confinement, to sleep
deprivation, to lack of adequate clothing in cold temperatures,
and other forms of abuse resulting in the death of some of
these detainees.
According to one news source, ``The internment program aims
to rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their
Islamic beliefs and reshape their very identities. The camps
have expanded rapidly over the past year, with almost no
judicial process or legal paperwork. Detainees who most
vigorously criticize the people and things they love are
rewarded, and those who refuse to do so are punished with
solitary confinement, with beatings and food deprivation.''
That was a quote from the media coverage of this.
Some local officials in the region have used chilling
political rhetoric to describe the very purpose of the
arbitrary detentions of Uyghur Muslims and members of other
Muslim ethnic minority groups. These are the terms they've
used: ``eradicating tumors'' or spraying chemicals on crops to
``kill the weeds.'' One expert who is testifying today
described Uyghur Xinjiang as ``a police state to rival North
Korea, with a formalized racism on the order of South African
apartheid.''
While the Chinese government has repeatedly denied
knowledge of the camps, a groundbreaking report by Adrian Zenz,
a scholar at the European School of Culture and Theology,
published through the Jamestown Foundation in May, found that
Chinese authorities were soliciting public bids for the
construction of additional camps and the addition of security
elements to existing facilities.
I would submit this report for the record and would also
note the Google Earth footage behind me, which clearly shows
the construction of these camps over the span of several
months.
[The submitted document appears in the Appendix.]
Those not subject to ``transformation through education''--
as they call it--in these detention facilities still face daily
intrusions in their home life. This includes compulsory ``home
stays,'' wherein Communist Party officials and government
workers are sent to live with local Uyghur and Kazakh families.
The data-driven surveillance in Xinjiang is assisted by
iris and body scanners, voice pattern analyzers, DNA
sequencers, and facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on
roads, or in train stations. Two large Chinese firms, Hikvision
and Dahua Technology, have profited greatly from the surge in
security spending, reportedly winning upwards of $1.2 billion
in Chinese government contracts for large-scale surveillance
projects.
Authorities employ hand-held devices to search smartphones
for encrypted chat apps and require residents to install
monitoring applications on their cell phones. More traditional
security measures are also employed. That includes extensive
police checkpoints.
The rise in security personnel is also accompanied by the
proliferation of ``convenience police stations,'' a dense
network of street corner, village, or neighborhood police
stations that enhances authorities' ability to closely surveil
and police local communities.
Just this month, reports emerged of officials, in a
humiliating public act, cutting the skirts and even long shirts
of Uyghur women on the spot, as they walked through local
streets. They did so as a means of enforcing a ban on ethnic
minorities wearing long skirts.
And yesterday there was an analysis released by the NGO
Chinese Human Rights Defenders indicating that 21 percent of
arrests in China last year were in Xinjiang, which has only 1.5
percent of the population--21 percent of the arrests last year
in all of China concentrated in an area with 1.5 percent of the
population. The number of arrests increased 731 percent over
the previous year and that does not include the detentions of
those in the ``political re-education centers,'' which are
carried out extralegally.
Radio Free Asia has led the way in reporting on this
crisis. And that has not come without a cost. Developments in
Xinjiang have had a direct impact on U.S. interests, most
notably the detention of dozens of family members of U.S.-based
Uyghur journalists employed by Radio Free Asia, as well as the
detention of dozens of family members of prominent Uyghur
rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the
Chinese government to silence effective reporting and rights
advocacy. We are delighted that RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja
can join us today to speak to her personal experience in this
regard.
The Commission has convened a series of hearings focused on
the ``long arm'' of China, and that dimension certainly exists
as it relates to the Uyghur diaspora community, including right
here in the United States.
With that, I want to welcome our witnesses. Why don't I
start with you, Mr. Christino, since Ambassador Currie----
Staffer. She's here.
Senator Rubio. I know. But I want to give her a second to
catch up. I saw her walk in.
Why don't we start with you. I was late a few minutes as
well. I know it takes time to put it all together.
So, welcome. Thank you for being here today.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CHRISTINO III, DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN
POLICY DIVISION, OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND TREATY
COMPLIANCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
Mr. Christino. Thank you, Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith,
and other Members of the Commission on China for convening this
hearing today on this important topic. Today I will discuss the
role of the Bureau of Industry and Security regarding export
license requirements for China.
Under the Export Administration Regulations, known as the
EAR, a Bureau of Industry and Security license is required for
the export or reexport of most items on the Commerce Control
List to China. Items on the CCL are identified by their
individually assigned Export Control Classification Numbers
according to the reasons for control, such as crime control and
detection, known as Crime Control.
The Commerce Control List is also comprised of items
controlled by the multilateral export control regimes such as
the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
as well as items controlled unilaterally for foreign policy
reasons. And here I would draw the distinction with the crime
controls--they are in fact unilateral, unlike controls over
nuclear items and other items that would be of concern for
security reasons to our international partners, and therefore
controlled on one of the regimes.
In support of U.S. foreign policy specifically to promote
the observance of human rights throughout the world, the United
States controls items on the Commerce Control List as required
by Section 6(n) of the Export Administration Act, as amended.
As set forth in the Export Administration Regulations, the U.S.
Government requires a license to export most crime control and
detection instruments, equipment, related technology, and
software to all destinations other than our closest allies such
as NATO members Australia, Japan, etc. Additionally, a license
is required to export certain crime-control items, including
restraint-type devices such as handcuffs and discharge-type
arms such as stun guns, to all destinations with the single
exception of Canada.
The Export Administration Regulations impose limited
controls on some items not on the Commerce Control List. Items
subject to Commerce licensing jurisdiction under our
regulations, but not specifically identified on the Control
List, are designated as EAR99. Such items generally do not
require a license for export or reexport to China unless
destined to weapons of mass destruction-related end uses or end
users, or unless the items are part of a transaction involving
a restricted party identified on one of several lists
maintained by agencies of the U.S. Government, including the
Bureau of Industry and Security's entity list, the Department
of State's restricted list, and the Department of the
Treasury's specially designated nationals list.
Items controlled for crime-control reasons are added to or
removed from the CCL based on continuous review of the merits
of maintaining the controls and the effectiveness of the
controls. Section 6 of the EAR prohibits the imposition of
foreign policy controls including crime-control items unless
certain determinations are made and certain factors reported to
Congress, such as the determination that the controls are
likely to achieve the intended foreign policy objective, a
description of consultative efforts with industry and other
supplier countries, and determinations related to the economic
impact on U.S. business and industry.
There is a specific crime control licensing review policy
related to China. The U.S. Government considers applications to
export or reexport most crime-control items favorably on a
case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in a country
or the sale involves a region of concern or there is evidence
that the government may have violated human rights.
The purpose of the controls is to deter the development of
a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, distance the
United States from such abuses, and avoid contributing to
disorder in a country or region. Now we maintain a general
policy of denial for certain items: Applications to export
crime-control items to countries that are not otherwise subject
to sanctions or comprehensive embargoes but are identified by
the Department of State as human rights violators, receive
additional scrutiny and are generally denied. There are
specific controls related to legislation popularly referred to
as Tiananmen Square sanctions.
I'd like to conclude by just noting that we do not receive
very many applications for exports to China. We did receive 25
last calendar year--21 were for the return of defective items
manufactured in China. They were returned to the original
Chinese manufacturers. There were nine denials, including
applications for stun guns, optical sighting devices, pepper
spray, etc., and voiceprint software, which I know was of
interest.
I am happy to answer any questions you have on my testimony
or anything relevant to the Export Administration Regulations
and the controls we maintain specific to China and crime-
control items. Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christino appears in the
Appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Ambassador Currie.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KELLEY E. CURRIE, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Ambassador Currie. Thank you so much, Senator Rubio. I
apologize. I think you know we have the IRF (International
Religious Freedom) Ministerial going on this week and between
that and trying to get down here from New York this morning, it
was a little bit difficult. But I do want to express our
appreciation for you and the Commission holding this very
important hearing today.
I am pleased to be able to appear before the Commission on
behalf of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and discuss
our concerns regarding the growing human rights crisis in
Xinjiang, with a particular focus on how this crisis is being
addressed--or not--at the United Nations. I would like to
submit my full remarks for the record and just give a brief
summary of them.
The United States is deeply troubled by the Chinese
government's worsening crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other
Muslims in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since
April 2017, the Xi Jinping leadership, under the guise of
fighting ``terrorism,'' ``secession,'' and ``religious
extremism,'' has greatly intensified the Chinese Communist
Party's long-standing repressive policies against mainstream
nonviolent Muslim cultural and religious practices in Xinjiang.
The stated goal of the current campaign is to ``sinicize
religion'' and ``adapt religion to a socialist society,''
suggesting that Beijing believes it now possesses the
political, diplomatic, and technological capabilities to
transform religion and ethnicity in Chinese society in a way
that its predecessors never could, even during the peak horrors
of the Cultural Revolution and other heinous Maoist campaigns
intended to remake Chinese society.
The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking.
Authorities now prohibit ``abnormal'' beards, the wearing of
veils in public, and classify refusal to watch state television
as a crime, refusal to wear shorts, abstention from alcohol and
tobacco, refusal to eat pork, fasting during the holy month of
Ramadan, and practicing traditional funeral rituals as
potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious
views.
Chinese authorities have banned parents from giving their
children a number of traditional Islamic names, including
Muhammad, Islam, Fatima, and Aisha, and have reportedly
required children under age 16 who have Islamic names to change
them. Of particular concern, since 2015 Chinese authorities
have increasingly criminalized or punished the teaching of
Islam to young people, even by their parents, adopting at least
six new laws or regulations to put parents and religious
leaders at legal risk if they promote nonviolent Muslim
scripture, rituals, and clothing to children.
Chinese authorities also continue to crack down in
particular on the use of Uyghur and other minority languages at
universities and in classroom instruction.
As you noted, we now believe, based on a wide array of
evidence, that the number of individuals detained in re-
education centers for violating these strictures since April
2017 numbers in at least the hundreds of thousands, possibly
millions. There are even disturbing reports that young children
have been sent to state-run orphanages if only one of their
parents is detained in internment camps. We call on China to
end these counterproductive policies and free all those
arbitrarily detained.
As you noted, with many things related to China's human
rights abuses, the repression does not stop at the Chinese
border. The detention and persecution of Uyghur and other
Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has compelled them to stop
communicating with their family and friends abroad. We also are
concerned by reports of Chinese authorities harassing Uyghurs
abroad to compel them to act as informants, return to Xinjiang,
or remain silent about the situation.
Chinese authorities appear to be targeting law-abiding
Uyghurs--including nonviolent activists and advocates for human
rights at home and abroad--as terrorist threats based solely on
the basis of their political, cultural, and religious beliefs
and practices.
Given the disturbing and severe nature of this crisis, it's
worth asking why the pre-eminent human rights bodies of the
United Nations haven't taken up this issue, exposed it, and
demanded changes in China's policies. Part of the answer
certainly lies in China's membership on the Human Rights
Council and as a permanent member of the Security Council, as
well as in its ability to portray itself as a member of the
``Global South'' in the Group of 77.
During the question and answer period I would be happy to
give more examples of how this is working at the UN and share
with you some of the particular experiences we've had,
including with the attempts by the Chinese to silence Uyghur
activists who wish to speak in UN forums, such as Dolkan Isa,
during the recent forum on indigenous peoples, and even shut
down human rights organizations and civil society organizations
that sponsor individuals such as Mr. Isa and their attempt to
speak.
I know I have run out of time, and I will leave that to the
Q & A.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to talk about these
important issues.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you for making the trip down here.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Currie appears in the
Appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. I want to start with just an editorial
statement and then go into a couple of questions. And I don't
even know how to do this while still containing my anger.
We are a free society--let me just start there--in the
United States. As just an example, what you have just described
here, what we are going to hear today is stuff from--like a
horrible movie. These are crazy things--things that we've read
about that used to happen thousands of years ago or things that
happened under these regimes in a science fiction novel.
I mean, talking about forcing people to eat certain foods
that violate the dietary laws of their religion, controlling
what people name their children, trying to strip their identity
from them, both religious and ethnic. The list goes on. These
are some of the most horrifying things that are happening in
the world today. That it doesn't lead newscasts in the country
and around the world in and of itself is problematic.
And then in this free country that we have--this is what I
was alluding to at the beginning--we have multinational
corporations who have every right--and I do not criticize them
for this. They have every right to be involved civically in our
country. When things happen in America and they don't like it,
they stop selling products, they boycott cities and towns.
They've done all sorts of things and it's their right to do so.
These are the same companies that are up here every day in
Washington, D.C. lobbying for us not to raise these issues so
they can have access to China's 1.4/1.3 billion-person
marketplace. And I just think it's hypocritical for American
corporations and multinationals doing business in China who are
fully prepared to boycott American cities and American
communities because they don't like things that are happening
here to be okay, to turn a blind eye to what is happening and
not criticize the government of China and the Communist Party
because they don't want to jeopardize their ability to sell
products in that country.
It's an outrage. It's an embarrassment. And I hope--again,
I doubt this is going to make it onto the CBS evening news or
any of the cable news shows tonight, but this is outrageous and
it's hypocritical. And the international organizations that
stand by and say nothing--why? Because China went into
somebody's country and built a road or a bridge or maybe bribed
them and gave them a billion dollars to be quiet and go along.
This is sick. And I just don't understand why there isn't
more coverage of this and why there isn't more understanding of
who we're dealing with here and what they're up to and what
they do. And the next time someone comes to me and says, Well,
you don't understand China, their peaceful rise, and this,
that, and the other--I have no problem. I have tremendous
admiration for the ancient culture and history of China and of
its people. And I want China to be a key player in the world.
We would love to have some help in dealing with all of the
challenges on this planet. It would be great to have another
superpower to partner with.
But this is what these people do with the power they have
now. Imagine what they will do when that power grows
militarily, economically, and geopolitically. Because if this
is how you treat your own people, how do you expect them to
treat people in some other part of the world? And I hope people
wake up and understand what we're confronting here and the
grave crisis that it presents.
In that vein, Mr. Christino, as you know, Representative
Smith and I wrote a letter. I have the letter here. It is dated
May 9, 2018--to Secretary Ross. We were asking for answers
about the sale by U.S. companies, American companies selling
surveillance and crime-control technology that is being used by
Chinese security forces and by their police. We specifically
raised concerns about a company named Thermo Fisher Scientific
which is a company in Massachusetts which reportedly is selling
DNA sequencers with advanced microprocessors to the Chinese
Ministry of Public Security and its Public Security Bureaus
across China.
The reply we got from Commerce noted that these DNA
sequencers have a legitimate end use, and I am sure they have a
legitimate end use. But they also have an illegitimate end use.
So what other recourse do we have if we know that this material
is being used in this manner--what other recourse do we have
other than to restrict their sale? Despite the fact that they
may have some legitimate use--theoretically, there is a
legitimate use for any product that is sold abroad. But we
don't sell these products because they are misused by the
people who are buying them. Why do we continue to allow the
sale of American technology to be used to commit this level of
atrocities?
Mr. Christino. Sir, I can point out to you that we have two
types of controls relative to the Export Administration
Regulations: controls over items, such as the DNA sequencer
itself. And as you correctly pointed out, due to the multiple
uses of it and the fact that it's not used solely or primarily
as a crime detection instrument, we do not control the
sequencer itself. There are certainly numerous uses in basic
science and medicine, including in China. So to try to control
the export of the item to China would be problematic at best.
The other type of control we have under the Export
Administration Regulations is a control over the activities of
entities that act in a manner that's inconsistent with U.S.
national security or foreign policy. Certainly human rights
violations are a concern with regard to U.S. foreign policy.
And we do have a process related to end-user review. You
mentioned the public security bureaus. We do have the
opportunity to review; we are reviewing as a result of the
information raised to us by this commission.
We are reviewing whether or not the evidentiary basis is
there, we're relying on interagency partners to look at whether
it is appropriate, through the end-user review committee, to
place these entities on the entity list.
Senator Rubio. Well, just on the issue of whether or not
the end user is using it this way, the Department of State is
seated right next to you, and they just testified publicly how
this information is being used. So I think we have an
interagency process right here in this committee. And I hope it
is taken seriously.
On the issue of the product itself, virtually any product
that is sold abroad has a legitimate use. Guns have legitimate
uses, rockets, and we restrict the sale of those to certain
people. We don't sell rockets, guns, tear gas, and crowd
suppressant to a certain group because they have a history of
oppressing people.
Is your testimony that you don't have the statutory
authority to restrict these products based on the way the law
is written today? Do you need a change in the law to be able to
restrict that or is it sort of internally a policy
determination at this time that it isn't wise to restrict the
sale of these items because they have a broader legitimate use
in China?
Mr. Christino. We have the appropriate authority both over
items and over the activities of entities that receive U.S.
items. The problematic nature of this challenge is that if you
were to try and control DNA sequencers exported to China, you
would have to be able to make a determination--rather, the
bureau and the department would need to be able to make a
determination that such controls would be effective and would
not adversely affect legitimate U.S. business interests in
terms of selling these for the numerous uses in basic science
or in medicine. And then you would also have to deal with
potential diversion concerns over legitimate sales.
We're looking at controls not just over the DNA sequencers
but over other items that may be used, to determine if there is
sufficient information to warrant a control over the item. But
the interagency discussion which includes various bureaus at
the State Department is at this point more focused on the
entities.
Chairman Rubio. Well, I don't have a problem with
restricting the entities, but those are easy to evade. In
China, the Communist Party controls anything. So whoever you
sell it to can easily transfer it for that use. I know you
don't make this decision. Therefore, I'm not trying to beat up
on you personally because you're here to represent the policy
of the Commerce Department.
But I do want to say this . . . it sounds like your answer
was, These companies have legitimate business interests and
make money in China selling these DNA sequencers in the whole
country, and most of the things they sell in the country are
used legitimately. And we don't want to unnecessarily burden
their ability to make a profit just because a small but
significant percentage of their sales might be being used in
this way.
If that is the direction we're going, I just find that to
be unacceptable. It's true--they can buy this from other
countries, and other companies want to sell it to them. I think
for us it comes down to the purpose of whether or not we want
companies housed in the United States benefiting from American
research, from our laws, from our freedom, from the protection
of our rule of law in this country, to somehow be complicit in
what is happening here, and in how their technology is being
used. And the fact that they are making some money in China is
to my mind not something that should counterbalance that
concern. Again, I know you don't make the decision, but I hope
you report it back.
Ambassador Currie, you're sitting here today. Does the
State Department believe that DNA sequencers and other
materials are being used in ways that we find to be a grotesque
violation of human rights?
Ambassador Currie. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
We do believe that the security state in Xinjiang is
excessive and is perhaps one of the most repressive in the
world at this time. We acknowledge that the system does include
thousands of security cameras, including in mosques, facial
recognition software, obligatory content monitoring apps on
smartphones, and GPS devices in cars, widespread new police
outposts, as you noted, and the embedding of Party personnel in
homes, and the compulsory collection of vast biometric datasets
on ethnic and religious minorities throughout the region,
including DNA and blood samples, 3D photos, iris scans, and
voiceprints.
We note that Human Rights Watch has documented that many of
these DNA samples were collected deceptively as part of what
regional officials called a ``health campaign.'' That is a
report by Human Rights Watch, not the U.S. Government, but it's
in my testimony, so I believe that we must find it somewhat
credible.
And the surveillance system has spurred experts in general
security and experts in Xinjiang to label it as one of the most
intrusive security police states in the world. There are also
grave concerns that there's an intention to migrate this system
from Xinjiang out more broadly into the rest of China, as this
system, the grid system that's in place in Xinjiang, migrated
first from Tibet into Xinjiang. It started out in Tibet and was
kind of rolled out as a pilot there, and then built on, scaled
up, in Xinjiang.
Chairman Rubio. Okay. My question was whether using DNA
sequencers in a way that violates human rights--my take on what
you just answered--and I know it's the--you need to recite the
policy of the administration. I think your answer was yes. And
all I ask is, Can the State Department please tell that to the
Commerce Department so that they----
Ambassador Currie. We will absolutely engage in interagency
discussions with the Commerce Department about appropriate uses
of technology, and----
Chairman Rubio. Just tell Commerce that DNA sequencers are
being used to violate human rights in a grotesque way so
hopefully they can get moving on denying this. I don't care how
much money Thermo--whatever their name is--Fisher--that
company, Thermo Fisher Scientific.
Are you ready?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Cochairman Smith. First of all, thank you, Chairman Rubio,
for pulling together this extremely important hearing.
What's happening against the Muslim Uyghurs--we know that
Rebiya Kadeer's entire family is incarcerated. When she got
out, came here--she came and testified at one of my hearings,
and just bowled us all over with her courage, her willingness
to sacrifice. At that time, at least two of her family were
incarcerated as a hedge by the Chinese dictatorship to say, You
say anything, we will hold it against them.
And now it is--as we all know--as bad as it was during
World War II, where the Muslim Uyghurs are being discriminated
against, thrown into prison, tortured and killed in a massive
way.
Back in 2006, I chaired a hearing to which I invited
Google, Cisco, Microsoft and Yahoo about their surveillance.
But in the case of Cisco, their sale of PoliceNet and other
means by which the Communist dictatorship could surveil, and
then apprehend, and then of course what follows then is torture
and long prison sentences.
One of the men that Yahoo coughed up was Shi Tao, who you
all recall--I know you recall it--you're shaking your head. I
know you recall it well--a wonderful guy, a journalist who
contacted a New York NGO and said, This is what we're told we
cannot do when Tiananmen Square's anniversary comes around.
And for that, he got 10 years. And who gave them that
information? Yahoo--they gave personally identifiable
information, which then was used as actionable police state
information, to not only get him, but then they collect other
people--or arrest them, I should say. Then they interrogate
them with torture, and then they cough up other names.
So we're bearing terrible fruit of inaction for years. And
as the Chairman said, it's gone far beyond PoliceNet--I am
saying that, but it has gone far beyond the original tools of
repression that a legitimate police force can and should use.
And now it's so far beyond that.
I introduced a bill called the Global Online Freedom Act.
One of the titles in that had to do with--just like we do with
South Africa, prohibiting, proscribing certain police useable
items that a repressive police state can use to gather up
religious freedom activists, human rights activists, as in the
case of the Uyghurs because of their ethnicity, and their
religion, the Muslim Uyghurs.
I couldn't get the bill passed. The K Street lobbyists
came, and they descended upon the Foreign Affairs Committee.
When we had the markup, I had people on the Democrat side and
some on the Republican side saying that I can't--I couldn't get
the bill out of committee.
Now we've got John Boehner, our former Speaker, joining in
the chorus of lobbyists for a dictatorship. If he speaks truth
to power behind closed doors, and more than that, that would be
great. But if he then comes up here and just promotes the
bottom line of Beijing, of Xi Jinping, who is now one of the
rivals for Mao Zedong when it comes to human rights abuse, we
have a problem.
So, again, I would ask you again and plead with you, we've
got to make sure, like we did with South Africa and others in
the past, make sure all of these items--and when there's a
dual-use capability that seemingly is benign for a commercial
use but also has a political or a police application, that we
go all out to make sure that that is on an export control
regime.
So if you could speak to that, because I think we have been
asleep at the switch. The Obama Administration, now Trump,
during the Bush Administration, we could not get any traction.
China has always been treated in a way that I have found
baffling.
The people of China are great people. They don't have the
government they deserve. They have a dictatorship that
represses them. Why do we enable dictatorship by giving them
these tools of repression? So if you'd like to respond to that?
This is the consequence, I think, of gross inaction over the
course of many years.
Mr. Christino. Sir, we do control quite a bit of items that
are used in the way you describe. We control fingerprint
analyzers, automated fingerprint retrieval systems, voiceprint
identification, along with the more traditional law enforcement
items normally used by a police force.
We also look very carefully at information technology
items, including computer penetration forensics tools to try to
ensure that we are appropriately controlling these items so
they are not used--I should say misused--in the manner that you
have described.
We continue to work with our interagency partners,
primarily the Department of State, specifically the Bureau of
Human Rights and Labor, the East Asia Pacific Bureau, etc., to
ensure that we are capturing the right items. And if we cannot
capture the item, that we are capturing the end use or the
entities. So we'll continue to do that.
Ambassador Currie. Thank you, Chairman Smith. And thank you
again for hosting this, for convening this important and very
timely hearing today.
At USUN, we're focused on what we're seeing as the end
result of the--I think--the policy approach that you outlined
of believing that China was going to rise peacefully and was
going to engage in political reform as it opened up
economically. That clearly has not happened. I think that
that's not a secret to anyone at this point, that that has not
been the outcome that those who supported and advocated that
policy desired.
So now we are dealing with the consequences of a China that
has grown rich and powerful and is increasingly authoritarian
in its behavior both at home and abroad. What we're seeing,
which is incredibly disturbing for us and which we are trying
to find ways to combat every day at USUN, goes beyond what we,
I think, had become accustomed to in terms of defensive
strategies where China would use its position and various
bodies to block criticism of it in the Human Rights Council or
in other places. What we're now seeing is an effort by China to
actually try to transform the entire normative framework of
human rights.
And when I say that, what I'm talking about is substituting
what we all think of as the normative framework of human
rights, of rights that attach at the individual level, basic
God-given human rights--in the parlance of the American way of
thinking about this, freedom of expression, freedom of
religion, freedom of thought, freedom of association--to
transform the whole human rights system into what the Chinese
characterize as one based on ``win-win'' cooperation or
mutually beneficial cooperation between states and a system
that prioritizes the concerns of governments, rather than
prioritizing their responsibility to respect the human rights
of their citizens. And what we're seeing at the UN, both in New
York and across the UN system, is deeply concerning in this
regard. The Chinese are using all of the tools of state power,
all of their capabilities, to try to undermine the normative
framework of human rights. And they're doing it in a way that
is both blatant, as well as under the radar.
So we are fighting back against it whenever we can. We are
trying to block them from putting the language of ``win-win''
and mutually beneficial cooperation into resolutions at the UN,
which they are doing across the board. We are trying to block
them from using the development system of the UN to undermine
efforts to promote good governance, anti-corruption, and human
rights as part of the package of responsible development
behavior, something that they are doing through a variety of
means. And we are also fighting to make sure that voices of
civil society can be heard at the UN, including people like
Uyghur activist Dolkan Isa, who the Chinese have tried to block
from participating in UN fora.
So at USUN, we are, I think, very cognizant of the threat
that the situation poses and are working very hard on a daily
basis. Our biggest challenge right now is that we are
relatively alone in this. And in a situation where you have got
193 member states, many of whom can be persuaded by some of the
tools that Senator Rubio mentioned, about the Belt and Road
Initiative, about the amount, about the kind of relationships
that the Chinese are building across the developing world, in
particular, but not just the developing world.
We are really struggling to gain traction in terms of
getting other member states to join us in this effort to push
back on even things as simple as the debt that the Chinese
system is building, the unsustainable debt levels in
development that the Chinese are creating with developing
countries.
So it is a massive struggle. This administration takes it
very seriously, and everything from where you heard the White
House push back on the Chinese political correctness with
trying to force U.S. businesses to change their websites on
Taiwan, to what we are doing every day at USUN. We are taking
these threats seriously. We are looking for every opportunity
to try to push back on them. And we are very serious about
standing up for the human rights of the Chinese people, in
particular, calling more attention to the situation in Xinjiang
because it is deeply underreported, as Senator Rubio noted.
Cochairman Smith. I will be very brief because I know my
time is running out or has run out.
Ambassador Currie, thank you for your leadership. And Nikki
Haley, please convey to her that I stand in great respect--I
think we all do--for all of the work that she has done. She is
often a lone voice, as our delegation and you have been
tenacious.
The redefinition of human rights is exactly what the Soviet
Union tried to do in the 80s and 90s. They used to say, Oh,
look America, you have a terrible problem of homelessness.
Therefore, we have a better situation than you do because
nobody's on the street. Yeah, they're all in the gulag or in
the psychiatric hospital.
But that said, we address our humanitarian needs, but as
you pointed out, they're not fundamental human rights--and they
are seeking redefinition.
Mr. Chairman, I held a series of hearings in my
subcommittee--that's the Africa, Global Health, Global Human
Rights Committee--on the influence of Chinese soft power,
particularly this indebtedness issue, which is putting the
African countries in huge debt where even more power can be
exerted by the Chinese. And then they call in those chits in
the UN, with just what you are finding--us standing alone on
this.
But hopefully for the Uyghurs and for the people suffering
in the autonomous region, they will join us in that. They are
even trying to influence Europe, amazingly. And they're having
an impact.
So thank you for your leadership.
Chairman Rubio. Senator King.
Senator King. Well, first I want to thank both Chairman
Smith and Chairman Rubio for their passion and attention to
this issue. It's troubling to say the least.
The first thing I would do, Mr. Chairman, is submit for the
record a long story that appeared in The Economist on May 31,
that outlines this problem. I think this is a dramatic
statement of exactly what we're talking about and the horror of
it. As I read it, all I could think of was my youthful reading
of ``1984'' and ``Brave New World.'' It is technology turned on
its head to enslave people instead of to liberate them.
I was also recently reading about the period of the 1930s
and the reluctance of America principally, but other countries,
to recognize what was going on in Germany. There was an almost
deliberate blind eye turned to what was being done. And of
course, it wasn't until a decade later that we realized the
full horror of the Holocaust. I've often thought of the
difficulty that that question presents; What if we had known in
detail, specifically in the 30s, what was going on in Germany?
What then would our obligations have been?
It seems to me that we are at a similar moment, only we
have more information. We know what's going on. We don't know
the exact details, but we know about reeducation camps, we know
about--as the Chairman recited--people being forced to change
their names, violate religious practices, modern-day apartheid.
We do know about it. So what do we do?
So, Ambassador, I appreciate your coming, number one, and I
appreciate the statements that you've made. But it seems to me
that what we really need is a--it's not as if we have no
relations with China. We have detailed interconnections, trade,
culture, many exchanges, ambassadors, the whole deal. What can
we do? What are the levers that we have? Because I don't want
somebody reading the history of this period and looking back 30
years from now or 50 years from now and saying, America
tolerated a holocaust or something similar. What are the levers
of power that we have that we can exert in this situation in
order to try to bring this country, this wonderful country to
its senses in terms of what they are doing to these people?
Ambassador, give me a laundry list.
Ambassador Currie. I wish I had a laundry list. Right now
what we can do at USUN is help to shine a light on the
situation. I think that the severity, the scope, and the
magnitude of this situation have really only become clear--I
would say--in the past few months. We had been hearing stories
more or less sporadically that this was happening, but some of
the research that Senator Rubio cited, the looking at the
tender offers, and understanding, being able to map those
things, and then as the stories--the Chinese have done an
excellent job of attempting to keep this under wraps, of not
allowing reporters to go into Xinjiang and actually report
directly on what is happening, including our diplomats. So it
has been a serious challenge to really get a handle on the
scope and severity of this.
So I am not saying that as an excuse that--we are just now
really starting to understand the scope of it. So we are
starting to shine a light on it and looking for more
opportunities to do that. And this hearing is an important one
today.
Senator King. But I think developing a laundry list is
important.
Ambassador Currie. And we have the tools. The tools are the
tools in the human rights world. They exist. It's always a
matter of political will for us about where we choose to use
them.
I think today's Ministerial on International Religious
Freedom where this topic will be discussed--it was mentioned in
Secretary Pompeo's op-ed yesterday. It was mentioned, and it
will be mentioned this week during the Ministerial. And I think
that, for us, part of it at this point is educating, frankly
speaking, a number of countries that are not as aware as we are
at this point of what is going on, because when I raised it
with colleagues at the UN, many of my colleagues, including in
the Muslim world, have no idea this is even happening.
Senator King. I think that is an important point because if
there is anything we have learned in the last 20 years about
sanctions, for example, they are much more effective if they
are multilateral, much more effective. And I think a very
important point is to talk to the rest of the world and say,
it's nice that they are offering to build you a bridge, but
understand that it comes with a price and the price may be paid
by innocent people in this province of China.
So I think that's an important part, but I hope that you
will--that the administration will develop a set of options,
policy options that can begin to not only express disapproval
or shine a light on the problem, but really have some direct
impact because this doesn't reflect well on the Chinese people.
It mars what would otherwise be something that might be
positive in terms of assisting undeveloped parts of the world.
But if it's done at the price of having to tolerate this, it's
certainly not in the interests of the people of China or the
people of the world.
Mr. Christino, I think if anything has come through, I
hope, this morning, it's that we feel very strongly that, to
the extent of your authority, we have really got to have
renewed attention to the export of technology that is being
used to develop what appears now to be the world's most
advanced police state. I mean, the idea of having people that
move in, that adopt a family, police stations 200 meters apart,
thousands if not millions of surveillance cameras, iris scans,
blood samples taken under false pretenses. I mean, this is
really the stuff of science fiction, and horrible science
fiction at that.
So I don't want it to be business as usual at your office.
This is a new challenge, as the Ambassador said. It has come
into focus in the last several months, the last year. So I hope
your office will renew its attention to this and be much more
alert to the potential use of this technology. And my view is,
even if there is a legitimate use for it, if it can be used for
this purpose, it should be under additional scrutiny if not
outright sanction by your office.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rubio. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. I'll just continue where Senator King left
off. Even if there is a legitimate use to it, why would we sell
it to China? Why would we authorize it to be sold to China? I
mean, they're not France. They're not Sweden. So I don't think
we should sell it to China regardless, even if there is a
legitimate use. And if the administration can't do it with
existing authorities, then perhaps Congress should explore
giving you more authorities to do so.
Mr. Christino, I know you have a lot of experience in this
field. Did we sell crowd control and policing equipment and
technology to the Soviet Union when it existed?
Mr. Christino. No, sir.
Senator Cotton. Why would we sell it to China now since
China is our number one geopolitical rival going forward in the
coming decades. They're plainly using this kind of technology
in Xinjiang to oppress their own people and to build their
national power in a way to challenge us. I mean, one of the
reasons China has been able to turn its focus outward onto the
blue seas and challenge us inside the first island chain and in
the South China Sea is that they've gained greater control of
their internal borders, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet.
I turn now, Ambassador Currie, to you, and something you
said earlier--I want to just explore a little bit further and
ask if you could elaborate and talk about the concept of a
pilot program. Some of these techniques were first piloted in
Tibet. Now they've been rolled out on a greater and more
advanced scale in Xinjiang, potentially going to the rest of
China.
Could you elaborate, please, on that?
Ambassador Currie. Certainly, Senator Cotton.
I think our understanding is that after the 2008 events in
Lhasa and the protests that took place then across the Tibetan
Plateau, the Chinese authorities came in with a much more
aggressive approach to policing and social control in Tibet.
And they began both with policing, with the closely spaced
police stations, the intense surveillance, and the control over
religious institutions and cultural institutions, the massive
political education, the pressure on state employees from
teachers to policemen to doctors of Tibetan extraction who were
forced to take political education classes, much more intensive
management of monasteries in Tibet.
They fused that approach with what we might call community-
based policing if it were being done for a proper purpose, but
which in this case is really just community-based oppression--
they fused that with a technological edge in Xinjiang and
doubled down on it. And they added some very particular aspects
to it in terms of the legal restrictions that they've passed
into regulations and have made more of a--put it under law,
which is something that the Chinese like to do to kind of
create a thin veneer of legality over the forms of oppression
that they're using against these minority communities.
Senator Cotton. Thank you for that. I suspect that is what
is going to happen. It will be rolled out substantially
throughout the country.
Also another issue that was touched upon briefly earlier,
the Belt and Road Initiative--pretty tall mountains down there
in Tibet. It is hard to get a road through there. So the road
in the Belt and Road Initiative, presumably is going primarily
through Xinjiang province into Central Asia and then perhaps
all the way into Europe. How closely connected is the
oppression that we see in Xinjiang province to that Belt and
Road Initiative, which of course is a direct challenge to the
United States' position as the world's leading economy and the
global military superpower?
Ambassador Currie. Security along the belt and road is a
major human rights challenge, not just inside China's borders
but across them. They definitely are insistent on having a high
degree of security through key corridors, and Xinjiang is one
of those key corridors.
Part of it--it goes beyond, also, the repression directed
at the Muslim minority communities in Xinjiang. And what we're
seeing in addition to the repression directed at those
communities is the continued incentivization of in-migration
and other activities to encourage the growth of the non-Uyghur,
non-Kazakh, non-Muslim population.
Senator Cotton. By in-migration--to call a spade a spade--
you mean, essentially, colonization, right?
Ambassador Currie. That is--it could be characterized----
Senator Cotton. The data I have here in front of me says
that in 1949, Xinjiang had 7 percent Han Chinese. Today it's up
to 40 percent.
Ambassador Currie. Some experts have characterized it as
colonization, yes. What we've seen there is also that the
Chinese residents of Xinjiang tend to dominate the businesses.
They get the state contracts, and they are involved in the
actual infrastructure development that is linked to the Belt
and Road.
Senator Cotton. Again, to call a spade a spade, the Chinese
there are dominating the businesses. They are dominating the
businesses because the Chinese Communist Party is empowering
them to have those businesses and disempowering all the native-
born Muslim Uyghurs or Kazakhs, or other minorities in
Xinjiang?
Ambassador Currie. Yes.
Senator Cotton. One final question. We talked earlier about
the loss of a market for American companies and things like
crowd control or policing technique, or more cutting-edge
technology that can be used for those things like DNA mapping
and facial recognition technology. One common argument you hear
from American companies is, Well, if we do not sell it to them,
someone is going to sell it to them, right? It reminds me of
the old line that a communist's definition of a capitalist is a
man who will sell us the rope with which we hang him.
But I just want to ask you, who are the countries whose
companies could pick up that business? And maybe, Mr.
Christino, this is better directed to you as well. If we stop
selling this kind of technology to China, in which countries
around the world are the companies located that would pick up
that business from American companies?
Mr. Christino. Well, with regard specifically to the DNA
sequencers that were mentioned prominently earlier during the
hearing, they're made essentially all over the world. It's
relatively simple technology. It's not very cutting-edge
technology. It has been around for at least 30 years. Some of
the main manufacturers are actually in China itself. And you
don't even need the item, the sequencer, in many cases. As we
see on TV all the time, there's a great deal of advertising for
DNA analysis. It's simply a swab and send. So there's plenty of
opportunity for the Chinese security services to continue to do
what they're doing without U.S. items.
Senator Cotton. Ambassador Currie, do you have any response
to that one?
Ambassador Currie. I would agree with my colleague that the
Chinese, not just in this area of technology, but they, as part
of the Made in China 2025 Drive and 2050 Drive, they have
definitely--the goal there is to make China technologically
self-sufficient so that even if we do put export controls on
all manner of things, then they would be able to produce them
domestically without having to rely on external sources for
items such as this.
Senator Cotton. OK. Thank you both.
Chairman Rubio. I have just two quick comments and a quick
question. Then I know Congressman Smith does as well before we
turn to our second panel. We want to thank you both for being
here.
Your answer to Senator Cotton's last question almost sounds
like, They're going to do it anyway, so we might as well allow
our companies to make some money on it. And I'm not saying
that's what your intention is in representing it that way, but
that's sort of the logical conclusion of it. This technology is
widely available. This is not going to be able to stop them
from doing it. And what I hope you'll take back to Commerce is,
I don't believe that any of us who are calling for this
technology, like the DNA sequencer, to be prohibited believe
that doing so will prohibit them--or stop them from doing this.
We just don't want American companies to be participants in it.
And I think that's the bigger point for us as a nation. You
can buy crowd control equipment. China will sell you crowd
control equipment. They'll sell you anything. They don't care
about your human rights record, democracy, anything like that.
If you have the cash, they'll sell it to you. That does not
mean that we go--we still deny the sale of certain equipment.
And it brings to light another point, and that is our laws have
to keep pace with our technology. What is used to control
crowds today is different from what it may have been 10, 15, 20
years ago. And that includes technological advances.
To that point--did you want to add something on that point?
Senator King. Well I just wanted to point out that this is
exactly the argument that was made in Britain to justify the
sale of Rolls Royce engines to the Luftwaffe in 1935. It was a
bad argument then, and it's a bad argument now because the
issue you are talking about is complicity. I don't want to be
complicit in this.
Chairman Rubio. Agreed.
And talking about the other thing that I think this brings
to light is, if you read through the regs and how they describe
crowd control and suppression, it's all 20th century technology
and it's still used. But in the 21st century, technology
increasingly plays a role.
I'll give you one example; the use of intense security
measures to surveillance technology. We know, for example, the
Chinese are now using in a particular region, in specific,
facial recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in
train stations.
It appears focused on using much of the surveillance and
data collected to monitor and repress Uyghurs. In fact, the
authorities reportedly integrate a lot of this surveillance. So
they're taking data from all sorts of things--the computer,
smartphones, closed circuit cameras, license plates, ID cards,
individual family planning and banking records, information on
their international travel--they're taking all of this
information and they're running it through something that's
called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform. And they're
using that data--all of that data--to identify people that they
think should be subject to investigation and potential
detention.
In essence, how they're defining who to put in these camps
is the process of an algorithm that's looking at all of this
data they're collecting on people and deciding from it who they
should be detaining. And here's why I point that out. A key
component of that in the 21st century is going to be artificial
intelligence, the ability to learn from the gathering of data
the way a human would and improve it each and every time. And I
raise that only because there's a tremendous irony in this room
here today. That picture that we have of a camp and how it grew
comes from Google Earth.
Google recently dropped out of a contract with the
Department of Defense, on Project Maven, artificial
intelligence--because its employees do not want to be involved
with the American Government and the DoD working on the use of
artificial intelligence to potentially harm people.
At the same time, Google has opened up an AI China Center.
And basically anything you do in China that's technological, if
you think you're going to constrain it to just the private
sector, you're crazy. All of it will be shared with the
military and with the repressive forces that are doing this.
And Google has no excuse. They know that this is happening
because they've got pictures of it. That's Google Earth.
So that's just one more example of the hypocrisy of an
American company that knows this is happening, doesn't want to
give AI technology to the military because God forbid we may
use it one day to target a terrorist or someone who wants to
harm America, but has no problem opening up a center of AI in
China knowing full well that anything you do in China--if it's
a benefit to the military, they're going to use it. If it's a
benefit to their security services, they're going to use it.
And my last question--this is a question. We've raised the
issue of Global Magnitsky sanctions; the purpose of Global
Magnitsky sanctions was to be able to identify an individual
doing horrible things and be able to impose sanctions upon
them. We clearly know horrible things are happening here to the
Uyghurs in their area. And we know that there are individuals
who are at least making the decision, and most certainly
individuals that are applying those decisions.
What is happening within State now? Is there consideration
being made? Is there deliberation? Is there talk? What are the
chances of being able to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions to
individuals that we know are in charge of these regions and, at
the highest levels, have to be held responsible for what's
happening?
Ambassador Currie. Well as you know, Global Magnitsky is a
rolling determination dataset where we are constantly looking
at individuals who are involved with either serious corruption
issues or gross human rights abuses. It's an interagency
process. It's not the State Department alone that manages that
process. In fact, the final determination and the final check
on that is actually with the Treasury Department. But it is an
interagency process, and the State Department does play an
important role in identifying targets and helping to move them
through the process, build the data packages around Global
Magnitsky.
I cannot speak to specific individuals that may be being
chosen or being looked at for sanctions, but what I can say is
that we do see the Global Magnitsky sanctions as an important
tool to help identify abusers and bring them--and use the
ability of the United States to sanction those individuals,
limit their access to the U.S. financial system and block them
from being able to--in some cases, even seize assets that they
may have in the U.S. financial system.
If there are suggestions that the Commission has for
individuals that the Department should be looking at, I would
encourage you to forward those to the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, because they generally start the
process rolling with determinations, and I'd be happy to take
anything back that you have.
Chairman Rubio. Well, you can count on--we most certainly
have ideas about individuals and it's probably not a complete
list. We're open to adding more people as this continues. My
only takeaway is, as you go back, and however this form reaches
the decision-makers in the interagency, to the extent that the
Department of State is involved in the interagency, we just--I
can't speak for everyone else, but I think there'd be a
consensus on the Commission and across Congress that if ever
there was a model case for how we intended Global Magnitsky to
be used as a tool, this would be it . . . because there is most
clearly abuse happening.
Wherever there is abuse, there are abusers. And in the case
of China, those abusers--if they're high enough in government--
are almost guaranteed to not just have U.S. visas, but either
they or their families have some access to either the U.S.
financial system, our universities, and are enjoying--that's
just the way it works for high-ranking individuals. They like
to travel the world, and they like to spend money in the U.S.
So if ever there was an example of where Magnitsky could be
powerful in making a statement about where we stand on this
issue, we believe this is one of them, and we will most
certainly continue to push for it and offer suggestions about
individuals.
Congressman Smith, you have the final questions.
Cochairman Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just let me add my strong endorsement to what you just said
about Global Magnitsky. I am the author of the Belarus
Democracy Act of 2004--great pushback when we did it.
Lukashenko, the dictator in Belarus, was sanctioned along with
about 200 other people. I went there twice, went to Minsk. The
first time he called me ``public enemy number one,'' but one by
one every political prisoner got out of prison. And it applied
not just to him, but to his family and to other families of his
group that were committing gross human rights violations.
So it does work. The Global Magnitsky Act, and the
Magnitsky Act itself, targeted toward Russia, is a tool of
surpassing capability.
I hope we would do a data call to our embassy in Beijing,
to our Ambassador Branstad and say, Give us the names--it's got
to really come--if they're not going to initiate it, and they
probably won't, it will come from Washington, I would hope, and
say, Who is responsible for this horrific carnage being imposed
upon the Muslim Uyghurs?
Rebiya Kadeer, who is here, her courage is--she should win
the Nobel Peace Prize for her courage. As a matter of fact, in
the past, many of us have asked that that happen, and she
should be present as well.
I cannot tell you how concerned all of us are. We've got
six Radio Free Asia families who are missing or are
incarcerated as part of this massive World War II-type roundup.
This is now similar to what the Nazis did in terms of the
massiveness of gathering people for torture and the like.
So the Magnitsky Act is just sitting there like low-hanging
fruit, tools that absolutely have to be deployed. And make up a
list, like I said--the second time I met with Lukashenko, he
was all sweetness and light. He's still a dictator. But all the
political prisoners have been released, to the best of our
knowledge.
On another related issue--in 2000, I wrote the Admiral
Nance/Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act. One of the provisions
we put in there said that anyone who is complicit with forced
abortion or forced sterilization, which during the Nuremburg
War Crimes Tribunal was properly construed to be a crime
against humanity for its Nazi usage against Poles and others;
it is just as much a crime against humanity today.
We know that China itself is missing 62 million women,
girls, who have been eviscerated from their population by sex
selection abortion. We know that it's been used as a genocidal
tool against the Tibetans and against the Uyghurs. Nobody ever
seems to talk about it except the Chairman and me, perhaps a
small number of others. It is like the topic that you don't
bring up because the choice community will look askance at
this. These women are being horribly and forcibly aborted.
Sometimes they bring--and it is being used as a tool of
genocide to eliminate the Muslim Uyghurs in that country.
You have an additional tool sitting there since 2000. It
was not used by the Obama administration. I brought it up over
and over again in hearings. I said you may disagree with me on
the right to life and the fact that unborn children ought to be
protected from the violence of abortion, but here we are
talking about forced abortion. Can we not even have agreement
there to try to protect people from this violence that is being
imposed upon them?
So you have another tool I would ask you to revisit,
especially as it relates to the Muslim Uyghurs--because they
are using it. I intervened in one case, brought to us by some
good friends of a woman who had been brought in with about 25
to 30 cadres, family planning cadres, police escorts, to have
her Muslim child aborted. I talked to the ambassador here--to
China--talked to our ambassador, our U.S. Ambassador, and that
one child got a reprieve and was saved. But one among millions
being slaughtered.
So please look at the Admiral Nance/Meg Donovan provision
to see if that could be brought out and used, get the dust off
of it because I think it'll make a difference. And, again, like
the Chairman said, the Magnitsky Act . . . you get a list of a
couple of hundred--to start off with--names, and then they
cannot come here. They cannot send their kids to NYU, which has
a--I spoke at NYU a couple of years ago on human rights in
Shanghai. Let's get it all out there. Okay, you're done. Your
families don't come here because of your egregious violations
of human rights.
So please, Magnitsky--this is a textbook case of where it
should be utilized. And I implore you, and again, the Chairman,
I thank you for again pulling together this extremely important
hearing.
And, again, I do thank you, Ambassador, both of you, for
your leadership at the UN. You've been extraordinary despite
what the Human Rights Council does, which unfortunately majors
in hypocrisy, focuses on Israel to the exclusion of the real
human rights abuses, and Nikki Haley has called that out so
courageously. And we thank her for that.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
And we have a second panel we want to get to as quickly as
possible because I know Senator King needs to go. I know
Congressman Smith has votes. But Senator Daines is here and I
know he had a few questions for this panel before we turn it
over.
Would our next panelists start getting ready because we are
going to jump into it pretty quick?
Senator Daines. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Chairman
Smith. I thank you for holding this hearing, and I want to
thank the witnesses for coming here today.
I spent more than half a decade in China in the private
sector. In fact, I had two children born in Hong Kong. I lived
in Guangzhou. I've led congressional visits to China every year
since I've been in the United States Senate. I have had the
opportunity to travel across the country in Xinjiang. I have
been in Urumqi as well. I've seen the prominent Uyghur Muslim
populations. I have been in Tibet and seen the Buddhist monks.
I just recently was in Dandong along the North Korean border.
This has allowed me to see firsthand the pervasive censorship
and the challenges the Chinese people face, as well as the
efforts made by the Chinese government to extend their
influence beyond their borders.
As your testimonies suggest, the State Department Human
Rights Report and numerous others indicate the situation in
Xinjiang is dire for its Uyghur population. Whether it's
pervasive surveillance, the destruction of thousands of
mosques, or the detention of hundreds of thousands in so-called
``reeducation camps,'' as well as indefinite detentions, it's
critically important that we, as a nation founded on freedom
and the rule of law, bring our influence to bear to advance
human rights in China and around the world.
Ambassador Currie, what do you see as China's endgame as it
relates to the persecution and the repression of its Uyghur
population? Is this cultural, economic, religious, or some
other combination?
Ambassador Currie. Thank you for that question.
We would say that it's all of those things. It is a
combination of those elements with an additional aspect of
political control. What we see is an effort to sinicize
religion and to bring--the Chinese Communist Party feels the
need to control anything that is not under its immediate
control. So it does put a lot of constraints on all religious
activity in China. And because of the global nature, in
particular of Islam and Christianity as well, those two
religions tend to come in for particular scrutiny and
particular suspicion from the authorities, and for a much more
coercive and much more restrictive approach.
So I believe that in Xinjiang and in the case of the Uyghur
population, in particular, there is an absolute--the State
Department sees an effort to sinicize religion and to bring the
practices of Uyghur Muslims into line with a level of
religiosity that the Party finds acceptable. And bearing in
mind that the Party is itself an atheist entity, we can surmise
that that is a very low level of religiosity, and one that is
very limited in terms of being--limited in terms of its
international relations and connections outside of China.
Senator Daines. Ambassador Currie, are there any particular
tools or technologies that would be helpful for the U.S.
Government or NGOs to support to assist those persecuted
populations?
Ambassador Currie. The tools that the United States is
using in terms of Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America,
getting the truth in to people, giving--and then making sure
that we are also reporting on the situation there, are
particularly important. Information is obviously critical here.
Our ability to understand what is going on in Xinjiang is
limited by the efforts of the Chinese government to cover up
and mask what they're doing. So the more that we can use
information technology, both to inform our own population and
our allies and other countries about what's happening as well
as to make the people of China aware of what is happening in
other parts of the country as well as the concerns that are
taking place outside of China regarding the treatment of ethnic
minorities and that these practices are not consistent with
respect for international human rights.
I believe that those are the things that the U.S.
Government can use to try to address the problem in terms of
technology. Beyond that, I think that we are--a lot of it is
about old-fashioned diplomacy and doing our jobs better of
educating our colleagues at the UN, for instance, about the
scope of what's going on and just trying to work and grow the
coalition of countries that are concerned around this issue.
Senator Daines. Yes, I remain very concerned since my
visits out to western China a couple of years ago, the
thousands of mosques that have been demolished. And whether
it's the Muslim people, Christian people, the level of
persecution--by all accounts, all reports we're receiving
here--is reaching levels that are virtually unprecedented in
modern history in China.
It is extending here to the United States, hearing reports
from Chinese students who are being called by professors back
in China saying, Do not associate and go to faith-based
activities. This is something that we haven't seen, and I
remain very, very concerned.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you both for being here. Ambassador Currie, thank you
for making the trip. Thank you, Mr. Christino as well. We
appreciate it. We are grateful. This was very insightful. Thank
you.
Our next panel will come forward. And as you guys get
positioned, Members will fluctuate in and out. Congressman
Smith had to leave. The House has votes. Members here have
meetings and different activities.
We certainly don't want to curtail your testimony. It is
important to hear your stories. Know that your full testimony
is going to be in the record.
We are probably going to have a hard stop in this meeting
at 12:10 or 12:15. So the less--the shorter you can get those
statements, the more time we can have to engage with you on
some details that I think will be enlightening for the
Commission and for our record.
[Pause.]
Chairman Rubio. All right. Okay.
Thank you all for being here. Ms. Hoja, we will begin with
you and your testimony. Thank you for being here. I have read
your full statement. It is very compelling. We want to hear
more from you today and I look forward to engaging with you.
Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF GULCHEHRA HOJA, UYGHUR SERVICE JOURNALIST, RADIO
FREE ASIA
Ms. Hoja. Thank you. As-Salaam-Alaikum. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Cochairman, and Members of the Commission, it's my privilege to
participate in today's hearing on a topic that deeply affects
me personally and professionally.
My name is Gulchehra Hoja. I am a journalist with Radio
Free Asia's Uyghur Language Service, and I am a U.S. citizen.
Given the time, I will not read my full statement, but share my
story.
I grew up in Urumqi, the capital of the Uyghur region in
China, where I began my career in broadcast journalism before
coming to the United States in 2001 to work for Radio Free
Asia. It was a great sacrifice to leave my homeland. I left
behind a successful career as a television journalist. I also
left my home, my parents, my family, and my friends. But coming
here guaranteed me freedom--something that could never be
realized in China. Being part of Radio Free Asia--which reports
on the true daily news happening in the Uyghur region--was the
dream of a lifetime.
As I testify before you today, it grieves me no end to say
that my parents remain under threat, and more than two dozen of
my relatives in China are missing--almost certainly held in
what are called reeducation camps run by the Chinese
government.
I first heard that my brother Kaisar Keyum was detained at
the end of September last year. Police had taken him when he
was driving my mother to a doctor's appointment, leaving her
alone in the car without any explanation. She waited for her
son who would never return. Kaisar was being held in one of the
so-called reeducation centers in Urumqi. We have not seen him
since.
In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from
life-threatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk
with my mother and father, or to learn how they were doing, was
almost too much to bear. I tried contacting other family but
could not reach them. And I learned in February that my aunts,
cousins, their children--more than 20 people had been swept up
by authorities on the same day. No one has confirmed where they
are being held, but I strongly suspect they are in the camps,
which sources say hold more than 1 million Uyghurs in extremely
poor conditions.
My parents were held in a medical facility in the detention
camps. They were allowed to leave in March--maybe because of
their poor health. Authorities have questioned my parents about
me, where I am, and my work for an organization they claim is
``anti-China.''
Many of my Uyghur colleagues at the RFA share the same
situation. Their families are also missing, detained and jailed
after receiving threats about their work at RFA. I hope and
pray for my family to be let go and released, but I know even
if that happens, they will still live under constant threat.
Despite these threats, I know, and my colleagues know, that we
must continue because of the important role we have as a source
of truth for Uyghur people.
I came to the United States to realize a dream, a dream of
being able to tell the truth without fear. It may be difficult,
but I will keep trying and I will never give up.
Thank you so much.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Gulchehra Hoja appears in the
Appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Professor Thum.
Mr. Thum. Thank you to the Chairs and to the committee for
organizing this incredibly important hearing.
STATEMENT OF RIAN THUM, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
NEW ORLEANS
I would like to submit my written testimony for the record
and just emphasize a few interpretive points here because we
have a lot of the data on the table already.
The first point I'd like to make is that this is an
emergency that is developing as we speak. Those numbers of
several hundred thousand to over a million Uyghurs, 5 to 10
percent of the Uyghur population disappearing into these
internment camps, are based on estimates from January, data
that came out in January about what happened in the previous
year. We have had another six months. People have continued to
disappear and very few people, usually sick people, have been
released.
We see new camps being built in the satellite imagery and
we have new advertisements from the Xinjiang authorities asking
for construction companies to build additional camps. The last
one to appear is about a 400,000-square-foot facility that will
probably come on line sometime between September and December.
This enormous and growing scale is important not just in an
absolute sense, where we have the feeling that maybe if it
crosses a big enough number the world will care, but also as a
proportion of the number of community members who disappear.
This is something you can see on the streets in southern
Xinjiang, in the closed buildings, the closed shops, the closed
houses, people who've disappeared. You can see it in one county
in Kashgar where 18 orphanages have been built--according to a
Financial Times report--in the last year alone to house the
children of those who have been sent to the detention camps.
My second point that I want to make is about the goals of
these camps, which is something that was asked about earlier.
These camps serve multiple goals. They serve the explicit
goal--which many Chinese officials seem to really believe in--
of changing the way people think through force, of purifying
them of supposedly bad ideas and inculcating love for the Party
and for Xi Jinping. They also serve to remove certain
demographics from the population, especially 20- to 40-year-
olds, which police have explicitly targeted. And, of course,
they serve as the background disciplinary threat that upholds
the totalitarian micromanagement of Uyghurs' everyday
activities and cultural expression.
But the frightening thing is that what we know from history
is that when you get large detention systems that are operating
in legal gray zones, or in this case perhaps even an entirely
extra-legal zone, there is a lot of room for improvisation on
the part of those who are running those camps. So the most
frightening purpose is the one that hasn't occurred yet. And
while right now torture and deaths in the camp seem to be
happening at pretty low levels, that can change. In fact, I
don't think we can rule out the possibility of mass murder.
The third point I want to make--and I will do it briefly--
is that the camps are not the only problem. Although I have
emphasized it here because they are easy to summarize, if you
take them out of the picture, we're still looking at one of the
most oppressive police states in the world with--as Senator
Rubio mentioned--a system of racism very similar to apartheid.
My last major point I want to make is about the deeper
causes of this. This is a colonial settler operation. And it
is--contrary to some opinions--not explicitly about religion
per se.
The Chinese Communist Party, despite being avowedly
atheist, has a great deal of tolerance for what they see as
Chinese religions being practiced by ethnic Chinese. When it
comes to a foreign religion or a religion seen as Chinese, like
Buddhism, practiced by non-Chinese, like Tibetans, that story
changes. And it becomes even more intense when it's Islam
because the Chinese Communist Party over the last 20 years or
so has adopted American and European discourses of Islamophobia
which they picked up largely through cooperation with the U.S.
global war on terror.
Because of that, this is a deeply entrenched worldview of
Chinese officials behind this, and I do not think, for that
reason, that we can convince Chinese officials to change their
path based on data about how it will improve the internal
situation. I think instead--they think this is working. So we
need to make this not a domestic issue, but a global issue.
And I see that I am out of time, so I will end there.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Professor Rian Thum appears in
the Appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Ms. Batke.
STATEMENT OF JESSICA BATKE, SENIOR EDITOR, CHINAFILE, AND
FORMER RESEARCH ANALYST AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Batke. Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and
distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting
me to speak today.
I am here in a personal capacity, so I am only representing
myself. Others have very ably already discussed what is
happening in Xinjiang, so I won't use my time on that. Instead,
first I'd like to talk a little bit about terminology. I
believe that if we are to treat what is happening in Xinjiang
with the seriousness and alarm that it merits, we first need to
accurately label what it is we are witnessing.
Official Chinese sources refer to these as ``transformation
through education centers'' or ``counter-extremism centers.''
And outside China, they are frequently called ``reeducation
camps.''
But from what we've heard today, we know these are somewhat
euphemistic characterizations and they do not clearly and
precisely define what it is we are witnessing. Some observers
have called them concentration camps based on a definition of
the state--for reasons of state security, targeting particular
ethnic and religious minorities and confining them into certain
spaces. Other people have wondered whether these camps--because
they are interning religious and ethnic minorities--could
presage something much worse, like ethnic cleansing.
And while I am not an expert in international law and I
don't feel I have standing to offer the legal term of art which
most accurately defines what we're seeing, I think the U.S.
Government and the international community, in general, needs
to think very hard about what is happening in these camps and
what we should call them, and whether they are an early warning
sign of something much worse to come.
Turning to the Chinese leadership--despite a general lack
of insight into Chinese leadership politics, Xinjiang Party
Secretary Chen Quanguo's role in this is unusually clear. His
tenure coincides not only with the large-scale use of these
camps, but as you noted, with the building of thousands of
convenience police stations, with a massive increase in
security personnel hiring and overall security spending, and as
we know now, a massive increase in arrests as well.
And this pattern of securitization, as was previously
mentioned, echoes very clearly Chen Quanguo's security policies
in another ethnic minority region in China--Tibet--when he was
Party Secretary there from 2011 to 2016. But though Chen has
been directly responsible for overseeing these policies,
neither Chen nor the policies themselves are sui generis. They
clearly fit into a larger policy trend of criminalization of
ethnic and religious identity, and that traces from central-
level guidance, at least from 2014 if not earlier, down through
regional regulations and local implementation.
So what is the impact beyond Xinjiang? Domestically,
surveillance capabilities and restrictive measures could be
employed, and indeed, by some accounts they are already being
employed, against other ethnic or religious minorities in
China.
Internationally, as we've discussed, Uyghurs in exile are
not only surveilled, but they can be coerced into reporting on
fellow Uyghurs back to Chinese state security authorities.
Other governments have assisted China in forcibly repatriating
ethnic minorities back to Xinjiang.
And finally, there is the issue of Chinese government
pressure, even indirectly, often encouraging self-censorship
among those of us who are here working and writing on China.
So I am going to make a few policy recommendations. It is a
mistake to think that staying silent on human rights in China
is a neutral act. Instead, every instance of silence just
resets Beijing's expectations and it raises the psychic cost of
reinjecting human rights back into the conversation later.
Beijing still does care about its international reputation,
meaning that both public and diplomatic pressure can be
effective tools in encouraging change.
My full recommendations are in my written statement, but
I'll just highlight a few of them here:
First, to maintain a clear, consistent, and full-throated
public defense of human rights and religious freedom in
Xinjiang in addition to direct diplomatic engagement.
To work with like-minded countries, particularly Muslim-
majority countries, to coordinate an international response to
the situation in Xinjiang and offer support to PRC citizens who
have fled Xinjiang, whether here in the United States or
elsewhere around the globe.
To limit private companies' ability to provide training
or equipment to Chinese state security agencies, and the
Chair's recent letter to Secretary Ross is very helpful in this
regard.
And finally, to sanction relevant Chinese officials under
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Any
sanctions package should include Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen
Quanguo. Sanctioning a sitting Politburo member who is one of
the top 25 leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in China
would clearly convey the United States' unequivocal
condemnation of these camps. There is a list of additional
leaders for your consideration in my written statement.
Thank you for your time. I welcome your questions.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jessica Batke appears in the
Appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Thank you all. Your testimony, while brief,
has really gotten to the point.
I want to start with the first one. You know, let me just
make sort of an editorial comment at the front end. I know
there's a lot going on up here. Every morning brings news,
depending on what's going on on Twitter--statements, press,
whatever it might be, but--and there is coverage here. There
are people. There are some cameras and some journalists and
others who might watch later.
What we've heard described here today has both deep
domestic and international implications of epic proportions. I
know of few, if any, humanitarian outrages in the world that
reach the level of what we've heard here described, and few in
modern history that reach this level. And I daresay if this was
happening in virtually any other part of the world, there'd be
an incredible amount of outrage and coverage. And while I'm
grateful to the journalists who are covering this today and
those that may write about it, I am disappointed. Frankly, I am
disappointed that there isn't more interest, that there isn't
more coverage. This is horrifying. It certainly is
significantly more important for the future of the world and
the 21st century.
You have a country that is in a full-scale effort to not
just catch the United States but supplant us as the world's
premier economic, military, geopolitical, and technological
power. And history has taught us that the most powerful country
in the world in any given era shapes that era, shapes the
global norms. It shapes the way the world looks, feels, and
acts.
I deeply believe that America's rise, and particularly
since the end of the Second World War, has led to the spread of
concepts about liberty, freedom, democracy, human rights, and
economic opportunity, and helped shape the post-World War II
era. And so we have to fear that in a world that is shaped by a
country--if that is what it reaches--that does this to their
own people, you can only imagine what they would be willing to
support, tolerate, and/or promote if they ever reach the same
status.
So I think this should inform our relationship and the
urgency of all of our tasks with regard to our relationship
with China. But focusing on this one in particular for a
moment, let me first address those--and this is going to deal
with your story, Ms. Hoja--of those who say to us--and I've had
people tell me this--Human rights is important, but we have to
be pragmatic and we can't raise it in every forum, can't talk
about it all the time, and at the end of the day there are
horrible things happening all over the world. We cannot tell
other countries what to do all the time. We need to be focused
on America and Americans.
Your story is about America and Americans. You are a United
States citizen. You work for Radio Free Asia. And you have
testified here today that your brother, your elderly and infirm
parents have been detained, that over 20 of your relatives,
including aunts, cousins, children, have been detained.
You have also testified here today, I believe in your
written testimony--you may have said it verbally as well--that
you know of other colleagues that have experienced the same. So
here we have the testimony of a United States citizen working
in a journalistic capacity whose family in another country has
been harassed, detained, in some cases without any contact with
their families, not knowing exactly what's going on, because
they don't like what you're saying in the United States--in the
United States. A United States citizen's family is being
detained, harassed, and harmed in another country as an effort
to silence you.
And it is a testament to your bravery and courage that you
have not been silenced and that you appear here today. I wonder
how many have been silenced, and how many have chosen not to
speak. And who can blame them? Who wants to put their family
through this?
You don't have to name names, but I'm interested in you
sharing with us for the record whether, in fact, your story is
an isolated one, or are there, in fact, more people who find
themselves in the circumstances you are in. Again, I will leave
it up to them to identify who they are and so forth, but is
yours the only story, or are other people going through the
exact same thing you are facing right now, other U.S. citizens?
Ms. Hoja. Of course, there are--the Chinese government
right now puts people in reeducation camps who have a friend or
family members outside of China. They feel they will influence
them. That is why. I don't know the number, but I believe
everyone, every Uyghur has somebody in the family or friends in
the camps right now. You can ask any Uyghur, any, including my
five other colleagues in our office.
And Rebiya Kadeer is here. Her sons, daughters, even
grandchildren are locked up. She doesn't know where they are,
how they are. And we recently confirmed Dolkan Isa's mother
passed away in the reeducation camps.
So I wonder what evidence we have to prove again and again.
So we've been trying to cover this darkness, the issues, for
more than one year because the Chinese government, this Chen
Quanguo, is using this policy harshly from the beginning of
last year. But we have been--for example, for 17 years, I've
been releasing every day, similar situations, similar human
rights issues, abuses by the Chinese, but unfortunately, we are
the only source. Radio Free Asia is the only voice to talk
about ourselves. So is that enough? We don't know--because I'm
still here. I'm raising my voice because we don't have a
choice. We don't have any other people to talk. So we are the
hope. So I have to stand up. I cannot give up.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Rubio. I ask you this, and I don't know if you
even know the answer. You may not, and it does not mean there
are not any people in these circumstances, but putting
ourselves in that position, I think few people would have the
courage that you have exhibited and the willingness to continue
to speak, knowing the consequences of it.
Are you aware of or do you fear, do you have any sense or
any reason to believe that there are those who have chosen--no
one blames them for it--who have chosen to stop speaking up for
purposes of avoiding what's happening to you?
Ms. Hoja. Of course, like when I heard my brother was
detained, I chose to not speak up, too, because my mother asked
me--she said, Please, I already lost you. I do not want to lose
my son, too. Because I have been, and we have been, my family
could not unite in 17 years. I believe other Uyghurs have
similar situations--somebody is locked up in the jail, or
detained, or in reeducation camps. We don't want to put them in
further danger because of our acts or any word against China.
Chairman Rubio. In your time talking about these issues,
highlighting them globally here in the United States, have you
ever felt like media outlets, individuals, companies, whoever,
have chosen to not speak about your cause for fear of the
impact it might have on their ability to cover events in China
or their ability to do business in China? In essence, they may
not have relatives, but they may have other interests in China
that they are afraid there will be retribution against them as
a result, and therefore, they do not really want to get
involved in your case.
And listen, this could extend from a political figure who
doesn't want to touch it because they have a company in their
home state who does a lot of business. It could be businesses.
It could be media outlets who have a bureau and don't want to
lose access to a fast-growing and important country. I don't
know if at any point you've felt that there are those who have
been complicit because of their own interests separate from
having family.
You don't have to tell us who they are unless you want to.
But I'm just curious whether that extends beyond simply those
who have family members.
Ms. Hoja. Yes, I know. If you want to interview someone who
is involved in human rights issues, or other issues they are
doing there, like investigations--some of them will say, Excuse
me, right now I cannot speak. Those kinds of reactions we are
facing all of the time. But I do not know the exact company or
the person. Maybe our colleagues can follow up that question.
Chairman Rubio. And again, we would be interested in that.
It can be done confidentially if you choose for us not to share
it. But I think it's part of the broader long arm of China,
which I think goes well beyond--I mean, we have seen it at
universities. There are universities in this country that will
not provide you, sadly, a forum to say what you've just said
because they're going to lose their Confucius Institute
funding, or they're going to lose their campus in mainland
China. And so they decide----
Ms. Hoja. Even some Uyghur researchers in other countries,
they have an opportunity to speak. They have freedom, but they
are afraid, too.
Chairman Rubio. All right.
Ms. Batke and Professor Thum, I wanted to focus on two
things. On our relationship with China, a lot has been said
about what we can do. How can we influence behavior?
It has been my experience that there are two things they
seem to respond to and only two things. Number one is sort of
sustained and committed pressure across the entire
relationship, meaning the entire--you cannot just carve out
pieces of it and say we're going to deal with trade here but
human rights over here. We're going to deal with military
affairs here but economics over here.
They most certainly pressure--the strategy China seems to
follow is not one of sweeping change, although when they see an
opportunity, they seize it. It seems to be one of slow, steady,
but consistent escalation. The South China Sea is an example.
Every time, they push a little bit further, creating a new
normal every step of the way. And they pressure across the
board--so today is very enlightening.
The administration had an opportunity to sanction ZTE. They
did, basically issuing a death penalty--allowed them to come
back into business by allowing them to buy chips from Qualcomm.
Qualcomm had a pending deal in China, and the response of the
Chinese after the ZTE thing got finalized is to continue to
slow-dance Qualcomm, an American company, until the point where
they've abandoned their hopes of doing business in China.
Basically, they continue to sustain their pressure while we
have given concessions on some things. I hope that was
enlightening for the administration. I know it's unrelated
directly to this topic.
But the first is sustained and committed pressure across
the relationship, and the second is something that Ms. Batke
pointed out, and that is invoking international partners. They
want to be--one of the goals of the Chinese Communist Party in
the 21st century is to remake the global order to benefit them,
to replace the Western global order that was established after
the Second World War, with one that has their imprint. And part
of that is the perception and the receptivity that people may
have to that, based on their perceptions of China.
And so if their perception of the Chinese Communist Party
is that it's a country with a lot of money, a non-interference
policy, that is there to help you build things and move ahead
without having to put up with some of the restrictions that
American aid or Western aid comes with . . . that makes them
appear benevolent and peaceful and in many cases continues the
whole ``bide your time and hide your power'' strategy that they
followed for a very long time.
If the perception of them is that they do bad deals, they
take advantage of their partners and they violate people's
rights . . . if it's a negative perception about the things
they do, they're very sensitive to that because it goes right
to the heart of their ability to remake the geopolitical
system. And that's why they are so fearful of sustained--of our
ability to invoke global partnerships to confront them and why
it's important that we continue to do so. It's a little hard to
do when you are fighting with some of the people that might
join us in that, on trade, but hopefully that will be resolved
so that we can do that.
So here are my two questions. The first is, Why is it so
important? I know why it was important in the context of the
Cold War and the Soviet Union--that in every instance virtually
every American President, in addition to raising Soviet
expansionism and nuclear weapons threats, always raised the
cause of human rights.
If I were standing here today and said, Look, China is too
powerful . . . they're too rich. We've got to do business with
them. We can't afford to mess all of that up by raising these
human rights issues--I've already outlined why I think it's
important, and that is to sustain pressure across the
relationship. But in your view, beyond the moralistic and
humanitarian rationale, from a geopolitical rationale, why is
it important that the United States, in every instance, raise
these issues in every forum in which we engage them and--that's
question 1. 1(A) is, Why is it important that it be public?
Because the other thing we get is, We're going to raise it with
them, but in private, because they don't like to lose face.
They don't want to be embarrassed. So why is it important that
we raise it geopolitically, just from sheer national interest,
and why is it important that some of that or a lot of it be
done publicly as opposed to in private one-on-one meetings? If
you could both comment on that.
Mr. Thum. I think, as Jessica Batke pointed out, when
things are not raised repeatedly, there is a reset of the norm.
And you have to claw back that little part of the discourse to
get it back on the table. And then that comes at a cost.
So I agree that it's important to raise this at every
moment. And there actually is a legislative opportunity here.
There's a law on the books from the late 90s that says that
Tibet has to be raised in certain circumstances, and it would
be very valuable, I think, to add the Xinjiang issue to that
piece of legislation. I would add, though, that it's quite
dangerous to link this Uyghur and Xinjiang issue to
geopolitics. I heard the words ``blue seas'' earlier, which
invokes this kind of balance where if we intervene in Xinjiang,
then that affects this global military strategic situation.
That plays in very neatly to the Chinese Communist Party's
story about why they are engaged in this kind of activity and
why they don't have to listen when people in the rest of the
world say that this violates international norms.
So I would hope we----
Chairman Rubio. ``Story'' meaning that the West is trying
to constrain and contain them from their rise?
Mr. Thum. The West is trying to constrain and contain, and
even that the West might have some sort of secret joy when
there's unrest or trouble in Xinjiang and that this can be used
as a pressure point on China in our geopolitical rivalry. So if
we don't separate those concerns, we're going to have a great
deal of trouble getting all of our international partners on
board in undermining the CCP's narrative on why this is
happening. And I'll also say just briefly----
Chairman Rubio. I don't think you are saying it shouldn't
be raised in every forum, but I take what you're saying as, it
should be its own separate category within the broader
engagement, meaning you don't trade human rights for a better
trade deal.
Mr. Thum. That's--yes, sure. I would accept that. I would
also say that we are thinking somewhat small here. Senator King
raised the long-standing criticism of America's activities in
regard to 1930s Germany. I would remind everyone that that
supposedly insufficient reaction included Roosevelt recalling
our Ambassador from Berlin. We are behind the curve on that
reaction which is considered historically now to be
insufficient.
Dr. Batke raised the issue of terminology and pointed out
that these nightmare words of the 20th century--concentration
camp, apartheid, gulag, all started out their careers as
euphemisms that were designed to hide the terrors. That's the
point we are at now. But one day Xinjiang's reeducation camps,
under one name or another, are going to join that list of
widely recognized atrocities. And I think we have a
responsibility to act boldly to address that issue.
Ms. Batke. I would second everything Dr. Thum just said. In
terms of why it is important to keep bringing it up all the
time, beyond what he just said, there's this issue of the
exporting of Chinese norms--as you were talking about--across
the world. And I think that one thing that is important to
remind other people is China touts itself as this country that
does not interfere in the internal affairs of another.
But beyond the moral imperative of bringing this up, it's
important to remember that when we don't, we are allowing them
to interfere in our internal affairs and decide how we decide
to bring up and frame things. And that's a point that I think
can be brought up again to other countries in terms of why they
should also be speaking up, because those norms are also being
reset and exported to those countries.
In terms of why it's important to keep these things public,
cordoning off these conversations into only private discussions
allows them to confine that discussion and allows them to walk
away from things without any sense of shame or embarrassment.
International pressure is effective. And I would point to the
case of Liu Xia who was just recently released from house
detention in Beijing and allowed to go to Germany. And that was
a two-pronged effort. That was a lot of quiet diplomacy behind
the scenes but also a sustained and public campaign keeping her
case in the public eye.
Chairman Rubio. And just on the public front versus
private, on an individual basis, if there is an individual case
somewhere in the world and progress can be made because there's
some internal political reason why they've got to be able to
save face--that's one thing. But we are talking about
detention, and frankly in my view, the torture, humiliation,
and abuse of hundreds of thousands of people--more, actually.
And that's why--there is not one individual that they could
somehow just--this is one person. And I am not downplaying that
one particular case, but that's what we do on this Commission.
It's overwhelming. We could--volumes of names if that's what we
choose to do in that regard.
I do want to ask both of you_the second part about invoking
international partners to confront it. It is my view that if
something even a quarter as bad as this were occurring in
virtually any Western democracy now or various other countries
around the planet, it would not just get more media coverage,
but it would be widely condemned in every international forum.
There would be widespread action against it. I mean, it would
be intolerable.
Why isn't this occurring in the same way? What have they
done or what is happening that has prevented this from reaching
that level of international attention? I suspect I know the
answer, but I would love to see if you agree. So I'm not going
to tell you my answer until you tell me yours.
Ms. Batke. Sure. I would say, quite baldly, money talks.
China is very effective at going to countries one-on-one and
making clear that they are happy to use their economic leverage
as necessary to get their silence. I think this is really clear
in the case of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. They've
only issued two statements about what's happening in Xinjiang:
one right after the Urumqi riots in 2009, and one in 2015. But
they said nothing since all of this has been happening in the
last year. I strongly suspect that that has to do with economic
concerns on their part.
Mr. Thum. Yes, I don't have much to add to that. I think
you're right. This would be roundly condemned if it happened
virtually anywhere else. It would be a major news item. And I
agree that this is about money and China's economic clout. It's
not helped by major powers like the U.S. retreating from human
rights concerns and putting economic concerns first. But yes,
that's absolutely what it is.
Chairman Rubio. It strikes me--and that's my assessment as
well. I mean, that is how I feel as well, and it is not--
obviously, money does talk, and Chinese investment abroad isn't
simply into roads and bridges. I mean, they fund political
parties. They fund individuals. There are all sorts of things
that come about as a result of this, and that leverage is one
they made very clear.
We've also seen them, for example, cut off tourism to South
Korea, allow agricultural products from the Philippines to rot
at the port, deny rare earth minerals to Japan--all in
retribution for decisions that were made in those countries.
So taking that as a factor, you basically testified here
today that the reason why certain countries cannot internally
make a political decision to confront this in international
forums is because the Chinese are using leverage. We've heard
how they go after the family members of United States citizens
as leverage to try to silence criticism of their practices.
And I think that's a pretty stark example of how
hypocritical they are when they talk about their policy of
noninterference when they are directly interfering in the
affairs of other countries, because they are interfering with
citizens of other countries by going after their families. They
are interfering with their political leaders by threatening to
cut them off from essential aid and help. They are shaping and
interfering quite directly. So the hypocrisy of that is
extraordinary.
I have one more question. We do need to wrap up.
Dr. Batke, I wanted to ask you about the testimony that you
gave regarding the Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and
his role within the leadership and the role that he plays in
the repressive measures. You pointed to him as sort of the one
individual that we should be looking at and--in your view, what
would be the psychological--we would have to view what the
economic impact of it is and the like. But you have talked
about it and you have described it as a pretty significant
escalatory measure, one that would get attention because for
the first time you are not going after a country or even a
party, but a specific individual.
I know I am asking you to speculate, but what impact do you
think that would have internally among them, knowing now that,
if they are participants in this sort of activity, they are now
individually going to be named internationally as complicit in
these activities?
Ms. Batke. You're right. I cannot speculate about what's
going on in their heads directly. I don't think that it would
necessarily stop people from choosing to participate. And as
much as we talk about repression, I think also there's a lot to
be said about the choices of people in government in terms of
whether they feel like they can completely step back from what
they've been asked to do. So I don't know that it would prevent
other young people from joining the government and choosing to
do this. But I do think it would be an incredibly powerful
symbolic step, particularly because Chen Quanguo is so high up
in the Chinese Communist Party, rather than going after someone
who is very low level, running maybe a camp or something.
Although I think we should name and shame those people as well.
This actually would show that the U.S. Government is
unequivocally condemning these camps and is willing to raise it
to a very high political level to do it.
Chairman Rubio. My last two questions, and I'll be brief.
On the first--you were here for the first panel. You saw
the back and forth with the Commerce Department--and again, I'm
paraphrasing. But what I took from it is two things. Number one
is our laws may potentially need to be updated to include new
things, such as these repressive tools. I mean these tools that
did not exist before.
But the other thing I took from it is we have to make--I am
paraphrasing, but the way I took it was, we look at this
product, the DNA sequencer. They're easy to do. They're not
really that complex, although if there was not something unique
about them, they wouldn't have to buy them from this company in
Massachusetts. But nonetheless, they're not that advanced.
China makes them. Plenty of other countries make them. They can
find them anywhere in the world anyway. And they have a
legitimate purpose.
If we deny it, they're still going to keep doing what
they're doing. The only consequence will be that some American
company will not be able to make money off of it. So since
they're going to do it anyway, we might as well continue to
make a profit.
In addition to the immorality of that and the notion about
whether we want to be complicit in it, isn't that exactly what
they're counting on, the idea that they know that one of the
most powerful constituencies in America is business interests
who, frankly, don't feel like they have a human rights
obligation. They feel like they have a fiduciary obligation to
their owners or shareholders to return a profit. And as a
result, for them, they bring pressure to bear on the United
States.
I see this in multiple realms, by the way, not just with
regard to China. But one of the most consistent arguments you
always get is of the business community coming back and saying,
you're hurting us. We have a good thing going, and this huge
market, and if you do this, you are going to hurt an American
company. The Chinese government clearly understands that
leverage point and they use it. Do they not?
Ms. Batke. Yes.
Chairman Rubio. Does anyone disagree with that?
Mr. Thum. I agree with that, and the conclusion that leads
me to is that whatever action the U.S. Government takes is
going to come at a cost. It's going to come at a cost to
American citizens, and it's going to come at a cost to the
options on the table for the U.S. Government. This is about
political will.
Chairman Rubio. All right. My final question is, if you're
sitting in the Chinese Communist Party headquarters today and
you're reviewing this policy, you probably aren't even aware
that we are having this hearing, but the people who are in the
embassy here are, and they are annoyed by it. They don't like
this commission. They most certainly don't like me, and they
get irritated when these things come up. But by and large, the
world will go on, and tomorrow morning this is not going to
lead headlines here, or anywhere, for that matter. The work
continues. There are people that are certainly being
intimidated by it.
In essence, they're sitting there thinking to themselves,
this stuff is working. No one's condemning us internationally.
We're continuing to do what we're doing. We're getting better
at it every single day. As time goes on, it'll get easier as
young people get disconnected from their heritage and their
families.
Yes, they will have some commission hearings and a couple
of senators and congressmen will write letters. And maybe they
will cut us off from a DNA sequencer one day, and maybe a
couple of our individuals might get sanctioned, but that's a
small price to pay for the big picture.
It's working. That's the saddest part of all. This strategy
they are carrying out is working. That would be their view. And
unless we change that dynamic or at least raise the price for
it, this will continue. It will grow. It will become more
widespread. In essence, it'll become the new normal. It will
become baked in to the reality.
Am I wrong in that horrible assessment?
Mr. Thum. I think you're right about the attitude that they
have toward this. And you're right about the threat that this
becomes baked in to a larger order. We see, for example, some
of these technologies used in Xinjiang being exported to South
America. But I don't think this is a hopeless cause because
China's expanding influence around the world depends a great
deal on its reputation. For that reason, its leaders are very
sensitive about its global reputation.
So the more that we can do publicly, and in particular, in
partnership with other countries around the world, to expose
what's going on and to shame the Chinese state for engaging in
this kind of behavior, the greater the cost will be. I think
it's a mistake to consider decision making at that level as
something where they're certain about what they are doing. They
see this as a balance of costs and benefits. And if we can add
to the cost side, we may very well be able to shape the
situation.
Chairman Rubio. And I don't disagree with your assessment
that this is not a hopeless cause. In fact, I only think it
becomes a hopeless cause if we accept it as a fact that we have
to deal with.
I raise the fact that it is working for the following
reason, and that is, we can have a lot of commission meetings.
We're going to issue our report, we're going to file bills,
we're going to write letters, we're going to give speeches, and
we are going to highlight this as much as we can. But this
needs to be prioritized at the highest levels of our engagement
both with China and the international community.
Congress is an important part of it, and we can even be the
catalyst for it. But there is no replacing executive-level
attention to this as part of the overall framework of our
interaction with the international community and with China.
And that is the only way that ultimately, we are going to see
that cost-benefit analysis adjusted.
Congress can be a catalyst for it. Individual senators and
congressmen can be a catalyst for it, but the execution of it
will require us to have sustained--across both parties, across
a sustained period of time, across multiple presidential
administrations--attention to this. This cannot be a one-off
issue. And that's the only way to keep it from becoming
hopeless. That's why I asked that, because if we want some
sense of urgency, we shouldn't think that simply shining a
light on it alone is going to change that dynamic.
We need the top people in our government not just to be
aware of this but to be outraged by it, and to embrace it as
part of our overall narrative. That's what we're hoping to do.
And that's what I hope the first panel took back.
So I want to thank you all for being here, particularly
you, Ms. Hoja. Thank you for being a part of this. I know this
is an ongoing issue for you. After we leave this hearing here
today, you live with this reality. But I thank you for your
courage, your bravery, and your willingness to stand here today
and provide that testimony. Thank you all for being a part of
it. I know it takes time away from your other endeavors to be a
part of this.
The record on this hearing will remain open for 48 hours in
case some of you would like to submit additional information
for the record so it can be a part of our record and maybe even
make it into our report before we issue it in October. And
there may be some follow-up questions from Members. If you have
time to answer, we'd love to have that.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]
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A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Anthony Christino III
Thank you Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, and Members of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China for convening this hearing
today on this important topic. Today I will be discussing the role of
the Bureau of Industry and Security in regard to export license
requirements for China.
Under the Export Administration Regulations (the EAR), a Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) license is required for the export or
reexport of most items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to China.
Items on the CCL are identified by their individually assigned Export
Control Classification Number according to their reasons for control.
The CCL is comprised of items controlled by the multilateral export
control regimes (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control
Regime, Australia Group, and Nuclear Suppliers Group) as well as items
controlled unilaterally for foreign policy reasons.
In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of
human rights throughout the world, the United States unilaterally
controls items on the CCL for crime-control reasons, as required by
Section 6(n) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended \1\
(the EAA). As set forth in the EAR, the U.S. Government requires a
license to export most crime-control and detection instruments,
equipment, related technology, and software to all destinations other
than Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, and members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Additionally, a license is required to
export certain crime-control items, including restraint-type devices
(such as handcuffs) and discharge-type arms (such as stun guns), to all
destinations except Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015).
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The EAR imposes some limited controls on items not on the CCL.
Items subject to Commerce licensing jurisdiction under the EAR but not
specifically identified on the CCL are designated EAR99. Such items
generally do not require a license for export or reexport to China
unless destined for certain WMD-related end uses or end users, or
unless the items are part of a transaction involving a restricted party
identified on one of several lists of sanctioned or restricted entities
maintained by agencies of the U.S. Government, including BIS, the
Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
Items controlled for crime-control reasons are added to or removed
from the CCL based upon continuous review of the merits of maintaining
the controls and the effectiveness of the controls. Section 6 of the
EAA prohibits the imposition of foreign policy controls, including on
crime-control items, unless certain determinations are made and certain
factors reported to Congress, such as determinations that the controls
are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy objective,
descriptions of consultation efforts with industry and other supplier
countries, determinations related to the economic impact on U.S.
industry and efforts to achieve the purpose of the controls through
alternative means, descriptions of foreign availability, and
determinations regarding the ability to effectively enforce the
controls.
crime control licensing review policy
The U.S. Government considers applications to export or reexport
most crime-control items favorably, on a case-by-case basis, unless
there is civil disorder in the country or the sale involves a region of
concern, or there is evidence that the government may have violated
human rights. The purpose of these controls is to deter the development
of a consistent pattern of human rights abuse, distance the United
States from such abuse, and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a
country or region. The U.S. Government maintains a general policy of
denial for specially designed implements of torture, regardless of the
intended destination.
Applications to export crime-control items to countries that are
not otherwise subject to sanctions or comprehensive embargoes, but that
are identified by the Department of State as human rights violators,
receive additional scrutiny in the license review process. The
Department of State reviews all license applications for these
countries on a case-by-case basis and makes recommendations to
Commerce.
specific licensing review policy for china for crime-control items
Following the 1989 military assault on demonstrators by the Chinese
government in Tiananmen Square, the U.S. Government imposed constraints
on the export to China of crime-control and detection instruments and
equipment on the CCL under Section 902(a)(4) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Public Law 101-246.
In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Commerce approved 25
licenses to China of crime-control items, 21 of which were for the
return of defective rifle scopes and one license for the return of
defective shotguns to their original Chinese manufacturers for refund
or replacement, and three were for biometric identification equipment
for a third country's visa system operating at its own diplomatic
facilities in China. There were nine denials, including applications
for cattle prods and stun guns, optical sighting devices, pepper spray,
fingerprint powder, dyes and inks, and voiceprint software, to Chinese
security agencies, manufacturing and development firms, and resellers.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today. I will
be happy to take your questions.
______
Prepared Statement of Kelley E. Currie
Thank you, Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith and other members of the
Commission for convening this important hearing today. I am pleased to
be able to appear before the Commission on behalf of the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations and discuss our concerns regarding the growing
human rights crisis in Xinjiang, with a particular focus on how this
crisis is being addressed--or not--at the United Nations, including
through its various human rights mechanisms and deliberative bodies. I
would like to submit my full remarks for the record.
As Secretary Pompeo noted yesterday in his op-ed welcoming the
first ever U.S.-sponsored Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, the
State Department recently hosted six journalists from Radio Free Asia's
Uyghur Service to hear directly from them about the situation on the
ground in Xinjiang. What RFA, as well as the Uyghur Service at VOA,
have documented over the past year is truly disturbing. Their reporting
indicates that Chinese authorities are likely detaining hundreds of
thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in what can only be
described as internment camps across Xinjiang. There, they are
subjected to ``political reeducation'' designed to undermine their
distinct Uyghur identity. One of these journalists, Gulchehra Hoja,
will testify in the next panel, and will undoubtedly tell you about how
23 of her family members--twenty-three--have been detained and how,
since their detention, the authorities have provided little to no
information about her family's well-being.
According to a growing number of credible reports by media and
human rights organizations, a version of Gulchehra's story is becoming
the norm for nearly every Uyghur living outside China who has family
still in Xinjiang. In fact, having a family member overseas appears to
be a key trigger for increased scrutiny for Uyghurs living in Xinjiang.
Likewise, having studied, traveled or worked overseas, appearing to be
an observant Muslim, and having an above average education also seem to
be among the reasons that certain individuals are subject to intensive
scrutiny by the authorities, including detention in the camps. Think
about that: over the past year, hundreds of thousands of law-abiding
Uyghur citizens of China--men, women, and even children--have
disappeared into state custody, with barely any notice from the
international community. That is why this hearing is so timely and
important.
The United States is deeply troubled by the Chinese government's
worsening crackdown on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in China's
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since April 2017 the Xi Jinping
leadership, under the guise of fighting ``terrorism,'' ``secession,''
and ``religious extremism,'' has greatly intensified the Chinese
Communist Party's long-standing repressive policies against mainstream,
non-violent Muslim cultural and religious practices in Xinjiang. The
stated goal of the current campaign is to ``sinicize religion'' and
``adapt religion to a socialist society,'' suggesting that Beijing
wagers that it now possesses the political, diplomatic, and
technological capabilities to transform religion and ethnicity in
Chinese society in a way that its predecessors never could, even during
the peak horrors of the Cultural Revolution and other heinous Maoist
campaigns intended to remake Chinese society.
The scope of this campaign is truly breathtaking: authorities now
prohibit ``abnormal'' beards and the wearing of veils in public, and
classify refusal to watch state television, refusal to wear shorts,
abstention from alcohol and tobacco, refusal to eat pork, fasting
during the holy month of Ramadan, or practicing traditional funeral
rituals, as potential signs that individuals harbor extreme religious
views. Chinese authorities have banned parents from giving their
children a number of traditional Islamic names, including ``Muhammad,''
``Islam,'' ``Fatima,'' and ``Aisha,'' and have reportedly required
children under age 16 who have Islamic names to change them. Of
particular concern, since 2015 Chinese authorities have increasingly
criminalized or punished the teaching of Islam to young people--even by
their parents--adopting at least six laws or regulations which put
parents and religious educators at legal risk for promoting non-violent
Muslim scripture, rituals, and clothing to children. Chinese
authorities also continue to crack down in particular on the use of
Uyghur and other minority languages at universities and in classroom
instruction.
Failing to comply with these restrictions, or activities such as
communicating with relatives abroad and studying in foreign countries,
has reportedly led to the detention of a large number of Uyghurs and
other Muslims, including families and children, in facilities for
purported ``patriotic reeducation.'' Detainees are required to learn
the Chinese language, recite Chinese and Xinjiang laws and policies,
watch pro-government propaganda videos, express their gratitude to the
Communist Party and General Secretary Xi Jinping, and renounce their
ethnic identities, religious beliefs, and mainstream cultural and
religious practices. Detainees are granted no due process or contact
with their families, and periods of detention have ranged from several
months to indefinite detention in many cases. A wide array of evidence
indicates that the number of individuals detained in such reeducation
centers since April 2017 numbers at least in the hundreds of thousands,
and possibly millions. There are even disturbing reports that young
children have been sent to state-run orphanages if even one of their
parents is detained in the internment camps. Notable detainees
reportedly include well-known Uyghur athletes, prominent
businesspersons, scholars, and students. There have been credible
reports of at least two dozen deaths in these camps, including senior
citizens who were incarcerated, including the widely revered 82-year-
old Uyghur religious scholar Muhammed Salih Hajim. We call on China to
end these counterproductive policies and free all those arbitrarily
detained.
To guarantee that this suppression continues beyond the internment
camps into the daily lives of all Uyghurs, Chinese authorities have
constructed a highly intrusive, high-tech surveillance system in
Xinjiang, which many experts fear will be extended throughout China.
This system includes thousands of surveillance cameras, including in
mosques; facial recognition software; obligatory content-monitoring
apps on smartphones and GPS devices on cars; widespread new police
outposts with tens of thousands of newly hired police, and even Party
personnel embedded in people's homes; and compulsory collection of vast
biometric datasets on ethnic and religious minorities throughout the
region, including DNA and blood samples, 3D photos, iris scans, and
voiceprints. Human Rights Watch has documented that many of these DNA
samples were collected deceptively as part of what regional officials
called a Xinjiang-wide ``health'' campaign. This surveillance system
has spurred security experts and Xinjiang specialists to label it one
of the world's most intrusive police states.
As with many things related to China's human rights abuses, the
repression does not stop at the Chinese border. The detention and
persecution of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has
compelled them to stop communicating with their family and friends
based abroad, including in the United States, for fear of retribution
by authorities. We have received reports that U.S. lawful permanent
residents and family members of U.S. citizens have been detained in
these detention centers for indefinite periods. We have also received
reports that U.S. citizens have been detained and interrogated while
visiting Xinjiang. In addition to the cases of the RFA journalists
mentioned earlier, we note that more than thirty relatives of Ms.
Rebiya Kadeer have been disappeared or detained. This treatment of U.S.
citizens, U.S. LPRs, and their family members is unacceptable, and we
unequivocally condemn these actions by the Chinese government. China
must provide information about the locations and medical condition of
those detained and immediately release them if there is no evidence of
actual criminal activity. We also have demanded that, at a minimum,
China should meet its obligations under international law to provide
consular access, not to mention minimum standards of due process, to
those it has detained.
We also are concerned by reports of Chinese authorities harassing
Uyghurs abroad in order to compel them to act as informants against
other Uyghurs, return to Xinjiang or remain silent about the situation
there, sometimes by detaining their family members. This includes
harassment of American citizens, LPRs, and individuals legally residing
in the United States. China has applied similar pressure to dual
nationals or family members of citizens in other countries. Dating back
to at least 2003, China has pressured other countries to forcibly
return Uyghurs, at times claiming that individuals are members of
``extremist groups'' without credible evidence. China has also abused
the INTERPOL Red Notice system, inappropriately placing international
security travel notices on religious and political dissidents. We
applaud governments that have resisted Chinese pressure and upheld
their commitments to international human rights.
What is happening in Xinjiang is not just a human rights matter; it
is also a security issue. China, like every other country, has the
right to protect its security. But for these measures against violent
extremism to be effective, they must promote good governance,
inclusion, and respect for the rights of its minority citizens.
However, draconian, indiscriminate, and disproportionate controls on
ethnic minorities' expressions of their cultural and religious
identities have the potential to incite radicalization and violence.
Chinese authorities appear to be targeting law-abiding Uyghurs--
including non-violent activists and advocates for human rights--as
terrorist threats on the basis of their political, cultural, and
religious beliefs and practices, even if they do not advocate violence.
Given the severity of this crisis, it is worth asking: why haven't
the pre-eminent human rights bodies of the United Nations taken up this
issue, exposed it, and demanded changes in China's policies? Part of
the answer certainly lies with China's membership on the UN's Human
Rights Council, its role as a permanent member of the Security Council,
and its ability to continue to portray itself as a developing country
from the ``Global South'' in alignment with the Group of 77. From its
perch on the HRC, China is able to effectively block any action on its
appalling human rights record in Xinjiang, as well as scrutiny of the
broader human rights crackdown under way in China. Likewise, by
severely limiting access for special rapporteurs, human rights experts
and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Chinese
limit the discourse around these abuses. As a veto-wielding member of
the Security Council, China effectively shuts down not only any
discussion of its human rights abuses, but uses its position to shield
other bad actors from criticism and generally block efforts to raise
human rights issues in the Council. In doing so, China gains favor with
other countries that have poor human rights records--of which there
remain far too many in the UN--and these help block criticism of China
in the General Assembly and other forums.
Perhaps more disturbing than these defensive strategies, however,
is China's ongoing, comprehensive effort to re-write the entire
normative framework of international human rights in a manner that is
more aligned with its authoritarian political system and the interests
of the Chinese Communist Party. This effort includes an emphasis on the
``right to development'' versus fundamental civil and political rights,
and the promotion of ``win-win'' cooperation on human rights that
privileges the interests of governments over their basic obligation to
respect inherent human rights that attach at the individual level. A
key aspect of this effort is China's ability to obfuscate its
intentions behind talk of ``mutually beneficial cooperation'' and a
``shared future of all humanity'' that appeals to other governments who
dislike being criticized for human rights violations. The Chinese took
a major step forward at the March 2018 session of the UN Human Rights
Council, when the Council passed a Chinese resolution promoting ``win-
win cooperation'' on human rights. The United States was the only vote
against the resolution. At the same session, I listened in horror as
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights praised the good intentions
he saw behind Xi Jinping's ``win-win'' slogans, seemingly oblivious to
the threat they pose to the very notion of respect for individual human
rights. Instead, he offered only a wan concern about the ``mismatch''
between the aspirations of ``win-win'' and its implementation on the
ground--as if they were not fruit of the same poisonous tree. In the
same speech, Prince Zeid expressed strong concerns about ``hate
speech'' and other perceived human rights abuses in the U.S. It was
nothing short of surreal.
In April, I had the opportunity to hear directly about the
situation in Xinjiang from Mr. Dolkan Isa, who is the president of the
World Uyghur Congress. He was in New York to attend the annual meeting
of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples. Mr. Isa is a quiet and
diligent person, now a naturalized German citizen, who carefully and
deliberately explains the repression that his community in Xinjiang is
experiencing--despite the fact that his own family has been targeted by
the authorities and he has essentially lost communication with them. We
had our discussion about this situation while we sat in a small lounge
outside the UN Security Council. The fact that Mr. Isa was even able to
sit in that lounge, inside the walls of the UN, was a minor miracle
given the extent to which Chinese authorities have gone to block him
from entering the premises over the years. In April 2017, while
attempting to attend the same Forum as a member of the Unrepresented
Nations and Peoples Organization delegation, Mr. Isa was forcibly
removed from the UN premises after representatives of the Chinese
mission to the UN alleged he was a security threat. The Chinese
authorities provided no evidence to back up their claims but UN
security removed Mr. Isa nonetheless. This shocking behavior was
subsequently documented in a report on reprisals against human rights
activists by the UN Secretary General. This report, which criticized
the manner in which UN security responded and called for changes to the
way the UN handled such allegations, was released one month before the
2018 Indigenous Peoples Forum. Yet the Chinese mission in New York
attempted again this year to block Mr. Isa from participating as an NGO
delegate, accusing him of involvement in terrorist financing and
recruitment, while again providing no evidence. After a lengthy delay
and several interventions from the U.S. and German missions on Mr.
Isa's behalf, he was finally allowed to participate on the final day of
the Forum.
Having been thwarted in their efforts to block Mr. Isa's
participation, the Chinese delegation then went after the German NGO
that had sponsored his participation--the Society for Threatened
Peoples. They used their position as a member of the UN committee that
accredits civil society participation to attempt to revoke the
Society's consultative status. In their remarks to the Committee, the
Chinese referred to Mr. Isa as a terrorist and a separatist who
threatened Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Let that sink
in for a moment--China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council,
a nuclear power with one of the biggest armies in the world--is
threatened by a mild-mannered German citizen who talks about China's
treatment of the Uyghur people.
Once again, the U.S. and German missions pushed back and we
ultimately overcame Chinese efforts to intimidate the NGO. Afterwards,
several NY-based colleagues expressed surprise that the normally
careful and disciplined Chinese delegation would go to such extreme
lengths--including a highly public fight with the United States in the
NGO Committee--to block the participation of a previously little-known
activist in a relatively obscure UN event. But those who follow human
rights issues in China were not the least bit surprised to see the
Chinese attempt to use the NGO Committee or any other part of the UN as
a tool to carry out reprisals against an individual who has spoken out
about China's human rights record, in particular China's treatment of
Uyghur Muslims.
With China facing both its Universal Periodic Review and a period
review in the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination later this year, there will be more opportunities to
call attention to the situation in Xinjiang, as well as the ongoing
abuses in Tibet and Inner Mongolia and the general crackdown under way
against human rights defenders, lawyers and other dissidents across
China. The question is: Will others join us? So far the silence has
mostly been deafening.
I want to conclude my remarks by talking about a case that is close
to my heart: the Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti. Ilham was an economics
professor at Minzu University who wrote blog posts and articles
asserting Uyghurs' rights to genuine autonomy under Chinese law, which
resulted in his arrest and a life sentence in prison in 2014 on charges
of separatism. He was the kind of moderate voice who advocated for
improved understanding between Han Chinese and Uyghurs while also
encouraging the Chinese authorities to respect Uyghurs' linguistic,
cultural, and religious rights. He was a friend to Chinese human rights
lawyers, Tibetan writers, and American scholars. His lovely daughter
Jewher is today a student at Indiana University. He was supposed to
travel with her and take up a teaching post there, but instead Chinese
authorities pulled him off a plane and took him to prison. Today, he is
serving a life sentence for separatism. We remain deeply concerned
about the ongoing detention of Ilham Tohti, not just because of the
issues around his arbitrary detention and unfair trial, as well as his
worsening medical condition as he serves his absurd sentence, but
because of the broader implications of China's targeting of him and
moderate voices like him--the very people who could help to build a
truly multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, stable and prosperous society
in Xinjiang and throughout China.
As a small tribute to Ilham and those like him who are suffering
for trying to improve human rights in Xinjiang and China, I would like
to read a Chinese poem written in the aftermath of Nobel Peace Prize
winner Liu Xiaobo's death a little more than one year ago. This poem
could just as easily apply to Ilham Tohti and the other voices calling
for moderation, peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights that
the Chinese government is attempting to silence in Xinjiang:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0993.007
The world should know what is happening in Xinjiang, and USUN is
committed to working toward that end--to watering the seeds, wherever
they are. We face an uphill climb to do so at the United Nations, but
we look forward to working with Congress, our colleagues in the
administration, and with other countries who are committed to human
rights, to ensure that China is not able to bury these abuses in the
ground.
______
Prepared Statement of Gulchehra Hoja
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cochairman, and distinguished members of the
Commission, it's my privilege to participate in today's hearing on a
topic that deeply affects me personally and professionally as a
reporter working for an organization with a congressional mission of
bringing reliable news and information to people in China.
My name is Gulchehra Hoja, I'm a journalist with Radio Free Asia's
Uyghur language service, and I'm a U.S. citizen. I grew up in Urumqi,
the capital of the Uyghur region in China, where I began my career in
broadcast journalism before coming to the United States in 2001 to work
for Radio Free Asia (RFA). It was a great sacrifice to leave my
homeland, where I had enjoyed success as a television journalist and
where my parents, family and friends would remain. But coming here
guaranteed me freedom--something that could never be realized in China.
There, censorship and the pressure to toe the official line make
truthful, objective journalism impossible. Being part of RFA, which
broadcasts trustworthy news daily into Xinjiang, was for me the dream
of a lifetime. Through this outlet, I could share this newfound freedom
with those loved ones left behind. What I didn't know then was the
price for making this dream a reality. Nor did I know that it would be
my family who would be forced to pay dearly for my freedom to live and
work as a journalist in the United States.
As I testify before you here today, it grieves me no end to say
that my parents remain under threat, and more than two dozen of my
relatives in China are missing--almost certainly held in reeducation
camps run by authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR).
I last saw my mother when she visited me here in the United States
in 2005. Only one of my three children has ever met my parents--my
oldest daughter, when she visited them with my husband in 2008. I had
no choice but to miss that family trip. Because of my work, it's too
dangerous for me to go back to China.
For the 17 years since I've worked for RFA, local police and
authorities have harassed my family. They've watched their every step,
monitored their movements, and constantly questioned them about my
whereabouts and whether I plan to return. The treatment my family has
had to endure is because of my decision to come to America. Authorities
considered it a betrayal. When I left the XUAR I had established myself
by launching and hosting the first children's program in the Uyghur
Region for Xinjiang TV. (To this day, I hear from Uyghurs living in
China that they saw me on television when they were children.) Chinese
state media officials recognized my appeal with Uyghur audiences and
rewarded me with national recognition and elevated status. But I always
knew in my heart, as someone who witnessed repression in daily life for
Uyghurs, that this success was not enough. I wanted to use my voice to
bring issues into the light. Without even knowing it then, I wanted to
be a real journalist--one who is unafraid to ask questions and unafraid
to seek answers.
I was raised by educated parents who taught me to value culture,
history, and most of all, open and free dialogue. It troubled me to
witness how Chinese authorities not only downplayed these aspects of
Uyghur identity--including religion and language--on state media, but
also sought to erase them entirely. When I first heard Radio Free Asia
during a trip to Europe, I knew right away that I had found my calling.
To hear a report about a protest by Uyghurs in Germany against
Beijing's restrictive policies in the XUAR that would otherwise never
be reported on, let alone known inside China, was amazing. Shortly
after, I contacted the director of RFA Uyghur and asked about working
for the broadcaster. He warned that I would have to give up everything
if I were to leave China and work for the organization. It was a
difficult choice, I told him, but it would be hard to live with myself
if I didn't make it.
Since coming to RFA, I have felt fortunate to continue my work as a
member of the world's only Uyghur language news service outside of
China. For the roughly 12 million Uyghurs living in China's Northwest,
one of the world's most restricted media environments, my colleagues
and I are the only credible source for in-depth news and information of
what's happening in their towns, cities, and villages. RFA first
reported on the July 2009 unrest in Urumqi, the following 10-month
communication blackout in the region, the harsh restrictions preventing
Uyghurs from observing the holy month of Ramadan and practicing their
faith, the banning of the Uyghur language being taught in many schools,
and the mass arrests and disappearances of men suspected of
participating in protests and unrest. I have followed these stories
with concern for my loved ones back home.
But early last year, my worries grew as my colleagues and I
uncovered even more disturbing evidence that China was building a
security state of vast reach and scope. We reported on the wide-
sweeping use of technology to track Uyghurs, the building of
convenience police stations that dot the streets of Kashgar and Urumqi,
even in mosques and elementary schools, and the confiscation of
passports to bar any travel or movement out of the region for most
Uyghurs. Chinese authorities showed barely any restraint in rounding up
people, taking their smartphones, and contacting and detaining their
family members. Authorities even began recalling hundreds of Uyghurs
studying abroad in Egypt and detaining them upon their return. These
individuals were being held in ``reeducation centers''--mostly in
Kashgar, where thousands of people would be held at a time, with little
if any contact with friends and family outside.
My worries proved true when I first heard that my brother Kaisar
Keyum was detained at the end of September last year. Police had taken
him when he was driving my mother to a doctor's appointment, leaving
her alone in a car without explanation as she waited for her son who'd
never return. Other family had to come get her. Kaisar was being held,
my family learned later, in one of the so-called reeducation
facilities. We have not seen him since.
In February, my parents, both elderly and suffering from life-
threatening ailments, went missing. Not being able to talk with my
mother and father or to learn how they were doing was almost too much
to bear. Being almost 7,000 miles away, I felt helpless--even more than
when my brother was taken. I tried contacting other family but could
not reach them. I learned in February that my aunts, cousins, their
children--more than 20 people--had been swept up by authorities. I
found out later that all had been detained on the same day. No one has
confirmed their whereabouts. But I strongly suspect they are being held
in these camps, which sources say hold over 1 million Uyghurs--men and
women, youngsters and the elderly--in cramped and squalid conditions.
My parents, whom I later discovered were held in medical facilities in
detention camps, were allowed to leave in March--probably because of
their poor health. Authorities had questioned my parents about me, my
whereabouts, and my working for an organization they allege is ``anti-
China.''
Nobody should suffer such treatment. But at least five of my
colleagues at Radio Free Asia have also faced similar situations where
family members in China have been detained. Often they too have heard
reports of authorities questioning family and friends about their work
for an ``anti-Chinese'' organization. Like me, they know little if
anything about their relatives--whether they are well or even alive.
It's a cruel irony that we as journalists can find out so much about
what's happening inside China's Northwest, yet so little about our own
families and loved ones. We are afraid to ask our friends and others
there because any contact and communication could endanger them as
well.
Despite these threats, I know--and my colleagues know--that we must
continue for the sake of not letting a light be swallowed in the
darkness, extinguished forever. We ask only that the United States and
the international community make clear in their dealings with China
that this treatment of our families in our former homeland is
unacceptable. I hope and pray for my family to be let go and released,
but I know even if that happens, they will still live under constant
threat. I came to the United States to realize a dream--a dream of
being able to tell the truth without fear. And it may be difficult, but
I'll keep trying and I'll keep working.
______
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio
Good morning. This is a hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. The title of this hearing is ``Surveillance,
Suppression, and Mass Detention: Xinjiang's Human Rights Crisis.''
We will have two panels testifying today. The first panel will
feature:
Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of the United States
on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States
Mission to the United Nations, and
Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division,
Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce.
The second panel will include:
Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia,
Rian Thum, Associate Professor at Loyola University New Orleans,
and
Jessica Batke, Senior Editor at ChinaFile and former research
analyst at the U.S. Department of State.
Thank you all for being here.
I want to begin by noting that this hearing is set against the
backdrop this week of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Ambassador for
International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback convening the first ever
State Department Ministerial to Advance International Religious
Freedom, which has brought together senior representatives from more
than 70 governments around the world to discuss areas of collaboration
and partnership in the cause of religious freedom globally.
Secretary Pompeo penned an op-ed in USA Today earlier this week
highlighting the Ministerial and the importance of advancing religious
freedom globally. He specifically mentioned Ms. Gulchehra's family.
The Chinese government and Communist Party are equal opportunity
oppressors--targeting unregistered and registered Christians, Tibetan
Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners, and others with harassment,
detention, imprisonment, and more.
The current human rights crisis unfolding in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region targeting Muslim minority groups is arguably among
the worst, if not the most severe, instances in the world today of an
authoritarian government brutally and systematically targeting a
minority faith community. This is an issue which the Commission has
been seized with for some time.
In April, we wrote U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad urging
him to prioritize this crackdown in his dealings with the Chinese
government and to begin collecting information to make the case for
possible application of Global Magnitsky sanctions against senior
government and Party officials in the region including Chen Quanguo,
the current Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary.
The Commission's forthcoming Annual Report, set to be released in
October, will prominently feature the grave and deteriorating situation
in Xinjiang.
While our expert witnesses will discuss the situation in greater
detail, I want to take a few minutes to paint a picture of life in
Xinjiang.
For months now, there have been credible estimates of between
800,000 and 1 million people from Xinjiang being held at ``political
reeducation'' centers or camps which are fortified with barbed wire,
bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors, and guard rooms.
Security personnel have subjected detainees to torture, medical
neglect and maltreatment, solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, lack
of adequate clothing in cold temperatures, and other forms of abuse,
resulting in the death of some detainees.
According to one news source, ``The internment program aims to
rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their Islamic beliefs
and reshape their very identities. The camps have expanded rapidly over
the past year, with almost no judicial process or legal paperwork.
Detainees who most vigorously criticize the people and things they love
are rewarded, and those who refuse to do so are punished with solitary
confinement, beatings and food deprivation.'' \1\
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\1\ http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-life-like-in-xinjiang-
reeducation-camps-china-2018-5
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Some local officials in the region have used chilling political
rhetoric to describe the purpose of the arbitrary detentions of Uyghur
Muslims and members of other Muslim ethnic minority groups, such as
``eradicating tumors'' or spraying chemicals on crops to kill the
``weeds.'' One expert who is testifying today described Xinjiang Uyghur
as ``a police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on
the order of South African apartheid.''
While the Chinese government has repeatedly denied knowledge of the
camps, a groundbreaking report by Adrian Zenz, a scholar at the
European School of Culture and Theology, published through the
Jamestown Foundation in May, found that Chinese authorities were
soliciting public bids for the construction of additional camps and the
addition of security elements to existing facilities. I submit this
report for the record and would also note the Google Earth footage
behind me, which clearly shows the construction of these camps over the
span of several months.
[The report appears in the Appendix.]
Those not subject to ``transformation through education'' in
detention still face daily intrusions in their home life, including
compulsory ``home stays,'' wherein Communist Party officials and
government workers are sent to live with local Uyghur and Kazakh
families.
The data-driven surveillance in Xinjiang is assisted by iris and
body scanners, voice pattern analyzers, DNA sequencers, and facial
recognition cameras in neighborhoods, on roads, and in train stations.
Two large Chinese firms, Hikvision and Dahua Technology, have profited
greatly from the surge in security spending, reportedly winning upwards
of $1.2 billion in government contracts for large-scale surveillance
projects. Authorities employ hand-held devices to search smart phones
for encrypted chat apps and require residents to install monitoring
applications on their cell phones.\2\ More traditional security
measures are also employed, including extensive police checkpoints.
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\2\ https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-
chinas-surveillance-state-
overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355
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The rise in security personnel is also accompanied by the
proliferation of ``convenience police stations,'' a dense network of
street corner, village, or neighborhood police stations that enhance
authorities' ability to closely surveil and police local communities.
Just this month, reports emerged of officials, in a humiliating
public act, cutting the skirts and even long shirts of Uyghur women on
the spot as they walked through local streets, as a means of enforcing
a ban on ethnic minorities wearing long skirts.
And yesterday there was an analysis released by the NGO Chinese
Human Rights Defenders indicating that 21% of arrests in China last
year were in Xinjiang, which has only 1.5% of the population. The
number of arrests increased 731% over the previous year and does not
include the detentions of those in the ``political reeducation''
centers which are carried out extralegally.
Radio Free Asia has led the way in reporting on this crisis. And it
has not come without a cost. Developments in Xinjiang have had a direct
impact on U.S. interests, most notably the detention of dozens of
family members of U.S.-based Uyghur journalists employed by Radio Free
Asia, as well as the detention of dozens of family members of prominent
Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, in an apparent attempt by the
Chinese government to silence effective reporting and rights advocacy.
We are delighted that RFA journalist Gulchehra Hoja is able to join us
today to speak to her personal experience in this regard.
The Commission has convened a series of hearings focused on the
``long arm'' of China, and that dimension certainly exists as it
relates to the Uyghur diaspora community, including in the United
States.
Without objection, we'll keep the hearing record open for 48 hours
to submit additional relevant materials including a bipartisan letter
to Secretary Pompeo that Senators Warner and Gardner are spearheading
this week--which I am pleased to sign--regarding the cases of the RFA
journalists' family members.
[The letter appears in the Appendix.]
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith
I commend Senator Rubio for holding this hearing. There is a dire
need to shine a light on the stunning and outrageous detention of
nearly one million Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities in
Xinjiang.
What is clear from news reports is that Uyghurs are being detained
in ``reeducation centers'' throughout Xinjiang. Those interned are
being asked to renounce Islam, inform on their families for
``extremism,'' and parrot their love for Xi Jinping and the Communist
Party.
Whole families disappear, children are detained, students studying
abroad and soccer players are detained because of their ``foreign''
contacts. There are reports of suicides and deaths and mistreatment in
these detention centers.
Human rights champion Rebiya Kadeer's whole family--sons,
daughters-in-law, grandchildren have disappeared. The disappearance of
the families of other Uyghurs has also happened--like Radio Free Asia's
heroic journalists.
It is mind-boggling. The Chinese government is constructing a high-
tech police state in Xinjiang whose goal is the forcible assimilation
and ``transformation'' of entire ethnic minority populations and the
``sinicization'' of their religious beliefs and practices. In fact,
retaining religious beliefs or attachment to culture and language makes
one a suspect in Xinjiang.
All this is being done in the name of counterterrorism and
counterextremism. But China's repression may just create the extremism
that they fear. Over the past year, the world has started to see too
many comparisons between the Nazis and the current Chinese government.
First there was the death of Liu Xiaobo, the first Nobel Peace Prize
laureate to die in state custody since Carl von Ossietzky died in Nazi
internment.
Now nearly one million are detained in what should be called
concentration camps--the largest jailing of an ethnic and religious
minority maybe since the Holocaust, certainly since the apartheid days
in South Africa. ``Reeducation'' is not a new tactic in China.
Tibetans, Falun Gong and other dissidents have experienced
``reeducation through labor''--but the size and scale of what is
happening to the Uyghurs is audaciously repressive, even by China's low
standards.
Where is the outrage? Where is the anger? I commend the State
Department and Secretary Pompeo for their public statements. But why
has the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation been silent? What have
Turkey and other Turkic nations been doing to address this issue?
We are at a critical point. Governments and parliamentarians need
to condemn what is happening in Xinjiang. The UN must investigate and
seek answers to what may be massive human rights abuses or worse.
Businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academics that remain
silent--because they want to remain in favor with the Chinese
government and Communist Party--risk losing their integrity by doing
so.
The International Olympic Committee should be asked to reassess
China's hosting of the 2022 games if they maintain an apartheid-like
police state targeting Muslim minorities. How can any law firm or lobby
shop shill for the government of China while Uyghurs are so brutally
and forcefully assimilated? Or when Tibetans, Christians, human rights
lawyers, and Falun Gong are systematically repressed?
I heard former Congressman Frank Wolf say recently that in the
1980s, no firm would have dared to work for the Soviet Union--but now
China's cash is too tempting to turn down even for some of my former
House colleagues. Shame. Shame. It is really a shame.
I wonder if the Congress should consider limiting U.S. Government
contracts by the exact amount lobby firms receive from China, Russia,
or some other authoritarian government. That would make for some
interesting business choices. Either make no profit from your dealings
with China or choose to represent an increasingly repressive and
authoritarian Chinese government.
No one should profit from representing authoritarian countries,
particularly when they constantly seek to undermine U.S. values and
interests. Chinese officials also should not profit from their
complicity in torture and arbitrary detention. This is the exact reason
the Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Act.
The Senator and I have urged the State Department to consider
levying Magnitsky sanctions on officials in Xinjiang. We will continue
to do so and press for the use of this important tool to hold officials
accountable. We urge anyone with specific and credible information
about the complicity of Chinese government officials in human rights
abuses in Xinjiang to send that information to us. We will make sure it
gets to the State and Treasury Departments.
I also think the sanctions available in the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 should be considered, particularly broad economic
sanctions targeting industries in Xinjiang that benefit China's
political leaders or other ``state-owned entities.'' We want to make
sure that Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities do not suffer from
such sanctions, but they do not much share in the wealth generated by
Chinese populations right now.
China has been designated as a ``Country of Particular Concern''
since 1999. That designation carries with it the possibility of
economic sanctions. This lever should be used now because, in my
opinion, what is happening in Xinjiang is currently the world's worst
religious freedom situation--the forced ``sinicization'' of Islam
through detention and severe restrictions on religious belief and
practice. Targeted and tough economic sanctions are the only way to
convince China's leaders that they have a clear interest in ending the
repression of China's Muslim minorities.
There is also an important role for the UN here. I am glad that
Ambassador Currie is here with us today. What is happening in Xinjiang
are clear violations of many international treaties and covenants to
which China is a party. I realize that China's veto on the UN Security
Council will create obstacles to many UN investigations, as will their
presence on the UN Human Rights Council, but we should be making them
use their veto, we should consider requesting a briefing on the
situation at the Security Council and work together with the OIC and
other Muslim-majority countries to raise the issue within the UN
system. At a time when the Chinese government is seeking to gain allies
through its Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in Central Asia and
Africa, it would seem the last thing they want is an international
debate about their poor and abusive treatment of ethnic and religious
minorities.
Finally, I want to commend the exemplary work of Radio Free Asia's
Uyghur Service reporters. Despite unacceptable threats to their
families, they have kept working and have provided us with an
extraordinary record of events. Your courage and professionalism are
admirable. Thank you.
Senator, I commend you again for holding this important hearing to
shine a light on an outrageous and horrible situation. We all need to
believe in the power of light and sunshine because evil flourishes only
in the dark.
______
Submissions for the Record
----------
Article Submitted by Senator Rubio
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
2018 The Jamestown Foundation. All rights reserved.
Article Submitted by Senator King
______
Apartheid with Chinese Characteristics
china has turned xinjiang into a police state like no other
Totalitarian Determination and Modern Technology Have Produced a
Massive Abuse of Human Rights
[From The Economist, May 31, 2018]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Hotan, Xinjiang Province.--``The prophet Sulayman approached his
son and said to him, `I have received a message from God. I want you to
circle the Earth and see if there are more people who are alive in
spirit or more people who are dead in spirit.' After a period the son
returned and said, `Father, I went to many places and everywhere I went
I saw more people who were dead than those who were alive.' ''
Hasan shared that message on a WeChat social-messaging group in
2015, when he was 23. Born in Yarkand, a town in southern Xinjiang,
Hasan had moved to the provincial capital, Urumqi, to sell jade and
shoes and to learn more about Islam. He described himself to Darren
Byler, an anthropologist from the University of Washington, as a Sufi
wanderer, a pious man with a wife and small daughter, who prayed five
times a day and disapproved of dancing and immodesty.
But in January 2015 the provincial government was demanding that
everyone in Urumqi return to their native home to get a new identity
card. ``I am being forced to go back,'' Hasan complained to Mr. Byler.
``The Yarkand police are calling me every day. They are making my
parents call me and tell me the same thing.'' Eventually, he and his
family boarded a bus for the 20-hour journey home. It was hit by a
truck. Hasan's wife and daughter were killed. He was hospitalized. ``It
was the will of Allah,'' he said.
Hasan hoped the authorities would allow him to return to Urumqi
because of his injuries. No chance. Having lost wife, child and
livelihood, Hasan lost his liberty, too. A fortnight after his
accident, he was sent to a reeducation camp for an indefinite period.
There, for all his relatives know, he remains.
Hasan is one of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, a Turkic-language
people, who have disappeared in Xinjiang, China's northwestern
province. It is an empty, far-flung place; Hasan's home town of Yarkand
is as close to Baghdad as it is to Beijing. It is also a crucial one.
The region is China's biggest domestic producer of oil and gas, and
much of the fuel imported from Central Asia and Russia passes through
on its way to the industries of the east coast. It is now a vital link
in the Belt and Road Initiative, a foreign policy which aims to bind
the Middle East and Europe to China with ties of infrastructure,
investment and trade.
But on top of that it is the home of the Uighurs, the largest
Muslim group in the country, and ethnically quite distinct from the Han
Chinese. A recent history of Uighur unrest_in particular bloody inter-
ethnic violence in Urumqi in 2009 that followed the murder of Uighurs
elsewhere in China_and subsequent terrorism have sent the government's
repressive tendencies into overdrive. Under a new party boss, Chen
Quanguo, appointed in 2016, the provincial government has vastly
increased the money and effort it puts into controlling the activities
and patrolling the beliefs of the Uighur population. Its regime is
racist, uncaring and totalitarian, in the sense of aiming to affect
every aspect of people's lives. It has created a full-fledged police
state. And it is committing some of the most extensive, and neglected,
human-rights violations in the world.
the not-quite-gulag archipelago
The government is building hundreds or thousands of unacknowledged
reeducation camps to which Uighurs can be sent for any reason or for
none. In some of them day-to-day conditions do not appear to be
physically abusive as much as creepy. One released prisoner has said he
was not permitted to eat until he had thanked Xi Jinping, the Chinese
president, and the Communist Party. But there have been reports of
torture at others. In January, 82-year-old Muhammad Salih Hajim, a
respected religious scholar, died in detention in Urumqi.
Kashgar, the largest Uighur city, has four camps, of which the
largest is in Number 5 Middle School. A local security chief said in
2017 that ``approximately 120,000'' people were being held in the city.
In Korla, in the middle of the province, a security official recently
said the camps are so full that officials in them are begging the
police to stop bringing people.
As a result, more and more camps are being built: the reeducation
archipelago is adding islands even faster than the South China Sea.
Adrian Zenz of the European School of Culture and Theology in Kortal,
Germany, has looked at procurement contracts for 73 reeducation camps.
He found their total cost to have been 682m yuan ($108m), almost all
spent since April 2017. Records from Akto, a county near the border
with Kyrgyzstan, say it spent 9.6% of its budget on security (including
camps) in 2017. In 2016 spending on security in the province was five
times what it had been in 2007. By the end of 2017 it was ten times
that: 59bn yuan.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
For all this activity, the government has not officially confirmed
that the camps exist. They are not governed by any judicial process;
detentions are on the orders of the police or party officials, not the
verdict of a court. A woman working as an undertaker was imprisoned for
washing bodies according to Islamic custom. Thirty residents of Ili, a
town near the Kazakh border, were detained ``because they were
suspected of wanting to travel abroad,'' according to the local
security chief. Other offences have included holding strong religious
views, allowing others to preach religion, asking where one's relatives
are and failing to recite the national anthem in Chinese.
A significant chunk of the total Uighur population is interned in
this way. If the rate of detention in Kashgar applied to the province
as a whole, 5% of the Uighur population of 10m would be detained. Other
evidence suggests that this is quite possible. In February, Radio Free
Asia, a broadcaster financed by an independent agency of the American
government, cold-called 11 families at random in Araltobe, in the north
of the province, far from the Uighurs' heartland. Six said family
members had been sent to camps. In a village later visited by Agence
France Presse in Qaraqash county, near Hotan, a fifth of adults had
been detained over four months.
Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch, an advocacy group, reckons the
overall number detained may be 800,000. Timothy Grose, a professor at
Rose-Hulman University in Indiana, puts the total between 500,000 and
1m, which would imply that something like a sixth to a third of young
and middle-aged Uighur men are being detained, or have been at some
point in the past year.
The Chinese government argues that harsh measures are needed to
prevent violence associated with Uighur separatism. In 2013 a Uighur
suicide-driver crashed his car into pedestrians in Tiananmen Square in
Beijing. In 2014 a knife-wielding Uighur gang slaughtered 31 travellers
at a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province, an incident some in
China compared to the September 11th 2001 attacks on America. Unrest in
Yarkand later that year led to a hundred deaths; an attack at a coal
mine in Aksu killed 50 people. Kyrgyz authorities blamed Uighur
terrorists for an attempt to blow up the Chinese embassy in Bishkek;
Uighurs have been blamed for a bombing which killed 20 at a shrine in
Bangkok popular with Chinese tourists.
There are worrying links, as the Chinese authorities are keen to
point out, between Uighur separatism and global jihad, especially in
the Uighur diaspora, which is based in Turkey. Chinese and Syrian
officials say 1,500 Uighurs have fought with Islamic State (IS) or
Jabhat al-Nusra (part of al-Qaeda) in Syria. A group called the
Turkestan Islamic Party, which demands independence for Xinjiang, is
banned under anti-terrorist laws in America and Europe. In 2016 a
defector from IS provided a list of foreign recruits; 114 came from
Xinjiang.
in the grid
But the system of repression in the province goes far beyond
anything that would be justified by such proclivities and affiliations.
In Hotan there is a new police station every 300 meters or so. They are
called ``convenience police stations,'' as if they were shops_and in
fact they do offer some consumer services, such as bottled water and
phone recharging. The windowless stations, gunmetal gray, with
forbidding grilles on their doors, are part of a ``grid-management
system'' like that which Mr. Chen pioneered when he was party boss in
Tibet from 2011 to 2016. The authorities divide each city into squares,
with about 500 people. Every square has a police station that keeps
tabs on the inhabitants. So, in rural areas, does every village.
At a large checkpoint on the edge of Hotan a policeman orders
everyone off a bus. The passengers (all Uighur) take turns in a booth.
Their identity cards are scanned, photographs and fingerprints of them
are taken, newly installed iris-recognition technology peers into their
eyes. Women must take off their headscarves. Three young Uighurs are
told to turn on their smartphones and punch in the passwords. They give
the phones to a policeman who puts the devices into a cradle that
downloads their contents for later analysis. One woman shouts at a
policeman that he is Uighur, why is he looking at her phone?
There can be four or five checkpoints every kilometer. Uighurs go
through them many times a day. Shops and restaurants in Hotan have
panic buttons with which to summon the police. The response time is one
minute. Apparently because of the Kunming knife attack, knives and
scissors are as hard to buy as a gun in Japan. In butchers and
restaurants all over Xinjiang you will see kitchen knives chained to
the wall, lest they be snatched up and used as weapons. In Aksu, QR
codes containing the owner's identity-card information have to be
engraved on every blade.
Remarkably, all shops and restaurants in Hotan must have a part-
time policeman on duty. Thousands of shop assistants and waiters have
been enrolled in the police to this end. Each is issued with a helmet,
flak jacket and three-foot baton. They train in the afternoon. In the
textile market these police officers sit in every booth and stall,
selling things; their helmets and flak jackets, which are
uncomfortable, are often doffed. A squad of full-time police walks
through the market making sure security cameras are working and
ordering shop assistants to put their helmets back on. Asked why they
wear them, the assistants reply tersely_``security.''
At the city's railway station, travellers go through three rounds
of bag checks before buying a ticket. On board, police walk up and down
ordering Uighurs to open their luggage again. As the train pulls into
Kashgar, it passes metal goods wagons. A toddler points at them
shouting excitedly ``Armoured car! Armoured car!'' Paramilitary
vehicles are more familiar to him than rolling stock.
Uniformed shop assistants, knife controls and ``convenience police
stations'' are only the most visible elements of the police state. The
province has an equally extensive if less visible regime that uses yet
more manpower and a great deal of technology to create total
surveillance.
improving lives, winning hearts
Under a system called fanghuiju, teams of half a dozen_composed of
policemen or local officials and always including one Uighur speaker,
which almost always means a Uighur_go from house to house compiling
dossiers of personal information. Fanghuiju is short for ``researching
people's conditions, improving people's lives, winning people's
hearts.'' But the party refers to the work as ``eradicating tumors.''
The teams_over 10,000 in rural areas in 2017_report on ``extremist''
behavior such as not drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan and
sporting long beards. They report back on the presence of
``undesirable'' items, such as Korans, or attitudes_such as an
``ideological situation'' that is not in wholehearted support of the
party.
Since the spring of 2017, the information has been used to rank
citizens' ``trustworthiness'' using various criteria. People are deemed
trustworthy, average or untrustworthy depending on how they fit into
the following categories: 15 to 55 years old (i.e., of military age);
Uighur (the catalogue is explicitly racist: people are suspected merely
on account of their ethnicity); unemployed; have religious knowledge;
pray five times a day (freedom of worship is guaranteed by China's
constitution); have a passport; have visited one of 26 countries; have
ever overstayed a visa; have family members in a foreign country (there
are at least 10,000 Uighurs in Turkey); and home school their children.
Being labelled ``untrustworthy'' can lead to a camp. To complete the
panorama of human surveillance, the government has a programme called
``becoming kin'' in which local families (mostly Uighur) ``adopt''
officials (mostly Han). The official visits his or her adoptive family
regularly, lives with it for short periods, gives the children presents
and teaches the household Mandarin. He also verifies information
collected by fanghuiju teams. The programme appears to be immense.
According to an official report in 2018, 1.1m officials have been
paired with 1.6m families. That means roughly half of Uighur households
have had a Han-Chinese spy/indoctrinator assigned to them.
Such efforts map the province's ideological territory family by
family; technology maps the population's activities street by street
and phone by phone. In Hotan and Kashgar there are poles bearing
perhaps eight or ten video cameras at intervals of 100-200 meters along
every street; a far finer-grained surveillance net than in most Chinese
cities. As well as watching pedestrians the cameras can read car number
plates and correlate them with the face of the person driving. Only
registered owners may drive cars; anyone else will be arrested,
according to a public security official who accompanied this
correspondent in Hotan. The cameras are equipped to work at night as
well as by day.
Because the government sees what it calls ``web cleansing'' as
necessary to prevent access to terrorist information, everyone in
Xinjiang is supposed to have a spyware app on their mobile phone.
Failing to install the app, which can identify people called, track
online activity and record social-media use, is an offence. ``Wi-Fi
sniffers'' in public places keep an eye, or nose, on all networked
devices in range.
Next, the records associated with identity cards can contain
biometric data including fingerprints, blood type and DNA information
as well as the subject's detention record and ``reliability status.''
The government collects a lot of this biometric material by stealth,
under the guise of a public-health programme called ``Physicals for
All,'' which requires people to give blood samples. Local officials
``demanded [we] participate in the physicals,'' one resident of Kashgar
told Human Rights Watch, an NGO. ``Not participating would have been
seen as a problem . . . .''
A system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP),
first revealed by Human Rights Watch, uses machine-learning systems,
information from cameras, smartphones, financial and family-planning
records and even unusual electricity use to generate lists of suspects
for detention. One official WeChat report said that verifying IJOP's
lists was one of the main responsibilities of the local security
committee. Even without high-tech surveillance, Xinjiang's police state
is formidable. With it, it becomes terrifying.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In theory, the security system in Xinjiang applies to everyone
equally. In practice it is as race-based as apartheid in South Africa
was. The security apparatus is deployed in greatest force in the
southwest, where around 80% of Uighurs live. In a city like Shihezi,
which is 95% Han, there are far fewer street checkpoints, if any, and a
normal level of policing. Where there are checkpoints, Han Chinese are
routinely waved through. Uighurs are always stopped.
the minarets torn down
Islam is a special target. In Hotan, the neighbourhood mosques have
been closed, leaving a handful of large places of worship. Worshippers
must register with the police before attending. At the entrance to the
largest mosque in Kashgar, the Idh Kha_a famous place of pilgrimage_two
policemen sit underneath a banner saying ``Love the party, love the
country.'' Inside, a member of the mosque's staff holds classes for
local traders on how to be a good communist. In Urumqi the remaining
mosques have had their minarets knocked down and their Islamic
crescents torn off. Some 29 Islamic names may no longer be given to
children. In schools, Uighur-language instruction is vanishing_another
of the trends which have markedly accelerated under Mr. Chen. Dancing
after prayers and specific Uighur wedding ceremonies and funerary rites
are prohibited.
Unlike those of South Africa, the two main racial groups are well
matched in size. According to the 2010 census, Uighurs account for 46%
of the province's population and Han Chinese 40% (the rest are smaller
minorities such as Kazakhs and Kyrgyz). But they live apart and see the
land in distinct ways. Uighurs regard Xinjiang as theirs because they
have lived in it for thousands of years. The Han Chinese regard it as
theirs because they have built a modern economy in its deserts and
mountains. They talk of bringing ``modern culture'' and ``modern
lifestyle'' to the locals_by which they mean the culture and lifestyle
of modern Han China.
So how have the Han and Uighur reacted to the imposition of a
police state? Yang Jiehun and Xiao Junduo are Han Chinese veterans of
the trade in Hotan jade (which the Chinese hold to be the best in the
world, notably in its very pale ``mutton-fat'' form). Asked about
security, they give big smiles, a thumbs-up and say the past year's
crackdown has been ``really well received.'' ``In terms of public
security, Urumqi is the safest it has ever been,'' says Mr. Xiao, whose
family came to the province in the 1950s, when the People's Liberation
Army and state-owned enterprises were reinforcing the border with the
Soviet Union. ``The Uighurs are being helped out of poverty,'' he
avers. ``They understand and support the policy.''
Not all Han Chinese in Xinjiang are quite as enthusiastic. Tens of
thousands came to the province fairly recently, mostly in the 1990s, to
seek their fortunes as independent traders and business people, rather
than being transferred there by state-owned companies or the army. They
approve of better security but dislike the damage being done to the
economy_for example, the way movement controls make it harder to employ
Uighurs. So far, this ambivalence is not seriously weakening the
support among the Han and, for the government in Beijing, that is all
that matters. It sees Xinjiang mainly as a frontier. The Han are the
principal guarantors of border security. If they are happy, so is the
government.
The Uighur reaction is harder to judge; open criticism or talking
to outsiders can land you in jail. The crackdown has been effective
inasmuch as there have been no (known) Uighur protests or attacks since
early 2017. It seems likely that many people are bowing before the
storm. As Sultan, a student in Kashgar, says with a shrug: ``There's
nothing we can do about it.''
But there are reasons for thinking resentment is building up below
the surface. According to anthropological work by Mr. Byler and Joanne
Smith Finley of Newcastle University in Britain, a religious revival
had been under way before the imposition of today's harsh control.
Mosques were becoming more crowded, religious schools attracting more
pupils. Now the schools and mosques are largely empty, even for Friday
prayers. It is hard to believe that religious feeling has vanished.
More likely a fair bit has gone underground.
And the position of Uighurs who cooperate with the Han authorities
is becoming untenable. The provincial government needs the Uighur elite
because its members have good relations with both sides. The expansion
of the police state has added to the number of Uighurs it needs to co-
opt. According to Mr. Zenz and James Leibold of La Trobe University in
Melbourne, 90% of the security jobs advertised in 2017 were ``third
tier'' jobs for low-level police assistants: cheap, informal contracts
which mainly go to Uighurs. But at the same time as needing more
Uighurs, the authorities have made it clear that they do not trust
them. Part of the repression has been aimed at ``two-faced officials''
who (the party says) are publicly supporting the security system while
secretly helping victims. Simultaneously recruiting more Uighurs and
distrusting them more creates an ever larger pool that might one day
turn against the system from within.
A Han businessman who travels frequently between Urumqi and Kashgar
says he used to feel welcome in the south. ``Now it has all changed.
They are not afraid. But they are resentful. They look at me as if they
are wondering what I am doing in their country.'' One of the few
detainees released from the camps, Omurbek Eli, told RFA that the
authorities ``are planting the seeds of hatred and turning [detainees]
into enemies. This is not just my view_the majority of people in the
camp feel the same way.''
hasan's warning
China's Communist rulers believe their police state limits
separatism and reduces violence. But by separating the Uighur and Han
further, and by imposing huge costs on one side that the other side,
for the most part, blithely ignores, they are ratcheting up tension.
The result is that both groups are drifting towards violence. Before he
disappeared, Hasan, the self-styled Sufi wanderer, expressed Xinjiang's
plight. ``To be Uighur is hard,'' he wrote on WeChat in 2015. ``I don't
even know what I am accused of, but I must accept their judgment. I
have no choice. Where there is no freedom, there is tension. Where
there is tension, there are incidents. Where there are incidents, there
are police. Where there are police, there is no freedom.''
______
Article Submitted by Rian Thum
__________
What Really Happens in China's `Re-education' Camps
[From The New York Times, May 15, 2018]
(By Rian Thum) 1
What does it take to intern half a million members of one
ethnic group in just a year? Enormous resources and elaborate
organization, but the Chinese authorities aren't stingy. Vast swathes
of the Uighur population in China's western region of Xinjiang--as well
as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other ethnic minorities--are being detained to
undergo what the state calls ``transformation through education.'' Many
tens of thousands of them have been locked up in new thought-control
camps with barbed wire, bombproof surfaces, reinforced doors and guard
rooms.
The Chinese authorities are cagey and evasive, if not downright
dismissive, about reports concerning such camps. But now they will have
to explain away their own eloquent trail of evidence: an online public
bidding system set up by the government inviting tenders from
contractors to help build and run the camps.
Uighurs have more in common, culturally and linguistically, with
Turks than Han Chinese, and many Uighurs are Muslim. Resentful of
China's heavy-handed rule in the region, some have resisted it, usually
through peaceful means, but on occasion violently, by attacking
government officials and, exceptionally, civilians. The state, for its
part, fuels Islamophobia by labeling ordinary Muslim traditions as the
manifestation of religious ``extremism.''
Over the last decade, the Xinjiang authorities have accelerated
policies to reshape Uighurs' habits--even, the state says, their
thoughts. Local governments organize public ceremonies and signings
asking ethnic minorities to pledge loyalty to the Chinese Communist
Party; they hold mandatory reeducation courses and forced dance
performances, because some forms of Islam forbid dance. In some
neighborhoods, security organs carry out regular assessments of the
risk posed by residents: Uighurs get a 10 percent deduction on their
score for ethnicity alone and lose another 10 percent if they pray
daily.
Uighurs had grown accustomed to living under an intrusive state,
but measures became draconian after the arrival in late 2016 of a new
regional party chief from Tibet. Since then, some local police officers
have said that they struggled to meet their new detention quotas--in
the case of one village, 40 percent of the population.
A new study by Adrian Zenz, a researcher at the European School of
Culture and Theology, in Korntal, Germany, analyzed government ads
inviting tenders for various contracts concerning reeducation
facilities in more than 40 localities across Xinjiang, offering a
glimpse of the vast bureaucratic, human and financial resources the
state dedicates to this detention network. The report reveals the
state's push to build camps in every corner of the region since 2016,
at a cost so far of more than 680 million yuan (over $107 million).
A bid invitation appears to have been posted on April 27--a sign
that more camps are being built. These calls for tenders refer to
compounds of up to 880,000 square feet, some with quarters for People's
Armed Police, a paramilitary security force. Local governments are also
placing ads to recruit camp staff with expertise in criminal psychology
or a background in the military or the police force.
Evidence of these technical details is invaluable, especially
considering the growing difficulties faced by researchers and reporters
trying to work in Xinjiang. Several foreign journalists have produced
important articles, despite police harassment and brief arrests; ethnic
Uighur reporters, or their families, endure far worse.
Given the risks, firsthand accounts from former detainees remain
rare--although a few are starting to emerge.
In February, a Uighur man studying in the United States gave
Foreign Policy one of the most detailed descriptions of detention
conditions published to date. He was arrested upon returning to China
for a visit last year, and then held for 17 days on no known charge. He
described long days of marching in a crowded cell, chanting slogans and
watching propaganda videos about purportedly illegal religious
activities. As he was being released, a guard warned him, ``Whatever
you say or do in North America, your family is still here and so are
we.''
--------------
\1\ Rian Thum is an associate professor of history at Loyola
University New Orleans and the author of ``The Sacred Routes of Uyghur
History.'' He has been conducting research in Xinjiang, China, for
nearly two decades. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/china-
re-
education-camps.html
Last month, an ethnic Kazakh man described to Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty his four-month stint in a camp in northern Xinjiang. He
met inmates serving terms as long as seven years. He said he had been
made to study how ``to keep safe the domestic secrets'' of China and
``not to be a Muslim.'' In these cases, as in many others, detainees
were held incommunicado, their families left to wonder what had
happened to them.
And now these rare eyewitness accounts are being corroborated, if
unwittingly, by the Chinese state itself, as it makes public calls for
contracts to build even more detention camps.
Many details of this carceral system are hidden, and remain
unknown--in fact, even the camps' ultimate purpose is not entirely
clear.
They serve as grounds for compulsory indoctrination. Some officials
use them for prevention as well, to lock down people they presumptively
suspect of opposing Chinese rule: In two localities the authorities
have targeted people under 40, claiming that this age group is a
``violent generation.''
The camps are also tools of punishment, and of course, a threat.
Few detainees are formally charged, much less sentenced. Some are told
how long a term they will serve; others are simply held indefinitely.
This uncertainty--the arbitrary logic of detention--instills fear in
the entire population.
Surveillance was markedly heightened during my last trip to
Xinjiang in December--so much so that I avoided talking to Uighurs then
for fear that just being in contact with a foreigner would get them
sent away for reeducation. Meanwhile, my Uighur contacts outside China
were pointing to the quota-based purges of the Communists' Anti-
Rightist campaign of 1957-1959 and ever-shifting rules during the
Cultural Revolution to explain that even if Uighurs in Xinjiang today
wanted to submit wholly to the security regime, they no longer knew how
to. Joining the security services used to be a rare way to ensure one's
personal safety. Not anymore.
Tens of thousands of families have been torn apart; an entire
culture is being criminalized. Some local officials use chilling
language to describe the purpose of detention, such as ``eradicating
tumors'' or spraying chemicals on crops to kill the ``weeds.''
Labeling with a single word the deliberate and large-scale
mistreatment of an ethnic group is tricky: Old terms often camouflage
the specifics of new injustices. And drawing comparisons between the
suffering of different groups is inherently fraught, potentially
reductionist. But I would venture this statement to describe the plight
of China's Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz today: Xinjiang has become a
police state to rival North Korea, with a formalized racism on the
order of South African apartheid.
There is every reason to fear that the situation will only worsen.
Several accounts of Uighurs dying in detention have surfaced recently--
a worrisome echo of the established use of torture in China's
reeducation camps for followers of the spiritual movement Falun Gong.
And judging by their camp-building spree in Xinjiang, the Chinese
authorities don't seem to think they have come close to achieving
whatever their goal there is.
______
Letter to Secretary Pompeo Submitted by Senator Rubio
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Witness Biographies
----------
Ambassador Kelley E. Currie, Representative of the United States on
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, United States
Mission to the United Nations
Ambassador Kelley E. Currie currently serves as the Representative
of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations, and Alternate Representative of the United States of America
to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Ambassador Currie specializes in political reform, development and
humanitarian assistance, human rights, and other non-traditional
security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. She previously was a Senior
Fellow with the Project 2049 Institute and held senior policy positions
with the Department of State and several international and non-
governmental human rights and humanitarian organizations. She also
served as foreign operations appropriations associate and staff
director of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus for Congressman John
Porter of Illinois. She holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law
Center and a B.A. cum laude from the University of Georgia's School of
Public and International Affairs. She is married to Peter Currie and
they have two children.
Anthony Christino III, Director of the Foreign Policy Division,
Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry
and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
Anthony Christino is the Director of the Foreign Policy Division
within the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance of the
Export Administration of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at
the U.S. Department of Commerce. As such, he is responsible for
licensing and the formulation of export control policy related to
countries subject to sanctions and special controls. Mr. Christino has
represented BIS in a wide variety of U.S. Government export control
fora and numerous industry outreach programs as well as in bilateral
and multilateral meetings with foreign governments. He holds a
bachelor's degree in international relations and a master's degree in
national security studies.
Gulchehra Hoja, Uyghur Service journalist, Radio Free Asia
Gulchehra ``Guli'' Hoja is a broadcaster with Radio Free Asia's
Uyghur Service, where she has worked since 2001. Prior to RFA, Ms. Hoja
was a successful TV personality and journalist in China's Uyghur
Region. But after hearing RFA's Uyghur Service, she decided to leave
China and join the U.S. effort to provide the Uyghur people with
trustworthy, uncensored journalism. At least two dozen of Ms. Hoja's
China-based relatives are missing, including her younger brother, who
was detained last September, all presumed to be held in so-called
``reeducation camps.'' Her parents were detained in February but were
released because of health issues. She has a bachelor's degree in
Uyghur language and literature from Xinjiang Normal University. Ms.
Hoja is a U.S. citizen, and lives in Woodbridge, Virginia with her
husband and three children.
Rian Thum, Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans
Dr. Thum is an Associate Professor of History at Loyola University
in New Orleans and a Fellow of the American Council of Learned
Societies. Dr. Thum's research and teaching are generally concerned
with the overlap of China and the Muslim World. His book, ``The Sacred
Routes of Uyghur History'' (Harvard University Press, 2014) received
the American Historical Association's Fairbank Prize and the American
Anthropological Association's Hsu Prize.
Jessica Batke, Senior Editor, ChinaFile and former Research Analyst
at the Department of State
Jessica Batke is a ChinaFile Senior Editor and runs The China NGO
Project. She is an expert on China's domestic political and social
affairs, and served as a Research Analyst at the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research for nearly eight years prior to
joining ChinaFile. In 2016, she was a Visiting Academic Fellow at
MERICS in Berlin, where she published papers on Chinese leadership
politics and created databases to catalogue hard-to-find, high-level
Chinese policy documents and details about policy advisory groups. She
is proficient in Mandarin.
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