[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

BORDER SECURITY, COMMERCE, AND TRAVEL: COMMISSIONER MCALEENAN'S VISION
FOR THE FUTURE OF CBP

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

APRIL 25, 2018

__________

Serial No. 115-62

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

__________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-900 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director

-------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY

Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairwoman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania J. Luis Correa, California
Will Hurd, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
John H. Rutherford, Florida Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Don Bacon, Nebraska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alison B. Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel

C O N T E N T S

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Page

Statements

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
The Honorable Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania:
Prepared Statement............................................. 16

Witness

Mr. Kevin K. McAleenan, Commissioner, U.S. Customs And Border
Protection, U.S. Department Of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19

For the Record

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security:
Statement of Anthony M. Reardon, National President, National
Treasury Employees Union..................................... 5
Letter From the Electronic Privacy Information Center.......... 8

Appendix

Questions From Chairwoman Martha McSally for Kevin K. McAleenan.. 47
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Kevin K. McAleenan 58
Questions From Honorable Mike Rogers for Kevin K. McAleenan...... 59
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Kevin K. McAleenan..... 60
Questions From Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan for Kevin K.
McAleenan...................................................... 75

BORDER SECURITY, COMMERCE, AND TRAVEL: COMMISSIONER MC ALEENAN'S VISION
FOR THE FUTURE OF CBP

----------

Wednesday, April 25, 2018

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Bacon, Thompson,
and Vela.
Also present: Representatives McCaul, Barragan, Correa,
Demings, and Richmond.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine
Commissioner McAleenan's vision for the future of Customs and
Border Protection. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
I would like to start by welcoming the newly-confirmed U.S.
Customs and Border Protection commissioner, Kevin McAleenan, to
testify before our committee today. Congratulate him on your
Senate confirmation last month. The Commissioner and CBP have
been and will continue to be the focal point for many of the
Trump administration's border security priorities.
The Nation is fortunate that the Commissioner is a seasoned
veteran, a consummate professional who knows the agency and its
issues well having been with CBP since the early days of its
creation.
CBP is a massive law enforcement agency created from the
fusion of several legacy agencies established in 2003. In fact,
today it is the largest law enforcement organization in the
Federal Government. But up until 2015 it was not even
authorized in statute, a situation that was finally addressed
by the work of this subcommittee.
The 19 codified duties of the commissioner are some of the
most important responsibilities that Congress has given any
single official: Securing the border, facilitating legitimate
travel and commerce, and administering important National
security programs that prevent bad actors from gaining access
to the country. With any organization this large, there are
significant challenges.
Staffing shortages at both the ports of entry and in the
Border Patrol exacerbated both by a hiring process that takes
far too long and retention challenges that have persisted for
years with no signs of abatement, CBP is critically
understaffed and remains well below its Congressionally-
mandated staffing levels by more than 1,000 CBP officers and
1,900 Border Patrol agents.
Combined with the growing crisis along the Southwest
Border, this shortage has the potential to put our Nation's
National security at risk. The number of illegal border
crossings during this month of March show an urgent need to
address the on-going situation. We witnessed a 203 percent
increase from March 2017 to March 2018 and a 37 percent
increase from last month to this month, the largest increase in
month-to-month since 2011.
Before 2013, approximately 1 out of every 100 arriving
aliens claimed credible fear or asylum. Today more than 1 out
of 10 do. Saying the words, ``credible fear'', just as many
aliens are coached by the drug cartels and mules to do, often
permits them to be released into the country regardless of the
merit of such claims to await for a court date years in the
future that many do not even show up for.
We also continue to see our system plagued by increased
levels of fraud among individuals crossing the border, which
then makes it more difficult to help those who need it the
most. In the past, over 90 percent of arriving aliens were
single adult males; today 40 percent are families and children.
The traffickers and smugglers know that if you arrive with a
family you have got a better chance of being released into the
United States, with most families only able to be detained for
less than 20 days due to court rulings.
We have seen smuggling organizations advertise this as an
enticement and we have seen traffickers use children as
leverage to gain entry into the country. Since the beginning of
this fiscal year, almost 22,000 unaccompanied minors and 40,000
families arrived at the border under these policies that enrich
the cartels.
In other words, because of the insanity of the loopholes in
our current law, the next generation of DACA-like people are
crossing the border and disappearing into the community.
We are a Nation of immigrants and we welcome about a
million legal immigrants into our country each year, but we are
being taken advantage of, and it needs to stop.
In addition to the border wall, we also need a policy wall,
as well, which is why I have been calling for these border
security loopholes to be closed.
We must change our immigration policy to enable the
agencies charged with protecting our border to do their job and
quickly remove dangerous public safety risks from our
communities.
Thankfully, in response to these troubling border security
trends, the President has called for the deployment of
thousands of National Guard troops to support the effort of the
men and women of CBP.
National Guard personnel have supported border security
operations several times in recent years. They have built
fences and roads, conducted ground surveillance along the
border, flown aviation support missions, monitored camera
feeds, and provided intelligence support.
They are truly a force multiplier that can provide unique
skills to boost our border security. I would like to thank
Arizona Governor Doug Ducey and other Governors along the
border who have answered the call to partner with the Federal
Government to deploy these border security reinforcements and
support the CBP mission.
The additional men and women deployed on our border will
reduce threats posed by violent drug cartels and other bad
actors that threaten border communities, and the Nation as a
whole.
In addition to the deployment of the Guard, Congress has
also recently provided CBP with billions of dollars to invest
in technology, wall replacement, and new wall construction that
will serve as a powerful deterrent to illegal entry.
We look forward to hearing an update on the status of wall
construction and a concrete--no pun intended--time line for its
completion.
I called this hearing today to allow the commissioner an
opportunity to present to our subcommittee, which has principal
oversight responsibility of the agency, what his vision is for
CBP.
I look forward to his testimony, followed by a thoughtful
discussion.
[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
April 25, 2018
I would like to start by welcoming the newly-confirmed U.S. Customs
and Border Protection Commissioner Kevin McAleenan to testify before
our committee today, and congratulate him on his Senate confirmation
last month.
The Commissioner and CBP have been, and will continue to be, the
focal point for many of the Trump administration's border security
priorities. The Nation is fortunate that the commissioner is a seasoned
veteran--a consummate professional who knows the agency and its issues
well, having been with CBP since the early days of its creation.
CBP is a massive law enforcement agency, created from the fusion of
several legacy agencies and established in 2003. In fact, today it is
the largest law enforcement organization in the Federal Government, but
up until 2015 it was not even authorized in statue--a situation that
was finally addressed by the work of this subcommittee.
The 19 codified duties of the Commissioner are some of the most
important responsibilities that Congress has given to any single
official--securing the border, facilitating legitimate travel and
commerce, and administering important National security programs that
prevent bad actors from gaining access to the country.
With any organization this large, there are significant challenges.
Staffing shortages at both the ports of entry and in the Border
Patrol, exacerbated by both a hiring process that takes far too long
and retention challenges that have persisted for years, with no signs
of abatement.
CBP is critically understaffed and remains well below its
Congressionally-mandated staffing levels by more than 1,000 CBP
officers and 1,900 Border Patrol agents.
Combined with the growing crisis along the Southwest Border, this
shortage has the potential to put our Nation's security at risk.
The number of illegal border crossings during the month of March
shows an urgent need to address the on-going situation at the border.
We witnessed a 203 percent increase from March 2017 compared to
March 2018 and a 37 percent increase from last month to this month--the
largest increase from month to month since 2011.
Before 2013, approximately 1 out of every 100 arriving aliens
claimed credible fear, or asylum. Today, more than 1 out of 10 do so.
Saying the words ``credible fear,'' just as many aliens are coached
by the drug cartels to do, often permits aliens to be released into the
country, regardless of the merit of such claims to await a court date
years into the future, that many do not even show up to.
We also continue to see our system plagued by increased levels of
fraud among individuals crossing the border which then makes it more
difficult to help those who need it the most.
In the past, over 90 percent of arriving aliens were single adult
males. Today 40 percent are families and children.
The traffickers and smugglers know that if you arrive with a
family, you have a better chance of being released into the United
States with most families only able to be detained for less than 20
days due to court rulings.
We have seen smuggling organizations advertise this as an
enticement and we have seen traffickers use children as leverage to
gain entry into our country.
Just since January, almost 22,000 unaccompanied minors and 40,000
families arrived at the border under these policies that enrich the
cartels.
In other words, because of the insanity of loopholes in current
law, the next generation of DACA-like people are crossing the border
and disappearing into our communities.
We are a Nation of immigrants and we welcome about a million legal
immigrants into our country each year, but we are being taken advantage
of and it needs to stop.
In addition to a border wall, we also need a policy wall as well,
which is why I have been calling for these border security loopholes to
be closed.
We must change our immigration policy to enable the agencies
charged with protecting our border to do their job and quickly remove
dangerous public safety risks from our communities.
Thankfully, in response to these troubling border security trends,
the President has called for the deployment of thousands of National
Guard troops to support the effort of the men and women of CBP.
National Guard personnel have supported border security operations
several times in recent years. They have built fence and roads,
conducted ground surveillance along the border, flown aviation support
missions, monitored camera feeds, and provided intelligence support.
They are truly a force-multiplier that can provide unique skills to
boost to our border security. I would like to thank Arizona Governor
Ducey and the other Governors along the border who have answered the
call to partner with the Federal Government to deploy these border
security reinforcements and support the CBP mission. The additional men
and woman deployed on our border will reduce threats posed by violent
drug cartels and other bad actors that threaten border communities and
the Nation as a whole.
In addition to the deployment of the Guard, Congress has also
recently provided CBP with billions of dollars to invest in technology,
wall replacement, and new wall construction that will serve as a
powerful deterrent to illicit entry.
We will look forward to hearing an update on the status of wall
construction and a concrete, no pun intended, time line for its
completion.
I called this hearing today to allow the Commissioner an
opportunity to present our subcommittee, which has principal oversight
responsibility over the agency, with his vision for CBP which has an
outsized role in our National security. I look forward to his
testimony, followed by a thoughtful discussion.

Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a
statement he may have.
Mr. Vela. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, for holding
today's hearing and thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, for your leadership on the Homeland Security
Committee, as well.
Commissioner McAleenan, congratulations on your recent
confirmation and thank you for joining us today. I know you
have been at CBP for more than a decade now and that you are
very familiar with the Office of Field Operations side of CBP.
My office and I receive daily notifications and press
releases from CBP about the volume and value of the narcotics
that are seized, coming through our ports of entry. For
example, CBP officers at the Pharr port of entry seized 45
pounds of cocaine, valued at more than $347,000, earlier this
month.
At the Progreso International Bridge, CBP officers seized
nearly 20 pounds of crystal meth, valued at more than $381,000,
in early April, as well. CBP publishes its enforcement
statistics monthly, and I have noted that, over the past
several years, more drugs are seized, on average, by the Office
of Field Operations than Border Patrol. The only exception to
that is marijuana, which Border Patrol interdicts at a much
higher rate.
In addition to keeping people and contraband from entering
illegally, CBP is also responsible for facilitating legitimate
trade and travel, both of which are major drivers for economic
growth.
This means CBP officers inspects $6.5 billion worth of
cargo on a daily basis. CBP officers are also responsible for
screening and vetting foreign and U.S. citizen travelers headed
to the United States and at our international airports, cruise
terminals, or land ports of entry.
The fact that CBP continues to rely on temporary duty
assignments and back-to-back shifts to make up for its officer
shortage remains a major concern. I have stated on multiple
occasions that CBP's officer staffing shortage and difficulty
in retaining professional Border Patrol agents are self-
inflicted vulnerabilities.
These CBP staffing issues are critical to border security,
yet the administration continues to avoid these problems.
Commissioner, I introduced the Border and Port Security Act to
give you the ability to hire more officers and agriculture
specialists, but we need your commitment to address the
internal problems that are making it difficult to keep new
personnel on board.
I am glad that my bill has bipartisan support, and I know
that Chairwoman McSally has her own proposal to address CBP's
officer staffing shortage. My hope is that we can work on this
issue in a bipartisan way, much like we did with the Public-
Private Partnership Authority granted to CBP to address
infrastructure need at our ports of entry.
The city of Donna and CBP have been working to establish
the model port concept or the new way to streamline cargo and
passenger vehicle inspections through the Donation Acceptance
Program.
This project is an example of the many ways investments in
our port infrastructure effects positive change along the
border. I hope that your confirmation gives you a greater
ability to ensure that the administration uses the facts when
considering changes to border security.
Madam Chairwoman, I ask for unanimous consent to enter
statements from NTEU and the Electronic Privacy Information
Center into the record.
Ms. McSally. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Anthony M. Reardon, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union
April 26, 2018
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this
testimony on the vision for the future of CBP. As president of the
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I have the honor of leading a
union that represents over 25,000 Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Officers and trade enforcement specialists stationed at 328 land, sea,
and air ports of entry across the United States and 16 PreClearance
stations.
Any vision of CBP's future must include the hiring of new personnel
at the ports of entry. CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) is the
largest component of CBP responsible for border security--including
anti-terrorism, immigration, anti-smuggling, trade compliance, and
agriculture protection--while simultaneously facilitating lawful trade
and travel at U.S. ports of entry that are critical to our Nation's
economy. CBP OFO has a current need to hire 2,516 additional CBP
officers and 721 agriculture specialists to achieve the staffing target
as stipulated in CBP's own fiscal year 2018 Workload Staff Model (WSM)
and Agriculture Resource Allocation Model (AgRAM.) As of February 3,
2018, CBP OFO has 23,002 CBP officers on-board at the ports of entry--
1,145 short of its fiscal year 2018 target of 24,147.
Trade and travel volume continue to increase every year, but CBP
OFO staffing is not keeping pace with this increase. New and expanded
Federal inspection facilities are being built at the air, sea, and land
ports, yet CBP OFO staffing is not expanding. For example, in June, a
new Federal inspection terminal will open at the San Diego Airport.
Inspection volume will increase from 300 air passengers an hour to
1,000 air passengers an hour. Currently, there are a total of 53 front-
line officers split between the airport and seaport. CBP needs to hire
and assign an additional 38 officers to the airport alone to staff this
new inspection facility. At the San Ysidro land port, 12 new pedestrian
lanes, and 8 new vehicle lanes come on line in June. There are no new
CBP officers assigned to this port and beginning on April 1, 2018, 150
CBP officers have been sent from other short-staffed ports to the
seriously short-staffed ports of Nogales and San Ysidro for 90-day
temporary duty assignments (TDYs).
To address CBP OFO staffing shortages and to address the ever-
increasing volume of trade through the ports of entry in the future,
Ranking Member Vela and others recently introduced H.R. 4940, the
Border and Port Security Act, stand-alone, bipartisan legislation that
would authorize the hiring of 500 additional CBP officers, 100
agriculture specialists, and additional OFO trade operations staff
annually until the staffing gaps in CBP's various Workload Staffing
Models are met. NTEU strongly supports this CBP officer and agriculture
specialist--only staffing authorization bill and urges every Member of
Congress to support this bill.
NTEU also asks Homeland Security Committee Members to request from
the House Appropriations Committee up to $100 million in fiscal year
2019 direct appropriations for the hiring of 500 CBP officers, 100 CBP
agriculture specialists, and needed non-uniformed trade operations and
support staff.
The President's fiscal year 2019 budget request does support the
hiring of new CBP officers to meet the current staffing need of 2,516,
but seeks to fund these new positions by increasing user fees. The
President's budget proposal only provides appropriated funding to hire
60 new CBP officer positions at the National Targeting Center. The
President's request seeks no appropriated funding to address the
current CBP officer staffing shortage of 2,516 additional CBP officers
as stipulated by CBP's own fiscal year 2018 WSM or to fund the
additional 721 CBP agriculture specialists as stipulated by CBP's own
fiscal year 2008 AgRAM.
User Fees.--As in the past, the administration's budget proposes
significant realignment of user fees collected by CBP. Currently, 33
percent of a CBP officer's compensation is funded with a combination of
user fees, reimbursable service agreements, and trust funds. The fiscal
year 2019 budget proposes to reduce OFO appropriated funding by
realigning and redirecting user fees, including redirecting the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) fee that would
require a statutory change. The fiscal year 2019 budget proposal would
redirect approximately $160 million in ESTA fees from Brand USA to CBP.
Rather than redirecting the ESTA fees to fund the additional 2,516 CBP
officer new hires needed to fully staff CBP officer positions in fiscal
year 2019 and beyond, as stipulated by CBP's WSM, the budget would in
fact reduce CBP's appropriated funding by $160 million. Therefore,
while the budget proposes to increase the number of CBP officer
positions funded by ESTA user fees by 1,093, it decreases appropriated
funding by $160 million, and reduces the number of CBP officer
positions funded by appropriations by 1,093 positions.
Once again, the President's budget includes CBP officer staffing
numbers that are dependent on Congress first enacting changes to
statutes that determine the amounts and disbursement of these user fee
collections. To accomplish the ESTA fee change in the President's
budget, Congress must amend the Travel Promotion Act of 2009 (Pub. L.
111-145). The President's request also proposes fee increases to the
Immigration and Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA) user fees, not a direct up-front appropriation, to fund CBP
officer new hires as stipulated by the WSM. However, Immigration and
COBRA user fees cannot be increased without Congress first enacting
legislation. A proposal to increase user fees has been part of the
administration's annual budget submission since fiscal year 2014 to
fund the hiring of new CBP officers. These user fee increase proposals
are again in the fiscal year 2019 budget request, even though the
committees with jurisdiction have never shown any interest or even held
a hearing to discuss this long-standing legislative proposal and the
administration has not pressed upon these committee Chairs to do so.
Opioid Interdiction.--CBP OFO plays a major role in addressing the
Nation's opioid epidemic--a crisis that is getting worse. The smuggling
of fentanyl and other opioids has increased markedly from 2.4 pounds in
fiscal year 2013 to 71,195 pounds seized in fiscal year 2017 by CBP
OFO. The scourge of synthetic opioid addiction is felt in every State
and is a threat to the Nation's economic security and well-being. The
majority of fentanyl is manufactured in other countries such as China,
and is smuggled primarily through the international mail and express
consignment carrier facilities (e.g. FedEx and UPS) and through ports
of entry along the Southwest Border. According to CBP, over the last 3
years, there were 181 CBP employees assigned to the 5 Postal Service
International Service Centers and 208 CBP employees assigned to the
Private Express Carrier Facilities.
Due to the on-going OFO staffing shortages, 208 CBP employees at
express consignment hubs is an extremely low number. In the past year,
the FedEx hub in Memphis processed 38 million imports and 48 million
exports--equaling 86 million in total package volume. There are
approximately 24 CBP officers in total screening all 86 million
shipments, and on average, about 15 CBP officers are working the main
overnight FedEx ``sort'' shift. Considering the volume at the FedEx
hub, NTEU has been told that the port requires a minimum of 60 CBP
officers to facilitate the flow of legitimate freight and ensure
successful interdiction of these synthetic chemicals. NTEU's CBP OFO
appropriation request supports this critical need at international
postal and express consignment hubs.
Agriculture Specialist Staffing.--Despite CBP's release of its
risk-based AgRAM that documents an on-going shortage of CBP agriculture
specialists--by 721--at the ports of entry, the budget request includes
no direct appropriation to hire these critical positions needed to
fulfill CBP's agriculture quarantine inspection (AQI) mission of pest
exclusion and safeguarding U.S. agriculture and natural resources from
the risks associated with the entry, establishment or spread of animal,
plant pests, and pathogens. NTEU's appropriations request includes a
direct appropriation to begin to hire the 721 agriculture specialists
as stipulated in their fiscal year 2018 AgRAM.
CBP Trade Operations Staffing.--CBP has a dual mission of
safeguarding our Nation's borders and ports as well as regulating and
facilitating international trade. CBP employees at the ports of entry
are the second-largest source of revenue collection for the U.S.
Government. In 2017, CBP processed more than $2 trillion in imports and
collected approximately $40 billion in duties, taxes, and other fees.
Since CBP was established in March 2003, however, there has been no
increase in non-uniformed CBP trade enforcement and compliance
personnel even though inbound trade volume grew by more than 24 percent
between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2014. Additionally, CBP trade
operations staffing has fallen below the statutory floor set forth in
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and stipulated in the fiscal year
2017 CBP Resource Optimization Model for Trade Positions. NTEU strongly
supports the funding through direct appropriations of 140 additional
positions at the CBP Office of Trade to support implementation of Trade
Enhancement and Facilitation Act (Pub. L. 114-125) requirements.
Increasing CBP officer staffing at the ports-of-entry is an
economic driver for the U.S. economy. According to the Joint Economic
Committee (JEC), ``every day 1.1 million people and $5.9 billion in
goods legally enter and exit through the ports of entry'' and finds
that border delays cost the U.S. economy upwards of $5 billion each
year. CBP estimates that the annual hiring of an additional 500 CBP
officers at the ports of entry would increase yearly economic activity
by $1 billion and result in an additional 16,600 jobs per year to the
U.S. economy.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this request on behalf of
the men and women represented by NTEU at the Nation's ports of entry.
NTEU asks that the Homeland Security Committee Members seek up to $100
million from the House Appropriations Committee for direct appropriated
funding for new CBP officers, agriculture specialists, and support
staff to build on the CBP OFO staffing advances made in the fiscal year
2018 omnibus measure.
______

Letter From the Electronic Privacy Information Center
April 24, 2018.
The Honorable Martha McSally, Chairwoman,
The Honorable Filemon Vela, Ranking Member,
U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security, H2-176 Ford House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairwoman McSally and Ranking Member Vela: We write to you
regarding the hearing on ``Border Security, Commerce and Travel:
Commissioner McAleenan's Vision for the Future of CBP.''\1\ EPIC
welcomes your continued leadership on CBP oversight and looks forward
to opportunities to work with you and your staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Border Security, Commerce and Travel: Commissioner McAleenan's
Vision for the Future of CBP, 115th Cong. (2018), H. Comm. on Homeland
Security, Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security, https://
homeland.house.gov/hearing/border-security-commerce-and-travel-
commissioner-mcaleenans-vision-for-the-future-of-cbp/ (Apr. 25, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (``EPIC'') is a public
interest research center established in 1994 to focus public attention
on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues.\2\ EPIC is focused on
the protection of individual privacy rights, and we are particularly
interested in the privacy problems associated with surveillance.\3\
EPIC also manages one of the most extensive open Government litigation
programs in the United States.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See About EPIC, EPIC.org, https://epic.org/epic/about.html.
\3\ EPIC, EPIC Domestic Surveillance Project, https://epic.org/
privacy/surveillance/, Statement of EPIC, Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Innovation, Successes, and Challenges, Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Mar. 13, 2017,
https://epic.org/testimony/congress/EPIC-SCOM-Drones-Mar2017.pdf; The
Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy
Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong.
(2013) (Statement of Amie Stepanovich, EPIC Director of the Domestic
Surveillance Project), available at https://epic.org/privacy/testimony/
EPIC-Drone-Testimony-3-13-Stepanovich.pdf; Comments of EPIC to DHS,
Docket No. DHS-2007-0076 CCTV: Developing Privacy Best Practices
(2008), available at https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/
epic_cctv_011508.pdf.
\4\ EPIC FOIA Cases, EPIC, https://epic.org/foia/; Marc Rotenberg
et al, The Open Government Clinic: Teaching the Basics of Lawyering, 48
IND. L. REV. 149 (2014); EPIC, Litigation Under the Federal Open
Government Laws 2010 (2010).
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EPIC understands that enhanced surveillance techniques will be part
of the discussion over border security.\5\ EPIC writes to warn that
enhanced surveillance at the border will almost certainly sweep up the
personal data of U.S. citizens. Before there is any increased
deployment of surveillance systems at the U.S. border, an assessment of
the privacy implications should be conducted. Additionally, deployment
of surveillance technology should be accompanied by new policy and
procedures and independent oversight to protect citizens' rights. And
any law enforcement agency that uses surveillance tools should be
prepared to comply with all current laws, including all open government
obligations. The privacy assessments, policies and procedures, and
oversight mechanisms should all be made public. Most critically, if the
CBP chooses to create or expand a system of records that contains
personal information which is retrievable by name, it must comply with
all of the requirements of the Privacy Act, including publishing a
System of Records Notice and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking so that
the public is able to comment on a record system established by a
Federal agency.\6\
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\5\ Samantha Schmidt, Border wall with Mexico won't be built `from
sea to shining sea,' DHS secretary says, Washington Post, April 6,
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/06/
border-wall-with-mexico-wont-be-built-from-sea-to-shining-sea-dhs-
secretary-says/.
\6\ 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 552a(e)(4).
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biometric entry/exit tracking system
Recently, new privacy risks have arisen with the deployment of
facial recognition technology at U.S. airports. An Executive Order
recommends that agencies ``expedite the completion and implementation
of biometric entry exit tracking system,''\7\ and Customs and Border
Protection (``CBP'') has deployed facial recognition technology at
several U.S. airports.\8\ But corresponding privacy safeguards have not
yet been established.
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\7\ Exec. Order No. 13,780 Sec. 8.
\8\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Deploys Facial
Recognition Biometric Technology at 1 TSA Checkpoint at JFK Airport
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/
cbp-deploys-facial-recognition-biometric-technology-1-tsa-checkpoint.
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EPIC would like to remind the committee that in 2009, Verified
Identity Pass, Inc., a corporate participant in the Transportation
Security Administration's (``TSA'') Registered Traveler program ceased
operations after declaring bankruptcy, following a massive data breach
concerning personal data, including biometric identifiers.\9\ Verified
Identity Pass, Inc. operated ``Clear,'' a TSA recognized Registered
Traveler program. Clear was the largest Registered Traveler program in
the Nation operating out of 20 airports with about 200,000 members.
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\9\ EPIC, Bankruptcy of Verified Identity Pass and the Privacy of
Clear Registered Traveler Data, https://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/
clear/.
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EPIC had warned this committee back in 2005 of the risks of the
Registered Traveler program.\10\ We explained that without ensuring
compliance with Federal Privacy Act obligations, the agency was placing
at risk the privacy and security of the American public. We said:
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\10\ The Future of Registered Traveler, 109th Cong. (2005), H.
Comm. on Homeland Security, Subcomm. on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity (testimony of Marc
Rotenberg), available at http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/
rt_test_110305.pdf.

``The Privacy Act creates critical and necessary safeguards not simply
to protect privacy, but also to ensure accuracy and accountability. Any
government-approved security system that keeps personal information on
individuals should meet the Privacy Act requirements for necessity,
relevance, and openness, including individual access and correction. It
should be made clear that these requirements apply whether the
information originates with the agency or with information provided by
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the individual.''

Facial recognition continues to pose significant threats to privacy
and civil liberties. Facial recognitions techniques can be deployed
covertly, remotely, and on a mass scale. Additionally, there is a lack
of well-defined Federal regulations controlling the collection, use,
dissemination, and retention of biometric identifiers. Ubiquitous
identification by Government agencies eliminates the individual's
ability to control the disclosure of their identities, creates new
opportunities for tracking and monitoring, and poses a specific risk to
the First Amendment rights of free association and free expression.
Transparency about these biometric surveillance programs is
essential, particularly because their accuracy is questionable. In
December 2017, a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit pursued by EPIC
produced the public release of a CBP report on iris imaging and facial
recognition scans for border control. The ``Southwest Border Pedestrian
Field Test'' revealed that the CBP does not perform operational
matching at a ``satisfactory'' level.\11\ In a related FOIA lawsuit,
EPIC obtained documents from the FBI concerning the Next Generation
Identification database which contains facial scans, fingerprints, and
other biometrics of millions of Americans.\12\ The documents obtained
by EPIC revealed that biometric identification is often inaccurate.\13\
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\11\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southern Border Pedestrian
Field Test Summary Report, https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-
entry-exit/Southern-Border-Pedestrian-Field-Test-Report.pdf (December
2016).
\12\ EPIC v. FBI--Next Generation Identification, EPIC, https://
epic.org/foia/fbi/ngi/.
\13\ DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NEXT
GENERATION IDENTIFICATION (NGI) SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT VERSION
4.4 at 244 (Oct. 1, 2010), https://epic.org/foia/fbi/ngi/NGI-System-
Requiremets.pdf.
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The use of facial recognition at the border has real consequences
for U.S. citizens as well as non-U.S. citizens. All people entering the
United States, including U.S. passport holders, could be subject to
this intrusive screening technique. EPIC has filed a FOIA lawsuit to
obtain documents to determine if there are proper privacy safeguards in
place for the collection of biometric information at U.S. airports.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ EPIC v. CBP (Biometric Entry/Exit Program), EPIC, https://
epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit/.
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There is also a new study from the MIT Media Lab which found that
facial recognition is less accurate for persons of color. The MIT study
found that the error rate in face recognition software for dark-skinned
females was 20.8 percent--34.7 percent, while the error rate for light-
skinned males was 0.0 percent--0.3 percent.\15\ As the New York Times
explained, ``[t]hese disparate results, calculated by Joy Buolamwini, a
researcher at the M.I.T. Media Lab, show how some of the biases in the
real world can seep into artificial intelligence, the computer systems
that inform facial recognition.''\16\ If it is correct that that facial
recognition as a form of identification discriminates against persons
of color in ways that other forms of identification do not, there is a
substantial civil rights concern that the committee should investigate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, Proceedings
of Machine Learning Research (2018) at 11, available at http://
proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf.
\16\ Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You're a White
Guy, New York Times, Feb. 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/
technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html.
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The involvement of private companies raises additional concerns.
CBP has enlisted airlines such as JetBlue and Delta to implement face
recognition technology in U.S. airports.\17\ JetBlue is running a self-
boarding program using facial recognition in lieu of checking boarding
passes. Delta aims to use facial recognition as part of baggage drop
off.\18\ It is unclear whether access to biometric identifiers by
JetBlue and Delta will lead to non-security uses of biometric
identifiers.
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\17\ Asma Khalid, Facial Recognition May Boost Airport Security But
Raises Privacy Worries, NPR, June 26, 2017, https://www.npr.org/
sections/alltechconsidered/2017/06/26/534131967/facial-recognition-may-
boost-airport-security-but-raises-privacy-worries.
\18\ Ben Mutzabaugh, Delta to test facial-recognition tech on new
self-service bag drop, USA TODAY, May 15, 2017, https://
www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2017/05/15/delta-
test-facial-recognition-tech-new-self-service-bag-drops/101703956/.
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These airlines are promoting facial recognition as a convenience,
but it's clearly part of a larger effort by the government to implement
a biometric surveillance program that will capture the facial images of
all air travelers. And travelers do not understand how this system,
once in place at airports, could be deployed in other settings.
The CBP and the TSA now plan deploy facial recognition technology
at TSA checkpoints--further expanding the use of a privacy-invasive
technology without regulations in place to provide proper protections.
Commissioner McAleenan should be asked the following questions:
Has the CBP conducted the necessary Privacy Impact
Assessments prior to deployments?
Are there plans to increase the use of facial recognition?
Has CBP detected racial bias in the deployment of its facial
recognition systems?
What safeguards are currently in place to protect facial
scans from hacking or breaches?
What restrictions on the use of biometric identifiers by
private companies have been established?
drones at the border
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is already deploying aerial
drones with facial recognition technology at the border.\19\ In 2013,
records obtained by EPIC under the Freedom of Information Act showed
that the CBP is operating drones in the United States capable of
intercepting electronic communications.\20\ The records obtained by
EPIC also indicate that the ten Predator B drones operated by the
agency have the capacity to recognize and identify a person on the
ground.\21\ The documents were provided in response to a request from
EPIC for information about the Bureau's use of drones across the
country. The agency has made the Predator drones available to other
Federal, State, and local agencies. The records obtained by EPIC raise
questions about the agency's compliance with Federal privacy laws and
the scope of domestic surveillance.
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\19\ Russel Brandom, The US Border Patrol is trying to build face-
reading drones, The Verge, Apr. 6, 2017, http://www.theverge.com/2017/
4/6/15208820/customs-border-patrol-drone-facial-recognition-silicon-
valley-dhs; Dept. of Homeland Security, Other Transaction Solicitation
(OTS) HSHQDC-16-R-00114 Project: Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)
Capabilities, Jul. 15, 2016, https://www.fbo.gov/spg/DHS/OCPO/DHS-OCPO/
HSHQDC-0916-R-00114/listing.html.
\20\ EPIC, EPIC FOIA--US Drones Intercept Electronic Communications
and Identify Human Targets, Feb. 28, 2013, https://epic.org/2013/02/
epic-foia-us-drones-intercep.html (record received available at https:/
/epic.org/privacy/drones/EPIC-2010-Performance-Specs-1.pdf.)
\21\ Performance Spec for CBP UAV System, Bureau of Customs and
Border Patrol, https://epic.org/privacy/drones/EPIC-2005-Performance-
Specs-2.pdf.
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Following the revelations about drone surveillance at the border,
EPIC, joined by 30 organizations and more than a thousand individuals,
petitioned CBP to suspend the domestic drone surveillance program,
pending the establishment of concrete privacy regulations.\22\ The
petition stated that ``the use of drones for border surveillance
presents substantial privacy and civil liberties concerns for millions
of Americans across the country.'' Any authorization granted to CBP to
conduct surveillance at the border must require compliance with Federal
privacy laws and regulations for surveillance tools, including drones.
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\22\ EPIC, Domestic Drones Petition, https://epic.org/
drones_petition/.
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Much of this surveillance technology could, in theory, be deployed
on manned vehicles. However, drones present a unique threat to privacy.
Drones are designed to maintain a constant, persistent eye on the
public to a degree that former methods of surveillance were unable to
achieve. The technical and economic limitations to aerial surveillance
change dramatically with the advancement of drone technology. Small,
unmanned drones are already inexpensive; the surveillance capabilities
of drones are rapidly advancing; and cheap storage is readily available
to maintain repositories of surveillance data.\23\ Drones ``represent
an efficient and cost-effective alternative to helicopters and
airplanes,'' but their use implicates significant privacy
interests.\24\ As the price of drones ``continues to drop and their
capabilities increase, they will become a very powerful surveillance
tool.''\25\ The use of drones in border security will place U.S.
citizens living on the border under ceaseless surveillance by the
government.
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\23\ See generally EPIC, Drones: Eyes in the Sky, Spotlight on
Surveillance (2014), https://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/
spotlight/1014/drones.html.
\24\ M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 Stan. L. Rev.
Online 29, 30 (Dec. 12, 2011); See also Jeffrey Rosen, Symposium
Keynote Address, 65 Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 966 (2013) (``[A]s police
departments increasingly begin to use drone technologies to track
individual suspects 24/7, or to put areas of the country under
permanent surveillance, this possibility of 24/7 tracking will become
increasingly real.'').
\25\ Bruce Schneier, Surveillance And the Internet of Things,
Schneier on Security (May 21, 2013), https://www.schneier.com/blog/
archives/2013/05/the_eyes_and_ea.html.
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The Supreme Court has not yet considered the limits of drone
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment, though the Court held 20 years
ago that law enforcement may conduct manned aerial surveillance
operations from as low as 400 feet without a warrant.\26\ No Federal
statute currently provides adequate safeguards to protect privacy
against increased drone use in the United States. However, some border
States do limit warrantless aerial surveillance. In 2015, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
warrantless aerial surveillance of, and interference with, a person's
private property.\27\ Accordingly, there are substantial legal and
Constitutional issues involved in the deployment of aerial drones by
law enforcement and State and Federal agencies that need to be
addressed.
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\26\ See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that a
police helicopter flying more than 400 feet above private property is
not a search).
\27\ State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161 (N.M. 2015); see Brief of Amicus
Curiae EPIC, id., available at https://epic.org/amicus/drones/new-
mexico/davis/State-v-Davis-Opinion.pdf.
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A 2015 Presidential Memorandum on drones and privacy required that
all Federal agencies to establish and publish drone privacy procedures
by February 2016.\28\ Emphasizing the ``privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties concerns'' raised by the technology,\29\ President
Obama ordered agencies to ensure that any use of drones by the Federal
Government in U.S. airspace comply with ``the Constitution, Federal
law, and other applicable regulations and policies.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ President Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum: Promoting
Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Feb. 15,
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/
15/Presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-
safegua.
\29\ Id. at 1(e).
\30\ Id. at 1.
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However, the DHS has failed to produce reports required by the 2015
Presidential Memorandum. EPIC has submitted a FOIA request for DHS's
policies and reports required under the Presidential Memorandum, but
the DHS has failed to respond.
Commissioner McAleenan should be asked:
How will CBP comply with State laws prohibiting warrantless
aerial surveillance when deploying drones?
When will CBP publish the drone privacy procedures report
required by the 2015 Presidential Memorandum?
We ask that this letter be entered in the hearing record. EPIC
looks forward to working with the subcommittee on these issues of vital
importance to the American public.
Sincerely,
Marc Rotenberg,
EPIC President.
Caitriona Fitzgerald,
EPIC Policy Director.
Jeramie Scott,
EPIC National Security Counsel.
Christine Bonnan,
EPIC Policy Fellow.

Mr. Vela. I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Vela follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Filemon Vela
April 25, 2018
My office and I receive daily notifications and press releases from
CBP about the volume and value of the narcotics that are seized coming
through our ports of entry. For example, CBP officers at the Pharr Port
of Entry seized 45 pounds of cocaine valued at more than $347,000
earlier this month. At the Progreso International Bridge, CBP officers
seized nearly 20 pounds of crystal methamphetamine valued at more than
$381,000 in early April as well.
CBP publishes its enforcement statistics monthly, and I have noted
that, over the past several years, more drugs are seized on average by
the Office of Field Operations than Border Patrol. The only exception
to that is marijuana, which Border Patrol interdicts at a much higher
rate.
In addition to keeping people and contraband from entering
illegally, CBP is also responsible for facilitating legitimate trade
and travel--both of which are major drivers for economic growth. This
means CBP officers inspect $6.5 billion worth of cargo on a daily
basis.
CBP officers are also responsible for screening and vetting foreign
and U.S. citizen travelers headed to the United States, and at our
international airports, cruise terminals, or land ports of entry.
However, the fact that CBP continues to rely on temporary duty
assignments and back-to-back shifts to make up for its officer shortage
remains a major concern of mine.
I have stated on multiple occasions that CBP's officer staffing
shortage and difficulty in retaining professional Border Patrol agents
are self-inflicted vulnerabilities. These CBP staffing issues are
critical to border security, yet the administration continues to ignore
these problems.
Commissioner, I introduced the Border and Port Security Act to give
you the ability to hire more officers and agriculture specialists, but
we need your commitment to address the internal problems that are
making it difficult to on-board new personnel and keep them.
I am glad that my bill has bipartisan support, and I know that
Chairwoman McSally has her own proposal to address CBP's officer
staffing shortage.
My hope is that we can work on this issue in a bipartisan way, much
like we did with the public-private partnership authority granted to
CBP to address infrastructure needs at ports.
In my district, the city of Donna and CBP have been working to
establish the Model Port concept, or the new way to streamline cargo
and passenger vehicle inspections, through the Donation Acceptance
Program. This project is an example of the many ways investments in our
port infrastructure affects positive change along the border.
I hope that your confirmation gives you a greater ability to ensure
the administration uses the facts when considering changes to border
security.

Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally and Ranking
Member Vela, for having this hearing. First, I would like to
congratulate you, sir, Commissioner McAleenan on your Senate
confirmation last month. Well done. I am glad the Senate
finally got that accomplished. They have a lot more to do in my
judgment, but that is another point of view.
Our country, though, is fortunate, I think, that you were
willing to answer the President's call and serve as
commissioner of this very vital, important agency. CBP has a
broad and important mission from securing our border to
facilitating legitimate trade to ensuring those who enter our
country do so legally.
Commissioner, you have a lot on your plate. I am confident,
though, that you are up to the task. Despite this historic drop
that we saw in apprehensions last year, more must be done to
secure the border. As you know and know very well, during the
last few months we observed a troubling spike in illegal
immigration, over 200 percent more crossings this year than
last.
Many who are apprehended at the border are not looking to
even evade capture, but rather they simply turn themselves in
to the nearest Border Patrol agent or CBP officer and claim a
fear of persecution and an asylum claim for persecution in
their country. That is what the drug cartels have coached them
to say, and that is what they do.
Unfortunately, the cartels understand the weakness of our
immigration laws all too well. They have marketed the use of
immigration loopholes to entice illicit migrants. I support
Secretary Nielsen's call to close these legal loopholes.
We need to change the law that treats unaccompanied minors
from Mexico and Central America differently. We must also
reform our asylum policies and ensure the prompt removal of
anyone who crosses the border illegally, regardless of where
they come from.
In response to the recent surge, mainly in south Texas, the
President deployed thousands of National Guard troops to
support the efforts of men and women of CBP. I applaud this
effort, but sending the National Guard to the border is nothing
really new. Guard troops helped build the fence in Operation
Jump Start under President Bush and provided much-needed
aviation support to supplement CBP's air and marine operations
under Operation Phalanx during the Obama administration.
I also want to thank my Governor, Governor Abbott, for his
leadership on border security. My home State of Texas, I
believe, has been leading the way when it comes to securing the
border. For years we have used the National Guard on our border
at our State's expense, to help ensure the safety of Texans,
despite years of inaction by previous administrations.
Congress has recently provided CBP with billions of dollars
to invest in technology, barrier replacement, new levee wall
construction in the Rio Grande Valley sector. I believe all of
this is desperately needed down there.
I believe this will serve as a powerful deterrent to
illegal entry as well as provide flood protection against the
Rio Grande Valley from the river. So this is a very important
issue and I look forward to an update on how CBP prepares to--
as this caravan, they call it, prepares to come up north into
the United States and other threats, as well.
Madam Chair, with that, I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
April 25, 2018
First, I would also like to congratulate Commissioner McAleenan on
his Senate confirmation last month.
Our country is fortunate that you were willing to answer the
President's call and serve as the commissioner of this agency.
CBP has a broad and important mission--from securing our border and
facilitating legitimate trade, to ensuring those who enter our country
do so legally.
Commissioner McAleenan, you have a lot on your plate. But I am
confident you are up to the task.
Despite the historic drop in apprehensions last year, more must be
done to secure the border.
During the last few months, we observed a troubling spike in
illegal immigration--over 200 percent more crossings this year than
last.
Many who are apprehended at the border are not looking to evade
capture. They simply turn themselves in to the nearest Border Patrol
agent, or CBP officer and claim a fear of persecution in their country.
This is what the cartels have coached them to do.
Unfortunately, the cartels understand the weakness of our
immigration laws all too well.
They have marketed the use of immigration loopholes to entice
illicit migrants.
I support Secretary Nielsen's call to close these loopholes.
We need to change the law that treats unaccompanied minors from
Mexico and Central America differently.
We must also reform our asylum policies and ensure the prompt
removal of anyone who crosses the border illegally.
In response to the recent surge, mainly in South Texas, the
President deployed thousands of National Guard troops to support the
effort of the men and women of CBP.
Sending the National Guard to the border is not new.
Guard troops helped build the fence in Operation Jump Start and
provided much-needed aviation support to supplement CBP's Air and
Marine Operations under Operational Phalanx.
I would like to thank Governor Abbott for his leadership on border
security. My home State of Texas has been leading the way.
For years we have used the National Guard on the border--at our
State's expense--to help ensure the safety of Texans, despite years of
inaction by the previous administration.
Congress has recently provided CBP with billions of dollars to
invest in technology, barrier replacement, and new levy wall
construction in the Rio Grande Valley Sector.
This will serve as a powerful deterrent to illegal entry as well as
provide flood protection against the Rio Grande River.
This is a very important issue and I look forward to hearing an
update on CBP's progress in South Texas.
I yield the balance of my time.

Ms. McSally. The Chairman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the Ranking Member for the full committee, gentleman
from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairwoman McSally and
Ranking Member Vela, for holding today's hearing. Commissioner,
good seeing you again. It is always nice to have a permanent
title after your nomination.
You officially have been head of CBP, for only a month, but
your many years in leadership positions within CBP will, no
doubt, serve you well in this new position. I encourage you to
use your deep knowledge of CBP to meaningfully inform the
Department's approach to border security.
Our border security challenges are more nuanced than simply
building a wall. At a time when the Department's own data show
that illegal entries are at the lowest level they have been
since the 1970's, it makes little sense as to why we should
heavily rely on building walls for the foreseeable future or
deploy National Guard's troops to the Southern Border.
During last month's subcommittee hearing, the Government
Accountability Office witness testified that U.S. Customs and
Border Protection still does not have the metrics to measure
how a wall contributes to border security, in general. I urge
you to correct this immediately.
Given that CBP has received more than $1 billion for
barriers and requested another $1 billion for the upcoming
fiscal year, I am concerned that we are bound to repeat many
mistakes if we do not know what we are getting in return.
I also echo Ranking Member Vela's frustration that the
Trump administration continues to overlook critical staffing
problems within CBP, and particularly the shortage of officers
manning our ports of entry. Both Border Patrol and the Office
of Field Operations are losing trained, experienced agents and
officers at a faster rate than CBP is able to replace them.
This is another problem that I urge you to address quickly.
Additionally, I am concerned by the policy proposals and
practices CBP and other components within DHS are using to
deter illegal immigration. In February, all 12 of the Democrats
on this committee and 63 other Democratic colleagues sent a
letter to Secretary Nielsen asking her to halt the practice of
separating migrant parents from their children when they are
apprehended at the border or in immigration detention in cases
that do not warrant it.
The practice is inhumane, excessively punitive, and can
deliberately interfere with their legal right to request
asylum. I reiterate my opposition to this practice and I
caution CBP from pursuing other such practices that do not
honor our values as a Nation of immigrants.
In your testimony, you commit to enhancing internal
integrity programs, transparency, and professionalism measures.
I take this to mean that misconduct and lack of professionalism
by errant agents and offices will be swiftly addressed.
A number of videos have circulated in recent months that
show CBP personnel acting in ways that do not seem to comply
with this policy. We know that the overwhelming majority of CBP
personnel work hard, conduct themselves professionally, and are
a credit to their agency. I hope that you are investigating
these incidents to ensure that they are not indicative of a
problem within CBP's ranks.
Last, Mr. Commissioner, I hope you are able to share with
us how your priorities for CBP align with the administration's.
As we have seen on multiple occasions, experts at CBP and DHS
are neither informing, nor even being notified in advance of
major policy changes to border security operation. The rollout
of the first travel ban Executive Order last year and the
recent National Guard deployment announcement come to mind as
examples.
I hope that your first-hand knowledge that more than walls
are required is well utilized.
I thank you for agreeing to testify before us today and
look forward to your testimony and yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 25, 2018
Our border security challenges are more nuanced than simply
building a wall.
At a time when the Department's own data show that illegal entries
are at the lowest levels they have been since the 1970's, it makes
little sense why we should heavily rely on building walls for the
foreseeable future or deploy National Guard troops to the Southern
Border.
During last month's subcommittee, the Government Accountability
Office testified that U.S. Customs and Border Protection still does not
have metrics to measure how a wall or even land-based technology
contribute to border security in general.
I urge you to correct this immediately.
Given that CBP has received more than $1 billion for barriers and
requested another $1 billion for the upcoming fiscal year, I am
concerned that we are bound to repeat many mistakes if we do not know
what we are getting in return.
I also echo Ranking Member Vela's frustration that the Trump
administration continues to overlook critical staffing problems within
CBP, in particular the shortage of officers manning our ports of entry.
Both Border Patrol and the Office of Field Operations are losing
trained, experienced agents and officers at a faster rate than CBP is
able to replace them.
This is another problem I urge you to address quickly.
Last, I am concerned by the policy proposals and practice CBP and
other components within DHS are using to deter illegal migration.
In February, all 12 of Democrats on this committee and 63 other
Democratic colleagues sent a letter to Secretary Nielsen asking her to
halt the practice of separating migrant parents from their children
when they are apprehended at the border or in immigration detention in
cases that do not warrant it.
The practice is inhumane, excessively punitive, and can
deliberatively interfere with their legal right to request asylum.
I reiterate my opposition to this practice, and I caution CBP from
pursuing other such policies that do not honor our values as a Nation
of immigrants.
In your testimony, you commit to enhancing ``internal integrity
programs,'' transparency, and ``professionalism measures.''
I take this to mean that misconduct and lack of professionalism by
errant agents and officers will be swiftly addressed.
A number of videos have circulated in recent months that show CBP
personnel acting in ways that do not seem to comply with policy.
We know that the overwhelming majority of CBP personnel work hard,
conduct themselves professionally, and are a credit to their agency.
I hope you are investigating these incidents to ensure they are not
indicative of a problem within CBP's ranks.

Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Mr. Barletta follows:]
Statement of Honorable Lou Barletta
Thank you commissioner for coming before this committee today to
discuss the importance of securing our borders, and for your service to
this country.
We have immigration laws for two reasons, to ensure the National
security of the United States, and to protect American jobs. I am
pleased that the American people finally have a partner in the White
House whose main priority is representing their interests.
There are many victims of illegal immigration; I do not need an
expert to explain the issue to me because I have lived it. When I was
the Mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, we had a massive illegal
immigration problem, as our population grew by 50 percent, but our tax
revenue stayed the same.
Hospitals and schools were overcrowded, our police force was
overwhelmed by the increased crime, and resources were stretched thin
and diverted from tax-paying Americans and legal immigrants.
We are a compassionate Nation, one with a proud and diverse
history. However, too often I am told we must have compassion for the
illegal alien who broke the law to enter our country. But I have sat at
the tables of Pennsylvanians who have lost loved ones to the violent
acts of illegal aliens, and it is those people for whom I have
compassion.
We as a Congress have failed by not enforcing the laws of our land
and refusing to put the safety and well-being of the American people
first.
For example, in Philadelphia, multiple child molesters have been
released back onto the streets because of the city's sanctuary policy.
Deadly narcotics like fentanyl continue to flood across our
borders. In Pennsylvania alone, drug overdose deaths rose by 37 percent
in 2016 according to the Drug Enforcement Administration.
It is time to secure our borders, enforce our Federal laws, and put
America first.

Ms. McSally. We are pleased to have Commissioner Kevin
McAleenan before us today to discuss a wide range of issues
facing CBP. Commissioner McAleenan was sworn in on March 20,
2018, as the fifth commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.
Prior to his confirmation, Mr. McAleenan served as the
acting commissioner since the beginning of this administration.
As the agency's chief executive, Mr. McAleenan oversees 60,000
employees, manages a budget of over $13 billion, and ensures
the effective operations of CBP's mission to protect National
security while promoting economic prosperity. The witness's
full written statement will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Commissioner McAleenan for 5
minutes.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN K. MC ALEENAN, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. McAleenan. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
Member Vela. It was nice to see the full committee Chairman
McCaul as well as Ranking Member Thompson here and Members of
the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
It is a privilege to speak to you about my priorities as
commissioner and to represent the nearly 60,000 strong men and
women of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
The opportunity to lead and work alongside these men and
women is the biggest privilege of my professional life. CBP is
central to many priorities for the American people and the
administration, from countering terrorism, to enhancing border
security, to securing and facilitating trade and travel.
Our dedicated officers and agents, specialists, pilots, and
support personnel are relentlessly perusing a more secure and
economically competitive Nation. My vision for CBP is that we
aspire to become the most effective, most innovative, and most
trusted and transparent law enforcement agency in the United
States while remaining the premier border security and
management agency in the world.
During my tenure as CBP commissioner, I have committed to
five overarching priorities: Attracting, retaining, and
developing the most qualified and resilient workforce to serve
our Nation and meet tomorrow's challenges; accelerating the
adoption of innovative technologies to keep America and our
people safe; building and strengthening partnerships across
Government and with international counterparts; transforming
the ways that our stakeholders interact with CBP and our
operations; and investing in our culture through Unity of
Effort initiatives that further develop a common purpose and a
mission commitment across all CBP's operational and support
components.
My written testimony submitted to the committee further
elaborate CBP's on-going efforts to enhance our security and
strengthen our organization, keeping our Nation safe my
priority strategies for continuing to improve.
With the support of Congress to provide the resources,
authorities, and legislative changes we need, I believe that
CBP will continue to make great strides across our core
missions and in every area of our operations.
We will also enhance her internal integrity programs and
pursue transparency and professionalism measures that will help
us increase and maintain the trust of the public we are sworn
to serve.
But even as we continue to enhance border security at and
between ports of entry, increasing our effectiveness at
identifying and interdicting threats, apprehensions of those
crossing our borders illegally or who are determined to be
inadmissible at ports of entry continue to rise.
Seizures of illicit hard narcotics are also increasing
across all categories, both at and between ports of entry,
especially methamphetamine and synthetic opioids like fentanyl.
As we strengthen our screening and vetting across multiple
agencies to identify potential threats before they enter the
United States, we continue to face a multifaceted and dispersed
terrorist adversary.
We need to continue to invest in and deploy critical
capabilities to prevent and interdict illegal crossings between
ports of entry: A modern border wall system, situational
awareness sensors, airborne mobile and fixed, access and
mobility and mission readiness, our virtual agents, pilots, and
air interdiction agents and support personnel.
At our ports of entry, we need enhanced nonintrusive
inspection equipment to detect deep concealment of drugs and
CBP officers and agriculture specialists, for trade enforcement
mission will augment our dedicated an expert team with
additional specialists, auditors and attorneys, and we need to
continue to build our world-leading capabilities at the
National target center and develop the new National vetting
center as well as supporting increase capacity for
international partners.
But CBP is ultimately only one part of a much larger
system, one that neither begins or ends at our borders. To
address threats of illegal immigration and human smuggling,
narcotics trafficking and terrorism, we need to close legal
loopholes in our immigration enforcement system, expand our
investigative and interdiction reach, and strengthen
international partnerships and policy alignment.
Illegal and irregular immigration will continue at
increasing levels unless a systemic vulnerabilities in our
statutory regime are addressed. If only a small percentage of
those border crossings apprehended by the Border Patrol in
certain categories are effectively repatriated, others drawn by
strong economy, the prospect of family reunification, and the
promise of a successful crossing will continue to follow.
These loopholes create a powerful magnet, draining energy
and youth from Central America even as we work to invest and
partner in the security and prosperity of the neighboring
region.
They put children at risk of violence and assault, they
enriched transnational criminal organizations, and they
threaten the security of our international neighbors and our
domestic neighborhoods.
The administration's legislative priorities on the
unaccompanied children family units, asylum and credible fear,
along with the requested investments in Central America and
elsewhere would help address these issues.
I urge Congress to act on these priorities and I look
forward to working with Members on both sides of the aisle to
address these challenges. Border security is National security;
it is a nonpartisan issue.
With the on-going support of Congress, CBP will continue to
secure our Nation's borders while facilitating international
trade and travel. Our dedicated front-line workforce and our
supporting team will ensure it.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McAleenan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin K. McAleenan
April 25, 2018
introduction
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today on behalf of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). I was
deeply honored to be confirmed by the Senate, and sworn in by the
Secretary on March 20, as the fifth commissioner of CBP. It is a
privilege to continue working alongside some of the finest
professionals in Government service to tackle the most compelling
mission set in law enforcement.
CBP is central to so many priorities for the American people and
the administration, from countering terrorism, to enhancing border
security, to securing and facilitating trade and travel. In our
relentless pursuit of a more secure and economically competitive
Nation, we aspire to be the most innovative and trusted law enforcement
agency in the world. During my tenure as CBP commissioner, I am
committed to streamlining CBP efforts and focusing on Unity of Effort
through a ``One CBP'' culture; to attracting and retaining the best
workforce to serve our Nation and meet tomorrow's challenges; to
accelerating the adoption of innovative technology to keep America and
our workforce safe; to building and strengthening partnerships across
Government and with our international counterparts; and to transforming
the ways our stakeholders interact with CBP.
My testimony today discusses CBP's on-going efforts to keep our
Nation safe and my priority strategies for enhancing those efforts. I
also appreciate the important oversight responsibility of this
committee and pledge to continue working with you to ensure we carry
out our missions in a manner consistent with the law.
With the support of Congress to provide us the resources,
authorities, and legislative changes we need, I believe that CBP will
make strides across our core missions and in every area of our
operations, from border security, counterterrorism, agriculture
protection, and travel and trade facilitation to trade enforcement. We
will also enhance our internal integrity programs and pursue
transparency and professionalism measures that will help us increase
and maintain the trust of the public we are sworn to serve.
My vision for the organization is that CBP become the most
effective, most innovative, and most trusted and transparent law
enforcement agency in the United States, while remaining the premier
border security and management agency in the world. Investing and
focusing on developing our culture, supporting and building our
workforce and its resiliency, and capitalizing on emerging technologies
will help us deepen partnerships and enhance how we engage our
stakeholders, for the traveling public and trade communities and others
that we regulate or interact with.
cbp unity of effort and ``one cbp''
As America's unified border agency, CBP protects the United States
from terrorist threats and prevents the illegal entry of inadmissible
persons and contraband, while facilitating lawful travel and trade.
Before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
CBP, border security, trade and travel compliance, and the facilitation
of international travel and trade were conducted by multiple agencies.
After September 11, 2001 I was extraordinarily fortunate to have the
opportunity to help lead the new focus on counterterrorism within the
United States Customs Service and then support the transition to our
unified border security agency as U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
On March 1, 2003, CBP became the Nation's first comprehensive border
security agency with a focus on maintaining the integrity of the
Nation's boundaries and POEs. The consolidation of these roles and
responsibilities allowed CBP to develop seamless security procedures
while ensuring compliance with the Nation's immigration, health, and
international trade laws and regulations.
Because of the work of CBP employees, the Nation's borders and the
American communities around them have never been more secure. But there
is much more to be done. As CBP progresses into its second decade, the
Nation will see a fully integrated approach to international security,
trade, and travel that makes the world safer, facilitates international
travel and trade, and pushes forward the continuous improvement of
CBP's operations. I am honored to lead these efforts.
attract and retain a world-class workforce
CBP's U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO)
agents patrol our Nation's borders, maritime approaches, and associated
airspace to prevent the illegal entry of people and goods into the
United States. CBP officers and agriculture specialists are multi-
disciplined and perform the full range of inspection, intelligence
analysis, examination, and law enforcement activities relating to the
arrival and departure of persons, conveyances, and merchandise at air,
land, and sea POEs. The people of CBP do the critical, sometimes
dangerous work of keeping Americans safe, often in remote locations and
in all kinds of environmental conditions. I am proud of their
dedication, integrity, and commitment, and it is a privilege to work
for and alongside each and every one of them.
CBP has faced challenges in the past to meet our hiring goals.
However, we have taken decisive action, while recognizing that much
work remains to be done to ensure we have enough officers and agents to
meet our needs well into the future. In the last 2 years, more than 40
individual improvements to CBP's hiring process have resulted in
significant recruitment and hiring gains--despite record low
unemployment around the United States and intense competition for
highly-qualified, mission-inspired people. With support from Congress,
we are making investments in our capability and capacity to hire across
all front-line positions. CBP is focusing on efforts to attract
qualified candidates and expedite their progress through the CBP hiring
process.
In the last 2 years, CBP has undertaken a comprehensive effort to
look across all of our recruitment and hiring process areas. We
implemented process changes that have resulted in significant
recruitment and hiring gains. We embraced the use of social media, and
are working to more effectively identify the best return on investment
in digital media. We have also introduced a mobile app for applicants
in our hiring pipeline to keep them engaged during the process. We are
going to introduce an ``applicant care'' component whereby we assign a
dedicated employee to an applicant to help them navigate the process.
We are also leveraging private-sector expertise and experience in
recruiting and human resources to provide additional capacity.
CBP's streamlined front-line hiring process has led to significant
reductions in the average time-to-hire. In the last 12 months close to
70 percent of new USBP agents and 60 percent of new CBP officers on-
boarded in 313 days or fewer, with 17 percent of each occupation on-
boarding within 92 days. While work remains to be done to improve the
process, this is a significant improvement from the 469-day overall
baseline established in January 2016. This streamlined process has
helped us to grow our workforce by reducing the number of qualified
candidates who drop out due to process fatigue or accepting more timely
job offers elsewhere. CBP's background investigation time is
approximately 90 days for a Tier 5 level investigation, which is
required for all of CBP's law enforcement officer applicants and 90
percent of CBP applicants overall. This is considerably faster than the
Government average for the same level investigation. CBP is also
recognized as having a best practice quality assurance program, which
other agencies regularly visit CBP to learn about.
As a result of these improvements, CBP's fiscal year 2017 hiring
totals surpassed fiscal year 2016 totals, including increases of 21
percent for CBP officers, 4 percent for USBP agents, and 91 percent for
AMO air interdiction agents. In fiscal year 2017, CBP reached the
highest number of USBP agent hires since fiscal year 2013, and the
highest number of air interdiction agents and marine interdiction agent
hires since fiscal year 2014. The total number of front-line applicants
increased by 73 percent between fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2017,
including a 41 percent increase from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year
2017.
CBP is also actively working to minimize attrition and fill
positions in ``hard-to-fill'' locations that are often remote and offer
very limited amenities compared to metropolitan locations. A stable
relocation program will help meet USBP operational requirements and
alleviate the workforce's concerns about lack of mobility, which is
significantly contributing to increased attrition. CBP is thankful for
the continued dedication of Members of Congress to working
collaboratively with CBP to find a variety of targeted solutions to
address our complex hiring challenges.
Consistent with the Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal
year 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act concerning the alternative
polygraph exam format, CBP conducted a 6-month pilot program that
allowed the agency to compare data points from applicants tested with
the new, alternative format against applicants tested with the previous
format. CBP developed this pilot in collaboration with the National
Center for Credibility Assessment, which governs all Federal polygraph
programs. Before making any determination on whether to continue with
the piloted test or return to the previous test, CBP is carefully
evaluating these metrics and measures to maintain CBP's high standard
of integrity for future applicants, and we ensure on-going
communication with Congress on this area of interest. While its format
may change, the exam retains all of the critical test topics of the
previous exam and maintains CBP's commitment to high integrity
standards for its personnel.
Additionally, DHS supports the Anti-Border Corruption
Reauthorization Act of 2017, which was ordered as H.R. 2213 in the
House of Representatives and S. 595 in the Senate. The House passed
H.R. 2213 on June 7, 2017, thanks to the strong support of this
subcommittee and the co-sponsorship of Chairwoman McSally, and the bill
is currently pending vote by the Senate. This pending legislation
grants the Commissioner authority to waive the polygraph requirement
for three groups of applicants who have a demonstrated, long-standing
history of public trust and meet specific criteria: Current, full-time
State and local law enforcement officers; current, full-time Federal
law enforcement officers; and veterans, active-duty service members,
and reservists. We thank the Members of Congress for your continued
support as we seek to hire the men and women who will fulfill CBP's
complex and crucial mission in the months and years to come.
empower with innovative technology
Technology enhances CBP's operational capabilities by increasing
our ability to detect and apprehend individuals illegally crossing the
border, to detect dangerous goods and materials concealed in cargo and
vehicles, and to detect and interdict illegal activity in the air and
maritime domains. Advanced detection and surveillance technology is a
critical element of CBP's multi-layered border security strategy to
deploy the right mix of personnel, technology, and tactical
infrastructure to enable us to meet the everyday challenges of a
dynamic border threat environment. For CBP, the use of technology in
the border environment is an invaluable force multiplier that increases
situational awareness. It allows us to more quickly deter, and more
safely detect illegal activity, including unauthorized border-crossers,
and interdict illicit materials, including illicit narcotics, and those
who attempt to smuggle them.
Border Security
President Trump has directed CBP toward a new standard of border
security between the POEs, and defined operational control as the
ability to prevent or interdict all illegal border crossings. To make
progress toward this standard, CBP will need substantial investments in
impedence and denial capabilities, surveillance technology, access and
mobility, and mission readiness and personnel. For impedence and
denial, a modern border wall system will significantly enhance CBP's
efforts to attain operational control of the border between the POEs.
Border barrier systems are comprehensive solutions. A wall system that
integrates sensors, cameras, lighting, and access and patrol roads, has
the support of our USBP agents working our borders and is the direct
result of an in-depth analysis of existing capability gaps. Between the
POEs, tactical infrastructure, including physical barriers, has long
been a critical component of CBP's multi-layered and risk-based
approach to securing our Southwest Border. It is undeniable that border
barriers have enhanced--and will continue to enhance--CBP's operational
capabilities by creating persistent impedance and facilitating the
deterrence and prevention of illegal entries of people and contraband.
Constructing and improving CBP's physical infrastructure is also
essential to keeping Americans safe. CBP is investing in modernizing
our land POEs along the Northern and Southern Borders to ensure that
CBP's physical infrastructure is operationally viable for front-line
and mission support functions. Thanks to the funding provided in the
fiscal year 2018 Omnibus, CBP is working with the General Services
Administration (GSA) to ensure that our priority requirements in
locations including Otay Mesa, CA, and Alexandria Bay, NY receive much-
needed updates. We look forward to working with GSA and Congress to
ensure that our physical infrastructure meets CBP's needs now and in
the future.\1\
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\1\ Alexandria Bay, NY, Lewiston Bridge, NY, San Luis I, AZ, Otay
Mesa, CA, Blaine, WA, and Calexico West, CA have been identified as
priority requirements in the President's fiscal year 2019 budget.
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CBP is actively engaging with our Nation's best minds in and
outside of Government to find innovative solutions to the challenges
facing our country. For example, groundbreaking software developed by
the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is giving AMO
agents the edge in combating international smugglers intent on evading
law enforcement. Minotaur, as the software is called, links sensors,
cameras, radar, and communications equipment into a single, automated
system, allowing operators to more efficiently identify and track any
suspicious or illegal activity on both land and sea. This technology,
when coupled with robust space-based satellite links, allows AMO to
increase the situational awareness of its law enforcement partners by
sharing video and radar track data real-time. As the Minotaur system
evolves, it will allow multiple aircraft to share information from
multiple sources, providing a never-before-seen level of air, land, and
maritime domain awareness for a larger number of users.
CBP is also partnering with DHS Science and Technology to access
emerging technologies and tools from startups and others. From
innovative surveillance approaches that can provide multi-sensor data
direct to our agents, to tools to protect our canines, to analyzing
data feeds, to empowering our agents on the ground with portable small
unmanned aircraft systems capability, CBP will continue to push for
more efficient and effective ways to support our personnel and carry
out our mission.
But CBP is part of a system which neither begins nor ends at our
borders, and which innovative technologies and enhanced interdiction
capabilities alone cannot prevent illegal crossings. The administration
seeks support from Congress to amend current law to facilitate the
expeditious return of Unaccompanied Alien Children (UACs) and family
units who are ineligible for relief. The administration supports
correcting the systemic deficiencies that created the asylum backlog,
and supports providing additional resources to reduce the immigration
court backlog and ensure the swift return of illegal border crossers. I
look forward to working with Congress on the legislation needed to
enhance the security of our country, ensure effective immigration and
enforcement, and protect American workers and taxpayers. These
legislative needs have a direct impact on CBP and our ability to
perform our mission.
Narcotics Interdiction
As America's unified border agency, CBP plays a critical role in
preventing dangerous drugs, including opioids, from reaching the
American public. CBP uses advanced detection equipment and technology,
including Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment and radiation
detection technologies, to maintain robust cargo, commercial
conveyance, and vehicle inspection regimes at our POEs. NII
technologies deployed to our Nation's land, sea, and air POEs include
large-scale X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, as well as a variety
of portable and hand-held technologies. NII systems enable CBP officers
to examine cargo conveyances such as shipping containers, commercial
trucks, and rail cars, as well as privately-owned vehicles, for the
presence of contraband without physically opening or unloading them.
CBP is establishing the Model Port concept as the guiding framework to
streamline the cargo and passenger vehicle inspection process to
increase the volume of vehicles examined. We anticipate completing
testing and evaluation of drive-through X-ray system pilots this year.
Additionally, we anticipate completing the technical architectural
framework that will be used within the design for the Donna, Texas land
POE through the Donations Acceptance Program. We will continue to adapt
our deployment of NII systems so that we can work smarter and faster in
detecting contraband, while expediting legitimate trade and travel.
Additionally, Operations Support's Laboratories and Scientific Services
Directorate plays a critical role in the detection of opioids and in
identifying the chemical screening devices that will help CBP target
new designer drugs, including opioids.
All told, in fiscal year 2017 CBP officers and agents seized or
disrupted over 1.9 million pounds of narcotics across the country,
including over 60,000 pounds of methamphetamine, over 330,000 pounds of
cocaine, over 4,800 pounds of heroin, and approximately 1,476 pounds of
illicit fentanyl.\2\ More than 790 pounds of illicit fentanyl have
already been seized in fiscal year 2018.
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\2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics-
fy_2017.
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CBP, with the support of Congress, has made significant investments
in and improvements to our drug detection and interdiction technology
and targeting capabilities at and in between our POEs, including in the
international mail and express consignment carrier (ECC) environments.
The United States Postal Service (USPS) receives international mail
from more than 180 countries, the vast majority of which arrives via
commercial air or surface transportation. An increasing number of
foreign postal operators provide advance electronic data (AED) to USPS,
which is then passed on to CBP.
CBP and the USPS are currently conducting an AED pilot on express
mail and e-packets from select countries at five of our main
International Mail Facilities (IMFs) to target high-risk shipments,
with plans for further expansion. USPS is responsible for locating the
shipments and delivering them to CBP for examination. Thus far in
fiscal year 2018, CBP has interdicted 186 shipments of fentanyl at the
John F. Kennedy International Airport IMF, a participant in the AED
pilot program. One hundred and twenty-five of those interdictions can
be attributed to AED targeting. We support efforts to expand the
ability of USPS to collect fees to help offset the additional cost
associated with building the capacity of foreign postal operators to
implement AED collection, to develop new scanning technology, and to
greatly increase the availability of AED for international mail.
Recent agreements between USPS and foreign postal operators
regarding AED have increased CBP's ability to target high-risk
shipments. Currently in the international mail environment CBP receives
AED on over 40 percent of all international mail shipments with goods.
The volume of mail and the potentially hazardous nature of various
types of illicit drugs presents challenges to CBP's interdiction
efforts in the international mail environment. CBP will continue to
work with USPS and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to address the
issue of AED and, through its participation on U.S. delegations to
meetings of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), is working to expand the
use of AED globally in ways consistent with the United States'
international obligations as a member of the UPU.
build and develop partnerships
CBP is committed to fulfilling our complex missions and to do that,
we are working with our partners across the country and around the
world. I am actively seeking to deepen our partnerships across all
levels of government and with our international counterparts to ensure
that information is shared quickly, resources are spent where they are
most needed, and that the American people and economy are kept safe.
Counter-Terrorism
Since September 11, the U.S. Government has improved information
sharing regarding known or suspected terrorists (KSTs), including by
creating the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The TSC is a multi-
agency organization administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and is responsible for managing and sharing the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB) which contains identity information on
international and domestic KSTs. We have also worked closely with our
foreign partners to deepen bilateral and international information
sharing to enhance the depth and quality of our information holdings.
For example, CBP offers its automated targeting system-global (ATS-
G) software, along with technical assistance, to potential
international partners. ATS-G is similar to the software used at the
National Targeting Center (NTC) and evolved from decades of experience
designing and operating passenger and cargo targeting systems. The
software can vastly improve how travelers flying in and out of a
country are vetted.
CBP also created the global travel assessment system (GTAS). GTAS
permits foreign countries to independently perform vetting activities
without the collaboration involved with ATS-G. Launched in 2016, GTAS
is free and designed for rapid use. The software is easily downloaded
from a special CBP website and ready to use. It can also be used to
improve an existing vetting system because the coding allows nations to
customize the software or just download the portions that meet their
needs.
GTAS is comparable to ATS-G because GTAS also automatically
evaluates passenger manifests in real time to identify suspicious
travelers or crew members who may pose a National security risk and
require a closer assessment. Using GTAS, governments can screen
suspects before they enter or leave that nation. Since the software is
new, CBP is working with the World Customs Organization in Brussels, a
group that promotes trade and supply chain security, to promote this
software. In an interconnected world, it is more important than ever
that countries conduct these risk assessments, and CBP is helping
advance global security through ATS-G, GTAS, and the expertise of the
NTC.
National Targeting Center (NTC)
At CBP's NTC, advance data and access to law enforcement and
intelligence records converge to facilitate the targeting of travelers
and cargo that pose the highest risk to our security in all modes of
inbound transportation. The NTC takes in large amounts of data and uses
sophisticated targeting tools and subject-matter expertise to analyze,
assess, and segment risk at every stage in the cargo/shipment and
travel life cycles. As the focal point of that strategy, the NTC
leverages classified, law enforcement, commercial, and open-source
information in unique, proactive ways to identify high-risk travelers
and shipments at the earliest possible point prior to arrival in the
United States.
To bolster its targeting mission, the dedicated men and women of
the NTC collaborate with critical partners on a daily basis, including
ICE Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI), the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the FBI, members of the intelligence community
(IC), and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). ICE-HSI and USPIS
investigative case data is fused with CBP targeting information to
bolster investigations targeting illicit narcotics smuggling and
trafficking organizations. Moreover, NTC works in close coordination
with several pertinent task forces, including the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), the High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Areas, the Joint Interagency Task Force--West (JIATF-W), the HS Joint
Task Force--West (JTF-W), and DHS Joint Task Force--Investigations
(JTF-I).
National Vetting Center
On February 6, 2018, President Trump ordered the establishment of a
National Vetting Center (NVC), to be managed by DHS under the guidance
of a newly-established National Vetting Governance Board. CBP will be a
key component helping lead the implementation of the NVC. The NVC will
be co-located with the NTC to leverage its existing capabilities,
workforce, system capabilities, network connections, and interagency
presence. The NVC will provide front-line Government personnel with the
information they need to keep terrorists, criminals, and other threats
out of the country. Consistent with applicable law and policy, it will
ensure that international travelers and visa and immigration benefit
applicants are vetted against all appropriate U.S. Government
information to identify National security and public safety threats.
Border Security
The number of individuals apprehended while trying to enter the
country illegally in between established POEs, and in those presenting
themselves for entry without proper documentation along our Southwest
Border, increased by 37 percent from February to March 2018. When
compared to March 2017, the increase is an extraordinary 203
percent.\3\ CBP is committed to working with our domestic and
international Government partners to secure our border and anticipate--
and even prevent--increases in apprehensions.
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\3\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration.
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To enhance CBP's capability in Southwest Border sectors the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD), in conjunction with border State
Governors, has begun deploying the National Guard to assist in stopping
the flow of deadly drugs and other contraband, gang members and other
criminals, and illegal aliens into this country. Initial forces are
already on the ground. The National Guard will assist CBP by providing
logistical and administrative support, operating detection systems,
providing mobile communications, augmenting border-related intelligence
analysis efforts, and repairing border infrastructure. National Guard
members will provide added surveillance, engineering, administrative,
and mechanical support to our agents on the front line to allow them to
focus on their primary responsibility of securing our border. National
Guard personnel will not conduct law enforcement activities, will not
be assigned responsibilities that require direct contact with migrants,
and will not be assigned missions that require them to be armed. This
deployment will allow CBP to send front-line personnel back to the
border and raise our interdiction and efficiency rates. CBP is working
with DHS and DOD to ensure a seamless coordination of efforts.
Throughout Central America, CBP leverages its Attache and Advisor
network to engage local immigration, border management, and police
authorities, as well as our Federal partners such as the DOS
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and ICE to enhance security and
promote prosperity in the region. CBP efforts in the region include
training, mentoring, and sharing best practices with local law
enforcement; making customs processes more efficient and transparent to
enhance trade facilitation; and build the capacity of law enforcement
in each country to counter drug smuggling activities, monitor, track,
and deter the illicit migration of third-country nationals, and
facilitate cross-border coordination.
CBP hosts monthly briefings/teleconferences with Federal, State,
and local partners regarding the current state of the border--both
Northern and Southern--to monitor emerging trends and threats and
provide a cross-component, multi-agency venue for discussing trends and
threats. The monthly briefings focus on drugs, weapons, and currency
interdictions and alien apprehensions both at and between the POEs.
These briefings/teleconferences currently include participants from:
The Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico, the Government of
Australia, ICE, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), DEA, FBI, DOD's U.S. Northern
Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern
Command, Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S), the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), U.S. Attorneys'
Offices (USAOs), Naval Investigative Command, State and Major Urban
Area Fusion Centers, and other international, Federal, State, and local
law enforcement as appropriate.
The Office of Intelligence (OI) hosts a bi-weekly fusion forum to
facilitate an open discussion with CBP's Federal, State, local, and
international partners on emerging trends and patterns, specific
problem sets confronted by each organization, and each organization's
attempts to address them. Additionally, OI personnel take part in a
variety of weekly or monthly conference calls related to a variety of
issues affecting CBP's mission including narcotics, terrorism, trade,
and migration.
CBP is enhancing our collaboration with other DHS components to
leverage the unique resources, authorities, and capabilities of each
agency to more effectively and efficiently execute our border security
missions against drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal
organizations, and other threats and challenges. Under the Department's
Unity of Effort initiative the JTF-W, JTF-East, and JTF-I operations
also increase information sharing with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies, improve border-wide criminal intelligence-led
interdiction operations, and address transnational threats.
Extended Border: Source and Transit Zone Operations
AMO's significant contribution of aerial support to the JIATF-S
mission \4\ to detect and monitor aerial and maritime transit of
illegal drugs into the United States has been critical to JIATF-S's
continued success. AMO's P-3s fixed-wing aircraft are an integral part
of the successful counter-narcotic missions with the JIATF-S. P-3s
patrol a 42 million-square-mile area that includes more than 41
nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard
approaches to the United States. Already in fiscal year 2018, AMO
involvement in the JIATF-S mission has resulted in the seizure of
52,839 pounds of cocaine, with a wholesale value of $711 million.
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\4\ Title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 statutory obligatory.
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International Trade Coordination and Facilitation
On March 26, 2018, I was in Mexico City to sign a memorandum of
cooperation with Osvaldo Santin, Chief of Mexico's Tax Administration
Service, to help our two countries better cooperate on trade and
customs compliance, as well as combat illicit activities. Issues
covered under this memorandum include anti-dumping duties, counterfeit
merchandise, and substandard pharmaceuticals.
Additionally, CBP and the Mexican tax service signed a memorandum
of understanding on a cargo pre-inspection program and Unified Cargo
Processing (UCP). UCP currently operates at seven ports of entry along
the U.S.-Mexico border, with the memorandum merging two more cargo pre-
inspection sites into UCP. UCP eliminates duplicative inspection
efforts while reducing border wait times and costs for the private
sector. The new agreement looks to expand the process to possibly more
than a dozen locations. CBP and the National Service for Agro-
Alimentary Public Health, Safety, and Quality--Mexico's agency
responsible for inspecting incoming goods for pests and diseases--also
signed an agreement to enable collaboration between the two agencies on
agriculture safeguarding, agriculture quarantine inspections at ports
of entry, and information sharing. The memorandum promotes cooperation
and information sharing to enable the United States to handle
legitimate and safe shipments quickly while addressing those that pose
a risk.
Collaboration with our Trade Partners in the Private Sector
CBP is actively engaging with our trade partners in the private
sector. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
(TFTEA) empowered CBP to collaborate with our partners in new ways, and
CBP remains committed to enforcing trade law in accordance with the
mandates of TFTEA and in close collaboration with our partners across
Government and the private sector while facilitating legitimate trade.
The Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC) advises
the Secretaries of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and DHS on all
matters involving the commercial operations of CBP, including advising
on significant proposed changes to regulations, policies, or practices.
The trade environment is changing rapidly. Most notably, CBP has seen a
nearly 50 percent increase in express consignment and international
mail shipments over the past 5 years. In fiscal year 2013, CBP
processed over 76 million express bills and, in fiscal year 2017, CBP
processed approximately 110 million bills. In fiscal year 2013, CBP and
the USPS processed approximately 150 million international mail
shipments. By fiscal year 2017, the number of international mail
shipments had swelled to over 400 million.
As new e-commerce participants may not know they are importers, or
understand the responsibilities of being an importer, COAC identified
the need for a mechanism to educate the public. COAC also identified
the need for better data collection, automation, and a legal framework
for sharing data. The working group also identified education and
outreach as a need. As a follow-up to recent meetings, the working
group developed recommendations that CBP is working to implement.
transforming cbp
As international trade and travel grow, so too does CBP's workload
and the expectations on our people and systems. I am committed to
ensuring that we meet those expectations, and the new and changing
demands placed on CBP, with the utmost professionalism in keeping with
the CBP vision: To serve as the premier law enforcement agency
enhancing the Nation's safety, security, and prosperity through
collaboration, innovation, and integration.
Biometric Exit
Since fiscal year 2013, CBP has led the entry/exit mission,
including research and development of biometric exit programs. A
comprehensive entry/exit system that leverages both biographic and
biometric data is key to supporting DHS's mission. Adding biometrics
provides greater assurance of the information already collected by CBP
and will allow for future facilitated processing upon both entry and
exit. CBP will use a traveler's face as the primary way of identifying
the traveler to facilitate entry and exit from the United States, while
simultaneously leveraging fingerprint records from most foreign
visitors, such as are collected during entry processing, to check
derogatory holdings and perform other law enforcement checks. This
innovative structure will make it possible to confirm the identity of
travelers at any point in their travel, while at the same time
establishing a comprehensive biometric air exit system.
Using the Traveler Verification Service (TVS), CBP has re-
architected data flows and data systems to pre-stage biometric data
throughout the travel process. TVS, a robust cloud-based service,
serves as the backbone to verify traveler identity across the air,
land, and sea travel modes of operation. TVS uses biometric data to
retrieve all associated traveler facial images from DHS holdings and
segregate them into smaller, more manageable data sets, for example, by
flight, by cruise, or by frequent border crossers. It fuses biometric
and biographic information, enabling the biometric data to be the key
to verifying traveler identity with the advance data. CBP has
demonstrated the capabilities of TVS at airports across the United
States \5\ as well as in the sea environment and plans to pilot the
capability at land POEs in 2018.
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\5\ Washington Dulles International Airport (June 2017); Atlanta
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (June 2017 upgrade
demonstration capability; original pilot in 2016); Houston George Bush
Intercontinental Airport (June 2017); Chicago O'Hare International
Airport (July 2017); Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (July
2017); Houston William P. Hobby Airport (August 2017); John F. Kennedy
International Airport (August 2017); Miami International Airport
(October 2017)
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CBP is continuing to discuss with additional airlines how they can
be incorporated into the program, and we are ready to partner with any
airline or airport that wishes to use biometrics to expedite the travel
process for its customers. One of our biometric exit partners has told
us that the new process allows it to board an A380, the largest
passenger plane in wide operation in the world, in less than 20
minutes.
In the land border environment CBP will conduct a technology
demonstration for ``at speed'' facial biometric capture camera
technology on vehicle inbound and outbound travelers at our land POEs.
CBP will utilize operational facilities at the Anzalduas, Texas, POE to
evaluate performance of ``at-speed'' facial technology including
determining optimal equipment placement, number of cameras necessary to
capture photos beyond the driver, and establish performance baselines.
Comparative analysis will be performed on facial recognition
matching algorithms being developed by academia and industry on images
captured during the technology demonstration against traveler photos on
file in Government holdings. CBP will create a gallery of expected
border crossers and validate the concept of ``face as a token'' and
close the arrival departure reporting gap in the vehicle environment.
The technology demonstration will begin in 2018.
Simplified Arrival
Our new simplified arrival process quickly and reliably uses the
traveler's face to biometrically verify identity and retrieve traveler
records from our systems. This eliminates manual, time-consuming steps
for most travelers, such as document scans and fingerprint captures,
which speeds up the inspection process. Simplified Arrival is the first
step in re-envisioning the entirety of how travelers arrive in the
United States. With a faster clearance process, airlines, airports, and
travelers benefit from shorter connection times and standardized
arrival procedures. Our initial pilot programs in Miami have shown that
arriving passengers can clear the immigration and customs area 35
percent faster using the new biometric process.
CBP is committed to working with our travel industry partners to
transform the international travel process and enhance the passenger
experience. CBP's goal is to integrate best practices into existing
processes and infrastructure to ensure a seamless, secure travel
experience for everyone.
Web-based service
We are committed to making sure that travel is secure and
straightforward. For example, in January 2018, CBP launched two new
traveler compliance initiatives to make it easier for Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) travelers to check the status of their stay in the United
States and remain in compliance with the terms of their admission. A
new feature added to the I-94 website under the ``View Compliance'' tab
allows VWP travelers to check the status of their admission to the
United States. This check will inform travelers of the number of days
remaining on their lawful admission or the number of days they have
remained past their admitted until date. In addition, CBP will now send
an email notification to VWP travelers who are still in the United
States 10 days prior to the expiration of their lawful admission
period. CBP has taken these proactive steps to help inform and remind
travelers of the terms of their admission and to prevent travelers from
overstaying.
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)
With the strong support of Congress, CBP reached an historic
milestone on February 24, 2018, deploying the last of the major
scheduled core trade processing capabilities in the Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE). ACE is the ``Single Window'' through
which all import and export data are reported by industry to more than
47 partner Government agencies, automating 269 different forms and
streamlining trade processes. Built on a modernized platform, ACE has
resulted in a 44 percent reduction in wait times for truck processing
at land POEs and the 68 times faster processing of bonds.
Looking ahead, CBP will focus on sustaining all deployed ACE
capabilities and ensuring ACE operates as a highly available, reliable
system. There is an on-going demand for additional and enhanced ACE
capabilities, and CBP will continue to collaborate with the trade
community, partner Government agencies, and stakeholders to implement
automated solutions that advance secure shipments, streamline trade
processes and support the strong enforcement of trade laws. This
includes increased focus on the rise of e-commerce and high-volume, low
value shipments, an aspect of the U.S. economy that presents
enforcement and trade facilitation challenges. System enhancements to
enable de minimis functionality will provide CBP access to previously
unavailable admissibility data for low-value shipments, resulting in
improved cargo processing and use of enforcement resources.
Transparency and Accountability
As commissioner, I am committed to ensuring transparency and
employee accountability regarding the use of force. The CBP National
Use of Force Review Board (NUFRB) is a review committee established to
review all significant use of force incidents--those that result in
serious bodily injury or death and those that involve the discharge of
a firearm,\6\ regardless of the outcome. The NUFRB is comprised of
senior officials from across CBP, as well as officials from DHS and
DOJ. As of October 2017, there have been 11 meetings of the board.
These meetings have reviewed 36 significant use of force incidents. CBP
recently completed a web-based tracking system for recommendations made
by the NUFRB.
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\6\ Excluding the euthanasia of an animal and AMO vessel disabling
fire or warning shots.
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Local Use of Force Review Boards (LUFRBs) were established to
conduct an objective review of the use of less-lethal devices not
addressed by the NUFRB. The LUFRBs provide CBP senior leadership with
an objective assessment of less-lethal force incidents from a regional
committee of leadership from components within CBP. CBP recently
initiated the development of a web-based tracking system for cases that
come before the LUFRB. This system will track the consideration and
disposition of cases heard by the LUFRBs. These systems will help us
hold one another accountable to the public--and to ourselves.
As part of CBP's continued emphasis on transparency and
accountability, CBP is also beginning to implement Incident-Driven
Video Recording Systems (IDVRS). CBP is first conducting a thorough
field evaluation (March-September 2018) and analysis to provide more
thorough information concerning the expansion of audio and video
recording capabilities through the incorporation of IDVRS. In an effort
to maintain a high level of transparency, CBP recently conducted a
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). The goal of the evaluation was to
determine the effectiveness of fixed, vehicle, and body-worn camera
technology to provide an accurate representation of law enforcement
encounters, while allowing CBP officers and agents to safely perform
their duties. CBP published the PIA to evaluate the privacy concerns
associated with CBP's use of incident-driven video recording technology
at and between POEs and to inform the public of potential privacy
concerns associated with the deployment of body-worn cameras and other
audio/video recording devices, as well as CBP's planned efforts to
mitigate those potential privacy concerns. The PIA is now available on
the DHS website.\7\
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\7\ https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhscbppia-052-incident-driven-
video-recording-systems-idvrs-evaluation.
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Body-worn cameras alone may not be the proper solution. CBP seeks
to determine the most effective and efficient solution to an IDVRS
strategy, including a comprehensive incorporation of body-worn,
vehicle-mounted, and permanently-fixed camera systems, to help CBP
further fulfill our commitment to transparency and accountability. We
will continue to pursue initiatives that advance our integrity and
transparency.
conclusion
The border environment in which CBP works is dynamic and requires
continual adaptation to respond to emerging threats and rapidly
changing conditions. I am proud of CBP's dedicated workforce, who
continue to meet these challenges with integrity and commitment. The
challenges facing our Nation are considerable. However, with the
talents and energy of the people of CBP, along with the support of the
administration and Congress, we will continue to make great strides in
the months and years ahead.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress, and I look
forward to your questions.

Ms. McSally. Thank you, Commissioner, and I recognize
myself for 5 minutes for questions.
We have been working on closing these legal loopholes for a
while, and I want to recognize that my bill, along the Chairman
McCaul and Goodlatte and Labrador, we address these issues, but
for the public out there, the layman, our constituents, maybe
they don't understand what we are talking about, right?
We are talking about how even if you have the will and the
desire in order to secure the border and with your CBP
personnel and your Border Patrol agents, if you catch someone,
you are able to swiftly be able to send them back and then that
deters others from coming and then it also stops the profits of
the cartels, that these loopholes do not allow that to happen
and we referenced it today. But can you paint it in layman's
terms what the issue is and how it is being exploited by these
cartels?
This caravan has gotten a lot of attention where there is a
large group of people coming here. Many of them will also
exploit this loophole, but it is happening every single day in
the communities along the border. So can you--give you an
opportunity to just talk through those and why it is so
important that we in Congress close these loopholes so that you
can do your job.
Mr. McAleenan. Sure. Thank you, Chairwoman. I would be
happy to talk through the loopholes.
What we are facing at the border--and our sector chief and
Rio Grande Valley, which is seeing about 50 percent of our
apprehensions Nationally, has invented a new term to address
the increasing traffic.
You highlighted some of it in your opening statement. As
opposed to 90 percent adults in a migrant workforce that we saw
in the past, we are now seeing 40 percent kids and families
crossing the border. He is taking the calling of these
populations nonimpactables, meaning that there is no
consequence, there is no response to an illegal entry for these
groups.
For unaccompanied children, I think you need only look at
the disparity between Mexican nationals and children from
Central America and further away. About 96 percent of Mexican
unaccompanied children are returned within 3 years. That number
drops to 3 percent for people from other countries.
Essentially, once a Border Patrol agent apprehends them,
and usually they are actually looking for a Border Patrol agent
once they cross the border, they are taken into custody,
processed, and quickly turned over via our partners at
Immigration and Customs Enforcement to Health and Human
Services where they can be properly cared for.
They then have their sponsor vetted and they are turned
over by Health and Human Services to someone living in the
United States, possibly illegally. So that is the process for
an unaccompanied child.
For a member of the family unit, if they are apprehended,
and again, they are not always seeking to evade Border Patrol
agents. Sometimes they are picked up relatively routinely right
at the border line. They are turned over to ICE. ICE takes them
to a family residential facility where they are processed and
detained, generally for less than 20 days. That is the expected
standard due to court decisions in the Ninth Circuit.
They are then released pending a court hearing, which could
happen many years out, and in the mean time they are living
here with authorization to be employed. This is a real
challenge, because that first threshold of determining whether
somebody may have a fear of returning to their country is very
low, so a very high percentage gets that. But the ultimate
court decision doesn't come for many years, so it creates a
significant pull factor for others.
Then the third category is adults that claim fear, that
also go through that asylum process and spend time here in
between that initial determination of fear and that ultimate
court decision, which could be many years out due to the
significant backlog in our immigration courts.
So, for a Border Patrol agent on the border, they want to
protect the American people from threats. They don't want to
interdict and process people that are coming to claim asylum
between ports of entry. It is not a good process. The status
quo is not acceptable.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. I appreciate you expanding on that.
I mean, the thing that is--the insanity is that essentially the
message is to any transnational criminal organization or really
anybody, just get yourself, get your kid, just get to the
boarder, look for someone, turn yourself in, say the right
words, and then you can disappear into the interior of the
United States with a very small percentage showing up for their
court date in the future. Correct?
Mr. McAleenan. That is correct. That is exactly right. The
transnational criminal organizations are preying on these
individuals. They are charging them $5,000 to $10,000 to
smuggle them to the border and allow them to use their area of
the border to cross. That enriches organizations that are
threatening the security and safety of Mexican citizens. It
puts those children at risk of assault and violence in the
process.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. So can you talk about the caravan
then? Then I will yield back and we will do another round, but
can you talk about the caravan and how this is impacting--
everyone is sort of watching this all happen with this big
caravan, but this is happening every day in smaller numbers.
Mr. McAleenan. Right. I think the caravan highlights the
challenge that the loopholes present. If we don't have
alignment in migration policy between countries, destination
and transit countries, if we don't have a statutory regime that
has loopholes closed, this invites groups like this to try to
come to our border and come into the United States in this
irregular fashion.
So we are going to enforce the immigration law. We are
going to absolutely treat claims of fear and protection fairly
as we encounter this group. But it presents a challenge and I
just think is highlighting publicly the issues that we are
facing in the statutory regime.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, and I yield back. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Vela.
Mr. Vela. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally. After we passed--
after the House passed the spending bill, the House Democratic
leader issued this statement. Democrats want explicit language
restricting border construction to the same see-through fencing
that was already authorized under current law.
What I am wondering if that is true or not, because when we
take a look at the provision for $445 million in primary
pedestrian levee fencing, that comes out to $17 million a mile.
Can you elaborate on that? Because $17 million a mile doesn't
sound like it is just see-through fencing.
Mr. McAleenan. So I think we are maybe covering a couple
different topics together. The 2017 appropriated funding is for
a replacement wall in El Paso sector, in El Centro sector, and
San Diego----
Mr. Vela. Yes, 2017. I am talking 2018.
Mr. McAleenan. Two-thousand eighteen, there is specific
appropriations for Rio Grande Valley levee wall in Hidalgo
County. That is a similar wall to what we built in 2008. That
is actually not see-through, because it is a concrete wall that
helps protect the levee. It is a hydraulic wall. That is
consistent with the appropriations language, and it is
something that we are working on planning and designing right
now to build.
Mr. Vela. Yes, and that was precisely my question, because
the statement seemed to be untrue, because that money is for a
concrete levee wall, right?
Mr. McAleenan. Yes, the language restricted to previous and
similar designs, to previous efforts, and that concrete wall is
very similar.
Mr. Vela. Now, in anticipation of our hearing today, I had
some constituents actually e-mail, because representing the Rio
Grande Valley sector, you can imagine there are people watching
what we do. But I had one question from a constituent. In its
end of year report, CBP reported a 45 percent increase in
assaults over fiscal year 2016, over 847 assaults in fiscal
year 2017.
Assaults against law enforcement personnel were led by U.S.
Border Patrol, accounting for 93 percent of overall assaults
and--reporting 6 percent of total assaults. I understand that
the method for counting and tracking assaults on CBP personal
changed a few years ago. Can you describe how these types of
incidents are counted and if the methodology changed or not?
Mr. McAleenan. Sure. First, I am very proud of the men and
women who secure our border and face dangers every day on
behalf of the American people. They are often subject to
assault and violence in carrying out their duties.
We are talking about violent transnational criminal
organizations that are often heavily armed that are prepared
for encounters with law enforcement, and I am very proud of how
they conduct themselves.
One of the areas where we have taken steps to increase our
transparency is publishing a lot of data on our enforcement
encounters, both in terms of our use of force by our agents and
officers but also on the force that they face as they are
patrolling the border.
So for our agents, we published two different sets of data
simultaneously, the number of incidents of assault and the
number of assaults, which could include the number of people
mounting an assault, the number of agents that are impacted, or
the weapons that are used in an assault.
So those two numbers are both transparently reported. We
did see a spike, an increase last year in the assaults. I think
that is a testament to the intensity of those incidents. We
think it is appropriate to report both numbers to inform the
public what our officers and agents are facing.
Mr. Vela. I know you and I are going to meet afterwards, so
I will go into some of this other stuff later. Let me ask about
this. With respect to infrastructure, can you tell us how much
funding is needed to fully modernize land ports of entry? Is
the donation authority program sufficient to make up this
funding shortage?
Mr. McAleenan. So, you know, that is a great question,
Congressmen. Our land ports of entry are critical to the
economy of the United States, to the legitimate flow of trade
and travel. You are absolutely right, there is a deficit in
investment in ports of entry that is decades-long that we need
to continue to work with Congress to fund.
CBP has developed a prioritized list in partnership with
GSA, the Department of Transportation, the Department of
Commerce, and our cross-border international partners where we
need port of entry investment. Each year, we work to fit as
much of that as we can in concert with GSA within the annual
budget caps.
But really, we have about a $4 billion deficit in ports of
entry. So the donation acceptance program which allows us to
work with private-sector entities, with cities and State and
local governments like you referenced in South Texas, meet some
of that need and provides flexibility where there is a return
on investment.
But we are going to continue to need appropriated support
for those gateways of international commerce that support all
50 States.
Mr. Vela. Well, thank you.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes
Mr. Rogers from Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It was obvious from
your first remarks in your opening statement that you recognize
that the most valuable component of your border security system
are people. We will talk about that more in a minute. But aside
from that, when you look at border infrastructure, what do you
think is the most critical component that you have to have to
secure that border, the Southwest Border?
Mr. McAleenan. For security? So it is not coming from me.
It is coming from our agents and our chiefs on the ground, who
through a process every year called the capabilities gap
analysis--that is then analyzed by our headquarters operations
team--tell us what they need to secure that border.
They have consistently identified four master capabilities.
The first is impedance and denial. That is the ability to stop
someone from easily crossing and disappearing--we call it
vanishing time--into the United States, into infrastructure and
U.S. side.
The second is situational awareness, being able to see what
is happening on that border through technology.
Third is access and mobility, the ability to reach that
border and move laterally along it so that they can affect
interdictions.
Last is mission readiness. That is our people and the
communications equipment they carry with them to get to those
spots.
Mr. Rogers. The No. 1 ability to impede is a wall or
barrier, correct?
Mr. McAleenan. Border barrier is a proven technique. We
have got 654 miles of it. It has been effective where we have
applied it, reducing crossings 90 percent and more in key areas
of San Diego, Yuma, El Paso, Nogales. It is a critical
capability.
Mr. Rogers. You just talked with the Ranking Member about
the funds that you have had to work with. Do you have enough to
be able to meet that challenge on that first component of
border security?
Mr. McAleenan. So, first of all, we appreciate the
President's request, listening to agents on the ground and what
they need to secure the border between ports of entry. This is
a significant investment in 2017 and 2018 in border wall.
Almost $2 billion combined. That will help us get started.
It is certainly a significant replacement wall. The RGV
wall that Congressman Vela alluded to, both a levee wall, which
we are working on 25 miles of levee wall in Hidalgo County as
well as 8 miles now in Starr County are important investments
in our highest traffic sector that we are working hard to get
built.
Mr. Rogers. Well, it was obvious from your outline of your
priorities that border security is a system. It is not any one
thing. One of the things that you have listed--I think it was
your No. 3 item--was technology. When it comes to procuring
technology, can you describe for us your process for what you
decide you need next and how you pursue that?
Mr. McAleenan. Sure. Actually, we have had a lot of
innovation in that side of our process lately by working with
DHS science and technology to try to access more innovative
technologies that are being developed by start-ups and provide
a much faster cycle from identifying a capability that we could
use in the hands of our agents and officers and then a
contracting with a start-up to start piloting it and ultimately
apply it.
We are doing that in multiple areas. A situational
awareness system for our Border Patrol agents where they can
have right there on a smartphone the picture from all the
sensors in their area. They can know where their fellow agents
are. For our trade professionals that are working on
identifying threats, intellectual property rights, or supply
chain elements that are by forced labor.
We have a contract on big data to help us analyze all the
trade information flowing at us. For our canine teams that are
working in 120 degree heat, say, in Calexico, California, we
are looking at wearable technology to keep them safe and really
trying to keep it that cutting-edge.
So it is really two things. It is the long-term planning on
things that our integrated fixed towers where we have an on-
going year-over-year contract with capable major systems
integrators, but also trying to access that emerging technology
and apply it more quickly and get it in the hands of our
agents. They don't want to show up at work and put their
smartphone on the dashboard. They want to be able to take that
with them and apply its capabilities as they patrol.
Mr. Rogers. Well, speaking of that, in March, the Acting
Deputy Commissioner Vitiello told the subcommittee that fiber
optic detection was something they wanted to incorporate. Is
that something you still plan to do into your security systems?
Mr. McAleenan. Absolutely. That is a core component of what
we are calling a border wall system. I didn't answer that part
of Congressman's Vela question fully. The difference in cost of
what we are proposing now from what we built in 2006 or 2008 is
that instead of just building a physical structure, we are
integrating the entire system, the sensors, the lighting, the
cameras and the access and control roads that we need to make
it effective. So it is a total cost, and for the property
acquisition, it is a total cost, not just one piece of it.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I hope you have success, because I have
been trying to do that for the 16 years I have been here. It
has never been a challenge that was met. Last, I hope you have
success on trying to deal with your retention problems. It is
hard to keep those folks on that border when they can make so
much more money in a big urban area.
It is such a difficult environment to work in, but I hope
you are successful. With that, I am sorry, my time is expired.
I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Correa from California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chairperson McSally and of
course Chairman McCaul for your time and Ranking Member
Thompson and Ranking Member Vela and of course Commissioner
McAleenan for being here today.
I come from the State of California. Today we are probably
the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, and we are
probably looking at becoming the No. 4 economy in the world
since we passed up Great Britain. Unemployment right now in my
county is less than 3 percent.
Big ag industry in my State, my farmers keep talking about
the need for more workers. I think we can all agree that our
immigration laws are broken in this country. Maybe not. But one
thing we can all agree on is the issue of drug addiction,
opioids, heroin, and the challenges it presents to our country.
It is my understanding that addiction deaths up about 500
percent in this country right now, all over the country so the
issue of illegal drugs is a major one for all of us and I think
all of us can agree on that.
As we talk about those precious taxpayer dollars we have in
this country, I wish we would have a matrix to measure what is
effective and what is not in terms of, as we call it,
addressing the border. Thirty years ago, the major port of
entry for a lot of our drugs was Miami and as we tightened down
on Miami the shift in drugs went from the seas to inland going
through Mexico. Results were Mexico was effectively
destabilized because of all the drugs running through Mexico,
as well as the money, as well as the arms.
As we began to squeeze in that area, we will probably find
Canada to be a major port of entry. Just where you are sitting
Commissioner a few months ago, we had the commandant of the
Coast Guard speaking. His testimony 2016, 580 ships that he
knew were caring drugs could not be stopped because they didn't
have the assets in the Coast Guard to interject those ships as
they were coming in from Latin America; 580 ships with drugs
could not be stopped that we knew were heading to our shores.
So as we are looking at the effectiveness of a wall, in
your words, it is an effective, proven tool. How does that
compare to, for example, additional border agents at our ports
of entry? I have gone to San Ysidro, California, the biggest
entry, the biggest port, the biggest crossed border port in the
world, and I have talked to those agents. What they have told
me is give us more dogs, give us more X-ray machines, give us
more trained personnel we can do better job.
As I talk to those agents, you can see them smiling from
one end of their face to the other when I asked them about,
tell me, how is it that you were able to spot that big shipment
of drugs coming through? It wasn't about a wall. It was about
trained agents being able to spot something irregular in that
vehicle coming across the border.
So as we look at the American taxpayer, looking at how much
we need to spend and we need to spend more on interjecting
drugs, where would you say our priority is in terms of
investment, on a wall, X-ray machines, trained personnel,
trained dogs? I know you are going to say all of it is good,
but if you had a buck, what would you spend it on first?
Mr. McAleenan. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
You predicted accurately that I was going to tell you it is a
balanced package of all of that.
Mr. Correa. Sir, I know it is balanced, but if I had to
prioritize, where would you place your money first?
Mr. McAleenan. Well, Congress is helping prioritize by
investing in our personnel.
Mr. Correa. Sir, how would you prioritize that investment?
Mr. McAleenan. I would prioritize it in an even posture,
because----
Mr. Correa. So you say all of the above.
Mr. McAleenan [continuing]. Because we can't put it all in
one area and not the other.
Mr. Correa. Dogs, trained agents, X-ray machines, a wall,
they are all equally----
Mr. McAleenan. Right.
Mr. Correa [continuing]. Effective at the border in
stopping drugs.
Mr. McAleenan. The fiscal year 2018 budget, which we
appreciate greatly, has a nice balanced investment in all of
those things. It is--nonintrusive inspection----
Mr. Correa. But, sir, in your opinion as a professional,
where do you think those dollars are the most effectively
invested? I know what those border agents told me in San
Ysidro. In your opinion, where are they most effectively
invested?
Mr. McAleenan. So, at the ports of entry, there are two
things. It is nonintrusive inspection technology, which
includes the X-rays so we can get more vehicles through them.
These are deep consealants that challenge our officers, more
canines----
Mr. Correa. I am running out of time, so let ask you----
Mr. McAleenan. And more CBP officers.
Mr. Correa. Compared to that border, it is not one, it is
the whole border, where is that money most effectively invested
to interdict drug shipments?
Mr. McAleenan. For hard narcotics, it is nonintrusive
inspection technology. That is the most important.
Mr. Correa. Madam Chair, I am out of time.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes Ms. Demings from Florida for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman, and to
the Ranking Member, as well. Commissioner, it is good to see
you. Congratulations on your confirmation.
Since 2009, the Orlando International Airport has seen its
international passenger arrivals increase by 89 percent, yet
the number of Custom and Border Patrol officers have stayed
relatively flat.
As a former law enforcement officer, I was assigned out at
OIA for a good number of years and so I know the critical role
that your agency serves. The airport authority has invested
millions of dollars in automatic passport control kiosks and
other technology. But in 2007, Customs and Border Patrol
officers serving at Orlando International Airport were notified
that some of the officers would be redeployed for about 90 days
to the Southwest Border crossings.
These temporary assignments would definitely--would
continue indefinitely. At the time, CBP official also made
statements--or officials also made statements that these
assignments are beneficial to both the temporary duty locations
as well as to their permanently assigned place because they had
gained broader experience.
Could you please tell me, how does CBP determine which
ports of entry will temporarily deploy officers to the
Southwest Border? More broadly, how are you prioritizing
personnel and resources for the ports of entry? I understand
the--I guess I would say marching orders to--to the border but
we are also extremely concerned about our ports of entry, as
well.
Mr. McAleenan. Sure. Thank you for that question. First of
all, we have tremendous relationship with Orlando International
Airport. Recently we have been piloting facial recognition
technology with Orlando, and they are so impressed by the
effectiveness that they are looking at expanding that
partnership with us.
You are absolutely right. They have invested through a
similar program to the donation acceptance program that we were
talking about earlier by partnering with us to facilitate that
travel, so that 89 percent growth in 2013 and 2014 were
actually able to reduce wait times. We have been able to stay
on top of that, through that partnership and through applying
enhanced technology, increased global entry membership, and I
think facial recognition is going to take us to the next level
on facilitating those entries.
I am also glad you asked about staffing at ports of entry
more broadly----
Mrs. Demings. Yes, how do you prioritize which ports you
are going to take from----
Mr. McAleenan. Sure.
Mrs. Demings [continuing]. To deploy somewhere else?
Because that certainly concerns me.
Mr. McAleenan. Understood. Just I guess the first point is,
our Southwest Border ports of entry, some of the biggest, San
Ysidro is represented as Correa mentioned as well as Calexico,
Nogales, Laredo. These are some of the toughest places we have
in terms of staffing and the traffic at the land border is
relentless, and that panoply of threats that we face at that
border provides a tremendous experience for our officers.
So we try to pull in a balanced way, from ports of entry
when we do these temporary TDYs to augment our abilities at the
Southern Border port of entry. So Orlando was probably asked
for staff at the same time that ports along the Eastern
Seaboard, in the Midwest, even the West Coast for seaports and
airports were asked to support those TDYs. So that is a rolling
basis. It is based on who is closest to their capacity for
staffing, and who needs help the most. So, that will continue
to be a future as we increase our hiring.
That said, we have hired 850 officers in the last 3 years.
We hired 200, a net 200 last year. We are expecting significant
progress this year thanks to the funding for 328 additional
officers. That continues to be a hiring priority for us.
I think it is maybe misunderstood that we are not asking
for officers. We actually are. We are sending a workload
staffing model to Congress every year.
Mrs. Demings. Let me ask you about that.
Mr. McAleenan. Yes.
Mrs. Demings. Particularly about attrition, you know, I
agree that you having worked along with your officers and
agents that they are fine men and women who do a great job. But
what are you doing to deal with attrition? What steps are you
taking to hold on to your current staff? I don't know what is
going on with the attrition rate, because it is high. What are
you doing to attract additional persons into the profession?
Mr. McAleenan. So first and foremost, the hiring is going
to be the best way to hold on to our current staff, as well,
because it is going to balance that workload out. There was a
reference to the overtime hours, to double shifts. We want to
limit that as much as we can. So that is one key piece.
Two, we are clarifying our career paths and offering
mobility--predictable mobility for our officers and agents. One
of the No. 1 reasons we see people leaving the CBP is that they
feel like they can't move to other locations. Maybe they have
taken a job on the border. They have been excited about the
opportunity to serve, but then they would like to move back to
a major metropolitan area, or go back home. They haven't had
the mobility within our system to do that. We now have a web-
enabled predictable process were we are supporting moves,
thanks to Congress.
This year, we are going to have almost 1,200 moves for
front-line personnel between our officers and agents through
multiple opportunities. So we think that mobility is going to
be key.
Then we are investing in workforce resilience. We have
created a National resiliency task force. We are trying to look
at the whole person, and not just the individual, but their
family. We are trying to address suicide prevention. We are
trying to address issues with stress, and provide that support
in that environment that shows our professionals that we care
about them and we care about their career progression.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you, Commissioner. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes Ms. Barragan from California for 5 minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, and our Ranking
Member. Commissioner, thank you for being here today.
I want to follow up a little on the questions of my
colleague, Mr. Correa from California. I also have concerns
about staffing levels at the ports of entry. I happen to
represent the port of Los Angeles. It is a--as you know, a very
busy port. We call it America's port.
I want to start by thanking you and CBP for the terrific
personnel that is down there and the partnership with the port
of Los Angeles. So I think the use of the ACE program has been
very helpful, the Automated Commercial and Environment program,
to help efficiency and the supply chain there.
But I remain concerned about the adequate staffing at major
points of entry, especially in our seaports and our airports,
where I happen to believe is the larger target of a terror
threat.
I know you alluded to this a little bit, but how do you
decide, when you are balancing CBP officers, between something
like the seaports, the airport, and then the border wall, the
Southwest Border?
Mr. McAleenan. Sure. So I mentioned the workload staffing
model. This is where we submit to Congress, every year, based
on a number of workload factors and threat vectors, how many
personnel we need in each area of our operations. It is
actually granular down to the specific port of entry.
So we have requested another 2,500 officers Nation-wide on
a prioritized basis. We have provided recommended fee proposal
for Congress to consider that would allow us to hire that
staffing, and the Port of Los Angeles is included.
We do appreciate--by the way, I had the leadership of the
Port of Los Angeles visit, I think, about a month ago.
Tremendous partnership there, and that communication and dialog
is, I think, critical.
The other way we try to balance that staffing is
recognizing the impact of our innovation. You mentioned the
Automated Commercial Environment single window, which is
providing significant capability, but we have also done several
things to help make us more efficient.
Our Radiation Portal Monitors, which we have at every exit
to the terminal at the Port of Los Angeles--those are now more
finely tuned so that they detect threats, but they don't
trigger on so many naturally occurring materials that are
backing up trucks.
Ms. Barragan. Right. You mentioned the 2,500 additional
officers. Is that from--I think I saw a most recent CBP Office
of Field Workload Staffing Model--is that where that comes
from?
Mr. McAleenan. Correct.
Ms. Barragan. I have been reading and looking, and I have
seen the administration put request in for more border agents,
but I haven't seen a request--rather, I haven't seen a request
from the administration for any of those 2,500 additional CBP
officers that you identify are needed.
Have you heard back on whether that is going to be coming
down the pipeline anytime soon on this administration making
that a priority?
Mr. McAleenan. It was actually in the President's 2018
budget as a fee request, and we sent that legislative proposal
forward the last 4 consecutive years to Congress. So there was
a formal request for officers against that requirement.
Ms. Barragan. OK. It is also my understanding that there is
a shortage of front-line CBP officers at the L.A. Long Beach
port complex, and that is also concerning to me. Is CBP
forecasting increased staffing at the seaports down in Los
Angeles and Long Beach?
Mr. McAleenan. So it is an important point. We have to not
only work on the land border ports of entry, which have that
present crush of traffic every day, but we have to support our
seaports, as well.
So, in that 2,500 that we have requested, a significant
number would go to seaports, including the Port of Los Angeles
Long Beach.
Ms. Barragan. So do you have a forecast at all on
increasing staffing down at those two ports? Do you have any
idea--like, are we talking about 6 months, a year? Do you have
any idea?
Mr. McAleenan. Well, it is dependent on increased funding
for us to hire new staff. If the workload balance changes in a
way that L.A.-Long Beach seaport needs staff more than another
port of entry, then we rebalance within that year and are able
to reassign through that mobility program that I referenced.
Ms. Barragan. Got it. Thank you.
I have heard from the Pacific Merchant Shipping
Association--the PMSA--about a new policy to charge terminals
for scanning operations outside of normal hours, which go from
8 o'clock a.m. to 3 o'clock--outside the hours of 8 o'clock
a.m. to 3 o'clock a.m.
Many of the terminals work outside of those hours, either
to build trains or have trucks lined up by 7 o'clock a.m. so
they are ready to leave once 8 o'clock a.m. hits. Now, they
have to pay by the hour for those operations which is--and
these costs, as I am hearing, are becoming unpredictable at
times. Are you committed, at all, to working with the PMSA--
will you commit to working with them to see what can be done to
reduce some of the impact and the cost?
Mr. McAleenan. I would be happy to work on that issue with
the PMSA.
Ms. Barragan. Great, thank you. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The gentlelady yields back. We are going to do
another round here. So, fully support the deployment of the
National Guard to the border. We have--representing a border
community myself, it is just taking too long to get the
political will for Washington, DC, to be able to meet the
President's intent to secure our border.
So I fully support it. Can you talk about the status of the
deployment, what the National Guard troops are doing and should
we see additional National Guardsmen and women deployed, as
well, for the mission?
Mr. McAleenan. CBP--we very much the opportunity to work
with the Guard again. As you noted, we did it in 2006. We did
it in 2010 and had on-going air surveillance support through
2016. So to have them back in significant numbers is going to
be a huge augmentation to our capabilities.
We have got 600 already on the ground with us, doing
missions like surveillance, operational support, everything
from helping us on the radio side, to intelligence analysts, to
the motor pool and then infrastructure. We have got to maintain
all of these roads, these access roads to the border. They have
capable units that are dedicated to these areas.
So they are going to extend our capability in a number of
different areas. To your point, Chairwoman, to enhance our
ability to secure that border as we continue to invest in the
resources necessary and the personnel to do so.
Ms. McSally. Great. So, how many are deployed right now?
Mr. McAleenan. Six hundred and seven as of this morning.
Ms. McSally. Is there any plan to deploy more?
Mr. McAleenan. There is, of course. We have a set of
missions that we have sent through the National Guard Bureau at
main Department of Defense, chopped out to the States. The
adjutants general are then the responding entities under the
command of the Governors, under Title 32, including Governor
Ducey who has been very supportive.
Then we are going to be applying those assets through our
sector command leadership to the specific mission we need. We
are also hoping to have support for our cargo and our
counternarcotics missions at ports of entry and for aviation
surveillance, as well, in the coming weeks.
Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. So this frees up the Border
Patrol agents to be able to be patrolling the border and
intercepting the illegal activity while you the Guardsmen
doing, many times within their core competencies in the
military, right, to provide some of those support functions,
but also concerned about the Border Patrol agents that we have
really being focused on the border.
There were some media reports on one station in particular,
I think had 700 agents assigned, and on any--or on one
snapshot, had only about 12 percent available out patrolling
the border. I always use my military analogies, right?
I commanded a fighter squadron, we had a small number of
fighter pilots and then we had other people that were trained
in all the other support functions, but if you want us to be
doing all the support functions, we probably won't do a good
job, No. 1. But we are the ones trained to be the fighter
pilots.
So, when you have got Border Patrol agents, highly-trained
law enforcement officers that are doing things like fleet
management and other admin--really other people should be
trained to do in other positions. How do we--you know, what is
the issue there? Because 12 percent is not adequate. We need to
make sure that these highly-trained agents are out there
patrolling the border.
What else can we do to partner with you to free them up to
do that job, while having less trained people or more specified
trained people, doing these other support functions, what we
call in the military, sometimes, some of the admin things and
the paperwork--I won't tell you what we call it, but anyways--
we are on the record here. But, you know, it is really an
important part of the mission, but you don't want the agents
doing all of that because it takes them away from the main
mission.
Mr. McAleenan. I could not agree more with you, Chairwoman,
that we want our highly-trained professionals out on the
border, doing their core law enforcement work and patrolling.
One of the areas that you highlighted, not just the mission
support side, but also processing. This goes back to the
loopholes.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Mr. McAleenan. The time it takes to properly process and
care for family units and kids is much more extensive than
other groups. The station that you cited is in Rio Grande
Valley sector where we see the most crossings of this type.
During that time we had about 60 percent of our agents
doing patrol work, sector-wide. So we understand the scrutiny.
We want to make sure those agents are out on the line; that is
where we need them. But that processing issue, supporting them
by--with remote processing, closing the loopholes, and then,
looking at, maybe, a more balanced workforce investment.
I know it is very important to invest in our very highly-
trained law enforcement professionals, but we need to support
them with a variety of occupations, that might be able to hire
to more quickly, to really free them up to do their work.
As you noted, we are going to realize a number of agents
back to the border from having the National Guard support us in
operational and mission support functions. But I think we can
do the same on a sustained basis, with a more balanced staffing
profile.
Ms. McSally. Because you don't need to be an agent to do
the processing, right? That could be a GS-7 who is doing that,
who is trained specifically for that? Or do you have to be an
agent?
Mr. McAleenan. That is an immigration officer function.
Ms. McSally. OK .
Mr. McAleenan. So--but we are doing things like remote
processing for stations that are not as busy in other sectors.
They are doing the interviews and processing via VTC, via
Skype, if you will. That has been helpful because we are trying
to alleviate those high-traffic sectors so they can get out on
the border doing their mission.
Ms. McSally. OK , thanks. I am out of time, so, gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Vela.
Mr. Vela. Are we using Department of Defense dollars or
Department of Homeland Security dollars to pay for the National
Guard deployment?
Mr. McAleenan. The National Guard deployment is funded by
the Department of Defense.
Mr. Vela. With respect to the issue of hiring, I mentioned
this to Chief Vitiello, I think. You know, we passed that
polygraph bill out of the House. But even then, even if we were
able to get that through the Senate and signed by the
President, you know, given the shortfall--and I appreciate the
numbers you were throwing out, with respect to 800 hires over 3
years and--but even then, that is still really well short of
the goals.
I am not really suggesting it is anybody's fault, but it
just seems to me that we need to take a really new look at the
way we are addressing that, right? What I have--and ever since
I brought this up with Chief Vitiello, back home, I talked to
one of our sheriffs just last week.
It seems to me that one of the things we might want to
really take a look at is, you know, focusing on hiring people
that are closer to the location of wherever they are going to
be sent.
Because what I am hearing from law enforcement personnel on
the ground, not necessarily who are in Border Patrol, but who
handle--you know, who supervise municipal police and sheriff's
deputies is that--one of the things is, you know, if you live
in the city of--if you live in the Rio Grande Valley, which is
Brownsville and McAllen, and you are not sure that you are
going to be able to be stationed within a 30- or 45-mile radius
of where you live, you know, even being stationed at the
checkpoint in Kingsville, for example, which doesn't look like
that far, but if that means you are going to commute and hour-
and-a-half back and forth each day or move your family to
Kingsville.
That appears to be one of the major challenges, I think, we
are confronting, at least from what I am hearing on ground.
Mr. McAleenan. So, that is an important policy that we have
for our Border Patrol agents, for their initial duty station,
to not be right there at home. We want to make sure that that
is an integrity and anti-corruption measure, to ensure that
they are not in a cycle with neighbors who might be involved in
cross-border criminal activity and be susceptible to that.
So we want to start them off in the agency in a location
that is a little bit further away. But there is a mobility
factor later in the career, and that is something that we are
trying to emphasize.
But to your point, taking a fresh look at every aspect of
our hiring cycle is my top mission support priority. It was my
first statement in what my vision is for CBP. Even though we
have made 40 separate process improvements, we have reduced the
time to hire, we have partnered with DOD on veteran hiring, all
of that is helping, but it is not enough.
We need to do more. That includes accessing the expertise
of the private sector, doing digital recruiting and marketing
in a more precise and targeted way, increasing our capacity at
different choke points in the hiring cycle, and then to your
point, effective administration of the polygraph, and ideally a
limited waiver for those that we can trust based on their
military and law enforcement service in other capacities.
Mr. Vela. Yes, I don't know. I think it sounds to me like
we probably ought to take a fresh look at that original policy
you mentioned, because it seems--it just seems from what I am
hearing is, is that every time I ask people that are on the
ground that appears to be the major challenge.
I think we ought to have a little bit more faith, you know,
in the system that we set up and in the agents that we hire.
Because I think if we are able to--I think our best chance at
being able to fulfill that shortage is going to be to address
the location issues. So you know, maybe that is something that
we can work on further.
I also--and we can talk about this when we are done, but I
submitted a letter, I think, requesting details on plans and,
you know, for what, when, and where with respect to the border
wall. I don't know if you have had a chance to respond to that
in writing, or when we might be able to get that.
Mr. McAleenan. I have a signed copy to deliver to you in
our meeting.
Mr. Vela. Thank you very much.
Mr. McAleenan. OK .
Ms. McSally. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Correa from
California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Commissioner, just there was a lot of discussion in this
committee and other places that the polygraph test was being a
major issue, in terms of your hiring goals. What is the latest
on that issue?
Mr. McAleenan. So we have been working to streamline our
administration of the polygraph and also to ensure that we have
the right polygraph protocol for a pre-employment test at an
agency of our size and scope.
So over the last 10 months, we have been piloting an
alternative, Federally-certified protocol for our pre-
employment polygraph. It is showing very good results.
It has reduced the time of the exam. It has maintained the
disqualification numbers that we had before. So we are still
identifying those people that haven't disclosed something in
their background that would be disqualifying, because we have
very stringent background standards.
But we are not seeing a physiological response in as many
cases that creates an inconclusive. So our pass rates have
increased using this protocol.
We are in the process of completing our pilot analysis and
certifying it and looking at it as something we are going to
use going forward. So we have really tried to improve our
polygraph administration on multiple levels.
Mr. Correa. Thank you. Shifting gears a little bit, talking
about National defense, terrorism. Folks that have been where
you are at right now have stated that if any terrorists or
drugs reach our borders, we have essentially lost the war. So
what we have got to do is really interdict the terrorist bad
folks as far as can from our border, as well as drugs.
Any thoughts, any comments on the progress or what we need
to do to help you with your cooperation with other countries,
other agencies, other attorney generals around the world that
may help us identify those bad folks before they get here?
Mr. McAleenan. Thank you for that comment, Congressman. I
could not agree more with you that addressing the threats as
early as possible in a travel cycle toward the United States is
the best way to secure our border.
We are doing that through our National Targeting Center.
Last year, over 2,800 individuals who turned out to be known or
suspected terrorists were prevented from even getting
permission to travel to the United States through a visa--
through an electronic system for travel authorization. Another
900 in the air environment were denied boarding before they
could fly to the United States.
Working with our allies around the world through
PreClearance programs so that we can clear travelers heading to
the United States before they even board a flight is another
method that is critical, and really just building the capacity
of our international partners.
We have had two U.N. Security Council resolutions that
highlight the importance of collecting data, from analyzing it,
from sharing watch list information, and from partnering across
borders so that we can protect this global travel cycle, has
been a very positive development.
CBP has been spearheading efforts to help allies around the
world, in the Western Hemisphere, in Europe, in Asia to develop
and utilize this capability, because we think it is critical to
our security going forward.
So Congress's support to those programs which were
authorized in our--in the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 has been very helpful. We intend to
continue those advances.
Mr. Correa. Anything else we can do to help you build those
relationships overseas?
Mr. McAleenan. On the relationships overseas, I think the--
we need to tackle this challenge on being able to protect
privacy between--and the sharing of data between countries,
while still addressing the threats.
We think with advanced technology, the ability to check
data in an anonymized way, and only see and share the hits,
that we have a process to do that. So being able to invest and
demonstrate that technology capability will enhance our
sharing.
Mr. Correa. So you do have some protocol for sharing
certain information with foreign governments that may be of
interest--mutual interest to all involved, so to speak, for
National securities purposes?
Mr. McAleenan. We absolutely do, both at CBP and with our
partners in the Federal law enforcement and intelligence
communities.
Mr. Correa. Would those consider Mexico, Colombia, and some
of those other Latin American countries?
Mr. McAleenan. Absolutely. Our partnership with Mexico is
about as active as any global partnership in the world,
including sharing information on trade violations, on potential
security threats, on immigration issues.
I just signed three agreements in Mexico City last month on
trade enforcement collaboration and information sharing. It is
a critical partnership.
Mr. Correa. I would like to get more information on those
agreements. Thank you very much, sir, for again, to your
service, and to your personnel for the good job they do.
Mr. McAleenan. Thank you.
Mr. Correa. Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman yields back. I have a few more
questions.
Mr. McAleenan. Right.
Ms. McSally. The first is on land ports of entry. These are
so critical for both economic opportunity and increasing cross-
border commerce, which is going to provide economic development
and jobs in America, but also for security.
The potential for additional hard drugs--we have seen the
vast majority of drugs are coming through the ports of entry,
as you mentioned, plus other contraband and things that could
make it through the ports of entry.
So this is the--these ports of entries, they are a part of
border security, but they are also a part of economic
development and opportunity. They are--many of them are
woefully inadequate, like the Douglas Port of Entry in my
district.
Built in 1933, this needs to be replaced. We have been
advocating for it since I have been here. Glad to see that it
is--there is a feasibility study going on now. There is an
opportunity for it to be funded in the future.
Have you been to the Douglas Port of Entry? Can you talk
about the importance to upgrade ports of entry like this, both
for economic opportunity and for security and counterterrorism
mission?
Mr. McAleenan. Absolutely. I have been to the Douglas point
of entry multiple times, a challenging facility to say the
least especially given the growth in traffic since the 1930's.
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. McAleenan. The change in our mission, the change in our
agency composition, it wasn't designed for where we are today.
So the imperative to invest both in the physical infrastructure
to accommodate the flow but also the security technology, the
offices, the detention areas, all of that is critical so we can
facilitate that cross-border trade and travel.
So we have initiated a feasibility study on the Port of
Douglas. That is going to tell us both the planning factors for
additional cargo flow, as well as the regular travel. We are
going to need to then put a budget wedge against that study to
see if we can modernize the port itself and we have in our
planning but also in what is the right structure for the future
of the port.
That is an area that we need to invest in across the board
on the border as well as in partnership with Mexico and Canada,
because if we don't align our investments and our priorities we
can create real challenges.
Ms. McSally. I agree. Can you tell me where the Douglas
Port fits in your priorities right now on the list?
Mr. McAleenan. The modernization of the Douglas Port of
entry is a top 10 priority that we have budgeted in the out
years.
Ms. McSally. OK. Top ten, but I mean we--just usually only
get 0 to 2 it seems over the last few years. So it was in the
5-year plan. Top 10 doesn't sound as high as I would like it to
be.
Mr. McAleenan. I believe it is a 2019 or 2020. I will get
back to you, Chairwoman, on exactly where----
Ms. McSally. OK. In fiscal year 2019 or fiscal year 2020,
you mean----
Mr. McAleenan. Yes.
Ms. McSally [continuing]. As working through--OK, great,
thank you. The other element that has been talked about already
is the opioid crisis, fentanyl specifically, coming through the
ports of entry. Do you have the adequate technology to detect
it--it can be deadly to our agents, as well--and the training
that they need in order to identify and be able to respond
quickly should they be exposed to it?
Mr. McAleenan. So middle of last year, I commissioned a
counter-opioid strategy at CBP. It is attacking everything from
the advanced data for instance in the international mail
environment to the technology we need to detect small vials of
fentanyl, which is extraordinarily potent, as you referenced.
The ability to test it, not only for the safety of our
officers and ICE specialists and canines, but also give us the
quick reaction so that we can do with an investigator partner a
controlled delivery and address the network that is bringing
that into the country, and not just make that individual
seizure.
So we have benefited from support from Congress to invest
in testing technology both in 2017 and now in 2018. We are
getting that out to all of the key ports of entry that need it,
and we are also buying naloxone, so that if there is an
accidental exposure that creates a health hazard for our
personnel, that they have naloxone on-site to address that
quickly, and it works also for our canines, as well.
Ms. McSally. You said you are buying naloxone. Is it not
available right now at all ports of entry?
Mr. McAleenan. It is available at all ports of entry, but
we want to deploy more, so it is more readily accessible----
Ms. McSally. OK.
Mr. McAleenan. Because of how quickly and how potent this
drug acts.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. All right.
Mr. Correa, do you have any more questions?
OK, I want to thank our witness for your valuable testimony
and Members for the questions.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witness. I ask you respond to those in
writing. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

----------

Questions From Chairwoman Martha McSally for Kevin K. McAleenan
Question 1a. Commissioner McAleenan, we have heard that U.S.
Customs and Border Protection is interested in joining the intelligence
community. This subcommittee firmly believes that Congress needs to be
consulted before any steps are taken.
From CBP's standpoint, where is the breakdown between CBP and the
IC happening that would warrant CBP gaining membership to the IC? Can
you provide specific examples?
Answer. CBP continues to work with its partners, including the IC,
to facilitate the sharing of data and information, as appropriate.
Later this month, senior CBP and DHS leadership will meet with the
principal deputy director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) to discuss
potential options to further strengthen the sharing of data and
information, especially in exigent and rapidly-evolving situations.
Question 1b. Are there specific reforms that can be made within the
intelligence community or the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
that could fix some of these problems without restructuring the IC?
Answer. We are working very closely with the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis (I&A) to increase CBP's ability to deliver on the
President's objectives on border security, trade enforcement, and
countering transnational organized crime. I&A leadership has
implemented important changes to manage and integrate intelligence
across the DHS intelligence enterprise, and CBP and I&A continue to
work together to facilitate the sharing of data and information, as
appropriate.
Question 2. Commissioner McAleenan, the fiscal year 2018 enacted
budget includes $196 million for border security technology acquisition
and deployment. Can you provide us with a breakdown of each technology
line item that this $196 million will fund?
Answer. The $196 million in the fiscal year 2018 enacted budget
refers to the additional funds provided for border security technology
acquisition and deployment. The table below identifies the allocation
of those funds by line item. The paragraphs below the table describe
the use of all funds enacted in fiscal year 2018 for border security
technology acquisition and deployment.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Technology ($ in Thousands) Year 2018 Year 2018 Year 2018
Request Plus Up Enacted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Integrated Fixed Towers................ $27,238 $12,000 $39,238
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 46,193 41,000 87,193
Northern Border (NB) RVSS.............. 0 7,000 7,000
Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 4,838 42,000 46,838
Innovative Towers...................... 0 10,000 10,000
Cross Border Tunnel Threat (CBTT)...... 11,955 30,000 41,955
Agent Portable Surveillance System 0 16,000 16,000
(APSS)................................
Linear Ground Detection System (LGDS).. 0 16,000 16,000
Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS).. 0 10,000 10,000
Maritime Detection Project (MDP)....... 0 9,000 9,000
Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK)...... 0 3,000 3,000
--------------------------------
Total Technology................. 90,224 204,000 294,224
------------------------------------------------------------------------

IFT: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $39.2 million funds partial
deployment of the IFT system in Tohono O'odham Nation, including 7
surveillance towers in Casa Grande and one in Ajo-2, the associated
Command and Control Center in the Tohono O'odham Nation in Tucson
Sector, and Program Planning and Control (PP&C) requirements, completes
two towers of the final IFT system in the Tohono O'odham Nation, and
funds some of the IFT Deferred ORD/Sensor Fusion/TSM Integration
requirements.
RVSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted funds the design and construction of
43 RVSS Upgrade Sensor & Relay towers for Brownsville, Falfurrias, Ft.
Brown, Harlingen, Kingsville and Weslaco USBP Station Areas of
Responsibility (AORs) and the design, construction, and deployment of
approximately 30 Relocatable towers, surveillance/communication
technology, and 3 Modular Command and Control (C2) centers in Rio
Grande Valley Sector.
NBRVSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $7.0 million funds
approximately 4 NB RVSS towers in Swanton Sector.
MVSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $46.8 million funds Program
Planning and Control (PP&C) to develop documentation for a follow-on
MVSS contract and completes the procurement and deployment of
approximately 49 MVSS systems to El Paso Sector and planning for
additional units in other sectors.
Innovative Towers: Fiscal year enacted of $10 million funds
acquisition of additional towers if they pass T&E, additional test and
evaluation, and transition planning.
CBTT: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $42.0 million funds CBTT system
procurement, including test and evaluation, IT security, and
engineering change proposals, alternative analyses, technology
demonstrations, test bed, and approximately 10.7 miles of persistent
tunnel detection technology.
APSS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $16.0 million funds approximately
39 systems that will be deployed on the Northern and Southern Border
based on USBP priorities.
LGDS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $16.0 million funds approximately
60 miles of LGDS technology deployed in conjunction with the Wall
System in RGV.
sUAS: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $10.0 million funds approximately
9 SUAS suites in RGV sector and 2 SUAS suites in Big Bend sector. 1
sUAS Suite consists of 1 fixed wing sUAS, 1 Vertical takeoff and
landing sUAS and 1 Hybrid sUAS.
MDP: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $9.0 million funds approximately 5
MDP towers in Buffalo Sector.
ATAK: Fiscal year PC&I enacted of $3.0 million funds planning,
servers, phone acquisition, user training, and dedicated TAK
development team.
Question 3a. Commissioner McAleenan, Chief Scott Luck testified
before this subcommittee last July about border security technology. He
noted that the Border Patrol was testing small unmanned aerial systems
in Arizona, Texas, and Vermont to help fill domain awareness gaps.
Can you update us on that status and results of that testing?
Answer. USBP conducted field demonstrations of small unmanned
aircraft systems (SUAS) September 2017 to March 2018. These
demonstrations helped familiarize USBP with SUAS in their operational
environment, demonstrate the effectiveness and suitability of SUAS, and
help refine operational and acquisition documentation supporting a
Program of Record. SUAS deployments will supplement current fixed-wing
technology and manned aircraft thereby reducing surveillance and
situational awareness gaps. Further, ease of mobility and portability
enable SUAS to be moved to high-risk areas, allowing agents to adapt to
changing threats.
Question 3b. CBP has requested $300 million for small UAS, what
exactly will that money go toward?
Answer. The SUAS funding will be used to procure and maintain SUAS,
and train BP agents. Doing so will meet the USBP's Full Operational
Capability (FOC) requirement for SUAS based on a documented 245k fiscal
year flight-hour capability gap.
Question 3c. Is there a specific time line or plan for a small UAS
strategy in the works?
Answer. Yes, the plan for SUAS is to award a contract(s) in fiscal
year 2019. The procurement of commercially available, high technology-
readiness systems will help to accelerate the procurement and deliver
capability to the field in an expedited manner.
Question 4a. Commissioner McAleenan, we have non-intrusive
inspection equipment and other innovative force multiplying
technologies deployed at our ports of entry, however, drugs are still
pouring in through these ports.
Do we have the technology but not the volume needed or are there
technical capabilities we are missing?
Answer. As threats and hazards evolve and trade volume increases,
smugglers will continue to seek ways to exploit the border environment.
To address this area with NII, CBP is actively working to integrate our
NII technology across operations, with an objective of reducing
processing time to examine a greater portion of conveyances, or
redirect officers to other high-priority operations. The key
limitations to achieve this objective include stand-alone NII
technology and the lack of pre-primary/primary NII imaging capability/
capacity.
Currently, NII systems are stand-alone systems, in that they do not
integrate with other hardware systems or transmit data across the CBP
Network. The lack of interoperability results in increased processing
time as officers and agents must complete manual, and often redundant,
data entry/data transfer activities. Additionally, NII scanning is
largely a secondary inspection process largely due to the size of the
technology and footprint of the port.
To address these areas, CBP is assessing technologies and
operational concepts that place NII in pre-primary or primary
inspection operations. Within this concept, CBP is assessing the
ability to transmit NII data to CBP IT systems and local command center
operations, and to perform remote health monitoring to support system
maintenance. Collectively, this would allow CBP to increase the volume
of conveyances examined without negative impact to facilitating lawful
trade and travel.
Question 4b. Why don't we have multi-lane scanning capabilities at
our land ports of entry?
Answer. CBP is actively exploring concepts that include placing
drive-through NII systems, inclusive of multi-lane scanning systems, in
pre-primary or primary operations. This would allow CBP to process both
commercial trucks and passenger vehicles.
CBP, together with DHS Science and Technology (S&T) and technology
vendors, are planning to initiate operational assessments of drive-
through passenger and cargo vehicle X-ray imaging systems along the
Southwest Border. The assessments will be used to determine the
feasibility of conducting pre-primary and primary NII scanning using
commercially available drive-through X-ray imaging technologies in a
new concept of operations. As commercial trucks and passenger vehicles
arrive at the port of entry, they will drive through the NII system; a
license plate reader will package the plate with the scan and send the
package into a command center, secondary, and/or to the primary
officer. As part of the assessment, CBP will evaluate how and where the
image is transmitted for officer review. The assessment will consider
the dynamic operational tempos and resources across ports, so CBP can
employ a flexible and adaptable concept to support the varying
environments. For example, one port may transmit to a Command Center
and another port may transmit to primary or secondary operations.
Question 5a. Commissioner McAleenan, this subcommittee believes
that the border security technology acquisition process needs serious
improvement.
Does CBP utilize the DHS Silicon Valley Innovation Program, which
reaches out to innovation communities across the Nation and around the
world to harness the commercial R&D ecosystem for technologies with
Government applications?
Answer. CBP has utilized the DHS Silicon Valley Innovation Program
(SVIP) since its inception as a way to identify commercially available,
innovative technology which can be rapidly developed, piloted, and
brought into CBP operations. These technologies can directly support
CBP by allowing front-line agents and officers to carry out our mission
more safely and effectively. We now have a portfolio of 13 commercial
start-ups piloting innovative technologies such as near-autonomous
small UAS, low-cost/high-performing sensors, travel technologies, and
machine learning capabilities. CBP views SVIP as a strategic partner
and a key mechanism for bringing innovative technology into the CBP
ecosystem.
Question 5b. What efforts are being made by CBP to work with the
private sector on technology innovation?
Answer. CBP has established the Commercial Technology Innovation
Program (CTIP) in order to identify, pilot, and deliver cutting-edge
commercial technology that makes our front-line personnel safer and
more effective. Through strategic partnerships such as the DHS Silicon
Valley Innovation Program, In-Q-Tel, and others, CBP is pursuing
innovation in three key capability areas: (1) Autonomous capabilities,
(2) advanced analytics and artificial intelligence, and (3)
communications, sensors, and data. As an example, CBP is piloting 4
fully autonomous, low-cost surveillance towers in the San Diego Border
Patrol Sector. The towers require no external power source and have the
ability to autonomously detect, identify, classify, and track targets
through a novel combination of radar and machine vision. Due to their
autonomy, the towers have enhanced situational awareness without
requiring additional personnel to operate them.
Question 5c. Is there a mechanism in place for the private sector
to initiate a proposal for scaling current border security technology
or to submit ideas for improving port of entry functions, or are all
CBP technology considerations Department initiated?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Commissioner McAleenan, the Interdict Act was signed
into law in January of this year, authorizing and providing CBP the
appropriation of $9 million for new opioid and other illicit substance
screening devices, laboratory equipment, facilities, and personnel for
support during all operational hours to expedite the testing of
suspected opioids seized at our borders and ports of entry. Has CBP
begun the procurement and hiring process for any of these
appropriations?
Answer. CBP thanks Congress for its support contained in the
INTERDICT Act authorizing language. The language will improve our
ability to interdict fentanyl, synthetic opioids, and other narcotics
and psychoactive substances illegally imported into the United States.
CBP assumes the enactment of this Bill drove some of the decisions in
the Appropriations Committees to appropriate the one-time $30.5 million
for Opioid Detection and Labs and the additional Non-Intrusive
Inspection acquisition funding. CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO)
and Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) have partnered in
anticipation of receipt of funds by building a spend plan. The funding
was allocated to OFO and LSS during the week of May 14, 2018, and
acquisitions are under way. There is no hiring process possible with
these appropriations as the funding appropriated was non-pay and only
available for 1 year.
Question 7. Commissioner McAleenan, there are independent companies
in existence that can test, verify, and evaluate solutions to ensure
that all border security technology products and services are
performing to their defined capabilities. Is CBP looking at utilizing
independent verification and validation in its technology acquisition
programs? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, CBP is utilizing independent verification and
validation (IV&V) in its technology acquisition programs in accordance
with DHS IV&V Annex to the DHS Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC)
Guidebook.
Question 8a. During our hearing on April 25, 2018, Commissioner
McAleenan indicated that fiber optic detection would be integrated into
a ``Border Wall System.''
What are CBP's near-term plans to test and evaluate potential fiber
optic intrusion detection solutions? Please provide the committee with
a time line for LGDS testing and evaluation.
Answer. CBP anticipates testing and evaluating potential fiber
optic intrusion detection solutions as part of source selection, and
after contract award in fiscal year 2019.
Question 8b. Has CBP established testing criteria, evaluation
considerations, and key performance parameters? If so, can this
information be shared with the committee?
Answer. As part of the normal acquisition and procurement process,
CBP is developing test criteria, evaluation considerations, and key
performance parameters. The information will be documented in the
solicitation which will be released by Q1 fiscal year 2019.
Question 8c. Will the fiber optic detection be deployed along the
Northern Border or just the Southwest Border?
Answer. Yes, the fiber optic detection system will be deployed
along the Northern Border and Southwest Border.
Question 9a. Commissioner McAleenan, in the past, CBP has outlined
the need for hiring an additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents, 540 AMO
agents and over 2,500 CBP officers in order to secure the borders. In
order to meet these new mandates, CBP is faced with the necessary task
of bringing on more than 750 additional mission support personnel. It
is my understanding that you have signed a contract with Accenture to
help the agency fill these positions.
Can you give us a ballpark estimate on how long it will take to
meet these ambitious staffing goals?
Answer. The Accenture contract allows CBP to front-line (BPAs,
CBPOs, and AMO agents) surge hiring requirements over the next 5 years,
while also allowing CBP to benefit from any innovation and efficiencies
Accenture brings to the recruiting and hiring process. The contractor
will help CBP hire 5,000 BPAs, 2000 CBPOs, and 500 AMO agents only. CBP
HRM resources will maintain focus on addressing front-line attrition
and non-front-line hiring needs to support the agency mission.
While this contract is specific to CBP's 5-year hiring goals, CBP
strives to constantly evolve to support its operational needs,
understanding that what worked just a few years ago quickly becomes
obsolete as technology advances, how we think about the workforce
environment advances, and the very nature of CBP's mission changes.
CBP's hiring demands are complex, interdependent, and driven by
National security objectives, Executive-level policies, Congressional
mandates, and component-specific operational requirements. There are
always opportunities to improve, and we're committed to continuously
reassessing and refining our organizational structure to maximize
effectiveness and process efficiency, as well as keep pace with
evolving demands. Our focus continues to be on front-line hiring and
ensuring CBP reaches Executive Order-mandated hiring targets for front-
line personnel, while at the same time providing the highest possible
level of support to our current employees.
While providing an estimated time frame for achieving all of our
hiring goals is difficult and subject to many variables, we believe
that leveraging Accenture's expertise, in addition to recent
refinements to our recruitment and hiring processes, responds to the
unique hiring challenges we face today. We are committed to ensuring
that our front-line staffing effort remains focused but agile,
centralized but precisely calibrated to the various, changing threat
environments across the border and through the ports.
Question 9b. Can you give us an overview of how that contract is
going so far? Have you seen progress in the speed and quality of the
hiring process?
Answer. The Contract had a 120-day start-up and transition period
for the Contractor to learn the CBP process, hire staff, and get them
cleared to work at CBP and process applicants. The Contractor began
marketing and recruiting in February and initial processing in March
2018, and the first EODs are scheduled in late fiscal year 2018. The
contractor currently has over 1,700 applicants in process.
The Contractor is using advanced data analytics to try new
recruiting methods and will also be developing innovative technology
solutions that will be leveraged by CBP. Some of their processing and
technology expertise has already been adopted into the CBP hiring
process.
Question 10. Commissioner McAleenan, there have been recent media
reports that state in certain Border Patrol sectors only about 13
percent of agents are patrolling along the border. What is the actual
percentage of agents that patrol the line each day per Border Patrol
sector on the Southwest Border?
Answer. The Southern Border sectors have, on average, 69 percent of
the agents on duty operating in border enforcement activities, at or
within the immediate border environment. Due to certain terrain
challenges and accessibility issues, our border enforcement posture
will not always be at the immediate border, but within a reasonable
distance where the U.S. Border Patrol can perform their law
enforcement/interdiction duties.
The other 31 percent of agents, on duty, not assigned to patrol the
border are tasked to a myriad of other activities such as performing,
processing/prosecutorial functions, intelligence-gathering operations,
collaborative operations with partner agencies, strategic planning
duties, and performing other necessary functions such as serving as
command and control staff. These numbers vary by sector and by area of
operation, but USBP's recognizes and adheres to the border security
mission through a proper, forward-deployed, methodology to deter,
identify, and mitigate incursions within the closest proximity to the
border as possible. The USBP recognizes that the ability to mitigate
incursions at the earliest identified point will greatly improve our
enforcement posture and deterrence capabilities.
Question 11a. Commissioner McAleenan, the workforce attrition rate
among agents in the Border Patrol has been an issue since the early
2000's. The Border Patrol has implemented mobility programs and
opportunities before, but here we are today still talking about
attrition.
What programs or incentives have worked to curb attrition in the
Border Patrol?
Answer. U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) has a systemic need to stabilize
the workforce and improve retention of employees with mission-essential
competencies. Our 3-year average attrition rate of 4.8 percent
continues to outpace the annualized 3-year hiring average of 2.3
percent; highlighting the immediacy of our need for retention
incentives.
Based on both internal and external surveys, Border Patrol agents
cite the primary reason for leaving is a lack of mobility. Mid-career
BPAs feel there is no opportunity to either relocate to a more
desirable location or advance from their current position, leading to
decisions to leave U.S. Border Patrol. The Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey (FEVS), HRM surveys, and the USBP Human Capital Study show a
strong correlation between a lack of agent mobility and lower morale
and higher attrition rates. Analysis of CBP's hiring and attrition
challenges revealed that USBP needed a program that improved
operational response capabilities with the flexibility to address
continually changing threats, and improve retention. The Operational
Mobility Program meets both criteria; additionally, it resolved the No.
1 reason for agent attrition--lack of mobility.
USBP's Operational Mobility Program provides a stable relocation
program for the USBP workforce to address declining morale and
attrition. To achieve needed mobility, CBP implemented an incremental
mobility program in fiscal year (+$25 million above $14 million in
baseline funding), with the goals of achieving a 12 percent workforce
mobility target by fiscal year 2000.
Question 11b. You talk about mobility programs, but what specific
programs do you plan to implement in the future to address the high
attrition rates?
Answer. CBP will continue to use its operational mobility program
to address attrition, and will continues to look for new approaches to
improve attrition rates for mission-essential competencies. CBP is also
working to make improvements to its hiring process so that attrition of
seasoned agents is less of an issue than it is currently.
Question 12a. Commissioner McAleenan, deploying the National Guard
to the Southwest Border is not a permanent solution to address CBP's
manpower shortage. While efforts to improve hiring and retention at CBP
have not proven to be successful so far, it's time to look at the full
range of options available. Particularly, in terms of tasks that do not
require the skill set that our agents and officers have, contracting
out that work might make sense.
Has CBP considered contracting out work that does not require a law
enforcement skill set, such carrying out day-to-day scanning and
screening functions, and image analysis, to the private sector?
Answer. CBP is interested in further exploring the ability of
having a cadre of personnel that are focused on image analysis and
manifest reconciliation, specifically as CBP continues to evaluate the
ability of pre-primary/primary NII Scanning with command center
operations. CBP has discussed utilizing image analyst personnel, either
contractor or non-law enforcement personnel (CBP technicians), to
reconcile the CONSIST manifest information and review the X-ray image
for the presence of anomalies. If an anomaly were discovered during the
image analysis, the analyst would notify an on-site CBP officer for
final adjudication. A CBP officer would always be on-hand to provide
supervision and/or guidance to the analysts. This concept would
optimize the role of the CBP officer by allowing them to focus on other
high-priority law enforcement duties.
CBP has implemented several business transformation initiatives to
optimize CBP officer resources and increase efficiency. Initiatives
such as Automated Passport Control (APC), Mobile Passport Control
(MPC), Vehicle and Pedestrian Ready Lanes, Trusted Traveler Programs,
and the CBP Mobile Program continue to result in significant savings.
From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, CBP saved over 1.4
million inspectional hours through business transformation. It is
estimated that through fiscal year 2019 CBP will save an additional
523,000 hours. Overall savings estimates from fiscal year 2012-fiscal
year 2019 equate to $52 million in salaries and expenses.
Question 12b. What are the logical next steps for CBP to make this
a reality?
Answer. The most logical next steps would be to develop analysis as
to the benefits and issues associated with this approach. Fortunately,
the Office of Field Operations is developing a data-driven staffing
model that analyzes mission and operational support positions,
activities, and functions in an effort to alleviate some of the
administrative burden of CBP officers and CBP agriculture specialists.
Some of the activities that we are considering within the context of
the Mission and Operational Support Resource Allocation Model (MOSRAM)
is operator support to Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment such a
Z-portals, fixed and mobile X-ray systems. While actual review and
adjudication of scanned images must be performed by a CBP officer or
CBP agriculture specialist there are other roles that could be
performed by a CBP technician.
Question 13a. Commissioner McAleenan, CBP deploys a variety of
personnel at its 15 PreClearance locations with different skill sets,
ranging from front-line officers to agricultural specialists.
For PreClearance locations, how do you determine the number and
type of personnel needed?
Answer. The deployment of CBP officers and agriculture specialists
to our PreClearance locations serves an important role in the CBP
mission of strengthening our ability to identify terrorists, criminals,
and other National security threats prior to encountering them on U.S.
soil. PreClearance operations places a trained law enforcement
professional at foreign points of departure to enforce our country's
laws and to protect the traveling public destined for the United
States. These law enforcement professionals already have many years of
service and experience prior to their potential selection for a
PreClearance location. They are required to apply for the position and
be selected through consideration of these skillsets and experience.
CBP works closely with foreign stakeholders, airlines, and agency
partners to provide and accommodate the appropriate number of personnel
at our PreClearance locations. These continual and on-going discussions
address any potential fluctuations due to economy, weather, and
industry, regionally or nationally, which could impact the staffing
overseas.
Question 13b. What is the average cost associated with deploying
one front-line CBP officer abroad? One support specialist?
Answer. The average cost of a CBP PreClearance employee abroad in
fiscal year was approximately $275,000 dollars. However, the cost of
stationing a PreClearance employee abroad can cost upwards of $400,000
dollars or more depending on a number of variables specific to each
individual deployment (e.g. relocation costs due to family size/
housing/location, Department of State allowances, and support costs at
a particular post, etc.). These numbers take into account any cost
reimbursement that CBP gets at certain PreClearance locations. It
should also be noted these costs do not include any State-side
``overhead'' support costs.
At this time, CBP PreClearance has limited support positions
overseas. However, CBP PreClearance is exploring the possibility of
increasing the number of mission support specialists and CBP
technicians overseas allowing officers and agriculture specialists to
be relieved of administrative duties that they are currently required
to complete. CBP PreClearance believes the average cost for a support
position would be around $225,000 dollars per year but could be higher
depending on the variables listed above.
Question 13c. How long is it currently taking to deploy a front-
line officer abroad to PreClearance locations?
Answer. The deployment of a front-line officer takes anywhere from
6-9 months, starting with extending the job offer and finishing with
the employee entering on duty in PreClearance. The time frame depends
on how soon the employee completes the pre-employment process, which
entails obtaining medical clearances and diplomatic passports for the
employee and their dependents from the Department of State, completing
all mandatory training, and obtaining a security clearance, if
applicable (required for supervisory positions).
Question 14a. Commissioner McAleenan, CBP is currently using a
risk-based approach to scan ``high-risk'' containers which amounts to
scanning 3-4 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo. There is a large gap
between the requirement in the law of scanning 100 percent of all cargo
containers before they are bound for the United States and the current
practice of scanning relatively few containers once they arrive on
shore.
Could you reasonably scan more containers, using a risk-based
approach?
Answer. As previously reported, DHS implemented both full-scale and
limited-capacity deployments of integrated scanning systems in foreign
ports under its Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). Due to challenges
identified during the initiative's pilot program, all operations, with
the exception of Port Qasim, Pakistan, have reverted from the 100
percent scanning model to the risk-based targeting approach of the
Container Security Initiative (CSI) program to optimize results through
advanced analysis of manifest data and identification of high-risk
cargo.
As noted in 20 previous reports titled Update on Integrated
Scanning System Pilot,\1\ initial SFI operations at pilot locations
afforded DHS the opportunity to test possible solutions to the complex
challenges posed by scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound maritime
containers, particularly at transshipment and high-volume ports. It was
determined that while scan data can be useful, operational costs are
significant even in limited environments. DHS documented numerous
challenges associated with implementing 100 percent scanning, including
diplomatic and operational challenges, port reconfiguration issues, the
potential for reciprocal requirements on United States ports, and the
lack of available technology to efficiently scan transshipped cargo.
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\1\ Update on Integrated Scanning System Pilot--Reported to
Congress: May 29, 2008; June 12, 2008; January 4, 2010; July 15, 2010;
January 24, 2011; May 20, 2011; February 29, 2012; October 3, 2012;
March 11, 2013; July 29, 2013; April 8, 2014; July 7, 2014; December
15, 2014; April 14, 2015; December 17, 2015; June 30, 2016; March 2,
2017; February 9, 2018.
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The DHS recognizes the need to proceed with container security
programs in a responsible, practical manner that maximizes the security
of maritime cargo, as well as facilitating its movement and enhancing
global supply chain resilience.
CBP is committed to a risk-based approach to cargo security. In
fiscal year 2017 less than one-half of 1 percent of maritime
containerized cargo was determined to be high-risk using the Automated
Targeting System (ATS). CBP scans all containers identified as high-
risk and also scans a significant number at random. Scanning more
containers would put an undue burden on CBP and foreign government
resources without adding any additional security.
CBP continues to refine and improve its targeting for potentially
high-risk cargo in all modes of transportation. As part of this
process, in May 2017, CBP introduced a new risk assessment methodology
for maritime cargo. The risk assessment methodology is based on the
latest available intelligence and incorporates scenarios and anomaly
detection capabilities. All available advance data, including manifest,
importer security filing, and entry, are assessed for risk through ATS,
which is one of the most advanced targeting systems in the world.
With the implementation of the new methodology, there has been a
reduction in the number of high-risk shipments identified, but an
increase in overall confidence that CBP is targeting the right
shipments for further scrutiny.
The maritime shipping environment is large, complex, and includes a
host of private and public sector stakeholders. To be successful, we
will need to continue to seek models for scanning and other supply
chain resilience solutions that make sense for industry stakeholders to
incorporate into their business processes, and from which other
governments can also realize value.
Question 14b. Of the 3-4 percent of containers that you do scan,
how often do you find contraband like illicit drugs or weapons?
Answer. As part of CBP's Container Security Initiative, CBP
officers are stationed in foreign seaports to work together with their
host counterparts to share information, develop investigative leads on
potential threats, and identify and examine high-risk shipments. During
fiscal year 2017, collaborative targeting efforts between Container
Security Initiative CBP officers and their foreign counterparts
resulted in the detection and seizure of approximately 15,200 kilograms
(16.75 tons) of cocaine, $41.5 million in undeclared merchandise, 18
stolen vehicles, $96,000 in undeclared currency, and 11 arrests.
CBP officers in overseas locations do not seize prohibited items,
but rather the host country authorities make a determination on the
disposition of illicit goods. CBP officers in foreign locations have
been instrumental in assisting their counterparts in disrupting and
dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations and effecting
controlled deliveries, which have led to arrests of those involved in
illicit activity.
Question 14c. Through partnerships, such as the Container Security
Initiative, what percentage of high-risk cargo is scanned overseas?
Answer. Approximately 82 percent of all high-risk cargo passes
through a CSI port. One hundred percent of that cargo is reviewed,
researched, and either mitigated or examined (scanned or physical
examination) by CBP officers in conjunction with foreign counterparts.
CBP has a dedicated team of CBP officers at the National Targeting
Center (NTC) that reviews the approximately 18 percent of high-risk
cargo that does not originate in a CSI port prior to that cargo leaving
the foreign port. The team will further research all potentially high-
risk cargo and either mitigate the risk or explore other avenues to
have the cargo examined.
Question 15a. Commissioner McAleenan, there are currently 61
Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports in 35 countries. For a port
to be considered part of CSI, CBP officers do not necessarily have to
be present at that port.
Is CBP considering adding more CSI ports? If so, will they have CBP
personnel on-site, or utilize a regional model of cooperation, like in
Italy, where one CBP officer has relationships with multiple ports in
the country?
Answer. CSI is always exploring opportunities to expand to
additional locations. When considering any possible expansion, some of
the factors which are considered are: Potential risk from certain
locations, political will of the host government, regular recurring
container volume to the United States, the type of technology utilized
by the host government (such as non-intrusive inspection equipment),
and/or their ability to procure such.
When expanding into a new location, CSI would, at least initially,
have CSI staff on-site in order to develop and enhance the working
relationship with host counterparts. At such a time when CSI feels a
level of confidence in the commitment, relationship, and responsiveness
of the host counterparts, CSI could then explore the feasibility of
adapting the operational model to a remote or regional targeting model.
Question 15b. How does CBP vet foreign customs officers tasked with
scanning containers that are cause for concern?
Answer. CBP is prohibited from vetting foreign customs officers
with whom they work in foreign locations due to sovereignty concerns.
In the vast majority of CSI ports, CBP officers do, however, actively
participate in the scanning and examination process in conjunction with
the host country counterparts. This close cooperative working
relationship allows CBP officers to identify any potential anomalies
during the scanning process.
CBP has provided and continues to provide training to foreign
counterparts in areas such as anomaly detection to increase capability
of the foreign counterparts.
Question 15c. Have there been instances of corruption in foreign
work forces at CSI ports?
Answer. CBP is unaware of any instance of corruption in foreign
work forces at CSI ports. The port authorities, local law enforcement,
and the terminal operators with whom CSI engages have steps in place to
mitigate or thwart potential corruption in the seaport environment.
Such steps include access controls, vetting of personnel with port
access, CCTV camera systems CSI personnel can access, roving patrols,
and the use of GPS devices on vehicles entering port facilities.
Question 16a. Commissioner McAleenan, we are currently giving
suppliers expedited screening privileges when they can prove they take
steps to secure their supply chain under CBP's C-TPAT program.
What percentage of U.S.-bound cargo originates from a C-TPAT
member?
Answer. Twelve different entity types are eligible for C-TPAT
certification. These entity types include, among others; importers,
exporters, highway carriers, sea carriers, and U.S. Customs brokers. Of
these 12 entities, U.S. importers are the largest entity, accounting
for 4,139 of the 11,562 certified members. The importers represent 54.1
percent of all cargo imported into the United States.
Question 16b. Has CBP had incidents where C-TPAT suppliers falsify
information or abuse the system? What are the consequences for doing
so?
Answer. The C-TPAT program was codified into law by the Security
and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. This law imposed
strict oversight requirements, including requiring C-TPAT to suspend or
remove program benefits/membership from any Partner that fails to meet
program requirements. Reasons for suspending/removing a partner
include, but are not limited to, the following: Failure to meet the
minimum security criteria; failure to meet eligibility requirements;
failure to comply with other rules, laws, and regulations; and security
breaches resulting in an enforcement action.
Typically, each suspension, removal, or determination of
ineligibility is preceded by extensive outreach efforts in order to
provide Partners with the opportunity to demonstrate compliance with
program requirements. In 2017, CTPAT suspended 32 partners and removed
118, for a total of 135 suspension and removal actions. In addition,
subsequent to suspending/removing a partner, additional outreach
efforts are conducted to help the Partner address the gaps,
vulnerabilities, or weaknesses that led to the suspension, removal, or
ineligibility determination. These efforts aim to help the Partner move
toward reinstatement. However, in accordance with the SAFE Port Act of
2006, cases involving a potential threat to National security, or
situations involving false/misleading information, may require
immediate action to suspend or remove a Partner.
Question 16c. A common concern from industry, is that they often do
not perceive tangible benefits from participation in the C-TPAT
program. Are you considering any additional benefits that can be
applied to members of the program?
Answer. CBP affords tangible trade facilitation benefits to C-TPAT
members to recognize their demonstrated commitment to adopt stronger
security practices throughout their international supply chains. C-TPAT
membership has value that exceeds dollars and cents. The benefits of
program membership includes risk avoidance, a communal approach to a
safer supply chain, and the advantage of the credibility that C-TPAT
membership brings. The C-TPAT benefits package has increased over the
years, and the program continues to explore additional benefits with
the trade community.
The program is also focusing on executing the Trusted Trader
strategy, which was developed in cooperation with the Commercial
Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC). Under the strategy, C-
TPAT is working to transition the current Importer Self-Assessment
(ISA) Program into CTPAT Trade Compliance by the end of fiscal year
2018. This transition will create the United States' equivalent of an
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) that addresses both security and
Customs trade compliance. As part of this effort, C-TPAT is working
with Trusted Trader stakeholders to test over 30 benefits and measure
their impact. The ultimate goal is for members to be able to document
their return on investment and quantify the value for their
participation in the program.
Additionally, in an effort to combat Importer Identification (ID)
theft and provide a new benefit to C-TPAT importers, the National
Targeting Center's (NTC) Tactical Trade Targeting Unit (T3U), Cargo and
Conveyance Security (CCS), and the CTPAT program have developed a
multilevel approach to protect C-TPAT participants from exploitation of
ID theft. They have created a notification and verification system
within CBP's automated system. The identification of anomalies can
represent a legitimate business change or vulnerability within the
importer's supply chain and serve as an ``ID monitoring'' tool.
CBP is also in the process of fully implementing the Advanced
Qualified Unlading Approval Lane pilot, or AQUA lane, at most major
U.S. seaports. AQUA Lane is an effort to cut down on costs for the
trade and better manage the CBP workforce by focusing resources on
high-risk sea carriers. Currently, AQUA Lane is in a pilot phase at 20
U.S. seaports.
C-TPAT has signed 11 mutual recognition arrangements (MRA) with the
following countries/AEO programs: New Zealand, Canada, Singapore,
Mexico, Dominican Republic, European Union (EU), Japan, Korea, Israel,
Jordan, and Taiwan. C-TPAT is also expanding its MRAs to include
incentives for C-TPAT members exporting to those nations. Currently,
benefits are afforded to CTPAT members exporting to Canada, Mexico,
Singapore, Israel, the European Union, and Japan.
C-TPAT is currently working with South Korea and New Zealand to
incorporate export incentives through the MRA and will be looking to do
the same, in the future, with the remaining MRA partners, Taiwan,
Dominican Republic, and Jordan.
Question 17. Commissioner McAleenan, the House passed H.R. 3551,
the C-TPAT Reauthorization Act of 2017 back in October. The bill
reauthorizes the cargo pre-vetting program for the first time in 11
years to ensure that the program is ready to meet the dynamic threats
currently facing the global supply chain and that C-TPAT participants
receive tangible benefits for their partnership with CBP. Knowing you
cannot officially endorse, would you say CBP generally supports the
measures within and intent of this bill?
Answer. C-TPAT has been an integral part of the CBP mission for
over 15 years. The program is currently undertaking major efforts to
modernize its approach so as to best respond to the threats facing the
current trade landscape. The measures within the bill and the intent of
the bill will allow C-TPAT to evolve into the program it needs to be
today and CBP generally supports both the measures within and intent of
this bill.
Question 18a. Commissioner McAleenan, 10 + 2 data and cargo
manifests are currently transmitted to the National Targeting Center
for vetting by CBP officers before cargo is bound for the United
States. Through that information, CBP determines if a shipment is
considered high-risk.
Can you discuss what triggers a container being designated as
``high-risk''?
Answer. The National Targeting Center (NTC) is an integral part of
CBP's layered security strategy and works closely with Container
Security Initiative (CSI) targeters stationed overseas as well as
domestic-based targeters located at our many ports of entry (POE) to
identify and mitigate high-risk cargo and conveyances prior to its
arrival in the United States. The strategy is highly reliant on advance
electronic data (AED) and CBP's Automated Targeting System.
In the maritime environment, CBP receives manifests and importer
security filings 24 hours prior to loading of U.S.-bound vessels. CBP
also receives container status messages within 24 hours of creation, or
receipt, within a carrier's tracking system, and vessel stow plans
either 48 hours after departure of the last foreign port, or any time
prior to arrival for short hauls. The data is fed into ATS where it is
automatically risk-assessed and made available for additional targeting
by thousands of users throughout CBP as well as the broader DHS
community.
As part of the automatic risk-assessment process, the NTC has
developed a set of targeting models that judge conditional risk factors
based on current intelligence on smuggling pathways. The data is
periodically updated and methodology refreshed to ensure a robust, up-
to-date, well-sourced approach to identify high-risk shipments. An
analyst can modify and deploy risk factors into the targeting modules
as intelligence is received to rapidly address and target changing
threats.
ATS also compares containers declared on vessel stow plans to
containers that have been declared on manifests in order to identify
arriving containers that are not manifested. Each year, CBP identifies
thousands of these potentially unmanifested containers prior to
arrival, which gives CBP time to contact the carrier and mitigate the
issue.
Question 18b. Have there been instances of shippers falsifying 10+2
data or using vague information to mask a shipment's true contents? And
if so, how many?
Answer. There is no doubt that this occurs, since falsifying
customs and other supply chain documentation is a time-honored
tradition amongst smugglers. However, the NTC is not aware of any
entity or system within CBP that regularly records these type of
metrics in a way that can be easily retrieved and analyzed. Please see
the additional background information provided below.
The targeting, examination, and seizure process is very
transactional and the focus is on the merchandise and violation itself
(e.g., ``smuggling'' or ``counterfeit goods''), rather than recording
the precise underlying reason a shipment was targeted (e.g., the
consignee on the importer security filing did not match the consignee
on the manifest). While the official seizure narrative may provide more
details regarding why a shipment was targeted, these underlying reasons
are often listed in the text field in the Seized Asset and Case
Tracking System (SEACATS), which makes retrieving the exact metrics
extremely burdensome and time-consuming.
Question 18c. Are there any other data points you think CBP should
include in 10+2 data collection?
Answer. As technology continues to progress, CBP may want to
incentivize the supply chain community to provide scanned copies of
their purchase orders, invoices, packing lists, and even digital
pictures of their merchandise and the smallest external packing
materials as early as practicable. This would allow CBP officials to
conduct a ``virtual examination'' before goods are placed on a U.S.-
bound vessel.
CBP has requested that the carrier community provide the following
data on a voluntary basis in order to perform targeting and compliance
operations more efficiently and effectively:
Each carrier's global container status message (CSM) feed.
(Will help with coast-wide and outbound targeting and tracking)
Each carrier's global vessel stow plans (BAPLIE)\2\ feed.
(Will help with coast-wide and outbound targeting and tracking)
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\2\ BAPLIE is a widely used UN/EDIFACT message in the shipping
industry. It is used by and between various parties to advise the exact
stowage positions of cargo on an ocean vessel.
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Electronic copies of all vessel documentation to include:
Registry/Certificate of Nationality
Tonnage Certificate
Certificate of Financial Responsibility
Certificate of Financial Responsibility (Alternate)
Continuous Synopsis Record
Safety Construction Certificate
Safety Equipment Certificate
Radio Certificate
Dangerous Goods Compliance
Ship Security
Safety Management Certificate
Load Line Certificate
Question 18d. How does CBP measure the effectiveness of its
algorithm that determines whether a shipment is ``high-risk'' or not?
Answer. The NTC reviews results from enforcement operations and
current intelligence to judge efficacy. With rapidly-changing threat
streams, CBP leverages both domestic and international partners to
rapidly deploy targeting rules and models that address current threats.
Feedback from the field, the trade community, law enforcement agencies,
and data analytics are also considered. The research is shared
throughout the CBP Intelligence Enterprise and reviewed for validation
against Classified materials.
Question 19a. Commissioner McAleenan, a viable biometric exit
system to track visa overstays has been a statutory mandate for over a
decade. What is the current time line for the implementation of a full
biometric exit system at all U.S. international airports?
Answer. Since receiving the mission in 2013, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) advanced an entry/exit strategy by conducting a
series of pilot programs and technical demonstrations, which resulted
in CBP developing a realistic and achievable biometric exit plan. CBP
has:
Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation;
Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to
integrate biometrics with the airline boarding process;
Transformed the entry process for certain flights at 7
airports, including PreClearance locations;
Facilitated a pilot program with one cruise line for
biometric disembarkation;
Launched a facial matching pilot with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) at a security checkpoint as a
proof of concept for enhancing the travel experience;
Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics; and
Solidified plans to deploy facial recognition technology in
the land border vehicle and pedestrian environments.
These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture
for the end-state solution. CBP's Traveler Verification System (TVS)
uses biographic data from the passenger manifest and previously-
collected photos contained in Government databases to perform facial
matching on-site to verify a traveler's identity. In early 2018, CBP
completed the TVS and remains committed to partnerships with all
airlines and airports across the United States. CBP is working toward
full implementation of biometric exit in the air environment within the
next 4 years to account for over 97 percent of departing commercial air
travelers from the United States.
CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit
solution to transform the entry process by using facial photographs to
identify travelers. This innovative approach uses the traveler's face
to unlock their electronic travel record, in turn providing an
immediate facilitative benefit, while at the same time leveraging
previously-collected fingerprints to run applicable law enforcement
checks in the background. CBP is piloting this concept at 7 airports,
to demonstrate that facial recognition technology facilitates
frictionless travel by reducing inspection time and creating an
improved customer experience for the traveling public.
Question 19b. Is biometric exit finally something that is going to
be accomplished?
Answer. CBP's partnership with stakeholders is critical to
accomplish implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is
committed to a process that meets the needs of all stakeholders to
fulfil the biometric entry-exit mandate. CBP's primary responsibility
is to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. CBP employees are working
diligently to ensure stakeholders--travelers, airline authorities, air
carriers, and other industry partners--are able to navigate these
changes seamlessly and with the least amount of disruption to our
economy.
If CBP were to deploy a Government-only solution, without
stakeholder input and support, cumbersome layers would be added to
existing travel processes which, in turn, would have adverse effects on
travel as a whole. Travelers would spend additional time going through
security and/or boarding processes. Additionally, significant
enhancements and modifications would be necessary to manage the
expected increase in air travel.
CBP is cognizant of limitations posed by existing infrastructure.
As a whole, operationally, there are significant differences between
the air, land, and sea environments. Each environment will require a
different strategy and method of implementation. CBP is currently
conducting field tests in the land and sea environments to validate
technology and operational processes to inform strategy and planning
activities going forward.
Enactment of the fiscal year Consolidated Appropriations Act
authorizes funding for a biometric exit program of up to $1 billion to
be collected in fees on H-1B and L-1 applications over a period of up
to 10 years. Based on actual collections in fiscal year 2016, fiscal
year 2017, and fiscal year 2018, the current 10-year projection for fee
fund collections is $585 million. CBP continues to closely monitor fee
collections to ensure that there are adequate resources to meet this
mandate.
Question 20. Commissioner McAleenan, CBP recently enacted a process
to allocate and prioritize AMO flight hours across various operational
needs within CBP and DHS. There is a significant gap between funded
hours of about 95,000 compared to the Border Patrol requirement of
about 220,000. Do you support the use of contractual air support to
fill this gap?
Answer. CBP is exploring a number of potential opportunities to
increase its situational awareness, close the gap in air support, and
increase law enforcement presence. We believe the 52 initiatives
contained within the Border Security Improvement Plan address these
gaps through additional investments in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection infrastructure and personnel.
Questions From Ranking Member Filemon Vela for Kevin K. McAleenan
Question 1. During the hearing you stated that CBP has a
prioritized list of port of entry infrastructure improvements developed
in partnership with GSA, the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Commerce, and international partners. Please provide the
committee with this prioritized list.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Attrition is a significant problem for CBP as a whole
and given that the component has not been able to meet the minimum
staffing level for CBPOs over several years, I am concerned that CBP
may not be doing enough to keep the workforce it currently has. Please
explain what is driving OFO's attrition rate.
Answer. The CBP officer (CBPO) attrition rate is based on
retirements, separations, and series losses. It counts CBPOs who leave
CBP or leave the 1895 series and therefore represents true attrition to
the CBPO population. The CBPO attrition rates have historically been in
the range of 3 percent to 3.5 percent. This attrition rate is
considered low.
For fiscal year Year-to-date (pay period ending April 28, 2018), we
have seen the attrition rate for CBPOs increase to 4.2 percent from the
3.3 percent seen through the same pay period in fiscal year 2017. This
is largely attributed to a spike in retirements. OFO has experienced 35
percent more retirements this year compared to the same time frame last
year. CBP monitors attrition rates throughout the fiscal year and
strives to close the staffing gap between our onboard and our
authorized staffing levels regardless of whether the gap is new,
positions yet to be filled, or backfills due to attrition.
Question 3. In recent years, Border Patrol has lost hundreds more
agents each year than it has been able to hire. What steps is CBP
taking to increase its retention of qualified Border Patrol agents?
Answer. CBP's Office of Human Resources Management (HRM) is engaged
with U.S. Border Patrol and other CBP operational components to advise
and inform decision makers of appropriate attrition mitigation
strategies. CBP is assessing funding requirements and prioritizing
incentives that will have the greatest impact in retaining the
workforce.
Engaging in open conversation with employees and their families
will enable CBP to identify factors leading to job satisfaction,
quality of life, and other issues influencing attrition. We are also
developing a CBP-wide Exit Survey. The exit survey results will allow
the agency to better understand the causes of attrition with the goal
of improving retention.
Last, CBP established the Workforce Resilience and Engagement
Division within HRM, which is dedicated to identifying and promoting
programs and initiatives to enhance work-life balance for employees and
their families, and to address issues like affordable and available
child care in remote locations, employee and family health and
wellness, and the impact of working in high-stress environments.
Questions From Honorable Mike Rogers for Kevin K. McAleenan
Question 1. Since April 2017 apprehensions on the Southwest Border
have been on a steady rise. What new operations or policies, if any,
have you put in place to try to deter or address the rise in
apprehensions and illegal crossings?
Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol has initiated several operations in
an effort to decrease the flow of illegal entries into the United
States via the Southern Border with Mexico. These initiatives and
operations include planning aimed at returning agents to border
security missions, enhancing situational awareness reporting, and
decreasing ``pull factors'' for those entering the United States from
countries other than Mexico. These initiatives and operations are the
Zero Tolerance Prosecution, Operation Guardian Support, and Operation
Department of Interior Support.
Zero Tolerance is an initiative aimed at criminally prosecuting 100
percent of those entering the United States illegally between the ports
of entry. USBP is working with the Assistant U.S. Attorneys across the
Southwest Border to successfully implement this initiative.
The Zero Tolerance Prosecution Initiative continues to be
implemented in accordance with the President's June 20, 2018 Executive
Order titled Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family
Separation. The Executive Order clearly directs USBP to enforce this
and other criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
until and unless Congress directs otherwise. It also directs USBP to
maintain family unity, including by detaining alien families together
where appropriate and consistent with law and available resources.
Operation Guardian Support is an initiative to use National Guard
personnel for support in non-enforcement operations to increase the
numbers of agents working border security operations. This effort
places qualified National Guard troops in duties as camera operators,
mechanics, construction efforts, and in helicopters to increase
enforcement efficiency. National Guard troops will not be used in any
enforcement activities.
Operation Department of Interior Support is a collaborative effort
where additional Law Enforcement Officers from the Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management are
working routine enforcement activities in Federal Lands that fall
within the border areas aimed to improve overall border security. Yuma,
Tucson, El Paso, Del Rio, and Rio Grande Valley Sectors are closely
coordinating with DOI for this operation. This increase in DOI
enforcement support also enhances USBP situational awareness reporting
capabilities.
Question 2a. On April 5, 2018, The Washington Times published an
article regarding how the Border Patrol is deploying its manpower
resources on the Southwest Border, specifically at the McAllen, Texas
Station. (https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/5/border-patrol-
agents-stuck-desk-duty-amid-trump-ca/)
What is the percentage of agents, out of those that are on duty,
that are actually assigned to patrol the border on a daily basis in a
``zone'' that is along the border (broken down by station and sector)?
Answer. The percentage of agents assigned to patrol the border on a
daily basis are broken down by stations with border zones in the Rio
Grande Valley Sector are stated below. As stated in the response to
question No. 10, the lower percentages in certain zones is due to
certain terrain challenges and accessibility issues. Our border
enforcement posture will not always be at the immediate border, but
within a reasonable distance where the Border Patrol can perform its
law enforcement/ interdiction duties.
Brownsville-63 percent
Fort Brown-68 percent
Harlingen-32 percent
McAllen-69 percent
Rio Grande City-79 percent
Weslaco-64 percent
Question 2b. Additionally, what was the percentage of agents, out
of those that were on duty, that were actually assigned to patrol the
border on a daily basis in a ``zone'' that is along the border for the
month of March 2018, including on the date in question in The
Washington Times story (also broken down by station and sector)?
Answer. The percentage of agents assigned to patrol border duties
on a daily basis for the month of March broken down by stations with
border zones in the Rio Grande Valley Sector are stated below.
Brownsville-63 percent
Fort Brown-68 percent
Harlingen-32 percent
McAllen-69 percent
Rio Grande City-79 percent
Weslaco-64 percent
On March 18, 2018 agents assigned to patrol border duties broken
down by stations with border zones in the Rio Grande Valley Sector are
stated below.
Brownsville-82 percent
Fort Brown-82 percent
Harlingen-44 percent
McAllen-62 percent
Rio Grande City-77 percent
Weslaco-71 percent
Question 3. As the deputy commissioner, acting commissioner, and
now commissioner, you've overseen a workforce attrition rate among
agents in the Border Patrol greater than any other since the early
2000's. What steps have you taken or do you intend to take, besides the
operational mobility program, to address this significant problem?
Answer. CBP will continue to use its operational mobility program
to address attrition, and will continues to look for new approaches to
improve attrition rates for mission essential competencies. CBP is also
working to make improvements to its hiring process so that attrition of
seasoned agents is less of an issue than it is currently.
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Kevin K. McAleenan
Question 1. Commissioner MacAleenan, the CBP is requesting $33.25
billion in funding, approximately $18 billion of which would be
allocated for 722 miles of border wall, 316 of which is new.
Can you detail the problems with our current border infrastructure,
and explain why replacing, expanding, and enhancing it is vital to the
National security of the United States?
Answer. In certain areas of the border, the border barrier has been
in place for many years and the effects of aging, along with numerous
incidents of breaching and patching, have diminished their
effectiveness over time. Barriers are integral to achieving the
requisite level of impedance and denial needed to establish operational
control of the border and operational control is an essential element
of a safe and secure border. Replacing, expanding, and enhancing border
barrier will increase the Border Patrol's ability to impede and deny
illegal activity at the border, effect a proper law enforcement
response, and bring border incursions to an appropriate resolution.
These activities are essential to both the border and National security
of the United States.
Question 2a. While I support the President's plan of building a
wall along our Southern Border, I also recognize this alone will not
stop illegal immigration. Approximately 40 percent of illegal aliens in
the United States are here because they overstayed their visa.
How close are we to fully putting in place a biometric entry/exit
system as outlined in the 9/11 commission report?
Answer. Since receiving the mission in 2013, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) advanced an entry/exit strategy by conducting a
series of pilot programs and technical demonstrations, which resulted
in CBP developing a realistic and achievable biometric exit plan. CBP
has:
Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation;
Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to
integrate biometrics with the airline boarding process;
Transformed the entry process for certain flights at 11
airports, including PreClearance locations;
Facilitated a pilot program with one cruise line for
biometric disembarkation;
Launched a facial matching pilot with the Transportation
Security Administration at a security checkpoint as a proof of
concept for enhancing the travel experience:
Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics; and
Solidified plans and began deploying handheld mobile devices
to collect biometrics and verify identity in the land border
vehicle and pedestrian environments.
These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture
for the end-state solution. CBP's Traveler Verification System (TVS)
uses biographic data from the passenger manifest and previously
collected photos contained in Government databases to perform facial
matching on-site to verify a traveler's identity. In early 2018, CBP
completed the TVS and remains committed to partnerships with all
airlines and airports across the United States. CBP is working toward
full implementation of biometric exit in the air environment within the
next 4 years to account for over 97 percent of departing commercial air
travelers from the United States.
CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit
solution to transform the entry process by using facial photographs to
identify travelers. This new innovative approach uses the traveler's
face to unlock their electronic travel record, in turn providing an
immediate facilitative benefit, while at the same time leveraging
previously collected fingerprints to run applicable law enforcement
checks in the background. CBP is piloting this concept at 7 airports to
demonstrate that facial recognition technology facilitates frictionless
travel by reducing inspection time and creating an improved customer
experience for the traveling public.
Question 2b. Can you explain what obstacles we are facing that have
delayed its implementation?
Answer. CBP's partnership with stakeholders is critical to
accomplish implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is
committed to a process that meets the needs of all stakeholders to
fulfill the biometric entry-exit mandate. CBP's primary responsibility
is to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. CBP employees are working
diligently to ensure stakeholders--travelers, airline authorities, air
carriers, and other industry partners--are able to navigate these
changes seamlessly and with the least amount of disruption to our
economy.
If CBP were to deploy a Government-only solution, without
stakeholder input and support, cumbersome layers would be added to
existing travel processes which, in turn, would have an adverse effect
on travel as a whole. Travelers would spend additional time going
through security and/or boarding processes. Additionallly, significant
enhancements and modifications would be necessary to manage the
expected increase in air travel. CBP is cognizant of limitations posed
by existing infrastructure. As a whole, operationally, there are
significant differences among the air, land, and sea environments. Each
will require a different strategy and method of implementation. CBP is
currently conducting field tests in the land and sea environments to
validate the technology and operational processes to inform strategy
and planning activities going forward.
The Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act authorizes
funding for a biometric exit program of up to $1 billion to be
collected through fee surcharges over a period of up to 10 years. Based
on actual collections in fiscal year 2016, fiscal year 2017, and fiscal
year 2018, the current 10-year projection for fee fund collections is
$585 million. CBP continues to closely monitor fee collections to
ensure that there are adequate resources to meet this mandate.
Question 3a. Commissioner, can you explain how the current hiring
process for Border Patrol agents prevents CBP from being properly
staffed?
Answer. All BPAs undergo a rigorous, multi-step pre-employment
process that evaluates them for a range of distinct qualities and
skills. Finding the right people, the most trustworthy and capable of
American citizens, to join us on the front line is one of the most
crucial functions of the agency and one of our greatest challenges.
CBP's rigorous process ensures only the best qualified applicants are
hired, and includes an entrance exam, interview, medical test,
polygraph examination, background investigation and physical fitness
test. Because CBP's recruiting and hiring processes are complex, they
require significant investment to meet the agency's hiring goals.
Question 3b. What are the biggest challenges you face in the hiring
process and what do you think must be changed?
Answer. CBP is committed to improving its pre-employment hiring
process through continuous evaluation, analysis, and refinement of its
practices. While many modifications to CBP's hiring process are
considered, we carefully weigh all risks and risk mitigation measures
to ensure the agency's high standards of integrity remain
uncompromised.
In the last 2 years, numerous refinements have streamlined CBP's
front-line hiring process and led to reductions in the average time-to-
hire. This has directly contributed to reducing the number of otherwise
qualified candidates who drop from the hiring process due to process
fatigue or accept more timely job offers elsewhere. In January 2016,
CBP required approximately 195 applicants for one BPA to enter on duty.
Today, CBP only requires on average 52 applicants for every one BPA
hire.
CBP continues to develop and implement initiatives designed to
attract applicants suited to the unique CBP mission demands, expedite
the pre-employment time line, and refine the hiring process. Of the 11
steps in CBP's hiring process, the polygraph phase continues to see the
highest combined failure and discontinuation rates. CBP is actively
focusing on increasing capacity in this area.
CBP supports the Anti-Border Corruption Reauthorization Act of 2017
(H.R. 2213 in the House of Representatives and S. 595 in the Senate).
The House passed H.R. 2213 on June 7, 2017, thanks to the strong
support of this subcommittee and the co-sponsorship of Chairwoman
McSally. This legislation would grant CBP authority to waive the
polygraph requirement for three groups of applicants who demonstrated
long-standing histories of public trust and meet specific criteria:
Current, full-time State and local law enforcement officers; current,
full-time Federal law enforcement officers; and veterans, active-duty
service members, and reservists. CBP thanks Members of Congress for
your continued support as we seek to hire women and men to fulfill
CBP's complex and crucial missions in the months and years to come.
Question 4a. A great deal of media coverage has been centered on
the ``caravan'' of men, women, and children approaching the Southern
Border in hopes of entering the United States from Honduras. Most of
these individuals would likely try to enter the country by seeking
asylum, the backlog of which is extensive and susceptible to fraud.
Do you believe that our asylum process, specifically, the credible
fear standard has to be improved?
Answer. Under section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, the term ``credible fear of persecution'' means that
there is a ``significant possibility'' that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum. In assessing whether this standard has been
met, an officer must take into account the credibility of the
statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such
other facts as are known to the officer. The standard is lower than the
standard required for asylum itself; the latter requires proof of
either ``past persecution'' or ``well-founded fear of persecution.''
Currently, between 80 and 90 percent of applicants are found to have a
credible fear of persecution or torture.
In its list of Immigration Principles and Policies released last
year, the White House stated that, as part of its push for asylum
reform, it sought to ``[e]levate the threshold standard of proof in
credible fear interviews.'' The Department acknowledges the importance
such a proposal would have in deterring fraud in the asylum process and
is supportive of the measure.
Question 4b. What additional resources, such as immigration judges,
are necessary to be able to quickly and efficiently process these
individuals when they arrive at the border?
Answer. A greater presence on the part of asylum officer staff is
also necessary, given the challenges we currently face in the asylum
process. In fact, in response to the President's Executive Order 13767
entitled ``Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,''
the Department has already increased USCIS asylum-officer deployments
to a larger number of Southwest Border detention facilities. Up to 60
asylum officers are currently deployed at 10 detention centers along
the border. Regarding additional immigration judges, DHS defers to the
Department of Justice.
Additional prosecutorial resources are also needed. The Department
recently announced it would begin referring more cases where
individuals have entered illegally between Ports of Entry for
prosecution by the Justice Department. The cooperative effort is one
the Department completely supports as an important deterrent against
frivolous asylum cases.
Further, the Department has returned to a ``last in, first out''
interview schedule, which will allow USCIS to focus quickly on those
applications that should be approved while also identifying frivolous,
fraudulent, or otherwise non-meritorious asylum claims earlier and
quickly place those individuals into removal proceedings. Last in/first
out asylum-application processing was first established by the asylum
reforms of 1995 and was used for 20 years until 2014. The aim then, as
now, was to deter those who might try to use a backlog as a means to
obtain employment authorization and build equities in the United
States.
Question 5a. When was the assessment completed that identified
deployment of the National Guard as necessary?
Answer. On April 4, 2018, the President of the United States sent a
mission directive to DoD specifying that DoD would assist DHS with
operational support personnel and air support. At this time, DHS began
to coordinate with DoD on mission directives that could assist the
overall mission of CBP in securing our borders.
Question 5b. What factors or criteria were used to determine this
approach would be the most effective and cost-efficient alternative?
Answer. As soon as the Presidential Directive was given to
Department of Defense, the Border Patrol began its planning process by
referencing its fiscal year capabilities gap assessment document and
its list of air requirements that Air and Marine Operations was unable
to meet in fiscal year 2018. These areas were identified as support
missions that the Department of Defense and National Guard could
immediately fill given the limited scope of the Operation Guardian
Support.
Question 5c. Did you recommend such a deployment and were you aware
of the President's plan regarding the National Guard prior to his
announcement earlier this month?
Answer. While the United States Border Patrol has a long working
relationship with the National Guard and Department of Defense, this
specific Operation was not pre-coordinated prior to April 4, 2018. The
Border Patrol was not aware of the President's plan until he made his
proclamation on April 4, 2018.
Question 7. How does this deployment impact the U.S. Border
Patrol's overall border security strategy?
Answer. CBP has identified operational support positions where
National Guard Personnel can assist that will allow Border Patrol
agents to return to border enforcement activities between the ports of
entries. This will allow CBP personnel to return to their primary roles
as law enforcement officers.
As more agents return to the border along with the additional
12,000 hours of air support, CBP will gain a greater amount of
situational awareness along the Southwest Border. This will enhance the
Border Patrol's ability to impede and deny illegal border crossing and
apply the appropriate law enforcement response between the ports of
entries.
The increased situational awareness, impedance, denial, and
appropriate law enforcement resolution are all elements of the
Operational Control model for the U.S. Border Patrol. The readiness of
personnel and equipment allows Border Patrol to execute the elements of
Operational Control.
Question 6a. Acting Deputy Commissioner Vitiello has mentioned the
possibility of using National Guard personnel at ports of entry,
specifically to assist with cargo inspections.
Can you please tell us under what authority this would be allowed?
Answer. National Guard personnel are authorized under title 32 of
the U.S. Code, by request of the President of the United States, to
conduct operations in support of Department of Homeland Security
Southern Border security missions.
Question 6b. Have National Guard personnel been assigned to ports
of entry in the past?
Answer. National Guard personnel have been assigned to ports of
entry in the past, assisting with cargo operations and dismantling
activities. Operation Jump Start, 2006-2010, and Operation Phalanx,
2012-2013, provided National Guard to assist at the ports of entry. For
example, National Guard personnel assisted in pre-primary inspections
of vehicles on the land border, using portable contraband detectors
(busters) and fiber optic scopes. They assisted in secondary
inspections in the passenger and cargo environment in the land border,
including cab checks. They searched vehicles, trucks, aircraft, and
vessels. They unloaded, landed, and searched cargo shipments under the
supervision of CBP officers in the air, land, and sea environment. They
performed traffic control in seaport and land borders. They performed
landed quantity verifications in the sea environment. They dismantled
vehicles or cargo suspected or found to contain narcotics, and
retrieved the packages of illegal substances under CBP officer
supervision. They participated in narcotic transport activities. They
performed counter-drug surveillance operations. The National Guard
assistance was a valuable force-multiplier, allowing CBP personnel to
inspect more and intercept more illegal shipments.
Question 6c. How they interact with general public and what
guidance will be required to govern that interaction?
Answer. Their duties will not bring National Guard members in
contact with illegal immigrants/detainees, or persons presenting
themselves for entry. National Guard members will have limited contact
with the public related to their duties, e.g., GSA vehicle vendors/
dealers, maintenance garages, and parts vendors. National Guard
personnel will have limited contact with vehicle drivers for the
purpose of ground guidance and directional movement of vehicles in
designated controlled areas.
Question 8a. Given that CBP does not have metrics in place to
accurately measure the contributions of existing fencing and
surveillance technology, how did CBP determine that it needs to heavily
rely on its ``impedance and denial'' capabilities, seemingly at the
expense of other capabilities?
Answer. Since the construction of barriers, USBP has made
significant operational gains in border security. Illicit drug and
human smuggling activity have decreased in those areas where barrier is
deployed, but illicit cross-border traffic has also shifted to areas
with limited or no border barrier. This reduction and shift in traffic
demonstrates the effectiveness of deploying physical barriers along the
border as well as the need for more I&D infrastructure.
Today's border wall is a part of an integrated system that will
deter and prevent illegal entries. The physical barriers are the
backbone of an integrated Border Wall System that will include all-
weather roads and lighting, as well as enforcement cameras and sensors
and detection technology as well as adequately staffed agents to
support that infrastructure. Future investments in Border Wall Systems,
while rooted in I&D, will also include the integration of additional
capabilities such as domain awareness and access & mobility to increase
certainty of arrest, agent safety, and overall public safety.
Question 8b. How, if at all, have the plans for the construction of
the wall system affected plans for deployments of surveillance
technologies along the Southwest Border?
Answer. Both the Linear Ground Detection System (LGDS) and Remote
Video Surveillance System (RVSS) Programs are part of the Border Wall
System Program (BWSP) Integrated Product Team (IPT) to ensure efficient
and effective deployment of surveillance technology as each wall
segment is constructed. In addition, relocatable RVSS surveillance
technology will be installed in certain areas where wall will be
constructed instead of the planned fixed RVSS surveillance technology
to provide current domain awareness capability in these locations and
avoid costly relocation of fixed infrastructure if the exact location
of fixed RVSS surveillance technology does not match the BWSP needs as
each wall segment is designed. When each wall segment is constructed
and fixed RVSS surveillance technology installed, the relocatable RVSS
surveillance technology will be redeployed to another location.
Question 9a. The border wall prototypes in San Diego have undergone
a long period of testing and evaluation. What is the status of the
results of this evaluation period?
Answer. CBP constructed 8 border wall prototypes in San Diego
County: 4 segments constructed of reinforced concrete and 4 segments
constructed of alternate materials. The purpose of the prototypes was
to explore additional border wall design attributes. CBP began testing
the border wall prototypes in late November 2017 and completed testing
and evaluation in March 2018. Two of the most important testing
criteria were how easily the wall can be scaled and how easily the wall
can be breached. During the evaluation and assessment phase, CBP
identified attributes from the prototypes that support Border Patrol's
operational criteria for possible addition to the existing border wall
design toolkit.
Question 9b. What are CBP's anticipated next steps for this
project?
Answer. CBP has identified attributes from the prototypes and is
currently working with a design firm to incorporate those attributes
into the existing border wall design toolkit.
Question 9c. How do you anticipate using these prototypes?
Answer. The current plan is for the prototypes to remain in place
along the current eastern terminus of the San Diego Secondary Wall. As
the prototype location is part of the site of the fiscal year 2018 San
Diego Secondary Wall, the long-term plan for the prototypes is still
being determined. Once the design for the San Diego Secondary Wall is
complete, CBP will be better-positioned to provide more information on
the future of the prototypes.
Question 10a. How has DHS estimated the costs associated with
planned barrier segments?
Answer. When CBP constructs border infrastructure and associated
cost estimates, CBP evaluates each segment of the physical border
against CBP border barrier requirements. CBP carefully considers the
unique operational requirements and terrain associated with each border
segment to identify the border barrier solutions and supporting
technology necessary to maximize effectiveness and provide situational
awareness for the Border Patrol. CBP continues to refine cost estimates
for the border wall program based on site-specific characteristics,
including the environment, land acquisition, and terrain factors, as
well as lessons learned from previous border wall construction.
Question 10b. To what extent has DHS factored in the costs of land
acquisition and terrain into those estimates?
Answer. CBP continues to refine cost estimates for the border wall
program based upon the terrain and land acquisition for each specific
site. Each segment of the wall construction has varying requirements
and associated real estate costs. CBP cannot yet determine the
anticipated total costs to survey, appraise, and acquire any necessary
real estate until rights of entry have been obtained, which will allow
the Government and its contractors to go enter privately-owned property
to conduct necessary pre-acquisition activities.
Question 11. Border Patrol staffing nearly doubled between fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2014 but staffing at ports of entry increased
less than 25 percent during this same time period and has continued to
lag. How are you prioritizing personnel and resources for the ports of
entry?
Answer. By effectively using targeted, monthly, port-specific,
entry-level vacancy announcements, CBP has closed, or nearly closed,
staffing gaps along the Southern and Northern Borders. Major Southern
Border ports such as El Paso, San Ysidro, Brownsville, Hidalgo, and
Eagle Pass either are at their authorized staffing level, or are
projected to be within the next month. The Port of Laredo is over 93
percent staffed and has 18 trainees scheduled to enter on duty in the
month of June. Additionally, the Port of Otay Mesa, CA, was recently
included on the May CBP officer vacancy announcement to help close
their staffing gaps.
The Arizona border ports and the Port of Calexico, CA, have proven
to be exceptionally difficult locations for hiring. Therefore, CBP
requested, and received approval, to increase the recruitment incentive
for these ports from 25 percent to 33 percent of an employee's basic
pay plus locality for a 3-year service period. Although it is too early
to see the long-term impact of this increase in recruitment incentive,
it is expected that the focused recruiting initiative and increased
recruitment incentive will result in increased staffing in these
difficult-to-hire ports.
Since the Office of Personnel Management approved an increase to
the recruitment incentive for the Arizona border ports and the Port of
Calexico, CA from 25 percent to 33 percent of an employee's basic pay
plus locality, 77 applicants have accepted CBP officer job offers with
the 33 percent incentive. In comparison, in the 2 prior years combined,
150 applicants accepted the 25 percent incentive for the AZ border
ports and the Port of Calexico. Therefore, in 3 short months, CBP has
experienced a marked increase in applicants accepting CBP officer job
offers to these ports. The average increase in incentive pay is
approximately $3,500 per applicant, per year of a 3-year service
agreement. Over a 3-year service period, the increased incentive for
these applicants is expected to cost approximately $810,000. Attrition
has yet to fully stabilize in these ports, however, the Port of Nogales
has experienced a net increase in staffing of 6.5 percent since the
recruitment incentive was first offered in February 2016.
Key ports along the Northern Border in Maine, Vermont, Washington,
and Montana have reached their authorized staffing levels. The Port of
Portal, ND, which has proven to be very difficult to staff, is over 91
percent staffed as of the beginning of July 2018.
The Port of San Francisco has had 16 applicants accept CBP officer
job offers since the recruitment incentive was approved in May 2018.
The average incentive is $12,611 each year for a 3-year service period.
The port's attrition has yet to stabilize, but increased numbers of
applicants are clearing pre-employment and accepting job offers. It is
expected that in the coming months that the port will experience a net
gain in staffing. The airports in Seattle and Boston recently received
additional CBP officer positions. Both airports have applicants
scheduled to enter on duty in the coming months, and applicants in pre-
employment, which is expected to satisfy the hiring requirements. For
John F. Kennedy Airport, there are nearly 600 applicants in the pre-
employment process with 49 applicants scheduled to enter on duty over
the coming months.
For the monthly CBP officer vacancy announcement for May 2018,
posted vacancies included the following airports: Dulles International
Airport (IAD), Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), and San
Francisco International Airport (SFO). Collectively, these locations
received nearly 1,500 applications in just 15 days.
Dulles International Airport received over 1,200 applications in
May 2018. Of those, nearly 500 applicants are in the pre-employment
process with 21 applicants scheduled to enter on duty in the coming
months. Los Angeles International Airport received nearly 2,000
applications in May 2018. Of those, nearly 700 applicants are in the
pre-employment process with 11 applicants scheduled to enter on duty in
the coming months.
Question 12a. CBP has the authority to provide additional
inspection services to private stakeholders through the Reimbursable
Services Program.
How many of these agreements does CBP have in place now?
Answer. As of May 14, 2018, CBP has signed Reimbursable Services
Agreements with 100 stakeholders.
Question 12b. How does CBP help its partners estimate the costs for
entering these kinds of agreements?
Answer. CBP emphasizes that partners are subject to the actual
costs linked to the salaries and benefits of the specific CBP employees
that process requests for services made by program partners. As a
general estimate, CBP will provide interested parties with tables that
include a variety of possible annual and hourly base salary and
overtime rates to represent the range of grade levels that might
perform the work under reimbursable services agreements. Estimates
include benefit rates to reflect Government contributions which are
required for employees earning overtime under the Customs Officer Pay
Reform Act (COPRA):

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rate (Percent) Type Calculation Basis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.45........................... Medicare.......... Applied to all
COPRA overtime
earnings.
6.20........................... FICA.............. Applied to all
COPRA overtime
earnings.
1.00........................... FERS One Percent.. Applied to the
first $22,500 of
COPRA overtime
earnings.
4.00........................... FERS Matching*.... Applied to the
first $22,500 of
COPRA overtime
earnings.
28.8........................... FERS Annuity...... Applied to the
first $22,500 of
COPRA overtime
earnings.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* [Sic.]

Also included are summaries of laws related to overhead, overtime,
and premium pay regulations that could be applicable contingent upon
the nature of the partner's request for reimbursable services. As
partners begin to request services, CBP provides points of contact to
address any questions tied to billing.
Question 12c. How do you determine which officers are assigned to
fulfill these agreements?
Answer. CBP uses the assignment procedures set forth in Article 35
of the National Collective Bargaining Agreement (NCBA) between CBP and
the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) for the assignment of all
overtime including assignments filled under the auspices of the
Reimbursable Services Program. Overtime assignments are made on least-
cost, low-earner principles; and in accordance with a call-out order
found in the NCBA.
Question 13a. Has CBP been successful in getting Congress to
increase Customs user fees to fund CBP officer new hires since the
initial request in the fiscal year 2014 budget proposal?
Answer. On December 4, 2015, the Fixing America's Surface
Transportation Act (FAST Act, Pub. L. 114-94) was signed into law.
Section 32201 of the FAST Act amended section 13031 of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c) by
requiring certain COBRA user fees and corresponding limitations be
adjusted to reflect certain increases in inflation. While this ability
to adjust COBRA fees for inflation was formally requested by CBP, the
FAST Act does not allow CBP to retain the fees collected as a result of
the inflationary adjustments. Congress has not granted approval on
recent legislative proposals to increase user fees to support increased
CBP officer hiring.
Question 13b. If not, can you please explain why CBP has chosen to
not request dedicated appropriations to hire the more than 3,500
officers needed to address OFO's staffing shortage?
Answer. CBP is committed to continued cooperation with the Congress
in order to assess the optimal resource solutions to support additional
CBP officer hiring efforts. Consistent with CBP's fiscal year 2017
Resource Optimization Strategy and prior budget requests, CBP has
submitted user fee increase legislative proposals to support additional
CBP officers. The proposed increases to the Immigration User Fee (IUF)
and COBRA User Fee would help CBP keep pace with travel volumes and
meet the requirements identified by CBP's Workload Staffing Model.
These fees are an important source of revenue for CBP field operations,
but have not kept pace with the rising cost of providing inspection
services or with rising inflation. Adjusting these fees will allow CBP
to recover more of its costs through user fees, rather than annual
appropriations, providing a funding source more closely aligned with
trends in travel demand. Fee increases for these programs allow DHS to
dedicate discretionary funding to programs for which user fees are not
authorized.
Question 14a. CBP has previously committed to fully implementing
biometric exit by the end of 2018. In your written testimony, you
describe this effort as the Traveler Verification Service, but you do
not mention a time line for full deployment. Is CBP on track to meet
the original 2018 deadline?
Answer. Since receiving the mission in 2013, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) advanced an entry/exit strategy by conducting a
series of pilot programs and technical demonstrations, which resulted
in CBP developing a realistic and achievable biometric exit plan. CBP
has:
Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation;
Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to
integrate biometrics with the airline boarding process;
Transformed the entry process for certain flights at 7
airports, including PreClearance locations;
Facilitated a pilot program with one cruise line for
biometric disembarkation;
Launched a facial matching pilot with the Transportation
Security Administration at a security checkpoint as a proof of
concept for enhancing the travel experience:
Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics; and
Solidified plans and began deploying handheld mobile devices
to collect biometrics and verify in the land border vehicle and
pedestrian environments.
These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture
for the end-state solution. CBP's Traveler Verification Service (TVS)
uses biographic data from the passenger manifest and previously
collected photos contained in Government databases to perform facial
matching on-site to verify a traveler's identity. In early 2018, CBP
completed the TVS and remains committed to partnerships with all
airlines and airports across the United States. CBP is working toward
full implementation of biometric exit in the air environment within the
next 4 years to account for over 97 percent of departing commercial air
travelers from the United States.
CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit
solution to transform the entry process by using facial photographs to
identify travelers. This innovative approach uses the traveler's face
to unlock their electronic traveler record, in turn providing an
immediate facilitative benefit, while at the same time leveraging
previously collected fingerprints to run applicable law enforcement
checks in the background. CBP is piloting this concept at 7 airports,
further demonstrating that facial recognition technology facilitates
frictionless travel by reducing inspection time and creating an
improved customer experience for the traveling public.
Question 14b. What remains to be addressed?
Answer. In order to fully implement biometric exit, CBP must
continue making progress in three key areas: Funding, stakeholder
engagement, and expansion to additional modes of travel.
First, while CBP received initial funding for the biometric exit
program through the fiscal year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act,
CBP must continue to closely monitor fee collections to ensure that
there are adequate resources to meet this mandate. The Act authorizes
funding for a biometric exit program of up to $1 billion to be
collected through fee surcharges over a period of up to 10 years. Based
on actual collections in fiscal year 2016, fiscal year 2017, and fiscal
year 2018, the current 10-year projection for fee fund collections is
$585 million. It is imperative that CBP monitor the funding forecast in
order to inform the time line of the biometric implementation strategy
(in all modes of travel) and future planned activities, to include
field tests, demonstrations, and partnerships with travel industry
stakeholders.
Second, CBP's partnership with stakeholders is critical to
accomplish implementation of a biometric entry/exit system. CBP is
committed to a process that meets and the needs of all stakeholders to
fulfill the biometric entry-exit mandate. CBP's primary responsibility
is to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. CBP employees are working
diligently to ensure stakeholders--travelers, airline authorities, air
carriers, and other industry partners--are able to navigate these
changes seamlessly and with the least amount of disruption to our
economy. While CBP has already begun collaborating with certain
airlines and airports to implement biometric entry and exit operations,
CBP must continue to support these on-going partnerships, while also
expanding our collaborative relationship to other industry partners.
If CBP were to deploy a Government-only solution, without
stakeholder input and support, cumbersome layers would be added to
existing travel processes which, in turn, would have adverse effects on
the travel as a whole. Travelers would spend additional time going
through security and/or boarding processes. Additionally, significant
enhancements and modifications would be necessary to manage the
expected increase in air travel.
Third, while CBP has made substantial progress in implementing
biometric exit in the air environment, due to limitations posed by
existing infrastructure, a different strategy and method of
implementation will be required for other modes of travel.
Operationally, there are significant differences among the air, land,
and sea environments. CBP is working to finalize a comprehensive
biometric land and sea strategies. In order to do so, CBP will be
conducting field tests in the land and sea environments to validate
technology and operational processes to inform strategy and planning
activities going forward.
Question 15a. In your testimony you mention that CBP is working
with airlines about incorporating the Traveler Verification Service in
their operations. What are some of the concerns airlines have about
this program?
Answer. The airlines are primarily concerned about integration
costs (e.g. equipment) associated with the Traveler Verification
Service (TVS). However, CBP's long-term vision for seamless travel is
the use of facial recognition technology for identity verification. The
passive application of this technology has the potential to replace
manual identity checks and boarding pass scans from curb to gate. This
will reduce friction points and save time for travelers, airlines, and
airports, without requiring new governmental processes that add
complexity to travel. CBP will utilize TVS to implement CBP's next
generation processing system for arriving travelers. This will allow
CBP to use facial recognition to match arriving passengers to the
flight manifest, reducing the need for passports to be opened,
fingerprints to be taken, and will streamline the entry process. The
vision and path forward provides airlines with the assurance that the
system is both financially viable and identifies the return on
investment.
Question 15b. How are roles and responsibilities being determined?
Question 15c. Do they vary by airline or is there a standard set of
responsibilities that all airline partners will need to assume?
Answer. CBP is working with industry partners to standardize our
policies, requirements, and arrangements that outline all respective
responsibilities. Generally, the set of responsibilities is as follows:
Using APIS data, CBP creates a temporary gallery of photographs and
Unique Identifiers (UIDs) for passengers on all departing and arriving
U.S. flights. These photos and UIDs are securely pushed to a cloud-
based matching service. CBP provides TVS web services and a secure
gateway for partner airlines and airports to submit traveler photos
through an internet Application Program Interface (API). Partners can
verify traveler identity using TVS throughout the travel process by
simply capturing a live traveler photo. The captured photo is compared
against the TVS photo gallery in real-time. TVS responds with identity
verification match results, eliminating manual and time-consuming
processing such as document checks or the use of boarding passes. CBP
currently does not require, but recommends that its partners also
delete: (1) Matching results within 14 days and (2) newly-captured
photos as soon as they are no longer needed for business purposes.
Airlines and airport authorities that do not require short-term
retention for business purposes will not use or retain the photos.
Question 15d. How are costs for operating this program going to be
shared?
Answer. CBP invested heavily in robust infrastructure and built a
matching service, the Traveler Verification Service (TVS), to support
the end-to-end vision for seamless air travel that meets the biometric
exit mandate. CBP will offer this service to all stakeholders. However,
because airlines and airports are responsible for many of the passenger
interactions, it is imperative they collaborate with CBP to co-create a
process to meet business, traveler, and security needs. As the TVS is a
device-agnostic biometric service, airline and airport partners have
flexibility when selecting and purchasing front-end cameras to capture
traveler photos to ensure the matching service aligns with their
business model and customer service experience.
Question 16a. We understand that certain groups have expressed
concerns about passenger privacy in this program. What are CBP and its
airline partners doing to inform the public about their privacy rights?
Answer. CBP takes its privacy obligations very seriously. CBP
provides general notification of the biometric exit program and its
various pilots through airport signage as well as through Privacy
Impact Assessments (PIAs), published on www.dhs.gov/privacy, and
through program information, such as Frequently Asked Questions,
readily available on www.cbp.gov. The PIAs account for the purpose of
the information collection in relation to the DHS mission and address
individual participation, security, data quality and integrity, and the
sharing of data, including its minimization and use limitation, as well
as auditing and accountability transparency.
CBP works with airline and airport partners to incorporate
notifications and processes into their current business models (i.e.
signage, gate announcements).
Question 16b. How are you engaging with groups concerned about
privacy and civil liberties?
Answer. CBP complies with all Privacy Act requirements and
Departmental policies that govern the collection, use, and maintenance
of personally identifiable information. DHS has published 5 PIAs,
available at www.dhs.gov/privacy, related to the biometric matching
system that supports biometric exit. As each pilot phase has commenced,
CBP has updated the required privacy documentation. CBP has also
published PIAs for the various biometric exit pilots. CBP has also
published information concerning biometric exit on its website, which
contains Frequently Asked Questions, links to privacy documentation and
exemplars of the signage that is posted at each boarding gate where
photographs are being collected.
In addition, CBP has met with privacy advocates twice regarding
biometric exit and has engaged in privacy discussions through DHS's
Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee (DPIAC). The meetings
with privacy advocates occurred in August 2017 in Washington, DC and
January 2018 in San Francisco, California. Each meeting included a
lengthy Q&A session. Discussions included review of current pilots,
retention policies, future biometric vision, and alternative screening
procedures. CBP briefed the DPIAC in September 2017 and again in May
2018, where CBP provided programmatic updates.
Question 17. Under the previous administration, CBP was
aggressively moving forward with negotiating and selecting new sites
for PreClearance, and this committee worked on a bipartisan basis to
help improve these efforts. What is the status of PreClearance today?
Answer. Today, CBP has law enforcement officers and agriculture
specialists stationed at 15 aviation PreClearance locations in 6
countries.\1\ In fiscal year 2017, CBP personnel stationed abroad
precleared more than 19 million travelers, representing over 15 percent
of all commercial air travelers to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Current PreClearance locations include: Dublin and Shannon in
Ireland; Aruba; Freeport and Nassau in The Bahamas; Bermuda; Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates; and Calgary, Toronto, Edmonton, Halifax,
Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver, and Winnipeg in Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP has hosted two open periods to-date, during which foreign
airports were invited to submit letters expressing their interest in
PreClearance operations. These airports underwent an evaluation by DHS
and the U.S. Department of State in collaboration with stakeholders
across the Government and with the aviation industry.
Prior to beginning PreClearance operations, the United States and
the host government must sign and enter into a PreClearance Agreement
granting CBP personnel the authority to inspect U.S.-bound travelers,
goods, and aircrafts.
In late 2016 the United States signed agreements to implement
PreClearance operations at Stockholm Arlanda Airport in Sweden and
Punta Cana International Airport in the Dominican Republic.
Implementation efforts currently await ratification and/or approval by
our international partners. CBP also continues to engage with several
of the host governments of other prioritized locations.
Question 18a. Now that you are Commissioner, how do you envision
using PreClearance?
Answer. CBP firmly believes that establishing PreClearance
operations in strategic locations will assist our efforts in
identifying terrorists, criminals, and other National security threats
prior to their boarding aircraft bound for the United States and this
is a critical step in CBP's continued efforts to enhance National
security and facilitate growing international travel and commerce. The
aviation security benefits of PreClearance are substantial because a
uniformed U.S. law enforcement officer interviews the precleared
passenger before he or she boards the plane. This added security layer
provides an additional opportunity to detect and stop threats as early
in the process as possible.
In addition to enhancing security, PreClearance has the potential
to increase capacity and growth opportunities for airports and air
carriers in the United States and abroad, while improving the passenger
experience. PreClearance generates the potential for significant
economic benefits for the United States and our international partners
by facilitating travel through all gateways creating an overall
increase in clearance capacity, and maximizing aircraft and gate
utilization. PreClearance can lead to faster connections and provides
passengers with the ability to exit the airport immediately upon
landing the United States.
Question 18b. Do you have plans to expand the program further?
Answer. Building upon the success of existing PreClearance
operations, CBP continues to work to expand the PreClearance program.
Question 18c. Or will you focus on developing what the previous
Commissioner negotiated?
Answer. CBP firmly believes in establishing PreClearance operations
in additional strategic locations. CBP is currently negotiating with
several countries prioritized during the open periods of expansion
while simultaneously working to support efforts by the governments of
Sweden and the Dominican Republic to bring the two agreements concluded
in 2016 into force.
Question 19. CBP awarded Accenture with a nearly $300 million
contract to assist in recruiting additional CBP law enforcement
personnel. That translates to about $40,000 per new hire going to the
contractor. I understand that funding was reprogrammed from a salaries
account that was not being used given the lack of hires this fiscal
year. Did CBP consider using that funding for retention incentives
instead? If not, why not?
Answer. CBP's staffing challenges are complex and require a multi-
pronged strategy that cuts across several lines of effort. These range
from developing our recruitment and hiring capacity, which includes
leveraging Accenture's expertise in Federal staffing, to reducing the
attrition rate of the existing workforce. Funding has been utilized for
our successful Operational Mobility Program for BPAs. Nearly 400 BPAs
accepted relocations during the program's first cycle, more than 100 of
whom received relocation incentives. CBP is currently exploring other
ways to curb attrition, including multiple employee engagement
initiatives and the expanded use of incentives.
Question 20. We understand the Accenture contract is ramping up.
What are CBP's plans for monitoring the contractor and ensuring that
the law enforcement personnel it recruits and hires meet CBP's
standards?
Answer. CBP has stood up a robust Program Management Office
dedicated to this contract to monitor Accenture's work through regular
touch points and oversight meetings. The contract imposes numerous
reporting and metrics development requirements upon Accenture, and
senior leadership meets regularly with the Program Manager and the
contractor to review status. CBP has already seen improvements in
applicant interest based on Contractor marketing, and applicants will
enter on duty through the same rigorous process currently used by CBP
HRM. There are also several inherently Governmental steps in the hiring
process where Government personnel will review contractor work. Final
suitability determinations will only be made by CBP employees with
expertise in the hiring process.
Question 21. Several advocacy groups have noted that CBP personnel
are behaving in ways that do not seem to align with policy. For
example, Border Patrol agents have been filmed boarding passenger
trains and buses without a warrant. They have also been filmed
improperly transferring custody of a migrant to Mexican officials based
on the person's appearance only. Please describe how you intend to
enhance CBP's internal integrity program.
Answer. U.S. Border Patrol agents are committed, and have
demonstrated that commitment daily, to treating everyone with
professionalism, dignity, and respect while enforcing the laws of the
United States.
U.S. Border Patrol agents routinely engage in enforcement
operations at transportation hubs that fall within the border areas (up
to 100 miles from a U.S. border), and along points of ingress into the
U.S. Border Patrol agents conduct numerous immigration inspections on
buses to identify passengers who are in the United States illegally.
Many times those determined to be in the United States illegally are
found to have recently crossed, have overstayed their visa, or have
violated the terms of their legal entry and are thus amenable to
removal, and/or have active warrants for their arrest. Inspections
conducted in transportation check operations are part of a layered
approach to prevent illegal aliens from traveling further into the
interior of the United States. Inspections are conducted at strategic
locations that serve as conduits for both human and narcotic smuggling,
and as a result, disrupt criminal organizations from further exploiting
certain modes of transportation. Enforcement operations at
transportation hubs will continue to play a vital role in the U.S.
Border Patrol's National security efforts.
U.S. Border Patrol agents perform their duties with great
professionalism in the face of an often hostile public. They regularly
ignore taunts from passengers recording their lawful actions, and treat
all individuals questioned with courtesy and respect. The Border Patrol
does not condone or permit ``profiling'' based on appearances. The
Border Patrol regularly apprehends illegal aliens and smugglers of all
nationalities and ethnicities. There is no prototypical subject to whom
Border Patrol agents look for to the exclusion of others. While CBP
always strives to maintain the utmost level of professionalism during
each encounter with the public, it remains CBP's foremost
responsibility to ensure that Border Patrol agents conduct a thorough
examination of every person questioned and to do so free of bias,
racial profiling, and within the authorities granted to them by law.
The public is entitled to fair, impartial, and courteous treatment.
The U.S. Border Patrol does not tolerate unprofessional or demeaning
behavior by its agents. CBP makes every effort to ensure that our
operations treat all members of the public in both a professional and
fair manner and inconvenience them as little as possible.
The incident captured in the March 27, 2017 video was an isolated
incident. El Centro Sector Border Patrol leadership resolved the
situation quickly and satisfactorily with the Mexican Consulate,
reaffirming the daily cooperation and coordination between the two
nations. On that date, U.S. Border Patrol agents encountered an
individual with mental health issues. This individual's mental state
complicated an often straightforward repatriation process. In the
video, our actions were not consistent with established operational
procedures. Corrective action was taken to ensure all Border Patrol
agents understand their obligations to following established processes,
practices, and policies. In this incident, like many others taking
place every day, the U.S. Border Patrol worked with their Mexican
Consulate counterparts who identified the individual as a Mexican
national who entered the United States illegally. That individual was
properly repatriated in coordination with Mexican immigration
officials.
While the video of this incident was not available at the time (it
was seen after the fact by CBP/USBP), the agency immediately followed
proper protocol and referred this particular incident to the CBP Office
of Professional Responsibility, as per policy. Additionally, the U.S.
Border Patrol used this case as an educational scenario with the CBP
Integrity Advisory Committee. The Integrity Advisory Committee educates
and trains CBP personnel on integrity issues to improve.
CBP has a workforce of dedicated men and women who are among the
finest civil servants in the world, who carry out their duties with the
utmost professionalism and efficiency. We are proud of the fact that
our work is defined by the core values of vigilance, service, and
integrity. The vast majority of CBP's agents and officers embody our
core values, perform their duties with integrity and are dedicated to
our mission of securing the American people and our borders while
facilitating legitimate trade and travel. The men and women of CBP
perform their duties professionally and treat those with whom they come
in contact with dignity and respect.
DHS and CBP take allegations of employee misconduct seriously.
Under a uniform system, allegations of misconduct are documented and
referred to the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) for independent
review and assessment. Some cases are retained by the OIG for
investigation while others are referred back to the component for
appropriate handling. If misconduct is substantiated, appropriate
corrective action will be initiated.
Question 22a. Though apprehensions are at historic levels, migrant
deaths continue to be high. As enforcement operations drive more
migrants to remote areas. Border Patrol agents have also been found to
have destroyed water supplies left in the desert by humanitarian
groups. Can you please explain why and how CBP changed the methodology
for counting migrant deaths?
Answer. USBP reports any deaths that their employees come across in
the course of their duties.
Question 22b. Are you investigating these allegations of Border
Patrol agents purposefully destroying water left for people stranded in
the desert?
Answer. U.S. Border Patrol takes all allegations seriously. The
actions depicted in the 2010-2013 videos re-released by the group No
More Deaths, were investigated by the CBP Office of Professional
Responsibility and the U.S. Border Patrol. As a result of the
investigation, disciplinary action was taken against the identified
agents involved and USBP reinforced guidance was issued to prevent
incidents like this from happening again.
Question 23a. Can you please explain why CBP changed its
methodology for counting assaults on CBP personnel?
Answer. Law Enforcement Safety Compliance (LESC) began collecting
and reporting assault and use of force data on February 5, 2016. In May
2017, the Office of Public Affairs began publishing the number of use
of force and assault incidents, in addition to the singular counts. The
inclusion of incidents provided additional context to the uses of force
and assaults, as there may be multiple actions--assaults and/or uses of
force--during a single incident. Presenting these actions within the
framework of incidents depicts the circumstances more clearly and
reduces the variability created by the singular counts in the month-to-
month statistics.
Question 23b. Does the year-to-year comparison that noted a 45
percent increase from 2016 to 2017 take into account this new
methodology?
Answer. The 45 percent increase in singular assaults from fiscal
year 2016 to fiscal year 2017 was driven in large part by incidents
which included multiple assailants using multiple weapon types to
assault USBP agents. Statistics are derived from counting weapon/
assault types, subjects, and officers/agents. Singular uses of force
and singular assaults are both calculated using the same method:
[number of officers/agents] x [number of subjects] x [number of weapon
types involved]. Incidents are counted once for each type of activity
they include. An assault incident is counted once regardless of the
number of singular assaults involved; likewise for uses of force. An
incident involving both assaults and uses of force generates one
assault incident and one use of force incident.
Question 23c. Please describe how this methodology is different
from previous ones.
Answer. There has been no change to the assault counting
methodology. The Intercept article titled, ``How the Border Patrol
Faked Statistics Showing a 73 Percent Rise in Assaults Against
Agents,'' states that, ``A review of the LEOKA (Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted) data shows that for years, the number of
assaults on Border Patrol agents reported to the FBI exactly matched
the figure published by CBP.'' The phrase ``for years'' is somewhat
selective, as it matched for only 3 years (2012, 2013, and 2014). The
FBI publishes LEOKA each year to provide information about officers who
were killed, feloniously or accidentally, and officers who were
assaulted while performing their duties. The FBI does not independently
track assaults on law enforcement officers; agencies report their own
numbers to the FBI. The LEOKA report publishes calendar year numbers of
officers assaulted and assailants, while CBP publishes fiscal year
incidents and singular assaults. The Intercept article's chart titled,
``The Border Patrol's False Assaults Data,'' erroneously displays both
CBP and LEOKA statistics as being fiscal year on its axis.
The table below displays the numbers of assaults reported from 2009
through 2017:

YEAR (FISCAL YEAR FOR CBP, CALENDAR YEAR FOR LEOKA)*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USBP Assaults.................. 1,073 1,061 675 555 468 373 378 454 786
LEOKA USBP Agents Assaulted.... 1,167 888 699 555 468 373 349 397 432
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* (2016 and forward reported by LESC; pre-2016 reported by USBP.)

Question 24. Which recommendations from the Homeland Security
Advisory Committee's CBP Integrity Advisory Panel's reports issued in
2015 and 2016 has CBP implemented?
Answer. The Homeland Security Advisory Committee's CBP Integrity
Advisory Panel made 53 recommendations (14 in the 2015 Interim report
and 39 in the 2016 final report) related to Integrity/Transparency, Use
of Force, and Discipline. To date, CBP has implemented/completed 42 of
the recommendations. A few notable ones are as follows:
Under the direction of the CBP Commissioner, should develop
and implement a comprehensive, proactive strategy for
preventing, deterring, identifying, and promptly investigating
potential corruption and acceptance of bribes by CBP personnel.
CBP's Integrity and Personal Accountability Strategy is predicated
on the concepts of corruption prevention, detection,
investigation, and response, along with cross-cutting
initiatives of organizational integration and integrity
awareness.
Adequately staff CBP's Office of Internal Affairs (now
Office of Professional Responsibility) with sufficient and
experienced 1,811 criminal investigators to timely and
effectively investigate allegations of corruption and use of
excessive force involving CBP personnel. Allocate and budget
for 550 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) 1,811 criminal investigators
in OPR, for a net increase of 350 FTE.
CBP has expanded its cadre of 1,811 criminal investigators in order
to improve quality, timeliness, and capacity to investigate
allegations of misconduct and corruption. Additionally, CBP is
expanding its specialty investigative units such as Cyber,
Technical Operations, and the Corruption Research Investigative
Unit to increase use of complex investigative techniques and
increase proactive efforts.
Establish clear goals and time lines for each step of the
discipline process to achieve agency-wide deterrence as well as
no action/closing of investigations as promptly as possible, to
include competent, appropriately prioritized and timely
investigations of all misconduct allegations, speedy and
thorough investigations, and prompt and appropriate discipline
and/or closure.
The Human Resources Management (HRM) Enterprise Dashboard was
launched in December 2016, and is available for senior
leadership review. HRM utilizes this data on a continuing basis
to identify potential opportunities for improvements to the
discipline process and other efficiencies. HRM will then
leverage the data collected from the case tracking system, via
the Enterprise Dashboard, and validate whether the metrics and
goals are appropriate or need revision.
Acknowledge all complaints received from the public by CBP.
If the complaint amounts to allegations of misconduct
potentially warranting discipline, CBP should acknowledge with
a letter or other documented communication to the complainant,
verifying receipt of the complaint and assuring a fair and
objective investigation.
The CBP Information Center (CIC) serves as the primary intake and
triage for the processing of all complaints, compliments, and
allegations. The CIC manages all public complaints through its
Compliments and Complaints Management System (CCMS). For
complaints received via the website or over the phone, CCMS
sends immediate notifications to the complaints with their
incident number for tracking purposes. For complaints received
via regular mail, CIC mails a letter of acknowledgment to the
complainant. Status updates are provided throughout the
complaint process, until the final status of ``closed'' is
achieved once it has been resolved. The response reaffirms that
CBP takes employee misconduct seriously and such complaints are
fully investigated.
Certain allegations of misconduct however, require review by the
OPR, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, or
another CBP/DHS office (i.e. discrimination or malfeasance).
For those types of complaints, the CIC transfers the complaint
to the appropriate office. These complaints are recorded by the
Joint Intake Center (JIC) through the Joint Integrated Case
Management System (JICMS). OPR maintains JICMS; however, DHS
OIG holds the right of first refusal to investigate such cases.
Require all CBP law enforcement personnel to immediately
self-report misconduct whether or not it leads to arrest.
OPR developed a new directive, for reporting allegations of
misconduct, including a requirement to immediately report
allegations of misconduct that result in arrest and/or
jeopardize the agency's mission that has been signed by the
Commissioner and issued to employees.
Develop local/regional Use of Force Incident Team (UFIT);
expand the role of the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB); pilot
mandated use of body armor in operational assignments.
CBP has implemented the UFIT and the local UFRB. As detailed in the
Use of Force Incident Guide, both the National and Local UFRBs
consist of representatives from all operational and training
components, as well as legal counsel to ensure consistent and
comprehensive incident reviews. The National UFRB will analyze
each incident and make observations and recommendations
concerning the application of deadly force, training and
tactical issues, policy, equipment, and any potential
misconduct arising from the incident.
Consider making these use of force policies openly available
for public inspection; policies on the use of force should
clearly state what types of information will be released, when,
and in what situation to maintain transparency.
The CBP Use of Force Policy, Guidelines, and Procedures Handbook is
publicly available on cbp.gov. Moreover, on April 8, 2016, the
UFCE (now LESC) and Office of Public Affairs (OPA) collaborated
to release 2015 and 2016 YTD use of force and assault against
agent/officer statistics on CBP.gov. LESC submits updated
statistics to OPA on the 8th day of each month reflecting the
previous month's numbers. OPA posts the updated statistics to
cbp.gov after vetting with the appropriate DHS and CBP
entities.
Questions From Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan for Kevin K. McAleenan
Question 1a. DHS officials have said that families are being
separated to protect the interests of minor children because CBP is
unable to verify the parental relationship or otherwise believe that
the child is in danger.
How many cases have been confirmed as false presentation as a
family unit?
Answer. Based on existing Federal law, including the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, DHS policy states that a family unit is an
alien parent or legal guardian and alien children. Therefore, if a
child arrives with a non-parent or legal guardian adult relative, such
as an aunt, uncle, grandparent, or adult sibling, the child is treated
as an Unaccompanied Alien Child (UAC).
In addition, there have been instances of human traffickers and
aliens smugglers using minor children to pose as a family unit to
receive favorable discretion regarding DHS custody pending processing
in accordance with either credible fear interviews with USCIS and/or
placement into INA Section 240 removal proceedings before an
Immigration Judge. In fiscal year 2018 from October 1 to April 30,
there were 148 fraudulent family units encountered between the ports of
entry along the Southwest Border.
CBP policy (Transportation, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS))
states in part that, CBP will maintain family unity to the greatest
extent operationally feasible, absent a legal requirement or an
articulable safety or security concern that requires separation. In
accordance with this policy, CBP strives to maintain the family units
of illegal aliens in our custody. However, there are numerous
situations that would require the separation of family units, such as:
(1) The criminal or immigration history of an adult in the family unit;
(2) evidence of abuse that would indicate that the child's safety is at
risk; and (3) questionable familial relationships (fraud).
Question 1b. What, if any, specific procedures have been put in
place to determine the validity of a bona-fide family relationship?
Answer. CBP treats all individuals with dignity and respect, and
complies with all relevant legal and policy requirements, including the
requirements of the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA).
In addition to adhering to the requirements of the FSA, CBP's
National Standards on TEDS, states in section 1.9 that ``CBP will
maintain family unity to the greatest extent operationally feasible,
absent a legal requirement or an articulable safety or security concern
that requires separation.''
In accordance with this policy, CBP strives to maintain the family
unity of aliens in custody to the greatest extent operationally
feasible, and that any operational decision to separate a family unit
is not made without taking the well-being of the child into account.
During the processing of a purported family unit, CBP agents and
officers review all available forms of identification, such as birth
certificates and passports, and all available electronic records to
determine the relationship between various members. CBP will also
contact the respective consulate to verify the documentation presented
to ascertain if a family relationship exists. CBP will observe and
document the interaction between the travelers to learn whether a
familial relationship exists. Additionally, if agents/officers suspect
the claimed familial relationship is false, agents/officers may
separate the adult and juvenile parties and interview them individually
to verify statements and detect deception.
Question 2a. CBP has acknowledged that one main indicator CBP uses
when deciding to separate a family is based on interviews with
children.
Is a child welfare professional present when the CBP officer is
conducting such questioning?
Answer. As a Federal Government agency, CBP does not operate as
part of State-managed child welfare systems. Nonetheless, CBP is
committed to ensuring child welfare when conducting interviews with
minors. CBP officers are trained to question children in an ``age-
appropriate'' manner to elicit responses. In addition, CBP officers are
trained in observational techniques and observe the interaction between
the adult and children to determine whether the relationship is bona-
fide.
In October 2015, CBP published National Standards on Transport,
Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) that set forth Nation-wide
standards governing CBP's interactions with detained individual
including provisions related to sexual abuse and assault prevention and
response. The TEDS standards have been implemented in all CBP
facilities. TEDS reinforces/reiterates the need to consider the best
interest of children and mandates adherence to established protocols to
protect at-risk populations to include transporting, detaining, and
caring for children.
U.S. Border Patrol agents routinely question children while in
custody. The majority of the time those questions are referenced to
their immediate needs such as water, food, blankets, showers, etc. USBP
facilities are short-term holding facilities and as such are not
staffed with child welfare personnel. A child welfare professional may
be brought into our facilities once USBP has determined that a child is
a UAC, after which placement under HHS/ORR oversight begins and CBP
transfers custody of the child to their staff to facilitate placement.
All Unaccompanied Alien Children are screened for potential risks
to being victims of human trafficking. This is captured on CBP form 93
Unaccompanied Alien Child Screening Addendum.
Question 2b. Is there a training guide or protocol that CBP
officers use to interview children coming across the border to
determine whether the parent/child relationship is bona-fide?
Answer. CBP officers receive training on interviewing techniques to
determine relationships amongst travelers. In addition, CBP officers
observe the interaction between the adult and child to assess whether
the relationship is bona-fide.
Question 2c. Are children of all ages questioned about family ties
to the individual they enter the United States with?
Answer. The decision to question children is made on an
individualized basis, based on the observation of CBP officers and
supervisors.
Question 3. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach operate more
hours than any other cargo gateway in the country because they are
processing cargo every day of the year. These ports handle over 17
million TEUs a year, which involves processing over 35,000 truck moves
a day, and over 100 trains a week with cargo destined for major cities
throughout the country. Container volumes are forecasted to grow
approximately 5 percent this year. In order for cargo to flow
efficiently, CBP needs to operate the radiation portal monitors for a
minimum of two shifts a day. Is CBP forecasting increased staffing at
the seaports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for the radiation portal
monitors to they can handle the increased volume?
Answer. The Los Angeles Field Office operates the Nation's largest,
and the world's 10th largest, sea port of entry. Recognizing the
forecasted trends, CBP is taking active measures to ensure scanning
operations are adequately staffed with the current workforce, and
implementing projects to enable efficiencies across radiation scanning
operations.
In February 2017, CBP expanded the Reimbursable Services Program
(RSP) to the seaport environment. CBP Leadership and port personnel at
Los Angeles/Long Beach have since conducted a number of outreach and
engagements with port and terminal stakeholders.
CBP, the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association (PMSA), and other
terminal operators, have collectively agreed to utilize a phased
approach to implement the RSP at the Port, beginning June 10, 2018.
Phase 1.--June 10-July 7: Any time before 0730 shift start
time;
Phase 2.--July 8-September 30, 2018: Saturday evening (1500-
0300); and,
Phase 3.--Dates TBD: Full implementation for all coverage
outside of core hours.
Another key efficiency we are working to address this forecasted
demand is implementation of Radiation Portal Monitoring (RPM) Remote
Operations, including a Command Center, which will also reduce resource
issues related to RPM monitoring and adjudication.
CBP is committed and has agreed to remain in close communications
with PMSA, and all Marine Terminals, to promote and gain efficiencies
to minimize the impact and costs to stakeholders.

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