[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DOING BUSINESS WITH DHS: INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CONTRACTOR
EMPLOYEE VETTING
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 27, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-51
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-485 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina J. Luis Correa, California
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Ron Estes, Kansas (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director
Erica D. Woods, Interim Subcommittee Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Senior Intelligence Advisor, Intelligence
and National Security Alliance:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Marc Pearl, President and CEO, Homeland Security and Defense
Business Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. David J. Berteau, President and CEO, Professional Services
Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. Brandon LaBonte, President and CEO, ArdentMC:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
DOING BUSINESS WITH DHS: INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CONTRACTOR
EMPLOYEE VETTING
----------
Tuesday, February 27, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Scott Perry
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Perry, Higgins, Estes, Correa, and
Rice.
Mr. Perry. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the Department of
Homeland Security's contractor fitness requirements, vetting
process, and reciprocity of fitness examinations between
components.
The Chair now recognizes himself for an opening statement.
DHS relies on thousands of contractor employees every day
to achieve its mission. From IT services to construction and
janitorial services, DHS and contractor employees work hand-in-
hand to secure our Nation. Given DHS's daunting task of
securing our Nation's borders, airports, and much, much more,
it is of the utmost importance that everyone working for DHS,
be it a Federal employee or contractor employee, is
appropriately vetted to ensure that he or she will uphold the
integrity of the Department.
However, I am concerned that DHS's process to vet the
character and conduct of contractor employees, known as a
fitness determination, is bureaucratic in the worst ways:
Inefficient, inconsistent, and lacking transparency.
The Office of Personnel Management or OPM sets minimum
fitness standards for all contractor employees in the Federal
Government. However, DHS components apply those standards
differently based on the nature of each position. This causes
difficulties for contractors with employees providing services
to multiple DHS components.
For example, if a contractor employee who has received a
favorable fitness determination from the Transportation
Security Administration, or TSA, is tasked to perform work on a
separate contract for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
or CBP, the CBP may not reciprocally accept TSA's fitness
adjudication. Therefore, the contractor employee must undergo
an additional fitness determination specific to CBP standards.
Differing applications of fitness standards causes
headaches due to lost time, increased costs, and inefficient
communication between DHS and industry. Often, industry
representatives are left in the dark and are unaware of how a
particular DHS component will apply fitness standards when
vetting contractor employees. This makes it difficult for
industry to know if their current personnel meet the
qualifications to earn a favorable fitness determination for a
specific component or how to seek out employees who could
qualify.
Moreover, any time spent waiting for work to begin while a
fitness determination or preliminary check is being conducted
is a cost industry must bear, which in turn, increases the
price to DHS. Delayed fitness determinations not only waste
taxpayer dollars, but also keep contractor employees from
providing DHS with much-needed services and oftentimes, I would
add, the most appropriate personnel.
Additionally, communication between DHS and industry during
this process is inefficient. In order for industry to receive
information on the status of a pending fitness determination,
industry must place the request with the Contracting Officer
Representative or COR, who then forwards the request to the
office conducting the review. The office conducting the review
then provides the requested information to the COR, who in turn
gives it to industry who asked in the first place.
This not only creates an unnecessary middleman, but also
places a burden on industry's relationship with the COR whose
main job is to manage the contract and provide technical
direction to industry.
Aside from the complications I just detailed, I am also
concerned that this convoluted process deters non-traditional
Government partners from wanting to do business with DHS. Why
would a company, large or small, choose to involve itself in
such a disparate and confusing process that directly impacts
their personnel and bottom line?
With the ever-increasing threat environment we face today,
DHS should work with both traditional and non-traditional
Government partners to ensure that robust market competition
provides the best services and technology at a competitive
price.
I want to reiterate that I support DHS's need to
appropriately vet its contractor work force that supports a
variety of missions. However, there should be a more
transparent and efficient way to do so. Other agencies actually
use better and more efficient ways.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding
their experiences with fitness determinations and any
suggestions they may have to improve the current process at
DHS.
[The statement of Chairman Perry follows:]
Statement of Chairman Scott Perry
February 27, 2018
DHS relies on thousands of contractor employees every day to
achieve its mission. From IT services to construction and janitorial
services, DHS and contractor employees work hand-in-hand to secure our
Nation. Given DHS's daunting task securing our Nation's borders,
airports, and much more, it is of the utmost importance that everyone
working for DHS, be it a Federal employee or contractor employee, is
appropriately vetted to ensure that he or she will uphold the integrity
of the Department. However, I am concerned that DHS's process to vet
the character and conduct of contractor employees--known as a fitness
determination--is bureaucratic in the worst ways: Inefficient,
inconsistent, and lacks transparency.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sets minimum fitness
standards for all contractor employees in the Federal Government.
However, the application of the standards differs across DHS components
as it relates to the nature of the specific position. This causes
difficulties as many contractor employees provide services for multiple
DHS components. For example, if a contractor employee who has received
a favorable fitness determination from the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is tasked to perform work on a separate contract
for Customs and Border Protection (CBP), CBP may not reciprocally
accept TSA's fitness adjudication. Therefore, the contractor employee
would have to undergo an additional fitness determination specific to
CBP standards.
Differing applications of fitness standards cause headaches in
terms of lost time, increased cost, and lack of communication for both
DHS and industry. Often, industry is left in the dark, and is unaware
of how one particular DHS component will apply fitness standards when
vetting contractor employees. This makes it difficult for industry to
know if their current personnel meet the qualifications to earn a
favorable fitness determination for a specific component, or for
industry to proactively find employees that do.
Moreover, any time spent waiting for work to begin while a fitness
determination or preliminary check is being conducted is a cost
industry must bear, which in turn, increases the price to DHS. Delayed
fitness determinations not only waste taxpayer dollars but also keep
contractor employees from providing DHS with much-needed services.
Additionally, communication between DHS and industry during the
process is inefficient. In order for industry to receive information on
the status of a pending fitness determination, industry must place the
request with the Contracting Officer Representative (COR), who then
forwards the request to the office conducting the review. The office
conducting the review then provides the requested information to the
COR, who in turn gives it to industry. This not only creates an
unnecessary middle-man, but also places a burden on industry's
relationship with the COR whose main job is to manage the contract and
provide technical direction to industry.
Aside from the complications I just detailed, I am also concerned
that this convoluted process deters non-traditional Government partners
from wanting to do business with DHS. Why would a company, large or
small, choose to involve themselves in such a disparate and confusing
process that directly impacts their personnel and bottom line? With the
ever-increasing threat environment we face today, DHS should work with
both traditional and non-traditional Government partners to ensure that
robust market competition provides the best services and technology at
a competitive price.
I want to re-iterate that I support DHS's need to appropriately vet
its contract workforce that supports a variety of missions. However,
there should be a more transparent and efficient way to do so. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding their experiences with
fitness determinations and any suggestions they may have to improve the
current process at DHS.
Mr. Perry. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority
Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa, for his statement.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Chairman Perry, for holding this
most important hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for being
here today.
As you know, the Federal Government is one of the world's
largest marketplaces. In fiscal year 2017, DHS service
contractors reported more than 54,000 full-time employees
employed under the DHS contracts. Given the vast nature of the
DHS mission, the Department must also use contractors
throughout the components to fulfill its critical needs. With
vacancies in the Trump administration at such a high level, DHS
should have transparent, practical policies designed to get
contractors on-board as quickly as possible.
Contracting companies have indicated that DHS is not
transparent with its fitness standards, hindering the firm's
abilities to understand the personnel needs of DHS. Companies
have also indicated that fitness standards vary across DHS
components or agencies, precluding reciprocities of favorable
fitness assessments when a contractor joins a contract with a
different DHS component.
These areas require proper oversight and management and can
do better by eliminating redundancies in the fitness
adjudication process and setting up consistent criteria
Department-wide and effective communication with contractor
employers.
Unfortunately, these administrative remedies appear to have
fallen low on the Department's priority list. At a time when
DHS resources are already spread thin, effective use of
taxpayer dollars should be centered on ways the Department can
operate and fulfill its mission in the most suitable, efficient
manner.
Contractors are an important piece of our mission. My
district is home to several companies with contract work at
DHS, especially small businesses with information technology in
the service area.
I look forward to speaking with witnesses today about their
interaction to DHS and how we can make this experience a more
positive one and how DHS can manage and develop opportunities
for small businesses. Again, I want to thank the witnesses for
appearing here today. Again, I thank the Chairman for this
hearing and I yield back the remainder of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Correa follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member J. Luis Correa
February 27, 2018
The Federal Government is one of the world's largest marketplaces.
In fiscal year 2017, DHS service contractors reported that more than
54,000 FTE were employed under DHS contracts.
Given the vast nature of the DHS mission, the Department must use
contractors throughout the components to fulfill critical needs.
With vacancies in the Trump administration at such a high level, it
goes without saying that DHS should have in place transparent,
practical policies designed to get contractors on board in a reasonable
amount of time.
Contracting companies have indicated DHS is not transparent with
its fitness criteria, hindering firms' ability to understand the
personnel needs of DHS components. Companies have also indicated that
fitness standards vary across DHS components, precluding reciprocity of
favorable fitness assessments when a contractor joins a contract with a
different DHS component.
These areas require proper oversight and management and can
certainly be corrected by eliminating unnecessary redundancy in the
fitness adjudication process, setting up consistent criteria
Department-wide, and effectively communicating with contractor
employees.
Unfortunately, these administrative remedies have fallen low on the
Department's priority list, namely because of misplaced focus on
ineffective, costly campaign promises, such as a billion-dollar border
wall.
At a time when DHS resources are already spread thin, effective use
of taxpayer dollars should be centered on ways the Department can
operate and fulfill its mission in the most suitable, efficient manner.
I certainly understand the importance of contractors to the DHS
mission.
My district is home to several companies with contract work at DHS,
particularly small businesses in the information technology and service
fields.
During my time in the California legislature and my time in
Congress, I have worked hard to develop solutions to help keep
California's small businesses competitive and thriving, so that we can
create more good jobs and grow our economy.
I look forward to speaking with witnesses today about their
interactions with DHS and how we can move the Department's contracting
practices in a more positive direction across the board, not only just
in contractor vetting, but also with how DHS manages and develops
opportunities for small businesses.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks the gentleman. Other Members of the
subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 27, 2018
Throughout my tenure on this committee, oversight of the Department
of Homeland Security's contracting practices has been one of my
priorities.
The Department's mission compels the agency to use contractors
throughout the components.
The personnel security clearance process and ambiguities in the
suitability standards across DHS are challenges for both DHS components
and contractors that support the agency's mission.
During the 113th and 114th Congresses, I introduced legislation to
streamline security clearance process at DHS.
Also, I asked the Government Accountability Office to examine the
process--which led to the personnel security process being placed on
the High-Risk List.
I certainly believe it is important to properly and timely vet
contractor employees to ensure they are fit to work at the Department,
and I hope to have a productive discussion on this issue today.
Today's witnesses will testify that having transparent policies for
contractors is a very manageable standard of operation and essential
for the success of the DHS mission.
However, nothing from this administration signals that improving
the contracting process is a priority.
Many of the Department's most recent public statements serve as an
extension of President Trump's campaign trail, placing a misplaced
focus on a border wall and deportation force.
Also, President Trump's budget places politics over priorities.
The Trump budget slashes the already feeble budget of the Office of
Inspector General, which as former Assistant Secretary Berteau
testifies, is essential for oversight in this area.
Furthermore, aside from the vetting and reciprocity issues in
contracting, there are other pressing contracting issues facing DHS.
For example, last year Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
experienced some of the most devastating hurricanes to the non-
contiguous United States.
DHS has a responsibility to provide to the territories an array of
life-saving items--including medical supplies, meals, and tarps.
Contractor support is essential in obtaining these vital needs.
Unfortunately, there have been serious problems with the contracts
awarded to date.
For example, a newly-created Florida company with an unproven
record, Bronze Star LLC, was awarded $30 million by FEMA to provide
emergency tarps and plastic sheeting in Puerto Rico.
Bronze Star failed to deliver those urgently-needed supplies, which
even months later remain in demand by hurricane victims on the island.
Similarly, FEMA improperly awarded $156 million to Tribute
Consulting, LLC, a company with no experience in large-scale disaster
relief and with at least five prior-cancelled Government contracts.
Of the over 30 million meals needed for Puerto Rico, Tribute
provided just 50,000 before the contract had to be canceled due to non-
performance.
The Department of Homeland Security must do better when it comes to
contracting oversight and adherence to the laws, policies, and
procedures in place to ensure these gross errors do not occur.
In response, on February 8, 2018, I introduced H.R. 4995, the ``Due
Diligence for FEMA Disaster Contractors Act of 2018,'' a bill requiring
the administrator of FEMA to establish a contractor review process for
disaster contracts valued at $1 million or more.
This legislation was co-sponsored by every Democratic Member of
this committee.
We can hold hearings and file legislation to improve the
contracting process, but we also have to have buy-in from the
administration.
We need to hear from the administration about contracting oversight
procedures and what they need from Congress to improve the process.
We also need to receive a commitment from Secretary Nielsen that
improving the contracting process is a priority.
Mr. Perry. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today. The witnesses' entire written
statements will appear in the record. The Chair will introduce
the witnesses first and then recognize each of the witnesses
for their testimony.
Mr. Charles Allen is the senior intelligence advisor for
the Intelligence and National Security Alliance or INSA. He
previously served at DHS as the assistant secretary for
Information and Analysis from 2005 to 2009 and was the
Department's first under secretary for intelligence and
analysis. Mr. Allen served nearly 50 years in the Central
Intelligence Agency before joining DHS. Welcome, sir.
Mr. Marc Pearl is the president and CEO of the Homeland
Security and Defense Business Council or HSDBC. The HSDBC
brings together industry and Government officials to share best
practices and perspective on pressing National security issues.
Mr. Pearl joined HSBDC in 2008. Thank you, sir.
Mr. David Berteau is the CEO of the Professional Services
Council or PSC. The PSC represents over 400 member companies of
all sizes that provide services to the Federal Government.
Prior to joining PSC, Mr. Berteau served as assistant secretary
of defense for logistics and material readiness. Thank you,
sir.
Mr. Brandon LaBonte is CEO of ArdentMC. His small business
provides technology and geospatial solutions to almost every
DHS operational component. ArdentMC has employees in 14 States
and the District of Colombia to support its DHS contracts.
Welcome, sir.
Thank you, all, for being here today.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Allen for your opening
statement, sir.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, SENIOR INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR,
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Correa,
Members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to talk about
something that I think is very important for the Department of
Homeland Security.
As the Chairman said, I am Charlie Allen. I served for
almost 50 years at the Central Intelligence Agency. I am here
representing the Intelligence and National Security Alliance as
it senior intelligence advisor, which is a nonpartisan forum
for advancing National security priorities through public-
private relationships. Also, I chair the INSA Security Policy
Reform Council, which seeks to improve Government security
policies and programs.
Fitness requirements may be needed to screen new hires and
contractors who are unknown to the U.S. Government. But I
believe they are completely unnecessary for personnel holding
security clearances.
Moreover, the lack of uniform fitness criteria among DHS
components is illogical and counterproductive. Components who
refuse to accept others' fitness determinations leads to
duplication of effort, lost time, wasted resources, which
undermine the Department's ability to fulfill its mission. I
saw these problems when I was DHS's chief intelligence officer
about 10 years ago. They still exist and I applaud the
committee for holding this hearing.
Before starting at work on a DHS contract in any capacity,
the contractor must receive favorable fitness determination
based on a background investigation. But the investigative and
adjudicative processes have shortcomings that undermines the
Department's effectiveness.
First, DHS fitness criteria are not consistent across the
Department. There is no rationale for component-specific
criteria. CBP, which intercepts drug traffickers as you know,
argues that anyone involved in drug trafficking is unfit to
work for CBP. But I would argue that a drug trafficker would
not be fit to work for any component whether it is TSA or FEMA.
Second, the lack of uniformed criteria prevents for
reciprocity among components. Contractors supporting multiple
DHS components must therefore be assessed multiple times, which
is a waste of time and resources.
Third, fitness assessments of contractors who hold security
clearances are a complete waste of time and resources,
particularly since clearance investigations are far more
comprehensive. I was just reinvestigated by the Department of
Defense and it took 35 months for me to be upgraded again to
receive Top Secret SCI information, but it is a real problem.
Contractors are harmed by an inefficient process that waste
time and money and impedes their work. First, lengthy fitness
investigations make it difficult for firms to fulfill their
contracts. Contractors routinely wait 3 or 4 months for a
fitness determination.
Second, firms incur substantial costs when staff wait for
fitness determinations, using average figures provided by one
large firm consulted by INSA, a company would lose $27,000 in
revenue for each employee who waits 30 business days for a
fitness determination. On a 50-person contract, which is
ordinary, the firm could lose over $1 million in revenue.
Third, fitness requirements deter firms for bidding on DHS
contracts. I have had a number of companies, particularly
smaller firms, can't weather the delays or incur additional
cost. The impact on Government is manifest. These efficiencies
undermine the Department's effectiveness. By impeding
contractors' work, the fitness process hinders DHS's ability to
execute its missions. Lost revenue increases firms' cost which
result in less value for the Government. DHS wastes time and
money investigating people unnecessarily.
Recommendations. What should we do about this? First, DHS
should eliminate fitness requirements for contractors who are
already cleared, who hold security clearances Secret or Top
Secret SCI.
Second, DHS should set uniform fitness criteria across the
Department. Consistent standards are a prerequisite for
reciprocity. Last January, the House passed this committee's
DHS Clearances Management and Administration Act H.R. 697,
which requires DHS to set uniform clearance adjudication
standards. DHS should take the same steps regarding fitness
standards. The committee should direct it to do so.
Third, DHS should mandate and implement fitness reciprocity
across all components. Fourth, a single DHS entity, preferably
the chief security officer with whom I worked closely at the
time when I was at the Department, should set Department-wide
standards for all fitness determinations. Fifth, Congress
should rescind the TSA-specific fitness requirements, which has
been enshrined in law.
Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, for testifying
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Charles E. Allen, a principal at the Chertoff Group, is the
senior intelligence advisor to the Intelligence and National Security
Alliance (INSA), a non-partisan, non-profit forum dedicated to
advancing intelligence and National security priorities through public-
private partnerships. He serves as chairman of INSA's Security Policy
Reform Council, which applies private sector expertise and commercial
best practices to improve the efficiency of U.S Government policies
regarding security clearances and related matters. From 2005-2009, he
served as the Department of Homeland Security's under secretary of
intelligence and analysis and chief intelligence officer. He concluded
47 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency by serving as
the assistant director of central intelligence for collection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 27, 2018
introduction
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Charlie
Allen. I am the senior intelligence adviser at the Intelligence and
National Security Alliance (INSA), a nonpartisan, nonprofit forum for
advancing intelligence and National security priorities through public-
private partnerships. I serve as chair of INSA's Security Policy Reform
Council (SPRC), which brings together industry and Government
stakeholders to improve the effectiveness of security policy and
programs and to enhance industry's ability to support National
security. The SPRC has been a thought leader for modernizing the
security clearance process. We have championed clearance reciprocity,
the adoption of continuous monitoring and evaluation for cleared
personnel, and other transformative steps to bring our trusted
workforce into the 21st Century. Many of the challenges associated with
the security clearance process apply to the DHS fitness and suitability
assessment process.
My testimony is informed by input from INSA's membership, which
includes small, medium, and large firms that have contracts with the
Department of Homeland Security and with individual DHS components, as
well as with the intelligence community and the Department of Defense.
My testimony is also informed by more than 40 years in the intelligence
community, which I concluded by serving as the Department of Homeland
Security's under secretary of intelligence and analysis and its chief
intelligence officer from 2005 to 2009.
Fitness determinations of contractor employees are essential to
developing a workforce the American people can trust to protect them.
Unfortunately, however, the inefficiency of this process deters some
companies from seeking work with the Department of Homeland Security;
hinders companies' ability to execute their contracts; increases
companies' costs; and ultimately undermines DHS's mission. The
Department's processes must be responsive to its industry partners, as
the Department depends on contractors' unique skills, expertise, and
experience for may critical functions.
I am here today to advocate for a number of reforms that would
eliminate inefficiencies in the DHS fitness/suitability process,
including: (1) Standardizing the suitability and fitness requirements
across the Department, consistent with the ``unity of effort'' campaign
undertaken by DHS Secretaries from both the current and previous
administrations, (2) making those requirements publicly available, (3)
empowering the Department's chief security officer to determine and
implement consistent requirements across the Department, and (4)
eliminating the requirement to conduct a fitness/suitability assessment
on Government or contractor personnel who possess a valid, in-scope
security clearance.
background
Before characterizing the challenges presented by DHS's fitness/
suitability requirements, it would be helpful to define some key terms
and explain the investigative and adjudicative process.
Fitness/Suitability Assessment
Before starting work on any DHS contract in any capacity, a
contractor must receive a fitness determination, based on a background
investigation, from the specific DHS component being supported. If the
contractor seeks to support a second DHS component organization, he or
she must go through a second fitness assessment.
The need for a fitness determination applies to everyone. It does
not only apply to contractors who are working at a DHS site and
accessing DHS networks and databases--people whom the Department would
understandably want to vet. It includes copy editors who review a
report written for DHS under contract. It includes program managers
overseeing project staffing and budgets. It includes security guards
checking IDs for a DHS-contracted conference at a contractor facility--
someone who will never access DHS information or facilities. There is
little, if any, need for contractors in such roles to be investigated
by the Department.
In the Department's Instruction Handbook on the DHS Personnel
Suitability and Security Program, DHS's chief security officer defines
``suitability/fitness'' as ``an assessment of an individual's character
or conduct that may have an impact on promoting the efficiency and the
integrity of the Federal service.''\2\ Assessments are conducted at
three levels--high-, medium-, and low-risk--depending on whether the
position has the potential for exceptionally serious, serious, or
limited impact ``on the integrity and efficiency of Federal
service.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Security
Officer, The Department of Homeland Security Personnel Suitability and
Security Program, DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007, June 2009, p. 5.
As of February 21, 2018: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/instruction-121-01-007-personnel-suitability-and-security-
program.pdf.
\3\ Department of Homeland Security, The Department of Homeland
Security Personnel Suitability and Security Program, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) website
\4\ describes the process of gathering information to conduct a fitness
assessment, the Department will investigate a wide range of past
behavior by the person requesting access, including ``illegal drug use,
financial delinquencies, employment history, residences, education,
police record, alcohol use and counseling, among other things.'' The
investigation involves interviews of ``close personal associates,
spouse, former spouse(s), former employers, co-workers, neighbors,
[and] landlords,'' and it involves checks of references and records
related to one's education, credit history, military service, tax
payments, and police interactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, ``Q&A Regarding
Background Investigations,'' website. Updated March 18, 2008. As of
February 16, 2018: https://www.uscis.gov/faq-page/qa-regarding-
background-investigations#t12832n40208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Clearance
If a contractor needs access to Classified information, he or she
will first have to be granted an appropriate level security clearance,
which differs from a fitness/suitability determination. The DHS
Suitability and Security Instruction Handbook defines a security
clearance as ``a determination that a person is able and willing to
safeguard Classified National security information''\5\--the release of
which, according to Executive Order 13526, could cause ``exceptionally
grave'' or ``serious'' damage to U.S. National security.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Department of Homeland Security, The Department of Homeland
Security Personnel Suitability and Security Program, p. 20.
\6\ Executive Order 13526, December 29, 2009, sec. 1.2. As of
February 21, 2018: https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-
eo.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that anyone who holds an active security
clearance has already gone through a background investigation that
considers the same factors evaluated in a DHS fitness assessment--
though likely far more in-depth--and had the findings be favorably
adjudicated. Yet even if one has a top-level security clearance--and
even if that clearance was granted and held by DHS--a contractor must
still undergo a less-thorough and duplicative fitness investigation and
assessment before he or she can begin work.
inefficiencies
In my personal experience and that of several INSA member firms, a
number of factors hinder timely suitability determinations.
1. Lack of transparency. Many DHS components do not make their full
suitability criteria publicly available, hindering firms'
ability to understand the personnel needs of a given DHS
component, both during the bid process and after the contract
is awarded.
2. Inconsistency. Fitness standards vary across DHS components,
precluding reciprocity of favorable suitability assessments
when a contractor joins a contract with a different DHS
component.
3. Redundancy. Even if an individual contractor has received a
favorable fitness determination from one DHS component, before
he or she can support a contract for another DHS component, he
or she must secure a favorable determination from that
component too. Similarly, even contractors who hold valid, in-
scope security clearances must undergo a fitness investigation
despite having successfully completed a more in-depth
background investigation that addresses the Office of Personnel
Management's fitness requirements and many of the issues of
concern to DHS components.
Lack of Transparency
In preparation for my testimony, I had intended to compare and
contrast the suitability criteria of different DHS components to see
where--and perhaps divine why--they differ. Unfortunately, only one--
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)--makes its full list
of criteria publicly known, as they are mandated in law. TSA is
statutorily required to consider 28 types of criminal behavior that
would disqualify an individual from employment with the agency.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The requirements are specified in 49 U.S.C. 44936(b) and 49
C.F.R. 1542.209(d). See The Insider Threat to Homeland Security:
Examining Our Nation's Security Clearance Processes, Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st
Sess. (November 13, 2013). (Gregory Marshall, Chief Security Officer of
the Department of Homeland Security, Answers for the Record to
Questions Submitted by Rep. Peter King.) As of February 21, 2018:
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg87372/pdf/CHRG-
113hhrg87372.pdf. The criteria are specified more clearly in
Transportation Security Administration, ``Self-Assessment for
Applicants for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),''
website, revised June 2011. As of February 17, 2018: https://hraccess-
assessment.tsa.dhs.gov/tsofaqs/backgroundrequire- ments.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the absence of information, contracting firms must decide
whether, how, and how much to bid for contracts without knowing whether
they have sufficient staff who will meet the fitness criteria. Firms do
not even receive clearly-defined fitness criteria after being awarded
the contract. As a result, they simply propose staff and wait.
Inconsistency
DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007 establishes minimum standards
for the DHS Personnel Suitability and Security Program but adds, ``any
DHS component is not prohibited from exceeding the requirements.''
Barring comprehensive data, I would hazard a guess many components have
added what they have identified as mission-specific criteria. The DHS
Inspector General, for example, reported that because Border Patrol
officials routinely come across illegal drug activity, CBP deems
unsuitable anyone who has ``ever had any illegal involvement in the
cultivation, manufacturing, distribution, processing, or trafficking of
any drug or controlled substance''.\8\ Clearly, a person with such a
history would not be fit to work at another DHS component, even if its
personnel do not directly address illegal narcotics. This highly
specific disqualifying factor is thus unnecessary. Yet because the
criterion exists, CBP must investigate whether a contractor violates it
even if the contractor has already been cleared to work by another DHS
component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
The DHS Personnel Security Process, OIG-09-65, May 2009, p. 19. As of
February 21, 2018: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-
65_May09.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not clear that component-specific security requirements have
demonstrated any value-added. Instead, they have precluded or delayed
qualified contractors from beginning work, introducing uncertainty for
firms, contractors, and the components depending on them. Favoring
component autonomy is a holdover from DHS components' legacy as
independent agencies. In the present era, when successive DHS
Secretaries advocate for a ``unity of effort'' across the Department,
no DHS component requires fitness standards so unique that a uniform
standard would not suffice.
The continued existence of component-specific criteria yields a
requirement for component-specific fitness assessments. DHS leadership
should direct components to assess whether the specific criteria that
are unique to them really add so significantly to determinations of
employee and contractor trust that these inconsistencies must be
maintained. A uniform set of standards would enable reciprocity across
components that is presently not possible.
Redundancy
When reciprocity is not an option, redundancy often surfaces. In
the absence of common adjudicative criteria and a shared database of
investigation data, DHS components are doomed to duplicate each other's
work. Contractors--who often support multiple components within DHS and
across broader USG--are considerably more susceptible to endure
redundant investigations.
DHS considers fitness determinations to be contract-specific. As a
result, a contractor who has successfully passed one DHS component's
fitness investigation cannot work on a contract for another DHS
component unless he passes that organization's own investigation. As a
comparison, consider if staff from this subcommittee could not support
another subcommittee without being reinvestigated.
Even worse, if a contractor is already supporting a DHS component
on a contract, having successfully received a fitness determination, he
cannot support a new task order on the same contract without undergoing
another fitness investigation by the same component. So even if this
individual is already doing work for a DHS component, he cannot work on
another project for the same organization without being reinvestigated.
This would be like investigating the staff of this committee so they
could support today's hearing and then investigating them all over
again to enable them to support a hearing scheduled for next week.
In particular, reinvestigating contractors with an existing fitness
determination or a valid, in-scope security clearance wastes time and
resources. A Government agency already has compiled the entire body of
information necessary to generate a complete fitness investigation
(i.e., interviews with neighbors and employers, checks of police,
academic, and credit records, etc.)--and adjudicated it successfully.
DHS policy indicates prior investigations conducted within the past 5
years would satisfy investigative requirements--but would not in and of
themselves prove sufficient for an affirmative adjudication. Rather,
data from investigative files must be ``obtained and reviewed in
conjunction with pre-employment checks to make a fitness decision for
employment.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Security
Officer, The Department of Homeland Security Personnel Suitability and
Security Program, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nothing illustrates the lack of interagency trust and an almost
compulsive need to check internal boxes more than requiring holders of
active security clearances to undergo a more cursory fitness assessment
from DHS. This happens all the time.
One INSA member firm hired an individual specifically
because he had a skill set relevant to a DHS contract. Yet
despite holding a Department of Defense Top-Secret clearance,
he is still awaiting a fitness determination from DHS 14 months
later.
The DHS program manager at one large services firm waited 4
months to receive her fitness determination from a DHS
component--even though a DHS Headquarters office, the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), already held her TS/SCI
clearance. During this 4 months, she could not bill to the
contract--so she could not oversee or manage her firm's work
for the component.
One company told INSA of a person who was denied a fitness
determination because he was married to a foreign national. But
this person held a TS/SCI clearance, which means that another
agency had already investigated the foreign spouse and
determined that she posed no security risk.
Fitness investigations of cleared personnel virtually never yield
derogatory information that would merit a denial of access. Data
provided by several INSA member companies indicate that the share of
their cleared personnel who are rejected for DHS fitness is between
zero and 1.3 percent. One of the firms explained that the few employees
it had who were denied fitness determinations had short-term debt
problems associated with the collapse of the housing market at the
beginning of the recent recession. Such employees are so few and far
between--and so low-risk--that the fitness investigations of these
firms' personnel added little, if any, to the Department's efficiency
or integrity.
I encountered this predicament more than I care to remember as
DHS's under secretary for intelligence. I frequently saw cleared
individuals with years of experience in the intelligence community
unable to come to work because they were awaiting a cursory suitability
or fitness review. If we are to make fitness and suitability standards
work for DHS and its industry partners, reciprocity must be part of the
solution.
impact on industry
The requirement that all personnel on a DHS contract receive a
fitness determination specific to that contract burdens both Government
and industry with delayed productivity and increased costs--thus
hindering the Department's ability to fulfill its mission.
1. Firms struggle to staff contracts in a timely manner despite
having qualified personnel available.--Firms often must rely on
contractors new to a DHS component in order to complete
staffing of a contract. One large services firm told us that
the average wait over the past 5 years has been 61 days.
Another large services firm told INSA that its staff waits 26
days on average for a fitness determination to do Classified
work and 42 days for a fitness determination to do Unclassified
work. Another INSA member organization asserted that its staff
routinely wait 60 to 90 days to receive fitness determinations.
In practice, the delays encountered are even longer, as it
takes roughly 1 to 2 weeks to complete and submit paperwork
before a fitness investigation can be started, and it takes
another 1 to 2 weeks after a fitness determination is provided
for the individual to be indoctrinated, or ``read in'' by the
DHS component.
Delays awaiting a fitness determination for contractors previously
unknown to U.S. Government are understandable and even prudent;
however, these figures also include contractors who hold Secret
or TS/SCI clearances, who received affirmative fitness
determinations from other DHS components, or who are already
working for the very same DHS component on another contract or
task order.
These delays can be incredibly counterproductive for firms who, by
the nature of contracting, have limited time to produce
results. Some contracts may be issued for only 1 year, with
additional option years if the work is done satisfactorily. A
2-month delay to investigate staff wastes as much as one-sixth
of a firm's performance period, thereby diminishing
productivity and undermining relationships between the
contractors and the Government officials they support.
2. Staffing delays increase overhead costs associated with contract
support.--Firms incur costs while their contractors wait for
suitability determinations. These costs increase the firms'
operating expenses and contribute to staff turnover, as bored
staff inevitably look for more engaging opportunities. One INSA
member firm stated it incurs $500,000 per year in overhead
costs waiting for staff fitness determinations. This figure
would be larger were it not for the firm's ability to give
employees other temporary assignments--work that may not be
substantive or professional rewarding.
Another firm reported average costs of $900 per day per employee
and average wait times of 42 days, or 30 business days, for a
fitness determination. That comes to a loss of $27,000 for each
individual slotted to work on a DHS contract. If the company
was required to provide 50 people on the contract--not an
unusual level of effort, particularly for an on-site staff
augmentation contract--the company would lose $1.35 million in
revenue waiting for DHS to conduct fitness assessments. If this
firm had won its contract under a firm fixed price or Lowest
Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) procurement, the firm would
be unable to recoup the costs of this lost staff time.
3. Costs incurred waiting for fitness determinations hit small- and
medium-sized firms especially hard.--Small firms do not have
the resources to carry unbillable staff while they wait for a
fitness determination that could take weeks or months to
receive. If a small firm cannot put its people to work
relatively quickly, it will be reluctant to pursue DHS
opportunities--or it may assign employees to other projects,
making them unavailable to support DHS when the fitness
determination comes through. If the Department wants to take
advantage of the skills and expertise of smaller firms--many of
which are owned by women, minorities, and veterans--fitness
determinations must be better aligned to provide firms with
greater certainty that their personnel will be able to do the
job efficiently.
recommendations
DHS can take a number of steps to eliminate the burden that the
fitness requirement places on its industry partners. In doing so, the
Department would improve its ability to execute its mission and reduce
costs for both contractors and the Government.
1. DHS should eliminate suitability requirements for staff who are
already hold a valid, in-scope security clearance. Fitness
assessments consider the same broad behavior and
characteristics that are investigated and evaluated in the
process of granting someone a clearance. DHS has no valid
reason for reinvestigating and readjudicating the same facts.
Requiring a more cursory and mostly duplicative background
check on contractors who have already undergone much more
thorough investigations is a waste of time and resources on the
part of both the Department and its industry partners.
2. DHS should set consistent criteria suitability standards across
the Department. As I have discussed, there is simply no reason
for DHS components to have different standards for fitness and
suitability. The Department should determine the criteria that
make someone fit or unfit to handle sensitive information and
tasks on its behalf and apply those standards across the entire
organization. Such a measure would be consistent with a 2006
DHS Management Directive that called for DHS to ``standardize
security policies and appropriate procedures'' across the
Department.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Department of Homeland Security, ``Security Line of Business
Integration and Management,'' Management Directive 11080, January 3,
2006, Sec. VI(C)(1)(a). As of February 20, 2018: https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=692121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. DHS should mandate--and implement--suitability reciprocity among
all components. Ten years ago, Under Secretary for Management
Elaine Duke signed a memorandum committing the Department to
implement suitability reciprocity at DHS headquarters.\11\ A
decade hence, this goal remains unfulfilled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security,
The DHS Personnel Security Process, OIG-09-65, May 2009, p. 18. As of
February 20, 2018: https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs/persec.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. DHS should share fitness investigations records across the
Department to facilitate reciprocity. The Department uses the
Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) to store
information needed to identify an individual and to track
completion of suitability/fitness and security-related
processes, including background investigations. Data in the
system includes a range of biographic and biometric data, as
well as records regarding previous suitability/fitness and
security clearance determinations.\12\ If the Department had
consistent fitness standards, a component could use this
database to verify that a contractor had already been granted a
fitness determination by another component and immediately
provide the contractor access needed to begin work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for
the Integrated Security Management System (ISMS), March 22, 2011, pp.
6-7. As of February 20, 2018: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy_pia_dhswide_isms_2011.pdf. Also Department of
Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Integrated
Security Management System (ISMS), DHS/ALL/PIA-038(c), June 26, 2017,
p. 6. As of February 20, 2017: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-dhsall038-isms-june2017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Fifth, to facilitate reciprocity, efficiency, and information
sharing, a single DHS official must be responsible for fitness/
suitability determinations and be held accountable for
performance that facilitates the Department's work. The DHS
chief security officer is the single official who is positioned
to oversee this issue across the Department. A DHS Directive of
2008, which describes this official's responsibilities and
authorities, states:
``The CSO exercises the DHS-wide security program authorities in
the areas of personnel security, physical security,
administrative security, special security, counterintelligence
operations, security-related internal investigations, and
security training and awareness . . . The CSO develops,
implements, and oversees DHS security policies, programs, and
standards; delivers security training and education to DHS
personnel; and provides security support to DHS components.
Working with the CSO Council, the OCSO integrates all security
programs used to protect the Department in a cohesive manner,
increasing efficiency and enhancing the overall security of
DHS.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Department of Homeland Security, ``Chief Security Officer,''
Directive 121-01, June 30, 2008, Secs. IV(A), V(A). As of February 20,
2018: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
mgmt_dir_121_01_office_of_the_chief_security_officer.6.30.08.pdf.
The Secretary should empower the Department's chief security
officer to set consistent standards, enforce their implementation, and
report on their effectiveness to Congress, industry, and other
stakeholders.
Finally, there is something specific that this body can do to
promote fitness/suitability reciprocity and unity of effort at DHS.
Congress should rescind the TSA fitness/suitability requirements that
it has enshrined in law.\14\ Statutory requirements will inhibit any
effort to standardize criteria across the Department and thus obstruct
reciprocity among components. The statutory criteria for TSA are mostly
(but not all) transportation-specific, but they should apply to anyone
who works at the Department. If one has been convicted of air piracy,
or interfering with an air crew, or smuggling drugs in an airplane, or
forging aircraft registration--not to mention garden-variety felonies
such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, or armed robbery--one is
not suitable to work at any component of the Department of Homeland
Security. There is no need to define such criteria in statute only, and
explicitly, to the TSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 49 U.S.C. 44936(b) and 49 C.F.R. 1542.209(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
These shortcomings, inefficiencies, and costs make it difficult and
costly for DHS contractors to provide the support for which the
Department has engaged them. More critically, however, they undermine
the Department's ability to keep the American people safe. DHS relies
heavily on industry to provide critical skills, experience, and
expertise necessary to fulfill the Department's mission. If DHS impedes
contractors' ability to do their work, it undermine its own
effectiveness.
The inefficiencies I have described should be no surprise to senior
officials at the Department of Homeland Security and its components. In
September 2015, in an appearance before this very subcommittee, Elaine
Duke--the current Deputy Secretary of the Department, but at the time a
private citizen--reflected upon her experience as a deputy assistant
administrator at TSA and as the under secretary for management of the
entire Department. In her prepared statement, she asserted:
``DHS must also address its security clearance, suitability, and on-
boarding processes for both its own and contractor employees. The long
lead times, duplicity [sic] between the clearance and suitability
processes, and lack of reciprocity between DHS components is very
costly both in terms of time and cost of investigations. Additionally,
it delays the time that employees can report to work, further degrading
the efficiency of offices waiting for key staff and contractor
support.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Making DHS More Efficient: Industry Recommendations to Improve
Homeland Security, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (September 18, 2015). (Prepared
Statement of Elaine C. Duke, Principal, Elaine Duke & Associates, LLC.)
As of February 21, 2018: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
114hhrg99575/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg99575.pdf.
Deputy Secretary Duke was onto something back in 2015. As I have
noted in my testimony, however, the Department continues to face the
same challenges in 2018.
On behalf of INSA and its members, I thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. I look forward to addressing your questions.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Pearl for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF MARC PEARL, PRESIDENT AND CEO, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND DEFENSE BUSINESS COUNCIL
Mr. Pearl. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and
distinguished Members of this subcommittee, I want to thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to provide the
collective perspective from what we call the Homeland Security
Industrial Base.
The issues surrounding fitness adjudication have frustrated
the industry and program heads at DHS since the Department's
inception 15 years ago this Thursday. All companies regardless
of size or capability are affected. Despite numerous forums
that the council and our members have participated in to bring
greater attention to the issue, we have yet to see any
improvement in communication or a more efficient process.
As my written testimony outlines more fully, the current
processes at DHS lack consistency and transparency, the same
thing that both of you opened up with, take too long, limit
competition, increase labor rates and are costly to both
Government and industry. As a result, the Department is
prevented from otaining the best work force and from having
mission-critical contracts executed in a timely manner.
We do believe that these, that changes can be made that
would ensure the integrity of the program and reduce the pain
points for everyone. There are numerous challenges facing
industry with respect to the fitness determination process at
DHS. Let me just briefly discuss two.
There is not a single standard for fitness across DHS. In
addition to eight types of conduct that may be incompatible
with the duties of a position, each component is also given
sole discretion in applying seven additional considerations.
Each component also has its own personnel security office with
different standards, different procedures, and different
adjudicators to determine what is acceptable.
While such differences may be justified in some instances,
specific policies and standards are not communicated to
industry and are inconsistently applied across DHS. The ability
to grant fitness reciprocity from another component or other
Federal agency ensures the saving of time, effort, and cost for
both sectors. Reciprocity allows companies to quickly onboard
or transfer employees to contracts that best fit their skills
and experience.
DHS and its components, unlike DOD, rely on equivalent
fitness standards to determine reciprocity, which means that
candidates who have a high-level security clearance can't
receive reciprocity without additional scrutiny. This is an odd
result when the investigation used for a TS SCI clearance
exceeds the investigation standards of, say, a CBP background
investigation.
The Department's different fitness standards also reduces
the pool of candidates who can promptly begin work, thereby
increasing labor rates and the amount of time between contract
award and contractor employees executing a contract.
Furthermore, neither the company nor the candidate is
informed of the investigation status, what is causing the
delay, what is needed to be resolved with regard to problems
identified. If a company knows that an individual will be
leaving the position in the future, it can't submit a
replacement name for a fitness determination until the seat is
empty. Candidates with the best skills and experience often
take other positions, because they can no longer sit around and
wait while the investigation process and the fitness
adjudication is going on.
In many instances, companies may not find this out until
after the adjudication and they must then start the process all
over again. While our members have instituted internal
processes to screen candidates, the uncertainty forces
companies to continue to recruit and provide conditional offers
of employment for a single position multiple times. As a
result, companies will often build time and cost on hiring
multiple candidates into their rates and their pricing models
before Government.
So, what can be done? Well, the council and members
strongly support the need for DHS to have sufficiently-vetted
contractors. The delays, inconsistencies, and cost inherent in
the current system must be measured against alternative ways to
get the same result.
Allow me to offer two recommendations. Both sectors save
time and money when fitness reciprocity, as we have already
heard, is available. In the short term, if DHS and its
components could work together to standardize, collapse, or
even find greater alignment with some of the fitness standards
across the Department, it would increase opportunity for
reciprocity.
In the longer term, the Federal Government needs to
continue efforts to standardize background investigations and
align them with suitability and fitness so that DHS could base
reciprocity on investigative elements rather than fitness
requirements. This would open up reciprocity to a much larger
class of individuals with security clearances.
DHS must also figure out ways, you have said it, Mr. Allen
said it, to communicate the status of candidate investigations
with industry throughout the process. DOD's electronic
personnel security status system, for example, allows a
designated person from industry to know the status and delays
with candidate investigations. DHS should consider this
approach. It would reduce staff workload, improve companies'
ability to plan, budget, and hire staff.
In conclusion, personnel security is a necessity and of
utmost importance, but there are ways to improve the process
without giving up the integrity of the program. DHS and
industry need to continue to work together to reduce the system
backlogs and time lines, allow companies to on-board quickly,
improve communication, and ensure that DHS has access to
quality contractor work force.
We urge Congress to consider the ideas that all of us are
putting forward today and play an active role in driving change
at DHS and across the Federal Government. I thank you for the
opportunity and to provide the collective perspectives of our
members, and I look forward to answering any questions that you
might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearl follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc A. Pearl
February 27, 2018
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
provide the collective perspectives from the Homeland Security
Industrial Base on some of the challenges contractors face with respect
to the DHS fitness adjudication process. I am Marc Pearl and serve as
the president and CEO of the Homeland Security & Defense Business
Council (Council). We are a non-profit, non-partisan corporate
membership organization of the leading large, mid-tier, and small
companies that provide homeland security and homeland defense
technology, product, and service solutions to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other Government agencies in the homeland
security enterprise.
The Council was created more than 13 years ago to facilitate
greater dialog and engagement between industry and Government on
critical issues that affect the mission and management of homeland
security. Our focus is to bring both sectors together to share
expertise and best practices, exchange perspectives of the procurement
process, and to discuss ways to improve contract outcomes and the
manner in which we conduct business together. In this regard,
particularly as it pertains to today's hearing, our members have led
and participated in a number of DHS forums, including Reverse Industry
Days and Personnel Security Acquisition Innovation Roundtables that
have identified challenges, future areas of focus, and provided
industry perspectives on the vetting process.
At the outset, we applaud DHS for its willingness to solicit
feedback from industry on its personnel security business practices and
engage with industry on this topic. However, despite the many
discussions, both industry and program officials at the Department have
been frustrated by the lack of meaningful change, particularly as it
relates to improving communication and making the process faster and
more efficient. Each component wants to individually set standards,
conduct their own or additional background investigations, and control
their process. Our perception is that many of the DHS components are
resistant to change and in in some cases this is not entirely
justified.
Industry understands and supports the need to properly vet
contractors, but the current system is inefficient at best or broken at
worst. The process lacks consistency, transparency, and communication.
It takes long amounts of time, sometimes requires duplicative efforts,
which limits competition, adds substantial costs to both Government and
industry, and prevents DHS from obtaining the best workforce to
accomplish its mission.
The Council's testimony today will focus on the challenges that
contractors experience trying to recruit, vet, and on-board employees
to the Government, the impact and costs to both Government and
industry, and a few recommendations to improve the process. We strongly
believe that changes can be made that would ensure the integrity of the
program and reduce the pain points for everyone.
background on contractor fitness and relationship to security
clearances
Suitability and fitness determination are often confused with the
determination to grant a security clearance. A security clearance
determines eligibility for access to Classified information. A
suitability check evaluates an individual's character and conduct to
determine if that person is suitable for Federal employment. Fitness--a
term often used interchangeably with suitability--refers to the
character and conduct required by a potential contractor employee to
perform work for or on behalf of a Federal agency. Suitability refers
to a potential Government employee. All contractor employees who need
access to DHS facilities, their IT systems, or Sensitive Information
must receive an appropriate fitness screening, based on the risk level
of their positions (i.e. low, moderate, or high).
The risk and sensitivity level of the position determines the type
of background investigation required.\1\ The information gathered
during the background investigation is used to determine fitness based
upon specific requirements set for different mission areas. Some
positions will require both a fitness determination and a security
clearance (depending on position sensitivity), while others only
require a fitness determination. Note that a fitness determination by
itself does not grant access to Classified information. However, the
background investigation used to determine fitness often involves many
of the same investigative criteria used in the security clearance
investigation. The decision to grant a security clearance is made in
addition to and subsequent to a final fitness determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Different types of background investigations include Single
Scope Background Investigation, Full Field Background Investigation,
Minimum Background Investigation, National Agency Check with Inquiries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
industry challenges with fitness determinations
Challenge 1: There are too many different fitness standards and
procedures across DHS, inconsistent application of policy, and
a need for better communication
DHS policy \2\ established by the Office of the Chief Security
Officer sets minimum standards and reporting protocols for the DHS
Personnel Suitability and Security Program. It does not, however,
prohibit DHS components from exceeding the minimum requirements. The
result is that each component has its own personnel security office
with different standards, procedures, thresholds, and adjudicators for
determining fitness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When determining fitness, adjudicators consider and evaluate the
presence or absence of eight (8) types of conduct that may be
incompatible with the duties of a position (i.e., alcohol and drug use,
financial irresponsibility, criminal and immoral conduct, dishonesty,
violence, employee misconduct/negligence, firearms and weapons
violations, statutory or regulatory bars). Each component within DHS
has established different requirements for fitness. For example, Border
Patrol has particular concerns with applicants that have ever had
involvement in illegal drug activity; USCIS with illegal immigration
activities; and TSA with theft and interpersonal issues. There are also
different tolerance levels for certain types of conduct (i.e., bad debt
levels range from nothing allowed to $3,000, $5,000, or $10,000
depending on the component). Each component is also given sole
discretion over whether any of seven (7) additional considerations \3\
are pertinent to the adjudication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ (1) Nature of the position for which the person is applying or
in which the person is employed: (2) The nature and seriousness of the
conduct; (3) The circumstances surrounding the conduct; (4) The recency
of the conduct; (5) The age of the person involved at the time of the
conduct; (6) Contributing societal conditions; and (7) The absence or
presence of rehabilitation or efforts toward rehabilitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some are learned through time, the different standards are
not always well-understood by industry. Companies frequently experience
uncertainty in knowing what policies and procedures will apply as well
as inconsistent application of similar policies across DHS. This is
particularly true for policies and procedures related to prioritizing
and expediting fitness determinations. Some members have said they have
experienced an expedited process on some critical contracts while
others did not believe prioritization procedures existed.
There is a need for more transparency, consistency, and better on-
going communication with industry on all of the different fitness
requirements, policies, and procedures. Having greater visibility and
understanding of these issues by component is critical to a company's
ability to recruit and pre-vet candidates, particularly to find
candidates that might be eligible for reciprocity. Increased
communication improves industry's ability to do business planning,
develop budgets, and hire candidates that will make it through the
process and execute contracts on time.
Challenge 2: Fitness reciprocity is difficult to achieve at DHS because
it is based upon equivalent fitness criteria rather than
equivalent investigative criteria
Reciprocity refers to the acceptance of a prior, favorable fitness
determination from another component or division of DHS or another
Federal agency, without requiring additional information. The ability
to grant fitness reciprocity for contractors is important because it
ensures security but provides a way to save considerable time and
effort as well as cost savings for both DHS and industry. The granting
of reciprocity on a previously favorable fitness determination allows
companies to quickly on-board or transfer employees to contracts that
best fit their skill sets and experience.
At DHS, fitness reciprocity can only occur when the new receiving
agency uses equivalent fitness criteria as the former agency, the
fitness criteria meets or exceeds the scope and standards for the new
position, and there is no break in service. An agency is not required
to grant reciprocal recognition of a prior favorable fitness
determination when:
The new position requires a higher level of investigation
than previously conducted for that individual;
An agency obtains new information that calls into question
the individual's fitness based on character or conduct; or
The individual's investigative record shows conduct that is
incompatible with the core duties of the new position.
This is different than the standards for fitness reciprocity at the
Department of Defense (DoD). Reciprocity criteria at DoD looks at
whether the determination was based on an investigation equivalent to
or more comprehensive than the investigation required for the new
position.
By relying on fitness standards to determine reciprocity, it
prevents candidates who have a high-level security clearance from
receiving fitness reciprocity. The effect is that even a candidate with
a Top Secret, SCI clearance from the DoD who is selected to work on a
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) contract will have to wait to have
his previous investigative file requested and reviewed (and possibly
undergo additional investigation steps) so that CBP can make an
additional determination on fitness according to its unique standards.
This is an odd result when the investigation used for a Top Secret, SCI
clearance exceeds the investigation standards of a CBP background
investigation.
With so many different fitness standards throughout DHS, there are
fewer opportunities for reciprocity to apply and for the Government
(and industry) to receive the benefits of the policy. When there are
reduced opportunities for reciprocity, there is a limited pool of
candidates who can begin contract work promptly. This increases the
likelihood of a company having to submit multiple candidates for single
positions, which increases the number of investigations and costs for
each component's Personnel Security Division (PSD), and increases the
amount of time between contract award and contractor employees
executing a contract.
Challenge 3: Unpredictable and lengthy time lines and the lack of on-
going communication negatively affects company's ability to on-
board quality employees
As mentioned above, at any point in the process after submitting
the requisite electronic forms to receiving notification of a fitness
determination, there exists the potential for numerous delays and
errors to occur. Often, neither the company nor the candidate is
informed of the status of the investigation, what is causing delays, or
what is needed to resolve problems. This makes the process
unpredictable and lengthy.
The contractor is also not allowed to submit someone else's name
for an investigation until the original individual's adjudication is
complete. They cannot submit another candidate(s) as a back-up.
Additionally, if a company has advance knowledge that an individual
will be leaving a position at some point in the future, they are not
permitted to submit the paperwork for a new candidate until the other
person has actually left. This also adds an unnecessary amount of time
to the process.
CBP is the DHS component that is most often cited by our members as
having the most stringent fitness and investigation standards and the
one that does not allow reciprocity from other components or agencies.
One company told us that the average processing time for their CBP
candidates has gone from less than 40 days in fiscal year 2015 to 111
days in fiscal year 2017. There are also outlier situations where
candidates with excellent credentials can take up to 2 years to receive
fitness approval (even when these individuals already possess a
security clearance) for reasons ranging from their having dual
nationality or extensive foreign contacts.
Due to the duration and unpredictable nature of the investigation
process, candidates with the best skills and experience frequently take
other positions while waiting for the completion or review of the
investigation and fitness adjudication. They do not want to wait months
or years to start a new job.
Companies are often not notified that a candidate accepted another
position until the background investigation and fitness adjudication is
complete. One company told us of an instance when their candidate's CBP
background investigation took 13 months. When they contacted the
candidate to notify him of his approval, they learned he already
accepted another position. This required the company to start the
hiring process all over again.
While our members have processes and procedures in place to screen
candidates for likely disqualifiers, there is always uncertainty
whether any individual will make it through the process. Companies must
regularly recruit, interview, and provide conditional offers of
employment for a single position multiple times. This happens so
frequently that companies often build the time and cost of hiring
multiple candidates into the company's rates and pricing models that
are charged to the Government.
Occasionally, as you can imagine, there are cases of delay and
denials due to errors in the investigation process. I can cite one case
where it took a candidate with a previous DoD Secret clearance over 14
months to undergo a CBP background investigation. At the end of CBP's
investigation, the individual was denied due to an alleged outstanding
debt. The candidate retained a lawyer who discovered the debt belonged
to someone with the same name, but not the same social security number
or date of birth. The candidate resubmitted his paperwork and is back
in the adjudication process at this time. Had there been better
communication with the candidate and the company throughout the
process, this issue could have been mitigated much earlier.
With every new candidate or error in the system, the Government
must spend additional time and money to conduct a new investigation,
fitness determination, or to correct mistakes. These delays result in
added cost, lost productivity, and prevent companies from executing on
mission-critical contracts. It also prevents DHS from getting the best
and most qualified contractor workforce.
Challenge 4: CBP's process adds an additional layer, forcing companies
to compete to attract vetted candidates, thereby further
raising labor costs
Due to the length of time involved with getting a previously non-
cleared person processed at CBP, people that already have a CBP
background investigation or a favorable fitness determination are
highly valued and sought after. Companies compete and try to steal
previously credentialed candidates away from other companies. These
candidates know they can negotiate for higher compensation because they
are the only resource available in the time frame of the company's
requirement. This frequently happens during re-competes when companies
seek to hire the same personnel that worked on the previous contract.
Another problem is that this class of individuals with already
existing CBP credentials often insists on working as independent
contractors (1099s), rather than as an employee. This affects the
company's ability to direct how the work is done and significantly
raises rates to the Government because of allowable billing practices
in these situations. The result is that the Government is paying
excessive compensation (well above market rates) for positions such as
software developers and system engineers. Companies often feel they
have no choice--either meet the demands of the available workforce or
not meet contract requirements.
Challenge 5: Lack of visibility and communication on the status and
known delays of a candidates investigation
The fitness process begins when selected candidates provide their
personal investigative data to the hiring agency through the electronic
system known as e-Qip. The Contracting Officers Representative (COR) is
the primary liaison between the PSD and the industry representative.
However, due to privacy concerns, the COR only communicates the status
and delays with the candidate. The candidate's employer is left with
little to no information until the adjudication is complete.
Companies need some ability to estimate how long the process will
take, general information on where the candidate's case falls in the
system, and if there are known delays that will extend the time line.
Companies are not seeking to have derogatory or embarrassing
information about a candidate disclosed. They simply need information
on status and delays, so they can appropriately plan for contract
execution, hiring, and future budgeting.
recommendations
While the Homeland Security & Defense Business Council and our
members strongly support the need for DHS to have appropriately and
sufficiently vetted contractors, we believe the problems and costs of
the current system far outweigh the security benefits. Change is needed
and can be accomplished. Some of it will require DHS to study and
evaluate the feasibility of consolidating functions and requirements
while other aspects will require change across the Federal Government.
In all instances, we feel that outreach to industry is a necessary
component--not just for input, but to ensure a commitment to work
together to resolve the delays and improve the overall process.
Right now, we see only support for the status quo and an
unwillingness, even by the Government officials who are burdened by the
current system, to champion change or for any of the components to cede
control. An improved system would have numerous benefits: It would
reduce system backlogs and time lines; prevent unnecessary delays so
that companies could on-board employees faster and begin contract work
promptly; increase communication and transparency; mitigate unneeded
costs and performance risk; avoid unnecessary duplication of effort;
and ensure that DHS has access to a quality contractor workforce, so it
can accomplish its mission most effectively and efficiently.
The Council has three (3) suggestions for improvements:
1. Increase opportunities for reciprocity
If DHS wants mission-critical contracts executed in a timely
manner, companies need to be able to on-board employees in a faster
manner. This can occur if reciprocity is available in more situations.
Currently, reciprocity is only granted at DHS when the new agency uses
equivalent fitness criteria and the fitness criteria meets or exceeds
the scope and standards for the new position. Obtaining fitness
reciprocity at DHS is difficult because every component has different
fitness requirements.
There is also no eligibility for fitness reciprocity when someone
has a high-level security clearance from another component or agency
even though candidates with the highest levels of security clearances
will have necessarily been vetted through that investigation for
fitness concerns. Many people in industry have a hard time
comprehending why someone with a Top Secret, SCI clearance from the FBI
or DoD would need to have an additional fitness determination for a
contractor position at DHS.
a. DHS should consider fitness reciprocity based upon
similar investigative elements rather than fitness
requirements
If DHS relied upon investigative elements (like DoD) rather than
fitness standards, this would increase opportunities for reciprocity.
This would create many instances where fitness could be automatically
granted by the fact that a candidate has a certain level of security
clearance.
b. Greater standardization and alignment is needed across
the Federal Government on the investigation
process, suitability/fitness standards, and
application forms
While Executive branch officials routinely honor other agencies'
security clearances or investigations, DHS often finds it necessary to
take additional steps to address limitations with available information
on prior investigations before granting reciprocity. OPM ensures that
certain clearance data necessary for reciprocity is available to
adjudicators but shared information often contains summary-level detail
so agencies take steps to obtain additional information, which prevents
or slows down the granting of immediate reciprocity. Agencies are
sometimes reluctant to be accountable for investigations and
adjudications conducted by other organizations. To increase the speed
and availability of reciprocity, granting agencies must have confidence
in the quality of prior investigations and adjudications and a clear
understanding of what conduct and character traits were evaluated
during the course of the investigation.
OPM has recognized this need and has been working on developing new
Federal Investigative Standards for years. The new approach, partially
in roll-out but not yet fully implemented, includes a five-tier
investigation system, each which is intended to build on a successively
higher level of investigation. Adjudication is also intended to build
upon, but not duplicate, the ones below it. For example, Tier 1
requires a, b, c; Tier 2 requires a, b, c, and d; Tier 3 requires a, b,
c, d, and e. Therefore, Tier 3 meets all Tier 1 and Tier 2
requirements.
The tiered investigation system must also be tied to the
investigative steps done for suitability/fitness determinations and
aligned to the different personnel security intake forms. The lack of a
single standard application form is still a barrier to aligning Federal
investigations.
If investigative standards are tied to fitness concerns, this would
allow DHS to have different fitness standards but still increase the
opportunities for fitness reciprocity. This would require some collapse
and simplification of DHS's current suitability/fitness standards but
would still allow the components to have different fitness standards
based upon their mission. More importantly, this would dramatically
increase the opportunities for fitness reciprocity by increasing the
pool of people available to work at DHS and make recruiting and
onboarding a faster process for industry.
c. Consolidate and improve communication on different
fitness standards across DHS
While it will take time for the Federal Government to standardize
investigations and tie them to fitness, DHS could still increase
eligibility for reciprocity by looking for more opportunities for
standardization, simplification, and reduction of the fitness
requirements that currently exist across the Department. In some cases,
as was suggested by the 2009 Inspector General report on the DHS
Personnel Security Process (OIG-09-65, May 2009), it could help for DHS
to set a maximum threshold (e.g. bad debt) and permit components to use
less but not more than the maximum amount as the standard.
We encourage the creation of a matrix or guide to the various
fitness requirements and conduct thresholds for different types of
positions across DHS and the Federal Government so that companies can
more readily determine which candidates are likely to receive
reciprocity. A matrix showing the greatest to least stringent
requirements across components and the Federal Government would provide
additional transparency and facilitate discussion into whether the
current fitness requirements make sense and whether certain agencies or
organizations should revise or realign their requirements.
2. Direct further investigation or study into opportunities to
centralize and consolidate the Personnel Security Department
functions within DHS to reduce the length of the process and
common delays
The 2009 Inspector General Report focused on the effectiveness and
efficiency of the suitability process with Federal employees, rather
than the fitness process with contractors. However, many of the
challenges and recommendations apply equally to the process for fitness
determinations and still apply to DHS almost a decade later. As was
suggested in the report, there are a number of opportunities for the
DHS PSD, as part of the Office of the Chief Security Officer, to
consolidate various functions of the personnel security process. Doing
this would not remove components ability to apply mission specific
requirements to their process. It would however help in aligning
policies, reducing duplicative efforts and known bottlenecks, improving
customer service, and increasing transparency into the system.
There may also be additional value in having the DHS Inspector
General or GAO look specifically at the fitness process since there are
aspects to and challenges with this process that are unique from the
suitability process.
3. Encourage DHS to explore the development of an electronic system
that provides companies with visibility into the status of
investigations and fitness determinations
DHS lacks communication into the status and known delays of
investigations. We believe the development of an electronic personnel
security status system, similar to what is used by the Defense Manpower
Data Center, would allow a properly designated person from industry
(such as the company's Facilities Security Officer) to have some
visibility into the status of a candidate investigations. Such a system
would not require DHS to share unfavorable or derogatory information
about a contractor employee that is discovered during an investigation.
It would simply allow a company to know where the candidate's status
falls against specific milestones in the process. Such a system would
reduce the amount of phone calls and emails to staff and give companies
a better sense that delays have occurred and whether more time will be
required for the investigation. This would dramatically increase
transparency and communication and improve a company's ability to plan,
budget, and hire staff.
conclusion
The current contractor vetting process at DHS lacks consistency,
transparency, and communication. It requires duplicative effort and
unnecessarily long amounts of time, it also limits competition which
creates substantial costs to both Government and industry, and prevents
DHS from obtaining the best workforce and ultimately from accomplishing
its mission.
Personnel security is of utmost importance, but there are ways to
improve the process without giving up the integrity of the program. We
urge Congress to consider the ideas put forth today and to continue to
play an active role in driving change both at DHS and across the
Federal Government.
On behalf of the Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, I
appreciate the opportunity to provide the collective perspectives of
our members on the challenges involved with the DHS fitness process for
contractor employees. The Council stands ready to answer any additional
questions you may have on these topics.
Mr. Perry. Chair thanks Mr. Pearl.
Thank you, sir.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Berteau for an opening
statement.
Can you push the mike, sir? Yes, the mike.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. BERTEAU, PRESIDENT AND CEO, PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES COUNCIL
Mr. Berteau. I am technically incompetent, so I don't know
how to push the button that says talk. I want to particularly
thank those here from home State of Louisiana, which I think is
what teaches us that you don't need to push a button in order
to talk, you just talk.
There are a couple of things I would like to say that are
not in my written statement and I appreciate your incorporating
them in the written statement. I don't have it in there, but I
should have had it in there and I think all my fellow panelists
would agree with this.
We need to recognize that every day there are thousands of
people who get up in the Department of Homeland Security and
come to work and do the absolute best they can. Some of those
people are on the Government payroll. Some of those people work
for contractors. They do their best to get their jobs done. I
think they deserve a better system to support them and that is
really what I think this committee can do to help and I think
it is important to recognize that. The deck is stacked against
them in many cases.
I would like to associate myself with some of the
recommendations that have already been made. In my statement, I
have a number of recommendations and I tend to focus on things
that I think this committee can do. But let me highlight three
things that I think are goals that we ought to have in place
here.
We frequently look at this as a tradeoff, right, that if
you are going to have a faster process you are going to
actually jeopardize security as part of that. I don't think
that's true, in fact, I think the opposite is true. In
particular, if you start bringing in the kind of 21st Century
capability we have of data and analytics and access to the
databases that are out there and use this in a continuous
evaluation process, you can actually speed the process up,
exercise standards that actually make sense and create true
reciprocity across the Department and actually increase
security in doing that. I think that is one goal that you
should certainly have in place.
There is a second goal, the reciprocity is clearly there.
Each component inside DHS thinks they have got something they
have got to protect. I don't like to compare DHS to DOD
because, in fact, that is not a fair comparison. But in this
case I think it is evident in the Defense department they have
managed to figure out how to transfer clearances very quickly,
and easily without any loss to the culture and integrity of any
of the components or subcomponents inside the Department.
There's no reason DHS can't achieve that same objective I think
going forward.
Then third is, and this is where the committee can really
help, we just don't have the information we need to have to
tell how things are going. So this is true obviously for
contractors, you described in your opening statement that
contractor has to ask the COR, the COR has to ask the office,
the office had to report back, et cetera. Frequently, there are
weeks or even months go by inside that process.
There is no reason why you can't have access to data right
from the beginning for everybody. The Government would be more
efficient, the contractors would be more efficient. If it is
going to take 12 months for me to get a suitability
determination, let me know that, I will go do something else
for 11 and a half months and then I will come back when the
time is done and let us get on with it, right?
So I think if you put all three of those together, stronger
reciprocity, a better, faster system that actually uses
innovation to increase security rather than decrease it, and
better reporting on the data, you will go a long way toward
making things better.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berteau follows:]
Prepared Statement of David J. Berteau
February 27, 2018
introduction
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify on behalf of the
Professional Services Council's (PSC) nearly 400 member companies and
their hundreds of thousands of employees across the Nation.\1\ PSC is
the voice of the Government technology and professional services
industry, supporting the full range and diversity of Government
missions and functions, including the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the DHS
personnel security and contractor employee vetting process and to
address several issues of critical importance to our member companies,
their employees, and the success of DHS missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For over 45 years, PSC has been the leading National trade
association of the Government technology and professional services
industry. PSC's member companies represent small, medium, and large
businesses that provide Federal agencies with services of all kinds,
including information technology, engineering, logistics, facilities
management, operations and maintenance, consulting, international
development, scientific, social, environmental services, and more.
Together, the association's members employ hundreds of thousands of
Americans in all 50 States. See www.pscouncil.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, I will make several specific observations of opportunities
and challenges in DHS and other agencies involved in the personnel
security and contractor employee vetting process. I will also offer
some recommendations for your consideration, and for consideration by
DHS and the Federal Government as a whole.
Let me start, though, with what I hope we can all agree are goals
worthy of support from this subcommittee as you focus on actions that
can improve the contractor employee vetting process. They include:
Speeding up vetting and clearance processes while increasing
security through better use of data and process innovation,
Defining and routinely applying reciprocity standards and
agreements across DHS component agencies, and
Providing timely and regular access to accurate information,
both for individual firms under contract and more broadly
across DHS, in order to improve vendors' ability to recruit and
retain workers and successfully provide essential contractor
support to DHS missions.
I believe there is much this committee can do in these and other
areas that will lead to practical and productive improvements.
contractors provide significant value to the government
Contractors play vital roles in assisting the Government in
providing services to the American people. In DHS, contractors support
every mission and function of the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE).
Many of the capabilities that contractors provide do not exist within
the Government, and contractors can quickly expand or adjust capacity
to meet changing DHS needs. The Government benefits from a strong,
diversified business base that supports its current and emerging
requirements.
To meet these demands, however, contractors need to be able to
hire, retain, assign, and transfer qualified, skilled employees to the
missions and functions with greatest need. Doing this means that DHS
needs to provide timely Entry on Duty (EOD) decisions, reliable
security clearance processing, reciprocal recognition of valid
clearances across the Department, and regular status updates to DHS
personnel and contractors.
psc recognizes the government's central role in personnel security
process
Proper vetting and personnel security practices are essential
before a Government or contractor employee receives regular access to
Government facilities and information. Contractor and Government
personnel go through the same personnel security process, conducted by
the same entities, subject to the same levels of scrutiny and with the
same kinds of risks. (The same personnel security process applies to
other partners in the HSE, including State and local public safety
officials as well as cyber and critical infrastructure officials in the
private sector.)
government's roles and responsibilities
At the Government-wide level, the National Background
Investigations Bureau (NBIB), established on October 1, 2016, is
currently the primary provider of background investigations (BIs),
including processing of electronic questionnaires, conducting National
agency record checks, and maintaining a central clearance repository.
In most cases, the NBIB processes the forms, schedules, and conducts
BIs, and delivers results to DHS to adjudicate employee suitability,
contractor fitness, and, when needed, a security clearance
determination. In some cases, DHS itself will conduct an initial
assessment that can lead to an Entry on Duty (EOD) determination.
challenges in personnel security vetting
Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) added
the personnel security clearance process to its High-Risk List.\2\ This
reaffirmed what the contractor community and National security experts
across the Government already knew: The Government-wide personnel
security clearance process is not meeting the needs of the Government
or of its contractor partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See January 25, 2018 GAO Press Release, available at: https://
www.gao.gov/press/high_risk_security_clearance_process.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The problems below affect DHS and the entire Federal Government.
Reciprocity Failures
DHS has many separate operating entities, and nearly all of them
place restrictions on recognizing a clearance from other parts of DHS.
These failures to grant reciprocal recognition of valid clearances, or
even EODs, make it unnecessarily difficult to transfer personnel from
one task or contract to another, even if the Government's missions are
negatively impacted by delaying or denying such reciprocity. Further,
there is no visibility into or reporting on the number of reciprocity
requests that are processed, how long they take, or why they are
denied. The absence of such data make it extremely difficult to address
problems.
Process Challenges
PSC member companies regularly report that cases are delayed
further by lost forms, communication disconnects, failure by DHS to
process responses, and inadequate tracking of cases or reporting of
their status, even to the responsible parties within DHS.
Backlog
The backlog of cases awaiting final determination is higher than it
has been in my nearly 40 years in this business. As of September 2017,
at least 700,000 individuals remained in limbo awaiting a clearance to
perform mission-critical work. In fiscal year 2016 initial
investigations for Secret clearances took 108 days on average, while
initial investigations for Top Secret clearances took an average of 220
days. Wait times have increased since then, but data are no longer
provided by the Government. These delays jeopardize Government
missions, undermine contract performance, and harm the ability of both
the Government and contractors to recruit and hire.
Lack of Access to Information
Last June, as part of a memorandum aimed at reducing reporting
burdens, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) canceled public
reporting by the Government on the backlog in security clearances.\3\
PSC registered a written complaint to OMB \4\ but to date no corrective
action on this has been forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ OMB Memo M-17-26, June 15, 2017, ``Reducing Burden for Federal
Agencies by Rescinding and Modifying OMB Memoranda,'' available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/
2017/M-17-26.pdf.
\4\ PSC Letter to OMB Director Mick Mulvaney, June 22, 2017,
available at: https://www.pscouncil.org/Downloads/documents/
PSC%20Letter%20on%20OMB%20Memos%206.22.- 17.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impact on Recruiting and Retention
The problems outlined above make it substantially harder for both
the Government and its supporting contractors to recruit, train, and
retain the new talent needed to meet Government needs. Picture recent
college graduates--skilled in the latest cybersecurity tools and
techniques--having to wait a year or more between being offered a
position and obtaining the clearances needed to start the work. Even if
they can secure a way to make a living while waiting, they will no
longer be current in the technology of their field. Only the most
dedicated will tolerate such delays, and no one benefits from them.
security clearance processes need to be better and faster
Most broadly, PSC recommends adopting and implementing what we call
the ``four ones.'' These principles can and should apply both to the
Government and to contractors. DHS has made progress, but greater
results are necessary. These principles are:
One application;
One investigation;
One adjudication;
One clearance.
DHS personnel security processes for both Government and contractor
employees are still quite decentralized. Various incremental
improvements have occurred over the years; however, as throughput has
increased and decreased so has the processing time for personnel. To
the Department's credit, for the past several years DHS personnel
security officials at DHS headquarters and component agencies have
engaged in an annual program with industry to discuss processing times
and recent policy changes. While this is a welcome forum, more should
be done to keep the lines of communication open on a continuous basis.
The recommendations below include concrete actions that Congress
can take and also include steps for the Executive branch to address
deficiencies and risks, reduce the backlog and speed up processing
times, and carry out effective oversight of initiatives at Federal
agencies, including DHS.
1. Ensure accurate, up-to-date, and publicly-reported information
on the backlog and wait times for individuals seeking to obtain
a clearance. Section 925 of the fiscal year 2018 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes many reporting
requirements on the size and scope of the backlog. Yet, unlike
previous Government reporting, this information will be seen
only by the Congressional committees of jurisdiction--leaving
the heavily-impacted contractor community in the dark, along
with many of their Government customers as well as State and
local officials.
2. Participate with the other committees of jurisdiction in
regular, detailed oversight of the 3-year process to transfer
authority for certain clearances from the NBIB to the
Department of Defense (DoD). Section 925 of the fiscal year
2018 NDAA requires DoD to eventually conduct its own background
and security investigations. The time line is demanding, and
detailed plans are not yet available, increasing risk. Congress
can and should ensure that DoD stays on track, while also
ensuring that the remaining clearance requests at NBIB remain a
priority.
3. Actively support funds and programs that will modernize and
improve the investigation process concurrently at DoD and NBIB.
The NDAA provided DoD with the authority to utilize existing
contractor background verifications to reduce duplication of
work. As this will save time and resources for DoD clearances,
Congress should give NBIB the same authority for actions taken
by DoD in the future.
4. Mandate true reciprocity among all DHS entities. Existing
regulations already provide guidance for implementing
reciprocal recognition, which should increase reciprocity
between and among agencies. This committee could require DHS to
account for and report all requests for reciprocal recognition
of clearances, along with the length of time to process such
requests and a list of the justifications for each distinct
exception for requests for reciprocal clearances from other
components within DHS.
5. In the forthcoming fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019
appropriations bills, support full funding for all the programs
that ensure investigations are thorough and timely. We know
that there are too few people processing clearances and there
is too little money to meet the demand while investing in the
needed process improvements.
6. Include in that funding the necessary support for more robust
use of technology, including adopting continuous evaluations
(CE) across the Government. The current process of
reevaluations is based on the calendar, not on risk or need.
Moving from a time-based process to continuous evaluation will
also contribute to increasing security and reducing insider
threats in a timely manner. To be successful, CE must be part
of the personnel system as well as security clearance,
suitability, and credentialing procedures. While the short-term
impact of CE on the backlog will be minimal, moving to CE will
significantly reduce the likelihood of future backlogs at the
level we are currently experiencing by removing a significant
number of periodic revaluations from the queue.
7. Some solutions would likely not require legislation:
Periodically, the inspector general or an independent
organization should ``test'' the process within each agency
randomly to assess the speed, quality, and level of customer
service;
Each agency should host a customer service or other type
of mailbox or hotline for people to contact with inquiries. DHS
can set a threshold for how frequently entities may make
inquiries; and
Each agency should have a current 1-pager that describes
the process at a high level so people know what to expect. They
should update it quarterly. It could include tips and resources
for contractors on hot topics like insider threat, where to
seek out more training on complying with security processes,
and tips for filling out the forms correctly.
The failures and shortcomings of the current personnel security
process impact uniformed personnel, civilian employees, and contractors
across the country--in every State and Congressional district--and
jeopardizes our homeland and National security.
doing business with dhs: maturing the acquisition function
As DHS continues to mature, and celebrates its 15th birthday this
week, the Department has made significant improvements in the way it
communicates and collaborates with industry. However, there remains
substantial room to improve the partnership with industry. It begins
with broadening communications channels, providing more comprehensive
and long-term outlooks about future mission needs, and reforming
acquisition processes to reduce costs, barriers to entry, and provide
meaningful and rapid access to the best solutions industry can offer.
The Importance of Continuous and Meaningful Communication with Industry
To enhance its partnership with the private sector, it is important
that DHS understands how industry is evolving and what motivates
industry to want to be a DHS partner. Industry dynamics are evolving at
a pace that is faster than at any time in recent history. Both
traditional DHS contractors and companies that have not traditionally
contracted with DHS are consistently developing innovative capabilities
and processes that can be leveraged and accessed by the Department. The
growing trend of ``as a service'' delivery models, such as cloud
computing, the evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT), data
analytics, the need to rapidly deploy and upgrade cybersecurity
capabilities, and emerging robotics and unmanned systems are prime
examples of how innovation is changing the way the private sector
operates. These developments and others may offer unlimited potential
to assist DHS with meeting its missions.
However, for such capabilities to be meaningfully utilized by the
Department, it is crucial that DHS regularly and effectively
communicate its desired outcomes to industry. To do so, the Department
must share both its short- and long-term goals with the public. While
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) is an important
component, such communication should occur more frequently than every 4
years. The QHSR, and on-going industry communication efforts, should
coherently lay out long-term DHS strategy and objectives beyond a 3- to
4-year time period, describe efforts by the Department to better
communicate its research and development objectives, and take steps to
better enable tech transfer initiatives so that R&D breakthroughs can
be applied to real-life solutions.
To its credit, the Department has been at the forefront of
conducting ``Reverse Industry Day'' (RID) sessions, where contractor
partners can present directly to Government personnel about the key
challenges and considerations they face in doing business with DHS.
These sessions have been well-received by participants in both
Government and industry, and we commend the Department on its
continuing commitment to holding RID sessions and appreciate having had
the opportunity to engage with DHS through this avenue.
The Benefits of a Well-Trained Acquisition Workforce
A well-trained, skilled, and supported DHS workforce is necessary
to achieve successful acquisition outcomes. But, regrettably, the
upcoming generation of DHS workers is still being trained and oriented
to traditional and outdated practices and rules. DHS should transform
the workforce to be grounded in cross-functional development, business
acumen, technical skill, and creative thinking. PSC recommends the
expansion of initiatives that seek frequent rotations for the DHS
workforce into functional areas outside of their main area of focus.
For example, much can be learned by program managers by spending some
time working within a Department acquisition office, and vice versa.
PSC also encourages new authorities that would permit the Department
and the private sector to experiment with personnel rotations.
Initiatives such as these can go a long way to remedying the human
capital challenges faced by the Department.
conclusion
On behalf of PSC and our members, I thank you for your time and
consideration of these matters. As always, PSC is available at your
convenience to address any questions or concerns the subcommittee has,
now and in the future. I will try to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Perry. All right, Mr. Berteau, thank you for your
testimony.
Chair now recognizes Mr. LaBonte for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON LA BONTE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, ARDENT MC
Mr. LaBonte. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you about my company's support to DHS. My name is Brandon
LaBonte. I am the president and owner of ArdentMC, a small
business that started in 2006 with a primary focus on providing
geospatial and technology solutions to the Department of
Homeland Security.
Much like many small businesses who focus on Homeland
Security, ArdentMC is driven by a desire to advance the use of
tools and technologies in the detection and deterrence of
terrorist activities, to help respond and recover from natural
and man-made disasters and to support our law enforcement
security efforts around the country.
While speaking today about our company's perspectives in
particular, I believe our experience is representative of small
businesses doing work at DHS across the board.
In the summer of 2016, I had the privilege of joining
representatives from the DHS Procurement Department and the
Personnel Security Division for an Acquisition Innovation
Roundtable, an AIR, on the contractor fitness process.
While fitness determinations are a challenge for both
industry and Government, the AIR allowed a better understanding
of opposing viewpoints. For example, the AIR revealed that DHS
seemed unaware that industry was hiring employees on the
contingency of them receiving their fitness determination, and
that recruiting costs were lost when excessive delays meant a
contingent employee might take a job elsewhere.
Given the monumental challenge faced by DHS, and the ever-
increasing volume of fitness requests submitted, I would
respectfully submit three recommendations to increase the
efficiency of the Department's fitness efforts and the level of
support for the mission.
First, DHS components should permit reciprocity of the
fitness determinations. We hired an employee that had supported
a DHS client for over 3 years. We submitted his fitness request
on November 4, 2015, expecting a quick result and good
continuity for the program.
His fitness was approved, but not until March 3, 2017,
about 15 months later. In the mean time, he took a job
somewhere else rather than wait for the fitness process to
clear. While differences in the way some components utilize
reciprocity are understandable, our experience is that
reciprocity is rarely honored between, or even within,
components.
This results in uncertainty for the contractor and fitness
delays. ArdentMC's average fitness determination time across
all our pending contracts as of last week was 213 days. A
uniform approach to an already-approved contractor employee
would increase predictability for contractors and mission
support for DHS.
Second, DHS should increase industry collaboration and
partnership in the fitness process. On February 22 of this
year--I think that was last week--we received an email from a
DHS component security office in response to repeated requests
for help with a delayed fitness submission, one that we
inquired about monthly since the submission had been put in.
The employee, it turns out, had been approved to work, had
been granted fitness on June 22, 2017, yet the component did
not convey the information and did not have it when we had
asked about it repeatedly. This results in less support to the
mission and over $120,000 of lost revenue, not an insignificant
amount for a small business. This multiplies when the number of
employees impacted increases.
Today, unlike DOD, DHS will not communicate with employers
about employees submitted for fitness. The result is excessive
delays and miscommunication, or in some cases no communication
between DHS and the employer. DHS should open communication
directly to the employers about the status of their employees
in consideration for fitness.
Finally, DHS should leverage industry's Government-approved
security officers. ArdentMC's corporate security officer known
to many as a Facilities Security Officer or an FSO, works
closely with DOD on submitting and monitoring the status of our
employees in the security clearance process. In fact, DOD
provides the training, the access, the authorization to handle
sensitive personal information across the board.
While the security process at DHS is distinct from DOD, the
type of information dealt with is the same. Industry provides
over 13,000 certified security officers today, all trained and
approved to handle the same type of information used in the DHS
fitness process through a program called the NISP, the National
Industrial Security Program.
DHS's work force could be augmented at no cost to the
agency while also providing visibility and transparency by
utilizing these FSOs to open communications with DHS. As a
company that began its mission supporting DHS and has continued
to work for DHS for over a decade, we believe we bring some
uncommonly deep insight into these challenges, and we certainly
understand the need for a secure work force.
We continue to hope to work with DHS and to be part of the
solution. Thank you for the opportunity to provide the
testimony and I am happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. LaBonte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon LaBonte
February 27, 2018
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about our
company's support to the Department of Homeland Security. My name is
Brandon LaBonte, and I am the president and owner of ArdentMC, a small
business started in 2006 with a primary focus on providing technology
and Geospatial solutions to the Department of Homeland Security. Much
like many small businesses who focus on homeland security, ArdentMC is
driven by a desire to advance the use of tools and technologies in the
detection and deterrence of terrorist activities, help response and
recovery to natural and man-made disasters, and support our law
enforcement and security efforts around the country. ArdentMC has
employees in 14 States and the District of Columbia supporting mission
programs across every DHS operational and support component except TSA
and FLETC. While I will speak today about our company's perspective in
particular, I believe our experiences are representative of the many
small businesses supporting DHS.
In the summer of 2016, I had the privilege of joining
representatives from the DHS Procurement Department and the Personnel
Security Division (PSD) for an Acquisition Innovation Roundtable (AIR)
on the contractor fitness process. While fitness determinations are a
challenge for both industry and the Government, the AIR allowed a
better understanding of opposing viewpoints. For example, the AIR
revealed that DHS was unaware that industry was hiring employees on the
contingency of their fitness determination, and that recruiting costs
were lost when excessive delays meant a contingent employee decided to
take another position.
Given the monumental challenge faced by DHS, and the ever-
increasing volume of fitness requests submitted, I would respectfully
submit three recommendations to increase both the efficiency of the
Department's fitness efforts and the level of support for the mission:
First--DHS components should permit reciprocity of fitness
determinations.
We hired an employee that had supported a DHS client for over 3
years. We submitted his fitness request on November 4, 2015, expecting
a quick result and good continuity due to his longstanding work in the
program. His fitness was approved, but not until March 3, 2017, about
15 months later. In the mean time, he took a different job rather than
wait. While differences in the way some components utilize reciprocity
are understandable, our experience is that reciprocity is rarely
honored between, or even within, components. This results in
uncertainty for the contractor and fitness delays. ArdentMC's average
fitness determination time across all our pending requests, as of last
week, is 213 days. A uniform approach to already-approved contractor
employees would increase predictability for contractors and mission
support for DHS.
Second--DHS should increase industry collaboration and partnership in
the fitness process.
On February 22 of this year we received an email from a DHS
component security office in response to repeated requests for help
with a delayed fitness submission. The employee, it turns out, was
approved to work on 6/22/2017, yet the component did not convey this
information. This results in less support to the mission, and over
$120,000 of lost revenue, a significant amount for a small business,
which multiplies as the number of impacted employees increases. Today,
unlike DoD, DHS will not communicate with employers about employees
submitted for fitness. This results in excessive delays and
miscommunications (or no communications) between DHS and the employer.
DHS should open communication directly to the employers about the
status of their employees in consideration for fitness.
Finally--DHS should leverage industry's Government-approved security
officers.
ArdentMC's corporate security officer (known as a Facilities
Security Officer, or FSO) works closely with DoD on submitting and
monitoring the status of our employees in the security clearance
process. In fact, DoD provides training, access, and authorization to
handle sensitive personal information. While the security process at
DHS is distinct, the type of information is the same. Industry provides
over 13,000 certified security officers today, all trained and approved
to handle the same type information used in the DHS fitness process.
DHS's workforce could be augmented at no cost to the agency, while also
providing visibility and transparency by utilizing these FSOs to open
communications with DHS.
As a company that began its mission support at DHS and has
continued to work for DHS for over a decade, we believe we bring some
uncommonly deep insight into these challenges. We continue to hope to
work with DHS and to be part of the solution. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide my testimony, and I'm happy to respond to any
questions.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks Mr. LaBonte and now recognizes
himself for 5 minutes of questioning, and I will start out with
Mr. Allen.
Go a little bit off the script here, but I am just very
curious from my standpoint as I looked at this. To me, if you
have a TS or TS SCI or even Secret clearance, is there anything
in the fitness standard that is more adjudicatory, is more in-
depth than any of those clearances that I have discussed,
because there are different levels of clearance I understand,
but particularly anything above the Secret level that you could
know of?
Mr. Allen. No, there isn't, Mr. Chairman. These are really
excruciatingly very precise efforts to find out who you are,
even if you have had a Top Secret SCI, you have to be
reinvestigated every 5 years. We are moving to a new standard I
think as Mr. Berteau stated about electronic. Today, we can
check very rapidly everything about you electronically. Your
whole life history is in digital dust there.
But the standards are excruciating for those holding the
highest clearances, SCI. A leakage of culture has occurred
recently in the intelligence community, but it doesn't mean
that you have to just sit and study the issue longer, you use
better techniques and electronics. But SCI, everything about me
is known to the National Background Investigative Bureau as
well as Defense Security Service, and my wife, they know
everything about my wife and my children.
So, it is very thorough when you get to that Top Secret SCI
and that is the reason I think it is redundant. I think if you
have gone through that and you are within scope, within 5 years
for a Top Secret SCI or a Secret within 10 years, I think you
are pretty fit to come work for DHS.
Mr. Perry. I certainly think that even if you--let us just
say you had a TS SCI, and you are halfway through the term of
your TS and you chose to put yourself out and you could be
hired, so a simple background check just to update that you
hadn't committed any crimes since you were adjudicated for your
TS SCI would seem to be to me sufficient.
As I thought about it, Mr. Snowden had a clearance, Bradley
Manning had a clearance, and these folks were people that ended
up being in my mind criminals. But that aside, it seems to me
the fitness test isn't going to be any more thorough than the
Top Secret or the Secret clearance.
So, my question to you, if you know, it is that does the
Department and the disparate organizations within the
Department want to maintain this fitness standard as a vehicle,
for lack of a better way of putting it? So we have got this
individual that we are vetting, he passes all the security--let
us just put it because I know it doesn't follow this track but
let us say we have the Top Secret, let us say he comes or she
comes with a security clearance, we just don't like the way he
parts his hair, or we don't like the way she dresses, or we
don't like her attitude or whatever. Do they want to maintain
that? Is it your sense that they want to maintain that, because
I am sure they are never going to say as a way to just say this
person is not something that is going to work at this agency
and we don't have to tell you why or provide any information.
We are just saying no regardless of the fact that they are
qualified.
Mr. Allen. Yes. It seems to me once DHS for a fitness
examination, if they check with the intelligence community,
they look in databases, JPAS for Defense or Scattered Castle
for the Top Secret SCI, they can verify when the person was
given the clearance, is the person within scope for the 5 years
or at a Secret level for 10 years. This can be validated very
quickly.
They have a lot of trust for a person who has gone through
a lot of examination repeatedly through his or her career. With
CIA, of course, you always have the added burden of going
through polygraphs which they readily are happy to give you
from time to time.
Mr. Perry. Sure. Sure. As a person who has held a clearance
for 30 years or so I for the life of me can't figure out the
efficacy of this program.
Mr. Pearl and Mr. Berteau, looking at the flow of
information for new hires--and I think we might do a couple of
rounds here because I want to ask a couple more questions a
round at a time--but I don't understand how the COR are as a
DOD person, as a military guy and understanding the functions
of the contracting representative, contracting officer
representative for DOD, what is the purpose for having them
somehow injected into the personnel decisions of the would-be
contractor?
I have got a contract. I want to hire the person to execute
the contract. In that process somehow it has to go to the COR
and then back to me before I can--what is their purpose for
being there? Am I missing something I guess is the question?
Because we don't want to make bad policy but I don't understand
why we are doing it that way.
Mr. Berteau. Second time I forget, but by the third time I
will remember to turn the button on first.
The COR's primary responsibility is actually to be the
interface between the administrative contracting officer and
the performing contractor in terms of making sure that the
contractor is doing what they have been hired to do and that
they can comply with the terms and conditions of the contract.
They don't have a contracting officer responsibility, but they
are graded on how well the contractor does in terms of
delivering on the scope of work.
You can see a scenario in which a COR is worried because
the contractor is not doing everything they signed up to do
because they have got funded requisitions that can't be filled
yet because the people assigned to fill that job are still
waiting on either their fitness determination or their security
clearance or both in some cases. So, the COR has a vested
interest in kind-of making that happen.
We have seen situations; I remember companies have told us
about them in preparation for this hearing where the COR is
pinging on the contractor because they are not delivering at
the same time as the COR is not necessarily pursuing get me
that answer more quickly so I can get these people to work.
So, you can see a way in which the two could work together.
The only way in which that works better though is if you have
got time on your side where you have got responsiveness and the
COR, the logical thing to do would be for the adjudicating
activities to be pushing the information even on a daily basis
so the COR just has to look at a checklist and say Joe is still
in process. Pete has been cleared. Don't wait 7 months to tell
me by email that he is ready to go, right? So, the system could
actually make the COR's job easier and more effective so he or
she can focus on their responsibilities with the contract.
Mr. Perry. Gentlemen, I am way beyond my time but I am
going to revisit that question with you a little further.
But at this time I would like to yield my time and
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Witnesses, thank you
very much for your information there. Let me get this straight,
so this is the Department of Homeland Security, a lot of
organizations, a lot of agencies within one umbrella with the
main task of protecting our country.
So, if you have a need, you go out and contract for
personnel because you need to take care of an issue that all of
us deem vital to our National security. Yet, it is taking a
very long time to go through these vetting processes.
So, my question, I would open it up to all of you is, why
does it take so long and why is it so secretive? I mean, once
you apply to go through these security clearances, is there
something that DHS found that is objectionable or it scares me
to think or is that application just gathering dust somewhere
and nobody is doing anything to move that clearance ahead?
Mr. Allen. Yes, Congressman. It does bother me greatly
because the criteria used by the various operating components
except for the Transportation Security Administration which has
a very long list of potential problems in law, the component-
specific criteria for a fitness examination are vague. They are
not really understandable and I thought Mr. Berteau just
outlined perfectly that the opaqueness of the process leaves
contractors--if you are a large-scale integrator, you can
absorb maybe time and keep people waiting to go on to the
contract. But for small firms, as was illustrated by one of our
witnesses, you can't do that.
You have to make this finding very quickly and if you do
the agency check, what they call the National agency check,
other checks on the individual and they want to put you on a
contract, a resume has been submitted, it should be pretty
quickly arrived at. You shouldn't have to wait days and weeks.
Some people just for fitness now wait 3 and 4 months and rarely
is there a denial but you have to wait for 3 or 4 months for
this to occur.
Mr. Correa. So, Mr. Berteau, just following up. You came up
with three points. This is not a trade-off primarily. No. 1, it
is not a trade-off being expedient and taking short cuts here.
Data analytics and access to information is there. So, why
can't we get through this system and move ahead? Again, are
these applications just gathering dust or somebody is actually
moving ahead, or are we working with old computers that don't
have access to these data analytics to move effectively forward
on these applications?
Mr. Allen. In my view, living with a tradition and a
culture, many of these components go back decades, Customs goes
back to the beginning of our country. But there is a lot of
history and culture and a way of separateness.
When I worked for Secretary Chertoff, his top priority was
keep terrorists out of the country, keep dangerous materials
out of the country and third, integrate the Department.
Mr. Correa. Go ahead, Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Correa, I think two of the dynamics that
are working here, No. 1 is that the problem is not just for
contractors; this problem also extends to Government career
civilians that you are trying bring in or to uniformed
personnel. It is the same set of systems and criteria that
often apply. In cases you will even find some of the
reciprocity challenges inside DHS apply to career civilian
personnel as well as to Government contractors.
We hire contractors for many, many reasons, and one of the
reasons that we like to use contractors is because of the
flexibility that contracting provides you. Once you have got a
Government career civil servant, that is the job they are in.
With contractors, you at least theoretically have the ability
to move to where the need is and to be able to go back and
forth. The Department is actually working against its own
interest by making it more difficult to do that with the
contractors that they have in place.
Mr. Correa. So, my question is why, I mean----
Mr. Berteau. I don't think anybody actually wakes up with
the intent----
Mr. Correa. Mr. Allen kind-of alluded to that which is the
integration issue, but why? Everybody has the best intentions
but----
Mr. Berteau. DHS alone can't fix this, of course.
Mr. Correa. So, do we need to legislate a law that says you
guys got to integrate all of this? You got to talk to each
other?
Mr. LaBonte. If I could add, Congressman. We talk about
security at DHS as though it is a monolithic Department that
handles the security but it is certainly not. As Mr. Allen
alluded, there are security offices in each component. So, the
component security offices have to submit their information to
an enterprise security office that uses investigations that
originate outside of the agency, typically OPM or other
sources.
That all initiates when a contractor sends it to a program
manager who send it to a COR who then sends it to a local
security officer and there are a lot of people in the chain. I
don't think it even sits to gain dust because someone is not
doing their job but there are just a lot of hand-offs where the
paper can be dropped.
Mr. Berteau. There are a bunch of systems that are
antiquated. Case management alone which is something that there
is good technology now to manage cases; this is what companies
that depend on customers do all the time. Things get lost.
Documents get lost. We have a number of companies that
submitted examples to me where multiple forms sent in the same
FedEx package signed for by the same person, they can find some
of those forms but they can't find others of those forms.
We have had examples where--well, your example that you had
of the citizenship application. I have got half the form here
but I don't have the other half of the form.
These are the kinds of things that I think that
individuals--I don't want to subscribe bad intent to anybody
because I don't think anybody is intending to screw this up,
but when you are a bureaucrat and you are faced with I can't
find the damn forms, you probably are not going to say the most
important thing for me to do today is to call the person whose
form I lost and tell him I lost the form. You are going to hope
it turns up, right? Maybe it will and maybe it won't.
Mr. Allen indicated I think how many months, Charlie, for
your last periodic investigation?
Mr. Allen. For the last one conducted by Defense Security
Service, 35 months. Although I continue to operate at Top
Secret SCI level, I didn't have the validation until December
14, 2017.
Mr. Berteau. Mine was 4 years. They lost the electronic
forms twice. Now, I thought the whole point of an electronic
form is you won't lose it.
Mr. Correa. Right.
Mr. Berteau. So, I had to go back and refill it out on e-
QIP, start all over again and then, of course, there are a lot
of outstanding things in the process that can be improved. You
have to have somebody who has both the incentive, the
motivation, and the authority to force those improvements to
come into play.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chair, I yield.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from California.
The Chair now recognizes the good gentleman from Kansas,
Mr. Estes.
Mr. Estes. Good. That was my whole goal was to make sure
that I addressed the issue and the third time was the charm for
me, right? I apologize for that.
The issue as we look at it, how to be more efficient and
effective in getting things done. Obviously, through DHS, there
are lots of agencies that cut across and have somewhat related
but different missions. As we are sitting here today, we are
thinking that there is a lot more related in terms of how we
can make that more efficient.
But I just wanted to talk, maybe just ask some questions.
There are a lot of things we have talked about as problems but
maybe starting with Mr. Allen, I mean, could we boil this down
to two or three top recommendations that we would make that we
would change differently, whether it is integrated systems,
whether it is rules and regulations, whether it is accepting
clearances that have already been done or fitness
determinations that have already been done from other agencies.
Mr. Allen. Yes. If the Department can't make the decisions,
then I think legislation will be required. There is really no
reason though, this decision could be made strikes me by the
Secretary, that if a contractor and we have thousands of them
who have some level of clearances, if they have a Secret or Top
Secret clearance, they do not need a separate fitness. That is
No. 1. You don't need a separate fitness report.
There has got to be uniformity across the Department. When
Elaine Duke was out of the Government in 2015, she talked about
this and she was under secretary for management while I worked
with Ms. Duke and she was terrific on this. She talked about
consistent standards. Why can't that be done it seems to me
within the Department?
Reciprocity across the component, if you are a contractor,
you are approved and you are fit to work for CBP, that is good
enough for ICE. You can also work on a contract at ICE. Strikes
me that these are the kinds of decisions--those are three--that
could be done.
Reciprocity, the intelligence community, to be fair, we
shouldn't be too harsh on DHS which I admire in many ways. It
took a long time to get reciprocity across the intelligence
agencies and we still don't have it totally. I remember when I
tried to get an NSA officer who has all the clearances in the
world, come down to work on a CIA contract that I was managing,
I had to move heaven and earth just to get that NSA officer
quickly under my management.
We have come a long way in the last 15 years. I submit that
DHS could come a long way with strong decision making by the
leaders of the Department.
Mr. Pearl. In terms of recommendations, obviously, we all
focused on similar in our written testimony, but I would point
out two things that may not require legislation. It is an
understanding, first of all and I don't want to be here to
defend DHS, but in the conversations that we have had, there is
a difference between the security clearance process and a
suitability and fitness process.
You are looking at character. You are looking at nature of
conduct, maybe a Snowden, I don't know. Some of the Top Secret,
some of the security clearances don't require an in-person
interview. You do your investigations around that. You don't
see the person.
A lot of folks from DHS in terms of the person-to-person
conduct that this agency has different from intelligence
community and different from in some ways the National
security. That should and could play--I am not here to defend
it but it exists and not just at DHS. The fitness and
suitability standards are across.
But I would look at two things. One is the nature of
communication. Even if you have a process that is broken, even
if you have a process where things are going on for a long
time, at least communicate with the contractor. At least along
the time line, stay in touch, check in, give them that
information.
You don't have to give what the background that they do not
part their hair. There is a thing about maybe credit checks or
how behavior at home, whatever it might be. That is No. 1,
communication.
No. 2, I would talk about the whole nature of
standardization, that there has to be a reason, why do you need
to ask that? When we have asked the USM over the years, the
last one being Russell Deyo, why does there need to be these
various questions that are added between a CBP officer and an
ICE officer. They couldn't really give us that answer. So, the
nature of a standardization of a sense of continuity and
communication I think are two of the ones that don't need a lot
of legislative action.
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Chairman, may I extend, I don't know if
you have got another question but----
Mr. Perry. Go ahead. Without objection, go ahead.
Mr. Berteau. I think the one single thing that is most
important here is in fact reporting on the information. You
have got 20-plus entities inside DHS than can deny reciprocity
to somebody who is either suitable or has a clearance somewhere
else. You really ought to require every one of those components
to report on a regular basis how many reciprocity requests they
get. How many did they approve, how long did it take?
For those that they denied, what is the general category of
denial? You don't have to give out personal information because
I go back to something that I think Mr. Allen alluded to, if
you are not good enough for one part, what makes it OK that you
are still good enough for the other part? Somebody ought to
actually answer that question, right?
I actually think if you take the heads of those components
and you require them to submit that data to you in writing
however periodically you want to get it, once a year, every 6
months or whatever, by the second time around they are going to
want to show something better than the set of data that was in
the first time around.
That is the single most important thing I think you could
do to draw attention to this issue and preventing anybody from
hiding behind, I just lost it and I do not want to go look for
it.
Mr. Estes. Thank you. I have exceeded my time and I
appreciate your answers and help us with that. So, I yield
back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Kansas and
now turns to Mr. Higgins from Louisiana.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us today. I have
three questions on three areas I would like address. I will get
to them quickly.
No. 1, we have discussed that the lack of coordinated
effort essentially within the DHS and its component agencies
both for fitness determinations which is for contractors and
for suitability determinations for employees and that the
overriding message we are receiving today and my own research
confirms this, is the redundancy within the system that we have
referred to.
So, I ask you gentlemen because no one has mentioned, you
are all, I am quite sure, familiar with the Department of
Homeland Security Authorization Act of 2017, that was passed
last year, in July of last year, July 20 of last year, this
body passed the Department of Homeland Security Authorization
Act, 386 to 41.
The first paragraph of the summary of that bill, the bill
amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, that as an agency, it
was never authorized, which meant it was spread across eight or
nine committees for oversight. Now, how can we have an
organized effort within a massive organization of this Nation
with many components without centralized command and control?
Does that not begin with this body's responsibility to
authorize that Department?
So, I bring you to this first paragraph, the bill amends
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish in the
Department of Homeland Security a headquarters which shall
among other things establish an overall strategy to
successfully further the mission of DHS and to ensure that DHS
successfully meets operational and management performance
objectives.
I would say this entire subcommittee hearing has pointed
out the fact that DHS has not successfully met operational and
management performance objectives, and yet the bill that was
passed by this body through this committee as a whole in the
summer of 2017 languishes in the Senate. So, I would hope that
my Senate colleagues are listening and I hope that your
organizations are communicating with our colleagues across the
way.
Regarding redundancy, I completely concur and I will just
ask you gentlemen, do you believe that the full authorization
of the Homeland Security in all of its components, the agency,
that the full authorization passed through the Senate, signed
by the President, would this help us address some of these lack
of controlled efforts as a centralized effort within an agency?
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Yes, I would just like--yes, thank you,
Congressman for the questions. On the whole problem of a number
of committees and subcommittee to which DHS has to report, it
is 88 or so or 90, that is--105, we struggled under Secretary
Chertoff and I know Governor Ridge did before I came to the
Department, we struggled and we found ourselves meeting with
many subcommittees across the Senate and the House of
Representatives in ways that did not further.
But, every--until we have a more centralized command and
control and oversight of the Congress, we want that oversight
and we want an intense oversight. That is the reason we
established the Homeland Security Committee.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for that answer.
Let me allow Mr. Pearl, yes or no, sir?
Mr. Pearl. Well, this subcommittee is not just the
oversight and that is the I think the nature of the vision, it
is oversight and management efficiency. Now, does that exist?
Do you colleagues hear that in the House? Was it completely
addressed in the authorization act? It was not.
The nature of what industry which has so many detailees and
so many contractors, that relationship between industry and
Government, much different, the relationship is different, has
not been fully addressed in the way that we can.
Yes. My answer to you----
Mr. Higgins. Would you not agree though that authorization
is the first step toward centralized command and control?
Mr. Pearl. It absolutely, but nothing that we have said
here today Mr. Higgins would in fact impede and be impeded by
the passage of an authorization bill, though it is needed. What
we are talking about are standards and procedures that are cut
across the entire Federal Government space and without the
calcification that DHS has as an----
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Allen referred to the culture, but the
primary problem here we are discussing today is redundancy in
its application toward fitness determination or suitability.
Mr. Berteau, yes or no?
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Higgins, I would. I would note that it
took the Department of Defense 39 years between the passage of
the National Security Act of 1947 and the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986 to consolidate the
authority, direction and control of the Department in the hand
of the Secretary of Defense.
I would hope that it does not take the Department of
Homeland Security that long. I think this authorization bill
makes some steps in the right direction there.
Mr. Higgins. Well stated, sir. Your mic was on. Mr.
LaBonte.
Mr. LaBonte. Yes. You know, I do not know if it solves the
problem, but I think centralizing through the authorization act
would only help. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. With your
indulgence and without further objection I would like to go for
a second round if you are interested in sticking around, fine.
If you are not, so, I am going to take another 5 minutes here.
Let me start out with Mr. LaBonte, first of all, are you of
the family that does all that race car driving in NASCAR?
Mr. LaBonte. I am still trying to find the connection.
Mr. Perry. All right, all right, because some people
complain about that dirty driving. No, that is not fair.
So, for people that might not be familiar that might be
watching this thing, what the heck is going on at DHS? Just as
an employer, right, you have some contracts, walk me through
the process of you think--you have got a contract and you are
trying to hire somebody and you are waiting for them to get
their fitness adjudication. You got a person, you submit for
that.
Where does that person go? What are you doing? How long is
it taking? How much is it costing you which is essentially
costing us because you, I am sure, planned for that in the
contract price when you bid. I would just like to know maybe
your--how do you even calculate that at this bid?
Mr. LaBonte. Yes. We figured out that on average we have
taken our contracts as we bid them and they are often 3-year,
4-year, 5-year contracts, and instead of bidding at full staff
at the beginning, we actually assume it is going to take at
least 6 months to get the full staffing levels because we never
are able to ramp up through the fitness process.
To walk you through the process, there are a couple of
different pieces, but to simplify, we will make an offer to a
potential employee. We will recruit them, we will spend the
money on a recruiter. We will spend the money on advertising.
We will find them. We will spend time and overhead interviewing
this people, trying to find out if they are the right person
for the job. We will bring them in and screen them with a
number of different sources.
We like the person, we make them an offer, and it is
contingent on them receiving a positive fitness determination
from the Government. They are then asked to fill out the e-Quip
form, that I think you probably are all familiar with,
outlining their background. We review that and it goes into our
COR, on our contract.
The COR looks at it, but I will be honest, the COR is not
trained generally speaking in personnel security issues. That
is not really their job. So they end up just sort-of forwarding
the information into the local security office for the
component. It may sit there for a very long time. Sometimes it
does, sometimes it doesn't. It then gets forward to PST. PST
will either initiate investigation or try to grab an
investigation that has been done recently and make their
evaluation.
All of this process takes months. We lose about 1 of every
3 candidates waiting on the fitness process.
Mr. Perry. What are they doing while they are waiting? What
are they doing?
Mr. LaBonte. So, we have not employed them.
Mr. Perry. You are not paying them?
Mr. LaBonte. I can't. I can't hire them. No, I can't.
Because if I hire them, I can't bill them on the contract so
that they would have to sit on overhead, that would put my----
Mr. Perry. So, they have got a job, but they don't have any
pay and they do not know when they are going to start the job.
So, just like everybody else they have bills to pay, lives to
live, and they move on.
Mr. LaBonte. Not only that. So, that is all true, and not
only that, but they ask us for information on the process----
Mr. Perry. And you can't.
Mr. LaBonte [continuing]. And I can't tell them anything.
Mr. Perry. Because you do not get it.
Mr. LaBonte. I am not allowed to get it. If I call DHS and
say, ``I have got an employee who has been in fitness for 6
months and I need some information.'' They will say, ``We will
not speak to you. Talk to your COR.''
Mr. Perry. All right, that will be for Round 3 for me. So,
let me get----
Mr. LaBonte. Sorry. You get me a little----
Mr. Perry. Yes, right. No, me too. But I just want--so, let
me ask you this, without--because I think Mr. Higgins,
Representative Higgins touched on a very important part which
is the authorization of this agency, which is fraught with its
own perils and of course it sits in the Senate.
But, let me ask you this, we have a Secretary and while it
may have taken DOD decades to bring all those forces together,
it seems to me and I guess my question to you folks, you are
smart people, is there any reason in the absence of an
authorization, right, as it sits in the Senate and waits for a
Presidential signature assuming it gets past the Senate, is
there any reason that the Secretary can't just wave her wand so
to speak and make it so?
Mr. LaBonte. I think that is partially a question for the
Secretary. From my perspective, DOD does this pretty well and
they have taken a long time to get there, but they figured out
how to do it. They figured out how to engage industry and work
back and forth.
Mr. Perry. So, what I am reluctant to do as a legislator
personally and I can't speak for anybody else on the dais here,
but it is to legislate this when it seems to me this is a
management/leadership function. We have a Secretary look at
these problems.
OK. You are using suitability and fitness when it seems to
me for the most part, security clearance fixes that.
Contractors operating, the COR is involved in this process,
probably should not be. I do not see any reason for them to be,
but maybe I am missing something. So, move the contracting
representative at the end to manage the project and let these
other folks at OPM and the people managing the individual
agency at DHS decide who they want to hire based on whatever
criteria, and cut half this overhead and redundancy out and
then, by the way, report on the progress to people that call.
This guy is a loser. We are not taking him. This lady is
great. So, you can expect her to be approved in 3 weeks or a
month. Like, that seems like to me something a Secretary can do
and so, I am asking you. Is there any reason that you know of
that the Secretary can't do what I just described?
Mr. LaBonte. So, I don't know of any reason. But I sat
across from PSD and I asked a question that was similar to that
of the director of personnel security. I said, ``Why can't you
utilize the folks who are already deputized by the DOD to help
you get this clearance done?''
The answer was ``We do not have a statutory way to engage
folks.'' I do not know. I am not lawyer.
Mr. Perry. Right, but that is a question for us to ask.
Mr. Allen. I think that is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I
do believe, for example, the Secretary of Homeland Security
certainly has a power to further empower and authorize the
chief security officer of the Department to centralize and
organize and structure and give direction so that we are not
broken up into little parcels of security as we are today.
Mr. Perry. Correction. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you. I just wanted to follow up on the
Chairman's line of questioning which is Secretary of DHS, does
the Secretary have a magic wand or do we need legislation to
move this forward? As I look at all of you here, you are going
to give me an answer, but I guess the person we have got to ask
is the Secretary of DHS. What is it exactly that you need to
implement these policies of efficiency?
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Correa, from my perspective, there are no
statutory or for that matter, regulatory impediments to the
Secretary undertaking to do that. But I think it is important
to recognize that many aspects of this problem are not under
the Department of Homeland Security's control.
If you look at and I think the fitness determinations are
largely entirely under their control unless they determine that
there is a point at which they have to hand off part of the
background investigation to the Office of Personnel Management
National Background Investigation Bureau to undertake
additional inquiries in that regard. At that point, it goes
into the hopper with all the rest of the Federal Government.
So, it is now competing for limited resources with a host of
other activities.
Mr. Correa. So, I guess, it is only something that might
happen.
Mr. Berteau. Right.
Mr. Correa. So, I guess the question is what percentage of
those actually get to be handed off and which----
Mr. Berteau. Well, and that is part of my point of where I
come back to. I think the single most important thing you can
do is to both reinforce the positive behavior from the
Secretary and expose those places where maybe there is a little
foot-dragging going on by requiring regular updates from them
over all of the details and the data that come out of that, how
many have been handed off to NBIB for further investigation,
what is the status of those, so that you actually I think
through your oversight can reinforce the positive things that
the Secretary can do, help steer the opportunities toward those
positive things and perhaps create a little disincentive for
ignoring the problem.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Allen, go ahead.
Mr. Pearl. I would just add, the context of measurements
and data, we don't have it. The companies do not have it in
terms of why decisions are made or how long, what are the
delaying challenges. You don't have it and I think that--and
the Secretary does not have it either because each of the
components--forget about everybody else.
The head of the components will argue and have argued to
us, and in your AIR that you were involved in, why they need to
be different, why TSA needs to be different from CBP, from ICE,
from Secret Service, et cetera. We have other character issues
and personal issues. What we need--I am glad that you have a
security clearance. That is great. You need it before we can
even go to fitness. But the fact is that we have other aspects
because of the interaction with the public or whatever excuses
they give.
I think that if you can get the kind of measurements, the
kind of reporting back between you and DHS, that would go a
long way to encouraging why a company and Mr. LaBonte's
examples are not by themselves, are not a silo. They exist
throughout the entire contracting community that are trying to
do business to the best of their ability with DHS.
Mr. Allen. I think, Mr. Correa, I think that one thing we
have to do is--or that you will have to do is to repeal the TSA
standards which are in law because if you are going to
encourage reciprocity across all of it, it should be a common
standard and there should be common reciprocity. As long as it
stands out by itself, it really is an impediment.
Mr. Correa. Yes.
Mr. LaBonte. If I may add, Mr. Congressman.
You asked the question is there a reason the Secretary
can't wave a wand and change it, the question was asked. I will
say that in the last 10 years that I have been doing this, this
process has gotten progressively worse and it has also changed.
It has changed I think absent those authorizing bills and
whatnot over time. So, if it could get worse over time, it
would seem like it could get better as well with management
action inside the organization.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say using the
oversight of this committee, I think we do have to have DHS
come in here and testify and try to figure out should we need a
better wand, the Secretary need a better wand or do we come up
with some good legislative solutions here, but, more
importantly, the on-going oversight to make sure that things
move in the right direction.
Mr. LaBonte, you were saying things got worse. Well, let's
say we get them--we get better. Again, no trade-offs, it is
just becoming more efficient for the sake of our National
security.
I yield, sir.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman from California.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaBonte, how large is your----
Mr. LaBonte. About 150 people, sir.
Mr. Higgins. One hundred fifty people. Are they all
contracted? What percentage of them is contracted before with
DHS, have been through fitness determination, suitability?
Mr. LaBonte. We are about 85 percent Homeland Security,
sir.
Mr. Higgins. OK. So, if you are going through the vetting
process for a new contract, those employees have to get vetted
completely all over again in the same manner?
Mr. LaBonte. Yes, sir. In fact, if employees who are
sitting at a desk at one of DHS's facilities change contracts,
without a new contract, without a real change, if they move, we
have got an office where we have four contracts and the people
sit in the same room. They collaborate together daily. If they
end up changing from one contract to the other, they are
required to go through fitness again.
Mr. Higgins. You gentlemen today have been describing the
colossal inefficiency of the Federal Government and it devours
of people's treasure and we are duty-bound and sworn by oath to
address it and fix it. I will tell you, there is a great deal
of IQ sitting at that table and you have all shared very
similar testimonies this day. They seem to be focused on
inconsistency and redundancy.
I turn to Mr. Allen's written testimony. He stated,
``Fitness standards across DHS components precluding
reciprocity of favorable suitability assessments when a
contractor joins a contract with a different DHS component,''
and you have experienced this, Mr. LaBonte?
Mr. LaBonte. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Redundancy is tied into the inconsistency. So,
it seems to me that this is an Executive fix and I can't
understand--I recognize the various components and it seems to
tie into what Mr. Allen has stated regarding culture, but I
refer to my colleague's question and I just like to repeat it.
Is there any reason that you gentlemen can see that within the
authority and the infrastructure of the Executive that this
could not be addressed at Secretary level?
Mr. Allen. My view, Mr. Higgins, is that a great deal of
this could be addressed by Executive decision by the leadership
of DHS, working with Tom Bossert over at the White House, a lot
could be done to improve this significantly and right away.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Pearl.
Mr. Pearl. Well, I don't want to wipe away the fitness
standards, but we want them standardized. We want to understand
a sense of consistency, a couple of examples. Drugs is one
example.
Some agencies don't care. Some agencies may say within the
last 3 years, within the last 10 years, that is not necessarily
just a security clearance uniform approach. So, different
components approach that question. They approach bad debt
differently. Some don't even allow the asking of the question.
Some set it at 3,000 or 5,000 or 10,000.
All they have to do is justify it to the Secretary. They
have to in essence say ``This is why we have found that when
you are a Border Patrol agent we need more----''
Mr. Higgins. But if there is a comprehensive effort and
study within the Executive, then, these things could be
addressed and standardized.
Mr. Pearl. Absolutely. That is all that we have really been
asking for. We have been asking for that.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Here is why I think leadership comes into
play. In the end, this process of making a determination of
whether somebody is suitable, whether somebody is fit, whether
somebody earns the trust of the Government to have a clearance
is a judgment call.
Mr. Higgins. Right.
Mr. Berteau, if you could automate this, if you could just
make it a checklist and automate it, it would be very easy to
do that.
In the end, judgment implies some level of acceptance of
risk, because you are not going to be right 100.0 percent at a
time. So, I think where the leadership comes into play is not
only giving the guidance, reporting the data, but giving the
coverage that says it is OK to use judgment in a way that does
not--you minimize risk by taking forever to do it. If you never
say yes, then, you are never in trouble for having said yes to
the wrong person.
The Secretary and the officials underneath the Secretary
need to provide the coverage that says it is OK to make a
decision. What you see all too often is, maybe there is
something suspicious out here. Well, maybe if we sit on it a
while, the guy will quit and he will withdraw his name and you
don't need to finish that.
Mr. Higgins. Excellent point.
Mr. Berteau. Let him exercise that risk in a way because
ultimately it is where is the Government putting its trust.
That is an important decision, but it is not one that should
take forever.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. LaBonte, close us out here, sir.
Mr. LaBonte. I would completely agree. I think there is a
lot that can be done within the management of the organization.
I mentioned that we can't communicate with DHS about our
employee status. That has not always been the case. That
changed in 2016 and as best as we can tell, it was just an
internal decision to make a change.
So, if they could have changed it to be more restrictive in
communication, they can change it to be more transparent with
the employers. There is a lot that could be done.
Mr. Higgins. Gentlemen, this has been a very enlightening
testimony. We very much appreciate your participation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Just a couple of final questions
before we close up here, I am just trying to determine because
I feel like I am missing something. We got a big agency that
wants to do the right thing. We got great people there, but
somehow, the wrong thing seems to happen more in this case than
the right thing.
What is the reason for the secrecy? Why can't they talk to
you about where your proposed employee/contractor is in the
pipe? Is there some reason we do not know? Is there something
that you know? Is there some National security thing that we
haven't considered? What is happening here?
Mr. Allen. It gets back, Mr. Chairman, to privacy. They do
not like to--if there is derogatory information and they are
evaluating and adjudicating whether the person is fit or not, I
think attorneys and others have made it, inability to
communicate well with the----
Mr. Perry. But other agencies do not have the same problem,
do they?
Mr. Allen. Yes, they do.
Mr. Perry. They do.
Mr. Allen. The Central Intelligence Agency is very----
Mr. Perry. How about DOD?
Mr. Allen [continuing]. Is very good in seeing----
Mr. Perry. There are a lot of contractors in DOD. How about
DOD?
Mr. Allen. They communicate. They have points of contact.
Mr. Perry. So, if somebody can do it, then, everybody can
do it. You got to want to do it though. You have to have a
system in place.
Mr. Allen. You got to want to do it. You got to have and
they have got to have the authority to say ``Things are on
track. Please hold on and we will give you the security
clearance.''
Mr. Pearl. Let me just say I think that that is why the
standardization is important because if you do not know what
the rules are, you make up your own rules.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
Mr. Pearl. Because there is a culture of risk aversion
particularly at DHS and whether it is the intel community or
DOD, but there is right now that culture of risk aversion, and
if I am not given the standards and the rules by which I
communicate, I am going to avoid it entirely.
I am afraid that if I don't give the right information out,
I tell the contractor personal identifiable information about a
particular person which I am really not allowed to give and the
general counsel's office says----
Mr. Perry. Wait a minute. Doesn't the contractor who has
hired so-and-so have some reasonable expectation to know about
the employer or the employee that he just hired that filled out
the SF-86?
Mr. Pearl. Absolutely. Yes.
Mr. Perry. So, what information is the Government going to
give him that he does not already know unless the person, the
prospective employee lied on the form, right? So, you could
just say, ``Look. The form doesn't match up. It doesn't comport
with reality.'' Is that enough information for you? I think if
we get that, we can move on, right?
OK. Let me ask you something else here. I understand you
want to keep the suitability fitness thing. I am not sure
because I don't know of other agencies that do that.
But, Mr. Allen, you have mentioned the TSA minimum standard
that that is in statute and that might be a hindrance to----
Mr. Allen. I think it is because it puts such excruciating
detail for TSA standards that it does inhibit I think other
components from common standards----
Mr. Perry. But is there anything--do any of the other
agencies such as the Secret Service or immigration, ICE, or--do
any of the other agencies have a lesser standard than that?
Mr. Allen. No. I would say not.
Mr. Perry. There could be a minimum standard at a minimum,
right?
Mr. Allen. I think there should be common standards and I
think they can be agreed upon with the proper leadership of
DHS.
Mr. Perry. It seems to me you could use the security
clearance requirement plus, right, for suitability because I
agree with you. If you are not conducting an interview, you
might miss something, so, security clearance, plus 10 questions
or this criteria and then move on.
Mr. Allen. It should be very efficient and very quick.
Mr. Perry. All right. I think we beat this horse--I think
it is dead, but anyhow.
Mr. Berteau. No. It is nowhere near dead.
Mr. Perry. Well, I guess the beating will continue from
here. I think me and the fine folks on the committee and the
wonderful staff here will try and figure out what the way
forward is here and with your input as well.
Did you have something----
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman, if you indulge me again for just
one question left, very quickly. We are talking about non-
legislative recommendations. We touched upon legislative
recommendations in terms of the TSA minimum. Any other thoughts
on legislative recommendations?
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Correa, I think one thing that is critical
here, we are operating right now under a continuing resolution
inside the Executive branch. That continuing resolution goes on
until March 23.
Presumably, eventually, the appropriators are going to
write the appropriations that will do this. I would urge this
committee to pay close attention to make sure that the
resources necessary to execute this mission and function inside
DHS are included in those appropriations. We will be glad to
help you pay attention to those and weigh in where appropriate
on there.
Mr. Higgins. Sir, you mentioned having sufficient
resources. If we streamline this thing and introduce
efficiencies, won't we devour less of the people's treasure and
do a better job?
Mr. Berteau. I think that is absolutely the case.
Mr. Allen. Absolutely.
Mr. Berteau. But I do not think we will streamline it by
March 24. I think we are going to----
Mr. Higgins. No. I agree completely that we have to fix
what is broken within this body in appropriation process, the
budgeting process, no doubt. But if we can develop standards
and processes within the DHS and its various components that
are reflective of best standards in private industry and
efficient management, would the entire Department of Homeland
Security not run more efficiently?
Mr. Berteau. It would entirely cost you less. That false
dichotomy that I laid out between speed and security, it is
also a false dichotomy between speed and cost.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the witnesses for their really
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. Members
may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we
will ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will
remain open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]