[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 115-69]

SENIOR LEADER MISCONDUCT: PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

__________

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

HEARING HELD

FEBRUARY 7, 2018

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

__________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

28-972 WASHINGTON : 2019

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado, Chairman

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio, Vice Chair ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DON BACON, Nebraska RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
Dan Sennott, Professional Staff Member
Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member
Danielle Steitz, Clerk

C O N T E N T S

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Page

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Coffman, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel............................. 1
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel..................... 2

WITNESSES

Fine, Glenn A., Principal Deputy Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 4
Harris, Lt Gen Stayce D., USAF, Inspector General of the Air
Force, United States Air Force................................. 8
McConville, GEN James C., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
United States Army............................................. 34
Moran, ADM William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
United States Navy............................................. 35
Ottignon, BGen David A., USMC, Inspector General of the Marine
Corps, United States Marine Corps.............................. 9
Quantock, LTG David E., USA, Inspector General of the Army,
United States Army............................................. 6
Shelanski, VADM Herman, USN, Naval Inspector General, United
States Navy.................................................... 7
Walters, Gen Glenn M., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps, United States Marine Corps.............................. 36
Wilson, Gen Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, United States Air Force................................. 36

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Coffman, Hon. Mike........................................... 57
Fine, Glenn A................................................ 59
Harris, Lt Gen Stayce D...................................... 97
McConville, GEN James C...................................... 107
Moran, ADM William F......................................... 113
Ottignon, BGen David A....................................... 103
Quantock, LTG David E........................................ 87
Shelanski, VADM Herman....................................... 92
Walters, Gen Glenn M......................................... 125
Wilson, Gen Stephen W........................................ 118

Documents Submitted for the Record:

Chart displayed by Ms. Speier................................ 133

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

Ms. McSally.................................................. 140
Ms. Speier................................................... 137

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Ms. Speier................................................... 145
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 148

SENIOR LEADER MISCONDUCT: PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 7, 2018.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Coffman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE COFFMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

Mr. Coffman. This subcommittee hearing is called to order.
I want to welcome everyone to this morning's Military
Personnel Subcommittee hearing. The purpose of today's hearing
is to receive testimony from the Department of Defense and the
services regarding efforts they have taken to investigate and
hold senior leaders accountable for misconduct and to
understand what programs and policies are in place to prevent
misconduct.
Our military enjoys the highest confidence rating by far of
any institution in American society. This well-deserved
reputation has been earned through the service and sacrifice of
millions of brave men and women. One by-product of this
reputation is that the military and its leaders are held to a
much higher standard than almost any other institution, and I
know that you wouldn't have it any other way.
Consequently, the misconduct of a few can greatly impact
the military's hard-earned reputation. When the misconduct
involves flag or general officers, the negative effects are
even greater. These incidents of senior leader misconduct, even
though relatively rare, not only hurt the victims involved, but
can have a lasting impact on the readiness of the unit in which
the senior leader has served.
While one incident of senior leader misconduct is too many,
it is important to acknowledge that the vast majority of senior
leaders serve with distinction. It is also important to
acknowledge that some of the acts of misconduct that the
military investigates and punishes would not be investigated,
much less punished, in the civilian world. Nonetheless,
military leadership must continue to ensure that all senior
leaders uphold the highest standards of ethical conduct, and
when senior leaders fall short, they must be held appropriately
accountable.
We will hear from two panels today. The first panel
consists of the Department of Defense and services' inspectors
general. They will discuss the reporting and investigation of
senior leader misconduct, in addition to the types of cases
they investigate.
For the second panel, we are honored to have the Vice
Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. They will discuss
what happens to those IG [inspector general] investigations, if
they are substantiated, how they hold individuals accountable,
and they will provide an overview of their prevention programs.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
ethics and mentorship programs in place to prevent misconduct.
I am also interested to hear how the services investigate
misconduct allegations and hold wrongdoers accountable.
Additionally, I would like to know what trends had developed
with regard to the types of issues that are being reported and
investigated. Finally, I look forward to hearing what
additional actions can be taken to further reduce incidents of
senior leader misconduct.
I would like to make two other administrative points.
First, it is important to note that the Department of Defense's
common definition of senior official includes an officer in the
grade of O-7 and above, including officers who have been
selected for promotion to O-7, or civilian member of the Senior
Executive Service. For the purposes of today's hearing and
consistent with the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, the
witnesses have been asked to focus on misconduct by senior
military officers in the rank of O-7 select and above.
I would also like to remind the members that the witnesses
today may not be able to answer certain questions regarding
specific cases if the answer would compromise an ongoing
investigation or would give rise to an accusation that the
military has prejudged the outcome of a pending investigation.
Before I introduce our first panel, let me offer the
ranking member, Ms. Speier, an opportunity to make her opening
remarks.
Ms. Speier.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffman can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today and for your service to
our country. You know, one of the core tenets of the armed
services and of our country is that no one is above the law.
From the most recent recruit to the most senior officer, all
service members are subject to the same UCMJ [Uniform Code of
Military Justice] laws and the same ethical code of conduct.
But there is a phrase in the military that goes like this,
``Different spanks for different ranks.'' And as Don
Christensen, the former general counsel for the Air Force said,
and I quote, ``An everyday troop is court-martialed for what a
general officer is given a slap on the wrist.''
So it is with great sorrow and anger that I have read
countless reports of misconduct among senior leaders, including
general officers and admirals. This is borne out by the data.
Buried on page 66 of an 85-page DOD [Department of Defense]
Inspector General [IG] report on, quote, ``Top DOD Management
Challenges,'' unquote, is a finding of a 13 percent increase in
complaints alleging misconduct by senior officials from fiscal
year 2015 to fiscal year 2017, from 710 to 803. An increase in
substantiated rate increase from 26 percent to 37 percent. The
most common allegations involved personal misconduct including
improper relationships, improper personnel actions, misuse of
governmental resources, and travel violations.
In my time on this committee, I have heard over and over
the importance of the chain of command and how it leads to
better justice outcomes, but many senior leaders who should be
the essential core of the chain of command are not being held
to the same standard as the rank and file. This corrupts
fairness, justice, and morale.
To illustrate the severity of this problem, I want to
highlight five cases of senior leader misconduct from just the
last few years. As you will see, these senior leaders committed
serious crimes and rule violations, yet received only light
administrative, not judicial, punishment. Most got no public
scrutiny until journalists inquired about their cases.
Army Major General John Custer had an inappropriate
relationship with a woman, had his staff buy her sexy clothes,
and lied to investigators about it. Lucky for him, General
Martin Dempsey, then Custer's commander, removed, and I am
underscoring this, removed the substantiated account of an
inappropriate relationship from Custer's record. How do you do
that? So the review board could only consider lesser charges.
Custer retired at a rank and kept his pension. So he retired at
rank and kept his pension. The public only knows about this
incident because a whistleblower told USA Today.
Second, Air Force General Arthur Lichte was alleged to have
coerced sex from a subordinate in 2007 and 2009. His victim
believes she had to reciprocate the general's advances due to
his rank and position. Lichte was reprimanded and demoted to
major general, but not for command rape but for a, quote,
``inappropriate sexual relationship.''
Army Major General Ralph Baker assaulted a woman at an off-
base event. For this he received a letter of reprimand and
retired as a brigadier general. The public learned about this 9
months after it happened following a FOIA [Freedom of
Information Act] request.
Army Major General David Haight's exploits earned him the
nickname ``swinging general.'' He had an 11-year affair and
regularly swapped sexual partners, which made him a foreign
intelligence threat and target. As punishment, Haight was
reprimanded and retired as a lieutenant colonel.
But make no mistake, not all misconduct is sexual. At West
Point, the man in charge of teaching future leaders ethics,
Superintendent Lieutenant General David Huntoon, Jr., made his
staff work at private charity dinners, give free driving
lessons, and feed a friend's cat. Huntoon received a reprimand
and retired at rank. The IG report was kept secret for more
than a year and only released via FOIA as Huntoon neared
retirement.
Colleagues, these are just 5 stories out of an estimated
500 since 2013. They don't even include criminal misconduct of
the type we have seen in the Fat Leonard case in which 330 Navy
personnel, including 60 current and retired admirals, are under
investigation for accepting bribes and gifts. And these aren't
just ordinary bribes and gifts. Some of them included an
$18,000 dinner or a $50,000 stay in a swank hotel. Sometimes
these bribes and gifts were exchanged for revealing classified
information. But I picked them because they are illustrative of
a deep and systematic problem in the armed services.
Leaders set the standard, and when that leadership is
toxic, it drips down to all levels of the military. Based on
the DOD Inspector General's own data, it is clear that the
current system of deterrence is not working. In today's
hearing, I want to hear from all our panelists about what they
are doing to exert sufficient oversight. In the case of the
inspector general, how are they working to increase
accountability and transparency? In the case of the vice
chiefs, what are they doing to combat criminal behavior and
corruption?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
Mr. Coffman. I thank the ranking member.
We will give each witness the opportunity to present his or
her testimony and each member an opportunity to question the
witnesses for 5 minutes. We would also respectfully remind the
witnesses to summarize, to the greatest extent possible, the
high points of your written testimony in 5 minutes or less.
Your written comments and statements will be made part of the
hearing record.
Let me welcome our first panel. Mr. Glenn A. Fine,
Principal Deputy Inspector General, United States Department of
Defense; Lieutenant General David E. Quantock, Inspector
General of the United States Army; Vice Admiral Herman
Shelanski, Naval Inspector General; Lieutenant General Stayce
D. Harris, Inspector General of the Air Force; Brigadier
General David A. Ottignon, Inspector General of the Marine
Corps.
With that, Mr. Fine, you are recognized for your opening
statement.

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Fine. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about
the work of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector
General regarding senior official misconduct, prevention, and
accountability. In my written statement, I describe how the DOD
OIG [Office of Inspector General] investigates allegations of
senior official misconduct and oversees military service IG
investigations of these allegations. In addition, I provide
statistics and trends on the number of misconduct complaints,
the types of misconduct, the number of investigations, the
timeliness of investigations, and substantiation rates for both
the DOD OIG and the service IG investigations. I also provide
additional statistics for a particular type of misconduct:
allegations of retaliation and reprisal by senior officials
against whistleblowers. In my oral testimony, I would like to
highlight a few key points from that statement.
First, I believe it is important to recognize that the vast
majority of senior officials in the DOD perform their
challenging jobs with dedication and integrity. My experience,
both as the IG of the Justice Department overseeing the DOJ
[Department of Justice] and the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] for 11 years and from my experience for over 2
years performing the duties of the DOD Inspector General, is
that only a very small percentage of these senior officials
fail to uphold the high ideals and ethics required of their
critical positions. However, some do commit misconduct. When
they do, they need to be held accountable. The DOD OIG and the
service IGs, therefore, seek to investigate allegations of
misconduct in a thorough, fair, professional, and timely way.
Second, the data I present in my written statement show
that there was a significant increase in the number of
complaints alleging misconduct by senior DOD officials from
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, and since then the number
of these complaints has been steady. During the same period,
the number of allegations warranting investigation by the DOD
OIG or service and component IGs has decreased.
Overall, the number of senior official cases with any
findings of substantiated misconduct rose between fiscal year
2008 and 2012 from 40 to 85, but has declined since then to 49
in fiscal year 2017. However, I want to make clear our
recognition that any misconduct by a senior official is
unacceptable.
Third, while the types of substantiated allegations against
senior officials involve a broad range of misconduct, the
allegations primarily fell within five main categories, which I
describe in my written statement. Within these categories,
there are several areas of particular concern. For example,
there are a number of substantiated allegations against senior
officials engaged in inappropriate relationships, and these
cases have received substantial public attention.
Fourth, the DOD OIG also has a criminal investigative arm,
the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, DCIS, to handle
investigations of criminal allegations. Currently, the biggest
case DCIS is handling involves Glenn Defense Marine Asia [GDMA]
and its owner, Leonard Francis, widely known as the Fat Leonard
case. GDMA provided husbanding services to U.S. Navy ships in
the Pacific, such as refueling and resupply. Francis
orchestrated a scheme to defraud the U.S. Navy of tens of
millions of dollars by routinely overbilling for goods and
services. Francis accomplished this criminal conduct by
systematically grooming and bribing Active Duty military and
civilian employees of the U.S. Navy with things of value, such
as dinners, gifts, hotel expenses, money, and the services of
prostitutes.
To date, Francis and 17 former Navy and DOD officials,
including a rear admiral and an SES [Senior Executive Service]
member, have pled guilty to criminal conduct. In addition, in
2017, nine senior officials previously assigned to the Navy's
7th Fleet were indicted for conspiracy, bribery, and false
statements. That case is ongoing.
Finally, my written statement discusses measures the DOD
OIG has implemented to further improve investigations of
misconduct. For example, to standardize investigations across
the DOD and to speed the review process, we are working to
implement a standardized case management database among the DOD
OIG and military service IGs.
To ensure compliance with laws and regulations and to share
best practices among the service IGs, we have begun conducting
quality assessment reviews of the service IGs similar to peer
reviews. To promote fairness, the DOD OIG provides subjects an
opportunity to comment on the accuracy of our substantiated
findings through the tentative conclusions letter process prior
to completion of our final report.
To promote transparency, the DOD OIG considers proactive
public release of our completed substantiated reports,
particularly those with findings of substantiated misconduct
involving high-level officials. To help address timeliness, we
have also reallocated resources within the DOD OIG to increase
the number of investigators working on misconduct and
whistleblower cases. However, handling the increasing number
and complexity of complaints requires resources, not only for
the DOD OIG, but also for the service and component IGs. It is
critical to adequately resource the DOD OIG, as well as the
service and component IGs, particularly when the DOD continues
to grow.
In conclusion, the DOD OIG and the service IGs have a
challenging but critically important mission to investigate
allegations of misconduct thoroughly, fairly, professionally,
and timely, and we will continue to seek to fulfill that
important responsibility.
That concludes my statement, and I would be glad to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Fine.
General Quantock.

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID E. QUANTOCK, USA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE ARMY, UNITED STATES ARMY

General Quantock. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
guests of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on senior leader misconduct. On behalf of the Secretary
of the Army, the Honorable Dr. Mark Esper, and our chief of
staff, General Mark Milley, thank you for your support of our
soldiers, Army civilians, families, and veterans.
The Army holds its senior leaders to the highest standards.
The trust and confidence of the American people, which is
intrinsic to who we are as an Army, is rooted in our character
and our credibility. We do acknowledge problems exist, and we
take senior misconduct very seriously. Over the past decade,
the Army Inspector General agency substantiated allegations
against only 3 percent of the general officer population per
year. While recent headlines on Army senior misconduct give the
appearance of widespread misbehavior, the truth is most
transgressions are technical violations committed by a very
small minority.
The most common substantiated allegations involving general
officers are misuse of government resources, failure to follow
regulations, and failure to take action. Substantiated
allegations for inappropriate relationships or sexual
misconduct over the past decade involved less than 1 percent of
general officers. This small fraction of senior leaders does
not represent the honorable service and character of the entire
general officer core.
Whistleblower reprisal remains the number one allegation.
The substantiation rate for whistleblower reprisal cases is 4
percent. A significant factor in the low 4 percent
substantiation rate is the misuse of the whistleblower reprisal
process. This typically occurs when a soldier or civilian is
held accountable by a senior official for misconduct or poor
performance, following a protected communication. The resulting
claim of reprisal creates challenges for senior commanders who
hold people accountable and then are faced with an inspector
general whistleblower reprisal investigation. And in the last 3
years, whistleblower reprisal has basically had a sixfold
increase and has been--is out of control, in my view.
The vast majority of the 685 general officers serving are
doing the right thing every single day. The positive trend over
the past 5 years has been a 51 percent reduction in the number
of general officer substantiated cases from 32 in 2013 to 15
last year. This includes a decrease in substantiated
allegations for official travel violations, inappropriate
political activities, non-Federal entities involvement,
conflicts of interest, and improper endorsements.
In closing, the overwhelming majority of Army general
officers abide by the letter and spirit of our laws and
regulations, and utilize sound judgment in the stewardship of
taxpayer resources. Those who do not are held accountable.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for your
continued support of our soldiers, our civilians, families, and
veterans. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Quantock can be found in
the Appendix on page 87.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Quantock, for your
testimony.
Vice Admiral Shelanski, you are now recognized.

STATEMENT OF VADM HERMAN SHELANSKI, USN, NAVAL INSPECTOR
GENERAL, UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral Shelanski. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier,
and Military Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you very
much for having us here today to discuss senior leader
misconduct and the opportunity to explain our senior leader
investigative process.
In the Navy, we take pride in living up to our core values
of honor, courage, and commitment. We expect the highest
ethical and moral behaviors of our senior leaders. Therefore,
we take any allegations of misconduct very seriously, and where
appropriate, investigate, and when substantiated, hold our
people accountable when they do not meet our high standards.
To be clear, there must be a violation of rule, regulation,
or law. There is a process in place with many offices that
handle this range of violations. Our primary role as the IG is
to conduct administrative investigations, not criminal or UCMJ
cases.
When we receive complaints on flag officers from our
hotline, Congress, or by referral from the DOD, we will open
investigation on credible allegations of misconduct against
one- and two-star admirals.
The investigation process is fair, deliberate, and
thorough. Our investigators are highly trained and experienced
professionals who rigidly adhere to the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency standards. We constantly
strive through process improvements to produce ever more timely
reports without sacrificing professional due diligence. Our
investigators receive lots of oversight, from our division
directors to legal review to a DOD review and their ultimate
approval.
At the end of our investigation, all reports go to the CNO
[Chief of Naval Operations] and the Secretary of the Navy. If
any allegation is substantiated, we submit a request to the
Office of the VCNO [Vice Chief of Naval Operations] that
appropriate corrective action be taken and documented.
Corrective action can range from verbal counseling to formal
disciplinary action under UCMJ. We receive a copy of the
documented corrective action recorded in our database and
provide a copy to the DOD IG. This adverse information will
remain in the officer's record for the entirety of their
career.
In the last 5 years, we have seen a steady decrease in the
number of overall flag officer complaints and also a decrease
in the number of cases substantiated. The most common
categories of substantiated offenses we have seen is misuse of
government vehicles and drivers for personal use, improper use
of official travel, improper gift acceptance, and prohibited
personnel practices.
In conclusion, I believe that our investigative process is
a necessary and effective tool to address questionable ethical
behaviors by our senior leaders. Thank you for your continued
support for our sailors, Marines, Navy families, and veterans.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Shelanski can be found
in the Appendix on page 92.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Vice Admiral Shelanski.
Lieutenant General Harris, you are now recognized.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN STAYCE D. HARRIS, USAF, INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General Harris. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to
testify before you today.
And as the Air Force Inspector General, I am responsible to
independently and continuously inspect, assess, investigate,
and report to the Secretary of the Air Force on the readiness,
economy, efficiency, and discipline of our force. And with the
Air Force core values of integrity first, service before self,
and excellence in all we do, I take special pride in helping
ensure our airmen live up to those values.
Misconduct by Air Force senior officers erodes the trust in
our service, the trust of our airmen, and the trust of our
country. And your Air Force is committed to the development of
ethical airmen leaders, and we are equally determined to ensure
accountability when standards are violated. And part of my
responsibility includes resolution of complaints against Air
Force general officers, officers selected for promotion to
brigadier general, and retired general officers.
The top three categories of violations we have seen in the
past 5 years may be generally categorized as ethics violations,
improper handling of personnel matters, and unprofessional
relationships, in that order. And every complaint against a
senior officer is diligently acted upon.
Our cases are investigated by an independent team of
investigating officers, augmented by embedded attorneys from
the Office of the Air Force Judge Advocate General. And Air
Force senior officer investigations are independent, thorough,
impartial, objective, and we are careful to meet all legal
requirements. This important work of ensuring accountability in
our most senior leaders promotes the discipline, efficiency,
and economy of our force.
Our process in conducting senior officer investigations
includes multiple layers of internal review, with every
investigation receiving a separate and independent legal review
signed by the director of administrative law for the Air Force.
And upon completion of each investigation, the Department of
Defense Office of the Inspector General provides an oversight
review, as was mentioned. Investigations with substantiated
allegations are referred to the appropriate command authority
to determine what disciplinary action is warranted.
And, finally, my deputy and I use a variety of venues and
products to promote education and awareness across our senior
officer population. It is important to me that we not only
investigate complaints against our senior officers, but that we
also work to reduce the incidence of misconduct by these high-
ranking leaders.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, members of the
subcommittee, I very much appreciate the committee's continuing
support of our Air Force and your interest in our efforts to
prevent misconduct by our senior officers. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Harris can be found in
the Appendix on page 97.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Lieutenant General Harris.
Brigadier General Ottignon, you are now recognized.

STATEMENT OF BGEN DAVID A. OTTIGNON, USMC, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE MARINE CORPS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

General Ottignon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. And how do you say it?
General Ottignon. It is pronounced Ottignon.
Mr. Coffman. Ottignon. I was close.
General Ottignon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
General Ottignon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Speier, distinguished members of the House Armed Services
Committee on Military Personnel. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today about this important topic.
My office provides the Secretary of the Navy and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps an impartial and [credible]
means to investigate or inquire into allegations of senior
official misconduct, impropriety, or violation of law. I
oversee a group of 25 dedicated professionals committed to
upholding the laws that govern the service.
In the past 10 years, 15 Marine Corps generals were
substantiated by a thorough investigation process led by an
inspector general. Most of these cases were violations of
administrative processes and standards of conduct regulations.
None of them were criminal in nature.
I have complete confidence in the investigatory process and
due diligence taken with each and every allegation brought
forward. Every general officer investigation is reviewed for
legal sufficiency and requires Department of Defense Inspector
General oversight.
The seriousness of which the Marine Corps approaches
character, leadership, and ethics is apparent in the demanding
standards that we expect all our leaders to uphold.
In the last year, my office has traveled around the globe
conducting training with commanding generals across the Corps
and conducting thorough inspections to ensure that the
application of our standards are consistent with our
foundational core values of honor, courage, and commitment.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, we thank Congress and this subcommittee
for the opportunity to discuss such an important issue with you
this morning and your continued support for our United States
Marine Corps and its families. I look forward to the
opportunity to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Ottignon can be found in
the Appendix on page 103.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Brigadier General Ottignon, for
your testimony.
We are going to limit to 5 minutes each member, but we will
do a second round, if necessary, for the first panel.
Some of you mentioned during your testimony that there is a
wide scope of misconduct that you investigate. Could you please
give some additional examples of the types of cases you
investigate, and if you see any misconduct trends emerging? Why
don't we start with you, Lieutenant General Quantock.
General Quantock. Yes, sir. I am just looking at the last--
last year, we had 15 substantiations. The range of the kind of
work that we do is late NCOERs [noncommissioned officer
evaluation reporting]. We had one particular general officer
that basically lied on his PT [physical training] test, height
and weight type stuff. One that inappropriately approved a
flyover, so misuse of government resources. The dignity and
respect, how they treated subordinates, what they were
substantiated for. Improperly using an IG investigation for
adverse action at the junior levels was substantiated.
So those are--misuse of subordinate times, subordinate--we
have made a huge effort in trying to get after certain cases
where general officers make technical type of mistakes with
subordinates primarily.
You know, we all have staffs, and a lot of times our staffs
try to do good things for us, and they try to make our life a
little bit nicer. We have beat the hell out of that the last
couple years. We have got an exportable training package. When
I sit down with a general officer that are going into command,
we encourage them to sit down. It is about 75, 80 pages of
PowerPoint slides, basically vignettes of what has got general
officers in trouble. Again, a lot of technical violations from
use of travel, getting rental cars, all those kind of things
that sets folks up for trouble.
Mr. Coffman. What is dignity and respect?
General Quantock. Dignity and respect is publicly
humiliating somebody. That is the genesis of dignity and
respect. So--but that exportable training package I think is
one of the leading reasons why in 2013 we had 32 general
officers out of 685, I might add, down to 15 that we have in
this last year. A lot of the technical violations have been
weeded out. So we continue to work this piece hard, not to
mention all of the efforts of the senior leadership to get out
there and make their vision well known.
Mr. Coffman. Next.
Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. So for us, over the last 3
years, a decrease trendwise in substantiated cases, so 10 in
2015, 4 in 2016. It looks like one will be substantiated for
2017. We are finishing that case up now.
You know, in general, most of the cases are about gifts
acceptance and solicitation. So these are the technical--I am
going out to lunch, and I accepted a gift of lunch from a
contractor that was more than the acceptable limit. It is also
in terms of endorsing non-Federal entities, so there are
certain charities that were not supposed--unless they are
federally recognized. In our official capacity, we are not
allowed to endorse them, so one of our flag officers was seen
to endorse it inappropriately, but, of course, mistakenly did
not know that at the time. Also, some pay and benefits, so, for
instance, leave statements, so inappropriate documentation of
leave. And so those are very technical violations in general,
so nothing in the order of larger, you know, more--so--and
specific, no sexual harassment or any of those type of trends,
sir.
Mr. Coffman. General Harris.
General Harris. Thank you. The greatest majority of our
violations have been ethics violations, as has been mentioned
by my peers. Misuse of a subordinate's time, misuse of a
government vehicle, unauthorized gifts, postgovernment
employment. But what is most important is that how we
proactively, within the IG enterprise, within the inspector
general enterprise, go out and educate our personnel, from the
most junior to the most senior, on the different pitfalls and
opportunities to lead the right example and to let them know
what to look out for, and even--there is complaints sometimes
that people don't think that would be an issue, giving out a
challenge coin to a contractor would be a violation, but we
continually educate our personnel on what the pitfalls are and
what they should do to correct them.
Mr. Coffman. Where in the career track do you begin that
education?
General Harris. From the very beginning.
Mr. Coffman. From the very beginning?
General Harris. Yes, sir.
General Ottignon. Sir, in the last 3 years, we have had
four substantiations. All of those were administrative in
nature, violations of Marine Corps order for fitness report
evaluations, for physical fitness evaluations. One was regards
to training. So our trend lines are, as I previously mentioned,
all administrative in nature.
Mr. Fine. Mr. Chairman, if I can add.
Mr. Coffman. Sure.
Mr. Fine. Since we have oversight over all the service IGs,
we have accumulated all the data on the types of misconduct,
and which we described on page 10 of my testimony. It generally
fell into five categories. First one, misconduct or ethical
violations, such as improper accepting services from a
subordinate, sexual relationships with subordinates, requiring
subordinates to perform personal services for them, misusing
your official position.
The second one is improper personnel matters, which also
involves unwelcome physical contact with subordinates and
improper hiring.
Third is misuse of government resources, such as using
vehicles to commute improperly or misuse of government
aircraft.
And the fourth is travel violations, traveling for purely
personal reasons.
And the fifth is other, for such things as improper
procurement, steering contracts.
On page 11, I talk and we discuss the trend lines, and the
trend lines are generally down, but they are still significant
in these categories. And of particular interest, I think to the
committee, is the inappropriate relationship category. On page
12, we talk about how many there are across the services, and
there has been a steady number of them. There were 10 in 2013
substantiated findings, and in the subsequent years----
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Fine, I am afraid I am out of time. I am
going to have to----
Ranking Member Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to put a chart up, if we could, that shows
each of the services. And this is for you to start, Mr. Fine.
So in the Air Force, the total closed cases were 54; 54 were
dismissed, zero were investigated in the Air Force. In the
Army, 101; 101 dismissed, zero investigated. Defense agency,
111; 110 dismissed, 1 was investigated. Thirty-six in the Navy;
36 dismissed, zero investigated.
Are you basically saying that none of these cases even
deserved to be investigated?
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
133.]
Mr. Fine. So that chart, Representative Speier, I think is
from our semiannual report for a 6-month period.
Ms. Speier. It is one half of the year.
Mr. Fine. Yes, one half of the year in 2017. What we have
is, in my testimony is a chart describing the number of cases
involving senior official misconduct overall for the last 10
years, and there is a substantial number investigated. The
chart that was up there has to do with, I think, three-star and
four-stars, which are the highest level ones. And so this chart
has to do with senior official cases, including two-stars, one-
stars, O-7 promotables, SES employees, et cetera.
We do look at all these cases seriously. We do intake. We
determine whether it warrants an investigation, and these are
the ones that did warrant investigation against the high-level
officials who was investigated against. But as you can see from
my chart on page 8, there is a significant number of ones that
are investigated and are substantiated.
Ms. Speier. But I am totally confused then. It says that
zero of these, out of 312 cases, 311 of them were dismissed.
Only one was investigated. Are we basically--are you basically
telling us that all of these cases were bogus?
Mr. Fine. No. And what this chart also does--it is probably
a confusing chart. The top part is the DOD OIG receiving those
cases. Many of them are referred down to the service or agency
and are investigated and closed by them. So if there is 54, for
example, that we get, we--these are the numbers we investigate,
and we refer them down to the Air Force, the Army, the Marine
Corps, and the Navy, and they investigate them and have
investigated many of them.
Ms. Speier. Well, it is still not making any sense to me.
Mr. Fine. Okay.
Ms. Speier. So there is 54 that you receive from the Air
Force. Why do you use the term ``dismissed'' if you were then
forwarding them to the Air Force IG?
Mr. Fine. So we receive far more than those, and we refer
many of them, 12 of them to the Air Force, for example, and of
the others we do not--we do intake and determine they don't
require an investigation. But there are a number of them that
do require investigation, as indicated by the chart below, the
numbers below.
Ms. Speier. Well, the numbers below are the ones that are
investigated by the service IGs.
Mr. Fine. Right.
Ms. Speier. You are not investigate--it looks like you are
not investigating any, by this chart. I don't want to take a
lot of time on this. I think this chart needs to be reviewed,
and I would like for you to come to my office. And I don't know
if Mr. Coffman would be inclined to hear more about this, but
this is deeply troubling to me.
All right. In one of the cases that I mentioned, there was
a recommendation by the IG of holding someone accountable for
substantiated claims, and then it went to the--in this case,
General Dempsey, who just struck one of the substantiated
claims. How often does that happen?
Mr. Fine. We have a chart on page 14 that it happens
sometimes. Of the allegations, of 427 allegations of
substantiated misconduct, over I think it is a 5-year period,
29 of them were declined to take action, and about 80 of them
are still pending. So in a small percentage of allegations they
are--the service has declined to take action.
Ms. Speier. So you are saying--did you not present your
document to us until yesterday?
Mr. Fine. We provided it, yes.
Ms. Speier. So I still don't have a copy of it,
unfortunately. Can you just go over that for me?
Mr. Fine. Certainly. On page 12, we discuss corrective
actions by rank of senior official, and this is over from
fiscal year 2013 to 2017, and we describe the actual discipline
corrective action that was taken, ranging from a letter of
counseling to suspension to removed from assignment. Of those,
the top line is declined to take action. In 29 of the 427
substantiated allegations, the service declined to take action.
Ms. Speier. All right. Would you please provide for me, in
those 29 cases where they declined to take action, the
specifics. Because I find it unjustified to have inspector
generals go through the process of determining, through
investigation, conduct that is inappropriate, have that be
presented to the chiefs, and then have them just strike it as
if it doesn't exist, as it happened in the Custer case. I mean,
that is fraudulent, as far as I am concerned.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here today.
I want to take a couple of questions for the four service
reps, give you a chance to think about, so I will go to Mr.
Fine and ask him a couple while you are stewing on a couple of
these questions. But I take--I find most commanders try their
best to do the right job on these things, but they are
imperfect. Some of them have made bad decisions, just as some
judges have, just as some district attorneys have. We are
imperfect, but I think we strive to be the very best we can and
try to get as close as perfect as we can.
So the first question I am going to come back to you all on
will be if we take commanders out of the discipline and
accountability process, what would be the impact on the mission
or the impact on morale and unit integrity from your opinion?
Secondly, how would you address the ranking member's point
that there are different spanks for different ranks? So I want
to come back to you all on that, give you a chance to think
about it.
Mr. Fine, my data shows we have 23--or 2,327 senior
leaders. 963 of those are general officers. Roughly, if you
could just give an average, what would you say, how many
allegations are made a year against those 2,327 senior leaders?
Mr. Fine. About 800. In our testimony, we discuss how many
have been made over the last 10 years. In 2008, there was 395.
Mr. Bacon. So 395 out of 2,327?
Mr. Fine. In 2008. Now in 2017, there is 803.
Mr. Bacon. Eight hundred?
Mr. Fine. Yeah.
Mr. Bacon. That seems like a lot for 2,327 senior leaders.
Mr. Fine. Those are the allegations, correct.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. Out of those allegations, how many
substantiated, just to put it on record here?
Mr. Fine. Eighty-three.
Mr. Bacon. So 83. And what would that come out as a
percentage? I guess it is 34 percent I think you had of the
allegations that were substantiated?
Mr. Fine. Well, of the cases that we actually investigate,
30 percent of them are substantiated.
Mr. Bacon. About 30 percent are substantiated. And they
range from overdue reports to the more serious?
Mr. Fine. Correct.
Mr. Bacon. So many of these are things that would nowhere
would be considered criminal in the private sector.
Mr. Fine. Most of these are--very few, a very small
percentage are criminal.
Mr. Bacon. If you just give me your thoughts, how many
would you say senior leaders have done something criminal,
sexual assault, for example, out of this last year's data? One
or two, three or four?
Mr. Fine. Very few have done criminal misconduct, except I
will mention the GDMA case, the Francis case, which is a----
Mr. Bacon. Right. Which is criminal, got it.
Mr. Fine. Which is criminal.
Mr. Bacon. So we are talking less than a handful out of
this 2,300-plus senior officers have done something criminal?
Mr. Fine. Yes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
One other thing, one of the things that concerned me as a
five-time commander is the length of time it takes to
investigate. When you have people under investigation for 2
years and then exonerated and their career is over, it seems to
me that we have to do something better there. I mean, just as a
person--I have never been investigated, thankfully, in five
commands, so I have been blessed, thanking the Almighty, but I
know some people have been under for 2 years and then they are
exonerated, you are like, man. Is there anything we can do
better there?
Mr. Fine. I think there is. We do strive for timeliness. We
recognize that when you are under investigation, your promotion
is held up, sometimes you can't retire, you can't be moved, and
it is difficult to be under the microscope, and many of them,
most of them are cleared in the end. So we do strive for
timeliness.
With the number of investigations, the number of
complaints, the resources, we also want to be thorough and
accurate, so it is a balance there. On some of them we can
handle quickly, some of them take longer. Having said that, all
of the IGs, we and the service IGs, are moving to try and
increase our timeliness without sacrificing quality, accuracy,
and thoroughness.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you.
Now I will go to our service reps. And I will go to the
first question, if we take commanders out of the process here,
what do you think the impact is on your service?
General Quantock. Sir, it would be absolutely devastating.
I have commanded from company all the way up through three
times as a two-star commander. Absolutely devastating if you
take--you know, we are not Walmart. We send soldiers to do very
dangerous things. I lost 13 soldiers as a brigade commander,
over 200 Purple Hearts. I tell them to go out there and protect
terrain, to escort convoys. They put their lives on the line.
So some folks, you know, may have problems with some of the
orders that I give. But we have to give them.
So it would be devastating. So to be able to have control
over the carrot and the stick, for another word that you could
use, carrot and the stick, you have got to have a lot of
carrots, but you also have got to have the stick to hold people
accountable and to uphold the high values that we have in the
Army that are not due for--that are not really applicable to
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
It would be absolutely devastating. And we are, right now,
the greatest service the world has ever seen, and we would
become a third-world country, a third-world army if we were to
remove commanders from the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Mr. Bacon. General Quantock, thank you. I will come back on
the different spanks.
General Quantock. Okay.
Mr. Bacon. Admiral Shelanski.
Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. I will agree with General
Quantock. Certainly, it is about good order and discipline. And
in terms of being--having the UCMJ capability at the commander
level is essential for that good order and discipline and the
morale of the crew, because they expect also fairness and
justice throughout their command, and they hold each other
accountable. And when one of their shipmates is not doing the
right thing, they want them to be held accountable, and that
has got to be done quickly and efficiently.
Mr. Bacon. I saw that in the Air Force. We had a commander
downgrade a court-martial, and he was held accountable for it.
With that, Chairman, I will come back for my second round
to finish these two rounds of questions for the service reps.
So, General Harris, I will come back to you later on my
second round with that. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Tsongas, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I think we would all agree that the military is a
rightly honored institution. We would not be the country we are
without it. But as we have heard and is so true, it is not
perfect and those serving are not perfect, so it is important
that there is a process in place to look at senior leader
misconduct.
So as we engage in the oversight of this process, and I am
grateful for this hearing, I think we have to be reassured that
the process is not biased in favor of those senior leaders
being investigated. So I have to say at the outset, it really
concerns me that in each service it is a general officer who
functions as an inspector general. It just seems to me that
there is an inherent conflict there and possibly an inherent
tilt in the process in favor of the general officer.
I don't necessarily want you all to comment on it, but I
think it is something that we all have to take into account.
But given that that is the fact, I am curious, who provides
oversight of all your work and makes sure that there is no
inherent bias, that it is being performed correctly to meet--to
be sure that we are truly identifying misconduct and holding
general officers responsible? So I would like to start with
you, Mr. Fine.
Mr. Fine. So we as the DOD OIG do provide oversight over
the service IGs. We review their reports to make sure that they
are thorough and complete and have done all that they should do
to track the leads, to investigate, to interview the
appropriate people. So we do that level of oversight.
We also have begun doing what we call quality assurance
reviews, similar to a peer review, to look at their processes,
their procedures in a systematic way to make sure they are
following the rules and regulations and they are adhering to
quality standards and are doing the right thing. So we provide
that oversight.
One of the questions that is often asked is, well, who
oversees us. We are overseen by other IGs. The CIGIE [Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency] has a
peer review process, and we are also regularly overseen by the
GAO [Government Accountability Office]. So there is oversight
over us, and we provide oversight over them, and that is a good
thing.
Ms. Tsongas. Do you have the ability to refer a case back
if you think it hasn't been appropriately investigated?
Mr. Fine. Yes, we do, and we do that.
Ms. Tsongas. And how often have you had to do that?
Mr. Fine. I don't have the exact numbers, but there are
occasions when we do do that. We review the report. And there
are times where we think they have not fully investigated or if
they reached a conclusion that is not supported by the
evidence, we refer it back to them for additional work.
Ms. Tsongas. I don't know if each of you would like to
comment how you do your job in a way that you feel is
fairminded, given that you represent and come out of the
service you are overseeing.
General Quantock. Yes. Yes, Congresswoman. I would just say
a couple of things. Number one is, in my last job I was a CID
[U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command] commander, so when I
left that job, I had three friends, and after this job I have
no friends. So the fact that, you know, this is not a highly
sought after--well, maybe some for the--highly sought after job
because we make hard calls with the DOD IG oversight. It is a
very fair process.
Just about the investigators that do a majority of my cases
are civilians, so they--and many of them have extensive years
of experience. One of my investigators has got 18 years.
Another has got 10 years of these kinds of cases. So it is very
well.
And not only that, we have many levels of legal review of
these cases to ensure we are doing due process both for the
complainant and for the subject. Once an investigation is done,
legal review. After that, it goes to my lawyer. He does the
legal review. After that, it goes to the Office of General
Counsel for their legal review. After I have had three legal
reviews and I have read the case and I understand the case and
I agree with the findings, I sign the case.
Ms. Tsongas. Are the findings conclusive or can you reject
the findings?
General Quantock. I have never rejected the findings that
have been brought to me. So after all of the scrutiny that goes
on with these things, I can almost exclusively say I don't
think I have overturned one case that has been brought to me. I
sign it, and it goes to DOD OIG for their oversight review. So
it is a very fair and thorough process.
Ms. Tsongas. So there is only somebody higher up in the
chain that could reject the findings or would likely reject the
findings?
General Quantock. After we get done with a case, it gets
adjudicated for cases, and that is what happens. Once it comes
down as substantiated, we are just calling balls and strikes.
We are saying did they violate a regulation, yes or no. If the
answer is yes, that the substantiation holds, even if it is for
small technical violations, then it goes--after the DOD IG
review, it goes over to the lawyer side of the Army, the TJAG
[The Judge Advocate General of the United States Army]. The
TJAG basically puts the case together and brings it to the
adjudicator, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. And the Vice
Chief of Staff, under advice of counsel, holds the person
accountable, according to due process and according to the
facts of the case and what he has been substantiated for.
Ms. Tsongas. Well, I appreciate--we don't have time to hear
from everybody, but still I do think it is deeply concerning
that you are generals in the service you are overseeing, and I
do think a civilian oversight perhaps would at least eliminate
the appearance----
General Quantock. Congresswoman, we have a lot of civilian
oversight, but our Army is made up of soldiers, okay? The vast
majority of our Army is soldiers, and I believe, having been a
commander a number of times, I also can look at the case and
also understand, you know--because, again, we are representing
the Army. I am the Army Inspector General. And I think from our
soldier's perspective, at least the vast majority who are
soldiers and know the fact that the person calling the shots at
the IG has been a former commander themselves, from the time I
was a captain all the way up to my last position, I think it is
important that that person is a soldier, a sailor, or an
airman, Marine.
Ms. Tsongas. We can agree to disagree. Thank you. My time
is up.
General Quantock. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Dr. Abraham, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a statement first. As a Congressman, certainly, I
think as the general public we want to know that the process is
intact. And what I am hearing from the panel is that the
process is good and that it is accountable and, more
importantly, it is responsible for the actions that are found.
Certainly, as a physician, I am judged by my peers on the
physician side, so, you know, I think it is--you have got to
have peer review, and I certainly don't think there is any
conflict there that--from being reviewed by your peers.
When I have asked for private conversations with several of
the vice chiefs behind you, I have gotten them and there have
been very forthcoming answers to direct questions, so I
appreciate the openness that you are affording me.
So, again, just a statement that I like the process. I
think the process is good, and what I am hearing is that the
process is working, because we are seeing a decrease, not only
in the severity of the accusations, but in the total number
too.
And I am going yield the rest of my time back to General
Bacon so he can continue his dialogue.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
What would be the impact of taking the commanders out of
this discipline process? General Harris, what would be your
perspective from the Air Force?
General Harris. Sir, I agree with my peers. It would be
absolutely devastating, and it would, you know, erode the good
discipline and order of our force.
And then as far as disparity in punishments, our data that
I have reviewed doesn't support that. We hold our officers
actually to a higher standard of accountability. And there is
actually two other articles of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 133, which is conduct unbecoming, and 134, which is
fraternization, which holds us accountable.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
General Ottignon.
General Ottignon. Sir, I agree with my peers as well. I
think removing the commander from the process would have grave
implications to the good order and discipline of the
organization, a fighting organization. And I agree also that
the data doesn't show that. I think we hold our senior leaders
more accountable in the Marine Corps.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
Going back to General Quantock and Admiral Shelanski on the
different spanks for different ranks, any feedback on that?
General Quantock. Yes, Congressman. I would tell you, if I
had to look at all the cases that I have looked at in my last
job as a CID commander and, of course, now as the IG, it is
about 6\1/2\ years, I would tell you it is huge, hugely swayed
on the part of a general officer being crushed, okay, for a
substantiation. And how is that? Well, what is the most
egregious--usually the most egregious kind of offenses that we
have general officers? Inappropriate relationships.
Now, I have adjudicated sergeant first classes, junior
soldiers for inappropriate relationships. They would get a
letter of reprimand. Same thing that we would give a general
officer, a letter of reprimand. However, on the general officer
side, they are done. And the sergeant first class isn't going
to get promoted either, but he isn't going to go backwards.
That general officer is done, okay, and a lot of times he will
retire at a grade a lot less. So he is effectively being fined,
in case for retirement, hundreds of thousands if not millions
of years when you have a major general go back to the rank of
lieutenant colonel.
Now, we can discount the fact that that soldier has been in
combat multiple times, and that is what we would like to do
sometimes by saying, well, we should just take his retirement
away, but what we have done is separated him from his family
multiple times, sometimes years at a time, and then we say the
person doesn't deserve anything? Again, a lot of times we
forget about that none of us at this table came in the Army as
generals. I spent 27 years coming up the chain just like
everybody else, and I have been 11 years as a general officer.
I can tell you we crush general officers, and should they be
crushed for these kind of offenses? Absolutely. They know since
the time they were second lieutenant what is right and what is
wrong. And when they do it, they expect the consequences, and
we should hold them accountable.
Mr. Bacon. I know I felt that way as a general officer in
the Air Force. Thank you.
Admiral Shelanski.
Admiral Shelanski. So I agree. And one particular case that
we would have that I could give you as an example. So a flag
officer viewing pornography on a government computer on a ship.
That type of work, should it have happened with an enlisted
sailor, that enlisted sailor would probably be brought to mast,
probably reduced in rate, withheld pending further, you know, 6
months, and then taken their rights away to utilize that
computer. And then once that 6 months was up, they would be
back in their job continuing as a sailor onboard the ship.
Flag officer, removed from his position, his command, and
retired as an O-6. Much harsher and much more deeply pressing
for his career.
Mr. Bacon. One question I will just leave for anybody's--if
they want to, you know, answer the question, does anyone here
think it would be better to bring a judge from the outside to
adjudicate these or does anyone here think a district attorney
outside of the military would do this better?
General Quantock. Only if you want to make the system much,
much longer and hold people in suspended animation forever.
That is the problem when you go to a purely jurisprudence
system. We all have advice and advice from SJAs [Staff Judge
Advocates]; we are not legally minded, but I get advice as a
commander from many different individuals. So I think that
would be a huge mistake.
Also, what I have been trying this 38 years that I have
been in the Army, I have been trying to find the perfect
profession. So as I look around all of the professions out
there, I haven't found one. We are not either, but we try real
hard to be that, and we hold people accountable, even for minor
discretions or minor violations of Army regulations.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
And I thank Dr. Abraham for yielding to me, and back to the
chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Dr. Wenstrup, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much. Thank you all for being
here to approach a very difficult topic for everyone involved.
I will say, and especially with what you just said, General,
you know, they say, ``To whom much is given, much is
expected,'' although I wouldn't say rank is given; it is often
earned, but the expectation is much greater. And I think that
is a fair assessment. You do expect more from your officers and
especially your general officers as you go up in rank. So I
appreciate that feedback.
Mr. Fine, you mentioned earlier about gathering data from
the IGs. So what do you see down the road with this? Is it
going to set maybe a tone for what type of punishment is
appropriate or what legal actions we need to take? What do you
expect to gain from that as that comes together?
Mr. Fine. Well, we regularly gather that data and have, and
I think it is important to report that for transparency to see
what is going on, even by service and by rank and by offense.
So we will continue to do that. It provides transparency on the
process, which is a good thing. I will mention one thing that
we intend to do is also to look at this issue about the
disparities, and we have--we are going to open a review and
evaluation to see if there are disparities that jump out.
Now, sometimes the disparities are because the cases are
different, and that is very hard to analyze. But I think, in
some ways, it is important to look at the overall statistics,
the numbers, and see if there are anomalies that jump out
either by rank, by service, by gender, by race, by all sorts of
stratifications, and we intend to do that. I think that is a
useful exercise.
Dr. Wenstrup. So you are really looking for, I guess, best
practices, if you will, when it comes to setting guidelines. I
mean, every case is different, and so you don't want to say
this is the mandatory sentence for this, you know, because you
want to take the case in its entirety. But are you expecting to
have guidelines from this?
Mr. Fine. No, I don't think we are going to have
guidelines. That is up to the services to implement corrective
action. But it is important to see what is happening and to
analyze that and to evaluate that. In terms of guidelines, I do
think there ought to be standardization and guidelines for how
we conduct the investigations----
Dr. Wenstrup. Okay.
Mr. Fine [continuing]. And to make sure that it is
relatively standard throughout the DOD so that if you are
subject to an investigation in the Air Force, you are not going
to be treated differently than if you are in the Navy. I think
that is helpful, that is important, so that there are
standardized, timely investigations, and we intend to look at
that as well.
Dr. Wenstrup. So are you far enough along at this point
where you would maybe be making suggestions or just pointing
out the differences or----
Mr. Fine. In terms of the standardization?
Dr. Wenstrup. Yes.
Mr. Fine. Yeah. I think there are some suggestions that we
have made and we will continue to make. One, there ought to be
a standardized case management system, a database, and we all
use it so that we track it and record it in similar ways and we
share information in a similar way. I think we ought to sort of
consider formats, formats of reports to be standardized; that
will speed things up as well.
I think we also ought to consider--there may be some
disagreement here--but sort of a tentative conclusion process
to give the subject an opportunity to comment on the report to
show if it is inaccurate or not. We do that. On the other hand,
that does lengthen the timeline a little bit because it gives
them time, and sometimes, as a result, you are required to do
more work, and that is the tradeoff. But I think that is a fair
process, and it gives them fairness and due process and
ultimately will make the decision on what is the ultimate
finding.
So I think those are the kinds of things that could be
useful to standardize. And I have had discussions with the
service IGs as well on that. We will continue to pursue that.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you very much.
And I want to thank you all for engaging with us on this
very difficult and important issue. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Kelly, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. This
is an important hearing.
I want to go back kind of on the line that General Bacon
had, or Congressman Bacon. Members of the service, especially
senior level leaders, whether they be command sergeant majors
or general officers, would you agree that they are more hard on
people for disgracing their uniform and their rank and their
awards than a civilian would be, because many times do you
think civilians are in awe of the things that you do and,
therefore, kind of give you a pass because of your service, and
a sitting other general who has done the same service is less
likely to be in awe of your career and the things you have
done? Would you agree with that?
General Quantock. Well, sir, I would just say that I don't
know if ``awe'' is the word. I think respected. My father was a
Vietnam vet. I will tell you the way they were treated back in
those days was incredibly poor. But I will tell you, there is a
lot of respect among us, but, yeah, of course, the people that
understand the culture--culture is a big deal in the military,
and it has evolved over time. I have seen huge changes for the
good since 1980 until the present day, and we continue to
change that culture for the good. But to make a complete
statement that civilians--I mean----
Mr. Kelly. Not necessarily in awe, but they tend to give
you the benefit of the doubt when maybe a peer or someone of
the same or a higher rank would not want their uniform
disgraced.
General Quantock. I would absolutely agree. The
professionalism of our noncommissioned officer corps is second
to none. And I have sat on many promotion boards with them, and
they get down to the standard of a particular individual, get
down to the----
Mr. Kelly. Let me rephrase. Would you as a general officer
in your job cut someone a break, another general officer,
because they are a general officer? Or would you be harder on
them because they disgraced the rank that you worked so hard to
earn?
General Harris. Harder.
Admiral Shelanski. Harder. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Kelly. And I want to go back just a second, General
Quantock. I think we have actually been in the same places a
couple of times. I looked at your bio, and I was at Taji in
2009 and 2010, and I think you were overall, and of course, we
had a facility there.
I want to ask you, Lieutenant General Ed Cardon recently
commented to the AP [Associated Press] that the Army is
reviewing ways to improve the senior officer corps through
pilot initiatives. And can you please expand on one or more of
these initiatives and explain how they reinforce ethical
behavior in general officers?
General Quantock. I will just tell you: It is a holistic
study by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the vice will have
much more on this than I do. But, really, it is a study on
basically the health of our general officer corps. Particularly
with the last 15, 16 years, we have run this general officer
corps into the ground. Not to mention our soldiers, our
sailors, our airmen, and our Marines. We have run this force
into the ground.
Many of us have been away from home years at a time. So--
but what--we never take a day off. When I am on leave, I am
attached to my BlackBerry and on my phone. My wife and I have
these discussions many times. Okay. I am never disconnected
from the Army. I lose leave every single year. Even though we
make sure that our subordinates take their 30 days of leave, we
never take--we basically--we put it over weekends; we don't
take any leave.
So the health of the force really requires us to give those
general officers a little bit of reprieve. So, from making them
take their leave----
Mr. Kelly. Let me move on to the next question. I want just
a little more answers on things. In my experience in the
military of people going forward for GO [general officer]
boards or general officers or senior level leaders in the
military, it has been my experience, my personal experience,
that I have seen far more people punished and prevented an IG
complaint to hold up a guy who the promotion board goes past
his MRD [mandatory removal date], and so he never makes general
officer, or he doesn't make O-6, or they don't make O-7 or O-8.
Has your experience been that far more senior leaders are
punished by being held or flagged for negative transactions by
an IG complaint that is not substantiated as to those who get
away with doing something wrong and never get punished?
General Quantock. Yes, sir. And that is the elephant in the
room. That is the whistleblower reprisal issue. When we talk
about numbers, whistleblower reprisal has skyrocketed because
of the misuse and misapplication of whistleblower reprisal
against senior officials. It is off the charts. I have been
investigated twice for whistleblower----
Mr. Kelly. Let me just real quick--and you guys understand.
Junior members know--or junior members of the military know if
they have a commander they don't like for some reason, that if
they file an IG complaint at the right time, it can end his
career, even though they have done nothing wrong and nothing to
substantiate it. Is that correct?
Admiral Shelanski. That is correct. So we, you know, we can
see a rise in complaints right around the time that the list
comes out.
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Rosen, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Russell, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
for being here.
I guess, Mr. Chairman, I don't understand why Members of
Congress want to trash the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It
is the one glue that holds our military together. We can
critique it. We can oversee it. We can hold it accountable.
But, God forbid, if people in the political environment ever
trash the Uniform Code of Military Justice and get rid of it--
you think we have screwed up the military good now, put it in
the hands, with no UCMJ, and put it out there where we have
people with no understanding of the institution that create,
Lord knows what, good order and discipline, decisions,
battlefield decisions that commanders have to make, that would
all be eroded and gone. And we would feel good about it, and
then we would hold our hearings and pound fists on tables and
point bony fingers talking about what went wrong as honorable
people sit here before us and holding them to account.
And, yes, Mr. Chairman, I am on my high horse.
How many of these offenses, General Quantock, were
discovered outside of the military?
General Quantock. Sir, I can think of one where actually it
was the press--it was an individual that decided to go to the
press----
Mr. Russell. So only one out of all of the hundreds or even
thousands of accusations, they were all discovered by the
institutions.
General Quantock. Yes, sir. Some were anonymous complaints.
Mr. Russell. Now, where I come from, that is the hallmark
of professionalism. You don't see that at IBM, and God knows we
don't see that here in Congress. So I guess the question would
be, why is it we think that it is a broken system? Yes, we have
problems. Yes, we see oversight that Congress has to be
responsible of, and we have civilian control of the military,
and that is the great Republic that we all serve.
But it is somewhat a little bit offensive to suggest that
the institution is unprofessional or somehow broken because it
discovers its own problems. In the business community, people
would love to have those problems. Congress, gosh, we would
love to have our own accountability where we discover the
problems before the American public does.
In terms of generals overseeing the military, wow, gosh,
that is kind of like Members of Congress overseeing government.
How could that be? The military has a better rate of
accountability than society as a whole, certainly better than
Congress, and perhaps even better than Hollywood, when it comes
to offenses and things like this that we see.
So I guess my question would be, what would be the damage
that we see as we continue to inflate the problem, not saying
ignore the problem--we have to take these things seriously, we
have to hold them to account, we are doing that, we see that--
but when it becomes inflated--and as was mentioned by my
colleague from Mississippi, IG complaints come up, and then,
you know, here come the investigations. And I have known many
great warriors who were held from senior level command, were
later exonerated after a 2-year period. They would have been
able to keep men and women alive in battle and do great service
to our Republic, but they never got the opportunity because,
because, because.
Could you speak to some of the other problems in your
capacity as inspector general that, when someone is exonerated,
do they ever get their life back? Are they ever restored, or
does the ship just pass them by?
General Quantock. Sir, both happens. Sometimes the ship--it
is based on timing. But sometimes the ship sails because
investigations take long. I will tell you, just the other day--
a couple months ago, I had a division commander that just came
back from Afghanistan, and I won't talk about his name. But he
comes in my office, he said: Sir, I am getting ready to resign.
I have had it. I have absolutely had it.
A disgruntled employee, a week before his change in
command, knowing the effect of it, throws an allegation out
there. Now, what happens is, of course, we spin up an
investigation. He is flagged, no award at the end of a division
command, despite his sacrifices to himself and his family. The
FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command] commander was coming down
there to pin an award on that guy, but that is off, but he
still was going to a pin an award on the spouse. The spouse
told her husband, said: I don't want the damn award. Okay.
So the families also were impacted on this because they
also sacrifice. So one day we are going to wake up, if we keep
this, we are going to wake up one day and realize, who the heck
wants to serve? Because we put people through hell. We put
families through hell. We put the soldiers through hell. We
work them like dogs. We deploy them into combat. We bring them
back, and here is your thanks. You are leaving without award.
There is this cloud over your head, possibly lost your
reputation. And then eventually he probably would get--he will
get exonerated, and then he will be--because I have looked at
the case, and there is nothing there.
This is the whistleblower reprisal. I have been
investigated twice for whistleblower reprisal when I came here
because I held somebody accountable because they beat up a CID
agent, beat up his weapon, pulled his weapon on his neighbor.
And because he sent a protected communication to Congress about
wanting to deploy and his unit said no, I got held up to 6
months. Or I downgraded an award from an MSM [Meritorious
Service Medal] to an ARCOM [Army Commendation Medal]. I am on
the awards board. I had no idea about the protected
communication. Another 4 months. We do this to the general
officer corps, not to mention to the entire Army all the time.
The reason why the numbers are so high from DOD IG about the
rise in complaints is because the misapplication of
whistleblower reprisal.
The law is good. It talks about gross waste of funds. It
talks about intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury to
the members of the Armed Forces. It talks about grievous
things, not downgrading an award. That is the problem we have.
We have hijacked the system, and there is a cloud over the
general officer corps because, right now, we are getting
hammered.
Mr. Russell. I thank the chairman.
And the only parting comment I will say is that people are
dragged into the IG to serve in IG capacities. They pick them
from some of the best performing folks that are out there. They
go kicking and screaming. They don't want those assignments.
They call all of the favors in to try to avoid them, and they
still have to go. And so my hats are off to all of those that
serve in our inspectors general departments within our
military.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Speier, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. I feel compelled to speak because we have an
obligation as Members of Congress to do oversight. When 400
service members are implicated in the Fat Leonard scandal, when
over 60 admirals are potentially implicated, we have an
obligation to look at the process. So I take great umbrage,
frankly, that it is suggested somehow that we don't have a role
here.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice is not on trial here.
We live by the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the
military. I mean, there are elements of it that I am not
particularly excited about, but for the most part, it is a--
frankly, a victim-centered code. We have made some changes over
the years, but what we are really looking at is a couple of
things, from my perspective.
Why is Congress oftentimes the last to know? We have
oversight responsibility. You should come to us when you have
got an issue with a senior officer and let us know so we are
not reading about it in the newspaper. When you have a scandal
like the Fat Leonard case in the Navy, it is incumbent on us to
look at that case in particular and see, why is it no
bystander, no bystander felt that they could come forward?
And to Lieutenant General Quantock, whistleblower
protection, I would argue, is not enough protection, and that
is why people don't come forward because they fear that there
will be reprisals. There were too many people that were engaged
in conduct unbecoming of officers in that case, and no one
called them out.
Now, let me now ask a question. I would like from each of
you to know what your backlog is, quickly, if you could.
Mr. Fine. We have a significant number of open
investigations, and we report them and----
Ms. Speier. Do you have a number?
Mr. Fine. I can get you the exact number.
Ms. Speier. I just want to get numbers at this point to see
whether or not we have got staffing issues.
Mr. Fine. We do have staffing issues. The complexity, the
number of cases that have risen, the number of cases that we
have to do, and we take them seriously. We take each of them
seriously. And you can only do more with less for so long, and
it does affect the timeliness of the investigations and how
long people are hung up.
So I do believe that it is important to adequately resource
IGs, both us and the service IGs. They are not the first people
that they think of when they are growing the military. But you
need to grow----
Ms. Speier. Okay. I have got limited amount of time. How
many additional staff do you think you need?
Mr. Fine. We could use 100 more additional staff. We have
1,600 employees. That is not that much. I think we could use a
significant number more.
Ms. Speier. All right.
Mr. Fine. I can give you more statistics and sort of basis,
but we need significant resources, as do they.
Ms. Speier. All right.
Lieutenant General.
General Quantock. Yes, Congressman, we have 50 open senior
official cases going on right now. I have 20 investigators. I
could easily double that. The average case is about over 400
days. Whistleblower reprisal, a separate division, I have
another 20 people doing that. I have 345 open cases. Average
length of a case is 391 days.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Thank you.
Vice Admiral.
Admiral Shelanski. Yes, ma'am. We have over 200 cases that
are open at this time, and we are just now finishing up and
getting up to our 2016 cases. So there is some lag time because
of the numbers of investigators. But I would have to give you a
specific number later, if that is okay.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Lieutenant General.
General Harris. Congresswoman, we welcome the opportunity
to partner with you on assessing our needs for plussing up our
forces. I would like to take that question for the record and
understand that our average investigation takes 187 days.
Ms. Speier. So yours take about half the time as the Army.
Is that right? Sounds like?
General Quantock. It sounds like it.
Ms. Speier. I think we should probably look at that. Why is
it one service can do it----
General Quantock. One service is much bigger than the other
service. The amount of service members does have an impact; but
I am not sure, I would have to look at the numbers.
Ms. Speier. Yeah, I think we should look at the numbers.
Brigadier General.
General Ottignon. Ma'am, I have 11 open cases on general
officers. I have 26 whistleblower reprisal cases open. I have
300 total cases--just over 300 cases open. I average 233 days
for a senior official investigation. And the remaining
investigations are upwards of 300 days.
Ms. Speier. Okay. I think we need to be sensitive to the
time it takes for these cases. We need to up, I think, the
service to the person who is charged and to those who are
actually providing the work among your--those who are employed.
At another point in time, I would like to know, in terms of
your investigators, how many of your investigators are
civilians? So I will take that for the record, if each of you
could provide that to me, as compared to those who are in the
military. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 137.]
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Abraham, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Abraham. Just to follow up. Again, the process is good.
In my opinion, it is working, simply because of the results
that you all have had to this point. Moving forward, General
Harris, you mentioned it a little bit in one of your answers.
Since this is an open hearing, let's let the general public
know, what are the services doing proactively from that second
lieutenant up to that four-star to help prevent this from
occurring over and over again?
General Harris. Thank you, Congressman, for the opportunity
to respond to this. So, proactively, two areas, prevention and
training. So, first, training. So, from the youngest airman,
whether you are an officer or enlisted, through every course of
leadership that you go through, you have an ethics training,
whether it be squadron officer school or airman leadership
school, all the way up to the senior leader officer course,
which general officers attend.
Proactively, in the inspector general system, of course, we
have our inspection process. And so not only are we assessing
the readiness of our force, but we are assessing the culture of
that force also and providing that feedback to the commander.
Reactively, of course, the IG investigates fair,
accurately, and thoroughly, any investigations, any complaints
that we have to ensure that we are offering due process in
upholding the standards of our service.
Dr. Abraham. Other members? General.
General Ottignon. Just briefly, sir. I would suggest that
it begins at the beginning of boot camp. It begins at the
beginning of officer candidate school. It is reinforced through
every service school as they continue in their career, both
enlisted and for officers. It becomes much more acute as the
general officer, upon selection, annual requirements that we
meet each year, as well as my office providing additional
training each year in the field. So it is often, and it is more
focused on the ethics piece throughout that year.
Dr. Abraham. Admiral.
Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. Like the generals just said,
from the beginning. So midshipmen, whether in ROTC [Reserve
Officer Training Corps], at the Naval Academy, or officer
candidate school, get their first taste of ethical training.
That goes up all through their career. It is mandatory when
they reach O-5 command that they go up to the Navy War College
where they go through the Navy leadership and ethics class. And
then, onward from there, as a flag officer, when they first
become a flag, they have ethics training.
I personally go to many of these classes. In fact, I either
virtually or in person to talk about cases and where fellow
commanders and flag officers before them have crossed the line.
Dr. Abraham. General Quantock.
General Quantock. Yes, sir. It is similar across all the
services. The additional thing is that we put a lot of focus on
the general officer education. Many different levels, that
every time you make a step, you get an ethics brief, every
year, you are getting an ethics brief.
I would also say that we also have to really get after it
at the battalion and brigade level, lieutenant colonel and
colonel level. At our pre-command course, you know, we have
extended it to 2 weeks. So they get SJAs, and of course, they
get me for an hour and a half because--and I have not missed
one in my 3\1/2\ years as the IG and 6\1/2\ years when you talk
about my CID time, because prevention is really the key.
If we can prevent people from walking into mistakes, that
is the key. And 99\2/3\ percent of our soldiers out there want
to do the right thing, but sometimes they walk into it. So our
goal is to prevent that from happening.
Dr. Abraham. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. I recognize myself. So one of the concerns is
the length of time that it takes to go through this process.
One element of that is certainly the resources in terms of the
number of personnel we are throwing at it. But is there
anything we can do procedurally to change the process to hasten
it, to get, you know, it is just--it is unfair to a lot of
parties to just tie this thing up for so long.
Mr. Fine, do you have any recommendations?
Mr. Fine. I do think a uniform process could help speed
things up, standardized databases, standardized formats, so
that we know what we are doing and we can do that more quickly.
I do think there ought to be sort of an assessment at the front
end in the intake level whether there is sufficient indicia of
credibility that it warrants an investigation. And then, if
there is indication as the investigation is going along that
there is a fundamental deficiency in the allegation, that it is
not substantiated, we can close it in a reasonably timely way.
Mr. Coffman. Sure.
Mr. Fine. So I think those are things that can be done. And
I do think resources, as I mentioned, is significant.
Mr. Coffman. Any other comments on this?
General Quantock. Yes, sir. And the point that I would
make, if I haven't mentioned reprisal, I would like to mention
reprisal again. Forty percent of my senior official cases are
caught up in reprisal because they basically have held somebody
accountable. So some better guidance to DOD on how they
basically interpret reprisal law so that just the significant
ones fall under that and not everything. Downgrading an award,
you know, hold somebody accountable because they beat somebody
up and pulled a weapon on them. Somebody had--a doc who was on
cocaine. Reprisal.
I mean, it goes on and on and on, the amount of cases,
because all I have to do is have a protected communication
followed by any kind of unfavorable personnel action, we are
off to the races on a whistleblower reprisal case. And, again,
average time is 391 days.
If we get some help, some guidance on that piece--I mean,
again, it is good law. It is there for very good reasons. But
if we could get some help in that particular area, that would
help on the resource piece as well.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Admiral Shelanski. Yes, sir. We have initiated a couple of
prototypes about intake analysis, and it has been very
profitable in terms of timesaving. So we continue to look at
process improvement.
But part of the issue besides that is IT [information
technology]. And I think, you know, as we continue to have to
scan documents and manually input things into the computer
system, it is a huge waste of time.
The effort by DOD to make one type of system that we all
can manage electronically eventually will save us a large
amount of time and effort that right now is taken up with just
antiquated systems that just eat up a lot of time.
General Harris. Our timeliness factors are really based on
the complexity of the allegation that we are investigating, the
volume of complaints, and then the availability of witnesses,
takes great time. But last year, we ran a process improvement
event, which got us down to the 187 days, and of course, we are
still looking to get it down even further.
General Ottignon. I would say that the Marine Corps is very
supportive of that law. I mean, that statute, we have great
confidence in it. Any changes that we have made over the
previous years obviously has a trickle-down effect to us
through the Department in procedure and policy. Statute of
limitations would be a perfect example of review of how 1
year's worth of time, as the general has alluded to in
examples, that is a pretty wide aperture that can provide us
the complexity of a case that makes that timing go out for
several hundred days to complete.
Mr. Coffman. Well, certainly what we want to have is a
system that we--apparently we do not have right now--where we
can expeditious--more expeditiously discipline officers in
substantiated cases, but not hurt their careers and not hurt
the military as a whole on cases that are not substantiated but
drag out forever. So we--there is really a need, I think, to
figure out how we can move this system along faster.
Ms. McSally, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really appreciate it. I do want to follow up on that.
While we do need a process to hold people accountable when they
have had wrongdoing and we need to make sure that there are no
dirtbags in senior leadership positions, I know way too many
examples of very good people who are caught up in this process,
whose names are maligned, who don't have a chance to defend
themselves until the investigation is nearly complete. They
don't even know what charges are brought against them. In the
court of public opinion, they are already guilty. They are not
exonerated publicly at all. So they end up--them and their
families are held in shame for long periods of time, only to
kind of disappear at the end of a long distinguished career.
This process--I mean, I hear and I know of way too many
examples of this. So, when we are talking about these processes
of sorting out the frivolous complaints, commanders have to
make tough decisions. Sometimes they have to clean up
organizations. Sometimes people don't like that. Sometimes
people have to, you know, be held accountable below them, and
we have got to be able to protect legitimate whistleblowers
while also protecting due process for the accused.
And, again, I have way too many examples that bring concern
to me about this process, both at the service level and at the
DOD IG level. So a couple of quick questions. We also I think
have a culture, by the way, if any of them ask for a lawyer,
they must be guilty. But then we have investigators that are
acting like prosecutors, and they are not getting the legal
advice that they need in order to not be trapped. So I think
that is a cultural issue, not necessarily a process issue.
So how long--if an investigation goes on and somebody is
exonerated, how long does that investigation stay on file? And
are they kept on file in order to confirm whether that person
is confirmable to a higher rank or a new job? Can anybody
answer that?
Mr. Fine. I can answer to the extent that we accumulate the
derogatory information, including substantiated findings, and
are required to provide that to both to Department and the
Senate when someone is up for promotion. We do it if there is a
substantiated case. If it is not substantiated, that is not
derogatory and----
Ms. McSally. So unsubstantiated cases are kept on file for
how long?
Mr. Fine. We keep the files. I mean, we don't get rid of
the files.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Fine. But in terms of--it doesn't go into their
personnel file.
Ms. McSally. Are we saying that there is no process by
which they are checking confirmability of any general officers
with unsubstantiated cases?
Mr. Fine. When we have a records check process and we do
that records check and if it is not substantiated, it does not
come up as a positive on that records check.
Ms. McSally. So it basically says nothing?
Mr. Fine. Right. We provide, you know, negative information
to the Department----
Ms. McSally. All right. What about the process of an
individual who is accused not knowing necessarily what they are
accused of until the investigation--in great detail, again, we
have heard recently of this happening--until the investigation
is wrapped up. And then they have to defend themselves after a
whole package of stuff has been put together, and now they are
having to, like, go through--down all these rabbit holes to
figure out how to defend themselves, instead of being upfront
right upfront. And this is an example from the Air Force.
General Harris.
General Harris. We defend our process, which we believe is
fair and accurate and thorough, and so we take the time to get
the information from our witnesses and the complainant in order
to gather all that together, and then, at the end, then we do
absolutely interview the subject so that they do have their
time to speak.
Ms. McSally. Do you see a concern that maybe an accused
needs to know upfront what they are accused of so they can in
parallel be preparing themselves to defend themselves because
sometimes these rabbit holes go deep, and then you are having
to unwind it if you are just handed this package at the end of
the whole thing?
General Quantock. Ma'am, I would just say, you have to be
very careful because if you start making allegations that you
just--you can set this individual up for reprisal. We do a lot
of--DOD IG does it. We do it. We do a credibility assessment.
In fact, there is a lot of heavy investigative load on the
front end as we try to see if--if this allegation is in fact
credible.
Credible determination is a big piece. Again, we work with
our DOD IG brethren up here to make sure that we agree, okay.
So then we will launch an investigation. But we want to get
some facts together. Because we also don't want to set this
general officer up, ``Hey, you are under investigation for
this.'' Well, if that person happens to be under command and it
may be unsubstantiated, then any time he deals with the person
who is making the complaint could set this person up for
reprisal. So we are very careful in that respect.
Ms. McSally. I hear you, but do you understand the concern
that I am conveying, that you guys may go through a very
lengthy process, and then somebody is just handed the----
General Quantock. But once we determine there is credible--
a credible allegation, that person is basically, ``Hey, here is
what you are being accused of,'' and we read him rights.
Admiral Shelanski. And that is the same with us. We have a
script that, once it is determined to be credible and we are
going to investigate, there is a script that we read, and you
are--the complaint is as follows; the following rule and
regulation has been violated. We tell them to not interview or
talk to anybody. So there is a whole script to make sure that
they understand exactly what is----
Ms. McSally. I hear what you are saying. Again, the vast
majority of these cases are unsubstantiated and frivolous
allegations. I am talking about the individual who has served
their country well, who is now being held up for retirement,
who is now being moved with their family and wondering what
their future is, and has already been tried in the court of
public opinion. And in the end, it is unsubstantiated. But them
holding on, wondering what their fate is for long periods of
time, not getting an ability to defend themselves until it is
all over. It may make you feel better that it is
unsubstantiated at the end, but the process that they went
through is not a positive one. And that is one I think that
really we need to shine a greater light on in order to protect
those that are accused who in the end are innocent.
Is there any sort of way that they can be publicly
exonerated? I know I missed the first round, but I got--Okay.
All right. Thank you. I will wind up and come back again----
Mr. Coffman. Without objection----
Ms. McSally. If you don't mind. I won't be long.
Is there a way for them to be publicly exonerated for
something that they didn't commit when this is all over, to at
least clear people's names?
Mr. Fine. One thing we do is we consider our reports for
proactive release. If they are substantiated and involve a
high-level official, we do not wait for a FOIA request years
later, but we release it. At the same time, if it has already
received public attention, if somebody is out there as having
been accused of something, we will consider that for proactive
release as well, just so that the result of that investigation
can be----
Ms. McSally. Well, there is a difference between being in
the media and having an entire unit and everybody that has ever
served with somebody hearing all the rumors and innuendoes and
what is going on as far as the investigation goes.
So is there not a way that we can--when somebody is
cleared, that you can, regardless of whether it has been in the
public eye, say, ``This person is exonerated,'' or if they
request that? Maybe some people don't want that, but----
General Quantock. Well, I think, as long as the person
agrees, they can go to the public affairs officer and have
the--say, ``Hey, it was not substantiated.'' But a lot of
folks, people don't realize what is going on unless they have
been substantiated. Here is, at least in my view, I have seen
this for 6\1/2\ years. How these things get into the press and
how they get in there--I mean, I am not big into public release
and public shaming; that is just not what I am into.
However, what I believe in is that, every 6 months, we have
two folks that FOIA, ``Give me all the substantiations for all
general officers,'' and we do. We give them a spreadsheet;
``Here is all the substantiations for all general officers.''
And then they pick the salacious ones, and then that makes the
next headline, the next newspaper. That is how this works. So
they all get out there. All the salacious ones get out there.
Ms. McSally. Yeah, I am talking about the unsubstantiated
ones.
General Quantock. I know exactly what you are talking
about. I am just saying that most people, if they are not
substantiated, don't want it out there because they are under
investigation, because most people don't know.
Ms. McSally. I hear you.
Can you talk about the process of what investigations are
done by the services and which investigations are done by the
DOD IG, really briefly? I see in your testimony it says
normally three- and four-stars are at DOD IG level or something
that is of such a high level of attention.
But is there other determinations on that? And if the
services actually close an investigation and unsubstantiate it,
do we have cases where the DOD IG decides to open it up again
or take it on after the fact?
Mr. Fine. So, on the front end, we do the three-star and
four-star, the SES employees, Presidential appointees,
intelligence-type investigations. And if there is a conflict or
some reason why the service IG shouldn't do it or can't do it,
we will do those as well. Otherwise, they do the investigation.
When it is completed, they provide it to us for oversight. If
we think it is thorough and has done all the investigative work
that needs to be done, we approve it. If we don't, we can send
it back to them for additional work.
Ms. McSally. So is there ever cases where you then take on
an investigation yourself after they have closed it?
Mr. Fine. There has been occasion, yeah.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Fine. Yeah, for good reason. Very rarely.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Fine. For additional information or for some specific
reason, but it has happened.
Ms. McSally. Thanks, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to make something really clear from my
perspective. I think we do have a problem with different spanks
for different ranks. As I understand it, there have been 70,000
court-martials in the Air Force, for instance, and not 1
general officer has ever been court-martialed.
When some of my colleagues were talking about the UCMJ and
how if--what the UCMJ does is provide for accountability where
there wouldn't be--where this isn't criminal conduct. There are
cases that have just been brought to my attention. For
instance, Lieutenant General Ron Lewis, who misused government
credit cards at two strip clubs, falsely claimed his credit
cards had been stolen, fraudulently stole over a thousand
dollars from a credit card company, violated an order by going
to a restricted area, and had an inappropriate relationship, he
didn't get prosecuted under the UCMJ. He didn't have a court-
martial. A junior enlisted would get prosecuted for that
offense.
General Kip Ward, misuse of government resources for his
personal gain, and his family was ordered to pay back $82,000.
That is theft. And under normal circumstances, that would be
subject to a court-martial. So, as we look at this issue, I
think one of the things that I would like to see, Mr. Chairman,
is that we take the time to make sure that everyone is being
treated fairly in the military.
I would really appreciate having from each of the services
the number of court-martials, how many for enlisted, how many
for officers, so we can just take a look at that as well.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 137.]
And let me also point out to you that yesterday we passed a
very strong sexual harassment bill in the House. There have
been a number of Members who have resigned or are retiring as a
result of sexual harassment, not sexual assault, here. And I
think that, as we look at the military, we are going to expect
the same level of responsibility for conduct that we are now
expecting of Members of Congress.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. We will now take a brief recess in order to
set the witness table for the second panel. We will take a 5-
minute recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Coffman. I wish now to welcome our esteemed second
panel. We would like to respectfully remind the second panel to
summarize, to the greatest extent possible, the high points of
your written testimony in 5 minutes or less. Your written
comments and statements will be made part of the record.
Our second panel consists of General James C. McConville,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Bill Moran, Vice Chief
of Naval Operations; General Stephen W. Wilson, Vice Chief of
Staff of the Air Force; General Glenn M. Walters, Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
With that, General McConville, you may now make your
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES C. McCONVILLE, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY, UNITED STATES ARMY

General McConville. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Speier, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, good morning. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
The United States military is one of the most trusted
institutions in the country, and we value that bond of trust,
and we recognize that every single day we need to wake up and
earn that trust. While senior misconduct in the Army is down 51
percent, we know that one act of misconduct breaks that trust
of the America people.
Senior misconduct in the United States Army has no place.
Our senior officers are developed through decades of formal and
informal training on ethics, Army values, leadership, and
character. And we provide additional training for those leaders
who have been selected to serve as general officers. The vast
majority of our senior officers uphold our demanding moral and
ethical standards just as we, their soldiers, and the American
people expect them to.
We are not a perfect institution, but we strive to be one.
Senior officers who fail to meet the Army standards are held
accountable. I, along with the other Army leaders, am committed
to upholding the standards of our profession and ensuring all
our senior officers do the same.
I appreciate your time and attention this morning, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McConville can be found
in the Appendix on page 107.]

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral Moran. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, thank
you for the opportunity to be here to speak to the subcommittee
members, the American public, but most importantly this
morning, to talk to our sailors.
The foundation of our joint forces--this is going to sound
like a broken record and just demonstrates how much we believe
in the values of our institution. The foundation of the joint
force is trust. When senior leaders fail, trust at the
institution level is put at risk, which can have a profound
impact on every aspect of developing and employing this force.
So we all take this topic extremely seriously. And while we
all seem to be trending in the right direction, as Jim just
articulated, every single one of these matters. At the end of
the day, we are an institution comprised of human beings who
are indeed fallible. So, to get after this, we have taken
deliberate steps to train and develop our enlisted and officer
corps throughout their careers, to preclude moral and ethical
failures. And when they do fail, we address them in ways to
preserve the larger trust in the institution.
Being transparent and accountable is part of this effort.
Our goal is, by the time senior leaders are produced, they have
a solid foundation formed through years of experience where the
principles of ethical behavior and moral decision making and
proper professional conduct are not only taught but reinforced
and tested.
As you have heard from our inspector general, we not only
routinely track the data, we look for trends. When we see
evidence, we explore and derive lessons learned to be better
leaders. And while we have ethical guidelines and even rules to
limit the consequences of poor decision making, the rules alone
are not what you and the American public expect from us. You
expect us to live up to higher standards of professional
behavior.
Transparency along these lines is central to our efforts to
strengthen trust within our ranks, within the institution, with
the American public, and I believe it strengthens our
relationship with Congress.
So thank you for the opportunity to be transparent today,
to speak candidly and directly about this critical topic,
because it is the foundation of our profession. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Moran can be found in
the Appendix on page 113.]

STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General Wilson. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify before you today. On behalf of our
Secretary of the Air Force and our chief of staff and the
670,000 total force airmen around the globe, it is an honor to
be here. It is honor to be here with my vice chiefs.
Late last summer, on the eve of our 70th birthday as a
Nation--a service, I had the privilege to stand a few miles
from here on the turf of the Nationals Ballpark. Forty-six of
America's sons and daughters were in front of me, the backdrop
of the Capitol behind them. They were about to enter the United
States Air Force.
In that moment, I thought about what we owe those patriotic
volunteers in return for their selfless service and their
selflessness. The word that came to mind was trust. I think all
of us, all of us vice chiefs, view maintaining trust and
confidence with the American people and with our force as the
essential element of our past and future mission success. It is
for that reason that we employ a deliberate and career-long
continuum of learning, not only in operations and leadership,
but in law and ethical standards for all airmen and certainly
for our senior officers.
Despite those efforts, at times, senior officers do break
bonds of trust by faltering in judgment and/or character. And
in those instances, we leverage a robust system of
investigation and accountability. Complaints are investigated
by independent teams of professionals. Disposition is done with
objectivity, steeped in process and law.
I know I can speak for my fellow chiefs here: Even one case
of senior officer misconduct is too many. Our goal is for all
airmen to do what is right at all times, regardless of the
circumstances, and no matter the rank or the position. If they
fall short of that goal, we will hold them accountable for
their actions.
Thank you for your continued leadership and your
partnership as we seek to achieve that goal and, by extension,
maintain the trust of all airmen and the American people. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in
the Appendix on page 118.]

STATEMENT OF GEN GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
OF THE MARINE CORPS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

General Walters. Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Speier,
and distinguished members of the House Armed Services
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today and report to you on this very important issue, the moral
and ethical conduct of our Marine general officers.
We know that our Nation's citizens expect the very best
from their Marines. They expect operational excellence. They
trust that their Marines are women and men of the highest
character, both on the battlefield and in every aspect of their
lives. We Marines expect the same from ourselves. We readily
accept this responsibility.
Our core values of honor, courage, and commitment guide our
moral and ethical conduct of every Marine. All Marines are
custodians of these core values. Our senior leaders set the
example for every Marine to emulate. They understand this
responsibility, and they spend their lives upholding these
values. They understand that winning our Nation's battles
requires a foundation of character within every Marine, and it
starts with them.
Marines learn these sacred values early and often. We
believe that through our continuum of training throughout an
officer's career and oversight and education provided by our
inspection programs, we build ethical decision makers. At every
level of officer training and education, we continually and
consistently emphasize ethical leadership as the foundation of
leading Marines.
Over the last 10 years, the Marines have averaged one and a
half cases per year of substantiated general officer
misconduct. In nearly half of these cases, the mistakes have
been administrative in nature. While we take pride in the moral
conduct of our generals, we acknowledge that there is always
room to improve. Like every improving and learning
organization, we remain proactive to evolving our education and
training and programs to ensure the disciplined moral conduct
of every Marine, especially our general officers.
On behalf of our Commandant, General Robert Neller, we
thank the Congress and this subcommittee for the opportunity to
discuss this important issue. We appreciate your continued
support to ensure the joint force remains the very best
military our Nation requires and expects. And I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Walters can be found in
the Appendix on page 125.]
Mr. Coffman. Let me ask this question, and I would
appreciate an answer from the Army, Navy, then the Air Force,
and then the Marine Corps. Many of us are familiar with the
consequences of a court-martial, a conviction. But less
familiar with some of the other administrative and nonjudicial
actions that can be taken against service members.
Could you explain the other options available to you when
disposing of senior leader misconduct cases and the
consequences thereof?
General McConville.
General McConville. Yes, sir, I could. You know, what is at
our disposal if we don't go to a court-martial is we could do a
memorandum of concern, a memorandum of reprimand, but what
really hurts an officer is a general officer memorandum of
reprimand that we put in their official file. And that goes in
their official file. It basically ends their career as they go
forward. And as they go to retire, that is seen by the board
that adjudicates what rank they will retire at. So, basically,
you could lose one, two, three stars, depending on what rank
you retire at, which is hundreds of thousands of dollars, for
some type of misconduct at that level.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. I was going to mention the
retirement grade determination process that all of us go
through, for any flag officer, senior leader, who has had a
substantiated allegation, that what we term becomes adverse
information to their record. We must do a board, and we all do
that, we carry out that process. A retirement grade
determination for one- and two-stars is ultimately signed off
by senior leaders in the Navy. All of our services with the
Secretary level. And for a three- or four-star retirement,
grade determination must be approved by the Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. Coffman. Let me fully understand this. So that--you
give some sort of a letter of admonition or whatever that is
there. So it is a career killer. So that person is not going to
get promoted. They may be able to finish out their tour of duty
or--at some level, I suppose, be able to finish their career.
So then they go to retirement, and then they are reviewed by a
board to determine whether or not they are going to be reduced
in rank in retirement? Am I clear on that?
Admiral Moran. If it's adverse information, yes, sir. I
would add--I won't speak for the rest of the services here--but
for the Navy, if a senior officer is found with substantiated
allegations that are serious, they are not asked--they will not
stay for the rest of their tour. They are often relieved of
their command, relieved of their duties, and asked to retire,
and then we go through the retirement grade determination.
Mr. Coffman. So somebody that you were going to allow to
finish their--it was a letter of admonition. It is a career
killer, but you are going to let them finish their tour of
duty.
Admiral Moran. Not necessarily. If it is serious enough for
a letter of admonition, they are not going to continue.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
General Wilson.
General Wilson. We have the same process. Ours would be
letter of reprimand, or an Article 15 type of instance, and the
same things apply. We would determine whether or not they
should still serve in that job. In most cases, for a senior
officer, if they have an Article 15 or letter of reprimand,
then are going to be removed from that job immediately, and
they will go through an officer grade determination to follow.
Mr. Coffman. So, effectively, if somebody got a letter of
admonition, forced to retire, reduced in rank in that
retirement, it is literally the equivalent of a fine of
hundreds of thousands of dollars, am I correct?
General Wilson. That is correct.
Mr. Coffman. General Walters.
General Walters. Sir, we follow the same process. The one
example I could give you, albeit is 10 years old, we had a
selected two-star. He had a substantiated finding on him. He
was retired as an O-6.
Mr. Coffman. Wow.
General Walters. So he didn't get a second star. He retired
as an O-6. I actually did the calculation last night, and if
you compare his O-6 retirement to an O-8 retirement, what he
really lost in compensation over a 30-year retirement is $1.9
million.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you all for your presentations, for your
conversations yesterday.
I guess this question could be asked of you as well. Could
you inform us by letter of how many court-martials there have
been of general officers? The chairman just talked about, you
know, the potential loss of rank and loss of hundreds of
thousands of dollars over one's lifetime in retirement,
although they still keep their retirement.
I am more interested in the value of a security clearance
because that is worth a lot of money--a whole lot more money
than $200,000, frankly. And in some cases, these cases that
have come before us where they have lied and done things that
would question their moral turpitude, drunkenness, under normal
circumstances, someone could in fact lose their security
clearance. But I wonder how many do lose their security
clearance.
Does anyone have any thoughts on that? And if you don't, if
you could also provide that to us for the record. Of these
cases that--we have seen so much prominence, and we can provide
them to you if you don't know them off the top of your head--I
would be curious to know how many actually lose their security
clearance because that is more valuable, I think, than many
other things.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 138.]
Ms. Speier. Admiral, you talked about transparency in your
opening remarks, and I think that that is really important from
the congressional oversight perspective. The DOD IG does
disclose substantiated cases, but to my knowledge, there isn't
any means by which each of your services would disclose to
Congress, for instance, substantiated cases. Could each of you
inform us as to whether or not you would be supportive of that?
General McConville. As far as the Army, if this committee
wants those cases, absolutely.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Admiral Moran. Yes, ma'am.
General Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
General Walters. No problem, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Admiral, the Fat Leonard case has come up a number of
times, and it is probably the most egregious case in the
history, certainly of the Navy, if not the military in general.
Because so many people were involved and so many people
corrupted by this individual, I am stunned that there weren't
any bystanders that spoke up.
First question, how did it actually--there were a number of
cases that were investigated by NCIS [Naval Criminal
Investigative Service] because there was bid rigging or
overcharging for fuel or the like that he was engaged in, but
many of those cases were dismissed. Have you done kind of a
postmortem on that to look at where the holes were within the
chain of command in terms of identifying the issues and
addressing them?
Admiral Moran. Ma'am, I hope you will respect this comment.
It is an ongoing Federal investigation by the Department of
Justice and the U.S. Attorney. I am very uncomfortable
answering questions that could prejudice the case in any way,
and so answering some of that--what you just asked--could
potentially cause us problems. And when it is done, and we are
hopefully getting to the very end of this now, when it is done
and all the files are turned over to us, we will do that. And
there is a process in place to make sure that we evaluate every
single case that comes to the Navy. Whether they are handled by
the Department of Justice or not, they come to us for final
resolution, and we cannot talk publicly about that until the
Department of Justice is complete with their investigation.
Ms. Speier. No, I appreciate that. And I am not asking you
to do that, but from a policy standpoint, are there any new
policies that you recognize would be helpful in preventing
cases like this from, you know, exploding into scandals that
are of proportions that it is hard to even comprehend?
Admiral Moran. Most of the issues revolve around the
contracting for services in overseas ports, so we have taken a
very strong turn on the process by which we do that. We put
layers of oversight into how those contracts are issued and who
is issuing them. And that sort of training in our supply corps
and in our general support corps has been very strong over the
last 5 years, and we think that largely has helped us drive
down the number of misconduct cases that have resulted outside
the scope of the GDMA case.
Ms. Speier. One last question. Bystanders, do you think
bystanders have a duty to report? Question for each of you.
General McConville. Absolutely.
Admiral Moran. In every single case. We talk a lot about
this in sexual harassment training, sexual assault, but all
what we would call behaviors that are destructive in nature.
Oftentimes, it can be quelled by a bystander, and we try to
teach that value to everyone.
General Wilson. Completely agree.
General Walters. Yes, ma'am, we teach, see something, say
something.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much.
I appreciate all of you being here and your leadership. I
would like to just go back to a question I asked from the
previous panel about the different spanks for different ranks.
Do you think we are holding people equally accountable, in your
view, whether it is a midlevel, senior NCO [noncommissioned
officer] to a senior officer? Thank you.
General McConville. I do. My previous--I was commanding
general of the 101st Airborne Division for 3 years, had general
court-martial authority, handled a lot of the cases at the
lower level, and now as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for
the last 7\1/2\ months. I believe we hold everyone
appropriately accountable, and when we look at senior officers,
we expect a higher standard from them, and when they don't meet
the standards, we hold them accountable.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
Admiral Moran.
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir. Both Jim and I served as prior
``1s,'' which are personnel commands, and in every disciplinary
case, every single one that reaches the level of where we are
trying to determine if someone should be retired early or
retired without pay or so on and so forth or released from
Active Duty, we see every one of those packages, and as vice
chiefs we see them again.
And so I think we get to see, across the board, a pretty
balanced view of senior and junior cases. And I think we all
also believe that if we do not do this in a fair way, we are
going to be held accountable by our sailors, soldiers, airmen,
and Marines, so I think we are very conscious of doing this in
a correct way.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral.
General Wilson.
General Wilson. Congressman Bacon, I completely agree with
my counterparts here that we hold all of our airmen to one
standard. And I would also add, though, that we hold our senior
officers to an exceptionally high standard, that we know that
we will be judged by that. And so in my time as the vice chief,
I have seen that we are not going to walk by any problem, that
we are going to hold any senior officer who does any misconduct
accountable for that. We are going to investigate it, then hold
them accountable.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
General Walters.
General Walters. Yes, sir. I agree with all my counterparts
here. I will just add one thing, is to remember that our senior
officers, one shot and you are adjudicated, one shot and you
are down, perhaps, whereas on some of the junior ranks, we try
to give them a second chance. Not--it is not a zero defect
mentality. I would say it is almost a zero defect mentality the
higher up you go.
Mr. Bacon. I know I appreciated second chances when I was
18 and 19.
General Walters. Yes, sir. Me too.
Mr. Bacon. I want to just sort of pose a rough hypothetical
and whoever wants to speak up on it. I think part of the issue
is if you have someone who has served honorably for 30 years,
say they are a one- or two-star at that point, and you are 31
and 32 as a three-star, maybe involved in an unprofessional
relationship or whatever it may be, and then you have to
determine at retirement, do you go back to the two-star or one-
star, versus someone, say, at the 8-year point and they do
something similar, how hard is that, from your perspective, to
determine is going back rank to the 30-year point or should it
even be more serious, depending on the crime or action taken?
How hard is that when you are making these determinations, I
guess?
Because my point being is sometimes you go back to the last
rank honorably served, but yet if it is a junior enlisted or
something that maybe they suffer a career-ending decision
there. So I just--I would just be curious for your insights.
General Walters. Perhaps I could illuminate a little bit,
sir. The grade determination is a process that is in place for
all of us, but the reminder is if--I don't care if it is a
junior Marine or a senior Marine, if the action is criminal,
then there is no rank involved. I can name that one in the last
5 years where it was a senior officer, an O-6, and he is zero.
Mr. Bacon. And he would retire with no rank?
General Walters. He gets no retirement, he is in jail, and
he is zero. He has got no rank at all.
Mr. Bacon. Any other comments?
General McConville. I will follow along with the comments.
I agree. It is a difference. We have had two court-martials,
and one I won't talk about right now, but that have been
adjudicated over the last 10 years, and both officers were of
criminal-type nature, and we will court-martial them if they
warrant that. But when it looks at--you know, we weigh every
single case on its merits. We look at what the soldier or the
officer has done over the many years, and we weigh all that,
and we put it together, and we try to do the right thing when
it comes to making a decision on their future.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. McSally, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on my previous line of questioning. How
long are unsubstantiated reports kept in each of your services?
Do you know?
Admiral Moran. Maybe I will start. Are we talking just
senior officers, ma'am?
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Admiral Moran. Yeah. So we have other terms when we talk
about investigations where they are substantiations and then
there are unsubstantiated but reportable information.
Reportable meaning that it wasn't adverse, but it is still
required by the Senate for confirmation. So it is a little bit
different from----
Ms. McSally. Okay. And what is an example of something that
is unsubstantiated but reportable?
Admiral Moran. Well, let's say they were--someone was
accused of something. Boy, so many of these are fresh in my
mind from a topic I am not at liberty to talk about. But if it
was you were alleged to have gone to a dinner with a contractor
and accepted that dinner, and it was unsubstantiated that it
was accepted by you but it was alleged to be that you had--you
did attend a dinner with a contractor, that can be reportable,
but not----
Ms. McSally. So there are people that are going through an
entire investigative process, they are cleared, but yet in a
nomination, even though they are cleared, it is reportable to
the Senate for confirmation?
Admiral Moran. The Senate is----
Ms. McSally. The allegation?
Admiral Moran. The Senate is entitled to any information on
an officer being considered for promotion to the rank of O-7
and above.
Ms. McSally. Okay. That was kind of my line of questioning
in the last session, but it seemed like all the panelists said
that unsubstantiated claims are never taken into account for
jobs or rank. And so now I am hearing that they are,
unsubstantiated claims are taken into account.
Admiral Moran. They have to be accounted for. That doesn't
mean that will prevent them from being promoted. It just means
we have to----
Ms. McSally. So within the services--I don't know if each
of you can answer--is there anywhere informally or formally in
your process of considering someone for a new job or rank where
you actually look at unsubstantiated investigations as part of
that process?
General McConville. Well, one of the things that we look at
is titling. When we look at vetting an officer, we look at all
the databases that come up to see where that--and I will give
you an example. And, you know, this did not hold up the
officer, but the officer was titled because his dog got loose
in the neighborhoods. The MPs [military police] came by. They
titled him for having a loose dog in the neighborhood, and he
was, you know--actually, he was, you know, substantiated for
having the dog loose in the neighborhood. So----
Ms. McSally. I am talking about where people are cleared
and are they somehow in any informal or formal process, are
people looking at the files of their cleared allegations and
cleared investigation as to whether they are going to offer
them for a new job or promotion? Do you see what I am trying to
get to the core of here?
General Wilson. We don't do that.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Thanks, General Wilson.
General Walters.
General Walters. No, I mean, we are required to report all
the information in a confirmation to the Senate.
Ms. McSally. So all information includes unsubstantiated
claims?
General Walters. You have to report whether they were
investigated in some cases, and these are the rules that are
set. We don't have a big stack of all the--in my office of all
the unsubstantiated. I don't have any of those. That is really
the legal review, and they know what parameters that the Senate
requires that goes in with a confirmation package. I sign off
on those. And it is usually a paragraph at the bottom that says
something along the lines of we looked at OGD-278, we have
looked at this, and no substantiations, but there was an entry
in here, and that is all it will be. And then it will be up to
the Senate to say tell me more, if they are interested.
Admiral Moran. Congresswoman, you will remember a
nonpunitive letter in your days where that is between the
commander and the individual, not to be for anyone else.
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Admiral Moran. That is required--a nonpunitive letter for a
flag officer or a nominee for flag is required by the Senate to
be reported.
Ms. McSally. Okay. But are you saying it is the current
law, like we have in the law, like that if--I am talking about
IG investigations that are closed and somebody has been
exonerated, that still the--even though they are innocent, just
because they were accused, that has to be reported to the
Senate?
Admiral Moran. No, ma'am, that is not what I am saying. I
am saying that if something was issued to an officer that is up
for promotion to flag, unlike for the rest of the service,
anyone else with a nonpunitive, that is no one else's business.
Those are still required to be brought forward.
Ms. McSally. Okay. So it still goes back to my question is,
is there anywhere in the process within the services that--I
know we have heard from General Wilson--that unsubstantiated
investigations are looked at formally or informally by the
services whether you are considering somebody for a new job or
promotion?
Admiral Moran. In a promotion boards, if it is not adverse
information, it is not examined during the promotion board.
Ms. McSally. I am not talking about a promotion board. I am
talking about as you all sit around talking about who is going
to be put into this next job or considered for the next star--
--
General Walters. Generally speaking, is we are looking at a
slate is I guess what you are talking about, is we do a slate.
We do slates continuing through the year because things change
and demand signals on people change. I can't remember anybody--
well, it is only two of us, the Commandant and I, saying, well,
there is an unsubstantiated claim. That never comes up.
Ms. McSally. Okay. I am over my time.
General Walters. Substantiated, sure.
Ms. McSally. I don't know if you guys get what I am trying
to get at, but accused doesn't mean guilty, and I just want to
make sure that that is being taken into consideration.
Mr. Coffman. Dr. Wenstrup, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I have a question, something that
I think I am seeing a rise in, and it is not at the same level
of some of the cases we have been talking about today. But you
have, not general officers, but officers that have the
responsibility of making sure that their troops are doing the
things they are supposed to do. And I have become aware of a
couple cases where the lower ranking person, either officer or
enlisted, wants to resist that, and all the leader is doing is
saying, listen, you have got to be in line, you have got to get
your job done. Then they go, the person not doing their job, go
and accuse some kind of bias, that this leader has some kind of
bias. And what I am seeing is these leaders, then, they are now
the accused of something just because they were trying to make
sure someone did their job. They make this claim that some kind
of bias, and now that leader is tied up in knots distracted
from doing the job they are supposed to do every day because
they have to defend themselves, and we are losing good people,
because they get to the point where it is like I want out. I
don't need this harassment when all I am trying to do is do
what is right. And you are all shaking your heads like I am
familiar with this type of antics taking place.
How do we--I am not saying that there can't be leaders that
are out of line. Don't get me wrong. But how do we defend the
people that are getting tied up in knots and kept from doing
their job in leadership because somebody who is not doing their
job decides they are going to take that route? And are you
seeing a rise in this type of----
General McConville. Well, I think I can speak for our
service is very concerned about those type issues. We want
commanders not to be looking over their shoulders when they are
making decisions. On the other hand, we want to make sure that,
you know, our soldiers have access, you know, if they see
something wrong, to come forward, and it really becomes trying
to find that sweet spot in between. And we have to watch that
as we go forward. And you heard IG talk about that kind of
concern about how maybe some people are taking advantage, and
we just have to watch that, and we have to come back.
And there are things we can do when we look at some of the
cases. Some of them may be triage upfront. We take a look at
it. We--you know, and there is risk in that because the best
thing to do is do a 4- or 500-day investigation, you will be
absolutely sure that you have no issues probably at the end.
On the other hand, you may hold up someone at retirement or
something like that, and I am not sure that is fair either. So
we are trying to find the best way to make this fair for both
involved.
Dr. Wenstrup. I would like to see some focus on speeding up
that process, because I am seeing some good people get dragged
through the mud for absolutely no good reason whatsoever just
because you told someone they need to get their OER [officer
evaluation report] done. I mean, that is a little bit
ridiculous, and then they start saying you are picking on me.
So, obviously, I am speaking from a real experience, and I
would love to hear from more of you.
General Walters. Sir, I think what we are talking--we have
a process, and we want whistleblowers to have the option to
come forward and tell us when wrong things are being done. But
that process right now, the reprisal process is broad ranging.
We have a thing called request mast. Administrative errors, any
young Marine can go all the way up the chain of command to get
whatever he believes or she believes is an error corrected. But
what I think we are seeing a trend instead of using that
request mast is they have got to go talk to the commander, then
the commander's commander, and up the chain. Instead of doing
that, they just pick up the phone and make a complaint on a
hotline for an administrative error. They didn't get the award
they think, they did not think their fitness report was
accurate, or they did not get the leave they wanted, or they
got declined on leave.
So these are administrative in nature, and we have the
request mast process to adjudicate those and accommodate those
and allows leaders to fix things when they are broken. As soon
as they pick up the phone for those kinds of issues, it goes
into a different process, which as you pointed out, can take
too long.
Dr. Wenstrup. By the way, it is not me involved with one of
those. I was an outside observer.
Go ahead.
General Wilson. I really think we are a little bit out of
balance on the whistleblower reprisal piece. About 96 percent
of the cases are not substantiated, so it would tell you that
we are spending a lot of time and yet it is not in balance. And
to your point, that has a chilling effect, not only on the
commanders, but on the force when they can't--when you were
trying to execute good order and discipline and you feel this
cloud above you.
And we completely agree that if somebody is going to be
investigated, it should be done in a timely manner. If they are
found guilty, then let's move on with that. If not, they should
be also on the innocent side remove that quickly. It is taking
way too long.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.
Admiral Moran. I agree. Timeliness is the issue here, to
your point, sir. And when we can get better at that, I think it
will help resolve a lot of this. But we are spending the same
amount of time on very few cases that are ultimately
substantiated.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Russell, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you
for being here today.
I guess a lot of the statistics that we see amalgamated
together include military misconduct, what would be clearly
viewed as potential misconduct, but may not be translatable in
the civilian world. But it also includes a wide array of tools
that are used to address that misconduct, and all of that gets
rolled up into this statistical analysis.
And so I guess my question would be, what percent of the
cases that we see--and some of the statistics I have looked at
it is like, okay, so maybe 10 percent of the cases warrant
further investigation, so 90 percent kind of thrown out. Of the
10 percent that are there, roughly 30 percent of those end up
being substantiated. And those are rough figures but, you know,
seems to be some consistency there. So we are still talking
small percentages. But even among that portion, not all of
those are for like the big headline cases that we see. A lot of
them could be, you know, you moved a boat with your household
goods when you shouldn't have or something.
Would you speak to that? What percent of the cases would
never translate into offenses in civilian employment?
Admiral Moran. Well, I will start, I guess. It is really
hard to say. Since I graduated from high school, I have had a
uniform on, so I don't really know. I will try to get that
answer for you and put it in writing, but I wish I could tell
you. All I know is the standards we have----
Mr. Russell. Well, I mean, there are some things, just like
with a sailor, I mean, you know, he is swabbing the deck or a
soldier buffing the floors or whatever over something that
would never--they would never have anything entered in any
record or file, there would never be any offense. And I know
that also can apply to general officers on certain standards of
conduct that the military expects and demands certainly of our
senior leaders, but yet if they were in the corporate world,
this would not be anything that would translate, and yet that
is still part of the statistical body. And that is what I am
trying to get at, whoever would like to address that.
General McConville. You know, we have had things from
officer evaluation reports being late because the commander was
waiting on a discipline issue before he actually wrote the OER.
So, technically, he was substantiated for late OER because he
was just waiting for this thing to resolve. Of course, you
know, it didn't ruin his career, but he did go through a
process which delayed him, and it runs all the way to an
inappropriate relationship.
And even on the civilian side, if you had an inappropriate
relationship, inappropriate consensual relationship, we hold
people very accountable for those type things. If you went to a
gentleman's club, you know, on the civilian, but we hold people
very accountable for those type things, and I think we should
have a high standard in the military.
Mr. Russell. General Wilson.
General Wilson. Over the last 5 years, we have had 77
cases. As we looked at that, about 60 percent of them I am
going to call an error in judgment in administrative
procedures. About 25 percent of those involve personnel
matters, and those that involve some type of sexual harassment
or inappropriate relationship was under 15 percent.
Mr. Russell. Thank you.
General Walters.
General Walters. Sir, I am looking at--so in the last 10
years, we have had 15 in our general officers. I was looking at
them, most of them are admin. They wouldn't be taken--held
accountable out in the government. I had one TAD [temporary
additional duty] where he got extra money on his TD [temporary
duty] claim. I guess that is theft, and that could be
chargeable out in the civilian world. We took care of it. I
think it was 10 bucks. And we made him cut a check, and then we
reprimanded him.
Mr. Russell. And I appreciate that.
And, Mr. Chairman, that is part of what I am just trying to
establish is that a lot of the statistics, you know, are rolled
into where it looks like a greater problem of misconduct.
And then my final question for Admiral Moran would be, we
have heard mentioned in both panels today the Fat Leonard case
and some things like that, but when a case comes up like that
that has translated over to the Justice Department, is the
military limited in how it can even comment or even defend or
maybe portray the other side of the story while it is in the
Justice Department and outside of the Department of Defense?
Admiral Moran. Yes, sir, we absolutely are. So I look
forward to the day when I can come back to this committee and
testify about what we have learned from that and about the
things we have put in place to address it. And that is much
where I was going with Congresswoman McSally's question. I am
very focused on that right now, and it is hard to talk about
it.
And some of those cases where they go through a justice
review and end up in a Navy review and are ultimately
unsubstantiated after years of investigation are really tough
to account for, but Congress now expects us, Senate expects us
to address that, even though they were unsubstantiated, just so
they know we have looked thoroughly at it. That was my point.
Mr. Russell. And I think that is important to note, Mr.
Chairman, because many times what might be the appearance of
that they are trying to hide or harbor information, the reality
is when it translates from Department of Defense over to
Department of Justice, they are prohibited from providing
perhaps very illuminating or alternative views, but yet they
can't, and so I think that is very important to establish in
the hearing today.
And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Ranking Member Speier.
Ms. Speier. In conversations with one of you, I guess it
was over someone being reprimanded for endorsement, it came up
that general officers could have outside employment. And then
we checked the UCMJ and found out there is no prohibition for
general officers to have outside employment, which I think is
pretty stunning. Would you approve of us passing an amendment
that would prohibit outside employment?
General McConville. I certainly would. I don't know what
general officer has time to have outside employment. I would
like to know who the person was.
Ms. Speier. That is what I was saying.
Admiral Moran. Yes, I want his job.
General McConville. If he is in the Army, I will get a new
job for him.
Admiral Moran. Ma'am, we will go back and look at the
statutes, but I want to believe that we are prohibited from
outside employment. We are not prohibited from serving on
certain organizations that are for the benefit of the military
services or volunteer organizations as a board member or a
contributor to that. But generally speaking, we have been
prohibited for as long as I can remember.
General Wilson. I agree with my colleagues.
Ms. Speier. All right.
General Walters. No, ma'am, I only experienced it once. I
was invited to be a member of a board for a heroes flight, and
my counsel said you can't. And it was gratis, so--I didn't have
the time anyway.
Ms. Speier. General Wilson, I am going to ask you just to
write me a memo on this, but to have 70,000 court-martials in
the Air Force and never once a court-martial of an officer
suggests that maybe there is something to that, so I would just
like you to write me a memo to give me some of your thoughts on
that.
The UCMJ also has a statute of limitations that in many
cases is less than it would be in the civilian world. For
instance, for bribery, UCMJ has a 5-year statute of
limitations. In the general society, it can be 7 to 10 years.
Would you look at the statute of limitations for, you know,
various forms of conduct in the military and give us your
recommendations as to which ones should be increased.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 139.]
Ms. Speier. And then, finally, General Walters, this was in
the paper today, in case you haven't seen it.
General Walters. Is that USA Today, ma'am?
Ms. Speier. Yes. It is ``Marine Corps brushed off sex
charges.'' And what is stunning about this particular case is
that you have two women who have been sexually harassed by the
same person, and nothing happened. And when the one survivor of
the sexual harassment went to her superior, they said no one
will believe you. And if you have heard anything from the
Members of Congress over the last few months is we believe the
women. So I hope that this becomes an anomaly as we continue to
evolve in terms of the issue of sexual harassment. I think we
have a huge problem. We have a huge problem in our academies,
and I think we have a huge problem in our services. That isn't
even getting to the issue of sexual assault. That is the issue
of sexual harassment, and I think we have got to do something
dramatic to shift the culture.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Ms. McSally, you are now recognized.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
So as we have talked about in both panels, we have got
probably an issue with reprisal whistleblower maybe being
overly utilized and legitimate cases obviously need to be
addressed and people need to be held accountable, but the
system is being bogged down with a lot of other cases. And in
some cases, as we all know, people, maybe it is their
situational awareness is low and their perception of reality is
such that they are reporting what they believe to be wrongdoing
that you all unsubstantiate. But in some cases somebody may be
fraudulently claiming wrongdoing of someone above them and you
will investigate that.
Again, assuming the person has been exonerated, has there
ever been examples of going back and the accused, you know,
being looked at for false claims or fraudulent claims or lying
to investigators or anything like that in those cases?
No examples of that at all?
General Wilson. I am not aware of any.
Ms. McSally. Is there a process even to take a look at
that, that somewhere along the line----
General Walters. I will put that under the heading of you
don't want to put anything out there that will preclude someone
from coming forward in the future. Good one.
Ms. McSally. Totally agree. However, if somebody has
brought together a false allegation----
General Walters. If they truly believed in their
allegation, although it proved to be false, I still don't
think--and it turned out not to be true, I don't think there
is----
Ms. McSally. My bet would be that would be the vast
majority of cases, but there may be a rare case within the
process that you need to take a look at whether, you know--
their own conduct is the issue. Is there any sort of process
there to even take a look at that, whether somebody lied or has
a fraudulent claim or anything like that? Everybody deserves
due process.
Admiral Moran. I am told there is a process, but can we get
back to you with a written response to that to give you more
detail behind it?
Ms. McSally. Sure. Great.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 140.]
Ms. McSally. And I don't know if you all can answer this
versus the IGs on the first panel, but what sort of training do
the investigators go through? And is there any sort of review
to ensure that they don't take a prosecutorial mindset of, you
know, rewarding getting some kills versus fact finding and just
sort of oversight of the investigator selection and processes?
Admiral Moran. I think that is another one we can get back
to you on, Congresswoman, but there have been perceptions of
that in the past, and I know that I have personally had
discussions with the gent sitting behind me in our IG chair,
and when we see that, he normally addresses it in his command,
and I trust that he will take appropriate action if there is
any evidence of that.
Ms. McSally. Any other comments on that?
General McConville. No, I agree. I think it is, you know,
same thing with our IG. That is why we have a lot of checks and
balances in the system, both in the legal side and the command
side. At least from where we sit, it is not arbitrary; it is
how these decisions are made, and that is why they take some
time because they are reviewed at every single level to make
sure we don't have things like that happening.
Ms. McSally. Anyone else?
General Wilson. I just think all the IGs would say that
they spend a lot of time on making sure their investigators are
trained right and trained appropriately. There are probably
cases where that has happened, overzealous investigators,
before, but I know all of us are emphasizing with our IGs the
importance of the training in doing it right.
Ms. McSally. General Walters.
General Walters. Always have to be on the lookout for that,
ma'am.
Ms. McSally. Thanks.
Would you all support--I mentioned on the first panel, if
someone who is exonerated wanted there to be a public statement
made that they were exonerated, would you support a process
that you all did that, not them, but you all did that?
General McConville. I would be glad to do it.
Admiral Moran. Same.
General Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. McSally. Is that something----
General Walters. No problem.
Ms. McSally [continuing]. We have to do or is that
something you could do within your own procedures, to allow
that option if they want you to make a statement that they have
been cleared?
General Walters. Let's look at the procedures, ma'am. And
my sense is, much like the IGs told you, that once it is over,
most members who are exonerated just want it to be done. They
don't want to bring it up again.
Ms. McSally. But if somebody would want it to be publicly--
--
General Walters. I don't see why we would not accommodate
that.
Ms. McSally. Can you all get back to me as to whether that
is internal or whether that is something we need to do? Great.
Thanks.
I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 141.]
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Russell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one comment on the outside employment. Unless
something has changed, officers in all the services are
prohibited from doing outside employment. The exception
probably back to the time we have been wearing tricorn hats was
they could write for publication and they could, if you had
some particular person whose wartime memoirs or experiences
were needing to be captured or published, you know, I think of
people like General Marshall and others people wanted to know,
and they were allowed to publish their memoirs or do things of
that nature. I am not sure that, Mr. Chairman, a bill would be
needed. I think all of that is currently in place, and then we
also don't want to put prohibitions on our Guard and Reserve
flag officers. My goodness, they wouldn't be able to eat and
feed their families. If any of you care to comment on it, that
is fine.
But, General Walters, you did not have a chance to reply
to, you know, we are accustomed in Congress to often getting
headlines that we don't deserve or that maybe we do, but would
you care to comment on the headline that was presented earlier?
General Walters. No, sir. I mean, it was brought to our
attention on Monday night. I know the reporter asked for some
information. We couldn't turn the FOIA information, the
redacted PII [personally identifiable information] fast enough
for him before he published. We have our lawyers looking into
it, and they are actually with the complainant right now
working out the mitigation plan. So we are looking deep into
it. I don't know all the facts yet, but I will find all the
facts.
Ms. Speier. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Russell. Of course.
Ms. Speier. This is a case that dates back to 2013 and
2017?
General Walters. Yes, ma'am. I think 2013 was in the
actions--what I was briefed in last night, 2013 were the
actions. The complaint came in and I think--I believe, I don't
know, but I believe that mitigation was put in place, but the
mitigation broke down, and now we have to go look at mitigation
again.
Ms. Speier. Well, there was a second--there was second
woman who then came forward, so there is----
General Walters. Right. And that one never reported, but
now she has, so we have to look at it.
One of the problems is getting people to report and having
trust in the system. And we have seen the increase of
reporting, and we have established, through the task force, I
will take this opportunity to offer a full brief on all we have
done since last year.
Ms. Speier. I don't want to take the gentleman's time.
Mr. Russell. And reclaiming the time, and I thank the
gentlelady.
And it is important we establish those trust and that we do
those things. And I think, Mr. Chairman, you know, with your
leadership, we have seen from our service academy
superintendents and commandants that have come and provided us
testimony that many times there is a very good process. And
when, you know, mention was made on some of that, that there
being a big problem, I would disagree. I think our hearings
here have substantiated that, while there are issues that
certainly must swiftly be dealt with, when compared to
collegiate America, my goodness, you know, colleges would love
to have the problems that our academies have in terms of
virtually nil in statistics. That doesn't mean that things that
happen there, they have to be swiftly dealt with to the fullest
extent of the uniform code and also law and criminal cases, but
I think that those hearings have been very, very helpful.
And thank you for your response, General Walters, on that.
And being a true conservative, I will even give back some time,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. I wish to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony this morning. Senior leader misconduct is an
extraordinarily important issue, and I want to thank the
witnesses for their candor.
There being no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

February 7, 2018

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 7, 2018

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 7, 2018

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[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING

February 7, 2018

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Mr. Fine. There are 76 civilian investigators and 1 military who
conduct senior official and whistleblower reprisal investigations at
the DOD OIG. Of the 76 civilian investigators, 63 have prior military
experience. [See page 27.]
General Quantock. We are authorized 20 investigators for senior
officials, 9 are Civilian and 11 are Military. This is investigators
only, it does not include those in leadership positions or those who
conduct complaint intake analysis. [See page 27.]
Admiral Shelanski. All of the NAVINSGEN investigators are civilian.
[See page 27.]
General Harris. The Air Force senior official investigations office
has 3 civilian investigators (GS-15s) and 8 military investigators
(colonels). [See page 27.]
General Ottignon. GMC rates 3 civilian senior official
investigators, currently 2 are assigned. Hiring actions are underway
for 2 additional civilian investigators. [See page 27.]
General Quantock. In FY17, the Army tried 531 courts-martial. Of
that number, 36 accused personnel were officers and 495 were enlisted
Soldiers. [See page 34.]
Admiral Shelanski. See attached chart for Navy Courts-Martial
summary. [See page 34.]

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

General Harris. The chart below shows the number of court-
martials--breaking out enlisted and officer--for the last five years.
[See page 34.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enlisted Officer Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 709 32 741
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 525 31 556
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 509 38 547
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 469 24 493
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 464 24 488
------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Ottignon. Disposition of corrective actions (court-
martials) records are maintained by the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant. [See page 34.]
Second panel
General McConville. Since 1999, the Army has preferred courts-
martial charges against four general officers. Three courts-martial
were tried to completion, the fourth is ongoing. The security clearance
status for these officers is as listed:
James Grazioplene: Does not have an active security clearance.
Jeffrey Sinclair: Does not have an active security clearance.
David R. Hale: Does not have an active security clearance.
Roger Duff: Does not have an active security clearance.
Over the last 5 years, the Army substantiated misconduct in 113
investigations involving 121 general officers (GOs). Total number of
substantiated allegations was 174. Of the 121 GOs substantiated for
misconduct between FY13 and FY17:
1--was prosecuted at a General Court-Martial and 1 is the defendant
in an ongoing General Court-Martial.
2--received Article 15s.
32--received Memorandums of Reprimand from the Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army (VCSA) or another commander.
35--received Memorandums of Concern from the VCSA or equivalent
written counseling from another commander or the Deputy Judge Advocate
General (DJAG).
34--received Verbal Counseling from the VCSA, another commander, or
DJAG.
1--retired GO had a master's degree previously awarded by the Army
War College revoked.
5--cases were not referred for Army disciplinary action because
they involved minor technical infractions investigated after the
officer retired or reflected misconduct in a civilian employment
capacity for a Reserve officer and were referred to the proper channel
for resolution. In 5 cases, the VCSA directed no action after reviewing
the investigative file and receiving legal advice.
5--cases are still pending disposition. [See page 39.]
Admiral Moran. In a review of court-martial records going back as
far as 2007, the Navy has no record of a court-martial of any flag
officer. In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted a flag
officer in federal court for misconduct committed while on active duty,
and in 2017 the DOJ indicted a retired flag officer for offenses
allegedly committed while on active duty. In these cases, DOJ
involvement precluded the Navy from court-martialing these officers.
In the past five years, there have been 24 substantiated misconduct
investigations against flag officers. Of these cases, 11 were a result
of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia investigation. The accountability
actions taken against the flag officers included relief of command,
administrative counseling, Secretarial letters of censure, and non-
judicial punishment. Two officers investigated for allegations of
misconduct related to GDMA had their local access to classified
material suspended. Of note, a Commander's decision whether to suspend
local access to classified materials for a service member under their
command is not part of the accountability process. Rather, this is a
separate determination as to whether the adverse or derogatory
information affects the standards used for clearance eligibility.
General Wilson. A search of the Air Force's current database, which
goes back through 1997, reveals no courts-martial involving a general
officer and no clearances revoked. [See page 39.]
In the past 5 years, Air Force Inspector General Investigations
substantiated 77 military senior officials' allegations. Command action
in those cases included: Article 15--1 Letter of Reprimand--21 Letter
of Admonishment--11 Letter of Counselling--24 Alternative Disposition
(verbal counselling or no action)--14 ``Other''--3 Pending--3 [See
page 39.]
General Walters. There have been no general officers court-
martialed in the Marine Corps in the last five years.
There have been nine* misconduct allegations substantiated against
general officers, and one against an SES in the last five years. [*
This number does not include 2017 contempt finding in Military
Commissions case].
In each case, the senior official was counseled and/or received a
non-punitive letter of caution (NPLOC). One officer who had been
selected for major general was eventually removed from the promotion
list after allegations were substantiated against him and his selection
was reviewed by a Promotion Review Board (PRB). The PRB determined
that, in light of the substantiated allegations, the officer was no
longer qualified for promotion.
The Marine Corps reviews on-going and completed misconduct
investigations prior to forwarding a general officer's nomination and
when determining an appropriate retirement grade recommendation.
No general officer has had their security clearance revoked. [See
page 39.]
General McConville. Due to recent updates, we do not recommend any
changes at this point. The Military Justice Review Group (MJRG)
recently studied this issue as part of a ``comprehensive and holistic
review'' that examined all punitive articles and recommended extending
the statute of limitations (SOL) for a child abuse offense from 5 to 10
years, extending the SOL for fraudulent enlistment to 5 years or the
length of the enlistment, and creating a new extension of the SOL when
DNA evidence implicates an accused for certain offenses. Congress
adopted these recommendations in NDAA FY17. Based on the recency and
completeness of the MJRG review, the accompanying appellate issues each
change generates, and the potential for due process violations, we are
not requesting any changes at this time. [See page 48.]
Admiral Moran. This issue was recently considered by the Military
Justice Review Group (MJRG). In December 2015, the MJRG reviewed the
question of whether the statutes of limitation in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) should be modified and the group's
recommendations were incorporated into the Military Justice Act of 2016
(MJA16).
The 2015 review and study of statute of limitations by the MJRG,
including a comparison with federal law, found that the statute of
limitations provisions under the UCMJ are largely in step with federal
counterparts for common law crimes. The three recommended substantive
changes that were included into MJA16 as changes to the statutes of
limitations established in Article 43, UCMJ are as follows: 1) Child
Abuse. Article 43(b)(2)(a) extends the statute of limitations
applicable to child abuse offenses from the current five years or the
life of the child, whichever is longer, to ten years or the life of the
child, whichever is longer, thereby aligning with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3283
(in 2006, Congress raised the limitations period in the Title 18
provision from five years to ten years).
2) Fraudulent Enlistment. Article 43(h) extends the statute of
limitations for Article 83 (fraudulent enlistment) cases from five
years to (1) the length of the enlistment, in the case of enlisted
members; (2) the length of the appointment, in the case of officers; or
(3) five years, whichever is longer.
3) Cases Involving DNA Evidence. Article 43(i) extends the statute
of limitations until a period of time following the implication of an
identified person by DNA testing that is equal to the otherwise
applicable limitations period, thereby aligning with 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 3297. Pursuant to Article 43, murder; rape and sexual assault;
rape and sexual assault of a child; absence without leave or missing
movement in time of war; and any other offense punishable by death may
be tried and punished at any time without limitation.
The statute of limitations for all other offenses is five years;
however, Article 43(d)-(g) provide several additional exceptions to the
statutes of limitations described above. These exceptions provide added
authority and flexibility for prosecuting offenses in a number of
circumstances unique to the military justice system including for
offenses committed in a time of war; when an accused is absent from
territory in which the United States has the authority to apprehend
him, or is in the custody of civil authorities or enemy forces; and
when prosecution is considered to be detrimental to the prosecution of
war or inimical to the national security. [See page 48.]
General Wilson. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a
five-year statute of limitations for most crimes. Congress has also
provided for an increased statute of limitations for some of the most
serious crimes to include murder, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of a
child. While statutes of limitations vary by state and federal civilian
jurisdictions, the current statute of limitations provision in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for adequate time to
prosecute instances of misconduct within the military.
Any change to the statute of limitations must consider the purposes
of such limitations. A statute of limitations ensures criminal
allegations are resolved in a timely fashion, ensures the availability
of evidence for both the prosecution and defense, and enables a fair
process. Given the purposes of statute of limitations provisions, the
adequacy of such provisions within the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and the availability of administrative actions, we do not
recommend any modification to the statute of limitations at this time.
[See page 48.]
General Walters. The Marine Corps is part of the Joint Service
Committee (JSC) on Military Justice. The JSC process continuously
evaluates whether changes to the UCMJ are warranted. The JSC was also
part of the recent Military Justice Review Group's comprehensive
revision of the Manual for Court-Martial which resulted in Military
Justice Act of 2016. The MJA of 2016 included some revisions to the
length of the statutes of limitations under Art. 43, Uniform Code of
Military Justice. There are no additional recommended changes at this
time. [See page 48.]
______

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY
General McConville. We take sworn and recorded testimony. Each
complainant, witness and subject are advised that they are required to
provide truthful testimony. If it is determined that an individual
provided a false official statement during an IG investigation, then
the matter could be referred to the appropriate command/organization
for resolution. It could also be documented as a substantiated finding
in the IG database. However, it is rare for us to find that an
individual provided false statements during an IG investigation. [See
page 49.]
Admiral Moran. Yes. If the claim is false, the complainant's
veracity in filing the complaint could be reviewed and addressed by
appropriate authorities at their discretion. ``Appropriate
authorities'' is a direct reference to the complainant's chain of
command. A commander or supervisor could/would be the appropriate
authority to address an allegation of misconduct on the part of a
service member or civilian (e.g., knowingly filing a false IG
complaint). [See page 49.]
General Wilson. Should a report submitted to any investigative
agency uncover misconduct, whether by the subject of the investigation
or by the person making the report, the Air Force maintains avenues to
appropriately respond to any misconduct. This might include criminal
prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, if the evidence
supports such action.
Integrity is one of the Air Force's core values and any lapse in
integrity, to include fabricating allegations of wrongdoing to utilize
the investigative process in a malicious manner, is taken seriously by
all levels of command. This would include knowingly making false
official statements or false claims to an investigator. [See page
49.]
General Walters. When a service member, in the process of making a
claim of reprisal or some other allegations, is suspected of making a
false official statement, which is a criminal offense under Article 107
UCMJ, the command or military law enforcement will investigate the
matter in order to provide the cognizant commander relevant information
to decide on how the alleged misconduct will be addressed. [See page
49.]
General McConville. All Army Inspectors General undergo a highly
structured, fully accredited training program based on the adult
learning model. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the
American Council on Education are the accrediting authorities for both
the Army IG Basic and Advanced Courses. Specifically for
investigations, the Basic Course provides 28.5 hours of hands-on,
scenario-driven instruction, and the Advanced Course provides 7 hours
of advanced critical-thinking and writing instruction. In a learner-
centric environment that leverages state-of-the-art, interactive
simulation and other technologies, students learn both policy and
doctrinal aspects of IG investigations through a combination of large-
and small-group instruction facilitated by hands-on practical exercises
based upon actual cases. The instructors then assess student knowledge
and application skills through a combination of knowledge-based tests
and application-based graded homework exercises. IG investigators
continue to enhance their skills and techniques through their local IG
office provided training and external training opportunities, such as
the Department of Defense IG Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations
course.
In addition to the above training, all investigators assigned to
conduct senior official investigations participate in a week-long
Investigator Development Program. This training focuses specifically on
those processes and procedures unique to senior official
investigations. It consists of 9 training blocks, each taught by an
experienced senior official investigator. Also, all new investigators
are assigned a civilian mentor who works with his/her mentee until the
new investigator has demonstrated proficiency in all tasks regarding
senior official investigations. Our extensive review process, which
includes peer reviews, multiple legal reviews, and several leadership
reviews, ensures that all investigations are thorough, accurate, and
unbiased, and that the conclusions are supported by a preponderance of
credible evidence. [See page 49.]
Admiral Moran. Investigators go through Basic and Advanced Hotline
training and Military Whistle Blower Reprisal Courses. The tenet that
``we serve as impartial fact-finders for the directing authority, and
are in no position to pass judgment or execute punishment,'' is
reinforced through the training, during practical exercises of
interviewing and report writing. Instructors, mentors, and leaders
evaluate these techniques throughout the courses and also provide
checks and balances, as an ongoing measure, from the Naval Inspector
General Headquarters, through quality assurance checks and oversight of
inquiries and reports of investigation that are within the purview of
the Naval Inspector General. [See page 49.]
General Wilson. Air Force senior official investigating officers
come from a variety of backgrounds. Nearly all are graduated senior-
level (colonel) commanders with 20+ year careers in the Air Force or
other military service. These investigating officers are chosen
selectively for their past performance, judgement, and maturity. The
training they receive includes interview training, investigating
writing training, courses presented by the Office of the Inspector
General, Department of Defense, and an extensive internal ``block
training'' process. Central to the training is the Council for
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ``Quality Standards for
Investigations.'' These standards and associated training explicitly
focus on ensuring investigations are independent, fair, thorough,
accurate, objective, impartial, ethical, unbiased, and accomplished
with due professional care. All Air Force senior official cases are
investigated using a ``team concept'' with an Investigating Officer and
an imbedded attorney advisor assigned to each investigation from start
to finish. The investigations are overseen by the Director of Senior
Official Inquiries. And, each investigation receives a separate and
fully independent legal review by the Director of Administrative Law
for the Air Force upon its completion. Our sole focus and desired
outcome is an independent, fair, accurate, thorough, and objective
investigation without regard for the specific finding on any individual
allegation. [See page 49.]
General Walters. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
[See page 49.]
General McConville. In accordance with our procedures, we try to
maintain the confidentiality of IG investigations to the maximum extent
possible. Each individual who provides information or testimony in
support of an IG investigation is told to not discuss the matters with
anyone other than the IG. Additionally, most of our investigations are
not ``sensitive'' or ``newsworthy'' and only involve a few personnel.
In the typical case, we do not see the need for a public exoneration.
In the rare instances when a senior official investigation becomes
widely known and has adversely impacted the organization, as well as
the credibility of the senior official, we would certainly support a
formal statement issued via public affairs channels that enables the
Army to publicly acknowledge that the senior official was cleared of
any wrongdoing. [See page 50.]
Admiral Moran. No. NAVIG does not support publically acknowledging
cases that are not substantiated. This protects the subject from
unwanted and unwarranted attention that may cause a negative perception
about them based on false allegations and may be damaging to their
career. [See page 50.]
General Wilson. The result of any investigation is always available
for official purposes internally within the Air Force and is generally
releasable to the subject of that investigation subject to legal
requirements. However, the Air Force currently does not provide a
public statement when any Airman, to include a senior leader, is
exonerated of an allegation. Such statements are generally not
permitted under the Privacy Act. However, if the subject of the
investigation permits the Air Force to release information that SAF/IG
did not substantiate an allegation against him/her, they could sign a
Privacy Act release authorizing the AF to release such information.
[See page 50.]
General Walters. When a servicemember is no longer the subject of
an investigation, and will be the subject of no criminal or
administrative action, it may be because that person has been
exonerated or it has been determined that there is simply not
sufficient evidence to proceed. In either case, there is no formal
process for publically and specifically addressing the fact that a
servicemember is no longer a suspect of criminal misconduct during or
following an investigation. Rather, the commander has the prerogative
to address the matter directly with the accused or through their
counsel. [See page 50.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 7, 2018

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
need?
Mr. Fine. Whistleblower Reprisal Case Backlog

The largest backlog exists in whistleblower reprisal cases. As of
March 6, 2018, there were 279 open whistleblower reprisal cases at the
DOD OIG. The 279 open cases are composed of 78 investigations, 122
intakes, 50 Alternative Dispute Resolution cases, and 29 cases from the
Military Services and the DOD Component IGs that the OIG is providing
oversight review. Of the 78 investigations, 75 (96%) are over 180 days
old and 67 (86%) are over 1 year old.
From FY 2013 to FY 2017, the number of reprisal complaints received
by the DOD OIG increased from 1,059 to 1,808 (71%) and the number of
intakes dismissed increased from 495 to 892 (140%). Because DOD OIG
investigators had to respond to the dramatic increase in incoming
complaints, they closed fewer investigations (decrease from 47 to 37).
Included in the increase in caseload is a significant increase in
the number of cases where sexual assault victims have alleged that
reprisal actions were taken against them. As of March 6, 2018, the DOD
OIG had 84 open sexual assault related reprisal cases. The 84 open
cases are composed of 30 investigations and 54 intakes.
The DOD OIG has implemented several initiatives to attempt to
address the large increase in workloads.
[bullet] In FY 2013, we deployed the Defense-Case Activity
Tracking System (D-CATS) enabling a paperless environment for data and
documentation and the seamless transmittal of cases within the DOD OIG.
[bullet] In FY 2014, we created the Oversight Branch with
investigators dedicated to performing oversight reviews of reprisal
cases referred to the Military Service and DOD Component IGs.
[bullet] In FY 2016, we streamlined the oversight process,
eliminating a backlog of over 200 cases, and improving the time to
complete oversight reviews from 70 days to 10 days.
[bullet] In FY 2016, we initiated reviews of the investigative
operations of the Military Service IGs to identify areas for improved
efficiency and to share best practices.
[bullet] In FY 2017, we established an Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) capacity, with a team a personnel who have completed
108 ADR cases and 18 settlements.

Resources Needed
At the start of FY 2018, I reallocated 21 FTEs from other DOD OIG
components to the Administrative Investigations (AI) Whistleblower
Reprisal Directorate (WRI) and DOD Hotline in an attempt to improve the
timeliness of the intakes and investigations conducted by the DOD OIG.
The DOD OIG has been aggressively recruiting and onboarding staff to
fill those FTEs, with 11 of 21 (52%) onboard.
However, more resources are needed. First, we need an increase of
21 FTES for the DOD OIG end strength in order to backfill the 21 FTEs
in the other DOD OIG components from whom I reallocated resources to
the whistleblower reprisal and Hotline units. This is necessary to
prevent the other DOD OIG components from suffering due to personnel
loss, in execution of their important missions.
Second, we need 10 FTEs to perform the process reviews of the
Military Service IGs. In FY 2016 and FY 2017, the DOD OIG conducted
process reviews of the Naval IG and the Air Force IG. We recently
initiated a review of the Army IG. These reviews, which are similar to
Federal IG peer reviews, are in-depth systemic assessments of
investigative operations. They require a team of 10 full time
investigators from 6-8 months to complete. We intend to conduct reviews
of each Military Service IG at least once every 3 years.

Senior Official Cases

As of March 6, 2018, there were 35 open senior official cases at
the DOD OIG. The 35 open DOD OIG cases were composed of 12
investigations, 13 intakes, and 10 cases from the Military Services and
the DOD Component IGs where the OIG is providing oversight review. Of
the 12 open DOD OIG investigations, 4 (33%) were over 180 days old and
1 (8%) was over 1 year old.
From FY 2013 to FY 2017, the number of senior official complaints
the DOD OIG received increased from 703 to 803 (14%). At the same time,
the average number of days the DOD OIG took to complete senior official
investigations increased from 267 days in FY 2013 to 472 days in FY
2017.
There are two primary reasons for the DOD OIG taking more time to
complete investigations in the past several years. First, is the
increasing complexity of the cases that occurred while the number of
investigators assigned to conduct investigations remained the same. The
complexity of investigations is measured by the number of allegations
and issues addressed, the number of witnesses interviewed, the number
of documents collected, and the number of pages in the final report.
Second, the DOD OIG investigation into allegations involving
intelligence reporting at U.S. CENTCOM was one of the largest
investigations ever to be conducted by the DOD OIG. The investigation
team addressed 25 allegations, conducted 150 interviews, collected 15
terabytes of data representing over 17 million classified documents,
and produced two reports of 190 (unclassified) and 542 pages
(classified). This case was conducted by 30 personnel and took 18
months to complete.
While the U.S. CENTCOM was an unusually complex case, there have
been an increasing number of other more complex cases and special
reviews that the office has completed in FY 2016 and FY 2017 at the
request of the Secretary of Defense.

Resources Needed
We believe we need an additional 12 investigators for the ISO
Directorate to conduct senior official investigations and special
reviews. This would provide us the investigative capability to more
expeditiously handle the increasing number of more complex
investigations and special reviews.
Finally, the resources outlined above are only for our
Administrative Investigations component. The DOD OIG also needs
additional resources to conduct audits, evaluations, and criminal
investigations; which I can discuss further if requested.
Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
Mr. Fine. Yes, from our perspective, it appears that the DOD has
appropriate systems in place to record and review adverse information.
For career actions requiring Senate confirmation, the checks of
investigative records for adverse and reportable information is
required by DOD Instruction (DODI) 1320.04, ``Military Officer Actions
Requiring Presidential, Secretary of Defense, or Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness Approval or Senate Confirmation.''
However, we are concerned about a recent policy change regarding
procedures for investigating issues or allegations presented to Army
IGs and for closing cases in the Army Inspector General Action Request
System (IGARS) database. A new Army policy directs that Army IGs will
not close out issues or allegations in IGARS as ``substantiated'' or
``not substantiated'' when those cases were received by IGs and
referred to commands for investigation. Instead, Army IGs are now
instructed to record the form of action taken by the command (i.e.,
commander's inquiry, AR 15-6) and close the case as ``Assistance.'' The
policy also covers complaints referred to an IG by the DOD Hotline.
This new policy is contrary to the DOD Hotline policy that requires
findings be stated as ``substantiated or not substantiated only,'' and
is inconsistent with DODI 1320.04 which requires DOD to inform the
President and Senate of adverse or reportable information. In addition,
we are concerned by the characterization of certain adverse information
in the Army IGARS by referring to them as ``assistance'' cases because
it may impact the DOD's ability to provide accurate information to the
President and the Senate about substantiated cases. We have raised our
concerns with the Army and the Department as to how this change will
affect the Army's and the Department's ability to document and review
patterns of adverse behavior.
Ms. Speier. Provide number of senior leader misconduct cases that
allegations were substantiated, with action recommended and the Service
did not take action. What was the substantiated allegation in each
case? What was the rationale for not acting?
Mr. Fine. From FY 2013 to FY 2017, there were 24 cases
substantiated by the DOD OIG and the Military Service and DOD Component
IGs where Military Service or DOD Senior Management Officials declined
to take action.
The rationale provided by the Services or the DOD for not taking
action included that they disagreed with the investigation conclusions,
they considered the subject's otherwise exemplary career, or that the
subject was no longer in the Military or Federal Service.
Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
need?
General Quantock. Our current investigations backlog is
approximately 10 cases. We base this backlog against our goal of
completing 60% of our senior official investigations in less than 180
days. The 180 day metric is based on historical case processing
timelines. Over the last 5 years, the average case processing time for
senior official investigations was 246 days, with a median of 192 days.
Note: We start our case processing timeline based on the date we
received the complaint, which is different than some of the other
services. In order to meet our case processing timeline goals for
senior official investigations, we estimate that we need approximately
2-3 additional investigators. An updated manpower analysis is currently
in progress.
Ms. Speier. When was LTG Quantock first made aware of complaints
and/or allegations against Mr. Joseph F. Guzowski related to treating
Army IG employees with dignity and respect? What actions did he take
upon being made aware of those complaints and/or allegations? On what
dates has LTG Quantock discussed these complaints and the resulting CID
and DOD IG investigations with Mr. Guzwoski? What was the content of
those conversations? What comments has LTG Quantock made to Mr.
Guzowski about the nature of allegations and/or complaints, the
investigations, or their disposition?
General Quantock. LTG Quantock learned of each allegation
separately. Regarding the 2012 allegation that Mr. Guzowski gave an
unwanted kiss to an IG employee, LTG Quantock was made aware in August
2015. Regarding the December 2016 inappropriate touching allegation,
LTG Quantock was made aware in early January 2017. Upon learning of
each allegation, LTG Quantock took immediate action. Once informed in
August 2015 of the 2012 allegation, LTG Quantock immediately notified
the Senior Official Investigations Division, which referred the matter
to the appropriate agency to address the complaint--the Department of
Defense Inspector General (DOD IG). LTG Quantock also immediately
referred the 2016 allegation to the Senior Official Investigations
Division, which then notified the Criminal Investigations Division
(CID) and the DOD IG. CID investigated and determined there was no
probable cause to believe Mr. Guzowski committed the offense of sexual
battery. DOD IG pursued its own investigation. LTG Quantock discussed
the DOD IG investigation findings with Mr. Guzowski only after the
release of DOD IG's final report. At that time, LTG Quantock informed
Mr. Guzowski that he would be temporarily detailed to the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, pending review and appropriate
action regarding the substantiated findings.
Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
General Quantock. The primary purpose of an investigation is to
determine if there is a senior official impropriety. In the course of
an investigation, we obtain evidence that is relevant to the
allegations under investigation. Based on the nature of the allegation,
we may identify instances of impropriety that occurred in prior years
during the course of the investigation. This evidence of past
impropriety would be documented in the DAIG report of investigation,
and could be used by a board to inform/support its grade determination
decision. Over the years, there have been a few cases where our
investigations identified misconduct that occurred several years prior.
In those instances, the senior official was ultimately reduced in grade
based on this information.
Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
need?
Admiral Shelanski. Currently the Naval Inspector General has a
backlog of 73 Reprisal Investigations, 60 Hotline Investigations and 4
Senior Official Investigations that do not meet DODIG's completion
timeline. An average Reprisal case takes 136 days, a Hotline case takes
79 and a Senior Official case takes 215.
Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
Admiral Shelanski. This question requires trend analysis, a process
for which we are not currently resourced. NAVINSGEN's role in a
retirement grade decision for a Flag Officer is to query our data base
to see if there has been any misconduct reported or documented against
the Flag Officer. These record queries are also done for Flag Officer
promotions.
Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
need?
General Harris. Air Force senior official investigations currently
has 16 open investigations and 12 complaints in intake. In CY 2017 the
average case duration for an Air Force senior official investigation
was 187 days. We are currently assessing our requirements to improve
timeliness through additional efficiencies and manpower, if necessary.
Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
General Harris. Air Force Inspector General senior official
investigations address specific complaints that include credible
evidence of a violation of law, instruction, regulation, or policy.
However, we also consider each complaint in its broader context and
review whether there have been any previous instances of misconduct or
trends over an officer's career. Previous performance or misconduct
issues would be included in the officer's record and reflected in that
record as an officer meets a promotion board. Any substantiated
allegations of a violation by an officer, past or present, are included
in the officer's record meeting a promotion board in a Senior Officer
Unfavorable Information File (SOUIF). As such, senior official
investigations themselves provide one piece of information that may
assist in decision making. Any individual investigation's results must
be combined with an officer's official record to get a comprehensive
picture of the officer's career, performance, and potential.
Ms. Speier. How big is your inspections backlog? How many days does
the average investigation take? How many more investigators do you
need?
General Ottignon. Currently, the Inspector General of the Marine
Corps (IGMC) has:
1. Open cases:
a. Senior Official Investigation 8
b. Senior Official (Preliminary Inquiry) 3
c. Whistleblower Reprisal 25
d. Hotline Investigations 292
e. Total IGMC Cases open 328 as of 12 March 2018
2. The average days it takes to receive, analyze, investigate and
close investigations (Averages)
a. 2014 186 days
b. 2015 220 days
c. 2016 280 days
d. 2017 330 days as of 12 March 2018
3. The IGMC office has conducted an internal look at requirements
to be in compliance with the Department standards. At the minimum, the
IGMC office requires an additional investigator (GS-14), an additional
supervisor (GS-15) for senior official investigations and 4 paralegal
administrative clerks (GS-9).
Ms. Speier. Do you feel the current investigations reveal patterns
of behavior far enough back in the career to assist the board in making
the correct determination? If not, how should this be corrected?
General Ottignon. Yes. The statutory board process for promotions
adheres to a process in which a member's complete record is reviewed
and weighed. Adverse material is considered during this process to
include IG investigation reports of misconduct that may have occurred.
Moreover, the Marine Corps conducts reviews every 90 days to ensure
nominees or selected members for promotion have not since had
misconduct
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
fully staffed?
Mr. Fine. There are 77 investigators at the DOD OIG Administrative
Investigations office, which conducts senior official and whistleblower
reprisal investigations (76 civilians and 1 active duty military). The
investigators possess an average of 14 years of investigative, audit,
or legal experience.
As noted above, we believe we need an additional 43 FTEs to conduct
senior official and whistleblower reprisal investigations and reviews
of investigative operations of the Military Service IGs. The DOD OIG
also needs additional resources to conduct audits, evaluations, and
criminal investigations; which I can discuss further if requested.
Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
fully staffed?
General Quantock. Our current authorizations for investigators who
conduct senior official investigations are as follows: Military--11
(COL-LTC) Civilian--9 (GS14) We do not have any contractors who serve
as investigators. Note that this does not include those in leadership
positions, nor does it include those who conduct complaint intake
analysis. Our civilian investigators have extensive investigative
experience. Typically, a new civilian hire has at least 3-5 years of
investigative experience. Currently, the average investigative
experience for our assigned civilians is approximately 10 years. Our
military investigators initially have little investigative experience.
However, each investigator receives extensive training in order to
become a qualified investigator of senior officials. In order to reduce
current case backlog to meet our established goals, we will need
approximately 2-3 additional investigators. An updated manpower
analysis is currently in progress.
Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
fully staffed?
Admiral Shelanski. At NAVINSGEN Headquarters, we currently have
four senior official investigators, four Hotline investigators, five
Reprisal investigators, one Congressional investigator, and two
supervisors, who also conduct investigations in addition to their
supervisory role. The investigators are all civilian GS employees.
Almost all have prior investigative experience, ranging from prior
military service to a former police officer investigator. To be fully
staffed, under current staffing levels, we would require a total of 16
additional investigators at NAVIG HQ and 24 additional investigators
throughout the enterprise.
Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
fully staffed?
General Harris. The Air Force senior official investigations office
has three civilian investigators and eight military colonel
investigators, and zero contractors. Air Force senior official
investigating officers come from a variety of backgrounds. These
investigating officers are chosen selectively for their past
performance, judgement, and maturity. Nearly all are graduated senior-
level (colonel) commanders with 20+ year careers in the Air Force or
other military service. The training they receive includes interview
training, investigating writing training, courses presented by the
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, and an
extensive internal ``block training'' process. Central to the training
is the Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
``Quality Standards for Investigations.'' These standards and
associated training explicitly focus on ensuring investigations are
independent, fair, thorough, accurate, objective, impartial, ethical,
unbiased, and accomplished with due professional care. All Air Force
senior official cases are investigated using a ``team concept'' with an
Investigating Officer and an imbedded attorney advisor assigned to each
investigation from start to finish. The investigations are overseen by
the Director of Senior Official Inquiries. And, each investigation
receives a separate and fully independent legal review by the Director
of Administrative Law for the Air Force upon its completion. Our sole
focus and desired outcome is an independent, fair, accurate, thorough,
and objective investigation without regard for a specific finding on
any individual allegation. The Air Force senior official investigating
office is currently fully staffed, although we are currently exploring
options to improve timeliness through efficiencies and additional
manpower.
Ms. Tsongas. How many civilian and military investigators serve in
your office? How many contractors? What level of prior investigative
experience do they have? How many investigators would you need to be
fully staffed?
General Ottignon. IGMC investigative branch has structure for 3
civilian investigators (GS-14). Currently there are 2 civilian
investigators serving. Hiring actions are underway for the vacancy.
Navy IG recently shifted an additional civilian investigator to IGMC
for a total of 4 civilian investors. Hiring actions are underway for
this vacancy as well. Civilian investigators have an average of 3 years
prior IG investigations experience.
There are no military investigators assigned to IGMC investigations
branch.

Second panel

Ms. Tsongas. For which felonies should the statute of limitations
be increased?
General McConville. Due to recent updates, we do not recommend any
changes at this point. The Military Justice Review Group (MJRG)
recently studied this issue as part of a ``comprehensive and holistic
review'' that examined all punitive articles and recommended extending
the statute of limitations (SOL) for a child abuse offense from 5 to 10
years, extending the SOL for fraudulent enlistment to 5 years or the
length of the enlistment, and creating a new extension of the SOL when
DNA evidence implicates an accused for certain offenses. Congress
adopted these recommendations in NDAA FY17. Based on the recent and
comprehensive MJRG review, the accompanying appellate issues each
change generates, and the potential for due process violations, we
would not recommend any changes at this time.
Ms. Tsongas. Which general officers have requested outside
employment in the past five years? Which of these cases were approved
and which were denied?
General McConville. Under the Joint Ethics Regulation, active duty
general officers, like all service members, must receive prior written
approval before engaging in a business activity or compensated outside
employment with a prohibited source. The approval authority may
disapprove outside employment if he/she determines that it will create
a conflict of interest with the officer's official duties, detract from
readiness, or pose a security risk. The decision to approve or deny
requests for outside employment submitted by active duty general
officers is made at the local level. The Army does not centrally track
this information. However, we are reviewing the need and feasibility of
a system that would provide Headquarters Department of the Army
visibility over active duty general officers engaged in outside
employment.
Ms. Tsongas. For which felonies should the statute of limitations
be increased?
Admiral Moran. This issue was recently considered by the Military
Justice Review Group (MJRG). In December 2015, the MJRG reviewed the
question of whether the statutes of limitation in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) should be modified and the group's
recommendations were incorporated into the Military Justice Act of 2016
(MJA16).
The 2015 review and study of statute of limitations by the MJRG,
including a comparison with federal law, found that the statute of
limitations provisions under the UCMJ are largely in step with federal
counterparts for common law crimes. The three recommended substantive
changes that were included into MJA16 as changes to the statutes of
limitations established in Article 43, UCMJ are as follows:
1) Child Abuse. Article 43(b)(2)(a) extends the statute of
limitations applicable to child abuse offenses from the current five
years or the life of the child, whichever is longer, to ten years or
the life of the child, whichever is longer, thereby aligning with 18
U.S.C. Sec. 3283 (in 2006, Congress raised the limitations period in
the Title 18 provision from five years to ten years).
2) Fraudulent Enlistment. Article 43(h) extends the statute of
limitations for Article 83 (fraudulent enlistment) cases from five
years to (1) the length of the enlistment, in the case of enlisted
members; (2) the length of the appointment, in the case of officers; or
(3) five years, whichever is longer.
3) Cases Involving DNA Evidence. Article 43(i) extends the statute
of limitations until a period of time following the implication of an
identified person by DNA testing that is equal to the otherwise
applicable limitations period, thereby aligning with 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 3297. Pursuant to Article 43, murder; rape and sexual assault;
rape and sexual assault of a child; absence without leave or missing
movement in time of war; and any other offense punishable by death may
be tried and punished at any time without limitation.
The statute of limitations for all other offenses is five years;
however, Article 43(d)-(g) provide several additional exceptions to the
statutes of limitations described above. These exceptions provide added
authority and flexibility for prosecuting offenses in a number of
circumstances unique to the military justice system including for
offenses committed in a time of war; when an accused is absent from
territory in which the United States has the authority to apprehend
him, or is in the custody of civil authorities or enemy forces; and
when prosecution is considered to be detrimental to the prosecution of
war or inimical to the national security.
Ms. Tsongas. Which general officers have requested outside
employment in the past five years? Which of these cases were approved
and which were denied?
Admiral Moran. The following retired Navy flag officers requested,
and were approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel under delegated
authority, to accept compensated civilian employment from a foreign
government. The Chief of Naval Personnel has not rejected any request
in the past five years. Since law requires approval of both the
Secretaries of Defense and State, the Department of State would need to
confirm which officer's requests were ultimately approved.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Name of Person Foreign Government Approved To Receive Payment for Employment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 Landay, William United Kingdom
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Bowman, Frank Saudi Arabia, Egypt
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Creevy, Lawrence Canada
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
201 Eccles, Thomas Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Gaini, Anthony United Kingdom
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Hall, Thomas Iceland
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Harnitchek, Mark Afghanistan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Johnson, Stephen Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 Sullivan, Paul Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Eccles, Thomas Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Gale, David Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Hilarides, William Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Locklear, Samuel Taiwan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Sullivan, Paul Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016 Donald, Kirkland Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 Eccles, Thomas Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 Hilarides, William Italy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017 Johnson, Stephen Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 Branch, Ted Australia and Canada
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 Donald, Kirkland Australia
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ RADM David Gale was approved to work for the Government of
Australia in August 2016 while still on active duty and his approved
retirement date was October 1, 2016.

Ms. Tsongas. For which felonies should the statute of limitations
be increased?
General Wilson. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for a
five-year statute of limitations for most crimes. Congress has also
provided for an increased statute of limitations for some of the most
serious crimes to include murder, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of a
child. While statutes of limitations vary by state and federal civilian
jurisdictions, the current statute of limitations provision in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for adequate time to
prosecute instances of misconduct within the military.
Any change to the statute of limitations must consider the purposes
of such limitations. A statute of limitations ensures criminal
allegations are resolved in a timely fashion, ensures the availability
of evidence for both the prosecution and defense, and enables a fair
process. Given the purposes of statute of limitations provisions, the
adequacy of such provisions within the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and the availability of administrative actions, we do not
recommend any modification to the statute of limitations at this time.
Ms. Tsongas. Which general officers have requested outside
employment in the past five years? Which of these cases were approved
and which were denied?
General Wilson. Air Force records available indicate that the
following general officers requested, and were approved, for outside
employment while on terminal leave:
Gen Larry Spencer--President, Air Force Association--approved
Lt Gen Robert Otto--Member, Oak Ridge National Lab Global Security
Directorate's Strategic Advisory Group--approved
Maj Gen James Martin, Jr.--Partner (non-equity), Kearney and
Company--approved
Maj Gen Scott Vander Hamm--Director of Strategic Initiatives,
Innovative Defense technologies--approved

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