[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 115-67]

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

__________

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

HEARING HELD

FEBRUARY 6, 2018

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

28-970 WASHINGTON : 2018

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress

WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee RO KHANNA, California
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin JIMMY PANETTA, California
MATT GAETZ, Florida
DON BACON, Nebraska
JIM BANKS, Indiana
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JODY B. HICE, Georgia

Jen Stewart, Staff Director
Tim Morrison, Counsel
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk

C O N T E N T S

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Page

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1

WITNESSES

Mattis, Hon. James N., Secretary of Defense...................... 4
Selva, Gen Paul J., USAF, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 9

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Mattis, Hon. James N......................................... 37
Selva, Gen Paul J............................................ 52
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 34
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 33

Documents Submitted for the Record:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Dr. Abraham.................................................. 73
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 74
Mr. Brooks................................................... 69
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 61
Mr. DesJarlais............................................... 73
Mr. Gallagher................................................ 74
Mr. Gallego.................................................. 77
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 66
Mr. Hice..................................................... 75
Mr. Hunter................................................... 64
Mr. Knight................................................... 72
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 62
Mr. Larsen................................................... 76
Mr. Rogers................................................... 58
Ms. Rosen.................................................... 79
Mr. Scott.................................................... 67
Ms. Speier................................................... 76
Mr. Turner................................................... 57
Dr. Wenstrup................................................. 71

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 6, 2018.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:36 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets today to hear testimony on the
administration's National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture
Review, both of which were recently released. We welcome back
the Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to discuss these important documents.
I cannot count the number of times I have heard members of
this committee talk about the importance of having a defense
strategy to help guide decisions that we and the executive
branch have to make. Now we have one. It is a component of the
broader National Security Strategy released in December, and it
has within it the Nuclear Posture Review, the first of its kind
since 2010. A lot has changed since 2010, and both documents
come at a critical time.
As the National Security Strategy points out, quote,
``America's military remains the strongest in the world.
However, U.S. advantages are shrinking as rival states
modernize and build up their conventional and nuclear forces,''
end quote.
There will undoubtedly be criticism of both documents. Some
of it will be based on valid shortcomings; some of it may
spring from more ideological differences. Debates about the
particulars are fair and to be expected. But it is also fair, I
think, to commend the administration for its attempt to bring
structure and rationality to our wide-ranging national security
efforts in what is surely a dangerous and volatile world.
One last point: We must never forget that, with any
strategy, the heart of our Nation's defense, our most valuable
asset, remains the people who serve. It is morally wrong to
send brave men and women out on missions under any strategy for
which they are not fully trained, equipped, and supported with
the best that this country can provide. That support should not
be conditioned on any other issue. And we can never forget that
there is a real human cost to failing to fully support them.
Strategy is important, but nothing is more important for
Congress than for us to do our job to support the men and women
who protect us fully and unconditionally.
I yield to the ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Mattis, General Selva. I
appreciate you both being here. And I very much appreciate the
fact that, as the chairman said, you have put out the National
Security Strategy. That is obviously a crucially important step
in figuring out how we put together our budget and how the
Department of Defense does its job.
And I will start by agreeing with the last point that the
chairman made. I think it is the most important one, and that
is whatever our strategy is, whatever it is that we tell the
men and women who serve in our military, this is what we expect
you to do.
It is our paramount obligation to make sure that we fund
that, that we do not have a situation where we give them so
many tasks but not enough resources to train for them. I think
we can--that is the definition of a hollow force, when we send
them into battle unprepared to do what we had told them to do.
And, unfortunately, due to a lot of the budgetary
challenges that we have had in the last 6 or 7 years, that has
been happening far too often, because we have lurched from
continuing resolution to government shutdown, to continuing
resolution, to sometimes an appropriations deal.
It is very difficult for both of you and for your
predecessors to plan what you are going to do when you do not
know how much money you are going to have one week to the next.
I think that is a very significant problem.
So I appreciate the strategies put together. My biggest
concern is, does it match the amount of resources that we are
likely to have to fund it. We are $21 trillion in debt, and
counting. The deficit last year was close to $700 billion, and
it is going up, not down.
So how do we make this fit? How does this work? And then
when you look at the broader picture, and we just cut taxes by
what is going to amount to $2 trillion. The immediate short-
term impact of that is that we are going to hit the debt
ceiling sooner than we had expected to because less revenue is
coming into the Treasury, so we will have to go ahead and do
that.
So in the face of a $21 trillion debt, $700 billion
deficit, and all of the needs that the chairman outlines--and
your strategy lays it out, and I think in this committee,
certainly, we all know the list. It is sort of up on the wall
over there, minus Iran and the threat from radical Islamist
extremisms--those are the threats that we face and how do we
meet them.
In the face of all of that, we decided to give away $2
trillion. And I could make an argument that in so doing, this
Congress made a public policy decision that we were not going
to fund defense at the levels that this committee thinks they
should. We decided not to fund it and then, okay, well, there
is other places we can get the money.
But the President has said he is not going to reform
mandatory spending at all. The State of the Union Address
promised more money than I think I can possibly imagine. And as
a side note, I think we ought to ban the State of the Union
Address--and I say that for Democrats and Republicans alike--
because the main thing that it does is it gives the Executive a
chance to stand up there and promise things that are
absolutely, utterly, and completely impossible to deliver. And
then the American public comes to expect it and rightfully gets
a little bit irritated when magic does not make it happen. And,
again, that is bipartisan. Every State of the Union Address I
have seen since I have been here I have walked out of there
thinking, we do not have that money. What is he talking about?
So we need to make improvements on that, to be sure.
And I worry greatly about how this strategy is going to be
implemented in the face of our debt and our deficits. And if
interest rates go up--I mean, we have been incredibly lucky
that we have been able to borrow all this money on the cheap.
If interest rates go up to 3 percent, you can forget about all
this stuff.
And I do not blame that on the defense budget. I understand
it is a piece of it. It is 17 percent of the budget. But our
overall budget picture does not add up, and I worry that,
ultimately, that will wind up costing the men and women who
serve, costing our ability to give them the training and the
equipment they need to carry out the missions that we all
hear--that we need.
The last thing I would say and what I want to hear is, as I
said, we have the list: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran,
violent Islamist extremist groups. How do we confront those
threats and protect our country? I just want to make a couple
quick comments on that.
There is a common thread between all of those threats, and
that is a threat to representative democracy, freedom, and
capitalism. All of those groups want to make the world safe, I
guess, for autocratic dictatorships. Then each one of them has
a slightly different viewpoint on what that dictatorship should
look like, but it is a fundamental threat to democracy and
representative government.
And I think we need to understand it in that context and
push back comprehensively to try and create a world that is
safe for freedom and democracy, because I think that is
incredibly important in keeping a peaceful and prosperous
world.
And lastly, I am interested in hearing from you--we hear a
lot from the military about what you do not have, about where
we are not spending enough money, about the threats that we are
not meeting. If we are going to get to where we need to go, we
need to hear where can we save money, you know, what part of
our National Security Strategy could we not spend money on.
Because if we do not hear places where we can save money, there
is no way we are going to have enough money to meet all the
places where we are being told that we need it. We need to hear
that.
And I want to say that I think your leadership at DOD
[Department of Defense] and the leadership that came before
under Ash Carter has really--and the leadership of the
chairman, has done a good job at getting at procurement reform,
getting at, you know, trying to get more out of the money that
we spend and pulling commercial technology, a bunch of
different ideas that can enable us to get more for less money.
But that is never going to be more important than it is
going forward, given the fiscal situation that we are in and
given the threat environment that is as described. How do we
meet that? So we are going to have to be a lot smarter about
how we spend our money, given the situation that we are in.
With that, I yield back, and I look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
The Chairman. The committee is pleased to welcome the
Secretary of Defense, Honorable James Mattis, and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Without objection,
your full written statements will be made part of the record.
Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you
would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Mattis. Well, thank you, Chairman Thornberry,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the
committee. I am here at your invitation to testify on two
subjects: the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear
Posture Review. I am joined by the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chief, General Selva.
Even in the midst of our ongoing counterterrorism
campaigns, my role is to keep the peace for one more year, one
more month, one more day, giving Secretary Tillerson and our
diplomats time to resolve crises through diplomatic channels.
The Department of Defense does this by providing the Commander
in Chief with military options that ensure our diplomats
negotiate from a position of strength.
Upfront, I need to note, 3 days from now I will visit our
Nation's first security force assistance brigade in Fort
Benning, Georgia, as they prepare to deploy to Afghanistan. To
advance the security of our Nation, these troops are putting
themselves in harm's way, in effect, signing a blank check
payable to the American people with their lives. They do so
despite Congress' abrogation of its constitutional
responsibility to provide sufficient, stable funding.
Our military have been operating under debilitating
continuing resolutions for more than 1,000 days during the past
decade. These men and women hold the line for America while
lacking this most fundamental congressional support: a
predictable budget.
Congress mandated--rightfully mandated this National
Defense Strategy, the first one in a decade, and then shut down
the government the day of its release. Today, we are again
operating under a disruptive continuing resolution. It is not
lost on me that as I testify before you this morning, we are
again on the verge of a government shutdown, or at best,
another damaging continuing resolution.
I regret that without sustained predictable appropriations,
my presence here today wastes your time, because no strategy
can survive, as you pointed out, Chairman, without the funding
necessary to resource it. Yet we all know that America can
afford survival.
Nations as different as China and Russia have chosen to be
strategic competitors. They seek to create a world consistent
with their authoritarian models and pursue veto power over
other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.
Rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran persist in taking
outlaw actions that undermine and threaten regional and global
stability. And despite our successes to date against ISIS's
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's] physical caliphate, violent
extremist organizations continue to sow hatred, incite
violence, and murder innocents. Across the globe, democracies
are taking notice.
We recognize great power competition is once again a
reality. We will continue to prosecute the campaign against
terrorism by, with, and through our allies. But in our new
defense strategy, great power competition--not terrorism--is
now the primary focus of U.S. national security.
Our military remains capable, but our competitive edge has
eroded in every domain of warfare: air, land, sea, cyber, and
space. Under frequent continuing resolutions and sequesters,
budget caps, our advantages continue to shrink. The combination
of rapidly changing technology, the negative impact on military
readiness resulting from the longest continuous stretch of
combat in our Nation's history, and insufficient funding have
created an overstretched and underresourced military.
During last week's State of the Union Address, President
Trump said weakness is the surest path to conflict. To those
who might suggest that we should accept a yearlong continuing
resolution, it would mean a return to a disastrous
sequestration level of funding for the military. And in a world
awash in change and increasing threats, there is no room for
complacency. History makes clear that no country has a
preordained right to victory on the battlefield.
Framed within President Trump's National Security Strategy
and aligned with the Department of State, our 2018 National
Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction for
America's military. A long-term strategic competition requires
the seamless integration of multiple elements of national
power, diplomacy, information, economics, finance,
intelligence, law enforcement, and military.
The Department's principal priorities are long-term
strategic competitions with China and Russia. Given the
magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and
prosperity today, Congress must commit to both an increased and
sustained investment in our capabilities.
Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to
deter and counter rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran;
defeat terrorist threats to the United States; and consolidate
our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a more
resource-sustainable approach.
More than any other nation, America can expand the
competitive space. We can challenge our competitors where we
possess advantages and they lack strength. To restore a
competitive military edge, this defense strategy pursues three
primary lines of effort: to build a more lethal force, to
strengthen traditional alliances while building new
partnerships, and reform the Department's business practices
for performance and affordability.
Our first line of effort emphasizes that everything we do
must contribute to the lethality of our military. In war, an
enemy will attack a perceived weakness. Therefore, we cannot
adopt a single preclusive form of warfare; rather, we must be
able to fight across the spectrum of combat. This means the
size and composition of our force matters. The Nation must
field a sufficient capable force to deter conflict. If
deterrence fails, we must win. To defend our way of life, our
military will embrace change while holding fast to traditional
proven attributes that make us the most formidable force on any
battlefield. Those who would threaten America's experiment in
democracy must know, if you threaten us, it will be your
longest and worst day.
To implement this strategy we will invest in key
capabilities, recognizing we cannot expect success fighting
tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's weapons and equipment.
Driven by this strategy, next week you will see in our fiscal
year 2019 budget investments the following: space and cyber,
nuclear deterrent forces, missile defense, advanced autonomous
systems, artificial intelligence, and professional military
education to provide our high-quality troops what they need to
win.
We will prioritize rebuilding readiness while modernizing
our existing force. We will also be changing our forces'
posture to prioritize readiness for warfighting in major
combat, making us strategically predictable for our allies and
operationally unpredictable for any adversary.
Our second line of effort is to strengthen traditional
alliances while building new partnerships. History is clear
that nations with allies thrive. We inherited this approach to
security and prosperity from the greatest generation, and it
has served the United States well for 70 years. Working by,
with, and through allies who carry their fair share is a source
of strength. Since the costly victory in World War II,
Americans have carried a disproportionate share of the global
defense burden while others recovered.
Today, the growing economic strength of allies and partners
has enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by more than 70
nations and international organizations participating in the
Defeat-ISIS campaign, and again in the 40-some nations standing
shoulder to shoulder in NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's] Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. Most
NATO allies are also increasing their defense budgets, giving
credence to the value of democracies standing together.
Our third line of effort serves as the foundation for our
military's competitive edge: Reforming the business practices
of the Department to provide both solvency and security and
thereby gaining full benefit from every dollar spent.
Every day we will earn the trust of Congress and the
American people. We must be good stewards of the tax dollars
entrusted to us. In this regard, we will deliver our
Department's full financial audit this year, because results
and accountability matter. The first audit in DOD's history
will reveal how we can be better stewards.
The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance
and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We
will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and
frequent modular upgrades. With your critical support, we will
shed outdated management and acquisition processes while
adopting American industry's best practices. If current
structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I expect my
service secretaries and defense agency heads to consolidate,
eliminate, and restructure to achieve the mission.
One of the key elements of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy is to ensure America's military provides a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Last January,
President Trump directed a Nuclear Posture Review to ensure the
United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible,
resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st
century threats and reassure allies.
I recently received a letter from Senators concerned that
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review would undermine decades of U.S.
leadership on efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the
existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. To the contrary,
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the mutually
reinforcing role of nuclear deterrence in a complex and dynamic
security environment, while underscoring continued U.S.
commitment to nonproliferation, to counter nuclear terrorism,
and to arms control.
Specifically, the review reflects the Department of
Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe and effective
nuclear deterrent that will successfully deter nuclear and
nonnuclear strategic attacks, assure our allies and partners,
respond effectively should deterrence fail, and hedge against
future uncertainties and dangers.
The United States remains committed to its global
leadership role to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and to
fulfill existing treaty and arms control obligations,
leadership that has reduced our nuclear weapons stockpile by
over 85 percent from its Cold War high. Yet we must recognize
that deterrence and arms control can only be achieved with a
credible capability.
A review of the global nuclear situation is sobering. While
Russia has reduced only the number of its accountable strategic
nuclear force, as agreed upon in the New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction] Treaty, at the same time, Russia has been
modernizing these weapons as well as other nuclear systems.
Moscow advocates a theory of nuclear escalation for
military conflict. China too is modernizing and expanding its
already considerable nuclear forces pursuing entirely new
nuclear capabilities. It is also modernizing its conventional
military to challenge U.S. military superiority. Despite
universal condemnation in the United Nations, North Korea's
nuclear provocations threaten regional and global peace, and
Iran's nuclear ambitions remain an unresolved concern.
Globally, nuclear terrorism remains a tangible threat.
As Senator McCain said last week, since the end of the Cold
War, we have let our nuclear capabilities atrophy under the
false belief that the era of great power competition was over.
As the new National Defense Strategy rightfully acknowledges,
we now face the renewed threat of competition from Russia and
China, and we cannot ignore their investments in nuclear
weapons in addition to conventional forces.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the findings of
previous reviews that the nuclear triad comprised of silo-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and
nuclear submarines is the most strategically sound means of
ensuring nuclear deterrence. To remain effective, however, we
must recapitalize our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces,
continuing a modernization program initiated during the
previous administration.
To quote my predecessor, Secretary Carter, quote, ``We have
been in a nuclear arms race for two decades now, but the U.S.
has not been running the race,'' unquote.
And as you can see demonstrated in this chart over here in
the corner of the room, that gives credence to my predecessor's
observation. The nuclear delivery system development over the
last 8 years shows numerous advances by Russia, by China, and
by North Korea, versus the near absence of such activity by the
United States, with competitors and adversaries developing 34
new systems in that time as compared to only 1 for the United
States, the F-35 aircraft.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
47.]
Secretary Mattis. Nuclear deterrence will continue to play
a critical role in preventing nuclear attack and large-scale
conventional warfare between nuclear arms states for the
foreseeable future. U.S. nuclear weapons assure and defend our
allies against conventional and nuclear threats, furthering our
nonproliferation goals and increasing global security.
The National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture
Review align with the President's National Security Strategy
guiding all of our efforts. As I said earlier, no strategy can
survive without the necessary stable, predictable funding.
Failure to modernize our military risks leaving us with a force
that could dominate the last war but be irrelevant to
tomorrow's security.
We need Congress to lift the defense spending caps and
support the budget for our military of $700 billion for this
fiscal year and $716 billion for next fiscal year. Let me be
clear: As hard as the last 16 years of war have been on our
military, no enemy in the field has done as much to harm the
readiness of the U.S. military than the combined impact of the
Budget Control Act's defense spending caps, worsened by
operating for 10 of the last 11 years under continuing
resolutions of varied and unpredictable duration.
The Budget Control Act was purposely designed to be so
injurious that it would force Congress to pass necessary
budgets. It was never intended to be the solution. For too long
we have asked our military to carry on stoically with a
success-at-any-cost attitude. Our troops work tirelessly to
accomplish every mission with increasingly inadequate and
misaligned resources simply because Congress has not maintained
regular order. The fact that our volunteer military has
performed so well is a credit to their dedication and
professionalism. We expect the men and women of our military to
be faithful in their service, even when going in harm's way. We
must also remain faithful to them.
Chairman, as you said in January, ``If Congress does not
come together to find a way to fund this strategy, Secretary
Mattis must explicitly inform Congress and the American people
of the consequences of failure.''
The consequences of not providing a budget are clear. Even
though we are protecting ongoing operations from continuing
resolution disruptions, each increment of funding in support of
our partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria requires a 15-day
congressional notification. My commanders in the field write to
me for help in getting timely and predictable funds for their
efforts as they work to execute our strategy against the enemy
in the field.
Additionally, should we stumble into a yearlong continuing
resolution, your military will not be able to provide pay for
our troops by the end of the fiscal year. We will not recruit
the 15,000 Army soldiers and 4,000 Air Force airmen required to
fill critical manning shortfalls. We will not maintain our
ships at sea with the proper balance between operations and
time in port for maintenance. We will ground aircraft due to a
lack of maintenance and spare parts. We will deplete the
ammunition, training, and manpower required to deter war, and
delay contracts for vital acquisition programs necessary to
modernize the force.
Further, I cannot overstate the impact to our troops'
morale from all this uncertainty.
Today, as I sit here, we are engaged in prudent planning in
the Pentagon for another disruptive government shutdown. You
know that I cannot care more about our country's defense than
this Congress, for it is Congress alone which has the
constitutional authority to raise and support armies and to
provide and maintain a navy.
We need Congress back in the driver's seat, not in the
spectator's seat of the Budget Control Act's indiscriminate and
automatic cuts. I know that in time of a major war, Congress
will provide our military with all it needs. But money at the
time of crisis fails to deter war. And you know we would be at
that point to have nothing--no time to prepare, as it takes
months and years to produce the munitions, the training, and
readiness required to fight well.
To carry out this strategy you rightly directed we develop,
we need you to pass a budget now. If we are to sustain our
military's primacy, we need budget predictability. Congress
must take action now to ensure our military's lethality is
sufficient to defend our way of life, to preserve the promise
of prosperity, and to pass on the freedoms we enjoy to the next
generation. And I ask that you not let disagreements on
domestic policy continue to hold our Nation's defense hostage.
General Selva will now discuss the military dimensions of
the 2018 National Defense Strategy and our Nuclear Posture
Review. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
The Chairman. General Selva.

STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Selva. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join
Secretary Mattis to brief on the National Defense Strategy and
the Nuclear Posture Review.
General Dunford and I, along with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, fully support the strategies outlined in the National
Defense Strategy and in the Nuclear Posture Review. Both
documents are the product of significant consultation and
collaboration between members of the Joint Staff and the OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff.
The National Defense Strategy provides detailed defense
policy guidance for military strategy, planning, and
operations. Therefore, the chairman's 2016 classified National
Military Strategy will require an update to maintain complete
consistency with the National Defense Strategy and the
President's National Security Strategy released in December.
Immediately upon release of the National Defense Strategy
published last month, General Dunford directed the Joint Staff
to commence a revision of the National Military Strategy, and
that process is now underway. Other subsequent guidance and
plans will be revised in turn to support the lines of effort
outlined in the National Defense Strategy and to operationalize
the concept of Dynamic Force Employment.
Additionally, we have begun to review the Joint Staff's
organization and processes to determine if we need to make
adjustments to support the chairman's global integrator
responsibilities and to better position the chairman to support
the Secretary's decision-making processes.
Refining the National Military Strategy and the Joint
Staff's organization and processes are a step towards
increasing the lethality and flexibility of the joint force in
light of the reemergence of great power competitions.
The Nuclear Posture Review also reflects the realities of
today's security environment, as well as projecting the future
environment and its potential impacts on U.S. nuclear weapons
policy and strategy. More specifically, the Nuclear Posture
Review paid particular attention to Russian, Chinese, and North
Korean activities intended to develop, modernize, and expand
their nuclear weapons capabilities and to integrate them into
their military strategies and doctrine. The Nuclear Posture
Review takes into account the potential for Iran to renew its
pursuit of nuclear weapons and capability in the future.
The review has determined that our strategy must be
tailored to each of these potential adversaries to effectively
communicate the cost of aggression, and this tailored strategy
approach requires that the United States maintain a flexible
and credible mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities that
can address a spectrum of adversaries and threats over a
significant period of time. It should not be lost on this
committee that the Nuclear Posture Review conducted its
assessment across a 30-year swath of the future.
The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the Nation's nuclear
triad as the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, assure
our allies, and hedge against an uncertain future. And as the
Secretary has mentioned, it reaffirms the need to recapitalize
each component of our legacy nuclear systems to ensure that our
nuclear capabilities remain ready, secure, capable, and
credible now and into the future.
Two supplemental capabilities recommended in the Nuclear
Posture Review, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile
and a modification of a small number of existing submarine-
launched ballistic missile warheads, would enhance deterrence
by ensuring that no adversary under any set of circumstances
can perceive an advantage through the use of a limited nuclear
escalation or other strategic attack.
Fielding these capabilities will not lower the threshold at
which the United States would employ nuclear weapons; rather,
it will raise the nuclear threshold for potential adversaries,
making the use of nuclear weapons less likely.
Nuclear weapons pose the only existential military threat
to our Nation. Therefore, there is no higher priority for the
joint force than fielding all of the components of an effective
nuclear deterrent to deter potential adversaries from nuclear
attack on any scale.
It is important to note that the National Defense Strategy
and the Nuclear Posture Review both make the assumption that
the military will receive timely, predictable, and sufficient
funding to execute these strategies. As General Mattis has
emphasized, we in uniform appreciate the support of this
committee and Congress, and we trust that Congress will provide
the funding needed to turn these strategies into reality.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, thank you for your
time. We look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Selva can be found in
the Appendix on page 52.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me just take a moment and give members a heads-up on
what our schedule looks like today. We are going to have votes
on the floor at about 11:30. The Secretary and General Selva
were gracious to move the start time of this hearing up to 9:30
to try to give us more time to get in questions before the
votes. But we are still not going to have time to get to
everybody. So we are going to do the best we can until we have
votes. We are going to break and go to the floor, and then we
will reconvene after votes in a closed, classified session so
that we can get further details about the National Security
Strategy.
Now, the Secretary still has to be over in the Senate later
today, so--but I think that is the best combination of things
to give us the most useful information in both public and in a
classified session.
Mr. Secretary, I was sitting here thinking that I believe
the statement you just gave is the clearest, most direct,
bluntest statement I have heard from any administration witness
about the importance of Congress doing its job in a way that
Mr. Smith and I both talked about in our opening statements.
And you were very clear about CRs [continuing resolutions] and
the damage they do to the military.
Later today, the House is going to vote on an appropriation
bill for the Department of Defense for the rest of the fiscal
year. It is consistent with about $700 billion of total
spending for our national defense account. And my question to
you is, is that bill, that level of funding consistent with the
National Defense Strategy that you have talked about today? And
if for whatever reason that does not--that level of resources
does not happen, what does that do to the strategy?
Secretary Mattis. Chairman, that is sufficient. I would
tell you, sir, that with it we can restore the competitive
advantage--or begin down the trail of restoring the competitive
advantage that has been eroded.
I would tell you additionally, sir, that without it, we
will be put into the position where the strategy would have to
be changed and we would have to accept greater risk, especially
in terms of deterring adversaries who might think that we are
weaker because they can register where our readiness is being
eroded.
The Chairman. Okay. Let me just ask one other thing in the
interest of time so we can get to other members. When you
assumed this office, there was speculation perhaps that you
were a skeptic on some aspects of our nuclear triad, our
nuclear deterrence.
You spent a year looking through it. The Nuclear Posture
Review is the result of the study that you and the Department
have put into it. But can you just kind of tell us, what--as
you have looked at our nuclear deterrence, how has your
thinking evolved? I mean, I do not know if you want to say if
you were a skeptic or not at the beginning, but it looks like
there was a change or at least some evolution. Why?
Secretary Mattis. I think that is a fair statement,
Chairman. I was confident that when I received the waiver from
the House and the Senate to go into this job that you expected
me to exercise my judgment. I came in wanting to challenge just
about everything. I wanted it to be proven to me that we needed
to spend every cent, that every time we had a troop in harm's
way it was for the well-being of the American people.
In this case, I looked at the triad piece by piece and the
elements of each leg of the triad. I was especially attentive
to the intercontinental ballistic missile force. After talking
with a lot of people, visiting the missile fields, and doing a
lot of study, I believe it is a stabilizing element that would
be a strong deterrent to anyone who decided they wanted to
employ nuclear weapons against us.
There was another weapons system that I was concerned could
be destabilizing, an air-launched cruise missile or a cruise
missile. You can see over here on the chart that, clearly,
Russia does not consider that destabilizing. Look at the number
that they have developed and fielded. And as I put together how
do we keep us in a position where this is a nuclear deterrent,
it has got to have those capabilities to be most persuasive.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
47.]
Secretary Mattis. Deterrence is in the eye of the
adversary. And that was the journey I embarked on. And it was a
little rough on the staff and those who came in promoting it at
first, but I think they were compelling by the time we were
done.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think you are quite correct that we have entered an era
where great power rivalry is back on the table. Obviously,
China and Russia have become more active in a variety of
different ways.
What disturbs me about the direction of this conversation
is, I do not believe that great power rivalry equals endless
arms race, that basically whenever you have a great power
rivalry all that is involved is military power. You have to
build as much as you can build, they have to build as much as
they build, and it goes up and up and up and up and up.
Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that there are other
important elements of dealing with great power rivalry,
starting, for instance, with the State Department, with
diplomacy, with the idea that dialogue between our
adversaries--between us and our adversaries is important?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman Smith, I would agree 100
percent. And I would point out we are not developing, for
example, nuclear torpedoes. Our Nation is quite capable of
developing new weapons, as you know. And unlike Russia, for
example, we have chosen not to do that to give opportunity for
our diplomats to do what you are recommending.
Mr. Smith. My question is, deterrence is also your
diplomatic stance. Deterrence is dialogue. And this is what
concerns me is, yes, we have to be able to deter Russia and
China from moving forward. But part of the way you deter them,
particularly in the nuclear arena, is to have a dialogue, to,
you know, do what, you know, Ronald Reagan did with Gorbachev
and with others, you know, and not just arms reduction, but at
least have an open discussion so that you do not miscalculate.
I mean, a lot of what we are building into here is we are
assuming that the Russians--gosh, if we do not have low-yield
nuclear weapons, then the Russians will think that they can get
away with a low-yield nuclear strike. Part of the way that you
make sure that they do not think that is you let them know. You
have a dialogue.
And I am very concerned right now that we do not have much
in the way of a dialogue with Russia or China. We did get
something in the DOD bill that we passed this year that would
mandate that happening, but we mandate a lot of things that the
executive branch does not do. So we need to do that.
But in the larger point, essentially what we are presented
with and what the chairman has presented us with is we have to
cut taxes massively, of course. So we have done that. And then
we have to fund defense.
So when you go back through those numbers that I mentioned
on the $21 trillion debt and $700 billion deficit that is
growing, now we are going to have a massive increase in
defense, we had the massive tax cut, you are going to gut
everything else. And let us forget for the moment our
infrastructure, education, things that are, I think, also
important to actually having a just and prosperous society.
Defense is important, without question. But if you gut
everything else, you create problems.
And let us just focus on security. If we pass this budget
that the Republicans want to put before us today, the State
Department will continue to be destroyed. As we all know,
career diplomats are leaving, there have been massive cuts in
their budget, and now we are proposing no budget for the State
Department. But we will give them a CR, but we are not going to
pay any attention to that whatsoever.
And it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy, okay. How do we
know we have to build massive weapons to deter Russia and
China? Well, we are not talking to them, so we have to presume
the worst. We are going to give up on diplomacy and simply
focus on having as many weapons as is humanly possible to make
sure that they are deterred.
Dialogue is incredibly important to deterrence. And not
just dialogue with Russia and China. We need allies. Look, if
we are in a great power rivalry in this world with both Russia
and China, given our massive debt and China's economic might,
that is going to be a tough hill to climb.
I mean, we can build the military--$1 trillion military,
and it is going to be hard to match all of that. We need
allies. We need friends. And there are a lot of possibilities:
India, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan. We still do not even have
an Ambassador to South Korea, but we are degrading diplomacy at
an incredibly rapid level. We are also degrading development,
which I think is an important part of it.
This is part of how--we talk about, you know, all that
stuff in the chart over there that China is doing. One of the
biggest things China is doing is they are spending a ton of
money all across the world to try to curry favor with countries
and also build their own economic might.
Now, they are doing it in an incredibly crass and terrible
way, because they do not care what the government does. They
are not going to pull money out of a country because of the
human rights violation. They do not care. They are doing it. We
are pulling back again. This budget that is being proposed guts
development.
And now let us just talk about the Department of Homeland
Security, passingly important, I would hope, for our national
security. It is part of the nondefense discretionary budget. It
too will be gutted by this approach. We will just leave it in
the wind in the CR because defense takes priority. We do
nothing else.
The Justice Department has played an enormous role in
stopping terrorist attacks and also, you know, bringing to
justice those who have committed them. It too gets gutted by
this budget.
So I always bristle a little bit when I hear the, you know,
how can we hold defense hostage to domestic political
priorities, as if those domestic political priorities were some
kind of luxury that, you know, we just engage in for fun and
enjoyment and are not really important.
All of those things are important. The State Department is
really important. In fact, I do not think it was you, but I
think it was your predecessor or someone who said--I think it
was you--said, if you are going to cut the State Department,
you better give me five more divisions, okay, because that is
what I am going to need to defend this country. It was either
you or General Dunford, I apologize.
So to sit here and say, you know, we are going to stand up,
spend all this money on defense because it would just be wrong
to prioritize other things is patently absurd and insulting.
Defense is incredibly important. It is not the only thing that
is important in keeping the peace.
This is more a speech than a question, but I think it is
important. You have got to agree, there are other things that
are important than keeping the peace. And if we do what is
being proposed today, we say to those other things, eh, they do
not matter. Department of Homeland Security does not matter,
Department of Justice does not matter, State Department does
not matter, none of that matters. Does that not make your job
vastly more difficult? That was a question.
Secretary Mattis. Congressman Smith, I take no issue with
the fact that we need to have regular order across all
government expenditures. Unfortunately, right now, what we are
doing is we are creating security vulnerabilities that can no
longer be denied.
Again, one look at the chart and you can see where we are
at. We cannot do new starts, we cannot get into cyber
protection, the very thing you hold dear, because we do not
have the ability to do so under continuing resolutions, 9 out
of the last 10 years.
I do not think there is anything contradictory in the way
you and I look at this right now. Secretary Tillerson and I
have a very close working relationship. Our military operations
are wrapped firmly inside our foreign policy. And the President
has directed Secretary Tillerson and I to find ways to engage
on nonproliferation and arms control.
Right now, we have constant communication with the Russians
on what I would call operational matters, counterterrorism, for
example, North Korea. But some of these are on pretty, pretty
big issues. But I agree that we need more communication with
Russia, with China along the level of I would almost call it
philosophical engagement as well as operational matters.
And I do not think there is anything at all ill-advised
about making certain that protecting the country is put
foremost so the country can do all the other things that you
were referring to.
Mr. Smith. I guess, I--foremost is okay. Only, exclusively,
while ignoring everything else, not okay. And that is what we
are about to do this afternoon.
So the only contradictory thing is to completely ignore the
rest of the budget, massively cut taxes and fund defense, and
act like you provided for security for the country.
But other people have got to get in. I made my point. I
appreciate you answering the question.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Just for the record, I hope we get a complete
budget agreement and we do it this week for all aspects of the
government. We can do that and we should.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to talk about the graveyard of empires. I think that
is what they say about Afghanistan and the history of
Afghanistan.
Mr. Secretary, a few headlines from the last 2 weeks:
``Kabul attacks cloud U.S. Afghan strategy.''
``Why are we still shedding our soldiers' blood for
pedophiles?'' Subtitle: ``The full extent of child sexual
assault committed by Afghan Security Forces may never be
known.''
Another heading: ``The Taliban is gaining strength and
territory in Afghanistan.''
Another headline: ``Taliban threatens 70 percent of
Afghanistan.''
Last headline: ``Pentagon blocks release of key data on
Afghan war.'' ``The Pentagon has restricted the release of
critical information on the progress being made in the war in
Afghanistan, a move that will limit transparency.''
In your prepared remarks you very kindly said, we need to
build the trust of the American people. How can we build the
trust of the American people after 16 years, over 2,300
Americans killed, over 20,000 wounded, and we spent $1
trillion?
I do not have to add to Mr. Smith's comments, but this
country is headed for bankruptcy. Mr. Trump campaigned--I have
30 of his comments and tweets. He was opposed to being in
Afghanistan. He wanted to pull out. He was very critical of
those who wanted to stay.
We are now increasing the number of our troops in
Afghanistan, and after 16 years, the American people have a
right to know of the successes. Some of that, I am sure, is
classified information, which I can understand. But I also know
that we are not getting the kind of information that we need to
get to know what successes we are having. And after 16 years, I
do not think we are having any successes.
I would love to have a classified hearing. Maybe that will
happen in a couple hours, and you would be able to tell us of
some benchmarks that we have made after 16 years.
A friend of yours is a friend of mine. The former
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chuck Krulak. He has been my
unofficial adviser on Afghanistan for 5 years. Previous
Secretary of Defenses have gotten questions that he asked me to
ask during hearings like this one. Not today did I get that
from him.
But 3 or 4 months ago when you talked about increasing the
number of troops in Afghanistan, he sent me a five-paragraph
email. I am certainly only going to read one sentence and then
I want to ask you the question. ``No one has ever conquered
Afghanistan, and many have tried. We will join the list of
nations that have tried and failed.''
Mr. Secretary, how can we, with this budget situation we
have got and an economic collapse in this country, how can we
continue to go on a policy after 16 years when the Secretary of
Defense that follows you and the Congressman that follows me or
Congresswoman, if we are still talking about Afghanistan in the
future and nothing is changing, I think there has got to be a
time that you would say to President Trump we have done all we
can do. Blood and treasure is lost, and we have nothing to show
that we have gained, except we still have trouble with the
leaders of Afghanistan having sex with little boys. Give me a
quick response if you can.
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, if we were engaged in
conquering Afghanistan, I would agree 100 percent with what you
just stated, if that was our sense of empire. In fact, what we
are doing to earn the trust of the American people is to ensure
another 9/11 hatched out of there does not happen during our
watch.
Further, the strategy we put together--and President Trump
challenged every assumption. It took months to put it together
to answer every question he had, and the gravity of protecting
the American people caused him to change his mind based on what
the intelligence services told him was the vulnerability we
would have if we pulled out of there.
That strategy did permit a more regional approach. It has
been embraced by nations as diverse as those in NATO and India.
We have now--we had declined to 39 nations fighting in the NATO
campaign from 50 years ago. It has gone now to 41. It has
started growing more allies. They are there because they
believe in the strategy, which means the Afghan boys continue
to carry the load for the fighting but now with advisers that
bring the NATO air support and fire support to bear to help
them.
The Taliban and Haqqani, they have not made their pitch to
the Afghan people in a positive way by murdering innocent
people. They are not incurring the support of the Afghan
people, whereas NATO does have that support.
It has been a long, hard slog, and I recognize that. But I
would also tell you that any attempt to keep information from
the American people, it was a NATO decision at that point. It
was a mistake, I might add, and that information is now
available. A number of those headlines, obviously, are selected
by their editors in order to make the story line they have.
We believe that the regionalized strategy will draw even
more allies, and it puts the enemy on the path towards
accepting reconciliation. We are not out to conquer it.
The Chairman. The time of the gentleman is more than
expired.
I would just mention to members, you can ask whatever you
want to, but if you ask a question for 4 minutes and leave the
Secretary less than a minute to offer, I am not going to cut
him off, but we are not going to get very far if that is the
approach.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both of you for your service and for being
here this morning.
I wanted to associate myself with the ranking member's
comments regarding the whole-of-government approach that is so
critical. I know that, Secretary Mattis, you mentioned too that
we must negotiate from a position of strength so that our
military capability should be clear and send that message. But
at the same time, we know how long it takes to develop high-
ranking officers who can provide our country with the best of
advice. And we must have that same timeline for the State
Department and for those individuals that negotiate, whether it
is in commerce or whatever, whatever realm that it is.
So I wanted to just go to the issue of lowering the
threshold in terms of nuclear capability. And there is a
question whether or not the Nuclear Posture Review is clear on
what it considers to be lowering the threshold versus some of
the comments that I think General Selva made that it is
possible to modernize nuclear capability and at the same time
lower that threshold as it is perceived by our adversaries.
Can you speak to that more? Because I think we are all
concerned about the Russian doctrine of escalating to
deescalate. Where are we, and how can we make that clear, I
think, to the American people?
Secretary Mattis. I think part of it can be addressed
through the continuity of our nuclear deterrent--and, again, I
never say ``nuclear''--nuclear deterrent strategy and how we
manage it and how we talk about it.
And if you look at the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review in which
it said we would only use nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances, I would refer to 2018 where we say in the most
extreme circumstances would we use those weapons. You see the
continuity between two different administrations, two different
political parties for the President.
And in regards to the lower-yield weapon, it is to make
certain that no one thinks that they could use a low-yield
weapon and put us in a position where we could only respond
with a high-yield weapon with the supposition that maybe we
would not.
And we can say what we know we would, but what matters in
deterrence is what does the adversary think. And in this
regard, deterrence is dynamic, and we must recognize that
today's deterrent must keep pace with the thinking of today's
adversaries or competitors.
Mrs. Davis. Could you respond, sir, though, to the belief
that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, that no matter what
that size may be, it would still signal that we are using a
nuclear weapon and perhaps even changing the rules of the game?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, I would agree. I do not think there
is any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear
weapon used any time is a strategic game changer. That said, we
do not want someone else to miscalculate and think because they
are going to use a low-yield weapon, that somehow we would
confront what Dr. Kissinger calls surrender or suicide, that we
do not want even an inch of daylight to appear in how we look
at the nuclear deterrent. It is a nuclear deterrent and must be
considered credible.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
General Selva as well, I mean, looking at that nuclear
modernization, the cost, $700 billion, $1.5 trillion, is that
something that, given the whole scope of what is needed in
terms of our defense budget, that makes sense today?
General Selva. My response is yes, it does make sense. It
makes sense in the context that we are talking across about a
40-year timespan, the cost of about $700 million to modernize
the three legs of the triad, to make available to future
Secretaries of Defense and Commanders in Chief a credible,
secure, reliable nuclear triad that allows those individuals 20
or 30 years into the future to be able to tailor strategic
responses as well as support the possibility of negotiating
away entire types and classes of weapons.
That process will have to continue over a long timespan.
The arsenal and weapons that we have today are ready, secure,
and credible, but they must be modernized over the span of time
to keep those options available to our Commanders in Chief.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. And, Secretary Mattis, General Selva, thank you
so much for your service and being here today. I especially
appreciate what you are doing, as a veteran myself, but
particularly as a grateful dad. I have had four sons and a
nephew serve overseas in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Army, Navy,
Air Force. And so I am just very, very grateful for your
service and your leadership. It is so reassuring as a military
parent.
Secretary Mattis, your Nuclear Posture Review, NPR,
recommends that the United States develop two supplemental
nuclear capabilities: First, a low-yield submarine-launched
ballistic missile, SLBM; and second, a sea-launched cruise
missile. Why are these needed for deterrence and assurance?
And following on that, some are arguing that they lower the
threshold for the United States to use nuclear weapons. Do you
believe that the addition of these capabilities to the U.S.
nuclear arsenal is an increase or decrease to the likelihood of
a nuclear war? And another angle, why should we need a low-
yield SLBM when we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity
bomb? Are these capabilities redundant?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I do not believe it lowers
the threshold at all. What it does, it makes very clear that we
have a deterrent if the Russians choose to carry out what some
of their doctrine people have promoted, their political leaders
have promoted, which would be to employ a low-yield nuclear
weapon in a conventional fight in order to escalate to
deescalate; in other words, to escalate to victory and then
deescalate. We want to make certain they recognize that we can
respond in kind. We do not have to go with the high-yield
weapon. Thus, the deterrent effort stays primary. It is not to
in any way lower the threshold to use nuclear weapons.
On the sea-launched cruise missile, as you know, we have an
ongoing issue with Russia's violation of the INF [Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]. I want to make certain that our
negotiators have something to negotiate with, that we want
Russia back into compliance. We do not want to forego the INF,
but at the same time we have options if Russia continues to go
down this path.
So the idea is, once again, to keep our negotiators
negotiating from a position of strength. I do not believe you
can go into a negotiation and try to get something for nothing.
I do not think the Russians would be willing to give up
something to gain nothing from us in terms of reduction.
Mr. Wilson. Well, if there is any negotiation, I certainly
have faith in your capabilities, and we look forward to working
with you.
Another issue that is so important and, Mr. Secretary, that
needs to be restated over and over, you referenced it in your
opening statement, but is there any stronger indication of
Congress' resolve, any action with better deterrent value to
peer competitors than repealing the Budget Control Act
sequestration and supporting our military with adequate and
reliable funding?
Secretary Mattis. No, there is not, Congressman. Congress
speaks for the American people I would probably say in the most
stabilizing and sobering message that this democracy will stand
up for itself.
Mr. Wilson. And an issue that Chairman Thornberry has been
leading on is to address our readiness issue. As we are here
just 2 days from another government shutdown, can you tell, in
your view, if Congress does not do its part to turn this crisis
around, can we expect to see further impacts to the military?
Should we anticipate more accidents, tragic accidents, as we
saw in the Pacific this year with the Fitzgerald and McCain?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, we are doing everything
possible to avoid any such repeats of those accidents. However,
there are a number of areas where when time is lost, if you
have pilots who are not taking in their flying time now, 5
years from now when they are majors or they are lieutenant
colonels, they will not have the level of expertise we would
expect, because they did not get the opportunity that they lost
during continuing resolutions or during budget shutdowns,
governmental shutdowns. It impacts us. And so it is not like we
maintain even the status quo if we go into one of these kind of
situations yet again. We actually lose ground--and I can go on
for a number of examples--in all the forces.
Mr. Wilson. I thank both of you for your service.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Selva, thank you for your service
and for your testimony here today. I also want to associate
myself with the comments of the ranking member when it comes to
taking a whole-of-government approach to funding our national
security priorities as well. But I want to turn to another
aspect of a security challenge that faces our country today.
Mr. Secretary, it is an accepted fact that our planet's
climate is changing. You acknowledged this yourself to our
committee, and you have shown leadership in this regard
submitting at your confirmation hearing that you will, and I
quote, ``ensure that the Department continues to be prepared to
conduct operations today and in the future, and that we are
prepared to address the effects of a changing climate on our
threat assessments, resources, and readiness. And I want to
commend you for those statements.
However, both the President's National Security Strategy
and the Department's National Defense Strategy fail to note
climate change as a threat. I am perplexed by that and
certainly ask why was that omitted? But as these changes occur,
how will you ensure the Department is prepared to respond? What
steps will the Department take to mitigate the challenges of a
changing land and seascape to ensure America's mission
resiliency and assurance?
Secretary Mattis. Congressman, on a military level, every
base we have has what we call extreme weather plans. We
acknowledge any kind of environmental impacts from the weather,
whether it be drainage systems or whatever we need in order to
keep that base operating, whether it be airfields, seaports,
marshalling bases for deployment, that sort of thing. This is a
normal part of what the military does and under any strategy it
is part and parcel.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I still find it perplexing that it was
left out of the National Defense Strategy.
But, General Selva, let me turn to part of your testimony.
I might take issue just with one part of it where you say
nuclear weapons pose the only existential military threat to
our Nation. I would add cyber weapons as also posing an
existential and asymmetric threat to our Nation as well.
In your assessment, both to you and to the Secretary, how
well-resourced and trained are our forces to deal with the
threats of cybersecurity?
General Selva. Congressman, we have established U.S. Cyber
Command [CYBERCOM] as the bulwark for the military networks
that we operate on in order to be able to defend the Nation.
CYBERCOM, in consultation and collaboration with the National
Security Administration, also provides for some of the
cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and industries around
the country.
My point in saying that nuclear weapons represent the only
military existential threat is because they would be used
uniquely for military purposes to threaten us and cause us to
capitulate or surrender in the face of a military threat. There
is no question that cyber is an asymmetric capability and this
Nation has vulnerabilities both in critical infrastructure as
well as civilian infrastructure, and we will continue to do the
work of normalizing our ability to defend those and provide the
kinds of advice we can through the National Security Agency as
well as Department of Justice and Department of Homeland
Security to defend those networks.
Mr. Langevin. Do you feel that our training is meeting
expectations as to where we need to be at this time to deal
with our cyber challenges?
General Selva. Sir, collaboration between both the military
capabilities to defend our networks and Department of Homeland
Security, Justice, and NSA [National Security Agency] to defend
national networks, the training's as good as we can possibly
make it and we are reacting to the threats that we can see.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Secretary, the National Defense Strategy
states that inter-state strategic competition rather than
terrorism is now the primary national security concern. It is
also our eroding--it also notes our eroding competitive
military advantage should diplomacy and deterrence fail. While
I agree that we must increase our military edge in the event of
conflict, today, our competitors are launching political,
economic, information, and cyber operations targeting us.
Where do you believe we are with respect to our competitive
advantage in these types of activities that do not rise to the
level of armed conflict? To what extent do you feel we should
be prepared to increase our proficiency in these areas?
Secretary Mattis. It is a great question, sir, because this
was what I was alluding to when I mentioned that we have the
potential to enlarge the competitive space, and it is right
into the areas you are talking about. We have to remember we
are a revolutionary act, this country, the kind of democracy
that we stand for.
And you can practice all the predatory economics you want.
You can send your military into Syria to prop up a despot if
you wish to. But the fact is we have areas of diplomacy, of
education, that go far beyond what other nations can reach back
and find strength in, and we can use that to build modern
partnerships. In other words, not abandon our traditional
partnerships, NATO for example, but certainly expand to a
broader array of partners today that do not want to be
basically made tribute states to someone else's economic or
political system.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you both. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your strong statements here
today. I have got two thank yous and a question, then I am
going to yield the remainder of my time to Mr. Gallagher. The
chairman said we are in tough time constraints and so not
everyone is going to be able to answer a question.
The two thank yous are, one, thank you for your strong
statements on the budget. I voted against the Budget Control
Act because I believed that sequestration would be damaging to
our military and that it would happen. And certainly, everyone
on this committee has fought ever since it has been implemented
to try to lift that burden on our military. Your strong words
are important to let people know the real effects of that.
It is very sad that in your comments you have a whole
section on impact of congressional inaction. But I must say
that the House has not really been inactive. We passed a
budget, the National Defense Authorization Act. We passed the
appropriation bills three times. We are going to do it again.
We really are dealing with a handful of those in the Senate
who are causing inaction. And I certainly call on Democratic
leadership in the Senate to dislodge the defense funding for
the military because of the various reasons that you are giving
us of the damage that is occurring by connecting defense
funding to other items.
Secondly, I want to thank you for your strong words in the
Nuclear Posture Review. We know we are coming off the 2010
Obama Nuclear Posture Review that actually assigned DOD the
responsibility of reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in
U.S. National Security Strategy, while at the same time giving
them the responsibility to modernize. It is very hard to reduce
at the same time you are to modernize.
Your chart is important because it certainly over here on
the right shows that those who say that we need to reduce our
nuclear weapons or slow our modernization because others will
follow is folly. Our reducing our nuclear weapons does not
result in anyone else doing so. It certainly is not based on
reality or history.
One correction, on the bottom right on your chart, you say
air-launched and the F-35. As you know, we are not--that is on
paper currently. That is not an accomplished capability. I look
forward to working with you on that.
Then to my question, you indicated that the INF Treaty was
continuing to be violated by Russia and we are continuing a
dialogue. We also know that, you know, they violated the
territorial integrity of a treaty with the Ukraine. They have
violated the Open Skies Treaty, violated the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe. How do we approach their
violation in the INF in dialogue when they show no indication
that treaties even matter to them?
Secretary Mattis. Well, sir, I have had extensive
discussions with our NATO allies and the Secretary General at
NATO on this issue. I have made clear that our approach is that
we do not want to withdraw from INF, but we are going to have
to see effort by Russia to get back in line with it. And State
Department is engaged on this with the Russians as we speak
right now. And also, we are going to stay inside the INF-
compliant requirements, but we are going to do research and
development of an alternative weapon that should put Russia in
a position to see the value to returning to be an INF-
compliant.
Mr. Turner. I yield to Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your tough words today and
for your hard work on the National Defense Strategy,
particularly its focus on great power competition.
As we try to operationalize that new focus, I am
particularly interested in some of the second-order
consequences where we might need to shift our thinking in order
to stay ahead of our competitors. And you recently endorsed the
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, and you have
talked about China's pursuit of veto authority over other
nations' economic decisions. Why, in your view, is this
legislation and a hard look at CFIUS [Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States] needed?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we have made very keen observations
of the amount of intellectual property that has been basically
under industrial espionage, has been rifled through in our
country and exfiltrated. And it is time that we also look at
what are the most critical national security industries that
may not be covered under the current act that we need to
broaden and deepen the protections for this advantage that we
have available, whether it be Silicon Valley, Seattle, or
elsewhere in the country.
Mr. Gallagher. And then can I quickly ask, General Selva,
what concerns do you have, from a military advice perspective,
on our ability to protect DOD's supply chain, critical
technology, and our industrial base, given current tools,
practices, and authorities?
General Selva. Thank you, Congressman. The supply chain and
the industrial base speak directly to the timeliness of CFIUS
actions and our ability to control who invests in those key
capabilities that allow us to supply, train, and deploy our
military forces. So the notion that we would not pay attention
to who is investing in the companies that actually allow us to
move and mobilize our force is folly. So the refinement and
renewal of the powers within the CFIUS capabilities to
determine who is doing that investing and for what reason put
us in a position of being able to understand the potential
vulnerabilities of those investments.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you both. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I could not help but notice in the response
to a question earlier, you said that--I think I heard you say
that we need SLCM [submarine-launched cruise missile] and the
SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] in order to have
democracy stand up for itself. I think that is what your
response was to a question.
You are not suggesting that if any one of us do not support
the development of SLCM or SLBM that we are not standing up for
our democracy?
Secretary Mattis. That would never be the way I
characterize someone's vote, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
So you also argued that the Nuclear Posture Review
provides, I think it was SLCM provides a bargaining chip in
dealing with INF Treaty violations of the Russians. Did I get
that correct?
Secretary Mattis. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Larsen. Is it a logical extension, then, that if we saw
a change in Russian behavior, the administration would stop the
development of either one or both?
Secretary Mattis. I do not want to say in advance of a
negotiation and undercut our negotiator's position what we
would or would not do. The point I would make is that
deterrence is dynamic. We have to deal with it as it stands
today, as we see it on the chart. And in that regard, I believe
that we have to give our negotiators something with which to
negotiate.
Mr. Larsen. Do you have any indication there would be a
change in Russian behavior with the development of either one
of these?
Secretary Mattis. I can only tell you that we go into this
with capabilities to make certain the Russians understand that
we have a capability and a deterring capability, and it is
based on not just the two nations, but the broader deterrent
portfolio as well.
Mr. Larsen. Sure. Does the United States currently have the
ability to deliver a nonstrategic nuclear weapon, a nuclear
response without this investment? Do they have the ability? I
am sorry, do they have the ability to deliver that without this
investment?
Secretary Mattis. Are you referring to a sea-launched
cruise missile?
Mr. Larsen. No, I am talking about the delivery of a
nonstrategic nuclear response. It would not have to be a sea-
launched.
Secretary Mattis. I would be cautious about saying any
nuclear weapon is nonstrategic, sir. If you mean a low-yield,
yes, we do.
Mr. Larsen. And what is the difference between that
capability and, say, a sea-launched?
Secretary Mattis. The gravity bomb that is the low-yield
means the bomber would have to penetrate, but today, air
defense systems are altogether different than 10 or 20 years
ago.
Mr. Larsen. And is there any investment going on in
counter-air defense to deal with that or is this the only--is
the development of a new capability the only solution?
Secretary Mattis. No, sir. We are certainly working on air
defense penetration capability; but, again, we have to deal
with where we are at today. We are working on the issue.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Kind of the where we are at question gets
to something I am not going to bore you with the details,
because we will probably get to it in subcommittee hearings,
but the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimate of now $1.2
trillion over 30 years, which I think the Department would
say--for the nuclear modernization, which the Department would
say is only or merely 6.4 percent of the budget when it was
much higher in the past. I do not know if that means the rest
of the defense budget is out of control and this one is under
control, or the fact that we do not really have an accounting
of what that $1.2 trillion is and that we are now looking at an
NPR that presumes additional development of capabilities, which
I presume would be on top of this current CBO estimate.
You can maybe address that briefly, but we are going to
have plenty of time over the next couple of months to explore
that, the money question, which is a big concern of all of
ours.
Can you tell us about the assurance? Since nuclear
deterrence is partly an assurance of allies, can you tell us
about the assurance a new low-yield nuclear weapon gives to our
allies or any response from specifically our NATO allies at
this point?
Secretary Mattis. Sir, we engaged in extensive consultation
with our NATO allies. I was on the phone this morning with one
of my counterparts, and she expressed the deep appreciation of
her country for the amount of collaboration that went into the
Nuclear Posture Review. And so, right now, I can tell you the
deterrence posture we have and we have outlined in the posture
review has gained a great deal of support from our allies.
Mr. Larsen. Well, I get thanks for collaboration all the
time and people then work against me. So I am just wondering
has NATO then yet taken a position? And I will follow up with
you later on that. Thanks a lot.
The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your attendance and your service to
the country.
The last Nuclear Posture Review published 8 years ago said,
quote: ``Russia is not an enemy and is increasingly a
partner,'' close quote. At that time, there were many of us on
this committee that did not believe that statement, and we
certainly do not today.
Russia continues to brazenly violate the INF Treaty,
continues to conduct dangerous nuclear exercises directed
against the United States, NATO allies, and regional partners,
and continues a military occupation of sovereign Ukrainian
territory. Finally, China clearly demands recognition as a
regional gatekeeper and a global influence.
With that backdrop, Secretary Mattis, how would you
characterize the changes we have seen in the global security
environment since the 2010 NPR, and why do these changes
matter, and how is your NPR recommending we adapt our nuclear
posture and policies?
Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I believe what we have seen is
that Russia and China, from, as you point out, Ukraine to
mucking around in our elections in the case of the Democratic
elections in the case of Russia, to China's militarization of
features in the South China Sea, we have seen them choose to
become strategic competitors with us vice what at one time we
had hoped would be some level of partnership.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that the 6 or 7 percent of our
defense budget that we are devoting to the nuclear enterprise
is an adequate level of spending to fund our Nation's number
one priority defense mission?
Secretary Mattis. I do believe it is. And I would point out
that it is around 3.5 percent for many years, climbing to 6.5,
6.7 at its top percentage about 2029, we believe. And at that
point, it would go into a more measured maintenance of what we
have built: the Columbia class, the B-21, this sort of thing,
Congressman.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Selva, thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Secretary, in the National Defense Strategy, you noted
that we are a resilient joint force in regards to our forward-
deployed forces. I am concerned regarding the U.S. Navy's
ability to remain resilient during conflict with a peer
adversary, specifically with depot-level ship repair capability
in the Pacific.
Now, in the Fleet Comprehensive Review, the Navy identified
capacity issues at the ship repair facility in Yokosuka, Japan.
The fiscal year 2018 NDAA, section 1047, requires the Secretary
of the Navy to submit a report on the ship depot maintenance
capability in the Western Pacific. It further requires the
Secretary of Defense to certify to congressional defense
committees whether or not the current ship depot maintenance
capability and capacity, including dry docks, in the Western
Pacific are sufficient to meet both peacetime and contingency
requirements.
So my question is, where is the Department in terms of
meeting these requirements, and how are you going about
determining if there is sufficient capability and capacity?
Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, where we are at right now
is we are examining the sufficiency of it in terms of just raw
capacity, the anticipated need if we go into conflict, and the
distribution over a number of locations, for obvious reasons.
So right now, we are still in the assessment. We obviously know
what we have right now, but whether it is sufficient for the
future is where we are concentrating the study. And I will make
certain that the Secretary of the Navy follows up on this as we
get more mature in our output.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The next question I have is that the people of Guam are
proud to host the continued bomber presence and one leg of the
nuclear triad with the recent addition of the B-2 and B-52
bombers. Considering the bomber presence and as the westernmost
territory of the United States, Guam holds vital strategic
bases, and I am happy to see the Department place a THAAD
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] system to aid in its
defense. However, in your strategy, you call for investment on
layered missile defense from North Korean threats.
Considering our strategic importance, is Guam adequately
defended from theater missile threats, and how do you intend to
bolster these defense systems in the future?
Secretary Mattis. Well, we will continue bolstering them to
keep pace with the threat out of North Korea. As you know,
besides the THAAD system, ma'am, we also keep the Aegis, the
ballistic missile defense U.S. Navy warship in the waters out
there, and we can always reinforce that. We also have several
of those ships in Japanese waters right now, and they can move
back and forth to include coverage of Guam in the mobile way
that comes to our Navy. But we are looking at all the systems,
to include Aegis Ashore, as we look toward the future
protection of our Pacific area.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think we
have talked about this. Just keep Guam in a secure position and
keep all the bombers and everything else you have there for a
while, anyway. And I thank you again.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Votes have come early. We do not have time to
get two more members in. So as soon as votes are completed on
the floor, we will come back and be in classified session up in
2212.
At this point, the open hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]

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A P P E N D I X

February 6, 2018

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 6, 2018

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 6, 2018

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. Turner. In April 2017, the State Department released its most
recent arms control compliance report. It found that Russia remains in
violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. a.
Secretary Mattis, what is your assessment of the impacts from Russia's
violation of this treaty--both on the U.S. and our allies? b. How does
the NPR and the Administration's December 2016 Russia strategy propose
to address this violation? c. How long should the U.S. continue to
remain in the INF Treaty if Russia continues to violate it?
Secretary Mattis. Russia's violation of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to
allies and partners in Europe and Asia. The value of the INF Treaty, or
any arms control treaty, depends on all parties remaining in
compliance. Moscow must understand that the United States will not
indefinitely endure Russia's non-compliance. The status quo, in which
the United States continues to comply while Russia continues
deployments in violation of the Treaty, is untenable. Therefore, the
United States is pursuing an integrated strategy supported by
diplomatic, economic, and military research and development actions to
persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. This
includes a review of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched,
intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable the United
States to defend itself and its allies and partners should Russia fail
to return to compliance. The supplemental sea-launched cruise missile
capability identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is also, in
part, designed to persuade Russia to return to compliance.
Mr. Turner. Secretary Mattis, should we be considering extending
the New START Treaty while Russia is violating the INF Treaty,
violating the Open Skies Treaty, violating the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe, and failing to comply with the Biological Weapons
Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and many other arms
control commitments? a. Do you believe we should pursue further nuclear
arms control measures with Russia while Russia is in violation of so
many existing arms control agreements?
Secretary Mattis. The United States remains willing to engage in a
prudent arms control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control
opportunities that return parties to predictability and transparency,
and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions
permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United
States and its allies and partners. The United States will continue to
implement fully the New START Treaty, which complements U.S. nuclear
deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and predictable
strategic balance between the United States and Russia. We will
consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate
time, taking into account Russia's compliance with its obligations
under the New START Treaty and other arms control agreements.
Russia's violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and partners
in Europe and Asia. The value of the INF Treaty, or any arms control
treaty, depends on all parties remaining in compliance. Moscow must
understand that the United States will not indefinitely endure Russia's
non-compliance. The status quo, in which the United States continues to
comply while Russia continues deployments in violation of the Treaty,
is untenable. Therefore, the United States is pursuing an integrated
strategy supported by diplomatic, economic, and military research and
development actions to persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable
compliance. This includes a review of U.S. options for conventional,
ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable
the United States to defend ourselves and our allies and partners
should Russia fail to return to compliance. The supplemental sea-
launched cruise missile capability identified in the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review is also, in part, designed to persuade Russia to return
to compliance.
Mr. Turner. In April 2017, the State Department released its most
recent arms control compliance report. It found that Russia remains in
violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
General Selva, you told us last year in March that Russia had now
operationally deployed the cruise missile that is violating this
treaty. Tell us--is Russia taking any steps that indicate it will come
back into compliance with this treaty? Have they stopped deploying
these missiles or are they deploying more of them?
General Selva. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, you are now the third consecutive
Secretary of Defense that has identified nuclear deterrence as the
highest-priority mission of the Department of Defense. Two different
Administrations, three different Secretaries. Do you believe 6 or 7
percent of our defense budget is an appropriate level of spending for
the nation's number one priority defense mission? Do you believe this
is affordable?
Secretary Mattis. Yes. Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent
is much less expensive than fighting a war that we are unable to deter.
We can afford this level of investment against one of the few
existential threats that we face.
Mr. Rogers. General Selva, we've now had three consecutive
Secretaries of Defense identify nuclear deterrence as the highest-
priority mission of the Department of Defense. Two different
Administrations, three different Secretaries. Do the Joint Chiefs of
Staff agree with this prioritization? Do the Joint Chiefs believe 6 or
7 percent of our defense budget is an appropriate level of spending for
the nation's number one priority defense mission? Do you believe this
is affordable?
General Selva. Yes, the Joint Chiefs agree the nuclear mission is
the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense. The Joint
Chiefs also support the nuclear force modernization program. I agree
with what Secretary Mattis said, ``America can afford survival.''
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, how do the supplemental capabilities
proposed by the NPR--a low-yield submarine-launched weapon and a sea-
launched cruise missile--help shore up deterrence and assurance in this
new era of great power competition?
Secretary Mattis. The low-yield ballistic missile and sea-launched
cruise missile are necessary to address our concerns that potential
adversaries may believe they can effectively threaten or employ limited
nuclear strikes. These supplemental capabilities, along with the
existing elements of our Triad, provide a diverse set of nuclear
capabilities that will provide flexibility to tailor the U.S. approach
to deterring different potential adversaries.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, do the supplemental capabilities
proposed by the NPR lower the threshold for nuclear use? Are they about
nuclear warfighting or about ensuring conflict is avoided all-together?
Do you believe the addition of these capabilities to the U.S. nuclear
arsenal increase or decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war?
Secretary Mattis. By convincing adversaries that even limited use
of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, we raise
the threshold for nuclear weapons use and decrease the likelihood of
nuclear war.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, why do we need a low-yield SLBM when
we already have a low-yield nuclear gravity bomb? Are these
capabilities redundant? How do adversary air defenses factor into the
recommendation for a low-yield SLBM?
Secretary Mattis. The low-yield submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) is highly survivable when deployed in ballistic nuclear
submarines at sea, while our gravity bombs are more vulnerable in fixed
storage and operating locations. SLBMs are highly accurate and, given
their speed and trajectory, are better able to penetrate modern
defenses that could challenge air-delivered weapons. This does not
reduce the need for air-delivered gravity bombs and dual-capable
aircraft, which can be forward deployed, contribute to allied burden
sharing, provide visible assurance to both allies and partners, and
serve as a tangible demonstration of U.S. extended deterrence
guarantees.
Mr. Rogers. General Selva, in your professional military judgment,
why do we need a low-yield SLBM when we already have a low-yield
nuclear gravity bomb? Are these capabilities redundant? How do
adversary air defenses factor into the recommendation for a low-yield
SLBM?
General Selva. One of the main roles of U.S. nuclear capabilities
is to deter adversaries. Deterrence is an art, not a science. It is not
possible to determine precisely what is needed to deter with high
confidence across a range of potential adversaries and circumstances.
It is, however, possible to get indications that one's deterrence
strategy, posture, and capabilities are potentially inadequate, and
that as a result there is an unacceptable risk of deterrence failure.
Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabilities call for the limited use
of nuclear weapons to coerce NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional
forces through the wider use of nuclear weapons if their coercive use
fails. They would not have adopted this strategy and doctrine, and they
would not be expending their limited resources to modernize and expand
their non-strategic nuclear forces (which are already approximately ten
times larger than NATO's), if they perceived current U.S. and NATO
nuclear posture as undeniably sufficient to deter such nuclear use.
The strategy and capabilities recommended in the NPR are intended
to reduce Russian confidence in their strategy by providing a wider
array of credible response options that can render their strategy
ineffective. Our purpose is to raise Russia's nuclear threshold, not
reduce our own.
A low-yield SLBM warhead will provide a near-term, relatively
inexpensive augmentation of our ability to credibly strike any target
in response to Russian limited nuclear use. A low-yield SLBM warhead is
survivable, prompt, and is able to strike targets that are heavily
defended against air-delivered strikes. All current U.S. low-yield
options are air delivered. Acquiring this capability will not lower the
threshold at which the United States would employ nuclear weapons.
Rather, it is designed to raise the nuclear threshold of potential
adversaries.
Possessing multiple low-yield strike capabilities is not redundant.
These systems will be ``complementary'' capabilities necessary to
address various potential adversary threat environments (e.g.
integrated air defenses) in a more credible manner.
Mr. Rogers. General Selva, in April 2017, the State Department
released its most recent arms control compliance report. It found that
Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. General Selva, you told us last year in March that Russia
had operationally deployed the cruise missile that is violating this
treaty. Tell us--is Russia taking any steps that indicate it will come
back into compliance with this treaty? Have they stopped deploying
these missiles or are they deploying more of them?
General Selva. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, what is your assessment of the
impacts from Russia's violation of the INF Treaty? What impact may this
violation have on our military, defense posture, and that of our
allies? How does the NPR and the Administration's December 2016 Russia
strategy propose to address this violation? How long should the U.S.
continue to remain in the INF Treaty if Russia continues to violate it?
Secretary Mattis. Russia's violation of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to
allies and partners in Europe and Asia. The status quo, in which the
United States continues to comply while Russia continues deployments in
violation of the Treaty, is untenable. Therefore, the United States is
pursuing an integrated strategy supported by diplomatic and economic
measures as well as military research and development actions intended
to persuade Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance. This
includes a review of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched,
intermediate-range missile systems which would enable the United States
to defend ourselves and our allies and partners should Russia fail to
return to compliance. The supplemental sea-launched cruise missile
capability identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is also, in
part, designed to persuade Russia to return to compliance.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, should we be considering extending
the New START Treaty while Russia is violating the INF Treaty,
violating the Open Skies Treaty, violating the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe, and failing to comply with the Biological Weapons
Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and many other arms
control commitments? Do you believe we should pursue further nuclear
arms control measures with Russia while Russia is in violation of so
many existing arms control agreements?
Secretary Mattis. The United States remains willing to engage in a
prudent arms control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control
opportunities that return parties to predictability and transparency,
and remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions
permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United
States and its allies and partners. The United States will continue to
fully implement the New START Treaty, which complements U.S. nuclear
deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and predictable
strategic balance between the United States and Russia. We will
consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate
time, taking into account Russia's compliance with its obligations
under the New START Treaty and other arms control agreements. We will
also work to bring Russia into compliance with its existing arms
control obligations, using military tools integrated with diplomatic
and economic measures as appropriate.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, is the nuclear declaratory policy in
the 2018 NPR in any significant way different from the Obama
administration's declaratory policy?
Secretary Mattis. No. The declaratory policy outlined in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is consistent with the declaratory policy
outlined in the 2010 NPR. The United States would only consider the use
of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital
interests of the United States, its allies and partners. Unlike the
2010 NPR, the 2018 NPR provides examples of ``extreme circumstances,''
which could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.
Mr. Rogers. General Selva, is the nuclear declaratory policy in the
2018 NPR in any significant way different from the Obama
administration's declaratory policy?
General Selva. It is different only in that it is deliberately
somewhat less ambiguous regarding what might constitute the ``extreme
circumstances'' in which we might consider the use of nuclear weapons
to defend the vital interests of the U.S. and our allies and partners.
This clarification does not in any way expand those circumstances. It
clarifies them in order to prevent misperception or miscalculation that
could result in deterrence failure.
Mr. Rogers. General Selva, do all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend and support the major recommendations of the Nuclear Posture
Review? Why?
General Selva. Yes. Because they recognize that deterrence of
nuclear attack is the highest priority mission of the Department of
Defense, and is thus a ``No Fail'' mission. The NPR recommendations are
a prudent approach to ensuring mission success.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, were our allies consulted as the NPR
was being considered and drafted? What did they say? How are they
reacting to the proposal to continue the Obama administration's program
of record and add two supplemental capabilities?
Secretary Mattis. Throughout the Nuclear Posture Review, we
consulted extensively with allies and partners. They were unanimous in
the view that the security environment has changed for the worse since
2010; offered a range of opinions on the environment and the continued
need for nuclear deterrence; and appreciated our efforts to consult
with them. Our East Asian allies in particular appreciated the
reaffirmation of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. In Europe,
reactions were positive, particularly our moves to strengthen
deterrence, reaffirm our declaratory policy, and further the goals of
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A number of
European allies emphasized the importance of balancing deterrence with
arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. Reactions to
continuation of the U.S. nuclear modernization program were generally
positive. No European allies objected to the inclusion of the
supplemental capabilities. Many viewed these supplemental capabilities
as an appropriate counter-balance to Russian, Chinese and North Korean
developments, while some did express reservations over possible Russian
and Chinese reactions.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, are you satisfied with DOD's
relationship with the National Nuclear Security Administration (which
supplies and maintains U.S. nuclear warheads)? What works best in this
relationship? What would you change? Is the forum for this
relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council, functioning as it should?
How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the Department
of Energy?
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense works closely with the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
to ensure that the U.S. nuclear stockpile and its supporting
infrastructure provide the warheads our forces need to reliably deter
nuclear attack against the United States, our allies and partners. I
look forward to working closely with Secretary Perry and the new NNSA
Administrator, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, on modernizing and recapitalizing
all aspects of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and U.S. nuclear
infrastructure to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent that
protects the homeland, assures allies and above all, deters
adversaries.
Mr. Rogers. General Selva, are you satisfied with DOD's
relationship with the National Nuclear Security Administration (which
supplies and maintains U.S. nuclear warheads)? What works best in this
relationship? What would you change? Is the forum for this
relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council, functioning as it should?
How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the Department
of Energy?
General Selva. Are you satisfied with DOD's relationship with the
National Nuclear Security Administration (which supplies and maintains
U.S. nuclear warheads)? Overall, I am satisfied with the relationship
between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). That doesn't mean there's no room for
improvement.
What works best in this relationship? The Nuclear Weapons Council.
What would you change? There is an increasing requirement for
transparency and timeliness of communication between the DOD and NNSA
through the NWC and its subordinate committees and staff. This needs to
improve in order to ensure success in the nuclear enterprise
modernization effort.
Is the forum for this relationship, the Nuclear Weapons Council,
functioning as it should? Yes.
How often do you speak to your counterparts in NNSA and the
Department of Energy? The NWC meets monthly, and I also meet with my
DOD and NNSA counterparts as needed in addition to these regularly
scheduled meetings.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, the Obama administration had a policy
of not pursuing any new U.S. nuclear capabilities and reducing the role
of U.S. nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. The 2010 NPR
claimed this would show leadership and discourage other nations from
pursing their own new nuclear capabilities. Has this policy influenced
the behavior of foreign nuclear powers, in particular of Russia? If our
potential adversaries are not following our lead here, is it dangerous
for us to continue down this road indefinitely if no other nation--
except perhaps our closest ally in the U.K.--is doing the same? In your
view, how likely is it that the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain
credible to 2050 or beyond if we never modify or improve its nuclear
capabilities while other countries continue to advance?
Secretary Mattis. For decades, the United States led the world in
efforts to reduce the roles and number of nuclear weapons. The
assumptions and priority goals that guided these efforts, as well as
the content of the 2001 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews, proved to be
mistaken. Although the United States has reduced its nuclear arsenal by
more than eighty-five percent since its Cold War peak, others have
moved in the opposite direction. Russia, China and North Korea are
growing their stockpiles, increasing the prominence of nuclear weapons
in their security strategies, and--in some cases--pursuing the
development of new nuclear capabilities to threaten peaceful nations.
In this environment, it is not possible to delay modernization of U.S.
nuclear forces if we are to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent. This
is a top priority of the Department of Defense.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Mattis, one of the supplemental capabilities
your NPR proposes is a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, which
we had in our arsenal for decades until the Obama administration
decided to eliminate it in 2010. So is this a ``new'' capability--or is
it just bringing back an old capability because the world didn't turn
out to be quite as benign as we may have wished.
Secretary Mattis. The nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile is
not a new capability as the United States deployed such weapons in the
past.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. Are you familiar with the Chinese telecommunications
firms, Huawei and ZTE? As you know, these firms are closely linked to
China's Communist Party and its intelligence services. Do you believe
it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to use that equipment
with its intrinsic risks to department cybersecurity? Do you think
cleared defense contractors should use it? Please elaborate any
thoughts or comments you have.
Secretary Mattis. Yes, the Department is familiar with Huawei and
ZTE and their linkages to the Government of the People's Republic of
China. Yes, the Department is concerned with use of any hardware,
software or service that foreign governments have influence over the
supply chains. I agree these companies' products present a risk to the
Department's cybersecurity and their use by cleared defense contractors
as it pertains to the Department's systems and information.
Mr. Conaway. Are you familiar with the Chinese telecommunications
firms, Huawei and ZTE? As you know, these firms are closely linked to
China's Communist Party and its intelligence services. Do you believe
it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to use that equipment
with its intrinsic risks to department cybersecurity? Do you think
cleared defense contractors should use it? Please elaborate any
thoughts or comments you have.
General Selva. Are you familiar with the Chinese telecommunications
firms, Huawei and ZTE? Answer: Yes. Huawei and ZTE are two of the
largest Chinese telecommunications equipment providers in the world.
Historically, both companies have engaged in business practices of
concern, especially within the context of U.S. National Security.
Additionally, Chinese security laws may present situations that would
prioritize Chinese National Security interests over corporate
interests--a threat that increases the more saturated the
telecommunications market becomes with both companies.
Do you believe it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to
use that equipment with its intrinsic risks to department
cybersecurity? Answer: While I personally have no formal role in DOD
procurement actions, I do feel that cybersecurity supply chain risks
need to have a stronger consideration in acquisition decisions. The
critical nature our information has on national security and military
operations demands we use companies that are vetted and screened to
provide the highest level of security. We must continue to improve
network security and resilience to ensure adversaries gain neither a
real or perceived advantage. It remains a priority for the Joint Force
to protect and defend its critical infrastructure from attacks, as well
as defend the nation's networks against cyberattacks of significant
consequence. However, there is no policy that currently restricts the
use of these products.
Do you think cleared defense contractors should use it? Answer: DOD
acquisition decisions to reduce supply chain risks to cybersecurity
ultimately depend upon cleared defense contractors to be effective, and
demands we use companies that are vetted and screened to provide the
highest level of security. Within that context, these cleared defense
contractors should be very cautious in their acquisition and use of
certain products, not just in DOD systems, but also in corporate
networks, systems and devices that could provide a threat actor with
access to DOD systems and associated critical program information.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges space as a
warfighting domain and rencognizes the need to organize for innovation
and introduce streamlined approaches to fielding new capabilities.
But DOD's record on producing space systems is abysmal. One recent
example is SBIRS, the Space-Based Infrared System that provides us with
missile warning. It experienced a 221% per unit cost increase with a 9-
year delay.
What kind of reforms is the Department taking to ensure
our space warfighting readiness?
We have observed the long-term strategic competition with China and
Russia for years, specifically with regard to our space capabilities.
While we have stagnated in delivering space capabilities to our
warfighters, China and Russia are dangerously close to outpacing us.
What kinds of capabilities, policies, and authorities
does the Department need to ensure that we stay ahead of these
countries and are able to fight and win through the space domain?
Clearly our failure to adequately prioritize space
warfighting is not merely a budgetary issue, but given that we're
coming off of a 30-year low in R&D investment, more resources would
certainly be useful, and also would say a lot about our commitment to
space. When should Congress expect to see space given a higher priority
in DOD's budget?
Secretary Mattis. Congress can see the higher priority on space
security in the President's Budget request, in the new National
Strategy for Space, in the National Security Strategy, and the National
Defense Strategy. Aligned with those strategies, the President's Budget
request includes $12.5 billion for Department of Defense (DOD) space
programs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, which is an increase of 9.4 percent
over the FY 2018 request. The President's Budget request also includes
$65.6 billion over the FY 2019-23 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP),
which reflects 13.9 percent growth over the previous five-year planning
period. As Congress has directed, DOD has consolidated this funding
under Major Force Program-12 to facilitate the DOD leadership's
strategic management and Congress' oversight of DOD's space funding and
programs. To compete, deter, and win through space, DOD must continue
to develop, test, deploy, and sustain the innovative and resilient
space capabilities our warfighters need to fight and win in all
domains. To that end, the FY 2019 defense space budget request provides
for increases in mission assurance of DOD's space-based capabilities
against growing threats, leverages commercial innovation and our
international partnerships to accelerate development and deployment of
new capabilities, strengthens lethality and readiness of the total
force, and enhances the nation's overall deterrence and warfighting
power. Furthermore, as Congress directed under Section 1601(c) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense is assessing the performance of the entire defense space
enterprise and developing reform recommendations that DOD will be
providing to Congress by August 2018.
Mr. Lamborn. The NPR puts considerable focus on three elements of
our nuclear deterrent that sometimes receive scant attention: (1) the
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system, which is old
but reliable and must be modernized; (2) the infrastructure within NNSA
that is literally falling apart; (3) and the people in uniform and out
civilian clothes, across DOD and NNSA, that form the backbone of our
deterrent. Without any of these three, we simply do not have a nuclear
deterrent in this country.
How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) system changed over time? What are the nature of
the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks,
attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary use of limited,
low-yield nuclear strikes?
Because it is so large and complex, responsibility for
the NC3 system is scattered across DOD. What steps does the NPR
recommend to address this organizational problem?
What steps are being proposed to get after NNSA's $4
billion backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance?
How will we ensure we take care of the unsung heroes of
national defense in DOD and NNSA that operate, support, and provide our
nuclear deterrent?
Secretary Mattis. The Nuclear Command, Control and Communication
(NC3) system is subject to challenges from both aging system components
and new threats, in particular space and cyber-space, adversary
strategies of limited nuclear escalation, and a diffusion of authority
and responsibility. The Administration is pursuing a series of steps to
strengthen NC3, including: 1) improving protection against space-based
and cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack
assessment; 3) improving command post and communication links; 4)
advancing decision support technology; and 5) integrating planning and
operations. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) directs the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deliver to me by 1 May a plan to reform
NC3 governance.
There is no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical
infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for
U.S. nuclear weapons. Just as our nuclear forces are an affordable
priority, so is a resilient and effective nuclear weapons
infrastructure. The NPR lays out several specific initiatives that
National Nuclear Security Agency will pursue and fund in its budget
requests, and implementation of these efforts is ongoing. The personnel
who maintain our nuclear deterrent are true professionals; I am
committed to ensuring they have the tools needed to execute their
mission.
Mr. Lamborn. The NPR puts considerable focus on three elements of
our nuclear deterrent that sometimes receive scant attention: (1) the
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system, which is old
but reliable and must be modernized; (2) the infrastructure within NNSA
that is literally falling apart; (3) and the people in uniform and out
civilian clothes, across DOD and NNSA, that form the backbone of our
deterrent. Without any of these three, we simply do not have a nuclear
deterrent in this country.
How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) system changed over time? What are the nature of
the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks,
attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary use of limited,
low-yield nuclear strikes?
Because it is so large and complex, responsibility for
the NC3 system is scattered across DOD. What steps does the NPR
recommend to address this organizational problem?
What steps are being proposed to get after NNSA's $4
billion backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance?
How will we ensure we take care of the unsung heroes of
national defense in DOD and NNSA that operate, support, and provide our
nuclear deterrent?
General Selva. Q: How have threats to our nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3) system changed over time? What are
the nature of the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to
cyber attacks, attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary
use of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes?
A: The Cold War legacy nuclear command, control, and communications
(NC3) system, which was last comprehensively updated almost thirty
years ago, was designed to operate in the face of a singular threat
from a single adversary. Since then, the NC3 system has grown
increasingly vulnerable to cross-domain threats from multiple actors.
Potential adversaries are expending considerable effort in the Space
and Cyber domains in particular that create new challenges for the NC3
system. The potential for adversaries to employ limited nuclear options
further complicates the NC3 system's ability to assure the command and
control of nuclear weapons at all times.
Q: Because it is so large and complex, responsibility for the NC3
system is scattered across DOD. What steps does the NPR recommend to
address this organizational problem?
A: To address this challenge, the Nuclear Posture Review report
directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with
key DOD stakeholders to deliver to the Secretary of Defense no later
than May 1, 2018, a plan to reform NC3 governance to ensure its
effective functioning and modernization. We must, and we will improve
NC3 governance to ensure the Department of Defense (DOD) is properly
organized to maintain a fully capable NC3 system to address current and
future environments.
Q: How have threats to our nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) system changed over time? What are the nature of
the threats to our NC3, particularly with regards to cyber attacks,
attacks on space-based assets, and potential adversary use of limited,
low-yield nuclear strikes?
A: The Cold War legacy nuclear command, control, and communications
(NC3) system, which was last comprehensively updated almost thirty
years ago, was designed to operate in the face of a singular threat
from a single adversary. Since then, the NC3 system has grown
increasingly vulnerable to cross-domain threats from multiple actors.
Potential adversaries are expending considerable effort in the Space
and Cyber domains in particular that create new challenges for the NC3
system. The potential for adversaries to employ limited nuclear options
further complicates the NC3 system's ability to assure the command and
control of nuclear weapons at all times.
Q: What steps are being proposed to get after NNSA's $4 billion
backlog of infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance? How will
we ensure we take care of the unsung heroes of national defense in DOD
and NNSA that operate, support, and provide our nuclear deterrent?
A: The United States will pursue initiatives to ensure the
necessary capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear
weapons infrastructure and the needed skills of the nuclear enterprise
workforce, including the following:
Pursue a joint DOD and DOE advanced-technology
development capability to ensure that efforts are appropriately
integrated to meet DOD needs.
Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce
plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. A
delay in this would result in the need for a higher rate of pit
production at higher cost.
Ensure that current plans to reconstitute the U.S.
capability to produce lithium compounds are sufficient to meet military
requirements.
Fully fund the Uranium Processing Facility and ensure
availability of sufficient low-enriched uranium to meet military
requirements.
Ensure the necessary reactor capacity to produce an
adequate supply of tritium to meet military requirements.
Ensure continuity in the U.S. capability to develop and
manufacture secure, trusted strategic radiation-hardened
microelectronic systems beyond 2025 to support stockpile modernization.
Rapidly pursue the Stockpile Responsiveness Program
established by Congress to expand opportunities for young scientists
and engineers to advance warhead design, development, and production
skills.
Develop an NNSA roadmap that sizes production capacity to
modernization and hedging requirements.
Retain confidence in nuclear gravity bombs needed to meet
deterrence needs.
Maintain and enhance the computational, experimental, and
testing capabilities needed to annually assess nuclear weapons.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. Right now we are seeing North Korea pursuing a charm
offensive with South Korea through its offered participation in the
Winter Olympics. How long do you anticipate the charm offensive will
last and do you see it as genuine progress or just a temporary
distraction? What concern do you have if North Korea continues to
advance its weapons and delivery programs at the pace it is undertaking
during this lull? Where does this all end? What should the Congress be
prepared for if a military conflict occurs?
Secretary Mattis. Congress can see the higher priority on space
security in the President's Budget request, in the new National
Strategy for Space, in the National Security Strategy, and the National
Defense Strategy. Aligned with those strategies, the President's Budget
request includes $12.5 billion for Department of Defense (DOD) space
programs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, which is an increase of 9.4 percent
over the FY 2018 request. The President's Budget request also includes
$65.6 billion over the FY 2019-23 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP),
which reflects 13.9 percent growth over the previous five-year planning
period. As Congress has directed, DOD has consolidated this funding
under Major Force Program-12 to facilitate the DOD leadership's
strategic management and Congress' oversight of DOD's space funding and
programs. To compete, deter, and win through space, DOD must continue
to develop, test, deploy, and sustain the innovative and resilient
space capabilities our warfighters need to fight and win in all
domains. To that end, the FY 2019 defense space budget request provides
for increases in mission assurance of DOD's space-based capabilities
against growing threats, leverages commercial innovation and our
international partnerships to accelerate development and deployment of
new capabilities, strengthens lethality and readiness of the total
force, and enhances the nation's overall deterrence and warfighting
power. Furthermore, as Congress directed under Section 1601(c) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense is assessing the performance of the entire defense space
enterprise and developing reform recommendations that DOD will be
providing to Congress by August 2018.
Mr. Hunter. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommends we retain
the longstanding ability to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft, like
F-15s and eventually F-35s, around the world--not just in Europe. This
includes Asia. Why is the ability to deploy dual-capable aircraft like
F-35s to Asia--in support of allies like Japan and South Korea--
important? Do our dual-capable aircraft help reassure our allies in
Asia?
Secretary Mattis. Dual capable aircraft should be capable and ready
to forward deploy to any region, to provide a clear signal to potential
adversaries that the United States possesses the forward-deployed
capabilities to respond promptly to potential escalation. Their
tangible presence also contributes significantly to the assurance of
allies. Dual capable aircraft make the U.S. nuclear deterrent more
flexible and enable better tailoring of our strategy to possible
regional adversaries.
Mr. Hunter. Right now we are seeing North Korea pursuing a charm
offensive with South Korea through its offered participation in the
Winter Olympics. How long do you anticipate the charm offensive will
last and do you see it as genuine progress or just a temporary
distraction? What concern do you have if North Korea continues to
advance its weapons and delivery programs at the pace it is undertaking
during this lull? Where does this all end? What should the Congress be
prepared for if a military conflict occurs?
General Selva.
It is important to first remember that North Korea has a
consistent track record of following periods of increased provocations
with ``charm offensives'' in hopes of extracting favorable concessions
from negotiations.
At this point, it is difficult to assess whether North
Korea's current calls for engagement will offer any different results.
It is likely, however, that North Korea will not conduct any actions
that will jeopardize the North-South Summit tentatively targeted for
April and the potential meeting with President Trump in May.
It would be a mistake to assume that North Korea will
cease to advance its weapons and delivery programs during this period.
We certainly do not operate under this assumption and remain focused on
supporting the Maximum Pressure Campaign to the fullest extent. We will
also maintain the readiness of our military forces to conduct a wide
range of military options.
Our end state still remains the Complete, Irreversible,
and Verifiable Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Both Secretary Mattis and General Dunford have been clear
on the potential costs of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. We
will prevail but Congress, and the American people, must be prepared
for a conflict that would result in a loss-of-life unlike any of us
have experienced in our lifetimes.
Mr. Hunter. he Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommends we retain
the longstanding ability to forward-deploy dual-capable aircraft, like
F-15s and eventually F-35s, around the world--not just in Europe. This
includes Asia. Why is the ability to deploy dual-capable aircraft like
F-35s to Asia--in support of allies like Japan and South Korea--
important? Do our dual-capable aircraft help reassure our allies in
Asia?
General Selva. The United States retains dual-capable aircraft
(DCA) to enhance stable regional deterrence and assure our allies. They
can be deployed globally to signal to both adversaries and allies U.S.
resolve and capability to respond to aggression and escalation. The NPR
did not conclude that permanently deploying DCA to Asia at this time is
necessary for deterrence or assurance purposes. Having the ability to
forward deploy DCA assures allies that the United States has effective,
credible, and flexible options to respond to aggression against them.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. Would you please discuss the requirement for the
LRSO cruise missile? Some are saying we don't need the LRSO if we
already have a penetrating bomber, such as the B-2 or B-21, armed with
nuclear gravity bombs. But the new Nuclear Posture Review states very
clearly that we need both LRSO and the B-21 bomber.
a. How do capabilities like LRSO, our bombers, and the nuclear-
armed sea-launched cruise missiles contribute to assurance and
deterrence in Asia? Do they reassure allies like Japan and South Korea
while deterring potential adversaries like China and North Korea?
b. We know how hard it is to defense against cruise missiles. Is
LRSO a cost-imposing strategy on our adversaries--would it force them
to spend lots of money if they want to defend against it? Please
discuss aging and maintenance in our current air-launched cruise
missiles. What happens to these missiles and this capability if LRSO is
not fielded on time? What is the risk to a credible nuclear deterrent?
Secretary Mattis. The Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile is
critical to ensure a diverse range of nuclear response options. Along
with a series of modernization efforts, LRSO will enable the B-52H to
remain an effective part of the nuclear-capable bomber force. The B-21
will be able to deliver both gravity bombs and the LRSO, maximizing
operational flexibility and effectiveness against a wide variety of
threats around the world.
Capabilities like the LRSO, bombers, and a modern sea-launched
cruise missile (SLCM) will provide the capability and capacity to
disperse forces across a variety of geographical locations and with
multiple flight profiles. This flexibility complicates adversary
defense planning, deters potential adversaries, and assures allies and
partners, particularly in Asia. Although the SLCM is complementary to
the LRSO, it is not a substitute because LRSO is necessary to sustain
an effective bomber-leg of the Triad. Further, LRSO will preserve the
bomber-leg's survivability potential and serve as a hedge against
unforeseen technical, programmatic, and geopolitical challenges.
The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), a system initially fielded
in the 1980s, is decades beyond its planned lifetime, faces a growing
threat from advanced air defense systems, and is becoming more
difficult to effectively sustain as it ages. It will not last much
beyond the LRSO planned availability. We must replace the aged ALCM
force in a timely way to maintain the credibility and viability of the
Triad's bomber-leg.
Mrs. Hartzler. The force shaping construct will likely drive
additional requirements for a larger force structure. The Navy and the
Air Force appear to be acutely impacted by the NDS. What is the
timeline for the services to align with the NDS and complete the new
force structure assessments?
Secretary Mattis. I anticipate the Services will have completed
their assessments and any required adjustments will be reflected in the
President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2020.
Mrs. Hartzler. The NDS makes clear that the size of our force
matters. Could you discuss what impact the current budget uncertainty
has on the ability to responsibly and effectively grow the force?
Secretary Mattis. The budget uncertainty associated with spending
caps and repeated continuing resolutions certainly had negative impacts
on the Department, and I welcome the recently enacted spending levels
that will hopefully afford the Department more budgetary
predictability. The National Defense Strategy requires modernized force
structure and the Department needs forces that are lethal, resilient,
agile, and ready. The Department needs sufficient quantities of those
capable forces to amass the combat power necessary for major
contingencies where the force will be contested across all domains.
Budget predictability is essential to striking the right balance of
investment in modernization, force structure sustainment, and readiness
across the FYDP to achieve these effects. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019
President's Budget submission, we intend to grow end-strength
(manpower) and certain types of platforms (e.g., surface ships), but we
are not yet growing major combat formations (e.g., whole new brigade
combat teams or fighter squadrons) given the priority to modernize the
Joint Force before we grow in that specific way. The Department is
doing everything it can to ensure the best return on investment with
the stable budgeting Congress is giving us in FY 2018 and 2019, and we
need that stability to continue into FY 2020 and beyond.
Mrs. Hartzler. The end of the Cold War, along with other factors,
resulted in the early termination of the B-2 program--ultimately only
21 of the planned 127 were built, ballooning ``per copy'' costs and
creating a ripple effect of supply chain issues that plague the program
to this day. The B-2 bomber is the only aircraft in the bomber fleet
that is able to operate in contested airspace. Today, we have 20 B-2
bombers--less when you take into account the number that are undergoing
maintenance versus combat coded. In addition, the B-52s, which are not
able to operate in contested airspace, are over 50 years old. Can you
comment on the importance of keeping the B-21 program on time, on
budget, and at the full number requested? How do continuing resolutions
effect DOD's ability to do just that and what is the ultimate impact on
our nuclear assurance and deterrence?
Secretary Mattis. The Department will continue to maintain a
strong, credible bomber force, comprised of B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s until
the B-21s are operational. The B-21 will replace much of the legacy
bomber fleet and will become the backbone of the U.S. strategic bomber
fleet and serve as a highly capable, visible, flexible deterrent to our
adversaries. Therefore, it is essential the program continue to execute
on time and budget and that we field a minimum of 100 B-21 aircraft.
Continuing resolutions add considerable budget uncertainty and are
detrimental to the ability to execute modernization efforts across the
board, to include programs like B-21 which is integral to nuclear
assurance and deterrence modernization. Stable and predictable budgets
are absolutely essential to satisfying B-21 cost and schedule targets.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Secretary Mattis and General Selva, in light of the
changes in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the emphasis on
Great Power competition, this Committee received testimony on January
30, 2018, on ``Readying the U.S. Military for Future Warfare'' which
pointed to the over-dependency of the force on space, as a critical
vulnerability.
Do you believe it is wise to double-down on the vulnerabilities of
space versus the development of capabilities which can operate in the
absence of connectivity with space?
Do you believe system redundancy is a necessity when facing the
reality of a high-end war with a peer competitor?
Secretary Mattis. Space is integral to modern, multi-domain
warfare. Space capabilities compound the lethality of U.S. forces,
enabling them to shoot, maneuver, and communicate with greater speed,
precision, accuracy, and clarity. Space provides many advantages that
cannot be replicated from other domains. As in any warfighting domain,
it is essential to balance our reliance on space capabilities with
mission assurance of those capabilities in the face of growing threats.
The National Defense Strategy places high priority on strengthening
mission assurance in the space domain by creating more resilient space
capabilities that are also more easily defended and reconstituted.
Redundancy is one of many pathways the Department pursues to strengthen
resilience. Redundancy can be achieved by diversification within the
space domain and across all domains through networks of U.S., allied,
partner, and commercial capabilities.
Mr. Scott. Secretary Mattis, in your National Defense Strategy
(NDS) document you describe a need to be ``strategically predictable,
but operationally unpredictable.'' Can you describe for the Committee
what this means for troop rotations and overseas assignments in terms
of the new Global Operating Model of ``contact,'' ``blunt,'' ``surge,''
and ``homeland forces''?
Secretary Mattis. Deterrence calls for the Department to
unfailingly meet the nation's defense commitments and defend the
nation's interests against any foe. Simultaneously, the Department must
be more agile and flexible in how we fulfill those commitments to make
the job of our competitors as difficult as possible.
The Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment balance
these demands. The four layers mix persistent forward forces with an
ability to surge when and where needed. Dynamic Force Employment
supplies forces in a less predictable way and improves the long-term
readiness of the Joint Force.
Mr. Scott. Secretary Mattis, with the shift in the Department's
focus towards Great Power competition and high-end warfare, can you
speak to the risk we are incurring and possible capability losses in
terms of low-intensity conflicts in areas such as AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM?
Is there a risk in returning to a dominate focus on Great Powers which
would come at the cost of readiness for low-intensity operations, that
to date have been a focus for the Department of Defense? I believe the
homeland would come under significant risk if the Department were to
shift resources away from these mission areas.
Secretary Mattis. The National Defense Strategy's (NDS) focus on
lethality and readiness for high-end warfighting generally requires
different kinds of capability and force structure than that needed to
meet the demands of low-intensity operations in the U.S. Africa Command
and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility. The Fiscal Year 2019
budget sustains funding for general purpose and special operations
capabilities tailored for these low-intensity demands. The NDS
prioritizes readiness recovery and more targeted capabilities to
meeting these kinds of demands (e.g., light attack fighters) going
forward.
Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, the rise of ``Mega-cities'' including the
build-up of urban areas in Asia, Africa, and Europe, increase the
likelihood of future urban warfare. Do you foresee protracted warfare
in urban and peri-urban areas as an inevitable conclusion and if so,
what steps are being taken to prepare the Force?
Secretary Mattis. Urban combat has been and will remain a
fundamental aspect of warfare. The Joint Force has gained significant
experience in urban operations over the last 17 years of war and has
worked to preserve the hard-won lessons learned. The Joint Force
continues to hone its expertise and preparedness for urban warfare
across the spectrum of conflict. In this vein, the Department is
enhancing close combat lethality and survivability, including in urban
environments.
Mr. Scott. Secretary Mattis, during your confirmation hearing you
stated you would examine the arguments behind whether or not the Long
Range Stand-Off Missile (LRSO) is destabilizing because it can be armed
with either a conventional warhead or a nuclear warhead. Well, the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) you released last week fully endorses LRSO
and calls for its development to continue. It notes that several
potential adversaries, particularly Russia, have many weapons systems
that can be nuclear or conventional and that our current air-launched
cruise missiles have this capability too. So did you conclude that LRSO
is not, in fact, destabilizing?
Secretary Mattis. As part of Nuclear Posture Review deliberations,
we reaffirmed that the inability of a nuclear-armed adversary to
distinguish between nuclear and conventionally-armed missiles is not
destabilizing. Cruise missiles and dual-capable aircraft have existed
for decades and have contributed to strategic stability.
Mr. Scott. Secretary Mattis and General Selva, in light of the
changes in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the emphasis on
Great Power competition, this Committee received testimony on January
30, 2018, on ``Readying the U.S. Military for Future Warfare'' which
pointed to the over-dependency of the force on space, as a critical
vulnerability.
Do you believe it is wise to double-down on the vulnerabilities of
space versus the development of capabilities which can operate in the
absence of connectivity with space?
Do you believe system redundancy is a necessity when facing the
reality of a high-end war with a peer competitor?
General Selva. The Department fully recognizes space as a
contested domain, with our adversaries seeking to offset any of our
space-derived advantages. As in other contested domains, we do not see
the solution as an ``either/or'' problem. Rather, we believe we need to
improve the survivability of our space systems while also exploring
terrestrial alternatives that will best add the resiliency needed by
the Joint Force. System redundancy does have a place in that solution
set, to include expanded, lower-cost commercial spacelift. The solution
is more about resilience, and to that end we are investing in
capabilities (I can describe these at a higher level of classification)
that cut across defensive operations, reconstitution, and resilience to
provide space mission assurance.
Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, the rise of ``mega-cities'' including the
build-up of urban areas in Asia, Africa, and Europe, increase the
likelihood of future urban warfare. Do you foresee protracted warfare
in urban and peri-urban areas as an inevitable conclusion and if so,
what steps are being taken to prepare the Force?
General Selva. Each of the big four (North Korea, Iran, Russia,
China) contain large urban areas that would present a substantial
military challenge to U.S. and partner nation forces. While fighting in
a mega-city (population >10M) would represent a significant challenge,
the impact of the migration of global populations into urban areas and
the corresponding increase to the number and size of cities worldwide
should not be underestimated. It is possible that we will find
ourselves fighting in urban and peri-urban areas, and we must continue
to prepare for military operations in urban settings. As an example,
the Army is presently conducting several studies on dense urban
environments that will examine current capabilities, required
capabilities, and make recommendations across the doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities,
and policy (DOTMLPF-P) domains to address urban operations.
The Services and USSOCOM train for urban operations from the
individual level through maneuver unit up to brigade, inclusive of both
ground forces as well as fixed and rotary wing assets in an Urban Close
Air Support (CAS) supporting role. The DOD has 66 ranges with urban
operations training capabilities identified in the most recent range
report with additional urban warfare training initiatives under
consideration by a number of the Services. Training in replicated sub-
sections of a megacity, as well as including electromagnetic warfare/
spectrum challenges more effectively into all training, are two
examples of urban warfare training initiatives being pursued.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. Please describe the changes made to the U.S. nuclear
deterrent since the Cold War. The NPR states the U.S. has reduced our
nuclear stockpile by over 85% since the height of the Cold War--how
have our nuclear forces and capabilities changed?
a. What classes or types of weapons have we eliminated since the
Cold War? How have foreign nuclear weapons programs changed?
b. Is the U.S. in a nuclear arms race with Russia? Please describe
Russia's nuclear forces modernization program--comparing and
contrasting it to ours.
Secretary Mattis. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has made significant reductions in nuclear forces eliminating
approximately 85% of U.S. inventory at the height of the Cold War
including capabilities such as short and medium range ballistic
missiles, nuclear mines, and artillery delivered weapons.
Foreign nuclear programs have changed at different times for
different reasons. The United Kingdom and France have retained their
core nuclear capabilities consisting of submarine-based systems and
dual capable fighter aircraft. China is modernizing and expanding its
already considerable nuclear forces with little to no transparency into
its intentions, and is pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities
tailored to achieve particular national security objectives. North
Korea continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile
capabilities. The United States is not in an arms race with Russia.
Russia has expanded and modernized its strategic and non-strategic
nuclear forces, including the addition of a number of novel systems as
described by President Putin in March 2018. By comparison, the United
States is recapitalizing systems at the end of their service life to
maintain a credible Triad. The Nuclear Posture Review also identified
two capabilities, a Low Yield Ballistic Missile and a Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile, to strengthen deterrence against Russia's growing
arsenal of theater-level nuclear weapons.
Mr. Brooks. Please describe the changes made to the U.S. nuclear
deterrent since the Cold War. The NPR states the U.S. has reduced our
nuclear stockpile by over 85% since the height of the Cold War--how
have our nuclear forces and capabilities changed?
a. What classes or types of weapons have we eliminated since the
Cold War? How have foreign nuclear weapons programs changed?
b. Is the U.S. in a nuclear arms race with Russia? Please describe
Russia's nuclear forces modernization program--comparing and
contrasting it to ours.
General Selva. In 1991, the United States had deployed 22 nuclear
weapon types in the stockpile across three military services (see Table
1). Today the U.S. has seven weapon types in the stockpile, five of
which are deployed by the Air Force, and two of which are deployed by
the Navy. The Army and Marine Corps no longer field nuclear weapons.

Table 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Warhead/Bomb Service Type Disposition
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B28 AF Gravity bomb Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W33 Army 8-inch AFAP Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B41 AF Gravity bomb Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W48 Army 155-mm AFAP Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W50 Army Pershing I Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W56 AF Minuteman II Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B57 AF, Navy Depth charge Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B61 AF Gravity bomb Active
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W62 AF Minuteman III Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W68 Navy Poseidon C3 Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W69 AF SRAM Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W70 Army Lance SRBM Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W71 Army Spartan ABM Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W76 Navy Trident C4 Active
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W78 AF Minuteman III Active
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W79 Army 8-inch AFAP Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W80 AF, Navy ALCM/TLAM-N Active/Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B83 AF Gravity bomb Active
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W84 Army GLCM Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W85 Army Pershing II Retired
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W87 AF Minuteman III Active
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W88 Navy Trident D5 Active
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We are not in a nuclear arms race with Russia. However, we are
cognizant of the significant ongoing changes in the nuclear forces of
three key states of concern: Russia, China, and North Korea.
Since 2010, Russia has continued to prioritize nuclear forces
modernization, resulting in increased warhead delivery capacity, and
improved operational capability. Russia plans to continue this effort.
In addition to modernizing ``legacy'' Soviet nuclear systems, Russia is
developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers across
every leg--land, air, and sea--of its strategic nuclear triad. For
example, Russia is developing at least three new intercontinental range
systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and new intercontinental, nuclear-
armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo, and a nuclear-
powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile. None of these systems is
currently limited by New START. Russia is also modernizing and
expanding its non-strategic nuclear forces and possesses significant
advantage in its nuclear weapons production capacity.
The U.S. nuclear modernization program will also modernize each leg
of the strategic nuclear triad. However, unlike Russia, the U.S.
program will not introduce new kinds of intercontinental range nuclear
systems. The U.S. modernization program also does not seek to
quantitatively match Russia's growing non-strategic nuclear weapons
arsenal, as our strategy does not require us to do so. Finally, the
U.S. program does not build new nuclear warheads. Instead, we life
extend existing systems.
China continues to increase the size and capabilities of its
nuclear forces. For example, China has developed a new road mobile
strategic ICBM, a new multi-warhead version of a silo- based ICBM, and
has armed its most advanced ballistic missile submarine with new
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. It has also deployed a nuclear-
capable precision guided intermediate-range ballistic missile capable
of attacking land and naval targets. Furthermore, it announced
development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, which will give
China a nuclear triad. In 1991, the United States had deployed 22
nuclear weapon types in the stockpile across three military services
(see Table 1). Today the U.S. has seven weapon types in the stockpile,
five of which are deployed by the Air Force, and two of which are
deployed by the Navy. The Army and Marine Corps no longer field nuclear
weapons.
We are not in a nuclear arms race with Russia. However, we are
cognizant of the significant ongoing changes in the nuclear forces of
three key states of concern: Russia, China, and North Korea.
Since 2010, Russia has continued to prioritize nuclear forces
modernization, resulting in increased warhead delivery capacity, and
improved operational capability. Russia plans to continue this effort.
In addition to modernizing ``legacy'' Soviet nuclear systems, Russia is
developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers across
every leg--land, air, and sea--of its strategic nuclear triad. For
example, Russia is developing at least three new intercontinental range
systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and new intercontinental, nuclear-
armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo, and a nuclear-
powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile. None of these systems is
currently limited by New START. Russia is also modernizing and
expanding its non-strategic nuclear forces and possesses significant
advantage in its nuclear weapons production capacity.
The U.S. nuclear modernization program will also modernize each leg
of the strategic nuclear triad. However, unlike Russia, the U.S.
program will not introduce new kinds of intercontinental range nuclear
systems. The U.S. modernization program also does not seek to
quantitatively match Russia's growing non-strategic nuclear weapons
arsenal, as our strategy does not require us to do so. Finally, the
U.S. program does not build new nuclear warheads. Instead, we life
extend existing systems.
China continues to increase the size and capabilities of its
nuclear forces. For example, China has developed a new road mobile
strategic ICBM, a new multi-warhead version of a silo- based ICBM, and
has armed its most advanced ballistic missile submarine with new
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. It has also deployed a nuclear-
capable precision guided intermediate-range ballistic missile capable
of attacking land and naval targets. Furthermore, it announced
development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, which will give
China a nuclear triad.
North Korea has accelerated its pursuit of nuclear weapons and
missile capabilities, and made explicit threats to use nuclear weapons
against the United States and its allies. In the past few years, North
Korea has dramatically increased its missile flight testing, most
recently including the testing of intercontinental-range missiles
possibly capable of reaching the U.S. homeland. It has conducted six
explosive nuclear tests since 2006, including a test of a significantly
higher-yield device. It also continues to produce plutonium and highly-
enriched uranium for nuclear weapons production.
While Iran has agreed to constraints on its nuclear program in the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it retains the
technological capability and much of the capacity necessary to develop
a nuclear weapon within one year of a decision to do so. Further,
absent extensive international actions many of the JCPOA's restrictions
on Iran's nuclear program will end by 2031. Iran's development of
increasingly long-range ballistic missiles, combined with its
aggressive strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring
governments, raise questions about its long-term commitment to
foregoing a nuclear weapons capability.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP
Dr. Wenstrup. How did developments in foreign nuclear weapon
programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into the
Nuclear Posture Review's process and conclusions? Being specific but
unclassified, what developments in foreign programs or actions of
foreign nations concern you the most, and how does that factor into the
NPR's recommendations for U.S. nuclear posture?
Secretary Mattis. The starting point for the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) was an assessment of today's strategic environment, including an
examination of foreign nuclear weapon programs. As stated in the
National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the NPR,
the return of great power competition and the growing importance of
nuclear weapons in the security strategies of other nuclear powers were
of significant concern. The NPR's resulting conclusions and
recommendations ensure that any potential adversary understands the
unacceptable costs they would incur should they employ a nuclear weapon
against the United States or our allies or partners.
Dr. Wenstrup. Leaving aside the poor-descriptor of ``non-
strategic,'' which really just means they aren't captured by any sort
of arms control agreement, what types of ``non-strategic'' nuclear
weapons does Russia have? We've heard its something like 11 different
types, including nuclear torpedoes, nuclear land-mines, nuclear-armed
air defense missiles, and more. a. How many of these non-strategic
nuclear weapons does Russia have? The unclassified estimates we've seen
say several thousand. b. How many types and how many numbers of non-
strategic nuclear weapons does the U.S. have? I understand it's just
the B61 gravity bomb and only a few hundred of them? c. Is this 10:1
imbalance significant? Does it impact deterrence or assurance?
Secretary Mattis. In the unclassified context, the Defense
Intelligence Agency estimates that Russia possesses approximately two
thousand non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and the numbers are
expanding. Russia has NSNW for close- and short-range ballistic
missiles (0-500 km range); air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise
missiles; anti-submarine weapons including torpedoes, depth bombs and
missiles; anti-ship missiles; gravity bombs and air-to-surface missiles
delivered by aircraft; anti-aircraft missiles and anti-ballistic
missiles. In contrast, the United States has one type of NSNW--the B61
gravity bomb delivered by dual-capable fighter aircraft.
The magnitude of the imbalance, when combined with Russian military
doctrine and practice, is concerning. Although this NSNW imbalance is
less meaningful for deterring direct attack on the U.S. homeland, it is
significant for extended deterrence and assurance of allies and
partners. Russian investment in these weapons and its behavior during
exercises indicate that it believes it can leverage these weapons to
coerce the United States and our allies and partners.
Dr. Wenstrup. How did developments in foreign nuclear weapon
programs, or other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into the
Nuclear Posture Review's process and conclusions? Being specific but
unclassified, what developments in foreign programs or actions of
foreign nations concern you the most, and how does that factor into the
NPR's recommendations for U.S. nuclear posture?
General Selva. From the outset, the Nuclear Posture Review working
group worked closely with the Intelligence Community conducting a
month's long deep dive into the latest assessments of foreign nuclear
weapon programs. Based on this review, the working group noted the
rapid deterioration of the threat environment since the 2010 NPR
despite U.S. efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons.
Our potential adversaries did not follow our lead. Rather, Russia,
China, and North Korea continued their efforts to expand and modernize
their nuclear forces, and other advanced military capabilities. Of
particular concern is the combination of Russia's nuclear strategy,
doctrine, and non-strategic nuclear capabilities. The NPR concluded
that we need to take steps to reduce Russia's confidence in their
strategy to initiate limited nuclear use to coerce the U.S. and NATO,
and recommended two additions to the existing nuclear modernization
program to do so: (1) a limited number of low-yield SLBM warheads in
the near-term, and (2) pursuit of a low-yield capable, nuclear-armed
SLCM.
Dr. Wenstrup. Leaving aside the poor-descriptor of ``non-
strategic,'' which really just means they aren't captured by any sort
of arms control agreement, what types of ``non-strategic'' nuclear
weapons does Russia have? We've heard its something like 11 different
types, including nuclear torpedoes, nuclear land-mines, nuclear-armed
air defense missiles, and more. a. How many of these non-strategic
nuclear weapons does Russia have? The unclassified estimates we've seen
say several thousand. b. How many types and how many numbers of non-
strategic nuclear weapons does the U.S. have? I understand it's just
the B61 gravity bomb and only a few hundred of them? c. Is this 10:1
imbalance significant? Does it impact deterrence or assurance?
General Selva. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KNIGHT
Mr. Knight. The Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that our nuclear
forces need to both deter potential adversaries and assure our allies.
Were our allies consulted as the NPR was being considered and drafted?
What did they say or recommend? When the Obama administration
eliminated the sea-launched cruise missile in the 2010 NPR, Japan in
particular was concerned. Has Japan or any of our other allies
expressed support from bringing this cruise missile capability back?
How does the ability to signal strategic intent with our nuclear
bombers, including the B-2 today and the B-21 in the near-future,
contribute to assurance of allies? In particular, how are our allies
reacting to the proposal to continue the Obama administration's program
of record and add two supplemental capabilities?
Secretary Mattis. Throughout the Nuclear Posture Review, we
consulted extensively with allies and partners. They were unanimous in
the view that the security environment has changed for the worse since
2010; offered a range of opinions on the environment and the continued
need for nuclear deterrence; and appreciated our efforts to consult
with them. Our East Asian allies in particular appreciated the
reaffirmation of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. In Europe,
reactions were positive, particularly our moves to strengthen
deterrence, reaffirm our declaratory policy, and further the goals of
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A number of
European allies emphasized the importance of balancing deterrence with
arms control and non-proliferation initiatives. Reactions to
continuation of the U.S. nuclear modernization program were generally
positive. No European allies objected to the inclusion of the
supplemental capabilities. Strategic nuclear bombers, as well as dual-
capable aircraft, both of which can be forward-deployed, provide a
visible display of U.S. capabilities and resolve, providing effective
signaling for deterrence and assurance, especially in times of tension.
Many viewed these supplemental capabilities as an appropriate counter-
balance to Russian, Chinese and North Korean developments, while some
did express reservations over possible Russian and Chinese reactions.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DesJARLAIS
Mr. DesJarlais. What does the NPR recommend to finally get on top
of the massive and complex challenge of NC3 modernization? What steps
are being proposed to get after NNSA's $4 billion backlog of
infrastructure problems and deferred maintenance? How will we ensure we
take care of the unsung heroes of national defense in DOD and NNSA that
operate, support, and provide our nuclear deterrent?
Secretary Mattis. The Nuclear Command, Control and Communication
(NC3) system is subject to challenges from both aging system components
and new threats, in particular space and cyber-space, adversary
strategies of limited nuclear escalation, and a diffusion of authority
and responsibility. The Administration is pursuing a series of steps to
strengthen NC3, including: 1) improving protection against space-based
and cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack
assessment; 3) improving command post and communication links; 4)
advancing decision support technology; and 5) integrating planning and
operations. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) directs the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deliver to me by 1 May a plan to reform
NC3 governance.
There is no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical
infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for
U.S. nuclear weapons. Just as our nuclear forces are an affordable
priority, so is a resilient and effective nuclear weapons
infrastructure. The NPR lays out several specific initiatives that
National Nuclear Security Agency will pursue and fund in its budget
requests, and implementation of these efforts is ongoing. The personnel
who maintain our nuclear deterrent are true professionals; I am
committed to ensuring they have the tools needed to execute their
mission.
Mr. DesJarlais. What would be the consequences, risks, or benefits
of delaying or cancelling certain modernization programs--such as the
GBSD land-based missile, the B-21 bomber, the long-range standoff
(LRSO) cruise missile, or the COLUMBIA-class submarine? How firm is the
need for the current schedules for these programs--or is there room for
slipping their schedules?
General Selva. Any delay or cancellation of these programs would
severely limit the capability and capacity of the Joint Force to meet
the objectives of the Nuclear Posture Review. Delays would require
service life extensions to legacy systems, and in cases such as the
OHIO class submarine, the service life cannot be extended. If any of
these programs are delayed or cancelled, our nuclear deterrence would
be severely degraded.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM
Dr. Abraham. Secretary Mattis, your Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
mentions the importance of refurbishing the infrastructure that
supports our nuclear deterrent, both at DOD bases and across the NNSA
enterprise. Several of the Air Force facilities that desperately need
recapitalization are the Weapons Storage Facility at our strategic
bomber bases, including Barksdale Air Force base. When you say nuclear
deterrence is our number one priority mission and we need to
recapitalize our force, do you include this type of infrastructure in
that prioritization?
Secretary Mattis. Yes. The Nuclear Posture Review commits the
United States to a safe, secure and effective nuclear posture through a
program to modernize and recapitalize the Triad and supporting
infrastructure, including National Nuclear Security Administration
infrastructure.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
Mr. Gallagher. In recent years, there have been press reports of a
number of joint ventures between U.S. companies and Chinese companies
on Chinese soil that involve the transfer of U.S. technology to the
detriment of the warfighter. These transactions appear to be designed
to both evade CFIUS and game the export control system. What is your
view on these types of transactions?
Secretary Mattis. I am concerned about China's attempts to increase
its military capabilities by gaining access to sensitive U.S.
technologies and know how, both directly within the United States and
through our allies and partners. China uses a range of acquisition
methods, both legal and illegal, in a comprehensive approach that tests
the gaps and seams in U.S. protection measures. For example, when a
Chinese company failed in successive attempts to secure export licenses
to access a U.S. company's equipment and technology, the Chinese sought
to circumvent U.S. exports controls by instead attempting to acquire
the company itself.
Furthermore, increasingly globalized science and technology means
that attempts to obtain U.S. technologies do not stop at U.S. borders.
A Chinese entity recently made an attempt to acquire a German company
with U.S. subsidiaries developing cutting-edge semiconductor
technologies. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) conducted an investigation and ultimately the parties abandoned
the acquisition and immediately entered into a joint venture, a
structure that is currently outside CFIUS's jurisdiction.
We must ensure that both the CFIUS review and the export control
processes effectively address the complexities of today's globalized
and dual-use science and technology environment. The Foreign Investment
Risk Review Modernization Act of 2017 (FIRRMA) legislation proposed by
Senator Cornyn would enhance the available processes to protect our
military technological advantage and national security interests by
expanding the scope of covered transactions, including to joint
ventures. Our export control licensing processes and authorities should
be similarly enhanced to complement any change to the CFIUS process,
including to protect emerging technologies, in order to ensure that the
U.S. Government response is sufficiently effective and comprehensive in
addressing this multi-vectored threat in a world characterized by
rapidly evolving science and technology.
We must take a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to
securing our sensitive technologies, with a range of robust and agile
authorities employed in concert to prevent transfers to China and other
countries that use similar methods to exploit our technology. Both the
methods of exploitation and the potential national security
implications are many and varied. The approach to securing American
technology must be similarly comprehensive.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. Nuclear Command, Control & Communications (NC3). A
recent review by the House Armed Services Committee staff shows at
least 35 different organizations claim to have responsibility for NC3:
9 separate organizations establish policy; 18 identify threats and
gaps; 12 establish requirements; 9 advocate capabilities; 20
organizations acquire and sustain systems; 15 organizations plan and
conduct operations. Most concerning, it appears that 31 organizations
provide oversight.
Questions: 1. Who is in charge of the NC3 enterprise in the
Department of Defense?; 2. Do you believe organizational reforms are
necessary to ensure clear responsibility and accountability for the
readiness and effectiveness of our NC3 enterprise? If yes, what changes
would you recommend?; 3. What are your priorities for NC3
modernization?; 4. Do you believe it is prudent to revisit our airborne
NC3 posture? If yes, what would the Department require to resume a
sustained NC3 airborne alert?
Secretary Mattis. The Nuclear Posture Review directs the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deliver a plan to me no later than May
1, 2018 to reform Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3)
governance to ensure its modernization and effective functioning
against current and future environments. In addition to NC3 governance
reform, the Administration will pursue a series of initiatives to
strengthen NC3, including: 1) strengthening protection against space-
based and cyber threats; 2) enhancing integrated tactical warning and
attack assessment; 3) improving command post and communication links;
4) advancing decision support technology; and 5) integrating planning
and operations. Airborne NC3 capabilities are key to the overall
survivability of the NC3 system; their modernization and sustainment
are well-warranted.
Mr. Bacon. Nuclear Command, Control & Communications (NC3). A
recent review by the House Armed Services Committee staff shows at
least 35 different organizations claim to have responsibility for NC3:
9 separate organizations establish policy; 18 identify threats and
gaps; 12 establish requirements; 9 advocate capabilities; 20
organizations acquire and sustain systems; 15 organizations plan and
conduct operations. Most concerning, it appears that 31 organizations
provide oversight.
Questions: 1. Who is in charge of the NC3 enterprise in the
Department of Defense?; 2. Do you believe organizational reforms are
necessary to ensure clear responsibility and accountability for the
readiness and effectiveness of our NC3 enterprise? If yes, what changes
would you recommend?; 3. What are your priorities for NC3
modernization?; 4. Do you believe it is prudent to revisit our airborne
NC3 posture? If yes, what would the Department require to resume a
sustained NC3 airborne alert?
General Selva. 1. Who is in charge of the NC3 enterprise in the
Department of Defense? A: In accordance with Presidential Policy
Directive 35, the Secretary of Defense is in charge of the Nuclear
Command and Control Communications (NC3) enterprise for the DOD. The
Council on Oversight on the National Leadership Command, Control, and
Communications System (CONLC3S) is responsible for oversight of the
command, control, and communications system for the national leadership
of the United States and provides oversight of the NC3 enterprise.
2. Do you believe organizational reforms are necessary to ensure
clear responsibility and accountability for the readiness and
effectiveness of our NC3 enterprise? A: The 2017 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a
plan to the Secretary of Defense for improving and reforming governance
of the overall NC3 System no later than 1 May 2018.
2a. If yes, what changes would you recommend? A: In response to the
NPR task, the Joint Staff is leading an effort to identify what, if
any, changes to existing roles, responsibilities, and authorities would
be required to improve and reform governance of the overall NC3 system.
3. What are your priorities for NC3 modernization? A: The NC3
enterprise is a complex system of systems, each part of which
contributes to its overall effectiveness. The Joint Staff is leading an
effort to ensure the Department is able to make risk-informed,
prioritized investment decisions within the NC3 enterprise.
4. Do you believe it is prudent to revisit our airborne NC3
posture? A: The Department continually assesses the posture of the
entire U.S. nuclear enterprise within the context of evolving threats
and emerging capabilities. As part of that effort, the Department is
exploring revised concepts of operation that include sustained NC3
airborne alert, but no decisions have been made to date.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HICE
Mr. Hice. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommends deploying a
low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on our submarines
in order to better deter Russia. Some have argued that deploying such a
low-yield warhead alongside our higher-yield SLBMs will lead to
instability in a crisis, an adversary mistaking a low-yield for a high-
yield warhead, or even that the submarine would be vulnerable to
counterattack if it only launches a single low-yield missile. Do you
put any credence into those arguments?
Secretary Mattis. No. Deploying a low-yield variant of the
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) will increase stability,
particularly in crisis, by demonstrating to an adversary that the
United States has the ability to respond to any level of nuclear use.
This reduces an adversary's incentive to use nuclear weapons in the
first place. Adversary discrimination is not a critical concern. There
is little to suggest that an adversary would view a single ballistic
missile launch--regardless of the weapon's yield--as an all-out attack
leading to a response in kind. In addition, the NPR examined the risks
of launching a single or small number of low-yield SLBMs from a single
nuclear-powered submarine and determined the risks to the ship are
minimal.
Mr. Hice. Do you believe the relationship between DOD and NNSA is
working? Are NNSA and DOE appropriately focused on their number one
mission of delivering nuclear weapons to the military? NNSA's
contracting structure with its labs and plants is very focused on
operational minutiae and cost savings, and mission deliverables to the
military often seem like an afterthought.
Secretary Mattis. The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are both
committed to modernizing and recapitalizing all aspects of the U.S.
deterrent. DOD looks forward to working with the new NNSA
Administrator, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, and endorses her recent remarks
reinforcing that DOD is NNSA's primary customer.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. Is reducing the role of nuclear weapons in conflict a
goal of this administration? If so, what new actions will be taken to
reduce the role of nuclear weapons?
Secretary Mattis. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the
Administration has made clear its long-term goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons coupled with the requirement that the United States have
modern, flexible and resilient nuclear capabilities until such a time
as nuclear weapons can prudently be eliminated from the world.
Mr. Larsen. The NPR makes clear that a portion of the ICBM forces
are in an alert status that would allow prompt launch in order to
prevent their destruction in a ``surprise first strike.'' Yet the NPR
criticizes the use of the term ``hair-trigger alert.'' Would ``launch
on alert'' be a correct description of the alert status of these
weapons, and what is the decision making process and timeline for their
launch?
Secretary Mattis. ``Launch on alert'' is not a correct description
of the alert status of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
force. The United States maintains a portion of its nuclear forces on
alert day-to-day, and retains the option of launching those forces
promptly. This posture maximizes decision time and preserves the range
of U.S. response options. Forces on day-to-day alert are subject to
multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and Presidential
decision-making. Over more than half a century, the U.S. has
established a series of measures and protocols to ensure that ICBMs are
safe, secure, and under constant control. Any U.S. decision to employ
nuclear weapons would follow a deliberative process.
Mr. Larsen. Does the ability to deliver a proportional nuclear
response enhance deterrence? Should proportionality be directly related
to the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon? How long would it take the
United States to ascertain the yield of a nuclear weapon used against
the U.S. or an ally? How long would it take an adversary to make a
similar calculation regarding a weapon used against its territory?
Secretary Mattis. Effective nuclear deterrence is about ensuring
potential adversaries do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of
any nuclear employment. As described in the Nuclear Posture Review, the
United States will apply a tailored approach supported by flexible
capabilities to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries,
threats, and contexts. In support of this, the United States will now
pursue select low-yield supplements that will enhance deterrence by
denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited
nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United
States and its allies.
The U.S. nuclear detection system is able to promptly determine the
yield of a nuclear detonation. Depending on the adversary, it could
take a similar timeframe to make a similar determination.
Mr. Larsen. How would deploying sea-launched nuclear cruise
missiles change operations, security, personnel and training
requirements for the Navy? What are the costs expected to be and how
would this requirement impact existing Navy missions and operations?
General Selva. We do not yet know how nuclear-armed SLCM
deployment will affect Navy operations, security, personnel, and
training requirements, as we have not yet developed the concept of
operations for this system, nor have we identified a specific technical
solution. The Navy will evaluate any required changes to operations,
security, personnel and training requirements as it implements the
Nuclear Posture Review direction for pursuing a sea launched cruise
missile (SLCM) capability. This effort will include conducting an
Analysis of Alternatives which will refine the costs associated with
any proposed SLCM options.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. The B83 is the last megaton-range weapon in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile, with a maximum yield about 75 times larger than the
bomb used against Hiroshima. While the B83 was set to be retired, the
Nuclear Posture Review sustains the weapon indefinitely. Why did the
Administration postpone the B83's retirement? What deterrence
requirements are met by retaining this weapon?
Secretary Mattis. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterates the
prior Administration's commitment to retain the B83-1 in the stockpile
until there is sufficient confidence in the B61-12 gravity bomb. Given
the changed threat environment, deterrence requirements to hold a
variety of protected targets at risk, and the unique capabilities of
the B83-1 bomb to fulfill those requirements, the Administration
decided to postpone B83-1 retirement until a suitable replacement is
identified.
Ms. Speier. The Nuclear Posture Review indicates that the United
States could return to explosive nuclear testing if ``geopolitical
challenges'' occur. Please cite examples of geopolitical challenges
that could precipitate a return to explosive nuclear testing.
Secretary Mattis. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reiterates U.S.
policy to continue observing the nuclear test moratorium that began in
1992. The NPR recognizes, however, that global threat conditions have
worsened markedly since 2010, and that the United States must remain
ready to resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe
technological or geopolitical challenges. Examples of geopolitical
challenges could include the emergence of new adversaries, expansion of
adversary nuclear forces, changes in adversary strategy and doctrine,
new alignments among adversaries, and the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
Ms. Speier. The B83 is the last megaton-range weapon in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile, with a maximum yield about 75 times larger than the
bomb used against Hiroshima. While the B83 was set to be retired, the
Nuclear Posture Review sustains the weapon indefinitely. Why did the
Administration postpone the B83's retirement? What deterrence
requirements are met by retaining this weapon?
General Selva. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Speier. The Nuclear Posture Review indicates that the United
States could return to explosive nuclear testing if ``geopolitical
challenges'' occur. Please cite examples of geopolitical challenges
that could precipitate a return to explosive nuclear testing.
General Selva. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) explicitly
identified the capacity to hedge against an uncertain future security
environment as a role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
strategy. This role is a recognition that the future security
environment is unknowable, and that it can change rapidly, as it did
since the 2010 NPR. A geopolitical challenge could emerge that would
require the United States to develop nuclear weapons with new military
capabilities that could only be achieved with confidence through
explosive testing. Due the uncertainty noted above, I cannot tell you
today what that challenge might be, but it would be prudent to be
prepared to address such a challenge.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
Mr. Gallego. The Nuclear Posture Review mentions that the United
States would consider using nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear
attacks that have strategic effects. Can you provide more detail under
what scenarios the United States would consider use of nuclear weapons
in a scenario that has stayed non-nuclear to that point?
Secretary Mattis. The United States will only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the United Sates, its allies, and partners. The Nuclear Posture
Review provides examples of ``extreme circumstances,'' which could
include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant non-
nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on
the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and
attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or
warning and attack assessment capabilities. That said, there is nothing
automatic about a United States nuclear response. Our response to
aggression will be with a means and at a time of our choosing.
Mr. Gallego. In which arenas and against which nuclear-armed foes
are we expecting to possibly use nuclear weapons to deter or turn back
non-nuclear attacks?
Secretary Mattis. The United States will not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in compliance
with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. The
United States is pursuing a tailored deterrence strategy, supported by
flexible capabilities designed to deter a range of adversaries across a
diverse set of potential contingencies. The Nuclear Posture Review
describes tailored strategies for Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.
Mr. Gallego. Under a Great Power Competition model, our allies and
strategic partners may have to shift their priorities and actions as
well. Competition with states can be expensive, especially for our
smaller allies and partners in Europe and Asia, many of which have
invested heavily in boutique counterinsurgency capabilities--often at
our request--since 2001. How should allied and partner states--many of
which cannot afford to make wholesale, rapid changes to their capital
acquisition schedules and force size--fit into this strategy? Can we
expect and rely on them to both fight with us in Coalitions against
terrorists and be a bulwark against a large, nuclear-armed state?
Secretary Mattis. The National Defense Strategy directs the
Department of Defense to strengthen and evolve our alliances and
partnerships to meet shared challenges. We expect allies and partners
to contribute their fair share to security. Each ally and partner is
unique. The Department of Defense is consulting with each ally and
partner on how it can contribute to addressing shared challenges. Some
allies and partners are postured to contribute to fighting terrorists
and deterring threats from states. Others will have capabilities that
incline them more toward one of those objectives. The overall
constellation of allies and partners will provide the potential to
build coalitions to meet a range of future challenges.
Mr. Gallego. Great power competition can, of course, lead to great
power war, which holds the potential for much higher servicemember- and
civilian casualties than the wars we have fought since Vietnam. Many in
Congress know and understand this, especially on the Armed Services
Committees, but Americans in general may not. What is the Department
and wider Administration doing to ensure that the the American People
are ready, willing, and able to pay the potentially massive human costs
of modern state-on-state conflict?
Secretary Mattis. The greatest deterrence to war is for the enemy
to be overmatched in all aspects and forms of warfare. My goal is to
build such a lethal military that it will enhance our diplomatic
persuasiveness. And we build such a Force of deterrence by successfully
implementing and resourcing the Department's strategy. Directly
inspired by the President's National Security Strategy, the Department
developed the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that clearly articulates
a strategic approach to deter aggression in critical theaters and,
should deterrence fail, prevail in protracted war with any great power
adversary. This approach encompasses three lines of effort: (1) build a
more lethal force; (2) strengthen alliances and attract new partners;
and (3) reform the Department for greater performance and
affordability. Proper resourcing of the strategy not only calls for
stable and predictable budgets, but also prioritizing mission-critical
operations and programs that most directly contribute to the success of
the strategy.
As part of building this lethal force, we are also prioritizing
medical and family readiness programs that allow our Service members to
be fully deployable and provide support for their loved ones, whether
the Service members are at home base or abroad. With this in mind, the
Department aims to make the best possible use of its resources to give
the strategy the best possible chance to succeed in both peacetime and
in wartime.
Mr. Gallego. Under a Great Power Competition model, our allies and
strategic partners may have to shift their priorities and actions as
well. Competition with states can be expensive, especially for our
smaller allies and partners in Europe and Asia, many of which have
invested heavily in boutique counterinsurgency capabilities--often at
our request--since 2001. How should allied and partner states--many of
which cannot afford to make wholesale, rapid changes to their capital
acquisition schedules and force size--fit into this strategy? Can we
expect and rely on them to both fight with us in Coalitions against
terrorists and be a bulwark against a large, nuclear-armed state?
General Selva. Allies and partners have made significant
investments in counterinsurgency capabilities, but many have also
advanced their capability and capacity to support major combat
operations. We must continue to assure allies and partners while
maintaining the ability to deter potential adversaries. We see that
some potential adversaries continue to operate below the threshold that
would drive a traditional military response. In this area,
counterinsurgency capabilities will likely be the best response. In
contested areas of the competition space, counterinsurgency is a viable
mission that could provide a competitive advantage in an allied or
coalition undertaking.
Mr. Gallego. Great power competition can, of course, lead to great
power war, which holds the potential for much higher servicemember- and
civilian casualties than the wars we have fought since Vietnam. Many in
Congress know and understand this, especially on the Armed Services
Committees, but Americans in general may not. What is the Department
doing to ensure that the Force and military families are ready,
willing, and able to pay the potentially massive human costs of modern
state-on-state conflict?
General Selva. The department does not prepare, per se, our Service
Members and their families to be ready, willing, and able to pay
massive human costs of state-on-state conflict. We prepare our Service
Members and their families to mobilize, deploy, fight, WIN, redeploy,
and reintegrate. That being said,--DOD and Joint Force senior leaders
routinely engage with external audiences, including the press, as well
as with military members and their families in an effort to keep them
informed about today's strategic security environment. Those
discussions often include frank conversations about how a high-end war
against a great-power adversary would result in catastrophic impacts to
all involved. As Secretary Mattis has consistently maintained,
diplomacy remains the priority effort in the current environment of
great power competition, but the Joint Force is working hard to restore
readiness to ensure the military is prepared to respond to any
contingency.--Services have Service Member and Family Readiness
programs. Current resiliency programs and Family Readiness best
practices prove to be effective, and will prove useful should there be
an high-end conflict.--The department is also prepared with contingency
plan for recovery, removal and next-of-kin notification for mass
casualties.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
Ms. Rosen. If we are indeed abiding by the 1992 nuclear test
moratorium and are not conducting explosive nuclear testing, why won't
the Administration push for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty?
Secretary Mattis. The United States will not seek Senate
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but will
continue to observe the nuclear test moratorium that began in 1992.
This approach is needed because America confronts an international
security situation that is more complex and demanding than any since
the end of the Cold War and must remain ready to resume nuclear testing
if necessary to meet severe technological or geopolitical challenges
that may emerge.
Ms. Rosen. In what ways could the expanded scenarios in the Nuclear
Posture Review allowing for the use of nuclear weapons against NON-
nuclear threats--including cyber threats--increase the likelihood of a
nuclear exchange between the United States and North Korea?
Secretary Mattis. The United States will only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the United States, its allies, and partners. The Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) provides examples of ``extreme circumstances,'' which
could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks. Significant
non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks
on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure,
and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and
control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. Although the
NPR discusses the need for a tailored strategy vis-a-vis North Korea,
this strategy does not lower the threshold for consideration of U.S.
nuclear use.
Ms. Rosen. The Nuclear Posture Review states that ``geopolitical
challenges'' could lead to a possible return to explosive nuclear
testing. What challenges might necessitate a return to explosive
testing, either below ground or above ground?
Secretary Mattis. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reiterates U.S.
policy to continue observing the nuclear test moratorium that began in
1992. The NPR recognizes, however, that global threat conditions have
worsened markedly since 2010, and that the United States must remain
ready to resume nuclear testing if necessary to meet severe
technological or geopolitical challenges. Examples of geopolitical
challenges could include the emergence of new adversaries, expansion of
adversary nuclear forces, changes in adversary strategy and doctrine,
new alignments among adversaries, and the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The NPR directs the National Nuclear Security
Administration to maintain the capability to resume underground nuclear
explosive testing if called upon to do so. It contains no requirement
for an above-ground nuclear explosive test capability.

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