[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE LONG ARM OF CHINA:
EXPORTING AUTHORITARIANISM
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 13, 2017
__________
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey,
TOM COTTON, Arkansas Cochairman
STEVE DAINES, Montana ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIM WALZ, Minnesota
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TED LIEU, California
GARY PETERS, Michigan
ANGUS KING, Maine
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Not yet appointed
Elyse B. Anderson, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Statements
Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator from
Florida; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1
Kalathil, Shanthi, Director of the International Forum for
Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED).......................................................... 4
Tiffert, Glenn, Ph.D., an expert in modern Chinese legal history
and a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution.................................................... 6
Richardson, Sophie, Ph.D., Director of China Research at Human
Rights Watch................................................... 8
Smith, Hon. Christopher, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey;
Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China........ 20
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Kalathil, Shanthi................................................ 34
Tiffert, Glenn................................................... 38
Rubio, Hon. Marco................................................ 46
Smith, Hon. Christopher.......................................... 47
Questions and Answers for the Record
Kalathil, Shanthi................................................ 49
Richardson, Sophie............................................... 51
Submissions for the Record
Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence...................... 56
Witness Biographies.............................................. 77
(iii)
THE LONG ARM OF CHINA:
EXPORTING AUTHORITARIANISM
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2017
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:55
a.m., in Room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator
Marco Rubio, Chairman, presiding.
Also present: Representative Christopher Smith, Senator
Angus King, and Senator Steve Daines.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chairman Rubio. Good morning. This is a hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The title of this
hearing is ``The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism
with Chinese Characteristics.''
I apologize to the witnesses. It has been a pretty busy day
this morning, and it is not even 11:00 yet.
We are going to have one panel testifying today. The panel
will feature Shanthi Kalathil, the Director of the
International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED); Dr. Glenn Tiffert, an expert in
modern Chinese legal history and a visiting fellow at Stanford
University's Hoover Institution; and Dr. Sophie Richardson,
Director of China Research at Human Rights Watch.
I thank all of you for being here.
Before we move to the topic at hand, I want to take a
moment to recognize Ms. Deidre Jackson on the Commission's
staff. After 38 years of government work, including nearly 16
years at the Commission, this is her final hearing before
retiring--hopefully to Florida.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Rubio. It will be at the end of this year.
[Applause.]
Chairman Rubio. We are very grateful to her for her
faithful service and for her important contribution to this
work.
The focus of this hearing today is timely. This is an issue
that merits greater attention from U.S. policymakers and that
involves the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, through
its government, to conduct influence operations, which exist in
free societies around the globe, and they are intended to
censor critical discussion of China's history and human rights
record and to intimidate critics of its repressive policies.
Attempts by the Chinese Communist Party and the government
to guide, buy, or coerce political influence and control
discussion of sensitive topics are pervasive, and they pose
serious challenges to the United States and our like-minded
allies.
The Commission convened a hearing looking at China's ``long
arm'' in May of 2016, and the focus at that time was on
individual stories from dissidents and rights defenders,
journalists, family members of critics of the regime who shared
alarming accounts of the intimidation, harassment, pressure and
fear they felt as a result of their work. This was especially
true for those who had family still living in China. This issue
persists.
Just recently, Chinese authorities reportedly detained over
30 relatives of the U.S.-based Uyghur human rights activist
Rebiya Kadeer, a frequent witness before this Commission. We
will no doubt hear similar accounts when Dr. Richardson
explores some of what Human Rights Watch documented in its
recent report on China's interference at United Nations human
rights mechanisms.
Beyond that, we hope today to take a step back from
individual accounts regarding China's ``long arm,'' and examine
the broader issue of the Chinese Communist Party's influence
around the world. What animates their efforts? What is their
ultimate aim? What sectors or institutions are most vulnerable
to this? And what can we do about it?
Given the scope of this issue, we will only begin to
scratch the surface here today. When examining these foreign
influence operations, it is important we understand the
Communist Party infrastructure that exists in support of this
endeavor.
The United Front Work Department is one of the Party
agencies in charge of influence operations at home and abroad.
The Chinese President elevated this entity's status in 2014,
calling their work the ``magic weapon'' for the ``Chinese
people's great rejuvenation.'' The UFWD is charged with
promoting a positive view of China abroad and exporting the
purported benefits of this authoritarian model.
United Front officials and their agents, often operating
under diplomatic cover as members of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, develop relationships with politicians at the state,
local and Federal level, and other high-profile or up-and-
coming foreign and overseas Chinese individuals to--in the
words of Wilson Center Global Fellow Anne-Marie Brady--
``influence, subvert, and if necessary, bypass the policies of
their governments and promote the interests of the CCP
globally.''
A key element in this long-arm effort has focused on
information technology and internet governance or sovereignty,
asserting national control of the internet and social media
platforms not only in recent domestic cyber legislation and
development plans, but also at international gatherings.
So we look forward to Ms. Kalathil's testimony, which will
further explore this important dimension of the Chinese
government's efforts.
China has developed tools to surveil social media and
mobile phone texting platforms and to disrupt overseas websites
that contain content the government finds politically
sensitive. Earlier this year it was reported that real-time
censorship of instant messaging platforms is now taking place.
Private group chats are censored without users' knowledge.
As it relates to China's long arm, the University of
Toronto's Citizen Lab, a human rights and information
technology research center, reported in mid-January of this
year on Chinese government censors' work to prevent Tibetans
inside and outside of China from discussing the Dalai Lama's
major religious teachings in India in January 2017.
The Chinese government is also clearly targeting academia.
The Party deems historical analysis and interpretation that do
not hew to the Party's ideological and official story as
dangerous and threatening to its legitimacy.
Recent reports of the censorship of international scholarly
journals illustrate the Chinese government's direct requests to
censor international academic content, something which
Professor Tiffert will address.
Related to this is the proliferation of Confucius
Institutes, and with them insidious curbs on academic freedom.
These are a major concern, an area which CECC cochairman, our
cochairman here, Congressman Smith, has been sounding the alarm
on for some time.
Chinese foreign investment and development, which is slated
to reach record levels with the Belt and Road Initiative, is
accompanied by a robust political agenda aimed in part at
shaping new global norms on development, trade and even human
rights.
There is much more that has been publicly reported in just
the last few months, and even more that will likely never be
known. The academic whose scholarly paper provides background
on the banned Chinese Democratic Party or other politically
sensitive issues refused a visa to conduct research in China,
or the Hollywood studio that has to shelve film scripts with a
storyline involving China's abuse of the Tibetan people, the
Washington think tank that puts out policy papers critical of
legislative initiatives that would negatively impact the
Chinese government, all the while never revealing their
financial ties with senior Chinese officials, or the American
internet company willing to censor content globally in order to
obtain access to the Chinese market.
There are endless scenarios. Some, I think, have happened,
some are happening, and some will continue to happen. And it
relates directly to Chinese foreign influence operations in
both their scope and in their reach.
There is an important growing body of research on this
topic.
So without objection, we will keep the hearing record open
for 48 hours to submit some additional relevant materials in
that regard, including the executive summary of an important
report by the National Endowment for Democracy, ``Sharp Power:
Rising Authoritarian Influence,'' which outlines in part
China's influence operations in young democracies including two
of them in our own hemisphere in Latin America.
[The executive summary/introduction to the report appears
in the appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Each year, the Commission releases an
Annual Report which painstakingly documents human rights and
rule of law developments in China. China's Great Firewall,
rights violations in ethnic minority regions, harassment of
rights defenders and lawyers, suppression of free speech,
onerous restrictions on civil society, these are the shameful
markings of an authoritarian, one-party state.
But to the extent that the same authoritarian impulses
animate the Chinese government's efforts abroad, it directly
threatens our most deeply held values and our national
interests.
Chinese leaders are engaged in the long game and it is
something that policymakers in the United States, and with our
like-minded allies, must take seriously.
Congressman Smith is not here in attendance. He is in the
middle of a hearing in the House but will be with us shortly.
I also welcome Senator King. Do you wish to say anything
for the record at the opening? If not, then we are going to
welcome our witnesses.
I guess we will begin with you, Ms. Kalathil, and just work
down the row. I thank you, and I apologize again for our late
start. But as I said, it is 11:00 and it feels like it is 5:00.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Rubio. Thank you for being here, all of you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Rubio appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF SHANTHI KALATHIL, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL FORUM
FOR DEMOCRATIC STUDIES, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Ms. Kalathil. Great. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Senator
King.
It is a great opportunity to speak to this important topic
alongside such expert colleagues.
Today I will address China's outwardly directed efforts to
shape expression and communication globally and the negative
implications this poses for democracies.
Consider, to begin with, a metaphor sometimes invoked to
explain China's domestic approach to the internet, that of the
walled garden. The garden is not devoid of color. Indeed,
certain flowers are cultivated and allowed to bloom profusely,
while those plants deemed weeds are yanked out by the root. In
this way is the space pruned to fit the preferences of the
master gardener.
While metaphors are always imperfect, this one does convey
important ideas about how the CCP approaches China's
information, media and technology sector. These ideas also have
relevance for its international approach. I will just briefly
touch on three key aspects here.
First, the technology. The so-called ``Great Firewall'' is
dependent on an increasingly advanced system of not just
censorship but comprehensive surveillance. It is estimated that
there are 170 million CCTV cameras in place, many now enhanced
with facial recognition technology, and 400 million new cameras
planned in the next three years.
The Wall Street Journal reported last week on people
detained for stray comments made on private chats on the WeChat
messaging platform. Government authorities can now identify
citizens on the street through facial recognition, monitor all
online behavior, and identify potential or even future
dissenters and troublemakers.
Second, it is not only about the technology. Beijing relies
on individuals, corporations and institutions for not just
censorship and self-censorship but the proactive shaping of
norms, narratives and attitudes.
Underpinning all of this activity is the third aspect,
Beijing's core economic bargain, which consists of preferential
treatment and implicit prosperity for those who respect
Beijing's so-called ``red lines,'' and punishment for those who
do not. And while Chinese internet and technology companies
have sometimes a not straightforward relationship with the
Party, they certainly understand this bargain.
This combination of aspects results in a system that
curtails freedom, suppresses dissent, and manages public
opinion, reliant not on any individual element but on a
principle of redundancy built into every layer.
Why is this domestic approach relevant to our topic today?
Because it is becoming evident that the CCP, under Xi Jinping,
is intent on encompassing the rest of the world within its
walled garden.
This isn't to say that China seeks to control every facet
of communication or that it wants to impose its exact model of
authoritarian governance everywhere. But it is increasingly
true that Beijing's technology ambitions, combined with its
attempts to determine on a global scale the parameters of
acceptable speech and opinion with respect to China, pose clear
threats to freedom of expression and democratic discourse
outside its borders.
So how does the Chinese government apply its gardening
techniques internationally? First, while it cannot control the
infrastructure and technology of the global internet, Chinese
companies are actively building out key telecommunications
infrastructure in developing countries, raising questions about
security and dissemination of censorship capabilities.
And if China succeeds in dominating the emerging global
market for data-enabled objects--also known as the Internet of
Things--its approach to embedded surveillance may become the
norm in places with weak individual privacy protections.
Meanwhile, the same Chinese tech giants mentioned in that
Wall Street Journal story are taking stakes in the firms that
provide key global apps and services. Just last Friday, it was
reported that WeChat's parent company, Tencent, and Spotify had
taken minority stakes in each other. This follows earlier
Tencent acquisitions of minority stakes in Snap, the parent
company of Snapchat, and Tesla.
Artificial intelligence companies such as iFlyTek pioneer
the surveillance aims of the government through the use of big
data and weak Chinese privacy standards, while also entering
into deals with industry leaders such as Volkswagen and others.
It is reasonable to ask whether Chinese firms with global
ambitions plan to follow the same explicit and/or unspoken
Party dictates with respect to data-gathering, surveillance,
and policing of ``sensitive'' communication abroad as they do
at home.
These technological advances also dovetail with Beijing's
efforts to shape the internet and other future technologies
through key internet governance bodies and discussions, as
Chairman Rubio mentioned. The Chinese government's initially
derided World Internet Conference in Wuzhen succeeded this year
in attracting high-level Silicon Valley participation,
including Apple CEO Tim Cook. Importantly, it established the
optic that the world's leading technology firms have blessed
China's approach to the internet.
I will briefly touch on some of these other aspects, the
second of which is that it is never only about the technology.
The Chinese government has spent tens of billions of dollars to
shape norms, narratives and attitudes in other countries,
relying on the cultivation of relationships with individuals,
educational and cultural institutions, and centers of policy
influence.
This is detailed in our new report on sharp power.
Finally, underlying all of this is China's carrot-and-stick
contract with the rest of the world. The global walled garden
approach would not be possible were governments, universities,
publishers, Hollywood, technology and other companies not roped
into this implicit and sometimes explicit bargain.
Therefore, it is both timely and necessary for democratic
governments and civil society to be proactive in asserting why
norms such as transparency, accountability, and pluralism are
critical to their interests.
I will reserve the rest of my suggestions on that front for
the Q and A.
Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kalathil appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Dr. Tiffert, are you prepared? I think you
are going to go next because he is closer to his PowerPoint.
Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF GLENN TIFFERT, Ph.D., VISITING FELLOW, HOOVER
INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Tiffert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished
members of the Commission.
I am very pleased to be invited to speak at today's
hearing. I have long followed the Commission and the work that
it does.
In recent years, technology has supercharged the dark art
of agitprop--that combination of political agitation and
propaganda Russian revolutionaries gave to the world more than
a century ago.
While attention now centers on how its devotees have
exploited social media to sow mistrust, intimidate, provoke and
polarize, for China such chicanery is but one facet of a much
more ambitious program.
The Chinese Communist Party is leveraging its economic
muscle and the technologies of the information age to pursue a
distinctively Leninist path to soft power. It depicts public
opinion as a battlefield upon which a highly disciplined
political struggle must be waged and won.
Inspired by Mao's call to use the past to serve the present
and to make foreigners serve China, the CCP is furthermore
quietly exporting its domestic censorship regime abroad,
enlisting observers everywhere, often without their knowledge
or consent in an alarming effort to sanitize the historical
record and globalize its own competing narratives.
Its timing is impeccable. Economic and technological
disruptions to our information ecosystem are eroding our
capacity to detect, much less combat, this information war.
Motivated by thrift and efficiency, many universities, in
particular, are shedding old volumes and outsourcing growing
parts of their collections to online providers, trusting these
providers to provide full replacement value and to guarantee
the integrity of their products. Much can go wrong with that
bargain, particularly since many of these providers are market-
driven ventures subject to commercial pressures. They may
adhere to different values, priorities, and standards of
stewardship than traditional libraries and may be accountable
to different constituencies.
Furthermore, things can go spectacularly wrong when they
confront the demands of a mercurial censorship regime and the
authoritarian government behind it, as with the PRC.
The providers who control those servers can silently alter
our knowledge base without ever leaving their back offices,
making one nondestructive edit after another, each propagating
nearly instantaneously around the world.
For censors, the possibilities are mouthwatering. Digital
databases offer them dynamic fine-grained mastery over memory
and identity. And in the case of China, they are capitalizing
on this to engineer a pliable version of the past that can be
tuned algorithmically to always serve the Party's present.
As George Orwell once wrote, ``Who controls the past
controls the future. Who controls the present controls the
past.'' Consider, for instance, the dominant academic law
journals published in the Mao-era PRC, which document the
emergence of China's post-1949 legal system and the often
savage debates that seized it. The online editions of these
journals have been redacted in ways that distort the historical
record but are largely invisible to the end user. The
consequences are unsettling. The more faithful foreign scholars
are to this adulterated source base and the sanitized reality
it projects, the more they may be unwittingly serving China by
promoting the agendas of the censors.
Now what does this look like? I offer to you the first
slide, an example of the table of contents from a leading
Chinese law journal from the 1950s. On the left is the original
scan of the original paper edition issued in the 1950s. To the
right is the actual table of contents presented online.
Now I've put red arrows to indicate the articles that are
simply invisible. They're gone. They're missing from the online
edition. This represents 30 of the journal's 72 pages,
including the first 9 lead articles. They've vanished, been
erased from the historical record.
Using information technology, the Chinese government and
its censors are sculpting this historical record in highly
targeted ways, trimming away the inconvenient bits to produce
exactly the shape they want.
The stakes today are real. Consider, for example, Yang
Zhaolong, one of the most brilliant legal minds of his
generation. In the early Mao era, Yang and quite a few like him
forcefully promoted a raft of concepts connected to the rule of
law. But they paid a terrible price for making those arguments.
Yang himself was branded a counterrevolutionary and spent 12
years in prison.
This presents very awkward background history for a regime
that has, since, not only written the rule of law into its
constitution, but also presents its policy of socialist rule of
law with Chinese characteristics as a culmination of an
originalist vision.
And in these graphs I present to you the red lines indicate
the historical record that has been erased from every issue of
these journals over a period of several years. They have
essentially eliminated the footprint of these individuals and
the arguments they made in support of the rule of law
historically in China.
Now it's worth noting that the computational techniques I
employed to analyze this censorship are doubled-edged weapons.
They can be repurposed to automate and enhance the work of the
censors.
Simply by manipulating any of the parameters in my dataset,
a censor can fabricate bespoke versions of the historical
record, each exquisitely tuned to the requirements of the
present. It's a very short hop, indeed, from the technologies
that already dynamically filter our newsfeeds to the nightmare
of Orwell's memory hole.
This is an old-fashioned version of how they used to do
that. This is a photo of the procession of Mao's funeral. One
includes the Gang of Four. And then shortly after their arrest,
the photo was reissued with the Gang of Four erased.
To be clear, the censorship is directed foremost at
controlling China's sense of itself. It is tendentiously
distorting memory and identity. It is prejudicing China's
possible futures and violating the trust of the people who use
these sources.
But insofar as we foreign observers are increasingly
reliant on these censored sources and online providers, it's
also enlisting us in the campaign to promote the Party's
agenda. This is disinformation on a grand scale turbocharged by
emerging technologies. And I expect that we will see much more
of it around the world in coming years.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tiffert appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Rubio. Dr. Richardson.
STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, Ph.D., CHINA DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Chairman Rubio and Senator King.
Many thanks for the timely hearing and for your principled and
persistent leadership on human rights issues in China. We also
want to thank you for your strong statement on International
Human Rights Day and another excellent report.
In January 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a
keynote speech at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Although
world leaders regularly give addresses there, few other
occasions have seen the UN impose restrictions such as those
instituted on this occasion.
Before Xi's arrival, UN officials closed parking lots and
meeting rooms, and sent home early many of the offices,
approximately 3,000 staff. The UN also barred nongovernmental
organizations from attending the speech.
Just a few months later, in April, security officials at
the UN headquarters, New York City, ejected from the premises
Dolkun Isa, an ethnic Uyghur rights activist originally from
China. Isa, who was accredited as an NGO participant, was
attending a forum on indigenous issues when UN security
confronted him and ordered him out of the building. No
explanation was provided and Human Rights Watch queries to the
UN spokesperson's office elicited no substantive information
about the incident.
The UN plays a crucial role in holding governments to their
international human rights obligations and helping to protect
human rights. And as a result, the UN's handling of these
situations points to larger concerns about the treatment and
protection of human rights activists critical of China as they
seek to participate in UN efforts, and about China's attempts
to thwart UN scrutiny of its own human rights record.
Those mechanisms are intended to protect the rights of all,
and they are now among the only means of redress for
independent activists from the mainland. Taken individually,
many of China's actions against NGOs might be viewed as an
annoyance or an irritant. But taken together, they amount to
what appears to be a systematic attempt to subvert the ability
of the UN human rights system to confront abuses in China and
beyond.
As a UN member state and party to several human rights
treaties, China engages with the UN human rights system. It is
a member of the Human Rights Council, participates in reviews
of its treaty compliance and universal periodic review process,
and allows some, but not all, UN independent human rights
experts to visit China.
But even as it engages with those institutions, China has
worked consistently and often aggressively to silence criticism
of its human rights record before UN bodies, and has taken
actions aimed at weakening some of the central mechanisms
available there, which in turn poses a longer-term challenge to
the integrity of the UN human rights system as a whole.
In a September 2017 report, we detailed how Chinese
officials have harassed activists, primarily those from China,
by photographing and filming them on UN premises in violation
of UN rules, and by restricting their travel to Geneva.
Members of this commission need no reminding about the case
of Cao Shunli.
China has also used its membership on the UN's Economic and
Social Council's NGO Committee to block NGOs critical of China
from being granted UN accreditation, and it has sought to
blacklist accredited activists.
Behind the scenes, Chinese diplomats, in violation of UN
rules, have contacted UN staff and experts on treaty bodies and
special procedures, including behavior that has, at times,
amounted to harassment and intimidation.
China has also repeatedly sought to block or weaken UN
resolutions on civil society, human rights defenders, and
peaceful protests, including when they do not directly concern
policy and practice in China.
It has pushed back against efforts to strengthen some of
the key mechanisms, notably, country-specific resolutions on
grave situations like North Korea and Syria, and efforts to
strengthen treaty-body reviews.
During UN peacekeeping budget consultations earlier this
year, China sought to slash funding for UN human rights
officers who play a vital role in monitoring alleged human
rights abuses in some of the world's most dangerous places.
Since our report was released, Chinese officials in two
separate UN sessions called out UN experts for raising
individual cases from China, suggesting that doing so was a
violation of their mandates.
In September, China tied Saudi Arabia for the most mentions
in an important UN report on reprisals by governments against
activists who engage with UN human rights mechanisms.
Recent Chinese efforts to spearhead UN initiatives such as
presidential statements and resolutions at the Human Rights
Council foreshadow a more active prominent role for China and
give rise to concern about ways it will exercise its power.
As a powerful P5 member of the UN Security Council, China
has a particular weight on the Human Rights Council. It has
played an influential role together with other members of self-
proclaimed like-minded groups, many of whom have poor human
rights records.
China is not alone in its obstructionist tactics, but it
should not become a powerful role model for others that hope to
hobble UN human rights bodies.
Many of China's actions are directly at cross purposes with
UN efforts to improve its human rights system. And while UN
officials have at times pushed back against improper Chinese
pressure or steadfastly ignored it, in other instances they
have capitulated or soft pedaled their concerns, presumably to
avoid confrontation with China.
Unless the UN and concerned governments can halt China's
encroachments, the UN's ability to help protect rights around
the globe is at risk, not only in Geneva.
We have several recommendations for you, but I just want to
highlight three very quickly.
The first is that China's next review under the universal
periodic review process is in 2018. We urge that the commission
consider a letter to the Chinese Ambassador here spelling out
the ways in which independent Chinese civil society should be
able to participate in that process.
In the context of U.S. support to UN Secretary Guterres's
Reform Plan, we urge the UN to adopt the recommendations about
China articulated in our report. But we also urge that Guterres
himself call out China when it violates UN rules and urge
Guterres to ensure that the UN is calling out China for its
human rights violations.
There are 24 different UN agencies in the mainland. Very
few of them are willing to speak about human rights at all.
Last, but not least, I think there is ample scope for this
commission, for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and for
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to conduct vigorous
research and public discussions into Chinese influence in the
U.S., whether that is about the integrity of electoral systems,
whether it is about academic freedom, whether it is about
domestic media practices. I think all of these issues require
further scrutiny.
Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you all for being here.
Let me turn to Senator King. You were here early--if you
have some questions.
Senator King. I am assuming we can sort of go back and
forth.
Chairman Rubio. Yes. It's not very crowded right now.
Senator King. I'm not sure who to address this to. I have a
technical question.
We all know that the Chinese censor the internet. How do
they do it physically? Do they own the pipes? How does that
censorship occur? Are they the owners of the distribution
system?
Dr. Tiffert.
Mr. Tiffert. There are a handful of gateways that sit
between the lines that enter China and the domestic Chinese
internet. It is through those gateways that enter the country
in various places, interconnects where they have very large
server farms that are performing real-time analysis of the data
going back and forth, filtering it, checking by protocols, by
content. They lead the world in this.
Senator King. But they are also censoring their own people.
Mr. Tiffert. They are. That's right. And they do that at
the level----
Senator King. Through the control of the pipes?
Mr. Tiffert. Yes. They do that at the level of the
individual ISPs, the providers domestically who will filter
data. And they also do that through the firms that deliver
services who are required to adhere and enforce Party policy.
For example, news sites, entertainment sites are required
to implement any Party directives that come down to erase
coverage of a particular topic or not to cover it at all.
Senator King. Well, I cannot help but note that tomorrow
our FCC is about to make a disastrous decision to essentially
turn the control of the internet over to the owners of the
pipes. It seems to me that makes it easier to censor and to
control because--and what if a Chinese company took a
significant ownership share in one of our large
telecommunication companies?
This decision that is being made tomorrow is terrible on a
lot of levels. But it seems to me it makes it easier to censor
the internet because you are getting the control away from the
public, the FCC, the people--to the people who own the
connections.
Ms. Richardson. I will just add two quick points.
I agree entirely with what Professor Tiffert has just said.
Whenever we have done research on this topic, we have also
found that companies, both Chinese and foreign ones, have
voluntarily censored topics that they thought were problematic
before they had even actually been asked to do so by any
Chinese government authority.
So we have long urged that companies should have to answer
questions about whether they were actually asked to do these
things, whether they were forced to comply with some real or
perceived Chinese law, or whether they had done it voluntarily.
Flip it around, and if you look at some of the Chinese
companies that are now conducting business overseas, for
example, Alipay. It is now offering services in Japan, not yet
here, I think.
But I think there are real questions to be asked about what
happens when you click that ``accept the terms of service'' box
because we know that Alipay and Alibaba aggregate data and hand
it over to Chinese security forces. And if you are a person
standing outside China, but you are using Alibaba services,
does that mean that your information, too, is going back to the
Ministry of Public Security?
Senator King. It worries me that--one of the reasons it's
so hard to censor our internet is it is so chaotic and
decentralized. And by flipping that over, which we think is
likely to happen tomorrow in one of the most wrongheaded
decisions I have ever encountered, we are making it easier to
have those kinds of controls.
Any evidence of Chinese direct intervention or intention to
intervene directly in our electoral process, a la the Russians?
Everybody is shaking your heads. The record won't show head
shakes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Tiffert. I am not sure that there is any evidence that
demonstrates that yet. Though it is something that people
should be paying attention to.
Senator King. Aren't there some recent incidents in
Australia of direct intervention in the electoral process?
Mr. Tiffert. Yes. And there's great concern in New Zealand
as well.
Senator King. Is there any reason to think it could not
happen here?
Mr. Tiffert. It's certainly a possibility.
Chairman Rubio. Could I interject?
This is an important point. So when you answer, no, I think
what you are answering--and if I am wrong, please correct me. I
don't want anybody to say that I am leading you in your answer
because I want this to be--I want your views on this to be
accurately reflected.
The question was, how does it compare to Russian
interference? And I think the answer you've given is there is
no evidence that they're posting stuff on Twitter or Facebook
for purposes of dividing the American people against each
other.
On the other hand, Senator King asked about Australia. What
we have seen around the world--and you will correct me if I am
wrong--is an effort to identify and nurture office holders,
think tanks, opinion makers, journalists, academia, and
encourage them both to enter in public service and even to
rise.
We've seen open source reports, for example, of outreach to
local and state elected officials, perhaps anticipating that
one day they will hold federal office. Or we've seen reports of
implied threats to cut off access to the Chinese market for
companies based in certain states unless those states'
authorities are cooperative or make statements friendly towards
their cause.
So I would argue that is influence. I think it's different.
I think it's softer, more subtle, more long term, but
nevertheless, it reflects what we saw in Australia where a
member of Parliament resigned after there were accusations made
that not only had he tipped off a Chinese national of some
alleged intelligence operation being conducted against him, but
that he perhaps allegedly had received cash from a wealthy
Chinese national, which he had used to pay off personal debts.
Again, no evidence that that has occurred in the United
States. But that level of influence--trying to play in the
politics and nurture a view and individuals who hold views
friendly to the narrative they're trying to put out. That you
have seen evidence of.
Mr. Tiffert. Absolutely. And I think in one sense what
distinguishes the Chinese efforts to wield influence in the
United States is that they are spending a great deal more money
to do that. They have commercial advantages, so they're able
through, for example, Confucius Institutes, to promote a
particular view of China and to close out discussion of certain
topics on campus. They are able to donate money to particular
causes.
Much of this is legal activity. They are able simply to
wield influence because they can write checks. That is
something that we didn't face as a country during the Cold War
with the Soviet Union. Their pockets were not as deep.
China is not necessarily appealing to hearts and minds.
It's appealing to wallets.
Ms. Kalathil. I would also add that in our recent report on
sharp power, we explicitly looked at Chinese influence in young
democracies and vulnerable democracies and found that through a
number of different avenues, including through investment in
the media, including through massive investment in people-to-
people exchanges, the Chinese government is really promoting a
certain narrative. And that narrative, of course, then enables
it to achieve its own interests in various ways.
So while it may be hard to point a finger at specific
election-related issues or specific political meddling at the
moment, there's no doubt that there are massive and extreme
efforts to exert influence through a number of things that
otherwise would have been seen as soft power, perhaps through a
different lens.
But when you consider that the aim of buying up media
outlets, particularly Chinese language media outlets, but not
limited to that, is really to shape a narrative and to
constrain discourse about China in particular, rather than to
open the discourse and to enable many different critical
perspectives. And that also is a very long-term and pernicious
form of influence.
Senator King. This is really a clash of values in terms of
open communication, free speech, and those kinds of things. It
seems to me that there is a continuum.
We have people-to-people programs. We bring students from
other parts of the world here. We have various information
about our country that has a--to use your term--a positive
narrative. But at some point, the question is, where does
puffery stop and--I don't know what the right word might be,
but some kind of subversion begin?
Let me ask a question. I've had recent information--a large
number of Chinese students in America, making great
contributions to our schools. I've known many of them, in
graduate schools, undergraduate schools. Is there any evidence
that the Chinese government is recruiting some of those
students as agents--either gathering intelligence or otherwise
malign activities in our country?
Again, I see a lot of nods. You've got to speak up.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, but I could take that and answer the
last one a little bit.
We have been doing some research for a couple of years on
threats to academic freedom from the Chinese government outside
China. And a piece of that has involved looking at the
realities for students and scholars who are originally from the
mainland on campuses in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere.
Certainly--it is not a new pathology that Chinese
government officials want to know what those students and
scholars are saying in classrooms. One does not have to have a
perfect year-on-year dataset to say that it has gotten worse,
but it's certainly a sufficiently real dynamic for people.
For example, we have a graduate student who told us about
something that he discussed in a closed seminar at a university
here. Two days later, his parents got visited by the Ministry
of Public Security in China asking why their kid had brought up
these touchy topics that were embarrassing to China in a
classroom in the U.S. So I think that surveillance is real.
If I could just back up slightly to the previous question--
I think there are a lot worse uses of resources than to try to
replicate Professor Anne-Marie Brady's work with respect to the
U.S. I think part of what's most extraordinary--this is the
research that was done on New Zealand--about that paper is that
it was all open source material, and nobody came out looking
good.
And it really did, I think, Senator King, get to the issue
that you are talking about. That it's fine to have
relationships, but at what point does that cross the line into
trying to achieve a certain kind of political outcome?
And I think that would not be hard to do. I think it's
essential. You could certainly look at which members of
Congress, for example, had their travel sponsored by different
Chinese government entities, many of which, of course, don't
necessarily have names that immediately convey that they are
government entities.
But I think it was reported by The Globe and Mail last week
that the current Canadian Ambassador, who is fairly new in
Beijing, had received the largest amount of money of any
sitting MP in the previous government from Chinese government
agencies to underwrite travel to China.
I think these are hard questions that need to get asked
about who is participating and what--and under what auspices.
Forgive me if this is a slightly uncomfortable thing to say,
but I think there are questions also to be asked about why
there was a representative of the Republican National Committee
at a meeting of political parties sponsored by the Chinese
Communist Party in Beijing last week.
I don't know. I have asked if somebody from the Democratic
National Committee was there too, but there were
representatives of the democratic political parties from all
over the world. Again, not necessarily illegal, but I think it
goes to legitimizing a political party that's anything but
democratic.
Senator King. Well, as Senator Rubio and I both know,
serving on the Intelligence Committee, it's a short jump from
supporting a candidate to trying to take out a candidate you
don't like. And that is--of course, we have seen the Russians
doing that around the world.
And the question is--we are not there yet. Is that a
likelihood? Is that a possibility? I think that is a reasonable
concern.
What's going on here--I call it geopolitical jujitsu, where
you are using your opponent's strengths as also their
weaknesses. Our strength is our openness, our free society, our
First Amendment, our protected expression. And that's being
used by our adversaries to undermine our system. It's kind of
an ironic turn, using our own values against us.
That's what's concerning to me because any country in the
world could look at what the Russians did here in 2016, and
say, wow, that worked. It was pretty cheap. And here's another
avenue for influence.
Chairman Rubio. Just to drill down on that point. There are
different ways of influencing. There is the more frontal
traditional approach that we have seen evidence of in 2016. And
that involves the posting and the driving of certain
information in order to exploit the existing divisions within a
society in and of itself.
And I have opined publicly that that's my view. That more
than anything else, this was designed to create chaos within
the political order in the United States and sow instability
and ensure that the next president, whoever that was, inherited
societal conflict and a political mess.
What you are describing is different. It is changing the
environment in which that debate is occurring, particularly as
it relates to a particular country's worldview.
And you all keep going back--and I think Dr. Tiffert, you
talked about that in your opening statement. You described
efforts to project a ``China model'' globally as an alternative
to the liberal order which, for decades--since the end of World
War II--was anchored by the United States.
So I would ask all of you, if you can concisely, what is
the narrative? What is this model? What is the message that
they are pushing? In essence, what do they want us to accept as
conventional wisdom about China and its role in the world and
international norms in 10, 15, 20 years? What are they asking
people to buy into?
Ms. Kalathil. Well, I would briefly say that in this
instance, it is instructive to look at the rhetoric surrounding
China's Belt and Road Initiative. The key phrase that is
attached to that initiative is ``community of common destiny.''
I think it's notable that you talked about how
authoritarian regimes are trying to use democracies' openness
against them. They're also subverting the rhetoric of
democracy. They are explicitly using terms like ``openness''
and ``community'' and terms that seem to imply a sort of
networked model of the world that is not unlike that pushed by
the liberal international order over the last many years.
The difference is that there is also, underlying all of
this, a quite explicit message of noninterference and
sovereignty. And that, of course, in China's case, fits
directly into its worldview and how it would like other
countries to treat it. And you see this also in its approach to
internet governance. You see it in many of its different
initiatives.
But it's notable that--I would say China is not trying to
say, be just like us. It is actually trying to use this very
inclusive language to paint a picture that seems like a
reasonable alternative to the liberal international order, one
that appeals to small states, to countries that feel
vulnerable, to those that feel that they might be safer or have
more of a say in a multipolar world.
It is this sort of approach that I think is actually new
and more sophisticated and one that we actually have to think
deeply about how to address.
Ms. Richardson. Good morning, Mr. Smith.
It's hard to improve on that.
I will just give you one quick example. Last weekend the
Chinese ministry for foreign affairs hosted a south-south
cooperation on human rights gathering.
The concluding document from that contained quite a bit of
language that at first blush sounds sort of like UN language
about human rights. It actually mentioned ``universality,''
somewhat disingenuously, but at least the word was there.
But it, like some of the Chinese government's other
efforts, for example, in UN resolutions, again, sort of pushed
the idea of sovereignty or national conditions, or with
Chinese, or swap in another country's name, characteristics.
Right? That always creates the opportunity for a state to opt
out of or not have to yield to international standards.
I think China is really seeking active partnership and
global support for that idea, and at the same time, pointing to
the U.S., and pointing to Brexit, and saying I think much more
clearly and aggressively that electoral democracy doesn't work.
It's a failure and that their system is superior.
Mr. Tiffert. I would add to those excellent points also
that China is doing a very good job of keeping its so-called
``alternative China model'' to the liberal international order
deliberately vague so that different regimes can read into it
what they choose to, simply as an alternative to what they
might regard as having to respond to demands from western
donors and western governments about things like human rights,
transparency, reducing corruption, environmental protection,
and other factors.
For them it's a direct appeal to the elites that might be
governing these already authoritarian or marginally democratic
regimes. It works in their self-interest.
To the extent that China is willing to bankroll economic
development without the conditions attached that organizations
like the World Bank might attach, then it's win-win for China
and for the elites who govern these other countries.
Chairman Rubio. And Congressman Smith has joined us. I am
going to recognize him in a moment while he gets organized
because I want to finish these thoughts and this is really at
the core of what this hearing is about.
A couple of things you have touched on. The first thing,
you said it earlier in response to Senator King, is we--let me
back up and say that we often are guilty of ascribing our
domestic political attributes to foreign actors, right? Or
foreign nations, other nations. We think to ourselves, this is
what it means here, so this is what it must mean over there.
So when the United States, whether it's McDonald's or Coca
Cola, or Apple, or Facebook, go to another country, they are
not there at the behest of the United States Government. They
aren't even under the control of the United States Government.
And oftentimes in academia, perhaps more often than not in
many cases, they certainly are not under our control. In fact,
many times they go abroad and are critical of their own country
and vice versa, which is their right in a free society.
One of the things we have heard from you today is that when
you look at the toolbox, the influence toolbox that the Chinese
Communist Party has in its government, all of these things are
part of that toolbox. In essence, when you are engaging in
commercial relationships with a Chinese company, potentially a
large one, in essence you are not dealing with an independent
multinational actor. You are dealing with an entity that grew
large and is capable of operating because they are willing to
be cooperative and in some cases, act as an agent on behalf of
whatever it is that is being asked of them.
And I think that poses threats up and down, from
technological transfers, the embedding of information and
technology that could ultimately wind up here in this country
because somebody is using that equipment for our telecom
networks, all the way to the information about what you buy on
a certain website, or the credit card and biographical
information. And that's a real important distinction.
The other point that you talked about was kind of buying
into the noninterference argument. Here is where we have a
couple of examples of how this effort is bearing fruit in
different parts of the world.
We had a vote a couple--I guess back in the summer of this
year in which Greece blocked a European Union statement at the
United Nations criticizing China's human rights record. There
was a lot of, ``What is that all about?''
And then you looked further and you realized that China's
COSCO Shipping--the owner of the world's fourth largest
container fleet--had just taken a 51 percent stake in Greece's
largest port last year.
So, again, you tie those two things together, maybe they're
related and maybe they're not. I believe that they are, but you
start to see where the political angle of a large Chinese
company--the economic angle, the economic power of a large
Chinese conglomerate is able to wield influence over a smaller
economy and how it votes at international forums.
Then we have the issue of access to this large market that
people are dying for. So, again, this is where you come into
this absurd situation where the World Internet Conference is
held in China, meant to promote China's vision of cyber
sovereignty, which all of you have talked about. Basically, the
governments all over the world should have the right to control
what appears on the internet in their countries.
The most confusing part of it all is that Apple CEO Tim
Cook stood up at that conference and he celebrated China's
vision of an open internet. He delivered the keynote speech on
the opening day of that gathering. He wasn't there alone, by
the way. He was joined by some of the other attendees from
Google and Cisco.
But the most ironic part about it is that in a written
response to questions to our colleagues, Senator Leahy and
Senator Cruz, back in June, or earlier this year--I don't
remember the month, maybe it was back in November. Apple
admitted that it had removed 674 VPN apps from its app store in
China. These are tools that allow users, of course, to
circumvent censorship by routing traffic through other
countries. They said they were complying with local law. Skype
was also removed from Apple's China store, as was reported by
the New York Times.
So, again, here's an example of a company, in my view, so
desperate to have access to the Chinese marketplace that they
are willing to follow the laws of that country even if those
laws run counter to what the company's own standards are
supposed to be.
And a good example for the United States and for our
people, how some of these individuals who like to come here and
lecture us about free speech and human rights, and domestic
problems, then go abroad and are fully cooperative on some
grotesque violation of human rights because there is a lot of
money to be made, and they don't want to offend their host
country.
Then the last thing I would point to before I turn it over
to Congressman Smith is the story that we all are now aware of,
of a University of Maryland valedictorian who experienced,
after her commencement speech where she praised free speech in
the U.S. as a breath of fresh air, she experienced this sort of
onslaught of online attacks.
In your written testimony, Ms. Kalathil, you wrote how the
Chinese government fabricates about 448 million social media
comments a year to inject certain narratives. But that is,
unfortunately, not an isolated case.
We have a number of others, and these are just a handful.
An overseas university--this month, for example--this article
is dated, but at some point a lecturer from Monash University
in Australia was suspended after a Chinese student complained
on Weibo of a classroom quiz that appeared to insult Chinese
officials.
In 2010, the University of Calgary announced that China's
education ministry had removed it from the list of accredited
overseas institutions. That came weeks after that University
had awarded an honorary degree to the Dalai Lama.
We saw how the University of California at San Diego
prompted the local chapter of the Chinese Students and Scholars
Association to threaten ``tough measures to resolutely resist
the school's unreasonable behavior'' because they had planned a
speech by the Dalai Lama.
So you start to see these are all evidence of the different
tools in that toolbox, which leads me to my final question for
all of you, and that is--well, my final question here because
Congressman Smith has questions for you, too.
Obviously, you are outspoken on this cause. All of you have
done a significant amount of work. We have read some of the
efforts that have been used to intimidate or otherwise.
Are any of you willing to share any experiences you have
had based on your work, whether it is efforts to discredit it,
whether it is efforts to influence people against your opinion,
or beyond? What have you experienced, if anything? Maybe you've
experienced nothing. But what have you experienced as a result
of the work you have done on this topic, and in particular,
appearing at this hearing today?
We often find that our witnesses in these hearings,
especially if they are Chinese and have family back home, face
consequences for that. But in your particular cases, have you
ever faced anything that made you feel as if it was a result of
your work on this topic?
Mr. Tiffert. Personally, I have not to date within the
United States. In China working on the topics that I work on, I
come under significant pressure, and the informants and people
that I speak to also do. I think that goes with the territory
and it is well recognized among people who work on modern China
and contemporary issues in China.
I have to say that in the classroom I've not experienced
any negative activity or any of the personal outrage that we
have seen at other universities, say in Australia, to my
teaching. I have been spared that.
I have found Chinese students to be extremely thoughtful
and even open-minded about issues that are passionately felt at
home.
But there definitely is the danger, and early career
academics are highly conscious of this, that there is always
the possibility that a minority might express unhappiness or
outrage at something that is taught because it is different
than the way they have been taught it. And that produces
unwelcome controversy.
And for faculty, because of the decline of tenure, faculty
become risk averse. They do not want to cause controversy
because they are also concerned that their universities may not
adequately support them in the event that the Chinese Students
and Scholars Association, or even a smaller group of students,
take issue with something that happens in the classroom.
So there is a self-censorship, a chilling of speech that
occurs as well.
Ms. Kalathil. Yes. I also have not personally experienced
that, in particular. But I would concur with Dr. Tiffert's
views. As I have taught classes, I think some of the Chinese
students in my class are surprisingly willing to be open about
their criticisms.
And it would be, indeed, sad if pressure on them by the
embassy, which I gather is starting to happen with more
regularity, would constrain them from expressing their views in
what is meant to be a free and open setting. That is a trend
that I think would be quite terrible.
Ms. Richardson. I can only recall maybe one or two
conversations over the years, the dozen years I have been at
Human Rights Watch, in which Chinese government officials said
anything that might have risen to the level of being
threatening. But certainly not anything that made me change my
job.
For us, the enormous challenge is about how we are able to
do research and correctly calculating what threats to people
who talk to us actually are. That has gotten more challenging
over the years, ensuring the safety of the people that we have
interviewed in the same way that--you were talking about the
safety or what happens to people who have come and testified
before you.
Chairman Rubio. The Cochairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Cochairman Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First
I want to thank you, again, for calling this hearing.
I apologize for being late. We had a Foreign Affairs
Committee meeting with Rex Tillerson behind closed doors that
went on for almost two hours.
I chaired it for a while and asked him some questions
regarding China. It was about the redesign effort to reform the
State Department's organization and operations, but it was also
about issues and the interface between reorganization and
foreign policy goals.
Again, but I want to thank you, Chairman Rubio, because
this is a really important hearing and part of a whole series
of hearings you've put together. So I want to thank you for
your tremendous leadership.
I did thank Rex Tillerson for putting China on Tier 3 on
the TIP Report. It is an egregious violator of trafficking. I
wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.
If ever there was a country that should have been on it
every year, especially in recent years, it is China. The
previous administration refused to do it. I held hearings to
try to hold them to account for it.
There was an automatic downgrade at one point, but that
wasn't because of merit, but because they were on the watch
list for too long. But this was made--and when you read the
narrative, it couldn't be more clear that sex trafficking,
labor trafficking are exploding in China.
They are missing some 62 million females, girls, because of
sex-selection abortion which is further driving the demand. And
nobody likes to talk about that because it's not politically
correct, but I will talk about it every day of the week. It is
a heinous crime against gender, against women, and it now has
another consequence and that is that it drives sex trafficking.
I did have a hearing yesterday in my subcommittee on human
rights--Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, a
really important hearing, in my opinion. We had two women--and
I would appreciate your thoughts on this--who escaped from
North Korea into China. They were trafficked. They made it back
into North Korea and told how they were beaten, how they were
just terribly mistreated, which violates the Refugee
Convention, as you know so well, that China has ratified.
There have been no consequences over the years for this
gross violation of refoulement--I asked Rex Tillerson about
that, and he is taking that back. I said, we need to raise it.
We know that our Nikki Haley does raise this issue, but it
needs to be a full court press in my humble opinion, to say
China violates the refugee convention with impunity and it's
time to end that. There needs to be a sanction. There needs to
be a, certainly, lifting of voices.
The Periodic Review comes up for China in November, I
believe it is, of next year. But the NGO submissions begin in
the spring. This commission ought to have a very strong
statement--and it will, I am sure, under Mr. Rubio's
leadership--to really make it clear that it's about time China
was held to account. They have had the long reach of the
Chinese dictatorship at the UN for far too long. They get a
slap on the wrist, if that, by the Human Rights Council. And,
obviously, China runs interference time and time again.
So if you could maybe speak to the issue of these women,
mostly, men too, but women who are trafficked, but then they
are sent back in violation of that refugee convention.
One other thing that was raised by Rex Tillerson, maybe I
did say this, but I don't think I did. He talked about
consolidating the dialogues--we have about two dozen dialogues
with China at midlevel--to four major ones. When he outlined
what they were, missing was a human rights dialogue. So I asked
him about it, and he said that human rights would be integrated
into the other dialogues.
And I said, I appreciate that. We need a whole-of-
government approach. But frankly, this ought to be on its own.
Would you have a fifth dialogue at the highest levels on human
rights so they know without any ambiguity the United States
believes in the fundamental freedoms and human rights that we
have enshrined in our Bill of Rights, and Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and so on and so forth?
You might want to speak to that because I think that's
important.
On the World Internet Conference, I want to associate
myself with the Chairman's remarks. In 2006, I began a series
of hearings. The first one was with Yahoo, Microsoft, Cisco,
and Google. And I had all of the top people raise their hands
and we swore them in, and for eight hours asked questions as to
why they were enabling the censorship, why they were part of
the apparatus of repression, and their answers were awful.
And then when you see Tim Cook talking about, as Mr. Rubio
said, the common future, it's an ominous continuing down that
path of allowing this repression, this surveillance, this
misuse of the internet by the Chinese dictatorship to repress
its own people. You might want to speak to that.
And then, finally, on the Confucius Institutes, we have had
a number of hearings on this commission as well as in my
subcommittee on the whole issue of the Confucius Institutes as
a way--we call it academic malware--where there is an all-out
attempt to, again, influence academia, students, Chinese
students, but also American students, in a way that would give
the Party line--and we have them in New Jersey. They're all
over the country.
Your thoughts on these Confucius Institutes. We all know
that heads of colleges and universities are ever in search of
more money and more programming. And if it comes free of
charge, certainly it's an engraved invitation to say, come to
our college or university. To me, it's an invitation for
disinformation.
So your thoughts on that.
[The prepared statement of Representative Smith appears in
the appendix.]
Ms. Kalathil. Thank you, Cochairman Smith.
I thought I would address one piece of what you brought up
and also what Chairman Rubio addressed in the role of U.S. and
other tech companies going to China and being complicit in
practices that enable surveillance and censorship.
One really fascinating development that's really just been
in the last few years is the inversion of this typical frame.
You've been holding hearings on this since 2006. We have all
been very familiar with the behavior of some of the U.S. tech
companies when they go to environments like China. There have
been efforts to try to produce more transparency and
accountability around their efforts there.
What we are seeing now, however, is, due to the emergence
of these Chinese internet and technology giants, including new
artificial intelligence companies, that essential framework has
been reversed. So that these companies, which have essentially
been incubated in an environment where they must do what the
Party says or they will not profit, are now large enough to
begin investing overseas.
So it's no longer simply about U.S. companies going to
China and, perhaps, being complicit in censorship and
surveillance. It's about what these really large Chinese
internet companies are going to do as they expand globally, and
will they bring aspects of the Chinese internet censorship and
surveillance system with them.
There are initial indications from research done by Citizen
Lab, which was mentioned earlier, that at least with one test
run, it was found that accounts that had been registered to
WeChat, which is the largest private chat messaging platform,
as well as mobile commerce, and a host of other things--when
devices registered within China were brought outside China,
they still were not able to access certain sites.
And in addition, certain key words had been censored within
chats without people knowing about it. There was no
transparency about this censorship. The researchers were only
able to determine this because they ran very specific tests on
it.
I think this is just the beginning of what could be a
larger trend and one that we also should keep our eye on, in
addition to trying to ensure that U.S. companies are not
complicit in human rights violations.
Thank you.
Ms. Richardson. I'll try to tackle North Korea and the
dialogues.
Obviously, Human Rights Watch regularly calls out the
Chinese government for violating the Refugee Convention,
particularly with respect to North Koreans. I don't think China
cares at all what we say about that.
In a way, honestly, our bigger concern at the moment,
particularly as, again, one doesn't have the perfect dataset
from one year to the next, but we have tracked more cases of
forced returns in the past year than in previous years.
One of the upsides of technology is that it has given us
much greater visibility into some of the cases of North Koreans
in China who desperately need assistance.
And at a time when the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees can't/won't exercise its protection mandate--it has
the mandate to go out and help those people. And it is
effectively prevented from doing that. It is a much larger
problem in Geneva than what is happening in the office in
Beijing.
But I think unless and until that problem for UNHCR can be
fixed, the U.S. and other like-minded governments should come
together to think about how to actually provide some protection
to those people.
Often when we raise that issue, actually ironically, one of
the answers we get back is that nobody wants to encourage the
further trafficking of North Koreans through China, as if
assisting these people would somehow increase traffickers'
business.
In our standards, that's a second-order problem. You save
people first. You keep them from being sent back to North
Korea. That's the first-line obligation. And we need to see
more governments willing to actually put a plan in place for
that.
On the topic of dialogues--we have talked about this a lot
over the years. I think it's very important that the larger
context be considered. We've always been of the view that the
Chinese government does not really take other governments'
interventions about human rights seriously unless it is coming
from the absolute top all the way down through a system.
I think in that sense, the President's trip was extremely
problematic because he essentially showed up and said he
thought that President Xi was doing a great job, which is going
to make it extremely difficult for anybody further down in the
system to effectively weigh in and not have their Chinese
counterpart say, but your boss just said that our boss was
doing a great job.
The dialogues have been very problematic over the years
because they are so contained and so siloed. I don't want it to
fall off the agenda, obviously.
The current framework of having only these four dialogues,
in which we're told, but given no evidence that human rights
issues have been raised or raised in an effective manner, I
think, is extremely problematic.
We have some ideas about what could be done instead. The--
for example, shadow dialogues with independent civil society.
This is something we recommended to the EU for years, as its
dialogues have gotten boxed in. But I'd be happy to share some
of our thinking about how to build this in in the current
environment and make it relevant for human rights defenders
from China.
Cochairman Smith. If you could and make it a part of the
record as well as convey to us.
Ms. Richardson. Of course. Happy to.
Cochairman Smith. You know, on your point before I go into
the final, yesterday the testimony couldn't have been clearer.
We had Bob King as our former Special Envoy testify. And he
noted that the numbers had dropped from 3,000 making their way
into South Korea to 1,500. That was in 2011.
Last year and this year, it's even a slower pace. So Xi
Jinping is actually further tightening the grip on those who
successfully make it into South Korea, which is, again, a very,
very horrible trend.
Mr. Tiffert. I'd like to address the question of the World
Internet Conference and Confucius Institutes.
It seems to me that the United States is accustomed to
dealing with or engaging with the world from a position of
strength, not just comprehensive economic and military
strength, but also a deep confidence of the enduring appeal of
our values around the world. And that, particularly since the
fall of the Berlin Wall, has produced a certain amount of
complacency. We thought, game over.
I don't think China ended the game. And I believe that we
are now playing different games, and the United States needs to
get its game back on.
Our confidence about our strengths, our power, our soft
power, not just our hard power, has produced a language of
responsible stakeholding, convergence. They'll become more like
us if we simply open our institutions to them and show them how
fabulous we are.
China is the first country, I think, this century to
challenge that from a position of comprehensive strength. They
are large. They are increasingly rich, increasingly militarily
powerful.
So we need to dig deep. Our way, I think, of dealing with a
lot of these issues is to harden our own institutions, some of
which are developing cracks--academia, the media, other
institutions.
China is exploiting those cracks, and it is doing it in
ways that, well frankly, are brilliant. But our best response
to these exploitations is to strengthen ourselves, to raise
consciousness, to get our game back on, and to reinvest in
ourselves.
It is a question of values. Senator King raised this
earlier. To the extent that we regard our engagement with them
as purely transactional and disengage values from it, then Tim
Cook can talk optimistically about a day when China may
suddenly open up without having to confront the problem of the
China of today.
Cochairman Smith. And you know that is a continuation of
Obama's strategy. I remember the Washington Post when the
previous--not Xi Jinping--the previous premier was here, the
Washington Post did a scathing editorial when he was asked
about why Liu Xiaobo was not brought up; here you are with a
Nobel Peace Prize winner, with the jailer sitting at a joint
press conference, and President Obama said maybe they have a
different system and they have a different culture, which I
found to be very, very disturbing.
Chinese people understand human rights. Look at Taiwan, how
it has flourished and people who have suffered so much for
their human rights by going to the Laogai and suffering
repression.
And the Post did a scathing editorial about that. So it's a
continuation of egregiously flawed policy and mindset, in my
opinion, which is why, again, we need to get human rights front
and center, which is what this commission tries so valiantly to
do under Mr. Rubio.
Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Senator King.
Senator King. I promise, Senator Rubio, a brief question,
but it is a big one.
There has been sort of an assumption through this hearing
that the intentions of China are malign. I don't know whether
that's true or not. Here is my question, and perhaps you can
take it for the record and give me a little one-pager. What
does China want? What are their goals? Is it military hegemony
in the region? Is it simply a more powerful economy, richer
people?
There was a story this morning that they may buy a stake in
Aramco in a private offering from Saudi Arabia. Is it access to
resources? I don't think we really have time to delve into
this, but I think it's an important question; what are their
motivations behind all of this? Is it malign or is it simply
self-interest defined as wanting to be the strongest economy in
the world or certainly in the region? Do they have territorial
ambitions?
I think it's a question worth asking. I would appreciate
your thoughts for the record.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you. I guess before we wrap up I did
want to give you all a chance to talk more in depth about the
United Front Work Department, one of these agencies that seems
to be the umbrella group for influence. Because it seems like
there is always--look, information has always been valuable,
right? And our approach to information has largely been to open
up our political process here in the United States, to allow
the world to watch it, and through our example, hopefully
influence them and say, see, you can have a pluralistic society
where people disagree about things, they argue about it, and in
the end you can still govern.
And we have been less than perfect, but in the process
people have seen our imperfections. We have debated some
substantial societal issues over the last 50 years, some of
which seem to bring us to the point of collapse. Yet,
nevertheless, our nation persevered.
What has changed is the democratization of information, in
essence, making it so diffuse, so easy to access from so many
different sources on an hourly basis; it is a great positive.
It has given us the opportunity for people all over the world
to be quickly informed. It's also created the opportunity for
people to be misinformed, and for information to be denied to
them, or only certain information to be provided.
So today, we continue with the existing model. And I am not
arguing that we should change it. But you turn on the
television and there is a station for every--no matter what
your opinion is, there is a station out there prepared to
confirm it.
We have in the case of China, an entity or a government
that has realized that this is a powerful weapon and that our
openness creates a space to provide information over a
substantial period of time in a slow and patient way to change
the environment.
It seems like this agency or department is at the tip of
that spear. If you could just talk a little bit about who they
are, what they do--but, ultimately, it seems to be that it is
from there where all of these efforts emanate, whether it is
sending people, influencing people, providing information--who
are they? What's their purview? What do they do?
Mr. Tiffert. I think the story has to begin with the
history of the Chinese Communist Party as a hunted
revolutionary movement over a century ago. They developed very
keen strategies, helped by the Soviet Union, in fact, to
cultivate allies among influential people in society to
neutralize opposition to the point where they would get the
upper hand.
The United Front Work Department is the tip of that spear
pointed out of China in order to cultivate friends and allies,
influence people abroad. Basically, it's their Dale Carnegie
strategy of making friends and influencing people, and doing it
underground in a way that is nonobvious.
It is a one-stop shop that coordinates national strategy
for that purpose. The United Front Work Department is engaged
with influencing foreign media, influencing foreign academia.
There have been many people who carry, sort of, closet
portfolios in the United Front Work Department who are working
in Chinese news agencies.
Their agenda, basically, is to reshape the international
environment in order to make it friendlier to China and advance
China's policy goals without seeming to act specifically as the
state.
Ms. Richardson. I will just add to that. I think many
people outside China circles, frankly, plenty of people in them
too, are not terribly aware of entities like the United Front
Work Department.
Look, to American or English-speaking political ears, it is
a funny-sounding term. It almost sounds like a public works
department, as if they took care of the pipes or something like
that.
I think there is not much recognition that the United Front
Work Department and other things like the "peoples friendship
associations," or patriotic fraternal associations are really
at the end of the day wholly owned subsidiaries of either the
Chinese government or the Party. They are not independent
entities.
There is also the reality that as the United Front Work
Department approaches political parties or institutions around
the world, it's not as if those institutions can then reach out
to the alternatives to the United Front Work Department or to a
different Chinese political party.
They do not get options because those aren't permitted to
exist. There is no rule that says just because you have met
with the United Front Work Department, you now need to meet
with somebody who is critical of the Chinese government. So I
think as a vehicle, it is very powerful and there aren't other
obvious voices to go out and to listen to.
Ms. Kalathil. Just to add briefly to that, I think those
are all very good points. I would also say that it is not only
about the United Front Work Department, as we have probably
demonstrated in our testimony today.
To go back to a concept that I referred to in my testimony,
I think--this was in respect to China's system of Internet
control, that it really could be applied to its system of
external influence, also. The idea is to have redundancy built
into every layer.
So it is not just about what the United Front Work
Department is doing. It's also about joint ventures that are
entered into with companies, particularly Hollywood or
technology, other companies that shape the environment so that
China can achieve its strategic interests. If we're not aware
of that entire environment, I think we are also probably
missing part of the puzzle.
Chairman Rubio. I think you touched on just a couple little
random notes I want to leave on the record so that they are
clear that they were discussed today.
The first is, as you just mentioned, entertainment and
Hollywood. There have been multiple reports of--I alluded to it
earlier--movie scripts, entertainment that was altered for
purposes of ensuring that that product had access to the
Chinese market.
I've always got to chuckle, the reports that I read about
the Chinese Communist Party were big fans of season one of
House of Cards. They were not big fans of season two for
different reasons.
Again, I think the average person doesn't realize there are
actually movies that are changed here in America because they
want to make sure the script is something that doesn't cause it
to not have access to this growing important market.
So just the strategic use of its consumer power in and of
itself could require everything from altering scripts to
figuring out what they will require companies to put in these
devices in case intelligence officials ever decide to turn it
on.
So when you see an American telecom carrier, or provider,
or whatever--has signed a deal with a company that has the
sponsorship and support of the Chinese Communist Party, you
should assume that as part of that, you are inheriting
something on this device that could potentially--whether it's
on the network or on your device--make you individually
vulnerable to surveillance at some point in the future.
Again, something that we need to understand because our
companies don't do that. You cannot go to them and say you must
put stuff on your phone that allows us to listen to anybody we
want anywhere we want when we tell you to. We have legal
processes if that is even ever done.
The second is I want to quote from a report--if it is not
already, it may be redundant, but I want this full report to be
included in the record without objection. It's a December
2017--this month, from the National Endowment for Democracy
about Latin America, an area that I spent a lot of time working
on in the Foreign Relations Committee.
[The full report can be found at https://www.ned.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-
Influence-Full-Report.pdf]
Chairman Rubio. And I quote from it saying, ``Beijing
strategy clearly targets Latin American elites, prominent
regional leaders from multiple fields, including politicians,
academics, journalists, former diplomats, current government
officials, students, among others are subtly--that is the key
word--subtly being enticed by the Chinese government through
personal interaction with the ultimate purpose of gaining their
support for China. As a result, many of these renowned and
influential people have already become de facto ambassadors of
the Chinese cause.'' And I would add de facto unwitting
ambassadors. I don't think they know that they are targeted for
this effort.
To some extent, all countries try to do that. They try to
convince you in one direction or another, but this is an
orchestrated effort in a part of the world.
It goes on to read, ``the people-to-people engagement,
money is key. Free-of-charge trainings, exchange programs,
scholarships in China have proven to be effective tools to
engage Latin America's regional elites, an idea that was
supported in 2016, by Xi Jinping, when he announced he would
train 10,000 Latin Americans by 2020.
``The media and academia are two areas of priority
attention for these efforts. Consequently, China is determined
to promote cooperation of different kinds between media
companies, universities, and think tanks both at the regional
and country level. Education and culture are increasingly
important in Beijing's toolkit as well.''
And it almost leads me to feel like 50 years from now when
historians write about this period of time, they're going to
write that policymakers here were lulled to sleep on a bunch of
matters while this massive effort was happening right
underneath us. And we didn't even realize it.
It is almost the analogy of the frog in the boiling pot.
And if you throw it in the boiling pot, it jumps right out. But
if you let it sit there as the water heats up, it never even
notices it is being boiled to death.
Another matter of interest that I want to make sure is
noted is a Wall Street Journal article that reported Facebook
is trying everything to reenter China, including developing
censorship tools. I want the record to reflect that in an open
hearing of the Intelligence Committee, I asked specifically
about it, and the answer from the general counsel was--and I
believe it was the general counsel--we comply with the laws of
the countries that we operate in.
So what that basically means is that Facebook, at least
according to the information provided to us, was prepared to
install censorship filters in order to get access to China and
their market. And it's an important thing to remember as we
move forward.
I have a final question, and this really relates to the
first point I was making. Just as they undertake those efforts
in Latin America, I think there is evidence that those efforts
exist here as well.
And you all alluded to, a moment ago, about a
representative of the RNC that was in China recently at a
conference, some political parties. We know there is extensive
travel, members of Congress and staff.
I guess my question is, what can we better do to educate
staffers on lobbyists or people-to-people exchange
opportunities that are sponsored by, whether it is the United
Front or its affiliated organizations or anyone?
In essence, is it not incumbent upon--we are not going to
prevent these trips--but is it not incumbent upon us to inform
members of our staff and members of the House and Senate that
when you go on these trips, here's why they do the trips, these
are the kinds of things they do--by the way, they are not the
only country in the world that does it. The Cuban government
does this as well.
But shouldn't there be something in place, a protocol in
place where when you accept one of these trips from certain
countries, you are made aware of the fact that these trips are
not done the way Belgium does them, or somebody else does them?
There is a rationale behind it, and that is to win you over to
their narrative and to what they want policy to be.
Ms. Richardson. I am happy to give you the affirmative,
yes. There should be a protocol that does that.
I agree that those trips should not be prevented, but
people need to understand why they have been asked and how the
Chinese Communist Party or the Chinese government will construe
their accepting those offers.
Mr. Tiffert. Absolutely. I would absolutely agree with
that. There needs to be a tremendous amount of consciousness
raising on the depth and sophistication of the influence
operations that are going on in the United States.
Beyond that, people who are invited to go should understand
that they've probably been invited for very specific reasons,
because of who they are, what their views might be, or where
they sit in an organizational food chain in order to exercise
that kind of influence that the Chinese government is hoping to
have over them and potentially policymaking.
Ms. Kalathil. I would just add, to step back and put it in
the context of democracies in general, and particularly the
emerging and vulnerable democracies that you referred to, in
Latin America and elsewhere--there is a distinct lack of
knowledge about China in many of these places, particularly in
the countries of Latin America, in the countries that make up
China's 16+1 initiative in Central and Eastern Europe.
There is not that deep breadth of knowledge which is
demonstrated by my fellow panelists here that can speak to
these issues. So a lot of the time these people go into these
exchanges with no context.
So what I would like to see happen generally in democracies
is for there to be more context and learning around this, more
transparency. And perhaps some kind of, as you get through
that, voluntary agreement to certain norms around whether it's
exchanges or academic publishing or anything, but something
that allows people to feel that they are not in it alone.
So if you are a university that is being approached by a
Chinese counterpart and asked to compromise your academic
freedom, you can reach out to others and understand that
there's a common understanding of what is and isn't beneficial
to democracies in that regard.
That, I think, would be a good first step.
Chairman Rubio. A final quick question; we are running out
of time.
Are any of you aware of efforts, whether it's in academia
or entertainment or anywhere for universities, for example, to
come together and confront this threat to academic freedom,
establish some level of standards about what they will and will
not do in the universities, a collective effort to all
affirmatively say, we don't care if you are going to deny us
trips and access to the marketplace or even to students or to
exchanges or the ability to have a campus on the mainland; we
are not going to allow you to pressure and undermine academic
freedom?
Are you aware of any such efforts to create some sort of
joint effort, whether it is in the entertainment industry or in
academia?
Mr. Tiffert. I think they are incipient. I hope that they
continue and develop further. There are conversations that are
beginning to happen along those lines, as consciousness about
the breadth of influence operations is getting raised.
We are nowhere near where we need to be, though.
Ms. Richardson. Just by chance, I happened to spend Sunday
morning with a group of China-focused academics. And this issue
dominated our conversation, and I think it is fair to say there
is enormous interest in having some sort of set of principles
or a code of conduct.
But I think there is also a recognition of how difficult it
would be to get institutions to sign on to that for fears about
loss of funding or the desires of fundraisers or administrators
versus the interests of faculty. But I think there is momentum
to capitalize on.
Ms. Kalathil. And I have seen that incipient movement which
I think is terrific. I do think that that is more likely to
occur in institutions that already privilege certain types of
democratic expression, such as university campuses or media
organizations. In areas such as technology or entertainment
companies, where the motive is to access China's market and
there is no underlying value base there, I think that is much
more difficult.
Chairman Rubio. Well, then I'll close with these three very
quick comments as a matter of personal privilege in this
regard.
The first is I hope my colleagues if they ever read this
record, if it's ever reported what we are about to talk about
here, what we have talked about today, realize that big
companies, corporations, business interests, their obligation
is to their shareholders, and/or owners to make money.
China is an enormous marketplace, so they are driven by
that. They are prepared to advocate for virtually anything that
allows them access to that marketplace. Just because they have
an English name and happen to be headquartered in the United
States does not make them advocates of the principles that we
need to balance as public policymakers.
And we should be wary of that because oftentimes some of
the strongest advocates for tyrannical regimes are the
businesses and individuals that are making good money in that
market due to their relationship with the current tyrannical
government, and their basic argument is, don't mess it up.
We've got a good thing going. We have lived through that with
Russian sanctions, to some extent a little bit with Venezuela
sanctions, and clearly when it comes to China, over and over
again.
Which leads me to my second point, and that is kind of a
sense of frustration about this issue. The reaction to today's
hearing will be one of two things: (1) largely ignored; or (2)
the argument that we are paranoid, that this is paranoia. This
is ridiculous. This is not at all what is happening.
And, of course, that furthers the narrative that the
Chinese Communist Party is always putting out, that we are just
a small, poor country trying to just catch up to where you are.
We are not any threat to you.
But the first part of ignoring really bothers me because
there will be a lot of coverage today about whatever the
President or someone else tweeted this morning. Meanwhile, this
extraordinary geopolitical issue that has incredible historical
importance in a way that people will write and talk about for a
century is happening right underneath us, and very few people
realize it. And those that do would rather talk about whatever
the outrage of the day is. I don't even know. I haven't gone
online to see what it is.
And the last point--and I always make this in these
hearings because I want to be abundantly clear. This is not
about the Chinese people. It is not even about China who we
hope will emerge--it does not have to have our system of
government, per se.
There are all sorts of different ways to structure
democracies. No one is more hopeful than we are, and me
personally, to have a China that is a partner in the
international community.
Can you imagine what a China that respects human rights and
the liberty and the dignity of all people, their own and others
abroad, could do in partnership with the United States? The
issues we could confront and solve.
It would be an extraordinary development in human events if
that were to occur. So this is in no way hostility towards the
people.
On the contrary I have respect for the achievements and the
importance of Chinese culture and Chinese history, a nation
that for almost all of human history has been the most
important or one of the most important in the world, has made
extraordinary contributions in the arts and the sciences, and
learning, and academia.
I want that potential and that history to be unleashed to
change the world in a positive way. Unfortunately that is not
what we see. What we see here on the behalf of the government
and the Communist Party is an effort to roll back the advances
towards human freedom that have been made over the last hundred
years, or particularly since the end of the Second World War.
And that's also important to communicate, because sometimes
when we talk about China, it means in the minds of some that we
are talking about the Chinese. And we are not. We are fully
cognizant that in a nation that large with that many people,
there are hundreds of millions of people who aspire to a
different way forward, but simply do not have the way to
advocate for it or are punished for advocating for it,
sometimes even with their lives. So that is always important to
leave clear on the record.
So with that, the record for this hearing, as I said at the
outset, is going to remain open for 48 hours so additional
documents and information can be provided.
I thank all of you for being here, for your patience. It's
been a long hearing, but I think an important one.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Shanthi Kalathil
december 13, 2017
Chairman Rubio, Chairman Smith, distinguished Members of the
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to speak to this important
topic today. It is an honor to testify before this Commission alongside
such expert colleagues.
Today I will address China's outwardly directed efforts to shape
expression and communication globally, and the negative implications
this poses for democratic expression and discourse, even within
democracies. In particular, I will discuss how the Chinese government
directs and harnesses private sector activity in the Internet and
technology space, as well its efforts to reshape global narratives
through a range of influence activities that have typically been
categorized as ``soft power.''
To begin with, consider a metaphor sometimes invoked to explain
China's domestic approach to the Internet, namely, that of the ``walled
garden.'' The garden is not devoid of color: indeed, certain flowers
are cultivated and allowed to bloom profusely, while those plants
deemed weeds are yanked out by the root. In this way is the space
pruned to fit the preferences of the master gardener.
While metaphors are always imperfect, this one does convey
important ideas about how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) approaches
China's information, media and technology sector, ideas that also have
relevance for its international approach. Three key aspects of its
domestic ``walled garden'' approach are relevant here.
First, the CCP has put the technology it needs into place. The so-
called ``Great Firewall'' is dependent on an elaborately layered system
of control, beginning with the technological and communications
``pipes'' themselves and extending to what is an increasingly advanced
system of not just censorship but comprehensive surveillance. A recent
BBC story noted that there are 170 million CCTV cameras in place, many
enhanced with facial recognition technology, and an estimated 400
million new cameras coming online in the next three years.i
The Wall Street Journal reported last week about a man detained for a
stray wisecrack made on a private chat on the WeChat messaging
platform; government authorities can now identify citizens on the
street through facial recognition, monitor all online behavior, and
identify potential (or even future) dissenters and
``troublemakers.''ii For an example of this dystopian model
taken to an extreme, look no further than the Chinese province of
Xinjiang, where the government tests tools like iris recognition, and
constant surveillance is a fact of daily life.iii
Second, it is not simply about the technology. Beijing relies
on individuals, corporations and institutions for not just censorship
and self-censorship but the proactive shaping of norms, narratives and
attitudes. For instance, the Chinese government places the
responsibility on private sector companies as gatekeepers to monitor
and circumscribe online activity, as well as on individual users to
self-censor. In addition, as a recent study noted, the government
fabricates roughly 448 million social media comments a year, injecting
certain narrative elements into online chatter to distract or cheerlead
in order to stop the spread of information that may spur collective
action.iv One of the study's authors has described the
overall approach as the three Fs: fear that induces self-censorship,
friction that makes true information hard to find, and flooding of the
information space with distraction or chaos.v
Underpinning all of this activity is the third aspect:
Beijing's core economic bargain, which consists of preferential
treatment and implicit prosperity for those who respect Beijing's so-
called ``red lines,'' and punishment for those who do not. Chinese
Internet and technology companies, who are probing frontiers in mobile
commerce, artificial intelligence, and a host of other areas, have with
direct or indirect help from the state evolved into formidable
behemoths with global ambitions. While their relationship with the
Party is not always straightforward, they understand that staying on
the CCP's good side (which includes reliable policing of communication
and development of technologies that will benefit the state) will
deliver tangible benefits, while getting crosswise might entail severe
corporate and even personal penalties.
The entire combination of these aspects is a complex system that
curtails freedom, suppresses dissent, and manages public opinion,
reliant not on any individual element but on a principle of redundancy
built into every layer. Why is this domestic approach relevant to our
topic today? Because it is becoming evident that the CCP under Xi
Jinping is intent on encompassing the rest of the world within its
``walled garden.''
This is not to say that China now attempts to control every facet
of communication, or that it wants to impose its exact model of
authoritarian governance everywhere. But it is increasingly true that
Beijing's technology ambitions, combined with its attempts to determine
on a global scale the parameters of ``acceptable'' speech and opinion
with respect to China, pose clear threats to freedom of expression and
democratic discourse outside its borders. Indeed, in 2015 Freedom
House's China Media Bulletin estimated that since Xi came to power, the
Chinese government had negatively affected freedom of expression
outside China over 40 times in 17 different countries and institutions;
that number has only increased since then.vi
While Beijing obviously cannot muffle dissent and
accountability across different countries in the same way it does at
home, it does seek to apply its principal ``gardening'' techniques
within the international sphere. First, while it cannot control the
infrastructure and technology of the global Internet, Chinese companies
are actively building out key telecommunications infrastructure in the
developing world, particularly on the African continent, which has
raised questions about security and the dissemination of censorship
capabilities.vii In addition, if China succeeds in
dominating the emerging global market for data-enabled objects (the
``Internet of Things''), as it seeks to do through its Internet Plus
initiative, its approach to embedded surveillance may become the norm
in places with weak individual privacy protection.
Moreover, the same Chinese tech giants whose platforms enable the
domestic surveillance described in last week's Wall Street Journal
story are taking stakes in the firms that provide key global apps and
services. Just last Friday, Tencent (the parent company of WeChat) and
Spotify announced that they had taken minority stakes in each other,
following earlier Tencent acquisitions of minority stakes in Snap (the
parent company of Snapchat) and Tesla.viii Artificial
intelligence companies such as iFlyTek pioneer the surveillance aims of
the government through the use of big data and weak Chinese privacy
standards, while also entering into deals with industry leaders such as
Volkswagen and others.ix It is reasonable to ask whether
Chinese firms with global ambitions plan to follow the same explicit
and/or unspoken Party dictates with respect to data-gathering,
surveillance and policing of ``sensitive'' communication abroad as they
do at home.
These technological advances dovetail with the government's efforts
to shape the Internet and other future technologies through key
Internet governance bodies and discussions. The Chinese government's
initially derided attempt to direct this conversation, the recently
concluded World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, succeeded this year in
attracting high-level Silicon Valley participation. Importantly, it
established the optic that the world's leading technology firms have
blessed China's approach to the Internet.
Second, as is the case within China's borders, it is never only
about the technology. The Chinese government has spent tens of billions
of dollars to shape norms, narratives and attitudes in other countries,
relying on the cultivation of relationships with individuals,
educational and cultural institutions, and centers of policy influence.
Such efforts are not properly conceived of through the familiar concept
of ``soft power,'' which is generally described as reliant on
attraction and persuasion, but rather as ``sharp power,'' which is
principally about distraction and manipulation, as argued in a new
study released last week by the National Endowment for Democracy
examining authoritarian influence in young democracies.x
One of the clearest examples of this ``sharp power'' is the
expanding network of Confucius Institutes, controversial due to their
lack of transparency, disregard of key tenets of academic freedom, and
ability to function as an arm of the Chinese state within academic
campuses.xi Concerns have been raised about self-censorship
on topics related to China in the realm of academic and other
publishing worldwide, posing fundamental questions about freedom of
expression in democracies.xii In addition, China's heavily
funded people-to-people diplomacy exposes visitors from Africa and
Latin America, as well as the young democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe within the context of China's ``16+1'' initiative, to a
carefully managed narrative about China's ``win-win'' approach, finding
fertile ground in countries which lack the expertise to examine these
messages and arguments critically.xiii
Finally, underlying all of this is the unavoidable aspect of
China's carrot-and-stick contract with the rest of the world. China's
efforts to enclose the rest of the world within its walled garden would
not have been feasible had not governments, universities, publishers,
Hollywood and technology companies all been roped into this implicit
and sometimes explicit bargain.xiv Apple CEO Tim Cook, one
of the most high-level Silicon Valley participants at the recent Wuzhen
conference, essentially underscored this point through his celebration
of China's digital vision, paired with the company's earlier yanking of
anti-censorship VPNs from its app store in China.xv
Some might say that the Chinese government is simply pursuing
its strategic and economic interests, like any other country. Even if
views differ on this, it nonetheless behooves the international
community to acknowledge that the values that inform Beijing's
interests in this realm pose serious concerns for democratic norms and
institutions around the world. It is therefore both timely and
necessary for democratic governments and civil society to be proactive
in asserting why norms such as transparency, accountability, and
pluralism are critical to their interests, and to come up with fresh
approaches to build resilience. First steps might include:
Continuing to shine a light on the ways in which the
Chinese government's media and technology initiatives, as well as
``sharp power'' influence activities, are impinging on democratic
institutions outside China's borders. While this is now beginning to
happen in some places, notably Australia and New Zealand, it is still
the case that most democratic societies are not yet connecting all the
dots, much less formulating nuanced responses that hew to core values.
Facilitating democratic learning, particularly within
countries without deep capacity to analyze China. Because the Chinese
government constrains critical discourse about issues it considers
sensitive, and these constraints are built into the fabric of its
engagement with both state and non-state actors in young democracies in
particular, genuine critical discourse about China may be lacking.
Seeking transparency in agreements with Chinese state-
affiliated institutions, such as Confucius Institutes and others.
Particularly (but not only) when public funds in democracies are
involved, civil society should insist on its right to understand
whether fundamental issues such as freedom of expression are placed at
risk.
Collectively establishing mutually agreed informal norms
and ``good practice'' within respective industries (such as publishing,
academia, media, film, and technology) so that individual actors are
not as susceptible as they are now to being picked off and pressured by
the Chinese government or its surrogates. For instance, academic
publishers in democratic settings might collectively agree to resist
censoring materials that pertain to China, and so on. In the absence of
such norms defending key democratic values, China will continue to set
standards based on the CCP's restrictive understanding of these values.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
_______________________________________________________________________
i ``In Your Face: China's All-Seeing State,'' BBC, Dec.
10, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-42248056/in-your-
face-china-s-all-seeing-state
ii Eva Dou, ``Jailed for a Text: China's Censors Are
Spying on Mobile Chat Groups,'' The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 2017.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jailed-for-a-text-chinas-censors-are-
spying-on-mobile-chat-groups-1512665007
iii Megha Rajagopalan, ``This is What a 21st Century
Police State Really Looks Like,'' Buzzfeed News, October 17, 2017.
https://www.buzzfeed.com/meghara/the-police-state-of-the-future-is-al
ready-here?utm_term=.vpk2O30p2#.xtprQxJor
iv Gary King, Jennifer Pan, Margaret E. Roberts, ``How
the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic
Distraction, not Engaged Argument,'' April 9, 2017. https://
gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf
v Joshua A. Tucker, Yannis Theocharis, Margaret E.
Roberts, and Pablo Barbera, ``From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media
and Democracy,'' Journal of Democracy Vol. 28, Issue 4, October 2017.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/liberation-turmoil-social-
media-and-democ
racy
vi Sarah Cook, ``Resisting Beijing's Global Media
Influence,'' The Diplomat, December 10, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/
2015/12/resisting-beijings-global-media-influence
vii John Reed, ``Africa's Big Brother Lives in
Beijing,'' Foreign Policy, July 30, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/
2013/07/30/africas-big-brother-lives-in-beijing/
viii Anna Nicolau, ``Tencent and Spotify Buy Minority
Stakes in Each Other,'' The Financial Times, Dec. 8, 2017. https://
www.ft.com/content/07ccf3e0-dc28-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482
ix Paul Mozur and Keith Bradshaw, ``China's A.I.
Advances Help Its Tech Industry, and State Security,'' The New York
Times, December 3, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/busi
ness/china-artificial-intelligence.html?_r=0
x Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, Juan Pablo
Cardenal, Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Meseznikov, and Gabriela
Pleschova, ``Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence,''
International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for
Democracy, December 2017. https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf
xi Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, ``The Meaning
of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian States Project Influence,'' Foreign
Affairs, Nov. 16, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/
2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power
xii Ellie Bothwell, ``Chinese power `may lead to global
academic censorship crisis,' '' Times Higher Education, December 7,
2017. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/chinese-power-may-lead-
global-academic-censorship-crisis
xiii Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, Juan Pablo
Cardenal, Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Meseznikov, and Gabriela
Pleschova, ``Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence,''
International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for
Democracy, December 2017. https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf
xiv Shanthi Kalathil, ``Beyond the Great Firewall: How
China Became a Global Information Power,'' Center for International
Media Assistance, March 2017. https://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/CIMA-Beyond-the-Great-Firewall_150ppi-for-web.pdf
xv Simon Denyer, ``Apple CEO backs China's vision of an
`open' Internet as censorship reaches new heights,'' The Washington
Post, December 4, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2017/12/04/apple-ceo-backs-chinas-vision-of-an-open-internet-as-
censorship-reaches-new-heights/?utm_term=.51bcf207a356
______
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, a U.S. Senator From Florida;
Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
december 13, 2017
Good morning. This is a hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. The title of this hearing is ``The Long Arm of
China: Exporting Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics.''
We will have one panel testifying today. The panel will feature:
Shanthi Kalathil: Director of the International Forum
for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED);
Glenn Tiffert, Ph.D.: expert in modern Chinese legal
history and visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution;
Sophie Richardson, Ph.D.: Director of China Research
at Human Rights Watch.
Thank you all for being here.
Before we move to the topic at hand, I want to take a moment to
recognize Ms. Deidre Jackson on the Commission's staff. After 38 years
of government work, including nearly 16 years at the Commission, this
is her final hearing before retiring at the end of the year. We thank
her for her faithful service and contribution to this important work.
The focus of today's hearing is timely. This is an issue that
merits greater attention from U.S. policymakers. Chinese government
foreign influence operations, which exist in free societies around the
globe, are intended to censor critical discussion of China's history
and human rights record and to intimidate critics of its repressive
policies. Attempts by the Chinese government to guide, buy, or coerce
political influence and control discussion of ``sensitive'' topics are
pervasive and pose serious challenges to the United States and our
like-minded allies.
The Commission convened a hearing looking at China's ``long arm''
in May 2016--the focus at that time was on individual stories from
dissidents and rights defenders, journalists and family members of
critics of the regime who shared alarming accounts of the intimidation,
harassment, pressure and fear they felt as a result of their work. This
was especially true for those with family still living in China. These
issues persist.
Just recently, Chinese authorities reportedly detained around 30
relatives of the U.S.-based Uyghur human rights advocate Rebiya
Kadeer--a frequent witness before this Commission. We'll no doubt hear
similar accounts when Dr. Richardson explores some of what Human Rights
Watch documented in its recent report on China's interference in United
Nations human rights mechanisms.
Beyond that, we hope today to step back from individual accounts
regarding China's long arm and examine the broader issue of Chinese
Communist Party influence around the world. What animates their
efforts? What is their ultimate aim? What sectors or institutions are
most vulnerable? And what can we do about it? Given the scope of the
issue, we will only begin to scratch the surface.
When examining these foreign influence operations it is important
that we understand the Communist Party infrastructure that exists in
support of this endeavor.
The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is one of the Party's
agencies in charge of influence operations at home and abroad. Chinese
President Xi Jinping elevated the UFWD's status in 2014, calling their
work the ``magic weapon'' for the ``Chinese people's great
rejuvenation.'' The UFWD is charged with promoting a ``positive'' view
of China abroad and exporting the purported benefits of its
authoritarian model.
United Front officials and their agents, often operating under
diplomatic cover as members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, develop
relationships with politicians and other high-profile or up-and-coming
foreign and overseas Chinese individuals to, in the words of Wilson
Center Global Fellow Anne-Marie Brady, ``influence, subvert, and if
necessary, bypass the policies of their governments and promote the
interests of the CCP globally.'' A key element in these ``long arm''
efforts has focused on information technology and Internet governance
or ``sovereignty,'' asserting national control of the Internet and
social media platforms not only in recent domestic cyber legislation
and development plans but also at international gatherings.
We look forward to Ms. Kalathil's testimony, which will further
explore this important dimension of the Chinese government's efforts.
China has developed tools to surveil social media and mobile phone
texting platforms, and to disrupt overseas websites that contain
content the government deems politically sensitive. Earlier this year
it was reported that ``real-time'' censorship of instant messaging
platforms is now taking place.
Private group chats are censored without users' knowledge. As it
relates to China's ``long arm,'' the University of Toronto's Citizen
Lab--a human rights and information technology research center--
reported in mid-January 2017 on Chinese government censors' work to
prevent Tibetans inside and outside of China from discussing the Dalai
Lama's major religious teaching in India in January 2017.
The Chinese government is also clearly targeting academia. The
Party deems historical analysis and interpretation that do not hew to
the Party's ideological and official story as dangerous and threatening
to its legitimacy. Recent reports of the censorship of international
scholarly journals illustrate the Chinese government's direct requests
to censor international academic content, something which Professor
Tiffert will address.
Related to this, the proliferation of Confucius Institutes, and
with them insidious curbs on academic freedom, are a major concern--an
area which CECC Cochairman Smith has been sounding the alarm on for
some time.
Chinese foreign investment and development, which is slated to
reach record levels with the Belt and Road Initiative, is accompanied
by a robust political agenda aimed in part at shaping new global norms
on development, trade and even human rights. There is much more that
has been publicly reported on in the last few months alone, and even
more that we will likely never know:
The academic whose scholarly paper provides background on
the banned China Democracy Party or other politically sensitive issues
refused a visa to conduct research in China;
The Hollywood studio that shelves the film script with a
storyline involving China's abuse of the Tibetan people;
The Washington ``think tank'' that puts out policy papers
critical of legislative initiatives that would negatively impact the
Chinese government, all the while never revealing their financial ties
with senior Chinese officials; or
The American internet company willing to censor content
globally in order to obtain access to the Chinese market.
There are endless scenarios. And there is a growing body of
important research on the topic.
Without objection, we'll keep the hearing record open for 48 hours
to submit some additional relevant materials in that regard, including
the executive summary of an important report by the National Endowment
for Democracy, ``Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence,'' which
outlines in part China's influence operations in young democracies
including two in our own hemisphere in Latin America.
Each year, the Commission releases an Annual Report which
painstakingly documents human rights and rule of law developments in
China. China's Great Firewall, rights violations in ethnic minority
regions, harassment of rights defenders and lawyers, suppression of
free speech, onerous restrictions on civil society--these are the
shameful markings of an authoritarian, one-party state.
But to the extent that the same authoritarian impulses animate the
Chinese government's efforts abroad, it directly threatens our most
deeply held values and our national interests. Chinese leaders are
engaged in the long game and it is something that policymakers in the
U.S. and like-minded allies must take seriously.
Please join me in welcoming our witnesses Ms. Shanthi Kalathil,
Director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at NED, Dr.
Glenn Tiffert, a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution and Dr. Sophie Richardson, China Director of Human Rights
Watch.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Smith, a U.S. Representative
From New Jersey; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China
december 13, 2017
This hearing is the second in a series looking at China's foreign
influence operations and the impact on universally recognized human
rights. With the Congress and U.S. public focused on Russian influence
operations, Chinese efforts have received little scrutiny and are not
well understood. This must change.
Attempts by the Chinese government to guide, buy, or coerce
political influence, control discussion of ``sensitive'' topics, and
export its authoritarian practices globally are widespread and
pervasive.
Long-time allies Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have been
rocked by scandals involving Chinese sponsored influence operations
targeting politicians, businesses, and academic institutions. Australia
in particular is in the midst of a national crisis and all like-minded
democratic allies should be supporting their efforts to root out those
elements intended to corrupt or co-opt Australian political and
academic institutions.
All countries pursue soft power initiatives to promote a
``positive'' global image and build good will, but the Chinese
government's use of technology, coercion, pressure, and the promise of
market access is unprecedented and poses clear challenges to the
freedoms of democratic societies.
An example of Chinese rewards given to companies and individuals
for abiding by the Chinese government's rules is the case of publisher
Springer Nature, the world's largest academic book publisher. Springer
Nature removed more than 1,000 articles from the websites of the
``Journal of Chinese Political Science'' and ``International Politics''
in order to comply with China's censorship directives and was later
``rewarded'' for its censorship by signing a lucrative strategic
partnership with the Chinese tech giant Tencent Holdings.
In addition to academic publishers, the Chinese government is going
to school on college and universities. American institutions are being
seduced by the promised infusion of much-needed wealth from China. But
one always has to pay a price--play by China's rules, don't ruffle
feathers and don't discuss or write about ``sensitive'' topics.
Universities committed to academic freedom are bound to run into
problems eventually.
I have held two hearings on the threat to academic freedom posed by
Confucius Institutes and the creation of U.S. campuses in China. We
should all be for creative research partnerships and expanding
educational opportunities for U.S. students, but not at the cost of
fundamental freedoms. I have asked the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to investigate academic partnerships between the U.S. colleges
and the Chinese government. The first report came out last Spring.
The GAO is now in the process of conducting investigations of
Confucius Institutes. I have written to all U.S. colleges with
Confucius Institutes and asked them to make their contracts public and
available for public inspection.
Many foreign businesses in China have already faced similar
dilemmas. Some, like Apple, which recently removed from its Chinese app
store applications that help users bypass China's ``Great Firewall.''
The networking site LinkedIn agreed to censor content and Facebook is
promising to do the same in order to get access to the Chinese market.
Chinese operations to curtail the activities of dissidents and
critics of the Communist Party are also pervasive, troubling, and must
be stopped. We have heard multiple stories from U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals living in the U.S. about efforts to intimidate,
censor, and silence them.
The case of Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui is just the latest
example of egregious behavior. High-ranking Chinese security ministry
officials, in the U.S. on transit visas no less, met with Mr. Guo
multiple times in order to threaten and convince him to leave the U.S.
Chinese agents have repeatedly violated U.S. sovereignty and law
according to the Wall Street Journal report on the incident. These
incidents and those we will discuss today are just the tip of the
iceberg.
The Commission's 2017 Annual Report contains several
recommendations to counter Chinese foreign influence operations--
including expanding the mandate of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA) to include Chinese government media organizations and think
tanks, expanded Internet Freedom initiatives and efforts to counter
Chinese propaganda and disinformation at the State Department. I
encourage those interested to look at our recommendations.
As we start to grapple with the scale and scope of Chinese
influence operations, we will be looking for new legislative ideas and
I hope our witnesses today can provide recommendations for the
Commission's action.
We must be clear from the outset that we support better relations
with the people of China and the United States. The issues we are
discussing here today are part of influence operations conducted by the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government.
President Xi Jinping, who has concentrated more power than any
Chinese leader since Mao, is determined to make the world safe for
authoritarianism. Beijing is intent on exporting its censorship regime,
intimidating dissidents and their families, sanitizing history, and
stifling critical discussion of its repressive policies.
These actions pose direct threats to deeply held core values and
fundamental freedoms enjoyed by all democratic societies. We must find
ways to effectively and resolutely push back. Doing so should be a
critical national interest.
Questions and Answers for the Record
question for shanthi kalathil, director of the international forum for
democratic studies at the national endowment for democracy, from
senator daines
Question. Ms. Kalathil, in your testimony, you reference a study
that highlights the Chinese government posting over 400 million social
media comments annually in an effort to influence political narratives
and advance their interests. Chinese official media organizations have
also bought space in U.S. and foreign newspapers to convey Beijing's
preferred narrative on various issues. How effective are these Chinese
government-sponsored efforts in shaping political discourse in foreign
countries?
Answer. My impression is that official media efforts, such as the
``China Watch'' inserts in the Washington Post and other newspapers,
have not been hugely successful to date in influencing attitudes in
other countries. Yet this is not the only strategy, or even the primary
strategy, upon which the CCP relies to shape discourse. The Chinese
government has invested truly vast resources and demonstrated serious
commitment at the highest political levels to influencing the media and
information space globally, focusing on what might be called the
``infrastructure'' of communication--not simply the pipes, but the
nodes that shape and control how information flows around the world.
This is accomplished through partnerships with foreign media companies;
cultivating close or beneficial relationships with influential people/
institutions in other countries (including academic publishers,
entertainment companies, political actors and others) who have the
power to proactively shape discourse in favor of Beijing or marginalize
discourse that it considers troublesome; and exerting influence over
the governance of communication at the ITU and other international
forums.
______
questions for shanthi kalathil, director of the international forum for
democratic studies at the national endowment for democracy, from
chairman rubio
Question. As Chinese researchers continue to make technological
advances that enable authorities to expand their surveillance powers,
rights advocates worry that artificial intelligence is being used to
carry out state suppression and erode privacy protections for Chinese
citizens. Chinese security officials have made use of artificial
intelligence, such as facial recognition technology and drones, to
surveil and police individuals, particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas of China. At the Fourth World
Internet Conference held in eastern China in early December, which was
attended by Apple chief executive Tim Cook and Google chief executive
Sundar Pichai, Chinese companies put such technology on full display. A
Chinese anti-terrorism expert who spoke at a panel on terrorism at the
conference described groups that speak out on behalf of Uyghur rights
as terrorists, and said the Chinese government should try to push
Twitter to change its terms of service to counteract such groups.
As American companies and individuals engage with Chinese
counterparts in cooperation on Internet forums and investment in
artificial intelligence, what steps can the U.S. Government take to
ensure that American companies adhere to the principles of free
expression and avoid enabling mechanisms used by the Chinese state to
repress its citizens? How can American Internet and technology
companies stick to longstanding commitments to open communications
while seeking to expand online forums in China?
Answer. The international community has long assumed that American
technology companies will by virtue of their very provenance promote
and defend principles of free expression and avoid enabling repression
when operating overseas. Sadly, this has not necessarily proven true in
many cases, although there are instances in which companies have
proactively taken steps to provide transparency about their actions
(such as Google's transparency reports that highlight when governments
have asked information to be removed from searches). These assumptions,
then, need to be re-examined, such that these companies are directly
asked about repression-enabling practices and strongly encouraged to
voluntarily adopt more rigorous principles that hew to democratic norms
when operating overseas. Such an effort occurred in the aftermath of
the famous Yahoo! case in 2003, in which the company provided
information to the Chinese authorities that led to the jailing of pro-
democracy writers Wang Xiaoning and Shi Tao. While the subsequent
establishment of the Global Network Initiative and other initiatives
has led to positive movement in this direction, the current moment
requires reinvigorated attention to these issues and a renewed broader
effort to hew to democratic principles.
Question. Do you believe that a World Trade Organization dispute
could be successfully used to challenge the Chinese government's
discrimination against U.S. technology and media companies?
Answer. While such remedies have been proposed in the past, to date
they have not achieved significant progress. It is possible that
renewed attention to this angle might result in greater success but
only if the companies themselves also believe that this approach is
worth the time and effort.
Question. In your written testimony you mentioned the expanding
network of Confucius Institutes around the world, including here in the
United States, which, as you noted, are controversial at least in part
because of ``their lack of transparency, disregard of key tenets of
academic freedom, and ability to function as an arm of the Chinese
state within academic campuses.'' What do you view as the greatest
challenge posed by Confucius Institutes? Is greater U.S. Government
oversight needed of Confucius Institutes?
Answer. My view of the challenge posed by the Confucius Institutes
is best summarized by a 2014 statement by the American Association of
University Professors, which noted the CI role in advancing ``a state
agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice
of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.'' At the very least,
the simple prospect of greater oversight of Confucius Institutes might
compel universities to be more forthcoming about the agreements signed
with such institutions. There has only been one comprehensive report
about the impact of Confucius Institutes within the U.S., and its fact-
finding was hampered by an unwillingness on the part of universities to
discuss their relationships with Confucius Institutes. Drawing
attention to these issues in a public way might open up more debate and
transparency, which would allow greater scrutiny and thus assessment of
the true extent of the challenge. If, as CI supporters contend, these
institutions serve an essentially benign cultural function, then they
should welcome this transparency.
Question. What can the U.S. Government do to overcome challenges
from Chinese United Front organizations and activities that seek to co-
opt U.S. interests in favor of Chinese political and economic
interests?
Answer. In all democracies, a range of tools should be brought to
bear for making transparent foreign government efforts that weaken
democratic institutions. In this way, neither China nor any other
country need be singled out, but merely held to the same standard as
all others. The challenge with United Front activities is that they
have been largely mischaracterized (or ignored) from the beginning and
have thus escaped scrutiny.
Question. You suggested that certain industries (publishing,
academia, film, technology, etc.) ought to band together to establish
agreed-upon informal norms and ``good practice.''
Are you aware of efforts already underway in that regard?
What role, if any, can policymakers play in facilitating
or supporting such efforts?
Answer. Within academia, some are already calling for voluntary
adherence to common democratic principles in such areas as academic
publishing. Such efforts should be lauded and supported, as they face
resistance from institutional structures conditioned to seek resources
where they can. Within the context of the private sector, the Global
Network Initiative is one effort providing a framework for
international technology and telecommunications companies that is
rooted in international standards, while also instilling a measure of
accountability (through regular independent assessments performed as a
condition of membership). It came about as a direct result of
Congressional inquiry into the human rights implications of technology
companies operating in China. While some may say that the GNI does not
go far enough, it is one example of a voluntary process that seeks to
implement some adherence to widely agreed human rights principles.
There are other examples from the corporate social responsibility/
business and human rights communities that may also be useful for
entertainment companies and other private firms grappling with these
challenges. Consistent attention to these issues by Congress serves as
a useful impetus for such initiatives.
______
questions for sophie richardson, director of china research at human
rights watch, from chairman rubio
Question. The United Front Work system is not just about shaping
the message or mobilizing friends, but also controlling the terms of
engagement for how foreigners engage China and the Chinese Communist
Party.
How can the United States better protect and educate its
citizens, including students, businesses, non-profit organizations,
Congressional employees, and other government staff at local, state,
and national levels against Chinese influence operations that seek to
shape attitudes and perceptions according to Chinese national
interests?
How can the United States regain and maintain control of
shaping the terms of engagement for U.S.-China bilateral relations in
light of United Front operations? What are some mechanisms and tactics
the U.S. Government can employ?
How can local governments, civil society groups, and
academic institutions counter Chinese United Front Work operations at
local levels?
Answer. A pressing priority for the U.S. and other democratic
governments is to thoroughly assess the ways in which human rights are
threatened by China's growing influence: are naturalized U.S. citizens
from China being threatened in the U.S. by mainland officials? Are
American universities changing their minds about commencement speakers
on their campuses because those individuals are disliked by Beijing?
Are local, state, or federal government agencies engaging with Chinese
government officials who have been responsible for serious human rights
violations in the mainland? An honest assessment would serve three
purposes: (1) to provide an accurate picture of the nature and scope of
national and local vulnerabilities, (2) to direct attention and
resources to protecting those areas, and (3) to acknowledge that
achieving this kind of influence is an explicit goal of the Chinese
government and Chinese Communist Party. Such a study could be carried
out at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or other
congressional bodies, and should include input from a variety of U.S.
government sources, ranging from law enforcement to education
officials, and drawing on federal, state, and local disclosure
mechanisms.
Legislators at the state and federal level should consider various
responses: if, for example, public universities are accepting Confucius
Institutes because they lack other resources for Chinese-language
instruction, education authorities should recognize the risks to
academic freedom and the institution's reputation and consider other
budgetary solutions. Government officials who have any engagement with
Chinese state or Communist Party entities could be required to disclose
that information on a monthly or quarterly basis, with a view towards
publishing it to promote greater transparency about those interactions.
Congressional committees or bodies, such as the Congressional Executive
Commission on China, could offer training seminars on the United Front
Work Department, the International Liaison Department, friendship
associations, and other Chinese state or Party agencies.
With respect to reshaping the terms of engagement, we recommend
that you consider the tactics outlined in my recent article ``How to
Deal with China's Human Rights Abuses.'' It is of concern to Human
Rights Watch that the current administration's overhaul of bilateral
dialogues appears to relegate human rights to the margins; we urge that
human rights be built into all bilateral dialogues implicating rights
concerns, including law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and academic or
``people to people'' exchanges. We also strongly urge greater outreach
by all branches of government to independent Chinese voices; there are
now dozens of Chinese lawyers, scholars, and experts on all manner of
topics who are outside China and independent of Beijing.
Question. United Front-affiliated organizations, such as the China-
U.S. Exchange Foundation and its domestic partner organizations, seek
to actively lobby Congress and influence Congressional staff as well as
state and local government officials through exchanges.
How can the U.S. Congress better educate its staffers on
lobbyists or ``people-to-people'' exchange opportunities sponsored by
United Front-affiliated organizations, such as the China Association
for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), that seek to actively
promote the Chinese Communist Party's political agenda?
What can the U.S. Government do to overcome challenges
from Chinese United Front organizations and activities that seek to co-
opt U.S. interests in favor of Chinese political and economic
interests?
In your sphere of work, how have you encountered United
Front-affiliated organizations or efforts, and to what extent should
the U.S. Congress and Government be concerned about actively guarding
against these efforts?
Answer. Individual members, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and House Foreign Affairs Committee, the two China commissions, and the
U.S.-China Working Group could provide seminars and other educational
opportunities to their staff members regarding different Chinese
influence agencies, and limit their ability to take money from or
participate in activities sponsored by those groups, particularly with
respect to travel to China. U.S. officials could be required to provide
information regarding the nature of overtures from those agencies,
their frequency, and who has responded positively to them could be
published on an at least quarterly basis. Such knowledge and reporting
requirements may significantly alter the scope of Beijing's efforts.
The U.S. could also strengthen support to and increase funding for
domestic programs and institutions that the Chinese government seeks to
influence. For example, state and local authorities could increase
funding to public schools and universities' Chinese language programs
and China studies departments, and provide grants to ethnic Chinese
civil society groups that are independent and self-organized, and
support independent Chinese-language media.
Question. Last week, on December 7, the Chinese government hosted a
``south-south'' human rights forum, during which Chinese officials
claimed the benefits of China's ``human rights development path with
Chinese characteristics.'' Can you discuss what this ``model'' consists
of, and whether it meets the international human rights standards
established by UN human rights instruments?
Answer. China's ``model'' falls far short of established
international human rights standards in several critical respects.
First, it explicitly prioritizes state sovereignty over rights of the
individual, and has been advanced at a time when China increasingly
rejects the universality of human rights. This model would leave
individuals living under abusive governments with no recourse to
independent courts or institutions, like the UN's human rights
mechanisms. Second, it explicitly prioritizes economic and social
rights, particularly a vaguely worded ``right to development,'' over
civil and political rights, effectively making the acquisition of an
undefined level of development the precursor to consideration of rights
like freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, or
political participation. Third, rather than welcoming a broad, organic
process of improving human rights in a given country, the model clearly
puts the state at the center of these discussions, leaving little room
for independent civil society to play a role other than the one the
state explicitly allows.
Lastly, as the final article of the December 2017 concluding
statement makes clear, there is no room for established international
human rights law in this model but rather vague, easily manipulated
standards: ``In terms of human rights protection, there is no best way,
only the better one. The satisfaction of the people is the ultimate
criterion to test the rationality of human rights and the way to
guarantee them. It is the responsibility of governments to continuously
raise the level of human rights protection in accordance with the
demands of their peoples.''
Question. The Human Rights Watch Report mentions a resolution
proposed by China at a June 2017 Human Rights Council session that
asserts the ``importance of development in human rights.'' This
resolution was adopted by a vote of 30 to 13. Why is the language of
``development'' critical to China's definition of human rights? Will
the adoption of this language have any long-term impact on the Human
Rights Council's work?
Answer. China emphasizes development as a human right because it is
the issue on which Beijing thinks it can most clearly demonstrate
progress--longer life expectancy, higher per capita income, and
millions of people lifted out of poverty. To the extent these are
demonstrably true, they are of course laudable achievements, yet China
consistently omits discussion of the less positive aspects of its
economic development strategy, including rampant pollution, the
appalling phenomenon of ``left-behind'' children, or the discriminatory
hukou system that leaves domestic migrant workers unable to access
state benefits.
China's emphasis on development appears to be part of a broader
strategy to insert its narrative into UN resolutions, promoting
development and economic, social and cultural rights at the expense of
civil and political rights, detracting attention from its systemic
denials of freedom of expression and crackdown on human rights
defenders and dissenting voices. The U.S., in its explanation of its
vote on the development resolution, rightly expressed concern that
China's text quotes key international instruments ``in a selective and
imbalanced way that often omits key language that fully explains the
relationship between human rights and development, or changes consensus
language to materially alter its meaning,'' noting that ``these and
other distortions of consensus language reinforce the incorrect message
that development is a prerequisite for states fulfilling their human
rights obligations--a message that is clearly inconsistent with states'
commitments reflected in the VDPA [Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action].'' The European Union similarly expressed concern that ``the
draft resolution introduced by China aims to construct an unhelpful
narrative which would elevate the process of development above human
rights.''
We understand that at the upcoming session of the Human Rights
Council in March 2018, China is proposing a similar initiative focused
on promoting dialogue and cooperation at the expense of addressing
serious human rights violations and protecting victims from abuse. It
is important that states engage in these debates to resist efforts to
distort the international human rights framework.
Question. There are 24 UN agencies with a presence in China; the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is not among
them. Is the resident coordinator (the head of the country team) doing
enough to help push the Chinese government on human rights, especially
in light of the non-presence of OHCHR?
Answer. The current resident coordinator is improving on his
predecessors' performance with respect to human rights by taking some
modest steps, including meeting with some human rights activists and
disseminating information about UN human rights mechanisms such as the
Universal Periodic Review. Yet, there is a great deal more his office
could do: ensuring robust discussion of human rights issues in annual
reports and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which
typically only make superficial reference to the issue; providing a
specific and platitude-free assessment of China's human rights
situation in Chinese government-run discussions such as the December
2017 ``South-South Forum on Human Rights''; making regular use of the
UN's ``Rights Up Front'' strategy to convene regular discussions across
those agencies about human rights developments in China. However,
taking those steps is not solely a question of an individual resident
coordinator's inclinations, but equally, if not more, a function of
thoughtful, consistent support for such an approach at the highest
levels of the UN. This in turn requires sustained, thoughtful support
from powerful UN member states such as the U.S.
Question. Are there realms other than the United Nations, such as
INTERPOL, where you think there is reason to be concerned about Chinese
government influence?
Answer. Human Rights Watch has expressed concern about Interpol's
ability to uphold its stated commitment to operating according to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the leadership of Chinese
Vice-Minister for Public Security Meng Hongwei, who became the
president of Interpol in November 2016. Human Rights Watch has also
documented that China--against Interpol regulations--has issued
politically motivated ``red notices''--alerts seeking the arrest and
extradition of wanted people--against dissidents and others abroad whom
China deemed problematic. China's record of arbitrary detention,
torture, and enforced disappearance, as well as unlawful forced
repatriation, raise concerns that those subject to Interpol red notices
from China will be at risk of torture and other ill treatment. Most
recently we have documented Chinese authorities' subjecting the family
members in China of ``red notice'' individuals to forms of collective
punishment--unlawfully punishing someone for the actions of another.
The authorities have also pressured relatives to travel to the
countries where red notice individuals live to persuade them to return
to China. Other Interpol member states such as the U.S. could condition
some of their financial support to the organization on its demonstrated
commitment to human rights in its operations.
Human Rights Watch has also tracked efforts by Chinese state-owned
enterprises to lower labor standards in Zambia, which has strong laws
protecting the rights to assembly and association; the sale of and
training on surveillance technology made by ZTE, a large Chinese
company, to Ethiopian authorities, who used that technology to repress
peaceful criticism; and the potential for the Chinese-established Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to replicate abusive practices of
previous international development banks.
Human Rights Watch has, since 2014, been researching threats to
academic freedom outside China but resulting from Chinese government
pressure. The abuses include: institutionally driven and self-imposed
censorship to avoid irking Chinese authorities; and threats,
harassment, and surveillance by Chinese authorities, and in some cases
by Chinese students and scholars, of one another, and of those seen as
critical of China. Given the number of mainland Chinese students in the
U.S., and the positive interest on U.S. campuses in studying China, it
is imperative that this realm of free expression be protected.
Question. In May 2017, Human Rights Watch issued a report on a
nationally searchable DNA database being built by Chinese police. Human
Rights Watch raised concerns over a lack of meaningful privacy
protections and a lack of consent for the collection of DNA and other
personal information, particularly for Uyghurs. A May 2017 report
published by the scientific journal Nature noted that police in the
northwest region of Xinjiang had reportedly purchased eight sequencers
produced by Thermo Fisher Scientific in Waltham, Massachusetts. These
machines can be used to examine DNA and match DNA samples collected
from a crime scene with individuals or their relatives listed in a
database.
Should U.S. officials be concerned about the sale of this
type of equipment to Chinese security personnel? What steps, if any,
should the U.S. Government take to ensure that equipment and technology
produced in the United States is not transferred to countries where
they will be used to carry out human rights violations?
Answer. In follow-up research, Human Rights Watch determined that
Xinjiang authorities are gathering DNA samples from all residents of
the region between the ages of 12-65 under the guise of a free public
health program.
While Human Rights Watch does not have evidence of complicity in
human rights violations by Thermo Fisher, its unwillingness to provide
assurances that it has undertaken thorough due diligence measures to
ensure that it is not enabling abuses is worrying. The US should, as a
matter of urgency, undertake a review of all U.S.-based companies
manufacturing surveillance technology in, and/or selling surveillance
technology to, China to ensure that existing export control standards
and ``dual use'' loopholes are not enabling abuses.
The U.S., including through congressional committees, could also
convene a panel of experts to focus on surveillance technologies and
take advice on whether it is necessary to revise export controls.
Question. The U.S. Embassy and U.S. companies have set up a working
group to engage with China's Belt and Road Initiative and provide a
forum for U.S. exporters to introduce their products and services. At a
forum on the Belt and Road Initiative hosted by the Chinese government
in Beijing in May 2017, Matthew Pottinger, senior director for Asia at
the National Security Council, expressed support for the initiative but
also raised concerns about transparency in the bidding process and
other issues.
Answer. Our primary concerns regarding the ``One Belt, One Road''
initiative include how the project may further undermine an already
highly abusive environment in Xinjiang, that many of the Central Asian
governments involved in the project have poor human rights track
records, particularly with major infrastructure projects, whether AIIB
members--even ones with strong protections in place for peaceful
expression--will tolerate public criticism of China, and whether those
who protest peacefully against One Belt, One Road projects will be
allowed an opportunity for meaningful engagement, be ignored, or be
imprisoned.
Private companies involved in One Belt, One Road projects should
recognize they have a responsibility to carry out effective human
rights due diligence, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. Companies should assess human
rights risks and take effective steps to mitigate or avoid those risks.
Companies also have a responsibility to ensure that people who claim to
experience abuses have access to appropriate remedies. Potential
financiers, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank,
should keep in mind their own responsibility to respect human rights as
they invest in One Belt, One Road.
If all One Belt, One Road participants aspire to respect human
rights, the project could be truly transformative. But that will
require dedicated commitment to community consultation, respect for
peaceful protest, openness to reject or change projects in response to
community concerns, and genuine commitment to transparency. Many
participating governments do not seem particularly inclined to respond
in such a manner to such challenges. Whether higher standards prevail
should be the key test of One Belt, One Road's long-term impact.
Question. As American companies, including General Electric, invest
in projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative, what steps, if
any, should U.S. officials take to ensure such investment complies with
international human rights standards? What steps can American companies
themselves put in place to ensure compliance with human rights norms?
Answer. See answer above for guidance on the human rights standards
for corporations.
Question. Under newly revised implementing regulations for its
counterespionage law, China's State Council has expanded state powers
to punish Chinese and foreign individuals for offenses the Chinese
government deems threatening to its national security or ``social
stability.'' Under the new rules, Chinese state security authorities
can bar foreigners from entering China if they are ``likely to engage
in activities that might endanger national security.'' Foreigners can
also be prevented from leaving China for a period of time, or can be
deported for ``harming national security.'' Foreign individuals or
groups who ``fabricate or distort facts'' can also be penalized. Human
rights organizations and governments have raised concerns that Chinese
national security legislation is enabling Chinese authorities to target
rights advocates and dissidents who criticize the CCP or advocate
political reform.
What steps could the United States and other governments
take to provide protection for Americans engaged in China-related civil
society, advocacy, and academic work, in order to prevent them from
potentially being punished under these regulations? How might the
United States and other countries seek to protect Americans' Chinese
counterparts from being punished for engaging in peaceful civil
society, advocacy, or academic efforts?
Answer. The U.S. government--through the White House, State
Department, and members of Congress and congressional committees--
should forcefully and publicly speak in defense of this work generally
and with respect to specific groups and individuals. U.S. officials
should also regularly remind Chinese authorities of its obligations
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, particularly in
light of the ongoing arbitrary detention of European and Taiwanese
citizens. Doing so not only helps those who have been silenced or
detained, but is also of assistance to other countries seeking the
freedom of their nationals.
The U.S. could also consider funding, through the State Department
and foundations such as the National Endowment for Democracy,
innovative work by independent Chinese civil society outside the
country if doing so in the mainland proves too risky; it could consider
doing so in collaboration with other like-minded groups. Engaging a
broad cross-section of Chinese in the U.S.--whether they are U.S.-born
or naturalized; whether they are scholars or dissidents--will help the
U.S. push back against the Chinese government's efforts to paint U.S.
concerns as biased or racist.
Question. The Commission has followed closely troubling
developments related to China's relatively new Overseas NGO Management
Law. We've received anecdotal accounts of U.S. foundations, during the
application process being asked to provide information to Chinese
authorities on their activities in the U.S., including research that
relates to China, despite the fact that none of that research is
occurring in China, or involves funds or other resources being
transferred to or within China.
Have you heard similar accounts?
What are the implications?
Answer. We have not heard of such inquiries in the context of the
FNGO Management Law, but have documented Chinese government inquiries
about the origins, perceived political affiliations, funders, and other
details of foreign NGOs in other countries and via the UN's ECOSOC
accreditation process for NGOs. The net effect of these efforts by
Beijing is to ensure that even groups working outside China are aware
that their work is being tracked, and, in the case of seeking ECOSOC
accreditation, that such status can be delayed for years at a time for
undertaking work Beijing does not like.
Submissions for the Record
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Witness Biographies
The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism with Chinese
Characteristics
december 13, 2017
Shanthi Kalathil, Director, International Forum for Democratic
Studies, National Endowment for Democracy
Shanthi Kalathil is Director of the International Forum for
Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. Previously
a Senior Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and a regular consultant for the World Bank, the
Aspen Institute, and others, she has written or edited numerous policy
and scholarly publications. She co-authored ``Open Networks, Closed
Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule,'' a widely
cited work that examined the Internet and authoritarian regimes. She is
a former Hong Kong-based staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal
Asia. She lectures on international relations in the information age at
Georgetown University. She received a B.A. in Communications from the
University of California at Berkeley and a M.Sc. in Comparative
Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Glenn Tiffert, Ph.D., Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University
Glenn Tiffert is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at
Stanford University. From 2015-2017, he was the Distinguished
Postdoctoral Fellow in Residence at the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for
Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. He has taught at UC-
Berkeley, Harvard, UCLA, and University of Michigan. He recently issued
a paper that identifies systemic digital censorship of essays from two
prominent Chinese law journals from the 1950s, which has obstructed
contemporary understanding of the debates about rule of law and
jurisprudence early in the Communist era. Moreover, the paper
demonstrates empirically how the increasing reliance by scholars
outside of China on filtered Chinese databases inadvertently empowers
the Chinese government to export its domestic censorship mechanisms
abroad. Professor Tiffert earned his Ph.D. in History from the
University of California at Berkeley.
Sophie Richardson, Ph.D., China Director, Human Rights Watch
Sophie Richardson serves as the China Director at Human Rights
Watch. A graduate of the University of Virginia, the Hopkins-Nanjing
Program, and Oberlin College, she is the author of numerous articles on
domestic Chinese political reform, democratization, and human rights in
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
She has testified before the European Parliament and the U.S. Senate
and House of Representatives. She has provided commentary to the BBC,
CNN, the Far Eastern Economic Review, Foreign Policy, National Public
Radio, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington
Post. Dr. Richardson is the author of ``China, Cambodia, and the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'' (Columbia University Press, Dec.
2009), an in-depth examination of China's foreign policy since the 1954
Geneva Conference, including rare interviews with policymakers.
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