[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-62]
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE READINESS
AND TRAINING: INTEROPERABILITY,
SHORTFALLS, AND THE WAY AHEAD
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 1, 2017
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__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona, Vice Chair ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi RO KHANNA, California
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
Drew Warren, Professional Staff Member
Brian Garrett, Professional Staff Member
Danielle Steitz, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Beaudreault, LtGen Brian D., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Plans,
Policies, and Operations....................................... 3
Lewis, VADM Andrew L., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5)......................... 4
Russell, Cary B., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Beaudreault, LtGen Brian D................................... 26
Lewis, VADM Andrew L......................................... 37
Russell, Cary B.............................................. 44
Wilson, Hon. Joe............................................. 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE READINESS AND TRAINING:
INTEROPERABILITY, SHORTFALLS, AND THE WAY AHEAD
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Friday, December 1, 2017.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:01 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wilson. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order. I welcome you today to this hearing of the House Armed
Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee on ``Amphibious
Warfare Readiness and Training.''
Today the subcommittee will hear from the Navy and Marine
Corps regarding the status of amphibious training and
readiness, specifically the challenges of amphibious ship
availability and Navy and Marine Corps interoperability. We are
also pleased to have the Government Accountability Office
present to comment on their recent study of the amphibious
operations training released in September 2017.
I ask the witnesses to do their best to describe where
shortfalls exist and what can be done to improve the less than
optimal state we are in, specifically how better and more
consistent funding could help. We have held a number of
readiness hearings and briefings on aviation, surface
combatants, DOD [Department of Defense] infrastructure, and
other topics. Every session points to the same grim conclusion:
our services are indeed in a readiness crisis. Marine
expeditionary units aboard U.S. Navy amphibious vessels are an
important element of our forward deployed strategic deterrent.
To be effective, the Navy-Marine Corps team must train together
regularly, certainly more than they do today. Because we have
too few ships, necessary training is not possible.
President Ronald Reagan frequently used the phrase
correctly, ``Peace through strength.'' I agree with President
Reagan and believe we have a higher level of defense funding--
must be achieved to achieve that goal. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today on how this capability can be
improved.
Before I introduce the witnesses, I am grateful to
recognize Ranking Member Madeleine Bordallo, the distinguished
gentlelady from Guam, for opening comments she would like to
make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to all of our witnesses for being here today. I do look
forward to discussing the challenges that are impeding
amphibious training and the mitigations and long-term solutions
to build and sustain readiness in the Marine Corps and the
Navy.
Amphibious operations are complex, and they are difficult
to say the least. There is a tremendous amount of planning and
preparations required to ensure the ships, sailors, and Marines
and equipment are properly coordinated to ensure the success of
a training event or, in the event of a contingency operation,
an actual amphibious landing.
The GAO [Government Accountability Office] report clearly
indicates there is currently a lack of overall strategy to
allocating limited resources that are needed for amphibious
training. The current operations tempo, as well as the limited
number of ships, compound this challenge. It is clear that
better coordination is required by the Navy and the Marine
Corps to ensure this critical warfighting and skill is restored
to a readiness level and is required to meet our operational
planning needs.
I am encouraged to see that both the Navy and the Marines
have concurred with all three recommendations made by GAO, and
I intend to monitor the progress as both services work to
restore this amphibious operation readiness. This committee is
keenly aware of the continuing impacts of sequestration and
unpredictable funding on readiness in every aspect of the
services.
I encourage the witnesses to share specific examples of how
unpredictable funding has impacted their ability to conduct
amphibious operations training. And I look forward to the
training, and thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo.
In connection with today's hearing we welcome members of
the full committee who are not members of the Readiness
Subcommittee who are or will be willing to attend. I ask
unanimous consent that these committee members be permitted to
participate in this briefing with the understanding that all
sitting subcommittee members will be recognized for questions
prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee. Without
objection. So ordered.
I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today. I want to
thank them for taking the time to be with us and their service
to our Nation. We have Lieutenant General Brian Beaudreault,
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S.
Marine Corps; Vice Admiral Andrew L. ``Woody'' Lewis, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and
Strategy, U.S. Navy; and we have Mr. Cary Russell, Director of
Defense Capabilities and Management of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
We will now ask each panel member to make brief opening
remarks before we proceed to member questions under the very
strict 5-minute rule of Mr. Warren.
We will begin with General Beaudreault.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN BRIAN D. BEAUDREAULT, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS
General Beaudreault. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member
Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, good
morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before
this subcommittee.
Today Marines and sailors are at sea operating as
amphibious ready groups [ARGs], Marine expeditionary units
[MEUs]. We have the America ARG and the 15th MEU out in the
Central Command region with some of its personnel about to
embark on allied ships. We have the Bonhomme Richard and the
31st MEU out in the Pacific. The Iwo Jima ARG is off the east
coast of the United States with the 26th MEU embarked preparing
to deploy, and we have Black Sea rotational Marines aboard DDGs
[guided-missile destroyers] getting ready to exercise in the
European theater. So your expeditionary forces in readiness are
postured forward and are accomplishing our national security
objectives.
The Marine Corps has reviewed the GAO report on Navy and
Marine Corps training, and we agree with the study, its
findings, and its recommendations.
Today's testimony provides the Navy and Marine Corps the
opportunity to inform the Readiness Subcommittee on the
challenges associated with amphibious operations training,
discuss our shortfalls, and describe our projected way ahead.
The current inventory of 32 amphibious warships is short of
our need to satisfy operational requirements, which does
negatively impact the naval force's ability to generate
readiness and negatively affects availability for training with
larger scale formations.
The amphibious force structure is projected to grow to a
total of 34 ships starting in fiscal year 2021. And the Marine
Corps supports the 38-ship requirement and the requisite
funding to develop readiness while concurrently fulfilling
validated joint requirements, accomplishing necessary fleet
maintenance, and maintaining capacity to respond to potential
contingencies. And as the amphibious ship inventory builds
toward 38 ships in fiscal year 2033, the Navy and Marine Corps
team will continue to explore innovative ways to employ
alternative platforms.
So on behalf of our Marines and sailors, civilians and
their families, we thank the Congress and this committee for
the opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Navy and
Marine Corps face, and we thank you for your support.
The most important actions that Congress can take now is to
immediately repeal the caps on defense spending in the Budget
Control Act, and provide a defense appropriation that ensures
sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding to train, man,
and equip your Navy and Marine Corps. And with your help we
will overcome these constraints and enable your Navy and Marine
Corps team to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement for the
record, and I would ask that to be accepted, and I look forward
to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Beaudreault can be found
in the Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Wilson. General, thank you very much, and the persons
who are here on the subcommittee certainly endorse your
statement in regard to the Budget Control Act sequestration. I
would like to now proceed to Admiral Lewis.
STATEMENT OF VADM ANDREW L. LEWIS, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY (N3/N5)
Admiral Lewis. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today alongside General
Beaudreault.
The team before you is inextricably linked. In our past, I
have commanded Marines and he has commanded sailors. We train
together, deploy together, and fight together. Our bond has
been strengthened over the centuries of our great services, and
today we look forward to testifying how we will continue that
bond in the future. I request my written statement be submitted
for the record, and I will keep these remarks brief.
Right now your Navy-Marine Corps team is forward deployed
and standing the watch. Sailors and Marines are at sea aboard
the America Amphibious Readiness Group with the 15th MEU in
Central Command, USS Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Readiness
Group with the 31st MEU in the Pacific, and the Iwo Jima
Amphibious Readiness Group with the 26th MEU in the Atlantic
preparing to deploy.
We are at the tip of the spear and working every day to
sharpen it. We reviewed the GAO report on Navy and Marine Corps
amphibious operations and training and agree with the study,
its findings, and its recommendations. We appreciate the
opportunity to inform the Readiness Subcommittee of the
challenges associated with Navy and Marine Corps amphibious
operations training and integration, discuss our shortfalls,
and lay out a projected way ahead.
The GAO report finds the Navy shortage of amphibious ships
to be detrimental to our ability to train. The 32 amphibious
ships currently in the fleet are stressed to meet both
combatant commander operational requirements, ongoing
contingency operations, and disaster relief, which impacts the
ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to improve readiness and
training as an integrated force.
Continuing resolutions and caps imposed by the Budget
Control Act have impacted our ability to plan and implement
training, ship maintenance, and modernization. While we have
prioritized maintenance and readiness dollars, the positive
effects of prioritized funding will not remove these deficits
in the near term. Restoring the readiness of the fleet requires
predictable, stable, and adequate funding over several years to
ensure that we can conduct the required maintenance on our
ships. This stability would help the Navy to restore stocks of
necessary parts, get more ships to sea on time, and better
prepare sailors and Marines for deployment.
Although a continuing resolution may be better than no
funding at all, the costs associated with not being able to
start new work cannot be overstated. Delays in shipyard
maintenance periods cause ships to either have their training
pipelines compressed or maintenance deferred. Deferred
maintenance creates an increase in costs due to a corresponding
increase in machinery to repair.
At the same time the value of skilled artisans is amplified
when work is stopped due to the lack of a labor force
possessing the qualifications to complete the repairs. Work
stoppages created by continuing resolutions force artisans to
seek alternate, more stable employment. Skilled shipyard
workers require 2 to 4 years of training to reach journeyman
certification and 5 to 10 years to reach master. Shipyards and
skilled workers require stable, predictable funding to maintain
their skilled workforce and invest in these critical training
programs in order to maintain and grow the shipyard capacity we
need.
Maintaining the fleet is not enough to ensure readiness
when adversary capabilities continue to improve. We need a more
lethal and effective force, which can only be realized through
modernization and new technologies. The same stable,
predictable, and adequate funding required for maintenance is
critical to the new programs and additional capacity we need to
get better. We are working together to overcome these
challenges at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations
and Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Through the Naval Board, the services incorporated
processes to posture for increased training and integration.
The commander of the United States Fleet Forces Command and
commander of the United States Marine Forces Command
established a co-led maritime working group to provide an
enduring interservice collaborative process that integrates
capabilities, force development, experimentation, and emerging
requirements with exercise planning, scheduling, and
resourcing.
The commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and commander of
the U.S. Marine Forces Pacific have similarly developed the
Pacific Naval Integration Working Group to represent the
Pacific issues. These four commands meet together quarterly to
include meeting at this time in Hawaii.
On behalf of all Marines, sailors, civilians, and their
families, we thank the Congress and this committee for your
support and this opportunity to discuss the key challenges your
Navy and Marine Corps face. The President's fiscal year 2018
[budget] request and the recently passed National Defense
Authorization Act look toward fleet wholeness and funding to
man, train, and equip and organize the Navy and Marine Corps.
These funds will only work if they are approved in a
consistent, predictable, and timely manner. With your help, we
will overcome these constraints and reshape your Navy and
Marine Corps to meet the challenges of the 21st century. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Lewis can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Admiral. We now proceed to
Mr. Cary Russell.
STATEMENT OF CARY B. RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Russell. Good morning Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member
Bordallo, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for having
me here today to talk about GAO's recent review of Navy and
Marine Corps training for amphibious operations.
The Navy and Marine Corps together maintain forces capable
of conducting amphibious operations; that is, military
operations launched from the sea using naval vessels to project
a Marine Corps landing force ashore. As you know, the United
States today faces a complex national security environment with
threats ranging from large-scale traditional state actors to
destabilizing nonstate actors.
Accordingly, the Navy and Marine Corps must have fully
trained and ready forces to address these threats in the
maritime domain. However, each of the military services today
are generally smaller and less combat ready than they have been
in many years. For example, over the past two decades the
number of Navy amphibious ships has decreased by 50 percent,
from 62 ships in 1990 to the 32 that we have today.
For my statement I am going to focus on three areas that we
examine in our latest report. First, the Navy and Marine Corps
ability to complete training for amphibious operations and
factors that limited that training. Second, steps taken by the
Navy and Marine Corps to mitigate training shortfalls. And
third, efforts to improve overall integration between the Navy
and Marine Corps for amphibious operations training referred to
as ``naval integration.''
With respect to the first area on completing amphibious
training, we found that the Navy's fleets of amphibious ships
and associated Marine Corps combat units that were just about
to deploy as part of those Marine expeditionary units had
generally completed the needed training for amphibious
operations. However, for that majority of forces not nearing a
deployment, such as those conducting home station training to
build and maintain core competencies, they fell considerably
short of being able to complete amphibious training
requirements. This was especially noticeable in Marine Corps
infantry battalions and V-22 Osprey tiltrotor squadrons.
These deficits can create a potential gap in the Marine
Corps ready bench of units. If called on these units could be
left scrambling to obtain last-minute training, risking their
ability to be fully ready once deployed and underway.
The most prevalent factor we found that hampered training
completion was a lack of available amphibious ships on which to
train. For example, data we collected or obtained from the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force, which operates out of the Pacific,
showed that the Navy was unable to fulfill 93 percent of its
request for Navy ship support for training in fiscal year 2016.
Other significant factors we identified across the Marine
Corps that hampered training included limited access to to
range space and maintenance delays for amphibious ships.
With respect to actions taken by the Navy and Marine Corps
to mitigate training challenges, we identified some important
steps that the services have taken. For example, the Navy in
working with the Marine Corps has assessed its needs for
amphibious ships to support current deployments while also
providing for adequate training and now plans to increase the
number of ships in the amphibious fleet from 31 to 38.
Also, the Marine Corps is currently evaluating its
amphibious training requirements and the number of forces that
must be trained and ready at any given time. However, despite
these actions, we found that the service's current approach for
amphibious operations training does not fully incorporate
strategic training in leading risk management practices, such
as prioritizing all available training resources.
For example, the Marine Corps relies more on an ad hoc
process to identify units that are available for home station
training when an amphibious ship becomes available, rather than
a process that would deliberately align the next highest
priority units with those ships and other resources.
Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have not
systematically evaluated a full range of alternatives to
achieve training priorities in light of the limited
availability of amphibious ships.
Further, while the Marine Corps has endeavored to
incorporate simulators and other virtual devices into its
training activities, we identified gaps in its processes to
effectively develop and use them; namely, weaknesses on the
front-end planning and postfielding evaluation of device
effectiveness.
And finally, with respect to naval integration for training
activities, the Navy and Marine Corps have taken steps to
improve coordination between the two services but have not
fully incorporated leading collaboration practices that would
help drive these efforts. For example, the Navy and Marine
Corps lack defined common outcomes that would help them create
a more integrated approach to managing and executing their
training programs.
This completes my statement, and I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Russell, and thank all
of you for your succinctness, and we will begin now on the very
concise 5-minute rule.
Even before we begin, yesterday, and I was really pleased,
and, Admiral, you brought it up again, the consequence of
continuing resolution that we have and we are facing that now.
And something that would be very helpful as I mentioned, and I
hope that both of you could provide succinct examples of what
the additional costs are due to a continuing resolution in real
world language very brief so that Congresswoman Bordallo and I
can receive that and we can provide it to the rest of the
subcommittee members so that we could actually use that to
explain to our constituents what the consequence of a
continuing resolution is.
And it would just be very helpful because it just doesn't
come across as it should. And we want to make it where our
constituents understand and also even our colleagues, it would
be good for them to understand, too.
Admiral Lewis, you clearly articulated in your written
statement and in your opening remarks why it is so important to
grow the number of amphibious ships currently in the Navy's
inventory. Can you please comment on why you would need
additional ships, particularly being challenged when the Navy
has plans to take commission LSDs [dock landing ships] offline
for up to 4 years at a time? Currently LSD-46, the USS Tortuga,
does not have planned availability fiscal years 2016 to 2019.
Can you please explain this further?
Admiral Lewis. Yes, sir. In regards to taking the ships
offline for maintenance, so these ships are old, and they are
ships that, you know, so it is akin to keeping a car that you
have had for a long time that the maintenance costs become
further and further. And we have--over time we have deferred
these maintenance because of continuing resolutions.
As an example of that deferred maintenance, the USS Gunston
Hall went into maintenance deferred an entire 3-year deferral
increased the costs from $44 million to $111 million. And the
time in maintenance went from 270 days to 696 days. You know,
if you compare that to the cost to your personal vehicle that
is, you know, a couple months' pay of all of us, regardless of
what kind of car it is. So that is a big impact to those funds,
those operating funds. That is how we fund those maintenance.
In the case of ships that we have taken offline, as you
state, we have really no other choice to do that because we
don't have adequate funding under continuing resolutions to do
that maintenance, you know, right in quick order. If we had
more funding we could, you know, tighten those timelines on
that maintenance on those older ships. However, we have done
the best that we can do with the funding that we have and
spread that maintenance out over time.
Mr. Wilson. I want to thank you for raising that it is not
just cost but delay and extension of time, and so if you all
could include that, not just costs, but the consequence of
offline and delay.
And General Beaudreault, what specific elements do the
Marine Corps atrophy and suffer the most from the lack of
amphibious ships and training opportunities?
General Beaudreault. Mr. Chairman, it is our ability to
train at higher echelons above the Marine expeditionary unit
and the amphibious ready group unit. Our forcible entry
capability, core competency of the Marine Corps and Navy team
here, is at risk above the MEU level. Simply we can do some
training through--of the command elements through virtual
systems, but at some point you have to put the ships to sea and
go through a mission rehearsal.
And the ability to generate the number of ships required to
train at a Marine expeditionary brigade [MEB] level just simply
isn't there. So we take it in bite-size chunks, and we try to
train elements of that MEB the best we can, but it is very,
very difficult lacking the capacity to put the entire MAGTF
[Marine air-ground task force] and Navy team together at sea.
That is the greatest challenge we have quite honestly right
now.
Mr. Wilson. Well, and I appreciate you pointing out that
virtual can be very helpful, but it is the actual practicality
of the operation itself. At this time we proceed to
Congresswoman Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Russell, you identified concerns with the way the Navy and the
Marine Corps were utilizing available training resources to
conduct amphibious training. Can you please provide us with
some specific examples where GAO felt the current process did
not effectively prioritize training?
Mr. Russell. Yes, ma'am. Well, I will start out by saying
with respect to the units that are just about to deploy for the
Marine expeditionary units, they were able to train, and they
were able to use those resources.
The issues we had were with that ready bench, that group
that was not ready to deploy, and what we found is that more
often the assignment of Navy ships to Marine Corps units was
done more ad hoc based on the availability of the units for the
Marine Corps units to match up to the ship based on the
availability of the ship, rather than having a system of
prioritization to look at those Marine Corps units that were
most likely to need training earlier.
So, for example, some of those units that might be tagged
to go as part of the special Marine task forces, the SPMAGTF
[special purpose Marine air-ground task force], for example, or
other things that might have a priority over others. That
distinction was not made in the process, rather, it was more of
a matching of availability.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much. Vice Admiral
Lewis and Lieutenant General Beaudreault, given the concerns
identified by GAO I am concerned that additional funding
targeted toward readiness may not be prioritized toward the
units that have the highest needs. In light of the GAO report,
can you describe what controls have been put in place or that
you plan to put in place in the coming year that will ensure
readiness resources are properly allocated to the units with
the most pressing needs? And you, General, first.
General Beaudreault. Thank you, ma'am. I would say that,
yes, we do have a plan and there are controls in place, and it
gets to what Mr. Russell just referred to. And we first ensure
that we can meet our steady-state requirement. Those next to
deploy have to be trained and certified to go forward and
execute their missions. 26th MEU, for instance, right now is
the priority effort to make sure they have got everything they
need before they depart the east coast of the United States to
go forward into the Central Command region.
Secondly, it is the ability to ensure of our OPLAN
[operation plan] readiness, and that calls for units, of
course, in number and in size greater than Marine expeditionary
units or amphibious ready groups. So we do take a look at our
OPLAN requirements and try to focus those units because the
units change all the time as units deploy on their normal
schedule, battalions change and squadrons change so we try to
keep pace with the units that are back at home station that may
be next to deploy. And that next to deploy focus is on those
specifically that may have to meet an OPLAN requirement.
Thirdly would be exercises. And with exercises comes
experimentation. We can't afford to have sets of ships that are
going to exercise and then we need another set to experiment.
We have integrated experimentation in with the exercises, and I
think Dawn Blitz is our most recent example of that where we
wanted to test our ability to shoot High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System off of an amphibious platform, which proved
itself.
So I would say that is the sequence, that is the plan. It
is to make sure that those that are next to deploy, meeting
OPLAN requirements, and then exercises and experimentation in
that order.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, General. Admiral.
Admiral Lewis. Yes, ma'am. Really to mirror what General
Beaudreault said, but I would--the first priority for funding,
additional funding that we need, would be go toward ship
maintenance, so as to be able to not have to defer any further
maintenance and to keep the maintenance time and costs and to
get done on time so they can get out and start the training
cycle.
The training cycle is about a year long, 6 months in which
we do the basic unit level training with the Navy with Marines
embarked with their basic core competencies and then the second
6 months is a fully integrated toward the higher end training.
The prioritization really starts with that maintenance to
make sure we start on time and then we can have the units that
we have in an inventory, which is not enough, but we can have
the units we have in the inventory to train with.
And then the third priority would be at the higher end, the
exercises, the larger formation exercises where the
experimentation takes place, as well.
Ms. Bordallo. So maintenance, training, and exercises in
that----
Admiral Lewis. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ranking Member. We now proceed to
Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Admiral, it is
not lost on me that between the two of you you have 66 years in
service to the country. I think if Mattis and Kelly combined
probably have over 80 years of service to the country, and as I
listen to any of the four of you that have talked, it is pretty
clear that the sequester and the caps have done more damage,
just Mattis has been very direct about it, than any outside
enemy to our military and our capabilities. And I want to
reiterate the point that I made yesterday, and I want to say
this as respectfully as I know how to do it. As long as you ask
for a continuing resolution you are going to get a continuing
resolution.
We can put an end to this madness by the end of this year,
but only if men like you and General Kelly and General Mattis
hold Congress' feet to the fire. Give us Christmas Eve, give us
Christmas Day to go home to our families. There are a lot of
men and women deployed around the world. Make us stop this
madness.
But if General Mattis comes out and says we need a
continuing resolution, I promise you, you are going to get a
continuing resolution. And from the members of HASC [House
Armed Services Committee] I don't pretend to speak for all of
them, but I will tell you that I think among the Democrats and
the Republicans on HASC we all want to help you solve this
problem. All of us do. I believe that to be true. It is not a
partisan issue from the members who are on HASC.
But I just promise you if Mattis and Kelly ask for a
continuing resolution, you are going to have a continuing
resolution, and until you hold Congress' feet to the fire you
are going to have to watch our capabilities further degrade.
And so I would just ask for your help in speaking with them and
making sure that they say no more continuing resolutions. If
Congress has to cancel going home for Christmas, then Congress
can cancel going home for Christmas just like the soldiers do.
But, again, I respect both of you, all three of you, and
thank you for your service, and I just hope that we can put an
end to this madness by December 31st, but it is up to you. It
is up to you all. Mattis can do it. Kelly can do it. They have
got enough credibility up here.
So Marine Corps logistics base in Albany we talked
yesterday about the shortfalls in helicopters. Today we are
talking about shortfalls in amphibious ships. General, you have
got two Marine Corps logistics centers. The one in Albany is
not technically in my district, but I have family that works
there, although we don't claim each other for fear of
termination. The maintenance on the amphibious assault
vehicles, who does that? Is that in Albany or is that in the
west coast depot?
General Beaudreault. Maybe both, but I am definitely
certain it is happening in Albany.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
General Beaudreault. And we greatly appreciate the work
that is being done there to include the recovery of the tornado
effects.
Mr. Scott. Absolutely.
General Beaudreault. In January of 2017 and what has been
able to be accomplished by that workforce is nothing short of
amazing. To include the reset of our equipment from
Afghanistan, we are 94 percent--we had, I believe, almost
87,000 items that were rolled back from combat that needed to
be reworked, and we are closing in on the completion of
resetting that equipment back in Albany, so tremendous effort
by your family members and others in Albany, and we greatly
appreciate the support of Congress on that.
Mr. Scott. I was there shortly after that storm, and we
were very fortunate that that tornado was a little bit further
to the south, and we would have lost some lives on that base.
They did a tremendous job of cleaning up and getting things
back in order.
What systemic challenges do you have at the Marine Corps
logistics base in Albany and what changes can we make to help
you with any of those challenges?
General Beaudreault. Sir, I better defer that to--I can
take that for the record if you might, and I will bring that
back to our director for installations and logistics. That was
squarely within his portfolio, and I can give you more accurate
answers.
[The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Perfect. Thank you. And I look forward to seeing
you December 23rd up here doing our job, and I hope that Mattis
and Kelly will help get us out of this mess by the end of the
year. Thank you. I yield.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Scott. I will
now proceed to Congressman Joe Courtney of Connecticut.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here. I would note, as Mr. Scott said, the
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] is now on its way
over to the White House, which passed with the strongest
bipartisan vote since 2008, and part of that mark or that bill
included the Seapower [Subcommittee] mark which increased the
size of the amphibious fleet by one boat above what the
President sent over. So there is some signs of intelligent
life, you know, on the Hill here, but obviously even at that
pace in terms of hitting the requirement of 38 ships it still
is going to take a while, and obviously in the meantime you
have to figure out the most creative ways possible to boost
training.
And, General, a number of us were over in Australia last
summer on a CODEL [congressional delegation], and they were
describing the joint amphibious training exercise that the
Marines did from Darwin in 2016. I mean, is that maybe another
sort of avenue in terms of, again, working with allies in terms
of doing joint training exercises to again sharpen people's
skills?
General Beaudreault. Sir, it is. I think you might be
referring to Tandem Thrust. That occurs on a recurring basis
down in Australia, so, yes, very much so, not just in Australia
to get aboard their partner ships but to get aboard ships from
the U.K. [United Kingdom], from Spain, France, the Dutch. So
what we refer to as an allied maritime basing initiative,
particularly in Europe, it is not uncommon to find U.S. Marines
aboard our allied partners' ships.
In addition to that our use of alternative platforms, the
ESDs [expeditionary transfer dock] and the expeditionary
support bases like the USS Puller and soon the USS Keith
provides that, you know, additional capability for us to get
aboard a ship and still exercise our aviation elements and our
command and control, so we are trying to be as creative as we
can with not just our amphib ships, but alternative platforms
as well as allied ships.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Mr. Russell, again, your report
kind of listed again sort of more creative ways to, you know,
increase jointness, and if you had to prioritize I mean--of the
recommendations--which one really that you think stands out as
probably the most effective in the short term?
Mr. Russell. Well, I would say it is a close call between
two of them, but certainly the idea of trying to more
systematically evaluate the training priorities and establish
or look at the alternatives to the amphibious ships, whether it
is maritime prepositioning fleet ships or allied ships, but
coming up with a strategic, thoughtful way to look and balance
those resources amongst priorities and alternatives is probably
one of the top recommendations in order to manage those
resources that are available to the best we can.
And then it goes back also to the second recommendation
that we made on naval integration, and that is strategically
thinking about how you tie together both the Navy and the
Marine Corps so that they are looking together at some of the
joint aspects of it in terms of leveraging availabilities and
creating those compatible systems and policies and procedures
where the two are working together in a more cohesive way.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. I thank you very much, Congressman Courtney. We
now proceed to Congresswoman Vicky Hartzler of Missouri.
Mrs. Hartzler. Good morning, gentlemen. In your report,
your testimony, General, you talk about how in 1990 the Navy
possessed 62 amphibious ships, and we have 32 today and then
how there was this, you know, mutually agreed 38-ship
requirement. You also mentioned that Admiral Greenert in April
of 2014 said that we need about 50 amphibious gray hulls. So
can you give me just a little bit of background on how you
settled for 38 and how many do you really think you need?
General Beaudreault. Thank you, ma'am, for that question.
The number 38 is really centered on a look that occurred in
2009 between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of
Naval Operations. It has held true since for the past 8 years,
and that is our requirement to be able to have a forcible entry
capability with two Marine expeditionary brigades.
And so if you look at the number of 38 and then it was
determined that 34 was based on the perceived funding levels
for the future was about 34 ships is what would be fiscally
affordable at that time, of which minus 10 percent in
maintenance would leave you about 30 operationally available to
support the lift of 2 Marine expeditionary brigades. So that is
essentially how we got to the 38.
We will get there in fiscal year 2033. So the risk is
between now and fiscal year 2033 on getting that to that
objective level. It is also the additional assumptions that was
made on 10 percent of that fleet being in maintenance when we
know that history indicates that we are at a higher percentage
than 90 percent, less availability, in other words, than what
we are finding in the ARGs, for instance today 14 of 32 ships
are undergoing maintenance.
Mrs. Hartzler. Well, this is very concerning. I just
returned from South Korea and Japan and Guam with Chairman
Wilson and Madeleine Bordallo and others and saw what our
Marines in the past have had to come on the shore at Okinawa
and at Guam, and as we look at what is going on in, you know,
South Korea we need to have this capability.
Your testimony also refers to the concerns with the
capacity gaps with mine countermeasures, naval surface fire
support. You say we need a modern and capable mine--counter-
mine capability facilitate access and the shortfalls. So what--
that is very concerning, as well. Can you tell me more about
what you are doing to address these concerns?
General Beaudreault. I can, and then I will maybe have
Admiral Lewis add any additional, particularly on the mine
countermeasures piece. It is a topic that was brought before
the Naval Board, in other words, between the Commandant and the
Chief of Naval Operations just a couple of months ago on
getting a comprehensive review from the N-95, which is
expeditionary warfare there within the OPNAV [Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations] staff, on looking at the challenges
we have and what are the proposed solutions.
We know that we don't have sufficient capacity in that
area, but we are looking at things that are, you know, unmanned
capability and other technical technology improvements in that
area. Naval surface fire support, we have addressed through the
kind of experimentation you have seen again in Dawn Blitz of
trying to look at extending the range of a naval gun, which is
about 13 miles today to look at what kind of Marine Corps
systems can we put afloat that will get us ranges out to 43
miles or perhaps in the future out to a couple hundred miles.
And do we take an amphibious ship like an LPD-17 class that
may be available to put a vertical launch system configuration
on that ship and bring a rocket system aboard that isn't there
today at some relative cost that may not be that great with the
existing systems we have today incorporated for shipboard use
that will get us though ranges out to 200 and perhaps tracking
what the Army is developing for long-range precision fires
maybe ranges out to 400-plus miles in the future.
So these are things we are all looking at in terms of
filling that gap on naval surface fire support and
technological developments on the mine countermeasures.
Mrs. Hartzler. Let me just ask one more question. The GAO
report talked about the virtual training option, but it also--
what is the status of your efforts to address GAO's
recommendations to develop guidance for the development and use
of virtual training devices and to what extent are Marine Corps
virtual training devices able to integrate with Navy devices
for the purposes of simulating amphibious operations?
General Beaudreault. Within our Training and Education
Command, they have really the portfolio for training in
general. And that would reside with Lieutenant General Walsh,
and I know they are looking hard at this. There is a Marine
Corps simulated training environment concept. I think the GAO
report is spot on in their assessment on the analysis up front
and the evaluation on the back end, but there are some things
that we are doing today through simulation that are definite
enhancements that allow for our live opportunities to be more
effective because we have been able to rehearse some of that,
primarily command elements.
But if you look at the comprehensive array of what is out
there in the virtual training world, everything from a
simulation system for a pilot to rehearse landings on a rolling
ship at night in rough seas to the command and control
capabilities we have at a place like Marine Corps training and
operations group at Twentynine Palms.
If we look at the ability of our MAGTF simulation systems
on rehearsing a staff's ability to plan in an integrated
fashion with the Navy prior to going to sea we do that
routinely with the MEUs. It is called R2P2, rapid response
planning process. So they do use some simulation in virtual
training to go through the preliminary stages.
In terms of systems that are designed really for amphibious
capabilities outside of, you know, what I have referred to in
our--we also--I will rewind the tape a little bit there and say
we also have some systems that are applicable to operations
ashore.
When Marines finally hit the beach, we have a squad
immersive trainer on both coasts that can be reconfigured to
replicate really any kind of environment. It is really kind of
at the squad level. So there are things that are applicable
that we are today ashore that would have amphibious operations,
but amphib-specific kinds of simulators, there aren't a lot
that we have today and perhaps none in the Navy that would get
us to where we would want to be in future. So it is a system of
systems that you can piece together to project what you need to
do once the landing force is ashore.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Hartzler. We now
proceed to Congressman Trent Kelly of Mississippi.
Mr. Kelly. Well, I broke the mike. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Leave it to a redneck to break something. You know, I want to
concur in what Austin Scott said. It is critical that we not
hear mixed messages from the military community whether that be
at the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] level or from our generals
or our admirals.
CRs [continuing resolutions] kill our readiness. I know
that I currently serve in our Guard, and I can tell you it
kills our readiness. And you will never hear me say anything
other than that. It is not okay for a CR, not a short one, not
a long one, not any one. It is killing our readiness. So I just
hope that that message will be heard.
The second part is we have gotten so focused on the COIN
[counterinsurgency] fight for the last 16 years. I see my
soldiers, I see young majors or sometimes a little older
majors, I see E-6s and E-7s who do not know how to fight the
real fight that we are here for and at the end of the day the
Marine Corps is not here to do a COIN fight. They are real good
at that, they are real good at a lot of things, but you guys
are here to make forced landing on a contested beachhead to get
us a foothold to go to war with our enemies to be able to
project power from there. It is critical that we have the
elements to do those things, we have the training to do those
things, and we focus on those tasks that are critical to us. I
mean, that is why we have a Marine Corps.
And so I guess going back [to] naval surface fires, you
know we don't have battleships anymore. We don't have the--we
do not have the ability to have naval surface fire support like
we had in the past. Tomahawks and CAS [close air support] are
great, but they don't do the same things as those big guns on
those battleships used to do, and if you are making a forced
landing I assure you, you don't want to go where just Tomahawks
and CAS have been because you still got a lot of fighting to do
to get through that.
How would you rate--General Beaudreault, how would you rate
the naval surface fire's readiness, and what are we doing to
improve it?
General Beaudreault. I will defer to Admiral Lewis on any
improvements to the naval surface fire support platforms. My
understanding of that which is afloat is fine. What we are,
just as you referred to, Congressman, is a range limitation.
The ship's survivability in a contested environment to close
within the ranges that would be required to even get support
from a 5-inch gun, for instance, is something we are going to
have to rethink.
So the coin of the realm in the future is long-range
precision fires, and more ships protection against missile
threats and an air threat, which looking at our potential
adversaries and our competitors out there, what they are
building, stealth capability and likewise is something that
we--this technological edge we used to have is something we are
very aware of, something we are very concerned about, and
something we need to counter.
So survivabilities of the amphibious platforms to get in
close is a big concern. We need to make them more lethal. We
need to make them more survivable. And the lethality goes to
the naval surface fire support piece, and the survivability
gets to the missile defense piece.
Mr. Kelly. Admiral, if you can talk about that, please?
Admiral Lewis. Yes, sir. The contested environment that you
referred to years ago was in close to the beachhead. It is now
everywhere. If you look throughout the maritime, all straits,
Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Straits, wherever and further out
into the maritime, so it is all the battlespace now. A
priority, a very high priority for the Navy is development of
long-range precision surface-to-surface fires that is very
much--and it is not just in this fight, it is in what we would
call, you know, traditionally a blue-water fight, which has
been very much--you know, it has been very blurred in that
regard from the contested space.
Where we are right now in surface fires is just over 10
nautical miles, and that is not far enough. Part of that,
though, is the systems and the command and control systems and
the ability to network our capabilities from Navy ships at sea
well out to sea to in close to onshore.
That networking is something that we are very focused on
with Navy and Marine Corps first and with the Air Force and
with the Army as we go forward. But that is something that it
is a real need. We are not close to achieving it. We have got
to get to the building blocks first, which is the basic units
and the capability of the ARG and MEU.
Mr. Kelly. I thank both of you for your answer. I think
that is something we need to really focus on and focus on
quick. The bottom line there is a lot of difference going into
a beachhead or a hardened target that has been saturated with
heavy fires than to go in somewhere that has kind of been just
kind of hit a little bit. There is a lot of fighting left and
we don't want to use Marines when we can do that with
firepower, and with that my time is expired.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Colonel, Congressman
Kelly. We now proceed to Congressman Mike Gallagher of
Wisconsin.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have a cool
southern accent, but I would like to associate myself with the
remarks of Mr. Kelly and Mr. Scott. I really think that now is
the critical time to get out from under this problem from a
budgetary perspective. I don't think we can afford another CR,
and so I think we have to make a stand over the next month. And
I know it might seem absurd from your perspective for us to put
the onus on you, given that we are a separate branch of
government which provides you with funding, and it is our job,
but we really need your help. Because you guys bring a
credibility that Congress does not.
Congress is rocking a 12 percent approval rating right now.
I think you guys have a 90 percent approval rating. So we are
going to need your partnership over the next month. By the way,
that approval rating is lower than cockroaches and
colonoscopies to give you a sense of how bad the problem is
right now. Because, and I hate to be critical since I have only
been here a year, but when it comes to this issue, which should
be the most important issue for all of us it just--it perplexes
me as to why a year into this Congress we are still in this
situation when we know how much damage the BCA [Budget Control
Act] and sequester has done to our military and how much damage
another continuing resolution would do as the Secretary laid
out in the letter to Chairman McCain and some others a month
ago. So I would just second the sentiments of Colonel Kelly and
Austin Scott.
This next month I view to be as absolutely critical, and I
am not going to support any effort that continues to punt this
problem down the road any further.
It is just, I can't look my buddies who are still on Active
Duty in the eye, given that I am unexpectedly in this role, and
do that. So if we have to cancel Christmas, it is fine with me.
I am happy to stay here, and they should lock us on the House
floor until we get this done.
So thank you for being here and shedding light on these
issues, and I just would ask sort of a follow-up of what
Congresswoman Hartzler suggested.
So we know we have gone from 61 amphibs down to 32, and the
requirement is 38. Is that correct? Do I have that right? So
can you just give me a sense, and forgive me if I missed this,
how that impacts our OPLANs, particularly in the Pacific, and
whether that should require us to rethink these OPLANs or
rethink whether they are even realistic to begin with?
General Beaudreault. Congressman, just on the evaluation of
our ability to execute any of the op plans if you would permit
I will take that question because I think it would--I don't
want to breach or wander into any of the classified territory.
So I think I can provide you the best most comprehensive answer
in that classified forum.
Mr. Gallagher. Sure.
Admiral Lewis. I echo that, but what I would mirror, and at
the unclassified level, if there is a conflict in the Pacific
that we are faced with right now and the scenario we are faced
with right now, it is not going to be like what we have been
faced with over the last 15 years. And that is a large-scale
conflict with a considerable risk to a lot of American lives.
And that is why--and our capacity in amphibious ships and
Marines and soldiers, airmen, sailors, Coast Guardsmen is not
where it needs to be. We are going to go to the fight and we
are going to win, but that is a real serious thing right now.
And the fact of passing a budget and not having a
continuing resolution will get us one step closer to being
prepared, but passing a continuing resolution will, as I said
in my opening remarks, and you mirrored much better than I
have, it has just stemmed the readiness issues. It hasn't
reversed them. And we are in a real need of reversing those
readiness issues.
Mr. Gallagher. Yes.
Admiral Lewis. And that was the only thing I would say on
top of that.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, usually I criticize people that use
their 5 minutes to give speeches and not ask questions, but I
am violating that today. I just want to go back to this point.
You know this is our--this is the centennial of our entry into
World War I, so I have been doing a kind of nerdy deep dive
into Wisconsin's history, and we led the opposition to the war.
Bob La Follette, our most famous politician, was the leader
of the progressive Republicans and fought on the Senate chamber
to delay Army merchant vessels and all this, but
notwithstanding that crazy debate that we had that really
divided the country--we had a lot of German-Americans in
Wisconsin--we managed to come together afterwards and do the
right thing for the country, and the entire country mobilized
in support of our troops.
That is not to say it wasn't without problems and we
experienced a lot of the interesting and divisive issues on the
homefront, but I just feel like this is the time where we got
to come together, and I think we can. I think we can. Working
with you guys, we can do it. Now is the decisive moment, and I
believe what we do over the next month can really put us on the
right path for the next decade or if not longer. So thank you
guys for being here and taking the time to shed some light on
these critical issues.
General Beaudreault. Congressman, I would like to follow up
for just one quick note on that and that probably the greatest
degradation we faced under the CR is our inability to do the
new starts. And we talk about building ships if we can't have
new starts. Our adversaries and potential adversaries are
cranking out new ships once every 6 weeks.
So we find this again our maritime superiority edge
narrowing through the continuing resolutions that is not
allowing us to stay on glide path for readiness recovery and
maintain a superiority on the sea, to be honest with you.
Mr. Gallagher. My time is expired, but I yield.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Gallagher. And
as we conclude it is obvious to you that we really are facing
the continuing resolution right now. You are, too.
And I appreciate Congressman Scott so eloquently presenting
it and backed up, of course, by Congressman Kelly, and
Congressman Gallagher, and Congresswoman Hartzler, and then
this may be lightning is going to strike, bipartisan with
Congresswoman Bordallo, and Congressman Courtney, but it really
would be helpful to us to have very brief, as I indicated
yesterday and I will restate, to have examples of increased
costs, to delays to the costs, and then you actually brought up
new items that need to be in this very brief one-page letter,
and that would be the new starts.
And then there could be a paragraph as to the capabilities
of adversaries that have a 6-week capability. That is just
incredible, but we need to have facts and actually Congressman
Gallagher was extremely correct.
I was going to point out that we need facts that would be
merit-based, but actually you have credibility and that would
help us as we explain to our colleagues the phenomenal
challenges to our country and the risk to our country and then
we can also, once we take some hard votes we are going to have
to go home and explain this to our constituents, and it can
best be done if we are presenting specific facts that you can
provide. Again, we want to thank you for your service.
It is just inspiring to me with such extraordinary
individuals, and we appreciate your service each of you, and,
Congresswoman Bordallo, of course, we need to represent--we
need to present the wonderful territory of Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to go on
record to say that I certainly support eliminating the CR.
Mr. Wilson. And again just bipartisan and to address the
issue of sequestration we keep punting, but we want to back you
up for the defense of our country. And with this we shall be
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 9:00 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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