[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2017
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 5, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2017
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 5, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
26-811 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma Cochairman
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
STEVE DAINES, Montana TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
TODD YOUNG, Indiana RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
GARY PETERS, Michigan TED LIEU, California
ANGUS KING, Maine
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, To Be Appointed
Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
Elyse B. Anderson, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Statement From the Chairs.................................... 1
Introduction................................................. 3
Overview..................................................... 5
Recommendations to Congress and the Administration........... 11
Political Prisoner Cases of Concern.......................... 16
Specific Findings and Recommendations........................ 21
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 62
II. Human Rights................................................. 66
Freedom of Expression........................................ 66
Worker Rights................................................ 84
Criminal Justice............................................. 102
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 127
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 147
Population Control........................................... 153
Freedom of Residence and Movement............................ 169
Status of Women.............................................. 176
Human Trafficking............................................ 186
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 198
Public Health................................................ 204
The Environment.............................................. 212
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 223
Civil Society................................................ 223
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 235
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 251
Access to Justice............................................ 268
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 282
V. Tibet......................................................... 299
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 319
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
I. Executive Summary
Statement From the Chairs
Seventeen years after the establishment of the
Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, the Commission's mandate to
monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in
China remains wholly relevant and urgently necessary.
China has benefited immensely from the international rules-
based order in driving its growth and lifting millions out of
poverty, but the political reform many believed would accompany
China's economic transformation and accession to the World
Trade Organization has failed to materialize. Chinese
government claims of global leadership in areas such as trade,
environmental protection, and the building of international
institutions--as expressed by President and Communist Party
Secretary Xi Jinping at several high-profile international
forums this past year--are belied by the reality of the Chinese
government's actions, which are not that of a responsible
stakeholder.
While China stresses the need for global connectivity and
openness, it continues to strengthen the world's most
sophisticated system of Internet control and press censorship
and forges ahead with what it calls ``Internet sovereignty,''
the notion that nations should have total control over the
Internet within their borders. The Chinese government's
expansive notion of sovereignty gives officials license to
decry international criticism of their human rights record as
one country interfering in the affairs of another. All the
while, the Chinese government extends its own ``long arm'' to
threaten and intimidate political and religious dissidents and
critics living abroad; establishes Confucius Institutes at
colleges and universities around the world, influencing these
academic environments with its political agenda; and invests
heavily in overseas media, exporting state propaganda and
exercising soft power to shape movie production and other
cultural media. Moreover, Chinese officials' complaints of
other nations' ``interference'' into China's affairs fail to
take into account that the Chinese government is obligated to
respect the fundamental rights of its citizens under its own
constitution, and under international conventions it has
willingly signed.
The Commission is mandated to document cases of political
prisoners in China--individuals who were detained or imprisoned
by the Chinese government for exercising their civil,
religious, and political rights. Steadfast advocacy on behalf
of individual political and religious prisoners, more than
1,400 of whom are active cases in the Commission's far from
exhaustive Political Prisoner Database, remains vital. These
men and women, whose ``crimes'' intersect with nearly every
issue area covered in the Commission's Annual Report, represent
the human toll exacted by China's repressive and authoritarian
one-party system. The death from liver cancer in July 2017 of
Liu Xiaobo--a Chinese intellectual and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize
laureate who was serving an 11-year sentence for ``inciting
subversion of state power'' in connection with his pro-
democracy work--brought renewed attention to the government and
Party's shameful treatment of political prisoners. In his last
days, authorities repeatedly denied Liu Xiaobo medical
treatment abroad, counter to his wishes and those of his wife,
Liu Xia.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6811.001
Introduction
The 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
is expected to convene around the time of the release of the
Commission's 2017 Annual Report. In advance of the Party
Congress, a twice-per-decade event, President and Communist
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has worked to consolidate
power, as demonstrated by the formalization of his role as the
``core'' (hexin) leader of the Party in guiding key policy
sectors including the economy, domestic reform, and national
defense. The anticorruption campaign against Party and
government officials, Xi's signature domestic initiative, has
effectively eliminated many of his potential political rivals,
and in the process has destabilized patronage networks and
certain political factions ahead of this gathering of Party
elites. Yet, the campaign has failed to instill accountability,
such as disclosure of officials' financial assets or meaningful
institutional checks on political power. The composition of the
Standing Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee
Political Bureau (Politburo) that emerges from the 19th Party
Congress will provide insight into the extent to which Xi may
be able to further influence politics beyond his presumed
second term as Party General Secretary.
As Xi has centralized power, he has simultaneously demanded
stricter ideological discipline within the Party and within
organizations under the Party's umbrella. The Party continued
to stress ideological conformity and discipline from media
outlets and journalists, in particular that the media must
function as a ``mouthpiece'' for the Party to shape ``public
opinion'' with uncritical, positive news. Speaking in October
2016 before a gathering of the heads of China's largest state
companies, Xi stressed that ``Party leadership and building the
role of the Party are the root and the soul for state-owned
enterprises.'' Similarly, in remarks at a December 2016 meeting
focused on the ideological work of China's universities, Xi
reminded senior Party members and academic officials that
``China's higher education institutions are under the
leadership of the CCP, and are socialist universities with
Chinese characteristics, so higher education must be guided by
Marxism, and the Party's policies in education must be fully
carried out.''
With the release of China's National Human Rights Action
Plan (2016-2020) in September 2016, the government continued to
subordinate human rights policy to the ideological guidance of
the Party, which diverges from international standards
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip
Alston, described this reality in his report on his August 2016
mission to China: ``The greatest challenge . . . is to
understand how the leading role of the Communist Party can
coexist with the recognition of individual rights and the
provision of meaningful accountability mechanisms . . ..'' The
Special Rapporteur, furthermore, described intrusive government
control of his schedule and surveillance of his movements in
China in his report, giving further weight to the critiques of
human rights organizations that the Chinese government has ``a
poor record in engaging with UN human rights mechanisms in a
constructive and cooperative fashion.''
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the Chinese
Communist Party continued to restrict the already limited space
for expression, religious activity, and peaceful assembly. In
addition to harassing and detaining government critics, Chinese
authorities also targeted those promoting workers' rights, the
rights of dispossessed villagers, and environmental protection.
Chinese authorities intensified crackdowns on foreign aid
workers, Christian churches, and non-governmental organizations
that play a crucial role in assisting and facilitating the
movement of North Korean refugees outside the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. Official censorship contributed to
the shrinking space for journalism and public debate. Citizen
journalists, such as Liu Feiyue and Huang Qi, whose human
rights websites are a key source of information on grassroots
protests and other rights defense efforts, were criminally
detained and as of September 2017 are awaiting prosecution. In
August 2017, authorities in Yunnan province sentenced Lu Yuyu,
the founder of ``Not the News''--a blog that published
information on mass incidents relating primarily to labor
protests--to four years in prison.
Hopes surrounding positive legislative and policy
developments this reporting year, including further reforms to
the household registration (hukou) system, were tempered by
continued problems with implementing reforms and uneven
enforcement of laws and regulations. Implementation of the PRC
Mental Health Law was marred by reports that government
authorities continued to forcibly commit individuals without
mental illness to psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) for
activities deemed ``troublemaking'' or politically
``sensitive.'' While the Party's General Office launched a
nationwide initiative to reform the Party-affiliated All-China
Women's Federation, independent women's rights organizations
were prevented from raising awareness of sexual harassment and
the government continued to target individual women's rights
advocates with criminal prosecution and harassment.
Chinese authorities continued to implement a ``universal
two-child policy'' and persisted in actively promoting coercive
population control policies that violate international
standards. Tellingly, the family planning bureaucratic
apparatus remains intact. The Chinese government's population
control policies have contributed to the country's demographic
challenges, including a rapidly aging population and shrinking
workforce that threaten to further slow China's economic
growth.
The Chinese government's lack of transparency affected many
of the areas that the Commission monitors. Chinese authorities
continued to consider pollution-related data to be sensitive
and censored reporting on the environment. For outside
observers, transparency concerns were at the forefront of
China's Belt and Road Initiative, a far-reaching economic and
political agenda aimed in part at shaping new global norms on
development and trade, and thereby growing China's influence.
The May 2017 Belt and Road forum culminated with the signing of
a communique in which the heads of state present committed
themselves to ``. . . democracy, good governance, the rule of
law, human rights, gender equality and women empowerment.''
Meanwhile Chinese authorities detained dozens of petitioners
and rights advocates in and around the gathering in Beijing
municipality. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),
which Chinese officials have promoted as an important center
for Belt and Road development projects, authorities reportedly
heightened security controls over Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities who live there, and imposed severe restrictions on
Internet access. In this same region, authorities began
expediting the collection of residents' DNA on a massive scale,
in many cases without consent, prompting transparency concerns
regarding the purpose of collecting such information. An
international rights group reported that the DNA collection was
in connection with China's ``stability maintenance'' measures.
The subsequent chapters of this report document these and
other human rights and rule of law developments in China during
the Commission's 2017 reporting year which spans, roughly,
September 2016 through September 2017. Each chapter examines
different aspects of the Chinese government's obligations to
protect human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and key human rights conventions, as well as in
China's Constitution. General themes and key developments
covered in the body of this report are outlined below.
Overview
Over the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the following
general themes and key developments emerged:
1. The government and Party continue to use the law as
an instrument of repression to expand control over
Chinese society.
2. The criminalization of China's human rights lawyers
and advocates is ongoing, including credible reports of
torture in detention.
3. Restrictions on religious freedom are intensifying,
particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
and Tibetan autonomous areas.
4. Twenty years after the handover, the long-term
viability of the ``one country, two systems'' model in
Hong Kong is increasingly uncertain given central
government interference.
The Law as an Instrument of Repression
The Commission observed that authorities continued to use
the law as an instrument of repression to expand control over
Chinese society, while outwardly providing the veneer of a
system guided by the rule of law.
The PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' (NGOs) Activities took effect on January 1,
2017. The government provided limited guidance for
international NGOs attempting to comply with the law, creating
an uncertain operating environment for these NGOs as well as
their local Chinese partners. Moreover, as many of China's
grassroots NGOs rely on funding from abroad, these groups now
face new administrative hurdles, increased government scrutiny,
and the potential loss of funding. This comes at a time when
the space for civil society, particularly any form of rights
advocacy, is already fraught following high-profile crackdowns
on NGOs and rights advocates in recent years.
Similar realities emerged surrounding the PRC Cybersecurity
Law, with foreign companies expressing concern over data
localization requirements, compromised security, privacy
safeguards, and discriminatory treatment. While the full
implications of the law are still unclear, provisions within
the law could give the Chinese government unprecedented access
to the technology and data of foreign companies, in part
through requiring companies to store their data on mainland
Chinese servers, an alarming proposition for businesses given
the Chinese government's track record of ineffective protection
of intellectual property rights. Chinese citizens, too, will
feel the impact of the law, as it lacks any guarantee to
protect the right to freedom of expression, and requires real-
name registration and storage of personal information, making
users more vulnerable to censorship and prosecution. As
written, the law could result in foreign companies being forced
to choose between aiding Chinese security agencies in their
repression and breaking the law.
Rights Lawyers Tortured and Criminalized
In a March 2017 annual report, Zhou Qiang, President of the
Supreme People's Court (SPC), touted the conviction and
sentencing of prominent rights lawyer Zhou Shifeng as a key
achievement of the Chinese judiciary in 2016. Zhou Shifeng and
other lawyers from the Fengrui Law Firm, including Wang
Quanzhang and Wang Yu, were the focus of the government's July
2015 crackdown on human rights lawyers and advocates. These
lawyers and advocates were involved in cases which the Party
deemed sensitive, representing practitioners of the Falun Gong
spiritual movement, ethnic rights advocates, and individuals
detained for alleged speech crimes. In the March report, the
SPC President urged high court presidents across China to
``draw your sword'' (liangjian) against Western principles of
``constitutional democracy, separation of powers, and judicial
independence.'' This language is consistent with broader Party
efforts to fuel nationalist sentiment with an undercurrent of
anti-Western hostility spurred by propaganda campaigns against
``foreign forces'' and increasing official rhetoric
characterizing rights lawyers as ``enemies of the state.''
Authorities used vague state security provisions in the PRC
Criminal Law to deny due process rights, including access to
independent legal counsel, in prosecuting several of the rights
lawyers detained in connection with the July 2015 crackdown.
Many of these lawyers were initially held under a relatively
new form of de facto incommunicado detention--``residential
surveillance at a designated location''--which allows for
detention in a secret location without access to a lawyer for
up to six months, leaving detainees at risk of torture. Reports
of severe mistreatment emerged in connection with several of
these cases, including forced ingestion of unknown medications
and the use of electric shock. Some rights lawyers preemptively
recorded or authored statements of denial of forced or coerced
confessions, in what observers described as an astute tactic to
recapture the narrative from their accusers. In a January 2017
written statement, prominent human rights lawyer Xie Yang said:
``If, one day in the future, I do confess--whether in writing
or on camera or on tape--that will not be the true expression
of my own mind. It may be because I've been subjected to
prolonged torture, or because I've been offered the chance to
be released on bail . . ..'' \2\
Chinese government and Communist Party officials use
various other methods to restrict and punish lawyers who take
on cases officials deem ``sensitive.'' When lawyers are
convicted of criminal activity, as is the case for numerous
prominent rights lawyers, officials may strip them of their law
licenses, subject them to constant surveillance, and curtail
their freedom of movement. Amended regulations that took effect
in November 2016, requiring law firms to establish internal
Party groups that will take part in the law firms' management,
may further hinder even licensed lawyers' ability to take on
cases the government deems ``sensitive.''
Prior to the 2015 crackdown, officials employed similar
measures to restrict and punish prominent rights lawyers. Many
of these people continue to suffer for their advocacy, as
represented in the cases of the following individuals:
Jiang Tianyong was disbarred in 2009 after
representing individuals such as Tibetan protesters and
victims of the 2008 contaminated milk powder scandal.
He disappeared in November 2016 and was formally
arrested six months later on charges of ``subversion of
state power.'' In August 2017, Jiang pleaded guilty to
``inciting subversion of state power'' at trial.
Public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, who had
advocated on behalf of religious and ethnic minorities,
engaged in activities commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen
protests, and represented defendants in politically
sensitive cases, such as artist Ai Weiwei, was given a
three-year suspended sentence in December 2015,
following 19 months in pretrial detention. Pu
permanently lost his law license as a result of his
conviction.
Ni Yulan, severely disabled after police beat
her while in detention, lost her job as a legal
consultant in 2002 as a result of her advocacy on
behalf of individuals forcibly evicted from their
homes. In 2016, Chinese authorities denied Ni a
passport to prevent her from traveling to the United
States to accept an award from the U.S. Department of
State honoring her courage and unstinting advocacy.
More recently, she has been repeatedly evicted from
rented apartments after police reportedly pressured her
landlords.
Gao Zhisheng, one of China's first rights
lawyers representing vulnerable groups such as house
church Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, and
farmers whose land was expropriated, was released from
prison in August 2014, after enduring severe torture.
Unable to practice law due to his criminal conviction,
he faces continued restrictions on his freedom of
movement and speech. As of August 2017, Gao is
reportedly missing.
Tang Jingling, who gained prominence as a
lawyer working on compensation and corruption cases,
has been prevented from practicing law since late 2005.
Officials detained him in 2014, prior to the 25th
anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989
Tiananmen protests, and in January 2016 sentenced him
to five years in prison for ``inciting subversion of
state power.''
Restrictions on Religious Freedom Intensify, Particularly in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibetan Autonomous Areas
In both law and practice, the Chinese government continued
to violate the religious freedom of its citizens by imposing
restrictions on religious practice and interpretations of
faith--restrictions that have intensified since Xi Jinping
became Communist Party General Secretary in November 2012.
These abuses were especially severe in ethnic minority areas.
Revised draft regulations governing religious activities and
assembly, issued in September 2016 and passed in September
2017, did not reflect any lifting of past repression, but were
a systematization of existing restrictions and an example of
the Party's attempts to coopt what it perceives to be the
positive aspects of religion--namely, provision of social
services and religion as an instrument for promoting national
unity and social stability.
Anticipating passage of the draft regulations, some local
government measures targeted Protestant Christian house
churches. These included the establishment of work plans to
force house churches to register or face closure; investigative
surveys; mobilization of security forces against privately
organized churches; surveillance of churches through informants
and the installation of cameras; destruction of religious
symbols, including crosses; dismissal of personnel; and
prohibitions on offering boxes, performing baptisms, and
appointing ministers.
In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), officials
introduced policies regulating some of the most personal
expressions of Uyghur Muslims' religious faith, including
circumcisions, weddings, and funerals. Authorities adopted new
regulations limiting the role of religion in education as well
as parents' ability to involve their children in religious
activities. The regulations also banned Islamic dress,
including veils and ``irregular'' beards, and prohibited
parents from naming their infant children any of a list of
dozens of ``Islamic'' names deemed ``extremist.'' Families who
failed to comply with the name prohibition risked denial of
household registration (hukou) for their newborns, thereby
restricting their access to social services such as education
and healthcare. Later reports indicated that the name
prohibition was extended to include anyone up to the age of 16.
In late 2016, authorities reportedly demolished thousands of
mosques in the XUAR as part of a ``mosque rectification''
campaign introduced by central government officials and
overseen by local security personnel.
In Tibetan autonomous areas, the Party and government
continued to violate the rights of religious freedom and
freedom of movement of Tibetan Buddhist monastics and laypeople
through a system of pervasive controls and restrictions on
religious practice, and through extensive and intrusive
surveillance that deepened the Party's penetration into
villages and religious institutions. The demolitions of
buildings and the expulsion and forced relocation of thousands
of monks and nuns from the renowned Buddhist institutes of
learning Larung Gar and Yachen Gar, both in Sichuan province,
further eroded institutions that serve to preserve Tibetan
Buddhism, language, and culture. As of August 2017, there were
five known self-immolations of Tibetans protesting Chinese rule
and calling for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet during
this reporting year. An estimated 7,000 Tibetan pilgrims from
Tibetan areas of China attempted to attend an important
religious teaching in India given by the Dalai Lama in January
2017. In advance of the teaching in India, however, Chinese
officials confiscated Tibetans' passports, ordered thousands of
Tibetans who were already in India to return to China, and
issued threats--including detention, loss of pension and jobs,
and prohibiting monks from returning to their monasteries--if
they failed to obey the order to return.
Long-Term Viability of ``One Country, Two Systems'' for Hong Kong Is
Increasingly Uncertain
Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of the British
handover of Hong Kong, the Commission observed further erosion
of the ``one country, two systems'' principle enshrined in Hong
Kong's Basic Law. The National People's Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) chose to intervene in an active Hong Kong
court case in November 2016, interpreting the Basic Law to
effectively prohibit two democratically elected Hong Kong
legislators from taking office in the Legislative Council
(LegCo). It was the first time the NPCSC had preemptively ruled
on a case under consideration by a local court, raising further
concerns about Hong Kong's autonomy.
The March 26, 2017, election of Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor
as Hong Kong's fourth Chief Executive was marred by reports of
Chinese central government officials and representatives
instructing Election Committee members to support Lam over
other candidates. The composition of the Election Committee,
which is already restricted to ensure support for candidates
approved by Chinese authorities, underscored the unmet demands
of the 2014 protests calling for universal suffrage and fully
democratic representation.
The May 2017 statements of Zhang Dejiang, NPCSC chairman
and head of the Party's coordination group on Hong Kong
affairs, further expounded on the central government's views
regarding the long-term trajectory of Hong Kong with an ominous
warning: ``Under no condition should the high degree of
autonomy be used as a guise to confront the Central
Government's authority.'' He underscored the primacy of Hong
Kong's Chief Executive over the judiciary and the legislature,
and pressed for more stringent national security laws in Hong
Kong, including the reintroduction of the controversial anti-
subversion and anti-sedition legislation under Article 23 of
the Basic Law.
In July 2017, a local court removed four democratically
elected pro-democracy legislators on grounds that they had
failed to take the oath of office properly, based on the same
controversial interpretation of the Basic Law used to prevent
two lawmakers from taking office in November 2016. Nathan Law
Kwun-chung, one of the leaders of the 2014 pro-democracy
protest and the youngest elected legislator in Hong Kong's
history, was among those removed from office. Hong Kong
authorities sentenced Law and two other leaders of the 2014
protest, Joshua Wong Chi-fung and Alex Chow Yong-kang, in
August 2017, to between six and eight months' imprisonment in
connection with their activities during the 2014 protests. The
Hong Kong Department of Justice pursued the harsher sentences
after Wong and Law had previously been sentenced to, and
completed, community service. Moreover, the new prison
sentences prevent each one of the three from running for
legislative office for five years. Their newly formed political
party, Demosisto, issued a statement in response to the
sentencing: ``The government is determined to put peaceful
protestors behind bars to mute all dissidents by abusing
judicial procedures.'' \3\
Additionally, Hong Kong journalists reported continuing
fears over press freedom, noting concerns over self-censorship,
government restrictions on reporters, and the 2015 abductions
and disappearances of five Hong Kong booksellers by mainland
Chinese authorities. In May 2017 testimony before the
Commission, bookseller Lam Wing Kee described the events
surrounding the disappearances of the booksellers, including
Gui Minhai, who remains in detention as of September 2017:
``This string of events demonstrates not only brutal
intervention in the freedom of expression in Hong Kong by the
Chinese government, but also how increasingly unscrupulous they
are.'' \4\
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Recommendations to Congress and the Administration
Embed Human Rights Throughout Bilateral Relations.
The Administration and Congress should develop an action plan
to facilitate interagency coordination on human rights in China
and develop a coordinated approach that prepares all agencies
interacting with Chinese government counterparts to pursue
measurable, results-oriented human rights and rule of law
outcomes. All agencies should be prepared to better articulate
the link between human rights improvements in China and U.S.
economic, security, and diplomatic interests.
Make Reciprocity a Priority. The Administration
should open high-level discussions to create a rules-of-the-
road agreement that ensures reciprocal treatment for U.S.
institutions, businesses, and nationals operating in China. The
Administration should take appropriate and reciprocal actions
to ensure that U.S.-based media outlets as well as academic and
non-governmental organizations have the same freedoms afforded
to a growing number of Chinese government-sponsored and funded
think tanks, academic institutions, and media entities in the
United States, while ensuring that independent Chinese media
and organizations remain welcome. In addition, any bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) with China should effectively
facilitate and enable market access for U.S. media companies
and education institutions.
Hold Officials Accountable for Abuses. The
Administration should use existing laws to hold accountable
Chinese government officials and others complicit in torture,
severe religious freedom restrictions, repatriation of North
Korean refugees, or those participating in forced abortions or
sterilizations, including by using the sanctions available in
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, and the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 2000. Congress should consider
allocating resources to identify and investigate Chinese
government officials responsible for human rights violations.
Seek a Law Enforcement Agreement That Upholds
Global Standards. Chinese government officials have sought
repatriation of Chinese citizens overseas in connection with
the government's anticorruption investigations, offering the
Administration an opportunity to press for a comprehensive law
enforcement agreement that establishes diplomatic assurances
guaranteeing verifiable prisoner due process protections and an
end to torture in detention and forms of arbitrary detention,
including ``residential surveillance at a designated
location.'' The U.S. Government should not agree to any
additional repatriations until the Chinese government can
demonstrate that they are meeting the standards set forth in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other international human rights instruments regarding the
treatment of criminal suspects.
Respond to Digital Protectionism. The
Administration should consider seeking a high-level trade
agreement to address the Chinese government's growing digital
protectionism that would include commitments on the free flow
of news and information and the non-discriminatory treatment of
U.S. digital products. The Administration should consider
initiating a World Trade Organization dispute to challenge
continued discrimination against U.S. technology and media
companies and prepare targeted trade sanctions if the Chinese
government continues to impose onerous requirements, including
data storage in China and the disclosure of source code and
encryption keys. The Administration should provide Congress
more detailed information about the effects of Internet
censorship on U.S. businesses in China and use existing legal
provisions to address intellectual property theft and the
privacy concerns of U.S. citizens due to Chinese cyber
espionage. The Administration and the committees of
jurisdiction in Congress should work to find ways to use the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
respond to unfair industrial policies that threaten national
security, including by expanding its mandate to look at foreign
investment in media and technology sectors.
Promote a Free Internet. The Administration, in
collaboration with Congress and the Chief Executive Officer of
the Broadcasting Board of Governors, should develop a
comprehensive, multiyear strategy that partners with civil
society, businesses, key technology industries, religious
leaders, and human rights defenders to counter efforts by the
Chinese government to promote ``Internet sovereignty''; develop
effective technologies that provide or enhance access to the
Internet; and conduct research on ways to counter threats to
Internet freedom, including the Chinese government's intent to
block access to virtual private networks (VPNs) starting in
early 2018. The Administration and Congress should consider
expanding programs providing digital security training for
civil society advocates and projects that track, preserve, and
recirculate media and Internet content deleted by Chinese
government censors.
Expand Mandate of FARA To Counter Propaganda. The
Administration and Congress should work together to expand the
mandate of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) to
encompass individuals working for foreign state-owned media,
government-backed think tanks, or other non-profit
organizations operating in the United States. In addition, the
Administration should develop a ``whole-of-government''
strategy to respond to Chinese government propaganda, including
by fully equipping the Global Engagement Center at the State
Department to research and counter disinformation and by
considering an expansion of resources for Voice of America and
Radio Free Asia programming in China.
Speak With a Unified Voice on Human Rights. The
Administration should, where appropriate, lead efforts with
allies to develop coordinated responses to human rights
violations, including by working together at the United
Nations, by creating a multilateral human rights dialogue or
jointly funding technical assistance and capacity-building
projects, or by engaging in joint advocacy and the sharing of
prisoner lists. The Administration should also coordinate with
businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop
a unified message about unfair industrial policies, digital
protectionism, and the harm to U.S. and global interests from
the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities.
Help Address China's ``Missing Girls'' Problem.
The Administration should integrate the provisions of the Girls
Count Act (Public Law No. 114-24) into foreign assistance
programs and consider appointing a Special Advisor at the U.S.
State Department to oversee the creation and coordination of
assistance programs to address the social and economic issues
created by the Chinese government's population control policies
and sex ratio imbalances, particularly projects that strengthen
property and inheritance rights for Chinese women and girls and
those that protect women and their families from the most
coercive aspects of the population control policies. The
Administration should develop talking points so that officials
and diplomats can discuss problems linked to China's dramatic
sex ratio imbalance as part of bilateral dialogues on security,
law, trafficking, human rights, and public health. In addition,
Congress should continue to link U.S. contributions to the UN
Population Fund for use in China with the end of all birth
limitation and coercive population control policies in China.
Seek Protections for North Korean Refugees.
Congress should reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act
and consider expanding efforts to channel uncensored news and
information into North Korea and to asylum-seekers in China
through all possible means, including through North Korean
defector communities. In addition, using the tools provided by
Congress, the Administration should be prepared to impose
secondary sanctions on Chinese corporations, individuals, or
banks that profit from North Korean forced labor and those
assisting the North Korean government in avoiding international
sanctions.
Make Religious Freedom Diplomacy a Priority. Given
that countries that severely restrict religious freedom are
likely to face domestic instability and may also threaten
regional stability, it is in the U.S. interest for the
Administration to implement fully the provisions of the Frank
R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public Law No.
114-281) and strategically employ the sanctions and other tools
associated with the U.S. State Department's designation of
China as a ``Country of Particular Concern'' for severe
restrictions on religious freedom. The Administration should
reestablish the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group
within the Department of State's Federal Advisory Committee to
bring together experts from government, universities, religious
and other NGOs to develop an effective multiyear plan to
promote and protect religious freedom in China.
Prioritize Efforts To Combat Human Trafficking,
Forced Labor, and Child Labor. Congress and the Administration
should ensure that the U.S. Department of State's Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and the U.S.
Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs
have sufficient resources and status within their Departments
to effectively combat human trafficking and more accurately
report on current conditions, including by reauthorizing the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Congress should
again consider legislation that improves U.S. Government data
collection and reporting on the issue of human trafficking for
the purpose of organ removal, globally and in China.
Promote Dialogue Regarding Tibet. The
Administration and Congress should work together to press for
unrestricted access to Tibetan autonomous areas in China and to
facilitate the full implementation of the Tibetan Policy Act of
2002, including establishing a diplomatic office in Lhasa, and
urging renewed dialogue between Chinese government officials
and the Dalai Lama's representatives. Administration officials,
including the President, should meet with the Dalai Lama in his
capacity as a spiritual leader and with the leaders of the
Central Tibetan Administration. Congress should consider
passage of the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (S. 821/H.R.
1872, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.).
Calibrate Counterterrorism Cooperation To Protect
Ethnic Minorities. Due to the Chinese government's practice of
labeling peaceful rights advocates and members of religious and
ethnic minority groups as extremists or terrorists, the
Administration should consider carefully the nature and scope
of its counterterrorism cooperation with the Chinese government
and, through the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, create guidelines for such cooperation to ensure
that the United States does not condone Chinese authorities'
crackdown on domestic political dissent or restrictions on the
freedoms of expression or religion. The Administration should
develop interagency talking points to raise issues of human
rights in China's ethnic minority areas during bilateral and
multilateral dialogues with Chinese military, public security,
or other appropriate government officials.
Ensure American Nationals Are Protected. The
Administration should consider seeking revisions to the U.S.-
China Consular Convention to clarify that Americans detained in
China may meet with a lawyer of their choice, contact their
families regularly, privately discuss the details of their case
with U.S. consular officials, and have U.S. Embassy officials
attend all legal proceedings. The Administration should
consider developing a formal strategy to secure the release of
American nationals and the family members of American nationals
who are extrajudicially detained in China and should work with
Congress to ensure regular reports on the number of U.S.
citizens detained or not permitted to leave China.
Reiterate U.S. Interest in Hong Kong's Autonomy.
The Administration should continue to issue annually the report
outlined in Section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act of 1992, subject to Congressional directives. Congress
should consider ways to express through public statements,
official visits, and resolutions the important connection
between a free press, a vibrant civil society, an independent
judiciary, and expanded democratic governance in Hong Kong and
the mutual interests shared by the United States and China in
maintaining Hong Kong as a center of business and finance in
Asia. The Administration and Congress should work together to
determine whether legislation or other measures are needed to
revise the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992,
including by passing the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy
Act (S. 417, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.).
Develop a Code of Conduct for Civil Society. The
Administration should work with U.S. civil society and non-
governmental organizations, including cultural-exchange and
sister-city programs, and humanitarian assistance, academic,
and religious organizations, to formulate a code of conduct for
interacting with the Chinese government in order to protect the
academic freedom and universally recognized human rights of
staff, faculty, or students living in China and to equip
institutions to respond effectively when Chinese authorities
attempt to encourage censorship, threaten visa denials or
access to China, or dictate who can participate or what can be
discussed in various programs, projects, or institutions.
Consistently Advocate for Political Prisoners. In
meetings with Chinese government officials, Administration
officials and Members of Congress should raise cases, both
publicly and in private, of individuals detained or imprisoned
for the peaceful expression of political or religious beliefs
and those promoting legal reforms and human rights. The
Administration should also consider creating a Special Advisor
for Political and Religious Prisoners to coordinate State
Department and interagency advocacy on behalf of political
prisoners. Experience demonstrates that raising individual
cases can result in improved treatment, lighter sentences, or
in some cases, release from custody, detention, or
imprisonment. U.S. officials are encouraged to consult the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database for credible and up-
to-date information on individual prisoners or groups of
prisoners. Please see representative cases of concern on the
following pages.
------------------------
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, legal
determinations, and recommendations, does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the
policies of the Administration.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 16 to
0.
Voted to adopt: Senators Rubio, Lankford, Cotton, Daines,
Young, Feinstein, Merkley, Peters, and King; Representatives Smith,
Pittenger, Franks, Hultgren, Kaptur, Walz, and Lieu.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6811.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6811.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6811.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6811.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6811.006
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Specific Findings and Recommendations
A summary of specific findings follows below for each
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
Freedom of Expression
Findings
Imprisoned writer Liu Xiaobo--an advocate of
democracy and non-violent political reform and China's
only Nobel Peace Prize laureate--died of liver cancer
on July 13, 2017, in Shenyang municipality, Liaoning
province, on medical parole. In the nine years prior to
his death, he spent one year in pretrial detention and
nearly eight years in prison on the charge of
``inciting subversion of state power'' for his
coauthorship of the political treatise Charter 08 and
several essays critical of the Chinese Communist Party
and government. The government and Party continued to
isolate his wife Liu Xia in extralegal confinement
after his death, a condition that Chinese authorities
imposed on her starting in October 2010, when the
Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that it would award
the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo.
The government and Party continued to stress
the need for ideological discipline from news media and
journalists, in particular that the media function as a
``mouthpiece'' for the Party. At a November 2016
meeting with the All-China Journalists Association
(ACJA), President and Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping urged media workers to ``embody the principle
of Party character'' and ``be reliable for the Party
and the people.''
Official news media continued to publish
articles about human rights lawyers as part of the
government and Party's ongoing crackdown on human
rights lawyers and advocates that began in and around
July 2015. Articles in the Global Times, The Paper,
Legal Daily, and Procuratorial Daily ascribed a litany
of criminal offenses to disbarred lawyer Jiang
Tianyong, including an assertion that he fabricated the
torture allegations of fellow rights lawyer Xie Yang.
Pervasive government and Party censorship
contributed to the shrinking space for journalism and
public debate, demonstrated by the closure of the
reform-minded journal Yanhuang Chunqiu; the suspension
of Consensus, a website known for open discussion and
commentary; the shutdown of the economic think tank
Unirule's website; and the two-month suspension in
October 2016 of Caixin news articles for republication.
Several Chinese journalists and media outlets
argued for the protection of journalists' physical
safety, government accountability, and guarantees of
their right to report on events in the public interest
following incidents of physical violence against and
obstruction of domestic Chinese journalists on
assignment this past year.
The government targeted citizen journalists
for prosecution this past year. In August 2017,
authorities sentenced Lu Yuyu, the founder of ``Not the
News''--a blog that published information on mass
incidents relating primarily to labor protests--to four
years in prison. In November 2016, authorities detained
Liu Feiyue and Huang Qi, founders of websites that
featured news from citizen journalists, and arrested
them in December, demonstrating the government's drive
``to criminalize those who document human rights abuses
and advocate for better human rights protections,''
according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders.
Foreign journalists continued to face
obstruction and harassment in their efforts to report
in China, including detention, physical abuse,
surveillance and restricted access, and visa renewal
challenges. The government blocked some international
news media, websites, and social media applications
(apps) within China. Chinese citizens who spoke with
foreign journalists were at risk of punishment such as
imprisonment, detention, travel denial, and dismissal
from organizations.
The Chinese government's Internet and social
media policies are aimed at controlling the flow of
information, which a U.S.-based expert said, ``guides
the narrative in the direction that the state
determines.'' Citizen Lab, an information technology
and human rights research center, published findings on
Chinese government content filtering of social media
platforms WeChat and Weibo, observing a high level of
flexibility and speed in response to issues and events
deemed politically sensitive, such as the death of Liu
Xiaobo, the names of detained human rights lawyers, and
a Tibetan Buddhist teaching held in January 2017.
This past year, authorities developed judicial
and legislative approaches to protect the ``national
historical narrative'' and took punitive action against
Chinese officials, academics, and journalists, for
speech critical of President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping, former leader Mao Zedong, and
political campaigns and incidents from modern Chinese
history. Authorities also detained and imprisoned
several citizens who criticized Xi and Mao, some using
censorship circumvention hardware and software to post
or repost their comments outside the Chinese
government's system of surveillance and censorship
(commonly known as the Great Firewall).
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Give greater public expression, including at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and
detention of both domestic and foreign journalists; the
denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign
journalists; and the censoring or blockage of foreign
media websites. Consistently link press freedoms to
U.S. interests, noting how censorship and restrictions
on journalists and media websites prevent the free flow
of information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, food safety
problems, and corruption, and act as a trade barrier
for foreign media and companies attempting to access
the Chinese market. Raise these issues with Chinese
officials during bilateral dialogues. Assess the extent
to which China's treatment of foreign journalists
contravenes its World Trade Organization or other
obligations.
Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that
develop and widely distribute technologies that will
assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society
organizations in circumventing Internet restrictions,
in order to access and share content protected under
international human rights standards. Continue to
maintain Internet freedom programs for China at the
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors to provide digital security training and
capacity-building efforts for bloggers, journalists,
civil society organizations, and human rights and
Internet freedom advocates in China.
Raise with Chinese officials, during all appropriate
bilateral discussions, the costs to U.S.-China
relations and to the Chinese public's confidence in
government institutions that are incurred when the
Chinese government restricts political debate, advocacy
for democracy or human rights, and other forms of
peaceful political expression. Emphasize that such
restrictions exceed international standards for
restrictions on free expression, particularly those
contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Emphasize that
such restrictions erode confidence in media and
government institutions. Submit questions for China's
next UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review,
asking China to explain what steps it will take to
ensure its restrictions on free expression conform to
international standards.
Urge Chinese officials to end unlawful detention and
official harassment of Chinese rights advocates,
lawyers, and journalists subject to reprisal for
exercising their right to freedom of expression. Call
on officials to end the illegal home confinement of Liu
Xia, the wife of the late Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Liu Xiaobo, and release or confirm the release of
individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising
freedom of expression, such as Lu Yuyu, Liu Feiyue,
Huang Qi, Wang Jing, Yang Xiuqiong, Zhang Haitao, Tashi
Wangchug, Wang Jiangfeng, Kwon Pyong, and other
political prisoners raised in this report and in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database. Raise this
issue in bilateral dialogues as well as through
multilateral institutions, such as the UN Human Rights
Council and its Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
Worker Rights
Findings
The Chinese government- and Communist Party-
controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)
remains the only trade union organization permitted
under Chinese law, and Chinese labor advocates and
international observers report that the ACFTU does not
effectively represent workers' rights and interests.
Chinese workers' right to collective bargaining remains
limited in law and in practice.
Labor advocates and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) reportedly continued to face
surveillance and pressure from authorities this past
year, following a December 2015 crackdown on Chinese
labor advocates and NGOs in Guangdong province that
domestic and international observers described as
``unprecedented.'' The detention and sentencing of
labor advocates amidst that crackdown reportedly has
had a chilling effect on labor NGOs, affecting
collective bargaining work in particular. In May 2017,
authorities in Jiangxi province detained three Chinese
men who were conducting research on behalf of a U.S.-
based labor NGO regarding working conditions in
factories producing shoes for international brands.
Authorities released them on bail in June. In addition,
the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs'
Activities, which took effect on January 1, 2017, may
further hinder the work of labor NGOs in China, as many
of them rely on sources of funding outside of mainland
China.
Following reports of a significant increase in
worker strikes and protests in the previous reporting
year, the number of worker actions appeared to remain
high this past year, though the Commission did not
observe reliable statistics. China Labour Bulletin data
indicate that government responses to worker strikes
and protests were mixed, ranging from assisting with
workplace negotiations to violent police intervention.
Some labor advocates asserted that the government's
suppression of strikes had increased. Labor advocates
also noted increasing difficulty in finding information
on strikes in China due to the chilling effect of the
December 2015 crackdown on labor NGOs and tightening
government control of the media.
The Commission continued to observe reports of
the use of child labor in China this past year. In one
widely reported case, Party-run media revealed that
clothing manufacturers in Jiangsu province had hired
workers from Yunnan province through recruiters, and
many of the workers were under the age of 16. According
to the report, employers beat the children for working
too slowly and withheld pay and identification
documents to prevent them from quitting. Such actions
are indicators of forced labor, according to the
International Labour Organization.
During this reporting year, government data
showed a continued decline in both workplace accidents
and deaths, though the Commission continued to observe
reports of lax enforcement of work safety laws and
regulations. The Commission did not observe officially
published statistics for occupational illness for 2015
or 2016. This past year, the government issued several
documents setting targets and outlining plans for
improving occupational health and safety.
Many categories of workers were unable to
benefit fully from the protections provided under
Chinese law, including workers above the retirement
age, student workers and interns, and independent
contractors or informal workers. During this reporting
year, the Commission continued to observe reports of
the mistreatment of dispatch laborers--workers hired
through subcontracting agencies--in violation of
domestic laws and regulations meant to prevent such
abuses. Moreover, firms reportedly used ``outsourced
labor,'' another form of subcontracted labor, to get
around new regulations on dispatch labor.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to exonerate labor
rights advocates Meng Han, Zeng Feiyang, Zhu Xiaomei,
and Tang Jian. Raise their cases in public and private
meetings with Chinese officials, and urge Chinese
officials to allow these advocates to continue their
work for labor NGOs. Encourage authorities to cooperate
with labor NGOs, noting the positive role such
organizations play in encouraging workers to address
their grievances peacefully and through legal channels.
Call on the Chinese government to respect
internationally recognized rights to freedom of
association and collective bargaining, and allow
workers to organize and establish truly independent
labor unions. Convey support in all appropriate
bilateral and multilateral dialogues for genuine
collective bargaining and direct elections of trade
union representatives, emphasizing that increased
worker representation can be beneficial for resolving
workplace grievances and preventing strikes and unrest.
In meetings with Chinese officials, highlight the
September 2016 report of Maina Kiai, the former UN
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association, which emphasizes that
labor rights are workers' human rights, and that the
failure to protect or enforce these rights
``exacerbates global inequality, poverty, violence and
child and forced labour.''
Encourage Chinese officials through all appropriate
bilateral discussions to publish information on
measures taken to prevent the employment of children
under the age of 16. Call on the Chinese government to
collect and publish detailed statistical data on
working children, including on child labor and
hazardous work, in order to better understand the
prevalence and nature of child labor in China and to
effectively target efforts to address this problem.
Promote and support bilateral, multilateral, and
multistakeholder exchanges among government officials,
academics, legal experts, and civil society groups to
focus on labor issues such as collective bargaining,
employment discrimination, and occupational health and
safety, particularly prevention of pneumoconiosis. Seek
opportunities to support capacity-building programs to
strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations
involved in defending the rights of workers.
When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society
participation into bilateral and multilateral
dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite
international unions and labor NGOs as well as domestic
civil society groups from all participating countries
to observe and contribute to relevant government-to-
government dialogues, particularly those relating to
trade. Although participation of the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions or Chinese government-
organized NGOs (GONGOs) may be constructive in some
cases, ensure such organizations are not treated as
independent civil society groups.
Support China's increased engagement and cooperation
with the International Labour Organization (ILO)
through funding for ILO technical cooperation projects
with China. Request that the ILO increase its work with
China on observing core labor standards, including
freedom of association and the right to organize.
Criminal Justice
Findings
During the 2017 reporting year, the Commission
observed continued reports of the Chinese government
using ``black jails'' and other extralegal and
extrajudicial measures to arbitrarily detain
individuals in violation of international human rights
standards. After the Chinese government abolished the
reeducation through labor system in 2013, Chinese
officials reportedly have continued to use ``black
jails''--detention sites that operate outside of
China's judicial and administrative detention systems--
to suppress individuals such as petitioners, rights
advocates, and religious practitioners.
The Chinese government continued to apply
broadly defined criminal provisions such as ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble'' and ``gathering a
crowd to disturb order in a public place'' to punish
petitioners, rights advocates, lawyers, and ethnic
minorities for the peaceful exercise of their rights.
The government emphasized the procuratorate's
supervisory role over criminal investigations and
continued to improve implementation of existing legal
provisions that address the problem of investigators'
use of coercion and overreliance on confession. Despite
official pronouncements, reports of coerced confession
continued to emerge this past year, with some
indicating that procurators participated in the
practice.
Authorities continued to charge citizens with
``endangering state security'' offenses. This is one of
three categories of crimes in the PRC Criminal Law
permitting the application of a coercive measure known
as ``residential surveillance at a designated
location,'' which can amount to incommunicado detention
for up to six months. In one such example, authorities
detained disbarred rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong without
providing notice to his family within the required
timeframe. The location of Jiang's detention remained
unknown for over six months.
This past year, the government denied access
to legal counsel to some individuals detained in
politically sensitive cases, such as those detained in
the crackdown against rights lawyers and advocates that
began in and around July 2015. Reports also show that
authorities harassed or intimidated defense lawyers by
means including detention and search and seizure of
their personal belongings.
Multiple reports of torture and abuse surfaced
this past year. Authorities reportedly tortured or
abused rights lawyers Xie Yang, Li Chunfu, Li Heping,
Wang Quanzhang, and rights advocate Wu Gan, all of whom
authorities detained in the crackdown that began in or
around July 2015. The Commission did not observe
reports of authorities holding criminally accountable
the perpetrators of abuse in these cases. In
particular, authorities in Xie Yang's case claimed that
the accounts of torture were fabricated. In the case of
Lei Yang, a resident of Beijing municipality who died
shortly after police took him into custody in May 2016,
procuratorate officials decided in December 2016 not to
prosecute the police officers who perpetrated fatal
physical violence against Lei.
The judiciary overturned 11 cases of wrongful
conviction in 2016. In one of these cases, judicial
reexamination commenced long after the execution of the
wrongfully convicted person, prompted by someone coming
forward who took responsibility for the crimes. The
court declined to make a finding of confession by
torture, which a legal expert said remains a
predominant cause of wrongful convictions.
2017 marks the 10th anniversary of the Supreme
People's Court regaining exclusive authority to review
death sentences, but a uniform standard of review
remained lacking. The government continued to treat the
number of executions as a state secret. Some observers
estimate the annual number to be in the thousands,
exceeding the number for all other countries combined.
Despite a purported ban on harvesting organs from
executed prisoners, a senior Chinese health official
admitted that the practice continued in at least one
case during this reporting year.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise with Chinese officials, during all appropriate
bilateral discussions, individual cases where officials
have used the investigation of alleged criminal
activity to target government critics and rights
advocates. Publicly convey support for human rights
advocates whom officials have deprived of liberty on
unsubstantiated criminal charges and for apparent
political or religious reasons.
Stress to the Chinese government the importance of
procedural compliance and effective legal
representation in criminal cases in relation to the
goal of rule-based governance.
Urge Chinese officials to end all forms of
extrajudicial detention that are imposed without
meeting the standards for a fair trial as set forth in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other international human rights
instruments.
Consult with Chinese officials regarding progress
toward adopting the recommendations made by the UN
Committee against Torture in relation to China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, such as the call to repeal the provisions
allowing ``residential surveillance at a designated
location.'' Further, encourage Chinese officials to
extend invitations to all UN special rapporteurs and
other special procedures that have requested visits to
China.
Stress to the Chinese government the need for greater
transparency on the number and circumstances of
executions, and urge Chinese officials to further limit
the crimes to which the death penalty is applicable.
Continue and, where appropriate, expand support for
programs involving U.S. entities engaging with reform-
minded Chinese organizations and individuals (both
within and outside the government) that draw on
comparative experience to improve the criminal justice
process. For example, the experience of the United
States and other jurisdictions can inform China as it
charts a path toward reducing reliance on confessions,
enhancing the role of witnesses at trials, and creating
more reliable procedures for reviewing death penalty
cases.
Call on the Chinese government to publicly commit to
a specific timetable for ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not
yet ratified.
Freedom of Religion
Findings
Both Chinese and international law provide
guarantees for religious freedom. Despite these
guarantees, the Commission continued to observe
widespread and systematic violation of the principles
of religious freedom as Chinese authorities exercised
broad discretion over the religious practice of Chinese
citizens.
The Chinese government released draft
revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA)
in September 2016. The draft revisions were released
following a major leadership conference on religious
policy convened by Chinese President and Communist
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping in April 2016. At
this conference, Xi promoted the ``sinicization'' of
religion in China, a term that officials have used
often in recent years to encourage the adaptation of
religious beliefs and activities to align with
government and Party interests. One international
rights organization characterized the draft revisions
to the RRA as ``implementing the new ideology [of
sinicization] on a legislative level.'' The draft
revisions were in line with a long-term Party policy of
using religion as an instrument for promoting national
unity and social stability, although commentators also
drew parallels with recently implemented restrictions
on civil society groups through legislative reforms
such as the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities. On September 7,
2017, the State Council issued the revisions to the
RRA, to take effect on February 1, 2018. The final
revisions contained few changes from the earlier draft.
The Chinese government's regulatory framework
for religious affairs imposes numerous restrictions on
religious freedom. Religious activity is subject to
extensive government approvals and restrictions,
including official guidelines for the content and
distribution of religious publications, restrictions
that limit religious activity to government-approved
sites, and requirements that religious personnel be
approved by local religious affairs authorities.
Current regulations require religious groups to
register with the government, and legal protection of
religious activities is contingent on complying with
registration requirements. Unregistered religious and
spiritual communities are especially vulnerable to
government harassment, detention, and other abuses; yet
groups may be sanctioned regardless of registration
status when officials view them as posing a challenge
to government authority. The government has also
continued to ban some belief systems outright.
While government and Party officials rarely
targeted Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities with
direct suppression, they nonetheless continued to
subject these religions to extensive regulation and
control.
The government maintained measures that impede
the freedom of Chinese Catholic congregations to be led
by clergy who are selected and who conduct their
ministry according to the standards called for by
Catholic religious beliefs. The government also
continued to harass, detain, or hold incommunicado
certain leading Catholic clergy.
Government and Party officials continued to
subject Protestant Christian belief and practice to a
wide range of restrictions and abuse. Unregistered
Protestant churches throughout China continued to face
raids during church gatherings, eviction from meeting
spaces, and official bans on worship. Authorities also
subjected some believers to harassment, violence, or
detention. In several instances, house church members
were detained on the charge of ``organizing and using a
cult to undermine implementation of the law'' under
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law.
The Commission noted reports of continued
repression of Falun Gong practitioners, by means
including harassment, arbitrary detention, and
prosecution. International observers continued to
express concern over reports that numerous organ
transplants in China have used the organs of detained
prisoners, including those of Falun Gong practitioners.
International medical professionals were skeptical of a
Chinese health official's claim that the organ
procurement system has been reformed in compliance with
international standards, noting discrepancies and a
lack of transparency in official data.
During this reporting year, officials
maintained policies exerting strong influence and
control over the religious belief and activities of Hui
Muslim believers. Although policies for Hui Muslims
remained far less repressive than those affecting
Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
hostile rhetoric targeting Hui Muslims from both
officials and the public increased. One expert said
that this could increase the likelihood that policies
affecting the religious freedom of Hui Muslims may
become more restrictive.
Religious communities outside of the five
religions that are the main objects of religious
affairs regulations continued to exist within China.
Some, such as folk religions and Eastern Orthodox
Christianity, are recognized at the local level. In
contrast, authorities maintained restrictions imposed
suddenly in 2014 on Jewish religious activity in
Kaifeng municipality, Henan province.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all
citizens freedom of religion in accordance with its
international human rights obligations. Stress to
Chinese authorities that freedom of religion includes
the right to freely adopt beliefs and practice
religious activities without government interference,
particularly those based on political goals.
Stress to the Chinese government that the right to
freedom of religion includes, but is not limited to:
the right of Buddhists and Taoists to carry out
activities in temples and select monastic teachers
independent of state controls; the right of Catholics
to be led by clergy who are selected and who conduct
their ministry according to the standard called for by
Catholic religious beliefs; the right of Falun Gong
practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong inside
China; the right of Muslims to freely preach, undertake
overseas pilgrimage, select and train religious
leaders, and wear clothing with religious significance;
the right of Protestants to exercise their faith free
from state controls over doctrine and worship, and free
from harassment, detention, and other abuses for public
and private manifestations of their faith, including
the display of crosses; and the right of members of
other religious communities, such as Judaism, to be
free from state control and harassment.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined,
detained, or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their
religious beliefs, as well as people confined,
detained, or imprisoned in connection to their
association with those people. Such individuals include
Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin, who has been under extralegal
confinement since July 2012 for renouncing his
affiliation with the Chinese Catholic Patriotic
Association; Pastors Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang of
Jinhua municipality, Zhejiang province; those
affiliated with the Living Stone Church in Guizhou
province, including its pastor, Li Guozhi (also known
as Yang Hua); and other prisoners mentioned in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database. The Administration should use existing laws
to hold accountable Chinese government officials and
others complicit in severe religious freedom
restrictions, including by using the sanctions
available in the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act and the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998. Ensure that conditions related to
religious freedom are taken into account when
negotiating any trade agreement as mandated by the
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015 (Public Law No. 114-26).
Call on the Chinese government to fully implement
accepted recommendations from its October 2013 UN
Universal Periodic Review, including taking necessary
measures to ensure that rights to freedom of religion,
religious culture, and expression are fully observed
and protected; cooperating with the UN human rights
system, specifically UN special procedures and mandate
holders; facilitating visits for UN High Commissioners
to China; taking steps to ensure lawyers working to
advance religious rights can practice their profession
freely and promptly investigating allegations of
violence and intimidation impeding their work; and
considering possible revisions to legislation and
administrative rules to provide better protection of
freedom of religion.
Call on the Chinese government to abolish Article 300
of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes
``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,'' and Article 27 of the PRC
Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which
provides for detention or fines for organizing or
inciting others to engage in ``cult'' activities and
for using ``cults'' or the ``guise of religion'' to
disturb social order or to harm others' health.
Encourage U.S. political leaders to visit religious
sites in China to raise awareness of and promote
freedom of religion.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty
and human rights, Philip Alston, following his 2016
visit to China, issued a report criticizing what he saw
as authorities' lack of consultation with ethnic
minorities regarding economic development that affects
them, and he recommended that the State Ethnic Affairs
Commission develop policies integrating human rights
considerations into all aspects of its policymaking.
As in past reporting years, Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR) authorities detained Mongol
herders who engaged in peaceful protests related to
grasslands, including those who voiced their concerns
online or talked with foreign reporters about their
complaints.
Mongol rights advocate Hada reportedly
continued to press authorities to hold officials
accountable for mistreating him during his 15-year
prison sentence and subsequent detention and
surveillance. IMAR authorities imprisoned Hada for 15
years starting in 1995 and then held him in extralegal
detention for another 4 years, following his
organization of peaceful demonstrations for Mongol
rights and his establishment of the banned Southern
Mongolian Democratic Alliance. In a November 2016
interview, he described his living conditions, in an
apartment heavily surveilled by security personnel, as
similar to those he experienced under detention,
complaining that authorities had at times cut off his
family's water and heat in an effort to compel him to
``cooperate with them and give up [his] ideas.''
Mongol parents and students in the IMAR
reportedly faced limits on access to Mongolian-language
instruction during the past reporting year, in spite of
Chinese law protecting the use of minority languages.
In late 2016, Mongol parents in Chifeng municipality,
IMAR, published open letters on social media and
demonstrated outside government offices to protest the
appointment of Han Chinese principals to the only two
kindergartens in Chifeng that provide instruction in
the Mongolian language. The administrations of the two
schools reportedly restricted the use of the Mongolian
language, and at least one of the schools banned Mongol
teachers from speaking Mongolian in the office.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to build the capacity of Mongol, Uyghur, and
Tibetan groups working to advance human rights,
environmental protection, economic development, and
rule of law in China through U.S. foreign assistance
funding and by encouraging additional support from both
UN and non-governmental sources.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance of
respecting and protecting ethnic minority cultures and
languages. Urge Chinese officials to provide ethnic
minority students and parents a choice of what language
or languages of instruction should be used at schools
they attend in accordance with the PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law and the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities. Call on Chinese officials to
establish mechanisms preserving and expanding existing
instruction in ethnic minority languages from the
preschool to the university level.
Call on the Chinese government to allow Mongol
herders to exercise their fundamental rights of freedom
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as
well as the right to be free from arbitrary detention.
Convey to Chinese officials the importance of
consulting with ethnic minority communities regarding
the impact of proposed development on their traditional
grazing lands.
Urge Chinese authorities to end restrictions on the
freedom of movement and other unlawful restrictions
against Hada, his wife Xinna, and their son, Uiles. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants ``everyone
. . . the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.'' Emphasize in
meetings with Chinese officials the need to hold
accountable local officials responsible for the
continued persecution of Hada, Xinna, and Uiles.
Population Control
Findings
Chinese government authorities continued to
actively promote and implement coercive population
control policies that violate international standards,
including the 1995 Beijing Declaration, the 1994
Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development, and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Authorities
continued to place an emphasis on birth limits and
adherence to family planning as a ``basic national
policy.'' The amended PRC Population and Family
Planning Law and provincial-level regulations limit
couples' freedom to build their families as they see
fit.
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year,
Communist Party and central government authorities
implemented the ``universal two-child policy,'' that
became effective on January 1, 2016, which allows all
married couples to have two children. Chinese
government statistics, however, showed that the
universal two-child policy had limited to moderate
impact after a year of implementation. The National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) reported that the
number of total births in 2016 was 17.86 million, 1.31
million more than the 2015 NBS figure. The increase was
lower than the 3 million additional births per year
that the National Population and Family Planning
Commission had predicted.
Human rights advocates, demographic experts,
and others expressed concerns that the coercive
implementation of family planning measures and human
rights abuses will persist despite the adoption of the
universal two-child policy.
The amended PRC Population and Family Planning
Law contains provisions that prohibit officials from
infringing upon the ``legitimate rights and interests''
of citizens while implementing family planning
policies. Some provincial population planning
regulations, however, continued to explicitly instruct
officials to carry out abortions for ``out-of-plan''
pregnancies, often referred to as ``remedial
measures.'' Local authorities continued to promote
``family planning work'' that entailed harsh and
invasive family planning measures. Officials imposed or
threatened various punishments to enforce family
planning policies, including heavy fines, detention,
forced sterilization, and abortion.
During this reporting year, central and local
governments continued to implement household
registration (hukou) reforms to register ``illegal
residents'' (heihu), a term commonly used to refer to
people who lack hukou in China. According to 2010
national census data, over 60 percent of the 13 million
``illegal residents'' were people born in excess of
birth quotas. Other reports indicated that the number
of ``illegal residents'' might be higher than 13
million. ``Illegal residents'' face considerable
difficulty accessing social benefits typically afforded
to registered citizens. The People's Daily reported in
March 2017 that approximately 14 million ``illegal
residents'' had registered for hukou since November
2012. Some ``illegal residents,'' however, reportedly
continued to face difficulty in registering for hukou,
including those born to unmarried parents.
Decades of population control policies have
exacerbated China's demographic challenges, which
include a rapidly aging population, shrinking
workforce, and sex ratio imbalance. China's total
fertility rate has dropped from approximately 3 births
per woman in the late 1970s to a reported 1.7 births
per woman in 2017, below the replacement rate of 2.1
births per woman necessary to maintain a stable
population. The NBS reported that from 2015 to 2016,
China's working-age population (persons between the
ages of 16 and 59) declined by 3.49 million people to
907.47 million, while the elderly population (persons
aged 60 or older) increased by approximately 8.86
million in 2016 to 230.86 million people, or 16.7
percent of the total population. The overall sex ratio
in 2016 was 104.98 males to 100 females, and there were
approximately 33.59 million more males than females in
China.
This past year, international media reports
continued to suggest a link between China's large
number of ``surplus males'' and the trafficking of
foreign women into China for forced marriage or
commercial sexual exploitation. Reports also indicate
that the Chinese government's population control
policies have contributed to illegal adoptions, as a
traditional preference for sons combined with birth
limits may encourage a black market for illegal
adoptions.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Press Chinese government officials to bring the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law into conformance
with international standards set forth in international
agreements, including the 1995 Beijing Declaration, the
1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. Urge the Chinese government to address concerns
about China's coercive implementation of the population
control policy raised by the UN Committee against
Torture in its concluding observations on the fifth
periodic review of China's compliance with the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Highlight the looming demographic challenges
currently facing China in bilateral meetings with
Chinese government officials--including a rapidly aging
population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio
imbalance. Urge the Chinese government to heed the
recommendations of domestic and international
demographic experts by ending all birth restrictions on
families and abolishing ``social compensation fees.''
Urge the Chinese government to continue its existing
efforts to register all Chinese citizens without hukou.
In line with the Girls Count Act of 2015, the U.S.
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development should support training and programs that
contribute to improvements in the registration of
girls, in order to increase rights and opportunities
for women and girls in China.
Use authorities provided in the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act, as appropriate, to
impose sanctions against Chinese officials who engage
in gross violations of human rights--including those
involving forced sterilizations and forced abortions--
of individuals while implementing family planning
policies. Call on China's central and local governments
to vigorously enforce provisions of Chinese laws that
provide for punishment of officials and other
individuals who engage in these abuses.
Publicly link, with supporting evidence, the sex
ratio imbalance exacerbated by China's population
control policies with potential regional humanitarian
and security concerns--human trafficking, crime,
increased internal and external migration, and other
possible serious social, economic, and political
problems--and discuss and address these issues in
bilateral dialogues.
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Findings
The Chinese government continued the use of
the household registration (hukou) system established
in 1958. The hukou system limits the right of Chinese
citizens to freely choose their place of residence. The
hukou system classifies Chinese citizens as either
rural or urban, conferring legal rights and access to
public services based on the classification.
Implementation of hukou regulations discriminates
against rural hukou holders, including those who
migrate to urban areas, by denying them equal access to
public benefits and services enjoyed by registered
urban residents. The hukou system contravenes
international human rights standards guaranteeing
freedom of residence and prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of ``national or social origin, . . . birth
or other status.''
The Chinese central government and local
authorities continued to implement reforms to the hukou
system and other restrictions on Chinese citizens'
freedom of residence. The central government reiterated
its plans to have 100 million individuals move to urban
areas and obtain local, urban-registered hukou between
2015 and 2020. Local jurisdictions took steps to
implement a new residence permit system, as directed by
the central government's January 2016 Provisional
Regulations on Residence Permits. As of August 2017, at
least 29 provincial-level jurisdictions had reportedly
issued implementing measures for residence permits.
Authorities continued to deny some Chinese
citizens who criticize the government their
internationally recognized right to leave the country,
through methods including mass confiscation of
passports and individual travel bans. Authorities in
Guangdong province prevented Australian permanent
resident and Chinese citizen Feng Chongyi from
returning to Australia for over a week in March and
April 2017, reportedly in connection with his research
on Chinese rights lawyers.
The Commission continued to observe reports of
Chinese government officials punishing rights advocates
and their families and associates, and targeting some
members of ethnic minority groups by restricting their
freedom of movement, in violation of Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Authorities heightened restrictions on movement during
politically sensitive periods, and placed particularly
strict controls on Uyghurs and Tibetans and residents
of ethnic minority areas.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on Chinese authorities to accelerate reforms to
the hukou system, including lowering restrictions on
migration to major cities and centers of economic
opportunity; equalizing the level and quality of public
benefits and services tied to local hukou and residence
permits; and implementing laws and regulations to
provide equal treatment for all Chinese citizens,
regardless of place of birth or residence, or hukou or
residence status.
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with
Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged
in research and outreach to migrants, in order to
advance legal and anti-discrimination assistance for
migrants and their families, and to encourage policy
debates aimed at eliminating inequality and
discrimination connected to residence policies,
including the hukou system.
Emphasize in meetings with Chinese officials that the
government's noncompliance with international standards
on freedom of movement and travel negatively affects
confidence in the Chinese government's commitment to
international standards.
Call on the Chinese central government to combat
provincial and local authorities' arbitrary and
discriminatory restrictions on the ability of residents
of ethnic minority areas, in particular Uyghurs and
Tibetans, to move freely inside China and to travel
abroad.
Raise specifically Chinese authorities' restrictions
on the freedom of movement and the right to leave the
country of rights defenders, lawyers, critics of the
government, and their family members and associates,
including, among others: Feng Chongyi, a professor and
Australian permanent resident; Lu Dongli, a rights
defender; Yao Lifa, a democracy advocate and former
independent local people's congress candidate; and
human rights lawyers Liu Zhengqing and Chen Jian'gang.
Status of Women
Findings
Despite a legal framework prohibiting
employment discrimination, employers in China continued
to discriminate against women in recruiting, hiring,
compensation, and other employment practices.
Employment discrimination against women based on
pregnancy continues to be a serious problem, with much
of the discrimination against women in employment due
to employers' desire to avoid the cost of maternity
leave for female employees. Such discrimination is
expected to worsen with the continuing implementation
of the ``universal two-child policy.''
The legal advocacy of women seeking redress
for gender discrimination in employment continued and
seemed to gain some influence. During this reporting
year, the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court in
Guangdong province held that a restaurant owed one
woman compensation and an apology for refusing to
interview or hire her for a chef's apprentice position
based on her gender. The Supreme People's Court (SPC)
included a recent gender discrimination case among its
guiding cases, released in August 2016. SPC official
Guo Feng said that because the case imposed civil
liability, it would deter other employers from
violating laws on gender equality.
Women in China continued to face challenges
with domestic and sexual violence. Experts on the PRC
Anti-Domestic Violence Law (in effect since March 2016)
noted that challenges to implementation include lack of
awareness, inadequate resources for training of public
security officials, gender discrimination within the
legal system, and enforcement that prioritizes family
cohesion and ``social stability'' over the safety of
victims. Victims of sexual violence also faced
challenges in obtaining legal redress, as they were
reportedly reluctant to come forward due to pressure
from family and society.
Women continued to lack secure rights to
property in both rural and urban areas due to a
combination of legal policies and traditionalist
cultural pressures, particularly after marriage.
Chinese officials prevented some women's
rights advocates from engaging in activism and
providing services--a continuation of the intensifying
restrictions on women's rights advocacy begun in 2015.
The Chinese government continued to target
individual women's rights advocates with criminal
prosecution and other forms of harassment. One
prominent example is that of women's rights and
democracy activist Su Changlan, whom authorities
detained in October 2014 and tried in April 2016 for
``inciting subversion of state power.'' She was
convicted on March 31, 2017, and is expected to be
released in October.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Publicly and privately urge the Chinese government to
give rights advocate Su Changlan immediate access to
medical care and to release her from arbitrary
detention. After Su's sentence ends in October 2017,
urge the Chinese government to ensure that she is free
of state-imposed surveillance, harassment, and
restrictions to her freedom of residence, movement, and
expression. In addition, urge the release of advocates
Chen Qitang and Shan Lihua, and immediately cease
intimidation and harassment of their family members and
associates.
Publicly and privately urge the Chinese government to
respect the freedom of expression and assembly of all
rights advocates, and in particular to refrain from
harassing and intimidating the independent women's
rights advocates seeking to increase awareness about
sexual harassment in public areas.
Urge the Chinese government to publicly expand its
commitment to gender equality through measures such as
increasing the number of women in the highest levels of
political leadership, instituting gender equality and
anti-harassment trainings in government workplaces, and
challenging discriminatory attitudes based on gender
through public education.
Commend the Chinese government for recent legal
developments aimed at promoting the welfare of women
and gender equality. These include the passage of the
PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law and the inclusion of a
gender discrimination case among the Supreme People's
Court's guiding cases. Encourage the government to
strengthen formal support services for implementation--
for example, by increasing funding for health services
or shelters for women experiencing violence, providing
funding and support for attorneys for legal services,
and allowing independent lawyers and advocates to
assist with the promotion and implementation of laws
related to gender equality through lawsuits and public
campaigns.
Support international exchanges among academics,
legal advocates, non-governmental organizations, and
others that focus on the implementation and enforcement
of recently adopted laws promoting gender equity. In
particular, facilitate and support technical assistance
programs that would help both men and women working in
law enforcement and the judiciary to implement the PRC
Anti-Domestic Violence Law effectively and challenge
discriminatory attitudes based on gender. As the first
point of contact, law enforcement in particular should
be trained in addressing reports of violence in a way
that does not undermine victims' concerns or safety.
Facilitate and support technical assistance programs
that would help the development of gender equality
education in schools and communities.
Encourage the collection and analysis of data on
gender-based disparities in economic and social life so
as to monitor changes.
Human Trafficking
Findings
As a State Party to the UN Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), China
is obligated to enact legislation criminalizing human
trafficking as defined by the UN TIP Protocol. The
definition of human trafficking in Chinese law,
however, remains inconsistent with UN TIP Protocol
standards. Inconsistencies between domestic law and
international standards contribute to the difficulty of
assessing the scale of human trafficking in China.
China remains a destination for the
trafficking of men, women, and children from throughout
Asia. The Commission observed reports of alleged human
trafficking of Chinese nationals to the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere for forced labor and sexual
exploitation. Men, women, and children reportedly were
trafficked within China's borders for forced labor,
forced begging, forced marriage, and sexual
exploitation.
This past year, the Chinese government
subjected individuals to forced labor in administrative
detention centers, pretrial detention, and through a
forced labor program known as hashar in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Chinese workers migrating within China and
their children were particularly at risk of human
trafficking, in part due to restrictions arising from
China's household registration (hukou) system.
Government restrictions on workers' rights to form
independent unions and collective bargaining also
exacerbated their vulnerability to trafficking.
The Chinese government continued to treat
North Korean refugees as economic migrants, and
maintained a policy of repatriating undocumented North
Koreans, leaving the refugees vulnerable to
trafficking. The government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea reportedly continued to generate
revenue by sending North Korean nationals to work in
China under conditions that one expert described as
slave labor.
China's sex ratio imbalance--exacerbated by
government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a
traditional bias for sons--created a demand for
marriageable women that may contribute to human
trafficking for forced marriage and sexual
exploitation. According to the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, in 2016, China had approximately
33.59 million more men than women.
Hong Kong remained a destination for human
trafficking, with migrant domestic workers particularly
at risk of exploitation for forced labor. A December
2016 ruling by a Hong Kong court found that Hong Kong's
Bill of Rights Ordinance requires the Hong Kong
government to enact stronger anti-trafficking
legislation. In response to questions from a Hong Kong
lawmaker regarding what steps the government had taken
following the court ruling, the government stated that
human trafficking ``is not prevalent or widespread in
Hong Kong,'' and that human trafficking ``is
effectively prohibited by various pieces of existing
legislation in Hong Kong.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
commitments under the UN TIP Protocol to bring anti-
trafficking legislation into alignment with
international standards, specifically with regard to
China's legal definition of human trafficking.
Emphasize that this would facilitate better data
collection and cross-border comparisons, which in turn
would better inform domestic and multilateral anti-
trafficking policies. Call on the Chinese government to
extend coverage of the UN TIP Protocol to include Hong
Kong.
Support U.S. Government efforts to improve human
trafficking data collection. Work with regional
governments, multilateral institutions, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to encourage and
support the collection of more accurate data in order
to better assess the scale and root causes of human
trafficking in Asia and monitor the effectiveness of
anti-trafficking measures.
Discuss in appropriate bilateral and multilateral
meetings the importance of protecting worker rights as
a means of combating human trafficking for the purpose
of forced labor. Stress that when workers are able to
organize and advocate for their rights, they are less
vulnerable to all forms of exploitation, including
forced labor. Highlight the September 2016 report of
the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, which
stated that the failure to protect workers' right to
freedom of association ``directly contributes to
problems such as human trafficking and slavery.''
Encourage and engage in continued regional
cooperation to combat human trafficking through
multilateral agreements and forums such as the
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against
Trafficking, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the
East Asia Summit. Such regional cooperation should
address migration and the flow of refugees, poverty,
sex ratio imbalances, and other risk factors that
contribute to human trafficking.
Pursue cooperation on anti-trafficking efforts
through the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law
Enforcement Cooperation. Support the work of the U.S.
Department of State's International Law Enforcement
Academy Program in Bangkok, Thailand, to build regional
law enforcement capacity.
Facilitate international exchanges among civil
society groups and industry associations to raise
awareness of best practices for identifying and
combating human trafficking in supply chains. Support
NGOs working on anti-trafficking research, education,
prevention, and victims' services throughout Asia.
Incorporate language into bilateral and multilateral
economic agreements requiring member countries to
improve data collection on human trafficking and to
take concrete steps toward eliminating human
trafficking within their borders.
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year,
the Chinese government's policy of detaining North
Korean refugees and repatriating them to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remained in place, in
violation of its obligations under international human
rights and refugee law.
Heightened security measures along the China-
North Korea and China-Southeast Asia borders increased
the risks North Korean refugees face, and may be
limiting the outflow of refugees from the DPRK. South
Korean Ministry of Unification data showed that 1,414
refugees reached South Korea in 2016, continuing the
trend of a significant decline in the number of
refugees entering South Korea since 2009.
Chinese authorities appeared to have
intensified crackdowns on organizations and
individuals--including foreign aid workers, Christian
missionaries and churches, and non-governmental
organizations--that have played a crucial role in
assisting and facilitating the movement of North Korean
refugees outside the DPRK.
North Korean women who enter China illegally
remain particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.
The majority of North Korean refugees leaving the DPRK
are women, many of whom are trafficked from the DPRK
into, or within, China for the purposes of forced
marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.
Many children born to Chinese fathers and
North Korean mothers remain deprived of basic rights to
education and other public services owing to a lack of
legal resident status in China. The denial of these
rights contravenes China's obligations under
international law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to immediately halt the
repatriation of North Korean refugees; consider using
the suite of sanctions that are available, where
appropriate, against Chinese government agencies and
individuals involved in the repatriation of North
Korean refugees; and press for increased international
monitoring of and accountability for the Chinese
government's treatment of refugees.
Call on the Chinese government to address the
concerns of the UN Committee against Torture by
incorporating the principle of non-refoulement into
domestic legislation and allowing UN High Commissioner
for Refugees personnel unimpeded access to North Korean
refugees in China.
Urge Chinese authorities to recognize the legal
status of North Korean women who marry or have children
with Chinese citizens, and ensure that all such
children are granted resident status and access to
education and other public services in accordance with
Chinese law and international standards.
Consider passing the North Korean Human Rights
Reauthorization Act of 2017 and implement relevant
provisions pertaining to North Korean refugees in
China. Appoint and confirm the U.S. Special Envoy on
North Korean Human Rights Issues, and encourage the
Special Envoy to work with South Korean counterparts to
coordinate efforts related to humanitarian assistance
and human rights promotion for North Korean refugees in
China, in accordance with the reauthorized North Korean
Human Rights Act.
Public Health
Findings
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year,
the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human
rights issued a report that assessed whether the
Chinese government's poverty alleviation efforts, many
of which dovetail with public health, ``have ensured
full respect for human rights in China.'' The Special
Rapporteur observed that the government overly
emphasizes development goals, and that challenges to
the protection of human rights and government
accountability include the Chinese Communist Party's
``leading role'' over government, civil society, and
public participation; a ``top-down'' government
approach; and lack of accurate, publicly available
data.
The government and Party continued to
prioritize the treatment of mental health in public
health policymaking. Despite implementation of the PRC
Mental Health Law, which became effective in 2013,
challenges in the treatment of mental health disorders
include a shortage of mental health personnel and
community-based services.
The Commission remained concerned by reports
that Chinese government authorities continued to
forcibly commit individuals without mental illness to
psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) for
activities, including petitioning, that are deemed to
be ``troublemaking'' or politically sensitive. Reports
of petitioners and others whom public security
officials forcibly committed to psychiatric facilities
this past year included Sheng Lanfu, Ren Naijun, and
Zhu Liangqun. Media coverage of the case of Xu
Xueling--a petitioner serving a four-year prison
sentence for ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble''--linked her petitioning to two instances of
forcible psychiatric commitment that authorities had
imposed to ``maintain stability.'' The December 2016
arrest of Liu Feiyue, founder of the human rights
website Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW), may
have consequences for access to grassroots reports of
forced psychiatric commitment given CRLW's regular
coverage of the topic.
Health-based discrimination in access to
employment, welfare, education, and medical treatment,
as well as difficulties in accessing legal relief or
accountability, reportedly remained widespread, despite
prohibitions to prevent it under Chinese laws and
regulations. Contributing factors, according to rights
lawyers, include a lack of compliance with the law and
inconsistencies between laws and regulations.
In June 2017, a court in Guangdong province
issued China's first-ever judgment that held an
employer violated Chinese law by discriminating against
an employee because the employee was HIV positive. The
court, however, rejected the employee's request to be
reinstated to his job.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to strengthen
implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) and
stop using forced psychiatric commitment to retaliate
against and silence persons with grievances against the
government or persons with dissenting opinions and
preferences. Immediately release from detention Liu
Feiyue, founder of Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, a
human rights website known for its coverage of the use
of forced psychiatric commitment. In addition, release
Xu Xueling--imprisoned in connection to petitioning two
instances of forcible psychiatric commitment--and other
individuals raised in this report and the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database subjected to forcible
psychiatric commitment for petitioning and other
activities authorities deemed politically sensitive.
Urge the Chinese government to establish panels made
up of legal, medical, social work, and security
professionals from within and outside the government to
monitor and report on the implementation of the MHL and
initiatives planned under the National Mental Health
Work Plan (2015-2020) to ensure that local
implementation consistently meets standards of care and
rights protection stipulated in the MHL, the PRC Law on
the Protection of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, and international standards.
Continue to support technical assistance and exchange
programs in the area of public health. Require that
U.S.-China cooperative programs include the
participation of U.S. and Chinese non-governmental
organizations.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of laws and regulations that
prohibit health-based discrimination in access to
employment and education, including abolition of the
national physical eligibility standards for civil
servants and teachers that discriminate against persons
with health conditions. Where appropriate, share the
United States' ongoing experience with and efforts in
promoting the rights of persons with disabilities in
education, employment, and public life, through non-
governmental advocacy and services, and legal and
regulatory means.
The Environment
Findings
During the 2017 reporting year, Chinese and
international media reports highlighted the severity of
China's air, water, and soil pollution, and related
health concerns. At the same time, Chinese authorities
continued to censor and control media reporting on the
environment. The Chinese government made statements
calling for public participation in environmental
protection. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on
extreme poverty and human rights, however, ``the
Government tends to rely almost entirely on top-down
processes.''
During this reporting year, citizens engaged
in a number of environmental protests over issues
including sand mining and air pollution. In October
2016, as many as 10,000 people in Xi'an municipality,
Shaanxi province, participated in a protest over a
waste incinerator project. In December 2016,
authorities reportedly briefly detained a number of
advocates in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province,
after they gathered wearing face masks to protest air
pollution.
Chinese authorities continued to harass and
detain environmental advocates. In October 2016,
Chinese authorities administratively detained Liu Shu,
the leader of an environmental non-governmental
organization (NGO), for 10 days in Changsha
municipality, Hunan province, for ``leaking counter-
espionage work state secrets.'' Her alleged offense was
sharing pollution data. In June 2017, the Shuangtaizi
District People's Court in Panjin municipality,
Liaoning province, sentenced Tian Jiguang, the founder
of the Panjin City Association of Volunteers for the
Protection of the Spotted Seal, to four years and six
months in prison. Chinese authorities detained Tian in
October 2013 after he wrote a blog post in which he
criticized a state-owned enterprise for water
pollution.
Judicial authorities assessed high court fees
on two NGOs following an environmental public interest
lawsuit. In January 2017, the Changzhou Intermediate
People's Court in Changzhou municipality, Jiangsu
province, ruled in favor of defendant chemical
manufacturers and held that the two NGOs that brought
the lawsuit were responsible for court fees totaling
1.89 million yuan (US$270,000). The head of the
litigation department at one of the NGOs expressed
concern that this case ``would set a precedent for
courts to use similar charging standards in future
environmental public interest lawsuits.''
In December 2016, the National People's
Congress passed the PRC Environmental Tax Law. The
legislation provides for new environmental taxes that
will be jointly managed by environmental and tax
authorities, superseding the previous pollution
discharge fees that had been managed by environmental
authorities. Some legal experts believe the potential
for tax authorities to collect taxes from polluters may
result in a strengthening of monitoring systems.
In December 2016, the Supreme People's Court
and Supreme People's Procuratorate issued an
interpretation on environmental crimes that, if
implemented, may lead to more criminal enforcement for
environmental data manipulation. The interpretation
provides that criminal penalties for companies found in
violation of environmental standards may be based on
the amount of money the company saved by not operating
the required pollution control equipment, and criminal
charges of more than three years could be imposed if
the money saved totaled over 1 million yuan
(US$140,000).
In October 2016, Chinese authorities
reportedly detained three environmental officials in
Xi'an for ``falsification'' of air quality data. In
June 2017, the Xi'an Intermediate People's Court
sentenced seven environmental officials, including the
three previously detained officials, to prison terms
ranging from 1 year and 3 months to 1 year and 10
months for ``damaging the computer information
system.'' In July 2017, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection, following a month-long inspection, strongly
criticized the Tianjin municipal government for
``wantonly covering up'' its failed environmental
protection efforts, finding that although Tianjin
authorities had many meetings and campaigns, ``it was
more lip service than action.''
The Chinese government continued to develop
and release comprehensive plans for improving the
environment, although it also announced plans to
increase coal-fired power capacity. In December 2016,
the National Development and Reform Commission released
China's 13th Five-Year Energy Development Plan, which
included a mandatory target for coal energy to account
for 58 percent or less of energy production by 2020, a
6-percent decrease from 2015. The 13th Five-Year
Electricity Development Plan, however, included plans
to increase coal-fired power capacity.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to support U.S.-China technical and legal
collaboration on environmental protection. U.S.-China
cooperation should focus on programs aimed at:
increasing media freedom; improving transparency and
the rule of law; reducing air, water, and soil
contamination; and improving government accountability.
Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen rule of law
in the environmental sector. Raise questions with
Chinese officials about the censorship of environmental
news reporting. U.S. officials should also raise
questions about the lack of transparency regarding
China's water and soil pollution.
Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of
environmental advocates and follow international
standards on freedom of speech, association, and
assembly, including those contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and China's
Constitution. Raise the imprisonment of environmental
advocate Tian Jiguang in meetings with Chinese
officials.
Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working to
expand awareness of citizens' environmental rights in
China and the protection of those rights. Include
environmental law and transparency issues in bilateral
human rights and legal expert dialogues.
Civil Society
Findings
During this reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued to deepen a
crackdown on NGOs and civil society advocates.
According to international human rights organizations,
Chinese authorities restricted the activities of rights
defenders by shrinking the space for expression,
association, and assembly. Authorities also targeted
rights advocates affiliated with NGOs this past year,
including those promoting religious freedom, workers'
rights, and the environment. Examples included the
prosecution of pastors and labor advocates, as well as
the detention of an environmentalist on ``state
security'' grounds. Regulatory developments,
particularly the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas
Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities (Overseas
NGOs' Activities Law) that took effect on January 1,
2017, threatened the continued presence of
international NGOs (INGOs) in China as well as the
independence of domestic NGOs reliant on foreign
funding. The Chinese government provided limited
clarifications on requirements for INGOs under the law.
Foreign governments and NGOs sought clarification from
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) on official
sponsorship requirements under the law.
The operating environment for INGOs in China
became more restricted and uncertain under the new
Overseas NGOs' Activities Law. Reports indicate that
INGOs are under greater scrutiny, and the law enables
the Chinese government to surveil and collect
information on such organizations. In addition,
domestic NGOs may face ``harsh penalties'' under the
expanded legal and regulatory framework given a
``political climate of heightened security concerns''
and ``decreased tolerance for certain kinds of activism
and expression.'' According to statistical data
released by the MPS, a total of 168 INGO representative
offices and 191 temporary activities had registered in
China by July 31, 2017. Out of those registered, the
United States had the highest number of registered INGO
representative offices at 50, followed by Hong Kong at
38, Japan at 14, and Germany and South Korea each at
13. Beijing municipality ranked first for the highest
total number of registered representative offices at
54, followed by Shanghai municipality at 35, Yunnan
province at 17, and Guangdong province at 12.
Registered representative offices of INGOs had
partnering ``professional supervisory units'' (PSUs)
from varying fields, with 66 representative offices
working with PSUs in the trade sector, 25 in civil
affairs, 21 in health and population planning, and 8 in
education.
In March 2017, Chinese authorities detained
Taiwan human rights NGO volunteer Lee Ming-cheh while
he was traveling to Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong
province, via Macau. Ten days after Lee disappeared,
the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) confirmed
that Chinese authorities were investigating Lee for
``endangering state security.'' On May 26, the TAO
confirmed that state security authorities in Hunan
province had formally arrested Lee on suspicion of
``subversion of state power.''
This past year, the Chinese government
continued to strengthen its policy of inspection and
ideological guidance over civil society. In March 2017,
following two State Council directives to carry out
inspections on the market and society released in 2015
and 2016, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) passed a
measure to advance official inspection of social
organizations, urging registration authorities to
conduct both planned and random inspections of civil
society groups. A leading small group on Party-building
in social organizations, administered by the MCA,
issued a document in March 2017 that prioritized work
on the Party's ideological guidance for NGOs, building
Party groups in organizations, and recruiting new
``outstanding and talented individuals'' from NGOs as
cadres.
The Chinese government continued efforts to
strengthen the philanthropic regulatory framework under
the PRC Charity Law to increase the level of giving in
China. In the first year after the law's March 2016
passage, 260 national- or provincial-level
organizations acquired ``charitable'' status and 13
provinces and municipalities reportedly began approving
charities. In addition to registering charities, the
law provides a legal framework for public fundraising
and increasing tax incentives, toward which the Chinese
government took steps in this past year. On February
24, 2017, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee adopted a revision to the PRC Enterprise
Income Tax Law, enabling donations over 12 percent of
an enterprise's annual total profit to be carried over
and deducted from taxable income during the following
three years.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to hasten the enactment
of legal provisions pertaining to civil society that
are consistent with China's Constitution as well as
China's international obligations. Urge China to ratify
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Urge the Chinese government to revise
or repeal the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas
NGOs' Activities and revise the PRC Charity Law to
reflect the principles of the ICCPR, especially the
rights to freedom of association, assembly, and
expression.
Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of
civil society advocates and NGOs and provide adequate
procedural due process for those undergoing criminal
trials.
Integrate civil society issues into bilateral
discussions and agreements with Chinese officials to
promote reciprocity in the approach and implementation
of civil society exchanges between the United States
and China.
Continue to fund, monitor, and evaluate foreign
assistance programs in China that support democracy
promotion, rule of law, and human rights advocacy.
Take measures to facilitate the participation of
Chinese civil society advocates in relevant
international conferences and forums, and support
international training to build their leadership
capacity in non-profit management, public policy
advocacy, and media relations.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year,
the Chinese Communist Party continued to play a leading
role in both state and society, restricting Chinese
citizens' ability to exercise civil and political
rights. Observers noted that the central role of the
Party in governing the state appears to have
strengthened since Chinese President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping came into power, further
``blurring'' the lines between Party and government. In
March 2017, Wang Qishan, a member of the Standing
Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee
Political Bureau (Politburo) and the Secretary of the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI),
said that ``under the Party's leadership, there is only
a division of labor between the Party and the
government; there is no separation between the Party
and the government.''
The Commission observed a continued emphasis
on Xi Jinping's leading role in guiding decisionmaking.
Following the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Sixth Plenum)
in October 2016, the plenum communique named Xi the
``core'' (hexin) of the Party. Some observers viewed
the Sixth Plenum as a ``victory for Xi'' over internal
political opposition. At the Sixth Plenum, the Party
also announced that the 19th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party (19th Party Congress) would
take place in Beijing municipality during the second
half of 2017.
This past year, Xi Jinping called for ``strict
governance'' of the Party. Regulations and guidelines
on intraparty supervision and behavioral standards
released after the Sixth Plenum stressed that cadres at
all levels must comply, especially those who hold
leadership positions. The CCDI continued punishing
high- and low-level Party officials for misconduct,
targeting officials in the government, military, and
state security apparatus. In July 2017, CCDI
authorities placed Sun Zhengcai, Party Secretary of
Chongqing municipality and a Politburo member, under
investigation for discipline violations--a move some
international observers called a political decision by
Xi to consolidate power ahead of the 19th Party
Congress. The CCDI also tightened supervision of its
anticorruption investigators and staff to ensure
stricter oversight of disciplinary enforcers.
The Party and Chinese government are
spearheading efforts to establish a new national
supervisory commission for enforcing anti-graft
measures, a move that may result in further blurring
and integration of Party and government functions. In
December 2016, the National People's Congress approved
a pilot project to set up supervisory commissions to
oversee government conduct in Beijing municipality and
Shanxi and Zhejiang provinces. In January 2017, the
CCDI announced plans to establish a new national
commission in order to integrate all government
officials who have authority to conduct Party
disciplinary inspection into one institution. The new
commission, designed to ``strengthen the Party's united
leadership over anticorruption work,'' will merge
anticorruption functions of the CCDI, Ministry of
Supervision, and Supreme People's Procuratorate.
Chinese authorities also continued to harass,
detain, and imprison democracy advocates who exercised
their rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and
demonstration. Some representative cases of advocates
whom authorities targeted this past year included Chen
Zongyao, Chen Zhixiao, Zhao Suli, Liu Feiyue, Huang Qi,
and Zi Su. Authorities detained and, in some cases,
sentenced individuals in connection with their
commemoration of the violent suppression of the 1989
Tiananmen protests. Such individuals included Shi
Tingfu, Li Xiaoling, and Ding Yajun. Authorities
continued to prosecute Fu Hailu, Chen Bing, Luo Fuyu,
and Zhang Juanyong, detained in 2016 in connection with
satirically labeled liquor bottles commemorating the
Tiananmen protests.
This past year, central Party authorities did
not take any substantial steps toward political
liberalization. Sources highlighted multiple instances
in which officials interfered with or inhibited
meaningful public participation in local elections,
demonstrating that China's political institutions do
not meet the standards for ``genuine'' elections
outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
Public security authorities and riot police
cracked down on protests that arose after authorities
detained Lin Zulian, chief of Wukan village, Donghai
subdistrict, Lufeng city, Shanwei municipality,
Guangdong province, in June 2016. International media
outlets reported that, around September 13, 2016,
security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets
against protesters, a move that resulted in serious
injuries to villagers. Police forces interrogated and
expelled foreign reporters from the village, blocked
access to the village, and detained villagers. In
December 2016, the Haifeng County People's Court tried
and convicted nine Wukan residents for their
participation in the protest and gave them prison
sentences ranging from 2 years to 10 years and 6
months.
The Chinese government continued to work
toward increasing citizens' access to information. In
June 2017, the State Council released draft revisions
to the 2008 Open Government Information (OGI)
Regulations and solicited public comments. The draft
revisions clarified the scope of OGI and defined the
types of information not subject to OGI. Areas not
subject to OGI requirements include local-level
information that ``endangers public safety or social
stability'' or that involves ethnicity or religion.
Despite moves in this past year to update the OGI
regulatory framework, Chinese authorities continued to
deny OGI requests in cases related to human rights
defenders.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support U.S. research programs that document and
analyze the governing institutions and ideological
campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as
its influence over companies, government agencies,
legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Employ a ``whole-of-government'' approach to
encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and release individuals detained or imprisoned for
exercising their rights to freedom of speech,
association, and assembly. These individuals include
those mentioned in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database, such as Chen Xi, Chen Wei,
and Zhu Yufu.
Support joint U.S.-China cooperative programs to
develop independent village committee and people's
congress election monitoring systems. Encourage central
and local Party and government leaders to implement
free and fair elections across China. Continue to fund,
monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of democracy
promotion and rule of law programs in China.
Support organizations working in China that seek to
work with local governments and NGOs to improve
transparency, especially with regard to efforts to
expand and improve China's open government information
initiatives. Urge Party officials to further increase
the transparency of Party affairs.
Call on the Chinese government to improve procedures
through which citizens may hold their officials
accountable outside of the internal Party-led
anticorruption campaign. Urge Party and government
officials to establish and improve public participation
in government affairs. Encourage top-level officials to
reform governing institutions to promote an authentic
multi-party system with protections for freedom of
speech, association, and assembly.
Commercial Rule of Law
Findings
December 11, 2016, marked 15 years since China
acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
Chinese government and Party, however, continued to
fail to comply with key WTO commitments, including
commitments to ensure equal treatment for foreign
enterprises; to practice a market economy; and to
enforce the rule of law with impartiality,
transparency, and uniformity. Instead, the Chinese
government continued to promote preferential treatment
for domestic industry and compel technology transfer,
creating an uneven playing field and altering market
prices both domestically and globally.
The Chinese government provided significant
financial and political support to outbound investment
this past year. This raised several concerns over
issues including the lack of transparency about the
Chinese government's involvement in commercial
dealings, the creation of an uneven playing field for
foreign companies, and the distortion of market prices
both domestically and globally. The Chinese
government's preferential treatment of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) in outbound investment may also
increase the influence of SOEs on foreign markets. Such
influence may further increase with implementation of
the Chinese government's plan for SOEs to play a major
role in its Belt and Road Initiative.
The government's strict control over the
Internet continued to serve as an indirect form of
preferential treatment for domestic enterprises by
obstructing consumers' access to global websites. In
March 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) identified Internet censorship in China as a
barrier to trade for a second year, noting that Chinese
authorities blocked ``11 of the top 25 global sites.''
Chinese authorities continued to provide
ineffective protection for intellectual property. In
April 2017, USTR again placed China on its 301 priority
watch list. In December 2016, USTR identified Taobao, a
subsidiary of the Alibaba Group and the largest online
shopping website in China, as a ``notorious market''
due to ``the large volume of allegedly counterfeit and
pirated goods.''
Several cases involving the arbitrary
detention and investigation of Chinese and American
businesspeople this past year highlighted ongoing rule
of law and due process concerns. On April 29, 2017,
Chinese authorities deported American businesswoman
Sandy Phan-Gillis to the United States after judicial
authorities sentenced her to three years and six
months' imprisonment on the charge of espionage.
Authorities detained Phan-Gillis in March 2015, and in
June 2016, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
found that she had been arbitrarily detained. Phan-
Gillis was reportedly tortured in prison, and she was
not able to meet with a lawyer for over a year. The
cases of three prominent executives of Chinese firms,
Xiao Jianhua, Guo Wengui, and Wu Xiaohui, highlighted
the risks that businesspeople face when suspected of
corruption or when dealing closely with corrupt
officials.
Food and drug safety in China remained a
concern for Chinese and international consumers and the
American business community operating in China. Their
concerns were exacerbated by regulatory uncertainty and
nontransparent enforcement. Reports in January 2017 of
counterfeit soy sauce made with industrial salt and
unsafe tap water raised particular concerns for
consumers around the world.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Ensure that China complies with its existing World
Trade Organization (WTO) commitments before resuming
negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
with China. A BIT with China should be based on
reciprocity, and allow for American investment in the
media, entertainment, Internet, and other sectors. The
BIT should also strengthen human rights and rule of law
protections.
The U.S. Department of State should consider issuing
a travel warning for China to warn Americans
considering travel to China of the risk of arbitrary
detention and torture by Chinese authorities, and the
risk that a detained American may not be allowed to
meet with a lawyer or discuss their case with U.S.
consular officials. The U.S. Department of State should
also consider revisions to the U.S.-China Consular
Convention to ensure that Chinese authorities are
required to detail the specific charges on which
Americans are detained, and that Americans detained in
China are allowed to discuss the details of their case
with U.S. consular officials and to meet with a lawyer.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should,
under WTO rules, request detailed information from the
Chinese government on Internet restrictions that result
in the blocking of the websites of U.S. companies. If
warranted, a WTO dispute should be considered. In
meetings with Chinese officials, urge the Chinese
government to stop blocking Internet users' access to
U.S. media and technology companies in China.
Encourage U.S. companies that receive censorship
requests from Chinese authorities to comply with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the
Global Network Initiative's Principles on Freedom of
Expression.
In meetings with Chinese officials, urge the Chinese
government to improve the transparency of its foreign
exchange controls and to move toward a market-based
exchange rate.
In meetings, urge Chinese government and Party
officials to increase the transparency of the
anticorruption campaign. Specifically raise concerns
regarding the reported abduction and detention of
Canadian citizen Xiao Jianhua from Hong Kong.
Access to Justice
Findings
The Chinese Communist Party's control over the
judiciary became more prominent this past year when the
Supreme People's Court (SPC) president urged high court
presidents from across China to reject Western
principles, including ``constitutional democracy,
separation of powers, and judicial independence.'' The
SPC president also noted the convictions of rights
lawyer Zhou Shifeng and other rights advocates as a key
achievement of the court system in 2016; international
human rights observers, however, said these convictions
were politically motivated.
With respect to developing a trial-centered
litigation system, a goal that the Party set forth in
October 2014, Chinese authorities issued an opinion
emphasizing the importance of in-court testimony and
developed evidentiary criteria for certain common
crimes in some localities.
This past year, the Chinese government
promulgated rules in an attempt to improve the legal
aid system, which continued to face problems such as a
shortage of legal aid workers, lack of technical
knowledge in non-lawyer staff, and insufficient
reimbursement for legal-aid related expenses.
In October 2016, the general offices of the
Chinese government and Communist Party issued a set of
measures that provides for sanctions on officials who
mistreat individuals who petition the government for a
range of grievances. Despite these new measures, the
Commission continued to observe reports of official
violence against petitioners. Furthermore, authorities
reportedly targeted groups that supported petitioners--
in November and December 2016, authorities detained and
then arrested Liu Feiyue and Huang Qi, founders of two
websites that report on human rights issues, including
officials' mistreatment of petitioners.
During this reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to detain and prosecute the rights
lawyers and advocates targeted during a nationwide,
coordinated crackdown that began in and around July
2015. Authorities harassed family members of those
detained and used arbitrary means to prevent lawyers
associated with them from renewing their law licenses.
The Ministry of Justice amended two sets of
measures governing the licensing of lawyers and law
firms this past year in ways that may violate the Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers. The amendments added
language mandating lawyers to support the Party's
leadership and imposing restrictions on lawyers'
ability to make independent professional judgments and
on their rights to freedom of speech and peaceful
assembly.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Encourage leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and
government to respect the independence of the judiciary
and to eliminate all forms of political influence on
it.
Encourage Chinese legislators and judicial officials
to implement an effective supervisory mechanism that
ensures courts at all levels accept cases filed by all
individuals, including petitioners and advocates, in a
non-discriminatory manner.
Encourage the Chinese government to take substantive
action to implement the trial-centered litigation
system that is designed to ensure the legality of
evidence obtained during the pretrial process.
Increase support for programs that promote dialogue
between U.S. and Chinese legal experts regarding how
China can structure and implement legal reforms.
Concomitantly increase support for collaboration
between U.S. and Chinese academic and non-governmental
entities to foster programs that enhance the Chinese
legal system's capacity for protecting citizens'
rights.
Urge the Chinese government to stop all forms of
persecution or prosecution of petitioners who use the
petitioning system to seek redress for their
grievances.
Urge the Chinese government to unconditionally
exonerate and lift any restrictions of liberty or
eligibility to practice law on the rights lawyers and
advocates detained in the crackdown that began in and
around July 2015, including Wang Yu, Bao Longjun, Zhou
Shifeng, Wang Quanzhang, Li Heping, Li Chunfu, Xie
Yang, Wu Gan, Hu Shigen, Gou Hongguo, Liu Xing, and
Zhang Wanhe. Raise concerns that the recent amendments
to measures regulating lawyers and law firm licensing
violate international standards concerning lawyers'
rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, and
independent exercise of professional judgment.
Urge the Chinese government to protect the
fundamental civil and professional rights of China's
lawyers, to investigate all allegations of abuse
against them, and to ensure that those responsible are
brought to justice. Urge the Chinese government to end
all forms of harassment or persecution against the
family members of human rights lawyers and advocates
affected by the July 2015 crackdown, including
surveillance, restrictions on domestic and
international travel, and preventing school attendance.
Xinjiang
Findings
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year,
central and regional government authorities introduced
new security measures and expanded implementation of
existing security controls targeting Uyghur communities
and individuals in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). According to official statistics, XUAR
authorities spent 30.05 billion yuan (approximately
US$4.43 billion) on public security in 2016, nearly 20
percent more than the previous year. After Chen Quanguo
became XUAR Communist Party Secretary in August 2016,
replacing Zhang Chunxian, regional authorities
implemented a number of new security measures. These
included, but were not limited to, the installation of
``convenience police stations'' throughout the region,
with 949 in the regional capital of Urumqi alone; the
convening of mass anti-terrorism rallies; the
recruitment of tens of thousands of security personnel
from both within and outside of the XUAR; the
implementation of a ``double-linked household''
(shuanglian hu) system; and the mandatory installation
of satellite-tracking devices on vehicles in one
prefecture in the XUAR.
On March 29, 2017, the XUAR People's Congress
adopted the region's first anti-extremism regulations.
The regulations categorize 15 actions as ``extremism,''
and according to a Chinese legal scholar, ``[draw] a
clear line between legal religion and illegal
religion.'' In July 2016, the XUAR People's Congress
adopted regional measures to implement the PRC
Counterterrorism Law, which also dealt with how to
punish religious extremists. The 2017 anti-extremism
regulations, however, provide more detailed
descriptions of the responsibilities of government
authorities to eliminate ``extremism.''
As in past reporting years, XUAR officials
continued to restrict Uyghurs' ability to travel
freely, in violation of Chinese law and international
legal standards. Beginning in October 2016, authorities
in locations throughout the XUAR reportedly ordered
residents to turn their passports in to police, with
varying deadlines of up to four months. Authorities
subsequently required residents to seek approval from
police for international travel in order to retrieve
their passports.
Beginning in late January 2017, Chinese
authorities reportedly ordered some Uyghurs studying
abroad in countries including Egypt, Turkey, France,
Australia, and the United States to return to the XUAR.
XUAR authorities detained or threatened to detain
relatives of some students to compel them to return,
and reportedly detained some returnees and forced some
to undergo ``political reeducation.''
During this reporting year, central and
regional government and Party officials continued to
promote the XUAR as an important center for Belt and
Road (also known as One Belt, One Road) Initiative
development projects. A U.S.-based Uyghur rights
organization criticized the economic inequality
exacerbated by official development projects, as well
as the enhanced securitization officials employed to
accompany such projects.
Central and regional officials also placed
restrictions on communication tools, issued regulations
limiting the spread of ``false'' and ``harmful''
information, and constrained the ability of foreign
journalists to report from the XUAR. In one example of
authorities restricting XUAR residents' access to
communication tools, authorities issued regulations,
effective October 1, 2016, requiring individuals in the
region to register with their real names before being
permitted to access the Internet, including on their
mobile phones.
XUAR government authorities expanded Mandarin-
focused ``bilingual education'' in the region, a policy
that contravenes international law and that a Uyghur
rights advocacy organization criticized for its
emphasis on Mandarin-language education at the expense
of other languages as well as for the loss of Uyghur
educators' jobs. Under ``bilingual education,'' class
instruction takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese,
largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by
ethnic minority groups. In June 2017, education
officials in Hotan prefecture, XUAR, banned the use of
the Uyghur language in schools through the secondary
school level, ``in order to strengthen elementary and
middle/high school bilingual education.'' The ban
includes a prohibition on Uyghur-language signage on
school grounds, as well as the use of Uyghur in
schools' public activities and educational management
work. In March 2017, state media announced that
authorities would strengthen preschool ``bilingual
education'' in the XUAR by building or expanding a
total of 4,387 ``bilingual kindergartens'' and hiring
10,000 ``bilingual teachers'' in 2017.
According to research conducted by Human
Rights Watch and reporting by the journal Nature,
security personnel have been collecting DNA samples
from Uyghurs in the XUAR and from other people
throughout China on a massive scale, in many cases
without consent. International observers raised the
concern that officials may misuse the collected
biometric data to heighten security controls on the
Uyghur population, as officials build a database of
citizens' biometric information not limited to those
with a criminal background, as in other countries, and
lacking the kinds of legal safeguards other countries
implement to manage their DNA databases.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support efforts to raise greater public awareness of
human rights conditions in the XUAR, support
initiatives to protect Uyghur culture, increase avenues
for Uyghurs to protect their human rights, and
undertake more frequent human rights-
focused visits to the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to implement policies
in the XUAR that promote both security and human
rights, and that hold regional and local officials
accountable for human rights violations carried out in
the name of security. Urge Chinese officials to
establish mechanisms ensuring that officials uphold the
rule of law when implementing security procedures and
refrain from arbitrary detention or surveillance of
citizens. In addition, urge Chinese officials to
include human rights safeguards in laws and regulations
related to counterterrorism efforts, in consultation
with international human rights experts, and to avoid
broadly worded, ambiguous definitions of terrorism and
terrorism-related offenses.
Call on the Chinese government to allow diplomats,
domestic and international journalists, and observers
greater freedom to report on XUAR-related issues, and
to allow domestic and international journalists to
freely express their views on government policy in the
XUAR, as provided for under Chinese and international
law.
Call on the Chinese government to adhere to domestic
laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of religious
belief as well as international standards guaranteeing
religious practice free from state restrictions.
Urge Chinese officials to respect the rights of
Uyghurs and all Chinese citizens to travel freely
outside of China, in accordance with Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which China has signed and committed to ratify. Urge
Chinese authorities to return passports and other
legally obtained travel documents to XUAR residents.
Call on the Chinese government to consult with non-
Han Chinese parents, teachers, and students regarding
which language or languages of instruction should be
used in XUAR schools, from the preschool to the
university level. Call on Chinese officials to provide
parents and students a choice of instruction in the
Uyghur language and other non-Chinese languages
prevalent in the XUAR, as mandated in Article 4 of
China's Constitution and Article 10 of the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law.
Encourage U.S. companies conducting business or
investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to
promote equal opportunity employment for ethnic
minorities and to support development projects that
incorporate consultation with ethnic minorities
regarding the economic, political, and social impact of
such projects. Encourage U.S. companies investing in
XUAR business opportunities to actively recruit ethnic
minority candidates for employment positions, implement
mechanisms to eliminate hiring and workplace
discrimination, and urge Chinese counterparts to
provide equal opportunity employment to ethnic
minorities.
Encourage U.S. companies conducting business or
investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to use
environmentally friendly business practices in their
operations and business strategies, and to promote
environmental preservation efforts in the region.
Call on the Chinese government to cease its mass
collection of DNA samples from Uyghurs in the XUAR, and
end efforts to build a database of Chinese citizens'
biometric information, until it enacts and implements
privacy protections, mechanisms to ensure informed
consent, and legal safeguards for DNA database
management, in order to prevent official misuse of
collected biometric data. Privacy protections should
meet the standards contained in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has
signed but not ratified. Chinese officials should also
implement transparent regulations governing the
storage, sharing, and usage of biometric information,
and establish legal procedures citizens can use to
effectively challenge the collection of such
information.
Tibet
Findings
There has been no formal dialogue between the
Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese Communist
Party and government officials since the ninth round of
dialogue was held in January 2010. In February 2017,
Zhu Weiqun, Chairman of the Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference and former senior Party
official, said that the Chinese government would not
engage in dialogue with what he referred to as an
``illegal group'' whose aim is to split China.
The Party and government continued
implementing repressive policies in Tibetan autonomous
areas through the use of extensive and intrusive
surveillance, strict regulations and rules to restrict
Tibetans' fundamental rights, and pervasive displays of
police and military force. New high-level appointments
in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)--Wu Yingjie as the
new Party Secretary of the TAR, and Qizhala (Che Dalha)
as the new governor--both of whom have extensive
experience in the region, are unlikely to lead to any
changes in policy or methods of governance in the TAR.
The Chinese government restated its position
that only it has the right to decide the Dalai Lama's
successor. The current Dalai Lama reiterated his
position on his reincarnation, and underscored that it
is not a matter for the Chinese government or Party to
decide, but rather a matter reserved for himself,
Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and the Tibetan people.
The Party and government continued to violate
the right of religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhist
monastics and laypersons through a system of pervasive
controls and restrictions on religious practice. The
expulsion of thousands of monks and nuns and
demolitions of homes at the famous Buddhist institutes
Larung Gar and Yachen Gar in Sichuan province were an
acute example during this reporting year of the Party's
crackdown on the right to religious freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.
An estimated 7,000 Tibetan pilgrims from
Tibetan areas of China attempted to attend an important
religious teaching given by the Dalai Lama in Bodh
Gaya, India, in early January 2017. In November 2016,
Chinese officials confiscated passports, issued
threats, and ordered Tibetans who had already traveled
to India and Nepal to return to China, violating their
rights of religious freedom and movement.
Self-immolations by Tibetans reportedly
focusing on political and religious issues continued
during this reporting year. As of August 21, 2017,
there were 5 known self-immolations in Tibetan
autonomous areas of China, 4 of which were confirmed to
be fatal, bringing the total number of such self-
immolations by Tibetans living in China to 144 since
2009, 127 of which were reportedly fatal. As in the
past, the self-immolators publicly called for the long
life of the Dalai Lama, his return from exile, and
freedom for Tibet.
Chinese authorities continued to detain and
imprison Tibetans for peacefully exercising their
rights to freedom of expression and opinion, including
advocacy for education in the Tibetan language. Tashi
Wangchug, an advocate for bilingual education in
Qinghai province, who has been detained since January
2016 following a November 2015 New York Times report
and video about his Tibetan language rights advocacy,
awaits trial for ``inciting separatism.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Encourage the Party and government to respect, as a
matter of the right of religious freedom, recognized
under Chinese and international law, that the decision
regarding the Dalai Lama's succession or reincarnation
must be reserved for the current Dalai Lama, Tibetan
Buddhist leaders, and the Tibetan people.
Urge the Chinese government to recognize the role of
restrictive Party policies and government measures, and
the increasing securitization of Tibetan autonomous
areas of China, in Tibetan self-immolations and
protests. Urge the Chinese government to cease treating
the Dalai Lama as a security threat, and stress to the
government the importance of respecting and protecting
the Tibetan culture and language--policy changes that
would promote and protect social stability in Tibetan
areas.
Encourage the Chinese government to respect the right
of Tibetans to travel domestically as well as
internationally, and to allow access to the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China to international journalists,
representatives of the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations, and U.S. Government
officials.
The Administration is urged to nominate, as soon as
practicable, an appropriate candidate to fill the
position of Under Secretary of State for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, who has
traditionally also simultaneously held the position of
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, and the Senate
is urged to confirm forthwith.
Urge the Chinese government to release Tibetan
language rights advocate Tashi Wangchug from detention,
withdraw the charges against him, and stress that
peacefully advocating for genuine bilingual education--
a right recognized under Chinese and international
law--is not a crime.
In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the
release of Tibetan political prisoners currently
detained or imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of
their human rights. The records of detained Tibetans in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database--albeit an
incomplete picture of the extent of Tibetan detentions
and disappearances--provides a useful resource for such
interactions with Chinese officials. Urge the Chinese
government and its security forces to cease using
arbitrary detention, disappearance, beatings, torture,
and intimidation to suppress and punish Tibetans'
peaceful exercise of their rights.
Urge the Chinese government to take fully into
account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
planning infrastructure, natural resource development,
settlement or resettlement projects, and tourist
attractions in the Tibetan areas of China.
Continue to request that the Chinese government
invite an independent representative of an
international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi
Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama
recognized in 1995, and who has been held
incommunicado, along with his parents, since May 17,
1995.
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Findings
On March 26, 2017, Hong Kong's Election
Committee elected Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor as Hong
Kong's fourth Chief Executive. Observers reported that
during the nomination period and election campaign,
Chinese central government officials and
representatives pressured Election Committee members to
support Lam over other candidates. The Election
Committee's composition, and therefore the Chief
Executive election, is restricted to ensure support for
candidates approved by Chinese authorities, despite
provisions in Hong Kong's Basic Law guaranteeing
political autonomy and democratic development for Hong
Kong.
After pro-democracy candidates gained seats in
the September 2016 Legislative Council (LegCo)
elections, the Chinese central government and Hong Kong
government moved to disqualify and remove from office
opposition legislators who had altered their oaths of
office. On November 7, 2016, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued an
interpretation of Hong Kong's Basic Law, holding that
oaths of office under Article 104 of the Basic Law are
legal commitments to both Hong Kong and China, and
prohibiting those whose oaths are determined to be
invalid from retaking the oath. Lawyers, legislators,
activists, and rights organizations strongly criticized
the NPCSC interpretation. The interpretation came while
a Hong Kong court was still considering the Hong Kong
government's case against two legislators-elect, Sixtus
``Baggio'' Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching. The Hong
Kong judge hearing the case ruled in the government's
favor, finding that Leung and Yau ``declin[ed] to take
the LegCo Oath'' and disqualifying the two.
Following the NPCSC interpretation, the Hong
Kong government continued to pursue legal cases against
participants in the 2014 pro-democracy protests and
members of the political opposition. In July 2017, a
Hong Kong court ruled in the government's favor to
disqualify four additional legislators over their oaths
of office, and charged another with desecrating the
Chinese and Hong Kong flags in a protest inside the
LegCo chamber. Hong Kong police also charged nine
leaders of the 2014 pro-democracy protests, including
two sitting legislators, the day after the Chief
Executive election.
In August 2017, the Hong Kong government
successfully appealed to increase the sentences of 13
protesters as well as pro-democracy student leaders
Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow. Some
international rights and domestic pro-democracy groups
asserted the prosecutions were politically motived,
which the Hong Kong government and two local legal
organizations have denied.
Hong Kong journalists reported continuing
fears over press freedom in Hong Kong, noting concerns
over self-censorship, government restrictions on
reporters, and the 2015 abductions and disappearances
of five Hong Kong booksellers by mainland Chinese
authorities. The Hong Kong government continued to
restrict the ability of online media to freely report,
including during the December 2016 Chief Executive
Election Committee subsector elections and the March
2017 Chief Executive election, drawing criticism from
international and Hong Kong rights organizations.
The Commission observed no progress in Macau
toward ``an electoral system based on universal and
equal suffrage . . .'' in line with provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as repeatedly recommended by the UN Human Rights
Committee. In December 2016, Macau's Legislative
Assembly revised the legislative electoral law to
disqualify candidates or legislators who do not swear
loyalty to Macau's Basic Law or who are ``not loyal''
to Macau. Critics of the revisions questioned the need
for such legal requirements and expressed concern that
the new law would threaten the right to free and fair
elections.
The Macau government continued to deny entry
to some pro-democracy politicians and activists from
Hong Kong. Macau authorities justified these denials by
asserting that the individuals barred from entering
Macau posed ``threats to Macau's internal stability and
security.'' One Macau pro-democracy activist suggested
that authorities wanted ``to prevent Hong Kong
activists from affecting the political atmosphere in
Macau.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Consider enacting the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act (S. 417) to monitor the state of Hong
Kong's autonomy from mainland China and reaffirm U.S.
support for democratization in Hong Kong.
Emphasize in meetings with Chinese and Hong Kong
officials that the continued erosion of Hong Kong's
autonomy under the ``one country, two systems''
principle, and as guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law, threatens the
underpinnings of U.S. policy toward Hong Kong,
particularly Hong Kong's separate treatment under U.S.
law.
Urge the Chinese and Hong Kong governments to restart
the electoral reform process and work toward
implementing Chief Executive and Legislative Council
elections by universal suffrage, in accordance with
Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law and Article 25 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).
Call on the Chinese and Macau governments to set a
timeline for implementing elections in Macau for Chief
Executive and the Legislative Assembly by universal
suffrage, as required under Article 25 of the ICCPR and
repeatedly urged by the UN Human Rights Committee.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http://
ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a
prisoner or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner's
database record for more detailed information about the
prisoner's case, including his or her alleged crime,
specific human rights that officials have violated,
stage in the legal process, and location of detention
or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations traveling to
China to present Chinese officials with lists of
political and religious prisoners compiled from
database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and private
citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city
relationships with China to explore the database, and
to advocate for the release of political and religious
prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's 2017 Annual Report provides information
about Chinese political and religious prisoners \5\ in the
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many
of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party's and
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare
summaries of information about political and religious
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific
Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual
Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at http://
ppdcecc.gov. (Information about the PPD is available at http://
www.cecc.gov/resources/political-prisoner-database.)
The PPD received approximately 393,000 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31,
2017--an increase of approximately 282 percent over the 139,300
requests reported in the Commission's 2016 Annual Report for
the 12-month period ending July 31, 2016.\6\ During the 12-
month period ending in July 2017, the United States remained
the country of origin for the largest share of requests for
information, with approximately 50.4 percent of such requests.
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, France was in the
second position, with approximately 2.7 percent of such
requests, followed by India (2.4 percent), China (2.3 percent),
Ukraine (2.1 percent), Brazil (2.1 percent), Japan (1.9
percent), the United Kingdom (1.8 percent), Taiwan (1.7
percent), and Romania (1.7 percent).
Internet Protocol addresses that do not provide information
about the name of the registrant or the type of domain were the
source of the largest share of online requests for information
during the Commission's 2017 reporting year, accounting for
approximately 44.9 percent of the 393,000 requests for
information in the 12-month period ending in July 2017. The
approximate number of requests from other sources are as
follows: Domains ending in .net were second, with 23.2 percent
of requests for PPD information. Domains ending in .com were
third, with 7.5 percent of online requests for information,
followed by U.S. Government (.gov) domains with 4.6 percent,
then by domains for Brazil (.br) with 1.9 percent, for the
European Union (.eu) with 1.4 percent, for Italy (.it), for
Germany (.de), and for Japan (.jp) with 1.1 percent each, and
for India (.in) with 1.0 percent. Educational (.edu) domains
accounted for 0.2 percent of requests for information, and
domains ending in .org for less than 0.1 percent of requests.
Domains for China (.cn) accounted for 0.1 percent of such
requests.
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the
staff member's area of expertise. The staff seek to provide
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners,
and about events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of August 1, 2017, the PPD contained information on
8,850 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,422 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
7,428 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or
soon after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that
there are considerably more than 1,422 cases of current
political and religious imprisonment in China. The Commission
staff work on an ongoing basis to add cases of political and
religious imprisonment to the PPD.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational
institutions, and individuals who research political and
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly
leveraged the capacity of the Commission's information and
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and
advocacy.
In 2015, the Commission enhanced the functionality to the
PPD to empower the Commission, the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, and individuals to
strengthen reporting on political and religious imprisonment in
China and advocacy undertaken on behalf of Chinese political
prisoners.
The PPD full text search and the basic search
both provide an option to return only records that
either include or do not include an image of the
prisoner.
PPD record short summaries accommodate more
text as well as greater capacity to link to external
websites.
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to handle the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These types include violations of the right to
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government
policy or government officials.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
Executive
Summary
Executive
Summary
Notes to Section I--Executive Summary
\1\ Tom Phillips, ``China's `War on Law': Victims' Wives Tell US
Congress of Torture and Trauma,'' Guardian, 18 May 17.
\2\ ``Chinese Rights Lawyer `Released' After Guilty Plea During
Subversion Trial,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 May 17.
\3\ Kelvin Chan, ``Young Leaders of Massive 2014 Hong Kong Protests
Get Prison,'' Associated Press, 17 August 17.
\4\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, ``Hearing on `Will
the Hong Kong Model Survive? An Assessment 20 Years After the Handover'
'' [Video file], YouTube, 3 May 17, 1 hr. 48 min. 47 sec.
Notes to Section I--Political Prisoner Database
\5\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to
advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize
government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative,
not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or
imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by
China's Constitution and law, or by international law, or both. Chinese
security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to
distract attention from the political or religious nature of
imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner
under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases,
defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce
confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of
evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone
to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel
adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access
to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a
defense.
\6\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 56.
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liu Xiaobo's Death in July 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imprisoned writer Liu Xiaobo--an advocate of democracy and non-violent
political reform and China's only Nobel Peace Prize laureate \1\--died
of liver cancer on July 13, 2017, in Shenyang municipality, Liaoning
province, on medical parole.\2\ In the nine years prior to his death,
he spent one year in pretrial detention and nearly eight years in
prison on the charge of ``inciting subversion of state power'' for his
coauthorship of the political treatise Charter 08 and several essays
critical of the Chinese Communist Party and government.\3\ Granted
medical parole on June 26, 2017,\4\ Liu remained under official
surveillance at a hospital in Shenyang, serving his 11-year prison
sentence,\5\ until his death.\6\ Liu's political activism dated back to
the 1989 Tiananmen protests,\7\ for which Chinese authorities
imprisoned him for 21 months; Liu subsequently served 3 years of
reeducation through labor from 1996 through 1999 for criticizing
government policies.\8\ Before his final detention in December 2008,
Liu was a prolific essayist and poet \9\ and active within Chinese
democracy and writers' advocacy communities.\10\
International media outlets,\11\ human rights organizations and
proponents,\12\ representatives of foreign governments,\13\ and the UN
human rights commissioner,\14\ among others,\15\ expressed concern and
censure regarding the Chinese government's treatment of Liu Xiaobo and
his wife, the poet and artist Liu Xia. Condemnation focused on Chinese
authorities' denial of Liu's request to receive medical treatment
outside China \16\ and restrictions on access in the hospital for Liu's
family.\17\ In the hospital, Liu reportedly wrote the forward to an
unpublished collection of Liu Xia's photography,\18\ but it is unknown
if he was able to speak openly about his conditions and medical
treatment in prison, his political and familial concerns, his wishes
with regard to his burial, or any other matters while under official
surveillance.\19\ The government and Party continued to isolate Liu Xia
in extralegal confinement after her husband's death, a condition that
Chinese authorities imposed on her starting in October 2010 when the
Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that it would award the 2010 Nobel
Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo,\20\ despite ongoing calls for her
release.\21\
Observers commented on the combination of propaganda and control in
the limited Chinese media coverage of Liu's illness and death.\22\ The
Party-run English-language media outlet Global Times,\23\ together with
other government and Party actors, engaged in an ``all-out government
propaganda effort to counter domestic and international criticism,''
according to Radio Free Asia.\24\ An academic group in Canada that
studies censorship reported Chinese censors deleted text and images
about Liu Xiaobo sent via the instant messaging tool WeChat before
content reached intended recipients.\25\ Individuals who sought to
commemorate Liu's death in China faced government harassment,\26\
including at least nine detained by authorities in Guangdong, Fujian,
and Liaoning provinces.\27\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Standards on Freedom of Expression
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
restrict expression in contravention of international human
rights standards, including Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 19
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\28\ According to
the ICCPR--which China signed \29\ but has not ratified \30\--
and as reiterated by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, countries may impose certain restrictions or
limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions are
provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of respecting
the ``rights or reputations of others'' or protecting national
security, public order, public health, or morals.\31\ An
October 2009 UN Human Rights Council resolution declares
restrictions on the ``discussion of government policies and
political debate,'' ``peaceful demonstrations or political
activities, including for peace or democracy,'' and
``expression of opinion and dissent'' are inconsistent with
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.\32\ The UN Human Rights Committee
noted in a 2011 General Comment that restrictions on freedom of
expression specified in Article 19(3) should be interpreted
narrowly and that the restrictions ``may not put in jeopardy
the right itself.'' \33\
Freedom of the Press
International non-governmental organization Reporters
Without Borders again ranked China among the five worst
countries for press freedom in its annual Press Freedom
Index.\34\ The Chinese government continued to be one of the
worst jailers of professional and citizen journalists, with
estimates of individuals in detention or imprisoned ranging
from 38 \35\ to approximately 100.\36\
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE NEWS MEDIA
The government and Party continued to prioritize control of
the press and media outlets for ``maintaining social and
political stability, and in advancing [the Party's] policy
goals.'' \37\ Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and state
media continued to stress the ``principle of Party character''
(dangxing yuanze) in the media,\38\ echoing Xi's highly
publicized statement in February 2016 that the news media
``must be surnamed Party'' (bixu xing dang).\39\ At a November
2016 meeting with the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA),
Xi urged media workers to ``embody the principle of Party
character,'' and ``be reliable for the Party and the people.''
\40\ The ACJA expounded on Xi's November speech in the Party's
theoretical journal Seeking Truth,\41\ describing the function
of ``supervision by public opinion'' (yulun jiandu)--an
official phrase debuted in 1987 to give the media some scope to
hold officials accountable in the public interest \42\--as a
form of positive, mainstream propaganda to pacify the
public.\43\ In a Xinhua report of the ACJA meeting, a senior
China Central Television executive declared positive news
reporting and ``supervision by public opinion'' are not
contrary to each other.\44\ Moreover, the government has
encouraged, and in some cases paid, social media users to post
positive comments about the government and Party to influence
public opinion.\45\ U.S.-based researchers have estimated these
types of social media comments to number around 448 million per
year.\46\
International experts have cautioned that media serving
``as government mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies
operating in the public interest'' are a major challenge to
free expression.\47\ In the case of the government and Party's
ongoing crackdown on human rights lawyers and advocates that
began in and around July 2015, official print and television
media outlets broadcasted forced confessions of human rights
lawyers this past year.\48\ State- and Party-run media outlets
The Paper, Legal Daily, and Procuratorial Daily published an
almost identical article under different bylines on December 16
and 17, 2016, that ascribed a litany of criminal offenses to
Jiang Tianyong,\49\ a lawyer disbarred in 2009 in connection
with his rights defense efforts.\50\ On March 1, 2017, the
Party-run media outlet Global Times published an article about
Jiang that alleged he fabricated the torture claims of fellow
rights lawyer Xie Yang.\51\ On March 2, Phoenix TV, a Hong
Kong-based station, reportedly broadcast a video of Jiang
admitting to this allegation.\52\ Chen Jian'gang, one of Xie
Yang's defense lawyers, repudiated the Global Times article and
the Phoenix TV broadcast and affirmed his role in transcribing
Xie's claims in the course of three meetings.\53\ [See Section
II--Criminal Justice and Section III--Access to Justice for
more information on Xie Yang and Jiang Tianyong as well as
developments in other cases of human rights lawyers and
advocates detained as part of the July 2015 crackdown.]
CENSORSHIP OF NEWS WEBSITES, HARASSMENT OF JOURNALISTS
Pervasive government and Party control and censorship
contributed to the shrinking space for journalism and public
debate.\54\ The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
observed that ``the Communist Party of China . . . targeted the
last few so-called `liberals' in the media'' in 2016,
demonstrated by the closure of the reform-minded journal
Yanhuang Chunqiu; \55\ the suspension of Consensus, a website
known for open discussion and commentary; \56\ the shutdown of
the economic think tank Unirule's website; \57\ and the two-
month suspension in October 2016 of Caixin news articles for
republication in other news media.\58\ The government's
punitive action against Caixin was for its alleged
``problematic guidance'' (daoxiang wenti) \59\ in covering the
opposition of some lawyers to revised administrative measures
for law firms, which prohibited lawyers from using media
outlets to publicize their cases.\60\
The Party regularly issues propaganda directives to control
Chinese news media through the Central Propaganda Department
and its lower level bureaus. Censored topics include Tibet,
Taiwan, and Falun Gong, as well as coverage of ``sensitive''
political anniversaries and events, such as the anniversary of
the 1989 Tiananmen protests and their violent suppression.\61\
This past year, some of the official censorship directives
reposted to the U.S.-based website China Digital Times \62\
targeted Liu Xiaobo's medical parole \63\ and reports on
natural disasters,\64\ public health,\65\ and pollution.\66\ In
June 2017, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly ordered
Chinese news media not to report independently on a landslide
in Sichuan province; journalists reportedly received government
press releases upon which to base their reports.\67\ An
international journalists' consortium selected nine
investigative news stories published in domestic Chinese media
outlets in 2016 that illustrated a range of public interest
reporting.\68\ China Digital Times, however, posted official
censorship directives for at least three of those news articles
or their subject matter.\69\
In spite of government-imposed censorship, media experts
have pointed to a ```semipolitical' sphere,'' in which some
Chinese journalists continued to cover ``. . . pertinent social
issues such as official accountability, gender equality, and
social welfare, amongst others.'' \70\ Another commentator
remarked that the ``highly personal focus'' of this form of
reporting may ``strip many articles of their larger, possibly
charged, political contexts.'' \71\ For example, two Party-
affiliated media outlets,\72\ Beijing News and Sixth Tone,
reported on the case of a man forced by local family planning
authorities in Yunnan province to undergo a vasectomy in
February 2017.\73\ Beijing News published an interview with the
man without additional analysis of the incident.\74\ While
Sixth Tone noted the government's ``strict birth control
measures since the 1980s . . .,'' \75\ it emphasized local
``unorthodox family planning practices,'' rather than examining
national family planning policy more broadly.\76\ [For more
information on this case and the implementation of population
planning policy, see Section II--Population Control.]
Several Chinese journalists and media outlets argued for
the protection of journalists' physical safety, government
accountability, and guarantees of their right to report on
events in the public interest following incidents of physical
violence against and obstruction of journalists on assignment
this past year.\77\ In December 2016, township-level police in
Qiqiha'er municipality, Heilongjiang province,\78\ reportedly
beat up two journalists from the official media outlet China
Education News who were investigating whistleblower allegations
about a local school's lunch program.\79\ Beijing News demanded
accountability from local officials for the violence against
its reporters during a February 2017 report on a fire in
Beijing municipality, noting that information on major
emergencies is in the public interest.\80\ Xinhua reporters
demanded accountability in the face of official obstruction
when they attempted to report on the case of a teenager who may
have committed suicide or been bullied to death in April 2017
at a school in Sichuan province.\81\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Prosecution of Citizen Journalists
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the heavy government censorship of official and market-oriented
media outlets, citizen journalists \82\ in China are a key source of
information on labor protests,\83\ petitioning the government for
redress of grievances, and other rights defense efforts.\84\ According
to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, the detentions this past year of the
founders of websites that featured citizen journalist reports
demonstrated the government's drive ``to criminalize those who document
human rights abuses and advocate for better human rights protections.''
\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Prosecution of Citizen Journalists--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lu Yuyu, founder of ``Not the News.'' In August 2017, the
Dali Municipal People's Court in the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture,
Yunnan province, sentenced citizen journalist Lu Yuyu to four years
in prison on the charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble.'' \86\ The same court reportedly released his collaborator
and girlfriend Li Tingyu on bail \87\ sometime after holding a closed
trial for her on the same charge in April 2017.\88\ Lu began
documenting mass incidents, such as labor protests and strikes,
across China in 2011; he and Li posted their work to Chinese and
international social media platforms under the names ``Not the News''
and ``Wickedonna.'' \89\ During Lu's trial in June 2017, Lu rejected
the prosecution's accusation that he had fabricated information about
mass incidents, emphasizing his aim to document history and make it
available for public access.\90\
Liu Feiyue, founder of Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch
website. In November 2016, authorities from Suizhou municipality,
Hubei province, detained Liu Feiyue, editor of the human rights
website Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW),\91\ arresting him in
December on the charge of ``subversion of state power.'' \92\ Radio
Free Asia reported that authorities added the charge ``illegally
supplying state secrets or intelligence for an overseas entity'' in
August 2017 to the case against him.\93\ CRLW has reported on a range
of human rights violations in China, such as protests and
demonstrations by petitioners and military veterans, and on the
forcible commitment of individuals without mental illness to
psychiatric facilities as a ``stability maintenance'' tool.\94\
Huang Qi, founder of 64 Tianwang website. In November 2016,
public security authorities from Sichuan province detained Huang Qi,
the founder of 64 Tianwang, and subsequently arrested him in December
on the charge of ``illegally supplying state secrets or intelligence
for an overseas entity.'' \95\ Based in Chengdu municipality,
Sichuan, Huang previously served prison sentences for posting
articles about the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests
and Falun Gong,\96\ and for aiding the parents of children who died
when poorly constructed school buildings collapsed during the 2008
earthquake in Sichuan.\97\
64 Tianwang volunteers. A number of volunteer citizen
journalists for 64 Tianwang \98\ were detained this past year or
served prison sentences. In September 2016, authorities in several
locations in China detained five 64 Tianwang volunteers who planned
to report on the G20 Summit in Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang
province.\99\ In June 2017, authorities criminally detained one of
these volunteers, Yang Xiuqiong, for disclosing information about
Huang Qi's case.\100\ In the cases of two additional 64 Tianwang
volunteers, authorities in Zhuji municipality, Zhejiang, reportedly
released Yang Dongying on November 5, 2016, upon her completion of a
sentence of one year and six months related to her criticism of local
police.\101\ Wang Jing continued to serve a four-year sentence in
Jilin province related to her 2014 64 Tianwang report on a self-
immolation incident at Tiananmen Square, despite multiple requests
for medical parole due to brain cancer.\102\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHALLENGES FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS
Several international organizations issued reports on the
difficult working conditions for foreign journalists in China,
including PEN America (September 2016),\103\ the Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC, November 2016),\104\ and
the International Federation of Journalists (January
2017).\105\ These reports detailed a range of methods used by
the Chinese government to restrict and harass foreign
journalists, including, as PEN America noted, ``physical abuse,
physical and online surveillance, denying or threatening to
deny reporters' visas, restricting reporters' access to certain
areas of the country, and harassment of sources and news
assistants.'' \106\ Selected cases from this reporting year
included the following:
Detention. In September 2016, local officials
reportedly briefly detained foreign journalists
covering protests in Wukan village, Lufeng county,
Shanwei municipality, Guangdong province.\107\
Plainclothes public security officers reportedly
assaulted several journalists from Hong Kong media in
Wukan and detained them for five hours at the Lufeng
Public Security Bureau before expelling them from
Lufeng.\108\
Harassment. A BBC correspondent and crew faced
at least two incidents of harassment and manhandling
while trying to interview an independent candidate for
a local election in Beijing municipality and a
petitioner in Hunan province in November 2016 \109\ and
March 2017,\110\ respectively.
Surveillance. A Los Angeles Times reporter
described tight surveillance of foreign journalists on
a government-organized tour in 2016 to Tibetan
autonomous areas of Sichuan province, noting:
``Everything was recorded. The foreign journalists
recorded the tour guides, and the Chinese reporters
recorded the foreign ones. The shadowy men recorded us
all.'' \111\
Blocked access. The government also continued
to block online access to the New York Times,
Bloomberg, Reuters, the Economist, and Time, as well as
to YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter.\112\ The
U.S. company Apple removed the New York Times
application (app) from its stores in China in December
2016, reportedly at the request of Chinese
authorities.\113\
Chinese citizens continued to be at risk of sanctions for
speaking with foreign journalists. The April 2017 judgment
against human rights lawyer Li Heping cited his having spoken
with foreign media as one of several activities that allegedly
``subverted state power.'' \114\ Radio Free Asia reported that
following its article in March 2017 on petitioning activities
by a group of private school, substitute, and kindergarten
teachers, security authorities had ``chats'' with some of the
teachers, surveilled their phone calls and social media posts
(blocking some messages), and threatened detention if the
teachers spoke with foreign reporters again.\115\ The threat of
retaliation, moreover, has resulted in a chilling effect: \116\
According to PEN America, Chinese expert sources were ``less
willing to share information or opinions with foreign media for
fear of government reprisal.'' \117\ Specific examples of
reprisals reported on during this past year included the
following:
Imprisonment. In November 2016, the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region High People's Court upheld a
19-year sentence against Zhang Haitao, an electronics
salesman and rights defender, for ``inciting subversion
of state power'' and ``stealing, spying, buying and
illegally supplying state secrets or intelligence for
an overseas entity.'' \118\ Zhang criticized the
government's ethnic policies, among other issues, in
his online writings and interviews with overseas news
media.\119\
Detention. Tashi Wangchug remained in pretrial
detention on the charge of ``inciting separatism'' for
his efforts to promote Tibetan language education in
Yushu (Kyegudo) city, Yushu (Yulshul) Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.\120\ In March
2016, authorities arrested him on the ``separatism''
charge due to his contact with New York Times
journalists whose two articles and a short documentary
about him were published in the New York Times in
November 2015.\121\
Travel denial. In March 2017, security
authorities in Qianyang county, Baoji municipality,
Shaanxi province, reportedly refused to issue a
passport and Hong Kong-Macau travel permit to Lu
Dongli, a long-time petitioner, due allegedly to his
activities connected to the July 2015 crackdown on
human rights lawyers and legal advocates and for
speaking with foreign reporters.\122\
Dismissal. In April 2017, the Chinese Academy
of Governance, a training institute for government
officials in Beijing,\123\ removed a retired professor
from an expert committee at the institute for
presenting ``flawed viewpoints'' during interviews with
foreign media in 2016.\124\
Intensifying Government and Party Control of the Internet and Social
Media
CENSORSHIP
The government and Party employ methods to implement
Internet and social media policies aimed at controlling the
flow of information in order to, as one expert said, ``guide
the narrative in the direction that the state determines.''
\125\ Reports this past year identified an intensification of
control over the Internet and social media platforms,
attributing it, in part, to the upcoming 19th National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party.\126\ The PRC Cybersecurity Law
took effect on June 1, 2017,\127\ giving online censorship
``the weight of law,'' according to the Wall Street
Journal.\128\ Also in June, the Cyberspace Administration of
China reportedly ordered the closure of 90 entertainment and
gossip social media accounts, purportedly to bring the service
providers into compliance with the Cybersecurity Law and
``ensure political security.'' \129\
Social media providers in China play a major role in
carrying out censorship as required by the government's legal
and regulatory requirements.\130\ The chairman of Weibo, a
Twitter-like social media platform, reportedly stated that
Weibo had been censoring fake news for years,\131\ following
the news that the U.S. company Facebook had taken steps to stop
the spread of misinformation.\132\ The domestic company Tencent
shut down 45,000 WeChat accounts for a six-month period--
approximately September 2016 through February 2017--allegedly
for rumor-mongering, though some WeChat group facilitators
speculated that Tencent closed their groups because of
politically sensitive content.\133\ [For more information on
the PRC Cybersecurity Law, see Section III--Commercial Rule of
Law.]
Citizen Lab, an information technology and human rights
research center based in Canada, published findings on content
filtering of social media platforms WeChat and Weibo, observing
a high level of flexibility and speed in response to issues and
events deemed politically sensitive.\134\ Liu Xiaobo's death;
\135\ the names of human rights lawyers, including many of
those ensnared in the July 2015 crackdown; \136\ and
information about the January 2017 Kalachakra, a major Tibetan
Buddhist teaching convened by the Dalai Lama in India, were
among the range of keywords, keyword combinations, and images
filtered by censors during this reporting year.\137\ The
consequences of the censorship are serious, according to
Citizen Lab: in the case of the rights defenders, international
advocacy via social messaging ``fail[s] to reach domestic
audiences in China due to information control practices.''
\138\ Restricted access to information about events like the
Kalachakra effectively constrains Tibetan Buddhists' religious
freedom and right to freedom of movement and assembly.\139\
CLOSING DOWN ACCESS TO VPNS
The Chinese government took aggressive action \140\ during
this reporting year to limit online users' attempts to
circumvent the Chinese government's censorship hardware and
software--its ``Great Firewall'' \141\--by means of virtual
private networks (VPNs) to access to prohibited websites and
social media platforms.\142\ These efforts included a notice in
January 2017 from the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT) requiring government approval for VPN service
providers in China \143\ and the publication by the Chongqing
Municipality Public Security Bureau in March of administrative
punishment guidelines for improper corporate or personal VPN
use within Chongqing, a province-level municipality.\144\
Commentators raised concerns that these regulatory efforts
``effectively [put] most of the country's providers of VPNs in
violation of the law.'' \145\ According to Bloomberg News, MIIT
authorities moved to prohibit individual use of VPN technology,
directing state-run telecommunications companies in July to
block such access by February 2018.\146\ MIIT refuted
Bloomberg's report via The Paper, asserting it had not issued a
directive toward that goal; rather, the targets of its January
2017 notice were VPN service providers lacking official
approval.\147\ In a similar vein, a provincial branch of the
Cyberspace Administration of China contacted five e-commerce
platforms in August, warning them to stop selling illegal
VPNs.\148\ In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),
authorities took criminal measures against VPN users: Fei Chang
Dao, a blog that monitors freedom of speech in China, reported
the case of Tian Weiguo, whom authorities in Kuitun city, Yili
(Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, sentenced to three
years' imprisonment on the charge of ``inciting ethnic hatred''
after he circumvented the government's censorship technology to
post comments on external social media platforms.\149\ In
another case from the XUAR, in October 2016, police in Changji
Hui Autonomous Prefecture reportedly detained an individual for
downloading VPN software, referring to it as ``violent and
terrorist software.'' \150\ [For more information on this case,
see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Punishing Citizens' Free Expression
The government and Party continued to violate international
standards on the right to freedom of expression, in part by
using laws and regulations to prosecute speech the government
finds politically sensitive.\151\ In addition to the Party and
government censorship mechanisms used to control official
narratives discussed earlier in this section, the Commission
observed judicial and legislative developments this past year
that aimed to protect the Party and government's version of the
``national historical narrative.'' \152\ In October 2016, the
Supreme People's Court (SPC) released four civil law model
cases about the purported libel of several World War II and
Korean War era figures, commenting that the protection of
heroes' reputations and honor are linked to ``core socialist
values'' and the protection of the public interest.\153\ SPC
President Zhou Qiang subsequently urged provincial high
people's court presidents at a January 2017 meeting to
``develop judicial interpretations for cases that harm the
reputations of heroes and historical figures; to protect
leaders and heroic martyrs according to law; and to resolutely
defend the Party and People's Liberation Army's glorious
history.'' \154\ In March, the National People's Congress
passed a code of civil law, which took effect on October 1,
2017; the law contains a provision to impose civil liability on
those who harm the ``names, portraits, reputations and honor''
of heroes and martyrs.\155\ This provision was a late addition
to the draft civil code,\156\ reportedly in reaction to one of
the model cases.\157\
This past year, authorities took punitive action against
Chinese officials, journalists, writers, publishers, and
university professors, including disciplinary action, job
termination, detention, and imprisonment for speech critical of
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping,\158\ former
leader Mao Zedong,\159\ and political campaigns and events of
modern Chinese history.\160\ A scholar observed that the
sensitivity around criticism of Xi Jinping and the Party
reflects ``a leadership worried about political agitation and
social unrest as disruptive reforms advance.'' \161\ Fei Chang
Dao posted the court judgments of citizens sentenced to prison
terms related to political opinions shared on social media
platforms on the charges of ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble'' \162\ and ``defamation.'' \163\ In April 2017, a
court in Shandong province sentenced long-time petitioner Wang
Jiangfeng to two years' imprisonment on the charge of ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble'' after sharing material within
two private social media chat groups that allegedly ``seriously
disparaged the individual reputations of Mao Zedong and Xi
Jinping.'' \164\ An ethnic Korean rights advocate Kwon Pyong
(Quan Ping) ``disappeared'' on October 1, 2016, shortly after
posting online a photo of himself wearing a T-shirt that
allegedly mocked Xi Jinping.\165\ Authorities in Yanji city,
Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, later
indicted Kwon on the charge of ``inciting subversion of state
power.'' \166\
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\ ``The Spirit of Liu Xiaobo,'' New York Times, 13 July 17.
\2\ Ibid.; Shenyang Municipal Justice Bureau, ``Liu Xiaobo's Death
Due to Illness'' [Liu xiaobo bing wang], 13 July 17.
\3\ The Tragic Case of Liu Xiaobo, Hearing of the Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, 14 July 17, Testimony of Yang Jianli, President,
Initiatives for China/Citizen Power. See also ``The Criminal Verdict''
in No Enemies, No Hatred, eds. Perry Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, and Liu
Xia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 336-
37, para. 15.
\4\ Liaoning Prison Administrative Bureau, ``Liu Xiaobo Approved
for Medical Parole Due to Illness'' [Liu xiaobo yin bing bei pizhun
baowai jiuyi], 26 June 17.
\5\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Liu Xiaobo Granted Medical Parole,'' 26
June 17. Dui Hua Foundation noted that, under Chinese law, ``[it] is
not correct to say that the prisoner granted medical parole is `free,'
nor is it correct to say that the prisoner has been `released.' The
prisoner is still serving his/or her sentence, albeit in a location
other than the prison itself.''
\6\ Chris Buckley, ``Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Dissident Who Won Nobel
While Jailed, Dies at 61,'' New York Times, 13 July 17.
\7\ Ibid.; Josh Chin, ``Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo, Who Fought for
Democracy in China, Dies in Police Custody,'' Wall Street Journal, 13
July 17.
\8\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Democratic Voice Liu Xiaobo Dies
in Custody,'' 13 July 17. See also ``The Criminal Verdict'' in No
Enemies, No Hatred, eds. Perry Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, and Liu Xia
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 337,
para. 18.
\9\ No Enemies, No Hatred, eds. Perry Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao,
and Liu Xia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2012), parts 1-3.
\10\ Chris Buckley, ``Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Dissident Who Won Nobel
While Jailed, Dies at 61,'' New York Times, 13 July 17; ``The Spirit of
Liu Xiaobo,'' New York Times, 13 July 17. For more information on Liu
Xiaobo, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
03114.
\11\ See, e.g., ``The Spirit of Liu Xiaobo,'' New York Times, 13
July 17; ``The Guardian View on Liu Xiaobo's Death: Free the Nobel
Laureate's Wife Now,'' Guardian, 13 July 17.
\12\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``G20: Press China To Free
Nobel Laureate,'' 5 July 17; Paul Carsten, ``Malala Condemns China Over
Death of Fellow Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo,'' Reuters, 18 July 17;
``Many Urge Release of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia, Beijing: Do Not
Interfere in Internal Affairs'' [Duofang cu huan liu xiaobo fufu ziyou
beijing: wu ganshe neizheng], Voice of America, 28 June 17.
\13\ See, e.g., Chris Buckley, ``Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Dissident Who
Won Nobel While Jailed, Dies at 61,'' New York Times, 13 July 17;
``China Protests Criticism From Germany, UN, France Over Late Dissident
Liu Xiaobo's Treatment,'' Agence-France Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong
Free Press, 15 July 17.
\14\ ``Concerned About Liu Xiaobo, UN Rights Office Urges Access to
Jailed Rights Defender,'' UN News Centre, 7 July 17; ``World Loses
`Principled Champion,' Says UN Rights Chief on Death of China's Liu
Xiaobo,'' UN News Centre, 13 July 17.
\15\ See, e.g., ``Many Urge Release of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia,
Beijing: Do Not Interfere in Internal Affairs'' [Duofang cu huan liu
xiaobo fufu ziyou beijing: wu ganshe neizheng], Voice of America, 28
June 17; ``Hong Kong Group Holds Candlelight Vigil in Central, Pressing
for Release of Liu Xiaobo'' [Gang tuanti zhonghuan zhuguang jihui cu
fang liu xiaobo], Voice of America, 29 June 17.
\16\ See, e.g., Tom Phillips, ``Activists Call on China To Release
Liu Xiaobo for Cancer Treatment Abroad,'' Guardian, 9 July 17.
\17\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``G20: Press China To Free
Nobel Laureate,'' 5 July 17.
\18\ Chris Buckley, ``Liu Xiaobo's Dying Words for His Wife,'' New
York Times, 14 July 17; Zhang Jiping, ``Exclusive: Complete Text of Liu
Xiaobo's Last Hand-Written Manuscript of July 5th Revealed, Last Gift
for Liu Xia'' [Dujia: liu xiaobo 7 yue 5 ri zuihou shougao quanwen
pilu, song gei liu xia zuihou liwu], Initium Media, 14 July 17.
\19\ The Tragic Case of Liu Xiaobo, Hearing of the Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, 14 July 17, Testimony of Yang Jianli, President,
Initiatives for China/Citizen Power.
\20\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Democratic Voice Liu Xiaobo Dies
in Custody,'' 13 July 17; ``Liu Xia Appears for First Time Since
Husband Liu Xiaobo's Funeral,'' Reuters, reprinted in Guardian, 19
August 17; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Widow of Nobel Laureate Feared
`Disappeared,' '' 20 July 17.
\21\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Hold Xi Jinping
Accountable for Liu Xiaobo's Death in Custody, Free Liu Xia,'' 13 July
17; ``The Guardian View on Liu Xiaobo's Death: Free the Nobel
Laureate's Wife Now,'' Guardian, 13 July 17; ``U.N. Rights Chief Seeks
Meeting With China Over Liu Xiaobo's Widow,'' Reuters, 20 July 17. For
more information on Liu Xia, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2010-00629.
\22\ Verna Yu, ``China's New Media Strategy: The Case of Liu
Xiaobo,'' The Diplomat, 28 July 17; Gerry Shih, ``China Controls
Information About Ailing Nobel Prize Laureate,'' 12 July 17; China
Digital Times, ``China Controls Information About Liu Xiaobo,'' 12 July
17; China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: No Reports on Liu Xiaobo's Medical
Parole,'' 29 June 17.
\23\ See, e.g., ``National Team of Medical Experts Treat Liu Xiaobo
as Abdominal Swelling Worsens,'' Global Times, 6 July 17; ``Dissidents
Waste Lives as China Prospers,'' Global Times, 16 July 17; ``Overseas
Forces Must Stop Politicizing Liu Xiaobo's Wife,'' Global Times, 18
July 17.
\24\ ``China in `Whitewash Campaign' Ahead of Liu Xiaobo's Death,''
Radio Free Asia, 13 July 17.
\25\ Masashi Crete-Nishihata et al., ``Remembering Liu Xiaobo,''
University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 16
July 17.
\26\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Widow of Nobel Laureate Feared
`Disappeared,' '' 20 July 17; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Seven
Confirmed Detained for Mourning Liu Xiaobo, Whereabouts of Liu Xia
Remain Unknown,'' 3 August 17; ``Poet Held in Southern China Over
Planned Poetry Anthology Remembering Liu Xiaobo,'' Radio Free Asia, 22
August 17.
\27\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Seven Confirmed Detained for
Mourning Liu Xiaobo, Whereabouts of Liu Xia Remain Unknown,'' 3 August
17; Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on Guangdong Sea Commemoration
Case: Wei Xiaobing and He Lin Released on Bail, All 6 of Those
Originally Criminally Detained Released, Ma Qiang Only One For Whom
Situation Is Unclear'' [Guangdong haiji an tongbao: wei xiaobing, he
lin qubao huoshi yuan bei xingju 6 ren jun huoshi ma qiang 1 ren reng
qingkuang bu ming], 20 August 17.
\28\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on
10 December 48, art. 19.
\29\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 15
July 17. China signed the convention on October 5, 1998.
\30\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua, 29
September 16, sec. V.
\31\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, 16 May
11, para. 24.
\32\ Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/
RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i).
\33\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19,
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para.
21.
\34\ Reporters Without Borders, ``World Press Freedom Index,'' last
visited 16 May 17, Index details, China.
\35\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Turkey's
Crackdown Propels Number of Journalists in Jail Worldwide to Record
High,'' 13 December 16; Committee to Protect Journalists, ``2016 Prison
Census: 259 Journalists Jailed Worldwide,'' 13 December 16.
\36\ Reporters Without Borders, ``World Press Freedom Index,'' last
visited 16 May 17, China.
\37\ David Bandurski, ``The Making of a Good Party Reporter,''
University of Hong Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China
Media Project, 3 January 17.
\38\ Wang Yanwen, ``Let the Principle of Party Character Stand Up
and Be Strengthened'' [Rang dangxing yuanze li qilai qiang qilai],
Seeking Truth, 15 February 17; Zhang Lei, ``Firmly Adhere to the
Principle of Party Character Without Wavering'' [Laolao jianchi
dangxing yuanze bu dongyao], Economic News, 17 February 17. See also Wu
Jing and Wang Sibei, ``Xi Jinping: Be Reliable News Media Workers for
the Party and the People'' [Xi jinping: zuo dang he renmin xinlai de
xinwen gongzuozhe], Xinhua, 7 November 16.
\39\ ``Xi Jinping's View on News and Public Opinion'' [Xi jinping
de xinwen yulun guan], People's Daily, 25 February 16. See also ``Xi's
Speech on News Reporting Resonates With Domestic Outlets,'' Xinhua, 22
February 16; China Digital Times, ``Xi's State Media Tour: `News Must
Speak for the Party,' '' 19 February 16; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 61.
\40\ All-China Journalists Association, ``Diligently Work at Being
a Media Worker on Whom the Party and People Can Rely'' [Nuli zuo dang
he renmin xinlai de xinwen gongzuozhe], Seeking Truth, 31 December 16.
See also Wu Jing and Wang Sibei, ``Xi Jinping: Be Reliable News Media
Workers for the Party and the People'' [Xi jinping: zuo dang he renmin
xinlai de xinwen gongzuozhe], Xinhua, 7 November 16.
\41\ All-China Journalists Association, ``Diligently Work at Being
a Media Worker on Whom the Party and People Can Rely'' [Nuli zuo dang
he renmin xinlai de xinwen gongzuozhe], Seeking Truth, 31 December 16;
David Bandurski, ``The Making of a Good Party Reporter,'' University of
Hong Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 3
January 17.
\42\ Li-Fung Cho, ``The Emergence of China's Watchdog Reporting,''
in Investigative Journalism in China: Eight Cases in Chinese Watchdog
Journalism, eds. David Bandurski and Martin Hala (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2010), 165-67. See also Anthony Kuhn, ``For Years,
I've Been a Correspondent in China. This Month, I Became a Viral
Star.,'' NPR, 18 March 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 62-
63.
\43\ All-China Journalists Association, ``Diligently Work at Being
a Media Worker on Whom the Party and People Can Rely'' [Nuli zuo dang
he renmin xinlai de xinwen gongzuozhe], Seeking Truth, 31 December 16;
David Bandurski, ``The Making of a Good Party Reporter,'' University of
Hong Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 3
January 17.
\44\ Wu Jing et al., ``Be a Reliable News Media Worker for the
Party and the People--Hugely Enthusiastic Responses Among News Workers
to General Secretary Xi Jinping's Important Speech'' [Zuo dang he
renmin xinlai de xinwen gongzuozhe--xi jinping zongshuji zhongyao
jianghua zai guangda xinwen gongzuozhe zhong yinqi relie fanxiang],
Xinhua, 8 November 16.
\45\ China's Information Controls, Global Media Influence, and
Cyber Warfare Strategy, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 4 May 17, Testimony of Xiao Qiang, Adjunct
Professor, Director, School of Information, University of California,
Berkeley, and Founder and Chief Editor, China Digital Times, 2. See
also Mary Gallagher and Blake Miller, ``Can the Chinese Government
Really Control the Internet? We Found Cracks in the Great Firewall.,''
Washington Post, Monkey Cage (blog), 21 February 17.
\46\ Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, ``How the
Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic
Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,'' Harvard University, Faculty Page
of Gary King, last visited 19 July 17, American Political Science
Review (forthcoming), 34; China's Information Controls, Global Media
Influence, and Cyber Warfare Strategy, Hearing of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 4 May 17, Testimony of
Margaret E. Roberts, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of California, San Diego, 2.
\47\ UN Human Rights Council, Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration:
Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade,
Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/
14/23/Add.2, 25 March 10, art. 1(a).
\48\ International Federation of Journalists, ``Media Cooperate in
Two More Televised `Confessions,' '' 9 March 17; China Change, ``Co-
opting Trump, Chinese State Propaganda Brands Torture Revelations `Fake
News,' '' 9 March 17. See also PEN America, ``Darkened Screen:
Constraints on Foreign Journalists in China,'' 22 September 16, 5.
\49\ Zhuang An, ``Jiang Tianyong, Suspected of Breaking the Law,
Placed Under Criminal Compulsory Measures According to Law'' [Jiang
tianyong shexian weifa fanzui bei yifa caiqu xingshi qiangzhi cuoshi],
The Paper, 16 December 16; Cai Changchun, ``Jiang Tianyong, Suspected
of Breaking the Law, Placed Under Criminal Compulsory Measures
According to Law'' [Jiang tianyong shexian weifa fanzui bei yifa caiqu
xingshi qiangzhi cuoshi], Legal Daily, 16 December 16; Wang Zhiguo,
``Jiang Tianyong, Suspected of Breaking the Law, Placed Under Criminal
Compulsory Measures According to Law'' [Jiang tianyong shexian weifa
fanzui bei yifa caiqu xingshi qiangzhi cuoshi], Procuratorial Daily, 17
December 16.
\50\ Amnesty International, ``China: Human Rights Lawyers
Disbarred,'' 15 July 09; ``Human Rights Lawyer: Failed Annual
Inspection and Registration, License Revoked, Worried Persecution Will
Continue'' [Weiquan lushi: nianjian bu guo zhizhao bei diaoxiao you
daya chixu], Radio Free Asia, 16 July 09; Elizabeth Lynch, ``Codifying
Illegality? The Case of Jiang Tianyong,'' China Law & Policy (blog), 20
January 17. See also Zhang Yan, ``Story of Torture Is `Fake,' '' China
Daily, 2 March 17.
\51\ ``Exposing the Truth of `Xie Yang's Torture': Catering to the
West With Baseless, False News'' [Jiemi ``xie yang zao kuxing''
zhenxiang: wei yinghe xifang pingkong niezao], Global Times, 1 March
17. The Global Times made reference to written records of Xie's January
2017 meetings with his defense lawyers, detailing Changsha
municipality, Hunan province, officials' use of torture against Xie.
See Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang
(One)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (yi)], reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 19 January 17; Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting
With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu
(er)], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17; Josh Chin,
``Document of Torture: One Chinese Lawyer's Story From Jail,'' Wall
Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 20 January 17. English
translations of the records of Xie's meetings are available at the
China Change website. See ``Transcript of Interviews With Lawyer Xie
Yang (1)--Arrest, Questions About Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Group,''
China Change, 19 January 17; ``Transcript of Interviews With Lawyer Xie
Yang (2)--Sleep Deprivation,'' China Change, 20 January 17;
``Transcript of Interviews With Lawyer Xie Yang (3)--Dangling Chair,
Beating, Threatening Lives of Loved Ones, and Framing Others,'' China
Change, 21 January 17; ``Transcript of Interviews With Lawyer Xie Yang
(4)--Admit Guilt, Keep Your Mouth Shut,'' China Change, 22 January 17.
\52\ `` `Global Times' Slanders Jiang Tianyong for Fabricating Xie
Yang's Torture, Jin Bianling Plans To Bring Lawsuit Against Authorities
for Defamation'' [``Huanshi'' dihui jiang tianyong niezao xie yang zao
kuxing jin bianling ni konggao dangju mohei], Radio Free Asia, 2 March
17; Yaxue Cao, ``China's Extraordinary Response to the 11-Nation Letter
Over the Torture of Human Rights Lawyers,'' China Change, 28 March 17.
\53\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Chen Jian'gang: Before and
After Meeting With Xie Yang'' [Chen jian'gang lushi: huijian xie yang
de qianhou], 3 March 17.
\54\ Other factors include financial and technical pressures. See,
e.g., Li Xueqing, ``News Buzz to Biz II: Xu Jun on China's Content
Entrepreneurs,'' Sixth Tone, 3 October 16; David Bandurski,
``Millennial Shift for China's Journalists,'' University of Hong Kong,
Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 25 April 17.
\55\ International Federation of Journalists, ``Strangling the
Media: China Tightens Its Grip,'' January 2017, 26-27. See also Xiao
Bai, ``The Death of `Yanhuang Chunqiu,' '' [``Yanhuang chunqiu'' zhi
si], InMediaHK, 10 October 16.
\56\ David Bandurski, ``The End of Consensus,'' University of Hong
Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 3
October 16; Tom Tsui, ``China's Consensus Net, a Website for Open
Intellectual Discussion, Has Suddenly Shut Down,'' Quartz, 3 October
16.
\57\ Jun Mai, ``Chinese Liberal Think Tank Slams Beijing Censors
After Website and Media Accounts Shut Down,'' South China Morning Post,
24 January 17.
\58\ David Bandurski, ``Speak Not of Lawyers Speaking Out,''
University of Hong Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China
Media Project, 12 October 16; Cao Guoxing, ``Caixin Online Temporarily
Suspended for Two Months for Reporting With `Problematic Guidance' ''
[Caixin wang yin baodao ``daoxiang wenti'' bei zanting zhuanzai liang
ge yue], Radio France Internationale, 11 October 16; China Digital
Times, ``Minitrue: Two-Month Ban on Republishing Caixin Content,'' 11
October 16.
\59\ Ibid. The government's criticism of Caixin's ``problematic
guidance'' may be a reference to the ``theory of guidance,'' a
government term from the 1990s that allowed space for market-oriented
media but required ``correct political guidance.'' For the ``theory of
guidance,'' see Qiao Mu, ``Stuck in the Middle,'' Oriental Daily, 13
February 17, translated in University of Hong Kong, Journalism and
Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 15 February 17.
\60\ David Bandurski, ``Speak Not of Lawyers Speaking Out,''
University of Hong Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China
Media Project, 12 October 16; Cao Guoxing, ``Caixin Online Temporarily
Suspended for Two Months for Reporting With `Problematic Guidance' ''
[Caixin wang yin baodao ``daoxiang wenti'' bei zanting zhuanzai liang
ge yue], Radio France Internationale, 11 October 16; China Digital
Times, ``Minitrue: Two-Month Ban on Republishing Caixin Content,'' 11
October 16.
\61\ Beina Xu and Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations,
``Media Censorship in China,'' 17 February 17; Sarah Cook, ``All the
News Unfit To Print: What Beijing Quashed in 2016,'' Foreign Policy,
Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 16 December 16. See also China Digital Times,
``Minitrue: Do Not Present Taiwan as a Separate Political Entity,'' 24
May 17; Sabine Peschel, ``Poet Yang Lian: `There Are Cracks and Holes
in China's Censorship,' '' Deutsche Welle, 1 July 16.
\62\ China Digital Times, a U.S.-based Web portal that aggregates
and analyzes English and Chinese language media, features translations
of leaked censorship directives at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/
directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth/. For an analysis of directives
posted to China Digital Times in 2016, see Sarah Cook, ``All the News
Unfit To Print: What Beijing Quashed in 2016,'' Foreign Policy, Tea
Leaf Nation (blog), 16 December 16.
\63\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: No Reports on Liu Xiaobo's
Medical Parole,'' 29 June 17.
\64\ See, e.g., China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Follow Xinhua on
Jiuzhaigou Earthquake,'' 8 August 17; China Digital Times, ``Jeremy
Brown: How the Party Handles Accidents,'' 10 August 17.
\65\ See, e.g., China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Delete Report on
Air Pollution Deaths,'' 6 February 17.
\66\ See, e.g., China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Do Not Repost News
on Zhejiang HIV Infections,'' 9 February 17.
\67\ Sue-Lin Wong, ``Chinese Reporters Say Blocked From Sichuan
Landslide Coverage,'' Reuters, 28 June 17. See also China Digital
Times, ``Jeremy Brown: How the Party Handles Accidents,'' 10 August 17.
Jeremy Brown has observed that the Party ``put[s] natural disasters in
the same category as accidents,'' viewing them as ``political
disturbances.''
\68\ Global Investigative Journalism Network, ``Best Investigative
Stories in China--2016,'' 20 February 17. This reporting included The
Paper's March 2016 report about an illegal vaccine trade network based
in Shandong province; Beijing News' report in May 2016 that expressed
skepticism of the official story about the death of an
environmentalist; and Caixin media's reports on a toxic running track
at a school in Beijing municipality and a fraudulent weight loss
product.
\69\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Don't Hype Article on Illegal
Vaccines,'' 22 March 16; China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Police Escape
Charges Over Arrest Death,'' 23 December 16; China Digital Times,
``Minitrue: Inner Workings of Shady Medical Business [Updated],'' 10
May 16.
\70\ Maria Repnikova and Kecheng Fang, ``China's New Media: Pushing
Political Boundaries Without Being Political,'' Foreign Affairs, 12
October 16.
\71\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ``China, Explained,'' Foreign
Policy, 3 June 16.
\72\ Joseph Kahn, ``Beijing Censors Taken to Task in Party
Circles,'' New York Times, 15 February 06; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian,
``China, Explained,'' Foreign Policy, 3 June 16.
\73\ Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong,
Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again'' [Yunnan
zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jiezha nanzi: yi beizi bu xiang zai hui na ge
difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17; Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father
of Four Forced To Undergo Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17.
\74\ Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong,
Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again'' [Yunnan
zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jiezha nanzi: yi beizi bu xiang zai hui na ge
difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\75\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To Undergo
Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ See, e.g., Wang Yu, ``Luyi, Henan, Responds to `Journalist on
Assignment Is Assaulted': Court Police Chief Removed and Others
Suspected To Be Involved Receive Punishment'' [Henan luyi huiying
``jizhe caifang zao ouda'': sheshi fajing duizhang bei mianzhi duoren
shou chufen], Beijing News, 8 December 16; Wang Ruifeng, ``Follow-Up to
Shandong Journalist Beaten While on Assignment: Four Prosecuted, Police
Station Chief Loses Job'' [Shandong jizhe caifang bei da xu: si ren bei
tiqi gongsu, paichusuozhang bei mianzhi], Southern Weekend, 9 October
16.
\78\ Wang Shichuan, ``How Many Shady Issues Are Hidden Behind Story
of Beaten Reporters? '' [Jizhe bei da shijian cangzhe duoshao heimu],
Beijing Times, 19 December 16.
\79\ Sun Qianqian and Wang Ruifeng, ``Incident of Reporters Beaten
Up in Gannan County, Heilongjiang: Deputy Chief of Police Station
Dismissed'' [Heilongjiang gannan xian ouda jizhe shijian: paichusuo
fusuozhang bei chezhi], Southern Weekend, 18 December 16.
\80\ Wang Yanhu, ``Journalists on Assignment About Fire Emergency
Are Beaten Up, Don't Let the Law-Breakers Remain Free With Impunity''
[Jizhe caifang huozai bei da, buneng rang weifazhe xiaoyao fawai],
Beijing News, 27 February 17; Li Ming and Wang Yu, ``Beijing News
Journalist on Assignment at Laiguangying Fire Pushed to Ground by 6
Men, Cell Phone Confiscated'' [Xin jingbao jizhe caifang laiguangying
huozai bei 6 nanzi fangdao zaidi qiangzou shouji], Beijing News, 27
February 17.
\81\ Lu Qingfu and Xie Jiao, ``Xinhua Agency's Three Questions
About the On-Campus Death in Lu County: How Long Must We Wait for the
Facts? '' [Xinhuashe san wen lu xian xiaoyuan siwang shijian: nachu
shishi xuyao duojiu], Xinhua, reprinted in Sina, 5 April 17. Local
officials prevented the journalists from speaking with the dead boy's
mother and cordoned off access to the school. See also ``Xinhua Agency
Report on Luzhou Incident Said To Be Coordinating With Stability
Maintenance, Police Deny Similar Incident Already Took Place at This
School'' [Xinhuashe baodao luzhou shijian bei zhi peihe weiwen chuan
gai xiao ceng fasheng tonglei shijian jingfang fouren], Radio Free
Asia, 6 April 17.
\82\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19,
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para.
44. The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that, ``Journalism is a
function shared by a wide range of actors, including professional full-
time reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers and others who engage
in forms of self-publication in print, on the internet or elsewhere . .
..''
\83\ Edward Wong, ``Chinese Police Detain Activist Who Documents
Labor Protests,'' New York Times, 27 June 16; ``Blogger Who Compiled
Reports of Protests, Demonstrations Stands Trial in China's Yunnan,''
Radio Free Asia, 23 June 17.
\84\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human
Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 22; ``Five Citizen
Journalists From 64 Tianwang Detained During the G20, Reporters Without
Borders Calls on Authorities To Release Those Detained'' [Liusi
tianwang wu gongmin jizhe G20 bei zhua wuguojie jizhe hu dangju shifang
beibuzhe], Radio Free Asia, 8 September 16.
\85\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human
Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 8.
\86\ `` `Not the News' Founder Lu Yuyu Heavily Sentenced to 4
Years'' [``Fei xinwen'' chuangbanren lu yuyu bei zhongpan 4 nian],
Radio Free Asia (RFA), 3 August 17. According to RFA, authorities
criminally detained Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu--Lu's collaborator and
girlfriend--in June 2016 on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.''
\87\ ``Case of `Not the News' Li Tingyu Tried in Secret on
Thursday'' [``Fei xinwen'' li tingyu zhou si mimi shenxun], Radio Free
Asia, 20 April 17; Rights Defense Network, `` `Not the News' Founder Lu
Yuyu Sentenced to 4 Years Today, Girlfriend Li Tingyu Released on
Bail'' [``Fei xinwen'' chuangbanren lu yuyu jin huoxing 4 nian nuyou li
tingyu qubao huoshi], 3 August 17.
\88\ ``Case of `Not the News' Li Tingyu Tried in Secret on
Thursday'' [``Fei xinwen'' li tingyu zhou si mimi shenxun], Radio Free
Asia, 20 April 17.
\89\ Oiwan Lam, ``Founder of Protest Reporting Outlet Goes Missing
in China,'' Global Voices, 23 June 16; Austin Ramzy, ``Chinese Court
Sentences Activist Who Documented Protests to 4 Years in Prison,'' New
York Times, 4 August 17. See also Wu Qiang, ``What Do Lu Yuyu's
Statistics of Protest Tell Us About the Chinese Society Today? '' China
Change, 6 July 16; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 82.
\90\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Not the News Case: Defense
Lawyers Wang Zongyue and Xiao Yunyang Broke Their Silence and Made
Public the Court Hearing Record of Lu Yuyu Who Was Arrested for Picking
Quarrels and Provoking Trouble for Documenting Civil Rights Defense
Incidents'' [Fei xinwen an yin jilu minjian weiquan shijian yi xunxin
zishi an daibu de lu yuyu qi bianhu lushi wang zongyue, xiao yunyang
dapo chenmo gongkai tingshen qingkuang jilu], 25 June 17. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2016-00177 on Lu Yuyu and 2016-00190 on Li Tingyu.
\91\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Liu Feiyue, Director of
Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, Criminally Detained on Charge of
Subversion of State Power'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue bei yi
dianfu guojia zhengquan zui xingju], 24 November 16; Nomaan Merchant,
``China Detains Editor of Human Rights Website for Subversion,''
Associated Press, 25 November 16; ``Rights Website Founder Detained on
Subversion Charges in China's Hubei,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 November 16.
\92\ Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on CRLW Director Liu
Feiyue's Case: Family Members Receive `Arrest Notice' From Suizhou,
Hubei, PSB'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue an tongbao: jiashu
shoudao hubei suizhou shi gong'anju fa de ``daibu tongzhishu''], 11
January 17.
\93\ `` `Illegally Providing State Secrets Abroad' Added to Liu
Feiyue's Case'' [Liu feiyue bei jiakong ``wei jingwai feifa tigong
guojia mimi zui''], Radio Free Asia, 16 August 17.
\94\ Nomaan Merchant, ``China Detains Editor of Human Rights
Website for Subversion,'' Associated Press, 25 November 16. For more
information about Liu Feiyue, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2016-00460.
\95\ Rights Defense Network, ``Mainland NGO `64 Tianwang' Director
Huang Qi Arrested by Authorities'' [Dalu NGO ``liusi tianwang'' fuzeren
huang qi yi bei dangju zhixing daibu], 20 December 16.
\96\ ``Police in China's Sichuan Raid Rights Website, Detain
Founder,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 November 16; ``Web Site Manager Huang Qi
Released After Completing Sentence, but Restricted to Home Village,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 7 June 05.
\97\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``School Construction Critic Gets Prison
Term in China,'' New York Times, 23 November 09. For more information
about Huang Qi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2004-04053.
\98\ Catherine Lai, ``Interview: Prize-Winning Chinese Citizen
Journalism Website Still Going Strong Despite Suppression,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 12 November 16.
\99\ Reporters Without Borders, ``RSF Demands Release of Five
Citizen Journalists Arrested During G20,'' 6 September 16; ``China
Detains Five Women Citizen Journalists During the G20 Summit''
[Zhongguo zhuban G20 fenghui qijian daibu wuming nu gongmin jizhe], 7
September 16. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2016-00394 on Qin Chao, 2016-00395 on Yuan
Ying, 2016-00461 on Lin Xiurong, 2016-00462 on He Yazhen, and 2016-
00464 on Yang Xiuqiong.
\100\ ``For Revealing Huang Qi's Indictment for `Disclosing
Secrets,' Tianwang Volunteer Yang Xiuqiong Faces Arrest'' [Pilu huang
qi bei kong ``xie mi'' tianwang yigong yang xiuqiong zao pibu], Radio
Free Asia, 28 June 17.
\101\ Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang, ``Tianwang Citizen Journalist Yang
Dongying Released Upon Completing Sentence'' [Tianwang gongmin jizhe
yang dongying xingman huoshi], 5 November 16; `` `They Took My 13-Year-
Old Son to the Police Station,' '' Radio Free Asia, 31 July 15. For
more information about Yang Dongying, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2017-00290.
\102\ ``Imprisoned Tianwang Citizen Journalist Wang Jing's Brain
Cancer Worsens, Urgently Needs Surgery'' [Tianwang gongmin jizhe wang
jing yuzhong naoliu jiazhong jixu shoushu], 13 February 17. For more
information on Wang Jing, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2014-00104. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 65.
\103\ PEN America, ``Darkened Screen: Constraints on Foreign
Journalists in China,'' 22 September 16.
\104\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Working Conditions
Survey 2016,'' November 2016, reprinted in Committee to Protect
Journalists, 15 November 16.
\105\ International Federation of Journalists, ``Strangling the
Media: China Tightens Its Grip,'' January 2017.
\106\ PEN America, ``Darkened Screen: Constraints on Foreign
Journalists in China,'' 22 September 16, 18; Foreign Correspondents'
Club of China, ``Working Conditions Survey 2016,'' November 2016,
reprinted in Committee to Protect Journalists, 15 November 16, 1;
International Federation of Journalists, ``Strangling the Media: China
Tightens Its Grip,'' January 2017, 34-41.
\107\ Natalie Thomas (@natalieinchina), Twitter post, 14 September
16, 10:12 p.m.; China Digital Times, ``Wukan: Press Expelled, Rewards
Offered,'' 15 September 16; International Federation of Journalists,
``Strangling the Media: China Tightens Its Grip,'' January 2017, 37-38.
See also Stephen McDonnell (@StephenMcDonnell), Twitter post, 14
September 16, 8:42 p.m.
\108\ ``5 Hong Kong Journalists, Including From Ming Pao, Detained
for 5 Hours, Faced Rough Treatment and Verbal Abuse, Forced To Leave
That Night'' [Mingbao deng 5 gangji bei kou 5 xiaoshi zao cubao duidai
ruma lianye bei song zou], Ming Pao, 14 September 16. See also China
Digital Times, ``Wukan: Press Expelled, Rewards Offered,'' 15 September
16.
\109\ ``Foreign Journalist Interviewing NPC Independent Candidate
`Attacked' '' [Waiguo jizhe caifang renda duli canxuanren zao
``gongji''], Voice of America, 18 November 16; Benjamin Haas, ``BBC
Crew Attacked in China and Forced To Sign Confession,'' Guardian, 3
March 17. According to the Guardian, BBC correspondent John Sudworth
was able to interview the independent candidate after the election took
place.
\110\ John Sudworth, ``China Congress: BBC Team Forced To Sign
Confession,'' BBC, 3 March 17; Benjamin Haas, ``BBC Crew Attacked in
China and Forced To Sign Confession,'' Guardian, 3 March 17.
\111\ Jonathan Kaiman, ``Eat, Pray, Love the Communist Party: A
Road Trip Through Tibetan Lands, Guided by China,'' Los Angeles Times,
9 January 17.
\112\ For information on the censorship status of websites and
keywords, see GreatFire.org, GreatFire Analyzer, last visited 19 July
17. See also Justin Ellick, ``Six Sites Blocked by China's Great
Firewall,'' Index on Censorship, 27 February 17.
\113\ Katie Benner and Sui-Lee Wee, ``Apple Removes New York Times
Apps From Its Store in China,'' New York Times, 4 January 17.
\114\ ``709 Crackdown: Lawyer Li Heping Released, Forced To Take
Medicine While in Detention'' [709 da zhuabu: li heping lushi huoshi
zaiya qijian zao qiangpo fuyao], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 17. For more
information on Li Heping, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00284.
\115\ ``Private School Teachers in Sichuan Protest Around
Government Offices, Call for Foreign Media Support and Face Threats of
Possible Detention'' [Sichuan minshi wei zhengfu kangyi xiang waimei
qiuzhu zao qiuhou suanzhang weixie zhuabu], Radio Free Asia, 5 April
17.
\116\ Te-Ping Chen, ``China Offers Rare Insight Into Punishment for
Speaking With Foreign Media,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 27 April 17.
\117\ PEN America, ``Darkened Screen: Constraints on Foreign
Journalists in China,'' 22 September 16, 7, 12, 26. See also Foreign
Correspondents' Club of China, ``Working Conditions Survey 2016,''
November 2016, reprinted in Committee to Protect Journalists, 15
November 16; Yaqiu Wang, ``In China, Sources Face Harassment, Jail for
Speaking to Foreign Media,'' Huffington Post, 24 February 17.
\118\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Zhang Haitao,'' last
visited 19 July 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Xinjiang Human Rights
Defender Zhang Haitao's Appeal Case Announced Today--Upholds First-
Instance Trial Judgment of 19 Years' Imprisonment'' [Xinjiang renquan
hanweizhe zhang haitao an jin ershen xuanpan--weichi yishen 19 nian
youqi tuxing de panjue], 28 November 16; Catherine Lai, ``Xinjiang
Court Upholds `Extraordinarily Harsh' 19-Year Sentence for Outspoken
Writer Zhang Haitao,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 29 November 16.
\119\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human
Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 18; Yaqiu Wang, ``Activist
in Xinjiang Sentenced to 19 Years for Online Writings and Rights
Activities,'' China Change, 21 January 16.
\120\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Drop Charges Against Tibetan
Education Activist,'' 15 January 17.
\121\ Edward Wong, ``Police in China Push for Trial of Tibetan
Education Advocate,'' New York Times, 30 August 16; Yaqiu Wang, ``In
China, Sources Face Harassment, Jail for Speaking to Foreign Media,''
Huffington Post, 24 February 17; Edward Wong, ``Tibetans Fight To
Salvage Fading Culture in China,'' New York Times, 28 November 15;
Edward Wong, ``A Showcase of Tibetan Culture Serves Chinese Political
Goals,'' New York Times, 19 December 15; Jonah M. Kessel, ``A Tibetan's
Journey for Justice,'' New York Times, Times Documentaries, 28 November
15. For more information on Tashi Wangchug, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00077.
\122\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangsu Rights Defender Xu Qin
Blocked From Traveling to Hong Kong, Shaanxi's Lu Dongli Denied Regular
Passport and Hong Kong-Macau Travel Permit on Suspicion of Involvement
in `July 9' Incident'' [Jiangsu weiquan renshi xu qin chujing fu
xianggang bei zu shaanxi lu dongli shexian canyu ``709'' shijian buyu
qianfa putong huzhao he gang'ao tongxing zheng], 15 March 17;
``Passport Not Processed for Suspected Involvement in 709 Case, Lu
Dongli Sues Qianyang County Public Security Bureau'' [She 709 an buyu
ban huzhao lu dongli qisu qianyang xian gong'anju], Radio Free Asia, 17
March 17.
\123\ Chinese Academy of Governance, ``About CAG,'' 29 December 10,
last visited 11 May 17.
\124\ Chinese Academy of Governance, ``Committee Bulletin on
Corrections Following Disciplinary Investigation'' [Zhonggong guojia
xingzheng xueyuan weiyuanhui guanyu xunshi zhenggai qingkuang de
tongbao], 26 April 17, 2(2)(7); Te-Ping Chen, ``China Offers Rare
Insight Into Punishment for Speaking With Foreign Media,'' Wall Street
Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 27 April 17.
\125\ China's Information Controls, Global Media Influence, and
Cyber Warfare Strategy, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 4 May 17, Testimony of Xiao Qiang, Adjunct
Professor, Director, School of Information, University of California,
Berkeley, and Founder and Chief Editor, China Digital Times, 2.
\126\ Liza Lin and Josh Chin, ``China's VPN Crackdown Weighs on
Foreign Companies There,'' Wall Street Journal, 2 August 17; Cate
Cadell, ``Amid VPN Crackdown, China Eyes Upgrades to Great Firewall,''
Reuters, 20 July 17.
\127\ PRC Cybersecurity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo
anquan fa], passed 7 November 16, effective 1 June 17.
\128\ Josh Chin, ``China Targets Social-Media Giants WeChat, Weibo
in Cybersecurity Probe,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 August 17.
\129\ Josh Chin and Eva Dou, ``Communist Party Pushes China's
Internet Censors To `Ensure Political Security,' '' Wall Street
Journal, 12 June 17.
\130\ Jedidiah R. Crandall et al., ``Chat Program Censorship and
Surveillance in China: Tracking TOM-Skype and Sina UC,'' First Monday,
Vol. 18, No. 7 (1 July 13), 2.1.
\131\ Josh Chin, ``China Targets Social-Media Giants WeChat, Weibo
in Cybersecurity Probe,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 August 17.
\132\ Ibid.; David Pierson and Melissa Etehad, ``Facebook Is
Working To Stop Fake News by Tapping Human Fact-Checkers,'' Los Angeles
Times, 15 December 16.
\133\ ``In Past Half Year, WeChat Closed 45,000 Accounts, and Is
Criticized for Suppressing Freedom of Speech'' [Weixin bannian fenghao
4.5 wan bei pi daya yanlun ziyou], Radio Free Asia, 6 March 17; ``Once
Again, Tencent Shuts Down Large Number of WeChat Groups'' [Tengxun
zaidu fengsha dapi weixin qun], Radio Free Asia, 22 March 17.
\134\ Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Jeffrey Knockel, and Lotus Ruan,
``Tibetans Blocked From Kalachakra at Borders and on WeChat,''
University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 10
January 17; Lotus Ruan, Jeffrey Knockel, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata,
``We (can't) Chat: `709 Crackdown' Discussions Blocked on Weibo and
WeChat,'' University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen
Lab, 13 April 17.
\135\ Masashi Crete-Nishihata et al., ``Remembering Liu Xiaobo,''
University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 16
July 17.
\136\ Lotus Ruan, Jeffrey Knockel, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata,
``We (can't) Chat: `709 Crackdown' Discussions Blocked on Weibo and
WeChat,'' University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen
Lab, 13 April 17.
\137\ Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Jeffrey Knockel, and Lotus Ruan,
``Tibetans Blocked From Kalachakra at Borders and on WeChat,''
University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 10
January 17.
\138\ Lotus Ruan, Jeffrey Knockel, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata,
``We (can't) Chat: `709 Crackdown' Discussions Blocked on Weibo and
WeChat,'' University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen
Lab, 13 April 17.
\139\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China: Stop
Violating Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief of Tibetans,'' 12
January 17.
\140\ ``What China's VPN Ban Means for Internet Users: Quicktake
Q&A,'' Bloomberg, 10 July 17.
\141\ Mary Gallagher and Blake Miller, ``Can the Chinese Government
Really Control the Internet? We Found Cracks in the Great Firewall.,''
Washington Post, Monkey Cage (blog), 21 February 17.
\142\ Gerry Shih, ``China Cracks Down on Tools Used To Get Around
Web Filters,'' Associated Press, 23 January 17; Oiwan Lam, ``China
Officially Outlaws Unauthorized VPNs,'' Global Voices, 23 January 17.
\143\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Circular on
Cleaning Up and Standardizing the Internet Access Service Market
[Qingli guifan hulianwang wangluo jieru fuwu shichang de tongzhi], 17
January 17, issued 22 January 17, 2(2.4); Sidney Leng et al., ``The
Who, What and Why in China's Latest VPN Crackdown,'' South China
Morning Post, 26 January 17.
\144\ Chongqing Municipal Public Security Bureau, Chongqing
Municipality Public Security Agencies' Internet Security Management
Administrative Punishment Guidelines [Wangluo anquan guanli xingzheng
chufa cailiang jizhun], effective 27 July 16, issued 17 March 17; Eva
Li, ``Chongqing Police To Punish Those Skirting China's Great
Firewall,'' South China Morning Post, 29 March 17.
\145\ China's Information Controls, Global Media Influence, and
Cyber Warfare Strategy, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 4 May 17, Testimony of Sophie Richardson, China
Director, Human Rights Watch, 5.
\146\ ``China Tells Carriers To Block Access to Personal VPNs by
February,'' Bloomberg, 10 July 17.
\147\ Li Xiyin, ``MIIT Refutes It Requested Telecoms To Prohibit
Individual VPN Service Providers: Regulatory Targets Are Unqualified
Ones'' [Gongxinbu fouren yao yunyingshang jinzhi geren VPN yewu: guifan
duixiang shi wu zizhizhe], The Paper, 12 July 17.
\148\ Cate Cadell, ``China Targets Alibaba's Taobao, Other E-
Commerce Sites, in VPN Crackdown,'' Reuters, 17 August 17; April Ma,
``Alibaba's Taobao Runs Afoul of Cyber-Regulators With Sale of Banned
Items,'' Caixin, 18 August 17.
\149\ ``Court Cites GFW Circumvention Software in Convicting Man
for Three Tweets That Incited Ethnic Hatred,'' Fei Chang Dao (blog), 29
March 17; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Kuitun Municipal People's
Court, Criminal Judgment [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu kuitun shi renmin
fayuan zingshi panjue shu], (2016) Xin 4003 Xing Chu No. 5, 24 March
16, reprinted in China Judgements Online, 1 November 16. For more
information on Tian Weiguo, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
database record 2017-00195.
\150\ Oiwan Lam, ``Leaked Xinjiang Police Report Describes
Circumvention Tools as `Terrorist Software,' '' Global Voices, 26
October 16; ``Man Held in China's Xinjiang for Downloading `Terrorist'
Circumvention Software,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 October 16.
\151\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Abusive Cybersecurity Law Set To
Be Passed,'' 6 November 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They
Target My Human Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation
of Human Rights Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 14-15.
\152\ Orville Schell, ``To Forget or Remember? China's Struggle
With Its Past,'' Washington Quarterly, Fall 2016, 150-53; Josh Chin,
``In China, Xi Jinping's Crackdown Extends to Dissenting Versions of
History,'' Wall Street Journal, 1 August 16; Josh Chin, ``China Set To
Tweak Civil Code To Punish Revisions of Martyr Lore,'' Wall Street
Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 13 March 17; Kiki Zhao, ``For
Mocking a Martyr, Chinese Blogger Runs Afoul of Beijing Court,'' New
York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 23 September 16.
\153\ Zhou Lihang, ``Supreme People's Court Issues Model Cases on
the Protection of Historical Figures' Personal Rights and Interests''
[Zuigao fayuan fabu baohu yingxiong renwu renge quanyi dianxing anli],
China Court Net, 19 October 17; Jeremy Daum, ``Not Heroes of Free
Speech,'' China Law Translate (blog), 21 October 16.
\154\ Zhang Ziyang, ``Zhou Qiang: Dare To Draw the Sword Against
Erroneous Western Thought'' [Zhou qiang: yao gan yu xiang xifang cuowu
sichao liang jian], China News Service, 14 January 17.
\155\ PRC General Provisions of the Civil Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo minfa zongze], passed 15 March 17, effective 1 October 17,
art. 185; ``China Focus: China Adopts General Provisions of the Civil
Law,'' Xinhua, 15 March 17.
\156\ Shan Yuxiao, ``Draft Civil Code Changed Again in Many Places,
Those Defaming the Reputations of Heroes and Martyrs Will Be Held
Responsible'' [Minfa zongze cao'an zai gai duo chu qinfan yinglie
mingyu jiang danze], Caixin, 12 March 17.
\157\ Zhou Lihang, ``Supreme People's Court Issues Model Cases on
the Protection of Historical Figures' Personal Rights and Interests''
[Zuigao fayuan fabu baohu yingxiong renwu renge quanyi dianxing anli],
China Court Net, 19 October 17; Verna Yu, ``China Bans `Defamation' of
Communist Party Heroes,'' America: The Jesuit Review, 20 March 17.
\158\ See, e.g., ``Typo Says Soccer Chairman Is China's Chairman,
LeTV Sacks Staffer'' [Wu cheng zuxie zhuxi wei guojia zhuxi leshi
chaoren], Apple Daily, 7 November 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Zhu
Delong, Former Associate Professor at Capital Normal University Who
Criticized CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in WeChat Group for
Creating Personality Cult, Had Online Opinions Shut Down and Served 5
Days of Administrative Detention'' [Qian shoudu shifan daxue fu
jiaoshou zhu delong yin zai weixin qun piping zhonggong zongshuji xi
jinping gao geren chongbai, fengsha wangluo minyi, jing bei xingzheng
juliu 5 tian], 15 August 17.
\159\ See, e.g., Bai Tiantian, ``Mao-Bashers Receive Punishment,''
Global Times, 17 January 17; ``Chinese Official Fired After Calling Mao
a `Devil,' '' Reuters, 16 January 17; ``Chinese Professor Sacked After
Criticizing Mao Online,'' Reuters, 10 January 17; Ben Blanchard,
``Chinese Academic Who Called Mao a `Devil' Says He Was Sacked,''
Reuters, 4 August 17.
\160\ See, e.g., ``Police Officer Who Reposted Article Critical of
`Land Reform' Is Sentenced to Prison'' [Jingyuan zhuanfa piping
``tugai'' wenzhang bei panxing], Radio Free Asia, 7 December 16. For
more information on Miao Yue, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2017-00261. ``Writer Xiong Feijun Among Three
Criminally Detained, Defense Lawyer Will Request Obtaining Guarantee
Pending Further Investigation'' [Zuojia xiong feijun an san ren zao
xingju daili lushi jiang ti qubao houshen], Radio Free Asia, 2 January
17; ``Wife of Hubei Writer Xiong Feijun Breaks Silence, Speaks of
Husband's Criminal Detention'' [Hubei zuojia xiong feijun qizi dapo
chenmo tan qi zhangfu bei xingju], Radio Free Asia, 31 December 16. For
more information on Xiong Yingxue (pen name Xiong Feijun), see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00502. China
Digital Times, ``Rebel Pepper: Who's Afraid of the Big Banned Book? ''
15 February 17. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2017-00112 on Dai Xuelin and 2017-00113 on
Zhang Xiaoxiong.
\161\ Alice Miller, ``What Would Deng Do? '' China Leadership
Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, No. 52 (Winter 2017),
14 February 17, 9.
\162\ ``Woman Sentenced to 18 Months Imprisonment for Tencent QQ
Posts That Insulted Leaders and Policies,'' Fei Chang Dao (blog), 27
February 17. Judicial authorities in Jinzhou municipality, Hebei
province, sentenced ``Ms. Li'' to one year and six months' imprisonment
on the charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' for
material she shared via a QQ chat group that ``insulted and vilified
foreign and domestic heads of state, national leaders, and national
religious policies as well as false information about major domestic
incidents.''
\163\ ``Man Sentenced to Six Months Imprisonment for Tencent Wechat
Posts Defaming Xi Jinping,'' Fei Chang Dao (blog), 23 February 17. In
January 2017, judicial authorities in Ningling county, Shangqiu
municipality, Henan province, sentenced ``Mr. Yu'' to six months'
imprisonment on the charge of ``defamation'' (PRC Criminal Law, Article
246). The verdict stated that ``Mr. Yu'' posted statements that
``defamed Comrade Chairman Xi Jinping'' to a WeChat group. PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 246.
\164\ ``For Satirizing `Bandit Mao' and `Steamed Bun Xi,' Shandong
Netizen Wang Jiangfeng Sentenced to Two Years in Prison'' [Fengci ``mao
zei'' ``xi baozi'' shandong wangmin panxing liang nian], Radio Free
Asia, 12 April 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Wang Jiangfeng of Shandong
Criminally Convicted for Speech, Sentenced to 2 Years in Prison''
[Shandong wang jiangfeng yin yan huozui bei pan 2 nian youqi tuxing],
12 April 17. For more information about Wang Jiangfeng, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00490.
\165\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yanji City, Jilin Province, Netizen
Kwon Pyong [Quan Ping] Suspected To Have Been Detained on October 1 for
Wearing T-Shirt in Public With Slogan Critical of Xi Jinping'' [Jilin
sheng yanji shi wangyou quan ping yi yin yu 10 yue 1 ri chuanxie you
piping xi jinping biaoyu de wenhua shan shang jie er zao jubu], 31
October 16; ``China Detains Jilin Activist for Wearing Anti-Xi Jinping
T-Shirt,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 November 16.
\166\ ``For Wearing T-Shirt Satirizing Xi Jinping, Kwon Pyong [Quan
Ping] Accused of `Inciting Subversion' '' [Quan ping chuan fengci xi
jinping wenhua shan bei kong ``shandian''], Radio Free Asia, 10
February 17.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Trade Unions
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains
the only trade union organization permitted under Chinese
law,\1\ and Chinese labor advocates and international observers
report that the ACFTU does not effectively represent workers'
rights and interests.\2\ The ACFTU constitution describes the
ACFTU as a ``mass organization'' \3\ under the leadership of
the Chinese Communist Party and ``an important social pillar of
state power.'' \4\ During the Commission's 2017 reporting year,
leading union officials held concurrent positions in the
government and Party,\5\ including ACFTU Chairman Li Jianguo,
who also served as Vice Chairman of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee and a member of the Party Central
Committee Political Bureau.\6\ At the enterprise level, company
management typically selects union representatives, often
selecting company managers to represent workers.\7\ Earlier
experiments with elections of ACFTU representatives and other
union reforms have reportedly stalled in recent years.\8\
Restrictions on workers' rights to freely establish and join
independent trade unions violate international standards set
forth by the International Labour Organization (ILO),\9\
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,\10\ International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\11\ and International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\12\
Collective Bargaining
This past year, workers' right to collective bargaining
remained limited in law and in practice. Provisions in the PRC
Labor Law, PRC Labor Contract Law, and PRC Trade Union Law
provide a legal framework for negotiating collective
contracts,\13\ but these laws designate the Party-controlled
ACFTU as responsible for negotiating with employers and signing
collective contracts on behalf of workers.\14\ The PRC Trade
Union Law requires trade unions to ``whole-heartedly serve
workers''; \15\ in practice, however, Chinese labor advocates
and other experts report that the ACFTU and its lower level
branches do not adequately represent workers' interests,\16\
often siding instead with enterprise management.\17\ In the
absence of effective union representation,\18\ some Chinese
labor non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had shifted their
focus in recent years, from providing legal aid and other
services to training workers in collective bargaining.\19\ A
December 2015 crackdown on labor rights advocates and NGOs in
Guangdong province, however, has reportedly had a chilling
effect on labor advocates' ability to promote collective
bargaining rights.\20\ As a member of the ILO, China is
obligated to respect workers' rights to collective
bargaining.\21\
Civil Society
The situation of labor rights advocates and NGOs has
worsened in recent years, and government suppression of labor
NGOs continued during this reporting year. Grassroots labor
NGOs have existed in China for decades, offering legal aid,
helping workers seek redress for workplace injuries and unpaid
wages, educating workers about their legal rights, and
providing a variety of social services to workers.\22\ In
recent years, some labor NGOs also began training workers in
collective bargaining.\23\ Authorities have long subjected
labor NGOs to various forms of harassment,\24\ but labor rights
advocates reported increasing pressure from authorities
beginning in late 2014.\25\ In December 2015, authorities
detained at least 18 labor advocates affiliated with several
labor NGOs \26\ in a crackdown that domestic and international
observers described as ``unprecedented.'' \27\ Labor advocates
and NGOs reportedly continued to face heightened surveillance
and pressure from authorities this past year.\28\ In May 2017,
authorities in Jiangxi province detained three Chinese men
conducting research on behalf of a U.S.-based labor NGO
regarding working conditions in factories producing shoes for
international brands.\29\ Authorities reportedly released all
three on bail in June.\30\ In addition, scholar Anita Chan
warned that the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs'
Activities, which took effect on January 1, 2017,\31\ may
further hinder the work of labor NGOs in China, as many of them
rely on sources of funding outside of mainland China.\32\
SENTENCING OF LABOR ADVOCATES
In fall 2016, a Guangdong province court sentenced four
labor advocates detained in the December 2015 crackdown: Zeng
Feiyang,\33\ Zhu Xiaomei,\34\ Tang Jian,\35\ and Meng Han.\36\
All four advocates were current or former staff of Guangdong-
based labor NGOs,\37\ and Zeng was the director of the Panyu
Workers' Services Center.\38\ On September 26, 2016, the Panyu
District People's Court in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong,
found Zeng, Zhu, and Tang guilty of ``gathering a crowd to
disturb social order.'' \39\ The court sentenced Zeng to three
years' imprisonment, suspended for four years; and sentenced
Zhu and Tang both to one year and six months' imprisonment,
suspended for two years.\40\ Authorities reportedly released
them following the trial.\41\ Though released, a suspended
sentence means the advocates may be constrained in their
ability to continue their labor advocacy work.\42\ On November
3, the same court found Meng Han guilty of ``gathering a crowd
to disturb social order,'' \43\ sentencing him to one year and
nine months' imprisonment.\44\ Authorities reportedly released
Meng upon completion of his sentence on September 3, 2017.\45\
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association stated that
authorities seemed to have targeted these labor advocates for
``being involved in a labour dispute,'' and noted that
targeting individuals for such activities ``constitutes a
serious interference with civil liberties in general and with
trade union rights in particular.'' \46\
CHILLING EFFECT ON LABOR NGOS
The detention and sentencing of labor advocates has
reportedly had a chilling effect on labor NGOs this past
year.\47\ Labor advocates and NGOs have maintained low
profiles,\48\ and NGOs have reportedly canceled trainings and
reduced programs.\49\ Legal scholar Aaron Halegua noted in an
October 2016 report that the December 2015 crackdown has made
labor NGOs reluctant to continue collective bargaining
work.\50\ Some international scholars have argued that in
targeting these labor advocates, Chinese authorities were
signaling that labor NGOs should stop working on collective
bargaining altogether.\51\ Panyu Workers' Services Center, the
organization reportedly at the center of the December 2015
crackdown,\52\ had trained and advised workers on collective
bargaining.\53\ The Chinese government's restrictions on labor
NGOs contravene international standards on freedom of
association, including those found in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.\54\ [For more information on
NGOs in China, see Section III--Civil Society.]
Worker Strikes and Protests
Following reports of a significant increase in worker
strikes and protests in the previous reporting year,\55\ the
number of worker actions appeared to remain high this past
year, though the Commission did not observe reliable
statistics. The Hong Kong-based NGO China Labour Bulletin
(CLB), which compiles data on worker actions collected from
traditional news and social media,\56\ documented 2,663 strikes
in 2016.\57\ This is fewer than the 2,776 strikes CLB
documented in 2015, but approximately double the 1,379 strikes
documented in 2014.\58\ According to their data, 76 percent of
worker actions in 2016 involved wage arrears.\59\ The
construction sector saw the largest number of strikes,
accounting for 40 percent of the total, followed by
manufacturing with 23 percent, and retail and services with 15
percent.\60\ CLB statistics from the first half of 2017
indicated similar trends: 40 percent of worker actions sampled
by CLB researchers were in the construction sector and 22
percent were in the retail and services sectors; 66 percent of
sampled strikes in the first half of 2017 involved wage
arrears.\61\ CLB researchers cautioned that their data were
limited and likely represented a small fraction of the total
number of strikes in China.\62\ Some local government figures
indicate that the number of strikes may be much higher: The
Party-run People's Daily reported that in the first 10 months
of 2016, labor and social security inspection bureaus across
Zhejiang province handled 1,701 labor-related ``sudden
incidents'' (tufa shijian),\63\ a term the government often
uses to refer to strikes and protests; \64\ China National
Radio, an official broadcaster, reported that in 2016,
Chongqing municipality handled 1,113 ``sudden incidents''
involving 64,500 workers.\65\ The Chinese government does not
publish national statistics on strikes.\66\
This past year, labor advocates noted increasing difficulty
in finding information on strikes in China due to the chilling
effect of the December 2015 crackdown on labor NGOs and
tightening government control of the media. In January 2017,
one Guangdong-based advocate told Radio Free Asia (RFA) that in
the past two years he observed fewer official media reports on
strikes, and noted that censorship of information relating to
strikes on social media had also increased.\67\ An advocate
from the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions believes that
because mainland labor NGOs are keeping a low profile following
the 2015 detention of labor advocates, some observers have the
``mistaken impression'' that strikes have decreased.\68\ In
addition, in June 2016, authorities targeted an independent
source of information on strikes and protests in China,
detaining citizen journalists Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu, who
documented strikes and protests.\69\ On August 3, 2017, the
Dali City People's Court in Yunnan province reportedly
sentenced Lu to four years' imprisonment for ``picking quarrels
and provoking trouble.'' \70\ The same court tried Li in secret
in April, and authorities reportedly released her on bail on an
unknown date.\71\ [For more information on censorship and media
restrictions, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
During this reporting year, government responses to worker
strikes and protests appeared to be mixed, and some labor
advocates asserted that the government's suppression of strikes
had increased. The Commission observed reports of disputes in
which Chinese authorities resolved disputes in court \72\ or
assisted in finalizing negotiations between workers and
management,\73\ as well as disputes in which authorities did
not get involved.\74\ The Commission also observed reports of
cases in which police responded violently to worker strikes and
protests.\75\ According to CLB data, police responded in some
way to approximately 26 percent of worker actions in 2016.\76\
In January 2017, labor advocates from Hong Kong and mainland
China told RFA that mainland authorities had increased
monitoring and suppression of worker strikes and protests.\77\
Chinese law does not protect workers' right to strike.\78\
A February 2017 study in the Journal of Industrial Relations
examined nearly 900 court cases between 2008 and 2015 in which
employers dismissed workers for their involvement in a strike;
the study found that courts deemed strikes to be unlawful in 64
percent of cases, typically holding that striking violated
workplace rules, and thus was acceptable grounds for
dismissal.\79\ The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, which China has signed and ratified,
guarantees workers' right to strike,\80\ and a December 2016
report from the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association noted
that the Committee ``has always recognized the right to strike
by workers and their organizations as a legitimate means of
defending their economic and social interests.'' \81\
Child Labor
The Commission continued to observe reports of the use of
child labor in China this past year.\82\ In one widely reported
case, clothing manufacturers in Changshu city, Suzhou
municipality, Jiangsu province, had hired workers from Yunnan
province through recruiters, and many of the workers were under
the age of 16.\83\ According to the Party-run Chuncheng Evening
Post, employers beat the children for working too slowly and
withheld pay and identification documents to prevent them from
quitting.\84\ Such actions are indicators of forced labor,
according to the ILO.\85\ Authorities detained at least two
individuals following the media reports.\86\ Domestic laws
generally prohibit the employment of minors under the age of
16,\87\ and China has ratified the two fundamental ILO
conventions on the elimination of child labor.\88\ The ILO
Country Office for China and Mongolia noted that the Chinese
government has not released official statistics on child labor
in China, nor has it reported any cases to the ILO.\89\ [For
more information on forced labor in China, see Section II--
Human Trafficking.]
Occupational Health and Safety
During this reporting year, government data showed a
continued decline in both workplace accidents and deaths,
though the Commission continued to observe reports of lax
enforcement of work safety laws and regulations. The State
Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) reported in January 2017
that workplace accidents and deaths declined 5.8 and 4.1
percent, respectively, in 2016 compared to 2015.\90\ SAWS also
reported that accidents and deaths in the coal, fireworks, and
transportation industries decreased during the same period, but
did not provide statistics.\91\ Although China has numerous
work safety laws and regulations,\92\ the Commission continued
to observe reports of lax enforcement of those laws.\93\
Official statistics indicate that pneumoconiosis--a lung
disease caused by inhaling dust \94\--is the most prevalent
form of occupational illness in China; moreover, pneumoconiosis
sufferers reportedly face difficulty obtaining workers'
compensation. The National Health and Family Planning
Commission (NHFPC) reported in December 2015 that
pneumoconiosis accounted for roughly 90 percent of all cases of
occupational illness in China in 2014.\95\ Although the
Commission did not observe officially published statistics for
2015 or 2016, the NHFPC noted in January 2016 that experts
expected rates of pneumoconiosis to remain high in the near
future.\96\ A December 2016 report by Beijing-based non-
governmental organization (NGO) Love Save Pneumoconiosis \97\
found that pneumoconiosis sufferers had difficulty obtaining
workers' compensation, as only 9.5 percent of surveyed
pneumoconiosis sufferers had signed formal contracts with
employers, and 84.8 percent had not obtained workers'
compensation insurance.\98\ The Party-run newspaper Workers'
Daily reported in March 2017 that pneumoconiosis sufferers
often had to spend significant time and money to obtain proper
diagnoses and receive compensation.\99\ In October 2016,
authorities in Ganluo county, Liangshan Yi Autonomous
Prefecture, Sichuan province, briefly detained several former
miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis for petitioning and
protesting to demand workers' compensation.\100\
This past year, the government issued several documents
setting targets and outlining plans for improving occupational
health and safety. The National Human Rights Action Plan of
China (2016-2020), released in September 2016, set the goal of
reducing workplace accident deaths by 10 percent by 2020.\101\
In December 2016, the State Council General Office issued the
National Occupational Illness Control Plan (2016-2020), with
stated goals including ``establishing and improving
occupational illness control structures for employer
responsibility, administrative supervision, enterprise self-
discipline, worker participation, and societal monitoring.''
\102\ In January 2017, the State Council General Office also
issued the 13th Five-Year Plan on Work Safety calling for
reductions in workplace accidents and deaths in various
categories, including reducing the number of deaths in
workplace accidents by 10 percent.\103\ A January 2017 National
Bureau of Economic Research working paper evaluating a previous
policy aimed at reducing workplace deaths found evidence that
local governments had manipulated statistics on workplace
deaths in order to meet their yearly targets.\104\
Wage Arrears
Wage arrears remained a significant problem this past year,
and were reportedly a growing problem in some sectors of the
economy. Wage arrears have long been a problem for China's 281
million migrant workers,\105\ particularly in the construction
industry.\106\ In 2016, 76 percent of all strikes documented by
China Labour Bulletin involved wage arrears.\107\ The Supreme
People's Procuratorate reported in March 2017 that the number
of prosecutions for failure to pay wages had increased 26.5
percent in 2016 compared to 2015.\108\ Although a January 2016
opinion issued by the State Council General Office set the goal
of containing the problem of migrant worker wage arrears by
2020,\109\ in January 2017, an official from the Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security told the People's Daily
that slowing economic growth had increased the risk of wage
arrears in the construction industry as well as other
sectors.\110\ International and domestic media reported this
past year that while wage arrears remained a problem in
traditional sectors of the economy, they were also becoming a
problem in new industries such as Internet commerce.\111\ Vice
Minister of Human Resources and Social Security Qiu Xiaoping
told People's Daily in January 2017 that one of the reasons
wage arrears remained a problem was that the penalties for
companies that failed to pay workers were ``especially low.''
\112\
Unemployment
China's economic growth rate continued to decline, and the
official unemployment rate reportedly did not provide an
accurate picture of employment in China. According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), in 2016, China's
rate of GDP growth was 6.7 percent.\113\ This was the slowest
rate in 26 years,\114\ though international economists
questioned the accuracy of China's GDP growth estimates.\115\
International news media reported declining employment in some
types of manufacturing,\116\ as well as layoffs,
underemployment, and early retirement in state sectors such as
steel and coal.\117\ Other economic indicators suggested that
both the service sector and manufacturing overall continued to
grow at a modest pace.\118\ The official urban registered
unemployment rate at the end of 2016 was 4.02 percent,\119\ but
this figure only included those urban residents who officially
registered as unemployed, rather than the number of unemployed
individuals nationwide.\120\ A study by the Hunan Provincial
Bureau of Statistics cautioned that the current methodology
excludes many of China's migrant workers,\121\ while one
official at a county-level human resources and social security
bureau noted increasing levels of ``hidden unemployment'' in
rural areas.\122\ In his June 2017 report to the United
Nations, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights
Philip Alston emphasized that accurate statistics are necessary
for ``successful'' economic policymaking.\123\ The 2010 PRC
Social Insurance Law stipulates that workers and employers
contribute to an unemployment insurance fund.\124\ NBS,
however, reported that as of late 2016, only around 23 percent
of workers contributed to unemployment insurance funds,\125\
and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
(MOHRSS) further reported in March 2017 that only around 17
percent of migrant workers contributed to unemployment
insurance funds.\126\
Social Insurance
During this reporting year, workers' rates of social
insurance coverage showed some improvement, but overall
remained low.\127\ According to the PRC Social Insurance Law,
workers are entitled to five forms of social insurance: basic
pension insurance, health insurance, work-related injury
insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity
insurance.\128\ Under the law, employers and workers are
required to contribute to basic pension, health, and
unemployment insurance; in addition, employers are required to
contribute to work-related injury and maternity insurance on
workers' behalf.\129\ According to NBS and MOHRSS, from 2015 to
2016, workers' compensation coverage increased slightly overall
from 27.7 to 28.2 percent,\130\ but decreased slightly for
migrant workers from 27.0 to 26.7 percent participating.\131\
Employment-based pension insurance coverage rates increased
from 45.7 percent to 48.8 percent for all workers, and
increased from 20.1 percent to 20.7 percent for migrant
workers.\132\ Employer-based health insurance coverage remained
below 40 percent for all workers and below 20 percent for
migrant workers.\133\ Unemployment and maternity insurance
coverage remained below 25 percent for all workers.\134\ In
addition to low levels of coverage, international experts noted
that because local governments manage social insurance funds,
many migrant workers face bureaucratic obstacles when
transferring their social insurance benefits to new
jurisdictions.\135\ Some migrant workers reportedly preferred
not to participate in social insurance programs, as they were
not confident their contributions would be available to them in
the future.\136\
Dispatch Labor
The Commission continued to observe reports this past year
\137\ of employers violating domestic laws and regulations on
the use of dispatch workers.\138\ In order to cut costs, firms
often use dispatch labor (laowu paiqian)--workers hired through
subcontracting agencies.\139\ Provisions in the PRC Labor
Contract Law stipulate that employers pay dispatch workers the
same as full-time workers doing similar work, and generally
only employ dispatch workers on a temporary, auxiliary, or
substitute basis.\140\ The 2014 Interim Provisions on Dispatch
Labor further required that dispatch labor make up no more than
10 percent of a firm's total workforce by March 2016.\141\
Despite these requirements, Chinese legal professionals found
that dispatch workers continued to receive lower wages and
benefits than their directly employed counterparts, and often
faced difficulties holding firms and dispatch agencies
accountable for labor law violations.\142\ Moreover, firms are
reportedly using ``outsourced labor'' (laowu waibao), another
form of subcontracted labor, to get around the requirement to
reduce the percentage of dispatch laborers they employ.\143\
According to a researcher with the Chinese Academy of Labour
and Social Security, although the number of dispatch workers in
China has declined in recent years, the use of workers who are
`` `outsourced in name, dispatch in reality' is rampant.''
\144\
``Employment Relationships'' and China's Labor Laws
This past year, many categories of workers were unable to
benefit fully from the protections provided under Chinese
law,\145\ including workers above the retirement age,\146\
student workers and interns,\147\ and independent contractors
or informal workers.\148\ The PRC Labor Law and PRC Labor
Contract Law apply to workers who have an ``employment
relationship'' (laodong guanxi) with their employers.\149\
Workers past the retirement age and students, however, are not
able to legally form an official ``employment relationship,''
\150\ and thus do not receive the protection of these labor
laws.\151\ Interns are protected by separate regulations
requiring that internships be relevant to students' plans of
study and prohibiting interns from working more than eight
hours per day.\152\ Yet the Commission continued to observe
reports of vocational schools sending students to work long
hours for low pay in jobs unrelated to their fields of
study,\153\ and one former recruiter said such practices were
common.\154\ Moreover, contract workers and casual or informal
employees such as delivery drivers, window washers, and street
cleaners \155\ typically do not receive social insurance
benefits, and are often unable to benefit from labor law
protections due to difficulties proving the existence of an
``employment relationship.'' \156\
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed 3 April 92, amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 9-11;
``China's Complicated Relationship With Workers' Rights,'' World
Politics Review, 25 January 17; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent
China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor
Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute,
October 2016, 11. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report
of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, adopted by the
Committee at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June
14, para. 23.
\2\ Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing Wants One Union To Rule Them All,''
Bloomberg Businessweek, 10 November 16; Wang Jiangsong (wang
jiangsong), ``Worker Representative Peng Jiayong Discusses a Workers'
Representative System at `Unirule Institute of Economics Bi-Weekly
Forum' '' [Gongren daibiao peng jiayong zai ``tianze shuang zhou
luntan'' changtan gongren daibiao zhi], WeChat post, 24 January 17;
Diana Fu, ``Disguised Collective Action in China,'' Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (March 2017), 505; Aaron Halegua,
``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the
Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-
Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 11; Tim Pringle, ``What Do Labour
NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute:
Analysis (blog), 17 October 16.
\3\ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal
Democratic Republic of Nepal, ``Major Mass Organizations,'' 27 October
04; Anthony J. Spires, ``Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an
Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of China's Grassroots
NGOs,'' American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 117, No. 1 (July 2011), 9;
Karla Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework From Ancient
Times to the ``New Reform Era'' (New York: Oxford University Press,
2013), 167-74. ``Mass organizations'' are organizations under the
Chinese Communist Party such as the All-China Women's Federation,
Communist Youth League of China, and All-China Federation of Industry
and Commerce. The Chinese Embassy in Nepal described these
organizations as ``a bridge linking the CPC [Communist Party of China]
and government with the people.'' According to scholar Anthony J.
Spires, in practice ``mass organizations'' have functioned as ``one-way
conduits for instructions from the top to the bottom.''
\4\ Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions [Zhongguo gonghui
zhangcheng], issued 22 October 13, General Principles.
\5\ See, e.g., All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``Xu Zhenchao,
All-China Federation of Trade Unions Vice Chairman (Part Time)'' [Xu
zhenchao quanguo zong gonghui fuzhuxi (jianzhi)], last visited 21 March
17; Fujian Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, ``Provincial
Federation Leadership'' [Sheng zong lingdao], last visited 22 March 17;
Beijing Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, ``Municipal Federation
Profile'' [Shi zong gaikuang], last visited 22 March 17; Pingchang
County Trade Association, ``Trade Union Leadership'' [Gonghui lingdao],
last visited 9 June 17.
\6\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``Li Jianguo, Chairman of
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions'' [Li jianguo quanguo zong
gonghui zhuxi], last visited 21 March 17.
\7\ Tim Pringle, ``What Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University
of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 17 October 16;
Jens Lerche et al., ``The Triple Absence of Labour Rights: Triangular
Labour Relations and Informalisation in the Construction and Garment
Sectors in Delhi and Shanghai,'' University of London, SOAS, Centre for
Development Policy and Research, Working Paper 32/17, February 2017,
11, 19; Samuel Wrest, ``Evaluating Trade Union Law and Collective
Bargaining in China: Key Considerations for Foreign Firms,'' China
Briefing (blog), 8 March 17.
\8\ Kevin Lin, ``Rising Inequality and Its Discontents in China,''
New Labor Forum, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2016), 71; ``China's Complicated
Relationship With Workers' Rights,'' World Politics Review, 25 January
17. For examples of reform efforts from previous reporting years, see
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 73-74; CECC, 2012 Annual
Report, 10 October 12, 60; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 67-
68.
\9\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87)
Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right To
Organise, 4 July 50, arts. 2, 3, 5. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16,
paras. 3, 16-17, 54, 57.
\10\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
23(4).
\11\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22(1); United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 9 June 17. China has signed but not
ratified the ICCPR. See also UN General Assembly, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16, para. 55.
\12\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 9 June 17. China has
signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN General Assembly, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16, para. 55.
\13\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 16-35; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07,
amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, arts. 51-56; PRC Trade
Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], passed 3 April 92,
amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 6, 20.
\14\ Ibid., art. 33; Ibid., arts. 6, 51, 56; Ibid., arts. 6, 20.
See also ``China's Complicated Relationship With Workers' Rights,''
World Politics Review, 25 January 17.
\15\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed 3 April 92, amended and effective 27 October 01, art. 6.
\16\ Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing Wants One Union To Rule Them All,''
Bloomberg Businessweek, 10 November 16; Wang Jiangsong (wang
jiangsong), ``Worker Representative Peng Jiayong Discusses a Workers'
Representative System at `Unirule Institute of Economics Bi-Weekly
Forum' '' [Gongren daibiao peng jiayong zai ``tianze shuang zhou
luntan'' changtan gongren daibiao zhi], WeChat post, 24 January 17;
Diana Fu, ``Disguised Collective Action in China,'' Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (March 2017), 505; Tim Pringle,
``What Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, China
Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 17 October 16.
\17\ Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing Wants One Union To Rule Them All,''
Bloomberg Businessweek, 10 November 16; Tim Pringle, ``What Do Labour
NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute:
Analysis (blog), 17 October 16.
\18\ Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing Wants One Union To Rule Them All,''
Bloomberg Businessweek, 10 November 16; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will
Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of
Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law
Institute, October 2016, 11; Kevin Lin, ``Rising Inequality and Its
Discontents in China,'' New Labor Forum, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2016), 71.
\19\ Tim Pringle, ``What Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University
of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 17 October 16;
Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal
Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University School
of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 38. See also Ivan
Franceschini, ``Revisiting Chinese Labour NGOs: Some Grounds for Hope?
'' Made in China, Issue 1 (January-March 2016), 19.
\20\ Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese Labor Activists Handed Suspended
Sentences,'' Wall Street Journal, 26 September 16; Tim Pringle, ``What
Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, China Policy
Institute: Analysis (blog), 17 October 16; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will
Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of
Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law
Institute, October 2016, 2, 43.
\21\ International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up, 18 June
98, art. 2(a). Article 2 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work states that ``all Members, even if they
have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining . . ..'' International Labour Organization, ``China,''
NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards, last
visited 9 June 17. China became a member of the ILO in 1919.
\22\ ``Interpreting Chinese Labour: Informalisation or Empowerment?
'' in Made in China Yearbook 2016: Disturbances in Heaven, eds. Ivan
Franceschini et al. (Canberra: Australian National University Press,
February 2017), 37; Diana Fu, ``Disguised Collective Action in China,''
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (March 2017), 506-7;
Tim Pringle, ``What Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University of
Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 17 October 16.
\23\ Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers,
Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University
School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 38; Tim Pringle,
``What Do Labour NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, China
Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 17 October 16. See also Ivan
Franceschini, ``Revisiting Chinese Labour NGOs: Some Grounds for Hope?
'' Made in China, Issue 1 (January-March 2016), 18-19.
\24\ Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers,
Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University
School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 36; Diana Fu,
``Disguised Collective Action in China,'' Comparative Political
Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 4 (March 2017), 507-8. See also CECC, 2012
Annual Report, 10 October 12, 59, 122.
\25\ Lin Yunfei, Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services Center, `` `Dead
End,' an Open Letter From Labor Rights Defense Organization Nan Fei
Yan'' [``Ci lu butong'' zhi laogong weiquan zuzhi nan fei yan de
gongkai xin], reprinted in New Citizens' Movement (blog), 19 October
15; Feng Renke and Li Linjin, ``The Plight of Chinese Labor Rights
NGOs'' [Zhongguo laogong weiquan NGO de kunjing], Financial Times, 2
March 15; Alexandra Harney, ``China Labor Activists Say Facing
Unprecedented Intimidation,'' Reuters, 21 January 15. For information
on the harassment of labor rights advocates and NGOs in the 2015 and
2016 reporting years, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 84-
85; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 85-86.
\26\ Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member
Zhu Xiaomei Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application
Rejected; Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15; Tom Phillips, ``Call for China To Free
Labour Activists or Risk Backlash From Frustrated Workforce,''
Guardian, 9 December 15; Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate
Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China
Change, 10 December 15. See also ``Guangdong Authorities Arrest Labor
Rights Advocates,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21
January 16.
\27\ ``Labor Conflicts at Hong Kong-Invested Enterprises in
Mainland Worsen, Worker Strikes and Protests Increase 30 Percent''
[Neidi gangzi qiye laozi ehua gongchao zeng sancheng], Radio Free Asia,
12 October 16; Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, ``China Arrests at
Least 3 Workers' Rights Leaders Amid Rising Unrest,'' New York Times, 5
December 15; Tom Phillips, ``Call for China To Free Labour Activists or
Risk Backlash From Frustrated Workforce,'' Guardian, 9 December 15. For
more information on government suppression of labor NGOs in previous
years, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 84-85; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 85-86; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10
October 12, 59, 122.
\28\ ``Under Increased Control, Labor Rights Defense Incidents
Difficult To Expose'' [Jiaqiang guankong xia laogong weiquan shijian
nan puguang], Radio Free Asia, 27 January 17; James Griffiths, `` `We
the Workers': On the Front Lines of China's Record-Level Labor
Unrest,'' CNN, 22 February 17; Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing Wants One
Union To Rule Them All,'' Bloomberg Businessweek, 10 November 16; Aaron
Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and
the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law,
U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 36.
\29\ John Ruwitch, ``Activist Probing Factories Making Ivanka Trump
Shoes in China Arrested: Group,'' Reuters, 31 May 17; Zhuang An, ``Case
of Illegal Use of Surveillance Equipment Uncovered in Ganzhou, Jiangxi,
Three Individuals Criminally Detained'' [Jiangxi ganzhou pohuo yi qi
feifa shiyong qieting qiezhao zhuanyong qicai fanzui an, xingju san
ren], The Paper, 6 June 17; China Labor Watch, ``Three China Labor
Watch's Investigators Released on Bail, Pending a Trial,'' 28 June 17.
\30\ Erika Kinetz, ``Making Ivanka Trump Shoes: Long Hours, Low Pay
and Abuse,'' Associated Press, 28 June 17; China Labor Watch, ``Three
China Labor Watch's Investigators Released on Bail, Pending a Trial,''
28 June 17.
\31\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu
zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1
January 17.
\32\ Renato Marques, ``Analysis: Labor-Related NGOs in China Facing
Hard Times,'' Macau Daily Times, 16 January 17. See also Ivan
Franceschini, ``Meet the State Security: Chinese Labour Activists and
Their Controllers,'' Made in China, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (January-March
2017), 37; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 74. For more information
on the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
226-27.
\33\ For more information on Zeng Feiyang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00427.
\34\ For more information on Zhu Xiaomei, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00428.
\35\ For more information on Tang Jian, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00017.
\36\ For more information on Meng Han, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00026.
\37\ Rights Defense Network, `` `12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Case'
Arrests Approved for Four Individuals, One Released, Whereabouts of Two
Unknown'' [``12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an'' jin si ren bei pizhun
daibu, yi ren huoshi, liang ren wu xialuo], 8 January 16.
\38\ Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member
Zhu Xiaomei Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application
Rejected; Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15; Red Balloon Solidarity, ``Sunday Topic: They
Promoted the Rights and Interests of Migrants, but Spent Migrant's Day
in a Detention Center'' [Zhouri huati: tamen wei yimingong shenzhang
quanyi yimin ri que zai kanshousuo duguo], Ming Pao, 19 December 15.
For additional information on Panyu Workers' Services Center, see Zhen
Jinghui, ``Zeng Feiyang: A Labor NGO's Fight for Survival'' [Zeng
feiyang: yi ge laogong NGO de jiafeng shengcun], South Reviews, 27
March 10, reprinted in Sina, 5 December 13.
\39\ ``Zeng Feiyang, Tang Huanxing, and Zhu Xiaomei Sentenced at
First Instance Trial for Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Social Order,
Three Defendants Admit Guilt, Express Remorse'' [Zeng feiyang tang
huanxing zhu xiaomei juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu an yishen dangting
xuanpan san beigao biaoshi renzui huizui], Xinhua, 26 September 16; PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15,
art. 290.
\40\ ``Zeng Feiyang, Tang Huanxing, and Zhu Xiaomei Sentenced at
First Instance Trial for Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Social Order,
Three Defendants Admit Guilt, Express Remorse'' [Zeng feiyang tang
huanxing zhu xiaomei juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu an yishen dangting
xuanpan san beigao biaoshi renzui huizui], Xinhua, 26 September 16;
Michael Forsythe, ``3 Labor Activists in China Get Suspended Prison
Terms,'' New York Times, 26 September 16.
\41\ ``Zeng Feiyang One of 3 Labor Figures Released With Suspended
Sentences'' [Zeng feiyang deng 3 laogong renshi bei pan huanxing
huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 26 September 16.
\42\ Michael Forsythe, ``3 Labor Activists in China Get Suspended
Prison Terms,'' New York Times, 26 September 16; Shawn Shieh,
``Guangzhou Labor Activists Are Given Suspended Sentences,'' NGOs in
China (blog), 14 October 16; Venus Wu and James Pomfret, ``Prominent
Southern China Labor Activist Avoids Jail,'' Reuters, 26 September 16.
For legal provisions on suspended sentences, see PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, arts. 75-77.
\43\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 290.
\44\ ``Guangdong Labor Rights Defender Meng Han Found Guilty of
Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Social Order, Sentenced to 21 Months in
Prison'' [Guangdong laogong weiquan renshi meng han juzhong raoluan
shehui zhixu zuicheng, pan jian 21 ge yue], Initium Media, 4 November
16; Catherine Lai, ``Guangdong Labour Activist Meng Han Sentenced to 1
Year, 9 Months,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 3 November 16.
\45\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Activist Meng Han Released
After 21 Months in Prison,'' 4 September 17.
\46\ International Labour Office, Reports of the Committee on
Freedom of Association: 380th Report of the Committee on Freedom of
Association, GB.328/INS/14, 23 November-10 December 16, para. 236.
\47\ ``Labor Conflicts at Hong Kong-Invested Enterprises in
Mainland Worsen, Worker Strikes and Protests Increase 30 Percent''
[Neidi gangzi qiye laozi ehua gongchao zeng sancheng], Radio Free Asia,
12 October 16; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers?
Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York
University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 2.
\48\ ``Under Increased Control, Labor Rights Defense Incidents
Difficult To Expose'' [Jiaqiang guankong xia laogong weiquan shijian
nan puguang], Radio Free Asia, 27 January 17; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will
Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of
Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law
Institute, October 2016, 36.
\49\ Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers,
Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University
School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 36-37.
\50\ Ibid., 2.
\51\ Ivan Franceschini, ``Revisiting Chinese Labour NGOs: Some
Grounds for Hope? '' Made in China, Issue 1 (January-March 2016), 19;
Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese Labor Activists Handed Suspended Sentences,''
Wall Street Journal, 26 September 16; Tim Pringle, ``What Do Labour
NGOs in China Do? '' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute:
Analysis (blog), 17 October 16.
\52\ ``Four Detained Labor Rights Defenders Arrested, Two Out on
Bail, Attack Aimed at Panyu Workers' Services Center'' [Bei zhua lao
wei renshi si pibu liang qubao maotou zhi zhi panyu dagongzu], Radio
Free Asia, 10 January 16; Zou Wei, ``Behind the Halo of the `Star of
the Labor Movement'--`Panyu Workers' Services Center' Manager Zeng
Feiyang and Others Investigated as Suspects in Serious Crimes'' [Jiekai
``gong yun zhi xing'' guanghuan de beihou--``panyu dagongzu wenshu
chuli fuwu bu'' zhuren zeng feiyang deng ren shexian yanzhong fanzui
anjian diaocha], Xinhua, 22 December 15.
\53\ Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese Labor Activists Handed Suspended
Sentences,'' Wall Street Journal, 26 September 16; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Labour Activist Meng Han Goes to Trial Amidst Intimidation
and Blatant Procedural Violations,'' 24 October 16.
\54\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts.
20(1), 23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22(1); International Labour
Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, 18 June 98, art. 2(a).
\55\ See, e.g., ``Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security:
Guarantee Migrant Workers' Wages Before the Spring Festival,
Maliciously Withholding Wages Will Bring Consequences'' [Renshebu:
chunjie qian baozhang nongmingong gongzi zhifu eyi qianxin jiang la
hei], People's Daily, 21 November 15; China Labour Bulletin, ``Strikes
and Protests by China's Workers Soar to Record Heights in 2015,'' 7
January 16; Pete Sweeney, ``China's Labour Law Under Fire as
Restructuring Threatens Jobs,'' Reuters, 12 March 16.
\56\ For information on China Labour Bulletin's methodology through
the end of 2016, see China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China
Labour Bulletin's Strike Map,'' 29 March 16. China Labour Bulletin
changed their methodology beginning in 2017. China Labour Bulletin,
``Strike Map Applies New Fixed Sampling Method in 2017,'' 17 February
17.
\57\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 15 May
17.
\58\ Ibid.
\59\ Ibid.
\60\ Ibid.
\61\ China Labour Bulletin, ``New Normal? Strike Map Shows Steady
Trends in Worker Actions in First Half of 2017,'' 15 August 17.
\62\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map Applies New Fixed Sampling
Method in 2017,'' 17 February 17; Hudson Lockett, ``China Labour Unrest
Spreads to `New Economy,' '' Financial Times, 2 February 17.
\63\ Shang Yang et al., ``Without Deterrent, Wage Arrears Become
Chronic Illness (Three Questions on People's Livelihoods--Focus on
Migrant Workers' Pay Demands (Part 2))'' [Meiyou zhensheli qianxin
cheng wanji (minsheng san wen jujiao nongmingong tao xin (xia))],
People's Daily, 6 January 17; China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map
Applies New Fixed Sampling Method in 2017,'' 17 February 17.
\64\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map Applies New
Fixed Sampling Method in 2017,'' 17 February 17; Human Rights Watch, ``
`A Great Danger for Lawyers': New Regulatory Curbs on Lawyers
Representing Protesters,'' Vol. 18, No. 15(c) (December 2006), 17; John
Kamm, Dui Hua Foundation, ``Statement on China's Initial Report Under
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,''
25 April 05.
\65\ Liu Zhan, ``Chongqing Strikes Hard Against Illegal Employment,
Protects Workers' Interests'' [Chongqing yanli daji feifa yonggong
baozhang laodongzhe liyi], China National Radio, 9 January 17.
\66\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strike Map Applies New Fixed Sampling
Method in 2017,'' 17 February 17; Tianyu Wang and Fang Lee Cooke,
``Striking the Balance in Industrial Relations in China? An Analysis of
Court Decisions of 897 Strike Cases (2008-2015),'' Journal of
Industrial Relations, Vol. 59, Issue 1 (February 2017), 27.
\67\ ``Under Increased Control, Labor Rights Defense Incidents
Difficult To Expose'' [Jiaqiang guankong xia laogong weiquan shijian
nan puguang], Radio Free Asia, 27 January 17.
\68\ Ibid.
\69\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Two Chinese Journalists
Detained for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble,' '' 28 June 16;
Oiwan Lam, ``Founder of Protest Reporting Outlet Goes Missing in
China,'' Global Voices, 23 June 16; Human Rights Campaign in China,
``Arrests of Lu Yuyu, Founder of `Not the News' Site Documenting Civil
Society Rights Defense Incidents, and Li Tingyu on Suspicion of Picking
Quarrels and Provoking Trouble Approved by Dali Procuratorate'' [Jilu
minjian weiquan shijian ``fei xinwen'' chuangbanren lu yuyu ji li
tingyu liang ren bei dali jianchayuan yi shexian xunxin zishi zui
pizhun daibu], 22 July 16. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00177 on Lu Yuyu and 2016-
00190 on Li Tingyu. For more information about Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu's
efforts documenting protests in China, see Wu Qiang, ``What Do Lu
Yuyu's Statistics of Protest Tell Us About the Chinese Society Today?
'' China Change, 6 July 16; Yaqiu Wang, ``Meet China's Protest
Archivist,'' Foreign Policy, Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 3 April 14.
\70\ `` `Not the News' Founder Lu Yuyu Receives Heavy Sentence of 4
Years'' [``Fei xinwen'' chuangbanren lu yuyu bei zhong pan 4 nian],
Radio Free Asia, 3 August 17; Rights Defense Network, `` `Not the News'
Founder Lu Yuyu Sentenced to 4 Years Today, Girlfriend Li Tingyu
Released on Bail'' [``Fei xinwen'' chuangbanren lu yuyu jin huo xing 4
nian nuyou li tingyu qubao huoshi], 3 August 17.
\71\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Li Tingyu,'' 20 February 17;
Rights Defense Network, `` `Not the News' Founder Lu Yuyu Sentenced to
4 Years Today, Girlfriend Li Tingyu Released on Bail'' [``Fei xinwen''
chuangbanren lu yuyu jin huo xing 4 nian nuyou li tingyu qubao huoshi],
3 August 17.
\72\ China Labour Bulletin, ``The Hidden Cost of Settling Yet
Another Labour Dispute,'' 23 December 16.
\73\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Official Union Catches Up With Labour
NGO in Collective Bargaining Case,'' 4 January 17.
\74\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``Across China, Walmart Faces Labor
Unrest as Authorities Stand Aside,'' New York Times, 16 November 16.
\75\ Yu Nakamura, ``Sony Worker Revolt Spotlights China Exit
Hazards,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 23 November 16; Yan Ning, ``Striking
Coca Cola Workers in Chengdu Encounter Violent Suppression, HKTCU
Protests at Hong Kong Headquarters'' [Chengdu kekou kele gongren bagong
zao wuli zhenya zhigongmeng dao gang zongbu kangyi], InMediaHK, 2
December 16.
\76\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 15 May
17.
\77\ ``Under Increased Control, Labor Rights Defense Incidents
Difficult To Expose'' [Jiaqiang guankong xia laogong weiquan shijian
nan puguang], Radio Free Asia, 27 January 17.
\78\ International Trade Union Confederation, ``The 2016 ITUC
Global Rights Index: The World's Worst Countries for Workers,'' 2016,
24; Tianyu Wang and Fang Lee Cooke, ``Striking the Balance in
Industrial Relations in China? An Analysis of Court Decisions of 897
Strike Cases (2008-2015),'' Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 59,
Issue 1 (February 2017), 22.
\79\ Tianyu Wang and Fang Lee Cooke, ``Striking the Balance in
Industrial Relations in China? An Analysis of Court Decisions of 897
Strike Cases (2008-2015),'' Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 59,
Issue 1 (February 2017), 27-28, 30-33.
\80\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1(d); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 10 June 17. China
has signed and ratified the ICESCR. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, A/71/385, 14 September 16, 54,
56-57.
\81\ International Labour Office, Reports of the Committee on
Freedom of Association: 380th Report of the Committee on Freedom of
Association, GB.328/INS/14, 23 November-10 December 16, para. 236.
\82\ See, e.g., ``Sale of Yunnan Child Workers Exposed in China's
Clothing Capital: Yunnan Kids Easily Cheated'' [Zhongguo fuzhuang zhi
du bei pu maimai yunnan tonggong: yunnan wa hao pian], Chuncheng
Evening Post, reprinted in Sina, 21 November 16; Wang Lin, ``Suspected
Child Labor! 14-Year-Old Working in Guang'an for 9 Months, Paid Only
100 Yuan'' [She guyong tonggong! yu 14 sui shaonian guang'an dagong 9
ge yue gongzi jin 100 yuan], Sichuan Online, 18 January 17. For
information on child labor from previous reporting years, see CECC,
2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 85-86; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8
October 15, 86; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 76-77.
\83\ ``Sale of Yunnan Child Workers Exposed in China's Clothing
Capital: Yunnan Kids Easily Cheated'' [Zhongguo fuzhuang zhi du bei pu
maimai yunnan tonggong: yunnan wa hao pian], Chuncheng Evening Post,
reprinted in Sina, 21 November 16; ``Buying and Selling Child Laborers
From Yunnan in China Clothing Capital Changshu Revealed'' [Zhongguo
fuzhuang zhi du changshu bei pu maimai yunnan tonggong], Beijing Times,
22 November 16; Mandy Zuo, ``Under 16 and Working 16 Hours a Day . . .
Chinese Clothes Factories Import Cheap Child Labour From Across
China,'' South China Morning Post, 22 November 16.
\84\ ``Sale of Yunnan Child Workers Exposed in China's Clothing
Capital: Yunnan Kids Easily Cheated'' [Zhongguo fuzhuang zhi du bei pu
maimai yunnan tonggong: yunnan wa hao pian], Chuncheng Evening Post,
reprinted in Sina, 21 November 16.
\85\ International Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on
Forced Labour,'' 1 June 12.
\86\ Wang Jiliang, ``Jiangsu Changshu Employers Suspected of Using
Child Labor: Children Endure Hardship To Work, [We] Have Never Beaten
or Verbally Abused Them'' [Jiangsu changshu shiyong tonggong xianyiren:
haizi gongzuo xinku cong mei da ma guo tamen], People's Daily, 24
November 16.
\87\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 15; PRC Law on the Protection of
Minors [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wei chengnianren baohu fa], passed 4
September 91, amended 29 December 06, effective 1 June 07, art. 38.
Article 15 of the PRC Labor Law prohibits the employment of minors
under 16, with exceptions for literature and the arts, sports, and
special handicrafts, provided the employer undergoes inspection and
approval and guarantees the child's right to compulsory education.
\88\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 138)
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73;
International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99; International Labour Organization,
``Ratifications of C138--Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138),'' last
visited 10 June 17; International Labour Organization, ``Ratifications
of C182--Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182),'' last
visited 10 June 17.
\89\ International Labour Organization, Country Office for China
and Mongolia, ``Child Labour in China and Mongolia,'' last visited 6
April 17.
\90\ Cui Shijie et al., ``CCTV: 60 Thousand Accidents and 41
Thousand Deaths in China in 2016'' [Yangshi wang: 2016 nian woguo
fasheng anquan shigu 6 wan qi siwang 4.1 wan ren], CCTV, reprinted in
State Administration of Work Safety, 16 January 17. For more
information on the 2017 National Work Safety Conference, see ``2017
National Work Safety Conference'' [2017 nian quanguo anquan shengchan
gongzuo huiyi], State Administration of Work Safety, last visited 20
July 17.
\91\ Cui Shijie et al., ``CCTV: 60 Thousand Accidents and 41
Thousand Deaths in China in 2016'' [Yangshi wang: 2016 nian woguo
fasheng anquan shigu 6 wan qi siwang 4.1 wan ren], CCTV, reprinted in
State Administration of Work Safety, 16 January 17.
\92\ See, e.g., PRC Work Safety Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
anquan shengchan fa], passed 29 June 02, amended 31 August 14,
effective 1 December 14; State Administration of Work Safety,
Production and Operations Work Unit Safety Training Provisions
[Shengchan jingying danwei anquan peixun guiding], issued 17 January
06, effective 1 March 06; Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology et al., Measures on Managing the Restricted Use of Harmful
Materials in Electrical and Electronic Goods [Dianqi dianzi chanpin
youhai wuzhi xianzhi shiyong guanli banfa], issued 21 January 16,
effective 1 July 16.
\93\ Zhang Ping, ``National People's Congress Standing Committee
Law Enforcement Inspection Group Report on Inspection of PRC Work
Safety Law Implementation'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu
weiyuanhui zhifa jiancha zu guanyu jiancha ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo
anquan shengchan fa'' shishi qingkuang de baogao], 21 December 16,
2(2); Lu Hongyong, ``Risky Business for China's Window Cleaners,''
Sixth Tone, 20 October 16. See also Mark Melnicoe, ``China: Fixing
Factory Labor Abuse Remains Elusive Goal,'' Bloomberg BNA, 19 December
16; China Labor Watch, ``Labor Rights Violations in Walmart and Home
Depot's Supplier Factory,'' 1 December 16, 13-14.
\94\ American Lung Association, ``Learn About Pneumoconiosis,''
last visited 5 June 17; American Lung Association, ``Pneumoconiosis
Symptoms, Causes and Risk Factors,'' last visited 5 June 17.
\95\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``2014 Report
on Occupational Illness Nationwide'' [2014 nian quanguo zhiye bing
baogao qingkuang], 3 December 15.
\96\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, Interpretation
of ``Opinion on Strengthening Pneumoconiosis Prevention Efforts for
Migrant Laborers'' [Jiedu ``guanyu jiaqiang nongmingong chenfeibing
fangzhi gongzuo de yijian''], 21 January 16.
\97\ Love Save Pneumoconiosis, ``About Us'' [Guanyu women], last
visited 6 April 17.
\98\ ``Love Save Pneumoconiosis Foundation Convenes Conference in
Beijing on Methods for Controlling Pneumoconiosis'' [Da ai qing chen
jijin chenfei bing fangzhi moshi yantaohui zai jing juxing], Xinhua, 12
December 16.
\99\ Zhang Rui and Chen Xiaoyan, ``CPPCC Delegate: Resolve
Pneumoconiosis Sufferers' `Painful Breaths' '' [Zhengxie weiyuan: gong
jie chenfei bing huanzhe ``huxi zhi tong''], Workers' Daily, 14 March
17.
\100\ Qian Jinghua, ``Black Lung Miners Demand Compensation, Get
Detention,'' Sixth Tone, 22 October 16. For more information on the
ongoing dispute between former miners and the Ganluo county government,
see China Labour Bulletin, ``Sichuan Detains Dying Miner Fighting for
Compensation,'' 11 August 16. For more information on the detained
miners, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2016-
00365 on Rao Zhongwen, 2017-00213 on Amu Ziha, and 2017-00214 on Luo
Ronggui.
\101\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 1(1). For an official English-
language translation, see State Council Information Office, ``National
Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted
in Xinhua, 29 September 16, sec. I(1).
\102\ State Council General Office, ``National Occupational Illness
Control Plan (2016-2020)'' [Guojia zhiye bing fangzhi guihua (2016-2020
nian)], issued 26 December 16, sec. 2(3).
\103\ State Council General Office, `` `13th Five-Year' Plan on
Work Safety'' [Anquan shengchan ``shisan wu'' guihua], issued 12
January 17, sec. 2(3).
\104\ Raymond Fisman and Yongxiang Wang, ``The Distortionary
Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence From China's `Death
Ceiling' Program,'' National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
23098, January 2017, 2-4, 8, 13.
\105\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic
of China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17. Migrant workers (nongmingong)
are Chinese nationals with rural household registrations who work in
urban areas. For more information on migrant workers, see, e.g., China
Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and Their Children,'' last visited
24 April 17; Sarah Swider, ``The Hukou System, Migration, and the
Construction Industry,'' in Building China: Informal Work and the New
Precariat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 21-29. For more
information on the household registration (hukou) system, see Section
II--Freedom of Residence and Movement.
\106\ Shang Yang et al., ``People's Daily Three Questions on Wage
Arrears: Still No Cure After Much Effort, What Is the Reason? ''
[Renmin ribao san wen qianxin shijian: jiuzhi buyu, yuanyin shi
shenme?], People's Daily, 6 January 17; Bai Tianliang, ``Ensure the
Payment of Wages, Give Migrant Workers Peace of Mind for the New Year''
[Quanli baozhang gongzi zhifu rang nongmingong anxin guonian], People's
Daily, 24 January 17; Hudson Lockett, ``China Labour Unrest Spreads to
`New Economy,' '' Financial Times, 2 February 17. See also State
Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action Plan of
China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2016-2020 nian)],
29 September 16, 1(1).
\107\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 15
May 17.
\108\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin
jianchayuan gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17, reprinted in National
People's Congress, 15 March 17.
\109\ State Council General Office, Opinion on Comprehensively
Managing the Problem of Migrant Worker Wage Arrears [Guowuyuan
bangongting guanyu quanmian zhili tuoqian nongmingong gongzi wenti de
yijian], issued 17 January 16, 1(2).
\110\ Shang Yang et al., ``People's Daily Three Questions on Wage
Arrears: Still No Cure After Much Effort, What Is the Reason? ''
[Renmin ribao san wen qianxin shijian: jiuzhi buyu, yuanyin shi
shenme?], People's Daily, 6 January 17.
\111\ Ibid.; Joyce Huang, ``Chinese Migrant Workers Protest Over
Unpaid Wages,'' Voice of America, 19 January 17; Hudson Lockett,
``China Labour Unrest Spreads to `New Economy,' '' Financial Times, 2
February 17.
\112\ Bai Tianliang, ``Fully Ensure the Payment of Wages, Give
Migrant Workers Peace of Mind for the New Year'' [Quanli baozhang
gongzi zhifu rang nongmingong anxin guonian], People's Daily, 24
January 17.
\113\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic
of China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17.
\114\ Katie Allen, ``Chinese Growth Slips to Slowest Pace for 26
Years,'' Guardian, 20 January 17. For comparison, China's GDP growth
rate was 6.9 in 2015, 7.4 in 2014, and 7.7 in 2013. National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``National Economy Making Steady Progress, Stable
in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong
youhao], 19 January 16; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2014
National Economy Running Smoothly Under the New Normal'' [2014 nian
guomin jingji zai xin changtai xia pingwen yunxing], 20 January 15;
National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2013 National Economy
Development Stable and Improved'' [2013 nian guomin jingji fazhan
wenzhong xianghao], 20 January 14.
\115\ Leslie Shaffer, ``The Curious Case of China's Remarkably
Consistent Economic Growth,'' CNBC, 19 October 16; ``Thank Fathom It's
Friday--Leading Questions on Chinese Growth,'' Fathom Consulting
(blog), 30 September 16. See also ``China Statistics Agency Sets Up
Special Arm To Combat Fake Data,'' Bloomberg, 20 April 17.
\116\ Pearl Forss and Yvonne Lim, ``As Economy Flags, Labour
Protests Multiply Across China,'' Channel NewsAsia, 18 October 16; Xie
Yu, ``Soaring Costs Force More Chinese Firms To Look Overseas, as
Latest Figures Show ODI Surges 53.7pc in Year to Date,'' South China
Morning Post, 18 October 16; Venus Wu, ``Cheap, but Not So Cheerful,
for China's Low-End Textile Exporters,'' Reuters, 4 November 16.
\117\ Christian Shepherd and Lucy Hornby, ``China Plans Early
Retirements To Trim Bloated State Payrolls,'' Financial Times, 13
November 16; Sue-Lin Wong, ``In China's Rustbelt Towns, Displaced Coal,
Steel Workers Lose Hope and Voice,'' Reuters, 5 March 17; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Coal, Steel Workers Oppose Raw Deals in Capacity
Reduction,'' 4 November 16.
\118\ Kelvin Chan, ``Official Survey: China Factory Activity Rises
to 2-Year High,'' Associated Press, reprinted in US News & World
Report, 30 November 16; ``China Manufacturing Gauge Climbs to Highest
in Almost Five Years,'' Bloomberg, 30 March 17; Pei Li and Mark
Magnier, ``Acupuncture and Amusement Parks: China Rolls Out Service-
Economy Gauge,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 14
March 17.
\119\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic
of China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17.
\120\ Deng Lianri et al., Shaoyang Municipal Bureau of Statistics,
Hunan Province Bureau of Statistics, ``Study of Unemployment Rate
Statistical Methodology'' [Shiye lu tongji fangfa yanjiu], 5 December
16; Pei Li and Mark Magnier, ``Acupuncture and Amusement Parks: China
Rolls Out Service-Economy Gauge,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 14 March 17.
\121\ Deng Lianri et al., Shaoyang Municipal Bureau of Statistics,
Hunan Province Bureau of Statistics, ``Study of Unemployment Rate
Statistical Methodology'' [Shiye lu tongji fangfa yanjiu], 5 December
16.
\122\ Han Shuhong, ``Analysis of the Current Increase in the Rural
Unemployment Rate'' [Muqian dui nongcun laodong shiye lu zenggao de
fenxi], Modern Economic Information, 20 March 17.
\123\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 77.
\124\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui
baoxian fa], passed 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, art. 44.
\125\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic
of China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17. See also China Labour Bulletin,
``China's Social Security System,'' last visited 3 April 17.
\126\ Xu Bo, ``Population of Migrant Workers Nationwide Reaches 282
Million'' [Quanguo nongmingong zongliang dadao 2.82 yi], Xinhua, 14
March 17; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic
of China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17.
\127\ For information on workers' low levels of social insurance
coverage in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 81-82; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 87-88; CECC,
2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 75.
\128\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui
baoxian fa], passed 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, arts. 1-4.
\129\ Ibid., arts. 10, 23, 33, 44, 53. See also China Labour
Bulletin, ``China's Social Security System,'' last visited 3 April 17.
\130\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2015
Annual Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2015 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 30 May 16, secs. 1-2; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``People's Republic of China 2016 National
Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 28
February 17.
\131\ Ibid.; Xu Bo, ``Population of Migrant Workers Nationwide
Reaches 282 Million'' [Quanguo nongmingong zongliang dadao 2.82 yi],
Xinhua, 14 March 17.
\132\ Ibid.
\133\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2015
Annual Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2015 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 30 May 16, secs. 1-2; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``People's Republic of China 2016 National
Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 28
February 17.
\134\ Ibid.
\135\ Beatriz Carillo, ``Migrant Labour and the Sustainability of
China's Welfare System,'' Made in China, Issue 4 (October-December
2016), 16; Matthias Stepan, ``How Sustainable Is China's Social
Security System? '' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute:
Analysis (blog), 14 October 16; Kevin Lin, ``Rising Inequality and Its
Discontents in China,'' New Labor Forum, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2016), 69.
\136\ Wu Lirong, ``How Far Are Workers From Pensions? `Money in
Hand Is Most Secure' '' [Yanglaojin li nongmingong you duo yuan? ``qian
zuan zai shouli zui anquan''], Workers' Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 19
January 17; Kevin Lin, ``Rising Inequality and Its Discontents in
China,'' New Labor Forum, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2016), 69; China Labor Watch,
``An Investigation Into Four Toy Sweatshops,'' 15 November 16, 15.
\137\ See, e.g., Thomas Kohlmann, ``VW's Casual Workers in China
Fight for Equal Pay,'' Deutsche Welle, 6 March 17; Miao Chunyu,
``Regulating Dispatch Labor and Perfecting the Supervision Mechanism''
[Guifan laowu paiqian yonggong wanshan jianguan jizhi], China Labour
and Social Security News, 21 January 17.
\138\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Interim
Provisions on Dispatch Labor [Laowu paiqian zanxing guiding], issued 24
January 14, effective 1 March 14; PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07, amended 28
December 12, effective 1 July 13, chap. 5, sec. 2; National People's
Congress Standing Committee, Decision on Amending the ``PRC Labor
Contract Law'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu
xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa'' de jueding],
issued 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13.
\139\ Zhang Shiyi, ``Study of the Dispatch Labor Legal Regime''
[Laowu paiqian falu zhidu yanjiu], Legality Vision, Vol. 34 (December
2016), 244; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers?
Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York
University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 7;
Miao Chunyu, ``Regulating Dispatch Labor and Perfecting the Supervision
Mechanism'' [Guifan laowu paiqian yonggong wanshan jianguan jizhi],
China Labour and Social Security News, 21 January 17.
\140\ PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong
hetong fa], passed 29 June 07, amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July
13, arts. 63, 66; National People's Congress Standing Committee,
Decision on Amending the ``PRC Labor Contract Law'' [Quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong hetong fa'' de jueding], issued 28 December 12,
effective 1 July 13.
\141\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Interim
Provisions on Dispatch Labor [Laowu paiqian zanxing guiding], issued 24
January 14, effective 1 March 14, arts. 4, 28. Article 28 includes an
exception allowing firms with dispatch labor agreements that were
signed prior to the effective date of the amendment to the PRC Labor
Contract Law to continue to employ those dispatch workers until their
contracts expire.
\142\ Miao Chunyu, ``Regulating Dispatch Labor and Perfecting the
Supervision Mechanism'' [Guifan laowu paiqian yonggong wanshan jianguan
jizhi], China Labour and Social Security News, 21 January 17; Zhang
Shiyi, ``Study of the Dispatch Labor Legal Regime'' [Laowu paiqian falu
zhidu yanjiu], Legality Vision, Vol. 34 (December 2016), 244; Deng
Yaling, ``Study of Legal Issues Regarding Equal Pay for Equal Work
Among Labor Dispatch Workers'' [Laowu paiqian yonggong tonggong
tongchou falu wenti yanjiu], Legal System and Society, Vol. 32
(November 2016), 283.
\143\ Miao Chunyu, ``Regulating Dispatch Labor and Perfecting the
Supervision Mechanism'' [Guifan laowu paiqian yonggong wanshan jianguan
jizhi], China Labour and Social Security News, 21 January 17; Aaron
Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and
the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law,
U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 7. For a discussion of the
differences between dispatch and outsourced labor, see Xi Lulu, ``On
the Differences Between Dispatch Labor and Outsourced Labor'' [Lun
laowu paiqian yu laowu waibao de jiebie], Journal of Heilongjiang
Administrative Cadre College of Politics and Law, Vol. 6 (2016), 70-73.
\144\ Miao Chunyu, ``Regulating Dispatch Labor and Perfecting the
Supervision Mechanism'' [Guifan laowu paiqian yonggong wanshan jianguan
jizhi], China Labour and Social Security News, 21 January 17.
\145\ For more information on how different categories of workers
are not afforded protections under Chinese labor laws, see
``Interpreting Chinese Labour: Informalisation or Empowerment? '' in
Made in China Yearbook 2016: Disturbances in Heaven, eds. Ivan
Franceschini et al. (Canberra: Australian National University Press,
February 2017), 32-39; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's
Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New
York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016,
7; Philip C. C. Huang, ``Misleading Chinese Legal and Statistical
Categories: Labor, Individual Entities, and Private Enterprises,''
Modern China, Vol. 39, Issue 4 (July 2013), 348.
\146\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Two Years With No Pay: Court Finally
Recognises Sanitation Workers' Struggle,'' 13 January 17.
\147\ Mark Melnicoe, ``China: Students Get Grim Lesson in Factory
Work,'' Bloomberg BNA, 14 December 16; Du Jiangqian and Yin Hang, ``A
Sichuan School's Student Internships Suspected of Becoming Cheap Labor,
Working 12 Hours in 1 Day'' [Sichuan yi xuexiao xuesheng shixi yi bian
lianjia gong 1 tian gongzuo 12 xiaoshi], Western China Metropolitan
Daily, reprinted in Tencent News, 21 October 16.
\148\ Ryan McMorrow, ``For Couriers, China's E-Commerce Boom Can Be
a Tough Road,'' New York Times, 31 January 17; ``Interpreting Chinese
Labour: Informalisation or Empowerment? '' in Made in China Yearbook
2016: Disturbances in Heaven, eds. Ivan Franceschini et al. (Canberra:
Australian National University Press, February 2017), 34, 37-38.
\149\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 2; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07,
amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 2; Aaron Halegua,
``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the
Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-
Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 2, 7; Philip C. C. Huang,
``Misleading Chinese Legal and Statistical Categories: Labor,
Individual Entities, and Private Enterprises,'' Modern China, Vol. 39,
Issue 4 (July 2013), 348.
\150\ For legal provisions relating to workers above the retirement
age, see State Council, PRC Labor Contract Law Implementing Regulations
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa shishi tiaoli], issued 18
September 08, art. 21; PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07, amended 28 December
12, effective 1 July 13, art. 44(2); Supreme People's Court,
Interpretation Regarding Various Issues in Using Appropriate Laws When
Accepting Labor Dispute Cases (Three) [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu
shenli laodong zhengyi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jishi
(san)], issued 13 September 10, art. 7. For legal provisions relating
to students, see Ministry of Labor, Opinion on Certain Issues Regarding
Fully Implementing the ``PRC Labor Law'' [Guanyu guanche zhixing
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa'' ruogan wenti de yijian],
reprinted in China Law Information, issued 4 August 95, art. 12; Gao
Linlin, ``Students in School Do Not Qualify as Subjects of an
Employment Relationship'' [Zai xiao sheng bushi shige de laodong guanxi
zhuti], Beijing Court Net, 24 May 12.
\151\ Mark Melnicoe, ``China: Students Get Grim Lesson in Factory
Work,'' Bloomberg BNA, 14 December 16; China Labour Bulletin, ``Two
Years With No Pay: Court Finally Recognises Sanitation Workers'
Struggle,'' 13 January 17. See also Luan Jun, ``Case Analysis: Labor
Service Relationship Is Not the Same as Employment Relations'' [Anli
jiexi: laowu guanxi bu dengyu laodong guanxi], Jiadong Online, 3 March
14.
\152\ Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Measures on
Managing Secondary Vocational School Student Internships [Zhongdeng
zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi guanli banfa], issued 26 June 07, arts. 3,
5; Ministry of Education et al., Provisions on Managing Vocational
School Student Internships [Zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi guanli
guiding], issued 11 April 16, arts. 6, 9.
\153\ Du Jiangqian and Yin Hang, ``A Sichuan School's Student
Internships Suspected of Becoming Cheap Labor, Working 12 Hours in 1
Day'' [Sichuan yi xuexiao xuesheng shixi yi bian lianjia gong 1 tian
gongzuo 12 xiaoshi], Western China Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in
Tencent News, 21 October 16; Jiang Jingjing, ``Farce of `Forced
Internships' Frequent, Corrupts the Moral Foundation of Vocational
Schools'' [``Bei shixi'' naoju pin chu baihuaile zhijiao de daode
jichu], Western China Metropolitan Daily, 20 November 16.
\154\ Du Jiangqian and Yin Hang, ``A Sichuan School's Student
Internships Suspected of Becoming Cheap Labor, Working 12 Hours in 1
Day'' [Sichuan yi xuexiao xuesheng shixi yi bian lianjia gong 1 tian
gongzuo 12 xiaoshi], Western China Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in
Tencent News, 21 October 16.
\155\ Ryan McMorrow, ``For Couriers, China's E-Commerce Boom Can Be
a Tough Road,'' New York Times, 31 January 17; Lu Hongyong, ``Risky
Business for China's Window Cleaners,'' Sixth Tone, 20 October 16; Lu
Yue et al., ``Protection of Online Contract Workers' Rights and
Interests Can't Be `Up in the Air' '' [Wang yue gong de quanyi baozhang
buke ``xuankong''], Workers' Daily, 9 March 17; ``Interpreting Chinese
Labour: Informalisation or Empowerment? '' in Made in China Yearbook
2016: Disturbances in Heaven, eds. Ivan Franceschini et al. (Canberra:
Australian National University Press, February 2017), 34, 37-38.
\156\ Ryan McMorrow, ``For Couriers, China's E-Commerce Boom Can Be
a Tough Road,'' New York Times, 31 January 17; Lu Yue et al.,
``Protection of Online Contract Workers' Rights and Interests Can't Be
`Up in the Air' '' [Wang yue gong de quanyi baozhang buke
``xuankong''], Workers' Daily, 9 March 17; ``Interpreting Chinese
Labour: Informalisation or Empowerment? '' in Made in China Yearbook
2016: Disturbances in Heaven, eds. Ivan Franceschini et al. (Canberra:
Australian National University Press, February 2017), 37-38.
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party officials continued to abuse
criminal law and police power to further their priorities in
``maintaining social stability'' and perpetuating one-party
rule at the expense of individual freedoms.\1\
Ongoing Use of Arbitrary Detention
Extralegal and extrajudicial forms of detention that
restrict a person's liberty without judicial oversight \2\
violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) \3\ and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\4\ Some commonly used forms
of extralegal and extrajudicial detention in China are
described below.
BLACK JAILS
``Black jails'' are detention sites that operate outside of
China's judicial and administrative detention systems.\5\ After
the Chinese government abolished the reeducation through labor
system in 2013,\6\ the Commission continued to observe Chinese
authorities' use of ``black jails'' \7\--including a type known
as ``legal education centers'' \8\--to suppress individuals
such as Falun Gong practitioners \9\ and petitioners.\10\ The
Commission also observed multiple reports of Chinese
authorities detaining rights advocates in ``black jails'' prior
to and during the annual meetings of the National People's
Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
in March 2017.\11\ [For more information on Falun Gong
practitioners and petitioners, see Section II--Freedom of
Religion and Section III--Access to Justice.]
PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS
Despite provisions in the PRC Mental Health Law \12\ and
related regulations \13\ aimed at protecting citizens from such
abuse, Chinese authorities continued to forcibly commit
individuals to psychiatric facilities for political reasons
\14\ and used psychiatric hospital staff as instruments of
``maintaining social stability.'' Civil Rights & Livelihood
Watch (CRLW), a human rights monitoring group based in China,
documented a case in Anhui province in which personnel of a
psychiatric facility participated in ``stability maintenance''
efforts by preventing a petitioner from traveling to Beijing
municipality.\15\ CRLW observed that despite new laws and
regulations aimed at improving mental health services,
individuals who need mental health care lack access, while
authorities continue to abuse the system to control petitioners
and others defending their rights.\16\
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY DISCIPLINARY PROCESS (SHUANGGUI)
Under an investigation process known as ``double
designation'' (shuanggui), Party investigators may summon Party
members \17\ to appear for interrogation at a designated time
and place for alleged Party discipline violations such as
corruption.\18\ The shuanggui process is within the Party's
control and outside China's legal system; it is a form of
extralegal detention \19\ that contravenes rights guaranteed
under the UDHR and the ICCPR.\20\ Human Rights Watch reported
in December 2016 that prolonged solitary confinement, ill
treatment, and threats against family members during shuanggui
remained common.\21\ In March 2017, a Canada-based media outlet
published a report detailing the torture and abuse that Wang
Longming, a former manager of a state-run tobacco factory,
suffered during his nearly two-month stay in shuanggui in
2015.\22\ According to the report, authorities subjected Wang
to numerous forms of torture, including sleep deprivation and
being forced to sit on a small stool for 20 hours.\23\
In December 2016, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee announced a pilot reform program that establishes
supervisory commissions (jiancha weiyuanhui) in three province-
level jurisdictions to take over the functions of investigating
corruption and other official misconduct, functions orginally
performed by three government bodies.\24\ The program
authorizes the supervisory commissions to carry out 12
investigative measures including interrogation (xunwen) and
confinement (liuzhi), without specifying limitations on the
length of time or the manner of implementation.\25\ According
to legal experts, the implications of this new program, such as
whether it will replace shuanggui \26\ and how the detention
authority will be exercised,\27\ remain unclear.
Criminal Law
USE OF CRIMINAL LAW TO PROSECUTE RIGHTS ADVOCATES
This past year, the Chinese government continued to use
broadly defined crimes to punish individuals such as rights
advocates, lawyers, and members of some ethnic minority groups.
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (Working Group)
considers a detention arbitrary ``even if it is authorized by
law . . . if it is premised upon an arbitrary piece of
legislation or is inherently unjust, relying for instance on
discriminatory grounds.'' \28\ During the Commission's 2017
reporting year, the Working Group found the detentions of
rights lawyer Xia Lin \29\ and religious leader Wu Zeheng \30\
to be arbitrary.\31\
Endangering state security. The Chinese
government continued to prosecute individuals under
``endangering state security'' charges for peacefully
exercising their rights.\32\ Articles 102 to 112 of the
PRC Criminal Law--listing offenses including
``subversion of state power,'' ``separatism,'' and
``espionage''--are collectively referred to as crimes
of ``endangering state security,'' some of which carry
the death penalty.\33\ In one recent example, in March
2017, the Foshan Intermediate People's Court in Foshan
municipality, Guangdong province, convicted Su Changlan
\34\ and Chen Qitang \35\ of ``inciting subversion of
state power'' and sentenced them to three years' and
four years and six months' imprisonment, respectively,
for ``attacking the socialist system'' by means of
spreading rumors and committing libel on the
Internet.\36\ Authorities in Foshan detained Su and
Chen in October and November 2014, after they voiced
support for the fall 2014 pro-democracy protests in
Hong Kong.\37\
Extortion. Authorities continued \38\ to
charge rights advocates and petitioners \39\ with
``extortion,'' \40\ the elements of which are undefined
in the PRC Criminal Law and judicial
interpretations.\41\ In cases of petitioners \42\
allegedly committing ``extortion'' against local
government entities,\43\ judgments published during
this past year show that some courts viewed petitioning
as a means of threat.\44\ Relying on information from
the Chinese judiciary's judgment database, a China-
based legal scholar observed an increase in such cases
between 2013 and 2016, from about 25 to 280 across
China.\45\
Gathering a crowd to disturb social order and
gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public place.
Authorities continued to invoke Articles 290 and 291 of
the PRC Criminal Law \46\ against citizens \47\ in
manners that infringed on their rights, including the
freedom of assembly and religion.\48\ For example, in
April 2017, the Changji Municipal People's Court in
Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, tried five individuals \49\ on the
charge of ``gathering a crowd to disturb social order''
for participating in unauthorized Christian
gatherings.\50\ In February 2017, the Supreme People's
Court issued measures specifying that individuals who
participate in sit-in protests, distribute print
materials, chant slogans, or hold up banners outside a
courthouse are subject to criminal prosecution under a
range of criminal offenses, including Articles 290 and
291 of the PRC Criminal Law.\51\
Picking quarrels and provoking trouble. This
past year, authorities prosecuted petitioners and
rights advocates \52\ for ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.'' \53\ A U.S.-based legal scholar
observed that ``the vagueness of the `crime' . . .
allows police unlimited discretion to detain and arrest
offenders for almost any action.'' \54\ The Chinese
government expanded this provision to cover Internet
activities in 2013 \55\ and has since used it to
prosecute individuals for online speech.\56\ For
example, in September 2016, the Gangzha District
People's Court in Nantong municipality, Jiangsu
province, sentenced Shan Lihua \57\ to two years and
three months' imprisonment partly in connection with
her online activities advocating women's rights and
helping victims of forcible demolition and
relocation.\58\
Illegal assembly, procession, or
demonstration. In December 2016, the Haifeng County
People's Court in Shanwei municipality, Guangdong,
convicted eight individuals \59\ of ``illegal assembly,
procession, or demonstration,'' \60\ among other
crimes, and imposed sentences ranging from 2 years' to
10 years and 6 months' imprisonment for participating
in protests that lasted for 85 days in Wukan village,
Donghai subdistrict, Lufeng city, Shanwei, calling on
the government to release Wukan's elected village
committee head Lin Zulian (also known as Lin Zuluan)
and to address villagers' complaints regarding official
corruption in village land sales.\61\ [For more
information on the Wukan village protests, see Section
III--Institutions of Democratic Governance.]
Other criminal offenses. This past year,
authorities accused rights advocates and religious
practitioners of other criminal offenses, including
``illegal business activity,'' \62\ ``defamation,''
\63\ ``misappropriation of funds,'' \64\ ``sabotaging
production and operation,'' \65\ ``organizing and using
a cult to undermine implementation of the law,'' \66\
and ``disturbing court order.'' \67\
Ongoing Challenges in the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law
COERCED CONFESSIONS
The Chinese government and Communist Party emphasized the
procuratorate's supervisory role over criminal investigation
and continued to improve implementation of the existing legal
provisions \68\ that address the problem of investigators' use
of coercion and overreliance on confession in criminal
cases.\69\ In October 2016, five central government bodies
issued a joint opinion that obligates the procuratorate in
certain important cases to ensure the legality of evidence
before the conclusion of an investigation by directly
questioning the criminal suspect about the existence of a
coerced confession or illegal evidence collection
practices.\70\ In June 2017, the same government bodies issued
provisions specific to the exclusion of evidence obtained by
torture.\71\ A U.S.-based legal scholar, however, noted the
ineffectiveness of the provisions because ``they maintain a
narrow view of what type of evidence should be excluded and
also continue to allow subsequent non-coerced confessions after
an initial coerced one.'' \72\ In March 2017, Cao Jianming,
Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP),
reported that in 2016, the procuratorate corrected 34,230 cases
of illegal investigation practices, such as extracting
confessions by torture, but did not report any instance of
criminal prosecution of investigators who engaged in abuse.\73\
Despite these official pronouncements, reports of coerced
confession continued to emerge this past year,\74\ with some
indicating that procurators participated in the practice.\75\
[For more information on custodial torture and abuse, see
Torture and Abuse in Custody in this section.]
RESIDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE AT A DESIGNATED LOCATION
Under Article 73 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL),
authorities can enforce a form of detention known as
``residential surveillance at a designated location'' (RSDL)
\76\ to detain a person at an undisclosed location for up to
six months in cases involving charges of ``endangering state
security'' (ESS), terrorism, or serious bribery.\77\ A U.S.-
based scholar noted that RSDL is susceptible to abuse if
authorities apply ESS charges as a pretext to forgo criminal
suspects' rights.\78\ Reports that emerged this past year
indicate that torture and abuse took place in the enforcement
of RSDL.\79\ In some cases, authorities reportedly enforced
RSDL even when they did not allege any of the three types of
offenses that permit this form of detention.\80\ In the case of
Jiang Tianyong, a disbarred rights lawyer who disappeared on
November 21, 2016, authorities reportedly did not provide his
family notice of him being detained under RSDL within the
timeframe required by law \81\ and refused to disclose his
detention location or to allow his family and lawyers to meet
with him.\82\ The location of Jiang's detention remained
unknown for over six months.\83\
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
This past year, the Chinese government denied access to
legal counsel to some individuals, particularly those detained
in politically sensitive cases. Individuals charged with ESS
crimes--which the government often used against rights
advocates \84\--continued to face obstacles in meeting with
their lawyers.\85\ In cases involving ESS, terrorism, and
serious bribery (``three categories of cases'' (sanlei
anjian)),\86\ Article 33 of the PRC Lawyers Law as amended in
2012 \87\ qualifies detainees' right to meet with their lawyers
by referencing the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which requires
lawyers to obtain approval from the agency investigating the
case but does not provide for a specific timeframe within which
the agency must decide on such an application.\88\ In the case
of detained lawyer Jiang Tianyong,\89\ his lawyers questioned
the legality of the authorities' decision to repeatedly deny
Jiang access to counsel on ESS grounds yet permit a news
reporter to interview him.\90\
This past year, authorities obstructed or denied access to
counsel for those detained in cases involving rights advocacy
or the exercise of internationally recognized freedoms,\91\ and
in some cases harassed or intimidated their lawyers.\92\ Liu
Zhengqing, lawyer of democracy advocate Chen Yunfei,\93\ said
that after a December 2016 court hearing in which he
represented Chen before the Wuhou District People's Court in
Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, court officials
detained him for four hours, searched his briefcase, and seized
his computer.\94\ Another report from this past year indicated
that the lawyer initially retained by the family of petitioner
Ding Meifang \95\ withdrew representation after government
officials reportedly asked the lawyer to demand that Ding make
a guilty plea.\96\
In May 2017, authorities detained rights lawyer Chen
Jian'gang, his wife, and their two minor children when they
were traveling in Yunnan province.\97\ Previously, Chen
publicized accounts of authorities torturing his client \98\
Xie Yang,\99\ a rights lawyer detained as part of the crackdown
against rights lawyers and advocates that began in and around
July 2015 (July 2015 crackdown).\100\
OTHER DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
The following examples highlight certain due process
violations that infringe on individuals' substantive rights:
Prolonged pretrial detention. Although the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law permits law enforcement
officials to extend the prescribed investigation
period,\101\ prolonged pretrial detention constitutes a
violation of international human rights standards.\102\
Some detainees reportedly remained in prolonged
pretrial detention,\103\ in some cases because
authorities extended the investigation period or
canceled scheduled hearings.\104\ One example suggests
that cooperation with the authorities can reduce a
detainee's time in detention: Zhang Wanhe,\105\ whom
authorities detained in June 2015 outside a courthouse
where she participated in an advocacy event,\106\ said
that authorities tried and then released her in January
2017 after she admitted guilt and terminated her
lawyer, whereas Yao Jianqing,\107\ whom authorities
detained at the same event, did not cooperate as Zhang
did and remained in pretrial detention.\108\
Delay in judicial proceedings. Delays in
judicial proceedings likewise lengthen a person's time
in detention.\109\ In one example, after military
veteran and petitioner Gao Hancheng \110\ appealed a
June 2016 conviction for ``gathering a crowd to disturb
social order,'' the Wuhan Intermediate People's Court
in Hubei province, after three adjournments, held a
pretrial conference for the first time on April 25,
2017, and did not issue a trial date.\111\ While in
detention, Gao reportedly had a stroke and lost
mobility in January 2017; the prolonged detention
reportedly contributed to the deterioration of his
health.\112\
Procedural irregularities in law enforcement.
Reports from this past year indicate that law
enforcement authorities in some localities did not
present proper documentation before restricting
citizens' liberty or conducting a search \113\ in
violation of China's domestic laws.\114\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Draft Amendment to the PRC People's Police Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2016, the Ministry of Public Security issued a draft
amendment \115\ to the PRC People's Police Law \116\ that includes
proposed statutory codification of existing regulations defining the
scope of police authority to carry and use firearms.\117\ The draft
amendment seeks to authorize police to use firearms in five situations,
including when someone commits or escapes after having committed an
offense that seriously endangers ``state security'' or ``public
safety,'' and when someone damages property that the government has
designated as a target of protection.\118\ Noting the broad definitions
of ``state security'' and ``public safety'' under Chinese law, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) criticized the draft amendment for being
inconsistent with international standards that prohibit law enforcement
officials from using firearms unless it is necessary to prevent
``imminent threat of death or serious injury . . ..'' \119\ HRW also
pointed out the lack of meaningful limitations on other police powers
covered by the proposed amendment.\120\ Radio Free Asia, for example,
published multiple reports of such abuse of police power this past
year.\121\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Torture and Abuse in Custody
This past year, reports continued to emerge that Chinese
authorities tortured and abused individuals in detention,\122\
including rights lawyers and advocates detained as part of the
July 2015 crackdown. Family members of rights lawyer Li Chunfu
\123\ reported that he returned home in January 2017 in a
severely altered physical and mental state, exhibiting paranoia
and schizophrenic behavior \124\ as well as having damage to
his neck and spine.\125\ Li told his wife that authorities had
drugged him daily for the first portion of his detention.\126\
Rights advocate Wu Gan \127\ and rights lawyer Wang Yu \128\
both reported that authorities tortured them with methods
including sleep deprivation and shackling of their hands and
feet.\129\ The China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group
reported in January 2017 that rights lawyers Wang Quanzhang
\130\ and Li Heping \131\ had been tortured by electric shock
to the point of fainting during the period they spent in
RSDL.\132\ Li Heping's wife also said that authorities had
forcibly medicated Li for 22 months with a drug that caused
``muscle pains, lethargy, and blurred vision'' and shackled him
for a month in such a way that he could not stand upright.\133\
Other reports from this past year described additional
instances in which authorities administered medication as a
means of torture.\134\
Rights lawyer Xie Yang also gave detailed descriptions of
the torture he suffered during his detention in connection with
the July 2015 crackdown. In January 2017, Xie told his lawyers
that during the portion of his detention spent under
residential surveillance at a designated location (RSDL),\135\
authorities deprived him of sleep, interrogated him for periods
of over 20 hours, forced him to sit on stacked stools, punched
him, kicked him, and kneed him in his abdomen and lower
extremities on multiple occasions.\136\ Xie noted that
officials carried out these actions directly under the camera
in the room to avoid being recorded.\137\ Xie also identified
over 20 officials who participated in his abuse \138\ and
revealed that officials repeatedly pressured him to confess and
to keep quiet about his torture.\139\ Xie said in a letter that
he reported the torture to two procurators, but they did not
make a record of it.\140\ Party- and state-run media claimed
that another detained lawyer fabricated the accounts of Xie's
torture,\141\ but Xie's lawyer affirmed their veracity.\142\
Inadequate Medical Treatment
The Commission further observed reports of authorities
denying or failing to provide detainees adequate medical
treatment,\143\ which may amount to torture \144\ or violation
of other international human rights standards.\145\ For
example, political reform advocate and Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Liu Xiaobo died of liver cancer in July 2017 while
serving an 11-year sentence for ``inciting subversion of state
power.'' \146\ Liu's health condition prompted questions of
``whether the cancer could have been diagnosed earlier, or
whether poor treatment contributed to his declining health.''
\147\
Lack of Accountability for Officials Involved in Torture
The Commission did not observe reports of Chinese
authorities imposing criminal liability on the perpetrators of
abuse in the above-mentioned cases, or in the case of Lei Yang.
A resident of Beijing municipality, Lei Yang died in May 2016
shortly after plainclothes police officers in Beijing took him
into custody.\148\ In December, authorities announced their
decision not to criminally prosecute the officers despite their
finding that the officers committed ``dereliction of duty''
\149\ and caused Lei's death by twice restraining him,
including by kneeling and stomping on his neck and face,
wrapping an arm around his neck, and pressing on the back of
his neck.\150\ Chinese law requires criminal prosecution if a
government official causes the death of one or more persons as
a result of dereliction of duty.\151\ The Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, which China signed and ratified,\152\ requires a
State Party to prosecute the perpetrator of torture or other
forms of mistreatment.\153\
Draft Law Affecting Public Security Bureau Detention Centers
The Chinese government issued a draft law that proposes to
limit the use of shackling in detention, but legal experts
question its effectiveness in curbing custodial abuse in
general because it does not improve transparency or resolve an
apparent conflict by continuing to allow police to run
detention centers. In a January 2017 ruling, the Supreme
People's Court (SPC) affirmed a lower court's dismissal of a
compensation claim filed by a former death-row inmate who
alleged that he suffered disfiguration and loss of mobility in
his limbs as a result of wearing shackles during
detention.\154\ The SPC found that the treatment alleged by the
claimant was consistent with the PRC Public Security Bureau
Detention Center Regulations (PSB Detention Center
Regulations),\155\ which require every death-row inmate to be
shackled.\156\ The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners, however, prohibit the use of chains or irons as
restraints and limit other kinds of restraints to the extent
necessary for reasons such as prevention of escape during
transfer, and of personal injury or property damage.\157\ In
June 2017, the Ministry of Public Security issued a draft law
that would replace the PSB Detention Center Regulations.\158\
The draft law limits the use of shackles to what is necessary
for ``preventing danger,'' bringing the current legal framework
closer to international standards in this respect.\159\ Lawyers
and legal scholars, however, are skeptical about the draft
law's effectiveness in curbing custodial abuse in general
because it lacks provisions that improves transparency and it
continues to give police the power to control PSB detention
centers, an arrangement that conflicts with the role of police
as investigators.\160\
Wrongful Conviction
In the past reporting year, the Chinese government made
some efforts to address the problem of wrongful conviction, but
custodial abuse and political interference continued to be
subjects of concern.\161\ According to a scholar, false
confessions--obtained mainly through torture--are the
predominant cause of wrongful convictions, and police
obstruction in procuratorial investigations undermined efforts
to curb this practice.\162\ To prevent local influence on
investigations, the Supreme People's Procuratorate reportedly
drafted provisions allowing criminal petitions (xingshi shensu)
involving possible grave injustice to be transferred to
agencies in other locations.\163\ The Commission did not
observe the publication of these provisions.
In February 2017, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) reported
that courts across China in 2016 corrected 11 cases of wrongful
conviction involving 17 individuals.\164\ In one case, the
SPC's second circuit tribunal rescinded the murder and rape
convictions of Nie Shubin, who was executed in 1995, after
another person confessed to the crimes in 2005.\165\ The court
concluded that, due to inconsistencies in Nie's confession, it
could not preclude the possibility that investigators induced
or directed him to confess, but it declined to find that
torture took place.\166\
While the SPC reported that authorities continued to grant
compensation in wrongful conviction cases,\167\ a report citing
official statistics notes that fewer courts disclosed state
compensation statistics between 2014 and 2016, which a Chinese
legal scholar said was inconsistent with central authorities'
stated goal of improving judicial protection against wrongful
conviction.\168\
Death Penalty
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
The Chinese government's claim of limited use of the death
sentence \169\ remained unverifiable as authorities continued
to treat the number of executions as a state secret. An April
2017 Amnesty International report estimated that the number of
executions in China remained in the thousands, exceeding the
number for all other countries combined, and reported that the
Chinese government continued its policy of nondisclosure of
death sentence statistics on state secrecy grounds.\170\
Amnesty International found that death penalty-related
documents published in China's official judicial document
database represented a fraction of the execution reports
retrieved from a search engine in China--about 5 percent in
2015 and 8.5 percent in 2016--which in turn is a fraction of
credible estimates given by non-governmental organizations and
scholars.\171\
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY CASES
In the 10-year period after the Supreme People's Court
(SPC) regained exclusive authority to review death penalty
cases,\172\ the low rate of legal representation in death
penalty cases and the lack of a uniform legal standard of
review have remained issues of concern. While the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law requires legal representation in cases where the
defendants may receive the death penalty,\173\ there is no
corresponding requirement in death penalty review cases before
the SPC.\174\ A study of judicial opinions published between
2014 and 2016 shows that legal counsel participated in 22 out
of 255 (8.63 percent) death penalty review cases, and the
majority of the defendants involved had junior high school or
lower levels of education.\175\ A legal practitioner reported
difficulty in preparing an effective defense due to the lack of
a uniform standard of review and further noted that some SPC
judges disposed of cases without addressing the points raised
by defense counsel.\176\
ORGAN HARVESTING FROM EXECUTED PRISONERS
This past year, the Commission did not observe any
rulemaking efforts to ban harvesting organs from executed
prisoners,\177\ but authorities reportedly imposed sanctions on
persons involved in one case of organ transplantation from an
executed prisoner. Amnesty International observed that China is
likely ``still sourcing organs from prisoners on death row'' as
of 2017, noting that senior Chinese health official Huang
Jiefu, who spoke at an international summit on organ
trafficking held at the Vatican in February 2017, did not deny
that the practice continued.\178\ Huang told reporters he was
sure that there were some violations of China's ban on
harvesting organs from executed prisoners, given China's
population size.\179\ In October 2016, Huang said at a
conference in Beijing municipality that he received information
about a paramilitary police hospital transplanting a kidney
from an executed prisoner to a Canadian patient for 30,000
Canadian dollars (approximately US$21,900).\180\ Huang said he
relayed the information to the Ministry of Public Security and
the National Health and Family Planning Commission, after which
authorities revoked the license of the doctor and the hospital,
sanctioned the hospital director, and detained court personnel
who facilitated the transaction.\181\
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
\1\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``As June Fourth Approaches,
Stability Maintenance Across the Country Intensifies, Dissidents and
Citizens Who Defend Rights Targeted for Stability Maintenance'' [Liusi
linjin gedi weiwen yankong jiaju, yijian renshi ji weiquan gongmin bei
mijixing weiwen], 1 June 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Communist Party
Member Zi Su Formally Arrested on `Inciting Subversion of State Power
Offense' for Asking Communist Party To Implement Direct Elections at
19th Party Congress'' [Yaoqiu zhonggong 19 da zhixuan de zhonggong
dangyuan zi su bei yi ``shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui'' zhengshi
daibu], 15 June 17. See also Jerome A. Cohen, ``Disappearance of
Chinese Human Rights Lawyer: What It Means To Be Placed Under
`Residential Surveillance' in China,'' Jerry's Blog, 26 December 16;
Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Submission by Human Rights
Watch to the National People's Congress Standing Committee on the Draft
Revisions to the Police Law,'' 22 December 16; Chang Wang and Vivian
Wu, Thomson Reuters, ``China's Legal System: 2016 Reviews and 2017
Predictions,'' Legal Current (blog), 2 March 17; Alex Linder, ``China's
Chief Justice Lists Jailing Human Rights Lawyer as Legal System's Top
Achievement of 2016,'' Shanghaiist, 14 March 17.
\2\ Harry Wu and Cole Goodrich, ``A Jail by Any Other Name: Labor
Camp Abolition in the Context of Arbitrary Detention in China,'' Human
Rights Brief, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Winter 2014), 4.
\3\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9.
\4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 9(1); United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 7 September 17. China has signed but
not ratified the ICCPR. See also CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October
14, 81; State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' 13 April 09, Introduction, sec.
V(1). The 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan issued by the
Chinese government in April 2009 stated that the ``essentials'' of the
ICCPR were some of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan was
framed, and that the government would ``continue legislative, judicial
and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with
this Covenant, and prepare the ground for ratification of the ICCPR.''
See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principle 4; International
Justice Resource Center, ``Increased Oppression of Chinese Human Rights
Defenders Draws International Criticism,'' 22 February 16.
\5\ Harry Wu and Cole Goodrich, ``A Jail by Any Other Name: Labor
Camp Abolition in the Context of Arbitrary Detention in China,'' Human
Rights Brief, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Winter 2014), 4; Amnesty International,
``China: Submission to the United Nations Committee against Torture
59th Session, 9 November-9 December 2015,'' October 2015, 16; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``We Can Beat You to Death With Impunity,''
October 2014, 6. See also ``Guo Gai and Wang Jianfen: Details of Black
Jails in Wuxi: Rescue and Torture Reenactment'' [Guo gai, wang jianfen:
wuxi hei jianyu shimo: yingjiu he kuxing yanshi], Charter 08 (blog), 23
December 15.
\6\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Abolishing Laws and Regulations Regarding Reeducation Through Labor
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu feizhi youguan
laodong jiaoyang falu guiding de jueding], issued and effective 28
December 13; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 82-84.
\7\ Amnesty International, ``China: Submission to the United
Nations Committee against Torture 59th Session, 9 November-9 December
2015,'' October 2015, 16; ``Black Jails Still in Vogue in Mainland,
Reeducation Through Labor Continues To Exist Under a Different Name''
[Dalu hei jianyu shengxing laojiao huan tang bu huan yao], Radio Free
Asia, 3 November 15. A petitioner reported that ``black jails''
provided no procedural protection and that human rights conditions had
deteriorated after the abolition of RTL.
\8\ Teng Biao, ``What Is a `Legal Education Center' in China,''
China Change, 3 April 14; ``2016 Summary of Persecution Against Falun
Gong Practitioners in Wuhan Municipality'' [Wuhan shi falun gong
xueyuan 2016 nian shou pohai zongshu], Clear Wisdom, 2 February 17.
``Legal education centers'' are sometimes called ``brainwashing
classes.''
\9\ See, e.g., ``2016 Summary of Persecution Against Falun Gong
Practitioners in Wuhan Municipality'' [Wuhan shi falun gong xueyuan
2016 nian shou pohai zong shu], Clear Wisdom, 2 February 17; ``2016
Case Summary of Persecution Against Falun Gong Practitioners in
Guangdong'' [2016 nian guangdong falun gong xueyuan shou pohai anli
zongshu], Clear Wisdom, 28 January 17.
\10\ Petitioners are citizens who use the ``letters and visits
system,'' also known as the petitioning system, to seek redress of
their grievances against the government. See, e.g., ``Two Petitioners
Put in Black Jail for 13 Days, Coughed Up Blood After Being Beaten and
Forced To Write About `Learning Experience' '' [Liang fangmin qiu hei
jianyu 13 ri bei ou tuxie bi xie ``xuexi xinde''], Radio Free Asia, 23
September 16; Rights Defense Network, ``On Legal System Promotion Day,
25 Petitioners From Sichuan and Chongqing Detained and Put in Black
Jail'' [Fazhi xuanchuan ri sichuan, chongqing 25 ming fangmin zaodao
kouya, guan hei jianyu], 4 December 16; ``Sixteen Petitioners From
Chongqing Expressing Injustice at Front Entrance of Zhongnanhai in
Beijing, Detained in Black Jail'' [16 ming chongqing fangmin beijing
zhongnanhai zhengmen han yuan bei song hei jianyu jiya], Radio Free
Asia, 21 December 16.
\11\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Statistical Report on
Shanghai Rights Defenders Persecuted in Connection With National Two
Sessions'' [Shanghai weiquan renshi yin quanguo lianghui er zao pohai
de tongji baogao], 12 March 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Statistical
Report on Rights Defenders in Shanghai Who Were Put in Black Jails or
Detained Before and After Two Sessions (Supplement)'' [Lianghui qianhou
shanghai weiquan renshi zao guan hei jianyu he juliu de tongji baogao
(buchong)], 16 March 17; ``Victims of Demolition, Hangzhou Farmer Put
in `Black Jail,' Police Did Not Accept Case Despite Report Being Made''
[Hangzhou chaiqian nongmin bei guan ``hei jianyu'' bao'an bu huo
shouli], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 17. See also Liu Shaohua, ``China
Enters Two Sessions Period'' [Zhongguo jinru lianghui shijian],
People's Daily, 2 March 17.
\12\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13, arts. 27, 30,
75(5), 78(1). See also ``[Editorial] Beware of Arbitrary Psychiatric
Treatment Due to Petitioning Dilemma'' [[Shelun] jingti xinfang kunju
xia de jingshenbing shouzhi luanxiang], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 14
June 16.
\13\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, Measures on Implementation of
Compulsory Medical Treatment (Trial) [Renmin jianchayuan qiangzhi
yiliao zhixing jiancha banfa (shixing)], issued 13 May 16, effective 2
June 16, arts. 9, 12.
\14\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2016 Year-End Summary of
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [2016 nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], 26 January 17.
\15\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Anhui Petitioner Shi
Chuanfeng Intends To Travel to Beijing, Psychiatric Facility Personnel
Join Interception!'' [Anhui fangmin shi chuanfeng yu jin jing
jingshenbing yuan renyuan canyu jie fang!], 8 November 16. See also
Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2016 Year-End Report on Mental
Health and Human Rights (Forced Psychiatric Commitment)'' [2016 nian
zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong
zongjie], 26 January 17.
\16\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2016 Year-End Summary of
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [2016 nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], 26 January 17.
\17\ Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, Provisions for Investigative Work of Cases by Disciplinary
Investigation Agencies [Zhongguo gongchandang jilu jiancha jiguan
anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli], issued 25 March 94, effective 1 May 94,
art. 28. Article 28 of the 1994 provisions requires any person or
organization having information about a case under investigation to
comply with the shuanggui process. Chinese Communist Party Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, Opinion on Strengthening the
Coordination Mechanisms in Case Investigation and on Further Regulating
the Measure of ``Double Designation'' [Zhongyang jiwei guanyu wanshan
cha ban anjian xietiao jizhi jinyibu gaijin he guifan ``lianggui''
cuoshi de yijian], issued 20 January 05, item 2(1); Flora Sapio,
``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,'' China Information,
Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), 14-15. The 2005 Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection opinion limits the application of shuanggui to
Party members.
\18\ Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, Provisions for Investigative Work of Cases by Disciplinary
Investigation Agencies [Zhongguo gongchandang jilu jiancha jiguan
anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli], issued 25 March 94, effective 1 May 94,
arts. 10, 28(3), 39; Human Rights Watch, `` `Special Measures':
Detention and Torture in the Chinese Communist Party's Shuanggui
System,'' 6 December 16; Amnesty International, ``No End in Sight:
Torture and Forced Confessions in China,'' November 2015, 34, 47.
\19\ Human Rights Watch, `` `Special Measures': Detention and
Torture in the Chinese Communist Party's Shuanggui System,'' 6 December
16; Flora Sapio, ``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,'' China
Information, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), 24.
\20\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 9. See also CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October
15, 102-3; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 87-88.
\21\ Human Rights Watch, `` `Special Measures': Detention and
Torture in the Chinese Communist Party's Shuanggui System,'' 6 December
16.
\22\ Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Shuanggui: The Harsh, Hidden Side of
China's War on Graft, and How One Man Disappeared Into It,'' Globe and
Mail, 26 March 17.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Launching State Supervision System Reform Pilot Program in Beijing
Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province, [Quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu zai beijing shi, shanxi sheng,
zhejiang sheng kaizhan guojia jiancha tizhi gaige shidian gongzuo de
jueding], issued 25 December 16, effective 26 December 16, item 1;
``Three Provincial-Level Administrative Jurisdictions, Beijing, Shanxi,
and Zhejiang, Establish Supervisory Commissions'' [Beijing, shanxi,
zhejiang san sheng shi jiancha weiyuanhui chengli], Supervision
Department of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 24 January
17. See also ``Promote Comprehensive and Rigorous Development of Party
Governance, Welcome the Opening of the Nineteenth Party Congress With
Exceptional Performance--Work Report from the Chinese Communist Party's
Eighteenth Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's Seventh
Plenary Session'' [Tuidong quanmian congyan zhi dang xiang zongshen
fazhan yi youyi chengji yingjie dang de shijiuda zhaokai--zai zhongguo
gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang jilu jiancha weiyuanhui di qi ci
quanti huiyi shang de gongzuo baogao], Xinhua, 19 January 17, sec.
1(2).
\25\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Launching State Supervision System Reform Pilot Program in Beijing
Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province, [Quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu zai beijing shi, shanxi sheng,
zhejiang sheng kaizhan guojia jiancha tizhi gaige shidian gongzuo de
jueding], issued 25 December 16, effective 26 December 16, item 2. See
also Ge Wenxiu et al., ``Fifty-Nine Lawyers Including Ge Wenxiu Openly
and Jointly Issued Four Suggestions to National People's Congress
Regarding `State Supervision Law (Draft)' '' [Ge wenxiu deng 59 wei
lushi lianming jiu ``guojia jiancha fa (cao'an)'' lifa xiang quanguo
renda gongkai tichu sidian jianyi], 11 August 17, reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 13 August 17.
\26\ Flora Sapio, ``An Interview About Shuanggui With the Globe and
Mail,'' REACH (blog), 10 January 17.
\27\ Lin Zizhen, ``Chen Guangzhong: Supervisory System Reform
Requires Initiating a Systematic Legislative Amendment Process'' [Chen
guangzhong: jiancha tizhi gaige xu qidong xitong xiu fa gongcheng],
Caixin, 17 January 17; Wang Lina, `` `Detention Authority' Makes First
Appearance in Supervision Pilot Reform, `Shuanggui,' `Shuangzhi' May Be
Affected'' [Jiancha gaige shidian shou xian ``liuzhi quan''
``shuanggui'' ``shuangzhi'' huo shou yingxiang], Caijing, 31 December
16.
\28\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/22/44, 24 December 12, para. 63.
\29\ For more information on Xia Lin, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00432.
\30\ For more information on Wu Zeheng, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00235.
\31\ UN Human Rights Council, Opinions adopted by the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention at Its 77th Session, 21-25 November 2016,
Opinion No. 46/2016 concerning Wu Zeheng and 18 Others (China), A/HRC/
WGAD/2016/46, 27 January 17, para. 64; UN Human Rights Council,
Opinions adopted by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its
76th Session, 22-26 August 2016, Opinion No. 43/2016 Concerning Xia Lin
(China), A/HRC/WGAD/2016/43, 12 October 16, para. 28.
\32\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on CRLW Director
Liu Feiyue's Case: Family Members Receive `Arrest Notice' From Suizhou,
Hubei, PSB'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue an tongbao: jiashu
shoudao hubei suizhou shi gong'anju jifa de ``daibu tongzhishu''], 11
January 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Director of Mainland NGO `64
Tianwang' Huang Qi Arrested by Authorities'' [Dalu NGO ``liusi
tianwang'' fuzeren huang qi yi bei dangju zhixing daibu], 20 December
16; ``Li Heping Charged With `Subversion of State Power' '' [Li heping
bei kong ``dianfu guojia zhengquan zui''], Radio Free Asia, 9 December
16; ``Lawyer Wang Quanzhang in 709 Case Formally Indicted on Subversion
Charge'' [709 an wang quanzhang lushi zhengshi bei qisu dianfu
zuiming], Radio Free Asia, 15 February 17; ``Indictment Against Xie
Yang Exposed, Lawyer To Counter Each Allegation'' [Xie yang an qisushu
baoguang daili lushi jiang zhu tiao fanbo], Radio Free Asia, 1 February
17; ``Sun Feng Convicted for Speech, Articles Posted Online Result in 5
Years' Imprisonment'' [Sun feng bei yi yan ru zui wangshang fawen huan
5 nian jianjin], Radio Free Asia, 21 November 16; ``Shenzhen's Li
Jiangpeng Accused of `Subversion,' Wang Jun's Pregnant Wife Remains
Subject to Monitoring After Returning to Shenzhen'' [Shenzhen li
jiangpeng bei kong ``dianfu'' wang jun yun qi hui shen reng shou
jiankong], Radio Free Asia, 10 April 17; Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Drop Charges Against Tibetan Education Activist,'' 15 January 17;
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Charged of [sic]
Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Tsegon
Gyal on `Silent Protest,' '' 29 December 16.
\33\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 54(2), 56, 102-113. All crimes of ``endangering
state security'' (ESS) carry a mandatory supplemental sentence of
deprivation of political rights, which include the rights of speech,
publication, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration. PRC
Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January
13, art. 73; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on
the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its
1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3
February 16, para. 14. In addition to the severe criminal penalty, ESS
offenses permit authorities to use ``residential surveillance at a
designated location,'' which in practice could ``amount to
incommunicado detention . . . putting detainees at a high risk of
torture or ill-treatment.''
\34\ For more information on Su Changlan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00406.
\35\ For more information on Chen Qitang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2009-00002.
\36\ ``Su Changlan and Chen Qitang Sentenced to 3 Years and 4 Years
and 6 Months Respectively, Citizens Expressed Support Online'' [Su
changlan, chen qitang fen huoxing 3 nian ji 4 nian ban gongmin wangluo
biaoda shengyuan], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 17. The Guangdong High
People's Court dismissed the appeals of Su and Chen on June 6, 2017.
``Appeals of Su Changlan and Chen Qitang Dismissed'' [Su changlan, chen
qitang shangsu zao bohui], Radio Free Asia, 7 June 17.
\37\ ``Hong Kong Groups Went to China Liaison Office To Support Su
Changlan and Tian Li'' [Xianggang tuanti dao zhonglianban shengyuan su
changlan, tian li], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 17; ``Appeals of Su
Changlan and Chen Qitang Dismissed'' [Su changlan, chen qitang shangsu
zao bohui], Radio Free Asia, 7 June 17.
\38\ Hua Xuan, ``The Logic of Different Areas Making Different
Judgments When Petitioners `Extort' Government'' [Dang fangmin
``qiaozha'' zhengfu butong diqu butong pan de luoji], Southern Weekend,
28 July 16.
\39\ See, e.g., Uncle Ou of Huiyang's Younger Sister (Huiyang ou bo
meimei), ``Progress Status of Case Against `Uncle Ou of Huiyang' Li
Jianxin'' [``Huiyang ou bo'' li jianxin anqing jinzhan qingkuang],
Weibo post, 27 March 17, 9:36 a.m.; Voice of Petitioners, ``Six
Petitioners From Hebei Accused of Extortion, Family Members Gather and
Kneel Down To Demand Explanation'' [Hebei liu fangmin bei kong qiaozha
lesuo jiashu jiti xiagui yao shuofa], reprinted in Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch, 19 January 17. For more information on Li Jianxin
(also known as Uncle Ou of Huiyang (Huiyang Ou Bo)), see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00498.
\40\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 274. See also Supreme People's Court and Supreme
People's Procuratorate, Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Extortion
[Zuigao renmin fayuan, zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu banli qiaozha
lesuo xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 1
April 13, effective 27 April 13, art. 1.
\41\ Cao Bo and Xiao Zhonghua, ``Doctrinal Critique of Using
Extortion Charge To Regulate Petitioning Activity'' [Yi qiaozha lesuo
zui guizhi xinfang xingwei de jiaoyixue pipan], Journal of Law
Application, No. 9 (2016), 43.
\42\ Petitioners are citizens who use the ``letters and visits
system'' to seek redress of their grievances against the government.
See, e.g., Philip Wen, ``Rare Disclosure Sheds Light on Plight of
China's Aggrieved Petitioners,'' Reuters, 2 March 17. Such grievances
reportedly include cases concerning demolition or expropriation of
property, social security, agriculture, land and resources, and
environmental protection. Benjamin L. Liebman, ``A Populist Threat to
China's Courts? '' in Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in
Contemporary China, eds. Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 309; Liang Shibin,
``Resolutely Fight To Win the Battle on Clearing Backlog of Petitioning
Cases'' [Jianjue da ying huajie xinfang ji'an gong jian zhan], Legal
Daily, 27 April 16.
\43\ Chinese courts reportedly have not settled the legal question
as to whether petitioning constitutes ``extortion.'' See, e.g., Li
Shide, ``Judges Explaining Law: Does Extorting the Government by Means
of Petitioning Constitute a Crime? How Should the Nature of the Matter
Be Determined? (Model Cases)'' [Faguan shuofa: yi shangfang yaoxie
qiaozha lesuo zhengfu shifou goucheng fanzui? ying ruhe dingxing chuli?
(dianxing anli)], Empirelawyers (fake diguo) (blog), 29 August 16; Cao
Bo and Xiao Zhonghua, ``Doctrinal Critique of Using Extortion Charge To
Regulate Petitioning'' [Yi qiaozha lesuo zui guizhi xinfang xingwei de
jiaoyixue pipan], Legal Application, No. 9 (2016), 43. See also Zhushan
County People's Procuratorate, ``Improper Petitioning Can Easily
Violate Ten Criminal Offenses!'' [Shangfang budang, rongyi chufan shi
zong zui!], 8 March 17.
\44\ See, e.g., Linying County People's Court, Luohe Municipality,
Henan Province, Criminal Judgment [Henan sheng linying xian renmin
fayuan, xingshi panjue shu], (2013) Lin Xing Chu Zi No. 30, 18 October
16, reprinted in China Judgements Online, 4 November 16; Hailun City
People's Court, Suihua Municipality, Heilongjiang Province, Criminal
Judgment [Heilongjiang sheng hailun shi renmin fayuan xingshi panjue
shu], (2016) Hei 1283 Xing Chu No. 120, 27 December 16, reprinted in
China Judgements Online, 19 January 17.
\45\ Cai Yiwen, ``Petitioning Henan Farmer Prosecuted for
`Blackmailing' Officials,'' Sixth Tone, 30 March 17.
\46\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 290, 291.
\47\ See, e.g., `` `Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Social Order Case'
Against 6 Nanjing Petitioners Commences, Public Blocked From
Attending'' [Nanjing 6 fangmin ``juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu an''
kaiting minzhong pangting zao ju], Radio Free Asia, 13 October 16;
Rights Defense Network, ``Old Lady Chen Xuebing of Guizhou Died in
Injustice Over an Acre of Life-Sustaining Land Being Divided Into
Three, Daughter Wang Hong Arrested for Petitioning'' [Wei yimu sanfen
huoming di, guizhou laotai chen xuebing bei yuansi nu'er wang hong
shangfang zao daibu], 3 November 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Ethnic
Mongolian Rights Defender Wenming From Horqin Left Rear Banner,
Tongliao Municipality, Inner Mongolia, Criminally Detained for Making a
Post Online'' [Neimenggu tongliao shi ke zuohou qi menggu zu weiquan
gongmin wenming yin wangshang fa tie bei xingshi juliu], 20 December
16; ``Filed Complaint Against Public Security Bureau Head, Arrest for
Shenyang Rights Defender Lin Mingjie Approved'' [Zhuanggao gong'an
juzhang shenyang weiquan renshi lin mingjie bei pi bu], Radio Free
Asia, 11 October 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Trial for Guangdong
Labor NGO Figure Meng Han, Charged on Suspicion of Gathering a Crowd to
Disturb Social Order, To Begin November 3, 2016'' [Guangdong laogong
NGO renshi meng han shexian ju zhong raoluan shehui zhixu an jiang yu
2016 nian 11 yue 3 ri zhi 4 ri kaiting], 20 October 16; ``Zeng Feiyang
and Two Other Labor Advocates Receive Suspended Sentences, Released''
[Zeng feiyang deng 3 laogong renshi bei pan huanxing huoshi], Radio
Free Asia, 26 September 16.
\48\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts.
18, 20(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 18, 21, 22.
\49\ For more information on the five individuals, see the
following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database:
2016-00454 on Yang Zhaocun, 2016-00470 on Wang Lulu, 2016-00471 on
Cheng Yajie, 2016-00472 on Zheng Lan, and 2016-00473 on Liu Yan.
\50\ ``5 Christians From Xinjiang Tried for Illegally Preaching''
[Xinjiang 5 jidutu feifa chuandao shou shen], Radio Free Asia, 27
October 16; State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05.
\51\ Supreme People's Court, Implementing Measures on People's
Courts' Carrying Out ``Provisions on Protecting Judicial Personnel in
Duly Performing Duties Designated by Law'' [Renmin fayuan luoshi
``baohu sifa renyuan yifa luxing fading zhize guiding'' de shishi
banfa], issued and effective 7 February 17, art. 11. The Supreme
People's Court issued the implementing measures pursuant to a set of
rules jointly issued by the general offices of the State Council and
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Tang Weijian,
``Interpretation Related to `Provisions on Protecting Judicial
Personnel in Duly Performing Duties Designated by Law' '' [``Baohu sifa
renyuan yifa luxing fading zhize guiding'' xiangguan jiedu], China
Peace Net, 28 July 16.
\52\ See, e.g., ``Lin Bingxing `Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Trouble,' Lawyer Expects Heavy Sentence'' [Lin bingxing ``xunxin
zishi'' lushi yuqi zhong pan], Radio Free Asia, 29 November 16; ``Zhao
Hongyan, Female Petitioner From Hefei, Sentenced to 2 Years'
Imprisonment at Trial of First Instance for Picking Quarrels and
Provoking Trouble, Lawyer Cheng Hai Retained To File Appeal'' [Hefei nu
fangmin zhao hongyan yishen bei yi xunxin zishi zui panxing 2 nian
cheng hai lushi shou tuo shangsu], Radio Free Asia, 14 December 16;
``Wang Fengyun, Petitioner From Inner Mongolia, Sentenced to 2 and a
Half Years, Asserts Appeal at Court'' [Neimeng fangmin wang fengyun bei
pan 2 nian ban dang ting ti shangsu], Radio Free Asia, 29 March 17;
Rights Defense Network, ``Court Hearing Concludes in Wuxi 413 Crackdown
Case, Court Did Not Announce Judgment'' [Wuxi 413 da zhuabu an tingshen
jieshu wei dangting xuanpan], 24 April 17; Rights Defense Network,
``Fuzhou Crackdown Bulletin: Today 8 Released on Bail, 3 People Still
Detained (October 12, 2016)'' [Fuzhou da zhuabu tongbao: jin 8 ren
qubao huoshi, reng you 3 ren zao jiya (2016 nian 10 yue 12 ri)], 12
October 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on 908 Suzhou Crackdown:
Changsu Rights Defender Gu Xiaofeng Placed Under `Residential
Surveillance at a Designated Location' by Suzhou Police for `Picking
Quarrels and Provoking Trouble,' Gu Yimin Released on Bail Last Month,
11 People Remain Under Residential Surveillance at a Designated
Location (February 7, 2017)'' [Suzhou 908 da zhuabu tongbao: changshu
weiquan gongmin gu xiaofeng bei suzhou jingfang yi ``xunxin zishi zui''
zhixing zhiding jusuo jianshijuzhu gu yimin shangyuedi huo qubao huoshi
reng you 11 ren bei zhiding jianshi juzhu (2017 nian 2 yue 7 ri)], 7
February 17.
\53\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 293.
\54\ Stanley Lubman, `` `Picking Quarrels' Casts Shadow Over
Chinese Law,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 30
June 14.
\55\ Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
the Handling of Criminal Cases Including Defamation by Means of the
Internet [Guanyu banli liyong xinxi wangluo shishi feibang deng xingshi
anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 10 September 13,
art. 5.
\56\ Edward Wong, ``China Uses `Picking Quarrels' Charge To Cast a
Wider Net Online,'' New York Times, 26 July 15. See also ``Hu Changgen
Probably Being Retaliated Against for Courageous Online Speech, To Be
Tried on Wednesday'' [Hu changgen yongyu wangshang jinyan yi zao baofu
zhou san shenxun], Radio Free Asia, 20 September 16; ``Hearing on Wang
Jiangfeng `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble Case' Temporarily
Postponed, Family Emphasize Charge Unfounded'' [Wang jiangfeng ``xunxin
zishi an'' linshi yanqi jiashu qiangdiao zuiming moxuyou], Radio Free
Asia, 21 February 17; ``11 Petitioners Face Prosecution for
Demonstration, Indicted on `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' ''
[11 fangmin shiwei zao qingsuan bei qisu ``xunxin zishi'' zui], Radio
Free Asia, 3 March 17.
\57\ For more information on Shan Lihua, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00033.
\58\ Gangzha District People's Court, Nantong Municipality, Jiangsu
Province, Criminal Judgment [Jiangsu sheng nantong shi gangzha qu
renmin fayuan xingshi panjue shu], (2016) Su 0611 Xing Chu No. 50, 29
September 16, reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 29 September 16; ``
`Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' Again, Jiangsu Rights Defender
Shan Lihua Sentenced to 2 Years and 3 Months'' [You shi ``xunxin
zishi'' jiangsu weiquan renshi shan lihua panxing 2 nian 3 ge yue],
Radio Free Asia, 29 September 16.
\59\ For more information on the eight individuals, see the
following records in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database:
2016-00463 on Zhuang Songkun, 2017-00100 on Hong Yongzhong, 2017-00101
on Wu Fang, 2017-00102 on Cai Jialin, 2017-00103 on Li Chulu, 2017-
00104 on Wei Yonghan, 2017-00105 on Chen Suzhuan, and 2017-00107 on
Yang Jinzhen.
\60\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 296.
\61\ Haifeng County People's Court, ``Haifeng County People's Court
Publicly Announces First Instance Judgment in Case Against Nine People,
Including Wei Yonghan and Zhang Bingchai, for Gathering a Crowd To
Disturb Social Order, Illegal Assembly, Procession, or Demonstration,
Gathering a Crowd To Disrupt Traffic, Obstructing Official Business,
and Intentionally Disseminating False Information, Haifeng First
Instance Judgment Announced'' [Haifeng xian renmin fayuan yishen
gongkai xuanpan wei yonghan, zhang bingchai deng 9 ren juzhong raoluan
shehui zhixu, feifa jihui, youxing, shiwei, juzhong raoluan jiaotong
zhixu, fanghai gongwu, guyi chuanbo xujia xinxi an haifeng yishen
xuanpan], 26 December 16; ``China Moves Ahead With Trials of Rebel
Villagers in Secret,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 December 16; ``China Jails
Nine Protestors From Guangdong's Rebel Village of Wukan,'' Radio Free
Asia, 27 December 16; Zhuang Liehong, ``How Nine Wukan Villagers Were
Illegally Tried and Sentenced in December, 2016,'' China Change, 5
January 17; ``Day Before Lin Zulian's Trial, Tension Builds in Wukan
Village Despite Relaxed Appearance'' [Lin zulian shenxun qianxi wukan
cun wai chi nei zhang], Radio Free Asia, 7 September 16. For background
information on Wukan village, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October
12, 129; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 142-43; CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 240.
\62\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 225. See, e.g., ``Exclusive: Xin Lijian, Outspoken
Entrepreneur From Guangdong, Indicted on Two Charges: `Illegal Business
Activity and Destruction of Accounting Evidence' [Dujia: guangdong
ganyan qiyejia xin lijian bei yi ``feifa jingying, xiaohui kuaiji
pingju'' liang zui yisong qisu], Bowen Press, 5 November 16; ``Writer
Xiong Feijun Among Three Criminally Detained, Defense Lawyer Will
Request Bail'' [Zuojia xiong feijun an san ren zao xingju daili lushi
jiang ti qubao houshen], Radio Free Asia, 2 January 17; Human Rights
Campaign in China, ``Accused of Illegal Business Activity Due to
Printing Religious Publications, Believer Li Hongmin of Guangfu Church
in Guangzhou Sentenced to 10 Months and Fined Ten Thousand Yuan by
Baiyun District Court'' [Yin yinshua zongjiao kanwu bei kong feifa
jingying zui guangzhou guangfu jiaohui xintu li hongmin zao baiyun qu
fayuan panxing 10 ge yue ji chufa jin yiwan yuan], 27 March 17.
\63\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 246. See, e.g., ``Lawyer Zhang Lei: Explanation
Regarding Hubei Liu Yanli's Case (January 4, 2017)'' [Zhang lei lushi:
guanyu hubei liu yanli an de shuoming (2017 nian 1 yue 4 ri)],
reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 4 January 17. For more information
on Liu Yanli, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2016-00380.
\64\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 272. See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Pastor Gu Yuese
Formally Arrested on January 7'' [1 yue 7 ri gu yuese mushi zhengshi
bei daibu], 9 January 17. For more information on Gu Yuese, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00100.
\65\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 276. See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Five
Farmers in Gushi County, Henan Province, Criminally Detained on
`Sabotaging Production Operation' for Protecting Dam and Field by
Stopping Sand Trucks From Moving Sand'' [Henan sheng gushi xian wu
nongmin wei hudi baotian zuzhi yunshache yun sha bei yi ``pohuai
shengchan jingying zui'' xing ju], 6 October 16.
\66\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300. See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Dali, Yunnan
Christian Tu Yan Case Transferred to Procuratorate, Two Female Pastors
in Chuxiong Arrested for Proselytizing'' [Yunnan dali jidutu tu yan an
yisong jian chuxiong liang nu mushi yin chuanjiao zao daibu], 7
February 17; ``Accused Langfang Hebei Falun Gong Practitioner Zhu
Xiaomei's `Cult Case' Sent Back for Investigation'' [Hebei langfang
falun gong xueyuan zhu xiaomei bei kong ``xiejiao an'' tui zhen], Radio
Free Asia, 4 May 17.
\67\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 309. See, e.g., ``At Least Nine Rights Activists
`Secretly Detained' in China's Suzhou,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 March 17;
``Xie Yang Indicted for Inciting Subversion of State and Disrupting
Court Order'' [Xie yang bei qisu shan dian guojia ji raoluan fating
zhixu zui], Radio Free Asia, 21 December 16.
\68\ See, e.g., PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14
March 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 54, 121. The 2012 amendment to
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) provided for the exclusion of
evidence obtained through illegal means such as torture, force, or
threat, and required audiovisual recording of the interrogation process
in serious cases involving life imprisonment or the death penalty. Xing
Shiwei, ``Audiovisual Recording Will Be Implemented in All Criminal
Cases'' [Suoyou xing'an xunwen jiang quan luyin luxiang], Beijing News,
22 September 15. In September 2015, the Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) announced that law enforcement agencies were implementing the
audiovisual recording system, as prescribed by the CPL, and that MPS
planned eventually to expand the scope of the system to cover all
criminal cases. Ministry of Public Security, Provisions on
Accountability for Public Security Agencies and People's Police in Law
Enforcement Misconduct [Gong'an jiguan renmin jingcha zhifa guocuo
zeren zhuijiu guiding], issued 24 February 16, effective 1 March 16,
arts. 12, 19. In March 2016, the MPS issued disciplinary rules to hold
police officers accountable for misconduct and subject them to
criminal, administrative, and disciplinary sanctions, including for
obtaining confessions through torturing detainees and retaliating
against whistleblowers or complainants.
\69\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Report on Strengthening
Supervision on Investigation and Protecting Judicial Justice
(Excerpts)'' [Zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu jiaqiang zhencha jiandu,
weihu sifa gongzheng qingkuang de baogao (zhaiyao)], Procuratorial
Daily, 7 November 16; Zheng Bochao et al., ``NPCSC Members Hope
Procuratorate To Improve Effectiveness of Supervision'' [Renda
changweihui zucheng renyuan xiwang jianfang zengqiang jiandu shixiao],
Procuratorial Daily, 8 November 16.
\70\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry
of Justice, Opinion on Promoting Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure
System Reform [Guanyu tuijin yi shenpan wei zhongxin de xingshi susong
zhidu gaige yijian], 11 October 16, item 5. The 2016 opinion obligates
procurators to ask criminal suspects before the conclusion of
investigation about the existence of coerced confession or illegal
evidence collection. Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security,
and Ministry of Justice, Provisions on Certain Questions Regarding
Excluding Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli
xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], effective
1 July 10, art. 7. An earlier set of provisions required the
procuratorate to produce evidence concerning the legality of the
evidence only upon inquiry by the court, rather than questioning the
criminal suspect at the pretrial stage.
\71\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry
of Justice, Provisions on Certain Issues Relating to Strictly Excluding
Illegal Evidence in Criminal Cases, issued and effective 27 June 17.
\72\ Margaret Lewis, ``Penetrating Law Into the Walls of Chinese
Detention Centers,'' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute:
Analysis (blog), 18 July 17. See also Jeremy Daum, ``Exclusive Focus:
Why China's Exclusionary Rules Won't Stop Police Torture,'' China Law
Translate (blog), 1 July 17.
\73\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin
jianchayuan gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17, 7; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97,
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 247;
``Supreme People's Procuratorate Report on Strengthening Supervision on
Investigation and Protecting Judicial Justice (Excerpts)'' [Zuigao
renmin jianchayuan guanyu jiaqiang zhencha jiandu, weihu sifa gongzheng
qingkuang de baogao (zhaiyao)], Procuratorial Daily, 7 November 16.
This November report states that the procuratorate corrected 175,062
cases of illegal evidence collection practices between 2013 and 2016.
The report does not provide disaggregated information in terms of the
specific actions taken by the procuratorate.
\74\ See, e.g., Craig Offman and Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Detained
Canadian Says China Tortured Her Into Giving Bribery Confession,''
Globe and Mail, 17 November 16; Te-Ping Chen, ``China's Anticorruption
Drive Ensnares the Lowly and Rattles Families,'' Wall Street Journal,
20 December 16.
\75\ See, e.g., Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan
Lawyer Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (er)],
reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17; ``Former State
Security Captain From Jinyang, Sichuan, Coerced To Confess Under
Torture (I)'' [Sichuan jinyang yuan guobao daduizhang bei xingxun
bigong (shang)], Radio Free Asia, 8 March 17.
\76\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 73; Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Issues
Oversight Rules for `Non-Residential' Residential Surveillance,'' Dui
Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 February 16. The Dui Hua Foundation
translated the term ``residential surveillance at a designated
location'' as ``designated-location residential surveillance.'' See
also UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 14. The UN Committee against Torture used the translation
``residential surveillance at a designated location.''
\77\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 73, 77. See also Eva Pils et al., ``
`Rule by Fear?' '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 18 February 16. Scholar Eva
Pils wrote: ``. . . whereas in 2011, the authorities made people
disappear stealthily and generally without admitting that this was
happening, forced disappearances have now effectively become part of
the system, and the authorities carry them out `in accordance with
law.' '' UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 14. The UN Committee against Torture criticized this coercive
measure because it ``may amount to incommunicado detention in secret
places, putting detainees at a high risk of torture or ill-treatment.''
Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Canada, 10 Other Countries Call Out China for
Torturing Human Rights Lawyers,'' Globe and Mail, 20 March 17.
\78\ Elizabeth M. Lynch, ``Codifying Illegality? The Case of Jiang
Tianyong,'' China Law & Policy (blog), 20 January 17. See also Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``NGO Mid-Term Assessment of China's
Implementation of 2nd Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Recommendations
(Report),'' 22 November 16, 56-57.
\79\ Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang
(One)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (yi)], reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 19 January 17; Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting
With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu
(er)], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17; Wang
Qiaoling, ``A Third Update on Lawyer Li Chunfu: He Was Drugged in
Custody,'' reprinted in China Change, 15 January 17; China Human Rights
Lawyers Concern Group (chrlcg), ``Li Heping and Wang Quanzhang Tortured
With Electric Shocks To Faint,'' Twitter post, 23 January 17, 1:17 a.m.
\80\ See, e.g., ``Two More People in Suzhou Crackdown Under
Residential Surveillance'' [Suzhou da zhuabu zai you liang ren jianshi
juzhu], Radio Free Asia, 9 November 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Rights Defense Network: Monthly Report on Detained Awaiting Trial and
Forcibly Disappeared Individuals in Mainland China (March 31, 2017)
Issue No. 18 (Total 199 Persons)'' [Weiquan wang: zhongguo dalu jiya
wei pan ji qiangpo shizong renyuan yue du baogao (2017 nian 3 yue 31
ri) di shiba qi (gong 199 ren)], 31 March 17.
\81\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 73; Zhuang An, ``Suspected of Committing a
Crime, Jiang Tianyong Duly Placed Under Criminal Coercive Measure''
[Jiang tianyong shexian weifa fanzui bei yifa caiqu xingshi qiangzhi
cuoshi], The Paper, 16 December 16; ``Lawyer Tan Chenshou: Case Status
Explanation Regarding Jiang Tianyong'' [Tan chenshou lushi: jiang
tianyong an ban'an qingkuang shuoming], China Free Press, 21 March 17.
\82\ ``Lawyer Tan Chenshou: Case Status Explanation Regarding Jiang
Tianyong'' [Tan chenshou lushi: jiang tianyong an ban'an qingkuang
shuoming], China Free Press, 21 March 17; ``Changsha PSB Denied Meeting
Request, Jiang Tianyong's Father and Lawyers Lodged Complaint''
[Changsha gong'an ju huijian jiang tianyong fu ji lushi ti kongsu],
Radio Free Asia, 30 December 16.
\83\ ``709 Crackdown: Lawyer Jiang Tianyong Formally Arrested After
Expiration of `Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location' ''
[709 da zhuabu: jiang tianyong lushi ``jianshi juzhu'' qiman zao
zhengshi daibu], Radio Free Asia, 1 June 17; ``Jiang Tianyong's Family
Received Arrest Notice, Charge Changed for the Third Time'' [Jiang
tianyong jiashu shoudao daibu tongzhishu zhikong zuiming san ci
biangeng], Radio Free Asia, 5 June 17.
\84\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Charged of Inciting Separatism, Detained Former Tibetan Political
Prisoner Tsegon Gyal on `Silent Protest,' '' 29 December 16; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human Rights Work as a
Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
China (2016),'' February 17, 26; ``Punishing Rights Lawyers a Top
Achievement, Says China,'' Al Jazeera, 12 March 17.
\85\ See, e.g., ``Study Abroad Student Quan Ping Wears T-Shirt That
Satirizes Leader, Right to Defense Counsel Illegally Stripped'' [Chuan
wenhua shan fengci lingdaoren liuxuesheng quan ping bianhu lushi zao
weigui boduo], Radio Free Asia, 13 February 17; Rights Defense Network,
``Lawyer Chen Jinxue: Lawyer Applies for Meeting With Jiang Tianyong on
Grounds That Meeting With Reporter Already Took Place, Changsha
Municipal Public Security Bureau Again Ignores Lawyer'' [Chen jinxue
lushi: lushi yi jizhe yi jian wei you shenqing huijian jiang tianyong,
changsha shi gong'anju you ju lushi yu men wai], 2 March 17; Civil
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lawyer Wen Donghai's Third Application To
Meet Liu Feiyue Denied'' [Wen donghai lushi di san ci shenqing huijian
liu feiyue zao ju], 24 March 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Sui
Muqing: Circular on Huang Qi Case--Lawyer Not Permitted To Meet With
Huang Qi or Make Bail Application on His Behalf (1 April, 2017)'' [Sui
muqing lushi: huang qi an tongbao--bu tongyi lushi huijian huang qi ji
wei qi banli qubao (2017 nian 4 yue 1 ri)], 1 April 17; ``Huang Qi of
64 Tianwang in Sichuan Has Worrying Health Conditions While Held in PSB
Detention Center'' [Sichuan liu si tianwang huang qi kanshousuo zhong
bingkuang kanyou], Voice of America, 21 February 17.
\86\ Tai Jianlin, ``Lawyers' Meeting Rooms at PSB Detention Center
Increased From Two to Nine'' [Kanshousuo lushi huijian shi liang jian
bian jiu jian], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 24 May 16.
\87\ PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lushi fa], passed
28 October 07, amended 26 October 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 33.
For the prior version, see PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
lushi fa], passed 28 October 07, effective 1 June 08, art. 33.
\88\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 37; Amnesty International, ``China:
Submission to the United Nations Committee against Torture 59th
Session, 9 November-9 December 2015,'' October 2015, 9.
\89\ For more information on Jiang Tianyong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00179.
\90\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyers Chen Jinxue and Tan
Chenshou: Lawyers' Opinion and Declaration Regarding Jiang Tianyong's
Purported Acceptance of Being Interviewed by Global Times'' [Chen
jinxue lushi, tan chenshou lushi: guanyu jiang tianyong suowei jieshou
huanqiu shibao caifang yi shi de lushi yijian ji shengming], 2 March
17; Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Chen Jinxue: Lawyer Applies for
Meeting With Jiang Tianyong on Grounds That Meeting With Reporter
Already Took Place, Changsha Municipal Public Security Bureau Again
Ignores Lawyer'' [Chen jinxue lushi: lushi yi jizhe yi jian wei you
shenqing huijian jiang tianyong, changsha shi gong'anju you ju lushi yu
men wai], 2 March 17.
\91\ See, e.g., ``Zhang Wanhe in Shandong Weifang Case Completed
Sentence and Released From Jail'' [Shandong weifang an zhang wanhe xing
man chuyu], Radio Free Asia, 4 January 17; ``Suzhou Rights Advocate Gu
Xiaofeng Taken Away by Police, Residence Raided'' [Suzhou weiquan
renshi gu xiaofeng bei jing daizou zhuzhai bei chao], Radio Free Asia,
6 February 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Status Report of Lawyer Tan
Chenshou's Meeting With Guiyang Living Stone Church Accountant and
Christian Zhang Xiuhong, Who Was Sentenced to Five Years' Imprisonment
on Illegal Business Activity'' [Tan chenshou lushi huijian yishen bei
yi feifa jingying zui panchu 5 nian youqi tuxing guiyang huoshi jiaohui
kuaiji jidutu zhang xiuhong de qingkuang tongbao], 24 February 17.
\92\ See, e.g., ``Call for Efforts To Save Hubei Veteran
Association President and Rights Defense Representative Gao Hancheng''
[Yu qing yingjiu hubei laobing huizhang weiquan daibiao gao hancheng],
Boxun, 12 March 17.
\93\ For more information on Chen Yunfei, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00014.
\94\ Liu Zhengqing, Human Rights in China, ``Solemn Declaration
Regarding Wuhou Court's Seizure of My Computer at Chen Yunfei's
Hearing'' [Guanyu chen yunfei an kaiting shi wuhou fayuan qiang wo
diannao de zhengzhong shengming], 26 December 16; Chen Yunfei, ``Lawyer
Liu Zhengqing, Defense Lawyer for Chen Yunfei, Issued Letter Addressed
to Chengdu Wuhou Court President'' [Chen yunfei bianhu lushi lushi liu
zhengqing zhi xin chengdu wuhou fayuan yuanzhang], reprinted in Free
China News, 2 January 17; ``Chen Yunfei's Termination of Legal
Representation Caused Cancellation of Court Hearing'' [Chen yunfei
jiepin lushi zhi tingshen liu chan gaozhong], Radio Free Asia, 26
December 16.
\95\ For more information on Ding Meifang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00094.
\96\ Rights Defense Network, ``Hefei Female Petitioner Ding
Meifang, Who Previously Voiced Support for Zhang Anni, Again Sentenced
to 2 Years for Petitioning, Parents Adamantly Insist She Was
Persecuted'' [Ceng canyu shengyuan zhang anni de hefei shi nu fangmin
ding meifang yin shangfang zaici bei panxing 2 nian, fumu jian cheng
shi bei pohai], 10 January 17.
\97\ ``Over a Hundred Lawyers in China Issued Joint Letter Calling
for Release of Human Rights Lawyer and His Family'' [Zhongguo baiming
lushi lianshu cu shifang renquan lushi ji jiaren], Voice of America, 4
May 17; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Six Individuals, Including
Chen Jian'gang, Detained During Trip to Yunnan'' [Chen jian'gang deng
liuren yunnan luyou beizhua], 3 May 17.
\98\ Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang
(One)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (yi)], reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 19 January 17; Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting
With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu
(er)], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17; ``Chen
Guiqiu Writes Letter to Government-Appointed Lawyer, Chen Jian'gang
Summoned by Ministry of Justice Again'' [Chen guiqiu zhi xin xie yang
an guanpai lushi chen jian'gang zai bei sifaju yuetan], Radio Free
Asia, 10 April 17.
\99\ For more information on Xie Yang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.
\100\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Liu Zhengqing: Bulletin on
Developments in 709 Xie Yang Case--Formal Indictment Received, Hearing
Won't Be Held Until After Spring Festival (January 4, 2017)'' [Liu
zhengqing lushi: 709 xie yang an jinzhan qingkuang tongbao--nadao qisu
shu chunjie qian buhui kaiting (2017 nian 1 yue 4 ri)], 4 January 17.
\101\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 154-57, 162.
\102\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 9(3), 9(4), 14(3)(c). The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entitles a person to be released
or to ``be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized
by law to exercise judicial power'' and ``be tried without undue
delay'' for the purposes of determining the lawfulness of the detention
and the criminal charge. See also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A
(III) on 10 December 48, arts. 9, 10; UN General Assembly, Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, A/RES/43/173, 9 December 88, principles 4,
11.
\103\ See, e.g., Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang, ``Gathering a Crowd To
Promote Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping, Mianyang Tries Deng Xuemei This
Month'' [Juzhong chuanbo mao zedong xi jinping mianyang ben yue shen
deng xuemei], 4 April 16; ``Su Changlan and Chen Qitang Sentenced to 3
Years and 4 Years and 6 Months Respectively, Citizens Expressed Support
Online'' [Su changlan, chen qitang fen huo xing 3 nian ji 4 nian ban
gongmin wangluo biaoda shengyuan], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 17;
``Appearing in Court in Pajamas and Having `Chinese Dream,' Chen Yunfei
Sentenced to 4 Years' Imprisonment'' [Shenchuan shuiyi chuting zuo
``zhongguo meng'' chen yunfei bei panqiu 4 nian], Radio Free Asia, 31
March 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Zhang Xiaoyu From Jiaozuo, Henan,
Sentenced to 3 Years and 6 Months' Imprisonment at Trial of First
Instance for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, Husband Xu Youchen
Sentenced to Death'' [Henan jiaozuo zhang xiaoyu yishen bei yi xunxin
zishi zui panchu 3 nian 6 ge yue xingqi zhangfu xu youchen bei pan
sixing], 10 January 17; ``Liu Shaoming, a 1989 Veteran and a Labor
Activist, Remains Imprisoned Without Sentence,'' China Change, 31 May
17; ``PSB Detention Center Refused To Allow Dong Guangping To Receive
Money Deposited for Him, Citizen Seeks Information Disclosure''
[Kanshousuo ju wei dong guangping cunqian gongmin yaoqiu xinxi
gongkai], Radio Free Asia, 23 May 17.
\104\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Activist Meng Han
Goes to Trial Amidst Intimidation and Blatant Procedural Violations,''
24 October 16; Edward Wong, ``Chinese Prosecutors Ask Court for More
Time in Detained Tibetan's Case,'' New York Times, 28 December 16; ``
`June Fourth Liquor Case' Returned for Investigation a Third Time,
Defendant's Counsel Sends Letter Urging Non-Prosecution'' [``Liusi jiu
an'' di san ci tuizhen beigao lushi quxin yaoqiu bu qisu], Radio Free
Asia, 1 March 17.
\105\ For more information on Zhang Wanhe (also known as Zhang
Weihong), see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-
00116.
\106\ ``In the Weifang Placard-Holding Case, Lawyer Met With Yao
Jianqing'' [Weifang jupai an lushi huijian yao jianqing], Radio Free
Asia, 17 May 16.
\107\ For more information on Yao Jianqing, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00160.
\108\ ``Zhang Wanhe in Shandong Weifang Case Completed Sentence and
Released From Jail'' [Shandong weifang an zhang wanhe xing man chuyu],
Radio Free Asia, 4 January 17.
\109\ See, e.g., Wang Jian, ``6 Petitioners From Hebei Charged With
Extortion: Received `Stipend for Food and Lodging' When Petitioning,
Victim of Extortion Unknown'' [Hebei 6 fangmin bei kong qiaozha:
shangfang shi shou ``shisu butie,'' qiaozha duixiang buming], The
Paper, 22 October 16; Voice of Petitioners, ``Six Petitioners From
Hebei Charged With Extortion, Family Gathered and Knelt Down To Ask for
Explanation'' [Hebei liu fangmin bei kong qiaozha lesuo jiashu jiti
xiagui yao shuofa], 19 January 17; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Hearing Adjourned in Case Against Shandong Petitioner Li Chunhua,
Charged on Suspicion of Obstructing Official Business'' [Shandong
fangmin li chunhua shexian fang'ai gongwu an yanqi kaiting], 2
September 16; ``Hu Changgen's Court Hearing Suddenly Cancelled'' [Hu
changgen tingshen tu bei quxiao], Radio Free Asia, 21 September 16;
Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang, ``Support Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai and Oppose Wu
and Wen, Sichuan Deng Xuemei Sentenced to 2 Years'' [Ting xi jinping bo
xilai fan hu wen sichuan deng xuemei huoxing 2 nian], 10 November 16;
``Yin Xu'an Trial of First Instance Concluded, Judgment To Be Announced
Another Day'' [Yin xu'an yishen jieshu zeri xuanpan], Radio Free Asia,
13 September 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Rights Defense Network:
Monthly Report on Individuals in Mainland China Not Yet Sentenced and
Forcibly Disappeared (March 31, 2017) No. 18 (199 People in Total)''
[Weiquan wang: zhongguo dalu jiya wei pan ji qiangpo shizong renyuan
yuedu baogao (2017 nian 3 yue 31 ri) di shiba qi (gong 199 ren)], 31
March 17. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 156, 202. Article 202 of the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law provides that the court of first instance generally must
render a judgment within two and at most three months after a case has
been filed. A three-month extension may be granted by the high people's
court for the following four reasons, as specified in Article 156: ``1)
grave and complex cases in outlying areas where traffic is most
inconvenient; 2) grave cases that involve criminal syndicates; 3) grave
and complex cases that involve people who commit crimes from one place
to another; and 4) grave and complex cases that involve various
quarters and for which it is difficult to obtain evidence.'' Further
extension requires approval by the Supreme People's Court and is
granted only under special circumstances.
\110\ For more information on Gao Hancheng, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00218.
\111\ Voice of Petitioners, ``Several Hundred Veterans Who Showed
Support for Eight Veterans at Their Hearing, Including Gao Hancheng,
Detained by Police'' [Shubai laobing shengyuan gao hancheng deng ba
laobing an kaiting zao jingfang zhuabu guanya], 27 April 17; ``Pretrial
Conference Held in Vietnam War Veteran Gao Hancheng's Case, Fellow
Soldiers Who Show Support Intercepted'' [Yuezhan laobing gao hancheng
an zhaokai tingqian huiyi zhanyou shengyuan zao lanjie], Radio Free
Asia, 27 April 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyers Li Yuhan and Wang
Fei Filed Bail Application for the Fourth Time for War Veteran Gao
Hancheng, Accused Wuhan Ankang Hospital of Torture'' [Li yuhan wang fei
lushi di si ci wei can zhan laobing gao hancheng shenqing qubao konggao
wuhan ankang yiyuan nuedai], 26 February 17; ``Call for Efforts To Save
Hubei Veteran Association President and Rights Defense Representative
Gao Hancheng'' [Yu qing yingjiu hubei laobing huizhang weiquan daibiao
gao hancheng], Boxun, 12 March 17. See also PRC Criminal Procedure Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 156,
232. Article 232 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law provides that the
court of second instance generally must adjudicate a case within two
months. A two-month extension may be granted by the high people's court
for the following four reasons, as specified in Article 156: ``1) grave
and complex cases in outlying areas where traffic is most inconvenient;
2) grave cases that involve criminal gangs; 3) grave and complex cases
that involve people who commit crimes from one place to another; and 4)
grave and complex cases that involve various quarters and for which it
is difficult to obtain evidence.'' Further extension requires approval
by the Supreme People's Court and is granted only under special
circumstances.
\112\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyers Li Yuhan and Wang Fei Filed
Bail Application the Fourth Time for War Veteran Gao Hancheng, Accused
Wuhan Ankang Hospital of Torture'' [Li yuhan wang fei lushi disi ci wei
canzhan laobing gao hancheng shenqing qubao konggao wuhan ankang yiyuan
nuedai], 26 February 17; ``Call for Efforts To Save Hubei Veteran
Association President and Rights Defense Representative Gao Hancheng''
[Yu qing yingjiu hubei laobing huizhang weiquan daibiao gao hancheng],
Boxun, 12 March 17.
\113\ See, e.g., ``Xie Yang's Legal Representative Chen Jian'gang
Detained in Yunnan'' [Xie yang daili lushi chen jian'gang zai yunnan
beizhua], Radio Free Asia, 3 May 17; ``Jiangsu Wang Jian To Be Tried on
Wednesday'' [Jiangsu wang jian zhou san shenxun], Radio Free Asia, 15
November 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Chang Hongyan, Host of
`Petitioners Saturday,' Taken into Custody in Lu Village, Beijing, on
Suspicion of Obstruction of Public Service, Under Which Arrest Was
Approved'' [``Fangmin xingqi liu'' zhuchiren chang hongyan zai beijing
lu cun bei yi shexian fanghai gongwu zui pibu zhua zou], 21 January 17;
``Family Church in Xinjiang Weili Construction Corps Suffered Search
and Seizure by Government'' [Xinjiang weili jianshe bingtuan yi jiating
jiaohui zao dangju chachao], Radio Free Asia, 1 March 17; Rights
Defense Network, ``Shandong Linqu Chen Zengjiang Detained While on a
Ride, Ate Guaranty Document at Police Station and Beaten'' [Shandong
linqu chen zengjiang chengche bei zhua paichusuo nei tunshi baozheng
shu zao da], 20 March 17; ``Three Important Burial Sites Become
Restricted Areas on `Tomb Sweeping Day,' 10 People Detained While
Paying Respect to Yang Jia'' [San da muqu cheng ``qingming'' jindi ji
yang jia 10 ren bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 5 April 17.
\114\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 83, 91, 117, 122, 136; PRC People's
Police Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin jingcha fa], passed 28
February 95, amended 26 October 12, effective, 1 January 13, art. 9.
\115\ Ministry of Public Security, PRC People's Police Law
(Amendment Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin jingcha fa (xiuding
cao'an gao)], 1 December 16, arts. 31-35. See also Liu Yizhan and Xiong
Feng, ``Three Points of Focus of Proposed Substantial Revision to
People's Police Law'' [Renmin jingcha fa ni daxiu jujiao san da guanzhu
dian], Xinhua, 3 December 16.
\116\ PRC People's Police Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin
jingcha fa], passed 28 February 95, amended and effective 26 October
12.
\117\ Ministry of Public Security, Provisions on the Administration
and Use of Public Security Agencies' Official-Use Firearms [Gong'an
jiguan gongwu yong qiang guanli shiyong guiding], issued and effective
9 October 99, arts. 2, 3; State Council, PRC Regulations on the
People's Police Use of Police Equipment and Weapons [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renmin jingcha shiyong jingxie he wuqi tiaoli], issued and
effective 16 January 96, arts. 3, 9; Ministry of Public Security,
Operating Rules and Procedures for On-Site Stopping of Illegal and
Criminal Conduct of Public Security Agencies by the People's Police
[Gong'an jiguan renmin jingcha xianchang zhizhi weifa fanzui xingwei
caozuo guicheng], issued and effective 27 January 10, arts. 30, 31. See
also PRC Firearms Management Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qiangzhi
guanli fa], passed 5 July 96, amended and effective 27 August 09, art.
5; Ministry of Public Security, Measures on Equipping Official-Use
Firearms [Gongwu yong qiang peibei banfa], issued 26 May 98, amended
and effective 28 August 02, art. I(1).
\118\ Ministry of Public Security, PRC People's Police Law
(Amendment Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin jingcha fa (xiuding
cao'an gao)], 1 December 16, art. 31.
\119\ Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Submission by Human
Rights Watch to the National People's Congress Standing Committee on
the Draft Revisions to the Police Law,'' reprinted in Human Rights
Watch, 22 December 16, 2-3, citing UN Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth
UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Havana, Cuba (27 August-7 September 1990), A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1,
principle 9.
\120\ Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Submission by Human
Rights Watch to the National People's Congress Standing Committee on
the Draft Revisions to the Police Law,'' reprinted in Human Rights
Watch, 22 December 16.
\121\ See, e.g., ``Dozens of Police Grab, Beat, and Detain
Demolition Victims, Mother and Daughter With Disabilities; Accused of
Wrongdoing After Sleeping in Government Building and Making Reports to
Foreign Media'' [Shushi jingcha zhua da juliu zao qiangchai canji munu
lusu zhengfu xiang waimei baoliao huozui], Radio Free Asia, 25 May 17;
``Man in Inner Mongolia Shot Dead After `Attacking Police' While
Intoxicated, Sparks Public Opinion and Debate'' [Neimenggu nanzi jiuzui
``xi jing'' bei jibi yinfa yulun zhengyi], Radio Free Asia, 10 January
17; ``Villagers From Taxian District, Anhui, Refuse To Relocate,
Several Hundred Police Cordon Off Village, Beat and Grab Villagers''
[Anhui taxian qu cunmin jujue banqian zao shubai jingcha feng cun zhua
da], Radio Free Asia, 2 June 17.
\122\ See, e.g., ``Chu Ling Refuses To Remain Silent, Exposes Jiang
Yefei Cruelly Beaten and Twice Underwent Operations'' [Chu ling jujue
zai chenmo pu jiang yefei bei dacan shoushu liangci], Radio Free Asia,
23 May 17; ``Chen Yunfei Tortured and Abused While Serving Sentence''
[Chen yunfei fuxing zhong shou kuxing nuedai], Radio Free Asia, 4 May
17; ``Wang Yuping, Prisoner Convicted of Inciting Subversion, Suffering
From Kidney Stones; Abused, Beaten, and Threatened in Jail'' [Shandian
fan wang yuping shenhuan jieshi yuzhong zao nuedai ouda weixie], Radio
Free Asia, 8 September 16.
\123\ For more information on Li Chunfu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00311.
\124\ ``Li Chunfu's Schizophrenia Suspected To Be Linked to Drug
That Public Security Gave Him'' [Li chunfu jingshen fenlie yi yu gongan
gei ta yong yao youguan], Radio Free Asia, 16 January 17; Wang
Qiaoling, ``A Third Update on Lawyer Li Chunfu: He Was Drugged in
Custody,'' China Change, 15 January 17; Wang Qiaoling, ``A Fourth
Update on Lawyer Li Chunfu's Situation: `What Are You Hiding From Me?'
'' China Change, 17 January 17; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern
Group, `` `709 Crackdown' Lawyers and Activists' Case Update*
(2015.10.24-2015.10.30),'' 30 October 15.
\125\ Wang Qiaoling, ``A Third Update on Lawyer Li Chunfu: He Was
Drugged in Custody,'' China Change, 15 January 17.
\126\ Wang Qiaoling, ``A Fourth Update on Lawyer Li Chunfu's
Situation: `What Are You Hiding From Me?' '' China Change, 17 January
17.
\127\ For more information on Wu Gan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00348.
\128\ For more information on Wang Yu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00252.
\129\ Yan Xin, ``Complaint by Lawyer Yan Xin Addressed to Tianjin
Municipal Procuratorate'' [Yan xin lushi zhi tianjin shi jianchayuan de
konggao han], reprinted in Human Rights in China, 16 December 16; Shen
Yu, ``Lawyer of `Butcher' Wu Gan Writes Letter to Tianjin Municipal
Procuratorate, Saying Wu Tortured by Domestic Security Officials''
[``Tufu'' wu gan lushi zhi xin tianjin shi jianchayuan zhi qi zaoyu
guobao jingcha kuxing], Radio France Internationale, 16 December 16;
``Wang Yu Reveals Custodial Abuse for the First Time, 709 Supporters
Protest at Courthouse in the Hague'' [Wang yu shouci baoguang yuzhong
shou kuxing 709 shengyuanzhe hai ya fating kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 10
July 17.
\130\ For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.
\131\ For more information on Li Heping, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00284.
\132\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (chrlcg), ``Li
Heping and Wang Quanzhang Tortured With Electric Shocks To Faint''
Twitter post, 23 January 17, 1:17 a.m.; ``Li Heping, Wang Quanzhang
Rendered Unconscious From Electric Shock'' [Li heping, wang quanzhang
ceng zao dianji zhi hunjue], Radio Free Asia, 23 January 17.
\133\ June Cheng, ``Wives of Chinese Torture Victims Beg Congress
for Help,'' World, 19 May 17; ``709 Crackdown: Lawyer Li Heping
Released, Forced To Take Medicine While in Detention'' [709 da zhuabu:
li heping lushi huoshi zaiya qijian zao qiangpo fuyao], Radio Free
Asia, 10 May 17.
\134\ Bob Fu, ``China's Tortured Lawyers,'' Wall Street Journal, 29
May 17; ``Two More Individuals in 709 Case Reported To Have Been Forced
To Take Medicine'' [709 an zaiyou liang ren bei qiangbi fuyao], Radio
Free Asia, 16 May 17; ``July 9 Lawyer Li Shuyun Exposes Torture,
Reveals Forced Drugging'' [709 lushi li shuyun jie kuxing pilu beipo
fuyao], Radio Free Asia, 14 May 17; John Sudworth, ``Chinese Lawyer Li
Heping `Suffered Torture by Torture Instruments for a Month' at Tianjin
PSB Detention Center'' [Zhongguo lushi li heping zai tianjin kanshousuo
``zheng yue zaoshou xingju zhemo''], BBC, 13 May 17; ``Li Heping
Exposes Torture Detail Again, Jiang Tianyong's Daughter Writes Open
Letter to Father'' [Li heping zai pu kuxing xijie jiang tianyong nu'er
gongkai zhi fu xin], Radio Free Asia, 31 May 17.
\135\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang
Placed Under Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location on
Suspicion of Disturbing Court Order, Inciting Subversion of State
Power'' [Hunan xie yang lushi bei shexian raoluan fating zhixu,
shandian zui zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu], 15 July 15; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by July 9 Crackdown on Rights
Lawyers,'' 13 July 15, updated 6 February 17; Rights Defense Network,
``In 709 Crackdown, Arrest Approved for Lawyer Xie Yang, Lawyer Xie
Yanyi, and Lawyer Li Heping's Assistant Zhao Wei (Kao La)'' [709 da
zhuabu shijian zhong xie yang lushi, xie yanyi lushi, li heping lushi
zhuli zhao wei (kao la) yi bei pizhun daibu], 11 January 16.
\136\ Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie
Yang (One)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (yi)], reprinted in
Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17. According to the meeting record,
a domestic security officer told Xie that the amount of rest Xie would
be allowed to have was undefined in the law and would be entirely at
the authorities' discretion, and could be as short as five minutes.
\137\ Ibid.
\138\ Ibid.; Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer
Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (er)], reprinted in
Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17; ``Transcript of Interviews With
Lawyer Xie Yang (1)--Arrest, Questions About Chinese Human Rights
Lawyers Group,'' China Change, last visited 8 August 17. Xie Yang
identified the following officials who were involved in torturing and
abusing him, directly or in complicity: 1) Captain Li Kewei of the
Changsha Municipal Domestic Security Detachment; 2) Lieutenant Wang
Dehua of the Changsha Municipal Domestic Security Detachment; 3)
Captain Wang Tietuo of the Sixth Brigade of the Changsha Municipal
Domestic Security Detachment; 4) Lieutenant Zhu Heng of the Sixth
Brigade of the Changsha Municipal Domestic Security Detachment; 5)
Instructor Ye Yun of the Sixth Brigade of the Changsha Municipal
Domestic Security Detachment; 6) Li Feng of the Hunan Domestic Security
Corps; 7) Captain Xie Leshi of the Dongkou County Domestic Security
Corps; 8) public security officers Zhou Lang, 9) Yin Zhuo, 10) Qu Ke,
11) Li Yang, 12) Zhou Yi, and 13) Zhuang Xiaoliang; 14) Department
Director Liu Xiaohong of the Hunan Provincial People's Procuratorate
Second Public Prosecution Department; 15) procurators Duan Xiaolong,
16) Jiang Bin, 17) Li Zhiming, 18) Wang Zhiyong, 19) Fang Hui, 20) Hu
Yongchao, 21) Li Weining, and 22) a deputy director surnamed Jin; and
22) Bailiff Yuan Jin. See also `` `China Human Rights Accountability
Center' Issues a Public Announcement To Collect Personal Information on
Seven Human Rights Abusers Who Tortured 709 Lawyer Xie Yang''
[``Zhongguo renquan wenze zhongxin'' fabu gonggao, zhengji dui 709
lushi xie yang shi yi kuxing de qi wei renquan shihaizhe geren xinxi],
Radio Free Asia, 31 January 17.
\139\ Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie
Yang (One)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi huijian jilu (yi)], reprinted in
Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17; Chen Jian'gang, ``Record of
Meeting With Hunan Lawyer Xie Yang (Two)'' [Hunan xie yang lushi
huijian jilu (er)], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 19 January 17.
\140\ ``Xie Yang of the 709 Case Personally Wrote Letter Seeking
Accountability From Changsha Procurators'' [709 an xie yang qinbi xin
wenze changsha jianchaguan], Radio Free Asia, 21 January 17.
\141\ ``Investigation Reveals Fake `Torture Stories' About Lawyer
Xie Yang,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 2 March 17; ``Truth of
`Xie Yang Tortured' Revealed: Fabricated To Cater to the West'' [Jiemi
``xie yang zao kuxing'' zhenxiang: wei yinghe xifang pingkong niezao],
Global Times, 1 March 17; Zhang Yan, ``Story of Torture Is `Fake,' ''
China Daily, 2 March 17.
\142\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Chen Jian'gang: Before and
After Meeting With Xie Yang'' [Chen jian'gang lushi: huijian xie yang
de qianhou], 3 March 17.
\143\ See, e.g., ``Lu Gengsong Tortured in Jail and His Health
Deteriorates, Outside World Calls for Granting Political Prisoners
Medical Parole'' [Lu gengsong yu zhong shounue jiankang ehua waijie
huyu yingjiu zhengzhifan baowai jiuyi], Radio Free Asia, 23 December
16; ``Hubei Prisoner of Conscience Wang Yuping Has Worrying Health
Concerns, Jiangsu Shan Lihua Lacks Medical Treatment and Medicine While
Imprisoned'' [Hubei liangxin fan wang yuping jiankang kanyou jiangsu
shan lihua yu zhong que yi shao yao], Radio Free Asia, 13 April 17;
``Hu Shigen's Seriously Deteriorating Health Exposes `Deal,' Huang
Wenxun Denied Tumor Treatment by Prison [Authorities]'' [Hu shigen
jiankang yanzhong shousun baoguang ``jiaoyi'' huang wenxun huan
zhongliu jianyu ju zhi], Radio Free Asia, 13 July 17.
\144\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Juan E. Mendez, A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 13, paras. 17-22; Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10
December 84, entry into force 26 June 87.
\145\ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic and
Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 57 and 2076 (LXII)
of 13 May 77, arts. 22-26; Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution A/RES/43/173 9 December 88, principle 24.
\146\ Chris Buckley, ``Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Dissident Who Won Nobel
While Jailed, Dies at 61,'' New York Times, 13 July 17.
\147\ Austin Ramzy, ``Chinese Hospital Invites Cancer Experts To
Help Treat Nobel Laureate,'' New York Times, 4 July 17. See also Tom
Phillips, `` `Time Running Out' for Terminally Ill Chinese Dissident
Liu Xiaobo,'' Guardian, 5 July 17; ``Questions Raised About Liu
Xiaobo's Prison Medical Treatment,'' Associated Press, 27 June 17.
\148\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Man's Death in Custody Prompts
Suspicion of Police Brutality,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 12
May 16.
\149\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 397.
\150\ Beijing Municipal People's Procuratorate, ``Beijing
Procuratorate Lawfully Conducted Examination and Investigation on Five
Police Officers, Including a Person Surnamed Xing, and Found Elements
of Dereliction of Duty Offense Established'' [Beijing jianfang yifa
shencha rending xing moumou deng wu ming she'an jingwu renyuan fuhe
wanhu zhishou zui goucheng tiaojian], 23 December 16; ``Person in
Charge of Fengtai District People's Procuratorate in Beijing Answers
Reporters' Questions About Dereliction of Duty Case of Five
Individuals, Including a Person Surnamed Xing'' [Beijing shi fengtai qu
renmin jianchayuan youguan fuzeren jiu xing moumou deng wu ren wanhu
zhishou an da jizhe wen], Qianlong Web, 23 December 16; Chris Buckley
and Adam Wu, ``No Trial for Beijing Officers Over Death of
Environmentalist,'' New York Times, 23 December 16; Beijing Municipal
Public Security Bureau (Ping'an Beijing), ``Police Officers and Persons
Responsible for the Lei Yang Case Receive Party and Government
Discipline'' [Lei yang an she an jingwu renyuan he xiangguan zerenren
shoudao dang zheng ji chuli], Weibo, 29 December 16, 4:00 p.m.
Authorities reported that they imposed administrative sanctions on law
enforcement personnel connected to the Lei Yang case.
\151\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 397; Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's
Procuratorate, Interpretation of Certain Issues Regarding the
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Dereliction of
Duty by Public Officials (One) [Guanyu banli duzhi xingshi anjian
shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi (yi)], issued 7 December 12,
effective 9 January 13, art. 1(1).
\152\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, last visited 11 May 17. China signed the
convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\153\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, arts.
4, 7, 16(1). Article 7 of the Convention against Torture provides,
``The State Party . . . shall submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.'' Article 16(1) provides,
``Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under
its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1 . .
..'' See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December
48, art. 5 (``No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment''); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 7
(``No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment''); Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, 27 August-7 September 90, 7 (``Governments shall
ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law
enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their
law'').
\154\ Compensation Committee, Supreme People's Court, State
Compensation Decision [Guojia peichang jueding shu], Case No. (2016)
Zui Gao Fa Wei Pei 11 Hao, 24 January 17.
\155\ PRC Public Security Bureau Detention Center Regulations
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kanshousuo tiaoli], issued and effective 17
March 90, art. 17.
\156\ Compensation Committee, Supreme People's Court, State
Compensation Decision [Guojia peichang jueding shu], Case No. (2016)
Zui Gao Fa Wei Pei 11 Hao, 24 January 17.
\157\ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, approved by the Economic
and Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 57 and 2076
(LXII) of 13 May 77, principles 33-34.
\158\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Ministry of Public Security's
Public Comments Solicitation Notice on the PRC Public Security Bureau
Detention Center Law (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)'' [Gong'anbu
guanyu ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo kanshousuo fa `gongkai zhengqiu
yijian gao' '' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de gonggao], 15 June 17; Ni
Dandan, ``Lawyers Skeptical About China's New Detention Center Law,''
Sixth Tone, 19 June 17.
\159\ Ministry of Public Security, PRC Public Security Bureau
Detention Center Law (Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo kanshousuo fa (gongkai zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued
19 June 17, art. 71; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955,
approved by the Economic and Social Council resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of
31 July 57 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 77, principles 33-34.
\160\ Margaret Lewis, ``Penetrating Law Into the Walls of Chinese
Detention Centers,'' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute:
Analysis (blog), 18 July 17; Cui Xiankang et al., ``Draft Law on
Detention Centers Won't Help Reduce Police Torture, Critics Say,''
Caixin, 20 June 17; ``Over a Hundred Chinese Lawyers and Citizens
Jointly Sign Citizen Opinion Letter on `Public Security Bureau
Detention Center Law' '' [Zhongguo bai lushi he gongmin lianshu
``kanshousuo fa'' gongmin yijianshu], Radio Free Asia, 6 July 17; Ge
Wenxiu et al., ``PRC Public Security Bureau Detention Center Law
(Public Comments Draft)'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kanshousuo fa
(gongmin jianyi gao)], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 5 July 17.
See also Ni Dandan, ``Lawyers Skeptical About China's New Detention
Center Law,'' Sixth Tone, 19 June 17.
\161\ For the Commission's past reporting on wrongful conviction,
see CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 88-89; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 106-8; and CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October
16, 106.
\162\ He Jiahong, Back From the Dead: Wrongful Convictions and
Criminal Justice in China, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press,
2016), 47, 50.
\163\ Zhang Cong, ``The Bottom Line of Adamantly Preventing
Wrongful Convictions (Dialogue)'' [Jianshou fangzhi yuanjia cuo'an de
dixian (duihua)], People's Daily, 29 March 17; ``SPP Official:
Provisions on Conducting Criminal Petition Examination in a Different
Locality Researched and Drafted'' [Zuigaojian guanyuan: yi yanjiu qicao
xingshi shensu anjian yidi shencha guiding], China News Service, 10
February 17; Zhou Bin, ``Supreme Procuratorate Criminal Case Petition
Office Director Explains Procuratorate's Work in Criminal Case
Petitions: Firmly Guard Against Wrongful Convictions'' [Zuigaojian
xingshi shensu ting tingzhang jiedu xingshi shensu jiancha gongzuo:
shoulao fangzhi yuanjia cuo'an dixian], Legal Daily, reprinted in
Supreme People's Procuratorate, 22 February 17.
\164\ Cao Yajing, ``Supreme People's Court Issues Judicial Reform
and Judicial Transparency White Papers'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan fabu
sifa gaige, sifa gongkai baipishu], People's Court Daily, reprinted in
China Court Network, 27 February 17.
\165\ Supreme People's Court, Criminal Judgment [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan xingshi panjue shu], (2016) Zui Gao Fa
Xing Zai No. 3, 30 November 16, reprinted in China Judgements Online, 2
December 16; Luo Sha and Bai Yang, ``Supreme People's Court Finds Nie
Shubin Not Guilty After Retrial'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan zaishen gaipan
nie shubin wuzui], Xinhua, 2 December 16.
\166\ Supreme People's Court, Criminal Judgment [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan xingshi panjue shu], (2016) Zui Gao Fa
Xing Zai No. 3, 30 November 16, reprinted in China Judgements Online, 2
December 16. In another case published during the Commission's 2017
reporting year, the Supreme People's Court rescinded several
intentional homicide convictions without directly addressing the
defendants' claims of torture. Supreme People's Court, Criminal
Judgment [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao fayuan xingshi panjue shu],
(2016) Zui Gao Fa Xing Zai No. 2, 20 January 17, reprinted in China
Judgements Online, 14 March 17; ``Supreme Court Announces Judgment in
Retrial in Case Involving Charges of Organizing, Leading, and
Participating in Criminal Syndicates, Intentional Homicide, and
Extortion Against Defendants, Including Sun Baoguo, Sun Baodong, and
Sun Baomin'' [Zuigaofa dui yuanshen beigaoren sun baoguo, sun baodong,
sun baomin deng ren zuzhi, lingdao, canjia heishehui xingzhi zuzhi,
guyi sharen, qiaozha lesuo deng zaishen yi an xuanpan], Xinhua, 23
January 17.
\167\ Supreme People's Court, ``Court Reform in China,'' 14 March
17, III. See also PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
guojia peichang fa], passed 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, 26 October
12, effective 1 January 13, art. 17; Supreme People's Court and Supreme
People's Procuratorate, Interpretations on Certain Issues Regarding the
Application of Law in Handling Criminal Compensation Cases [Guanyu
banli xingshi peichang anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi],
issued 28 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 21; ``Supreme
People's Court Issues Newest State Compensation Standard, Daily
Compensation Amount for Infringement of Personal Freedom Set at 258.89
Yuan Per Day'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongbu guojia peichang zuixin
biaozhun qinfan gongmin renshen ziyou quan de peichangjin biaozhun wei
meiri 258.89 yuan], People's Court Daily, reprinted in Supreme People's
Court, 31 May 17; 2016 China Law Yearbook [2016 zhongguo falu nianjian]
(Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 2016), 1299, table 9. According to
the 2016 China Law Yearbook, in 2015, official data indicates that
courts awarded compensation in 606 of 2,528 adjudicated cases involving
compensation claims in criminal matters.
\168\ Shan Yuxiao, ``Awaiting Further Disclosure on State
Compensation'' [Guojia peichang dai jinyibu gongkai], Caixin, 28
February 17.
\169\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17.
\170\ Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' April
2017, 14, 27-28; Amnesty International, ``Death Sentences and
Executions 2016,'' April 2017, 2, 4, 19; Amnesty International, ``Death
Penalty: World's Biggest Executioner China Must Come Clean About
`Grotesque' Level of Capital Punishment,'' 11 April 17.
\171\ Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' April
2017, 27-28.
\172\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC People's
Courts Organic Law (Amended) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin fayuan
zuzhi fa (xiuzheng)], passed 1 July 79, amended 2 September 83, 2
December 86, 31 October 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 12; National
People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on Amending PRC People's
Courts Organic Law [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui
guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin fayuan zuzhi fa'' de
jueding], issued 31 October 06, effective 1 January 07; Supreme
People's Court, Decision on Issues Relating to the Unified Exercise of
the Approval Authority on Death Penalty Cases [Zuigao renmin fayuan
guanyu tongyi xingshi sixing anjian hezhunquan youguan wenti de
jueding], issued 13 December 06, effective 1 January 07.
\173\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 34; Supreme People's Court and Ministry of
Justice, Several Provisions on Comprehensively Protecting Lawyers in
Fulfilling Their Duty To Defend According to Law, and Ensuring Quality
in the Handling of Death Penalty Cases [Zuigao renmin fayuan sifabu
guanyu chongfen baozhang lushi yifa luxing bianhu zhize, quebao sixing
anjian banli zhiliang de ruogan guiding], issued 21 May 08, art. 2.
\174\ Hua Xuan, ``Ten Years After Regaining Death Penalty Review
Authority: What Can Lawyers Do for Death Row Inmates'' [Sixing fuhe
shangshou shinian: lushi neng wei sixingfan zuo shenme], Southern
Weekend, 16 September 16; Li Haiyang, ``Ten Years After Regaining Death
Penalty Review Authority, Experts Call for Uniform Adjudication
Standard'' [Sixing fuhe quan shouhui shinian zhuanjia huyu tongyi
caipan biaozhun], Legal Weekly of Business Daily, 10 October 16.
\175\ Ibid.
\176\ Ibid. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``NGO Mid-Term
Assessment of China's Implementation of 2nd Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) Recommendations (Report),'' 22 November 16, 31.
\177\ Although the Chinese government has promulgated rules to
regulate the sourcing of organs, it has not outlawed sourcing organs
from executed prisoners. PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October
97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December
02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29
August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 234-1. The PRC Criminal Law
prohibits organized trading of organs, the removal of organs without
consent, and the inducement of another to donate organs by fraud or
coercion. State Council, Regulations on Human Organ Transplants [Renti
qiguan yizhi tiaoli], issued 31 March 07, effective 1 May 07, arts. 7,
21. The State Council's Regulations on Human Organ Transplants prohibit
medical facilities from charging a fee for the transplanted organ.
Ministry of Health, Certain Provisions on Standardizing Live Organ
Transplantation [Weishengbu guanyu guifan huoti qiguan yizhi de ruogan
guiding], issued and effective 28 December 09. In general, the Ministry
of Health's Certain Provisions on Standardizing Live Organ
Transplantation implement the State Council's Regulations on Human
Organ Transplants. National Health and Family Planning Commission,
Regulations on Administering Procurement and Distribution of Human
Organ Donations (Trial) [Renti juanxian qiguan huoqu yu fenpei guanli
guiding (shixing)], issued 13 August 13, effective 1 September 13,
arts. 5, 6. The trial Regulations on Administering Procurement and
Distribution of Human Organ Donations create organ procurement
organizations in every provincial-level administrative jurisdiction and
require them to register procured organs in a national registry.
\178\ Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' April
2017, 12; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ``China May Still Be Using Executed
Prisoners' Organs, Official Admits,'' Guardian, 7 February 17.
\179\ Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ``China May Still Be Using Executed
Prisoners' Organs, Official Admits,'' Guardian, 7 February 17. See also
Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' April 2017, 12.
\180\ `` `Zero Tolerance on Transplantation of Organs Sourced From
Executed Prisoners,' Huang Jiefu Said Armed Police Hospital's License
Revoked for Illegal Operation'' [``Ling rongren siqiu qiguan yizhi''
huang jiefu zhi wujing yiyuan feifa shoushu zao chupai], Ming Pao, 17
October 16.
\181\ Ibid.
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of Religion
International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom
Both Chinese and international law provide guarantees for
religious freedom. Despite these guarantees, the Commission
continued to observe widespread and systematic violation of the
principles of religious freedom as Chinese authorities
exercised broad discretion over the religious practice of
Chinese citizens.
Under international law, freedom of religion or belief
encompasses both the right to form, hold, and change
convictions, beliefs, and religion--which cannot be
restricted--and the right to outwardly manifest those beliefs--
which can be limited for certain, specific justifications.\1\
These principles are codified in various international
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).\2\ China has signed \3\ and stated its intent
to ratify \4\ the ICCPR, which obligates China to refrain in
good faith from acts that would defeat the treaty's purpose.\5\
Article 36 of China's Constitution guarantees citizens
``freedom of religious belief'' and protection for ``normal
religious activities.'' \6\ With essential terms such as
``normal'' undefined, it is unclear whether China's
Constitution protects the same range of belief and outward
manifestation that is recognized under international law.\7\ In
other ways, however, China's Constitution and other Chinese
legal provisions \8\ join the ICCPR in prohibiting
discrimination based on religion \9\ and loosely parallel the
ICCPR's prohibition on coercion \10\ by forbidding state
agencies, social organizations, and individuals from compelling
citizens to believe or not believe in any religion.\11\
China's Constitution prohibits ``making use of religion to
engage in activities that disrupt social order, impair the
health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of
the State.'' \12\ The ICCPR does allow State Parties to
restrict outward manifestations of religion or belief, but such
restrictions must be ``prescribed by law and . . . necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.'' \13\
Religious Affairs Regulations and Policy
Religious affairs in China are administered by a network of
Party committees, government agencies, and official religious
organizations under the direction of the Standing Committee of
the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau
(Politburo).\14\ The United Front Work Department (UFWD), under
the Party's Central Committee, develops and oversees
implementation of Party policies on religion and monitors
religious groups and leaders on behalf of the Party.\15\ The
government agency responsible for religious affairs at the
national level is the State Administration for Religious
Affairs (SARA) under the State Council, while subnational
bureaus manage religious affairs at lower levels.\16\ These
religious affairs agencies have effective authority over the
state-sanctioned ``patriotic'' religious associations that act
as liaisons between the government and practitioners of the
five ``main'' religions in China,\17\ while the UFWD vets the
association leaders.\18\ Public security bureaus are generally
responsible for enforcement of laws against religious activity
deemed illegal.\19\ The ``610 Office'' is a working group, made
up of officials from a number of Party and government agencies,
that was originally established in 1999 to coordinate and
execute operations for campaigns aimed at eliminating the
practice of Falun Gong.\20\ In 2003, the ``610 Office'' was
authorized to target other religions as well.\21\
The Chinese government's regulatory framework for religious
affairs imposes numerous restrictions on religious freedom. The
2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), in effect during
this reporting period, protect ``lawful'' religious rights.\22\
``Lawful'' is not defined, and religious activity is subject to
extensive government approvals and restrictions.\23\ These
include official guidelines for the content and distribution of
religious publications, restrictions that limit religious
activities to government-approved sites, and requirements that
religious personnel be approved by local religious affairs
authorities.\24\
Current regulations require religious groups to register
with the government, and legal protection of religious
activities is contingent on complying with registration
requirements.\25\ Registration requirements can be burdensome
and sometimes impossible for religious groups to fulfill--for
example, smaller groups may not have the requisite 50
individual members \26\ or the resources to complete complex
financial reporting requirements.\27\ Officials will deny
registration applications of religious groups that are not
affiliated with a state-sanctioned patriotic association.\28\
This poses a challenge for the registration of religious groups
that refuse to join patriotic associations; some groups prefer
not to join due to their desire to maintain autonomy or their
view that doing so would violate their religious beliefs.\29\
Registration and the regulatory system that it facilitates
impose restrictions \30\ on rights to religious freedom or
belief recognized under international law, such as the right to
meet as a religious group,\31\ the right to determine religious
leadership \32\ and content of worship,\33\ the right to
religious education,\34\ the right to publication and
dissemination of religious materials,\35\ and the right to
international communication and exchange.\36\
Unregistered groups and registered groups alike operate in
an environment that is uncertain, as officials may tolerate or
punish them depending on whether their activities align with
government and Party interests. In practice, experts observe
that officials may tolerate the religious activities of
unregistered groups,\37\ especially if officials believe that
the activities promote social or economic development
interests.\38\ Unregistered religious and spiritual communities
are vulnerable to government harassment, detention, and other
abuses,\39\ yet groups may be sanctioned regardless of
registration status when officials view them as posing a
challenge to government authority or the Party's interests,\40\
with some religious groups and practices banned outright.\41\
The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief has
stated that ``registration as a precondition for practicing
one's religion or belief'' is a limitation interfering with the
right to freedom of religion or belief.\42\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese government released draft revisions to the Regulations on
Religious Affairs in September 2016,\43\ soliciting public comment for
a one-month period.\44\ In a written explanation, the government
highlighted objectives that included addressing the use of religion to
threaten national security, strengthening the role of patriotic
religious organizations, regulating religious content on the Internet,
allowing religious groups to register for legal status and obtain
property rights over their assets, and combatting commercialization in
the religious sector.\45\ Some Chinese religious believers and scholars
viewed a few of the proposed changes as potential improvements on
current regulations, particularly the provision allowing religious
groups to register for legal status.\46\ The draft revisions also
included new provisions codifying the role of public security in the
implementation of religious affairs regulations \47\ and increased
government scrutiny of religious groups,\48\ prompting observations
that such measures would serve to increase government control of
religious groups.\49\ The draft revisions also included new penalties
for those ``providing facilities'' for unauthorized religious
activities,\50\ which experts believed might be used to target
unregistered Protestant groups.\51\ Observers also noted that the draft
revisions failed to clearly define some important terms, such as
``extremism,'' ``normal,'' and ``abnormal,'' thus giving authorities
broad discretion to restrict citizens' religious rights.\52\ One Muslim
leader said that such discretion over the definition of ``extremism''
in local regulations had already led to large-scale repression of
religious freedom in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\53\ The
release of the draft revisions followed a major leadership conference
on religious policy convened by President and Party General Secretary
Xi Jinping in April 2016,\54\ during which Xi promoted the
``sinicization'' of religion in China, a term that officials have used
often in recent years to encourage the adaptation of religious beliefs
and activities to align with government and Party interests.\55\ One
international rights organization characterized the revisions as
``implementing the new ideology [of sinicization] on a legislative
level.'' \56\ The revisions are in line with a long-term Party policy
of using religion as an instrument for promoting national unity and
social stability,\57\ although commentators also drew parallels with
recently implemented restrictions on civil society groups through
legislative measures such as the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas
Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities.\58\ In January 2017, the
SARA included implementation of revisions to the RRA in its 2017 Work
Objectives, stating that it would hold meetings and trainings regarding
implementation and provide guidance to local governments to align local
regulations with the revisions.\59\
On September 7, 2017, the State Council issued revisions to the RRA,
to take effect on February 1, 2018.\60\ The final revisions contained
few changes from the draft released for public feedback.\61\ One
scholar stated that he believed some of the ``candid'' recommendations
offered by lawyers and legal scholars went unconsidered and that the
final revisions were ``more restrictive'' than the draft version.\62\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other laws and Party policies also continued to restrict
citizens' freedom to hold religious beliefs and practice
religion. Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law criminalizes
``organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of
the law.'' \63\ In January 2017, the Supreme People's Court and
the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a joint
interpretation of Article 300 that set out new sentencing
guidelines and expressly criminalized certain forms of Internet
usage to disseminate information about a ``cult,'' among other
revisions.\64\ One international rights organization speculated
that the new sentencing guidelines might reduce the length of
sentences under Article 300, yet also expressed concern about
the authorization of new penalties, such as deprivation of
political rights.\65\ The revised interpretation took effect in
February 2017.\66\ In addition, the PRC National Security Law
stipulates that ``the use of religion to conduct illegal
criminal activities that threaten state security'' must be
prevented and punished.\67\ The law also contains mandates to
``maintain the order of normal religious activities,'' ``oppose
the interference of foreign influence into domestic religious
affairs,'' and ``suppress cult organizations.'' \68\ The long-
standing \69\ ban on religious belief for Party members
remained in effect; SARA Director Wang Zuo'an reiterated the
ban in a July 2017 article for a major Party journal,\70\
noting that in recent years, certain high level officials had
been found to believe in religion and that officials with
religious beliefs would ``undergo education to relinquish their
beliefs'' or face punishment.\71\
Chinese Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism
While government and Party officials rarely targeted
Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities with direct
suppression, they nonetheless continued to subject these
religions to extensive regulation and control. A large number
of Chinese citizens engage in Buddhist and Taoist practices,
with estimates of around 244 million Buddhists as of 2010,\72\
and 173 million citizens engaging in some Taoist practices as
of 2007.\73\ [For information on Tibetan Buddhism, see Section
V--Tibet.]
Government regulations continued to require Taoist and
Buddhist temples to register with their local religious affairs
bureau,\74\ and to forbid unregistered sites from conducting
religious activities and collecting donations.\75\ Despite this
prohibition, numerous active Buddhist and Taoist sites have not
registered.\76\
The government and Party continued their wide-ranging
control and support of officially sanctioned practice of
Chinese Buddhism and Taoism. In addition to maintaining
extensive regulations,\77\ authorities continued to exercise
control over sanctioned practice by, for example, administering
sanctioned sites in conjunction with religious leaders.\78\
Authorities ensure the political reliability of Taoist
religious leadership by requiring all candidates for the clergy
to obtain the approval of the local patriotic association and
religious affairs bureau for ordination.\79\
Chinese officials continued to hold the leader of the
Buddhist Huazang Dharma group, Wu Zeheng,\80\ and several
followers in custody. Authorities sentenced Wu to life in
prison in 2015 on charges of ``organizing and using a cult to
undermine implementation of the law,'' \81\ rape, fraud, and
the production and sale of poisonous or harmful food.\82\ In
November 2016, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
issued opinions concluding that the Chinese government
arbitrarily detained Wu and his followers for ``legitimate
exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
freedom of religion and freedom of association,'' opining that
Wu and the other detainees should be released immediately and
compensated for the violations of their rights.\83\ Wu served
an 11-year sentence from 1999 to 2010 for ``economic crimes''
after openly criticizing official restrictions on religious
freedom in China.\84\
Christianity--Catholicism
The Chinese government maintained measures that impede the
freedom under international standards \85\ of Chinese Catholic
congregations to be led by clergy who are selected and who
conduct their ministry according to Catholic religious beliefs.
The number of Catholics is estimated to be around 12 million,
with the State Administration for Religious Affairs reporting
that 5.7 million Catholics were part of officially sanctioned
congregations in 2014.\86\ The government continued to push for
Chinese Catholic bishops to be ``self-selected and self-
ordained'' \87\--selected through the patriotic religious
organizations in consultation with government and Party
officials, and then ordained by Chinese bishops without the
involvement of the Holy See.\88\ Many Chinese Catholics,
sometimes known as ``underground Catholics,'' avoid the
ministry of these bishops because they believe legitimate
ecclesiastical authority can be conferred only by the Pope's
mandate.\89\ Many Chinese Catholics also object to bishops who
are members of the patriotic religious association for Chinese
Catholics, the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA).\90\ The
Holy See has declared the CPA ``incompatible with Catholic
doctrine'' because it claims authority over Chinese bishops and
their church communities while being backed by the Chinese
government and maintaining independence from the Holy See.\91\
The Chinese government and the Holy See were reportedly
close to an agreement about the system of bishop appointments
in China in October 2016,\92\ but the potential agreement was
in question after Paul Lei Shiyin, an excommunicated bishop
ordained without papal approval, participated in two ordination
ceremonies for Chinese bishops later in the year.\93\ Local
observers reportedly believed that Lei's inclusion in the
ordinations was directed by the Chinese government to signal
its ultimate authority over the Catholic Church in China.\94\ A
Catholic news media outlet reported that a round of talks in
June 2017 ``was not smooth,'' ending with ``no open gesture
from either side.'' \95\
Government officials continued to detain or otherwise
restrict the freedom of Catholic leaders in both the
underground and official church. In April 2017, officials
reportedly detained two underground Catholic bishops in
undisclosed locations--Peter Shao Zhumin of the Diocese of
Wenzhou in Zhejiang province \96\ and Vincent Guo Xijin of the
Diocese of Mindong in Fujian province.\97\ The bishops were
unable to preside over Easter services, and Catholic news media
reported that the local governments intended to pressure the
bishops into joining the CPA.\98\ Guo was reportedly released
in May 2017; Shao was released after five days in detention,
but detained again in May 2017.\99\ According to the Catholic
news outlet LaCroix, this was the fourth time authorities had
detained Shao since he became the Bishop of Wenzhou after his
predecessor passed away in September 2016.\100\ As of August
2017, the Commission had not observed any reports as to the
whereabouts or condition of Shao or of several underground
Catholic leaders from Hebei province, including Coadjutor
Bishop Cui Tai, Bishop Cosmos Shi Enxiang, and Bishop James Su
Zhimin.\101\ A bishop in the official church, Thaddeus Ma Daqin
of the Diocese of Shanghai, remained under surveillance and
extralegal confinement at Sheshan seminary in Shanghai
municipality, although he reportedly rejoined the Shanghai
branch of the CPA by January 2017.\102\ Authorities had
restricted Ma's freedom of movement and communication after his
public resignation from the CPA during his ordination ceremony
in July 2012.\103\
Christianity--Protestantism
Chinese government and Communist Party officials continued
to subject Protestant Christian belief and practice to a wide
range of restrictions, infringing upon the religious freedom of
an estimated 60 to 80 million Chinese Protestants.\104\
Instances of official persecution of Protestant communities
in 2016 reportedly increased from the prior year.\105\
International rights organization ChinaAid said that the
intensified clampdown of recent years may be due in part to
official concern that Protestant communities pose a potential
threat to the dominance of the Communist Party because of their
size, socioeconomic diversity, independent and decentralized
manner of organization, and connections with Christian groups
based in foreign, democratic countries.\106\ International
observers asserted that official hostility toward Protestantism
may also be connected to the Party's ``sinicization'' campaign
in recent years aimed at adapting religious belief and
practices in China to align with government and Party
interests.\107\
Officials increased restrictions and monitoring for
churches that have joined the Three-Self Patriotic Movement
(TSPM), the state-controlled organization that manages
Protestant religious practice.\108\ These increased
restrictions, commentators noted, continued a trend of
expanding the enforcement of repressive policies from house
churches to officially sanctioned churches.\109\ Such measures
included a prohibition on churches organizing summer activities
for youth in Henan province \110\ and a ban on minors
participating in any church activities for many churches in
Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang province.\111\ Earlier in the
year, the Zhejiang TSPM reportedly issued a written requirement
for all churches, including Catholic churches, to install
surveillance cameras for the purported purpose of
``strengthening anti-terrorism efforts.'' \112\ Local officials
began the forcible installation of cameras in some churches in
March 2017 and reportedly beat those who attempted to oppose
their efforts.\113\
Chinese officials continued policies aimed at pressuring
unregistered Protestant congregations, commonly known as house
churches, to join the TSPM.\114\ As in previous years,\115\
Protestant house churches continued to face raids during church
gatherings,\116\ eviction from meeting spaces,\117\ and
official bans on worship.\118\ ChinaAid further reported that
authorities forced some churches in Wenzhou to install
surveillance cameras for government monitoring, in apparent
connection with the TSPM notice mentioned above.\119\
Authorities also reportedly subjected some believers to
harassment,\120\ violence,\121\ or detention.\122\ In Jiangxi
province, local governments reportedly issued directives to
forcibly remove crosses and perimeter walls from churches;
\123\ by August 2017, authorities had removed at least 10
church crosses,\124\ leading local religious leaders to raise
concerns about parallels to the official cross-removal campaign
in Zhejiang beginning in 2014 that ultimately removed more than
2,000 crosses.\125\ The Wenzhou Municipality Ethnic and
Religious Affairs Bureau in Zhejiang announced a new plan for a
program that would deploy over 1,500 religious affairs bureau
liaisons to monitor the religious activity of all households in
Lucheng district, Wenzhou.\126\ In several instances,
authorities detained house church members on charges of
``organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of
the law,'' under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law.\127\ Some
researchers have noted with concern that some Chinese
authorities may be applying the criminal ``cult'' designation
to religious groups beyond those officially banned by the
government to generally cover all religious organizations not
officially registered with the government.\128\ Chinese
Protestant communities expressed concern that the revisions to
the Regulations on Religious Affairs \129\ would provide a
legal basis for further restricting the activities of
unregistered Protestant congregations.\130\
During this reporting year, prominent cases involving the
detention of Protestant Christian believers included:
Li Hongmin. Authorities arrested Li Hongmin, a
member of a house church in Guangdong province, in July
2016 and tried him for ``illegal business activity''
\131\ in October 2016.\132\ The indictment accused him
of printing Christian books without official
permission.\133\ In March 2017, authorities sentenced
him to 10 months' imprisonment and a fine of 10,000
yuan.\134\ Local authorities harassed his wife, Xu Lei,
and pressured her landlord to evict her after she
attempted to petition authorities in Beijing
municipality regarding Li's detention.\135\
Living Stone Church members. Authorities tried
several members of the Living Stone Church, a house
church in Guiyang municipality, Guizhou province, after
extended periods of detention, including Pastor Li
Guozhi (also known as Yang Hua, sentenced to two years
and six months' imprisonment in December 2016 for
``intentionally leaking state secrets''),\136\ Zhang
Xiuhong (a church deacon, sentenced to five years'
imprisonment in February 2017 for ``illegal business
activity,'' \137\ later reduced in August 2017 to a
three-year sentence, suspended for five years),\138\
and church members Wang Yao and Yu Lei (tried in
October 2016 for ``intentionally leaking state
secrets,'' both had yet to receive a ruling as of
August 2017).\139\ In March 2017, Pastor Yang Hua's
lawyers asserted that he urgently needed to be
hospitalized for a serious medical condition and asked
the procuratorate to review the necessity of his
detention.\140\ The Guiyang government subjected many
other Living Stone Church members to repressive
measures such as fines, harassment, surveillance, and
detention after designating the church an ``illegal
social group'' in 2015.\141\
Zhang Shaojie. The pastor of a registered TSPM
church in Nanle county, Puyang municipality, Henan
province, Zhang Shaojie continued to serve a 12-year
sentence issued in 2014 for ``fraud'' and ``gathering a
crowd to disturb social order.'' \142\ In June 2017,
his daughter reported that authorities were depriving
him of sleep, food, and access to the outdoors, and
also forbid him from discussing conditions in prison
with family members during visits.\143\ Authorities
detained Zhang in November 2013, after a group of
church members traveled to Beijing municipality to file
a petition regarding a land dispute with local
authorities.\144\
Gu Yuese. Authorities in Hangzhou
municipality, Zhejiang province, detained Gu Yuese for
a second time in December 2016 and re-arrested him in
January 2017 for ``misappropriation of funds.'' \145\
Gu is reportedly the highest level figure within a
government-sponsored religious organization to have
been arrested in nearly thirty years--he was the leader
of China's largest officially sanctioned church \146\
and chairperson of the China Christian Council, a
patriotic religious organization, at the provincial
level.\147\ He was detained in January 2016 and
stripped of these positions in February 2016 after he
expressed opposition to the ongoing cross-removal
campaign in Zhejiang.\148\ Authorities had arrested Gu
on the same charge in January 2016 and released him on
bail in March 2016.\149\
Falun Gong
As in previous years, authorities continued to detain Falun
Gong practitioners and subject them to harsh treatment.\150\
Due to extreme government suppression, it is difficult to
determine the number of Falun Gong practitioners in China.\151\
Officials have reportedly subjected practitioners to extreme
physical and psychological coercion, with human rights
organizations \152\ and Falun Gong practitioners documenting
coercive and violent practices against practitioners during
custody, including physical violence,\153\ forced drug
administration,\154\ and other forms of torture.\155\ In March
2017, Minghui (Clear Wisdom), a U.S.-based news organization
affiliated with Falun Gong, reported 80 confirmed deaths of
Falun Gong practitioners in 2016 due to treatment while in
custody.\156\ Authorities commonly prosecute Falun Gong
practitioners under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law.\157\
International observers continued to express concern over
reports that numerous organ transplants in China have used the
organs of detained prisoners, including Falun Gong
practitioners.\158\ International medical professionals were
skeptical \159\ of a Chinese health official's claims that
organ procurement systems have been reformed in compliance with
international standards, noting a lack of transparency \160\
and discrepancies in official data.\161\
Islam
During this reporting year, officials maintained policies
exerting strong influence and control over the religious belief
and activities of an estimated 10.5 million \162\ Hui Muslim
believers. Although policies for Hui Muslims remained less
repressive than those affecting Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR),\163\ hostile rhetoric targeting
Muslims in general from both officials and the public \164\
increased.\165\ One expert said that this could increase the
likelihood that policies affecting the religious freedom of Hui
Muslims may become more restrictive.\166\ [For information on
freedom of religion for Uyghur and other minority group Muslim
believers in the XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Ongoing policies included ``political reliability'' and
``patriotic education'' requirements for religious leaders. To
be officially certified, imams must be educated at state-
sanctioned Islamic schools and be approved by the local
religious affairs bureau and the Islamic Association of China,
the patriotic religious association for Chinese Muslims.\167\
After certification, imams must continue to attend political
training sessions.\168\ Both the Islamic Association of China
(IAC) and the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA)
continued to promote interpretations of Islamic law and belief
that support the Chinese political system.\169\ All Chinese
Muslims seeking to carry out the Hajj pilgrimage must fulfill
requirements for ``political reliability,'' including taking
``patriotic education'' classes, obtaining approval from their
local religious affairs bureau, and participating only through
tours arranged by the IAC.\170\
This past year, officials made a number of statements
claiming a need to counter an alleged increase of Muslim
extremist influence in Chinese society, while reportedly
tacitly approving anti-Muslim commentary and the harassment of
Muslim believers on social media networks. SARA Director Wang
Zuo'an stated in November 2016 that Islamic extremism was
spreading to China's ``inland provincial areas,'' and that
authorities should respect Islamic beliefs, but that religious
influence on political, legal, or educational affairs would not
be tolerated.\171\ A U.S.-based scholar stated that ``interest
groups'' had used the recently permissive environment for
``Islamophobia'' online to justify security measures taken
against Uyghur communities in the XUAR.\172\ Observers also
noted a connection with the recent ascendance of Party
officials who support hard-line policies on religion.\173\ In
one example from December 2016, a propaganda official in the
XUAR used inflammatory language in an online post regarding the
rebuilding of a historic mosque in Hefei municipality, Anhui
province, by the local Hui Muslim community; locals
subsequently held demonstrations against the mosque and
threatened local Hui Muslim believers.\174\ Domestic online
commentators have also criticized the Chinese government's
restrictions on Hui Muslim believers for being too lax relative
to restrictions on Muslims in the XUAR.\175\ One expert stated
that the anti-Muslim anxiety generated on social media could
put pressure on local officials to respond with policy
measures,\176\ making Hui Muslim communities vulnerable to
increased surveillance and restrictions.\177\
Other Religious Communities
Religious communities outside of the five religions that
are the main objects of religious affairs regulation \178\
continue to exist in China; some enjoy official support, while
others face suppression from authorities. For example, despite
lacking formal recognition at the national level, some folk
religious sites \179\ and Eastern Orthodox Christian
communities \180\ are recognized at the local level. In
contrast, authorities maintained the restrictions imposed
suddenly in 2014 on Jewish religious activity in Kaifeng
municipality, Henan province.\181\ The Chinese government also
maintained its official policy of allowing some foreign
religious communities to hold religious services for foreign
nationals.\182\
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
\1\ Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human
Rights Law and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
19.
\2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR
upholds a person's right to ``have or adopt a religion or belief'' and
the freedom to manifest that religion or belief ``in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.'' Article 18 also prohibits coercion
that impairs an individual's freedom to freely hold or adopt a religion
or belief. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81.
\3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76; United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, last visited 18 July 17. China has signed but not ratified the
ICCPR.
\4\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 5. The Chinese government most
recently stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR in its 2016-2020
National Human Rights Action Plan. See also State Council Information
Office, ``Progress in China's Human Rights in 2012,'' reprinted in
Xinhua, May 2013, chap. VI; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic
of China to the United Nations, ``Aide Memoire,'' reprinted in United
Nations, 13 April 06, para. IV; State Council and European Union,
``Joint Statement of the 12th China-EU Summit,'' reprinted in PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 09, para. 8.
\5\ United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 23 May 69, entry into force
27 January 80, arts. 18, 26.
\6\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
\7\ Ibid., art. 36; Liu Peng, ``Crisis of Faith,'' China Security,
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), 30.
\8\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 2(2); PRC
Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93,
15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 26.
\10\ Ibid., art. 18(2).
\11\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36; State Council,
Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30
November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 2.
\12\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
\13\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 18; UN Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or
Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 July 93, para. 8.
\14\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 38-39.
\15\ Ibid.; Carsten T. Vala, ``Protestant Christianity and Civil
Society in Authoritarian China,'' China Perspectives, No. 3 (October
2012), 46.
\16\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 38-39.
\17\ Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question
in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 153, 330.
The ``patriotic'' religious associations are state-controlled
institutions that represent the five ``main'' religions of China: the
Buddhist Association of China, the China Islamic Association, the China
Taoist Association, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the
National Conference of Bishops (an organization led by Catholic
clergy), the Three-Self (for ``self-governing, self-supporting, and
self-propagating'') Patriotic Movement and the Chinese Christian
Council (the latter two organizations have overlapping membership and
represent Protestants). According to Goossaert and Palmer, although
``nominally independent,'' the ``patriotic'' religious associations are
effectively under the authority of the State Council's agency for
religious affairs.
\18\ Ibid.,154.
\19\ Jessica Batke, ``PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the
CCP,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, No. 52 (Winter 2017), 14 February 17, 3; Vincent Goossaert
and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 330.
\20\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 41. See also Sarah Cook
and Leeshai Lemish, ``The 610 Office: Policing the Chinese Spirit,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 17, 16 September 11.
\21\ Ibid.
\22\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 3.
\23\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05. The
Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA) contains provisions authorizing
official intervention into religious practices, beliefs, and
organization, e.g., art. 6 (requiring religious groups to register with
the government); art. 8 (requiring institutions for religious education
to apply for government approval); art. 11 (requiring hajj, the
religious pilgrimage undertaken by Muslims, to be organized through the
national religious body of Islam); art. 17 (requiring sites for
religious activities to set up management organizations and exercise
democratic management); and art. 18 (requiring sites for religious
activities to set up management systems for personnel, finance,
accounting, hygiene, and health, among other requirements, all under
the supervision of local government agencies).
\24\ Ibid. The Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA) contains
provisions authorizing official intervention into religious practices,
beliefs, and organization, e.g., art. 6 (requiring religious groups to
register with the government); art. 7 (providing official guidelines
for the content and distribution of religious publications); art. 8
(requiring institutions for religious education to apply for government
approval); art. 11 (requiring hajj, the religious pilgrimage undertaken
by Muslims, to be organized through the national religious body of
Islam); art. 12 (requiring religious activities to be held at state-
approved sites); art. 17 (requiring sites for religious activities to
set up management organizations and exercise democratic management);
art. 18 (requiring sites for religious activities to set up management
systems for personnel, finance, accounting, hygiene, and health, among
other requirements, all under the supervision of local government
agencies); and art. 27 (subjecting religious personnel to qualification
by a religious body and subsequent reporting to religious affairs
bureaus).
\25\ Ibid., art. 6. Article 6 requires religious organizations to
register in accordance with the Regulations on the Management of the
Registration of Social Organizations.
\26\ Ibid., art. 10(1).
\27\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 16, 32-33.
\28\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on
Religious Freedom in Mainland China (2016),'' 27.
\29\ ``Some Perspectives and Analysis From Several Scholars and
House Church Pastors on the `Draft Revisions to the Regulations on
Religious Affairs (Deliberation Draft)' '' [Guanyu ``zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songsheng gao)'' laizi jiwei zongjiao xuezhe yu
jiating jiaohui muzhe de guandian yu fenxi], Christian Times, 16
September 16; Huoshi (Living Stone) Church Members, ``The Huoshi Church
Case--The Typical Pattern of Government Suppression of House
Churches,'' reprinted in ChinaAid, 13 June 17; Sarah Cook, Freedom
House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression,
and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 53.
\30\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 6;
State Council, Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued 25 October
98, amended and effective 6 February 16, art. 35. Article 6 of the
Regulations on Religious Affairs require religious organizations to
register in accordance with the Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations, and protects the religious
activities of only those religious organizations in compliance with the
latter regulations. The religious activities of all other religious
organizations receive no such explicit protection under the Regulations
and as such may be deemed illegal, resulting in a restriction of
certain religious activities. See also ChinaAid, ``Church Torn Apart by
Abuse Pens Letter Describing Persecution,'' 13 June 17.
\31\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81, art. 6(a); State Council,
Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30
November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 6; State Council, Regulations
on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui
tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued 25 October 98, amended and
effective 6 February 16, art. 35. While the Declaration includes the
freedom to ``worship or assemble in connection with a religion or
belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes,''
Article 6 of the Regulations on Religious Affairs requires religious
organizations to register in accordance with the Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Social Organizations. The latter in turn
prohibit activities conducted by unregistered social organizations
(art. 35), thus restricting the right of unregistered religious groups
to assemble and worship, as well as establish and maintain places for
those purposes.
\32\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81, art. 6(g); State Council,
Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30
November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 27. While the Declaration
includes the freedom to ``train, appoint, elect or designate by
succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and
standards of any religion or belief,'' the Regulations on Religious
Affairs permit only those religious personnel approved by the relevant
religious associations, referred to as ``religious organizations''
(zongjiao tuanti), to conduct religious activities (art. 27). China
Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on Religious Freedom in
Mainland China (2016),'' 27.
\33\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81, art. 6(c), (h); State
Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 12. While the
Declaration includes the freedoms to ``make, acquire, and use to an
adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the
rites or customs of a religion or belief'' (art. 6(c)), and to
``celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of
one's religion or belief'' (art. 6(h)), the Regulations on Religious
Affairs have provisions such as requiring group religious activities to
be held at registered sites with ``qualified'' religious personnel and
in ``compliance with religious doctrines and canons'' (art. 12).
\34\ Ibid., arts. 5(2), 6(e); Ibid., arts. 3, 8, 9, 43. While the
Declaration includes the freedom of every child to ``have access to
education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the
wishes of his parents'' (art. 5(2)), and the freedom to ``teach a
religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes'' (art. 6(e)),
the Regulations on Religious Affairs prohibit use of religion to
``interfere with the educational system of the State'' (art. 3) and
require institutions for religious education to be approved at the
national level (art. 8).
\35\ Ibid., art. 6(d); Ibid., art. 7. While the Declaration
includes the freedom to ``write, issue and disseminate relevant
publications'' (art. 6(d)), the Regulations on Religious Affairs
regulate the contents of religious publications and require compliance
with other administrative rules (art. 7).
\36\ Ibid., art. 6(i); Ibid., arts. 10, 11, 22, 43. While the
Declaration includes the freedom to ``establish and maintain
communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion
and belief at the national and international levels'' (art. 6(i)), the
Regulations on Religious Affairs require separate approval for large-
scale religious activity that involves those governed by different
provincial-level administrations (art. 22) and further require the hajj
pilgrimage and religious studies abroad to be arranged by the state-
sanctioned national religious organizations (arts. 10-11).
\37\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 16; Ian Johnson, The Souls of China (New York: Pantheon
Books, 2017), 28, 56-57; Tim Oakes and Donald S. Sutton,
``Introduction,'' in Faiths on Display: Religion, Tourism, and the
Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 15-17;
Richard Madsen, ``Church State Relations in China--Consequences for the
Catholic Church,'' Religions & Christianity in Today's China, Vol. 5,
Nos. 3-4 (2015), 66.
\38\ Tim Oakes and Donald S. Sutton, ``Introduction,'' in Faiths on
Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 15-17; Richard Madsen, ``Church State
Relations in China--Consequences for the Catholic Church,'' Religions &
Christianity in Today's China, Vol. 5, Nos. 3-4 (2015), 66.
\39\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 16, 44.
\40\ Ibid., 5-7.
\41\ Ibid., 2; Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 9, 144-53; Vincent Goossaert and
David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 339.
\42\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion and Belief, Ahmed Shaheed, A/HRC/34/50, 17 January
17.
\43\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Draft Revisions to
the Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], 7 September 16.
\44\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Request for Public
Comment on ``Draft Revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs
(Review Draft)'' [``Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen
gao)'' gongkai zhengqiu yijian], 8 September 16.
\45\ Department on Legislative Affairs for Politics, Law, and
National Defense, State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Explanation
Regarding the ``Draft Revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs
(Review Draft)'' [Guanyu ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an
(songshen gao)'' de shuoming], 7 September 16.
\46\ Wang Lude, ``Some Religious Scholars and House Church Pastors
Offer Perspectives and Analyses of the `Draft Revisions to the
Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft)' '' [Guanyu ``zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)'' laizi jiwei zongjiao
xuezhe yu jiating jiaohui muzhe de guandian yu fenxi], Christian Times,
23 September 16; Yang Kaile, ``Commentary on the `Draft Revisions to
the Regulation on Religious Affairs (Review Draft)' (I)'' [``Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)'' pinglun (yi)], Pu Shi
Institute for Social Sciences, 23 September 16.
\47\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Draft Revisions to
the Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], 7 September 16, arts. 42, 63,
67, 71.
\48\ See, e.g., State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Draft
Revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft)
[Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], 7 September 16,
arts. 6, 9, 33, 35, 65.
\49\ ``China Amends `Regulations on Religious Affairs' To Expand
Authority of Public Security'' [Zhongguo xiuding ``zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli'' wei gong'an kuoquan], Radio Free Asia, 11 September 16; Wang
Lude, ``Some Religious Scholars and House Church Pastors Offer
Perspectives and Analyses of the `Draft Revisions to the Regulations on
Religious Affairs (Review Draft)' '' [Guanyu ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli
xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)'' laizi jiwei zongjiao xuezhe yu jiating
jiaohui muzhe de guandian yu fenxi], Christian Times, 23 September 16.
\50\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Draft Revisions to
the Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], 7 September 16, art. 68.
\51\ Guo Baosheng, ``House Churches Already Lack Legal Space To
Exist--Comments on the Draft Revisions to the Regulations on Religious
Affairs'' [Jiating jiaohui yi wu falu shengcun kongjian--ping zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an], Human Rights in China Biweekly, Issue
192, 16-29 September 16; ChinaAid, ``Professor Yang Fenggang Discusses
`Regulations on Religious Affairs Draft Revisions' '' [Yang fenggang
jiaoshou tan ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli xiugai gao''], 10 September 16.
\52\ Li Guisheng et.al., ``Five Lawyers Challenge `Draft Revisions
to the Religious Affairs Regulations (Review Draft)' '' [Wu lushi
tiaozhan ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)''],
reprinted in WeChat Bay, 19 September 16; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Suffocating Religious Freedom in Tibet: China's Draft
Regulations on Religious Affairs,'' 25 October 16.
\53\ Cao Guoxing, ``Muslim Scholar Provides Opinion Regarding
Chinese Government's Revisions to `Religious Affairs Regulations' ''
[Musilin xuezhe jiu zhongguo guanfang xiugai ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli''
tichu yijian], Radio France Internationale, 23 September 16.
\54\ ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve Religious Work Standards
Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshi xia
zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23 April 16. For more information
on the April 2016 National Conference on Religious Work, see CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 122.
\55\ ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve Religious Work Standards
Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshi xia
zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23 April 16; CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, 6 October 16, 128.
\56\ ChinaAid, ``2016 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution
of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February 17, 5.
\57\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Draft Revisions to
the Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], 7 September 16, art. 4; Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee, ``The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on
the Religious Question During China's Socialist Period'' [Guanyu woguo
shehuizhuyi shiqi zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben zhengce],
reprinted in China Ethnicity and Religion Net, 31 March 82; Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, Document No. 6: On
Some Problems Concerning Further Improving Work on Religion, 5 February
91, translated in Asia Watch, ``Freedom of Religion in China,'' January
1992, 35-42. See also Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The
Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2011), 325; State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs
(RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March
05, art. 3. The RRA states that ``Religious organizations, sites for
religious activities and religious citizens shall . . . safeguard
unification of the country, unity of all nationalities, and stability
of society.''
\58\ Jessica Batke, ``PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the
CCP,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, No. 52 (Winter 2017), 14 February 17, 4-5; Ian Johnson,
``China Seeks Tighter Grip in Wake of a Religious Revival,'' New York
Times, 7 October 16.
\59\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2017 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2017 nian gongzuo yaodian], 26 January 17.
\60\ ``Li Keqiang Signs State Council Order Issuing Revised
`Regulations on Religious Affairs' '' [Li keqiang qianshu guowu ling
gongbu xiuding hou de ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli''], Xinhua, 7 September
17.
\61\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, amended 14 June 17, effective 1
February 18. See also Ying Fuk Tsang, ``Is Practicing Socialist Core
Values the Core Value of Religious Beliefs? '' [Jianxing shehui zhuyi
hexin jiazhiguan shi zongjiao xinyang de hexin jiazhi ma?], Stand News,
8 September 17; ``China Passes New Religious Regulations `To Prevent
Extremism,' '' World Watch Monitor, 8 September 17; Bernardo
Cervellera, ``New Regulations on Religions: Annihilate Underground
Communities, Suffocate Official Communities,'' AsiaNews, 11 September
17.
\62\ ``12 Years Later: The New `Regulations on Religious Affairs'
Issued by China'' [12 nian hou zhongguo gongbu xinde ``zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli''], Voice of America, 9 September 17. For more commentary
critical of the revisions to the RRA, see also Ying Fuk Tsang, ``Is
Practicing Socialist Core Values the Core Value of Religious Beliefs?
'' [Jianxing shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan shi zongjiao xinyang de
hexin jiazhi ma?], Stand News, 8 September 17; ``Chinese Government
Strengthen Control of Religion'' [Zhongguo zhengfu qianghua dui
zongjiao de guanzhi], Radio Free Asia 7 September 17; Wang Yi, ``My
Five Positions on the New `Regulations on Religious Affairs' '' [Wo dui
xin ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' de wu ge lichang], Wang Yi's Microphone,
reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 8 September 17; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``International Campaign for Tibet Statement on
China's Revised Religious Regulations,'' 8 September 17.
\63\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300.
\64\ Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Related to Handling Criminal Cases
Concerning Organizing, Using a Cult To Undermine Implementation of the
Law [Guanyu banli zuzhi, liyong xiejiao zuzhi pohuai falu shishi deng
xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 25 January
17, effective 1 February 17; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Will a New Judicial
Interpretation on Cults Lead to Greater Leniency? '' Dui Hua Human
Rights Journal, 24 February 17.
\65\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Will a New Judicial Interpretation on
Cults Lead to Greater Leniency? '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 24
February 17.
\66\ Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Related to Handling Criminal Cases
Concerning Organizing, Using a Cult To Undermine Implementation of the
Law [Guanyu banli zuzhi, liyong xiejiao zuzhi pohuai falu shishi deng
xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 25 January
17, effective 1 February 17.
\67\ PRC National Security Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guojia
anquan fa], passed and effective 1 July 15, art. 27.
\68\ Ibid.
\69\ Zhu Weiqun, ``Communist Party Members Cannot Believe in
Religion'' [Gongchandang yuan buneng xinyang zongjiao], Seeking Truth,
17 December 11.
\70\ Liu Caiyu, ``Party Members Told To Give Up Religion for Party
Unity or Face Punishment,'' Global Times, 18 July 17.
\71\ Wang Zuo'an, ``Doing Religious Work Well Requires Discussion
of Politics'' [Zuo hao zongjiao gongzuo bixu jiang zhengzhi] Seeking
Truth, 14 July 17.
\72\ Pew Research Center, ``Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures
Project--China,'' last visited 10 June 17. See also Zhe Ji, ``Chinese
Buddhism as a Social Force: Reality and Potential of Thirty Years of
Revival,'' Chinese Sociological Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Winter 2012-
2013), 10-12. Quantitative assessments for the total number of
Buddhists are difficult because Buddhist religious identity does not
need to be formalized within a particular institution and may overlap
with other religious practices.
\73\ Katharina Wenzel-Teuber, ``2015 Statistical Update on
Religions and Churches in the People's Republic of China,'' China
Heute, No. 1 (2016), translated in Religions & Christianity in Today's
China, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2016), 25.
\74\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 15;
Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
32-33.
\75\ State Administration for Religious Affairs et al., Opinion
Regarding Issues Related to the Management of Buddhist Monasteries and
Taoist Temples [Guanyu chuli sheji fojiao simiao, daojiao gongguan
guanli youguan wenti de yijian], issued 8 October 12; Sarah Cook,
Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival,
Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 32-33.
\76\ Meijiang District People's Government, ``Regional Variations
in Chinese Taoism'' [Zhongguo daojiao de diyuxing chayi], 6 October 14.
\77\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA)
[Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05,
arts. 6, 8, 13-15, 27. See, e.g., RRA, art. 6 (requiring religious
organizations to register in accordance with the Regulations on the
Management of the Registration of Social Organizations); art. 8
(requiring an application to the State Administration for Religious
Affairs (SARA) to establish an institute for religious learning); arts.
13-15 (imposing an application procedure to register venues for
religious activity); and art. 27 (requiring the appointment of
religious personnel to be reported to the religious affairs bureau at
or above the county level and requiring reporting the succession of
living Buddhas for approval to governments at the prefecture level or
higher, and requiring reporting for the record the appointment of
Catholic bishops to SARA). For measures regulating Taoist religious
activity, see, e.g., Chinese Taoist Association, Measures for the
Management of Taoist Temples [Daojiao gongguan guanli banfa], issued 23
June 10, amended 29 June 15, reprinted in State Administration for
Religious Affairs, 15 October 15; Chinese Taoist Association, Measures
for the Appointment of Key Religious Personnel in Taoist Temples
[Daojiao gongguan zhuyao jiaozhi renzhi banfa], issued 23 June 10,
amended 29 June 15, reprinted in State Administration for Religious
Affairs, 15 October 15. For measures regulating Buddhist religious
activity, see, e.g., Buddhist Association of China, Measures for the
Appointment of the Heads of Theravada Buddhist Monasteries [Nanchuan
fojiao siyuan zhuchi renzhi banfa], issued 3 November 11, reprinted in
State Administration for Religious Affairs, 21 December 11; Buddhist
Association of China, Measures for the Management of Monastic Vows in
National Chinese Buddhist Monasteries [Quanguo hanchuan fojiao siyuan
chuanshou santan dajie guanli banfa], issued 3 November 11, reprinted
by State Administration for Religious Affairs, 21 December 11.
\78\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 32.
\79\ Ibid., 33; Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The
Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2011), 332-33.
\80\ For more information on Wu Zeheng, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00235.
\81\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300.
\82\ Jared Genser, ``The Detention of Wu Zeheng,'' The Diplomat, 4
February 17; Wei Meng, ``Wu Zeheng, Leader of Evil Cult `Huazang
Dharma,' Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in First Instance Trial''
[Xiejiao zuzhi ``huazang zongmen'' toumu wu zeheng yishen bei panchu
wuqi tuxing], Xinhua, 31 October 15.
\83\ UN Human Rights Council, Opinions of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/WGAD/2016/46, 21-25 November 16, paras. 60-
66.
\84\ Jared Genser, ``The Detention of Wu Zeheng,'' The Diplomat, 4
February 17; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wu Zeheng,'' 22 July 16.
\85\ Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81, art. 6(g).
\86\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 45.
\87\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``State
Administration for Religious Affairs 2017 Work Objectives'' [Guojia
zongjiao shiwu ju 2017 nian gongzuo yaodian], 26 January 17.
\88\ China Catholic Patriotic Association and Bishops' Conference
of the Catholic Church, Provisions for Selecting and Ordaining Bishops
[Zhujiao tuan guanyu xuan sheng zhujiao de guiding], 8 April 13.
\89\ Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The Division of the Roman Catholic
Church in Mainland China: History and Challenges,'' Religions, Vol. 8,
No. 3 (March 2017), 1, 3, 6-7.
\90\ ``This Year's Religious Work Agenda: Push `Self-Selection,
Self-Ordination' and Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Catholic
Patriotic Association'' [Bennian zongjiao gongzuo jihua: tuijin zixuan
zisheng ji qingzhu aiguo hui liushi zhounian], Union of Catholic Asian
News, 14 February 17; Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The Division of the Roman
Catholic Church in Mainland China: History and Challenges,'' Religions,
Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 2017), 7.
\91\ Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops,
Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in
the People's Republic of China, 27 May 07; Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, ``The
Division of the Roman Catholic Church in Mainland China: History and
Challenges,'' Religions, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 2017), 7-8.
\92\ Lisa Jucca and Benjamin Kang Lim, ``Exclusive: Vatican and
China in Final Push for Elusive Deal on Bishops,'' Reuters, 20 October
16.
\93\ Ilaria Maria Sala, ``The Warming Relations Between China and
the Vatican Seem To Have Gone Cold,'' Quartz, 22 December 16. See also
``A Reminder of Who Is In Charge,'' Sunday Examiner, 10-16 December 16.
\94\ ``A Reminder of Who Is In Charge,'' Sunday Examiner, 10-16
December 16.
\95\ ``Vatican Admits to New Challenges in China Talks,'' La Croix,
2 August 17.
\96\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``Msgr. Peter Shao Zhumin, Bishop of
Wenzhou (Underground) Seized by Police,'' AsiaNews, 13 April 17.
\97\ Wang Zhicheng, ``Underground Mindong Bishop Guo Xijin Missing
for Four Days,'' AsiaNews, 10 April 17.
\98\ Ibid.; Bernardo Cervellera, ``Msgr. Peter Shao Zhumin, Bishop
of Wenzhou (Underground) Seized By Police,'' AsiaNews, 13 April 17.
\99\ ``Vatican-Approved Bishop Seized for a Fourth Time in China,''
La Croix, 25 May 17.
\100\ Ibid.
\101\ ``China: Catholic Priests Missing; Woman Killed in Church
Demolition,'' Independent Catholic News, 19 April 16; Victoria Ma,
``Baoding Catholics Call for Safe Return of Missing Father Yang,''
AsiaNews, 16 April 16. In Hebei province, three underground Catholic
priests remained missing after disappearing under suspicious
circumstances in April 2016. ``Chinese Catholics Appeal for Release of
Long-Imprisoned Bishop,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 1 September 15;
Bernardo Cervellera, ``Two Chinese Bishop Martyrs Recognised as
`Illustrious Unknown' for 2011,'' AsiaNews, 30 December 11; Michael
Forsythe, ``Questions Rise on Fate of Chinese Bishop,'' New York Times,
13 February 15. Authorities in Hebei have not given any information as
to the whereabouts or condition of three underground Hebei bishops:
Coadjutor Bishop Cui Tai of Xuanhua district, Zhangjiakou municipality
(detained in August 2014); Bishop Cosmas Shi Enxiang (missing since
2001; in February 2015 officials denied an unconfirmed report that he
had passed away); and Bishop James Su Zhimin of Baoding municipality
(detained in 1996; last seen in public in 2003). For more information,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2004-05378 on
Shi Enxiang and 2004-05380 on Su Zhimin.
\102\ ``Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin Returns to Shanghai CPA, Still
Doesn't Appear Completely Free'' [Ma daqin zhujiao chongfan shanghai
aiguohui, wei xianshi yi huode wanquan ziyou], Union of Catholic Asian
News, 25 January 17. See also ``Chinese Bishop's Weibo Account Blocked,
Movement Restricted,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 3 May 16; John
Sudworth, ``Missing China Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin `Sent to Political
Classes,' '' BBC, 24 December 13; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October
13, 88-89; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 92; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 122. For more information on Ma Daqin, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00336.
\103\ ``Shanghai Ordination Under Investigation,'' Union of
Catholic Asian News, 11 July 12; ``Chinese Bishop's Weibo Account
Blocked, Movement Restricted,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 3 May 16;
John Sudworth, ``Missing China Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin `Sent to
Political Classes,' '' BBC, 24 December 13. See also CECC, 2013 Annual
Report, 10 October 13, 88-89.
\104\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 9.
\105\ ChinaAid, ``2016 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February
17, 34-35.
\106\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 49-50.
\107\ Anna Scott Bell, ``Revisionist Religion: Xi Jinping's
Suppression of Christianity and Elevation of Traditional Culture as
Part of a Revisionist Power Agenda,'' Georgetown Journal of Asian
Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 2016), 79-81; ChinaAid, ``2016 Annual
Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and Christians in
Mainland China,'' 1 February 17, 9, 14.
\108\ See, e.g., Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for
China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi
Jinping,'' February 2017, 44.
\109\ Guo Baosheng, ``Analysis of the Movement to Sinicize
Christianity'' [Jidu jiao zhongguohua yundong pouxi], China Strategic
Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 2 (15 January 17); ``Henan Government Prohibits
Churches From Holding Summer Activities for Youth'' [Henan zhengfu
jinzhi jiaohui juban qingshaonian shuqi huodong], Radio Free Asia, 18
July 17; ``Zhejiang Repressing Religion Again, Prohibits Minors From
Participating in Meetings'' [Zhejiang zaidu daya zongjiao jin wei
chengnianren canjia juhui], Radio Free Asia, 21 August 17.
\110\ ``Henan Government Prohibits Churches From Holding Summer
Activities for Youth'' [Henan zhengfu jinzhi jiaohui juban qingshaonian
shuqi huodong], Radio Free Asia, 18 July 17.
\111\ ``Zhejiang Repressing Religion Again, Prohibits Minors from
Participating in Meetings'' [Zhejiang zaidu daya zongjiao jin wei
chengnianren canjia juhui], Radio Free Asia, 21 August 17.
\112\ ``Forced Installation of Surveillance Cameras at All Churches
in Zhejiang, Officials Claim Reason Is `Anti-Terrorism' '' [Zhejiang ge
jiaotang bei qiang zhuang jiankong tantou guan cheng weile ``fan
kong''], Radio Free Asia, 25 March 17.
\113\ Ibid.; ChinaAid, ``Zhejiang Province Orders Churches To
Install Surveillance Equipment,'' 2 April 17.
\114\ Guo Baosheng, ChinaAid, ``The Extant Danger for House
Churches in the `Four Groups' Religious Policy'' [Weiji jiating jiaohui
cunzai de ``si ge yi pi'' zongjiao zhengce], 17 October 16; ChinaAid,
``Ultimatum Forces Choice of Truth or Government Monitoring for
Guangdong Church,'' 31 July 17; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle
for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under
Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 42, 46-47.
\115\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 127-28; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 126-28; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9
October 14, 95-98; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 91-94.
\116\ ChinaAid, ``Raids Continue on House Church Meetings in
Guangdong,'' 3 April 17; ``China Cracks Down on Xinjiang's Christians
in `Anti-Terror' Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 February 17. See also
ChinaAid, ``2016 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of
Churches and Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February 17, 20-22, 24-
25.
\117\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Guangdong House Church Evicted After
Multiple Raids,'' 7 September 16; ChinaAid, ``Church Evicted,
Christians Barred From Renewing Residential Permits,'' 15 May 17.
\118\ Qiao Nong et al., ChinaAid, ``Sichuan Church Penalized for
Holding Services,'' 27 September 16; ``China Cracks Down on Xinjiang's
Christians in `Anti-Terror' Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 February
17.
\119\ ChinaAid, ``Further Denials of Water, Electricity for House
Churches in Wenzhou,'' 8 June 17.
\120\ Ian Johnson, ``In China, Unregistered Churches Are Driving a
Religious Revolution,'' Atlantic, 23 April 17; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid,
``Beijing Holy Love Fellowship House Church Gathering Harassed by Visit
From Public Security'' [Beijing sheng ai tuanqi jiating juhui gong'an
dengmen saorao], 7 July 17. See also ChinaAid, ``2016 Annual Report:
Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and Christians in Mainland
China,'' 1 February 17, 39.
\121\ ChinaAid, ``More Than 20 Christians Beat by Officials,'' 25
October 16; ChinaAid, ``Christians Hospitalized Resisting Authorities'
Forced Surveillance Attempts,'' 10 April 17.
\122\ ``China Cracks Down on Xinjiang's Christians in `Anti-Terror'
Campaign,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 February 17. See also ChinaAid, ``2016
Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and
Christians in Mainland China,'' 1 February 17, 35.
\123\ ``Governments Throughout Jiangxi Forcibly Remove Crosses in
Effort To Control Protestant Believers'' [Jiangxi duochu zhengfu qiang
chai shizijia tu kongzhi jidutu], Radio Free Asia, 4 August 17.
\124\ ChinaAid, ``Jiangxi Officials Remove Crosses,'' 4 August 17.
\125\ ``Governments Throughout Jiangxi Forcibly Remove Crosses in
Effort To Control Protestant Believers'' [Jiangxi duochu zhengfu qiang
chai shizijia tu kongzhi jidutu], Radio Free Asia, 4 August 17. See
also CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 96-97; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 127-28; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
128-29.
\126\ Wenzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau,
``Lucheng District, Wenzhou Municipality, Uses Advantage of Large Grid
To Increase the Level of Regulation of Religious Affairs According to
Law'' [Wenzhou shi lucheng qu yituo da wangge youshi tisheng zongjiao
shiwu yifa guanli shuiping], Zhejiang Province Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Committee, 11 October 16; ChinaAid, ``Lucheng District in
Wenzhou Increases Monitoring of Religion, Prevents Children From
Attending Church'' [Wenzhou lucheng qu qianghua zongjiao jiankong,
zuzhi ertong qianwang jiaotang], 19 October 16.
\127\ ChinaAid, ``Nine Unlawfully Detained Christians Released,'' 6
February 17; ``Protestant Church Member Prosecuted for Involvement in
`Evil Cult,' '' Radio Free Asia, 9 February 17; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 300.
For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2017-00144 on Tu Yan and 2017-00145 on Su Min. See also Sarah
Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
48-49.
\128\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 48-49. See also Teresa Wright and Teresa Zimmerman-Liu,
``Engaging and Evading the Party-State: Unofficial Chinese Protestant
Groups in China's Reform Era,'' China: An International Journal, Vol.
11, No. 1 (April 2013), 10.
\129\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Draft Revisions to
the Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], 7 September 16.
\130\ Wang Lude, ``Some Perspectives and Analysis From Several
Scholars and House Church Pastors on the `Draft Revisions to the
Regulations on Religious Affairs (Review Draft)' '' [Guanyu ``zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)'' laizi jiwei zongjiao
xuezhe yu jiating jiaohui muzhe de guandian yu fenxi], Christian Times,
23 September 16.
\131\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 225.
\132\ Rights Defense Network, ``Li Hongmin, Christian in Guangzhou,
Charged With Illegal Business Activity for Printing Christian
Publications, Judgment Not Made at Hearing Held on October 17''
[Guangzhou jidutu li hongmin yin yinshua jidujiao kanwu bei kong feifa
jingying zui an 10 yue 17 ri kaiting weipan], 20 October 16. For more
information on Li Hongmin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2017-00019.
\133\ Rights Defense Network, ``Li Hongmin, Christian in Guangzhou,
Charged With Illegal Business Activity for Printing Christian
Publications, Judgment Not Made at Hearing Held on October 17''
[Guangzhou jidutu li hongmin yin yinshua jidujiao kanwu bei kong feifa
jingying zui an 10 yue 17 ri kaiting weipan], 20 October 16.
\134\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Accused of Illegal Business
Activity Due to Printing Religious Publications, Believer Li Hongmin of
Guangfu Church in Guangzhou Sentenced to 10 Months and Fined 10
Thousand Yuan by Baiyun District Court'' [Yin yinshua zongjiao kanwu
bei feifa jingying zui Guangzhou guangfu jiaohui xintu li hongmin zao
baiyun qu fayuan panxing 10 ge yue ji chufa jin yi wan yuan], 27 March
17.
\135\ ChinaAid, ``Wife Fears Lengthened Prison Sentence, Financial
Ruin After Selling Christian Books,'' 1 March 17.
\136\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guiyang Living Stone Church Pastor
Yang Hua (Li Guozhi) Sentenced To Serve 2 Years and 6 Months'' [Guiyang
huoshi jiaohui yang hua mushi (li guozhi) an yishen bei pan youqi
tuxing 2 nian liu ge yue], 5 January 17. For more information on Li
Guozhi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-
00001.
\137\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Living Stone Church Christian Zhang
Xiuhong Released on Suspended Sentence on Appeal'' [Huoshi jiaohui
jidutu zhang xiuhong ershen huanxing huo shi], 9 August 17.
\138\ Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ``Church Deacon Released on
Probation,'' 9 August 17. For more information on Zhang Xiuhong, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00014.
\139\ ``Trial Commences for Two Religious Believers Suspected of
Revealing State Secrets, Family Members Not Allowed To Attend'' [Liang
xintu she xiemi zui kaiting, jiaren buzhun pangting], Radio Free Asia,
25 October 16. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2016-00383 on Wang Yao and 2016-00453 on Yu
Lei.
\140\ ``Jailed Living Stone House Church Pastor Now in Critical
Condition; Lawyers Request Medical Bail,'' China Change, 25 March 17.
\141\ Yaxue Cao, ``Living Stone: A Portrait of a House Church in
China,'' China Change, 21 December 15.
\142\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``No Daylight, One Steamed Bun a Day:
Pastor Zhang Shaojie Subject to Torture in Jail'' [Bu jian tian ri mei
ri yi mantou zhang shaojie mushi yuzhong shou nuedai], 21 June 17; Qiao
Nong, ChinaAid, ``County Officials Call Nanle Three-Self Church a Cult,
Pastor Zhang Shaojie and Twelve Others Stripped of Office'' [Nanle
sanzi jiaohui bei xian guan zhi xiejiao zhang shaojie mushi deng 12 ren
bei che zhi], 13 July 17. For more information on Zhang Shaojie, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00126.
\143\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``No Daylight, One Steamed Bun a Day:
Pastor Zhang Shaojie Subject to Torture in Jail'' [Bu jian tian ri mei
ri yi mantou zhang shaojie mushi yuzhong shou nuedai], 21 June 17.
\144\ ChinaAid, ``Arrested Pastor and Believers of Protestant
Church in Nanle County, Puyang Municipality, Henan Province Hitherto
Still Not Released'' [Henan puyang shi nanle xian jidu jiaohui bei zhua
mushi he xintu zhijin wei shifang], 18 November 13; ChinaAid,
``Updated: Exclusive: Incarcerated Pastor Reports Torture in Prison for
Attempting Court Appeal,'' 25 July 17.
\145\ ChinaAid, ``Authorities Arrest Highest-Profile Pastor Since
Cultural Revolution,'' 10 January 17. For more information on Gu Yuese,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00100.
\146\ ChinaAid, ``Authorities Arrest Highest-Profile Pastor Since
Cultural Revolution,'' 10 January 17.
\147\ ``The Case of Hangzhou Pastor Gu Yuese: Re-Detained After
Bail'' [Hangzhou gu yuese mushi jiao'an: qubao hou zai zao daibu],
Radio Free Asia, 10 January 17.
\148\ Ibid.
\149\ Ibid.
\150\ For information on suppression of Falun Gong practitioners
from previous years, see, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
125-27; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 123-25. See also
``Communist Party Calls for Increased Efforts To `Transform' Falun Gong
Practitioners as Part of Three-Year Campaign,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 March 11.
\151\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 113.
\152\ Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2017,'' 2017, 196; Amnesty
International, ``Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the
World's Human Rights,'' 22 February 17, 121; Sarah Cook, Freedom House,
``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and
Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 108, 115.
\153\ ``Ms. Guo Baohua Savagely Beaten at Tianjin Women's Prison,''
Clear Wisdom, 9 March 17; Amnesty International, ``Urgent Action: Falun
Gong Practitioner Said To Have Been Tortured in Detention,'' 23
September 16.
\154\ ``Retired Teacher Drugged Again Following Second Arrest in
Less Than 9 Months,'' Clear Wisdom, 20 April 17; ``Inner Mongolia Woman
Given Psychiatric Drugs in Prison,'' Clear Wisdom, 4 March 17.
\155\ ``Mr. Liao Zhijun Tortured in Wangling Prison,'' Clear
Wisdom, 24 April 17; ``Anhui Man Arrested and Interrogated With
Torture,'' Clear Wisdom, 28 March 17; ``Practitioner Who Escaped Labor
Camp Seized and Brutally Abused in Detention,'' Clear Wisdom, 22 March
17.
\156\ ``80 Falun Gong Practitioners Confirmed To Have Died in 2016
as a Result of Arrests and Torture,'' Clear Wisdom, 23 March 17.
\157\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 115-16; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing
fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97,
amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02,
28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August
15, effective 1 November 15, art. 300.
\158\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Debate Flares Over China's Inclusion
at Vatican Organ Trafficking Meeting,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 7 February 17; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ``Vatican Defends
Inviting Chinese Ex-Minister to Organ Trafficking Talks,'' Guardian, 6
February 17; Maria Cheng and Nicole Winfield, ``UN: China Moves To Stop
Taking Organs From Prisoners,'' Associated Press, 9 February 17; Sarah
Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
120-21; T. Trey et al., ``Transplant Medicine in China: Need for
Transparency and International Scrutiny Remains,'' American Journal of
Transplantation, 19 September 16. See also David Kilgour, Ethan
Gutmann, and David Matas, ``Bloody Harvest/The Slaughter: An Update,''
International Coalition to End Organ Pillaging in China, 22 June 16,
updated 30 April 17; Matthew Robertson, ``Investigative Report: A
Hospital Built for Murder,'' Epoch Times, 4 February 16; Matthew
Robertson, ``At Congressional Hearing, China's Organ Harvesting Seen
Through Rose-Colored Glasses,'' Epoch Times, 29 June 16.
\159\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Debate Flares Over China's Inclusion
at Vatican Organ Trafficking Meeting,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 7 February 17; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ``Vatican Defends
Inviting Chinese Ex-Minister to Organ Trafficking Talks,'' Guardian, 6
February 17; Maria Cheng and Nicole Winfield, ``UN: China Moves To Stop
Taking Organs From Prisoners,'' Associated Press, 9 February 17.
\160\ T. Trey et al., ``Transplant Medicine in China: Need for
Transparency and International Scrutiny Remains,'' American Journal of
Transplantation, 19 September 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Debate Flares
Over China's Inclusion at Vatican Organ Trafficking Meeting,'' New York
Times, Sinosphere (blog), 7 February 17; Stephanie Kirchgaessner,
``Vatican Defends Inviting Chinese Ex-Minister to Organ Trafficking
Talks,'' Guardian, 6 February 17; Maria Cheng and Nicole Winfield,
``UN: China Moves To Stop Taking Organs From Prisoners,'' Associated
Press, 9 February 17.
\161\ Ibid.
\162\ Alice Y. Su, ``The Separation Between Mosque and State,''
Asia Society, ChinaFile, 21 October 16; Sarah Cook, Freedom House,
``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and
Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017, 68.
\163\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 66.
\164\ Mu Chunshan, ``Anti-Muslim Sentiment Is Taking Over China's
Social Media Scene,'' The Diplomat, 13 September 16.
\165\ Gerry Shih, ``Unfettered Online Hate Speech Fuels
Islamophobia in China,'' Associated Press, 10 April 17.
\166\ Viola Zhou, ``Why China's Hui Muslims Fear They're Next To
Face Crackdown on Religion,'' South China Morning Post, 11 March 17.
\167\ Islamic Association of China, Measures for Confirming the
Credentials of Islamic Professional Religious Personnel [Yisilan jiao
jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], issued 7 August 06, art. 3.
\168\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 76.
\169\ Ibid., 77. See also CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11,
101-2.
\170\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 77. See also State Council, Regulations on Religious
Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1
March 05, art. 11; Islamic Association of China, ``2017 Sichuan Hajj
Participants Pre-Departure Training Held in Chengdu'' [2017 nian
sichuan chaojin renyuan xing qian peixun zai chengdu juxing], 7 July
17.
\171\ Christian Shepherd and Michael Martina, ``Religious Extremism
Is Spreading to Inland China: Official,'' Reuters, 28 November 16;
Laura Zhou, ``China's Muslims Urged To Resist Extremism,'' South China
Morning Post, 6 January 17.
\172\ Gerry Shih, ``Unfettered Online Hate Speech Fuels
Islamophobia in China,'' Associated Press, 10 April 17.
\173\ Ibid.
\174\ Ibid.
\175\ Viola Zhou, ``Why China's Hui Muslims Fear They're Next To
Face Crackdown on Religion,'' South China Morning Post, 11 March 17.
\176\ Ibid.
\177\ Ibid.
\178\ State Council Information Office, ``The Situation of
Religious Freedom in China'' [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou
zhuangkuang], October 1997, sec. I. The central government has referred
to the five religions as China's ``main religions,'' stating that the
religions citizens ``mainly'' follow are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam,
Catholicism, and Protestantism. Henan Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, Henan Province Regulations on Religious Affairs
[Henan sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05, effective 1
January 06, art. 2; Shaanxi Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Shaanxi Province Regulations on Religious Affairs [Shaanxi
sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 23 September 00, amended 30 July
08, effective 1 October 08, art. 2. Some local regulations on religious
affairs define ``religion'' to mean only these five religions.
\179\ See, e.g., Zhejiang Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Committee, Zhejiang Province Measures for the Management of
Registration of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Zhejiang sheng minjian
xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao guanli banfa], issued 19
October 14, effective 1 January 15; Taizhou Municipality Ethnic and
Religious Affairs Bureau, Circular Concerning the 2016 Launch of
Registration Work for Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Guanyu kaizhan
2016 minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao gongzuo de
tongzhi], issued 13 April 16; Hunan Province People's Government, Hunan
Province Measures for the Management of Registration of Venues for Folk
Belief Activity [Hunan sheng minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji
guanli banfa], issued and effective 24 August 09; Shaoxing Municipality
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Shaoxing Municipality Implementing
Plan for Registration of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Shaoxing shi
minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao gongzuo shishi
fang'an], issued 14 May 15; State Administration for Religious Affairs,
``State Administration for Religious Affairs Convenes Expert Scholars'
Forum on Folk Beliefs'' [Guojia zongjiao shiwuju zhaokai minjian
xinyang zhuanjia xuezhe zuotanhui], 18 March 16. See also Vincent
Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 343, 346. According to
Goossaert and Palmer, there is limited official tolerance outside this
framework for ethnic minority and ``folk'' religious practices.
\180\ See, e.g., Songbei District People's Government, Harbin
Municipal Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activity
[Ha'erbin shi zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli banfa], issued 10
September 09, reprinted in Harbin Municipal People's Government, 5
April 17, art. 2; State Council Information Office, ``The Situation of
Religious Freedom in Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang de zongjiao xinyang ziyou
zhuangkuang], reprinted in Xinhua, 2 June 16, secs. 1, 3. The Orthodox
church has also been recognized to varying degrees at the local
government level.
\181\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Jews of Ancient Lineage Huddle Under
Pressure,'' New York Times, 24 September 16; ``Chinese Jews Living in
Kaifeng, Henan, Recently Encountered Suppression by Authorities''
[Zhongguo henan kaifeng de youtai jiao shequn, jinlai zaodao dangju
daya], Radio Free Asia, 26 September 16.
\182\ State Council, Provisions on the Management of Religious
Activities of Foreigners Within the People's Republic of China
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli
guiding], issued and effective 31 January 94, art. 4. See also State
Administration for Religious Affairs, Implementing Details for the
Provisions on the Management of Religious Activities of Foreigners
Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao
huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, amended 29
November 10, effective 1 January 11, arts. 7, 17(5).
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority Rights
Introduction
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party officials continued to act in
contravention of domestic and international law with regard to
members of China's 55 recognized minority ``nationalities.''
\1\ The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections
for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of these
``nationalities,'' in addition to a system of regional autonomy
in designated areas.\2\ Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed
and declared an intention to ratify, contains safeguards for
the rights of ``ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities''
within a state.\3\ In practice, however, Chinese authorities
reportedly implemented policies that marginalized the cultures
and languages of ethnic minority populations.\4\ [See Section
IV--Xinjiang and Section V--Tibet for additional information on
these areas.]
State Minority Policy
According to the 2016-2020 National Human Rights Action
Plan issued by the State Council, Chinese authorities will
``prioritize'' rights for ethnic minorities including ``[t]heir
ability to participate in the deliberation and administration
of state affairs,'' their right to economic development, and
their right ``to learn, use and develop their own spoken and
written languages.'' \5\ Nevertheless, during this reporting
year, officials continued to promote top-down development
initiatives that restricted ethnic minorities' ability to
preserve and practice their cultures and languages.\6\ The UN
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip
Alston, following his 2016 visit to China, issued a report
criticizing what he saw as authorities' lack of consultation
with ethnic minorities regarding economic development that
affects them, and he recommended that the State Ethnic Affairs
Commission develop policies integrating human rights
considerations into all aspects of its policymaking.\7\ He
noted that ``most ethnic minorities in China are exposed to
serious human rights challenges, including significantly higher
poverty rates, ethnic discrimination and forced relocation.''
\8\
LIMITS ON MONGOLIAN-LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION
Mongol parents and students in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR) reportedly faced limits on access to
Mongolian-language instruction during the past reporting year,
in spite of Chinese law protecting the use of minority
languages.\9\ In late 2016, Mongol parents in Chifeng
municipality, IMAR, published open letters on social media \10\
and demonstrated outside government offices to protest the
appointment of Han Chinese principals to the only two
kindergartens in Chifeng that provide instruction in the
Mongolian language.\11\ The administrations of the two schools
reportedly restricted the use of the Mongolian language, and at
least one of the schools banned Mongol teachers from speaking
Mongolian in the office.\12\ In April 2017, four rights
advocates, representing 429 Mongol teachers who had taught in
the Mongolian language in Horchin (Ke'erqin) Right Forward
Banner, Hinggan (Xing'an) League, IMAR, petitioned regional
government authorities in Hohhot municipality, IMAR, over
authorities' dismissal of the teachers from their jobs
beginning in the year 2000, which they said authorities did
without providing justification.\13\
Grasslands Protests in Inner Mongolia
During this reporting year, Mongol herders in the IMAR
demonstrated over the state's role in the loss of their
traditional grazing lands, the harmful ecological effect of
state development on grassland and livestock,\14\ and the
state's failure to provide herders with adequate compensation
for their land.\15\ As in past reporting years,\16\ authorities
detained many of the Mongol herders who peacefully protested,
including those who voiced their concerns online or talked with
foreign reporters about their complaints.\17\
Representative examples of protests by Mongol herders and
villagers included the following:
On October 17, 2016, in Hailas (Hailasu)
township, Ongniud (Wengniute) Banner, Chifeng, nearly
200 herders marched toward the construction site of a
state-run pig farm and blocked the road, in protest
against what they alleged was the farm's occupation of
their traditional grazing lands.\18\ Local officials
reportedly sent more than 400 police officers to deal
with the protest; the police beat many herders and
detained at least three.\19\
On November 2, 2016, dozens of herders in
Zaruud (Zalute) Banner, Tongliao municipality, IMAR,
protested in front of banner government offices over an
aluminum plant's pollution of a local river, which the
herders said had poisoned their sheep.\20\ Security
personnel reportedly detained nine of the herders, and
prevented others from attending the protest.\21\
On April 10, 2017, over 300 herders in Horchin
(Ke'erqin) Left Rear Banner, Tongliao, gathered in an
attempt to block bulldozers and tractors from turning
up earth on their grazing lands for a government
afforestation project.\22\ On April 13, security
personnel reportedly took 13 of the herders into
custody, placing them under administrative detention
for 10 days.\23\
On April 10, 2017, in Horchin (Ke'erqin) Right
Forward Banner, Hinggan (Xing'an) League, IMAR, over
3,000 Mongols protested in the streets and in front of
a local government building, demanding compensation for
Mongols whose traditional land had reportedly been
taken or ruined due to state initiatives and
policies.\24\ Protesters clashed with nearly 1,000
security personnel, who reportedly detained at least 30
people and beat many protesters, some severely.\25\
In addition, in early August 2017, in Evenk Autonomous
Banner, Hulunbei'er municipality, IMAR, more than 100 ethnic
Evenki herders reportedly protested over restrictions on
livestock grazing on local grasslands.\26\ Police reportedly
beat and injured many of the herders.\27\
Beginning on May 10, authorities in Xilingol (Xilinguole)
League, IMAR, reportedly administratively detained Mongol
Yangjindolma for 15 days for ``inciting and planning an illegal
gathering.'' \28\ She told Radio Free Asia (RFA) that she had
planned an activity to call for the designation of a ``Protect
the Grasslands Day,'' and to commemorate the sixth anniversary
of the death of Mongol herder Mergen, who was run over by a
coal truck in 2011 while protesting against a mining company's
destruction of grasslands.\29\ On June 20, Yangjindolma
submitted a petition in Hohhot municipality, IMAR, the regional
capital, to protest against her alleged detention and
torture.\30\ She told RFA that authorities had shackled her to
a ``tiger bench'' for 24 hours while interrogating her.\31\
Hada Continues To Protest Official Mistreatment
Mongol rights advocate Hada reportedly continued to press
authorities to hold officials accountable for mistreating him
during his 15-year prison sentence and subsequent detention and
surveillance.\32\ IMAR authorities imprisoned Hada for 15 years
starting in 1995 and then extralegally detained him for another
4 years,\33\ following his organization of peaceful
demonstrations for Mongol rights and his establishment of the
banned Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance.\34\ In a
November 2016 interview, he described his current living
conditions, in an apartment heavily surveilled by security
personnel, as similar to those he experienced under detention,
and complained that authorities had at times cut off his
family's water and heat in an effort to compel him to
``cooperate with them and give up [his] ideas.'' \35\ In the
same interview, his wife Xinna said Chinese officials were
determined to force Hada to ``admit to his crimes.'' \36\ In a
separate development, in May 2017, authorities in Hohhot
reportedly forcibly demolished a building that Xinna used to
store books and other items without her consent.\37\ In the
summer of 2017, authorities reportedly restricted her Internet
access.\38\
In an example of government restrictions on Mongols'
freedom of speech, in October 2016, authorities shut down the
Genghis Khan website, after numerous tributes to recently
deceased Mongol rights advocate and author Govruud Huuchinhuu
appeared on the site.\39\ Authorities had for years persecuted
Huuchinhuu in part due to her advocacy on behalf of Hada.\40\
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
\1\ Shenghai He, ``An Overview of China's Ethnic Groups and Their
Interactions,'' Sociology Mind, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 2017), 1. The
Sociology Mind article provides the number of officially recognized
ethnic minorities, or ``nationalities,'' as 55.
\2\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended
28 February 01. For protections related to languages, religious
beliefs, and customs, see Articles 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, and 53.
\3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 27.
\4\ See, e.g., ``China Bans `Extreme' Islamic Baby Names Among
Xinjiang's Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 April 17; Southern Mongolian
Human Rights Information Center, ``Parents Protest Appointment of
Chinese Principals and Ban of Mongolian Language in Kindergartens,'' 22
November 16; Letter to the Ambassador and Permanent Representative,
Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United
Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special Rapporteurs (each covering a
separate area of human rights): the Special Rapporteur in the field of
cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and
sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur
on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard
of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the
Special Rapporteur on minority issues; and the Special Rapporteur on
freedom of religion or belief, AL CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16.
\5\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 3(1); State Council
Information Office, ``Full Text: National Human Rights Action Plan of
China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua, 29 September 16,
sec. III(1).
\6\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``End of the Road: One
Belt, One Road and the Cumulative Economic Marginalization of the
Uyghurs,'' 6 March 17, 13-14, 31; Simon Denyer, ``China Says Tourism Is
Tibet's Best Hope. But Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught? ''
Washington Post, 6 October 16.
\7\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 45.
\8\ Ibid., para. 44.
\9\ ``Parents Protest Curbs on Mongolian Language Teaching in
Chinese Schools,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 December 16. See also ``Inner
Mongolian Mother Language Substitute Teachers Petition IMAR Government,
Request Truth Behind Dismissals'' [Neimenggu muyu daike jiaoshi zizhiqu
zhengfu qingyuan yaoqiu chaming jiegu zhenxiang], Radio Free Asia, 19
April 17. For Chinese law protecting the use of minority languages,
religious beliefs, and customs, see PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84,
effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, arts 10-11, 21, 36-37,
47, 49, 53.
\10\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Parents
Protest Appointment of Chinese Principals and Ban of Mongolian Language
in Kindergartens,'' 22 November 16.
\11\ ``Parents Protest Curbs on Mongolian Language Teaching in
Chinese Schools,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 December 16.
\12\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Parents
Protest Appointment of Chinese Principals and Ban of Mongolian Language
in Kindergartens,'' 22 November 16.
\13\ ``Inner Mongolian Mother Language Substitute Teachers Petition
IMAR Government, Request Truth Behind Dismissals'' [Neimenggu muyu
daike jiaoshi zizhiqu zhengfu qingyuan yaoqiu chaming jiegu zhenxiang],
Radio Free Asia, 19 April 17. See also Rights Defense Network, ``The
Voice of IMAR Xing'an League Substitute Teachers'' [Neimenggu xing'an
meng daike jiaoshi de xinsheng], 19 April 17.
\14\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Herders Stage Protest, Demanding Halt of COFCO Pig Farm
Project,'' 21 October 16; `` `The Leaseholders Have Destroyed the
Forest,' '' Radio Free Asia, 19 April 17; ``More Than a Hundred Herders
Block Pig Farm Construction Site in Chifeng, IMAR, Protest Against
Pollution of Grasslands and Disruption of Means of Livelihood''
[Neimeng chifeng bai duo mumin du yangzhuchang gongdi kangyi wuran
caoyuan duan shenglu], Radio Free Asia, 22 October 16; ``Several
Hundred Inner Mongolian Farmers and Herders Block Road To Protest COFCO
Pollution, 18 Individuals Taken Into Custody'' [Nei menggu shubai
nongmumin du lu kangyi zhongliang jituan wuran 18 ren bei zhua], Radio
Free Asia, 29 May 17; ``Inner Mongolian Farmers and Herders Protesting
Pollution From State-Owned Enterprise Criminally Detained, 2 Approved
for Arrest'' [Nei menggu nongmumin kangyi guoqi wuran bei xingju 2 ren
bei pibu], Radio Free Asia, 12 July 17.
\15\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``3,000
Mongolians Take to the Streets, 30 Arrested, Protest Continues,'' 12
April 17; ``Violent Conflict as Inner Mongolian Herders Protest Against
Occupation of Grasslands Without Compensation, 7 People Are Detained''
[Neimeng mumin kangyi qiangzhan caochang wu butie bao chongtu 7 ren bei
bu], Radio Free Asia, 18 May 17.
\16\ See, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 143-44;
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 138-39.
\17\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Activist Detained After Tweet About Land
Dispute,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 December 16; ``China To Prosecute Ethnic
Mongolian Over Tweet About Land Dispute,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 February
17; ``Two Mongol Youths in Inner Mongolia Who Criticized Officials on
WeChat Detained'' [Neimeng liang menggu zu qingnian weixin piping
guanyuan bei ju], Radio Free Asia, 27 February 17; ``Mongol Youth
Arrested for Online Posts, Wife Sends Open Letter to IMAR Secretary
Asking for Help'' [Menggu zu qingnian wangshang fatie bei bu qizi xiang
neimeng shuji fa gongkai xin qiuzhu], Radio Free Asia, 7 February 17.
\18\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Herders Stage Protest, Demanding Halt of COFCO Pig Farm
Project,'' 21 October 16. For reports on the herders' concerns about
untreated sewage and other pollutants from the state-run pig farm, see
``Several Hundred Inner Mongolian Farmers and Herders Block Road To
Protest COFCO Pollution, 18 Individuals Taken Into Custody'' [Nei
menggu shubai nongmumin du lu kangyi zhongliang jituan wuran 18 ren bei
zhua], Radio Free Asia, 29 May 17; ``Inner Mongolian Farmers and
Herders Protesting Pollution From State-Owned Enterprise Criminally
Detained, 2 Approved for Arrest'' [Nei menggu nongmumin kangyi guoqi
wuran bei xingju 2 ren bei pibu], Radio Free Asia, 12 July 17.
\19\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Herders Stage Protest, Demanding Halt of COFCO Pig Farm
Project,'' 21 October 16.
\20\ ``Herders Protest Pollution in Tongliao, Inner Mongolia, 9
People Are Detained'' [Neimenggu tongliao mumin kangyi wuran 9 ren bei
bu], Radio Free Asia, 3 November 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Nine
Rights Defenders in Arikunduleng, Zaruud Banner, IMAR, Detained by
Authorities for Opposing Huolin River Aluminum Plant Pollution''
[Neimenggu zalute qi arikunduleng 9 weiquan gongmin yin kangyi huolin
he luchang wuran bei dangju zhuabu], 3 November 16.
\21\ Ibid. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2017-00244 on Buren, 2017-00250 on Tian Hu,
2017-00251 on Eridemutu, 2017-00252 on Shuang Fu, 2017-00253 on
Huricha, 2017-00254 on Alata, 2017-00255 on Buhechaolu, and 2017-00256
on Hanggaili. One of the nine herders was unnamed.
\22\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders
Protest Afforestation Project, 13 Detained,'' 15 April 17.
\23\ Ibid. See also ``Hundreds of Herders Suppressed for Protesting
Occupation of Grasslands, 13 People Detained'' [Shu bai mumin kangyi
caochang bei zhan shou zhenya 13 ren bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 14
April 17.
\24\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``3,000
Mongolians Take to the Streets, 30 Arrested, Protest Continues,'' 12
April 17.
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ ``Clashes as Ethnic Evenk Herders Protest China's Grazing Ban
in Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 August 17; ``Inner Mongolian
Herders Clash With Police Over Grasslands Protest, Etuoke Forward
Banner Herders Say Thousands of Mu of Grassland Have Been Seized'' [Nei
menggu mumin caochang jiufen yu jing chongtu e qian qi mumin su qian mu
caochang bei qiangzhan], Radio Free Asia, 4 August 17.
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Activist Lodges Formal Complaint Over
`Tiger Bench' Torture, Interrogation,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17;
``Organizer of Event Commemorating Mergen Detained, Herders Call on
Government To Designate Grasslands' Environmental Protection Day''
[Zuzhi jinian morigen huodong bei juliu mumin cu zhengfu queding
caoyuan huanbao ri], Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17.
\29\ Ibid. For Commission analysis on the death of Mergen, see
``Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use,
Mining Operations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1
July 11.
\30\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Activist Lodges Formal Complaint Over
`Tiger Bench' Torture, Interrogation,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17;
``Organizer of Event Commemorating Mergen Detained, Herders Call on
Government To Designate Grasslands' Environmental Protection Day''
[Zuzhi jinian morigen huodong bei juliu mumin cu zhengfu queding
caoyuan huanbao ri], Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17.
\31\ Ibid.
\32\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Dissident Appeals `Separatism' Conviction
to China's Highest Court,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 November 16. See also
Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada's Appeal to
the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China,'' 21
November 16; Kerry Brown, ``Lost in Time: Hada, an Inner Mongolian
Dissident,'' openDemocracy, 7 December 16.
\33\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada's
Appeal to the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of
China,'' 21 November 16; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information
Center, ``Mongolian Dissident's Son Arrested and Detained for
`Obstructing Official Business,' '' 16 October 15.
\34\ ``Inner Mongolian Dissident's Family Targeted,'' Radio Free
Asia, 5 December 10; Hada, Xinna, and Uiles, ``Open Letter From Hada
and His Family Members,'' reprinted in Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, 2 July 14; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``SMHRIC Statement to the UN Special Rapporteur on
the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association,'' 19
February 14. For Commission analysis on Hada, Xinna, and Uiles, see
``Authorities Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights Advocate's
Wife and Son,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1,
3 January 13, 2. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2004-02045 on Hada, 2010-00704 on Xinna, and
2010-00705 on Uiles.
\35\ ``Ethnic Mongolian Dissident Appeals `Separatism' Conviction
to China's Highest Court,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 November 16.
\36\ Ibid.
\37\ ``Mongolian Rights Advocate Xinna's Building Demolished''
[Menggu zu weiquan renshi xinna jiafang wu zao tou chai], Radio Free
Asia, 23 May 17.
\38\ Ben Blanchard, ``China Marks 70 Years of Inner Mongolia's
Founding, Activist Complains of Curbs,'' Reuters, 8 August 17;
``Mongolian Rights Advocate Xinna's WeChat [Account] Shut Down, Mongol
Herder Detained for Forwarding Picture of Xi Jinping'' [Menggu zu
weiquan renshi xinna weixin bei fenghao menggu zu mumin zhuanfa xi
jinping xiang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 21 June 17.
\39\ `` `She Was the Pride of the Mongolian People,' '' Radio Free
Asia, 28 October 16.
\40\ Ibid. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Southern Mongolian Human Rights Defender, Dissident Writer and
Activist Huuchinhuu Died,'' 25 October 16. See also CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 140.
Population
Control
Population
Control
Population Control
International Standards and China's Coercive Population Policies
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, Chinese
authorities continued to actively promote and implement
coercive population control policies that violate international
standards. 2016 marked the first full year that the Chinese
Communist Party and central government authorities implemented
the ``universal two-child policy'' that allows all married
couples to have two children.\1\ Authorities continued to place
an emphasis on birth limits and adherence to family planning as
a ``basic national policy.'' \2\ The amended PRC Population and
Family Planning Law and provincial-level regulations limit
couples' freedom to build their families as they see fit, and
include provisions that require couples be married to have
children and limit them to bearing two children.\3\ Exceptions
allowing for additional children exist for couples who meet
certain criteria, which vary by province, including some
exceptions for ethnic minorities,\4\ remarried couples, and
couples who have children with disabilities.\5\ Officials
reportedly continued to enforce compliance with population
planning targets using methods including heavy fines,\6\
detention,\7\ forced sterilization,\8\ and abortion.\9\
Coercive controls imposed on Chinese women and their
families, and additional abuses engendered by China's
population and family planning system, violate standards set
forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development.\10\ China was a state
participant in the negotiation and adoption of both.\11\ Acts
of official coercion committed in the implementation of
population control policies contravene provisions of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention),\12\ which China
has ratified.\13\ In November 2015, the UN Committee against
Torture conducted its most recent periodic review of China's
compliance with the Convention.\14\ In its concluding
observations, the Committee stated its concerns about China's
``use of coercive measures for the implementation of the
population policy,'' and ``reports of coerced sterilization and
forced abortions, [and] the lack of information on the number
of investigations into such allegations.'' \15\
Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
Amid demographic and economic concerns voiced by population
experts and research institutions,\16\ central Party
authorities issued a decision at the Fifth Plenum of the 18th
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October
2015 to adopt a ``universal two-child policy'' (quanmian
erhai), thereby allowing all married couples to have two
children.\17\ On December 27, 2015, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee amended the PRC Population and
Family Planning Law, which became effective on January 1,
2016.\18\ As of August 2017, 30 provincial-level jurisdictions
had revised their population and family planning regulations in
accordance with the amended national law.\19\ Despite these
policy and legislative revisions, central government officials
emphasized that family planning policy will remain a ``basic
national policy'' (jiben guoce) \20\ and stressed the need to
``maintain and strengthen'' the family planning apparatus at
the grassroots level.\21\ Human rights advocates, demographic
experts, and others expressed concerns that the coercive
implementation of family planning measures and human rights
abuses will persist despite the adoption of the universal two-
child policy.\22\
Chinese government statistics showed that the universal
two-child policy had limited to moderate impact during its
first year of implementation in 2016. During the Commission's
previous reporting year, the National Health and Family
Planning Commission (NHFPC) had predicted that the universal
two-child policy would result in population growth,\23\ with an
additional 3 million children born per year \24\ and an
estimated total of 17.5 to 21 million children born per year
during the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020).\25\
According to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China (NBS) in January 2017, the number of total births in
2016 was 17.86 million, 1.31 million more births than the 2015
NBS figure of 16.55 million.\26\ The NHFPC employed a different
methodology; its data showed that the number of total births in
2016 was 18.46 million, or approximately 1.91 million more
births than the 2015 NBS figure.\27\ Although both the NBS and
NHFPC figures were lower than the predicted annual growth of 3
million additional births, NHFPC officials stated that the
growth had met official expectations \28\ and that the
universal two-child policy was effective,\29\ and predicted
that the growth would continue.\30\ The numbers of total births
in 2016 as reported by NBS and NHFPC--of which approximately 45
percent were second children--were the highest since 2000.\31\
Some government reports and observers differed from the
NHFPC over the impact of the universal two-child policy,
suggesting that the growth in the number of births in 2016
might be a short-term phenomenon.\32\ Some married couples were
reportedly waiting for the government policy to change in 2016
in order to avoid fines associated with having a second child,
while others were waiting to have a child in the Year of the
Monkey, a more auspicious year for having children according to
the traditional lunar calendar.\33\ Reports suggested that the
impact of the universal two-child policy may be limited in the
long term, as the fertility rate is likely to remain low.\34\
Other population experts, such as Yi Fuxian and Huang Wenzheng,
expressed reservations about the official birth data,
estimating a lower number of total births in 2016 in the range
of 12 million to 13 million.\35\ Some experts also noted that
the universal two-child policy does not adequately address the
issue of low fertility rate and the high costs associated with
controlling fertility, and urged the Chinese government to end
all birth restrictions.\36\
Many married couples were reportedly reluctant to have a
second child due to a number of factors, including the high
cost of rearing an additional child,\37\ lack of adequate child
care and education options,\38\ lack of energy to look after
children,\39\ disruption to career development,\40\ and the
perception that having one child is enough due to decades-long
government propaganda.\41\ Central government authorities
pledged to implement ``supporting policy measures'' to address
these concerns, including efforts to enhance public services
for women and children's health care,\42\ child care, and
education,\43\ in order to ``promote long-term and balanced
population development.'' \44\ During this reporting year,
government authorities continued to implement the birth
registration system and promoted registration of children
online, allowing married couples to register their first two
children without going through complicated approval or
application processes \45\ that were common prior to the 2016
amendment to the PRC Population and Family Planning Law.\46\
Coercive Implementation
Abuses committed during the implementation of family
planning policies continued during the Commission's 2017
reporting year. The amended PRC Population and Family Planning
Law contains provisions that prohibit officials from infringing
upon the ``legitimate rights and interests'' of citizens while
implementing family planning policies.\47\ Some provincial-
level population planning regulations and local family planning
agencies, however, continued to explicitly instruct officials
to carry out abortions, often referred to as ``remedial
measures'' (bujiu cuoshi), for ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies.\48\
OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS
Language used in official speeches and government reports
from jurisdictions across China continued to reflect an
emphasis on the harsh enforcement of family planning measures.
During this reporting year, as in previous years,\49\ official
reports from several provinces across China--including
Hainan,\50\ Henan,\51\ Hubei,\52\ Hunan,\53\ and Jiangxi \54\--
continued to promote ``family planning work'' that entailed
harsh and invasive family planning measures. Phrases such as
``fight the family planning battle'' (da hao jisheng fanshen
zhan),\55\ ``resolutely implement'' (hen zhua),\56\ and ``spare
no efforts'' (quanli yifu) \57\ continued to appear in official
speeches and government reports, indicating sustained efforts
to promote these family planning campaigns.\58\
Some local government authorities stated in official
reports that the goal of ``family planning work'' is to
``maintain a low birth level'' (wending di shengyu
shuiping),\59\ while others emphasized the need to strictly
control and punish ``illegal reproductive behaviors'' \60\ and
implement ``remedial measures'' to address ``illegal
pregnancies.'' \61\ Authorities imposed implementation
targets,\62\ demanded family planning officials carry out the
invasive ``three inspections'' (intrauterine device (IUD),
pregnancy, and health inspections) \63\ and ``four procedures''
(IUD insertion, first-trimester abortion, mid- to late-term
abortion, and sterilization),\64\ and demanded the collection
of ``social compensation fees'' (shehui fuyang fei).\65\ In one
example, a government report from Shaoyang municipality, Hunan,
indicated that municipal authorities carried out 2,320 ``birth-
control'' operations in 2016--1,790 IUD insertions, 430 IUD
removals, 10 sterilizations, and 90 abortions.\66\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case of Forced Sterilization in Yunnan Province
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to state-funded news media Sixth Tone and Party-run media
Beijing News, in February 2017, government officials in Luokan
township, Zhenxiong county, Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province,
detained Hu Zhenggao and later beat him and forced him to undergo a
vasectomy.\67\ The alleged incident occurred when Hu, currently a
registered resident of Sichuan province, returned to his hometown in
Yunnan for the lunar New Year holiday.\68\ Local authorities accused
Hu, a father of four, of violating the family planning policy \69\ and
demanded that he either pay 20,000 yuan (approximately US$2,900) or
undergo a vasectomy.\70\ Hu had three children with his ex-wife--who
underwent sterilization afterward--and had paid a fine in 2000 for
violating the family planning policy.\71\ In 2015, Hu had another child
with his current wife in Sichuan, and Sichuan authorities reportedly
approved the birth.\72\ Zhenxiong authorities denied that Hu had been
threatened or maltreated, insisting that Hu had ``volunteered to
undergo the vasectomy,'' \73\ and that enforcement action was
lawful.\74\
According to Sixth Tone, village-level leaders in Zhenxiong confirmed
that such operations are commonplace, as the county government imposes
annual quotas on village officials to carry out sterilizations.\75\ One
village was punished by cuts in government funding and public sector
jobs after it had failed to meet its sterilization target.\76\
Following the news reports, the Yunnan Province Health and Family
Planning Commission directed local authorities to investigate the
incident.\77\ According to a March 2017 Beijing Youth Daily report, the
Zhenxiong County Party Standing Committee ordered the county's Party
Discipline Inspection Commission to ``admonish'' Luokan township
leaders and urged them to hold relevant family planning personnel
accountable.\78\ Futhermore, the Yunnan Province Health and Family
Planning Commission issued a circular forbidding local governments from
carrying out forcible family planning operations.\79\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PUNISHMENT FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of
punishment to enforce citizens' compliance with population
planning policies. In accordance with national-level legal
provisions,\80\ local governments have directed officials to
punish noncompliance through heavy fines, termed ``social
compensation fees,'' which reportedly compel couples to choose
between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring a fine
much greater than the average annual income in their
locality.\81\ On November 10, 2016, official Chinese news media
Taihai Net reported a case in which local authorities in Wuping
county, Longyan municipality, Fujian province, launched a
``special action group'' to forcibly collect ``social
compensation fees'' from violators who had children in excess
of birth quotas.\82\ During an enforcement campaign, Wuping
authorities detained two individuals surnamed Cheng and Lan who
had refused to pay the fines.\83\ The report also warned that
the authorities would continue to forcibly collect ``social
compensation fees'' within their jurisdiction and ``to punish
and educate'' violators, in order to ``effectively curb illegal
births.'' \84\
This past year, domestic news media reported an increase in
the number of administrative lawsuits Chinese citizens filed
against family planning agencies for the collection of ``social
compensation fees.'' \85\ These cases were related to married
couples who gave birth to a second child in violation of
previous family planning policies and birth limits.\86\ Some
observers called on government authorities to rescind these
imposed fines; \87\ during the annual parliamentary meetings in
March, several National People's Congress delegates and members
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference also
urged the government to abolish the ``social compensation fees
system.'' \88\ The State Council issued draft Regulations on
the Collection and Management of Social Compensation Fees in
November 2014; \89\ as of July 2017, the Commission had not
observed reports of the Chinese government issuing the
regulations.
In addition to fines, officials imposed or threatened other
punishments for family planning violations. These punishments
included detention,\90\ forced sterilization,\91\ and
abortion.\92\ The PRC Population and Family Planning Law
prohibits and provides punishments for officials' infringement
on citizens' personal, property, and other rights while
implementing population planning policies.\93\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hukou Reform Addressing the Issue of ``Illegal Residents''
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, central and local
governments continued to implement household registration (hukou)
reforms to register ``illegal residents'' (heihu), a term commonly used
to refer to people who lack hukou in China. According to 2010 national
census data, there were approximately 13 million ``illegal residents''
in China,\94\ of whom over 60 percent were people born in excess of
birth quotas.\95\ Other reports indicated that the number of ``illegal
residents'' might be higher than 13 million.\96\ These ``illegal
residents'' face considerable difficulty accessing social benefits
typically afforded to registered citizens, including government-
subsidized healthcare, public education, and social security.\97\
According to U.S.-based news media Duowei, survey data from the Chinese
Academy of Macroeconomic Research of the National Development and
Reform Commission showed that nearly half of the 13 million
unregistered population were illiterate or people who had never
received formal education, and about 43.8 percent of the unregistered
population were unemployed.\98\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hukou Reform Addressing the Issue of ``Illegal Residents''-- Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central Party and government authorities issued directives during the
Commission's previous reporting year to address the issue of ``illegal
residents.'' \99\ According to a March 2017 People's Daily report, all
31 provincial-level governments have issued implementing opinions for
hukou reform, and approximately 14 million ``illegal residents'' have
registered for hukou since November 2012.\100\ The state-run media
China Central Television reported in February 2017 that authorities
registered 1.435 million ``illegal residents'' in 2016.\101\ Some
``illegal residents,'' however, reportedly continued to face difficulty
in registering for hukou, including those born to unmarried
parents.\102\ According to a March 2017 People's Daily report, a
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) official stated that the MPS aims to
completely resolve the issue of ``illegal residents'' within the next
two to three years.\103\ [For more information on China's hukou system,
see Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demographic Consequences of Population Control Policies
Decades of population control policies have exacerbated
China's demographic challenges, which include a rapidly aging
population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio imbalance.
Affected in recent decades by government restrictions on the
number of births per couple, China's total fertility rate has
dropped from approximately 3 births per woman in the late 1970s
\104\ to a reported 1.7 births per woman in 2017, below the
replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman necessary to maintain
a stable population.\105\ The fertility rate is even lower in
some major cities, such as Shanghai municipality, which has a
fertility rate of approximately 0.7 births per woman,
reportedly one of the lowest in the world.\106\
China's low fertility rate has contributed to a rapidly
aging population and a shrinking workforce. According to a
January 2017 National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS)
report, from 2015 to 2016, China's working-age population
(persons between the ages of 16 and 59) declined by 3.49
million people to 907.47 million, continuing a downward trend
from the previous year.\107\ At the same time, the elderly
population (persons aged 60 or older) increased by
approximately 8.86 million in 2016 to 230.86 million people, or
16.7 percent of the total population.\108\ According to the
2017 State Council National Population Development Plan,
China's working-age population is expected to decline rapidly
from 2021 to 2030, while the elderly population will increase
markedly during the same period and is predicted to reach a
quarter of the population by 2030.\109\ Some population experts
suggested that the elderly population would account for
approximately one-third of China's total population by 2050,
according to a China Daily report.\110\ These demographic
trends reportedly may burden China's health care, public
services, and retirement systems,\111\ and weaken China's
economy as labor costs rise and competitiveness erodes.\112\
The Chinese government's restrictive family planning
policies also have exacerbated China's sex ratio imbalance.
Although Chinese authorities continue to implement a ban on
``non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective
abortion,'' \113\ some people reportedly continue the practice
in keeping with a traditional cultural preference for
sons.\114\ According to an NBS report, China's overall sex
ratio in 2016 was 104.98 males to 100 females, and there were
approximately 33.59 million more males than females in China
(708.15 million males to 674.56 million females).\115\
Demographic experts have expressed concerns that the sex ratio
imbalance in China could lead to ``violent crime,'' \116\ ``sex
crimes,'' ``trafficking of women,'' \117\ and social
instability.\118\ This past year, international media reports
continued to suggest a link between China's large number of
``surplus males'' \119\ and the trafficking of foreign women--
from countries including Cambodia,\120\ Burma (Myanmar),\121\
North Korea,\122\ and Vietnam \123\--into China for forced
marriage or commercial sexual exploitation. [For more
information on cross-border trafficking, see Section II--Human
Trafficking.]
Reports also indicate that decades of birth limits under
China's population control policies combined with a traditional
preference for sons may have contributed to a black market for
illegal adoptions.\124\ In November 2016, public security
authorities in seven provinces detained 157 individuals
involved in the acquisition and selling of children, and
rescued 36 children, some of whom reportedly were 10 days old
when taken.\125\ As of December 2016, authorities had not been
able to locate the parents of at least nine of the
children.\126\ According to reports, some parents sold their
children because of financial difficulty, while some buyers
wanted male children due to a traditional preference for
sons.\127\
Population
Control
Population
Control
Notes to Section II--Population Control
\1\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``December 12,
2016, National Health and Family Planning Commission Regular Press
Conference Text Record'' [2016 nian 12 yue 12 ri guojia weisheng
jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 12 December 16; PRC
Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15,
effective 1 January 16, art. 18.
\2\ State Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-2030)
[Guojia renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30 December 16,
chaps. 2(1), 3(1); National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``December 12, 2016, National Health and Family Planning Commission
Regular Press Conference Text Record'' [2016 nian 12 yue 12 ri guojia
weisheng jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 12 December 16;
National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``State Council Policy
Regular Press Conference: `13th Five-Year Plan' Health Plan and
Deepening Medical and Health System Reform Plan During the `13th Five-
Year Plan' Period'' [Guowuyuan zhengce lixing chuifeng hui: `` `shisan
wu' weisheng yu jiankang guihua'' ji `` `shisan wu' qijian shenhua
yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige guihua'' youguan qingkuang], 23 December 16.
\3\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 18. Article 18 of the
Population and Family Planning Law stipulates, ``the state advocates
two children per married couple.'' For provincial population
regulations that require couples be married to have children and limit
them to bearing two children, see, e.g., Fujian Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Province Population and Family
Planning Regulations [Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli],
issued 29 April 88, amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18 November 00,
26 July 02, 14 December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16, arts. 8, 12;
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee,
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning
Regulations [Guangxi zhuang zu zizhiqu renkou he jihua shengyu tiaoli],
issued 23 March 12, amended 13 January 14, 15 January 16, art. 13.
\4\ See, e.g., Fujian Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 29 April 88,
amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18 November 00, 26 July 02, 14
December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16, art. 9(4-5); Heilongjiang
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Heilongjiang Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Heilongjiang sheng renkou
yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 18 October 02, amended 13 December 13,
22 April 14, 17 April 15, 21 April 16, art. 13.
\5\ For provincial population planning provisions that allow these
exceptions for having an additional child, see, e.g., Zhejiang Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhejiang Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Zhejiang sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 3 September 02, amended 28 September 07, 13 January 14,
14 January 16, reprinted in Zhejiang Province Health and Family
Planning Commission, art. 18(1-4); Sichuan Province People's Congress
Standing Committee, Sichuan Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2
July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17 October 97, 26 September 02, 24
September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January 16, art. 13(1); Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning Regulations [Guangxi
zhuang zu zizhiqu renkou he jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 23 March 12,
amended 13 January 14, 15 January 16, art. 14(1-5); Jiangxi Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 16 June 90, amended 30 June 95, 20 June 97, 29 July 02,
27 March 09, 16 January 14, 20 January 16, reprinted in People's Daily,
art. 9(2-3).
\6\ See, e.g., Song Shiqing and Liu Jiaying, ``China Fining Parents
for Second Kid Born Before One-Child Policy Scrapped,'' Caixin, 6
February 17; ``Wuping Court Detains Another 2 People, Special Action To
Forcibly Collect Social Compensation Fees Continues According to Law!''
[Wuping fayuan you ju 2 ren yifa qiangzhi zhengshou shehui fuyang fei
zhuanxiang xingdong zai chixu!], Taihai Net, 15 November 16.
\7\ See, e.g., Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in
Zhenxiong, Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again''
[Yunnan zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi buxiang zai hui
nage difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17; ``Wuping Court Detains
Another 2 People, Special Action To Forcibly Collect Social
Compensation Fees Continues According to Law!'' [Wuping fayuan you ju 2
ren yifa qiangzhi zhengshou shehui fuyang fei zhuanxiang xingdong zai
chixu!], Taihai Net, 15 November 16.
\8\ See, e.g., Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in
Zhenxiong, Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again''
[Yunnan zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi buxiang zai hui
nage difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17; Zhao Meng and Fu Danni,
``Sterilization Quotas Endure in Two-Child Policy Era,'' Sixth Tone, 22
February 17.
\9\ See, e.g., John Sudworth, ``China's Forbidden Babies Still an
Issue,'' BBC, 28 October 16. See also Reggie Littlejohn, Women's Rights
Without Frontiers, ``Will You Let Them Get Away With This? '' 19
December 16.
\10\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the
Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 95, and endorsed by UN
General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 22 December 95, paras. 9(Annex
1), 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments which
participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their
commitment to ``[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of
women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;'' (para. 9) and
``[t]he explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all
women to control all aspects of their health, in particular their own
fertility, is basic to their empowerment (para. 17). Programme of
Action adopted by the Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development, 13 September 94, paras. 7.2, 8.25. Paragraph 7.2 states,
``Reproductive health therefore implies that people . . . have the
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how
often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men
and women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective,
affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice .
. ..'' Paragraph 8.25 states, ``In no case should abortion be promoted
as a method of family planning.'' For coercive controls imposed on
Chinese women and their families, see, e.g., Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese
Father of Four Forced To Undergo Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February
17; John Sudworth, ``China's Forbidden Babies Still an Issue,'' BBC, 28
October 16; ``Wuping Court Detains Another 2 People, Special Action To
Forcibly Collect Social Compensation Fees Continues According to Law!''
[Wuping fayuan you ju 2 ren yifa qiangzhi zhengshou shehui fuyang fei
zhuanxiang xingdong zai chixu!], Taihai Net, 15 November 16; Zhao Meng
and Fu Danni, ``Sterilization Quotas Endure in Two-Child Policy Era,''
Sixth Tone, 22 February 17.
\11\ United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, 27 October 95, chap. II, para. 3; chap. VI,
para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the Fourth World
Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action. United Nations Population Information Network, Report of
the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), A/
Conf.171/13, 18 October 94, chap. II, sec. C; chap. VI, sec. 1. China
was one of the participating States at the ICPD, which reached general
agreement on the Programme of Action. The Programme of Action is
provided as an annex to the above ICPD report.
\12\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art.
1; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 51. In 2016, the UN Committee against Torture noted its concern
regarding ``reports of coerced sterilization and forced abortions, and
regrets the lack of information on the number of investigations into
such allegations . . . [and] the lack of information regarding redress
provided to victims of past violations.'' For acts of coercion
committed in the implementation of population planning policies, see,
e.g., Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To Undergo
Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17; Zhao Meng and Fu Danni,
``Sterilization Quotas Endure in Two-Child Policy Era,'' Sixth Tone, 22
February 17.
\13\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, last visited 22 March 17. China signed the
Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\14\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16.
\15\ Ibid., para. 51.
\16\ ``What's It Like To Be an `Invisible' Child Under China's One-
Child Policy? '' Catholic News Agency, 5 March 17; Wang Ling,
``Population Report to the Decisionmaking Level, Proposes To
Immediately Implement Universal Two-Child [Policy]'' [Renkou baogao
shangdi juece ceng jianyi liji fangkai quanmian sheng erhai], China
Business Network, 16 October 15; Olivia Lowenberg, ``Why China Is
Shifting to a `Two-Child' Policy,'' Christian Science Monitor, Global
News Blog, 21 October 15.
\17\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Chinese Communist
Party 18th Party Congress Fifth Plenum Announcement,'' [Zhongguo
gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi
gongbao], 29 October 15; Peng Xiaofei et al., ``China To Adopt
Universal `Two-Child' Policy'' [Woguo quanmian fangkai ``erhai''
zhengce], Beijing Youth Daily, 30 October 15.
\18\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Amending the Population and Family Planning Law [Quanguo renda
changweihui guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua shengyu fa de jueding],
issued 27 December 15; PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01,
amended 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16.
\19\ ``Social Compensation Fee [Collection] Standards Clearly
Defined in 25 Provinces, How Much Is the Excess Birth Fine in Your
Hometown? '' [25 shengfen mingque shehui fuyang fei biaozhun ni de
jiaxiang chaosheng fa duoshao?], People's Daily, reprinted in Beijing
Daily, 3 August 17.
\20\ State Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-
2030) [Guojia renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30
December 16, chaps. 2(1), 3(1); National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``December 12, 2016, National Health and Family Planning
Commission Regular Press Conference Text Record'' [2016 nian 12 yue 12
ri guojia weisheng jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 12
December 16; National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``State
Council Policy Regular Press Conference: `13th Five-Year Plan' Health
Plan and Deepening Medical and Health System Reform Plan During the
`13th Five-Year Plan' Period'' [Guowuyuan zhengce lixing chuifeng hui:
`` `shisan wu' weisheng yu jiankang guihua'' ji `` `shisan wu' qijian
shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige guihua'' youguan qingkuang], 23
December 16.
\21\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``National
Health and Family Planning Commission General Office Bulletin on the
State of Supervision and Inspection Work on the `Population and Family
Planning Law' '' [Guojia weisheng jisheng wei bangong ting guanyu
``renkou yu jihua shengyu fa'' jiandu jiancha gongzuo qingkuang de
tongbao], 3 March 17, sec. 3(4); National Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``January 2017 Regular Press Conference Document Two:
National Health and Family Planning Work Meeting Arranges Key Tasks for
2017'' [2017 nian 1 yue lixing xinwen fabuhui cailiao er: quanguo
weisheng jisheng gongzuo huiyi bushu 2017 nian zhongdian renwu], 9
January 17; State Council, `` `13th Five-Year Plan' Health and Wellness
Plan'' [``Shisan wu'' weisheng yu jiankang guihua], 27 December 17,
sec. 3(6).
\22\ See e.g., Reggie Littlejohn et al., ``Continued Coercion:
China's Two-Child Policy Threatens Human Rights and Prosperity''
[Webcast], Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 8 March 17; Jonathan
Abbamonte, ``Women Continue To Face Coercion, Crippling Fines Under
Two-Child Policy,'' Epoch Times, 29 November 16; Zhang Jing, Women's
Rights in China, ``Can Implementing the Two-Child Policy Improve
China's Human Rights Conditions? '' [Kaifang erhai zhengce neng gaishan
zhongguo renquan zhuangkuang ma?], 4 October 16; ``China Birth Rate Up
After One-Child Rule Change,'' BBC, 23 January 17.
\23\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of Director Li Bin and Others Answering Journalists' Questions
Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy' '' [Li
bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce'' da jizhe wen
wenzi shilu], 8 March 16.
\24\ ``Chinese Officials Say, Three Million Additional Births Per
Year With the Universal Two-Child Policy'' [Zhongguo guanfang shuo,
kaifang ertai meinian duo sheng sanbai wan ren], Radio Free Asia, 10
November 15.
\25\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Department
of Community Family Planning Official Answers Questions From Health
News and China Population Daily Journalists Regarding the Number of
Births in 2015'' [Zhidaosi fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da
jiankang bao, zhongguo renkou bao jizhe wen], 20 January 16.
\26\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Achieved a Good Start for the `13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016''
[2016 nian guomin jingji shixian ``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20
January 17; Shan Juan, ``Second-Child Policy Increases Births by 7.9
Percent,'' China Daily, 23 January 17. For the total number of births
in 2015, see National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Making Steady Progress, Stable in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin jingji
yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16.
\27\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17. For an
estimate of the total number of births in 2015, see National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``National Economy Making Steady Progress, Stable
in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong
youhao], 19 January 16.
\28\ Huang Ying, ``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child Policy Implemented
for One Year, 18.64 Million Newborns'' [Guojia weijiwei: quanmian erhai
shixing yi nian xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan], Beijing News, 11 March 17.
See also `` `Universal Two-Child Policy' Implemented, Chinese
Population Grows by Only One Million, Much Lower Than Expected''
[``Quanmian erhai'' shanglu zhongguo renkou jin zeng yibai wan yuan di
yu yuqi], Bowen Press, 10 January 17; Deng Xiaoci, ``Two-Child Policy
Brings China 1 Million More Newborns in 2016,'' Global Times, 15
December 16.
\29\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17; Scott
Cendrowski, ``China's Landmark One-Child Policy Reversal Doesn't Seem
To Be Working,'' Fortune, 24 February 17; Shan Juan, ``Second-Child
Policy Increases Births by 7.9 Percent,'' China Daily, 23 January 17.
\30\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17.
\31\ Ibid.; Li Hongmei, ``China's Two-Child Policy Shows Evident
Effects,'' People's Daily, reprinted in Global Times, 28 February 17.
\32\ See, e.g., Scott Cendrowski, ``China's Landmark One-Child
Policy Reversal Doesn't Seem To Be Working,'' Fortune, 24 February 17;
State Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-2030) [Guojia
renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30 December 16; Mu
Guangzong, ``Two-Child Policy Has Demographic Limits,'' China Daily, 26
December 16; John Clinkard, ``Below Replacement Birth Rates in China
and Japan Colour Their Future Population Grey,'' Daily Commercial News,
9 February 17.
\33\ Scott Cendrowski, ``China's Landmark One-Child Policy Reversal
Doesn't Seem To Be Working,'' Fortune, 24 February 17; John Clinkard,
``Below Replacement Birth Rates in China and Japan Colour Their Future
Population Grey,'' Daily Commercial News, 9 February 17; ``Lifting the
One-Child Policy Fails To Stem China's Population Woes,'' World Weekly,
2 March 17.
\34\ State Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-
2030) [Guojia renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30
December 16; Mu Guangzong, ``Two-Child Policy Has Demographic Limits,''
China Daily, 26 December 16; Ko Tin-yau, ``Why China's Baby Boom May
Not Last Long,'' Hong Kong Economic Journal, 25 January 17.
\35\ Zhuang Pinghui and Josh Ye, ``China Sees 1.3 Million More New
Babies in 2016 . . . But Workforce Shrinks As Population Ages,'' South
China Morning Post, 22 January 17.
\36\ `` `Universal Two-Child Policy' Implemented, Chinese
Population Grows by Only One Million, Much Lower Than Expected''
[``Quanmian erhai'' shanglu zhongguo renkou jin zeng yibai wan yuan di
yu yuqi], Bowen Press, 10 January 17; Andrew Mason, ``Strategies for
Addressing Demographic Challenges,'' China Daily, 10 January 17; Deng
Xiaoci, ``Two-Child Policy Brings China 1 Million More Newborns in
2016,'' Global Times, 15 December 16.
\37\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17; Huang Ying,
``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child Policy Implemented for One Year, 18.64
Million Newborns'' [Guojia weijiwei: quanmian erhai shixing yi nian
xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan], Beijing News, 11 March 17; Li Hongmei,
``China's Two-Child Policy Shows Evident Effects,'' People's Daily,
reprinted in Global Times, 28 February 17.
\38\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17; Li Hongmei,
``China's Two-Child Policy Shows Evident Effects,'' People's Daily,
reprinted in Global Times, 28 February 17; All-China Women's
Federation, ``Joining Efforts To Safeguard Women's Rights in 2nd-Child
Policy Era,'' 20 January 17; Huang Ying, ``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child
Policy Implemented for One Year, 18.64 Million Newborns'' [Guojia
weijiwei: quanmian erhai shixing yi nian xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan],
Beijing News, 11 March 17.
\39\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17.
\40\ Ibid.; Huang Ying, ``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child Policy
Implemented for One Year, 18.64 Million Newborns'' [Guojia weijiwei:
quanmian erhai shixing yi nian xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan], Beijing
News, 11 March 17; Li Hongmei, ``China's Two-Child Policy Shows Evident
Effects,'' People's Daily, reprinted in Global Times, 28 February 17.
\41\ Yanzhong Huang, ``China's New Two Child Policy: Too Little,
Too Late,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound (blog), 1
December 16. See also Simon Denyer and Congcong Zhang, ``China Drops
One-Child Policy, but `Exhausted' Tiger Moms Say One Is Plenty,''
Washington Post, 16 October 16.
\42\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17; State
Council, `` `13th Five-Year Plan' Health and Wellness Plan'' [``Shisan
wu'' weisheng yu jiankang guihua], 27 December 17, sec. 3(6); Huang
Ying, ``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child Policy Implemented for One Year,
18.64 Million Newborns'' [Guojia weijiwei: quanmian erhai shixing yi
nian xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan], Beijing News, 11 March 17.
\43\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17; State
Council, `` `13th Five-Year Plan' Health and Wellness Plan'' [``Shisan
wu'' weisheng yu jiankang guihua], 27 December 17, sec. 3(6); State
Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-2030) [Guojia
renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30 December 16.
\44\ Huang Ying, ``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child Policy Implemented
for One Year, 18.64 Million Newborns'' [Guojia weijiwei: quanmian erhai
shixing yi nian xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan], Beijing News, 11 March 17;
National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record of
January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17.
\45\ State Council, `` `13th Five-Year Plan' Health and Wellness
Plan'' [``Shisan wu'' weisheng yu jiankang guihua], 27 December 17,
sec. 3(6); National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``January
2017 Regular Press Conference Document Two: National Health and Family
Planning Work Meeting Arranges Key Tasks for 2017'' [2017 nian 1 yue
lixing xinwen fabuhui cailiao er: quanguo weisheng jisheng gongzuo
huiyi bushu 2017 nian zhongdian renwu], 9 January 17, para. 3; Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, Decision Regarding
the Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy and Reform and
Improvement of Family Planning Service Management [Guanyu shishi
quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de
jueding], issued 31 December 15, sec. 3(8); Department of
Communications, National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``January 15, 2016, NHFPC's Regular Press Conference Text Record''
[2016 nian 1 yue 15 ri guojia weisheng jisheng wei lixing xinwen fabu
hui wenzi shilu], 15 January 16.
\46\ See, e.g., Jiang Dahong and Wang Yue, ``Some Required More
Than 40 Seals, Some Had Not Obtained [Birth Permits] After the Children
Were Born'' [You de yao gai 40 duo ge zhang, you de haizi sheng le hai
mei na dao shou], Life Times, 20 November 12. See also CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 145.
\47\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 39.
\48\ For examples of provincial-level population planning
regulations instructing officials to carry out abortions, see Jiangxi
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 16 June 90, amended 30 June 95, 20 June
97, 29 July 02, 27 March 09, 16 January 14, 20 January 16, art. 15;
Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou yu jihua
shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08, 30 July
10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 12. See also Judith Banister and
Christina Wu Harbaugh, Center for International Research, Bureau of the
Census, ``China's Family Planning Program: Inputs and Outcomes,'' June
1994, iv. For some examples of local family planning agencies
instructing officials to carry out abortions, see Yongshun County
People's Government, Yongshun County People's Government Office
Circular Regarding Carrying Out 2017 Annual Winter Population and
Family Planning Quality Service Activities [Yongshun xian renmin
zhengfu bangongshi guanyu kaizhan 2017 niandu dongji renkou he jihua
shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 10 November 16, sec. 3(2);
Chongyi County Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Chongyi County
Health and Family Planning Commission 2016 Draft Budget Instructions''
[Chongyi xian weijiwei 2016 nian bumen yusuan cao'an bianzhi shuoming],
5 January 17, sec. 2(8). See also Yu Han, ``Chinese People Suffer From
Family Planning [Policy's] Forced Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua
shengyu qiangzhi jiezha renliu hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15
June 12.
\49\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 149-50; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 146; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October
14, 104; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 100; CECC, 2012
Annual Report, 10 October 12, 91; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October
11, 111; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 118.
\50\ See, e.g., Lin Shengdong, Haikou Municipality Population and
Family Planning Commission, ``Impose Responsibility, Promote
Rectification--Changliu Township of Xiuying District Convenes Family
Planning Work Promotion Meeting'' [Yashi zeren, tuijin zhenggai--
xiuying qu changliu zhen zhaokai renkou jisheng gongzuo tuijin hui], 8
March 17. See also Yu Han, ``Chinese People Suffer From Family Planning
[Policy's] Forced Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua shengyu
qiangzhi jiezha renliu hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15 June 12.
\51\ See, e.g., Moling Township Communist Party Committee and
Government Office, ``Moling Township's Carrying Out of Spring Family
Planning Centralized Service Activities Welcomed'' [Moling zhen kaizhan
chunji jihua shengyu jizhong fuwu huodong shou huanying], reprinted in
Xiangcheng People's Government, 28 March 17. See also Judith Banister
and Christina Wu Harbaugh, Center for International Research, Bureau of
the Census, ``China's Family Planning Program: Inputs and Outcomes,''
June 1994, iv.
\52\ See, e.g., Zitongya Village Party Branch, Zitongya Village
Committee, ``Zitongya Village Family Planning Work Report'' [Zitongya
cun jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 13 October 16. See also Yu
Han, ``Chinese People Suffer From Family Planning [Policy's] Forced
Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua shengyu qiangzhi jiezha renliu
hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15 June 12.
\53\ See, e.g., Wang Bin and Zhu Mingde, ``Yintang Township's
`Three Clearings and Three Implementations' Special Campaign Achieved
Tangible Results'' [Yintang xiang ``san qing san shi'' zhuanxiang
xingdong qude shixiao], Shuangfeng Net, 28 March 17. See also Yu Han,
``Chinese People Suffer From Family Planning [Policy's] Forced
Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua shengyu qiangzhi jiezha renliu
hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15 June 12; Yongshun County People's
Government, Yongshun County People's Government Office Circular
Regarding Carrying Out 2017 Annual Winter Population and Family
Planning Quality Service Activities [Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu
bangongshi guanyu kaizhan 2017 niandu dongji renkou he jihua shengyu
youzhi fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 10 November 16, sec. 3(2). See also
Judith Banister and Christina Wu Harbaugh, Center for International
Research, Bureau of the Census, ``China's Family Planning Program:
Inputs and Outcomes,'' June 1994, iv.
\54\ See, e.g., Chongyi County Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Chongyi County Health and Family Planning Commission 2016
Draft Budget Instructions'' [Chongyi xian weijiwei 2016 nian bumen
yusuan cao'an bianzhi shuoming], 5 January 17, sec. 2(8); Wen Yan,
Xiushui County Communist Party and Government, ``Based on Practice,
Rely on Strength, Use Innovative Ideas To Promote the Economic and
Social Development of Huanggang'' [Lizu shijian yituo youshi yi
chuangxin linian tuidong huanggang jingji shehui fazhan], 31 October
16, sec. 4(4). See also Yu Han, ``Chinese People Suffer From Family
Planning [Policy's] Forced Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua
shengyu qiangzhi jiezha renliu hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15
June 12.
\55\ Shi Zhenghai, Kapu Ethnic Mao'nan Township Government, ``Kapu
Ethnic Mao'nan Township Implements the Spirit of the Countywide Family
Planning Promotion Meeting and Convenes the Family Planning Work
Deployment Meeting'' [Kapu maonan zu xiang guanche luoshi quanxian
jihua shengyu tuijin huiyi jingshen ji zhaokai jihua shengyu gongzuo
bushu hui], reprinted in Pingtang County People's Government, 22 March
17. See also Yang Zhihui and Zhang Donghong, ``Yang Yiwen: Know Shame
and Have Courage, Spare No Efforts To Fight Well and Win the Battle''
[Yang yiwen: zhichi houyong quanli yifu dahao daying fanshen zhang],
Red Net, 20 February 17; Lin Shengdong, Haikou Municipality Population
and Family Planning Commission, ``Impose Responsibility, Promote
Rectification--Changliu Township of Xiuying District Convenes Family
Planning Work Promotion Meeting'' [Yashi zeren, tuijin zhenggai--
xiuying qu changliu zhen zhaokai renkou jisheng gongzuo tuijin hui], 8
March 17.
\56\ Yongshun County People's Government, Yongshun County People's
Government Office Circular Regarding Carrying Out 2017 Annual Winter
Population and Family Planning Quality Service Activities [Yongshun
xian renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu kaizhan 2017 niandu dongji renkou
he jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 10 November 16, sec.
3(2); Wen Yan, Xiushui County Communist Party and Government, ``Based
on Practice, Rely on Strength, Use Innovative Ideas To Promote the
Economic and Social Development of Huanggang'' [Lizu shijian yituo
youshi yi chuangxin linian tuidong huanggang jingji shehui fazhan], 31
October 16, sec. 4(4); Chongyi County Health and Family Planning
Commission, ``Chongyi County Health and Family Planning Commission 2016
Draft Budget Instructions'' [Chongyi xian weijiwei 2016 nian bumen
yusuan cao'an bianzhi shuoming], 5 January 17, sec. 2(8).
\57\ Yang Zhihui and Zhang Donghong, ``Yang Yiwen: Know Shame and
Have Courage, Spare No Efforts To Fight Well and Win the Battle'' [Yang
yiwen: zhichi houyong quanli yifu dahao daying fanshen zhang], Red Net,
20 February 17; Wang Rong et al., Yuyang District People's Government,
``Yuyang District Convenes Population and Family Planning Work
Meeting'' [Woqu zhaokai renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi], 19
March 17.
\58\ See, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 150; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 146; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9
October 14, 104; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 100.
\59\ See, e.g., Zitongya Village Party Branch, Zitongya Village
Committee, ``Zitongya Village Family Planning Work Report'' [Zitongya
cun jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 13 October 16; Wang Rong
et al., Yuyang District People's Government, ``Yuyang District Convenes
Population and Family Planning Work Meeting'' [Woqu zhaokai renkou he
jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi], 19 March 17.
\60\ See, e.g., Wang Rong et al., Yuyang District People's
Government, ``Yuyang District Convenes Population and Family Planning
Work Meeting'' [Woqu zhaokai renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi], 19
March 17.
\61\ See, e.g., Yongshun County People's Government, Yongshun
County People's Government Office Circular Regarding Carrying Out 2017
Annual Winter Population and Family Planning Quality Service Activities
[Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu kaizhan 2017 niandu
dongji renkou he jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 10
November 16.
\62\ Ibid.; Lin Shengdong, Haikou Municipality Population and
Family Planning Commission, ``Impose Responsibility, Promote
Rectification--Changliu Township of Xiuying District Convenes Family
Planning Work Promotion Meeting'' [Yashi zeren, tuijin zhenggai--
xiuying qu changliu zhen zhaokai renkou jisheng gongzuo tuijin hui], 8
March 17.
\63\ See, e.g., Shen Yantong, Qingyuan County People's Government,
``Lingtou Township Actively Carries Out Spring `Three Inspections'
Service Work for Women of Child-Bearing Age'' [Lingtou xiang jiji
kaizhan chunji yuling funu ``san cha'' fuwu gongzuo], 22 March 17; Li
Xiaoxia, Wujiagang District People's Government, ``Family Planning
Service Down to the Grassroots, `Three Inspections' Event Warms
People's Hearts'' [Jisheng fuwu song xiaxiang ``san cha'' huodong nuan
ren xin], 27 March 17. See also Ma Jian, Women's Rights in China,
``Investigation Into the `Three Inspections' of Rural Family Planning''
[Nongcun jihua shengyu zhong de ``san cha'' qingkuang diaocha],
reprinted in Boxun, 15 April 09.
\64\ See, e.g., Lin Shengdong, Haikou Municipality Population and
Family Planning Commission, ``Impose Responsibility, Promote
Rectification--Changliu Township of Xiuying District Convenes Family
Planning Work Promotion Meeting'' [Yashi zeren, tuijin zhenggai--
xiuying qu changliu zhen zhaokai renkou jisheng gongzuo tuijin hui], 8
March 17; Wen Yan, Xiushui County Communist Party and Government,
``Based on Practice, Rely on Strength, Use Innovative Ideas To Promote
the Economic and Social Development of Huanggang'' [Lizu shijian yituo
youshi yi chuangxin linian tuidong huanggang jingji shehui fazhan], 31
October 16, sec. 4(4). See also Yu Han, ``Chinese People Suffer From
Family Planning [Policy's] Forced Sterilizations and Abortions'' [Jihua
shengyu qiangzhi jiezha renliu hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent, 15
June 12.
\65\ See, e.g., Yongshun County People's Government, Yongshun
County People's Government Office Circular Regarding Carrying Out 2017
Annual Winter Population and Family Planning Quality Service Activities
[Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu kaizhan 2017 niandu
dongji renkou he jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong de tongzhi], 10
November 16; Wen Yan, Xiushui County Communist Party and Government,
``Based on Practice, Rely on Strength, Use Innovative Ideas To Promote
the Economic and Social Development of Huanggang'' [Lizu shijian yituo
youshi yi chuangxin linian tuidong huanggang jingji shehui fazhan], 31
October 16, sec. 4(4). ``Social compensation fees'' are also known as
``social maintenance fees.''
\66\ Fan Yuedong and Hu Hongtao, Statistical Bureau of Shaoyang
Municipality, ``Study on the Effectiveness of Universal Two-Child
Policy Implementation in Shaoyang Municipality'' [Shaoyang shi quanmian
lianghai zhengce shishi xiaoguo diaocha], reprinted in Statistical
Bureau of Hunan Province, 2 August 17.
\67\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To Undergo
Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17; Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man
Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong, Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to
That Place Again'' [Yunnan zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi
buxiang zai hui nage difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\68\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To Undergo
Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17.
\69\ Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong,
Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again'' [Yunnan
zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi buxiang zai hui nage
difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\70\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To Undergo
Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17; Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man
Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong, Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to
That Place Again'' [Yunnan zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi
buxiang zai hui nage difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\71\ Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong,
Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again'' [Yunnan
zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi buxiang zai hui nage
difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\72\ Ibid.
\73\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To Undergo
Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17.
\74\ Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong,
Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again'' [Yunnan
zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi buxiang zai hui nage
difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\75\ Zhao Meng and Fu Danni, ``Sterilization Quotas Endure in Two-
Child Policy Era,'' Sixth Tone, 22 February 17.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ Ibid.
\78\ Zhang Fan, ``Man Did Not Sign Consent Document Prior to
Operation, Relevant Accountability [Measures] Already Initiated''
[Nanzi shu qian wei qian tongyi shu yi qidong xiangguan wenze], Beijing
Youth Daily, 1 March 17.
\79\ Ibid.
\80\ State Council, Measures for Administration of Collection of
Social Maintenance Fees [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli banfa],
issued 2 August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7. See also PRC
Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15,
effective 1 January 16, arts. 18, 41.
\81\ See, e.g., John Sudworth, ``China's Forbidden Babies Still an
Issue,'' BBC, 28 October 16; ``Two-Child Policy Implemented for 10
Months, Questioning Again the Social Compensation Fees'' [Erhai zhengce
luodi shi yue zai wen shehui fuyang fei], Radio Free Asia, 7 October
16.
\82\ ``Wuping Court Detains Another 2 People, Special Action To
Forcibly Collect Social Compensation Fees Continues According to Law!''
[Wuping fayuan you ju 2 ren yifa qiangzhi zhengshou shehui fuyang fei
zhuanxiang xingdong zai chixu!], Taihai Net, 15 November 16.
\83\ Ibid.
\84\ Ibid.
\85\ Wang Ling, ``NHFPC: Administrative Lawsuits Related to Social
Compensation Fees Increase in Some Areas'' [Weijiwei: bufen diqu shehui
fuyang fei xiangguan xingzheng susong anjian zengjia], Chinese Business
Network, 4 March 17; Wang Ling, ``More `Second Child Born Before Policy
Became Effective' Cases Nationwide, Need To Make Clear Whether To Keep
or Abolish Social Compensation Fees'' [Quanguo ``qiang sheng erhai''
anjian zengduo shehui fuyang fei cun fei dai mingque], China Business
Network, 24 March 17; ``Zhejiang Couples Fined for `Giving Birth'
Before the Two-Child Policy Became Effective, Lawsuit Filed Against
Family Planning Agencies'' [Zhejiang fuqi zai erhai zhengce qian
``qiang sheng'' bei fa qisu jisheng bumen], China Youth Daily, 24 March
17.
\86\ ``Zhejiang Couples Fined for `Giving Birth' Before the Two-
Child Policy Became Effective, Lawsuit Filed Against Family Planning
Agencies'' [Zhejiang fuqi zai erhai zhengce qian ``qiang sheng'' bei fa
qisu jisheng bumen], China Youth Daily, 24 March 17; Wang Ling, ``More
`Second Child Born Before Policy Became Effective' Cases Nationwide,
Need To Make Clear Whether To Keep or Abolish Social Compensation
Fees'' [Quanguo ``qiang sheng erhai'' anjian zengduo shehui fuyang fei
cun fei dai mingque], China Business Network, 24 March 17.
\87\ Wang Zhongde, ``Social Compensation Fees Associated with
`Illegal' Second Child, Need To Question Whether Policy [Is
Implemented] in Good Faith'' [``Weifa'' sheng erhai de shehui fuyang
fei xu kaowen zhengce shanyi], Guangming Net, 3 February 17; Wang Ling,
``More `Second Child Born Before Policy Became Effective' Cases
Nationwide, Need To Make Clear Whether To Keep or Abolish Social
Compensation Fees'' [Quanguo ``qiang sheng erhai'' anjian zengduo
shehui fuyang fei cun fei dai mingque], China Business Network, 24
March 17; Ma Weihui, ``Zhou Guangquan: Not Good To Pursue Collection of
Social Compensation Fees for Violators Who Did Not Pay for the Second
Child Born in Excess of Birth Quota'' [Zhou guangquan: shangwei shi
jiao de ertai chaosheng shehui fuyang fei buyi zai zhuishou], China
Times, 8 March 17.
\88\ Wang Ling, ``More `Second Child Born Before Policy Became
Effective' Cases Nationwide, Need To Make Clear Whether To Keep or
Abolish Social Compensation Fees'' [Quanguo ``qiang sheng erhai''
anjian zengduo shehui fuyang fei cun fei dai mingque], China Business
Network, 24 March 17; Wang Ling, ``NHFPC: Administrative Lawsuits
Related to Social Compensation Fees Increase in Some Areas'' [Weijiwei:
bufen diqu shehui fuyang fei xiangguan xingzheng susong anjian
zengjia], Chinese Business Network, 4 March 17.
\89\ Wang Ling, ``More `Second Child Born Before Policy Became
Effective' Cases Nationwide, Need To Make Clear Whether To Keep or
Abolish Social Compensation Fees'' [Quanguo ``qiang sheng erhai''
anjian zengduo shehui fuyang fei cun fei dai mingque], China Business
Network, 24 March 17; See also Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why
Haven't Regulations on the Management of Social Compensation Fee
Collection Been Issued? '' [Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou
guanli tiaoli weihe nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16.
\90\ Sun Ruili and Li Jin, ``Man Forcibly Sterilized in Zhenxiong,
Yunnan: [I] Never Want To Go Back to That Place Again'' [Yunnan
zhenxiong bei qiangzhi jieza nanzi: yibeizi buxiang zai hui nage
difang], Beijing News, 14 February 17.
\91\ Ibid.; Wang Lianzhang, ``Chinese Father of Four Forced To
Undergo Vasectomy,'' Sixth Tone, 14 February 17.
\92\ John Sudworth, ``China's Forbidden Babies Still an Issue,''
BBC, 28 October 16.
\93\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 39(1-2). Article 4 of
the PRC Population and Family Planning Law states that officials
``shall perform their family planning work duties strictly in
accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and
they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of
citizens.'' Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal
or administrative punishment if he ``infringe[s] on a citizen's
personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and
interests'' or ``abuse[s] his power, neglect[s] his duty, or engage[s]
in malpractice for personal gain'' in the implementation of population
planning policies.
\94\ ``Over Ten Million Illegal Residents in China Are a Lost
Generation, Truth About Their Lives Is Shocking'' [Zhongguo qian wan
heihu cheng shiluo yi dai shenghuo zhenxiang chumu jingxin], Duowei, 20
December 16; ``Ministry of Public Security: 1.4 Million More
Individuals Without Hukou Registered for Hukou in 2016'' [Gong'anbu:
2016 nian you you 140 duo wan wu hukou renyuan dengji shang le hukou],
CCTV, reprinted in Xinhua, 13 February 17.
\95\ ``Over Ten Million Illegal Residents in China Are a Lost
Generation, Truth About Their Lives Is Shocking'' [Zhongguo qian wan
heihu cheng shiluo yi dai shenghuo zhenxiang chumu jingxin], Duowei, 20
December 16.
\96\ Ibid. See also Wang Ling, ``Ministry of Public Security High-
Level Meeting Discusses the Unresolved Issue of 13 Million `Illegal
Residents' '' [Gong'anbu gaoceng kaihui shangtao 1300 wan ``heihu''
wenti dai jie], China Business Network, 23 November 15.
\97\ Coco Liu and Shanshan Chen, ``Lost Lives: The Battle of
China's Invisible Children To Recover Missed Years,'' Reuters, 14
December 16; ``Ministry of Public Security: 1.4 Million More
Individuals Without Hukou Registered for Hukou in 2016'' [Gong'anbu:
2016 nian you you 140 duo wan wu hukou renyuan dengji shang le hukou],
CCTV, reprinted in Xinhua, 13 February 17; ``Over Ten Million Illegal
Residents in China Are a Lost Generation, the Truth About Their Lives
Is Shocking'' [Zhongguo qian wan heihu cheng shiluo yi dai shenghuo
zhenxiang chumu jingxin], Duowei, 20 December 16.
\98\ ``Over Ten Million Illegal Residents in China Are a Lost
Generation, the Truth About Their Lives Is Shocking'' [Zhongguo qian
wan heihu cheng shiluo yi dai shenghuo zhenxiang chumu jingxin],
Duowei, 20 December 16.
\99\ ``Ministry of Public Security: 1.4 Million More Individuals
Without Hukou Registered for Hukou in 2016'' [Gong'anbu: 2016 nian you
you 140 duo wan wu hukou renyuan dengji shang le hukou], CCTV,
reprinted in Xinhua, 13 February 17. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report,
6 October 16, 152-53.
\100\ Zhang Yang, ``Ministry of Public Security: Completely Resolve
Hukou Registration Issue for `Illegal Residents' in Two to Three
Years'' [Gong'anbu: 2 zhi 3 nian nei chedi jiejue ``heihu'' luohu
wenti], People's Daily, 25 March 17.
\101\ ``Ministry of Public Security: 1.4 Million More Individuals
Without Hukou Registered for Hukou in 2016'' [Gong'anbu: 2016 nian you
you 140 duo wan wu hukou renyuan dengji shang le hukou], CCTV,
reprinted in Xinhua, 13 February 17.
\102\ Ibid.; ``Over Ten Million Illegal Residents in China Are a
Lost Generation, Truth About Their Lives Is Shocking'' [Zhongguo qian
wan heihu cheng shiluo yi dai shenghuo zhenxiang chumu jingxin],
Duowei, 20 December 16.
\103\ Zhang Yang, ``Ministry of Public Security: Completely Resolve
Hukou Registration Issue for `Illegal Residents' in Two to Three
Years'' [Gong'anbu: 2 zhi 3 nian nei chedi jiejue ``heihu'' luohu
wenti], People's Daily, 25 March 17.
\104\ World Bank, ``Fertility Rate, Total (Births Per Woman),''
last visited 10 May 17.
\105\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text Record
of January 2017 Special Press Conference on Progress of Universal Two-
Child Policy Work'' [2017 nian 1 yue quanmian lianghai zhengce gongzuo
jinzhan zhuanti xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 22 January 17; Huang Ying,
``NHFPC: Universal Two-Child Policy Implemented for One Year, 18.64
Million Newborns'' [Guojia weijiwei: quanmian erhai shixing yi nian
xinsheng ying'er 1864 wan], Beijing News, 11 March 17; ``After
`Universal Two-Child Policy,' Growth in the Number of Newborns Still
Lower Than Expected'' [``Quanmian erhai'' hou xinsheng'er jizeng dan
reng diyu yuqi], BBC, 26 January 17.
\106\ Hua'erjie Laoye, ``Ren Dapao: Is China's Real Estate Market
Really China's `Ticking Time Bomb?' '' [Ren dapao: zhongguo loushi zhen
de shi zhongguo jingji de ``dingshi zhadan'' ma?], Sina, 14 March 17.
\107\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Achieved a Good Start for the `13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016''
[2016 nian guomin jingji shixian ``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20
January 17; Zhuang Pinghui and Josh Ye, ``China Sees 1.3 Million More
New Babies in 2016 . . . But Workforce Shrinks As Population Ages,''
South China Morning Post, 22 January 17.
\108\ Ibid.
\109\ State Council, National Population Development Plan (2016-
2030) [Guojia renkou fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian)], issued 30
December 16.
\110\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Family-Planning Policy May Need More
`Adjustment,' '' China Daily, 1 December 16.
\111\ ``The World's Most Populous Country Is Turning Gray,''
Bloomberg, 26 January 17; Yanzhong Huang, ``China's New Two Child
Policy: Too Little, Too Late,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Asia
Unbound (blog), 1 December 16; Mark Hanrahan and Eric Baculinao,
``China Population Crisis: New Two-Child Policy Fails To Yield Major
Gains,'' NBC News, 28 January 17.
\112\ ``The World's Most Populous Country Is Turning Gray,''
Bloomberg, 26 January 17; Yue Wang and Paul Armstrong, ``Aging China
Considers Incentives To Boost Child Birth--Too Little, Too Late? ''
Forbes, 7 March 17; Mark Hanrahan and Eric Baculinao, ``China
Population Crisis: New Two-Child Policy Fails To Yield Major Gains,''
NBC News, 28 January 17.
\113\ For national laws and regulations prohibiting the practices
of non-medically necessary gender determination testing and sex-
selective abortion, see PRC Population and Family Planning Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29
December 01, amended 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 35;
National Health and Family Planning Commission et al., Regulations on
Prohibiting Non-Medically Necessary Sex Determination and Sex-Selective
Abortion [Jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de tai'er xingbie jianding he xuanze
xingbie rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 28 March 16,
effective 1 May 16. For provincial regulations that ban non-medically
necessary sex determination and sex-selective abortion, see, e.g.,
Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou yu jihua
shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08, 30 July
10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 31; Sichuan Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Sichuan Province Population and Family
Planning Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli],
issued 2 July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17 October 97, 26 September
02, 24 September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January 16, art. 23.
\114\ See, e.g., Xi Lu, ``Uprooting Generations-Old Gender Bias,''
Global Times, 12 January 17; ``China Cracks Down on Fetus Sex
Diagnosis,'' China Internet Information Center, 12 January 17; ``China
Arrests Over Illegal Network Determining Baby Gender,'' BBC, 15 October
16.
\115\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Achieved a Good Start for the `13th Five-Year Plan' Period in 2016''
[2016 nian guomin jingji shixian ``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20
January 17; ``Chinese Birthrate Rises in 2016,'' GB Times, 20 January
17.
\116\ Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, 30 April 14. See
also Xuan Li, ``China's `Bare Branches': Unmarried Men Stuck Between
Tradition and Capitalism,'' Scroll.in, 29 January 17.
\117\ Peng Xunwen, ``Who Will Marry the 30 Million `Surplus Men' ''
[3000 wan ``shengnan'' gen shui jiehun], People's Daily, 13 February
17; Xiao Shan, ``2030: 30 Million Bare Branches in China, Concerns
About Crime'' [2030 nian: zhongguo guanggun da jun 3000 wan you fanzui
yinyou], Radio France Internationale, 13 February 17.
\118\ Peng Xunwen, ``Who Will Marry the 30 Million `Surplus Men' ''
[3000 wan ``shengnan'' gen shui jiehun], People's Daily, 13 February
17; ``Millions of Chinese Males Face Difficulty Finding a Partner,''
CGTN, 11 March 17; ``Gender Equality in China Would Bring Huge Economic
Benefits,'' South China Morning Post, 31 October 16.
\119\ See, e.g., Peng Xunwen, ``Who Will Marry the 30 Million
`Surplus Men' '' [3000 wan ``shengnan'' gen shui jiehun], People's
Daily, 13 February 17.
\120\ See, e.g., ``Trafficked Cambodian Woman in China Rescued and
Returned Home'' [Guaimai zhi zhongguo de jianpuzhai funu bei jiejiu
huiguo], Sohu, 1 March 17.
\121\ See, e.g., Nick Grono, ``Sold Into China for Marriage,''
Huffington Post, World Post, 8 March 17.
\122\ See, e.g., Robbie Gramer and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ``With
Human Trafficking Report, Tillerson Rebukes China on Human Rights,''
Foreign Policy, 27 June 17.
\123\ See, e.g., Huileng Tan, ``Vietnamese Child Bride Alarms China
as Official Says Gender Imbalance To Weigh for Years,'' CNBC News, 12
October 16; ``China Police Rescue 32 Trafficked Vietnamese Brides,''
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in The Nation, 9 February 17.
\124\ See, e.g., Taidejia'er, ``Taidejia'er's Thoughts Regarding
News of Trafficking of Children'' [Taidejia'er guanyu guaimai ertong
xinwen de sikao], 17 December 16; ``Ministry of Public Security Cracks
Infant Trafficking Case in 7 Provinces, Parents Sell Children, Rescued
Children Now Orphans'' [Gong'an pohuo 7 sheng fan ying an qinsheng fumu
chushou huojiu ying'er bian gu'er], Ming Pao, 14 December 16.
\125\ `` `Very Large Infant-Trafficking Case,' Shocking Source of
Trafficked Infants: Some Gave Birth to Children in Order To Sell''
[``Te da fan ying an'' bei guai ying'er laiyuan ling ren zhenjing: you
ren zhuanmen sheng xiaohai lai mai], CCTV, reprinted in The Paper, 15
December 16; ``Ministry of Public Security Cracks Infant Trafficking
Case in 7 Provinces, Parents Sell Children, Rescued Children Now
Orphans'' [Gong'an pohuo 7 sheng fan ying an qinsheng fumu chushou
huojiu ying'er bian gu'er], Ming Pao, 14 December 16.
\126\ ``Ministry of Public Security Cracks Infant Trafficking Case
in 7 Provinces, Parents Sell Children, Rescued Children Now Orphans''
[Gong'an pohuo 7 sheng fan ying an qinsheng fumu chushou huojiu ying'er
bian gu'er], Ming Pao, 14 December 16.
\127\ Ibid.; `` `Very Large Infant-Trafficking Case,' Shocking
Source of Trafficked Infants: Some Gave Birth to Children in Order To
Sell'' [``Te da fan ying an'' bei guai ying'er laiyuan ling ren
zhenjing: you ren zhuanmen sheng xiaohai lai mai], CCTV, reprinted in
The Paper, 15 December 16.
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Freedom of Residence
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to restrict the freedom of residence of
Chinese citizens through the use of the household registration
(hukou) system, established in 1958.\1\ The hukou system
classifies Chinese citizens as rural or urban, conferring
certain legal rights and access to public services based on the
classification.\2\ Implementation of this system discriminates
against rural hukou holders and migrants to urban areas by
denying them equal access to public benefits and services
enjoyed by registered urban residents, including housing,
education, and social insurance.\3\ The hukou system
contravenes international human rights standards guaranteeing
freedom of residence and prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of ``national or social origin, . . . birth or other
status.'' \4\
The Chinese government continued to implement reforms to
residence policies, including the hukou and residence permit
systems. Hukou reform, including the expansion to new urban
residents and migrants of public benefits traditionally tied to
hukou status, remained a policy goal for the Chinese
government, as outlined in several national-level policy
documents.\5\ In line with previous policy pronouncements aimed
at increasing China's rate of urbanization,\6\ in September
2016, the State Council issued a plan building on previous
efforts to facilitate 100 million residents in obtaining urban
hukou by 2020.\7\ The plan also calls for 45 percent of the
population to have urban hukou by 2020.\8\ According to a
February 2017 National Bureau of Statistics of China report, at
the end of 2016, China's urban population stood at over 792.9
million people, or 57.4 percent of the population; \9\ 41.2
percent of the population were urban residents with urban-
registered hukou.\10\
After the State Council issued national provisional
regulations on residence permits that took effect in January
2016,\11\ at least 29 provincial-level jurisdictions had
reportedly issued implementing measures for residence permits
as of August 2017.\12\ The Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
reportedly announced that provincial- and local-level
governments issued more than 28.9 million residence permits
nationwide in 2016.\13\ The MPS also reportedly announced that
provincial and local authorities nationwide abolished all
previous temporary residence permit systems (zanzhuzheng) and
replaced them with the newer residence permit systems
(juzhuzheng).\14\
In February 2017, the MPS reportedly confirmed a State
Council decision \15\ that urban areas with fewer than 3
million permanent residents would not be permitted under hukou
reform policies to implement points systems to determine
applicants' eligibility for obtaining local hukou.\16\ These
systems assign values, determined by local governments, to
migrants based on factors including education level,
contributions to social insurance, and preferred work
experience.\17\ Urban areas with populations above 3 million
will be able to keep points systems and tighter restrictions on
migrants' ability to apply for local hukou.\18\ A draft Beijing
municipality planning document, for example, proposed setting a
cap on Beijing's population at 23 million in 2020.\19\
While some policymakers recognized the difficulties migrant
workers face in settling in large cities and obtaining hukou or
residence permits there, as well as the need to relax
restrictions on in-migration,\20\ policy experts noted that
existing proposals to reform the hukou and residence permit
systems did not meaningfully address disparities in rural and
urban status, especially as many rural-to-urban migrants seek
economic opportunity in larger cities where in-migration
remained strictly controlled.\21\
International Travel
Chinese authorities continued to deny some citizens who
criticized the government, those citizens' relatives and
associates, and others--including ethnic minorities--their
internationally recognized right to leave the country. Article
12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which China has signed and committed to ratify,\22\ provides
that ``[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country . . ..''
\23\ Under Article 12, countries may restrict this right, but
only ``to protect national security, public order'' and other
select public interests.\24\ Chinese laws grant officials the
authority to prevent from leaving the country those deemed
threatening to state security or whose ``exit from China is not
allowed.'' \25\ Chinese officials used this authority to
arbitrarily keep government critics, rights defenders, and
others from leaving China.\26\ The Commission observed the
following representative cases during the 2017 reporting year:
Chinese authorities continued \27\ to restrict
the travel rights of individuals in connection with a
nationwide crackdown on public interest lawyers and
rights advocates that began in or around July 2015.\28\
For example, in March 2017, public security authorities
in Shaanxi province refused to issue rights defender Lu
Dongli a passport or permit to travel to Hong Kong or
Macau, reportedly in connection with his support for
detainees in the July 2015 crackdown as well as his
interviews with foreign media about the crackdown.\29\
Beginning in October 2016, public security
officials in several county-level jurisdictions of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) reportedly
ordered residents of those areas to turn in their
passports to authorities.\30\ Officials also required
residents to apply for approval before traveling
abroad.\31\ Rights organizations criticized the
passport confiscations as restricting the movement of
XUAR residents \32\ and serving as ``collective
punishment.'' \33\ In 2017, officials in some XUAR
jurisdictions also reportedly ordered around 200,000
ethnic Kazakhs to turn in their passports and
Kazakhstan permanent residence permits, though
officials subsequently returned at least some of the
documents.\34\ [For more information, see Section IV--
Xinjiang--Freedom of Movement.]
Chinese authorities threatened Tibetans who
traveled, or planned to travel, to India to participate
in a January 2017 religious gathering led by the Dalai
Lama.\35\ Officials in some parts of Gansu, Qinghai,
and Sichuan provinces seized passports from Tibetan
residents to prevent them from traveling.\36\ Chinese
authorities in some Tibetan areas destroyed the
religious pilgrims' passports upon their return to
China and questioned them about their activities in
India.\37\
In March 2017, Chinese authorities prevented
Feng Chongyi, a Chinese citizen and Australian
permanent resident, from leaving China after he spent
several weeks conducting research on Chinese rights
lawyers.\38\ Border control officials in Guangzhou
municipality, Guangdong province, detained Feng on
March 24 at the Guangzhou airport; authorities later
held him at a Guangzhou hotel.\39\ Feng's lawyer said
that authorities accused Feng of ``threatening national
security,'' and surmised that the travel restrictions
were due to Feng's research on rights lawyers detained
in the crackdown beginning in or around July 2015.\40\
Authorities allowed Feng to return to Australia in
early April.\41\ Feng told Australian media that his
detention was meant to deter other academics from
researching ``sensitive issues or sensitive topics''
related to China.\42\
In March 2017, Chinese authorities reportedly
prevented several dozen mainland Chinese residents from
traveling to Hong Kong to participate in a history
seminar on the 1950s Anti-Rightist Movement.\43\
Chinese authorities used a variety of means to dissuade
or prevent seminar participants from attending,
including confiscating their travel permits.\44\
Domestic Movement
During this reporting year, the Commission observed reports
of Chinese government officials punishing rights advocates and
their families and associates, and targeting members of some
ethnic minority groups, by restricting their freedom of
movement domestically. Article 12 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights provides that ``[e]veryone
lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement . . ..'' \45\
Authorities increased restrictions on freedom of movement
during politically sensitive periods, including before and
during the May 2017 Belt and Road Initiative forum in Beijing
municipality \46\ and the June 2017 anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests.\47\
During the March 2017 meetings of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference in Beijing (``Two Sessions''), Chinese authorities
repeatedly seized or detained critics of the government as well
as petitioners who sought meetings in Beijing with government
officials, temporarily restricting their movement and sometimes
forcibly returning them to their places of residence.\48\
During this time, authorities sent some individuals on ``forced
travel'' (bei luyou), compelling them to leave their places of
residence and preventing them from traveling to politically
sensitive areas, especially Beijing.\49\ For example,
authorities in Qianjiang municipality, Hubei province, forced
former independent local people's congress candidate Yao Lifa
to leave Qianjiang during the Two Sessions, reportedly moving
him between five different provinces for 18 days before
allowing him to return to Qianjiang.\50\ Local authorities
sometimes held these individuals in ``black jails'' (hei
jianyu), a form of extralegal confinement.\51\ Authorities also
continued restrictions on the movement of lawyers, particularly
lawyers who have worked on behalf of rights advocates or
political prisoners, such as Liu Zhengqing \52\ and Chen
Jian'gang.\53\ Before the May 2017 trial of Chen's former
client Xie Yang, authorities in Yunnan province briefly
detained Chen and his family, later forcibly escorting him back
to Beijing.\54\
Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other residents of ethnic minority
areas in particular faced strict controls on their freedom of
movement. Tibetans and residents of Tibetan areas had
restrictions placed on their freedom of movement around the
time of the March 2017 anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising
against Chinese rule, including the imposition of requirements
on some Tibetans to obtain local government approval for local
travel.\55\ In February 2017, authorities in Gansu province
prevented more than one thousand Tibetans from traveling to
participate in a Tibetan Buddhist gathering at Kirti Monastery
in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture, Sichuan province.\56\ Security officials in
Bayinguoleng (Bayingol) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, reportedly ordered all drivers to
have satellite navigation systems installed in their cars by
June 30, 2017,\57\ effectively allowing authorities to surveil
drivers.\58\ Authorities characterized the order as a counter-
terrorism measure.\59\ [For more information on government
restrictions on Uyghurs and Tibetans, see Section IV--Xinjiang
and Section V--Tibet.]
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement
\1\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Regulations
on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji
tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.
\2\ Kam Wing Chan, ``Crossing the 50 Percent Population Rubicon:
Can China Urbanize to Prosperity? '' Eurasian Geography and Economics,
Vol. 53, No. 1 (2012), 67; Spencer Sheehan, ``China's Hukou Reforms and
the Urbanization Challenge,'' The Diplomat, 22 February 17.
\3\ Kam Wing Chan, ``Crossing the 50 Percent Population Rubicon:
Can China Urbanize to Prosperity? '' Eurasian Geography and Economics,
Vol. 53, No. 1 (2012), 67; UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report
of China, Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the
Committee at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June
14, para. 15. See also Ming Lu and Yiran Xia, ``Migration in the
People's Republic of China,'' Asian Development Bank Institute, ADBI
Working Paper Series, No. 593, September 2016, 3, 5-7; Mark Magnier, ``
`Apartheid Without the Racism': How China Keeps Rural Folks Down,''
Wall Street Journal, 24 April 17.
\4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General
Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1); UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations on the Second Periodic Report of China, Including Hong
Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 40th
Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June 14, para. 15; UN Human
Rights Council, Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip Alston, A/HRC/35/26/
Add.2, 28 March 17, paras. 27-28.
\5\ See, e.g., State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out
Household Registration System Reform [Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu tuijin
huji zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 24 July 14, 1(9); State Council,
Provisional Regulations on Residence Permits [Juzhuzheng zanxing
tiaoli], issued 26 November 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 1, 2;
State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action Plan
of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2016-2020
nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 1(2), 1(3).
\6\ PRC Central People's Government, ``National New-Type
Urbanization Plan (2014-2020)'' [Guojia xinxing chengzhenhua guihua
(2014-2020 nian)], 16 March 14; State Council, Certain Opinions on
Deeply Carrying Out New-Type Urbanization Construction [Guowuyuan
guanyu shenru tuijin xinxing chengzhenhua jianshe de ruogan yijian],
issued 2 February 16; State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out
Household Registration System Reform [Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu tuijin
huji zhidu gaige de yijian], issued 24 July 14.
\7\ State Council General Office, ``Plan Promoting 100 Million
Individuals in Cities Without Household Registration To Obtain Hukou''
[Tuidong 1 yi fei huji renkou zai chengshi luohu fang'an], issued 30
September 16.
\8\ Ibid., 1(3).
\9\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic of
China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17.
\10\ Ibid.; Liu Yizhan, ``China's Household Registration System
Reform Makes Major Progress'' [Woguo huji zhidu gaige qude zhongda
jinzhan], Xinhua, 11 February 17.
\11\ State Council, Provisional Regulations on Residence Permits
[Juzhuzheng zanxing tiaoli], issued 26 November 15, effective 1 January
16.
\12\ Han Pengfei, ``Ministry of Public Security: Full Coverage of
Residence Permit System To Be Implemented Within the Year'' [Gong'anbu:
juzhuzheng zhidu yu nian nei shixian quan fugai], China Macroeconomic
Information Network, 8 August 17; ``Residence Permit System To Achieve
Full Coverage Within the Year'' [Juzhuzheng zhidu quan fugai jiang yu
nian nei shixian], Xinhua, 6 August 17. See, e.g., Chongqing Municipal
People's Government, Chongqing Municipality Implementing Measures for
Residence Permits [Chongqing shi juzhuzheng shishi banfa], issued 18
September 16; Henan Province People's Government, Henan Provincel
Implementing Measures for Residence Permits [Henan sheng juzhuzheng
shishi banfa], issued 8 December 16.
\13\ Liu Yizhan, ``China's Household Registration System Reform
Makes Major Progress'' [Woguo huji zhidu gaige qude zhongda jinzhan],
Xinhua, 11 February 17.
\14\ Ibid.
\15\ State Council General Office, ``Plan Promoting 100 Million
Individuals in Cities Without Household Registration To Obtain Hukou''
[Tuidong 1 yi fei huji renkou zai chengshi luohu fang'an], issued 30
September 16, (6).
\16\ ``Ministry of Public Security: Urban Areas With Under 3
Million Permanent Residents May Not Implement Points Systems for
Obtaining Hukou'' [Gong'anbu: chengqu changzhu renkou 300 wan yixia
chengshi bude shishi jifen luohu], Caixin, 9 February 17.
\17\ Spencer Sheehan, ``China's Hukou Reforms and the Urbanization
Challenge,'' The Diplomat, 22 February 17; Zhou Dongxu, ``China
Democratic League Central Committee: Propose Abolishing `Invisible
Threshold' for Migrant Workers Settling in Cities'' [Minmeng zhongyang:
jianyi xiaochu nongmingong luohu chengzhen de ``yinxing menkan''],
Caixin, 9 March 17.
\18\ ``Ministry of Public Security: Urban Areas With Under 3
Million Permanent Residents May Not Implement Points Systems for
Obtaining Hukou'' [Gong'anbu: chengqu changzhu renkou 300 wan yixia
chengshi bude shishi jifen luohu], Caixin, 9 February 17.
\19\ Kong Xiangxin and Luo Xiaoguang, `` `Beijing Municipality
Master Plan (2016-2030)' Set To Begin Public Comment Period''
[``Beijing chengshi zongti guihua (2016 nian-2030 nian)'' bianzhi jinru
zhengqiu gongzhong yijian jieduan], Xinhua, 28 March 17; Lucy Hornby,
``Beijing's Migrants No Longer Welcome as City Caps Population,''
Financial Times, 20 April 17.
\20\ Huang Ziyi, ``Deputy Cai Jiming: Large Cities Should Relax
Restrictions on Population Size'' [Cai jiming daibiao: da chengshi ying
fangkai renkou guimo xianzhi], Caixin, 3 March 17; Zhou Dongxu, ``China
Democratic League Central Committee: Propose Abolishing `Invisible
Threshold' for Migrant Workers Settling in Cities'' [Minmeng zhongyang:
jianyi xiaochu nongmingong luohu chengzhen de ``yinxing menkan''],
Caixin, 9 March 17.
\21\ Cara Wallis, ``Hukou Reform and China's Migrant Workers,''
University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 10
October 16; Juan Chen et al., ``Beyond Hukou Reform: Enhancing Human-
Centered Urbanization in China,'' Paulson Institute, 23 February 17, 6-
7.
\22\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 13
July 17; State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua
(2016-2020 nian)], 29 September 16, sec. 5.
\23\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2).
\24\ Ibid., art. 12(3).
\25\ PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa], issued
29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 13(7); PRC Exit and Entry
Administration Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chujing rujing guanli
fa], issued 30 June 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 12(5).
\26\ See, e.g., ``Christian Pastor Accused of [Being] `Falun Gong,'
Denied Issuance of Passport and Hong Kong-Macau Travel Permit''
[Jidujiao mushi bei zhi ``falun gong'' ju fa huzhao ji gang'ao tongxing
zheng], Radio Free Asia, 16 November 16; ``Pastor Zhang Chongzhu
Prevented From Leaving Country'' [Zhang chongzhu mushi bei xianzhi
chujing], Radio Free Asia, 13 June 17; ``China Demands Ethnic Kazakh
Nationals Hand Over Passports, Hundreds of Thousands Unable To Unite
With Family'' [Zhongguo yaoqiu hasakezu guomin jiao hui huzhao shu
shiwan ren wufa yu jiaren tuanju], Radio Free Asia, 13 June 17.
\27\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 170-71.
\28\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangsu Rights Defender Xu Qin
Blocked From Traveling to Hong Kong, Shaanxi's Lu Dongli Denied Common
Passport and HK-Macau Travel Permit on Suspicion of Involvement in
`July 9' Incident'' [Jiangsu weiquan renshi xu qin chujing fu xianggang
bei zu shaanxi lu dongli shexian canyu ``709'' shijian bu yu qianfa
putong huzhao he gang'ao tongxingzheng], 15 March 17; ``Two Rights
Defenders Prohibited From Leaving Country To Go to Hong Kong'' [Liang
weiquan renshi bei jin chujing dao xianggang], Radio Free Asia, 15
March 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Feng Zhenghu: The Tribulations of
China's Lawyers--42 Lawyers and Others Prevented From Leaving Country''
[Feng zhenghu: zhongguo lushi de zaoyu--42 ming lushi deng ren bei
xianzhi chujing], 2 July 17.
\29\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangsu Rights Defender Xu Qin
Blocked From Traveling to Hong Kong, Shaanxi's Lu Dongli Denied Common
Passport and HK-Macau Travel Permit on Suspicion of Involvement in
`July 9' Incident'' [Jiangsu weiquan renshi xu qin chujing fu xianggang
bei zu shaanxi lu dongli shexian canyu ``709'' shijian bu yu qianfa
putong huzhao he gang'ao tongxingzheng], 15 March 17; ``Two Rights
Defenders Prohibited From Leaving Country To Go to Hong Kong'' [Liang
weiquan renshi bei jin chujing dao xianggang], Radio Free Asia, 15
March 17; ``Passport Not Processed for Suspected Involvement in 709
Case, Lu Dongli Sues Qianyang County Public Security Bureau'' [She 709
an bu yu ban huzhao lu dongli qisu qianyang xian gong'anju], Radio Free
Asia, 17 March 17.
\30\ ``Shihezi, Xinjiang, Tightens Border Controls Again, Public
Security Requires Residents To Turn in Passports'' [Xinjiang shihezi
biankong zai shoujin gong'an yao jumin shangjiao huzhao], Voice of
America, 21 October 16; ``China Recalls Passports Across Xinjiang Amid
Ongoing Security Crackdown,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 October 16; Edward
Wong, ``Police Confiscate Passports in Parts of Xinjiang, in Western
China,'' New York Times, 1 December 16.
\31\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in
Xinjiang,'' 21 November 16.
\32\ World Uyghur Congress, ``The World Uyghur Congress Raises
Strong Concerns Over the Confiscation of Passports,'' 21 October 16;
Human Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in
Xinjiang,'' 21 November 16.
\33\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in
Xinjiang,'' 21 November 16.
\34\ ``Protests Continue in Kazakhstan Over China's Treatment of
Kazakhs,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 July 17; ``Dozens of Ethnic Kazakhs
Detained Amid Security Crackdown in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free
Asia, 1 August 17.
\35\ ``China Seizes Tibetans' Passports in a Bid To Block Travel,''
Radio Free Asia, 14 November 16; Annie Gowen, ``Hundreds of Tibetans
Defy China, Gather at Birthplace of Buddhism in India,'' Washington
Post, 13 January 17.
\36\ ``China Seizes Tibetans' Passports in a Bid To Block Travel,''
Radio Free Asia, 14 November 16.
\37\ ``Tibetans Ordered Home by China Are Questioned by Police,
Lose Their Passports,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 January 17; ``Tibetan
Pilgrims See Passports Destroyed on Their Return,'' Radio Free Asia, 31
January 17.
\38\ Chris Buckley, ``China Bars Professor at Australian University
From Leaving, Lawyer Says,'' New York Times, 26 March 17; Louise Watt,
``Scholars Urge China To Let Academic Return to Australia,'' Associated
Press, 30 March 17.
\39\ Chris Buckley, ``China Bars Professor at Australian University
From Leaving, Lawyer Says,'' New York Times, 26 March 17; ``Australia-
Based Scholar Feng Chongyi Still Held in Soft Detention in Guangzhou''
[Lu ao xuezhe feng chongyi reng bei ruanjin guangzhou], Radio Free
Asia, 27 March 17.
\40\ ``Australia-Based Scholar Feng Chongyi Still Held in Soft
Detention in Guangzhou'' [Lu ao xuezhe feng chongyi reng bei ruanjin
guangzhou], Radio Free Asia, 27 March 17.
\41\ Philip Wen, ``Australia-Based Academic Leaves China After
Questioning,'' Reuters, 1 April 17; Nick McKenzie et al., ``China's
Operation Australia: The Party Line,'' Sydney Morning Herald, last
visited 16 August 17.
\42\ Nick McKenzie et al., ``China's Operation Australia: The Party
Line,'' Sydney Morning Herald, last visited 16 August 17.
\43\ ``Dozens of Mainlanders Blocked From Going to Hong Kong To
Attend Seminar on Anti-Rightist Movement'' [Dalu shu shi ren bei jin
lai gang chuxi fanyou yundong yantaohui], Radio Free Asia, 28 March 17.
\44\ ``HK Holds Seminar on Anti-Rightist Movement, CCP Uses
Underhanded Suppression'' [Gang ban fanyou yundong yantaohui zhonggong
yinzhao daya], Apple Daily, 28 March 17.
\45\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(1).
\46\ See, e.g., ``China Ups `Stability Maintenance' Alert as PLA
Veterans Head to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 April 17; ``China in
Nationwide Security Crackdown During New Silk Road Forum,'' Radio Free
Asia, 15 May 17; Nathan VanderKlippe, ``China Jails Its Citizens as It
Touts Global Benefits of `New Silk Road,' '' Globe and Mail, 17 May 17.
\47\ See, e.g., ``As Sensitive Dates Approach, Guangzhou Begins To
Pressure Rights Defenders'' [Min'gan rizi jiang zhi sui kaishi dui
weiquan renshi shiya], Radio Free Asia, 18 May 17; ``China Puts
Activists Under House Arrest, Surveillance Ahead of Massacre
Anniversary,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17; ``Chinese Writer and Lawyer
Girlfriend Forced To Leave Guangzhou on Sensitive Dates'' [Zhongguo
zuojia ji lushi nuyou min'gan ri bei bi li guangzhou], Voice of
America, 30 May 17; ``Chinese Police Tighten Security in Beijing, Round
Up Activists for Tiananmen Massacre Anniversary,'' Radio Free Asia, 4
June 17.
\48\ See, e.g., ``With National Two Sessions About To Convene,
Local Governments on Guard Against Petitioners Heading to Beijing''
[Quanguo lianghui jijiang zhaokai difang zhengfu yanfang fangmin fu
jing], Radio Free Asia, 9 February 17; ``As Beijing's Two Sessions
Near, Authorities Hold Large-Scale Clearing Out of Petitioner
Villages'' [Beijing lianghui jiang zhi dangju daju saodang shangfang
cun], Radio Free Asia, 13 February 17; ``With `Two Sessions' Drawing
Near, Large-Scale Suppression of Dissidents in Many Areas''
[``Lianghui'' linjin gedi da guimo yazhi yiyi renshi], Radio Free Asia,
28 February 17.
\49\ See, e.g., ``Hu Jia's Two Sessions `Forced Travel' Excessively
Long, Health Suffers Without Way To Take Scheduled Medicine'' [Hu jia
lianghui ``bei luyou'' chaoshi wufa dingshi fuyao jiankang shousun],
Radio Free Asia, 21 March 17.
\50\ Rights Defense Network, ``Former Qianjiang, Hubei, People's
Congress Deputy, Yao Lifa Has Freedom of Person Restricted and Forced
To Travel for 18 Days Before and After Two Sessions'' [Hubei qianjiang
shi qian renda daibiao yao lifa lianghui qianhou bei xianzhi renshen
ziyou qiangzhi luyou 18 tian], 18 March 17. For more information on Yao
Lifa, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2011-
00532.
\51\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Statistical Report on
Rights Defenders in Shanghai Who Were Put in Black Jails or Detained
Before and After the Two Sessions (Supplement)'' [Lianghui qianhou
shanghai weiquan renshi zao guan hei jianyu he juliu de tongji baogao
(buchong)], 16 March 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Zhuhai Authorities
Build Black Jail on Hilltop, Chen Fengming Held for 18 Days [During]
`Two Sessions' '' [Zhuhai dangju shanding shang jian hei jianyu, chen
fengming ``lianghui'' bei qiujin 18 tian], 19 March 17.
\52\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lawyer Liu Zhengqing
Prevented From Traveling to Beijing To Work on Case Because of
`Convening of Two Sessions' '' [Liu zhengqing lushi fu jing ban'an bei
yi ``kai lianghui'' wei you lanjie], 27 February 17.
\53\ Amnesty International, ``China: Human Rights Lawyer Released
on Bail Amid Relentless Crackdown,'' 10 May 17.
\54\ ``Xie Yang's Legal Representative Chen Jian'gang Detained in
Yunnan'' [Xie yang daili lushi chen jian'gang zai yunnan bei zhua],
Radio Free Asia, 3 May 17; Amnesty International, ``China: Human Rights
Lawyer Released on Bail Amid Relentless Crackdown,'' 10 May 17. See
also Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Press
Briefing Notes on China,'' 5 May 17.
\55\ ``During Sensitive Period in March, Multiple Places in Tibetan
Areas Under Strict Controls and Surveillance'' [San yue min'gan qi zang
qu duo di bei yanguan yankong], Radio Free Asia, 14 March 17.
\56\ ``Police Block Over One Thousand Tibetans From Traveling to
Sichuan To Participate in Religious Activity'' [Jingfang zu'nao yu qian
zangren fu chuan canyu zongjiao huodong], Radio Free Asia, 16 February
17.
\57\ Edward Wong, ``Western China Region Aims To Track People by
Requiring Car Navigation,'' New York Times, 24 February 17; ``China
Orders Satellite Positioning Installed in All Cars in Autonomous
Prefecture in Xinjiang'' [Zhongguo xialing xinjiang yi zizhizhou quanbu
qiche anzhuang weixing dingwei], Radio Free Asia, 21 February 17.
\58\ Tom Phillips, ``China Orders GPS Tracking of Every Car in
Troubled Region,'' Guardian, 20 February 17; Philip Wen, ``Region in
China's Restive Xinjiang To Track Vehicles as Anti-Terror Measure,''
Reuters, 21 February 17.
\59\ Ibid.
Status of Women
Status of Women
Status of Women
Public Participation
POLITICAL DECISIONMAKING
The Chinese government is obligated under its international
commitments \1\ and domestic laws \2\ to ensure gender-equal
political participation; women, however, continued to be
underrepresented in political decisionmaking positions. Female
representation in top-level Communist Party and government
leadership remains low or non-existent,\3\ and one scholar
noted that it would likely remain negligible after the
leadership change at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party scheduled for autumn 2017.\4\
Overall, representation at upper and lower levels of the
government continues to fall short of the 30 percent target
recommended by the UN Commission on the Status of Women.\5\ The
proportion of female delegates at the 12th National People's
Congress (NPC), seated in 2013, was 23.4 percent.\6\ A draft
decision presented during the annual session of the 12th NPC in
March 2017 projected that a greater proportion of female
delegates would be elected to the 13th NPC in January 2018, but
did not specify how.\7\
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ADVOCACY
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, Chinese
officials prevented some women's rights advocates from engaging
in activism and providing services--a continuation of the
intensifying restrictions on women's rights advocacy that began
in 2015 \8\--while promoting Party-affiliated alternatives for
protecting women's rights and interests.
A leading feminist activist described the political
environment as ``very difficult'' and reported that independent
groups were unable to organize activities on behalf of women's
rights.\9\ Activists also voiced serious concern about online
censorship after a social media company blocked a prominent
social media account for women's rights, ``Feminist Voices,''
for 30 days in February 2017.\10\ The account shutdown was
allegedly directed by the Cyberspace Administration of China,
the government agency responsible for overseeing all online
content.\11\ [For more information on censorship, see Section
II--Freedom of Expression.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 2017 ``Human Billboard'' Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 1, 2017,\12\ women's rights advocate Zhang Leilei initiated an
anti-sexual harassment campaign with the feminist group Women Awakening
Network \13\ based in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province.\14\
feminist group Women Awakening Network.\14\ Zhang recruited 100
volunteers from across China via social media as ``human billboards''
who would publicly carry posters to raise awareness about preventing
sexual harassment on public transportation.\15\ Volunteers from at
least 23 cities participated and around 10 feminist or LGBT groups held
activities in conjunction with the campaign.\16\ Zhang started the
campaign after authorities repeatedly refused permission for a crowd-
funded advertisement against sexual harassment in a Guangzhou subway
station.\17\ On May 17, 2017, authorities ordered Zhang to halt the
billboard campaign because it was ``too large,'' comparing it to the
planned anti-sexual harassment activity in March 2015 that led to the
criminal detention of five women's rights advocates (also known as the
Feminist Five).\18\ They also told Zhang to suspend all other
activities and leave the city for the remainder of the year due to
heightened public security in anticipation of the 2017 Fortune Global
Forum to be held in Guangzhou in December.\19\ Guangzhou authorities
also searched the home of three others involved in the campaign.\20\
Zhang subsequently suspended the campaign and canceled a series of
planned follow-up activities.\21\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2016, the Party's Central Committee General
Office launched a nationwide initiative to reform the Party-
affiliated All-China Women's Federation (ACWF).\22\ The reforms
direct the ACWF to more actively intervene in individual cases
to protect women against violations of their rights and
interests, to improve aid delivery, and to enhance the ACWF's
online presence.\23\ The initiative also charged the ACWF with
``leading women to listen to the Party [and] follow the path of
the Party'' and ``strengthening the leadership of the Party.''
\24\
The Chinese government also continued to target individual
women's rights advocates with criminal prosecution and other
forms of harassment and intimidation.
The Foshan Intermediate People's Court in
Guangdong province convicted Su Changlan,\25\ an
influential organizer and advocate for women's rights
and democratic village elections, of ``inciting
subversion of state power'' on March 31, 2017.\26\ The
court sentenced Su to three years in prison and a
subsequent three-year deprivation of political
rights.\27\ Su is expected to be released in October
2017.\28\ Authorities repeatedly violated her legal and
procedural rights by holding her in secret detention,
denying her legal counsel, repeatedly extending her
detention before her trial in April 2016, and deferring
a judgment four times.\29\ In June 2017, her brother
reported that her life was ``definitely in danger''
because of inadequate medical treatment,\30\ and
Amnesty International said in August 2017 that her
health suffered ``a sharp deterioration due to ill-
treatment and poor detention conditions over the past
years.'' \31\ The UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention in 2015 determined that the Chinese
government had arbitrarily detained Su and called on
the government to release her immediately and grant
reparation for harm suffered during her detention.\32\
Public security officials detained Su in October 2014
after she voiced support for the pro-democracy
demonstrations in Hong Kong.\33\
Also on March 31, 2017, the same Foshan court
sentenced Chen Qitang,\34\ to four years and six
months' imprisonment and three years' deprivation of
political rights for ``inciting subversion of state
power.'' \35\ Chen had worked with Su to document
domestic violence in Guangdong and actively published
essays critical of government policies.\36\ Authorities
prolonged his detention for more than two years.\37\
The Gangzha District People's Court in Nantong
municipality, Jiangsu province, convicted Shan
Lihua,\38\ a women's rights advocate, of ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble'' in September 2016.\39\
During her detention, authorities reportedly subjected
Shan to torture and other rights violations; her
brother stated that officials at the Nantong PSB
Detention Center beat her ``until she couldn't stand,''
\40\ and that authorities refused her access to
counsel.\41\ The judgment sentencing Shan referenced
her protesting the sexual abuse of students by school
officials in Hainan province in 2013 and the detention
of women's rights advocate Ye Haiyan.\42\
Local authorities in Beijing municipality
repeatedly pressured Ye Haiyan, a prominent advocate
for women, commercial sex workers, and people living
with AIDS, to move residences between January and March
2017.\43\ [For more information on restrictions on
residence and movement prior to the annual meetings of
the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, see Section II--
Freedom of Residence and Movement.] Ye reportedly
remained under constant surveillance by authorities,
and was unable to participate in public demonstrations
or leave the country after Chinese authorities told her
that her passport was ``lost'' after she attempted to
apply for a visa in 2014.\44\ A U.S.-based filmmaker
making a documentary about Ye's activism reported that
officials threatened the filmmaker's family in China in
order to discourage her from releasing the film.\45\
Gender-Based Discrimination
EMPLOYMENT
Women in China continued to face a variety of
institutional, legal, and social barriers to equal employment,
which the Chinese government is obligated to address under its
international commitments \46\ and domestic laws.\47\ Employers
frequently discriminate against women in recruiting,\48\
hiring,\49\ and promotion.\50\ Although existing laws prohibit
such practices,\51\ the system for enforcement remains
inadequate: Repercussions for violating the law are rare \52\
and negligible,\53\ and victims of discrimination at work are
reluctant to seek a legal remedy due to the risk of dismissal
and time involved.\54\ Discriminatory legal policies also
continued to bar women from performing certain jobs--in some
cases based on whether they are menstruating, pregnant, or
breastfeeding.\55\ Disparities in the workplace also manifested
in widespread sexual harassment \56\ and women earning on
average 65 percent of what men earn.\57\ Although the
Commission did not observe statistics on the pay gap for rural
women this past year, in 2011 women's income was 56 percent
that of men's in rural areas,\58\ despite the fact that women
reportedly make up a majority of the rural labor force,
according to a February 2015 news report.\59\
Experts and female respondents to a recent survey
attributed much of the discrimination against women in
employment to employers' desire to avoid the cost of maternity
leave for female employees.\60\ An All-China Women's Federation
survey found that 54.7 percent of employers asked women about
their marital status and reproduction-related issues during the
interview process, and many women reported that employer
concerns about maternity had resulted in reduced salary and
impeded career development and advancement.\61\ In another
survey, the greatest proportion of women reporting gender
discrimination were those between 25 and 34, particularly those
without children.\62\ Experts said that such discrimination
would likely be exacerbated by the ``universal two-child
policy'' implemented in January 2016.\63\ [For more information
on the ``universal two-child policy,'' see Section II--
Population Control.]
Some women continued to demand more active enforcement of
existing Chinese law through gender discrimination lawsuits,
the first of which was reportedly settled out of court in
2013.\64\ In September 2016, Gao Xiao (pseudonym) obtained a
judgment from the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court in
Guangdong province for 2,000 yuan (US$300) and a public apology
from a restaurant chain that refused to interview or hire her
for a chef's apprentice position based on her gender.\65\ In
March 2017, following the company's inaction, the court again
ordered the restaurant to publicly apologize.\66\ In another
case in July 2017, a university student filed the first gender-
based employment discrimination suit in Shenzhen municipality,
Guangdong, against the Shenzhen Municipal Human Resources and
Social Security Bureau for failing to address her complaint
regarding a discriminatory job recruitment advertisement posted
online by a local business.\67\
Some Chinese government officials promoted the use of law
to resolve gender discrimination issues in employment. The
Supreme People's Court (SPC) included a recent gender
discrimination case among the guiding cases released in August
2016,\68\ making it a judgment that courts ``at all levels
should refer to . . . when adjudicating similar cases.'' \69\
The judgment granted compensation to a female plaintiff who
sued a courier service that refused to hire her because of her
gender.\70\ SPC official Guo Feng said that imposing civil
liability would deter employers from discriminating on the
basis of gender.\71\ In March 2017, several National People's
Congress (NPC) delegates spoke out in support of creating an
anti-discrimination law for employment to address widespread
discrimination.\72\
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Women, particularly after marriage, continued to lack
secure rights to property in both rural and urban areas due to
a combination of legal policies and traditionalist cultural
pressures. One NPC Standing Committee member noted that rural
women continue to face challenges in asserting rights to land
due to a lack of decisionmaking power at both the household and
village level.\73\ According to a 2016 interview with a Chinese
professor, 18 percent of married rural women did not have their
names included on the land contracts of the household of either
their husband or parents, and nearly 53 percent of married
women had had land contracts canceled by their home villages as
of 2014.\74\ Urban women also face difficulties defending their
property rights; for example, in fall 2016, a court ruled
against a woman who, after her husband proposed divorce, sued
to have her name added to the title of a home she had
contributed to purchasing.\75\ A 2011 Supreme People's Court
interpretation of the PRC Marriage Law grants property in a
divorce to the party named on the deed.\76\ Research from 2012
indicated that a majority of married women or their families
contribute to the purchase of homes, but most women are not
named on the deed of the home.\77\
Violence Against Women
Women in China continued to face challenges with domestic
and sexual violence as officials continued to develop a legal
and institutional infrastructure to prevent such abuse. All-
China Women's Federation statistics show that ``30 percent of
married women have experienced some form of domestic
violence.'' \78\ At the end of June 2017, courts reportedly had
issued 1,284 total protection orders under the PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law,\79\ in effect since March 2016.\80\
Experts on the domestic violence law note that challenges to
implementation include lack of awareness,\81\ inadequate
resources for training of officials,\82\ gender discrimination
within the legal system,\83\ and enforcement that prioritizes
family cohesion and ``social stability'' over the safety of
victims.\84\ Victims of sexual violence also face challenges in
obtaining legal redress--experts note that victims of sexual
harassment are reluctant to come forward due to pressure from
family and society.\85\ A 2013 UN study found that nearly one
in five Chinese women reported being the victims of rape,\86\
and a 2015 survey of Chinese college students found that 34.8
percent of female respondents (and 35.6 percent of male
respondents) had experienced sexual harassment or violence.\87\
The non-governmental organization China Labour Bulletin noted
that while sexual harassment is ``widespread,'' it is rare for
women to obtain justice through the legal system.\88\
Status of Women
Status of Women
Notes to Section II--Status of Women
\1\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180
of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, arts. 7, 24. Under
Article 7(b) of CEDAW, China, as a State Party, is obligated to
``ensure to women, on equal terms with men,'' the right ``[t]o
participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public
functions at all levels of government . . ..'' United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited 13 July 17.
China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on
November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and
obligations contained in these articles.
\2\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92,
amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral
Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji
renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December
82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, 29
August 15, art. 6. Both of these laws stipulate that an ``appropriate
number'' of female deputies should serve at all levels of people's
congresses.
\3\ ``China Political Leaders'' [Zhongguo zhengyao], Chinese
Communist Party News, People's Daily, last visited 17 July 17;
``Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Leadership Organization Members'
Biographies'' [Zhonggong shiba jie zhongyang lingdao jigou chengyuan
jianli], Xinhua, 15 November 12. Within Party leadership, only 2 of the
25 members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central
Committee (Politburo) are women, and there are no women among the 7
members of the Politburo Standing Committee--the most powerful
governing body in China. There are no women serving as Party
secretaries at the provincial level. In government leadership, women
hold 2 out of 25 national-level ministerial positions and 2 out of 31
governorships of provinces, provincial-level municipalities, and
autonomous regions. For more information on female members of the
Politburo since 1945, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, Notes
to Section II--Status of Women, 176, endnote 5.
\4\ Cheng Li, Brookings Institute, ``Status of China's Women
Leaders on the Eve of 19th Party Congress,'' 30 March 17.
\5\ Ibid.; Women's Studies Institute of China, ``The Shadow Report
of Chinese Women's NGOs on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic
Report Submitted by China Under Article 19 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Temporary
Special Measures and the Political and Public Life (Article 4 & 7),''
September 2014, 1-2; Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of
China to the United Nations, Introductory Statement by H.E. Mme. Song
Xiuyuan, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Consideration of China's
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports by the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 23 October 14, sec. 3.
According to official statistics from 2013, women made up 23.4 percent
of the 12th National People's Congress and 22.6 percent of all village
committee members. ``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to
Women by 1995--United Nations Commission on the Status of Women,'' UN
Chronicle, Vol. 27, No. 2, June 1990, reprinted in Popline. The target
of 30-percent female representation in leadership positions by 1995 was
recommended by the UN Commission on the Status of Women at its 34th
session in 1990.
\6\ Women's Studies Institute of China, ``The Shadow Report of
Chinese Women's NGOs on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report
Submitted by China Under Article 19 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Temporary
Special Measures and the Political and Public Life (Article 4 & 7),''
September 2014, 1-2. In the 12th Session of the National People's
Congress, which began in 2013, women held 23.4 percent of seats.
\7\ Wang Chen, ``Explanation of the `(Draft) Decision of the 5th
Meeting of the 12th National People's Congress on Member Quotas and
Election Issues for the 13th National People's Congress' '' [Guanyu
``di shi'er jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di wuci huiyi guanyu di
shisan jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao ming'e he xuanju wenti
de jueding (cao'an)'' de shuoming], National People's Congress, 8 March
17, item 3.
\8\ See, e.g., Rebecca E. Karl et al., ``Dark Days for Women in
China? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 18 March 15; Maya Wang, ``China's
Chilling Message to Women,'' CNN, 7 April 15. See also CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 172-73; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 178-79.
\9\ Echo Huang, ``Activist Li Maizi on Why Feminism Is `Going
Backwards' in China,'' Quartz, 13 March 17; Leta Hong Fincher,
``China's Feminist Five,'' Dissent Magazine, 4 October 16.
\10\ Didi Kristen Tatlow, ``Chinese Feminist Group's Social Media
Account Suspended,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 22 February 17.
\11\ Ibid. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 66-67.
\12\ Zhang Leilei, ``They Said: You Must Call Off the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Campaign You Started'' [Tamen shuo: ni bixu jiaoting ni faqi
de fan xing saorao xingdong], 18 May 17, reprinted in China Digital
Times, last visited 22 August 17.
\13\ ``Anti-Sexual Harassment: Guangzhou Women's Rights Advocate
Starts `Human Billboard' Campaign'' [Fandui xing saorao guangzhou
nuquan huodongzhe faqi ``renrou guanggao pai'' huodong], Radio Free
Asia, 9 May 17.
\14\ Sarah O'Meara, ``How To Be More Than a Token Woman in Chinese
Politics,'' Sixth Tone, 26 December 16.
\15\ Zhang Leilei, ``They Said: You Must Call Off the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Campaign You Started'' [Tamen shuo: ni bixu jiaoting ni faqi
de fan xing saorao xingdong], 18 May 17, reprinted in China Digital
Times, last visited 22 August 17; Women Awakening Network (GZxmtnx),
``Let's Go! This Girl Is Becoming China's First Human Billboard Against
Sexual Harassment'' [Xingdong! zhege nuhai jiang chengwei zhongguo
shouge fan xing saorao roushen guanggao pai], Weibo post, 1 May 17,
2:27 p.m.
\16\ Zhang Leilei, ``They Said: You Must Call Off the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Campaign You Started'' [Tamen shuo: ni bixu jiaoting ni faqi
de fan xing saorao xingdong], 18 May 17, reprinted in China Digital
Times, last visited 22 August 17.
\17\ Zou Yun, ``Feminist Activist Ignores Police Advice To Leave
City,'' Sixth Tone, 22 May 17; Tony Lin, ``End of the Line for Subway
Ad Against Sexual Harassment,'' Sixth Tone, 28 April 17.
\18\ ``Guangzhou Anti-Sexual Harassment `Human Billboard' Campaign
Called Off, Police Order Women's Rights Organization Member To Leave
Guangzhou'' [Guangzhou fan xing saorao ``renrou guanggao pai'' huodong
bei jiaoting, nuquan zuzhizhe bei jingcha yaoqiu likai guangzhou],
Radio Free Asia, 19 May 17; Zhang Leilei, ``They Said: You Must Call
Off the Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign You Started'' [Tamen shuo: ni
bixu jiaoting ni faqi de fan xing saorao xingdong], 18 May 17,
reprinted in China Digital Times, last visited 22 August 17; Edward
Wong, ``5 Women's Rights Activists Are Formally Detained in Beijing,''
New York Times, 13 March 15; Rachel Lu, `` `They Are the Best Feminist
Activists in China,' '' Foreign Policy, Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 17
March 15. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 178; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 173.
\19\ Zou Yun, ``Feminist Activist Ignores Police Advice To Leave
City,'' Sixth Tone, 22 May 17; ``Guangzhou Anti-Sexual Harassment
`Human Billboard' Campaign Called Off, Police Order Women's Rights
Organization Member To Leave Guangzhou'' [Guangzhou fan xing saorao
``renrou guanggao pai'' huodong bei jiaoting, nuquan zuzhizhe bei
jingcha yaoqiu likai guangzhou], Radio Free Asia, 19 May 17.
\20\ Nuala Gathercole Lam, ``Guangzhou Police Search House of
Feminist Activists,'' Sixth Tone, 27 June 17.
\21\ ``Guangzhou Anti-Sexual Harassment `Human Billboard' Campaign
Called Off, Police Order Women's Rights Organization Member To Leave
Guangzhou'' [Guangzhou fan xing saorao ``renrou guanggao pai'' huodong
bei jiaoting, nuquan zuzhizhe bei jingcha yaoqiu likai guangzhou],
Radio Free Asia, 19 May 17.
\22\ ``CCP Central Committee General Office Publishes `ACWF Reform
Agenda' '' [Zhongban yinfa ``quanguo fulian gaige fang'an''], People's
Daily, 22 September 16.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ For more information on Su Changlan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00406.
\26\ Catherine Lai, ``An `Absurd Verdict': Jail Terms for China
Activists Who Voiced Support for Hong Kong's Pro-Democracy Occupy
Protests,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 31 March 17; Foshan Intermediate
People's Court, Guangdong Province, Criminal Court Judgment [Guangdong
sheng foshan shi zhongji renmin fayuan, xingshi panjue shu], (2015) Fo
Zhong Fa Xing Yi Chu Zi No. 131, 30 March 17, reprinted in Independent
Chinese PEN Center, 31 March 17.
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ Foshan Intermediate People's Court, Guangdong Province,
Criminal Court Judgment [Guangdong sheng Foshan shi zhongji renmin
fayuan xingshi panjue shu], (2015) Fo Zhong Fa Xing Yi Chu Zi No. 131,
30 March 17, reprinted in Independent Chinese PEN Center, 31 March 17.
\29\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Su Changlan Named 2017
Recipient of Cao Shunli Memorial Award for Human Rights Defenders,'' 13
March 17.
\30\ ``Fears Grow for Health of Chinese Women's Rights Activist Su
Changlan,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 June 17.
\31\ Amnesty International, ``Open Letter Calling for the Urgent
Medical Attention of Su Changlan,'' 10 August 17.
\32\ UN Human Rights Council, Opinions adopted by the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention at Its 74th Session, 30 November-4 December
2015, Opinion No. 39/2015 Concerning Su Changlan (China), A/HRC/WGAD/
2015/39, 25 February 16, paras. 22-32.
\33\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Su Changlan Named 2017
Recipient of Cao Shunli Memorial Award for Human Rights Defenders,'' 13
March 17; UN Human Rights Council, Opinions adopted by the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its 74th Session, 30 November-4
December 2015, Opinion No. 39/2015 Concerning Su Changlan (China), A/
HRC/WGAD/2015/39, 25 February 16, paras. 6-7.
\34\ For more information on Chen Qitang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2009-00002.
\35\ ``Su Changlan and Chen Qitang Heavily Sentenced for Supporting
Occupy Movement'' [Su changlan, chen qitang zhichi zhanlin yundong bei
zhongpan], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 17.
\36\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan: Some Thoughts
on Su Changlan's Indictment'' [Liu xiaoyuan lushi: wo dui su changlan
an qisu yijianshu de jidian kanfa], Rights Defense Network, 6 May 15.
\37\ ``Su Changlan and Chen Qitang Heavily Sentenced for Supporting
Occupy Movement'' [Su changlan, chen qitang zhichi zhanlin yundong bei
zhongpan], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 17.
\38\ For more information on Shan Lihua, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00033.
\39\ `` `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' Again, Jiangsu
Rights Defender Shan Lihua Sentenced to 2 Years and 3 Months'' [You shi
``xunxin zishi'' jiangsu weiquan renshi shan lihua panxing 2 nian 3 ge
yue], Radio Free Asia, 29 September 16.
\40\ ``China Jails Women's Rights Campaigner After `Torture' in
Detention,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 September 16.
\41\ `` `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' Again, Jiangsu
Rights Defender Shan Lihua Sentenced to 2 Years and 3 Months'' [You shi
``xunxin zishi'' jiangsu weiquan renshi shan lihua panxing 2 nian 3 ge
yue], Radio Free Asia, 29 September 16.
\42\ Gangzha District People's Court, Nantong Municipality, Jiangsu
Province, Criminal Judgment [Jiangsu sheng nantong shi gangzha qu
renmin fayuan xingshi panjue shu], (2016) Su 0611 Xing Chu No. 50, 29
September 16, reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 29 September 16.
\43\ ``Striking Hard Before the Two Sessions, Ye Haiyan Forced To
Relocate Again'' [Lianghui qian yanda: ye haiyan zai bei banqian],
Deutsche Welle, 6 March 17; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Women's
Rights Defender Ye Haiyan Ordered by Beijing's Songzhuang Government To
Move'' [Nu quan hanweizhe ye haiyan bei beijing songzhuang zhengfu
xialing bipo banqian], 18 January 17.
\44\ Joanna Chiu, ``Documentary `Hooligan Sparrow' Shows How
Dangerous It Is To Protest Against Rape in China,'' Quartz, 24 October
16; Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: Clipping a
Sparrow's Wings in China,'' 15 July 14.
\45\ Joanna Chiu, ``Documentary `Hooligan Sparrow' Shows How
Dangerous It Is To Protest Against Rape in China,'' Quartz, 24 October
16.
\46\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 11.1; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
23 June 17. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified
it on November 4, 1980. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last
visited 23 June 17. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and
ratified it on March 27, 2001.
\47\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 48; PRC Labor Law
[Zhongghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5 July 94, effective 1
January 95, art. 13; PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3
April 92, amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 2.
\48\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last
visited 23 July 17; ``Nearly 90 percent of Female College Students
Experience Discrimination in On-Campus Recruitment'' [Zhongguo daxue
xiaoyuan zhaopin jin 9 cheng nu daxuesheng zao qishi], Radio Free Asia,
25 November 16.
\49\ Zhong Yi, ``NPC Representative Sun Xiaomei: To Protect Women's
Legal Labor Rights, Employment Discrimination Should Be Eliminated''
[Renda daibiao sun xiaomei: weihu funu hefa laodong quan ying xiaochu
jiuye qishi], China News Service, 12 March 17.
\50\ World Economic Forum, ``The Global Gender Gap Report 2016,''
26 October 16, 142-43. According to the World Economic Forum report,
women remained underrepresented in management positions, with 17.5
percent of firms including women in top-level management. Zhaopin,
``Zhaopin: Chinese Women Still Facing Discrimination in Workplace,'' 6
March 17. In a 2017 survey conducted by Zhaopin, an online job-seeking
and recruitment platform, 25 percent of women reported experiencing
severe or very severe gender discrimination in promotions and generally
waited longer for promotions.
\51\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 12-13. Gender-based
discrimination against employees or applicants for employment is
prohibited under Articles 12 and 13 of the PRC Labor Law. See also
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Provisions on
Employment Services and Employment Management [Jiuye fuwu yu jiuye
guanli guiding], issued 5 November 07, amended 23 December 14,
effective 1 February 15, arts. 20, 58(2); PRC Constitution, issued 4
December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March
04, art. 48.
\52\ Tang Xiaoqing, ``Female College Students Face Employment
Discrimination; Multi-Pronged Approach Can Eliminate `Obstacles' '' [Nu
daxuesheng zaoyu jiuye qishi duoguanqi xiafang neng xiaochu
``lanlushi''], China News Service, reprinted in Xinhua, 20 November 16;
Lim Yan Liang, ``Job Seekers in China Face All Manner of
Discrimination,'' Straits Times, 12 June 17; China Labour Bulletin,
``Workplace Discrimination,'' last visited 23 July 17.
\53\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last
visited 23 July 17; Tang Xiaoqing, ``Female College Students Face
Employment Discrimination; Multi-Pronged Approach Can Eliminate
`Obstacles' '' [Nu daxuesheng zaoyu jiuye qishi duoguanqi xiafang neng
xiaochu ``lanlushi''], China News Service, reprinted in Xinhua, 20
November 16.
\54\ Hatty Liu, ``Getting Rights Wrong,'' World of Chinese, 13
October 16.
\55\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 59-61, 63; State Council,
Special Provisions for the Protection of Female Employees' Labor [Nu
zhigong laodong baohu tebie guiding], issued and effective 28 April 12,
Appendix, para. 1 (labor restrictions for all women), para. 2 (labor
restrictions during menstruation), para. 3 (labor restrictions during
pregnancy), para. 4 (labor restrictions while breastfeeding).
\56\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last
visited 23 July 17; `` `Refuse To Get Laid, Get Laid Off': Supervisors
Responsible for 80 Percent of Workplace Sexual Harassment'' [``Bu shang
chuang jiu xia gang'' ba cheng zhichang xing saorao laizi shangsi],
Radio Free Asia, 14 December 16; Jane Li, ``Young Chinese Women Dare To
Say No to Sexual Harassment, Says Expert,'' South China Morning Post,
14 December 16.
\57\ World Economic Forum, ``The Global Gender Gap Report 2016,''
26 October 16, 142.
\58\ All-China Women's Federation and National Bureau of Statistics
of China, ``Report on Major Results of the Third Wave Survey on the
Social Status of Women in China,'' 21 October 11, 2.
\59\ Tania Branigan, ``For Richer, For Poorer: How China's Laws Put
Women Second,'' Guardian, 24 February 15.
\60\ Zhong Yi, ``NPC Delegate Sun Xiaomei: To Protect Women's Legal
Labor Rights, Employment Discrimination Should Be Eliminated'' [Renda
daibiao sun xiaomei: weihu funu hefa laodong quan ying xiaochu jiuye
qishi], China News Service, 12 March 17; ``Prolonged Maternity Leave
May Worsen Women's Employment Status: Experts,'' The Paper, translated
and reprinted in All-China Women's Federation, 21 October 16. See also
Tang Xiaoqing, ``Female College Students Face Employment
Discrimination; Multi-Pronged Approach Can Eliminate `Obstacles' '' [Nu
daxuesheng zaoyu jiuye qishi duoguanqi xiafang neng xiaochu
``lanlushi''], China News Service, reprinted in Xinhua, 20 November 16;
China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last visited 23
July 17.
\61\ Zhong Yi, ``NPC Delegate Sun Xiaomei: To Protect Women's Legal
Labor Rights, Employment Discrimination Should Be Eliminated'' [Renda
daibiao sun xiaomei: weihu funu hefa laodong quan ying xiaochu jiuye
qishi], China News Service, 12 March 17.
\62\ Zhaopin, ``Zhaopin: Chinese Women Still Facing Discrimination
in Workplace,'' 6 March 17.
\63\ Zhao Yusha, ``New Two-Child Policy Makes Employers Leery of
Hiring Women,'' Global Times, 23 March 17.
\64\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Plaintiff Obtains 30,000 Yuan in
China's First Gender Discrimination Lawsuit,'' 9 January 14; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last visited 23 July 17.
See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 179-80; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 173; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October
14, 113; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 110.
\65\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Restaurant To Serve Feminist Chef Apology,
Court Orders,'' Sixth Tone, 21 September 16.
\66\ `` `I Was Hoping for a Legal Breakthrough,' '' Radio Free
Asia, 31 March 17.
\67\ ``Shenzhen's First Gender-Based Employment Discrimination
Case: Female College Student Takes Bureau of Human Resources and Social
Security to Court'' [Shenzhen xingbie jiuye qishi di yi an: nu
daxuesheng jiang renshebu gaoshang fating], China Banned Book News, 14
July 17. See also Gender-Based Employment Discrimination Supervision
Brigade (Jiuye xingbie qishi jiancha dadui), ``Only Men Need Apply,
Where Is the Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security? '' [Zhaopin
xian nanxing, rensheju zai nali?], WeChat Post, 16 February 17; China
Labour Bulletin, ``China's Women Fight Back Against Workplace
Discrimination,'' 8 March 17.
\68\ ``Supreme People's Court Model Cases on Enhancing Core
Socialist Values'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu hongyang shehui zhuyi
hexin jiazhiguan dianxing anli], 23 August 16; Wang Chunxia, ``Protect
Women's Rights to Equal Employment Through Law'' [Yifa baohu funu
pingdeng jiuye quan], China Women's News, 23 August 16.
\69\ Supreme People's Court Judicial Committee, Supreme People's
Court Provisions on Case Guidance Work, issued 26 November 10,
reprinted in Stanford Law School, Guiding Cases Project, art. 7; Mark
Jia, ``Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform,'' Harvard
Law Review, Vol. 129, No. 8 (10 June 16), 2213.
\70\ ``Supreme People's Court Model Cases on Enhancing Core
Socialist Values'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu hongyang shehui zhuyi
hexin jiazhiguan dianxing anli], 23 August 16; Wang Chunxia, ``Protect
Women's Rights to Equal Employment Through Law'' [Yifa baohu funu
pingdeng jiuye quan], China Women's News, 23 August 16. For more
information on recent gender discrimination cases, see CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 179-80.
\71\ Wang Chunxia, ``Protect Women's Rights to Equal Employment
Through Law'' [Yifa baohu funu pingdeng jiuye quan], China Women's
News, 23 August 16.
\72\ Fu Dongyan, ``Anti-Discrimination Law for Employment Should Be
Introduced Soon'' [Fan jiuye qishi fa yinggai jinkuai chutai], China
Women's News, reprinted in People's Daily, 15 March 17; Li Huifang,
``NPC Delegate Luo He'an: Proposes Introducing `Anti-Employment
Discrimination Law' '' [Quanguo renda daibiao luo he'an: tiqing chutai
``fan jiuye qishi fa''], Red Net, 12 March 17.
\73\ Yang Yifan, ``Protecting Rural Women's Land Contract Rights''
[Weihu nongcun funu tudi chengbao quanyi], China Women's News, 6 March
17.
\74\ Li Huiying, ``Rural Land Rights Certificates Should Safeguard
Women's Legal Interests: Expert,'' Women of China, 22 April 16.
\75\ Wei Zhezhe, ``Real Estate Bought in Wedlock, Why Can't a Name
Be Added? '' [Hunnei gouzhi fangchan, weisha bu neng jia mingzi?],
People's Daily, 19 October 16.
\76\ ``Supreme People's Court Guidance on `Certain Issues on the
Application of the PRC Marriage Law' (Three)'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
guanyu shiyong ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa'' ruogan wenti de
jieshi (san)], issued 9 August 11, art. 10. See also CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 174.
\77\ Tania Branigan, ``For Richer, For Poorer: How China's Laws Put
Women Second,'' Guardian, 24 February 15.
\78\ ``Domestic Abuse Towards Women Happen Every 7.4 Seconds in
China,'' CRI English, 25 November 16.
\79\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, chap.
4.
\80\ Luo Sha, ``Nation's Courts Issue Total of 1,284 Protection
Orders Since Implementation of Anti-Domestic Violence Law'' [Fan jiabao
fa shishi yilai quanguo fayuan fachu renshen anquan baohu ling 1284
fen], Xinhua, 19 July 17. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October
16, 180.
\81\ Bibek Bhandari, ``Domestic Violence Law Ignored by Most
Employers, Study Finds,'' Sixth Tone, 9 May 17.
\82\ Ibid. See also Wang Chunxia, ``Seminar on Discussing Prominent
Problems of Anti-Domestic Violence Law Held in Beijing,'' Women of
China, 25 October 16.
\83\ Emily Rauhala, ``Despite a New Law, China Is Failing Survivors
of Domestic Violence,'' Washington Post, 7 February 17.
\84\ Ibid. See also ``Effectiveness of Chinese Laws Against
Abuse,'' CCTV, 25 November 16.
\85\ Cherie Chan, ``Combating Stigma of Sexual Harassment in
China,'' Deutsche Welle, 9 August 16.
\86\ Wang Xiangxian et. al., ``Research on Gender-Based Violence
and Masculinities in China: Quantitative Findings,'' UN Population Fund
China Office, 2013, 25.
\87\ Yu Mingshan, ``Chinese Family Planning Association: Over 30
Percent of Surveyed College Students Suffered Sexual Violence or
Harassment'' [Zhongguo jisheng xiehui: chao san cheng shoufang
daxuesheng ceng zao xing baoli huo xing saorao], Xinmin Evening Post,
27 September 16; Catherine Lai, ``Over 30 Per Cent of College Students
in China have Experienced Sexual Violence or Harassment--Survey,'' Hong
Kong Free Press, 29 September 16.
\88\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Why Sexual Harassment Persists in the
Workplace,'' 9 January 17.
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Human Trafficking
Defining Human Trafficking
As a State Party to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (UN TIP Protocol),\1\ China is obligated to enact
legislation criminalizing human trafficking as defined by the
UN TIP Protocol.\2\ The definition of human trafficking under
the PRC Criminal Law,\3\ however, remains inconsistent with UN
TIP Protocol standards.\4\ The UN TIP Protocol definition of
human trafficking involves three components: the action of
recruiting, transporting, harboring, or receiving persons; the
means of coercion, deception, or control; \5\ and ``the purpose
of exploitation,'' including sexual exploitation or forced
labor.\6\ Chinese law focuses on the act of selling a woman or
child,\7\ rather than the purpose of exploitation.\8\ The
definition of trafficking in the PRC Criminal Law does not
clearly cover all forms of trafficking in the UN TIP
Protocol,\9\ including certain types of non-physical coercion;
\10\ offenses against male victims; \11\ and forced labor,\12\
though forced labor is illegal under a separate provision of
the law.\13\ In addition, the Chinese legal definition of
trafficking includes the purchase or abduction of children for
subsequent sale without specifying the purpose of these
actions.\14\ Under the UN TIP Protocol, illegal adoptions
constitute trafficking only if the purpose is exploitation.\15\
Human trafficking experts note a dearth of reliable statistics
on the scale of human trafficking in general; \16\ in China,
inconsistencies between domestic law and international
standards further contribute to the difficulty of assessing the
scale of human trafficking.\17\ A scholar with the Centre for
Human Rights Studies at the University of Zurich, Switzerland,
argued that the discrepancies in the Chinese legal definition
make international comparisons of human trafficking difficult
and have ``serious, negative implications for formulating an
effective national anti-trafficking strategy.'' \18\
Trends and Developments
CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING
China remains a destination country for the trafficking of
men, women, and children from throughout Asia,\19\ and a source
country for trafficking to Europe, the United States, and
elsewhere.\20\ Vietnamese media reported an increase in the
number of victims of human trafficking in 2016; the majority of
cases were reportedly women trafficked to China for forced
marriage or sexual exploitation.\21\ According to a study of
trafficked men and boys, Vietnamese males were also trafficked
to China for the purpose of forced labor in factories.\22\
Burmese and Cambodian nationals were reportedly trafficked to
China for forced marriage and forced labor,\23\ and Nepalese
and Lao women were reportedly trafficked to China for sexual
exploitation.\24\ According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
and the International Organization for Migration, China is also
a source country for human trafficking to Europe.\25\ This past
year, the Commission observed reports of alleged human
trafficking of Chinese nationals to the United States \26\ and
elsewhere \27\ for forced labor and sexual exploitation.
DOMESTIC TRAFFICKING
According to UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking
in Persons (UN-ACT), men, women, and children were trafficked
within China's borders for forced labor, forced begging, forced
marriage, and sexual exploitation.\28\ During this reporting
year, the Commission observed domestic media reports of women,
including women with intellectual disabilities, trafficked for
the purpose of forced marriage,\29\ and of men trafficked for
forced labor in brick kilns in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangdong
provinces.\30\ A case involving the use of child labor by
clothing manufacturers in Jiangsu province,\31\ also appeared
to constitute trafficking for forced labor, as employers
reportedly used violence against the children and withheld pay
and identity documents.\32\ [For more information on this case
and child labor in China, see Section II--Worker Rights--Child
Labor.]
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR
This past year, the Chinese government subjected
individuals to forced labor during pretrial detention and while
held in administrative detention centers. The International
Labour Organization (ILO) definition of forced labor makes an
exception for labor performed ``as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law . . .''; \33\ however, the
Commission observed reports of individuals performing forced
labor in detention before trial.\34\ In a form of
administrative detention known as compulsory drug
detoxification, authorities detained suspected drug users
without trial and reportedly required them to perform
labor.\35\ According to a March 2017 article in the state-run
news agency Xinhua, one compulsory drug detoxification center
in Shaanxi province typically held detainees for two years.\36\
The center provided education and training for two months, and
for the remainder of the time, detainees ``participated in
handicraft labor.'' \37\ As the government does not convict
compulsory detoxification detainees in court, the requirement
to perform labor constitutes forced labor under the ILO
definition \38\ and human trafficking under the UN TIP
Protocol.\39\ Compulsory drug detoxification centers are
similar to reeducation through labor (RTL),\40\ another form of
administrative punishment in which detainees were detained
without trial \41\ and subjected to forced labor.\42\ Although
the government abolished RTL in 2013,\43\ Zhang Sujun, Vice
Minister of the Ministry of Justice, said in November 2014 that
authorities had converted most RTL facilities to compulsory
drug detoxification centers.\44\
According to the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), authorities
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) subjected some
Uyghur residents to hashar, a type of forced labor for public
works projects.\45\ A November 2016 WUC report found that some
local governments in the XUAR periodically required Uyghur
residents to participate in forced labor under threat of
financial penalty and detention.\46\ In February 2017, Uyghur
farmers told Radio Free Asia that local officials claimed to
have abolished hashar, yet still required Uyghur residents to
participate in flood control and tree planting.\47\ Government-
sponsored compulsory labor constitutes forced labor as defined
by the ILO \48\ and human trafficking under the UN TIP
Protocol.\49\ [For more information on forced labor in the
XUAR, see Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Risk Factors
This past year, Chinese workers migrating within China and
individuals with disabilities were at risk of human
trafficking, and government restrictions on worker rights
exacerbated this risk. Despite reforms, international observers
reported that the household registration (hukou) system
continued to disadvantage and marginalize internal migrant
workers,\50\ reportedly exacerbating their vulnerability to
trafficking.\51\ Migrant workers' children, often unable to
migrate with their parents due in part to the hukou system,\52\
were also at an increased risk for human trafficking.\53\ [For
more information on the hukou system, see Section II--Freedom
of Residence and Movement.] Individuals with disabilities were
at risk for forced marriage and forced labor, including forced
begging.\54\ The Chinese government limits workers' right to
freedom of association by restricting independent unions \55\
and limiting the right to collective bargaining.\56\ A
September 2016 UN report noted that the government's failure to
protect workers' fundamental right to freedom of association
limits workers' ability to advocate for their rights,
``directly contribut[ing] to problems such as human trafficking
and slavery.'' \57\ [For more information on restrictions on
worker rights in China, see Section II--Worker Rights.]
In addition to domestic human trafficking, men, women, and
children in neighboring countries face the risk of human
trafficking into China. Poverty in Southeast Asian countries
contributes to human trafficking from that region.\58\ Migrants
and women are particularly at risk.\59\ The Chinese government
continued to treat North Korean refugees as economic migrants
and maintained a policy of repatriating undocumented North
Koreans,\60\ leaving the refugees, who are predominantly women,
vulnerable to trafficking for forced marriage.\61\
Additionally, the government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) reportedly continued to generate
revenue by sending North Korean nationals to work in China
under conditions that one expert described as slave labor.\62\
Reporting from this past year indicated that North Korean
security personnel accompanied the workers and withheld their
passports.\63\ Workers reportedly worked up to 20 hours per day
and typically did not receive their wages until they returned
to North Korea.\64\ [For more information, see Section II--
North Korean Refugees in China.]
China's sex ratio imbalance--exacerbated by government-
imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional bias for
sons \65\--created a demand for marriageable women that may
contribute to human trafficking for forced marriage and sexual
exploitation.\66\ According to the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, in 2016, China had approximately 33.59
million more men than women.\67\ The official sex ratio at
birth was approximately 113.5 boys born for every 100 girls in
2015.\68\ According to demographers, a typical sex ratio at
birth is within the range of 103 to 107 boys born for every 100
girls.\69\ As of August 2017, the government had not released
the sex ratio at birth for 2016. [For more information on
China's population policies, see Section II--Population
Control.]
Anti-Trafficking Efforts
During this reporting year, the Supreme People's Court
(SPC) issued an interpretation on the trafficking of women and
children, while the number of human trafficking cases tried in
the courts declined. The December 2016 SPC interpretation
clarified the application of the law in trying trafficking
cases.\70\ The interpretation specified the meaning of certain
terms used in anti-trafficking provisions of the PRC Criminal
Law,\71\ including defining ``children'' as under the age of
14.\72\ This is inconsistent with the UN TIP Protocol, which
defines children as under the age of 18.\73\ Additionally, the
SPC Information Center and Judicial Cases Research Institute
reported that Chinese courts tried 4 percent fewer human
trafficking cases in the first nine months of 2016 than in the
same period in 2015.\74\
The Ministry of Public Security maintained a mobile
application (app) launched in May 2016 to locate missing
children.\75\ The app reportedly assisted in locating 533
missing children, including 21 trafficked children, as of
December 2016.\76\ This figure relies upon the definition of
human trafficking in Chinese law,\77\ which does not conform to
the UN TIP Protocol.\78\
The Chinese government continued its involvement in the
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking
(COMMIT),\79\ developing with other member states a set of
common indicators of human trafficking and common guidelines
for identifying trafficking victims.\80\ UN Action for
Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), a project
of the UN Development Programme that serves as the COMMIT
Secretariat,\81\ reported that the new indicators and
guidelines aimed to improve victim identification and service
provision.\82\
Hong Kong
This past year, Hong Kong remained \83\ a destination for
human trafficking, with migrant domestic workers (MDWs)
particularly at risk of exploitation for forced labor. The Hong
Kong Census and Statistics Department's 2016 annual digest
reported that in 2015, there were over 340,000 MDWs working for
households in Hong Kong, the majority of whom came from the
Philippines and Indonesia.\84\ According to local and regional
non-governmental organizations, MDWs are often in debt due to
excessive fees paid to employment agencies both in their home
countries and in Hong Kong, and many employers exert control
over MDWs by confiscating their passports, preventing them from
contacting friends and family, and in some cases through
physical and emotional abuse.\85\ Local advocacy groups noted
that two regulations--requiring MDWs to live with their
employers \86\ and to leave Hong Kong within two weeks of
termination of a contract \87\--contributed to MDWs' risk of
exploitation for forced labor.\88\
A December 2016 ruling by the High Court of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, Court of First Instance, found
that Hong Kong's laws do not adequately address human
trafficking.\89\ The current definition of human trafficking in
Hong Kong's Crimes Ordinance covers only the cross-border
movement of persons ``for the purpose of prostitution'' and not
other forms of trafficking such as trafficking within Hong
Kong's borders and forced labor.\90\ A victim of human
trafficking challenged the Hong Kong government in court,
arguing that Hong Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance requires the
Hong Kong government to enact stronger anti-trafficking
legislation.\91\ In December 2016, the court ruled in favor of
the victim, finding that the Hong Kong government had an
obligation under the Bill of Rights Ordinance ``to enact
measures to ensure the prohibition of forced or compulsory
labour.'' \92\ Hong Kong lawmaker Kenneth Leung submitted
questions to the Hong Kong government regarding what steps it
had taken following the December 2016 ruling.\93\ The
government responded in June 2017 that it ``attaches great
importance to combating [trafficking in persons],'' but also
stated that human trafficking ``is not prevalent or widespread
in Hong Kong,'' and that human trafficking ``is effectively
prohibited by various pieces of existing legislation in Hong
Kong.'' \94\ While China acceded to the UN TIP Protocol in
2010, the Chinese central government has not extended the
Protocol to apply to Hong Kong.\95\ [For more information on
Hong Kong, see Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and
Macau.]
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
\1\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters,
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, last visited 12 May
17.
\2\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03, art. 5.1. See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/HRC/35/37, 28 March 17, para.
14.
\3\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 240.
\4\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03. Topics that need to be addressed in domestic
legislation to bring it into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol
include the addition of non-physical forms of coercion into the legal
definition of trafficking (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)), the
trafficking of men (covered under the definition of ``trafficking in
persons'' in Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol), and stipulating the
``purpose of exploitation'' (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)). For an
examination of the ways in which Chinese laws are inconsistent with the
UN TIP Protocol, see Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China:
Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-
Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 148-77.
\5\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What Is Human Trafficking? ''
last visited 11 June 17; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN
TIP Protocol), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Note that for
children younger than 18 years old, the means described in Article 3(a)
are not required for an action to constitute human trafficking.
\6\ Ibid.; Ibid., art. 3(a), (c), (d). For information on how
international standards regarding forced labor fit into the framework
of the UN TIP Protocol, see International Labour Office, International
Labour Organization, ``Human Trafficking and Forced Labour
Exploitation: Guidance for Legislation and Law Enforcement,'' 2005, 7-
15; International Labour Office, International Labour Organization,
``Hard To See, Harder To Count: Survey Guidelines To Estimate Forced
Labour of Adults and Children,'' Second Edition, 2012, 12, 19;
International Labour Organization, ``Questions and Answers on Forced
Labour,'' last visited 13 April 17.
\7\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as
``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or
transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling [the
victim].''
\8\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 159.
\9\ Ibid., 151, 166; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October
97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December
02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29
August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 240; UN Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25
December 03, art. 3(a). See also UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What
Is Human Trafficking? '' last visited 12 April 17.
\10\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 159; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 240; UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). See also Office To Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking
in Persons Report,'' 19 June 13, 130.
\11\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 160, 166; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 240; UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). See also Supreme People's Court
Information Center and Judicial Cases Research Institute, ``Judicial
Big Data Special Report on Crimes Involving Trafficking'' [Sifa da
shuju zhuanti baogao she guai fanzui], 22 December 16, 11. The PRC
Criminal Law defines trafficking as ``abducting, kidnapping, buying,
trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child,
for the purpose of selling [the victim].''
\12\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 159; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 240; UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a).
\13\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 244.
\14\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 166-67, 170-71; PRC Criminal
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01,
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 240; UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). The PRC Criminal Law defines
trafficking as ``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in,
fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of
selling [the victim].'' In contrast, the purpose of exploitation is a
key element of the UN TIP Protocol definition of human trafficking. For
reports from the 2017 reporting year that describe the sale of children
as human trafficking without specifying the purpose of the sale, see,
e.g., Chen Xiaobo, ``Zhejiang Announces Sentences in Large Cross-
Provincial Infant Trafficking Case, First Defendant Receives Suspended
Death Sentence'' [Zhejiang xuanpan yiqi teda kuasheng fanying an di yi
beigaoren bei pan sihuan], Xinhua, 4 November 16; Zhu Hengshun,
``Combating Trafficking in Women and Children Also Requires Amending
the `Adoption Law' '' [Daji guaimai ertong funu yexu xiugai ``shouyang
fa''], Beijing News, 24 December 16.
\15\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November
00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a), (c). The purpose of
exploitation is one of the required elements of a trafficking case
under Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to
Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the Official
Records (Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols
Thereto, A/55/383/Add.1, 3 November 00, para. 66; Bonny Ling, ``Human
Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and
Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law,
Vol. 17 (2016), 171.
\16\ Anne T. Gallagher, ``Editorial: The Problems and Prospects of
Trafficking Prosecutions: Ending Impunity and Securing Justice,'' Anti-
Trafficking Review, Issue 6 (2016), 2-3; Jan van Dijk and Peter G.M.
van der Heijden, ``Multiple Systems Estimation for Estimating the
Number of Victims of Human Trafficking Across the World,'' UN Office on
Drugs and Crime, 15 June 16, 2-4; Patrick L. Kerr and Rachel Dash,
``Ethical Considerations in Mandatory Disclosure of Data Acquired While
Caring for Human Trafficking Survivors,'' AMA Journal of Ethics, Vol.
19, No. 1 (January 2017), 45-46.
\17\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 177; Office To Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking
in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 131.
\18\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 176-77.
\19\ See, e.g., Nicola S. Pocock et al., ``Labour Trafficking Among
Men and Boys in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Exploitation, Violence,
Occupational Health Risks and Injuries,'' PLoS ONE, Vol. 11, No. 12 (16
December 16), 7; ``Chinese Marriage Proposals Become Prostitution
Nightmares for Some Lao Girls,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 February 17; UN
Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Global Report on Trafficking in Persons
2016,'' December 2016, 106.
\20\ See, e.g., UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons 2016,'' December 2016, 76, 106; Polaris, ``More
Assistance. More Action. 2016 Statistics From the National Human
Trafficking Hotline and BeFree Textline,'' January 2017, 2; Kong
Linghan, ``Chinese Individuals With Disabilities Trafficked to Malaysia
To Beg'' [Zhongguo canjiren bei guaipian dao malaixiya xingqi], Beijing
Youth Daily, 19 October 16.
\21\ ``Rise in Organised Crime Reported,'' Viet Nam News, 8 March
17; ``Vietnam's Human Trafficking Victims Rise 13 Pct in 2016,''
VnExpress International, 6 January 17; ``VN Faces Growing Human
Trafficking to China,'' Viet Nam News, 24 October 16. See also Zhang
Yan, ``China, Vietnam Fight Human-Trafficking,'' China Daily, 22 May
17.
\22\ Nicola S. Pocock et al., ``Labour Trafficking Among Men and
Boys in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Exploitation, Violence,
Occupational Health Risks and Injuries,'' PLoS ONE, Vol. 11, No. 12 (16
December 16), 7.
\23\ Office To Monitor Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of
State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--Burma,'' June 2017; San Yamin
Aung, ``Government Releases Trafficking Statistics for 2016,''
Irrawaddy, 11 January 17; Nadia Jung, Chab Dai Coalition, ``New Trends
and Observations in Cambodian Trafficking Cases,'' 20 July 17; Khy
Sovuthy and Zsombor Peter, ``Hopeful Fashion Students Trafficked to
China To Work in Factory,'' Cambodia Daily, 9 January 17.
\24\ Office To Monitor Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of
State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--Nepal,'' June 2017; Bikash
Sangraula, ``Traffickers Ensnaring Easy Targets in Nepal 2 Years After
Quakes,'' Kyodo News, 24 April 17; ``Chinese Marriage Proposals Become
Prostitution Nightmares for Some Lao Girls,'' Radio Free Asia, 13
February 17.
\25\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Global Report on Trafficking
in Persons 2016,'' December 2016, 76. See also International
Organization for Migration, ``China, EU Work To Combat Human
Trafficking,'' 15 November 16.
\26\ See, e.g., Polaris, ``More Assistance. More Action. 2016
Statistics From the National Human Trafficking Hotline and BeFree
Textline,'' January 2017, 2; Lee Rood, ``Des Moines Identified as Top
100 Human Trafficking Site,'' Des Moines Register, 16 November 16;
``Wis. Veterinarian Sentenced for Sex, Labor Trafficking in Twin
Cities,'' WCCO CBS Minnesota, 8 March 17.
\27\ See, e.g., Kong Linghan, ``Chinese Individuals With
Disabilities Trafficked to Malaysia To Beg'' [Zhongguo canjiren bei
guaipian dao malaixiya xingqi], Beijing Youth Daily, 19 October 16;
Chester Robards, ``Human Rights Group Wants Probe After DPM Revealed
CCA Workers' Passports Withheld,'' Nassau Guardian, 20 March 17; Isla
Binnie, ``Spanish Police Arrest 25 in Suspected Chinese Mafia Bust,''
Reuters, 19 April 17; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons 2016,'' December 2016, 106.
\28\ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``China,'' last visited 13 April 17.
\29\ See, e.g., Chen Tong, ``Woman With Intellectual Disability
Trafficked Several Times, Tuanfeng Police Crack Trafficking in Women
Case, 3 Caught'' [Zhizhang nu bei duo ci guaimai tuanfeng jingfang
pohuo guaimai funu an 3 ren luowang], China News Service, 25 November
16; Li Bin, ``Man Who Trafficked Woman With Intellectual Disability
Sentenced'' [Nanzi guaimai zhizhang nu bei panxing], Anhui Legal News,
6 December 16; Sun Shengfeng and Yi Zhang, ``Ziyuan Girl Went Out To
Work, Trafficked to Fujian Mountains, To Be Wife of Man in His
Forties'' [Ziyuan shaonu waichu dagong bei guaimai dao fujian shanli
gei 4 xun nanzi dang laopo], Guilin Life, 25 January 17.
\30\ Chen Jin and Ma Junjie, ``Putian Man Trapped in Illegal Yunnan
Brick Kiln for 13 Years: Only Two Meals a Day, Beaten for Running
Away'' [Putian nanzi bei kun yunnan hei zhuan chang 13 nian: yitian jin
liang dun fan taopao zao duda], Southeast Net, 10 November 16; Qiu
Yanxia, ``Lincang Man Escapes Illegal Brick Kiln, Warm-Hearted Traffic
Police Help Him Return Home'' [Lincang nanzi taochu hei zhuan chang
nuanxin jiaojing zhu qi hui jiaxiang], Qujing Daily, 16 March 17.
\31\ ``Sale of Yunnan Child Workers Exposed in China's Clothing
Capital: Yunnan Kids Easily Cheated'' [Zhongguo fuzhuang zhi du bei pu
maimai yunnan tonggong: yunnan wa hao pian], Chuncheng Evening Post,
reprinted in Sina, 21 November 16.
\32\ Ibid.; International Labour Organization, ``Questions and
Answers on Forced Labour,'' last visited 13 April 17. The International
Labour Organization lists ``withholding of wages or identity documents
[and] physical or sexual violence'' as indicators of forced labor. UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a), (c), (d). Note that for children
under age 18, the means described in Article 3(a) are not required for
an action to constitute human trafficking.
\33\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30, art. 2.1, 2.2(c);
``Ratifications of CO29--Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),''
International Labour Organization, last visited 10 July 17. Article 2.1
defines forced or compulsory labor as ``all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.'' China has not
ratified this convention.
\34\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyers Huang Simin and Ge Yongxi:
Record of Pre-Spring Festival Meeting With Li Tingyu (January 14,
2017)'' [Huang simin lushi, ge yongxi lushi: chunjie qian huijian li
tingyu xiao ji (2017 nian 1 yue 14 ri)], 15 January 17; Yang Baolu, ``
`Hope for Acquittal, Don't Want To Lose My Job' '' [``Qiwang wu zui
panjue, bu xiang diudiao gongzuo''], Beijing Youth Daily, 16 February
17.
\35\ Patrick Tibke, International Drug Policy Consortium, ``Drug
Dependence Treatment in China: A Policy Analysis,'' February 2017, 4,
8; Global Commission on Drug Policy, ``Advancing Drug Policy Reform: A
New Approach to Decriminalization,'' 2016, 14. For relevant legal
provisions, see PRC Narcotics Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jindu fa],
passed 29 December 07, effective 1 June 08, arts. 38, 41, 43, 47; State
Council, Drug Detoxification Regulations [Jiedu tiaoli], issued 26 June
11; Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Administrative Bureaus Compulsory
Drug Detoxification Work Regulations [Sifa xingzheng jiguan qiangzhi
geli jiedu gongzuo gui-
ding], issued 3 April 13, effective 1 June 13. See also Human Rights
Watch, `` `Where Darkness Knows No Limits': Incarceration, Ill-
Treatment, and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,'' January
2010, 27-31.
\36\ ``Shaanxi Province Women's Compulsory Drug Detoxification
Center Hosts Open House, Calls on Everyone To Stay Away From Drugs''
[Shaanxi sheng nu qiangzhi geli jiedusuo kaifang ri huodong huyu dajia
yuanli dupin], Xinhua, 8 March 17.
\37\ Ibid.
\38\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30, art. 2. See also
Patrick Tibke, International Drug Policy Consortium, ``Drug Dependence
Treatment in China: A Policy Analysis,'' February 2017, 8; Human Rights
Watch, `` `Where Darkness Knows No Limits': Incarceration, Ill-
Treatment, and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation in China,'' January
2010, 27-31.
\39\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03, art. 3(a). Compulsory drug detoxification center
detainee labor can be viewed as constituting trafficking under Article
3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol, as authorities engage in the
``harbouring'' and ``receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force . . . for the purpose of exploitation.'' According to Article
3(a), exploitation includes ``forced labour.'' See also Office To
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State,
``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2017, 126, 128.
\40\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17
December 13, 9.
\41\ Ibid., 5; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish Re-
Education Through Labor,'' 8 January 13; State Council, Decision on the
Issue of Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang
wenti de jueding], issued 3 August 57, item 3; State Council,
Supplementary Provisions on Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu
laodong jiaoyang de buchong guiding], issued 29 November 79, items 1-2.
\42\ Amnesty International, `` `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17
December 13, 17-18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish Re-
Education Through Labor,'' 8 January 13; State Council, Decision on the
Issue of Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang
wenti de jueding], issued 3 August 57, item 2.
\43\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Abolishing Legal Provisions Regarding Reeducation Through Labor
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu feizhi youguan
laodong jiaoyang falu guiding de jueding], issued and effective, 28
December 13; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 130.
\44\ Sun Ying, ``Ministry of Justice: Vast Majority of Nation's
Former Reeducation Through Labor Centers Have Been Turned Into
Compulsory Drug Detoxification Centers'' [Sifabu: quanguo jueda duoshu
yuan laojiao changsuo zhuan wei qiangzhi geli jiedu changsuo], China
National Radio, 5 November 14.
\45\ World Uyghur Congress, ``Forced Labour in East Turkestan:
State-Sanctioned Hashar System,'' November 2016, 4-5. See also ``For
Xinjiang's Uyghurs, `Hashar' by Any Other Name Still Means Forced
Labor,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 February 17.
\46\ World Uyghur Congress, ``Forced Labour in East Turkestan:
State-Sanctioned Hashar System,'' November 2016, 4.
\47\ ``For Xinjiang's Uyghurs, `Hashar' by Any Other Name Still
Means Forced Labor,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 February 17.
\48\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30, art. 2. See also
Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of
State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2017, 126, 128.
\49\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03, art. 3(a). Compulsory labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region can be viewed as constituting trafficking under
Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol, as authorities engage in the
``harbouring'' and ``receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force . . . for the purpose of exploitation.'' According to Article
3(a), exploitation includes ``forced labour.'' See also Office To
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State,
``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2017, 126, 128.
\50\ Cara Wallis, ``Hukou Reform and China's Migrant Workers,''
University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 10
October 16; Spencer Sheehan, ``China's Hukou Reforms and the
Urbanization Challenge,'' The Diplomat, 22 February 17; Bonny Ling,
``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation
and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law,
Vol. 17 (2016), 157.
\51\ Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China: Challenges of
Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-Pacific Journal on
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 157; Office To Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking
in Persons Report,'' June 2017, 128.
\52\ ``The Changing Face of China's Migrant Population,''
Economist, 2 December 16; Mark Robertson and Aine McCarthy, ICTI Care
Foundation, ``Supply Chain Solutions to China's Left-Behind Children
Problem,'' 20 November 16; China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and
Their Children,'' last visited 10 May 17.
\53\ ``Lawmaker Calls for End to Issue of Left-Behind Children,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 9 March 17; Mark Robertson and Aine
McCarthy, ICTI Care Foundation, ``Supply Chain Solutions to China's
Left-Behind Children Problem,'' 20 November 16.
\54\ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``China,'' last visited 13 April 17; Kevin Schoenmakers,
``Mentally Disabled Freed From Slavery in Yunnan Brick Kiln,'' Sixth
Tone, 18 September 16; Kong Linghan, ``Chinese Individuals With
Disabilities Abducted and Taken to Malaysia To Beg'' [Zhongguo canjiren
bei guaipian dao malaixiya xingqi], Beijing Youth Daily, 19 October 16;
Chen Tong, ``Woman With Intellectual Disability Trafficked Several
Times, Tuanfeng Police Crack Trafficking in Women Case, 3 Caught''
[Zhizhang nu bei duo ci guaimai tuanfeng jingfang pohuo guaimai funu an
3 ren luowang], China News Service, 25 November 16.
\55\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed 3 April 92, amended and effective 27 October 01, arts. 9-11;
``China's Complicated Relationship With Workers' Rights,'' World
Politics Review, 25 January 17; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent
China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor
Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute,
October 2016, 11. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report
of China, including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the
Committee at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13 June
14, para. 23. For relevant international standards regarding the right
to freely form and join independent unions, see International Labour
Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right To Organise, 4 July 50, arts. 2, 3, 5;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 23(4);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 22.1; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1.
\56\ Eli Friedman, ``Collective Bargaining Is Dead: The Situation
Is Excellent,'' Chinoiresie, 20 April 17; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will
Represent China's Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of
Labor Rights,'' New York University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law
Institute, October 2016, 11, 43; Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese Labor
Activists Handed Suspended Sentences,'' Wall Street Journal, 26
September 16. For relevant international standards regarding the right
to collective bargaining, see International Labour Organization, ILO
Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, 18 July 51;
International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 154) Concerning
the Promotion of Collective Bargaining, 11 August 83; International
Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up, 18 June 98, art. 2(a).
\57\ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai,
A/71/385, 14 September 16, paras. 2, 4, 11, 74.
\58\ Catherine Renshaw, ``Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia:
Uncovering the Dynamics of State Commitment and Compliance,'' Michigan
Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, Issue 4 (2016), 629, 656; Siv
Hong Lim, ``Cross-Border Labor Migration Surges in Cambodia, Raising
Risk of Human Trafficking,'' Asia Foundation, In Asia (blog), 14
December 16; ``Vietnam's Human Trafficking Victims Rise 13 Pct in
2016,'' VnExpress International, 6 January 17.
\59\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2017, 108,
115, 129, 245-46, 428; Nicola S. Pocock et al., ``Labour Trafficking
Among Men and Boys in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Exploitation,
Violence, Occupational Health Risks and Injuries,'' PLoS ONE, Vol. 11,
No. 12 (16 December 16), 2; International Organization for Migration,
``Myanmar,'' last visited 11 May 17; Siv Hong Lim, ``Cross-Border Labor
Migration Surges in Cambodia, Raising Risk of Human Trafficking,'' Asia
Foundation, In Asia (blog), 14 December 16; UN Action for Cooperation
against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), ``Human Trafficking
Vulnerabilities in Asia: A Study on Forced Marriage Between Cambodia
and China,'' 25 August 16, v; ``Vietnam's Human Trafficking Victims
Rise 13 Pct in 2016,'' VnExpress International, 6 January 17.
\60\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Force 8 Refugees Back to
North Korea,'' 23 April 17; ``North Korean Defectors Urge China To Help
People Fleeing Hermit State,'' Kyodo, reprinted in South China Morning
Post, 18 March 17; Christine Chung, Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea, ``North Korean Mothers Fight To Be Reunited With Stateless
Children Left Behind in China,'' HRNK Insider (blog), 4 November 16.
See also UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 46.
\61\ Jubilee Campaign, ``Statement Submitted by Jubilee Campaign, a
Non-Governmental Organization in Consultative Status With the Economic
and Social Council,'' UN Commission on the Status of Women, E/CN.6/
2017/NGO/103, 28 November 16, 2-3; ``North Korean Defectors Urge China
To Help People Fleeing Hermit State,'' Kyodo, reprinted in South China
Morning Post, 18 March 17; Christine Chung, Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea, ``North Korean Mothers Fight To Be Reunited With
Stateless Children Left Behind in China,'' HRNK Insider (blog), 4
November 16.
\62\ Sylvia Yu, ``Gaps in Records Cloak China's North Korean `Slave
Labourers' in Mystery,'' South China Morning Post, 10 August 17; Sue-
Lin Wong and Philip Wen, ``North Korea Factories Humming With `Made in
China' Clothes, Traders Say,'' Reuters, 12 August 17. For information
on North Korean workers in China from previous reporting years, see UN
General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, A/70/362, 8 September 15, paras. 24-27; Shin Chang-
Hoon and Go Myong-Hyun, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, ``Beyond the
UN COI Report on Human Rights in DPRK,'' 11 December 14, 21-30;
International Network for the Human Rights of North Korean Overseas
Labor, ``The Conditions of the North Korean Overseas Labor,'' December
2012, 19-21; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 186.
\63\ Sylvia Yu, ``Gaps in Records Cloak China's North Korean `Slave
Labourers' in Mystery,'' South China Morning Post, 10 August 17.
\64\ Ibid.
\65\ Zhuang Pinghui, ``Boys To Vastly Outnumber Girls in China for
Years: Population Official,'' South China Morning Post, 12 October 16;
Liberty Asia and Thomson Reuters Foundation, ``From Every Angle: Using
the Law To Combat Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia,'' November 2014,
44; Population Reference Bureau, ``PRB Discuss Online: Will China Relax
Its One-Child Policy? '' 22 February 11.
\66\ ``Vietnam's Human Trafficking Victims Rise 13 Pct in 2016,''
VnExpress International, 6 January 17; Get It Right This Time: A
Victims-Centered Trafficking in Persons Report, Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House
of Representatives, 22 March 16, Testimony of Mark Lagon, President,
Freedom House; Liberty Asia and Thomson Reuters Foundation, ``From
Every Angle: Using the Law To Combat Human Trafficking in Southeast
Asia,'' November 2014, 44.
\67\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``People's Republic of
China 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical
Bulletin'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2016 nian guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan tongji gongbao], 28 February 17.
\68\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2015 National
Economy Steadily Progressing and Stable'' [2015 nian guomin jingji
yunxin wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16.
\69\ See, e.g., UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ``The
World's Women 2015: Trends and Statistics,'' 2015, 6; Christophe Z.
Guilmoto, ``Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in
China and India, 2005-2100,'' Demography, Vol. 49 (2012), 77-78; Stuart
Basten and Georgia Verropoulou, `` `Maternity Migration' and the
Increased Sex Ratio at Birth in Hong Kong SAR,'' Population Studies,
Vol. 67, No. 3 (2013), 325; Population Control in China: State-
Sponsored Violence Against Women and Children, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 30 April 15, Testimony of
Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2.
\70\ Supreme People's Court, Interpretation of Certain Issues
Regarding the Specific Application of Laws for Trying Trafficking of
Women and Children Cases [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli guaimai
funu ertong fanzui anjian juti yingyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi],
issued 22 December 16, effective 1 January 17.
\71\ Ibid., arts. 1, 9.
\72\ Ibid., art. 9.
\73\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November
00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(d).
\74\ Supreme People's Court Information Center and Judicial Cases
Research Institute, ``Judicial Big Data Special Report on Crimes
Involving Trafficking'' [Sifa da shuju zhuanti baogao she guai fanzui],
22 December 16, 3.
\75\ Ren Huan, `` `Everyone Combatting Trafficking' Aids in
Reunions'' [``Quanmin daguai'' zhu tuanyuan], Guangming Daily, 26
January 17; Ryan Woo, ``Mobile App Helps China Recover Hundreds of
Missing Children,'' Reuters, 4 February 17; ``China's Online Platform
Helps Track Down 260 Missing Kids,'' Asia One, 17 November 16.
\76\ Ren Huan, `` `Everyone Combatting Trafficking' Aids in
Reunions'' [``Quanmin daguai'' zhu tuanyuan], Guangming Daily, 26
January 17.
\77\ Ibid.; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15,
effective 1 November 15, art. 240.
\78\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force
25 December 03, art. 3. Topics that need to be addressed in domestic
legislation to bring it into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol
include the addition of non-physical forms of coercion into the legal
definition of trafficking (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)), the
trafficking of men (covered under the definition of ``trafficking in
persons'' in Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol), and stipulating the
``purpose of exploitation'' (see UN TIP Protocol, Article 3(a)). For an
examination of the ways in which Chinese laws are inconsistent with the
UN TIP Protocol, see Bonny Ling, ``Human Trafficking and China:
Challenges of Domestic Criminalisation and Interpretation,'' Asia-
Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 17 (2016), 148-77.
\79\ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region, signed 29
October 04, reprinted in UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking
in Persons (UN-ACT), last visited 11 June 17. The six signatories to
the MOU were Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and
Vietnam.
\80\ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``New in `Tools & Guidelines': COMMIT Indicators of Human
Trafficking & Guidelines on Victim Identification and Referral
Mechanisms,'' 17 February 17; UN Action for Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), ``COMMIT SOM 11 in Vientiane, Lao PDR
Concluded,'' 28 November 16; Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative
against Trafficking (COMMIT), ``Identifying Victims of Trafficking and
Associated Forms of Exploitation: Common Indicators for First
Responders,'' reprinted in UN Action for Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), November 2016; Coordinated Mekong
Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), ``Victim
Identification and Referral Mechanisms: Common Guidelines for the
Greater Mekong Sub-Region,'' reprinted in UN Action for Cooperation
against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), November 2016.
\81\ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``Who,'' last visited 12 May 17.
\82\ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-
ACT), ``COMMIT SOM 11 in Vientiane, Lao PDR Concluded,'' 28 November
16.
\83\ For information on human trafficking in Hong Kong from
previous reporting years, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
189-90; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 187-88.
\84\ Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, ``Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics''
[Xianggang tongji niankan], October 2016, 43. The Hong Kong government
refers to migrant domestic workers as ``foreign domestic helpers.'' For
general information on migrant domestic workers, see International
Labour Organization, ``Domestic Workers,'' last visited 12 July 17;
International Labour Organization, ``Migrant Domestic Workers,'' last
visited 12 July 17.
\85\ Hong Kong Federation of Asian Domestic Workers and Progressive
Labor Union of Domestic Workers in Hong Kong, ``Between a Rock and a
Hard Place,'' October 2016, 4-5, 34, 36; Chenyu Liang, Migration Policy
Institute, ``Maid in Hong Kong: Protecting Foreign Domestic Workers,''
Migration Information Source, 20 October 16; Mike Ives, ``After Window-
Washing Deaths, a Debate Over Migrants' Rights in Hong Kong,'' New York
Times, Sinosphere (blog), 23 November 16; Justin Heifetz, ``Foreign
Domestic Worker Abuse Is Rampant in Hong Kong,'' Vice, 4 April 17.
\86\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Visa/Extension of Stay Application Form for
Domestic Helper From Abroad [Cong waiguo shoupin lai gang jiating
yonggong qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao], last visited
21 April 17, 6(ii); Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Employment Contract for a Domestic Helper
Recruited From Outside Hong Kong, last visited 21 April 17, item 3;
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Immigration
Department, ``Foreign Domestic Helpers,'' last visited 21 April 17,
Q30.
\87\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Visa/Extension of Stay Application Form for
Domestic Helper From Abroad [Cong waiguo shoupin lai gang jiating
yonggong qianzheng/yanchang douliu qixian shenqing biao], last visited
21 April 17, 6(vi); Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, ``Conditions of Employment for Foreign Domestic
Helpers: A General Guide to the Helper,'' last visited 21 April 17,
item 3; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Immigration
Department, ``Foreign Domestic Helpers,'' last visited 21 April 17,
Q33, Q44.
\88\ Hong Kong Federation of Asian Domestic Workers and Progressive
Labor Union of Domestic Workers in Hong Kong, ``Between a Rock and a
Hard Place,'' October 2016, 4-5; Mike Ives, ``After Window-Washing
Deaths, a Debate Over Migrants' Rights in Hong Kong,'' New York Times,
Sinosphere (blog), 23 November 16; Justin Heifetz, ``Foreign Domestic
Worker Abuse Is Rampant in Hong Kong,'' Vice, 4 April 17.
\89\ In the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List,
No. 15 of 2015, HCAL 15/2015, 23 December 16, paras. 351, 355-57, 367.
See also Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383) [Di 383 zhang
xianggang renquan fa'an tiaoli], issued 8 June 91, amended 15 Feburary
17, sec. 8, art. 4.
\90\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) [Di 200 zhang xingshi zuixing
tiaoli], issued 31 December 72, amended 2 August 12, sec. 129(1); Hong
Kong Bar Association, ``Hong Kong Bar Association's Submission to the
United Nations Committee Against Torture,'' 17 October 15, para. 22;
Liberty Asia and Reed Smith Richards Butler, ``Legal Overview of Human
Trafficking in Hong Kong,'' 2015, 15.
\91\ In the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List,
No. 15 of 2015, HCAL 15/2015, 23 December 16. For details of the man's
case, see paragraphs 160 and 161. For a discussion of the legal issues
under consideration in the case, see paragraphs 162 and 163. See also
Adam Severson, ``Reviewing Hong Kong's Human Trafficking Case,''
Justice Centre Hong Kong (blog), 15 January 16; Eddie Lee, ``South
Asian in Judicial Review Had To Return to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages,
High Court Hears,'' South China Morning Post, 15 January 16;
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383) [Di 383 zhang xianggang
renquan fa'an tiaoli], issued 8 June 91, amended 15 February 17, sec.
8, art. 4.
\92\ In the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List,
No. 15 of 2015, HCAL 15/2015, 23 December 16, paras. 351, 355-57, 366-
67.
\93\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, ``LCQ21:
Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Persons,'' 21 June 17.
\94\ Ibid.
\95\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal
Matters, 12.a., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, last visited
7 July 17. See also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and
Eighth Periodic Reports of China, adopted by the Committee at its 59th
Session (20 October-7 November 2014), CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8, 14 November
14, para. 56.
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean Refugees in China
Introduction
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the Chinese
government's policy of detaining North Korean refugees and
repatriating them to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) remained in place, despite substantial evidence that
repatriated persons face torture, imprisonment, execution, and
other inhuman treatment.\1\ The Chinese government regards
North Koreans who enter China without proper documentation as
illegal economic migrants \2\ and maintains a policy of
forcible repatriation based on a 1998 border protocol with the
DPRK.\3\ China's repatriation of North Korean refugees
contravenes its international obligations under the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention's 1967 Protocol, to which China has acceded.\4\
China is also obligated under the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
to refrain from repatriating persons if there are ``grounds for
believing that [they] would be in danger of being subject to
torture.'' \5\
Repatriation of Refugees and Border Conditions
This past year, heightened security measures along the
China-North Korea and China-Southeast Asia borders increased
the risks North Korean refugees face, and may be limiting the
outflow of refugees from the DPRK. South Korean Ministry of
Unification data reportedly showed that 1,414 refugees reached
South Korea in 2016, continuing the trend of a significant
decline in the number of refugees entering South Korea since
2009.\6\ International news media reported cases in which
Chinese authorities detained North Korean refugees, causing
concerns that authorities planned to repatriate them.
November 2016. Chinese authorities reportedly
detained over 30 North Korean refugees in Shenyang
municipality, Liaoning province, while they were in
transit to Southeast Asia.\7\ South Korean media
reported that authorities later transferred the
refugees to Dandong municipality, Liaoning--near the
North Korean border--possibly in preparation for
repatriation.\8\
March 2017. Chinese authorities reportedly
detained in total about 20 North Korean refugees in the
following four locations: Hubei province; \9\ Shenyang,
Liaoning; Tianjin municipality; and an unknown location
near the China-Laos border.\10\
June 2017. According to Human Rights Watch,
Chinese authorities detained five North Korean refugees
near Yanji city, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture
(KAP), Jilin province.\11\
July 2017. According to South Korean news
media Chosun Ilbo, Chinese authorities detained in
total 43 North Korean refugees in the following three
locations: 27 in Yunnan province; 5 in the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region; and 11 in Jilin.\12\ The five
members of a North Korean refugee family detained in
Yunnan, including a former senior North Korean Workers'
Party official, reportedly committed suicide after
Chinese authorities transferred them to Shenyang,
Liaoning, for deportation.\13\ Moreover, according to a
Daily NK report, Chinese authorities repatriated 70
North Korean refugees who were held in Tumen city,
Yanbian KAP, Jilin.\14\
The North Korean government's imprisonment and torture of
repatriated North Koreans render North Koreans in China
refugees sur place who fear persecution upon return to their
country of origin.\15\ In July 2017, Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, voiced his concern over
the increase in the number of detentions and repatriations of
North Koreans refugees caught in China, urging the Chinese
government to abide by its obligations under the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and to give
``special protection to DPRK citizens who transit through
China's territory.'' \16\ In response, China's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu Kang stated that ``North
Koreans who illegally enter Chinese territory are not
refugees,'' and that ``the Chinese government has properly
addressed the issue . . . in accordance with domestic and
international laws and humanitarian principles.'' \17\
Crackdown on Foreign Aid Workers
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities appeared to
have intensified crackdowns on organizations and individuals--
including foreign aid workers, Christian missionaries and
churches, and non-governmental organizations--that have played
a crucial role in assisting and facilitating the movement of
North Korean refugees outside the DPRK.
December 2016. Chinese authorities reportedly
deported more than 30 South Korean citizens, including
Christian missionaries, who were based in Yanbian
Korean Autonomous Prefecture (KAP), Jilin province.\18\
According to United Press International, some of these
South Koreans ``were known to have been involved in
assisting North Korean defectors,'' and a South Korean
diplomatic source described the simultaneous
deportation of this many South Korean citizens as
``unprecedented.'' \19\
January 2017. According to international media
reports, Chinese authorities deported 32 South Korean
missionaries, who were based in Yanji city, Yanbian
KAP.\20\ Many of the missionaries reportedly provided
assistance to North Korean refugees to escape to South
Korea.\21\
February 2017. Chinese authorities reportedly
detained four people, including a South Korean
missionary and a Korean-American pastor, at a hotel in
Yanji.\22\ According to international media reports,
Chinese authorities also detained two South Korean
pastors and their family members in Qingdao
municipality, Shandong province, and Qinhuangdao
municipality, Hebei province, respectively.\23\ Chinese
authorities reportedly accused the pastors of ``human
smuggling,'' for assisting North Korean refugees at
risk of repatriation.\24\
Trafficking of North Korean Women
North Korean women who enter China illegally remain
particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. The demand for
trafficked North Korean women has been linked to a sex ratio
imbalance in China exacerbated by the Chinese government's
population planning policies.\25\ Sources indicate that the
majority of North Korean refugees--approximately 70 to 80
percent--leaving the DPRK are women,\26\ many of whom are
trafficked by force or deception from the DPRK into or within
China for the purposes of forced marriage and commercial sexual
exploitation.\27\ The Chinese government's refusal to recognize
these women as refugees denies them legal protection and is
thought to encourage the trafficking of North Korean women and
girls within China.\28\ China is obligated under the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, to take measures to
safeguard trafficking victims and suppress all forms of
trafficking of women.\29\ [For more information on the sex
ratio imbalance and trafficking of women in China, see Section
II--Population Control and Section II--Human Trafficking.]
Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents
Many children born to Chinese fathers and North Korean
mothers remain deprived of basic rights to education and other
public services, owing to the children's lack of legal resident
status in China. According to some estimates, the population of
children born in China to North Korean women ranges between
20,000 and 30,000.\30\ The PRC Nationality Law provides that
all children born in China are entitled to Chinese nationality
if either parent is a Chinese citizen.\31\ Chinese authorities
reportedly continue to largely deprive these children of their
rights to birth registration and nationality.\32\ Without proof
of resident status, these children are unable to access
education and other public services.\33\ In some cases, bribery
of local officials reportedly has allowed some children to
obtain identification documents.\34\ The denial of nationality
rights and access to education for these children contravenes
China's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.\35\
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
\1\ James Burt, ``Actions Speak Louder Than Words,'' Korea JoongAng
Daily, 6 February 17; John Hemmings and Talia Jessener, ``Don't Forget
the Treatment of North Korean Defectors,'' The Diplomat, 14 February
17; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 46. In November 2015, in its Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, the UN Committee against Torture noted ``over
100 testimonies received by United Nations sources . . . in which
nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicate that
persons forcibly repatriated to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea have been systematically subjected to torture and ill-
treatment.''
\2\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Force 8 Refugees Back to
North Korea,'' 23 April 17; Jack Kim, ``China Detains Two South Korean
Pastors for Helping North Korea Defectors: Report,'' Reuters, 15 March
17; Megan McQueen, ``The Second Escape: Human Rights Violations Reach
Beyond the North Korean Border,'' Politic, 14 December 16.
\3\ Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State
Security and People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security,
Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National
Security and Social Order in the Border Areas, signed 8 July 98,
effective 28 August 98, arts. 4, 9. The protocol commits each side to
treat as illegal those border crossers who do not have proper visa
certificates, except in cases of ``calamity or unavoidable factors.''
\4\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28
July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly
resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, entry into force 22 April 54,
arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by
the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, `` . . . owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country . . ..'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that,
``No Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, last
visited 10 July 17. China acceded to the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees on September 24, 1982. Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 2198 (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 4 October 67;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless
Persons, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, last visited 10
July 17. China acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees on September 24, 1982. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Don't Force 8 Refugees Back to North Korea,'' 23 April 17; Greg
Scarlatoiu, Korean Economic Institute, ``The North Korean Human Rights
Conundrum: Moving Forward,'' 28 February 17.
\5\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art.
3. Article 3 states that, ``No State Party shall expel, return
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV,
Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, last visited 10 July 17. China
signed the Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October
4, 1988. UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 46. In November 2015, in its Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China's compliance with the Convention, the UN
Committee against Torture stated its concerns about China's lack of
``national asylum legislation and administrative procedures'' for
determining refugee status, as well as China's ``rigorous policy of
forcibly repatriating all nationals of the [DPRK] on the ground that
they have illegally crossed the border solely for economic reasons.''
See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Force 8 Refugees Back to
North Korea,'' 23 April 17.
\6\ ``Number of N.K. Defectors Grows 11 Pct On-Year 2016: Data,''
Yonhap News Agency, 3 January 17; ``North Korean Defectors to South Up
by 10.9% in 2016,'' Business Standard, 3 January 17. The number of
North Koreans who defected to South Korea in 2009 was 2,914.
\7\ Kim Seong Hwan, ``8 More N. Korean Escapees Arrested in
China,'' Daily NK, 6 December 16; Elizabeth Shim, ``Report: Dozens of
North Korean Defectors Arrested in China,'' United Press International,
1 December 16.
\8\ Kim Seong Hwan, ``8 More N. Korean Escapees Arrested in
China,'' Daily NK, 6 December 16. See also Elizabeth Shim, ``Report:
Dozens of North Korean Defectors Arrested in China,'' United Press
International, 1 December 16.
\9\ Kim Myong-song, ``6 N. Korean Defectors Arrested in China,''
Chosun Ilbo, 17 March 17.
\10\ Elizabeth Shim, ``China Arrests More Than a Dozen North Korea
Defectors,'' United Press International, 17 March 17.
\11\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Return 5 Refugees to North
Korea,'' 24 June 17. See also ``Human Rights Group Urges China Not To
Repatriate 5 N.K. Defectors,'' Yonhap News Agency, 26 June 17.
\12\ Kim Myong-song, ``Fugitive N. Korean Family Kill Themselves in
China,'' Chosun Ilbo, 24 July 17.
\13\ Ibid.
\14\ Kim Ga Young, ``China Repatriates 70 North Korean Defectors,''
Daily NK, 2 August 17.
\15\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Return 5 Refugees to North
Korea,'' 24 June 17; Human Rights Watch, ``Letter From HRW to Chinese
President Xi Jinping Re: North Korean Refugees,'' 24 June 17; UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Protection and International
Migration, 17 January 07, para. 20.
\16\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``End of
Visit Press Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the
Republic of Korea,'' 21 July 17; ``U.N. Human Rights Envoy Welcomes S.
Korea's Push for Engagement With N. Korea,'' Yonhap News Agency, 21
July 17.
\17\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Spokesperson Lu Kang Holds Regular Press Briefing on July 24, 2017''
[2017 nian 7 yue 24 ri waijiaobu fayanren lu kang zhuchi lixing
jizhehui], 24 July 17.
\18\ Elizabeth Shim, ``China Deported 30 South Korean Nationals,
Report Says,'' United Press International, 25 January 17.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ Gu Li, ``China Deported 32 South Korean Missionaries, Possible
Retaliation Against THAAD'' [Zhongguo zhu 32 ming hanguo chuanjiaoshi
yi baofu sade], Radio France Internationale, 11 February 17; Jack Kim
and Ju-min Park, ``China Expels 32 South Korea Missionaries Amid
Missile Defense Tension,'' Reuters, 11 February 17.
\21\ Gu Li, ``China Deported 32 South Korean Missionaries, Possible
Retaliation Against THAAD'' [Zhongguo zhu 32 ming hanguo chuanjiaoshi
yi baofu sade], Radio France Internationale, 11 February 17.
\22\ Ibid.; Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, ``China Expels 32 South Korea
Missionaries Amid Missile Defense Tension,'' Reuters, 11 February 17.
\23\ Elizabeth Shim, ``China Arrests Christian Missionaries for
North Korea Activities,'' United Press International, 15 March 17; Jack
Kim, ``China Detains Two South Korean Pastors for Helping North Korea
Defectors: Report,'' Reuters, 15 March 17.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ See, e.g., Robbie Gramer et al., ``With Human Trafficking
Report, Tillerson Rebukes China on Human Rights,'' Foreign Policy, 27
June 17; ``North Korean Women Defectors Escape From Life of Deprivation
Only To Be Forced Into Slavery, Says Activist,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in Straits Times, 3 November 16.
\26\ Kim Myong-song, ``Statistics Highlight Abuse of N. Korean
Women in China,'' Chosun Ilbo, 9 November 16; ``Human Traffickers,
Forcible Repatriation, Female North Korean Defectors Still Suffering in
China'' [Renkou fanzi, qiangzhi qianfan, tuobei nuxing zai hua reng
shou jian'ao], Voice of America, 5 November 16; Christina Couch, ``The
Psychological Trauma of Defecting From North Korea,'' PBS, NOVA Next,
16 February 17.
\27\ ``Trafficked Into China With No Escape for 15 Years,''
Unification Media Group, reprinted in Daily NK, 25 April 17; ``Human
Traffickers, Forcible Repatriation, Female North Korean Defectors Still
Suffering in China'' [Renkou fanzi, qiangzhi qianfan, tuobei nuxing zai
hua reng shou jian'ao], Voice of America, 5 November 16; ``My Mission:
One Woman's Calling To Help North Korean Women in China,'' World Watch
Monitor, reprinted in Sight, 24 January 17.
\28\ ``Human Traffickers, Forcible Repatriation, Female North
Korean Defectors Still Suffering in China'' [Renkou fanzi, qiangzhi
qianfan, tuobei nuxing zai hua reng shou jian'ao], Voice of America, 5
November 16; ``North Korean Women Defectors Escape From Life of
Deprivation Only To Be Forced Into Slavery, Says Activist,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in Straits Times, 3 November 16; Hong Mei,
``If Father Is Chinese, Defectors Face Difficulty in Obtaining South
Korean Government Financial Assistance'' [Ruo fuqin wei zhongguo ren
tuobeizhe nan huo han zhengfu zizhu], Epoch Times, 10 November 16.
\29\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 6; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
10 July 17. China signed the Convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified
it on November 4, 1980. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00,
entry into force 25 December 03, arts. 6-9; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, A Protocol To Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, last visited 10 July 17. China acceded
to the Protocol on February 8, 2010.
\30\ Kim Myong-song, ``Statistics Highlight Abuse of N. Korean
Women in China,'' Chosun Ilbo, 9 November 16; Hong Mei, ``If Father Is
Chinese, Defectors Face Difficulty in Obtaining South Korean Government
Financial Assistance'' [Ruo fuqin wei zhongguo ren tuobeizhe nan huo
han zhengfu zizhu], Epoch Times, 10 November 16.
\31\ PRC Nationality Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoji fa],
passed, issued, and effective 10 September 80, art. 4. Article 4 of the
PRC Nationality Law provides that, ``Any person born in China whose
parents are both Chinese nationals and one of whose parents is a
Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality.''
\32\ Christine Chung, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
``North Korean Mothers Fight To Be Reunited With Stateless Children
Left Behind in China,'' HRNK Insider (blog), 4 November 16; Janelle L.
B. Macintosh et al., ``Global Immunizations: Health Promotion and
Disease Prevention Worldwide,'' American Journal of Maternal/Child
Nursing, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May/June 2017), 140; Hong Mei, ``If Father Is
Chinese, Defectors Face Difficulty in Obtaining South Korean Government
Financial Assistance'' [Ruo fuqin wei zhongguo ren tuobeizhe nan huo
han zhengfu zizhu], Epoch Times, 10 November 16; Yang Tianheng,
``Farmers Buy North Korean Defector Wives, Generating Misfortune''
[Nongmin mairu tuobei xinniang shuchu le buxing], Oriental Daily, 19
November 16.
\33\ Ibid.
\34\ See, e.g., ``Trafficked Into China With No Escape for 15
Years,'' Daily NK, 25 April 17; Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon Park, European
Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible Children: The
Stateless Children of North Korean Refugees,'' December 2015, 88.
\35\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, arts. 2, 7, 28(1)(a). Under the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, China is obligated to register children born within the
country immediately after birth and also provide all children with
access to education without discrimination on the basis of nationality.
See also Christine Chung, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
``North Korean Mothers Fight To Be Reunited With Stateless Children
Left Behind in China,'' HRNK Insider (blog), 4 November 16.
Public Health
Public Health
Public Health
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the UN Special
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights issued a report
that assessed whether the Chinese government's poverty
alleviation efforts, many of which dovetail with public health
and the right to health,\1\ ``have ensured full respect for
human rights in China.'' \2\ The report, based on the Special
Rapporteur's official mission to China in August 2016,
commended the government's massive scale of poverty alleviation
in China over the past three decades,\3\ noting improved
mortality rates and greater access to healthcare and health
insurance.\4\ The Special Rapporteur, however, observed that
the government has overly emphasized development goals,\5\ and
highlighted fundamental challenges, including:
the Chinese Communist Party's ``leading role''
over government, civil society, and public
participation, which is difficult to ``reconcile'' with
individual rights protection and accountability
mechanisms; \6\
the government's top-down approach, which
leaves ``marginal'' space for non-governmental
organizations and affected individuals to participate
in policymaking and advocacy; \7\ and
the lack of publicly available, accurate
data,\8\ such as on the employment of persons with
disabilities \9\ and the number of children completing
compulsory education.\10\
Developments in Mental Health Policy and Law
The government and Party continued to prioritize mental
health in public health policymaking.\11\ Despite
implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law (MHL), which became
effective in 2013,\12\ significant challenges in the treatment
of mental health disorders include the shortage of
psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, and community-based
rehabilitation services.\13\ According to a psychiatric expert
at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, resources are concentrated
primarily in urban, developed areas in eastern China; rural
areas and less developed areas of central and western regions
``lag far behind in availability of services.'' \14\ A senior
health official reported in April 2017 that more than 50
percent of individuals with severe mental illness live in
poverty.\15\
INVOLUNTARY AND FORCED PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT
The MHL provides protections against wrongful involuntary
admission and treatment,\16\ which are intended, in part, to
prevent the forced commitment to psychiatric facilities of
individuals without mental illness (bei jingshenbing).\17\ In
June 2017, a district court in Zhumadian municipality, Henan
province, reportedly invoked these provisions in a lawsuit
against a psychiatric hospital for having involuntarily
committed a man for 19 days in 2015 to undergo ``conversion
therapy'' at the direction of his wife and her family.\18\ The
court found in favor of the plaintiff, noting that his
hospitalization ``infringed on his personal liberty'' as he did
not meet the MHL's standard of dangerousness to himself or to
others under which an individual may be involuntarily
committed.\19\ News media, moreover, reported a positive
outcome for a case in Shanghai municipality known as the first
under the MHL.\20\ In July 2017, the plaintiff in that case,
after 15 years in a psychiatric facility, obtained approval to
discharge himself following a psychiatric evaluation that found
the plaintiff ``possessed full competence in civil matters.''
\21\ Prior to that evaluation, the plaintiff remained subject
to his guardian's refusal to allow discharge \22\ ever since
his initial involuntary commitment due to schizophrenia.\23\
The Commission continued to observe reports of official use
of forced psychiatric commitment in response to activities the
government deemed to be ``troublemaking'' or politically
sensitive,\24\ including petitioning the government over legal
grievances and rights violations. Reports of petitioners and
others whom public security officials temporarily committed to
psychiatric facilities this past year included Sheng Lanfu,\25\
Ren Naijun,\26\ and Zhu Liangqun.\27\ In January 2017,
authorities reportedly released petitioner Li Jiafu after more
than two years' detention at a Zhejiang province psychiatric
facility.\28\ The Paper--a state-funded news outlet--continued
to cover the case of Xu Xueling, a petitioner sentenced to four
years in prison in April 2016 by a court in Shandong province
on the charge of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.''
\29\ Media coverage of her case linked her petitioning to her
grievances over two instances of bei jingshenbing imposed by
authorities for ``stability maintenance,'' \30\ which a news
outlet described as a form of extrajudicial detention.\31\ The
December 2016 arrest \32\ of Liu Feiyue--founder of the human
rights website Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW) \33\--may
have consequences for grassroots reporting of forced
psychiatric commitment given CRLW's regular coverage of the
topic.\34\
Health-Based Discrimination
Health-based discrimination in access to employment,
welfare, education, and medical treatment, as well as
difficulties in accessing legal relief or accountability,
reportedly remain widespread,\35\ despite prohibitions to
prevent it under Chinese laws and regulations.\36\ Contributing
factors, according to rights lawyers, include a lack of
compliance with the law and inconsistencies among laws and
regulations.\37\ The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and
human rights also cited ``access to basic services and . . .
problems of exclusion'' due to the multidimensional character
of poverty \38\ as factors that create barriers for persons
with disabilities, ethnic minority groups, and the rural
poor.\39\ The following reports from this past year illustrate
aspects of these challenges.
Employment. Two HIV-positive men--one in
Guangdong province \40\ and the other in Jiangxi
province \41\--pursued legal remedies after being
deemed ineligible for employment following physical
examinations that disclosed their health status to
their employers. In June 2017, the plaintiff in the
Guangdong case won his case on appeal in China's first-
ever judgment that held an employer-defendant violated
Chinese law by discriminating against a plaintiff
because he or she was HIV positive.\42\ The court,
however, rejected the plaintiff's request to be
reinstated to his job.\43\ The plaintiff in the Jiangxi
case appealed the trial court's dismissal of his claims
in October 2016,\44\ but withdrew the appeal in June
2017 after settlement.\45\ In a November 2016 letter to
the central government, a group of lawyers cited the
Jiangxi case, asserting the Civil Servants' General
Recruitment Physical Eligibility Standards--which
designate HIV/AIDS a disqualifying factor for
government employment \46\--are the ``most significant
systemic obstacle'' for persons living with HIV/AIDS in
accessing equal employment opportunities.\47\
Welfare. In March 2017, the Beijing News
reported on the death of an autistic teenager in
Shaoguan municipality, Guangdong,\48\ that raised
concerns about the oversight of care centers and
government accountability in providing welfare to those
in need.\49\ Poor quality food and negligence by a care
center in Shaoguan and additional negligence on the
part of police and a homeless shelter in Dongguan
municipality, Guangdong, contributed to the boy's
death.\50\ Coverage of the case, moreover, revealed
that at least 20 individuals had died at the Shaoguan
care center between January 1 and February 18,
2017.\51\
Education. In a positive development, the
government revised the regulatory framework on access
to education for students with disabilities, including
revised Regulations on Education for Disabled Persons
(Regulations) \52\ that stipulate local governments
should provide funding in official budgets for the
education of disabled students,\53\ and revised
provisions on reasonable accommodations for students
with disabilities who take the college entrance exam
(gaokao).\54\ In June 2017, news media reported
education authorities in Shanghai municipality and
Guangxi province provided accommodations for a few
dozen students with disabilities taking the gaokao.\55\
Human Rights Watch cautioned that the revised
Regulations were not sufficient to ensure inclusive
education standards at mainstream schools.\56\ A
research survey released in March 2017 found that
nearly 30 percent of children with disabilities are
asked to leave mainstream schools due, in part, to a
shortage of teachers with special education
training.\57\
Public Health
Public Health
Notes to Section II--Public Health
\1\ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
and World Health Organization, The Right to Health, Fact Sheet No. 31,
June 2008, 1-4. See also State Council Information Office, ``National
Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' 13 April 09, secs.
I(2)-(4), III(3); State Council Information Office, ``National Human
Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015),'' 11 June 12, secs. I(2)-(4),
III(2)-(5); State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua,
29 September 16, secs. I(2), (3), (5); III(3)-(5).
\2\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 15; Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``End-of-Mission Statement
on China, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,'' 23 August 16.
\3\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, paras. 12-14, 56 (achieving
``almost universal health coverage''), 76 (``strong and genuine
commitment to building a `moderately prosperous society' '' ).
\4\ Ibid., paras. 13, 56.
\5\ Ibid., para. 45; Human Rights in China, ``UN Expert: Chinese
Government Needs `Genuine Accountability,' '' 23 August 16.
\6\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 16.
\7\ Ibid., paras. 6(b)-(g), 7, 8, 30, 32, 36. The Special
Rapporteur censured this ``top-down'' approach as manifested in the
Chinese government's intrusive control over his meeting schedule in
China, which prevented and obstructed a variety of non-governmental
stakeholders from meeting with him. He stressed that the Chinese
government's control over his schedule was contrary to the level of
access that is expected during Special Rapporteur missions.
Additionally, the Special Rapporteur pointed out that the China
Federation for Persons with Disabilities, which facilitated some of the
meetings during his mission, is led by government officials and
performs government functions; thus ``it hardly qualifies as a civil
society organization.''
\8\ Ibid., para. 29.
\9\ Ibid., para. 35.
\10\ Ibid., paras. 54, 55.
\11\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text
Transcript of Regular News Conference in April'' [Guojia weisheng
jishengwei 4 yue lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 7 April 17;
National Health and Family Planning Commission, Propaganda Department,
et al., Guiding Opinion on Strengthening Mental Health Services [Guanyu
jiaqiang xinli jiankang fuwu de zhidao yijian], issued 30 December 16;
State Council, `` `13th Five-Year' Hygiene and Health Plan'' [``Shisan
wu'' weisheng yu jiankang guihua], 10 January 17, 3 (1, 7, 11, 12);
State Council General Office, ``National Mental Health Work Plan (2015-
2020)'' [Quanguo jingshen weisheng gongzuo guihua (2015-2020 nian)], 18
June 15. See also Bin Xie, ``Strategic Mental Health Planning and Its
Practice in China: Retrospect and Prospect,'' Shanghai Archives of
Psychiatry, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2017), 115.
\12\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13; ``Li Keqiang:
Promoting the Emphasis of Healthcare Services' Shift Downward and
Deepening Resources for Clinical Treatment'' [Li keqiang: tuidong
yiliao fuwu zhongxin xiayi he zhenliao ziyuan xiachen], Caixin, 21
December 16; State Council General Office, ``National Mental Health
Work Plan (2015-2020)'' [Quanguo jingshen weisheng gongzuo guihua
(2015-2020 nian)], 18 June 15; State Council Information Office,
``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August
2016, sec. I(5).
\13\ Su Weichu, ``Total Number of Registered Individuals With
Severe Mental Disorders Is 5.4 Million, Still Have Major Shortage of
Psychiatrists'' [Quanguo zai ce yanzhong jingshen zhang'ai huanzhe 540
wan jingshen ke yisheng quekou rengran hen da], Jiemian, 7 April 17;
Qiuping Zhong et al., ``China Mental Health Reform--Perspective About
Psychiatric Nursing Assistants,'' Journal of Preventive Medicine &
Healthcare, 31 March 17; Bin Xie, ``Strategic Mental Health Planning
and Its Practice in China: Retrospect and Prospect,'' Shanghai Archives
of Psychiatry, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2017), 116. See also Liu Jiaying, ``More
Than Half of Those With Severe Mental Disorders Fall Into Poverty,
Overall Increase in Depression-Related Mental Disorders'' [Zhongguo
guoban yanzhong jingshen zhang'aizhe xian pinkun yiyu zhang'ai zongti
shangsheng], Caixin, 7 April 17.
\14\ Bin Xie, ``Strategic Mental Health Planning and Its Practice
in China: Retrospect and Prospect,'' Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry,
Vol. 29, No. 2 (2017), 116.
\15\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Text
Transcript of National Health and Family Planning Commission Regular
News Conference in April'' [Guojia weisheng jishengwei 4 yue lixing
xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 7 April 17; Liu Jiaying, ``More Than Half
of Those With Severe Mental Disorders Fall Into Poverty, Overall
Increase in Depression-Related Mental Disorders'' [Zhongguo guoban
yanzhong jingshen zhang'aizhe xian pinkun yiyu zhang'ai zongti
shangsheng], Caixin, 7 April 17.
\16\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13, arts. 27, 30,
75(5), 78(1).
\17\ Danuta Mendelson and Nuannuan Lin, ``Mental Health Legislation
(Civil) in Australia and China: A Comparative Perspective,'' Journal of
Law and Medicine, Vol. 23, No. 4 (June 2016), 775. See also Liu Xing
and Gao Siwei, `` `Mental Health Law' Puts End to `Forcible Psychiatric
Commitment' '' [``Jingshen weisheng fa'' zhongjie ``bei
jingshenbing''], China Youth Daily, 29 October 12; ``China Adopts
Mental Health Law, Protecting Rights,'' Xinhua, 26 October 12.
\18\ Xing Bingyin, ``Gay Man From Henan Forcibly Committed for 19
Days, Sued Psychiatric Hospital and Won Lawsuit, Compensated 5,000''
[Henan tongxinglian nanzi bei qiangzhi zhiliao 19 tian zhuanggao
jingshenbing yuan shengsu, huo pei 5 qian], The Paper, 3 July 17; ``Gay
Man From Henan Sued Psychiatric Hospital'' [Henan tongxinglian nanzi
zhuanggao jingshenbing yuan], Radio Free Asia, 13 July 17. See also Li
Tiezhu, ``Trial Postponed in Case of `Gay Man Forcibly Committed to
Psychiatric Hospital' in Henan'' [Henan ``tongxinglian bei
jingshenbing'' an yanqi kaiting], Beijing Youth Daily, 22 September 16.
\19\ ``Gay Man From Henan Sued Psychiatric Hospital'' [Henan
tongxinglian nanzi zhuanggao jingshenbing yuan], Radio Free Asia, 13
July 17; Jonathan Tcheng, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: China Court
Rules Against Forced Conversion Therapy,'' 10 July 17; Cai Jiaxin and
Li Rongde, ``Court Rules Hospital Violated Gay Man's Liberty,'' Caixin,
5 July 17. See also Yang Shao and Bin Xie, ``Operationalizing the
Involuntary Treatment Regulations of China's New Mental Health Law,''
Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2013), 384.
\20\ Wang Jingshuo, ``Litigant in `First Case Under Mental Health
Law' Obtains Approval To Discharge Himself From Hospital'' [``Jingshen
weisheng fa di yi an'' dangshiren huozhun zixing banli chuyuan shouxu],
China Youth Daily, 8 August 17; Qu Zhengzhou, ``That the Rights of
Mentally Ill Persons Have Been Ignored Makes Me Cry'' [Jingshenbing
huanzhe quanli bei hushi lingren xixu], Yanzhao Metropolitan Daily,
reprinted in Phoenix News, 9 August 17. See also CECC, 2014 Annual
Report, 9 October 14, 124-25; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15,
203.
\21\ Wang Jingshuo, ``Litigant in `First Case Under Mental Health
Law' Obtains Approval To Discharge Himself From Hospital'' [``Jingshen
weisheng fa di yi an'' dangshiren huozhun zixing banli chuyuan shouxu],
China Youth Daily, 8 August 17. See also Yang Shao and Bin Xie,
``Operationalizing the Involuntary Treatment Regulations of China's New
Mental Health Law,'' Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry, Vol. 25, No. 6
(2013), 384-85. According to Shao and Xie, one of the challenges
involuntarily committed patients face regarding hospital discharge
under the PRC Mental Health Law is that ``[in] China, hospitals are not
permitted to simply discharge involuntarily admitted patients on their
own recognizance, they need to be discharged to the family member or
organization that signed the admission procedures.''
\22\ Wang Jingshuo, ``Litigant in `First Case Under Mental Health
Law' Obtains Approval To Discharge Himself From Hospital'' [``Jingshen
weisheng fa di yi an'' dangshiren huozhun zixing banli chuyuan shouxu],
China Youth Daily, 8 August 17; Qu Zhengzhou, ``That the Rights of
Mentally Ill Persons Have Been Ignored Makes Me Cry'' [Jingshenbing
huanzhe quanli bei hushi lingren xixu], Yanzhao Metropolitan Daily,
reprinted in Phoenix News, 9 August 17.
\23\ Luo Jieqi, ``Involuntarily Committed for 10 Years, Lawsuit
Against Psychiatric Hospital Allowed To File'' [Fei ziyuan zhu yuan shi
nian su jingshenbing yuan huo li'an], Caixin, 24 December 13.
\24\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2016 Year-End Summary on
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [2016 nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], 26 January 17; ``Petitioners Forcibly
Committed to Psychiatric Hospitals, Disguises Control of Personal
Liberty'' [Fangmin bei guan jingshenbing yuan bianxiang kongzhi renshen
ziyou], Radio Free Asia, 2 February 17.
\25\ Voice of Petitioners, ``After Dalian Petitioner Sheng Lanfu
Held for Ten Days, Faced Forced Commitment in Psychiatric Hospital and
Treatment for Fifteen Days'' [Dalian fangmin sheng lanfu bei ju shi
tian hou zao qiangsong jingshenbing yuan zhiliao shiwu tian], 4 April
17.
\26\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Online Political
Commentator Ren Naijun Released From Detention Center, Then Forcibly
Committed to Psychiatric Hospital, Family Had To Make 6 Promises for
Him To Be Allowed To Return Home'' [Shanghai wangluo zhenglun zuojia
ren naijun huoshi likai kanshousuo you bei zhuan jingshenbing yuan
jiaren zuochu 6 xiang chengnuo cai huozhun huijia], 22 May 17.
\27\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhu Liangqun Maltreated
While at Detention Center and Forcibly Detained at Psychiatric
Hospital'' [Zhu liangqun zai kanshousuo zaoshou nuedai bing bei
qiangzhi song jingshenbing yuan], 27 December 16.
\28\ Voice of Petitioners, ``Forcibly Committed to Psychiatric
Hospital for Over Two Years, Zhejiang Petitioner Li Jiafu Released''
[Bei guan jingshenbing yuan liang nian duo de zhejiang fangmin li jiafu
huoshi], 27 January 17; ``Petitioners Forcibly Committed to Psychiatric
Hospitals, Disguises Control of Personal Liberty'' [Fangmin bei guan
jingshenbing yuan bianxiang kongzhi renshen ziyou], Radio Free Asia, 2
February 17.
\29\ Song Jiangxuan, ``Shandong Petitioner Forcibly Committed to
Psychiatric Hospital Twice, Is Found Not To Have Mental Illness Before
Criminal Sentencing, Appeal Rejected'' [Shandong fangmin liang ci bei
song jingshenbing yuan, huoxing qian you bei rending mei bing, shensu
zao bohui], The Paper, 4 January 17. See also Song Jiangxuan,
``Petitioner From Shandong Forcibly Committed to Psychiatric Hospital
Sentenced to 4 Years: Coerced Money From Government, Now No Longer
Mentally Ill'' [Shandong ceng bei song jingshengbing yuan fangmin
zhongshen pan 4 nian: qiangna zhengfu qian, xian mei jingshenbing], The
Paper, 22 July 16; Song Jiangxuan, ``Shandong Petitioner Committed to
Psychiatric Hospital Two Times, Prior to Sentencing She Was Evaluated
as `Showing No Signs of Mental Illness' '' [Shandong fangmin liang ci
bei song jingshenbing yuan, panxing qian you bei jianding ``wu
jingshenbing biaoxian''], The Paper, 13 June 16. According to The
Paper's report in January 2017, in December 2016, a Shandong court
denied Xu's legal challenge of her conviction, holding that Xu's
repeated petitioning established the basis of the offense. For more
information on Xu Xueling, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2017-00018.
\30\ Huang Yuhao, ``Many Petitioners From Xintai, Shandong, Seeking
To Petition in Beijing Sent to Psychiatric Hospitals'' [Shandong xintai
duoming yu jin jing shangfangzhe bei qiang song jingshenbing yuan],
Beijing News, reprinted in Sina, 8 December 08; Song Jiangxuan,
``Shandong Petitioner Committed to Psychiatric Hospital Two Times,
Prior to Sentencing She Was Evaluated as `Showing No Signs of Mental
Illness' '' [Shandong fangmin liang ci bei song jingshenbing yuan,
panxing qian you bei jianding ``wu jingshenbing biaoxian''], The Paper,
13 June 16. See also Andrew Jacobs, ``Whistle-Blowers in Chinese City
Sent to Mental Hospital,'' New York Times, 8 December 08.
\31\ ``[Editorial] Beware of Arbitrary Psychiatric Treatment Due to
Petitioning Dilemma'' [(Shelun) jingti xinfang kunju xia de
jingshenbing shouzhi luanxiang], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 14 June
16.
\32\ Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on CRLW Director Liu
Feiyue's Case: Family Members Receive `Arrest Notice' From Suizhou,
Hubei, Public Security Bureau'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue an
tongbao: jiashu shoudao hubei suizhou shi gong'anju jifa de ``daibu
tongzhishu''], 11 January 17.
\33\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Civil Rights & Livelihood
Watch Founder Liu Feiyue Criminally Detained on Charge of Subversion of
State Power'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue bei yi dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui xingju], 24 November 16; Nomaan Merchant, ``China Detains
Editor of Human Rights Website for Subversion,'' Associated Press, 25
November 16; ``Rights Website Founder Detained on Subversion Charges in
China's Hubei,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 November 16.
\34\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Feiyue,'' 19 December
16; Nomaan Merchant, ``China Detains Editor of Human Rights Website for
Subversion,'' Associated Press, 25 November 16. See also Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch, ``2016 Year-End Summary on Mental Health and Human
Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric Commitment)'' [2016 nian zhongguo
jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], 26
January 17; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 Year-End Summary on
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [2015 nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], 8 February 16; Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch, ``2014 Year-End Report on Mental Health and Human
Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric Commitment)'' [2014 nian zhongguo
jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao], 14
January 15; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2013 Year-End Report on
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [Erlingyisan nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan
(bei jingshenbing) nianzhong baogao], 13 February 14.
\35\ See, e.g., ``AIDS in China: Mostly Sexually-Transmitted,
Discrimination Widespread'' [Zhongguo ai xianzhuang: xing chuanbo
weizhu shou qishi pubian], Deutsche Welle, 1 December 16 (employment
discrimination); Zeng Yu and Wang Chengwei, ``For Blind Students,
Braille Exams Pave Way to Higher Education,'' Sixth Tone, 17 November
16 (access to education); Yang Jingru and Sha Lu, ``I Would Like a Set
of Exam Papers in Braille'' [``Wo jiushi xiangyao yi fen mangwen
shijuan''], Beijing News, 16 May 17 (access to education); Catherine
Lai, ``China's New Rules on Education for People With Disabilities
Still Fall Short, Says NGO,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 25 February 17
(access to education); C. Hutchison et al., ``Financial Barriers and
Coping Strategies: Qualitative Study of Accessing Multidrug-Resistant
Tuberculosis and Tuberculosis Care in Yunnan,'' BMC Journal, 22
February 17 (access to medical treatment); Li Jie, ``More Than Half of
HIV-Positive Persons of Multiple Sexual Orientations Have Delayed
Medical Care'' [Guoban HIV yangxing duoyuan xingbiezhe ceng tuoyan
jiuyi], Southern Daily, 7 December 16 (access to medical treatment).
\36\ National laws and regulations that promote equal access to
employment and education and prohibit health-based discrimination
include the PRC Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canjiren baozhang fa], passed 28 December
90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 30-40; PRC
Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa],
passed 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 3, 29, 30; State
Council, Regulations on the Treatment and Control of HIV/AIDS [Aizibing
fangzhi tiaoli], issued 18 January 06, effective 1 March 06, art. 3;
State Council, Regulations on the Employment of Persons with
Disabilities [Canjiren jiuye tiaoli], issued 14 February 07, effective
1 May 07, arts. 3, 4, 13, 27. See also Wan Yanhai, ``AIDS, Human Rights
and Public Security in China,'' University of British Columbia, Peter
A. Allard School of Law, Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project,
Working Paper 16-1, 13 June 16.
\37\ ``On the Eve of AIDS Day, 60 Lawyers Advocate for the End of
Employment Discrimination in Letter to State Council'' [Aizibing ri
qianxi, 60 lushi jianyan guowuyuan xiaochu jiuye qishi], China Free
Press, 28 November 16; Chu Hua, ``Hearing Held on First Case in
Guangzhou Involving Employment Discrimination Against HIV-Infected
Person, Plaintiff Asks for Renewal of Contract'' [Guangzhou shouci aizi
ganranzhe jiuye qishi an kaiting yuangao yaoqiu xuqian hetong], Knews,
21 December 16; Gao Feng, ``Legal Community Urges Guarantees So That
Persons With HIV/AIDS Seeking Employment Do Not Face Discrimination''
[Falu jie cu baozhang aizibingren qiuzhi bu shou qishi], Radio Free
Asia, 28 April 17.
\38\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 21.
\39\ Ibid., paras. 34-36.
\40\ Chu Hua, ``Hearing Held on First Case in Guangzhou Involving
Employment Discrimination Against HIV-Infected Person, Plaintiff Asks
for Renewal of Contract'' [Guangzhou shouci aizi ganranzhe jiuye qishi
an kaiting yuangao yaoqiu xuqian hetong], Knews, 21 December 16.
\41\ ``AIDS in China: Mostly Sexually-Transmitted, Discrimination
Widespread'' [Zhongguo ai zhuangkuang: xing chuanbo wei zhu shou qishi
pubian], Deutsche Welle, 1 December 16.
\42\ ``First Case of Person With HIV/AIDS Winning Employment
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Work Unit'' [Quanguo shouli aizibingren
gao danwei jiuye qishi shengsu], Radio Free Asia, 21 June 17; Yang Hai
and Lin Jie, ``The First Winning Lawsuit'' [Di yi ci shengsu], China
Youth Daily, 28 June 17. See also Chu Hua, ``Hearing Held on First Case
in Guangzhou Involving Employment Discrimination Against HIV-Infected
Person, Plaintiff Asks for Renewal of Contract'' [Guangzhou shouci aizi
ganranzhe jiuye qishi an kaiting yuangao yaoqiu xuqian hetong], Knews,
21 December 16.
\43\ Yang Xiaomei and Gan Shangzhao, ``Final Ruling Announced in
Guangdong's First Case of Employment Discrimination Due to HIV/AIDS''
[Guangdong shouli aizibing jiuye qishi an zhongshen xuanpan], People's
Court News, reprinted in China Court Net, 21 June 17.
\44\ ``AIDS in China: Mostly Sexually-Transmitted, Discrimination
Widespread'' [Zhongguo ai zhuangkuang: xing chuanbo wei zhu shou qishi
pubian], Deutsche Welle, 1 December 16.
\45\ ``Guy in Jiangxi With AIDS Sues Human Resources Bureau and
Wins 50,000 Yuan in Compensation, Legal Community Advocates Eliminating
Discrimination at the Source'' [Jiangxi aizi xiao huo qisu rensheju
huochang wu wan yuan lushi jie huju qingchu qishi yuantou], China Free
Press, 6 June 17.
\46\ Ministry of Human Resources and Ministry of Health, Civil
Servants' General Recruitment Physical Eligibility Standards (Trial)
[Gongwuyuan luyong tijian tongyong biaozhun (shixing)], issued 17
January 05, reprinted in State Administration of Civil Service, 29
October 08, art. 18.
\47\ ``On the Eve of AIDS Day, 60 Lawyers Advocate for the End of
Employment Discrimination in Letter to State Council'' [Aizibing ri
qianxi, 60 lushi jianyan guowuyuan xiaochu jiuye qishi], China Free
Press, 28 November 16. China Free Press included a copy of the lawyers'
letter and the list of cosigners. ``Chinese Lawyers Call for End to HIV
Testing of New Employees on World AIDS Day,'' Radio Free Asia, 1
December 16.
\48\ Wang Jingyi and Deng Yuchen, ``An Autistic Youth's Road to
Death'' [Yige zibizheng shaonian de siwang zhi lu], Beijing News, 20
March 17; Chen Yuanyuan, ``Why Is There a High Frequency of Deaths at
Care Centers Among Persons Receiving Emergency Assistance? '' [Bei
jiuzhu renyuan heyi zai tuoyang zhongxin gaopin siwang], Beijing News,
20 March 17; Wang Jingyi, ``Follow-up on `Investigation Into Death of
Autistic Youth at Lianxi Care Center,' Xinfeng County Head: Life Is
Precious, We Are Responsible'' [``Lianxi tuoyang zhongxin zibizheng
shaonian siwang diaocha'' zhuizong xinfeng xianzhang: renming guantian
women you zeren], Beijing News, 20 March 17. See also Chris Buckley and
Adam Wu, ``Autistic Boy's Death One of Many Linked to Squalid `Care
Center' in China,'' New York Times, 20 March 17.
\49\ Cai Jiaxin and Sheng Menglu, ``20 Deaths in 49 Days Exposed at
Care Center, Inadequate Oversight, Who Will Be Held Responsible? '' [49
tian wang 20 ren bao tuoyang zhongxin jianguan shicha shui lai danze?],
Caixin, 21 March 17; ``High Rate of Death at Homeless Shelter in
Shaoguan, Guangdong, Raises Public Attention'' [Guangdong shaoguan yi
tuoyang zhongxin siwanglu gaofa yulun guanzhu], Radio Free Asia, 21
March 17; Zhou Ke, ``Guangdong Conducting Serious Investigation Into
Responsible Persons for Lianxi, Xinfeng Care Center Incident''
[Guangdong yansu chachu xinfeng lianxi tuoyang zhongxin shijian
zerenren], Xinhua, 27 March 17; ``Responsible Persons in Shaoguan `Care
Center Death Incident' Taken Under Control'' [Guangdong shaoguan
``tuoyang zhongxin siwang shijian'' fuzeren bei kongzhi], CCTV, 21
March 17; Chris Buckley and Adam Wu, ``Autistic Boy's Death One of Many
Linked to Squalid `Care Center' in China,'' New York Times, 20 March
17.
\50\ Wang Jingyi and Deng Yuchen, ``An Autistic Youth's Road to
Death'' [Yige zibizheng shaonian de siwang zhi lu], Beijing News, 20
March 17; Chen Yuanyuan, ``Why Is There a High Frequency of Death at
Care Centers Among Persons Receiving Emergency Assistance? '' [Bei
jiuzhu renyuan heyi zai tuoyang zhongxin gaopin siwang], Beijing News,
20 March 17; Wang Jingyi, ``Follow-up on `Investigation Into Death of
Autistic Youth at Lianxi Care Center,' Xinfeng County Head: Life Is
Precious, We Are Responsible'' [``Lianxi tuoyang zhongxin zibizheng
shaonian siwang diaocha'' zhuizong xinfeng xianzhang: renming guantian
women you zeren], Beijing News, 20 March 17.
\51\ Chen Yuanyuan, ``Why Is There a High Frequency of Death at
Care Centers Among Persons Receiving Emergency Assistance? '' [Bei
jiuzhu renyuan heyi zai tuoyang zhongxin gaopin siwang], Beijing News,
20 March 17; Cai Jiaxin and Sheng Menglu, ``20 Deaths in 49 Days
Exposed at Care Center, Inadequate Oversight, Who Will Be Held
Responsible? '' [49 tian wang 20 ren bao tuoyang zhongxin jianguan
shicha shui lai danze?], Caixin, 21 March 17.
\52\ State Council, Regulations on Education for Persons with
Disabilities [Canjiren jiaoyu tiaoli], issued 23 August 94, amended 1
February 17, effective 1 May 17. See also CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10
October 13, 122.
\53\ State Council, Regulations on Education for Persons with
Disabilities [Canjiren jiaoyu tiaoli], issued 23 August 94, amended 1
February 17, effective 1 May 17, art. 48; Hu Hao et al., ``Protecting
Persons With Disabilities' Enjoyment of the Equal Right To Receive an
Education--Three Major Highlights of the Revised `Regulations on
Education for Persons With Disabilities' '' [Baozhang canjiren xiangyou
pingdeng jieshou jiaoyu de quanli--xiuding hou de ``canjiren jiaoyu
tiaoli'' tuxian san da liangdian], Xinhua, 23 February 17.
\54\ Ministry of Education and China Disabled Persons Federation,
Nationwide Provisions for the Uniform Management of Ordinary College-
and Higher-Level School Entrance Examinations for Participating
Students With Disabilities [Canjiren canjia putong gaodeng xuexiao
zhaosheng quanguo tongyi kaoshi guanli guiding], 27 April 17; `` `New
Regulations' Again Released for Disabled Students Taking College Exam:
Braille Test-Takers Can Extend Exam Time by a Half' '' [Canjiren gaokao
zaichu ``xingui'': mangwen kaosheng ke yanchang yiban kaoshi shijian],
Jiemian, 29 April 17.
\55\ Lin Yanhua, ``Guangxi To Provide Reasonable Accommodation for
Disabled and Special Needs Student Test-Takers, Fostering a Warm and
Harmonious College Exam'' [Guangxi wei canji, teshu kaosheng tigong
heli bianli dazao wenxin hexie gaokao], China News Service, 6 June 17;
Li Jing, ``Shanghai Municipal Education Commission Foreign Language
Listening Skills Items for Attention, 18 Students With Hearing
Disabilities Took Test for Free'' [Shanghai shi jiaowei fa waiyu tingli
zhuyi shixiang, 18 ming tingli canji kaosheng mian ceshi], The Paper, 7
June 17.
\56\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Rules for Students With
Disabilities Inadequate,'' 6 March 17; Catherine Lai, ``China's New
Rules on Education for People With Disabilities Still Fall Short, Says
NGO,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 25 February 17. See also CECC, 2013 Annual
Report, 10 October 13, 122.
\57\ Save the Children, ``Integrated (Inclusive) Education Round
Table Convened, Release of Sample Survey Report on Mainstreaming
Students'' [Quanna (ronghe) jiaoyu zuotanhui zhaokai fabu suiban jiudu
chouyang diaocha baogao], 7 March 17; ``About 30 Percent of Chinese
Students With Disabilities Are Asked by Schools To Drop Out of School''
[Zhongguo canji xuesheng zhong jin sancheng ceng bei xuexiao yaoqiu
tuixue], Radio Free Asia, 15 March 17. Radio Free Asia noted that
official statistics show that the percentage of disabled children in
total receiving compulsory education is around 70 percent.
The Environment
The Environment
The Environment
Introduction
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the Chinese
government reported modest progress in air and water pollution
reduction,\1\ while Chinese and international media reports
detailed the ongoing severity of China's air, water, and soil
pollution, and related health concerns.\2\ Chinese President
and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping reiterated the
government's commitment to environmental protection.\3\ Some
reports noted improvements in data disclosure for air pollution
and on pollution sources,\4\ yet lack of transparency with
respect to environmental data remains a problem.\5\ Government
inspectors this past year found widespread violations of
domestic environmental standards by firms in China,\6\ and in
at least one incident of data falsification, prosecuted
environmental officials for manipulating air quality monitoring
readings.\7\ Chinese officials continued to make statements
calling for public participation in environmental protection;
\8\ in terms of holding polluters accountable, however, as
highlighted in a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme
poverty and human rights, ``the Government tends to rely almost
entirely on top-down processes.'' \9\ During this reporting
year, authorities detained environmental advocates,\10\
censored media reporting on the environment \11\ and natural
disasters,\12\ and cracked down on environmental protests,\13\
highlighting the government's conflicting goals of improving
the environment and ``maintaining social stability.'' \14\
Reported Environmental Progress
During this reporting year, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and Chinese authorities reported modest progress toward
achieving the government's goals of improving air quality and
reducing water pollution. According to analysis of official
data by Greenpeace, an international environmental advocacy
group, ``74 percent of Chinese cities fail[ed] to meet China's
national air quality standards'' in 2016,\15\ an improvement
from the 80 percent of cities that failed to meet the standards
in 2015.\16\ The government reported that in 2016, national
targets for surface water pollution were met, with 67.8 percent
of surface water meeting officially designated moderate to high
standards and only 8.6 percent of surface water failing to meet
the lowest standards.\17\ In the first half of 2017, 70.0
percent of surface water reportedly met the moderate to high
standards and 8.8 percent of surface water failed to meet the
lowest standards.\18\ Authorities and independent sources
nevertheless noted continuing areas of concern, such as
deteriorating water quality in some areas and the prevalence of
cancer villages and groundwater pollution.\19\
Environmental Health Concerns
Reports from this past year continued to demonstrate that
air,\20\ water,\21\ and soil pollution \22\ caused serious harm
to the health of persons living in China. In February 2017, a
U.S.-based research team published a report finding that air
pollution globally may be responsible for approximately one out
of five dementia cases for persons living in areas with high
concentrations of fine particulate matter
(PM2.5).\23\ Many cities in China have high annual
average concentrations of PM2.5.\24\ In May 2017, a
group of international scientists published research on the
``striking'' consequences of diesel emissions on public health,
finding that 31,400 premature deaths in China per year may be
caused by diesel emissions.\25\ In July 2017, a European non-
profit organization reported the health costs in China ``from
fossil fuels through air pollution-caused premature deaths'' at
approximately US$1.7 trillion in 2015.\26\ Chinese and
international media reported that health concerns motivated
some urban residents to move away from polluted areas \27\ or
take other action, such as beginning to monitor pollution or
requesting government information on pollution, to protect
their health.\28\
Transparency Regarding Environmental Data
During this reporting year, environmental NGOs and the
Chinese government expressed concern regarding the transparency
or accuracy of pollution-related data. The Institute of Public
& Environmental Affairs (IPE), a Beijing-based NGO, reported
there were still ``significant issues'' with air pollution
disclosures by many cities, and that in some key cities,
monitoring data was still withheld from public disclosure.\29\
IPE developed Blue Map, a mobile application (app) that
provides real-time information on environmental quality.\30\ As
of January 2017, users had reportedly downloaded the app over 3
million times.\31\ In January 2017, a provincial environmental
protection bureau reportedly ordered developers of another
mobile application, Air Matters, to stop reporting pollution
levels above a certain amount.\32\ In October 2016, Chinese
authorities reportedly detained three environmental officials
in Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi province, for ``falsification''
of air quality data.\33\ In June 2017, the Xi'an Intermediate
People's Court sentenced seven environmental officials,
including the three officials previously detained, to prison
terms ranging from 1 year and 3 months to 1 year and 10 months
for ``damaging the computer information system.'' \34\ In July
2017, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), following
a month-long inspection, strongly criticized the Tianjin
municipal government for ``wantonly covering up'' its failed
environmental protection efforts, finding that although Tianjin
authorities had convened many meetings and launched campaigns,
``it was more lip service than action.'' \35\ MEP inspectors
discovered that officials from the Binhai New Area and Wuqing
districts in Tianjin had ``taken shortcuts'' (zou jiejing) to
report better air quality by spraying water and reducing
traffic near air quality monitors, and that Jinghai district
water bureau officials had fabricated official documents.\36\
Public Interest Litigation
The Supreme People's Court (SPC) continued to take steps to
strengthen the legal framework that provides for environmental
organizations to file environmental public interest
lawsuits.\37\ The number of organizations filing this type of
lawsuit, however, remained low.\38\ In March 2017, the SPC
released for the first time summaries of 10 public interest
lawsuits as model cases.\39\ The plaintiffs in some of the
model cases were entities under government supervision,
including procuratorates in three cases, rather than
independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs).\40\ Although
an estimated 700 environmental NGOs in China have standing to
bring public interest lawsuits, the number of environmental
NGOs that filed litigation in China reportedly decreased from
11 in 2015 to 6 in the first 11 months of 2016.\41\ Some
foreign experts remain optimistic about the future of
environmental public interest litigation in China due to the
government's apparent support for such litigation,\42\ although
significant challenges exist, including the high costs of
litigation.\43\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soil Pollution Litigation in Changzhou
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2016, Chinese media reported that hundreds of students had
fallen ill at the Changzhou Foreign Languages School in Changzhou
municipality, Jiangsu province.\44\ Following these reports, two
environmental NGOs--Friends of Nature (FON) and the China Biodiversity
Conservation and Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF)--sued three
chemical manufacturers that allegedly polluted the soil near the
school.\45\ In January 2017, the Changzhou Intermediate People's Court
ruled in favor of the chemical manufacturers and held that the two NGOs
were responsible for court fees totaling 1.89 million yuan
(US$270,000).\46\ The head of the litigation department at CBCGDF
expressed concern that this case ``would set a precedent for courts to
use similar charging standards for future environmental public interest
lawsuits.'' \47\ In February 2017, FON and CBCGDF reportedly appealed
the judgment.\48\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Suppression of Environmental Protests and Advocates
Chinese citizens continued to raise their concerns about
health issues related to the environment through street-level
protests and other forms of public advocacy.\49\ China's
Constitution provides for freedom of speech, assembly,
association, and demonstration,\50\ as do the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights \51\ and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.\52\ The following cases illustrate
the ongoing lack of protection for citizens' rights to freedom
of speech, assembly, association, and demonstration when they
raise environmental concerns:
Shaanxi province. In October 2016, residents
in Xi'an municipality, Shaanxi, protested plans to
build a waste incinerator in a local drinking water
priority protection area.\53\ Local residents
reportedly estimated that the crowds numbered over
10,000 people.\54\ Following the protests, authorities
reportedly restricted residents' movement and censored
media coverage.\55\
Sichuan province. In December 2016,
authorities reportedly briefly detained a number of
advocates in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan, after they
gathered wearing face masks to protest air
pollution.\56\ In addition, authorities in Chengdu
responded to the local pollution protests by
prohibiting students from wearing face masks, issuing
censorship instructions to the media, and sending text
messages to local students urging them to ``trust in
the government to carry out anti-pollution work.'' \57\
Henan province. Between September 29 and
October 10, 2016, public security officials in Gushi
county, Xinyang municipality, Henan, took into custody
seven residents of Tianhu village, Yangji township,
Gushi,\58\ initially holding them at the Gushi PSB
Detention Center and criminally detaining them on
suspicion of ``sabotaging production and business
operations.'' \59\ The detentions were reportedly
connected to the residents' protests against and
attempts to prevent illegal sand mining that threatened
village fields and irrigation systems.\60\ One detained
villager reported that authorities tortured him to
obtain his signature on investigation documents.\61\
Hunan province. According to Radio Free Asia,
on October 9, 2016, police in Changsha municipality,
Hunan, took environmental NGO leader Liu Shu into
custody.\62\ On October 10, authorities ordered Liu to
serve 10 days of administrative detention for ``leaking
counter-espionage work state secrets''; her alleged
offense was sharing pollution data.\63\ Liu is the
director of the Shuguang Environmental Protection and
Public Interest Development Center, an NGO in
Changsha.\64\
Liaoning province. In August 2016, the Panjin
Intermediate People's Court in Panjin municipality,
Liaoning, rescinded a 12-year prison sentence against
Tian Jiguang.\65\ Upon retrial, however, the
Shuangtaizi District People's Court in Panjin sentenced
him to four years and six months in prison in June
2017.\66\ Tian was the founder and leader of the Panjin
City Association of Volunteers for the Protection of
the Spotted Seal.\67\ Authorities in Panjin detained
Tian in October 2013 on charges including ``extortion''
after he wrote a blog post in which he criticized a
state-owned enterprise for water pollution.\68\
Regulatory Developments
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
implemented or drafted regulatory changes affecting
environmental monitoring and wildlife protection. In December
2016, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the PRC
Environmental Tax Law.\69\ The legislation, which will take
effect in January 2018,\70\ provides for new environmental
taxes that will be jointly managed by environmental and tax
authorities,\71\ superseding the previous pollution discharge
fees that had only been managed by environmental
authorities.\72\ Some legal experts believe the potential for
tax authorities to collect taxes from polluters may result in a
strengthening of pollution monitoring systems.\73\ In July
2016, the NPC amended the PRC Wildlife Protection Law, which
took effect in January 2017.\74\ An international non-
governmental organization noted ``positive changes'' and areas
of concern with the law, including that the breeding and
selling of protected animals like the tiger may continue.\75\
During this reporting year, the NPC reportedly was in the
process of drafting a new soil pollution law,\76\ and in June
2017, the NPC amended the PRC Water Pollution Prevention and
Control Law.\77\ China Daily, a state-run media outlet,
highlighted a new ``river chief system'' that gives provincial
and local officials ``major responsibility for addressing water
pollution'' in the amended law.\78\
In December 2016, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and
Supreme People's Procuratorate issued an interpretation on
environmental crimes that, if implemented, may lead to more
criminal enforcement for environmental data manipulation.\79\
The interpretation, which took effect on January 1, 2017,
provides that criminal penalties for companies found in
violation of environmental standards may be based on the amount
of money the company saved by not operating the pollution
control equipment; \80\ criminal charges of more than three
years could be imposed if the money saved totaled over 1
million yuan (US$140,000).\81\ The Director of the SPC research
office said that the new interpretation would enhance the
effectiveness of relevant legislation to allow for the
prosecution of environmental crimes.\82\
The government continued to develop and release
comprehensive plans for improving the environment, although the
government also announced plans to increase coal-fired power
capacity. In December 2016, the National Development and Reform
Commission released China's 13th Five-Year Energy Development
Plan (Energy Development Plan),\83\ which builds upon mandatory
environmental targets in China's overall 13th Five-Year Plan
for National Economic and Social Development adopted in March
2016.\84\ The Energy Development Plan set a mandatory target
that energy from coal will account for 58 percent or less of
energy production by 2020, a 6-percent decrease from 2015.\85\
The 13th Five-Year Electricity Development Plan, however,
included plans to increase coal-fired power capacity from 900
gigawatts in 2015 to no more than 1,100 gigawatts in 2020,\86\
despite plans to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and existing
coal overcapacity.\87\
The Environment
The Environment
Notes to Section II--The Environment
\1\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``2016 Report on
Environmental Conditions in China'' [2016 nian zhongguo huanjing
zhuangkuang gongbao], 31 May 17, 5; ``State Council Report on 2016
China Environmental Conditions and Fulfillment of Environmental
Protection Targets, and Report on Study of Environmental Protection Law
Enforcement and Investigation and Consideration of Opinions''
[Guowuyuan guanyu 2016 niandu huanjing zhuangkuang he huanjing baohu
mubiao wancheng qingkuang yu yanjiu chuli huanjing baohu fa zhifa
jiancha baogao ji shenyi yijian qingkuang de baogao], 24 April 17,
para. 1(1)-(2); Gao Jing, ``Environmental Quality Improvement a `Heavy
Burden Going Forward'--Minister of Environmental Protection Chen Jining
Responds to Hot Topic of Serious Air Pollution'' [Huanjing zhiliang
gaishan ``fuzhong qian xing''--huanbaobu buzhang chen jining huiying
zhong wuran tianqi redian huati], Xinhua, 7 January 17; ``China
Exclusive: Environment Minister Feels `Guilty' for Air Pollution,''
Xinhua, 7 January 17.
\2\ Alice Yan, ``Smog Linked to Third of Deaths in China, Study
Finds,'' South China Morning Post, 23 December 16; Ruan Yulin, ``61
Chinese Cities Begin Air Pollution Warnings'' [Zhongguo 61 ge chengshi
qidong kongqi wuran yujing], China News Service, 31 December 16;
``Local Govts Need To Be Tougher on Polluters,'' China Daily, 6 January
17; Deng Tingting, ``In China, the Water You Drink Is as Dangerous as
the Air You Breathe,'' Guardian, 2 June 17; Zheng Jinran, ``Water
Quality To Be Prioritized,'' China Daily, 20 December 16; ``The Most
Neglected Threat to Public Health in China Is Toxic Soil,'' Economist,
8 June 17.
\3\ Wang Zihui, ``Since the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping Has
Repeatedly Stressed `Clear Water and Green Mountains' '' [Shiba da
yilai, xi jinping fanfu qiangdiao ``lu shui qing shan''], Xinhua, 5
June 17; ``Xi Calls for Building of Socialist Ecological
Civilization,'' Xinhua, 2 December 16.
\4\ Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs, ``Seeking Blue
Together: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2016 Annual
Report,'' 19 January 17, 7, 9; Institute of Public & Environmental
Affairs, ``Blue Sky Roadmap Phase IV: Managing the `Gap Effect,' ''
August 2016, 3; Angel Hsu et al., ``Addressing Gaps in China's
Environmental Data: The Existing Landscape,'' Yale Data-Driven
Environmental Solutions Group, January 2017, 4; Beth Gardiner,
``China's Surprising Solutions To Clear Killer Air,'' National
Geographic, 5 May 17.
\5\ Deng Tingting, ``In China, the Water You Drink Is as Dangerous
as the Air You Breathe,'' Guardian, 2 June 17; Angel Hsu et al.,
``Addressing Gaps in China's Environmental Data: The Existing
Landscape,'' Yale Data-Driven Environmental Solutions Group, January
2017, 8-9; Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs, ``Blue Sky
Roadmap Phase IV: Managing the `Gap Effect,' '' August 2016, 1.
\6\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Bulletin on
Strengthening the State of Supervision and Investigation of Air
Pollution Prevention in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, and Neighboring
Areas'' [Huanjing baohubu tongbao jing jin ji ji zhoubian diqu daqi
wuran fangzhi qianghua du cha qingkuang], 8 June 17; ``Inspections Find
70 Pct of Firms Violated Environmental Rules,'' Xinhua, 11 June 17;
Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Bulletin on 2017 First Quarter
Air Quality Special Inspection Situation'' [Huanjing baohubu tongbao
2017 nian di yi jidu kongqi zhiliang zhuanxiang du cha qingkuang], 30
March 17; Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Bulletin on
Strengthening the State of Supervision and Investigation of Air
Pollution Prevention in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, and Neighboring
Areas'' [Huanjing baohubu tongbao jing jin ji ji zhoubian diqu daqi
wuran fangzhi qianghua du cha qingkuang], 19 April 17; Bibek Bhandari,
``Polluting Plants Shut by Officials Found Still in Use,'' Sixth Tone,
21 April 17.
\7\ Ning Jun, ``For Giving Air Quality Monitoring Equipment
`Facemask,' Chang'an Environmental Protection Bureau Branch Director
Among Seven People Sentenced'' [Gei kongqi caiyangqi ``dai kouzhao''
huanbao chang'an fenju juzhang deng 7 ren huoxing], Chinese Business
View, 16 June 17; Zhou Dongxu, ``Wang Shekun: Falsification of
Environmental Protection Data, Air Quality Monitor `Wearing a Facemask'
Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg'' [Wang shekun: huanbao shuju zaojia
kongqi caiyangqi ``dai kouzhao'' zhi shi bingshan yijiao], Caixin, 28
October 16; ``China Holds Five Officials Over `Falsification' of Air
Monitoring Data,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 October 16; Edward Wong and
Vanessa Piao, ``When China Wants Better Air Readings, Cotton Does the
Trick,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 28 October 16.
\8\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection Vice Minister Zhao
Yingmin Interprets the ` ``13th Five-Year Plan'' for National Eco-
Environmental Protection' '' [Huanjing baohubu fubuzhang zhao yingmin
jiedu `` `shisan wu' shengtai huanjing baohu guihua''], China
Environment News, reprinted in Ministry of Environmental Protection, 6
December 16; Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Vice Minister Zhao
Yingmin Interprets the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Eco-
Environmental Conservation,'' 3 January 17; Sue-Lin Wong and David
Stanway, ``China Urges Closer Ties With Non-Government Bodies, Media in
War on Water Pollution,'' Reuters, 21 April 17; Angel Hsu et al., ``The
Potential for Citizen-Generated Data in China,'' Yale Data-Driven
Environmental Solutions Group, January 2017, 6-8. See also CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 208; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October
07, 136-37.
\9\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 68.
\10\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Earth Day: China
Must Protect Human Rights To Effectively Protect the Environment,'' 20
April 17; ``China Jails Environmental Activist for `Revealing State
Secrets,' '' Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16; ``Chinese Environmental
Protester Seeks Refuge in Thailand Ahead of Earth Day,'' Radio Free
Asia, 21 April 17.
\11\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Notice on Chengdu
Environmental Coverage,'' 12 December 16; ``China Cracks Down on
Chengdu Smog Protests, Detains Activists, Muzzles Media,'' Radio Free
Asia, 13 December 16; ``Xian Under Security Alert After Thousands
Protest Incinerator Plant,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 October 16.
\12\ See, e.g., China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Delete Report on
Causes of Deadly Landslide,'' 27 June 17; China Digital Times,
``Minitrue: Follow Xinhua on Jiuzhaigou Earthquake,'' 8 August 17.
\13\ See, e.g., ``Xian Under Security Alert After Thousands Protest
Incinerator Plant,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 October 16; Benjamin Haas,
``China Riot Police Seal Off City Centre After Smog Protesters Put
Masks on Statues,'' Guardian, 12 December 16.
\14\ See, e.g., Alex L. Wang, ``Explaining Environmental
Information Disclosure in China,'' Social Science Research Network,
last visited 15 April 17, 20, 56; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Earth Day: China Must Protect Human Rights To Effectively Protect the
Environment,'' 20 April 17.
\15\ Greenpeace, ``Almost Three Quarters of Chinese Cities Yet To
Reach Air Quality National Standards,'' 17 January 17. See also
Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``2016 Report on Environmental
Conditions in China'' [2016 nian zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang
gongbao], 31 May 17, 5.
\16\ Greenpeace, ``China Saw Average PM2.5 Levels Fall
by 10% in 2015, but 80% of Cities Still Fail To Meet National Air
Quality Standards,'' 20 January 16.
\17\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``MEP Releases the
Developments in Water Pollution Control,'' 27 March 17; Dongmei Han et
al., ``Deep Challenges for China's War on Water Pollution,''
Environmental Pollution, Vol. 218 (November 2016), 1223, 1227. The
Chinese government's surface water quality standards range from the
highest quality rating, Grade I, to the lowest of Grade VI.
\18\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Ministry of
Environmental Protection Bulletin for First Half of 2017 on Water
Quality in Every Province (Autonomous Region and Municipality) and
Places Where Water Quality Declined'' [Huanjing baohubu tongbao 2017
nian shangbannian ge sheng (qu, shi) shuizhi qingkuang he shuizhi
xiajiang duanmian], 14 August 17; ``China Reports Uneven Progress in
Reducing Water Pollution,'' Xinhua, 14 August 17. See also Ministry of
Environmental Protection, ``MEP Releases the Developments in Water
Pollution Control,'' 27 March 17; Dongmei Han et al., ``Deep Challenges
for China's War on Water Pollution,'' Environmental Pollution, Vol. 218
(November 2016), 1223, 1227.
\19\ Christian Shepherd, ``China's Environment Ministry Finds
Patchy Progress on Water and Soil Pollution,'' Reuters, 24 April 17;
Matthew Currell, ``Deep Challenges: China's `War on Water Pollution'
Must Tackle Deep Groundwater Pollution Pathways,'' American Geophysical
Union, Water Underground (blog), 16 March 17; Greenpeace, ``Evaluation
of Water Quality Improvement Conditions in Every Province (Autonomous
Region and Municipality) of China During the `12th Five-Year Plan' ''
[``Shi'er wu'' qijian zhongguo ge sheng (zizhiqu, zhixiashi) dibiao
shui huanjing zhiliang gaishan qingkuang pinggu], May 2017, 35; Deng
Tingting, ``In China, the Water You Drink Is as Dangerous as the Air
You Breathe,'' Guardian, 2 June 17; Sue-Lin Wong and David Stanway,
``China Urges Closer Ties With Non-Government Bodies, Media in War on
Water Pollution,'' Reuters, 21 April 17; Ministry of Environmental
Protection, ``2016 Report on Environmental Conditions in China'' [2016
nian zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao], 31 May 17, 5.
\20\ Die Fang et al., ``Mortality Effects Assessment of Ambient
PM2.5 Pollution in the 74 Leading Cities of China,'' Science
of the Total Environment, Vols. 569-70 (1 November 16), 1551; Alice
Yan, ``Smog Linked to Third of Deaths in China, Study Finds,'' South
China Morning Post, 22 December 16; Lisa Marshall, ``Diesels Pollute
More Than Tests Detect; Excess Emissions Kill 38,000 Yearly,'' CU
Boulder Today, 15 May 17.
\21\ Dongmei Han et al., ``Deep Challenges for China's War on Water
Pollution,'' Environmental Pollution, Vol. 218 (November 2016), 1222-
23, 1229-30; Matthew Currell, ``Deep Challenges: China's `War on Water
Pollution' Must Tackle Deep Groundwater Pollution Pathways,'' American
Geophysical Union, Water Underground (blog), 16 March 17.
\22\ ``The Most Neglected Threat to Public Health in China Is Toxic
Soil,'' Economist, 8 June 17; Changsheng Qu et al., ``China's Soil
Pollution Control: Choices and Challenges,'' Environment Science &
Technology, Vol. 50, No. 24 (8 December 16), 13181.
\23\ Edward Wong, ``Pollution Leads to Greater Risk of Dementia
Among Older Women, Study Says,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 4
February 17; Emily Underwood, ``The Polluted Brain,'' Science Magazine,
26 January 17.
\24\ Die Fang et al., ``Mortality Effects Assessment of Ambient
PM2.5 Pollution in the 74 Leading Cities of China,'' Science
of the Total Environment, Vols. 569-70 (1 November 16), 1546; Ministry
of Environmental Protection, ``2016 Report on Environmental Conditions
in China'' [2016 nian zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao], 31 May
17, 8. See also Edward Wong, ``Pollution Leads to Greater Risk of
Dementia Among Older Women, Study Says,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 4 February 17.
\25\ Lisa Marshall, ``Diesels Pollute More Than Tests Detect;
Excess Emissions Kill 38,000 Yearly,'' CU Boulder Today, 15 May 17.
\26\ Health and Environment Alliance, ``Hidden Price Tags: How
Ending Fossil Fuel Subsidies Would Benefit Our Health,'' July 2017, 27;
Catherine Early, ``Health Costs of China's Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Highlighted,'' China Dialogue, 2 August 17.
\27\ Zhang Wenli, ``Three Mothers, Under Smog,'' Sixth Tone, 29
December 16; Ye Ye, ``In Smog Besieged Beijing, How Can Start-Up
Companies Survive? '' [Bei wumai weikun de beijing, chuangye gongsi yao
ruhe shengcun?], 36Kr, 20 December 16; Meng Jing, ``Beijing Start-Ups
Move Out as Hazardous Smog Smothers Capital,'' South China Morning
Post, 4 January 17. See also American Chamber of Commerce in China,
``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017, 84.
\28\ Zhang Wenli, ``Three Mothers, Under Smog,'' Sixth Tone, 29
December 16; Anthony Kuhn, ``For Some in China's Middle Class,
Pollution Is Spurring Action,'' NPR, 2 March 17; Angel Hsu et al.,
``The Potential for Citizen-Generated Data in China,'' Yale Data-Driven
Environmental Solutions Group, January 2017, 9, 11-12.
\29\ Shen Su'nan et al., Institute of Public & Environmental
Affairs, ``Blue Sky Roadmap Phase IV: Managing the `Gap Effect,' ''
August 2016, 1.
\30\ Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs, ``About IPE,''
last visited 15 June 17. The Blue Map App can be downloaded from the
IPE website at www.ipe.org.cn. Real-time maps of water quality,
wastewater, air emissions, and air quality are also available.
\31\ Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs, ``Seeking Blue
Together: Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 2016 Annual
Report,'' 19 January 17, 8.
\32\ Wang Lianzhang, ``Government Orders Chinese Air Quality App To
Limit Readings,'' Sixth Tone, 10 January 17.
\33\ Michael Lelyveld, ``China Fraud Case Raises Smog Suspicions,''
Radio Free Asia, 14 November 16; Jane Li, ``Chinese Officials
Questioned After Cotton Wool Shoved in Equipment To Monitor Air
Pollution: Report,'' South China Morning Post, 25 October 16; Catherine
Lai, ``Three Xi'an Officials Detained After Stuffing Cotton Into Air
Quality Monitor To Alter Data,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 26 October 16.
\34\ Xi'an Intermediate People's Court, ``Seven Defendants,
Including Li Sen, Openly Sentenced in Two First-Instance Cases of
Damaging the Computer Information System'' [Beigaoren li sen deng qi
ren pohuai jisuanji xinxi xitong yishen liang'an gongkai xuanpan], 16
June 17; ``China Court Sentences Seven Over Falsifying Air Quality
Data,'' Xinhua, 16 June 17.
\35\ Zhao Yusha, ``Tianjin Slammed for Air, Water Pollution
Coverup,'' Global Times, 30 July 17. See also Ministry of Environmental
Protection, ``First Central Environmental Protection Inspection Team
Gives Feedback on Inspection Results to Tianjin Municipal Government''
[Zhongyang di yi huanjing baohu ducha zu xiang tianjin shi fankui ducha
qingkuang], 29 July 17; Zhuang Pinghui, ``China's Environment Watchdog
Reads Riot Act to Megacity Over Litany of Pollution Failures,'' South
China Morning Post, 31 July 17.
\36\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``First Central
Environmental Protection Inspection Team Gives Feedback on Inspection
Results to Tianjin Municipal Government'' [Zhongyang di yi huanjing
baohu ducha zu xiang tianjin shi fankui ducha qingkuang], 29 July 17;
Zhuang Pinghui, ``China's Environment Watchdog Reads Riot Act to
Megacity Over Litany of Pollution Failures,'' South China Morning Post,
31 July 17. See also Zhao Yusha, ``Tianjin Slammed for Air, Water
Pollution Coverup,'' Global Times, 30 July 17.
\37\ PRC Environmental Protection Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
huanjing baohu fa], issued 26 December 89, amended 24 April 14,
effective 1 January 15, art. 58. The PRC Environmental Protection Law
established the legal framework for environmental organizations to file
public interest lawsuits. For an example of Supreme People's Court
efforts to strengthen this legal framework in the past, see, e.g.,
Supreme People's Court, Interpretation Regarding Certain Issues Related
to Application of the Law in Environmental Civil Public Interest
Litigation [Guanyu shenli huanjing minshi gongyi susong anjian shiyong
falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 6 January 15, effective 7 January
15.
\38\ Yu Zhuang, ``The Challenge of Litigation Costs and Damage
Assessment Fees in Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China,''
Comparative Jurist, William & Mary Law School's International and
Comparative Law Blog, 13 May 17.
\39\ ``Supreme People's Court Releases Public Interest
Environmental Litigation Model Cases'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan fabu
huanjing gongyi susong dianxing anli], Xinhua, 7 March 17; Zhang Chun,
``Six Important Environmental Cases,'' China Dialogue, 11 April 17;
Yanmei Lin, ``China's Supreme Court Releases Ten Model Environmental
Public Interest Litigation Cases,'' Vermont Law School, Asia
Environmental Governance Blog, 13 March 17.
\40\ ``Supreme People's Court Releases Public Interest
Environmental Litigation Model Cases'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan fabu
huanjing gongyi susong dianxing anli], Xinhua, 7 March 17; Zhang Chun,
``Six Important Environmental Cases,'' China Dialogue, 11 April 17. See
also Zhang Yan, ``Public Interest Lawsuits To Grow Over Pollution, Food
and Drugs,'' China Daily, 14 March 17. The China Daily article quotes a
senior Supreme People's Procuratorate official as saying that a public
interest lawsuit by the procuratorate should be ``the last resort,''
and that governmental and non-governmental organizations should be
urged to file cases first.
\41\ Yu Zhuang, ``The Challenge of Litigation Costs and Damage
Assessment Fees in Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China,''
Comparative Jurist, William & Mary Law School's International and
Comparative Law Blog, 13 May 17.
\42\ See, e.g., Dimitri de Boer and Douglas Whitehead, ``Opinion:
The Future of Public Interest Litigation in China,'' China Dialogue, 8
November 16; ``How China Is Using the Law To Protect the Environment,''
Client Earth, 24 October 16.
\43\ Scott Wilson, ``China's NGO Regulations and Uneven Civil
Society Development,'' University of Nottingham, China Policy
Institute: Analysis (blog), 15 February 17; Zhang Chun, ``Environmental
Law Blunted by Crippling Court Costs,'' China Dialogue, 22 August 16.
\44\ Shi Yi, ``Court Rules Against NGOs in Changzhou Polluted
School Case,'' Sixth Tone, 25 January 17. See also Jiang Xiaoping,
``Middle School Moves to New Site as 500 Students Have Health
Irregularities, Some Found To Have Leukemia'' [Zhongxue ban xinzhi 500
xuesheng shenti yichang gebie chachu baixuebing], CCTV, reprinted in
Sina, 17 April 16; Tom Phillips, ``China's Toxic School: Officials
Struggle To Contain Uproar Over Sick Students,'' Guardian, 19 April 16;
Yu Zhuang, ``Friends of Nature (China)'s Fight Against Soil Pollution
in China,'' Vermont Law School, Asia Environmental Governance Blog, 13
May 16.
\45\ Changzhou Intermediate People's Court, Jiangsu Province, Civil
Judgment [Jiangsu sheng changzhou shi zhongji renmin fayuan minshi
panjue shu], (2016) Su 04 Min Chu No. 214, 25 January 17, reprinted in
China Judgements Online, 27 February 17; Zhang Chun and Tang Damin,
``The Changzhou Soil Pollution Case Is Far From Over,'' China Dialogue,
24 February 17.
\46\ Changzhou Intermediate People's Court, Jiangsu Province, Civil
Judgment [Jiangsu sheng changzhou shi zhongji renmin fayuan minshi
panjue shu], (2016) Su 04 Min Chu No. 214, 25 January 17, reprinted in
China Judgements Online, 27 February 17; ``Changzhou Polluted Soil
Environmental Groups Lose Litigation, Plan To Collect Donations for
Difficult Sum of 1.89 Million Yuan in Legal Fees'' [Changzhou dudi an
huanbao zuzhi baisu, nan chengdan 189 wan susong fei ni mujuan], China
Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 7 February 17.
\47\ Michael Standaert, ``Chinese Ruling Threatens Environmental
Public Interest Suits,'' Bloomberg, 24 February 17.
\48\ Zhang Chun and Tang Damin, ``The Changzhou Soil Pollution Case
Is Far From Over,'' China Dialogue, 24 February 17.
\49\ See, e.g., ``Clashes Flare Amid Mass Incinerator Protests in
China's Guangdong,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 May 17. See also Michael
Standaert, ``As China Pushes Waste-to-Energy Incinerators, Protests Are
Mounting,'' Yale Environment 360, 20 April 17.
\50\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
\51\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 19, 21, 22; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, last visited 10 September 17; State Council
Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-
2020)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2016-2020 nian)], 29 September
16, sec. 5. China has signed and stated its intent to ratify the ICCPR.
\52\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts.
19, 20.
\53\ ``Xian Under Security Alert After Thousands Protest
Incinerator Plant,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 October 16; ``10,000 in Xi'an
Protest Against Construction of Waste Incinerator, Many Are Detained''
[Xi'an wan ren kangyi lese fenshao chang jianshe duo ren bei bu], Radio
Free Asia, 17 October 16.
\54\ Ibid.
\55\ ``Xian Under Security Alert After Thousands Protest
Incinerator Plant,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 October 16.
\56\ See, e.g., ``The Artist Protesters in a Polluted City on
Edge,'' BBC, China Blog, 13 December 16; ``China Cracks Down on Chengdu
Smog Protests, Detains Activists, Muzzles Media,'' Radio Free Asia, 13
December 16.
\57\ ``China Cracks Down on Chengdu Smog Protests, Detains
Activists, Muzzles Media,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 December 16.
\58\ Rights Defense Network, ``Five Gushi County, Henan Province,
Villagers Criminally Detained on Suspicion of `Sabotaging Production
and Business Operations' for Protecting Dikes and Defending Fields by
Blocking Sand Mining Truck From Mining Sand'' [Henan sheng gushi xian
wu nongmin wei hudi baotian zuzhi yunsha che yunsha bei yi ``pohuai
shengchan jingying zui'' xingju], 6 October 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Gushi County, Henan Province, Police Criminally Detained Five
Villagers for Protecting Dikes and Defending Fields, Two More
Criminally Detained, Seven People Criminally Detained in Total'' [Henan
sheng gushi xian jingfang xingju hudi baotian wu nongmin bei xingju zhi
you xingju er ren, gong xingju qi ren], 13 October 16. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2017-00084 on Xu Jiande, 2017-00085 on Wu De'an, 2017-00087 on Sun
Jiaxiu, 2017-00089 on Yu Yunshan, 2017-00091 on Zhang Jinzhi, 2017-
00092 on Wu Xiufang, and 2017-00093 on Wu Deqian.
\59\ Rights Defense Network, ``Five Gushi County, Henan Province,
Villagers Criminally Detained on Suspicion of `Sabotaging Production
and Business Operations' for Protecting Dikes and Defending Fields by
Blocking Sand Mining Truck From Mining Sand'' [Henan sheng gushi xian
wu nongmin wei hudi baotian zuzhi yunsha che yunsha bei yi ``pohuai
shengchan jingying zui'' xingju], 6 October 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Gushi County, Henan Province, Police Criminally Detained Five
Villagers for Protecting Dikes and Defending Fields, Two More
Criminally Detained, Seven People Criminally Detained in Total'' [Henan
sheng gushi xian jingfang xingju hudi baotian wu nongmin bei xingju zhi
you xingju er ren, gong xingju qi ren], 13 October 16.
\60\ Ibid. See also Vince Beiser, ``Sand Mining: The Global
Environmental Crisis You've Probably Never Heard Of,'' Guardian, 27
February 17.
\61\ Rights Defense Network, ``Gushi County, Henan Province, Public
Security Used Brutal Torture Against Rural Rights Advocate Xu Jiande''
[Henan sheng gushi xian gong'an shiyong canbao kuxing zhemo weiquan
nongmin xu jiande], 19 March 17.
\62\ ``For Exposing Pollution Data, Environmental Protection NGO
Director Liu Shu Detained'' [Pilu wuran shuju huanbao NGO fuzeren liu
shu bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16; ``China Jails
Environmental Activist for `Revealing State Secrets,' '' Radio Free
Asia, 11 October 16; ``Changsha Environmental Public Interest Figure
Liu Shu Accused of `Disclosing State Secrets,' Detained by Police''
[Changsha huanbao gongyi renshi liu shu bei zhi ``xielou guojia mimi''
zao jingfang juliu], Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16. For more
information on Liu Shu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2016-00451.
\63\ ``For Exposing Pollution Data, Environmental Protection NGO
Director Liu Shu Detained'' [Pilu wuran shuju huanbao NGO fuzeren liu
shu bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16; ``China Jails
Environmental Activist for `Revealing State Secrets,' '' Radio Free
Asia, 11 October 16; ``Changsha Environmental Public Interest Figure
Liu Shu Accused of `Disclosing State Secrets,' Detained by Police''
[Changsha huanbao gongyi renshi liu shu bei zhi ``xielou guojia mimi''
zao jingfang juliu], Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16.
\64\ Ibid.
\65\ Zhou Tailai and Li Rongde, ``Environmental Activist Convicted
of Blackmailing Oil Giant Has Sentence Commuted,'' Caixin, 28 June 17.
See also Love Is One Hundred Over Zero (Ai shi yibai bi ling), ``March
1, International Spotted Seal Day. China's Number 1 Protector of
Spotted Seals--Tian Jiguang, Remains in Prison!'' [3 yue 1 ri, guoji
haibao ri. zhongguo ban haibao baohu di yi ren--tian jiguang, reng zai
jianyu zhong!], Weibo post, 1 March 17, 3:13 p.m.; Liu Ji,
``Environmentalist Tian Jiguang's Extortion Conviction Rescinded:
Original Verdict Had Unclear Facts and Violated Procedures'' [Huanbao
renshi tian jiguang qiaozha an youzui panjue bei chexiao: yuanpan
shishi bu qing weifan chengxu], The Paper, 12 August 16.
\66\ Ibid.
\67\ Zhou Tailai and Li Rongde, ``Environmental Activist Convicted
of Blackmailing Oil Giant Has Sentence Commuted,'' Caixin, 28 June 17;
Love Is One Hundred Over Zero (Ai shi yibai bi ling), ``March 1,
International Spotted Seal Day. China's Number 1 Protector of Spotted
Seals--Tian Jiguang, Remains in Prison!'' [3 yue 1 ri, guoji haibao ri.
zhongguo ban haibao baohu di yi ren--tian jiguang, reng zai jianyu
zhong!], Weibo post, 1 March 17, 3:13 p.m. For more information on Tian
Jiguang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-
00452. See also Yaxue Cao, ``12 Years in Prison for Trying To Protect
Spotted Seals,'' China Change, 16 November 15; Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2015--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau),'' 13 April 16, 48; Guo Rui, ``Retrial for the Number One
`Protector of Spotted Seals,' Tian Jiguang, First Instance Sentence of
12 Years Shocked Environmental World'' [``Baohu ban haibo'' di yi ren
tian jiguang an zaishen yishen bei pan 12 nian zhenjing huanbao jie],
Phoenix Net, 29 April 16.
\68\ Yaxue Cao, ``12 Years in Prison for Trying To Protect Spotted
Seals,'' China Change, 16 November 15; Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2015--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau),'' 13 April 16, 48; Guo Rui, ``Retrial for the Number One
`Protector of Spotted Seals,' Tian Jiguang, First Instance Sentence of
12 Years Shocked Environmental World'' [``Baohu ban haibo'' di yi ren
tian jiguang an zaishen yishen bei pan 12 nian zhenjing huanbao jie],
Phoenix Net, 29 April 16.
\69\ PRC Environmental Protection Tax Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo huanjing baohu shui fa], passed 25 December 16, effective 1
January 18; ``China Focus: China To Introduce Environmental Tax for
Enhanced Pollution Control,'' Xinhua, 25 December 16.
\70\ PRC Environmental Protection Tax Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo huanjing baohu shui fa], passed 25 December 16, effective 1
January 18, art. 28.
\71\ Ibid., arts. 14-15; Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress,
``China: New Law Replacing Pollution Discharge Fee With Environmental
Protection Tax,'' Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, 8 February
17. See also ``China Pins Hopes on Taxation for Environmental
Protection,'' Xinhua, 9 December 16.
\72\ National Development and Reform Commission, Measures for the
Administration of Standards for Levying Pollutant Discharge Fees [Paiwu
fei zhengshou biaozhun guanli banfa], issued 28 February 03, effective
1 July 03, art. 3; Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress, ``China: New
Law Replacing Pollution Discharge Fee With Environmental Protection
Tax,'' Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, 8 February 17.
\73\ Shen Jinzhong, ``Legal: Environmental Protection Tax Law
Reforms,'' American Chamber of Commerce in China, 13 April 17; ``China
Law and Policy (February 2017): New Taxes To Support Environmental
Protection in China,'' O'Melveny and Meyers LLP, 7 February 17. See
also Owen Haacke, US-China Business Council, ``Navigating the Haze of
Environmental Compliance,'' China Business Review, 7 April 17; Scott
Daniel Silverman and Danian Zhang, ``China Issues Environmental
Protection Tax Law,'' Baker McKenzie, 6 January 17.
\74\ PRC Wildlife Protection Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yesheng
dongwu baohu fa], passed 8 November 88, amended 28 August 04, 27 August
09, 2 July 16, effective 1 January 17, art. 58.
\75\ Environmental Investigation Agency, ``China's Revised Wildlife
Protection Law: Concerns and Opportunities,'' 3 March 17. According to
the Environmental Investigation Agency, ``There are an estimated 5,000-
6,000 captive tigers held in more than 200 facilities in China, many of
which are linked to trade in tiger parts and derivatives . . ..''
\76\ ``China's Top Legislature Schedules Bi-Monthly Session,''
Xinhua, 15 June 17.
\77\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Amending the ``PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law''
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo shui wuran fangzhi fa'' de jueding], 27
June 17. See also ``China Considers Draft Revisions To Curb Water
Pollution,'' Xinhua, 19 December 16.
\78\ Zheng Jinran, ``Water Law Approved With `Chief' System,''
China Daily, 28 June 17; PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shui wuran fangzhi fa], passed 11 May 84,
amended 15 May 96, 28 February 08, 27 June 17, effective 1 January 18,
art. 5. See also Wu Wei, ``What Is the Evaluation System Under `River
Chief System? Huairou Uses Monthly `Point System' '' [``Hezhang zhi''
zenme kaohe? huairou an yue ``da fen''], Beijing News, 12 August 17.
\79\ Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
Handling Environmental Crimes [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin
jianchayuan guanyu banli huanjing wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu
ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 23 December 16, effective 1 January 17,
reprinted in Sina, 26 December 16, arts. 1(8), 1(9), 3(5), 17; ``Press
Conference on the Release of the `Supreme People's Court, Supreme
People's Procuratorate Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in Handling Environmental Crimes' '' [Guanyu juban
``zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu banli huanjing
wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi'' xinwen
fabuhui], Supreme People's Court, 26 December 16; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 338.
\80\ Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
Handling Environmental Crimes [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin
jianchayuan guanyu banli huanjing wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu
ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 23 December 16, effective 1 January 17,
reprinted in Sina, 26 December 16, art. 17. See also Paul Davies and
Andrew Westgate, ``China Focuses on Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws,'' Latham and Watkins LLP, 12 January 17; PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15,
art. 338.
\81\ Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
Handling Environmental Crimes [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin
jianchayuan guanyu banli huanjing wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu
ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 23 December 16, effective 1 January 17,
reprinted in Sina, 26 December 16, art. 1(8); PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 338;
``Press Conference on the Release of the `Supreme People's Court,
Supreme People's Procuratorate Interpretation of Certain Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Environmental Crimes' ''
[Guanyu juban ``zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu
banli huanjing wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de
jieshi'' xinwen fabuhui], Supreme People's Court, 26 December 16.
\82\ ``Press Conference on the Release of the `Supreme People's
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate Interpretation of Certain Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Environmental Crimes' ''
[Guanyu juban ``zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu
banli huanjing wuran xingshi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de
jieshi'' xinwen fabuhui], Supreme People's Court, 26 December 16; Cao
Yin and Zheng Jinran, ``Court Applies Criminal Law to Data Fraud,''
China Daily, 27 December 17; Paul Davies and Andrew Westgate, ``China
Focuses on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws,'' Latham and
Watkins LLP, 12 January 17.
\83\ National Development and Reform Commission, `` `13th Five-
Year' Energy Development Plan'' [Nengyuan fazhan ``shisan wu'' guihua],
issued December 2016.
\84\ National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan on
National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua gongyao],
issued 17 March 16, chap. 3. Ten of the 25 targets were related to
resources or the environment and all of them were mandatory. See also
Katherine Koleski, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
``The 13th Five-Year Plan,'' 14 February 17, 3, 15-19; Xiao Tang et
al., ``Mandatory Targets and Environmental Performance: An Analysis
Based on Regression Discontinuity Design,'' Sustainability, Vol. 8, No.
931 (2016), 14.
\85\ National Development and Reform Commission, `` `13th Five-
Year' Energy Development Plan'' [Nengyuan fazhan ``shisan wu'' guihua],
issued December 2016, 15; Alvin Lin, ``Understanding China's New
Mandatory 58% Coal Gap Target,'' Natural Resources Defense Council,
Experts Blog, 17 March 17.
\86\ National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy
Agency, `` `13th Five-Year' Electricity Development Plan (2016-2020)''
[Dianli fazhan ``shisan wu'' guihua (2016-2020 nian)], issued 7
November 16, 13; Meng Meng, ``China To Cap Coal at 55 Percent of Total
Power Output by 2020: NEA,'' Reuters, 7 November 16.
\87\ Anders Hove and Lydia McMullen-Laird, ``Looking Beyond the
Gigawatts in China's Power Plan,'' China Dialogue, 2 December 16; Ma
Tianjie, ``China Outdid Itself Again in Setting 2020 Low-Carbon
Targets,'' China Dialogue, 5 January 17.
Civil Society
Civil Society
III. Development of the Rule of Law
Civil Society
Introduction
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to implement reforms by encouraging the
development of social services and welfare-oriented
organizations while suppressing civil society organizations and
advocates that the government deems ``politically sensitive.''
\1\ The Chinese government in recent years has allowed and used
``local, limited, and issue-based partnerships'' with civil
society to strengthen government functions and public image.\2\
Scholars note that the Chinese government, while desirous of
the benefits from civil society, has sought to minimize
potential political challenges to the government posed by a
developed civil society.\3\ Philip Alston, the UN Special
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, observed after
a mission to China in August 2016 that ``the role of civil
society organizations is becoming increasingly circumscribed
and those whose work goes much beyond that of being service
providers for the Government are now very much under threat.''
\4\ Government policies toward grassroots civil society in
China remain restrictive,\5\ subordinating civil society
organizations and activities to Chinese Communist Party
control.\6\ Chinese officials continued to violate \7\
international standards key to civil society \8\ found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the freedoms
of association,\9\ assembly,\10\ and expression.\11\
The number of Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
is difficult to determine, in part because of the complex
regulatory framework, the existence of unregistered NGOs and
informal associations, the pace of growth of the non-
governmental and non-profit sector, and the range of different
types of such organizations.\12\ According to the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, at the end of 2016, China had 699,523 registered
``social organizations'' (shehui zuzhi)--the official term for
NGOs \13\--that consisted of 359,000 non-governmental, non-
commercial organizations (minban feiqiye danwei), or what the
government now calls social service organizations (shehui fuwu
jigou); 5,523 foundations (jijinhui); and 335,000 social
associations (shehui tuanti).\14\ Many social associations and
foundations are government-organized non-governmental
organizations (GONGOs) and have close ties to the
government.\15\ Many grassroots NGOs, with few or no ties to
the government, remain unregistered or are registered as
business entities due to restrictions and barriers to
registration imposed by the government.\16\ Experts at a U.S.
think tank event this past year estimated that there are as
many as 3 million unregistered social organizations in China;
\17\ past estimates ranged from 1 million to 8 million.\18\
According to one European scholar, only ``a couple of
thousand'' Chinese NGOs are comparable to Western NGOs in their
purpose and function as organizations promoting solidarity or a
specific public interest cause.\19\
Continued Crackdown on Civil Society
During this reporting year, the government and Party
continued to deepen a crackdown on NGOs and civil society
advocates. According to international human rights
organizations, Chinese authorities restricted the activities of
rights defenders by shrinking the space for expression,\20\
association,\21\ and assembly.\22\ Authorities targeted rights
advocates affiliated with NGOs this past year, including those
promoting religious freedom,\23\ worker rights,\24\ and the
environment.\25\ Examples included the prosecution of pastors
and labor advocates as well as the detention of an
environmentalist on ``state security'' grounds.\26\
International NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that
in 2016, Chinese authorities repeatedly cracked down on rights
advocates for ``endangering state security,'' criminalizing
activities ``promoting and protecting human rights.'' \27\
Examples of civil society advocates detained, charged, or
sentenced this past year included the following:
In October 2016, authorities in Yuhua
district, Changsha municipality, Hunan province, took
environmental advocate Liu Shu into custody and ordered
her to serve 10 days' administrative detention for
allegedly ``disclosing counter-espionage-related state
secrets.'' \28\ Liu reportedly ``suppl[ied] data to an
unidentified contact about environmental pollution.''
\29\ Liu was the director of the environmental NGO
Shuguang Environmental Protection and Public Interest
Development Center, founded in 2013 to investigate
environmental issues, including through large-scale
testing of drinking water.\30\ [For more information on
the government's treatment of environmental advocates,
see Section II--The Environment.]
In November and December 2016, Shenzhen
municipality, Guangdong province, public security
authorities detained or forcibly disappeared a group of
at least 12 rights advocates after they reportedly
gathered for dinner on November 14 to discuss current
political affairs.\31\ The advocates included Wang Jun,
Deng Hongcheng, Xiao Bing, Ma Zhiquan, Li Nanhai, Ding
Yan, Wang Jianhua, Dong Lingpeng, Song Liqian, Wang
Wei, and Huang Anyang.\32\ These individuals reportedly
have been involved in civil society and rights advocacy
for vulnerable groups.\33\
In December 2015, Chinese authorities began a
crackdown against labor advocates affiliated with labor
NGOs in Guangdong.\34\ In September 2016, the Panyu
District People's Court in Guangzhou municipality,
Guangdong, found Zeng Feiyang, Zhu Xiaomei, and Tang
Jian guilty of ``gathering a crowd to disturb social
order,'' sentencing Zeng to three years' imprisonment,
suspended for four years, and both Zhu and Tang to one
year and six months' imprisonment, suspended for two
years.\35\ State-run media outlet Xinhua reported that
Zeng ``admitted that he received funding and training
from `some overseas organizations hostile to China.' ''
\36\ In November 2016, the same court found Meng Han
guilty of ``gathering a crowd to disturb social
order,'' sentencing him to one year and nine months'
imprisonment.\37\ Zeng, Zhu, Tang, and Meng were
affiliated with Panyu Workers' Services Center, a labor
NGO in Guangzhou.\38\ The detention and sentencing of
these labor advocates has had a ``chilling effect'' on
labor advocacy in China,\39\ and while labor NGOs are
still operating, many are ``lay[ing] low'' and cutting
back on programming.\40\ [See Section II--Worker Rights
for more information on labor NGOs and advocates.]
On July 15, 2017, authorities released Xu Zhiyong, a
prominent legal advocate and one of the initiators of the New
Citizens' Movement,\41\ after he served a four-year sentence on
the charge of ``gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public
place.'' \42\ Authorities alleged that Xu was the
``ringleader'' of peaceful demonstrations against government
corruption and advocacy for equal education rights.\43\ Police
in Tianjin municipality reportedly blocked individuals from
meeting Xu at the prison on the day of his release.\44\ After
he arrived at his residence in Beijing municipality,
plainclothes police and community security guards reportedly
blocked people from visiting Xu, barring anyone who was not a
neighborhood resident from entering the area near his home.\45\
New Overseas NGOs' Activities Law Takes Effect
Regulatory developments, particularly the PRC Law on the
Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations'
Activities (Overseas NGOs' Activities Law) that took effect on
January 1, 2017, threatened the continued presence of
international NGOs (INGOs) in China as well as the independence
of domestic NGOs reliant on foreign funding, according to
scholars.\46\ The Overseas NGOs' Activities Law requires that
INGOs set up and register a representative office or apply for
a temporary activities permit with the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) in order to operate in mainland China.\47\
The Chinese government provided limited clarifications on
requirements for INGOs under the law.\48\ Foreign governments
and NGOs sought clarification from the MPS on official
sponsorship requirements through ``professional supervisory
units'' (PSUs) \49\ that are tasked with overseeing INGOs'
registration and activities, permissible INGO activities,
registration requirements for ``temporary activities,'' and the
division of responsibility between PSUs and public security
offices in administering INGOs.\50\ On October 14, 2016, the
MPS and the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau (PSB)
released a draft ``Guidebook for Foreign NGOs' Registration of
Representative Offices and Filing of Temporary Activities'' at
a joint forum in Shanghai, reportedly inviting nine INGOs to
comment on the draft.\51\ On November 8, the MPS and the
Shanghai PSB held a meeting with 11 foreign consulates about
preparations for the implementation of the Overseas NGOs'
Activities Law, during which an MPS official said that there
would not be a ``grace period'' for INGOs in complying with the
law.\52\ The MPS released the final version of the guidebook on
November 28, which described procedures and provided documents
required for INGOs to register.\53\ On December 20--11 days
before the implementation date--the MPS released the official
list of PSUs, classified by different fields of permissible
INGO activity in China.\54\ The extent to which PSUs may be
willing or capable of handling the procedures for sponsoring
NGOs remained unclear.\55\ Central- and provincial-level public
security agencies set up offices and online platforms to serve
INGOs seeking registration in China.\56\
According to statistical data released by the MPS, by July
31, 2017, a total of 168 INGO representative offices and 191
temporary activities had registered in China.\57\ Out of those
registered, the United States had the highest number of
registered INGO representative offices at 50, followed by Hong
Kong at 38, Japan at 14, and Germany and South Korea each at
13.\58\ Beijing ranked first for the highest number of total
representative offices registered at 54, followed by Shanghai
at 35, Yunnan province at 17, and Guangdong province at 12.\59\
Registered INGO representative offices had partnering PSUs from
varying fields, with 66 representative offices partnering with
PSUs in the trade sector, 25 partnering with PSUs in civil
affairs, 21 partnering with PSUs in health and population
planning, and 8 partnering with PSUs in education.\60\ Asia
Society's ChinaFile published data analysis on INGOs registered
by the end of July and found that out of the total number of
registered INGOs from the United States, 19 percent worked in
the field of trade; 13 percent each worked in the fields of
health and education; and 9 percent worked in the environmental
field.\61\ MPS reported that INGOs had filed a total of 191
temporary activities in China by the end of July.\62\ ChinaFile
found that a majority of temporary activities that began on or
before July 31 were conducted by Hong Kong INGOs; the provinces
with the most temporary activities were Sichuan, Guizhou,
Guangdong, and Yunnan; and the most common fields of work were
youth, education, and poverty alleviation.\63\
The operating environment for INGOs in China has become
more restricted and uncertain under the new Overseas NGOs'
Activities Law. Reports indicate that INGOs are under greater
scrutiny,\64\ and the law enables the Chinese government to
surveil and collect information on such organizations.\65\
Experts see the law as potentially threatening to the existence
and activities of overseas organizations that previously
operated in a ``grey area.'' \66\ In addition, domestic NGOs,
as one commentator noted, may face ``increasingly harsh
penalties'' under the expanded legal and regulatory framework
amidst ``heightened security concerns'' over civil society.\67\
The law may further hinder the work of domestic NGOs in China,
as many of them rely on sources of funding outside of mainland
China.\68\ The uncertainty fostered by the Overseas NGOs'
Activities Law has given rise to suggestions as to how INGOs
may legally operate in China.\69\ Two European experts proposed
``smart indigenization,'' whereby INGOs primarily provide
financial resources and indirect institutional support ``to
build up human and organisational capacity in China's nascent
civil society sector.'' \70\ According to the China Human
Rights Lawyers Concern Group, the Overseas NGOs' Activities Law
has ``[made] it more risky for lawyers to cooperate and work
with international NGOs.'' \71\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities Detain Taiwan NGO Volunteer Lee Ming-cheh
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 19, 2017, authorities detained Taiwan human rights NGO
volunteer Lee Ming-cheh, a manager at Wenshan Community College in
Taipei, Taiwan, while he was traveling to Zhuhai municipality,
Guangdong province, via Macau, to arrange medical treatment for his
mother.\72\ Ten days after Lee disappeared, the State Council Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO) confirmed that Chinese authorities were
investigating Lee for ``endangering state security.'' \73\ On May 26,
the TAO confirmed that state security authorities in Hunan province had
formally arrested Lee on suspicion of ``subversion of state power.''
\74\ State-run media reported that Lee had ``colluded with
mainlanders,'' ``established illegal organizations,'' and ``plotted and
carried out activities to subvert state power.'' \75\ The report also
said that authorities had put Lee under ``coercive measures,'' \76\
raising concern that he may be at risk of torture.\77\ International
human rights organizations and media outlets reported Lee may be the
first foreign NGO worker whom authorities detained after the Overseas
NGOs' Activities Law came into effect in 2017, citing the shrinking
space for INGO activities under the new legislation.\78\ On March 30, a
group of domestic and international NGOs released a joint statement
expressing concern about Lee's detention.\79\ The NGOs demanded Lee's
immediate release, details on his detention, his right to legal counsel
of his choosing, and access to medical care.\80\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Regulatory Environment
This past year, the Chinese government continued to
strengthen its policy of carrying out inspections and promoting
ideological guidance over civil society. In March 2017,
following two State Council directives to carry out inspections
of the market and social organizations released in 2015 and
2016,\81\ the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) passed a measure
to advance the official inspection of social organizations,
urging registration authorities to conduct both planned and
random inspections of civil society groups.\82\ Party-building
in social organizations--whereby Party members at social
organizations form internal supervisory groups--continued to be
a priority of the Party and government.\83\ A leading small
group on Party-building in social organizations, administered
by the MCA, issued a document in March 2017 that prioritized
work on the Party's ideological guidance for NGOs, building
Party groups in organizations, and recruiting new ``outstanding
and talented individuals'' from NGOs as cadres.\84\ Although
the MCA released revised drafts of the three major regulations
that govern the registration and management of social
organizations,\85\ social service organizations,\86\ and
foundations \87\ for public comment in 2016, the MCA had not
released the final versions as of August 2017.
Changes and Progress in the Philanthropic Sector
The Chinese government continued efforts to strengthen the
philanthropic regulatory framework under the PRC Charity Law to
increase the level of giving in China. In the first year after
the law's March 2016 passage, 260 national- or provincial-level
organizations acquired ``charitable'' status and 13 provinces
and municipalities reportedly began approving charities.\88\ In
addition to registering charities, the law provides a legal
framework for public fundraising \89\ and increasing tax
incentives,\90\ toward which the Chinese government took steps
this past year. On February 24, 2017, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee adopted a revision to the PRC
Enterprise Income Tax Law, enabling donations over 12 percent
of an enterprise's annual total profit to be carried over and
deducted from taxable income during the following three
years.\91\ The law previously limited annual deductions from
charitable donations to 12 percent of the company's annual
profit.\92\ Despite these efforts, an expert at Tsinghua
University reportedly said that implementation of the Charity
Law will depend on various factors, including the availability
of open information to the public and the level of oversight to
prevent malfeasance.\93\ In 2016, the Charities Aid Foundation,
an international organization, ranked China last among 140
countries in its World Giving Index, down one place from
2015.\94\ In order to foster Chinese philanthropy over the long
term, one observer pointed out that the Chinese government
should build the financial and legal infrastructure necessary
to facilitate philanthropic funds and endowments, and to
``professionalize'' the management process of
organizations.\95\ According to the 2016 Blue Book on Rule of
Law, the Charity Law needs accompanying regulations with more
concrete implementing details in order to become
operational.\96\
Civil Society
Civil Society
Notes to Section III--Civil Society
\1\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Three Activists Feared
`Disappeared,' '' 16 December 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``
`They Target My Human Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017,
2, 27.
\2\ Ming Hu et al., ``Termination of Nonprofit Alliances: Evidence
From China,'' Voluntas, Vol. 27, Issue 5 (October 2016), 2509.
\3\ Rong Zhao et al., ``Understanding Service Contracting and Its
Impact on NGO Development in China,'' Voluntas, Vol. 27, Issue 5
(October 2016), 2233; Hui Qin, ``Understanding China's Third Sector,''
Stanford Social Innovation Review, 16 February 17.
\4\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``End-of-
Mission Statement on China, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,'' 23 August 16;
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme
Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip Alston, A/HRC/
35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 32.
\5\ CIVICUS, ``Bleak Outlook for Chinese Civil Society in 2017,''
Monitor, 15 February 17; Human Rights Watch, ``China Should End
Restrictions on Civil Society Participation in Anti-Poverty Policies,
and Cooperate With UN Mandate-Holders Without Interference,'' 9 June
17. See also Paul Woods, ``From Restrictive to Prescriptive? Prospects
for China's Church Engaging With the Civil Society,'' Transformation,
Vol. 33, Issue 1 (2016), 38; Ming Hu et al., ``Termination of Nonprofit
Alliances: Evidence From China,'' Voluntas, Vol. 27, Issue 5 (October
2016), 2501.
\6\ Party Central Committee General Office and State Council
General Office, Opinion on Reforming Management System of Social
Organizations To Promote Social Organizations' Healthy and Orderly
Development [Guanyu gaige shehui zuzhi guanli zhidu cujin shehui zuzhi
jiankang youxu fazhan de yijian], issued 21 August 16, 2(2-3); Ben
Blanchard, ``China To Strengthen Communist Party's Role in Non-Govt
Bodies,'' Reuters, 21 August 16; Ministry-Administered Leading Small
Group on the Work of Party-Building in Social Organizations, ``Key Work
Points for Ministry-Administered Party-Building in Social Organizations
in 2017'' [Buguan shehui zuzhi 2017 nian dangjian gongzuo yaodian], 6
March 17, reprinted in Ministry of Civil Affairs, 10 March 17, 2(5)-
(7); Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs Convenes
Meeting on Promoting Ministry-Administered `Two Comprehensive
Coverages' Work for Social Organizations,'' [Minzhengbu zhaokai buguan
shehui zuzhi ``liang ge quan fugai'' gongzuo tuijin hui], 10 March 17;
Bo Wei, ``Party-Building Work To Lead Grassroots Social Organizations'
Healthy Development'' [Dangjian gongzuo yinling jiceng shehui zuzhi
jiankang fazhan], Philanthropy and Public Interest News, reprinted in
Xinhua, 24 May 17; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General
Office, Opinion on Strengthening Party-Building Work in Social
Organizations (Provisional) [Guanyu jiaqiang shehui zuzhi dang de
jianshe gongzuo de yijian (shixing)], issued 28 September 15, item
2.4(1).
\7\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human Rights
Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 1-2; ``Crackdown Against
Civil Society in China Continues,'' Voice of America, 14 June 17. See
also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 223-25.
\8\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina
Kiai, A/HRC/35/28, Advance Unedited Version, 23 May 17, paras. 23-24.
\9\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
20; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 22.
\10\ Ibid., art. 20; Ibid., art. 21.
\11\ Ibid., art. 19; Ibid., art. 19.
\12\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom
Monitor: China,'' last visited 28 August 17.
\13\ Karla W. Simon and Holly Snape, ``China's Social Organisations
After the Charity Law,'' Made in China, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (January-March
2017), 26-27.
\14\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Social Service Seasonal
Statistics Quarterly Report (Fourth Quarter of 2016)'' [Shehui fuwu
tongji jibao (2016 nian 4 jidu)], 20 February 17.
\15\ Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society: A Model
Analysis of Trends in the NGO Sector,'' in NGO Governance and
Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2016), 48; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law,
``Civic Freedom Monitor: China,'' last visited 28 August 17.
\16\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom
Monitor: China,'' last updated 9 June 17; Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the
Dynamics of Civil Society: A Model Analysis of Trends in the NGO
Sector,'' in NGO Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath
and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 52-53. See also
Isabel Hilton et al., ``The Future of NGOs in China: A ChinaFile
Conversation,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14 May 15.
\17\ Carolyn Hsu et al., ``The State of NGOs in China Today,''
Brookings Institution, 15 December 16.
\18\ Deng Guosheng, ``The State of and Obstacles to Chinese
Grassroots NGO Development'' [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de xianzhuang
yu zhang'ai], Social Outlook, reprinted in Shanda 960, Vol. 5 (June
2010). In 2010, Tsinghua University professor Deng Guosheng estimated
that there were 1 to 1.5 million grassroots NGOs in China, of which 90
percent were unregistered. Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil
Society,'' in NGO Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath
and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 53. More recent
estimates on unregistered NGOs from 2014 range from 40 to 70 percent.
``Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier,'' Economist, 12 April 14;
Kristie Lu Stout, ``People Power in the People's Republic of China,''
CNN, 26 June 14. In 2014, the Economist estimated that there were 1.5
million unregistered groups while CNN reported an estimate of 2
million. Li Fan, ``The Current State of Civil Society in China'' [Woguo
gongmin shehui de xianzhuang], Tianze Economic Research Institute
(Unirule), Biweekly Forum, 12 September 14. Li Fan, director of World
and China Institute, a Chinese NGO research center, claimed that China
has 8 million unregistered NGOs, while Hu Xingdou, an economics
professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology, and Xu Xin, a law
professor at Beijing Institute of Technology, both questioned Li's
claim, saying that Li's definition of what constitutes an NGO was too
broad. His calculations included groups such as quasi-governmental mass
organizations, spun-off government units, business associations,
recreational clubs, virtual groups, and rural mutual aid groups.
\19\ Elizabeth C. Economy, ``Podcast: The Future of China's Civil
Society,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound (blog), 7 March
17, 4 min. 5 sec. The podcast episode featured University of Nottingham
Assistant Professor Andreas Fulda, who estimated that ``maybe a couple
thousand'' NGOs in China were comparable to those in the West in their
function.
\20\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Three Activists Feared
`Disappeared,' '' 16 December 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``
`They Target My Human Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017,
2.
\21\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human
Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 2.
\22\ Ibid.
\23\ See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Authorities Arrest Highest-Profile
Pastor Since Cultural Revolution,'' 10 January 17; Yaxue Cao, ``The
Shepherds of Living Stone Church,'' China Change, 25 December 16.
\24\ See, e.g., Michael Forsythe, ``3 Labor Activists in China Get
Suspended Prison Terms,'' New York Times, 26 September 16. See also
``Prosecution of Labor Advocates Has Chilling Effect on Labor NGOs,
Strikes Continue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22
February 17.
\25\ See, e.g., ``China Jails Environmental Activist for `Revealing
State Secrets,' '' Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16.
\26\ ChinaAid, ``Authorities Arrest Highest-Profile Pastor Since
Cultural Revolution,'' 11 January 17; Yaxue Cao, ``The Shepherds of
Living Stone Church,'' China Change, 25 December 16; ``Prosecution of
Labor Advocates Has Chilling Effect on Labor NGOs, Strikes Continue,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 February 17; ``China
Jails Environmental Activist for `Revealing State Secrets,' '' Radio
Free Asia, 11 October 16.
\27\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human
Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 2-3. See also ``China Jails
Environmental Activist for `Revealing State Secrets,' '' Radio Free
Asia, 11 October 16.
\28\ ``For Exposing Pollution Data, NGO Leader Liu Shu Detained''
[Pilu wuran shuju huanbao NGO fuzeren liu shu bei bu], Radio Free Asia,
11 October 16; ``China Jails Environmental Activist for `Revealing
State Secrets,' '' Radio Free Asia, 11 October 16; ``Changsha
Environmental Public Interest Figure Liu Shu Accused of `Disclosing
State Secrets,' Detained by Police'' [Changsha huanbao gongyi renshi
liu shu bei zhi ``xielou guojia mimi'' zao jingfang juliu], Radio Free
Asia, 11 October 16.
\29\ Ibid.
\30\ Ibid.
\31\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] Eleven Activists
Remain Forcibly Disappeared in Shenzhen, at Risk of Torture in Police
Custody (1/5-1/12/2017),'' 12 January 17; Human Rights Campaign in
China, ``Shenzhen Crackdown, Shenzhen Public Security Bureau Prohibits
Meeting With Lawyer, Claims Li Jiangpeng Case One of Endangering State
Security, Meeting May Hinder Investigation or Possibly Leak State
Secrets'' [Shenzhen da zhuabu shenzhen shi gong'anju yi li jiangpeng
anjian shu weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian huijian you ai zhencha
huozhe keneng xielou guojia mimi jujue lushi huijian], 27 May 17.
\32\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] Eleven Activists
Remain Forcibly Disappeared in Shenzhen, at Risk of Torture in Police
Custody (1/5-1/12/2017),'' 12 January 17. For more information, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2017-00050 on Deng
Hongcheng, 2017-00062 on Wang Jun, 2017-00063 on Li Nanhai, 2017-00064
on Xiao Bing, 2017-00065 on Wang Wei, 2017-00066 on Ma Zhiquan, 2017-
00067 on Ding Yan, 2017-00068 on Dong Lingpeng, 2017-00070 on Wang
Jianhua, 2017-00096 on Song Liqian, and 2017-00097 on Huang Anyang.
\33\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Ten People Remain Missing in
Shenzhen Crackdown; Lawyers Accompany Family to Bantian Police Station
To Learn About Family Members' Disappearance but Police Offered
Conflicting Information, Saying They Had Not Handled This Case and
Refusing To Issue Case Acceptance Receipts for Missing Person Cases''
[Shenzhen da zhuabu shiren rengran shilian jiashu zai lushi peitong xia
qianwang bantian paichusuo liaojie jiaren shilian qingkuang dan
paichusuo xinxi qianhou maodun dafu meiyou banli ci'an bing yi renko
shizong an bu shuyu anjian wei you jujue tigong anjian shouli huizhi],
29 November 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] Eleven
Activists Remain Forcibly Disappeared in Shenzhen, at Risk of Torture
in Police Custody (1/5-1/12/2017),'' 12 January 17.
\34\ Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, ``China Arrests At Least 3
Workers' Rights Leaders Amid Rising Unrest,'' New York Times, 5
December 15; Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid
of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China Change, 10
December 15.
\35\ ``Zeng Feiyang, Tang Huanxing, and Zhu Xiaomei Sentenced at
First Instance Trial for Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Social Order,
Three Defendants Admit Guilt, Express Remorse'' [Zeng feiyang tang
huanxing zhu xiaomei juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu an yishen dangting
xuanpan san beigao biaoshi renzui huizui], Xinhua, 26 September 16. For
more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database
records 2015-00427 on Zeng Feiyang, 2015-00428 on Zhu Xiaomei, and
2016-00017 on Tang Jian.
\36\ ``China Court Sentences Trio for Disturbing Social Order,''
Xinhua, 26 September 16.
\37\ ``Guangdong Labor Rights Defender Meng Han Found Guilty of
Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Social Order, Sentenced to 21 Months in
Prison'' [Guangdong laogong weiquan renshi meng han juzhong raoluan
shehui zhixu zuicheng, pan jian 21 ge yue], Initium Media, 4 November
16. For more information on Meng Han, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2014-00026.
\38\ Catherine Lai, ``Guangdong Labour Activist Meng Han Sentenced
to 1 Year, 9 Months,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 3 November 16; Rights
Defense Network, `` `12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Case' Arrests Approved
for Four Individuals, One Released, Whereabouts of Two Unknown''
[``12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an'' jin si ren bei pizhun daibu, yiren
huoshi, liangren wu xialuo], 8 January 16.
\39\ Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing Wants One Union To Rule Them All,''
Bloomberg, 10 November 16; ``Labor Conflicts at Hong Kong-Invested
Enterprises in Mainland Worsen, Strikes Increase 30 Percent'' [Neidi
gangzi qiye laozi ehua gongchao zeng san cheng], Radio Free Asia, 12
October 16; Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers?
Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York
University School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 2.
\40\ Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers,
Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University
School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 36-37.
\41\ For information on the New Citizens' Movement and Xu Zhiyong,
see 2014 CECC Annual Report, 133-34.
\42\ Rights Defense Network, ``Well-Known Rights Defender Xu
Zhiyong Completed Sentence and Released, Group Prevented From Welcoming
Him'' [Zhuming renquan hanweizhe xu zhiyong jin xingman huoshi zhongren
yingjie pukong], 15 July 17.
\43\ Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, ``China Sentences Xu Zhiyong,
Legal Activist, to 4 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, 26 January 14.
See also ``Xu Zhiyong Tried for Advocacy of Education Equality and
Official Transparency,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law
Update, No. 1, 5 March 14; ``Officials Detain Xu Zhiyong Amidst a
Crackdown on Individuals Calling for Greater Government
Accountability,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 August
13. For more information on Xu Zhiyong, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2005-00199.
\44\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Beijing Xu Zhiyong Released
Today, Residence Under Strict Surveillance'' [Beijing xu zhiyong jinri
chuyu juzhu di zao yanmi jiankong], 15 July 17.
\45\ Ibid.
\46\ Andreas Fulda, ``A New Law in China Is Threatening the Work of
International NGOs,'' The Conversation, 6 January 17; Scott Wilson,
``China's NGO Regulations and Uneven Civil Society Development,''
University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 15
February 17; Kenneth Roth, ``The Great Civil Society Choke-Out,''
Foreign Policy, 27 January 17. For the full text of the law, see PRC
Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations'
Activities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei
huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17.
\47\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu
zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1
January 17, art. 9.
\48\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Handbook for Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Registration of Representative Offices and
Filing of Temporary Activities'' [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi daibiao
jigou dengji he linshi huodong bei'an banshi zhinan], 28 November 16;
Ministry of Public Security, ``Areas of Activity and Program Directory
and Professional Supervisory Units Directory for Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations Within China (2017)'' [Jingwai feizhengfu
zuzhi zai zhongguo jingnei huodong lingyu he xiangmu mulu, yewu zhuguan
danwei minglu (2017)], 20 December 16; International Center for Not-
for-Profit Law, ``Civic Freedom Monitor: China,'' last visited 28
August 17; Nectar Gan, ``Why Foreign NGOs Are Struggling With New
Chinese Law,'' South China Morning Post, 14 June 17; Jia Xijin,
``China's Implementation of the Overseas NGO Management Law,'' Southern
Weekly, translated in China Development Brief, 6 March 17.
\49\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu
zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1
January 17, art. 11. See also Shawn Shieh, ``More FAQs on the Overseas
NGO Law: Reading the Fine Print,'' NGOs in China (blog), 8 January 17.
\50\ Anthony J. Spires, ``China's New INGO Law: A Brief Summary of
Concerns Voiced by INGOs,'' in ``Feedback on the INGO Law,'' Anthony J.
Spires (blog), 20 September 16, 1-4. See also Ministry of Public
Security, ``MPS Held a Briefing With Some Officials From Foreign
Consulates in Shanghai Explaining the Relevant Preparations for the
Overseas NGOs' Activities Management Law'' [Gong'anbu zai shanghai
zhaokai bufen guojia zhu hu lingshiguan tongqi hui tongbao ``jingwai
feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa'' xiangguan zhunbei
gongzuo], 9 November 16; Jia Xijin, ``China's Implementation of the
Overseas NGO Management Law,'' Southern Weekly, translated in China
Development Brief, 6 March 17.
\51\ Zou Wei and Zhu Hong, ``MPS To Issue Operating Guidelines for
Overseas NGO Representative Offices Registration and Temporary
Activities Record Filing'' [Gong'anbu ni chutai jingwai feizhengfu
zuzhi daibiao jigou dengji he linshi huodong bei'an banshi zhinan],
Xinhua, 14 October 16; Shawn Shieh, ``Draft Guidelines for the Overseas
NGO Law Announced at Shanghai Forum,'' NGOs in China (blog), 17 October
16.
\52\ Ministry of Public Security, ``MPS Held a Briefing With Some
Officials From Foreign Consulates in Shanghai Explaining the Relevant
Preparations for the Overseas NGOs' Activities Management Law''
[Gong'anbu zai shanghai zhaokai bufen guojia zhu hu lingshiguan tongqi
hui tongbao ``jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa''
xiangguan zhunbei gongzuo], 9 November 16; Shawn Shieh, ``Foreign
Consulates Meet With Public Security Officials About the Overseas NGO
Law,'' NGOs in China (blog), 8 December 16.
\53\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Guidelines for Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Registration of Representative Offices and
Filing of Temporary Activities'' [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi daibiao
jigou dengji he linshi huodong bei'an banshi zhinan], 28 November 16.
\54\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu
zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1
January 17, art. 3; Ministry of Public Security, ``Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations Fields of Activity List, Directory of
Professional Supervisory Units (2017)'' [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi zai
zhongguo jingnei huodong lingyu he xiangmu mulu, yewu zhuguan danwei
minglu], 20 December 16.
\55\ NGOCN, ``Nine Days After the Implementation of the Overseas
NGO Law, We Chatted With the Civilian Police Overseas NGO Office''
[Jingwai fa shishi de dijiu tian, women he jingwai ban minjing liao le
liao], 10 January 17; Shawn Shieh, ``Follow Up on the Overseas NGO
Law--The List of Professional Supervisory Units Has Been Issued,'' NGOs
in China (blog), 21 December 16.
\56\ Ministry of Public Security, ``Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Service Platform'' [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi banshi fuwu
pingtai], last visited 18 July 17. See, e.g., Qinghai Province Public
Security Bureau, ``Qinghai Province Public Security Bureau Overseas
Non-Governmental Organizations' Management Office'' [Qinghai sheng
gong'an ting jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli bangongshi], last visited
18 July 17; Shandong Province Public Security Bureau, ``Shandong
Province Public Security Bureau Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Management Office'' [Shandong sheng gong'an ting jingwai
feizhengfu zuzhi guanli bangongshi], last visited 18 July 17.
\57\ Overseas NGO Management Office, Ministry of Public Security,
``January to July Statistical Data on Number of Overseas NGO
Registration of Representative Offices and Temporary Activities''
[Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi daibiao jigou dengji linshi huodong bei'an 1
zhi 7 yue shuju tongji], 1 August 17.
\58\ Ibid. See also Jessica Batke, ``Visually Understanding the
Data on Foreign NGO Representative Offices and Temporary Activities,''
Asia Society, ChinaFile, 19 July 17.
\59\ Overseas NGO Management Office, Ministry of Public Security,
``January to July Statistical Data on Number of Overseas NGO
Registration of Representative Offices and Temporary Activities''
[Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi daibiao jigou dengji linshi huodong bei'an 1
zhi 7 yue shuju tongji], 1 August 17. See also Jessica Batke,
``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign NGO Representative Offices
and Temporary Activities,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 19 July 17.
\60\ Overseas NGO Management Office, Ministry of Public Security,
``January to July Statistical Data on Number of Overseas NGO
Registration of Representative Offices and Temporary Activities''
[Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi daibiao jigou dengji linshi huodong bei'an 1
zhi 7 yue shuju tongji], 1 August 17.
\61\ Jessica Batke, ``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign
NGO Representative Offices and Temporary Activities,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, 19 July 17. In one of ChinaFile's graphics, ChinaFile
estimated the number of INGO representative offices based on ``fields
of work'' in which the INGOs are engaged. This resulted in ChinaFile's
total count for representative offices being higher than the total
number of representative offices listed on the Ministry of Public
Security website for the same period. Even if an INGO engages in
multiple fields of work, the INGO may register with only one
Professional Supervisory Unit in one field of work.
\62\ Overseas NGO Management Office, Ministry of Public Security,
``January to July Statistical Data on Number of Overseas NGO
Registration of Representative Offices and Temporary Activities''
[Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi daibiao jigou dengji linshi huodong bei'an 1
zhi 7 yue shuju tongji], 1 August 17.
\63\ Jessica Batke, ``Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign
NGO Representative Offices and Temporary Activities,'' Asia Society,
ChinaFile, 19 July 17. ChinaFile analysis showed that 98 temporary
activities were carried out by Hong Kong INGOs and 31 by U.S. INGOs. 34
temporary activities were held in Sichuan province, 22 in Guizhou
province, and 18 each in Guangdong and Yunnan provinces. 58 temporary
activities were in the field of youth, 48 in education, and 25 in
poverty alleviation.
\64\ Geraldine Johns-Putra et al., Minter Ellison, ``China's New
Foreign NGO Law: How Will It Impact Australian Universities Operating
in China? '' reprinted in Lexology, 22 February 17; Nectar Gan, ``Why
Foreign NGOs Are Struggling With New Chinese Law,'' South Morning China
Post, 14 June 17; Christian Shepherd and Michael Martina,
``International NGOs' China Operations Hit by Registration Delays Under
New Law,'' Reuters, 6 July 17.
\65\ Shawn Shieh, ``The Origins of China's New Law on Foreign
NGOs,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 31 January 17.
\66\ Andreas Fulda, ``A New Law in China Is Threatening the Work of
International NGOs,'' The Conversation, 6 January 17; Scott Wilson,
``China's NGO Regulations and Uneven Civil Society Development,''
University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 15
February 17; Shawn Shieh, ``The Origins of China's New Law on Foreign
NGOs,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 31 January 17.
\67\ Carolyn Hsu et al., ``The State of NGOs in China Today,''
Brookings Institution, 15 December 16.
\68\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 74; Ivan Franceschini,
``Meet the State Security: Chinese Labour Activists and Their
Controllers,'' Made in China, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (January-March 2017), 37;
Renato Marques, ``Analysis: Labor-Related NGOs in China Facing Hard
Times,'' Macau Daily Times, 16 January 17.
\69\ See, e.g., Andreas Fulda, ``A New Law in China Is Threatening
the Work of International NGOs,'' The Conversation, 6 January 17;
Geraldine Johns-Putra et al., Minter Ellison, ``China's New Foreign NGO
Law: How Will It Impact Australian Universities Operating in China? ''
reprinted in Lexology, 22 February 17; Horst Fabian, ``China's New
Overseas NGOs Law: Uncertain, Contested Future of EU-China Civil
Society Cooperation but No Closed Spaces,'' Bundesnetzwerk
Burgerschaftliches Engagement, BBE Newsletter for Engagement and
Participation in Europe, 29 November 16, 23.
\70\ Andreas Fulda and Jennifer Brady, ``How Foreign Non-Profit
Organisations Should Respond to China's New Overseas NGO Management
Law,'' University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute Policy Paper
2016, No. 1, 4.
\71\ China Human Rights Concern Group, ``2016 Annual Report on
China Human Rights Lawyers,'' April 2017, 55.
\72\ Amnesty International, ``China: Taiwan NGO Worker Detained on
Vague National Security Charges,'' 29 March 17; Benjamin Haas, ``China
Says It Has Detained Taiwanese Activist Missing Since 19 March,''
Guardian, 29 March 17.
\73\ Benjamin Haas, ``China Says It Has Detained Taiwanese Activist
Missing Since 19 March,'' Guardian, 29 March 17.
\74\ ``Taiwan Suspect Arrested on Mainland,'' Xinhua, 26 May 17.
\75\ Ibid.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ Amnesty International, ``Urgent Action Update: Taiwan NGO
Worker Arrested for Subversion,'' 2 June 17.
\78\ Benjamin Haas, ``China Says It Has Detained Taiwanese Activist
Missing Since 19 March,'' Guardian, 29 March 17; ``China Bars Wife of
Detained Taiwan NGO Worker From Flying to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia,
10 April 17; Catherine Lai, ``Watchdog Warns of `Chilling Effect' as
China Confirms It Is Holding Missing Taiwanese NGO Worker,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 29 March 17; Amnesty International, ``Urgent Action: Taiwan
NGO Worker Held Incommunicado in China,'' 29 March 17.
\79\ Taiwan Association for Human Rights et al., ``Free Li Ming-
Che: The Joint Statement from NGOs,'' 30 March 17.
\80\ Ibid.
\81\ State Council General Office, Circular on Expanding Random
Sampling To Standardize Supervision During and After Events [Guowuyuan
bangongting guanyu tuiguang suiji choucha guifan shizhong shihou
jianguan de tongzhi], 29 July 15; State Council, Circular on the
Release of the 2016 Major Points on Improving Service Reform Through
Advancing Changes in Governance and Management [Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa
2016 nian tuijin jianzheng fangquan fangguan jiehe youhua fuwu gaige
gongzuo yaodian de tongzhi], 23 May 16.
\82\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Circular on the Release of the
``Provisional Measures on the Random Sampling of Social Organizations''
[Minzhengbu guanyu yinfa ``shehui zuzhi choucha zanxing banfa'' de
tongzhi], 13 March 17; Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Explanation of the
`Provisional Measures on the Random Sampling of Social Organizations'
'' [Guanyu ``shehui zuzhi choucha zanxing banfa'' de shuoming], 14
March 17.
\83\ Ministry-Administered Leading Small Group on the Work of
Party-Building in Social Organizations, ``Key Work Points for Ministry-
Administered Party-Building in Social Organizations in 2017'' [Buguan
shehui zuzhi 2017 nian dangjian gongzuo yaodian], 6 March 17, reprinted
in Ministry of Civil Affairs, 10 March 17; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
``Ministry of Civil Affairs Convenes Meeting on Promoting Ministry-
Administered `Two Comprehensive Coverages' Work for Social
Organizations'' [Minzhengbu zhaokai buguan shehui zuzhi ``liang ge quan
fugai'' gongzuo tuijin hui], 10 March 17. See also ``Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee General Office Releases `Opinion on
Strengthening Party-Building Work in Social Organizations
(Provisional)' '' [Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting yinfa ``guanyu
jiaqiang shehui zuzhi dang de jianshe gongzuo de yijian (shixing)''],
Xinhua, 28 September 15, item 2.4(1); Patricia M. Thornton, ``The
Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots
Society? '' China Quarterly, Vol. 213 (March 2013), 2, 7; CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 236.
\84\ Ministry-Administered Leading Small Group on the Work of
Party-Building in Social Organizations, ``Key Work Points for Ministry-
Administered Party-Building in Social Organizations in 2017'' [Buguan
shehuizuzhi 2017 nian dangjian gongzuo yaodian], 6 March 17, reprinted
in Ministry of Civil Affairs, 10 March 17, secs. 1(1)-(2), 2(5)-(7),
3(9). See also Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs
Convenes Meeting on Promoting Ministry-Administered `Two Comprehensive
Coverages' Work for Social Organizations'' [Minzhengbu zhaokai buguan
shehui zuzhi ``liang ge quan fugai'' gongzuo tuijin hui], 10 March 17;
Bo Wei, ``Party-Building Work To Lead Grassroots Social Organizations'
Healthy Development'' [Dangjian gongzuo yinling jiceng shehui zuzhi
jiankang fazhan], Philanthropy and Public Interest News, reprinted in
Xinhua, 24 May 17.
\85\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of
Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu
yijian gao)], 1 August 16.
\86\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial
Enterprises (Revised Draft for Public Comment) [Minban feiqiye danwei
dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26
May 16.
\87\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Management of
Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui
guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16.
\88\ Holly Snape, ``The Chinese Design of the Charity Law,'' China
Development Brief, 20 April 17.
\89\ PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed
16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 22-23.
\90\ Ibid., arts. 79-84.
\91\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision
Regarding Revision of the ``PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law'' [Quanguo
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo qiye suodeshui fa'' de jueding], 24 February 17; PRC
Enterprise Income Tax Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qiye suodeshui
fa], passed 16 March 07, amended and effective 24 February 17.
\92\ Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress, ``China: Enterprise
Income Tax Law Revised To Encourage Charitable Giving,'' Library of
Congress, Global Legal Monitor, 9 March 17.
\93\ Fu Chang, `` `Charity Law' Standardized the Qualifications of
Charitable Organizations for the First Time, Implemented for Half a
Year as of Today'' [``Cishan fa'' shouci guifanle cishan zuzhi zige
rujin shishi yi bannian], Jinwang Net, 23 March 17.
\94\ Charities Aid Foundation, ``CAF World Giving Index 2016,''
October 2016, 4, 16, 38.
\95\ Yong Lu, ``Why Giving Is Harder Than Earning: Philanthropy in
China,'' China Research Center, 3 January 17.
\96\ Gao Kai, ``Blue Book: 2016 Social Rule of Law Development
Accelerated, Early Steps Established for System of Trustworthiness''
[Lanpishu: 2016 nian shehui fazhi fazhan jiasu chengxin tixi chubu
jianli], China News Service, 20 March 17.
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of Democratic Governance
The Chinese Communist Party Asserts Greater Control Over State and
Society
In China's one-party, authoritarian political system,\1\
the Chinese Communist Party maintains what one rights
organization calls a ``monopoly on political power.'' \2\ The
Party plays a leading role in state and society,\3\ restricting
Chinese citizens' ability to exercise civil and political
rights.\4\ Observers noted that the central role of the Party
in governing the state appears to have strengthened since Xi
Jinping became the Party General Secretary and President in
November 2012 and March 2013, respectively,\5\ further
``blurring'' the lines between Party and government.\6\ In
March 2017, Wang Qishan, a member of the Standing Committee of
the Communist Party Central Committee Political Bureau
(Politburo) and the Secretary of the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection, said that ``under the Party's
leadership, there is only a division of labor between the Party
and the government; there is no separation between the Party
and the government.'' \7\
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, under Xi's
leadership, the Party demanded absolute loyalty from its
members,\8\ directing and influencing politics and society at
all levels, including in the military,\9\ economy,\10\
Internet,\11\ civil society,\12\ and family life.\13\
Furthermore, the Party continued to exert power over the
judiciary,\14\ undermining the independence of courts and the
rule of law in China, despite legal reform efforts.\15\ In
September 2016, the State Council Information Office released
the 2016-2020 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP).\16\ The
HRAP subordinates the Chinese government's human rights policy
to the ideological guidance of the Party,\17\ which the
international organization Human Rights in China said is part
of the Chinese government's efforts ``to modify international
human rights standards to fit China's conditions.'' \18\ In the
HRAP, the Chinese government pledged to ``continue to advance
related legal preparations and pave the way for ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).'' \19\ China signed the ICCPR in 1998 \20\ but has yet
to ratify it, despite the government's expressed intent to do
so.\21\
XI JINPING NAMED ``CORE'' OF THE PARTY
The Commission observed a continued emphasis on Party
General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's leading role in
guiding decisionmaking this past year. Following the Sixth
Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party (Sixth Plenum) in October 2016, the plenum communique
named Xi the ``core'' (hexin) of the Party.\22\ Some observers
viewed the Sixth Plenum as a ``victory for Xi'' over internal
political opposition.\23\ At the Sixth Plenum, the Party also
announced that the 19th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (19th Party Congress) would take place in
Beijing municipality during the second half of 2017.\24\ At the
annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference in March 2017,
Premier Li Keqiang affirmed Xi as the ``core'' of the Party in
his delivery of the State Council's report on the work of the
government in 2016.\25\ He noted that with the 19th Party
Congress approaching, this would be ``a year of great
significance for advancing the cause of the Party,'' and that
the government would ``put into practice the principles from .
. . Xi Jinping's major addresses and his new vision, thinking,
and strategies for China's governance.'' \26\ According to
reports, the ``core'' title confers status to Xi as the
foremost leader of China, signals to lower cadres to follow
Xi's policy guidance, and--despite reported signs of insecurity
among the Party leadership \27\--strengthens Xi's ability to
influence the appointment of the next generation of cadres at
the 19th Party Congress.\28\ One scholar, however, contended
that Xi's new ``core'' status signaled a strengthening of the
Party's collective leadership.\29\ The composition of the
Politburo Standing Committee is expected to change
significantly at the 19th Party Congress as five of seven
members reach the retirement age--based on precedent, not
formal Party rules \30\--of 68 or older in 2017.\31\
Anticorruption Campaign: Consolidating Party Discipline
This past year, President and Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping called for ``strict governance'' of the Party.\32\
Regulations and guidelines on intraparty supervision and
behavioral standards released after the Sixth Plenum stressed
that cadres at all levels must comply, especially those who
hold leadership positions--including high-level officials in
the Party Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing
Committee.\33\ The Party's Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCDI) continued punishing high- and low-level Party
officials for misconduct, targeting officials in the
government,\34\ military,\35\ and state security apparatus.\36\
In July 2017, CCDI authorities placed Sun Zhengcai, Party
Secretary of Chongqing municipality and a Politburo member,
under investigation for suspected discipline violations \37\--a
move that some international observers called a political
decision by Xi to consolidate power ahead of the 19th Party
Congress.\38\ The CCDI also tightened supervision of its
anticorruption investigators and staff to ensure stricter
oversight of disciplinary enforcers.\39\ In 2016, CCDI
authorities reportedly administered disciplinary penalties for
nearly 415,000 individuals.\40\ The Supreme People's
Procuratorate reported that in 2016, a total of 47,650 people
were investigated for crimes of professional misconduct.\41\
Courts at all levels reportedly finished adjudicating 45,000
cases involving 63,000 individuals related to corruption and
bribery.\42\ In July 2017, the Party Central Committee amended
the Regulations on Chinese Communist Party Inspection Work,\43\
shifting the focus of Party supervision and inspection from
fighting corruption to enforcing Party ideology and
loyalty.\44\
The Party and government are spearheading efforts to
establish a new national supervisory commission for enforcing
antigraft measures, a move that may result in further blurring
and integration of Party and government functions.\45\ In
December 2016, the National People's Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) approved a pilot project to set up
supervisory commissions to oversee government conduct in
Beijing municipality, Shanxi province, and Zhejiang
province.\46\ This multicity pilot project aimed to integrate
corruption control officials from different institutions into
one agency to increase effectiveness.\47\ Following the pilot
projects, in January 2017, the CCDI announced plans to
establish a new national commission in order to integrate all
government officials who have authority to conduct Party and
government disciplinary inspection into one institution.\48\
The plan also called for the NPCSC to oversee the creation of a
new leading small group (lingdao xiaozu) on deepening reform of
national supervisory institutions.\49\ A Chinese legal scholar
said that the new commission may help to delineate the roles of
investigators and prosecutors handling corruption cases and
make anticorruption efforts ``more systematic.'' \50\ The new
commission, designed to ``strengthen the Party's united
leadership over anticorruption work,'' \51\ will merge
anticorruption functions of the CCDI, Ministry of Supervision,
and Supreme People's Procuratorate and integrate roles among
Party, government, and judicial institutions.\52\ Reports raise
questions as to whether the new institution will administer
shuanggui, the non-transparent and extralegal Party
disciplinary process that requires Party members to appear for
interrogation at a designated time and place.\53\ Reports this
past year indicate that officials tortured individuals detained
under shuanggui; \54\ and that authorities reportedly used
confessions extracted through extralegal procedures during
shuanggui in subsequent legal proceedings.\55\ [For more
information on shuanggui, see Section II--Criminal Justice.]
CORRUPTION REMAINS PREVALENT IN CHINA
Despite the anticorruption efforts directed by central
Party officials, 83 percent of Chinese citizens reportedly
perceived corrupt officials as a ``big problem,'' according to
a 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center.\56\ Transparency
International ranked China 79 out of 176 countries in its 2016
Corruption Perceptions Index, and gave China a score of 40 for
its level of clean governance, with 100 being the highest
possible score.\57\ Local-level corruption reportedly remains
common in rural China.\58\ Local officials reportedly engaged
in embezzlement,\59\ land expropriation,\60\ and forced
demolition of homes.\61\ Some officials reportedly had ties to
criminal syndicates that used intimidation and violence to
extort money from villagers.\62\ In January 2017, at separate
high-level meetings for their respective agencies, Wang Qishan,
the Secretary of the CCDI,\63\ and Cao Jianming, the
Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate
(SPP),\64\ acknowledged problems of village-level corruption
and indicated plans to tackle corruption among village
officials and related criminal activities. The SPP subsequently
issued an official directive instructing lower-level
prosecutors to work with other government agencies and Party
organizations to target ``village tyrants,'' a term that the
SPP used to describe officials who are involved in corruption
and violence against villagers.\65\
Continued Crackdown on Free Speech, Association, and Assembly
Chinese authorities continued to harass, detain, and
imprison advocates who exercised their rights to freedom of
speech, assembly, and demonstration. The following are
representative cases from this reporting year:
Prior to the G20 Summit in Hangzhou
municipality, Zhejiang province, in September 2016,
authorities forcibly disappeared, detained, and sent on
forced travel dozens of rights advocates, reportedly to
prevent advocacy activities around the event.\66\ On
August 20, domestic security protection officers from
Yueqing city, Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang, seized
rights advocate Chen Zongyao (also known as Chen Chen)
and his son Chen Zhixiao in Yueqing.\67\ The two were
preparing to travel to Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu
province, prior to the G20 Summit in spite of
authorities' requests that they not go to Suzhou or
Hangzhou.\68\ On August 22, officials criminally
detained both men on suspicion of ``obstructing
official business,'' and formally arrested them on
September 27.\69\ On January 25, 2017, the Yueqing
Municipal People's Court sentenced Chen Zongyao to 10
months' imprisonment, suspended for 1 year and 6
months, and Chen Zhixiao to 6 months' detention,
suspended for 10 months.\70\ Chen Zongyao reportedly
had engaged in rights advocacy activities in the
past.\71\
In November 2016, authorities detained Liu
Feiyue, founder of rights monitoring website Civil
Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW) and Huang Qi, founder
of rights monitoring website 64 Tianwang.\72\
Authorities in Suizhou municipality, Hubei province,
detained Liu on November 17 for allegedly accepting
foreign funding to support CRLW \73\ and arrested him
on the charge of ``inciting subversion of state power''
on December 23.\74\ Authorities from Mianyang and
Neijiang cities and Chengdu municipality, Sichuan
province, detained Huang on November 28 and arrested
him on the charge of ``illegally providing state
secrets overseas'' on December 16.\75\ Liu founded CRLW
in 2006 to create a platform for reporting on
prohibited topics, such as the detention of rights
advocates, human rights violations, and political
protests.\76\ Established in 1998, 64 Tianwang is
reportedly the first known Chinese human rights website
and is an important source for independent reports on
government conduct and human rights violations.\77\
Zhao Suli, the wife of Qin Yongmin, a founder
of the banned China Democracy Party and chair of the
domestic NGO China Human Rights Watch, remains missing
after authorities in Wuhan municipality, Hubei
province, detained Zhao and Qin in January 2015.\78\ In
March 2017, Radio Free Asia reported that Zhao's family
filed lawsuits in Wuhan and in Zhengzhou municipality,
Henan province, Zhao's birthplace, in attempts to
determine her whereabouts.\79\ Authorities in Wuhan
have charged Qin with ``subversion of state power'' but
have not tried him as of August 2017.\80\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities Arrest Author of Open Letter Recommending Replacement of Xi
Jinping at 19th Party Congress
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2017, state security officials from Chengdu municipality,
Sichuan province, detained Zi Su, a Communist Party member and retired
Yunnan Provincial Committee Party School instructor,\81\ and in June,
formally arrested him on the charge of ``inciting subversion of state
power'' after he published an open letter calling for direct intraparty
elections and the replacement of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping at
the 19th Party Congress.\82\ In May, authorities reportedly criminally
detained Huang Jianping, Zhang Ai, and Shao Zhongguo on the charge of
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' \83\ and forcibly
disappeared Huang Xiaomin \84\ in connection with their support of Zi
by writing essays or sharing the open letter online. Authorities also
administratively detained Zhu Delong, former Capital Normal University
professor who reportedly signed on to Zi's open letter, in August after
he criticized Xi Jinping on a social media platform.\85\ Chengdu
authorities previously detained Zi in October 2016 on suspicion of
``inciting subversion of state power'' for suspected ties to ``foreign
forces,'' \86\ later releasing him on bail in November 2016.\87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year, authorities persecuted individuals for
participating in memorial events in remembrance of the violent
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Cases from this
past year included:
In April 2017, the Chengdu Municipal
Procuratorate in Sichuan prosecuted Fu Hailu, Chen
Bing, Luo Fuyu, and Zhang Juanyong for ``inciting
subversion of state power'' in connection with images
Fu posted online in 2016 showing satirically labeled
liquor bottles commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen
protests.\88\ The four men have been in pretrial
detention for over a year.\89\
On June 4, 2017, authorities from Zhuzhou
municipality, Hunan province, summoned at least 10
individuals including Guo Min, Guo Sheng, Chen
Xiaoping, Chen Siming, Li Ming, Liu Zhen, Sun Huazhu,
Wen Bo, Tang Yuchun, and Tang Xueyun after they
participated in an artistic commemoration of the 1989
Tiananmen protests,\90\ later ordering 6 of them to
serve 7 to 10 days' administrative detention.\91\
On June 5, 2017, authorities in Nanjing
municipality, Jiangsu province, criminally detained Shi
Tingfu and formally arrested him on July 6 on suspicion
of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble''
reportedly for giving a speech in front of the Nanjing
Massacre Memorial Hall while wearing a shirt that read
``Don't Forget June Fourth.'' \92\ As of July,
authorities detained Shi at the Yuhuatai District PSB
Detention Center in Nanjing, where he reportedly
suffered torture such as beating, sleep deprivation,
and inadequate food.\93\
On June 4, 2017, police in Beijing
municipality detained Li Xiaoling and later criminally
charged her with ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble,'' \94\ for standing in front of Tiananmen
Square while holding a sign that said ``June 4th
Journey To Shine a Light'' and a picture of her eye,
which she said was injured and rendered nearly blind by
police in May.\95\
On June 12, 2017, police in Beijing
municipality detained petitioner Ding Yajun for posting
a photo online of herself and other petitioners
commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\96\ A court
in Heilongjiang province reportedly tried Ding on July
31 for ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' but
did not issue a judgment.\97\
Lack of Substantial Political Liberalization
This past year, central Party authorities did not take any
substantial steps toward political liberalization.\98\ China's
Constitution declares China's political system to be a
socialist democracy with ``multi-party cooperation'' and
``political consultation'' under the leadership of the
Communist Party.\99\ This past year, Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping praised the consultative system as uniquely ``Chinese''
and ``socialist,'' having developed under the Party's
leadership.\100\ In the past, types of ``consultation'' have
included intraparty input on decisions about Party cadre
appointments, development projects at grassroots levels, and
some comments on draft laws, as well as discussions between
Party representatives and the national Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the eight
``democratic'' minor parties.\101\ According to one scholar,
the CPPCC's political influence is ``minimal'' and primarily
serves to ``legitimize'' Party rule.\102\ Philip Alston, the UN
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights,
observed after a mission to China in August 2016 that, ``Public
participation . . . is a notion to which Chinese officials
continue to subscribe, but it is invariably described very much
in terms of participating in the implementation of pre-
determined Party policies, rather than in the formulation or
monitoring of those policies.'' \103\ Xinhua reported that at
the annual political advisory meetings of the CPPCC and the
National People's Congress (``Two Sessions'') in March 2017,
delegates ``whole-heartedly'' upheld the Party Central
Committee with Xi as ``core.'' \104\ International media and
analysis reported that the 2017 Two Sessions ``followed a tight
script'' with ``no surprises,'' and delegates affirmed their
``unswerving loyalty'' to Xi as ``core'' of the Party in the
lead-up to the 19th Party Congress.\105\
Local Elections in China's One-Party State
Sources from this past year highlighted multiple instances
in which officials interfered with or inhibited meaningful
public participation in local elections,\106\ demonstrating
that China's political institutions do not meet the standards
for ``genuine'' elections outlined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights \107\ and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.\108\ This past year, villages and counties
across China held local-level elections that take place once
every five years.\109\ A report from Rights Defense Network
highlighted an increase in citizen participation, organizing,
and rights awareness, but also noted official interference with
local elections, including incidents where independent
candidates were administratively and criminally detained,
restricted in their freedom of movement, beaten, harassed,
kidnapped, and held in soft detention.\110\ For example, on
September 19, 2016, domestic security protection officers in
Qidong county, Hengyang municipality, Hunan province, detained
democracy advocate Guan Guilin, ordering him to serve 10 days'
administrative detention on suspicion of ``obstructing
elections'' after he reportedly attempted to register as an
independent candidate for the Qidong County People's Congress
election.\111\ Following Guan's administrative detention,
authorities did not release him and instead criminally detained
him on suspicion of ``organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law,'' \112\ releasing him on October
29.\113\ In November 2016, public security officials in
Dongxihu district, Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, ordered
Gao Hongwei, Jia Fuquan, and Zeng Shouyun to serve nine days'
administrative detention on the basis of ``harming voters'
ability to exercise their right to vote'' and ``disrupting the
order of elections.'' \114\ Gao, Jia, and Zeng had set up a
booth in Dongxihu to distribute flyers and campaign for votes
as independent candidates in the local people's congress
election.\115\ In November 2016, police from Shanghai
municipality administratively detained five campaign assistants
of Shanghai candidate Feng Zhenghu for five days, accusing them
of ``disrupting the order of elections.'' \116\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crackdown on Wukan Village Protesters
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public security authorities and riot police cracked down on protests
that arose after authorities detained Lin Zulian, chief of Wukan
village, Donghai subdistrict, Lufeng city, Shanwei municipality,
Guangdong province, in June 2016.\117\ Wukan residents elected Lin, an
advocate for the return of land to villagers, to the village committee
in 2012 in a special election \118\ and reelected him in 2015.\119\ On
and around September 13, 2016, international news media reported that
security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters, a
move reportedly ordered by Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua,\120\
that resulted in serious injuries to villagers.\121\ Police forces
interrogated, expelled, or barred reporters from the village,\122\
blocked access to the village,\123\ and detained villagers,\124\
including at least one Internet user.\125\ Reports from a Party-run
news media outlet characterized international reporting on events in
Wukan as ``foreign forces'' conducting ``public opinion warfare,''
\126\ while other provincial media outlets published alternative
narratives on events in Wukan that downplayed the violence and
unrest.\127\ In December 2016, the Haifeng County People's Court tried
and convicted \128\ nine Wukan residents for their participation in the
protest and imposed prison sentences ranging from 2 years to 10 years
and 6 months.\129\ Those imprisoned included Wei Yonghan,\130\ Hong
Yongzhong,\131\ Yang Jinzhen,\132\ Wu Fang,\133\ Cai Jialin,\134\
Zhuang Songkun,\135\ Li Chulu,\136\ Chen Suzhuan,\137\ and Zhang
Bingchai.\138\ In March 2017, Radio Free Asia reported that Wukan
residents were under constant surveillance by authorities and feared
speaking to outsiders.\139\ In August 2017, officials reportedly
canceled the household registration (hukou) of exiled Wukan activist
Zhuang Liehong and threatened his family in China, in apparent attempts
to stop his advocacy in the United States.\140\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation of Open Government Information Regulations and Citizen
Access to Information
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
continued to work towards increasing citizens' access to
official information. In June 2017, the State Council released
draft revisions to the 2008 Open Government Information (OGI)
Regulations and solicited public comments.\141\ The draft
revisions clarified the scope of OGI and defined the types of
information not subject to OGI.\142\ Areas not subject to OGI
requirements include local-level information that ``endangers
public safety or social stability'' or that involves ethnicity
and religion.\143\ The draft revisions also included a set of
new provisions calling for all levels of government to promote
and establish mechanisms for OGI work.\144\ One U.S.-based
expert noted that while the Chinese government's efforts to
advance greater citizen access to official information have
resulted in considerable progress in recent years, ``government
transparency remains uneven and often unsatisfactory,'' with
few OGI requests granted, few wins for OGI lawsuits, and
detentions of some citizens who submit OGI requests.\145\ The
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found that 73 out of 100
county-level governments scored lower than 60 points for
transparency, with Nang county, Linzhi (Nyingtri) municipality,
Tibet Autonomous Region, scoring the lowest at 12.75
points.\146\ The study found that municipal governments overall
scored significantly higher for transparency than county
governments, with Xiamen municipality, Fujian province, and
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, ranking as the top
two.\147\ Despite moves in the past year to update the OGI
regulatory framework, Chinese authorities continued to deny OGI
requests in cases related to human rights defenders, including
cases of those petitioning,\148\ advocating for civil
society,\149\ and requesting information on the use of ``black
jails'' and other secret detention sites.\150\
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
\1\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2017--China,'' last
visited 11 April 17; Jidong Chen et al., ``Sources of Authoritarian
Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China,'' American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April 2016), 385; David Shambaugh,
China's Future (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 98, 115, 121-22; Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016--China (Includes
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 3 March 17, 1.
\2\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2017--China,'' last
visited 11 April 17.
\3\ David Shambaugh, China's Future (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016), 98-99. See also Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin,
Congressional Research Service, ``Understanding China's Political
System,'' 20 March 13, summary; Chinese Communist Party Constitution
[Gongchandang zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November
87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14
November 12, General Program. For an English translation, see
``Constitution of Communist Party of China,'' Xinhua, 18 November 12,
reprinted in People's Daily, 29 March 13. The Party Constitution states
that, ``Acting on the principle that the Party commands the overall
situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must
play the role as the core of leadership among all other organizations
at the corresponding levels.'' PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82,
amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, Preamble;
PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15
March 00, amended and effective 15 March 15, art. 3.
\4\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2017--China,'' last
visited 11 April 17.
\5\ David Shambaugh, China's Future (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016), 115, 121-22; ``Chairman of Everything,'' Economist, 2 April 16;
``Xi Jinping: Party, Government, Military, Civil, and Academic; East,
West, South, North, and Center: The Party Leads Everything'' [Xi
jinping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi
lingdao yiqie de], The Paper, 30 January 16.
\6\ Christopher K. Johnson and Scott Kennedy, ``China's Un-
Separation of Powers: The Blurred Lines of Party and Government,''
Foreign Affairs, 24 July 15.
\7\ ``Wang Qishan: Build an Integrated Party-Led Anticorruption
System, Improve Governing Capacity, Perfect the Governance System''
[Wang qishan: goujian dang tongyi lingdao de fanfubai tizhi tigao
zhizheng nengli wanshan zhili tixi], Xinhua, 5 March 17. See also Shi
Jiangtao, `` `No Separation of Powers': China's Top Graft-Buster Seeks
Tighter Party Grip on Government,'' South China Morning Post, 6 March
17; Ben Blanchard and Philip Wen, ``Nothing To See but Comfort for Xi
at China's Annual Parliament,'' Reuters, 15 March 17.
\8\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Certain Guidelines
Regarding Intraparty Political Life Under New Circumstances'' [Guanyu
xin xingshi xia dangnei zhengzhi shenghuo de ruogan zhunze], Xinhua, 2
November 16. See also Chen Yannan, ``People's Daily New Lessons and
Reflections: Solidifying Political Character With Absolute Loyalty
Toward the Party'' [Renmin ribao xinzhi xinjue: zhujiu dui dang juedui
zhongcheng de zhengzhi pin'ge], People's Daily, 15 March 17; ``Xi
Jinping Wants Officials To Declare Allegiance to Himself,'' Economist,
6 April 17.
\9\ Liang Pengfei and Zhou Yuan, ``Absolute Loyalty, Unified
Military Command'' [Juedui zhongcheng junling guiyi], Liberation Army
News, 12 March 17.
\10\ See, e.g., National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2016
National Economy Established Good Start to the `13th Five-Year Plan' ''
[2016 nian guomin jingji shixian ``shisan wu'' lianghao kaiju], 20
January 17; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2016: A Good
Start for China's Economy During the 13th Five-Year Plan Period,'' 20
January 17.
\11\ See, e.g., Cyberspace Administration of China, ``National
Cyberspace Security Strategy,'' [Guojia wangluo kongjian anquan
zhanlue], reprinted in Xinhua, 27 December 16. See also Joyce Huang,
``China Launches Corruption Crackdown on Social Media Ahead of Party
Congress,'' Voice of America, 24 April 17; Beina Xu and Eleanor Albert,
Council on Foreign Relations, ``Media Censorship in China,'' 17
February 17.
\12\ See, e.g., Ministry-Administered Leading Small Group on the
Work of Party-Building in Social Organizations, Ministry of Civil
Affairs, ``Key Work Points for Ministerial Management of Party-Building
in Social Organizations in 2017'' [Bu guan shehui zuzhi 2017 nian
dangjian gongzuo yaodian], 6 March 17, 1(1)-(2), 2(5)-(7), 3(9). See
also Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs Convenes
Meeting on Promoting the `Two Comprehensive Coverages' Work for Social
Organization Management'' [Minzhengbu zhaokai bu guan shehui zuzhi
``liang ge quan fugai'' gongzuo tuijin hui], 10 March 17.
\13\ See, e.g., National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``December 12, 2016, National Health and Family Planning Commission
Regular Press Conference Transcript'' [2016 nian 12 yue 12 ri guojia
weisheng jishengwei lixing xinwen fabuhui wenzi shilu], 12 December 16;
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Chinese Communist Party
18th Party Congress Fifth Plenum Announcement'' [Zhongguo gongchandang
di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi gongbao], 29
October 15; State Council, Circular Regarding National Population
Development Plan (2016-2030) [Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa guojia renkou
fazhan guihua (2016-2030 nian) de tongzhi], issued 25 January 17, 2(1),
3(1). See also Ananya Roy, ``Strict Birth Control Measures in China
Force Parents To Abandon Child or Go Into Hiding,'' International
Business Times, 28 October 16.
\14\ ``Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission
Meeting Convenes in Beijing'' [Zhongyang zhengfa gongzuo huiyi zai jing
zhaokai], Xinhua, reprinted in China Law Society, 13 January 17; Zhang
Ziyang, ``Zhou Qiang: Dare To Draw the Sword Against Erroneous Western
Thought'' [Zhou qiang: yao ganyu xiang xifang cuowu sichao liangjian],
China News, 14 January 17.
\15\ Zheping Huang, ``China's Top Judge Is One of the Country's
Most Vocal Critics of Judicial Independence,'' Quartz, 18 January 17;
Michael Forsythe, ``China's Chief Justice Rejects an Independent
Judiciary, and Reformers Wince,'' New York Times, 18 January 17.
\16\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua,
29 September 16.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ Human Rights in China, ``The China Challenge to International
Human Rights: What's at Stake? '' November 2016, 14-16.
\19\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua,
29 September 16, sec. V.
\20\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 21, 22(1); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, last visited 10 September 17. China has
signed but not ratified the ICCPR.
\21\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76; UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/25/5,
4 December 13, para. 153. During the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government's human rights
record in October 2013, the Chinese government representative stated
``China is making preparations for the ratification of ICCPR and will
continue to carry out legislative and judicial reforms.''
\22\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``18th Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee Sixth Plenum Communique'' [Zhongguo
gongchangdang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi
gongbao], 27 October 16.
\23\ Chris Buckley, ``China's Communist Party Declares Xi Jinping
`Core' Leader,'' New York Times, 27 October 16; J.P., ``Why It Matters
That Xi Jinping Is Called the `Core' of China's Communist Party,''
Economist, 16 November 16; Kazuyuki Suwa, Tokyo Foundation, ``Xi
Jinping's China: Concentrating and Projecting Power,'' 19 January 17.
\24\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``18th Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee Sixth Plenum Communique'' [Zhongguo
gongchangdang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi
gongbao], 27 October 16; Chris Buckley, ``China's Communist Party
Declares Xi Jinping `Core' Leader,'' New York Times, 27 October 16.
\25\ State Council, ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 5 March 17; State Council, ``Report on the Work of the
Government,'' 5 March 17.
\26\ Ibid.
\27\ Chris Buckley, ``Xi Jinping May Be `Core Leader' of China, but
He's Still Really Nervous,'' New York Times, 1 November 16.
\28\ Chris Buckley, ``China's Communist Party Declares Xi Jinping
`Core' Leader,'' New York Times, 27 October 16; Kazuyuki Suwa, Tokyo
Foundation, ``Xi Jinping's China: Concentrating and Projecting Power,''
19 January 17; J.P., ``Why It Matters That Xi Jinping Is Called the
`Core' of China's Communist Party,'' Economist, 16 November 16; Michael
Martina and Benjamin Kang Lim, ``China's Xi Anointed `Core' Leader, On
Par With Mao, Deng,'' Reuters, 27 October 16.
\29\ Alice Miller, ``What Would Deng Do? '' China Leadership
Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, No. 52 (Winter 2017),
6-8.
\30\ Chris Buckley, ``Xi Jinping, Seeking To Extend Power, May Bend
Retirement Rules,'' New York Times, 2 March 17; ``Will Xi Bend
Retirement `Rule' To Keep Top Officials in Power? '' Bloomberg, 31
October 16.
\31\ Alice Miller, ``The Road to the 19th Party Congress,'' China
Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, No. 51
(Fall 2016), 9.
\32\ ``Xi Calls for Creativity in Strict CPC Governance,'' Xinhua,
6 January 17.
\33\ Ibid.; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``18th
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sixth Plenum Communique''
[Zhongguo gongchangdang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci
quanti huiyi gongbao], Xinhua, 27 October 16; ``Xi Jinping: An
Explanation of `Certain Guidelines on Governing Intraparty Political
Life Under New Circumstances' and `Chinese Communist Party Intraparty
Supervision Regulations' '' [Xi jinping: guanyu ``guanyu xin xingshi
xia dangnei zhengzhi shenghuo de ruogan zhunze'' he ``zhongguo
gongchandang dangnei jiandu tiaoli'' de shuoming], 2 November 16;
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Chinese Communist Party
Intraparty Supervision Regulations'' [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei
jiandu tiaoli], reprinted in Xinhua, 2 November 16; Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee, ``Certain Guidelines on Governing Intraparty
Political Life Under New Circumstances'' [Guanyu xin xingshi xia
dangnei zhengzhi shenghuo de ruogan zhunze], reprinted in Xinhua, 2
November 16. See also Benjamin Lee, ``In China, a Tale of 2 Plenums:
`Core Leader' vs. Collective Leadership,'' The Diplomat, 15 November
16.
\34\ See, e.g., ``Former Senior Political Advisor Sentenced to 13
Years for Graft,'' Global Times, 13 December 16.
\35\ See, e.g., ``46 Military Officers Punished for Discipline
Violations,'' Xinhua, 22 March 17.
\36\ See, e.g., ``Former Senior Political Advisor, Police Chief of
Tianjin Stands Trial for Graft,'' Xinhua, 29 March 17.
\37\ ``Comrade Sun Zhengcai Suspected of Serious Violations of
Discipline, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Decides To Open
Case and Conduct Investigations'' [Sun zhengcai tongzhi shexian
yanzhong weiji zhonggong zhongyang jueding dui qi li'an shencha],
Xinhua, 24 July 17.
\38\ Chris Buckley, ``Former Political Star in China Is Under Party
Investigation,'' New York Times, 24 July 17; Tom Phillips, ``Man Tipped
as China's Future President Ousted as Xi Jinping Wields `Iron
Discipline,' '' Guardian, 25 July 17.
\39\ Wu Mengda et al., ``Overwhelming Situation Already Formed--
What Will Be the New Signals of Anticorruption Efforts in 2017? Eight
Major Points From the CCDI Seventh Plenum Communique'' [Yadaoxing
taishi yijing xingcheng 2017 nian fanfu jiang you naxie xin xinhao?--
zhongyang jiwei qi ci quanhui gongbao ba da kandian], Xinhua, 8 January
17. See also Brenda Goh, ``China Tightens Rules After Anti-Corruption
Staff Caught Up in Graft,'' Reuters, 8 January 17.
\40\ ``415,000 Punished for Discipline Violations in 2016,''
Xinhua, 5 January 17.
\41\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin
jianchayuan gongzuo baogao], 15 March 17.
\42\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report (Summary)'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao (zhaiyao)], Xinhua, 12 March 17, part 1.
\43\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Regulations on
Chinese Communist Party Inspection Work [Zhongguo gongchandang xunshi
gongzuo tiaoli], effective 3 August 15, amended 1 July 17.
\44\ Ibid., 11(1); ``CCP Issues Revised Regulation on Inspection To
Strengthen Party Supervision,'' Xinhua, 14 July 17; Yang Sheng, ``CPC
Issues New Inspection Rules,'' Global Times, 26 July 17.
\45\ Benjamin Kang Lim and Philip Wen, ``China's Anti-Corruption
Overhaul Paves Way for Xi To Retain Key Ally,'' Reuters, 3 March 17;
Jun Mai, ``Why Is China Blurring the Line Between Party and State? ''
South China Morning Post, 15 April 17.
\46\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Launching State Supervision System Reform Pilot Program in Beijing
Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province, [Quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu zai beijing shi, shanxi sheng,
zhejiang sheng kaizhan guojia jiancha tizhi gaige shidian gongzuo de
jueding], issued 25 December 16, effective 26 December 16.
\47\ Ibid.; Cao Yin, ``Anti-Graft Agencies Set To Be Realigned,''
China Daily, 12 January 17.
\48\ Wang Qishan, ``To Promote Comprehensive and Rigorous
Development of Party Governance, and Welcome the Opening of the 19th
Party Congress With Exceptional Performance--Work Report From the
Chinese Communist Party's 18th Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection's Seventh Plenary Session'' [Tuidong quanmian congyan
zhidang xiang zongshen fazhan yi youyi chengji yingjie dang de shijiu
da zhaokai--zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang jilu
jiancha weiyuanhui di qi ci quanti huiyi shang de gongzuo baogao],
reprinted in Xinhua, 19 January 17, sec. 1(2).
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ Cao Yin, ``Anti-Graft Agencies Set To Be Realigned,'' China
Daily, 12 January 17.
\51\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office
Issues `Proposal Launching State Supervision System Reform Pilot
Program in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang
Province'' [Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting yinfa ``guanyu zai beijing
shi, shanxi sheng, zhejiang sheng kaizhan guojia jiancha tizhi gaige
shidian fang'an], Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 7
November 16. See also Jerome Doyon, ``One-Man Rule and the Party:
Internal Discipline and the Risk of Gerontocracy,'' China Analysis,
Special Issue: Discipline and Punish: Party Power Under Xi, European
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2017, 4.
\52\ Benjamin Kang Lim and Philip Wen, ``China's Anti-Corruption
Overhaul Paves Way for Xi To Retain Key Ally,'' Reuters, 4 March 17.
\53\ Zhiqiong June Wang, ``China's New Anti-Corruption Body Raises
Worrying Questions About the Rule of Law,'' The Conversation, 17 May
17; Nathan VanderKlippe, ``Shuanggui: The Harsh, Hidden Side of China's
War on Graft, and How One Man Disappeared Into It,'' Globe and Mail, 26
March 17.
\54\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Secretive Detention System Mars
Anti-Corruption Campaign,'' 6 December 16; Nathan VanderKlippe,
``Shuanggui: The Harsh, Hidden Side of China's War on Graft, and How
One Man Disappeared Into It,'' Globe and Mail, 26 March 17.
\55\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Secretive Detention System Mars
Anti-Corruption Campaign,'' 6 December 16.
\56\ Richard Wike and Bruce Stokes, Pew Research Center, ``Chinese
Public Sees More Powerful Role in World, Names U.S. as Top Threat,'' 5
October 16, 4-5, 7-8. According to the Pew report, 64 percent of
Chinese people believe that corruption will lessen over the next five
years.
\57\ Transparency International, ``Corruption Perceptions Index
2016,'' 25 January 17. China's score improved by three points from 37
to 40 between 2015 and 2016.
\58\ Dali Yang, ``Dirty Deeds: Will Corruption Doom China? ''
Foreign Affairs (July/August 2017). See, e.g., Luigi Tomba, ``What Does
Wukan Have To Do With Democracy? '' Chinoiresie, 2 February 17;
``Police Probe Village Officials in China's Hunan After Beating Death
of `Good Official,' '' Radio Free Asia, 13 June 17.
\59\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang, Yili Villagers' Rights Defense
Representative Talks About Local Government Corruption Issues (9)''
[Xinjiang yili cunmin weiquan daibiao tan difang zhengfu guanyuan tanfu
wenti (jiu)], Radio Free Asia, 4 October 16; Shi Yu, ``CCDI Exposes 2
Jiangxi Cadres, Village Officials Investigated for Embezzling 7 Million
Yuan of Public Funds'' [Jiangxi 2 ming ganbu bei zhongyang jiwei
dianming puguang cun guan nuoyong 700 wan yuan gongkuan bei chachu],
People's Daily, 11 May 17; Li Xiule, ``Village Cadres Collectively
Violate Regulations, Embezzle Over 5 Million Yuan in Public Funds To
Invest in Financial Products'' [Cun ganbu jiti weigui nuoyong gongkuan
500 yu wan yuan yongyu touzi licai], Procuratorial Daily, reprinted in
Xinhua, 6 June 17.
\60\ See, e.g., Lauren Teixeira, ``Why Is Nanjing Demolishing Its
Last Historic Neighborhood? '' SupChina, 18 July 17; Rights Defense
Network, ``Disabled and Landless Rural Couple From Shandong Arrested,
Without Money To Hire Lawyer, They Only Can Allow the Government To
Frame Them'' [Shandong canji shidi nongmin fufu shuangshuang zao daibu,
wu qian pin lushi zhi neng ren you zhengfu gouxian], 4 April 17;
``Large-scale Clash Between Police and Nearly 10,000 Guangdong
Villagers Protesting Against Corrupt Officials'' [Guangdong jin wan
cunmin kangyi tanguan jing min da guimo chongtu], Voice of America, 3
April 15.
\61\ See, e.g., Lauren Teixeira, ``Why Is Nanjing Demolishing Its
Last Historic Neighborhood? '' SupChina, 18 July 17; Rights Defense
Network, ``Wuxi [Resident] Xu Haifeng Levies Complaint Against Public
Security, Procuratorial, and Court Officials to Departments of Wuxi
Municipality, Jiangsu Province, and the Central Government, for the
Framing and Imprisonment of 77-Year-Old Mother Wang Jindi'' [Wuxi xu
haifeng jin xiang wuxi shi, jiangsu sheng, zhongyang ge zhineng bumen
konggao gouxian ziji nian yi 77 sui muqin wang jindi zuolao de
gongjianfa zerenren], 8 October 16. For more information on Wang Jindi,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00037.
\62\ Jie Wenjin et al., ``Emphasize Striking Against `Protective
Umbrella' for Occupational Crimes--Focus on Addressing `Village
Tyrants' and Clan-Related Criminal Gang Activities Nationwide'' [Tuchu
daji chongdang ``baohu san'' de zhiwu fanzui--jujiao quanguo zhengzhi
``cunba'' he zongzu eshili xingdong], Xinhua, 12 February 17. See also
Zhao Fuduo, ``Procuratorate Office To Vigorously Address `Village
Tyrants,' Severely Punish Rural Village-Level Corruption'' [Jiancha
jiguan jiang dali zhengzhi ``cunba'' yancheng nongcun jiceng fubai],
Caixin, 15 January 17.
\63\ Wang Qishan, ``To Promote Comprehensive and Rigorous
Development of Party Governance, and Welcome the Opening of the 19th
Party Congress With Exceptional Performance--Work Report From the
Chinese Communist Party's 18th Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection's Seventh Plenary Session'' [Tuidong quanmian congyan
zhidang xiang zongshen fazhan yi youyi chengji yingjie dang de shijiu
da zhaokai--zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang jilu
jiancha weiyuanhui di qi ci quanti huiyi shang de gongzuo baogao],
reprinted in Xinhua, 19 January 17, sec. 3(5); ``Comrade Wang Qishan's
Biography'' [Wang qishan tongzhi jianli], People's Daily, last visited
21 July 17.
\64\ Wang Zhiguo et al., ``Cao Jianming: Create a Safe and Stable
Social Environment for the Successful Convening of the 19th Party
Congress'' [Cao jianming: wei dang de shijiu da shengli zhaokai yingzao
anquan wending shehui huanjing], Procuratorial Daily, 15 January 17; Li
Rongde, ``China's Top Prosecutor Takes Aim at Corrupt Village Officials
Over Rural Land Grabs,'' Caixin, 16 January 17.
\65\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, ``Supreme People's
Procuratorate Releases Opinion, Stresses Striking Against Occupational
Crimes That Serve as `Protective Umbrellas' for `Village Tyrants' ''
[Zuigaojian xiafa yijian tuchu daji wei ``cunba'' chongdang ``baohu
san'' de zhiwu fanzui], 3 February 17.
\66\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `They Target My Human
Rights Work as a Crime': Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2016),'' February 2017, 16.
\67\ ``Stability Maintenance in Hangzhou for G20: Chen Zongyao and
His Son, Citizens From Leqing, Wenzhou, Were Detained'' [Hangzhou G20
weiwen: wenzhou yueqing gongmin chen zongyao fuzi bei juliu], China
Free Press, 22 August 16.
\68\ Ibid.
\69\ Ibid.; Rights Defense Network, ``Yueqing, Zhejiang Citizens
Chen Zongyao (Chen Chen) and Chen Zhixiao, Father and Son, Detained for
Hanging `Constitutional Noodle Shop' Sign'' [Zhejiang yueqing gongmin
chen zongyao (chen chen), chen zhixiao fuzi yin guale ``xianzheng
mianguan'' zhaopai zao daibu], 29 September 16.
\70\ Rights Defense Network, ``In Wenzhou, Zhejiang `Constitutional
Noodle Shop' Case, Father and Son Chen Chen (Chen Zongyao) and Chen
Zhixiao Released Under Suspended Sentence'' [Zhejiang wenzhou
``xianzheng mianguan'' zhaopai an chen chen (chen zongyao), chen
zhixiao fuzi bei pan ruanxing huoshi], 25 January 17.
\71\ Rights Defense Network, ``Yueqing Zhejiang Citizens Chen
Zongyao (Chen Chen) and Chen Zhixiao, Father and Son, Detained for
Hanging `Constitutional Noodle Shop' Sign'' [Zhejiang yueqing gongmin
chen zongyao (chen chen), chen zhixiao fuzi yin guale ``xianzheng
mianguan'' zhaopai zao daibu], 29 September 16. For more information,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00275 on
Chen Zongyao and 2016-00306 on Chen Zhixiao.
\72\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Civil Rights & Livelihood
Watch Founder Liu Feiyue Criminally Detained on Charge of Subversion of
State Power'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue bei yi dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui xingju], 24 November 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Three Activists Feared `Disappeared,' '' 16 December 16; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, ``Chairs Ask Chinese Ambassador for
Information on Detained Rights Advocates and American Citizen Sandy
Phan-Gillis,'' 7 December 16.
\73\ ``Liu Feiyue Criminally Detained on Charge of `Subversion of
State Power,' Authorities Accuse Him of Receiving Foreign Funding''
[Liu feiyue bei yi ``dianfu zui'' xingju dangju zhikong qi shoushou
jingwai zizhu], Radio Free Asia, 25 November 16.
\74\ Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on CRLW Director Liu
Feiyue's Case: Family Members Receive `Arrest Notice' From Suizhou,
Hubei PSB'' [Minsheng guancha fuzeren liu feiyue an tongbao: jiashu
shoudao hubei suizhou shi gong'an ju jifa de ``daibu tongzhishu''], 11
January 17. For more information on Liu Feiyue, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00460.
\75\ Rights Defense Network, ``Director of Mainland NGO `64
Tianwang' Huang Qi Arrested by Authorities'' [Dalu NGO ``liusi
tianwang'' fuzeren huang qi yi bei dangju zhixing daibu], 20 December
16. For more information on Huang Qi, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2004-04053.
\76\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Editor of Human Rights
News Website Detained in China,'' 28 November 16.
\77\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Huang Qi,'' 19 December 16,
last visited 24 July 17.
\78\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Husband and Wife Qin
Yongmin and Zhao Suli Disappeared for Nearly One Year, Worrying Many''
[Qin yongmin, zhao suli fufu shizong jijiang man yi nian yin gejie
danyou], 1 January 16; Human Rights in China, ``China Human Rights
Watch Organization Registration Announcement (No. 10)'' [Zhongguo
renquan guancha zuzhi zhuce wengao (di shi hao)], 25 March 14;
``Persecuted Lawyer Ma Lianshun Forced To Withdraw From Qin Yongmin
Case'' [Zao daya ma lianshun lushi bei po tuichu qin yongmin an], Radio
Free Asia, 23 July 17. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2004-02138 on Qin Yongmin and 2016-
00069 on Zhao Suli.
\79\ ``Relatives of Qin Yongmin's `Disappeared' Wife in Legal
Appeal,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 17.
\80\ ``Qin Yongmin Detained for Two and a Half Years, Fifth Lawyer
Forced To Withdraw'' [Qin yongmin bei ju liang nian ban di 5 wei lushi
zao bitui], Renmin Bao, 27 July 17; ``Qin Yongmin Pressured To Change
Lawyer for Fifth Time, Lawyers Obstructed and Unable To Be Involved''
[Qin yongmin shouya 5 huan lushi reng shou zunao lushi wufa jieru],
Radio Free Asia, 2 August 17.
\81\ Rights Defense Network, ``Chinese Communist Party Member,
Retired Yunnan Province Party School Instructor Zi Su Published
Recommendation on 19th Party Congress, Currently Detained at Chengdu
No. 2 Detention Center'' [Zhonggong dangyuan, yunnan shengwei dangxiao
tuixiu laoshi zi su fabiao zhi shijiu da jianyi hou muqian yi bei
shoujian zai chengdu di er kanshousuo], 12 May 17.
\82\ ``Former Yunnan Party School Instructor Zi Su Arrested on
Suspicion of `Inciting Subversion' for Proposing Direct Intraparty
Elections for General Secretary'' [Yunnan faqi dangnei zhixuan qu
zongshuji changyi de dangxiao qian jiaoshi zi su bei yi shexian
``shandian zui'' pibu], Radio Free Asia, 16 June 17. For full text of
open letter, see Rights Defense Network, ``Chinese Communist Party
Member, Retired Yunnan Province Party School Instructor Zi Su Published
Recommendation on 19th Party Congress, Currently Detained at Chengdu
No. 2 Detention Center'' [Zhonggong dangyuan, yunnan shengwei dangxiao
tuixiu laoshi zi su fabiao zhi shijiu da jianyi hou muqian yi bei
shoujian zai chengdu di er kanshousuo], 12 May 17.
\83\ Rights Defense Network, ``Chinese Communist Party Member,
Retired Yunnan Province Party School Instructor Zi Su Published
Recommendation on 19th Party Congress, Currently Detained at Chengdu
No. 2 Detention Center'' [Zhonggong dangyuan, yunnan shengwei dang xiao
tuixiu laoshi zi su fabiao zhi shijiu da jianyi hou muqian yi bei
shoujian zai chengdu di er kanshousuo], 12 May 17; Rights Defense
Network, ``Due to `Case of Zi Su Suggesting Replacement of General
Secretary at 19th Party Congress,' Huang Jianping of Nanchang, Jiangxi,
Zhang Ai of Kunming, Yunnan, and Shao Zhongguo of Yuncheng, Shanxi,
Detained'' [``Zi su jianyan shijiu da genghuan zongshuji an'' jiangxi
nanchang huang jianping, yunnan kunming zhang ai, shanxi yuncheng shao
zhongguo san ren bei juliu], 6 May 17.
\84\ ``Huang Xiaomin of Sichuan Secretly Kidnapped for His Support
of Academic Zi Su'' [Shengyuan xuezhe zi su sichuan huang xiaomin zao
mimi bangjia], Radio Free Asia, 21 May 17; ``Sichuan Rights Defender
Huang Xiaomin Missing for More Than Three Months'' [Sichuan weiquanzhe
huang xiaomin shizhong yu san yue], Radio Free Asia, 23 August 17.
\85\ ``Former Capital Normal University Instructor Administratively
Detained Prior to 19th Party Congress for Citicizing Xi Jinping''
[Shijiu da qian pi xi jinping yuan shou shida jiaoshou zao xingju],
Radio Free Asia, 17 August 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Chinese
Communist Party Member, Retired Yunnan Province Party School Instructor
Zi Su Published Recommendation on 19th Party Congress, Currently
Detained at Chengdu No. 2 Detention Center'' [Zhonggong dangyuan,
yunnan shengwei dangxiao tuixiu laoshi zi su fabiao zhi shijiu da
jianyi hou muqian yi bei shoujian zai chengdu di er kanshousuo], 12 May
17.
\86\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Authorities From Chengdu,
Sichuan, Should Immediately Release Zi Su and Other Democracy
Advocates'' [Sichuan chengdu dangju ying liji shifang zi su deng minzhu
renshi], 10 November 16; ``Mainland Dissident Scholar Zi Su Released on
Bail'' [Dalu yijian xuezhe zi su qubao huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 26
November 16.
\87\ ``Mainland Dissident Scholar Zi Su Released on Bail'' [Dalu
yijian xuezhe zi su qubao huoshi], Radio Free Asia, 26 November 16. For
more information on Zi Su, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2016-00445.
\88\ ``Four People in `June Fourth Liquor' Case Prosecuted for
Inciting Subversion'' [``Liusi mingjiu'' an 4 ren bei qisu shandian
zui], Radio Free Asia, 14 April 17. For more information, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00240 on Fu
Hailu, 2016-00241 on Chen Bing, 2016-00242 on Luo Fuyu, and 2016-00243
on Zhang Juanyong. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
239.
\89\ ``On the Eve of June Fourth, Family Members of the `June
Fourth Liquor Case' Made a Statement Hoping Their Family Members Will
Return Home Soon'' [Liusi qianxi ``liusi jiu'an'' jiashu fa shengming
ji jiaren zaori huijia], Radio Free Asia, 2 June 17.
\90\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Hunan, Zhuzhou, Citizens Guo
Min and Guo Sheng Released After Being Detained for 10 Days for
Commemorating June Fourth's 28th Anniversary With Performance Art''
[Hunan zhuzhou gongmin renti xingwei yishu jinian liusi 28 zhounian
huodong canyuzhe guo min he guo sheng juliu shi tian qiman huoshi], 15
June 17.
\91\ Ibid.
\92\ China Political Prisoner Concern, ``Shi Tingfu (CPPC Number:
00544)'' [Shi tingfu (CPPC bianhao: 00544)], 2 July 17; Amnesty
International, ``Urgent Action Update: Activists Arrested for Tiananmen
Commemoration (China: UA 148.17),'' 28 July 17.
\93\ China Political Prisoner Concern, ``Shi Tingfu (CPPC Number:
00544)'' [Shi tingfu (CPPC bianhao: 00544)], 2 July 17.
\94\ ``Li Xiaoling's Administrative Detention Becomes Criminal
Detention, Residence Searched, Sun Dongsheng Forcibly Taken Back to
Harbin'' [Li xiaoling xingju bian xingju zhusuo bei chao sun dongsheng
bei qiangzhi daihui ha'erbin], Radio Free Asia, 9 August 17.
\95\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Nine Detained in `Li
Xiaoling June Fourth Walk To Shine a Light Case,' All Released on Bail
Today'' [``Li xiaoling liusi guangming xing an'' bei bu jiu ren jinri
quanbu qubao], 5 July 17.
\96\ Amnesty International, ``Urgent Action Update: Activists
Arrested for Tiananmen Commemoration (China: UA 148.17),'' 28 July 17.
\97\ ``Ding Yajun Tried on Monday for Commemorating June Fourth,
Court To Announce Judgment on Another Day'' [Ding yajun she jinian
liusi zhou yi shenxun fating zeri xuanpan], Radio Free Asia, 31 July
17.
\98\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2017--China,'' last
visited 11 April 17.
\99\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, preamble; State Council
Information Office, ``White Paper on China's Political Party System,''
reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 15 November 07,
preface.
\100\ Li Zhuo, ``In Carrying On the Past and Moving Toward Future,
Develop Socialist Consultative Democracy (New Knowledge, New
Experience)'' [Zai jiwang kailai zhong fazhan shehui zhuyi xieshang
minzhu (xinzhi xinjue)], People's Daily, 31 March 17.
\101\ David Shambaugh, ``Let a Thousand Democracies Bloom,'' New
York Times, 6 July 07; ``Q&A: Roles and Functions of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference,'' Xinhua, 3 March 17; China
Digital Times, ``Q&A: Steven Balla on NGO Law & Public Consultation,''
4 May 16.
\102\ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, ``The Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC): Its Role and Its Future,'' Europe
China Research and Advice Network, Short Term Policy Brief 25, October
2011, 2.
\103\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``End-
of-Mission Statement on China, by Professor Philip Alston, United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,'' 23
August 16.
\104\ ``CPPCC `Whole-Heartedly' Upholds CPC Central Committee With
Xi as Core: Top Political Advisor,'' Xinhua, 13 March 17.
\105\ ``Two Sessions Watch: CPPCC Emphasizes Core Consciousness,
Stability Maintenance Intensified'' [Lianghui zhiji: zhengxie qiangdiao
hexin yishi weiwen jibie shenggao], Voice of America, 5 March 17; Ben
Blanchard and Philip Wen, ``Nothing To See but Comfort for Xi at
China's Annual Parliament,'' Reuters, 15 March 17; David Bandurski,
``Has Xi Jinping Gotten His Crown? '' University of Hong Kong,
Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 19 March 17.
\106\ Rights Defense Network, ``Election Monitor Office: Citizens
Participate in Elections Amidst High Pressure From Stability
Maintenance--2016 Citizen Election Participation Summary'' [Xuanju
guancha gongzuoshi: gongmin canxuan zai weiwen gaoya zhong qianxing--
2016 gongmin canxuan zongshu], 24 January 17; Javier C. Hernandez, ``
`We Have a Fake Election': China Disrupts Local Campaigns,'' New York
Times, 15 November 16; ``Four Held in China's Hunan Over Bid for
Independent Election Candidacy,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 September 16.
\107\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 48, art.
21. ``Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives . . .. The
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.''
\108\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25.
\109\ Rights Defense Network, ``Election Monitor Office: Citizens
Participate in Elections Amidst High Pressure From Stability
Maintenance--2016 Citizen Election Participation Summary'' [Xuanju
guancha gongzuoshi: gongmin canxuan zai weiwen gaoya zhong qianxing--
2016 gongmin canxuan zongshu], 24 January 17; Lyu Qiuping et al.,
``Xinhua Insight: China Pursues Its Own Style of Democracy in Local
Elections,'' Xinhua, 15 November 16; Teng Xiufu, ``Quick Discussion on
County- and Village-Level People's Congress Elections and Change of
Sessions'' [Qiantan xian xiang liang ji renda daibiao huan jie xuanju
zhi tongbu], China Law Information, 21 July 16.
\110\ Rights Defense Network, ``Election Monitor Office: Citizens
Participate in Elections Amidst High Pressure From Stability
Maintenance--2016 Citizen Election Participation Summary'' [Xuanju
guancha gongzuoshi: gongmin canxuan zai weiwen gaoya zhong qianxing--
2016 gongmin canxuan zongshu], 24 January 17.
\111\ ``Four Held in China's Hunan Over Bid for Independent
Election Candidacy,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 September 16; Rights Defense
Network, ``Guan Guilin, Independent Candidate for Qidong County
People's Congress in Hengyang, Hunan, Administratively Detained and
Then Criminally Detained'' [Hunan hengyang qidong xian renda daibiao
duli canxuan ren guan guilin bei xingzheng juliu hou you zao xingshi
juliu], 14 October 16. For more information on Guan Guilin, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00384.
\112\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guan Guilin, Independent Candidate
for Qidong County People's Congress in Hengyang, Hunan,
Administratively Detained and Then Criminally Detained'' [Hunan
hengyang qidong xian renda daibiao duli canxuan ren guan guilin bei
xingzheng juliu hou you zao xingshi juliu], 14 October 16; Zhu Li,
``Citizen Candidate for People's Congress Criminally Detained,
Communist Party Accused of Disregarding the Law'' [Gongmin canxuan
renda daibiao zao xingju zhonggong bei zhi bujiang falu], Vision Times,
18 October 16.
\113\ Rights Defense Network, ``Rights Defense Network: Monthly
Report on Detainees Without Sentences and Forcibly Disappeared
Individuals in Mainland China (October 31, 2016) Issue 13 (Total of 201
People)'' [Weiquan wang: zhongguo dalu jiya wei pan ji qiangpo shizong
renyuan yuedu baogao (2016 nian 10 yue 31 ri) di shishan qi (gong 201
ren)], 31 October 16, sec. 1(3).
\114\ Rights Defense Network, ``China Election Monitor (2016) 37:
Wuhan Municipality Public Security Bureau Dongxihu District Branch
Suspected of Illegally Detaining Three Independent Candidates (1)''
[Zhongguo xuanju guancha (2016) zhi sanshiqi: wuhan shi gong'anju
dongxihu qu fenju shexian feifa juliu san wei duli houxuanren (yi)], 1
January 17; Rights Defense Network, ``China Election Monitor (2016) 39:
Wuhan Municipality Public Security Department Dongxihu District Bureau
Suspected of Illegally Detaining Three Independent Candidates (3)''
[Zhongguo xuanju guancha (2016) zhi sanshijiu: wuhan shi gong'an ju
dongxihu qu fenju shexian feifa juliu sanwei duli houxuan ren (san)],
12 January 17. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2017-00184 on Gao Hongwei, 2017-00197 on Zeng
Shouyun, and 2017-00198 on Jia Fuquan.
\115\ Rights Defense Network, ``China Election Monitor (2016) 37:
Wuhan Municipality Public Security Bureau Dongxihu District Branch
Suspected of Illegally Detaining Three Independent Candidates (1)''
[Zhongguo xuanju guancha (2016) zhi sanshiqi: wuhan shi gong'anju
dongxihu qu fenju shexian feifa juliu san wei duli houxuanren (yi)], 1
January 17.
\116\ ``Beijing Independent Candidate Complained at People's
Congress but No One Helped Him, Five People Assisting Campaign in
Shanghai Administratively Detained for `Disrupting Elections' ''
[Beijing duli houxuanren renda tousu wuren jiedai shanghai 5 ren
zhuxuan bei yi ``pohuai xuanju zui'' xingju], Radio Free Asia, 15
November 16; ``Shanghai Rights Defender Feng Zhenghu Runs for People's
Congress, Citizens Assisting Campaign Taken Away by Police'' [Shanghai
weiquan renshi feng zhenghu canxuan renda daibiao zhuxuan minzhong zao
jingfang daizou], Radio Free Asia, 14 November 16; Rights Defense
Network, ``Five Shanghai Supporters of Feng Zhenghu, Xu Peiling, Zheng
Peipei, Cui Fufang, Fan Guijuan, and Dai Zhongyao, Are Released and
Welcomed by Many Citizens'' [Shanghai feng zhenghu 5 min bei juliu de
zhuxuan zheyuanzhe xu peiling, zheng peipei, cui fufang, fan guijuan,
dai zhongyao zhong gongmin yingjie], 22 November 16.
\117\ China Digital Times, ``A Violent End to Wukan's Democratic
Experiment,'' 21 September 16; ``Chinese Riot Police Crush Wukan's
Democracy Experiment, Ending Headache for Xi,'' Reuters, 14 September
16.
\118\ ``China's Wukan Village Elects Protest Leaders To Run
Council,'' Bloomberg, 4 March 12; ``China's Wukan Continues To Elect
Village Leaders,'' Xinhua, 4 March 12; James Pomfret, ``China
`Democracy' Village Chief Arrested for Graft, Riot Police Deployed,''
Reuters, 18 June 16.
\119\ Luigi Tomba, ``What Does Wukan Have To Do With Democracy? ''
Chinoiresie, 2 February 17.
\120\ James Pomfret and Benjamin Kang Lim, ``Exclusive: Provincial
Party Boss Ordered Crackdown on China's `Democracy Village' With Eye on
National Power,'' Reuters, 23 September 16. See also Zhuang Liehong,
``Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World About the
Suppression of Wukan,'' China Change, 23 November 16.
\121\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``Wukan, a Chinese Village, Erupts in
Unrest Over Activists' Arrests,'' New York Times, 13 September 16;
``Wukan Erupted Again With Severe Conflict, Several Dozen People
Injured by Tear Gas and Rubber Bullets'' [Wukan zaibao yanzhong chongtu
shushi ren bei cuileidan, xiangjiao zidan suo shang], Radio Free Asia,
13 September 16; James Pomfret, ``Chinese Villagers Describe Police
Beatings in `Wild Crackdown' on Protest,'' Reuters, 14 September 16;
Zhuang Liehong, ``Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World
About the Suppression of Wukan,'' China Change, 23 November 16.
\122\ ``Wukan China Unrest: `A Village Under Siege' '' [Video
file], BBC, 14 September 16, 2 min. 28 sec.; ``Reporters Detained,
Beaten by Chinese Police in Rebel Village of Wukan,'' Radio Free Asia,
15 September 16; Zheping Huang, ``Chinese Authorities Are Offering a
$3,000 Bounty to Wukan Villagers Who Turn in Foreign Journalists,''
Quartz, 15 September 16.
\123\ `` `Short Video' Wukan Villagers Continue Protests for 85
Days To Support Lin Zulian, Public Security Detained 13 People in
Middle of Night'' [``Duanpian'' wukan cunmin chixu youxing 85 ri ting
lin zulian gong'an banye rucun ju 13 ren], Ming Pao, 12 September 16.
\124\ Lufeng City Public Security Bureau (Ping'an lufeng), ``Wukan
Villagers Cai Jialin, Zhang Xiangkeng, Yang Jinzhen, and Other Criminal
Suspects Detained'' [Wukan cunmin cai jialin zhang xiangkeng yang
jinzhen deng ren shexian fanzui bei ji'na gui'an], Weibo post, 13
September 16, 6:03 a.m.; Zhan Yijia and Ye Qian, ``13 Villagers in
Wukan, Guangdong Suspected of Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Public Order
Detained by Public Security Bureau'' [Guangdong wukan 13 min cunmin yin
shexian juzhong raoluan gonggong zhixu deng bei gong'an jiguan ji'na],
Xinhua, 13 September 16; `` `Short Video' Wukan Villagers Continue
Protests for 85 Days To Support Lin Zulian, Public Security Detained 13
People in Middle of Night'' [``Duanpian'' wukan cunmin chixu youxing 85
ri ting lin zulian gong'an banye rucun ju 13 ren], Ming Pao, 12
September 16.
\125\ Zheping Huang, ``Chinese Citizens Are Being Arrested for
Sharing News About the Wukan Village Rebellion Online,'' Quartz, 16
September 16.
\126\ Shui Mei, ``Foreign Media Fails To Trick Wukan Villagers on
Rumor,'' Global Times, 15 September 16; Shan Renping, ``Western Media
Uses Wukan Vigil as Public Opinion Warfare To Stoke Unrest,'' Global
Times, 20 September 16.
\127\ David Bandurski, ``In Wukan, a Clean Sweep,'' University of
Hong Kong, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, China Media Project, 22
September 16.
\128\ Haifeng County People's Court, ``Haifeng County People's
Court Publicly Announces First Instance Judgment in Case Against Nine
People Including Wei Yonghan and Zhang Bingchai, for Gathering a Crowd
To Disturb Social Order, Illegal Assembly, Procession, or
Demonstration, Gathering a Crowd To Disrupt Traffic, Obstructing
Official Business, and Intentionally Disseminating False Information,
Haifeng First Instance Judgment Announced'' [Haifeng xian renmin fayuan
yishen gongkai xuanpan wei yonghan, zhang bingchai deng 9 ren juzhong
raoluan shehui zhixu, feifa jihui, youxing, shiwei, juzhong raoluan
jiaotong zhixu, fanghai gongwu, guyi chuanbo xujia xinxi an haifeng
yishen xuanpan], 26 December 16; Zhuang Liehong, ``How Nine Wukan
Villagers Were Illegally Tried and Sentenced in December, 2016,'' China
Change, 5 January 17.
\129\ Ibid. See also ``Corruption and Weak Property Protections
Fuel Protests in Rural China: The Case of Wukan Village,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 May 17.
\130\ For more information on Wei Yonghan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00104.
\131\ For more information on Hong Yongzhong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00100.
\132\ For more information on Yang Jinzhen, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00107.
\133\ For more information on Wu Fang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00101.
\134\ For more information on Cai Jialin, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00102.
\135\ For more information on Zhuang Songkun, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00463.
\136\ For more information on Li Chulu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00103.
\137\ For more information on Chen Suzhuan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00105.
\138\ For more information on Zhang Bingchai, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00106.
\139\ ``Wukan Activist's Mother Interrogated, Intimidated After
Incognito Visit,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17.
\140\ ``Guangdong Wukan Rights Defense Leader Zhuang Liehong and
His Wife and Child's Household Registration Canceled'' [Guangdong wukan
weiquan lingxiu zhuang liehong yi jia san kou huji bei zhuxiao], Radio
Free Asia, 12 August 17.
\141\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Circular on
Soliciting Comments on the ``PRC Open Government Information
Regulations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments)'' [``Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu
yijian gao)'' zhengqiu yijian de tongzhi], 6 June 17; State Council
Legislative Affairs Office, Open Government Information Regulations
(Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)],
reprinted in Renmin University of China Law School, Research Centre for
Constitutional and Administrative Law, Calaw.cn Net, 7 June 17.
\142\ Ibid.; Ibid., arts. 14-17.
\143\ Ibid.; Ibid., art. 14(3).
\144\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Open Government
Information Regulations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], reprinted in Renmin University of China Law
School, Research Centre for Constitutional and Administrative Law,
Calaw.cn Net, 7 June 17, arts. 7-8, 19-21, 22-24. See also ``Open
Government Information Regulations: Current Reform Draft Comparison,''
China Law Translate (blog), 7 June 17.
\145\ Jamie P. Horsley, ``Will Engaging China Promote Good
Governance? '' Brookings Institution, John L. Thornton China Center,
Strategy Paper 2, January 2017, 5-6.
\146\ Li Yukun, ``Political Commentary: What's the Level of
Openness for Government Affairs Among County-Level Governments? CASS
Released Report Finding 70 Percent Scored Under 60 Points'' [Zhengjie:
xianji zhengfu zhengwu gongkai shuiping ruhe? zhongguo sheke yuan fabu
baogao cheng qi cheng budao 60 fen], Beijing News, 20 March 17.
\147\ Ibid.
\148\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Rights Defense
Petitioner From Rushan City, Weihai, Shandong, Li Hongsheng, Sentenced
to 3 Years and 9 Months at Second-Instance Trial'' [Shandong weihai
rushan shi weiquan fangmin li hongsheng ershen bei pan 3 nian 9 ge yu],
9 November 16; ``14 Beijing Petitioners Sue District Government, Court
Uses Approach of Having `Chats' To Avoid Going to Trial'' [Beijing
shisi fangmin qisu qu zhengfu fayuan yi ``tanhua'' fangshi weigui
kaiting], Aboluo Net, 14 June 17.
\149\ See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Shenzhen
Crackdown: Shenzhen Municipal Public Security Bureau Classifies Li
Jianpeng Case as Endangering State Security, Refuses To Permit Meeting
With Lawyer [Because Meeting] May Obstruct Investigation or Leak State
Secrets'' [Shenzhen da zhuabu, shenzhen shi gong'an ju yi li jiangpeng
anjian shu weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian huijian you'ai zhencha
huozhe keneng xielou guojia mimi jujue lushi huijian], 27 May 17.
\150\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Gangzha Government
Refuses To Provide Open Government Information on Black Jails, Zhang
Hua of Nantong Will Apply for Administrative Reconsideration'' [Gangzha
zhengfu bu gongkai hei jianyu xinxi, nantong zhang hua jiang shenqing
xingzheng fuyi], 18 May 17.
Commercial Rule
of Law
Commercial Rule
of Law
Commercial Rule of Law
Introduction
December 11, 2016, marked 15 years since China acceded to
the World Trade Organization (WTO).\1\ The Chinese government
and Communist Party are bound by commitments detailed in the
WTO agreements and China's accession documents.\2\ The
Commission found during its 2017 reporting year that the
government and Party continued to fail to comply with key WTO
commitments, including to ensure equal treatment for foreign
enterprises; \3\ to practice a market economy; \4\ and to
enforce the rule of law with impartiality, transparency, and
uniformity.\5\ Instead, the Chinese government continued to
promote preferential treatment for domestic industry,\6\ compel
technology transfer,\7\ and provide significant financial and
political support to outbound investment,\8\ creating an uneven
playing field and altering market prices both domestically and
globally.\9\ Additionally, Chinese officials continued to
enforce commercial regulations inconsistently, arbitrarily, and
non-transparently, making it difficult for foreign enterprises
to compete or enjoy open access in the Chinese market.\10\
Chinese authorities have promoted economic reform in policy
documents and official speeches,\11\ yet actual progress toward
reform reportedly remains limited.\12\ The Chinese government's
implementation of its WTO commitments is a measure of the
overall development of rule of law in China and of the Chinese
government's willingness to comply with its international
commitments.\13\
Evaluation of China's Commitment to Equal Treatment
When it joined the WTO, China committed to ensure non-
discrimination against foreign enterprises with respect to the
procurement of goods, services, and enforcement of intellectual
property rights.\14\ Despite official rhetoric claiming
openness,\15\ Chinese officials continued to promote
discriminatory policies that reportedly perpetuated an uneven
playing field for foreign enterprises.\16\ Moreover, many
reports note that private enterprises have opaque ties to the
government and Party, giving these companies an unfair
advantage in Chinese markets and in courts.\17\ Summarizing the
current adverse climate for foreign businesses competing in
China, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
reported in March 2017 that ``China continued to pursue a wide
array of industrial policies in 2016 that seek to limit market
access for imported goods, foreign manufacturers and foreign
service suppliers, while offering substantial government
guidance, resources and regulatory support to Chinese
industries.'' \18\ While President and Party General Secretary
Xi Jinping stated in January 2017 that ``China will keep its
door wide open and not close it,'' \19\ the American Chamber of
Commerce in China (AmCham) reported in a January 2017 survey
that 81 percent of foreign companies felt ``less welcome in
China than before'' in 2016, an increase from 77 percent the
previous year.\20\
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
continued to promote industrial policies that reportedly
disadvantage foreign enterprises and distort global
markets.\21\ For example, authorities continued to implement
``Made in China 2025,'' a plan released by the State Council in
May 2015,\22\ which is reportedly a US$300 billion plan with
the goal of becoming self-sufficient in 40 percent of core
components and key basic materials by 2020, and 70 percent by
2025.\23\ Chinese authorities' de facto technology transfer
requirements for foreign companies that want to be involved in
``Made in China 2025'' and the Chinese government's promotion
of indigenous innovation raise national treatment and other
concerns, according to recent reports by representatives of the
U.S. and European business communities.\24\
INTERNET CENSORSHIP
The Chinese government's strict control over the Internet
continued to serve as an indirect form of preferential
treatment for domestic enterprises, as consumers' access to
global websites remained obstructed. In March 2017, USTR
identified Internet censorship in China as a barrier to trade
for a second year, noting that Chinese authorities blocked ``11
of the top 25 global sites'' and highlighting U.S. industry
research that found that ``up to 3,000 sites in total are
blocked.'' \25\ The March 2017 USTR report also stressed that
even external sites that are not blocked must pass through the
filters of China's ``Great Firewall,'' in some cases slowing
sites down so much as to ``significantly degrade the quality of
the service, in some cases to a commercially unacceptable
level, thereby inhibiting or precluding the cross-border supply
of certain services.'' \26\ In October 2016, a U.S. computer
industry association reported that the blocking of U.S.
services in China, including Google, Facebook, Twitter,
Dropbox, and LinkedIn, had resulted in the loss of billions of
dollars in revenue for U.S. companies, while China-based
Internet firms had an ``unfair commercial advantage'' as they
were not blocked in China or the United States.\27\ AmCham's
2017 China Business Climate Survey Report, published in January
2017, found that 87 percent of surveyed companies reported that
Internet censorship negatively affected their ``company's
competitiveness and operations in China,'' \28\ and a July 2017
report by AmCham Shanghai found that for small- and medium-
sized member companies surveyed, ``improved [I]nternet access''
was their main reform priority.\29\ Moreover, the Chinese
government's arbitrary and non-transparent blocking of websites
may violate its WTO commitment to follow the rule of law,
according to a computer industry association.\30\ In January
2017, USTR reported that it had continued outreach to the
Chinese government to discuss its ``arbitrary blocking of
commercial websites.'' \31\ In July 2017, the Chinese
government reportedly requested that Apple and a Chinese
partner of Amazon take actions to limit Internet users in China
from downloading or using virtual private networks (VPNs) to
access websites censored by Chinese authorities.\32\
AmCham,\33\ the European Chamber of Commerce in China,\34\ and
a representative of the Hong Kong Information Technology
Federation,\35\ expressed concerns that the restrictions on
VPNs will negatively affect business users.
CYBERSECURITY
The Chinese government took regulatory steps this past year
to strengthen cybersecurity, but foreign business leaders
warned that some of these steps could disadvantage foreign
firms. In November 2016, the National People's Congress passed
the PRC Cybersecurity Law, which took effect on June 1,
2017.\36\ In April 2017, the Cyberspace Administration of China
(CAC) released draft implementing measures for the data
localization requirements of the PRC Cybersecurity Law,\37\
mandating that Chinese authorities conduct a security review of
certain types of data before companies can transmit the data
out of China.\38\ AmCham raised concerns that these new
measures on data localization would ``discourage foreign
investment by unnecessarily imposing prohibitively complex or
expensive requirements'' in order to store their data in
China.\39\ In May 2017, 54 business groups sent a letter to the
CAC expressing concerns regarding provisions in the draft
measures, writing that the draft measures suggest ``China is
continuing to move away from its bilateral commitments,
international obligations, and global norms.'' \40\ The CAC
subsequently informed business groups that enforcement of
certain implementing measures of the PRC Cybersecurity Law
would be postponed until December 31, 2018.\41\
FOREIGN INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
The Chinese government continued to limit foreign
investment in China, and although the government took
regulatory steps to reduce investment restrictions this past
year, the impact of these changes remained unclear. A May 2017
report by a research firm and non-profit organization found
that the Chinese government's restrictions on foreign
investment reportedly contributed to an imbalance of
acquisitions, with acquisitions by U.S. companies in China at
their lowest level since 2009.\42\ In January 2017, the State
Council released the Circular Regarding Several Measures on
Expanding Further Openness and Active Utilization of Foreign
Investment, with the stated aim of increasing foreign
investment in China.\43\ In June 2017, the National Development
and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce jointly
released a revised Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance
Catalogue (2017 Catalogue).\44\ The 2017 Catalogue reduced the
number of categories for which foreign investment is limited
from 93 to 63; \45\ however, foreign investment in media-
related entities continues to be ``prohibited.'' \46\ In July
2017, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China issued a
press release that criticized ``[t]he continued use of such a
discriminatory catalogue'' that maintained the ``fundamental
distinction'' between ``domestically-invested and foreign-
invested enterprises with respect to market entry and approval
requirements.'' \47\
During this reporting year, AmCham identified negotiation
of a U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty as a priority for
alleviating restrictions on foreign investment.\48\
International experts have noted that human rights concerns are
becoming increasingly important in the drafting and enforcement
of bilateral investment treaties.\49\
Evaluation of China's Commitment To Practice a Market Economy
While the Chinese government committed under WTO agreements
to generally ``allow prices for traded goods and services in
every sector to be determined by market forces,'' \50\ it
continues to distort domestic and global prices with its
practice of providing what the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) describes as ``substantial subsidies'' to
domestic industries,\51\ and with its non-commercial operation
of state-owned enterprises.\52\
CHINESE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
Chinese authorities continued to provide substantial
subsidies to domestic industries including steel and aluminum,
resulting in overcapacity in China and distorted global
markets.\53\ According to USTR, for example, despite declining
demand and no comparative advantages in energy and raw material
inputs for steel making, China's steel capacity continued to
grow.\54\ Some international experts point to government
subsidies as a key cause of overcapacity in the steel and
aluminum sectors.\55\ This overcapacity has led to excess
global supply, distorting global market prices.\56\ The Chinese
government has previously claimed it would allow ``market
forces to play a central role'' in allocating resources and
reducing overcapacity,\57\ yet output in many areas has
reportedly continued to increase.\58\ A report commissioned by
an international environmental advocacy group found that
China's steel capacity increased as many of the steel factories
the Chinese government claimed it shut down as part of efforts
to reduce overcapacity had already been closed or were already
idle.\59\
This past year, the U.S. Government filed WTO disputes
against the Chinese government regarding its use of subsidies
to boost domestic production. In September 2016, the U.S.
Government filed a dispute over Chinese subsidies for wheat,
rice, and corn producers.\60\ In January 2017, the U.S.
Government filed a WTO dispute regarding Chinese subsidies to
the aluminum sector.\61\ In April 2017, the U.S. Government
requested that the Chinese government notify the WTO about 80
government measures that provided subsidies to Chinese
companies.\62\ The U.S. Government's 584-page request included
translations of each of the measures,\63\ as the Chinese
government had failed to provide translations themselves,
despite committing to provide translations of all its trade
laws, regulations, and other measures.\64\ The request noted
that these subsidies were part of a program that appeared to be
a ``successor'' to China's Famous Brands Program, which the
U.S. Government successfully challenged in a WTO dispute filed
in 2008.\65\ In addition to not providing translations, the
Chinese government has not fully complied with its WTO
obligations to publish all trade-related laws, regulations, and
other measures, making WTO disputes more challenging.\66\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-Owned Enterprises and the Communist Party
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to play a key role in the
Chinese economy.\67\ According to 2016 statistics, the National Bureau
of Statistics of China reported that there were 133,631 SOEs \68\ and
291,263 state-holding companies operating in China.\69\ Observers note
that SOEs tend to be less productive than private companies,\70\ yet
Chinese government statistics showed that the number of industrial
sector state-holding companies increased yearly from 2011 to 2015.\71\
According to an April 2017 International Monetary Fund (IMF)
publication, SOEs accounted for over 50 percent of bank credit in China
and around 60 percent of corporate debt in China.\72\ The provision of
loans from state-owned banks to SOEs on a non-commercial basis serves
as a major form of government subsidy in China,\73\ and according to
the IMF distorts the ``allocation of resources'' and promotes
``inefficiency.'' \74\
The Chinese Communist Party played an increasingly important role in
SOEs \75\ and reportedly increased its influence over other types of
corporate entities in China as well.\76\ While Chinese officials
maintain that SOEs are ``entitled to make independent business
operation decisions,'' \77\ in October 2016, President and Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed Party leadership is the ``root''
and ``soul'' of SOEs.\78\ In June 2017, the director of the State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
reported that SOEs employed over 40 million workers, more than 10
million of whom were Party members.\79\ Experts note that the Party
asserts a leadership role in corporate decisionmaking for SOEs.\80\
According to an August 2017 Wall Street Journal analysis, since 2016,
at least 32 Hong Kong-listed SOEs have proposed amendments to their
articles of association to explicitly give Party committees the
authority to advise corporate boards; \81\ these companies have a
combined market capitalization of approximately $1.2 trillion USD,
totaling nearly one-third of the total value of stocks listed in Hong
Kong.\82\ Private companies are also subject to Party control and
influence,\83\ with 1.6 million non-public companies having internal
Party groups, according to Party Central Committee statistics.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evaluation of China's Commitment to Rule of Law
Despite the Chinese government's WTO commitments to ``apply
and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner
all its laws, regulations and other measures,'' \85\ Chinese
officials continued to enforce laws and regulations, including
in the commercial sphere, in an arbitrary and non-transparent
manner.\86\ The American Chamber of Commerce in China's
(AmCham) 2017 American Business in China White Paper found that
``inconsistent regulatory interpretation and unclear laws
[were] the top business challenge . . . for the second year in
a row.'' \87\
WEAK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AND LIMITED REFORMS
This past year, the Chinese government continued to provide
ineffective protection for intellectual property rights. For
example, in April 2017, the USTR again placed China on its
priority watch list in its 2017 Special 301 Report, due to
concerns including ``widespread infringing activity'' as well
as problematic ``[s]tructural impediments to civil and criminal
enforcement.'' \88\ In 2016, 88 percent of counterfeit imports
seized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reportedly
were from China (52 percent) and Hong Kong (36 percent).\89\ In
December 2016, the USTR re-listed Taobao, a subsidiary of the
Alibaba Group and the largest online shopping website in China
by merchandise volume, as a ``notorious market'' due to ``the
large volume of allegedly counterfeit and pirated goods
available and the challenges rights holders experience in
removing and preventing illicit sales.'' \90\ In December 2016,
the National People's Congress issued a draft PRC E-Commerce
Law for public comment that, according to AmCham, may make it
more difficult for trademark owners to obtain the removal of
online listings for goods with infringing trademarks on e-
commerce platforms.\91\
During this reporting year, the Chinese government also
took actions that, according to some legal experts, could
strengthen intellectual property protection. In December 2016,
the China Trademark Office revised the Trademark Review and
Examination Standards,\92\ and in January 2017, the Supreme
People's Court (SPC) issued provisions on administrative
trademark litigation.\93\ Some legal experts noted that the
revised standards and SPC provisions could provide greater
protection in China against bad faith trademark filings.\94\
The SPC, in a case decided in December 2016 prior to its
issuance of the provisions, ruled partially in Michael Jordan's
favor in a series of administrative trademark disputes over a
Chinese company's use of the American basketball star's name in
China.\95\
DUE PROCESS CONCERNS FOR BUSINESSPEOPLE
Despite official reports of progress in judicial
transparency,\96\ certain cases involving Chinese and foreign
businesspeople detained or investigated this past year
highlighted ongoing transparency and due process concerns. The
Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of State's
country information for China notes that ``[t]he Chinese legal
system can be opaque and the interpretation and enforcement of
local laws arbitrary. The judiciary does not enjoy independence
from political influence.'' \97\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arbitrary Detention of Sandy Phan-Gillis
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 25, 2017, the Nanning Intermediate People's Court in Nanning
municipality, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, reportedly sentenced
American businessperson Sandy Phan-Gillis to three years and six
months' imprisonment on the charge of espionage in a closed trial.\98\
On April 29, Chinese authorities deported Phan-Gillis to the United
States.\99\ In March 2015, Chinese state security agents had detained
Phan-Gillis as she traveled from Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong
province, to Macau.\100\ In June 2016, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention found that Chinese authorities had arbitrarily
detained Phan-Gillis.\101\ At a Commission hearing, Jeff Gillis, Phan-
Gillis's husband, asserted that Chinese authorities tortured his wife
and denied her ``many of the rights she is entitled to under Chinese
and international law.'' \102\ Gillis noted that ``Sandy was not
allowed to speak with her lawyer for well over a year. She was not
charged with a crime for well over a year. For about the first year and
a half, her monthly 30-minute visits with the U.S. Consul were
supervised by agents of China State Security, the very people who
tortured her.'' \103\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cases of three prominent executives of Chinese firms,
Xiao Jianhua, Guo Wengui, and Wu Xiaohui, highlighted the risk
that businesspeople face when suspected of corruption or when
dealing closely with corrupt officials.\104\ In January 2017,
unidentified security personnel reportedly abducted Xiao, a
Canadian citizen, from a hotel in Hong Kong and detained him at
an unknown location believed to be in mainland China.\105\ In
April 2017, after Guo alleged corruption involving family
members of Chinese government officials,\106\ Interpol
reportedly issued a ``red notice'' at the request of the
Chinese government seeking Guo's provisional arrest and
extradition.\107\ In June 2017, Chinese authorities reportedly
detained Wu Xiaohui, the chairman of Anbang Insurance, on
undisclosed grounds.\108\ The Hong Kong-based newspaper South
China Morning Post described ``Wu's Anbang'' as ``one of the
most powerful and well-connected players on the domestic and
overseas capital markets.'' \109\ In 2014, Anbang purchased the
Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York for US$1.95 billion.\110\
[For more information on the Party and government's
anticorruption efforts, see Section III--Institutions of
Democratic Governance.]
FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS
Although in previous years the Chinese government
intervened to devalue the yuan and thereby unfairly promote
Chinese exports, recent government interventions had the goal
of preventing a rapid depreciation of the yuan, according to an
April 2017 report by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.\111\
The report notes that the Chinese government needs to
demonstrate that its lack of intervention to devalue the yuan
``over the last three years represents a durable policy shift .
. ..'' \112\ The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the
American Chamber of Commerce in China expressed continuing
concerns regarding transparency of foreign exchange
interventions and capital control regulations.\113\
UNEVEN ENFORCEMENT OF FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS
Chinese officials continued to emphasize the importance of
food safety this past year, as several food safety concerns
came to light and exposed ongoing regulatory challenges. In
March 2017, Premier Li Keqiang described the effort to
strengthen food safety regulation as requiring ``the utmost
rigor.'' \114\ According to analysis published by the Paulson
Institute in April 2017, however, ``microbiological hazards
remain unchecked, supply chain management is weak, and policies
are uncoordinated across disparate levels of the government.''
\115\ According to the China Food and Drug Administration, in
2016, authorities punished violators of food safety regulations
in 181,000 cases.\116\ Chinese and international media reported
on a number of food safety scandals in China, including those
affecting soy sauce \117\ and milk powder.\118\ In describing a
scandal in Tianjin municipality involving counterfeit soy sauce
made with industrial salt and unsafe tap water that was ``unfit
for human consumption,'' a Renmin University professor said
``the fact that these small food processors were able to churn
out fake products worth hundreds of million [sic] of yuan
undetected for years shows what little local authorities have
done to weed out the problem of poor-quality food'' and that it
``underscores how weak law enforcement is in fighting food
safety violations.'' \119\ In October 2016, new food safety
measures took effect, requiring online platforms to establish a
system for examining vendor credentials and product
quality.\120\ According to an American law firm's analysis, the
new measures may make it easier for companies to determine the
source and stop the sale of counterfeit food products by
imposing liability and disclosure requirements on online
platforms.\121\
The American Chamber of Commerce in China noted that the
existence of ``complex compliance concerns'' due to the
``opaque nature of Party influence on government and weak
regulatory transparency'' \122\ and ``inconsistency in [the
government's] interpretation of policies, laws, and
regulations, and in standards for law enforcement'' created
difficulties for food companies operating in China.\123\ For
example, in October 2016, the Jiading District Market
Supervision and Management Bureau in Shanghai municipality
reportedly revoked the food production license and issued an
additional 24 million yuan (US$3.55 million) in fines to
Shanghai Husi and its U.S. parent company, OSI Group, for a
July 2014 food safety incident.\124\ In 2016, OSI Group had
criticized the judgment in the related criminal case as
``inconsistent with the facts and evidence,'' claiming
authorities had recognized that the case was ``never'' about
food safety, but was influenced by accusations made in
misleading media reports.\125\
The U.S. and Chinese governments' trade negotiations during
this reporting year included a focus on food safety in the beef
and poultry trade.\126\ In June 2017, the Chinese government
permitted the import of American beef into China for the first
time since 2003, when imports were stopped due to concerns over
mad cow disease in the United States.\127\ In June 2017, the
Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) published a proposed rule to permit the
import of ``poultry products from birds slaughtered in
[China]'' based on a determination that China's ``poultry
slaughter inspection system is equivalent'' to that in the
United States.\128\ A U.S. non-profit organization recommended
that USDA withdraw the proposed rule because ``China's food
safety system is simply too weak to ensure that poultry exports
are safe to eat.'' \129\
Outbound Investment and Regional Trade Partnerships
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
continued to provide significant financial incentives to
promote outbound investment, raising concerns that the Chinese
government's lack of transparency in commercial dealings and
its preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
may have an even greater impact on foreign markets than it has
to date. In May 2017, a total of 29 foreign heads of state or
government \130\ and representatives from over 130 countries
\131\ gathered in Beijing municipality at the first global
forum on the Chinese government's Belt and Road (B&R)
Initiative.\132\ The initiative consists of a ``belt'' on land
from China to Europe, as well as a ``road'' of shipping routes
from China through Southeast Asia to India and Europe, and the
Chinese government envisions global ``participation.'' \133\
Several European Union member countries raised concerns about
transparency shortcomings and a lack of social and
environmental safeguards \134\ in the joint communique issued
after the forum.\135\ SOEs have played a leading role in B&R
infrastructure projects; \136\ since the announcement of B&R in
2013, 47 central SOEs have participated in 1,676 B&R
infrastructure projects.\137\ For example, the SOE China
Communications Construction announced US$12.6 billion in new
projects in 2016, a reported 10 percent of total new B&R
projects announced.\138\ Two American researchers described the
B&R Initiative as ``a game-changing plan to bring about the
next stage of globalization,'' noting that Chinese authorities
plan for approximately US$1 trillion in concessionary loans for
infrastructure projects through state-owned policy banks.\139\
During this reporting year, the Chinese government played a
key role in multilateral financial institutions. For example,
the China-led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB)
played a significant role in international financing,
reportedly approving over US$1.7 billion in loans in 2016.\140\
The AIIB also co-financed projects with other multilateral
banks, including the World Bank \141\ and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB).\142\ A U.S. human rights organization noted that in
projects co-financed by the AIIB and the World Bank, ADB, or
other multilateral financial institutions, ``the social and
environmental standards or safeguard policies of those
institutions are likely to apply.'' \143\
Commercial Rule
of Law
Commercial Rule
of Law
Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law
\1\ China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
December 11, 2001. A list of members and their dates of membership is
available on the WTO website. World Trade Organization, ``Protocols of
Accession for New Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods
and Services,'' last visited 5 June 17.
\2\ Information on China's participation in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), including principal accession documents, schedules,
trade policy reviews, and dispute case documents, can be found on the
WTO website. China's commitments are detailed in these documents, as
well as in WTO agreements applicable to all members, including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. World Trade Organization, ``WTO Legal
Texts,'' last visited 5 June 17. See also U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), ``World Trade Organization: Analysis of
China's Commitments to Other Members,'' October 2002, 12-13. The GAO
analysis found that China had made 685 WTO commitments, including 77
transparency-related commitments, 57 commitments related to laws and
regulations, and 67 nondiscrimination-related commitments.
\3\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 3. See
also China's Compliance With WTO Commitments, Hearing of the U.S. Trade
Representative Office, 5 October 16, Written Testimony of the US-China
Business Council, Submitted on September 21, 2016, in Response to the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative's Request for Comments and
Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China's Compliance With WTO
Commitments, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 158 (16 August 16), 54646-
47.
\4\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 9(1). See
also Julia Ya Qin, ``The Challenge of Interpreting `WTO-Plus'
Provisions,'' Wayne State University Law School, Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, No. 09-18, 2 July 09, 4-5.
\5\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(A)2,
2(C)1, 2(D)1; U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``World Trade
Organization: Analysis of China's Commitments to Other Members,''
October 2002, 31.
\6\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 11-14; U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, ``Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local
Protections,'' 2017, 6-8; China's Compliance With WTO Commitments,
Hearing of the U.S. Trade Representative Office, 5 October 16, Written
Testimony of the US-China Business Council, Submitted on September 21,
2016, in Response to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative's
Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China's
Compliance With WTO Commitments, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 158 (16
August 16), 54646-47.
\7\ Wilbur Ross, ``American Genius Is Under Attack From China,''
Financial Times, 14 August 17; Nigel Cory, Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation, ``RE: Comments in Response to Executive Order
Regarding Trade Agreements Violations and Abuses.,'' 31 July 17, 10;
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ``Presidential
Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative,'' 14 August 17.
\8\ ``President Xi's Speech at Opening of the `Belt and Road'
International Cooperation Forum'' [Xi jinping zai ``yidai yilu'' guoji
hezuo gaofeng luntan kaimushi shang de yanjiang], Xinhua, 14 May 17;
``Full Text of President Xi's Speech at Opening of Belt and Road
Forum,'' Xinhua, 14 May 17. At the opening of the Belt and Road forum,
Xi pledged that China would contribute an additional 100 billion yuan
(US$14.5 billion) to the Silk Road Fund, as well as additional funding
by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. See
also Nadege Rolland, China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic
Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau
of Asian Research, 2017), 101-4; Tom Hancock, ``China Encircles the
World With One Belt, One Road Strategy,'' Financial Times, 3 May 17;
Li-Wen Lin, ``A Network Anatomy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,''
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, February 2017, 8; Greg Levesque, ``China's Evolving Economic
Statecraft,'' The Diplomat, 12 April 17.
\9\ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ``Made in China 2025: Global
Ambitions Built on Local Protections,'' 2017, 6-8, 11, 40; Robert D.
Atkinson et al., Information Technology & Innovation Foundation,
``Stopping China's Mercantilism: A Doctrine of Constructive, Alliance-
Backed Confrontation,'' 16 March 17, 1-3; Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, ``2016 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,''
January 2017, 36.
\10\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017, 4,
10, 12, 38, 46, 48, 82, 98. Based on a survey of American Chamber of
Commerce in China (AmCham) members, AmCham found that for the second
consecutive year ``inconsistent regulatory interpretation and unclear
laws'' was the top business challenge.
\11\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain
Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong
zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding], issued 12 November 13, sec. 1(2); State Council, Circular
Regarding Certain Measures on Expanding Further Openness and Active
Utilization of Foreign Investment [Guowuyuan guanyu kuoda duiwai
kaifang jiji liyong waizi ruogan cuoshi de tongzhi], issued 17 January
17; ``President Xi's Speech to Davos in Full,'' World Economic Forum,
17 January 17; ``President Xi Jinping's Keynote Speech at the Opening
of the Annual World Economic Forum in 2017'' [Xi jinping zhuxi zai
shijie jingji luntan 2017 nian nianhui kaimu shi shang de zhuzhi
yanjiang], Xinhua, 18 January 17; State Council, ``Report on the Work
of the Government,'' 16 March 17; State Council, ``Government Work
Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 16 March 17.
\12\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 2; American Chamber
of Commerce in China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,''
April 2017, 4; European Union Chamber of Commerce in China and Roland
Berger, ``European Business in China: Business Confidence Survey
2017,'' May 2017, 39.
\13\ See, e.g., The Broken Promises of China's WTO Accession:
Reprioritizing Human Rights, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 1 March 17, Written Statement Submitted by Michael
R. Wessel, President, The Wessel Group, Commissioner, U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission; Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, ``2016 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,''
January 2017, 4-5; World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body,
Trade Policy Review, China, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/342, 26
September 16, 33-34. See also WTO: Will China Keep Its Promises? Can
It? Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 6 June
02, Written Statement Submitted by Susan S. Westin, Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office, 3-4.
\14\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(A)(2),
3.
\15\ ``Li Keqiang Speech With Foreign Delegates at 2017 China
Annual Development Forum'' [Li keqiang huijian chuxi zhongguo fazhan
gaoceng luntan 2017 nian nianhui de jingwai daibiao bing zuotan],
Xinhua, 20 March 17; ``China's Door Opens Wider to Outside World:
Premier,'' Xinhua, 21 March 17; World Trade Organization, Trade Policy
Review Body, Trade Policy Review, China, Minutes of the Meeting,
Addendum, WT/TPR/M/342, 28 October 16, 208-9, 377; World Economic
Forum, ``President Xi's Speech to Davos in Full,'' 17 January 17; Ma
Si, ``Regulator Says Made in China 2025 Is Fair,'' China Daily, 13
March 17; ``China Internet Regulator Says Cyber Security Law Not a
Trade Barrier,'' Xinhua, 31 May 17.
\16\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,'' March 2017, 80, 86, 89-90;
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ``Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built
on Local Protections,'' 2017, 6-8; Robert D. Atkinson et al.,
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, ``Stopping China's
Mercantilism: A Doctrine of Constructive, Alliance-Backed
Confrontation,'' March 2017, 1-3.
\17\ Yi-Zheng Lian, ``China, the Party-Corporate Complex,'' New
York Times, 12 February 17; James McGregor, ``How Trump Can Win With
China,'' Foreign Policy, 3 February 17; Yuhua Wang, ``Relative Capture:
Quasi-Experimental Evidence From the Chinese Judiciary,'' Social
Science Research Network, 7 December 16, 21-23; Mark Wu, ``The `China,
Inc.' Challenge to Global Trade Governance,'' Harvard International Law
Journal, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring 2016), 283-84, 295. Wu described the
Chinese government's ``various mechanisms to advantage Chinese firms
over their foreign competitors'' and the ``close links between the
Chinese Party-state and Chinese enterprises, both state-owned and
private . . ..'' Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, ``Investment Climate Statements for 2017: China,''
last visited 17 July 17; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR), ``2016 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January
2017, 168. USTR reported that: ``Many U.S. companies in 2016 continued
to express serious concerns about the independence of China's
judiciary. In their experience and observation, Chinese judges continue
to be influenced by political, government or business pressures,
particularly outside of China's big cities.''
\18\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,'' March 2017, 80.
\19\ World Economic Forum, ``President Xi's Speech to Davos in
Full,'' 17 January 17.
\20\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China
and Bain & Company, ``China Business Climate Survey Report,'' January
2017, 30.
\21\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), ``2016 Report
to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 11-17.
Industrial policies of concern that USTR identified included secure and
controllable requirements for information and communications
technologies, indigenous innovation, export restraints, subsidies,
excess capacity, and value-added tax. See also Robert D. Atkinson et
al., Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, ``Stopping China's
Mercantilism: A Doctrine of Constructive, Alliance-Backed
Confrontation,'' March 2017, 4; European Union Chamber of Commerce in
China, ``China Manufacturing 2025: Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of
Market Forces,'' 7 March 17, 1.
\22\ State Council, ``Made in China 2025'' [Zhongguo zhizao 2025],
19 May 15.
\23\ Keith Bradsher and Paul Mozur, ``China's Plan To Build Its Own
High-Tech Industries Worries Western Businesses,'' New York Times, 7
March 17; State Council, ``Made in China 2025'' [Zhongguo zhizao 2025],
19 May 15, sec. 3(3). See also European Union Chamber of Commerce in
China, ``China Manufacturing 2025: Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of
Market Forces,'' 7 March 17, 9.
\24\ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ``Made in China 2025: Global
Ambitions Built on Local Protections,'' March 2017, 26, 34; European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``China Manufacturing 2025: Putting
Industrial Policy Ahead of Market Forces,'' March 2017, 1, 15-16, 39-
40.
\25\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,'' March 2017, 90; Internet
Association, ``National Trade Estimate Report Comments on Digital Trade
Barriers,'' October 2016, 32-33.
\26\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,'' March 2017, 90.
\27\ Internet Association, ``National Trade Estimate Report
Comments on Digital Trade Barriers,'' October 2016, 32-33.
\28\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China
and Bain & Company, ``2017 China Business Climate Survey Report,''
January 2017, 47.
\29\ American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, ``2017 China
Business Report,'' July 2017, 10.
\30\ Computer & Communication Industry Association, ``Comments of
Computer & Communications Industry Association Regarding Foreign Trade
Barriers to U.S. Exports for 2017 Reporting,'' 27 October 16, 2, 6. See
also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``United States Seeks
Detailed Information on China's Internet Restrictions, 19 October 11;
California First Amendment Coalition, ``CFAC Briefing Paper: China's
Internet Measures Violate Its WTO Obligations,'' 19 November 07, 1.
\31\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 158.
\32\ See, e.g., ``Apple Takes Down Apps Used by Chinese To Scale
`Great Firewall,' '' Radio Free Asia, 31 July 17; ``Amazon's China
Partner Bans Use of VPNs by Customers Amid Ongoing Crackdown,'' Radio
Free Asia, 2 August 17; ```This Time Appears Different': China's Web
Users Fear Losing Tools To Bypass Censorship,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 6 August 17; Paul Mozur, ``China's
Internet Censors Play a Tougher Game of Cat and Mouse,'' New York
Times, 3 August 17. See also UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David
Kaye, OL OTH 16/2017, 4 August 17. Special Rapporteur David Kaye wrote
a letter to Apple CEO Tim Cook that asked, inter alia, whether
``Chinese authorities issue[d] a request or demand, formal or informal,
to remove the subject APPs from the app store? ''; ``[w]hat legal
analysis led Apple to believe that it would be required by Chinese law
to remove the subject applications . . .''; whether ``Apple object[ed]
to or otherwise resist[ed] the application of Chinese law . . .''; and,
whether Apple took ``into account international instruments such as the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the Global
Network Initiative's Principles on Freedom of Expression . . ..''
\33\ `` `This Time Appears Different': China's Web Users Fear
Losing Tools To Bypass Censorship,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in
Hong Kong Free Press, 6 August 17.
\34\ Ibid.
\35\ ``Amazon's China Partner Bans Use of VPNs by Customers Amid
Ongoing Crackdown,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 August 17.
\36\ PRC Cybersecurity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo
anquan fa], passed 7 November 16, effective 1 June 17. See also Paul
Mozur, ``China's Internet Controls Will Get Stricter, to Dismay of
Foreign Business,'' New York Times, 7 November 16; Sophie Richardson,
``Beijing Adds Veneer of Legal Legitimacy on Censorship,'' Cipher
Brief, 11 December 16.
\37\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Measures for Security
Assessment of Outbound Transmission of Personal Information and
Important Data (Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Geren xinxi he
zhongyao shuju chujing anquan pinggu banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)] 11
April 17, art. 9. See also ``China Releases Draft Rules To Implement
Requirements on Outbound Data Transmission,'' Baker McKenzie, 19 April
17.
\38\ Eva Dou, ``China Moves To Further Tighten Regulation of
Digital Information,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 April 17; ``Chinese
Draft Cyber Law Requires Security Assessment for Companies Exporting
Data,'' Bloomberg, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 11 April 17.
\39\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017,
264.
\40\ Letter from ACT | The App Association et al. to Office of the
Leading Small Group for Cyberspace Affairs, Chinese Communist Party
Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, Cyberspace Administration
of China, reprinted in China Trade Extra, 15 May 17, 2.
\41\ Liu Zhen and Wendy Wu, ``China Gives Businesses 19 Months To
Comply With Controversial Cross-Border Cyber Data Rules,'' South China
Morning Post, 1 June 17; Sui-Lee Wee, ``China's New Cybersecurity Law
Leaves Foreign Firms Guessing,'' New York Times, 31 May 17. See also
Samm Sacks, ``China's Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What To Expect,''
Lawfare (blog), 1 June 17.
\42\ Thilo Hanemann et al., Rhodium Group and National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, ``Two-Way Street: 2017 Update, US-China Direct
Investment Trends,'' May 2017, 15, 36. See also Jennifer M. Harris,
``Chinese Investment in the United States: Time for New Rules? ''
Lawfare (blog), 11 April 17.
\43\ State Council, Circular Regarding Certain Measures on
Expanding Further Openness and Active Utilization of Foreign Investment
[Guowuyuan guanyu kuoda duiwai kaifang jiji liyong waizi ruogan cuoshi
de tongzhi], issued 17 January 17; United States Information Technology
Office, ``Foreign Investment Opportunities Expand in 2017,'' 22 January
17.
\44\ National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of
Commerce, Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (2017
Revision) [Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2017 nian xiuding)],
issued 28 June 17, effective 28 July 17.
\45\ Ibid.; Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress, ``China: Catalog
of Foreign Invesment Industries Updated,'' Library of Congress, Global
Legal Monitor, 7 August 17.
\46\ National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of
Commerce, Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (2017
Revision) [Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2017 nian xiuding)],
issued 28 June 17, effective 28 July 17, sec. 2, items 20-26; National
Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce, Foreign
Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (2015 Revision) [Waishang
touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2015 nian xiuding)], issued 10 March 15,
effective 10 April 15, sec. 11, items 25-31.
\47\ European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``Revised Foreign
Invesment Catalogue Falls Short of Expectations,'' 5 July 17. See also
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China and Roland Berger,
``European Business in China: Business Confidence Survey 2017,'' 31 May
17, 8, 39. The European Chamber of Commerce survey found that 40
percent of respondents anticipated that ``regulatory barriers'' would
increase over the next five years, while only 15 percent responded that
they thought regulatory barriers would decrease over the next five
years.
\48\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017, 8,
16. See also Ian Talley, ``U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin: China
Bilateral Investment Treaty `On Our Agenda,' '' Wall Street Journal, 6
June 17.
\49\ ``Five Trends To Watch in Business and Human Rights in 2017,''
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 6 March 17. See also Lorenzo Cotula,
International Institute for Environment and Development et al.,
``Rethinking Investment Treaties To Advance Human Rights,'' September
2016, 9; Patrick Dumberry and Gabrielle Dumas Aubin, ``How To
Incorporate Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties? ''
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty
News, 22 March 13.
\50\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 9.1.
\51\ See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016
Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 13.
\52\ ``Xi Stresses Unwavering Party Leadership of State-Owned
Enterprises at National State-Owned Enterprises Party-Building Work
Meeting'' [Xi jinping zai quanguo guoyou qiye dang de jianshe gongzuo
huiyi shang qiangdiao: jianchi dang dui guoqi de lingdao bu dongyao],
Xinhua, 11 October 16; Zhou Xin, ``Communist Party the Top Boss of
China's State Firms, Xi Jinping Asserts in Rare Meeting,'' South China
Morning Post, 13 October 16; W. Raphael Lam and Alfred Schipke,
International Monetary Fund, ``Getting China's `Trusted Sons' Back Into
Shape,'' 27 April 17; Keith Zhai, ``China Mulling Higher Pay for State-
Owned Company Executives, Source Says,'' Bloomberg, 9 May 17.
\53\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 13; Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, ``Obama Administration Files WTO Complaint
on China's Subsidies to Aluminum Producers, 12 January 17; Philip
Blenkinsop, ``EU Sets Steel Import Duties To Counter Chinese
Subsidies,'' Reuters, 9 June 17.
\54\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 13. See also Brian
Spegele and John W. Miller, ``China Continues To Prop Up Its Ailing
Factories, Adding to Global Glut,'' Wall Street Journal, 9 May 16;
Greenpeace, ``Despite Claims of Cuts, China Sees Steel Operating
Capacity Increase in 2016, Air Quality To Suffer,'' 13 February 17.
\55\ Simon Lester and Huan Zhu, Cato Institute, ``It's Time To
Negotiate a New Economic Relationship With China,'' 4 April 17; Michael
Komesaroff, Center for Strategic and International Studies, ``Make the
Foreign Serve China: How Foreign Science and Technology Helped China
Dominate Global Metallurgical Industries,'' 10 March 17, 1, 18-20.
\56\ See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Obama
Administration Files WTO Complaint on China's Subsidies to Aluminum
Producers,'' January 2017; Michael Komesaroff, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, ``Make the Foreign Serve China: How Foreign
Science and Technology Helped China Dominate Global Metallurgical
Industries,'' 10 March 17, 2, 16; ``How Chinese Overcapacity Hits
American Workers,'' Economist, 15 June 17.
\57\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 AmCham China White Paper: American Business in China,''
2017, 4; World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade
Policy Review, China, Minutes of the Meeting, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/342/
Add.1, 28 October 16, 423. See also Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee, Decision on Certain Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige
ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 5 November 13, sec. 1(2).
\58\ See, e.g., Henry Sanderson and Henry Foy, ``Call To Tackle
China's Soaring Aluminium Output,'' Financial Times, 19 March 17.
\59\ Greenpeace East Asia and Beijing Custeel E-Commerce Co., Ltd.,
``Research Report on Overcapacity Reduction in China's Steel
Industry,'' 3 March 17, 5-6. See also Song Yingge, ``China's Steel
Output Gains in 2016,'' Shanghai Daily, 21 January 17; Liang Qian and
Zhang Jiagang, ``NDRC: Soaring Steel Prices Unsustainable, Next Year
Continue Cutting Capacity'' [Fagaiwei: gang jia baozhang buke chixu
mingnian jixu qu channeng], Economic Information Daily, 10 November 16;
Michael Lelyveld, ``China's Steel Output Climbs Despite Cuts,'' Radio
Free Asia, 30 May 17.
\60\ World Trade Organization, DS511, China-Domestic Support for
Agricultural Producers, last visited 15 June 17; Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, ``United States Challenges Excessive Chinese
Support for Rice, Wheat, and Corn,'' September 2016.
\61\ World Trade Organization, DS519, China-Subsidies to Producers
of Primary Aluminum, last visited 15 June 17; Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, ``Obama Administration Files WTO Complaint on China's
Subsidies to Aluminum Producers,'' January 2017.
\62\ World Trade Organization, Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Request From the United States to China
Pursuant to Article 25.10 of the Agreement, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/71, 19 April
17, 1-6.
\63\ Ibid., 8-584.
\64\ World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade
Policy Review, China, Minutes of the Meeting, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/342/
Add.1, 28 October 16, 427; World Trade Organization, Report on the
Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 01,
para. 334.
\65\ World Trade Organization, Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Request From the United States to China
Pursuant to Article 25.10 of the Agreement, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/71, 19 April
17, 1.
\66\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' January 2017, 21-22; Robert D.
Atkinson et al., Information Technology & Innovation Foundation,
``Stopping China's Mercantilism: A Doctrine of Constructive, Alliance-
Backed Confrontation,'' March 2017, 24.
\67\ W. Raphael Lam and Alfred Schipke, International Monetary
Fund, ``Getting China's `Trusted Sons' Back Into Shape,'' 27 April 17;
Sea-Jin Chang and Sandy Yuan Jin, ``The Performance of State Owned
Enterprises in China: An Empirical Analysis of Ownership Control
Through SASACS,'' National University of Singapore (NUS), NUS Business
School, Centre for Governance, Institutions & Organisations, 2016, 8.
\68\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Number of Business
Entities by Region and Status of Registration (2015),'' China
Statistical Yearbook 2016, 2016, Table 1-8.
\69\ Ibid., Table 1-7.
\70\ W. Raphael Lam and Alfred Schipke, International Monetary
Fund, ``Getting China's `Trusted Sons' Back Into Shape,'' 27 April 17.
See also Curtis J. Milhaupt and Mariana Pargendler, European Corporate
Governance Institute, ``Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned
Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for
Reform,'' April 2017, 47-48.
\71\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Main Indicators of
State-Holding Industrial Enterprises by Region,'' China Statistical
Yearbook 2016, 2016, Table 13-5; Ministry of Finance, State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, ``2016 January-
December State-Owned Enterprises and State-Holding Enterprises Economic
Developments'' [2016 nian 1-12 yue quangguo guoyou ji guoyou konggu
qiye jingji yunxing qingkuang], 26 January 17. Chinese government
reporting on profits of state-owned and state-invested enterprises
refers to both state-owned enterprises and state-holding companies as
``state-owned enterprises.''
\72\ W. Raphael Lam and Alfred Schipke, International Monetary
Fund, ``Getting China's `Trusted Sons' Back Into Shape,'' 27 April 17.
See also Jay H. Bryson, ``Are SOEs a Millstone Around China's Neck? ''
Wells Fargo Securities, 18 May 16. Bryson reported that at the end of
2014, bank loans to SOEs totaled almost 50 percent of total business
loans and 30 percent of all loans in China.
\73\ See, e.g., Ing. Jan Bejkovsky, ``State Capitalism in China:
The Case of the Banking Sector,'' Proceedings of the International
Academic Research Conference on Small & Medium Enterprises, 2-4 August
16, 7; ``China's State Firms Borrow Cheaply,'' Economist, Daily Chart
(blog), 23 November 16.
\74\ Wojciech Maliszewski, ``Resolving China's Corporate Debt
Problem,'' International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper, October
2016, 7-8. See also ``China's Uncannily Stable Growth Versus the Price
of Reform,'' Economist, 19 October 16.
\75\ ``Xi Stresses Unwavering Party Leadership of State-Owned
Enterprises at National State-Owned Enterprises Party-Building Work
Meeting'' [Xi jinping zai quanguo guoyou qiye dang de jianshe gongzuo
huiyi shang qiangdiao: jianchi dang dui guoqi de lingdao bu dongyao],
Xinhua, 11 October 16; Zhou Xin, ``Communist Party the Top Boss of
China's State Firms, Xi Jinping Asserts in Rare Meeting,'' South China
Morning Post, 13 October 16.
\76\ Curtis J. Milhaupt and Mariana Pargendler, European Corporate
Governance Institute, ``Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned
Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for
Reform,'' April 2017, 46-48; Mark Wu, ``The `China, Inc.' Challenge to
Global Trade Governance,'' Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 57,
No. 2 (Spring 2016), 283-84.
\77\ World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade
Policy Review, China, Minutes of the Meeting, Addendum, WT/TPR/M/342/
Add.1, 28 October 16, 399.
\78\ ``Xi Stresses Unwavering Party Leadership of State-Owned
Enterprises at National State-Owned Enterprises Party-Building Work
Meeting'' [Xi jinping zai quanguo guoyou qiye dang de jianshe gongzuo
huiyi shang qiangdiao: jianchi dang dui guoqi de lingdao bu dongyao],
Xinhua, 11 October 16; Zhou Xin, ``Communist Party the Top Boss of
China's State Firms, Xi Jinping Asserts in Rare Meeting,'' South China
Morning Post, 13 October 16.
\79\ Xiao Yaqing, ``Deepening the Reform of State-Owned
Enterprises; Stronger, More Outstanding, Larger State-Owned
Enterprises'' [Shenhua guoqi guozi gaige zuo qiang zuo you zuo da
guoyou qiye], Study Times, reprinted in State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission of the State Council, 16 June 17; Wendy
Wu, ``How the Communist Party Controls China's State-Owned Industrial
Titans,'' South China Morning Post, 17 June 17.
\80\ Curtis J. Milhaupt and Mariana Pargendler, European Corporate
Governance Institute, ``Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned
Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for
Reform,'' April 2017, 46.
\81\ Gregor Stuart Hunter and Steven Russolillo, ``Now Advising
China's State Firms: The Communist Party,'' Wall Street Journal, 14
August 17. See also Jennifer Hughes, ``China's Communist Party Writes
Itself Into Company Law,'' Financial Times, 15 August 17.
\82\ Gregor Stuart Hunter and Steven Russolillo, ``Now Advising
China's State Firms: The Communist Party,'' Wall Street Journal, 14
August 17.
\83\ Yi-Zheng Lian, ``China, the Party-Corporate Complex,'' New
York Times, 13 February 17; The Broken Promises of China's WTO
Accession: Reprioritizing Human Rights, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 March 17, Written Statement Submitted
by Michael R. Wessel, President, The Wessel Group, Commissioner, U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 3.
\84\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Organization
Department, ``2015 Report on Communist Party Statistics: Communist
Party Members Totaled 88.758 Million'' [2015 nian zhongguo gongchandang
dangnei tongji gongbao: dangyuan zongshu wei 8875.8 wan ming], 30 June
16.
\85\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(A)(2).
\86\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017, 12.
\87\ Ibid.
\88\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2017 Special 301
Report,'' April 2017, 1, 28. See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ``2017
Special 301 Submission,'' 9 February 17, 6.
\89\ Office of International Trade, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``Intellectual
Property Rights Seizure Statistics, Fiscal Year 2016,'' 25 January 17,
14.
\90\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Out-of-Cycle
Review of Notorious Markets,'' December 2016, 12. See also Michael
Schuman, ``A Small Table Maker Takes on Alibaba's Flood of Fakes,'' New
York Times, 18 March 17; ``Alibaba Urges Tougher Counterfeiting Laws,
Enforcement & Penalties,'' Alizila, 27 February 17. Alibaba Group
claimed itself to be ``a victim of counterfeiting,'' posting a
statement that asserted criminals escape punishment, and noting that in
2016, Alibaba had provided Chinese authorities with 4,495 criminal
leads, but that those leads had only led to 33 convictions.
\91\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017, 92;
National People's Congress, PRC E-Commerce Law (Draft) [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo dianzi shangwu fa (cao'an)], 27 December 16, reprinted in
Ministry of Commerce, China Sourcing, 29 December 16, art. 34.
\92\ China Trademark Office, State Administration of Industry and
Commerce, ``Trademark Review and Examination Standards'' [Shangbiao
shencha ji shenli biaozhun], December 2016.
\93\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Certain Issues Related
to Trials of Administrative Cases Involving the Grant and Confirmation
of Trademark Rights [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli shangbiao
shouquan quequan xingzheng anjian ruogan wenti de guiding], issued 10
January 17, effective 1 March 17.
\94\ Mark Cohen, ``2017 Opens With More Positive Trademark
Developments,'' China IPR (blog), 12 January 17; ``New Changes in
Examination Standards and Provisions of Trademark Cases,'' Kangxin, 13
March 17; Paul Ranjard, ``What To Expect From the SPC's New Trademark
Judicial Interpretation? '' Wan Hui Da Peksung, last visited 15 June
17. See also Hudson Lockett, ``China's Top Court Bars Deceptive Use of
Celebrity Names in Trademarks,'' Financial Times, 11 January 17;
``SAIC: Online Marketplaces' Trademark Infringement and Counterfeit
Goods Problem Relatively Serious, Key Points of Management'' [Gongshang
zongju: wangluo shichang shangbiao qinquan jiamao jiao yanzhong xi
guanli zhongdian], China News Service, 25 April 17.
\95\ Liu Jing, ``Supreme People's Court Announces Judgment in 10
Related `Jordan' Trademark Administrative Disputes'' [Zuigao renmin
fayuan gongkai xuanpan ``qiaodan'' shangbiao zhengyi xingzheng jiufen
10 jian anjian], Supreme People's Court, 9 December 16; ``Michael
Jordan Partly Wins Trademark Lawsuit,'' Xinhua, 8 December 16; Sui-Lee
Wee, ``Michael Jordan Owns Right to His Name in Chinese Characters,
Too, Court Rules,'' New York Times, 7 December 16.
\96\ See, e.g., Supreme People's Court, ``Judicial Transparency by
People's Courts,'' 14 March 17. See also Jerome A. Cohen and David
Wertime, ``A Crack of Daylight Enters Chinese Court Proceedings,''
Foreign Policy, Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 12 October 16.
\97\ Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
``China,'' last visited 15 June 17. See also Dan Harris, ``China Debts
and Layoffs and Hostage Situations,'' China Law (blog), 3 June 17.
Harris believes that the number of foreigners being held hostage in
China due to business disputes is likely increasing.
\98\ Chris Buckley, ``China Sentences Phan Phan-Gillis, U.S.
Businesswoman, in Spying Case,'' New York Times, 25 April 17; Chun Han
Wong and Charles Hutzler, ``China Convicts U.S. Businesswoman of
Spying,'' Wall Street Journal, 25 April 17. For more information on
Phan-Gillis, see the text box ``Disappearance and Arbitrary Detention
of an American Businesswoman'' in CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October
16, 255.
\99\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Dui Hua Welcomes Return of Sandy Phan-
Gillis to the United States,'' 28 April 17; Chris Buckley, ``China
Deports American Woman Convicted on Spying Charge,'' New York Times, 29
April 17.
\100\ Bridget Johnson, ``Houston Businesswoman Marks Second Year
Unjustly Detained in China,'' PJMedia, 20 March 17; ``Free Sandy,''
Houston Chronicle, 27 March 17.
\101\ UN Human Rights Council, Opinion No. 12/2016 Concerning Phan
(Sandy) Phan-Gillis (China), Opinions adopted by the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention at its Seventy-Fifth Session, 18-27 April 2016, A/
HRC/WGAD/2016/12, 22 June 16, para. 21. See also Edward Wong, ``China
Violated Rights of Detained American, U.N. Panel Says,'' New York
Times, Sinosphere (blog), 7 July 16.
\102\ The Broken Promises of China's WTO Accession: Reprioritizing
Human Rights, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 1 March 17, Written Statement Submitted by Jeff Gillis, Husband
of American Businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis, 2.
\103\ Ibid., 3. See also Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant
Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. State Department, to Christopher
Smith, House of Representatives, 2 December 15. According to the U.S.
State Department, the Chinese government's restrictions on
communication between U.S. consular officials and Phan-Gillis were
``inconsistent'' with China's obligations under the U.S.-China Consular
Convention.
\104\ Minxin Pei, ``Chinese Tycoon's Disappearance Foreshadows
Showdown in Beijing,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 6 February 17; Scott
Cendrowski, ``Billionaire's Disappearance in Hong Kong May Be Part of
China's Anti-Corruption Campaign,'' Fortune, 6 February 17; Jun Mai and
Nectar Gan, ``China Confirms Tycoon Guo Wengui Wanted by Interpol,''
South China Morning Post, 20 April 17; Lucy Hornby, ``Chinese Crackdown
on Dealmakers Reflects Xi Power Play,'' Financial Times, 9 August 17;
``Analyst: The Detention of Anbang's Wu Xiaohui Is Not Without Risk''
[Fenxi renshi: anbang wu xiaohui bei ju bu wu fengxian], Voice of
America, 16 June 17.
\105\ Minxin Pei, ``Chinese Tycoon's Disappearance Foreshadows
Showdown in Beijing,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 6 February 17; Scott
Cendrowski, ``Billionaire's Disappearance in Hong Kong May Be Part of
China's Anti-Corruption Campaign,'' Fortune, 6 February 17.
\106\ Michael Forsythe, ``Greater Corruption in China? A
Billionaire Says He Has Evidence,'' New York Times, 17 April 17. See
also Human Rights in China, ``Gao Wenqian: Guo Wengui's Explosive
Revelations and Xi Jinping's Dilemma,'' 18 May 17.
\107\ Jun Mai and Nectar Gan, ``Interpol Issues Red Notice for
Chinese Tycoon Guo Wengui `At Beijing's Request' After Corruption Claim
Report,'' South China Morning Post, 20 April 17; Jun Mai and Nectar
Gan, ``China Confirms Tycoon Guo Wengui Wanted by Interpol,'' South
China Morning Post, 19 April 17.
\108\ Keith Bradsher and Sui-Lee Wee, ``Why Did China Detain
Anbang's Chairman? He Tested a Lot of Limits,'' New York Times, 14 June
17; Xie Yu, ``Murky Waters Surrounding Wu Xiaohui and Anbang,'' South
China Morning Post, 8 July 17; Lucy Hornby, ``Chinese Crackdown on
Dealmakers Reflects Xi Power Play,'' Financial Times, 9 August 17.
\109\ Xie Yu, ``Murky Waters Surrounding Wu Xiaohui and Anbang,''
South China Morning Post, 8 July 17.
\110\ Ibid.; Henny Sender, ``Anbang's Wu Xiaohui Pays the Price for
Defying Beijing,'' Nikkei Asian Review, 22 June 17.
\111\ Office of International Affairs, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, ``Report to Congress: Foreign Exchange Policies of Major
Trading Partners of the United States,'' 14 April 17, 3. The U.S.
Department of Treasury report notes that a rapid devaluation of the
yuan would result in ``negative consequences for the United States,
China, and the global economy.'' See also Brad W. Setser, ``So, Is
China Pegging to the Dollar or to a Basket? '' Council on Foreign
Relations, Follow the Money (blog), 9 April 17.
\112\ Office of International Affairs, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, ``Report to Congress: Foreign Exchange Policies of Major
Trading Partners of the United States,'' 14 April 17, 15.
\113\ Ibid.; American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic
of China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017,
166, 364. See also Brad W. Setser, ``So, Is China Pegging to the Dollar
or to a Basket? '' Council on Foreign Relations, Follow the Money
(blog), 9 April 17.
\114\ State Council, ``Report on the Work of the Government,'' 15
March 17; ``Li Keqiang: Food and Drug Safety Affects Public Health,
Regulation Requires the Utmost Rigor'' [Li keqiang: shipin yaopin
anquan shiguan renmin jiankang, bixu guan de yaneryouyan], Jilin Food
and Drug Administration, 7 March 17; Kathleen McLaughlin, ``China
Pledges To Cut Pollution and Boost Food Safety,'' Science, 6 March 17.
\115\ John Kojiro Yasuda, Paulson Institute, ``Paulson Policy
Memorandum: Meeting China's Food Safety Challenge,'' 4 April 17, 1.
\116\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Stronger Steps on Safety of Food Set,''
China Daily, 28 February 17.
\117\ Zhou Dongxu and Li Rongde, ``Tianjin Probes Counterfeit Ring
That Produced Toxic Soy Sauce,'' Caixin, 19 January 17; Alice Yan,
``China's Latest Food Scandal: `Leftovers, Industrial Salt' Used To
Make Fake-Branded Food,'' South China Morning Post, 16 January 17.
\118\ Viola Zhou, ``19 Arrested for Selling Hundreds of Tonnes of
Expired Milk Powder in China,'' South China Morning Post, 24 October
16.
\119\ Zhou Dongxu and Li Rongde, ``Tianjin Probes Counterfeit Ring
That Produced Toxic Soy Sauce,'' Caixin, 23 January 17.
\120\ China Food and Drug Administration, Measures on Investigating
and Punishing Illegal Conduct Related to Online Food Safety [Wangluo
shipin anquan weifa xingwei chachu banfa], issued 13 July 16, effective
1 October 16. See also ``New Rule Stresses Online Platforms'
Responsibility in Food Safety,'' Xinhua, 29 September 16.
\121\ Courtney Diem Macintosh and Andrew Sim, ``New Online Food
Trading Safety Measures Introduced in China,'' Baker McKenzie, 1
October 16; China Food and Drug Administration, Measures on
Investigating and Punishing Illegal Conduct Related to Online Food
Safety [Wangluo shipin anquan weifa xingwei chachu banfa], issued 13
July 16, effective 1 October 16, arts. 18, 39-43.
\122\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China, ``2017 American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2017, 48.
\123\ Ibid., 238. See also European Union Chamber of Commerce in
China, ``European Business in China Position Paper 2016/2017,'' 2016,
181. The European Chamber reported that, ``Unclear laws and regulations
and inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the laws have opened
up food regulation to further potential risks.''
\124\ John Ruwitch, ``Shanghai Watchdogs Fine OSI and Unit Over
Meat Scandal,'' Reuters, 3 October 16. See also Shanghai Municipality
Food and Drug Administration, ``Shanghai Municipality Announcement of
List of Operators and Related Responsible Staff Who Violated Food and
Medicine Manufacturing Rules'' [Shanghai shi shipin yaopin yanzhong
weifa shengchan jingyingzhe yu xiangguan zeren renyuan zhongdian
jianguan mingdan gonggao], 2 June 17.
\125\ OSI Group, ``OSI Group February 1, 2016 Statement,'' 1
February 16. See also ``SPC and CCTV Jointly Introduce the Selection
Results for the `Ten Significant Cases Advancing Rule of Law in 2016'
'' [Zuigaofa yangshi lianhe kaizhan ``2016 nian tuidong fazhi jincheng
shi da anjian'' pingxuan jieguo jiexiao], Supreme People's Court, 20
April 17; US-China Business Council, ``Food Safety in China: What US
Companies Are Bringing to the Table,'' November 2016, 8. The US-China
Business Council noted that member companies had reported concerns
about exaggerated media reporting and disgruntled employees providing
misleading photographs to the media.
\126\ See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, ``Joint Release:
Initial Results of the 100-Day Action Plan of the U.S.-China
Comprehensive Economic Dialogue,'' 11 May 17; Maria Godoy, ``Chinese
Chicken Is Headed to America, but It's Really All About the Beef,''
NPR, 12 May 17.
\127\ ``U.S. Beef Debuts in China After 14 Years, May Help Balance
Trade,'' Bloomberg, 30 June 17; Dominique Patton, ``Chinese Ready To
Tuck Into U.S. Beef Imports After 14-Year Wait,'' Reuters, 29 June 17.
\128\ Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, ``Eligibility of the People's Republic of China (PRC) To
Export to the United States Poultry Products From Birds Slaughtered in
the PRC,'' 9 CFR Part 381, RIN 0583-AD64, Federal Register, Vol. 82,
No. 115 (16 June 17), 27625-29.
\129\ Food & Water Watch, ``Food & Water Watch Urges USDA To Cancel
Proposal To Import Poultry From China,'' 15 August 17; Wenonah Hauter,
Food & Water Watch, ``RE: Docket No. FSIS-2016-0002,'' 15 August 17.
See also Lucy Hornby, ``China's Love of US Chicken Feet Proves a Recipe
for a Perfect Trade,'' Financial Times, 14 August 17; Maria Godoy,
``Chinese Chicken Is Headed to America, but It's Really All About the
Beef,'' NPR, 12 May 17.
\130\ ``Joint Communique of Leaders Roundtable of Belt and Road
Forum,'' Xinhua, 15 May 17.
\131\ ``China Focus: World's Major Economies Present at B&R
Forum,'' Xinhua, 15 May 17; Anthony Kuhn, ``For China's `New Silk
Road,' Ambitious Goals and More Than a Few Challenges,'' NPR, 16 May
17.
\132\ ``Joint Communique of Leaders Roundtable of Belt and Road
Forum,'' Xinhua, 15 May 17. See also National Development and Reform
Commission et al., ``Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road
Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road'' [Tuidong gong jian
sichou zhi lu jingjidai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhi lu de yuanjing
yu xingdong], March 2015; Nadege Rolland, China's Eurasian Century?
Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative
(Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 119-20; Joshua
Eisenman and Devin T. Stewart, ``China's New Silk Road Is Getting
Muddy,'' Foreign Policy, 9 January 17.
\133\ National Development and Reform Commission et al., ``Vision
and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road'' [Tuidong gong jian sichou zhi lu jingjidai
he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhi lu de yuanjing yu xingdong], March
2015, sec. II. See also Tom Hancock, ``China Encircles the World With
One Belt, One Road Strategy,'' Financial Times, 3 May 17; ``The
Economist Explains: What Is China's Belt and Road Initiative? ''
Economist, 15 May 17.
\134\ Angela Stanzel, European Council on Foreign Relations,
``China's Belt and Road--New Name, Same Doubts? '' 19 May 17; Elias
Glenn et al.,``Update 2--Germany Demands More Free Trade Guarantees on
China Silk Road Plan--Minister,'' Reuters, 14 May 17.
\135\ ``Joint Communique of Leaders Roundtable of Belt and Road
Forum,'' Xinhua, 15 May 17.
\136\ State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration of the
State Council, ``Transcript of State Council Information Office Press
Conference on the Situation of State-Owned Enterprises Participation in
Joint Construction of the `Belt & Road' '' [Guoxinban zhongyang qiye
canyu ``yidai yilu'' gong jian qingkuang fabuhui shilu], 9 May 17; Wu
Gang, ``SOEs Lead Infrastructure Push in 1,700 `Belt and Road'
Projects,'' Caixin, 9 May 17.
\137\ Ibid.
\138\ Summer Zhen, ``China To Build Colombo CBD Under `Belt and
Road Initiative,' '' South China Morning Post, 10 May 17; Celia Chen
and Peggy Sito, ``Here's How Li Ka-shing Dominates Trade Along the Belt
and Road Initiative,'' South China Morning Post, 12 May 17.
\139\ Joshua Eisenman and Devin T. Stewart, ``China's New Silk Road
Is Getting Muddy,'' Foreign Policy, 9 January 17.
\140\ Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, ``AIIB Celebrates Its
First Anniversary; Launches Its 2017 Agenda,'' 16 January 17.
\141\ World Bank, ``World Bank and AIIB Sign Cooperation
Framework,'' 23 April 17. As of April 2017, the AIIB and World Bank had
co-financed five projects.
\142\ Asian Development Bank, ``ADB Approves Second Cofinancing
With AIIB To Boost Natural Gas Output, Transmission in Bangladesh,'' 21
November 16.
\143\ Inclusive Development International, ``Making Inroads:
Chinese Infrastructure Investment in ASEAN and Beyond,'' 2016, 5-6. See
also Sara Hsu, ``How China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Fared
Its First Year,'' Forbes, 14 January 17.
Access to
Justice
Access to
Justice
Access to Justice
Introduction
While many Chinese citizens persist in seeking redress for
violations of their rights,\1\ the Commission continued to
observe a significant discrepancy between official statements
that affirm the
importance of law-based governance \2\ or that promote recent
legal developments \3\ and the actual ability of citizens to
access justice.\4\ Developments during the 2017 reporting year
also continued to demonstrate that individuals and groups who
attempt to help citizens advocate for their rights do so at
significant professional and personal risk.
Judicial Reform Efforts
During this past year, the Commission observed some
progress and ongoing challenges as Chinese courts and local
governments implemented certain key areas of the judicial
reforms outlined in the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Fourth Plenum Decision on Several Major Issues in
Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According
to Law (Fourth Plenum Decision) from October 2014.\5\ Key
developments included the following areas.
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The Commission continued to observe actions and statements
by Chinese authorities that contradict their claim of judicial
independence. The Supreme People's Court (SPC) repeatedly
emphasized the Chinese Communist Party's leadership role over
the judiciary.\6\ At a conference held in January 2017, SPC
President Zhou Qiang urged high court presidents from across
China to reject Western ideals including ``constitutional
democracy, separation of powers, and judicial independence.''
\7\ The SPC-run People's Court Daily published a series of
articles arguing that Chinese courts retain independence in
decisionmaking even while they are subject to the Party's
leadership.\8\ Some legal professionals and scholars, however,
viewed Zhou's speech as a setback in the progress toward
judicial independence.\9\
In his March 2017 delivery of the SPC's annual work report,
Zhou Qiang reiterated the SPC's goal of judicial independence,
yet in the same presentation, he noted the convictions of
rights lawyer Zhou Shifeng and other rights advocates \10\ as
key achievements of the court system in 2016.\11\ Amnesty
International and other human rights organizations
characterized these trials as politically motivated,\12\ and
one China-based lawyer said the SPC work report signified that
the court system is a political tool of the Party.\13\ In this
past year, reports of other politically motivated convictions
continued to emerge.\14\ [See Section II--Criminal Justice for
more information.]
The Party continued to exert control over the judiciary,
including the four newly established cross-jurisdictional
circuit tribunals \15\ that have a mandate to improve judicial
independence by preventing interference by local officials.\16\
An inspection group under central Party authorities conducted
an inspection beginning in November 2016 \17\ to ensure
ideological alignment of the SPC,\18\ which in turn exerts
leadership over the circuit tribunals \19\ through their Party
branch groups.\20\ In July 2017, the SPC issued an opinion with
a provision instructing chief judges to carry out plans made by
Party branch groups and adjudication committees.\21\
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Although a senior Party official declared that courts had
substantially achieved accountability reforms,\22\
implementation by lower courts remained at an initial stage,
and certain problems that authorities intended to correct
persisted in some localities. Meng Jianzhu, a Party Central
Committee Political Bureau member and Political and Legal
Affairs Commission Secretary, said in January 2017 that central
Party authorities had substantially completed the policy-making
aspect of the judicial accountability reform,\23\ and in a
subsequent meeting urged political and legal affairs committee
leaders to complete basic reform efforts before the 19th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party \24\ scheduled
to take place in the latter part of 2017.\25\ In April, the SPC
clarified the supervisory roles of provincial-level court
presidents and chief judges, and generally prohibited them from
giving oral or written instructions on cases that they did not
hear.\26\ Some lower courts have issued rules to implement the
reform \27\ or held meetings for that purpose.\28\
Nevertheless, an SPC official responsible for judicial reform
reported that certain problems regarding accountability
persisted in some localities, which included court presidents
and chief judges taking part in adjudicating cases not assigned
to them and not being able to effectively supervise associate
judges.\29\
CASE FILING
Despite official reports showing improvement in the case
filing system,\30\ some courts reportedly continued to deny
individuals access to the court system. Based on the Fourth
Plenum Decision,\31\ the SPC issued a set of provisions in
April 2015 that requires courts to accept all cases meeting
certain procedural requirements,\32\ instead of first
subjecting them to substantive review.\33\ Rights advocate Feng
Zhenghu, however, observed that some courts in Shanghai
municipality continued to conduct substantive review.\34\ He
documented 187 cases between May 2015 and December 2016 in
which seven courts in Shanghai reportedly failed to open a case
or issue a decision that explained their refusal to do so \35\
in cases seeking judicial review of issues including
administrative detention and land expropriation agreements.\36\
In addition, when Feng ran for the local people's congress in
November 2016 as an independent candidate, police from Shanghai
administratively detained five of his campaign assistants,\37\
who then tried to file a lawsuit to rescind the administrative
decisions after their release.\38\ The Yangpu District People's
Court in Shanghai reportedly twice rejected their filings
without issuing any official documentation explaining the
decision.\39\ Rights defenders in other localities likewise
experienced difficulties in filing their cases.\40\
TRIAL-CENTERED LITIGATION SYSTEM
Chinese authorities took steps to implement a goal set
forth in the October 2014 Fourth Plenum Decision to shift
toward a trial-centered litigation system that includes
improving the practice of having witnesses and experts testify
at trial.\41\ The Supreme People's Court (SPC), Supreme
People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry
of State Security, and Ministry of Justice issued a joint
opinion in October 2016 that detailed key components to
improving in-court testimony and argument,\42\ but the opinion
subjects a witness' appearance to the court's determination
that the testimony has great significance to the case.\43\ One
SPC official said that courts, procuratorates, and public
security bureaus in some localities developed evidentiary
criteria for certain common crimes to standardize investigation
and to prevent illegally obtained evidence from entering the
trial phase.\44\ In June 2017, the SPC selected courts in 17
locations to pilot the implementation of three procedures of
the trial-centered litigation system, namely, pretrial
conference, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, and
judicial investigation procedure for courts of first
instance.\45\ [For more information on developments in China's
criminal procedure system, see Section II--Criminal Justice--
Ongoing Challenges in the Implementation of the Criminal
Procedure Law.]
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY
The Chinese judiciary reported progress and addressed
challenges in improving judicial transparency. In November
2016, SPC President Zhou Qiang reported improvements, including
the publishing of court proceedings online and making case
information available to litigation parties through court
websites and text messaging.\46\ Zhou also acknowledged several
challenges, including selective disclosure of case judgments by
some courts, the lack of a robust system for third-party
evaluation of courts' disclosure efforts, and the need for
further delineation of judicial disclosure standards.\47\ In
October 2016, new SPC provisions went into effect that further
specify disclosure standards which require judges to publish
case identification information even when case content is being
withheld and to state the reason supporting nondisclosure
except when doing so may endanger state security.\48\ A March
2017 report shows, however, that only five courts published
this information on their websites.\49\ Amnesty International
observed that documents related to death penalty sentences
published on the judiciary's centralized database between 2011
and 2016 represented a small fraction of executions in China,
concluding that ``authorities appear to be engaged in an
elaborate policy of systematic evasion . . ..'' \50\ [For more
information on the judiciary's publication of death penalty-
related documents, see Section II--Criminal Justice.]
Legal Aid
The Chinese government promulgated rules in an attempt to
improve the legal aid system, which continued to face problems
such as a shortage of legal aid workers, the lack of technical
knowledge in non-lawyer staff, and insufficient reimbursement
for legal-aid related expenses.\51\ In February 2017, the
Ministries of Justice (MOJ) and Finance jointly issued an
opinion directing their provincial-level bureaus to play an
active role in administering the legal aid system and to
specifically allocate funds toward implementing measures,
including supporting the recruitment and training of new
lawyers for legal aid work, obtaining legal aid services from
law firms through government procurement, and ensuring prompt
payment that is commensurate with the legal services
rendered.\52\ The Supreme People's Procuratorate, SPC, and MOJ
issued an opinion in April specifying that legal aid services
cover criminal case petitions (xingshi shensu),\53\ a process
that can be used to correct wrongful convictions.\54\ A U.S.-
based expert noted that access to legal aid by migrant workers
had improved in the years since a 2006 State Council regulatory
change; many of these workers, however, continued to have
difficulty obtaining aid because of variance in local
rules.\55\
Citizen Petitioning
The petitioning system (xinfang), also known as the
``letters and visits system,'' has been a popular mechanism
outside of the formal legal system for citizens to present
their grievances to authorities, either in writing or in
person.\56\ The petitioning system reportedly has been
ineffective in addressing citizens' grievances due to factors
such as the large number of petitions,\57\ the limited
authority of local xinfang offices,\58\ shortcomings in the
accountability system,\59\ and corruption.\60\ In October 2016,
the State Council General Office and the Party Central
Committee General Office issued measures directing government
and Party agencies to conduct a performance review at least
once a year and providing sanctions for conduct such as
ineffective handling of negative public opinion or mistreatment
of petitioners that results in serious consequences.\61\
The Commission continued to observe reports of violence
against petitioners. In November 2016, the public security
bureau in Yuechi county, Guang'an municipality, Sichuan
province, issued a notice stating that it started an
investigation and detained nine individuals suspected of being
responsible for the death of petitioner Yang Tianzhi, whom
individuals acting under a reported agreement with Yuechi
officials forcibly returned to Sichuan to prevent him from
petitioning in Beijing municipality.\62\ Although the
Commission observed additional reports of violence against
petitioners this past year, the reports did not include
information about officials being held accountable.\63\
During this reporting year, petitioners continued to face
reprisals. Authorities detained petitioners, alleging criminal
or administrative offenses including ``disrupting order in a
public place,'' \64\ ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble,'' \65\ and ``obstructing official business.'' \66\ In
addition, in the period leading up to and during the annual
meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference in March 2017, authorities
reportedly rounded up petitioners, including Hong Kong
residents, in Beijing municipality and other locations.\67\
Authorities reportedly targeted groups and individuals that
supported petitioners. Between November and December 2016,
authorities in Hubei and Sichuan provinces reportedly detained
Liu Feiyue \68\ and Huang Qi,\69\ and arrested them on charges
related to ``endangering state security.'' \70\ Liu and Huang
each operated websites that monitor a range of human rights
issues, including those that involve petitioners.\71\ A
volunteer who worked for Huang's website suggested that Huang's
detention was related to his investigative reports on Yang
Tianzhi's death.\72\ In March 2017, the Fengtai District
People's Court in Beijing tried Chang Hongyan,\73\ who
organized protests every weekend against the violent treatment
of petitioners, on the charge of ``obstructing official
business.'' \74\
Harassment of Human Rights Lawyers and Advocates
As the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human
rights observed, ``the crackdown on human rights lawyers . . .
made it very difficult for lawyers to be other than
governmental facilitators.'' \75\ This past year, the Chinese
government continued to detain and, in some cases, prosecute
rights lawyers and advocates targeted during a coordinated,
nationwide crackdown that began in and around July 2015 (July
2015 crackdown).\76\
On April 28, 2017, the Tianjin No. 2
Intermediate People's Court sentenced rights lawyer Li
Heping \77\ to three years in prison, suspended for
four years, with four years' deprivation of political
rights for ``subversion of state power.'' \78\
On May 8, 2017, the Changsha Intermediate
People's Court in Hunan province tried rights lawyer
Xie Yang,\79\ who pleaded guilty to ``inciting
subversion of state power'' and ``disrupting court
order,'' and retracted his prior claim of having been
tortured.\80\ The court released Xie on bail without
issuing a judgment.\81\ In a statement released by
Xie's lawyer in January, Xie denied any wrongdoing and
said a plea of guilt would be a result of torture or an
exchange for release.\82\ Shortly after Xie's release
on May 10, authorities reportedly took him away to an
unknown location for ``recovery.'' \83\ Xie returned
home in August, but authorities reportedly had
installed multiple surveillance cameras and a
fingerprint-operated metal gate outside of his home,
which Xie asked to be removed.\84\
In February 2017, Tianjin authorities indicted
rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang \85\ on ``subversion of
state power.'' \86\ In July 2017, Wang's wife said that
she had not received any news about her husband, and
authorities reportedly prevented him from meeting with
legal counsel retained by the family.\87\
Disbarred rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong \88\
reportedly disappeared in November 2016 after meeting
the wife and lawyers of Xie Yang in Changsha.\89\ On
December 23, Jiang's family received notice that
Changsha authorities had placed Jiang under
``residential surveillance at a designated location''
on December 1 on suspicion of ``inciting subversion of
state power.'' \90\ On May 31, 2017, Changsha police
arrested Jiang on the same charge, and held him at the
Changsha No. 1 PSB Detention Center.\91\
Tianjin authorities released rights lawyers Li
Chunfu \92\ and Xie Yanyi \93\ on bail in January 2017
after having detained them for nearly a year and a half
for ``subversion of state power'' and ``inciting
subversion of state power.'' \94\
On August 14, 2017, the Tianjin No. 2
Intermediate Court tried rights advocate Wu Gan \95\ in
a closed hearing for ``subversion of state power.''
\96\ Procuratorial and judicial authorities reportedly
had remanded Wu's case for supplemental investigation a
total of four times \97\ over the course of his lengthy
pretrial detention that began in May 2015.\98\
Authorities reportedly used arbitrary means to prevent
lawyers from obtaining licenses to practice law. For example,
the Fengrui Law Firm, which previously cultivated and attracted
human rights lawyers,\99\ ceased operations when authorities
reportedly targeted it following the July 2015 crackdown.\100\
In March 2017, a partner of the firm said that associates were
unable to participate in the annual licensing examination.\101\
The partner added that authorities confiscated and had not
returned the firm's accounting records and that the Beijing
municipality justice bureau suspended the licensing examination
partly on the ground that the firm had not conducted an annual
audit.\102\
Moreover, authorities reportedly harassed family members of
those connected to the July 2015 crackdown by imposing home
confinement,\103\ enforcing surveillance,\104\ interfering with
their domestic and international travel,\105\ pressuring
landlords to evict them from their residence,\106\ or ordering
school officials to deny admission to their children.\107\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulations on Licensing of Lawyers and Law Firms
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendments to two sets of regulations governing the licensing of
lawyers and law firms took effect this past year,\108\ highlighting the
government and Party's policy to further control and restrict the legal
profession in ways that may violate the UN Basic Principles on the Role
of Lawyers.\109\ The amendments to the Measures on Managing Lawyers'
Practice of Law and Measures on Managing Law Firms added language
mandating lawyers to support the Party's leadership and prohibiting
them from taking certain actions such as denying the government's
``cult'' designations, provoking dissatisfaction with the Party or the
government, signing joint petitions or issuing open letters to
undermine the judicial system, and organizing sit-in protests and other
forms of demonstration outside judicial or other government
agencies.\110\ The Measures on Managing Law Firms requires firms to
establish internal Party groups that will participate in their
policymaking and management.\111\ The amendments prompted opposition
from some in the legal community, including a petition signed by 168
lawyers who claimed that the regulations violated China's Constitution,
domestic laws, and international standards.\112\ The Commission did
not, however, observe any reports of public opposition to the
amendments from the All China Lawyers Association, the quasi-
governmental agency that purportedly protects the ``rights and
interests'' of Chinese lawyers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Access to
Justice
Access to
Justice
Notes to Section III--Access to Justice
\1\ See, e.g., ``Hearing Held on First Case in Guangzhou Involving
Employment Discrimination Against HIV-Infected Person, Plaintiff Asks
for Renewal of Contract'' [Guangzhou shouli aizi ganranzhe jiuye qishi
an kaiting yuangao yaoqiu xu qian hetong], Knews, 21 December 16; Li
Yutong, ``Female Employees Win or Settle Over 80 Percent of Labor
Disputes Involving Maternity Allowance'' [She shengyu jintie laodong
zhengyi an nu yuangong shengsu ji tiaojie chao bacheng], Beijing News,
7 March 17; Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, China
University of Political Science and Law, ``Hearing on Review of `First
Child Lead Poisoning Litigation' '' [``Ertong xieqian di yi an''
zaishen tingzheng], 23 December 16; Wang Le, ``Hearing Forthcoming on
Case in Which 5 Tianjin Fishermen Sued ConocoPhillips for Oil Leak:
Defended Rights for 3 Years, Asked To Restore Ecosystem to Pre-
Pollution Conditions'' [Tianjin 5 yumin su kangfei louyou an jiang
kaiting: weiquan 3 nian, rang huifu wuran qian shengtai], The Paper, 8
December 16; ``Farmer in His Sixties Who Taught Himself the Law Won
Litigation Against SOE'' [Liuxun nongmin zixue falu guansi daying
yangqi], Radio Free Asia, 3 February 17.
\2\ ``Xi Jinping: Adhere to Combining the Principles of Law-Based
and Virtue-Based Governance'' [Xi jinping: jianchi yifa zhiguo he yide
zhiguo xiang jiehe], Xinhua, 10 December 16; Xu Jun et al.,
``Comprehensive Rule-Based Governance To Protect Fairness and Justice''
[Quanmian yifa zhiguo baozhang gongping zhengyi], People's Daily, 4
March 17.
\3\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17, 16-17; ``Supreme People's Procuratorate
Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin jianchayuan gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17,
6.
\4\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Jiang Tianyong's Father
Sued Legal Daily and Procuratorial Daily for Reputation Infringement,
Court Denied Opening Case in Violation of the Law'' [Jiang tianyong zhi
fu qisu fazhi ribao jiancha ribao qinfan mingyu quan, fayuan weifa
jujue li'an dengji], 22 December 16; ``Elderly Changsha Vietnam War
Veteran Died in Home Demolition Clash, Court Refused To Accept Case and
Authorities Seized Body'' [Changsha yuezhan laobing chaiqian chongtu
zhong shenwang fayuan ju li'an dangju qiang shiti], Radio Free Asia, 4
October 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Xinna: Rights Defense Path of
Hulunbuir Herder Dahubayila'' [Xinna: hulunbei'er mumin dahubayila de
weiquan zhi lu], 15 January 17.
\5\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14; ``Xi Stresses
Boosting Public Confidence in Judicial System,'' Xinhua, 25 March 15;
Luo Shuzhen, ``Have Strength To Reform and Innovate, Continue To
Improve Judicial Credibility, Allow the People in Each Judicial Case To
Have the Feeling of Fair Justice'' [Yongyu gaige chuangxin buduan tigao
sifa gongxinli rang renmin qunzhong zai mei yi ge sifa anjian zhong dou
ganshou dao gongping zhengyi], China Court Net, 8 May 15; State Council
Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014,''
reprinted in Xinhua, 8 June 15. For more information on the Fourth
Plenum Decision, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 267-69.
\6\ See, e.g., Luo Shuzhen, ``Zhou Qiang: Thoroughly Study the
Implementation of the Spirit of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th
Central Committee, Always Uphold the Principles of Strict Party
Management and Strict Court Management'' [Zhou qiang: shenru xuexi
guanche dang de shiba jie liu zhong quanhui jingshen shizhong jianchi
congyan zhidang congyan zhiyuan], People's Court Daily, 8 December 16;
Qi Wenxin, ``Zhou Qiang: Adhere to the Principle of Strict Party
Management, Substantively Strengthen People's Courts' Party-Building
Work'' [Zhou qiang: jianchi congyan zhidang qieshi jiaqiang renmin
fayuan dangjian gongzuo], Supreme People's Court Net, 9 January 17;
Ning Jie, ``Zhou Qiang: Resolutely Advancing People's Courts' Judicial
Reform'' [Zhou qiang: jianding buyi tuijin renmin fayuan sifa gaige],
Supreme People's Court Net, 23 February 17; Zhou Bin, ``Zhou Qiang
Emphasizes Comprehensively Strengthening Party-Building Within Courts
at National Conference on Party-Building Within Courts'' [Zhou qiang
zai quanguo fayuan dang de jianshe gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao
quanmian jiaqiang renmin fayuan dang de jianshe], Legal Daily, 24 May
17.
\7\ Luo Shuzhen, ``Conference of High People's Courts Presidents
From Across the Nation Held in Beijing'' [Quanguo gaoji fayuan
yuanzhang huiyi zai jing zhaokai], Supreme People's Court, 14 January
17. Commission staff notes that similar language appeared in Zhou
Qiang's speeches previously. See, e.g., ``Zhou Qiang: Provide Robust
Legal Protection To Facilitate and Advance `The Four Comprehensives' ''
[Zhou qiang wei xietiao tuijin ``si ge quanmian'' tigong youli sifa
baozhang], Supreme People's Court, 25 February 15; ``Zhou Qiang:
Promote Awareness of Catching Up, Dare To Reform and Renovate,
Resolutely Implement Work'' [Zhou qiang: zengqiang kanqi yishi yongyu
gaige chuangxin henzhua gongzuo luoshi], Supreme People's Court, 8
January 16; ``Zhou Qiang: Solve Difficult Problems With Unwavering
Confidence and Firmly Advance Judicial Reform'' [Zhou qiang: jianding
xinxin pojie nanti zhashi tuijin sifa gaige], Supreme People's Court, 8
July 16.
\8\ See, e.g., Li Qiang, ``Confidently Adhere to the Path, Dare To
Draw the Sword Against Erroneous Thought'' [Jianchi daolu zixin, ganyu
xiang cuowu sichao liang jian], People's Court Daily, 16 January 17;
Fan Mingzhi, ``Why China's National Conditions Do Not Allow for Copying
of Western Judicial Independence'' [Zhongguo guoqing weihe bu yunxu
zhaoban xifang sifa duli], People's Court Daily, 16 January 17; Lu
Zhen, ``Promoting Erroneous Thought Endangers the Nation's Political
Security'' [Guchui cuowu sichao weiji guojia zhengzhi anquan], People's
Court Daily, 18 January 17.
\9\ See, e.g., `` `Drawing a Sword Against Judicial Independence'
Sparked Debate Among Netizens'' [``Dui sifa duli liang jian'' yinfa
wangmin chunqiang shejian], Deutsche Welle, 16 January 17; Mai Yanting,
``Chief Justice Zhou Qiang Publicly Rejects Judicial Independence,
Commentary Says It Shows Regression and Violates United Nations'
Resolution'' [Dafaguan zhou qiang gongkai fandui sifa duli pinglun
cheng daoxing nishi jian wei lianheguo jueyi], Radio France
Internationale, 16 January 17; ``Chinese Intelligentsia Jointly Signed
Letter Asking Supreme Court's Zhou Qiang To `Go Away' '' [Zhongguo
zhishijie lianshu yaoqiu zuigaoyuan zhou qiang ``zou ren''], Voice of
America, 19 January 17; Jerome A. Cohen, ``China's Chief Justice's
Extraordinary Statement: The Most Enormous Ideological Setback for a
Professional Judiciary,'' Jerry's Blog, 17 January 17. According to New
York University School of Law professor Jerome Cohen, Zhou Qiang's
speech ``is much more threatening to the judicial cadres than the usual
recitation about the importance of following the Party line . . .. This
statement is the most enormous ideological setback for decades of
halting, uneven progress toward the creation of a professional,
impartial judiciary.''
\10\ ``Zhou Shifeng Sentenced in First Instance Trial, Guilty of
Subversion of State Power, Sentenced to Seven Years'' [Zhou shifeng an
yishen dangting xuanpan dianfu guojia zhengquan zuiming chengli panchu
youqi tuxing qi nian], Xinhua, 4 August 16. On August 4, the Tianjin
No. 2 Intermediate People's Court tried and sentenced Zhou Shifeng to
seven years' imprisonment. For more information on Zhou, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00272. Other
individuals connected to the case whom authorities also sentenced in
August 2016 are Hu Shigen, Gou Hongguo, and Zhai Yanmin. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2004-02053 on Hu Shigen, 2015-00331 on Gou Hongguo, and 2016-00115 on
Zhai Yanmin.
\11\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17, 2, 16, 24.
\12\ Amnesty International, ``China: Assault on Human Rights
Lawyers and Activists Escalates With Convictions After Sham Trials,'' 4
August 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Drop Cases Against Rights
Lawyers,'' 17 June 16; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``China's Latest
Crackdown Is Not Its Worst,'' 12 September 16; ``Rights Activists
Denounce Achievements Touted by Top China Judge,'' Voice of America, 14
March 17.
\13\ ``Supreme Court President Zhou Qiang: Sentencing Rights Lawyer
Is One of Court's Important Achievements in Past Year'' [Zuigao fayuan
yuanzhang zhou qiang: dui weiquan lushi panxing shi qunian fayuan
zhongda chengjiu zhiyi], Radio Free Asia, 12 March 17.
\14\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Wuxi Rights Defender
Cheng Sheng Criminally Detained by Binhu PSB of Wuxi Municipality for
Petitioning in Beijing'' [Wuxi weiquan renshi cheng sheng beijing
shangfang zao wuxi shi binhu gong'an fenju xingshi juliu], 5 February
17; Taiwan Association for Human Rights, ``Free Li Ming-Che: The Joint
Statement From NGOs,'' 30 March 17; Human Rights in China, ``Human
Rights in China: Chronicle of Major Events of Rights Defense in China
(March 13-March 26, 2017)'' [Zhongguo renquan: zhongguo weiquan dashi
ji (2017 nian 3 yue 13 ri 3 yue 26 ri)], 28 March 17; China Change,
``Liu Shaoming, a 1989 Veteran and a Labor Activist, Remains Imprisoned
Without Sentence,'' 31 May 17; ``Lawyer Says Administration Interferes
With Judiciary in Zhao Zhenjia's Case, Not Optimistic'' [Lushi zhi zhao
zhenjia an she xingzheng ganyu sifa burong leguan], Radio Free Asia, 11
August 17.
\15\ Guo Shihui, ``Donning Glory and Dream, Judicial Reform Sets
Sail Again'' [Daishang guangrong yu mengxiang, si gai zai qihang],
China Court Net, 29 December 16; Shan Yuxiao, ``One Month Since SPC
Newly Added Circuit Tribunals, Third Circuit Already Began To Hear Case
in Which Citizen Sues Official'' [Zuigaofa xin zeng xunhui fating
manyue san xun yi kaishen min gao guan an], Caixin, 27 January 17.
\16\ Cao Yajing, ``Taking Fast but Steady Strides, Making
Preparations for Advancement'' [Ti ji bu wen dili qianxing], China
Court Net, 27 October 16; Xu Li and Luo Zhijian, ``Building Unwavering
Confidence in Socialist Judicial System With Chinese Characteristics''
[Jianding zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sifa de zhidu zixin], Study Times,
12 April 17.
\17\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Central Second
Inspection Group Gives Feedback to Supreme People's Court on Itemized
Inspection'' [Zhongyang di er xunshi zu xiang zuigao renmin fayuan
dangzu fankui zhuanxiang xunshi qingkuang], 21 February 17. The article
reports that the inspection group conducted individual conversations,
received petitions from the public, and reviewed relevant documents.
The article, however, did not provide further details on what the group
inspected or the method it used to conduct the inspection.
\18\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Regulations on
Chinese Communist Party Inspection Work [Zhongguo gongchandang xunshi
gongzuo tiaoli], effective 3 August 15, arts. 14, 15. Courts were not
within the inspection group's jurisdiction prior to the August 2015
amendment. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Regulations on
Chinese Communist Party Inspection Work (Trial) [Zhongguo gongchandang
xunshi gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)], issued 13 July 09, art. 10.
\19\ Supreme People's Court Chinese Communist Party Group,
``Bulletin From the Supreme People's Court Party Group Concerning
Status of Inspection and Rectification'' [Zhonggong zuigao renmin
fayuan dangzu guanyu xunshi zhenggai qingkuang de tongbao], Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of Supervision, 27
April 17.
\20\ Li Wanxiang, ``Full Jurisdictional Coverage Achieved''
[Shixian guanxia fanwei quan fugai], Economic Daily, 30 December 16;
Supreme People's Court, ``Primary Reform Measures Used by Circuit
Tribunals'' [Guanyu xunhui fating caiqu de zhuyao gaige cuoshi], 28
January 15; Yu Ziru, ``SPC Fourth Circuit Tribunal Opens Today, Chief
Judge Jing Hanchao: Will Cultivate This `Experimental Field' Well''
[Zuigaofa di si xunhui fating jinri guapai tingzhang jing hanchao:
zhong hao zhe kuai ``shiyan tian''], Xinhua, 28 December 16; Qiu
Yanjun, ``SPC's Fifth Circuit Tribunal Hosts Party-Themed Activity''
[Zuigaofa di wu xunhui fating kaizhan zhuti dangri huodong], Supreme
People's Court Net, 3 January 17.
\21\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion on Implementing Judicial
Accountability (Trial) [Zuigao renmin fayuan sifa zerenzhi shishi
yijian (shixing)], issued 31 July 17, effective 1 August 17, reprinted
in EmpireLawyers (fakediguo), WeChat post, 13 August 17, art. 60(5).
\22\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, items 3.1, 3.2;
Supreme People's Court, Certain Opinions on Improving Judicial
Accountability of the People's Courts [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu
wanshan renmin fayuan sifa zerenzhi de ruogan yijian], issued 21
September 15, arts. 15.2, 17, 25. The Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee set forth the judicial accountability reform policy in the
Fourth Plenum Decision in October 2014, and the Supreme People's Court
issued a document detailing the reform measures in September 2015.
\23\ Na Diya, ``Meng Jianzhu: The Key to Judicial Accountability
Reform Is To Truly Carry Out Central Committee Policy'' [Meng jianzhu:
sifa zerenzhi gaige shouxian yao buzhe bukou zhixing hao zhongyang
zhengce], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 13 January 17.
\24\ ``Meng Jianzhu: Ensure Immediate Effectiveness of Policies and
Measures on Judicial Reform'' [Meng jianzhu: quebao sifa gaige zhengce
cuoshi luodi jianxiao], Supreme People's Court Net, 30 March 17.
\25\ ``British Media: Unprecedented Personnel Reshuffling Before
CCP 19th Party Congress'' [Ying mei: zhonggong shijiu da qian kongqian
renshi da xipai], Duowei News, 9 January 17.
\26\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion on Implementing Judicial
Accountability System and Improving Adjudication Supervision
Administrative Mechanism (Trial) [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu luoshi
sifa zerenzhi wanshan shenpan jiandu guanli jizhi de yijian (shixing)],
issued 12 April 17, effective 1 May 17, items 1, 2. The SPC issued this
opinion to elaborate on certain aspects of the reform laid out in an
earlier SPC opinion issued in 2015. Supreme People's Court, Certain
Opinions on Improving Judicial Accountability of the People's Courts
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu wanshan renmin fayuan sifa zerenzhi de
ruogan yijian], issued 21 September 15. See also ``Q&A on Hot Topics of
Judicial Reform'' [Sifa gaige redian wenda], People's Court Daily,
reprinted in China Court Net, 10 April 17; Supreme People's Court,
Opinion on Implementing Judicial Accountability (Trial) [Zuigao renmin
fayuan sifa zerenzhi shishi yijian (shixing)], issued 31 July 17,
effective 1 August 17, reprinted in EmpireLawyers (fakediguo), WeChat
post, 13 August 17, art. 12; Susan Finder, ``Supreme People's Court
Ramps Up Its Judicial Responsibility System,'' Supreme People's Court
Monitor (blog), 13 August 17. Susan Finder noted that the official text
of the trial implementing opinion had not been issued as of August 13,
2017, but that several WeChat accounts had posted the document.
\27\ See, e.g., You Chunliang and Wang Dongxing, ``Shenzhen
Intermediate Court Comprehensively Implements Judicial Accountability
System'' [Shenzhen zhongyuan quanmian luoshi sifa zerenzhi], Legal
Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 1 October 16; Li Yakun et al., ``Shenzhen
Intermediate Court Takes the Lead in Implementing Reform on Judicial
Accountability System'' [Shenzhen zhongyuan shuaixian luoshi sifa
zerenzhi gaige], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 19 September 16;
``Shenzhen Court Comprehensively Implements Judicial Accountability
System, How To Pursue Accountability in Case Adjudication Problems? ''
[Shenzhen fayuan quanmian luoshi sifa zerenzhi pan'an wenti ruhe
zhuize?], Bendibao, 19 September 16.
\28\ See, e.g., Yan Jiyong and Gao Qun, ``At Judicial
Accountability System Reform Leading Small Group Conference Held at
Provincial Court, Bai Quanmin Places Emphasis on Working Hard To
Implement and Push Reform Development Continuously and Extensively''
[Bai quanmin zai sheng fayuan sifa zerenzhi gaige lingdao xiaozu huiyi
shang qiangdiao puxia shenzi zhua luoshi, buduan tuidong gaige xiang
zongshen fazhan], reprinted in Shandong Provincial High People's Court,
27 April 17; Peng Qi, ``District-Wide Judicial Reform Report Conference
Convenes'' [Quan qu sifa tizhi gaige huibao hui zhaokai], Tibet Daily,
3 June 17; Zong He, ``Meeting of Provincial Party Committee Standing
Committee Emphasizes Seriously Learning and Implementing Important
Instructional Directive Issued by General Secretary Xi Jinping To
Ensure Various Judicial Reforms in Our Province Are Immediately
Effective'' [Shengwei changweihui huiyi qiangdiao renzhen xuexi guanche
xi jinping zongshuji zhongyao pishi jingshen quebao wosheng sifa tizhi
gaige gexiang renwu luodi jianxiao], Anhui Daily, 21 July 17.
\29\ Hu Shihao, ``Ensure Immediate Effectiveness of Judicial
Accountability System Reform'' [Quebao sifa zerenzhi gaige luodi
jianxiao], People's Court Daily, 18 April 17. Problems that the
judicial accountability reform aims to address include court presidents
and chief judges taking part in adjudicating cases that they are not
assigned to and ineffective supervision of associate judges. Supreme
People's Court, Certain Opinions on Improving Judicial Accountability
of the People's Courts [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu wanshan renmin
fayuan sifa zerenzhi de ruogan yijian], issued 21 September 15, arts.
6, 21-24.
\30\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17. SPC President Zhou Qiang reported that
courts below the SPC accepted 18 percent more new cases in 2016 than
2015, and that the national rate of on-site case filing reached 95
percent. Sun Quan and Gou Lianjing, ``Three Highlights Emerge in Wuxi
Liangxi Court's `Anti-Domestic Violence' Work'' [Wuxi liangxi fayuan
``fan jiabao'' gongzuo zaixian san liangdian], China News Service, 24
November 16. A court in Wuxi municipality, Jiangsu province, reported
that it had established a system to expedite case filing in domestic
violence cases.
\31\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item 4.2.
\32\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Certain Issues Related
to Case-Filing Registration [Zuigaoyuan guanyu dengji li'an ruogan
wenti de guiding], issued 13 April 15, effective 1 May 15, arts. 2, 4-
6; Supreme People's Court, Opinion on People's Courts' Implementation
of the Case-Filing Registration System Reform [Guanyu renmin fayuan
tuixing li'an dengji zhi gaige de yijian], issued 15 April 15,
effective 1 May 15, items 2.1-2.5; Supreme People's Court, Judicial
Reform of Chinese Courts [Zhongguo fayuan de sifa gaige], February
2016, 30.
\33\ Ren Rong et al., Beiguan District Court, Anyang Municipality,
Henan Province, ``How To Develop the Functions and Operations of Case-
Filing Courts'' [Guanyu li'an ting de zhineng jiqi zhineng fahui],
Minsheng Legal Weekly, 20 December 15; Fan Chunsheng, ``Findings of a
Court That Pioneered the Case-Filing Review System: Litigation Is No
Longer Difficult'' [Yi jia li'an dengji zhi gaige xianxing fayuan de
tansuo: da guansi buzai nan], Xinhua, 26 January 16.
\34\ ``I Want To File a Case--Shanghai Judiciary's Failings Case
Compilation (Volume 5)'' [Wo yao li'an--shanghai bu zuowei anli huibian
(di 5 ji)], ed. Feng Zhenghu, Feng Zhenghu Blog, January 2017.
\35\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Certain Issues Related
to Case-Filing Registration [Zuigaoyuan guanyu dengji li'an ruogan
wenti de guiding], issued 13 April 15, effective 1 May 15, art. 9. The
SPC opinion requires courts to issue an order or decision explaining
the basis of the court's refusal to open a case.
\36\ ``I Want To File a Case--Shanghai Judiciary's Failings Case
Compilation (Volume 5)'' [Wo yao li'an--shanghai bu zuowei anli huibian
(di 5 ji)], ed. Feng Zhenghu, Feng Zhenghu Blog, January 2017.
\37\ ``Beijing Independent Candidate Complained at People's
Congress but No One Helped Him, Five People Assisting Campaign in
Shanghai Administratively Detained for `Sabotaging Elections' ''
[Beijing duli houxuanren renda tousu wuren jiedai shanghai 5 ren
zhuxuan bei yi ``pohuai xuanju zui'' xingju], Radio Free Asia, 15
November 16; ``Shanghai Rights Defender Feng Zhenghu Runs for People's
Congress, Citizens Assisting Campaign Taken Away by Police'' [Shanghai
weiquan renshi feng zhenghu canxuan renda daibiao zhuxuan minzhong zao
jingfang daizou], Radio Free Asia, 14 November 16.
\38\ ``5 Campaign Assistants of Feng Zhenghu Brought Litigation
Over Their Administrative Detention, Court Did Not Accept Case'' [Feng
zhenghu 5 ming zhuxuan bei xingju tiqi susong bu huo fayuan shouli],
Radio Free Asia, 18 April 17.
\39\ Ibid.
\40\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``In an Effort To Stop
Beijing PSB's Illegal Reprimand, Rights Defender Wu Jufang From
Nanjing, Jiangsu, Contests and Appeals Beijing Xicheng Court's Decision
Refusing To Open Case'' [Ezhi beijing gong'an weifa xunjie, jiangsu
nanjing weiquan renshi wu jufang bufu beijing xicheng fayuan buyu li'an
caiding tiqi shangsu], 21 March 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Case Not
Opened Over One Year After Complaining of Illegality in Land Matter, Ye
Yanqing of Yiwu Won in Remand Petition'' [Jubao tudi weifa yinian duo
wei li'an, yiwu ye yanqing shenqing zaishen huosheng], 19 February 17;
Rights Defense Network, ``Feidong County Court Opened Administrative
Litigation Case Filed by Huang Kejin, Contesting Administrative
Detention Punishment Imposed by Feidong Police for Walking Near
Tiananmen Square'' [Huang kejin bufu feidong jingfang dui qi zai
tian'anmen guangchang fujin xingzou xingwei de zhi'an juliu chufa zhi
xingzheng susong huo feidong xian fayuan li'an], 28 December 16; ``709
Crackdown: Lawyer Jiang Tianyong Formally Arrested After Expiration of
`Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location' '' [709 da zhuabu:
jiang tianyong lushi ``jianshi juzhu'' qiman zao zhengshi daibu], Radio
Free Asia, 1 June 17.
\41\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item 4.3.
\42\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry
of Justice, Opinion on Promoting Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure
System Reform [Guanyu tuijin yi shenpan wei zhongxin de xingshi susong
zhidu gaige yijian], 10 October 16, items 8, 12, 13. The Party's
Leading Small Group on Comprehensive Reform issued an opinion on this
subject matter in June 2016. ``Xi Jinping: Concentrate Reform Resources
and Activate Innovative Energy To Improve Effectiveness in Carrying Out
Reform Work'' [Xi jinping: juji gaige ziyuan jifa chuangxin huoli
gengjia fuyou chengxiao zhuahao gaige gongzuo], Xinhua, 27 June 16.
\43\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry
of Justice, Opinion on Promoting Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure
System Reform [Guanyu tuijin yi shenpan wei zhongxin de xingshi susong
zhidu gaige yijian], 10 October 16, item 12. The implementing opinion
issued by the Supreme People's Court in February 2017 retains similar
language. Supreme People's Court, Opinion on Implementing
Comprehensively Promoting Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure Reform
[Guanyu quanmian tuijin yi shenpan wei zhongxin de xingshi susong zhidu
gaige de shishi yijian], issued 17 February 17, art. 14.
\44\ Yu Ziru, ``Chen Zhiyuan: Continue To Promote Trial-Centered
Criminal Procedure System Reform, Work Hard To Raise `Three Rates' ''
[Chen zhiyuan: jixu tuijin yi shenpan wei zhongxin de xingshi susong
zhidu gaige lizheng tigao ``san lu''], Xinhua, 12 March 17. See also
``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo
baogao], 12 March 17, 13.
\45\ Liu Jingkun, ``Supreme People's Court Prepares To Start the
`Three Procedures' Pilot Program'' [Zuigao fayuan bushu kaizhan
``sanxiang guicheng'' shidian gongzuo], People's Court Daily, 11 June
17.
\46\ Zhou Qiang, ``Supreme People's Court Report on the Status of
Deepening Judicial Disclosure and Promoting Access to Justice'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu shenhua sifa gongkai, cujin sifa gongzheng
qingkuang de baogao], National People's Congress, 5 November 16. See
also Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item 4.4.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Publishing Case
Judgments Online by People's Courts [Guanyu renmin fayuan zai
hulianwang gongbu caipan wenshu de guiding], issued 25 July 16,
effective 1 October 16, art. 6.
\49\ Annual Report on China's Rule of Law, No. 15 (2017) [Zhongguo
fazhi fazhan baogao no. 15 (2017)], eds. Li Lin and Tian He (Beijing:
Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2017), 241-42.
\50\ Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' April 2017,
8, 27-28.
\51\ Hao Xixi, ``Some Thoughts on Improving the Quality of Legal
Aid Services'' [Dui tigao falu yuanzhu fuwu zhiliang de jidian sikao],
China Court Net (Baotou Development District Court), reprinted in China
Legal Aid Net, 14 October 16.
\52\ Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance, Opinion on
Lawyers Carrying Out Legal Aid Work [Guanyu lushi kaizhan falu yuanzhu
gongzuo de yijian], issued 17 February 17, item 5. See also Wang Qian
``Vice Minister of Justice Zhao Dacheng Offers Detailed Explanation for
`Opinion on Lawyers Carrying Out Legal Aid Work' '' [Sifabu fubuzhang
zhao dacheng xiangjie ``guanyu lushi kaizhan falu yuanzhu gongzuo de
yijian''], Xinhua, 9 March 17.
\53\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, and
Ministry of Justice, Opinion on Gradually Implementing Legal
Representation System in Criminal Case Petitions [Guanyu zhubu shixing
lushi daili shensu zhidu de yijian], issued 1 April 17, arts. 1, 4, 5.
\54\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 241; Zhou Bin, ``SPP Criminal Case
Petition Division Director Explains Procuratorate's Work in Criminal
Case Petitions: Firmly Guard Against Wrongful Convictions'' [Zuigaojian
xingshi shensu ting tingzhang jiedu xingshi shensu jiancha gongzuo:
shoulao fangzhi yuanjia cuo'an dixian], Legal Daily, reprinted in
Supreme People's Procuratorate, 22 February 17.
\55\ Aaron Halegua, ``Who Will Represent China's Workers? Lawyers,
Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of Labor Rights,'' New York University
School of Law, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, October 2016, 23.
\56\ Regulations on Letters and Visits, issued 5 January 05,
effective 1 May 05; Benjamin L. Liebman, ``A Populist Threat to China's
Courts? '' in Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary
China, eds. Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Liang Shibin, ``Resolutely Fight To
Win the Battle on Clearing Backlog of Petitioning Cases'' [Jianjue da
ying huajie xinfang ji'an gong jian zhan], Legal Daily, 27 April 16.
Such grievances reportedly include cases concerning demolition or
expropriation of property, social security, agriculture, land and
resources, and environmental protection.
\57\ See, e.g., ``Over Ten Thousand Temporary Teachers From 29
Provinces and Municipalities Caused Another National Group Petitioning
Movement'' [29 shengshi yu wan ming minban jiaoshi zai xian quanguo
jiti shangfang chao], Radio Free Asia, 19 October 16; ``Two Thousand
Petitioners From Shaanxi Went Petitioning at Provincial Letters and
Visits Bureau, Ask for Release of Rights Defense Representative''
[Shaanxi liangqian min shi sheng xinfang ju shangfang yaoqiu shifang
weiquan daibiao], Radio Free Asia, 13 April 17.
\58\ See, e.g., Liu Yuguo, ``Chengdu Establishes a New Platform for
`Sunshine Petitioning' '' [Chengdu dazao ``yangguang xinfang'' xin
pingtai], People's Daily, 4 May 16; Liu Guiying, ``Problems and
Improvements of the Grassroots Petitioning System'' [Jiceng xinfang
zhidu cunzai de wenti ji wanshan], People's Tribune, 23 March 16; Xu
Dandan, ``Discussion of Shortcomings of China's Petitioning System and
Their Solutions'' [Qiantan zhongguo xinfang zhidu de biduan ji qi
jiejue tujing], Feiyang Net, 27 February 16.
\59\ State Bureau of Letters and Visits, ``State Bureau of Letters
and Visits Convenes Press Conference To Explain `Implementing Measures
on Letters and Visits Accountability System' '' [Guojia xinfang ju
zhaokai xinwen tongqi hui jiedu ``xinfang gongzuo zerenzhi shishi
banfa''], 26 October 16.
\60\ Guo Hongmin, ``Record-Deleting `Money-Hoarding Syndicate' of
State Bureau of Letters and Visits'' [Guojia xinfang ju de xiaohao
``liancai tuan''], Prosecutorial View, 2 May 17.
\61\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and
State Council General Office, Measures on Implementing Calls and Visits
Accountability System [Xinfang gongzuo zeren zhi shishi banfa],
effective 8 October 16, arts. 9, 11.
\62\ Yuechi County Public Security Bureau (Yuechi gong'an),
``Report Regarding the Death of Yang Tianzhi'' [Guanyu yang tianzhi
siwang anjian de qingkuang baogao], Weibo post, 12 November 16. See
also Wu Yang, ``Report From Yuechi, Sichuan, Regarding `Interception
and Detention of Male Petitioner in His 70s Resulted in Death': 9
Individuals Taken Into Custody, County Commission for Discipline
Inspection Starts Accountability Mechanism'' [Sichuan yuechi tongbao
``jie fang jujin zhi 7 xun nanzi siwang'': zhuahuo 9 ren xian jiwei
qidong wenze], China Youth Daily, 14 November 16.
\63\ See, e.g., ``Over a Thousand Petitioners From Different Places
Gather in Beijing To Protest Violent Interception of Petitioners'' [Yu
qian gedi fangmin beijing kangyi baoli jie fang], Radio Free Asia, 28
November 16; ``Pregnant Petitioner From Heilongjiang Sent Home With
Mouth and Body Bound'' [Heilongjiang yunfu fangmin zao feng kou kunbang
qianfan], Radio Free Asia, 23 January 17; Voice of Petitioners, ``Over
a Hundred Old Veterans From Sichuan Petitioned at Provincial Civil
Affairs Department and Were Violently Driven From Scene'' [Sichuan bai
yu tuiwu laobing sheng min zheng ting qingyuan bei baoli qingchang], 8
February 17.
\64\ See, e.g., ``Arrest for Shenyang Petitioner Lin Mingjie
Approved, Guangdong Rights Defender Xiao Yuhui Criminally Detained''
[Shenyang fangmin lin mingjie bei pi bu guangdong weiquan renshi xiao
yuhui zao xingju], Radio Free Asia, 7 October 16; Voice of Petitioners,
``Liaoning Dalian Zhou Jinxia Detained for `Abnormal' Petitioning''
[Liaoning dalian zhou jinxia yin ``feizhengchang'' shangfang bei
juliu], 15 March 17; Voice of Petitioners, ``Wuhan's Jiang Yanchun
Released on Bail After 36 Days' Arbitrary Detention'' [Wuhan jiang
yanchun zao renyi jiya 36 tian hou qubao shifang], 4 January 17.
\65\ See, e.g., Voice of Petitioners, ``Wuhan's Jiang Yanchun
Released on Bail After 36 Days' Arbitrary Detention'' [Wuhan jiang
yanchun zao renyi jiya 36 tian hou qubao shifang], 4 January 17;
``Hubei Rights Defender Ding Yuanshun Released on Bail'' [Hubei weiquan
renshi ding yuanshun bei qubao], Radio Free Asia, 16 January 17; Rights
Defense Network, ``Rights Defender Zhao Zhenjia Arrested, Urgent Need
for Human Rights Lawyer To Provide Legal Aid'' [Renquan hanweizhe zhao
zhenjia bei daibu, ji xu renquan lushi tigong falu yuanzhu], 25
February 17.
\66\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Rights Defender Ding Deyuan
Criminally Detained for `Obstructing Official Business,' Tortured in
PSB Detention Center'' [Shanghai renquan hanweizhe ding deyuan zao
jingfang yi ``fang'ai gongwu zui'' xingju kanshousuo zao nuedai], 14
November 16; ``Hundreds of Sent-Down Youth Clash With Police While
Defending Rights in Shanghai, One Person Criminally Detained''
[Shanghai shubai zhiqing weiquan yu jingfang chongtu yi ren bei
xingju], Radio Free Asia, 16 September 16.
\67\ See, e.g., Voice of Petitioners, ``Two Sessions Nearing, Many
Petitioners Detained or Lost Contact'' [Lianghui linjin duoming fangmin
zao zhuabu shilian], 2 March 17; ``Social Stability During `Two
Sessions': Petitioners in Beijing Continue To Be Intercepted by Local
Authorities, Internet Space Narrows'' [``Lianghui'' weiwen: zai jing
fangmin chixu zao difang dangju lanjie wangluo kongjian shouzhai],
Radio Free Asia, 2 March 17; ``Government on Guard as Two Sessions in
China Convene, Many Petitioners Detained'' [Zhongguo lianghui zhaokai
dangju yanzhen yidai duoming fangmin bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 5
March 17; ``As Two Sessions Nears, Petitioners From Hong Kong Said To
Be Taken Away or Subjected to Soft Detention'' [Quanguo lianghui linjin
gangren fangmin chuan zao daizou huo ruanjin], Oriental Daily, 27
February 17.
\68\ For more information on Liu Feiyue, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00460.
\69\ For more information on Huang Qi, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-04053.
\70\ Rights Defense Network, ``Bulletin on Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch Director Liu Feiyue's Case: Family Members Receive
`Arrest Notice' From Suizhou Municipality, Hubei, PSB'' [Minsheng
guancha fuzeren liu feiyue an tongbao: jiashu shoudao hubei suizhou shi
gong'anju fa de ``daibu tongzhishu''], 11 January 17; Rights Defense
Network, ``Mainland NGO `64 Tianwang' Director Huang Qi Arrested by
Authorities'' [Dalu NGO ``liusi tianwang'' fuzeren huang qi yi bei
dangju zhixing daibu], 20 December 16; ``Sichuan State Security Summon
Tianwang Volunteers in Close Succession To Collect Evidence, Huang Qi
Suspected of Serious Criminal Offenses'' [Sichuan guobao miji chuanhuan
tianwang yigong souzheng zhi huang qi she yanzhong xingshi zuixing],
Radio Free Asia, 5 December 16.
\71\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Introduction to CRLW''
[Minsheng jianjie], last visited on 28 March 17; `` `64 Tianwang'
Founder Huang Qi Detained, Home Raided by Police'' [``Liusi tianwang''
chuangbanren huang qi zao jingfang chaojia jiya], Radio Free Asia, 29
November 16.
\72\ ``Sichuan State Security Summon Tianwang Volunteers in Close
Succession To Collect Evidence, Huang Qi Suspected of Serious Criminal
Offenses'' [Sichuan guobao miji chuanhuan tianwang yigong souzheng zhi
huang qi she yanzhong xingshi zuixing], Radio Free Asia, 5 December 16.
\73\ For more information on Chang Hongyan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00109.
\74\ ``Hearing Held on Heilongjiang Petitioner Chang Hongyan's
Case, Petitioners Detained for Showing Support Outside Court''
[Heilongjiang fangmin chang hongyan an kaiting fangmin fayuan wai
shengyuan bei zao zhuabu], Radio Free Asia, 2 March 17. See also Rights
Defense Network, ``Chang Hongyan, Host of `Petitioners Saturday,' Taken
Into Custody in Lu Village, Beijing, Arrest Approved on Suspicion of
Obstructing Official Business'' [``Fangmin xingqi liu'' zhuchiren chang
hongyan zai beijing lu cun bei yi shexian fanghai gongwu zui pibu
zhuazou], 21 January 17; ``Petitioner Chang Hongyan Arrested in
Beijing, Zhao Zhenjia Detained for Organizing Signed Petition To Oppose
Interception of Petitioners'' [Fangmin chang hongyan zai jing zao daibu
zhao zhenjia zuzhi fan jiefang qianming bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 20
January 17; Rights Defense Network, ``Fengtai District Procuratorate in
Beijing Indicts Heilongjiang Rights Defender Chang Hongyan for
`Obstructing Official Business,' Because of Observing Interception of
Petitioners'' [Heilongjiang weiquan renshi chang hongyan yin weiguan
jiefang mianlin bei beijing fengtai qu jianchayuan yi ``fanghai gongwu
zui'' qisu], 27 December 16.
\75\ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China, Philip
Alston, A/HRC/35/26/Add.2, 28 March 17, para. 72.
\76\ See, e.g., Josh Chin and Te-Ping Chen, ``China Targets Human-
Rights Lawyers in Crackdown,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 July 15; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Secretly Detained Lawyers at Risk of Torture,''
20 July 15; Huang Qingchang and Zou Wei, ``Revealing the Dark Secrets
of `Rights Defense' Incidents'' [Jiekai ``weiquan'' shijian de heimu],
Xinhua, 11 July 15.
\77\ For more information on Li Heping, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00284.
\78\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``July 9 Crackdown: Lawyer Li
Heping Secretly Tried by Tianjin No. 2 Intermediate Court on April 25,
Sentenced on April 28 To Serve Three Years, Suspended for Four'' [709
da zhuabu li heping lushi yu 4 yue 25 ri zao tianjin er zhong yuan mimi
shenpan 4 yue 28 ri xuanpan huoxing san nian huanqi si nian zhixing],
28 April 17.
\79\ For more information on Xie Yang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.
\80\ Josh Chin, ``China Court Says Lawyer Retracts Torture Charge;
Wife Calls Trial a Farce,'' Wall Street Journal, 8 May 17.
\81\ Ibid.
\82\ ``709 Crackdown: Letter Written by Xie Yang Revealed, Says He
Has Not `Pleaded Guilty'; Li Wenzu Received Death Threat'' [709 da
zhuabu: xie yang qinbi xin baoguang fou ``renzui'' li wenzu zao siwang
weixie], Radio Free Asia, 8 March 17.
\83\ Ye Xuan, ``Xie Yang Released on Bail but Is Forced To
`Recover,' Wife and Daughters' Escape Experience Revealed'' [Xie yang
qubao huoshi you bei ``liaoyang'' qi nu taowang lixian bei pilu],
Deutsche Welle, 11 May 17; Chen Guiqiu, ``I Hope That Xie Yang Will Be
Truly Free'' [Chen guiqiu: xiwang xie yang huode zhenzheng de ziyou],
Amnesty International, 10 May 17.
\84\ ``Hunan 709 Lawyer Xie Yang Returns Home, Asks That
Surveillance Installations Be Dismantled'' [Hunan 709 lushi xie yang
chongfan jiazhong yaoqiu chaichu jiankong sheshi], Radio Free Asia, 9
August 17.
\85\ For more information on Wang Quanzhang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00278.
\86\ Rights Defense Network, ``July 9 Case Bulletin: Lawyer Wang
Quanzhang Indicted for Subversion of State Power'' [709 an tongbao:
wang quanzhang lushi bei yi dianfu guojia zhengquan zui qisu], 15
February 17.
\87\ Li Wenzu et al., ``Sincerely Invite CCTV To Interview Family
of Lawyer Wang Quanzhang in 709 Crackdown'' [Li wenzu deng: chengzhi
yaoqing CCTV caifang 709 da zhuabu wang quanzhang lushi de jiating],
reprinted in Independent Chinese PEN Center, 5 July 17; ``Lawyer's
Application for Meeting Denied, Wang Quanzhang `Disappeared' Again''
[Lushi shenqing huijian bei ju wang quanzhang zaidu ``shizong''], Radio
Free Asia, 31 July 17.
\88\ For more information on Jiang Tianyong, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00179.
\89\ Rights Defense Network, ``Record of Developments in Forcible
Disappearance Incident of Rights Lawyer Jiang Tianyong (Through
December 4, 2016)'' [Renquan lushi jiang tianyong zao qiangpo shizong
shijian jinzhan jilu (jiezhi 2016 nian 12 yue 4 ri)], 4 December 16.
\90\ ``Jiang Tianyong Detained Over a Month, Family Just Received
Residential Surveillance Notice'' [Jiang tianyong bei zhua yu yue
jiashu cai jie jian ju tongzhi], Radio Free Asia, 23 December 16.
\91\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiang Tianyong's Arrest Approved on
Suspicion of `Subversion of State Power,' His Father Today Formally
Received Arrest Notice'' [Jiang tianyong bei she ``dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui'' pibu qi fu jinri zhengshi shoudao daibu tongzhishu], 5
June 17.
\92\ For more information on Li Chunfu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00311.
\93\ For more information on Xie Yanyi, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00308.
\94\ Human Rights in China, ``Detained in `709' [Crackdown], Lawyer
Li Chunfu Released on Bail, Physical and Mental Conditions Abnormal''
[``709'' bei bu lushi li chunfu qubao houshen, shenxin zhuangkuang
yichang], 13 January 17; ``709 Incident Lawyer Li Chunfu Driven Insane
After 1 and a Half Years of Torture'' [709 shijian lushi li chunfu zao
1 nian ban kuxing bifeng], Radio Free Asia, 14 January 17; ``Human
Rights Lawyer Xie Yanyi Still Not Free After Release on Bail'' [Renquan
lushi xie yanyi qubao houshen hou reng bu ziyou], Voice of America, 6
January 17.
\95\ For more information on Wu Gan, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2010-00348.
\96\ ``Authorities Acted As If Facing Enemy During Wu Gan's Closed
Trial, About 20 Citizens Detained Outside Courthouse'' [Wu gan an bimen
shenli dangju rulin dadi yue 20 gongmin fayuan wai bei zhua], Radio
Free Asia, 14 August 17. See also Human Rights Campaign in China,
``Butcher Wu Gan Case: Tianjin Municipal People's Procuratorate Second
Branch Indicts Him on Suspicion of Subversion of State Power for
Behavior Including Online Essays, Raising Banners in Front of Court,
Posting Videos on the Internet, Holding Signs, Collecting Donations for
the Jiansanjiang Case, Submitting a Complaint Letter, and Posting Big-
Character Posters'' [Tufu wu gan an tianjin shi renmin jianchayuan di
er fen yuan yi tufu wangshang wenzhang, fayuan menkou la hengfu,
luxiang shangchuan dao hulianwang, ju pai, jiansanjiang an mujuan,
dijiao konggao xin, zhangtie dazibao deng xingwei qisu qi dianfu guojia
zhengquan zui], 4 January 17.
\97\ ``709 Wu Gan's Case Returned for Investigation Again, Jiang
Tianyong Continues To Be Denied Counsel Meeting'' [709 an wu gan zai
tui zhen jiang tianyong reng jinjian lushi], Radio Free Asia, 21 July
17.
\98\ Rights Defense Network, ``Urgent Attention: Human Rights
Defender Butcher (Wu Gan) Detained at Jiangxi High Court Gates'' [Jinji
guanzhu: weiquan renshi tufu (wu gan) zai jiangxi gaoyuan menkou
beizhua], 19 May 15.
\99\ Sida Liu and Terence C. Halliday, Criminal Defense in China:
The Politics of Lawyers at Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2016), 113.
\100\ ``Zhou Shifeng: Chinese Law Firm Founder Jailed for
Subversion,'' BBC, 4 August 16.
\101\ ``Liu Xiaoyuan Criticizes Government for Engaging in Cultural
Revolution Style Persecution by Association in 709 Case'' [Liu xiaoyuan
piping 709 an dangju gao wenge shi zhulian], Radio Free Asia, 22 March
17.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ ``Wang Yu's Lawyer Yu Wensheng Went to Inner Mongolia To
Visit Her With No Result'' [Wang yu daili lushi yu wensheng fu neimeng
tanwang wu guo], Radio Free Asia, 10 October 16.
\104\ ``Family Members in 709 Case Harassed, Beijing Seems To
Conclude Case in Haste'' [709 an jiashu zao saorao beijing si jiyu
jie'an], Voice of America, 3 May 17; Human Rights Campaign in China,
``709 Crackdown: Surveillance on 709 Family Escalates, Li Heping's Wife
Wang Qiaoling Worried She Might Be Forcibly Disappeared and Leaves Last
Words in Case of Unforeseen Circumstances'' [709 da zhuabu shijian 709
jiashu jiankong shengji li heping qizi wang qiaoling danxin bei shizong
tiqian liuxia yiyan yifang buce], 7 April 17; ``Li Wenzu's Efforts To
Rent Home Thwarted, Yuan Shanshan's Family Harassed'' [Li wenzu zufang
shouzu yuan shanshan jiaren bei saorao], Radio Free Asia, 29 August 16.
\105\ ``Over a Hundred Lawyers in China Issued Joint Letter Calling
for Release of Human Rights Lawyer and His Family'' [Zhongguo bai ming
lushi lianshu cu shifang renquan lushi ji jiaren], Voice of America, 4
May 17; Gerry Shih, ``AP Exclusive: China Lawyer's Family Says US
Helped Them Flee,'' Associated Press, 9 May 17.
\106\ ``709 Lawyer Xie Yanyi's Wife Faces Pressure and Eviction''
[709 lushi xie yanyi qizi zao shiya poqian], Radio Free Asia, 19
October 16; ``Li Wenzu's Efforts To Rent Home Thwarted, Yuan Shanshan's
Family Harassed'' [Li wenzu zufang shouzu yuan shanshan jiaren bei
saorao], Radio Free Asia, 29 August 16.
\107\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Lawyer Chen Jian'gang
Faces Difficult Situation Again, His Child Denied Admission to School''
[Haizi shangxue bei ju chen jian'gang lushi you yu buke miaoshu de
zhuangkuang], 16 May 17; ``709 Case: Li Wenzu's Son Prevented From
Attending School by State Security, Lawyer Zhang Kai Harassed by
Police'' [709 an: li wenzu erzi bei guobao zunao wufa shangxue zhang
kai lushi zao jingcha saorao], China Free Press, 1 September 16.
\108\ Ministry of Justice, Measures on Managing Lawyers' Practice
of Law [Lushi zhiye guanli banfa], issued 28 May 08, amended 18
September 16, effective 1 November 16; Ministry of Justice, Measures on
Managing Law Firms [Lushi shiwusuo guanli banfa], issued 28 May 08,
amended 30 November 12, 6 September 16, effective 1 November 16.
\109\ Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Adopted by the
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990,
preamble, arts. 20, 23. The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
emphasizes the right of having access to an independent legal
profession and grants lawyers freedom of expression and association, as
well as civil and penal immunity for good faith statements made in the
course of carrying out their duties.
\110\ Ministry of Justice, Measures on Managing Lawyers' Practice
of Law [Lushi zhiye guanli banfa], issued 28 May 08, amended 18
September 16, effective 1 November 16, arts. 2, 37-40; Ministry of
Justice, Measures on Managing Law Firms [Lushi shiwusuo guanli banfa],
issued 28 May 08, amended 30 November 12, 6 September 16, effective 1
November 16, arts. 3, 50. For prior versions of the measures, see
Ministry of Justice, Measures on Managing Lawyers' Practice of Law
[Lushi zhiye guanli banfa], issued 28 May 08, effective 18 July 08;
Ministry of Justice, Measures on Managing Law Firms [Lushi shiwusuo
guanli banfa], issued 28 May 08, effective 18 July 08.
\111\ Ministry of Justice, Measures on Managing Law Firms [Lushi
shiwusuo guanli banfa], issued 18 July 08, amended 30 November 12, 6
September 16, effective 1 November 16, art. 4.
\112\ ``Proposal To Duly Repeal Measures on Managing Law Firms
Recently Issued by Ministry of Justice'' [Yifa chexiao sifabu xin ban
lushi shiwu suo guanli banfa de jianyi shu], 30 September 16, reprinted
in Constitution and Human Rights Net, 9 October 16. Other legal
professionals and NGOs likewise voiced opposition to the amendments.
See, e.g., ``Three Human Rights Lawyers Call for Repealing
Unconstitutional Measures on Managing Law Firms'' [San renquan lushi
huyu chexiao weixian de lusuo guanli banfa], Radio Free Asia, 27
September 16; ``Chinese Ministry of Justice's Measures on Managing Law
Firms Caused Discontent, Lawyer Wang Quanping Alleges Minister Wu
Aiying Responsible for Violating Law and Dereliction of Duty''
[Zhongguo sifabu lusuo guanli banfa yin buman lushi wang quanping
konggao buzhang wu aiying weifa shizhi], Radio Free Asia, 27 October
16; ``China Issues Another Amendment, New Rules on Measures on Managing
Lawyers' Practice of Law, Lawyers Issue Statement of `Four Refusals' ''
[Zhongguo zai xiuding lushi zhiye guanli xin gui lushi fabiao ``si bu''
shengming], Radio Free Asia, 21 October 16; Yu Pinjian, ``Angrily
Denouncing Ten Violations of Measures on Managing Law Firms!' '' [Nuchi
xin ``lushi shiwusuo guanli banfa'' zhi shi zong zui!], Yu Pinjian's
Blog, 16 October 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Revised Measures
on Law Firms Further Curb Independence of Chinese Lawyers (9/21-10/3,
2016),'' 3 October 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Rules Gag
Lawyers,'' 25 October 16; Human Rights Now, ``Day of the Endangered
Lawyer 2017,'' 24 January 17, 1-3.
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
IV. Xinjiang
Security Measures and Conflict
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, central and
regional government authorities introduced new security
measures and expanded implementation of existing security
controls targeting Uyghur communities and individuals in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). According to official
statistics, XUAR authorities spent 30.05 billion yuan
(approximately US$4.43 billion) on public security in 2016,
nearly 20 percent more than the previous year.\1\ After Chen
Quanguo became XUAR Communist Party Secretary in August 2016,
replacing Zhang Chunxian,\2\ regional authorities implemented a
number of new security measures.\3\ These included, but were
not limited to, the installation of ``convenience police
stations'' throughout the region, including 949 in the regional
capital Urumqi alone; \4\ the convening of mass anti-terrorism
rallies; \5\ the recruitment of tens of thousands of security
personnel from both within and outside of the XUAR; \6\ the
implementation of a ``double-linked household'' (shuanglian hu)
system; \7\ and the mandatory installation of satellite-
tracking devices on vehicles in one prefecture in the XUAR.\8\
Chen previously implemented some of these measures in the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR), where he served as Party Secretary for
five years,\9\ and many international observers expressed the
view that central government and Party authorities sought,
through Chen's appointment, to enhance ``stability'' and
security in the XUAR, using a more hardline approach than his
predecessor.\10\ Australian scholar James Leibold criticized
recent security measures in the XUAR as ``counterproductive''
and ``disproportional to the actual threat posed,'' and said
such measures ``[threaten] to make China's problem with terror
far more serious and complex in the future.'' \11\
``Convenience police stations.'' Among the
security initiatives that Chen Quanguo introduced to
the XUAR was the establishment of ``convenience police
stations'' (bianmin jingwu zhan).\12\ The stations
enhance authorities' ability to closely surveil and
police local communities, in what two international
scholars described as ``Orwellian levels of
securitization.'' \13\ In the latter part of 2016,
authorities recruited close to 30,000 security
personnel to staff the stations, which provide
``convenient'' services to the community--including
medical supplies and mobile phone charging
stations.\14\ In the first seven months of 2017,
authorities reportedly advertised more than 53,000
additional security positions in the XUAR, which a
European researcher connected to the establishment of
the stations.\15\
Mass rallies. Beginning in December 2016, XUAR
authorities held mass rallies reportedly as a show of
force and to emphasize the need to fight terrorism and
violence.\16\ In February 2017, tens of thousands of
security personnel participated in ``anti-terror''
rallies in four cities in the XUAR.\17\ On May 29,
during the Ramadan period, officials throughout the
XUAR reportedly held simultaneous mass anti-terrorism
rallies involving more than six million people.\18\
Scholar James Leibold called the February rallies
``political theatre'' showing that ``the party is in
firm control in Xinjiang and those who seek to resist
will be crushed.'' \19\
``Double-linked household'' system. Officials
in multiple jurisdictions in the XUAR have begun
implementing this system, which divides households into
groups of 10 for the dual purposes of ``watch[ing] over
each other'' and poverty relief.\20\ The system is
reportedly aimed in part at using local communities to
curb security threats and ``religious extremism'' and
supervise individuals designated ``key persons'' of
interest to security authorities.\21\
DNA collection. According to research
conducted by Human Rights Watch and reporting by the
journal Nature, security personnel have been collecting
DNA samples from Uyghurs in the XUAR and from other
people throughout China on a massive scale, in many
cases without consent.\22\ International observers
raised the concern that officials may misuse the
collected biometric data to heighten security controls
on the Uyghur population, as officials build a database
of citizens' biometric information not limited to those
with a criminal background, as in other countries, and
lacking the kinds of legal safeguards other countries
implement to manage their DNA databases.\23\
Several violent incidents involving ethnic or political
tensions reportedly took place in the XUAR between December
2016 and February 2017.\24\ These included a December attack in
Qaraqash (Moyu) county, Hotan prefecture, in which several
attackers--who reportedly had Uyghur names--killed a Communist
Party official and a security guard and injured three other
individuals using knives and an explosive device; \25\ a
January attack in Guma (Pishan) county, Hotan, in which police
killed three individuals whom official media outlets described
as ``terror suspects''; \26\ and a February attack in Guma, in
which three Uyghur men stabbed five Han Chinese pedestrians to
death and injured five others.\27\ According to a Radio Free
Asia report, two of the three suspects in the February attack
were angry at local officials for clamping down on an
``illegal'' prayer service their family had held in their
home.\28\
Legal and Counterterrorism Developments
On March 29, 2017, the XUAR People's Congress adopted the
region's first anti-extremism regulations.\29\ The regulations
categorize 15 actions as ``extremism,'' and according to a
Chinese legal scholar, ``[draw] a clear line between legal
religion and illegal religion.'' \30\ While the XUAR People's
Congress adopted regional measures in July 2016 to implement
the PRC Counterterrorism Law that also described how
authorities should work to counter religious extremists,\31\
the 2017 regional regulations provide more detailed
descriptions of the responsibilities of XUAR government
authorities to eliminate ``extremism.'' \32\ Measures aimed at
countering ``extremism'' in the XUAR in recent years reportedly
have often threatened to criminalize Uyghurs' peaceful practice
of religious faith.\33\
International rights groups expressed concern over Chinese
authorities' lack of transparency in reporting information
regarding terrorism convictions and executions. According to
research Human Rights Watch (HRW) published in March 2017, the
Supreme People's Court (SPC) annual work report for 2016 did
not provide information on terrorism cases, including the
number of people convicted on terrorism charges, as it had in
previous years.\34\ As noted by HRW, the opacity of Chinese
authorities' reporting on terrorism prosecution in the XUAR
provides leeway for officials to silence critics and repress
religious identity.\35\ Both HRW and Amnesty International
criticized Chinese authorities' implementation of the PRC
Counterterrorism Law, which took effect in January 2016, with
regard to the latitude the law's wording provides officials in
punishing individuals for ``terrorism'' and ``extremism.'' \36\
A report Amnesty International published in April 2017
documented a discrepancy between death penalty cases reported
in the Chinese media and those included in China Judgements
Online, a publicly accessible database created by the SPC in
July 2013.\37\ According to Amnesty International, while
Chinese media provided information on the executions of 27
people for incidents related to terrorism in 2014 and 2015, the
SPC database only included approved death sentences for 10 of
these people.\38\ Amnesty International also noted that while
Uyghurs make up 0.7 percent of China's total population, 4
percent of the death penalty cases included in China Judgements
Online were of Uyghurs.\39\
As in the previous reporting year,\40\ XUAR officials in
some locations reportedly offered substantial monetary rewards
for information on suspected terrorist activity.\41\ In March
2017, Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in Guma
(Pishan) county, Hotan prefecture, offered up to 500,000 yuan
(approximately US$74,000) for tips on ``suspicious terrorist
activity or suspicious individuals,'' such as ``double-faced''
cadres, Party members, and religious clergy,\42\ referring to
those who ``pretend to support national unity but secretly
spread separatism and extremism.'' \43\ Officials in several
other counties in Hotan also reportedly offered rewards: for
instance, in Chira (Cele) county, officials announced they
would reward tip providers with 10,000 yuan (approximately
US$1,500) for information on ``the suspicious activities of
individuals returning from overseas travel.'' \44\
XUAR Party and government authorities punished or
criticized local officials for what they called failures to
effectively combat religious extremism and terrorism. In April
2017, Party authorities announced that they had punished 97
cadres in Hotan, including those who reportedly failed to carry
out surveillance of residents' worship at local mosques or who
did not regulate ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals,
according to Party policy.\45\ Among the 97 cadres was Jelil
Matniyaz, a village Party chief, whom authorities demoted in
part because he refused to smoke in front of religious
figures.\46\ One Hotan official reportedly said Matniyaz's
refusal to smoke ``conforms with extreme religious thought.''
\47\ Another one of the cadres was Salamet Memetimin, a village
Party official, whom authorities reportedly punished for
holding her marriage ceremony at home, instead of at a
government office.\48\ In April, a senior Uyghur official
criticized local cadres in Kashgar city, Kashgar prefecture,
for not fulfilling their duties to fight terrorism and
religious extremism.\49\
Development Policy
During this reporting year, central and regional government
and Party officials continued to promote the XUAR as an
important center for Belt and Road (B&R) (also known as One
Belt, One Road) Initiative development projects.\50\ A U.S.-
based Uyghur rights organization criticized the economic
inequality exacerbated by official development projects, as
well as the enhanced securitization officials employed to
accompany such projects.\51\
Chinese officials have expressed the belief that
development and the reduction of poverty will lessen security
threats. An article published by an Australian think tank in
March 2017 cites a former Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, who
said the economic gains of the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor, one of the B&R's most important initiatives, will
help ``[tackle] the incubator of terrorism, namely poverty.''
\52\ The same article cites the head of the XUAR branch of the
People's Bank of China as stating that enhancing transport
connections between the XUAR and Central Asia will bring both
``economic and national security dividends.'' \53\
In March 2017, Zhu Weiqun, currently Chairman of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Ethnic and
Religious Affairs Committee \54\ and formerly a senior Party
official,\55\ cautioned that due to increased cross-border
exchanges along the Silk Road economic belt, authorities must
seek to prevent ``religious extremism'' from arising in areas
of northwest China with a large ethnic minority population.\56\
Although Zhu did not specifically mention Uyghurs in his
speech, international media and other observers have reported
that authorities' actions aimed at preventing ``religious
extremism'' have frequently targeted Uyghurs' peaceful Islamic
religious practices.\57\ Zhu stressed that the ``sinicization''
of Islam was vital to the success of the Silk Road economic
belt, and Chinese authorities must cooperate with relevant
countries to enhance security and prevent terrorism for China's
own interest and the economic interest of these countries.\58\
[For more information on ``sinicization,'' see Section II--
Freedom of Religion.]
According to research published in March 2017 by a U.S.-
based Uyghur rights organization, development initiatives in
the XUAR have disproportionately benefited Han Chinese
residents and simultaneously marginalized Uyghurs and other
ethnic minorities.\59\ In its report, the organization asserted
that central and regional government authorities used
development projects associated with the Silk Road and B&R
strategies to enhance securitization and state control over
minority populations in the XUAR, and to facilitate Han
migration to areas previously dominated by Uyghur
communities.\60\
Freedom of Religion
XUAR officials continued to use new legislation and other
measures that narrowed the scope of Uyghur Muslims' ability to
peacefully practice their religious faith and express their
Muslim cultural identity. On September 29, 2016, the XUAR
People's Congress adopted two new regulations, effective
November 1, limiting the role of religion in education.\61\
Article 9 of the XUAR Regulations on the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency provides that parents or guardians may not
``organize, lure or force minors into attending religious
activities,'' and may not ``force them to dress in extremist
clothing or other extremist symbols.'' \62\ Article 17 of the
regulations stipulates that educational authorities must teach
students ``to resist ethnic separatism, extremist ideology and
the infiltration of religion on campus.'' \63\ Article 25 of
the XUAR Regulations on the Popularization of High School
Education in Southern Parts of the Region stipulates that ``no
organization or individual'' may ``coerce, lure, or in the name
of religion obstruct or interfere with'' the high school
education of students of a relevant age, causing them to miss
school or drop out of school.\64\
On March 29, 2017, the XUAR People's Congress adopted the
XUAR Anti-Extremism Regulations, the region's first anti-
extremism regulations, defining 15 actions as ``religious
extremism'' and containing provisions for government officials
and the public to constrain such actions.\65\ Article 9 of the
regulations classifies the 15 ``extremist'' actions, including
the wearing of burqas with face coverings, spreading religious
fanaticism through ``irregular'' beards or name selection, and
not allowing children to receive public education.\66\ A U.S.-
based Uyghur rights organization said authorities sought to use
the regulations to ``codify repressive actions'' in order to
``provide a veneer of legality.'' \67\
During the reporting period, regional officials introduced
policies regulating some of the most personal expressions of
Uyghurs' religious faith. The Global Times, a Party-run media
outlet, reported in November 2016 that in September,
authorities established new local religious and residential
committees in some locations in the XUAR to ``manage religious
practices.'' \68\ According to a Chinese scholar cited in the
report, under the new pilot practice, authorities required
local residents ``to report their religious activities or
activities attended by religious people, including
circumcision, weddings, and funerals.'' \69\ In April 2017, an
international media report indicated authorities throughout the
XUAR had begun banning baby names deemed ``extremist,'' with a
penalty of preventing noncompliant parents from registering
their children for household registration (hukou).\70\ Radio
Free Asia (RFA) and Human Rights Watch reported that according
to the ``Naming Rules for Ethnic Minorities,'' dozens of names
with Islamic connotations, including Saddam and Medina, were
banned.\71\ On June 1, an international media report indicated
that XUAR authorities expanded the ban on names to cover anyone
up to age 16.\72\ [For more information on the hukou system,
see Section II--Population Control and Section II--Freedom of
Residence and Movement.]
A Hong Kong-based policy analyst wrote in February 2017
that XUAR Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was considering reducing
the number of mosques in the XUAR, as Chinese experts on
Uyghurs view mosques as incubators for Islamic fundamentalism
and anti-Chinese sentiment.\73\ Prior to this analyst's claim,
RFA reported in December 2016 that in three months in late
2016, authorities demolished thousands of mosques in the XUAR
as part of a ``mosque rectification'' campaign introduced by
central government officials and overseen by local security
personnel.\74\ RFA said it independently confirmed the
destruction of mosques in Kashgar, Hotan, and Aksu prefectures,
and received reports of demolitions in other parts of the
XUAR.\75\ RFA interviewed local officials who cited ``the
safety of worshippers'' due to the age of the mosques among the
official reasons for the campaign.\76\ In August 2017, RFA
reported that authorities in Kashgar prefecture had begun
implementing a directive earlier in the summer that ordered
local mosques to fly the national flag of China and to replace
religious inscriptions with patriotic banners.\77\
According to a report from RFA, in May 2017, authorities in
Urumqi municipality, XUAR, sentenced Uyghur religious scholar
Hebibulla Tohti to 10 years in prison for ``illegal religious
activity.'' \78\ In September 2015, the Islamic Association of
China, which had sponsored his studies, reportedly praised his
academic work upon his completion of a doctorate degree in
theology at Al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo, Egypt.\79\
Tohti reportedly returned from Egypt to the XUAR in July 2016
when Chinese officials threatened Uyghurs studying in Egypt
with punishment and detained their relatives, in some cases, to
compel them to return.\80\ During his initial detention in
July, authorities reportedly questioned Tohti about having
taught religion to Uyghurs in Egypt without the approval of
Chinese officials, among other ``illegal activities.'' \81\
As in previous reporting years,\82\ XUAR officials
reportedly imposed controls on Uyghur Muslims' observance of
Ramadan, while heightening security measures and carrying out
detentions of religious believers throughout the XUAR.
Authorities placed restrictions on fasting for state employees
and teachers,\83\ forced restaurants to remain open,\84\ and
held events aimed at increasing ``stability maintenance'' \85\
work during Ramadan. In late May 2017, authorities reportedly
detained at least 22 Uyghurs in areas in and around Hotan
prefecture for engaging in religious activities.\86\ In
addition, authorities reportedly assigned Chinese officials to
stay in every Uyghur household in Hotan during Ramadan for up
to 15 days, to prevent Uyghurs from fasting or praying.\87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities Crack Down on Ethnic Kazakh Muslims
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2017, authorities reportedly cracked down on ethnic Kazakh Muslim
residents of the XUAR, detaining many for peaceful religious activities
and for ``offenses'' such as sending online messages on emigration
issues, as well as for having connections to friends and relatives
living in Kazakhstan and for ``having close ties'' to Uyghur Muslims in
the XUAR.\88\ In June 2017, officials in Wumachang township, Qitai
county, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, reportedly issued a
notice saying that local Muslims must obtain a permit before praying,
or they could be detained for ``illegally engaging in religious
activities.'' \89\ Local Kazakhs, however, said authorities
subsequently detained many Muslims who applied for a permit, and also
detained some local imams for presiding over prayers without having
obtained a permit.\90\ In early 2017, authorities in Altay (Aletai)
prefecture sentenced well-known Kazakh imam Okan to 10 years'
imprisonment for performing traditional Kazakh funerary rites.\91\ In
or around April, a court in Emin county, Tacheng prefecture, Yili
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, sentenced Kazakh Yesihati to 10 years'
imprisonment after he reportedly posted online content regarding
Kazakhstan's immigration policies.\92\ In June, authorities in Changji
Hui Autonomous Prefecture reportedly detained ethnic Kazakh imam Akmet
for unknown reasons; several days later authorities said he had hung
himself and returned his body to his family.\93\ XUAR authorities
reportedly detained more than 100 of Akmet's acquaintances who made
comments online about his death.\94\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Expression
During this reporting year, central and regional officials
placed restrictions on communication tools,\95\ issued
regulations limiting the spread of ``false'' or ``harmful''
information,\96\ and constrained the ability of foreign
journalists to report from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.\97\ In one example of new state controls on cell phone
use, in or around July 2017, authorities in multiple XUAR
jurisdictions ordered residents to install an application
called Jingwang Weishi (or ``Web Cleansing Guard'') on their
cell phones that enables the government to surveil their online
activities, monitoring ``terrorist'' and ``illegal religious''
content.\98\ Authorities reportedly set up checkpoints to
randomly check whether residents had installed the software on
their phones, and those who had failed to do so faced a
possible 10-day detention.\99\
As in the previous reporting year,\100\ authorities
reportedly penalized mobile phone users for downloading
software to circumvent the Great Firewall, the censorship
hardware and software that Chinese authorities use to filter
the Internet.\101\ International media reported in October 2016
that, according to an official crime report that was issued by
public security authorities in Changji Hui Autonomous
Prefecture and leaked on Chinese social media, public security
authorities in Changji classified the downloading of Internet
censorship circumvention software to a mobile device as
``terrorist'' in nature.\102\ According to the crime report,
Changji security personnel detained a local Internet user in
October 2016 for allegedly downloading the software to bypass
the Great Firewall.\103\ [For more information on Internet
restrictions in China, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
In another example of authorities' restrictions on XUAR
residents' access to communication tools, regional authorities
issued regulations, effective October 1, 2016, requiring
individuals in the region to register with their real names
before being permitted to access the Internet, including on
their mobile phones.\104\ In December 2016, the XUAR People's
Congress issued regulations providing for punishments for
residents who spread ``false'' or ``harmful'' information on
the Internet.\105\ Under the regulations, website operators who
``create, compile, spread, release or copy'' ``false'' or
``harmful'' content can be subject to substantial fines, and
authorities may shut down their websites.\106\ Types of
``false'' or ``harmful'' information covered by the regulations
include information that is ``harmful to national security'';
``promotes religious fanaticism, or destroys religious
harmony''; and ``promotes ethnic hatred or ethnic
discrimination.'' \107\
Freedom of Movement
As in past reporting years,\108\ XUAR officials continued
to restrict Uyghurs' ability to travel freely, in violation of
Chinese law and international legal standards. Beginning in
October 2016, authorities in locations throughout the XUAR
reportedly ordered residents to turn their passports in to
police, with varying deadlines of up to four months.\109\
Authorities subsequently required residents to seek approval
from police for international travel in order to retrieve their
passports.\110\ In a statement published in November, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) likened the passport recall to similar
restrictions in the Tibet Autonomous Region, describing it as a
form of ``collective punishment.'' \111\ HRW said public
security personnel in eight locations throughout the XUAR
confirmed that regional public security bureau authorities
issued the recall, and that authorities were implementing it
across the XUAR.\112\ HRW described the passport recall as
having ``no basis in Chinese law,'' and specifically noted
Articles 2 and 15 of the PRC Passport Law.\113\ According to
Article 2 of the law, ``no organization or individual should .
. . illegally seize passports.'' \114\ Article 15 of the law
limits Chinese officials' authority to seize passports to
instances ``where necessary for handling a case,'' and only to
passports belonging to ``the parties of a case.'' \115\ In
addition, according to Article 12 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, ``[e]veryone shall be free to
leave any country, including his own.'' \116\
XUAR authorities also reportedly restricted the ability of
ethnic Kazakhs to travel freely, and confiscated the Chinese
passports and permanent residence permits for Kazakhstan of
around 200,000 individuals, though authorities reportedly later
returned at least some of these documents.\117\ In addition,
XUAR officials reportedly detained some ethnic Kazakhs who
returned to China after living in or visiting Kazakhstan.\118\
Beginning in late January 2017, Chinese authorities
reportedly ordered some Uyghurs studying abroad in countries
including Egypt, Turkey, France, Australia, and the United
States to return to the XUAR.\119\ XUAR authorities detained or
threatened to detain relatives of some students to compel them
to return,\120\ and reportedly detained some returnees and
forced some students to undergo ``political reeducation.''
\121\ Chinese authorities reportedly threatened Uyghur and
Kazakh students studying in Egypt with punishment if they did
not return to China.\122\ Despite concern from international
organizations that Chinese authorities would mistreat the
students upon their return to China,\123\ as of August 2017,
Egyptian authorities had reportedly forcibly deported at least
22 individuals.\124\ Reports from July and August indicated
that XUAR authorities had detained some Uyghurs, as well as
their accompanying family members, upon their return, and some
Kazakhs whom authorities deported from Egypt disappeared.\125\
Labor
Some government and private employers within the XUAR
discriminated against non-Han job applicants. As in past
reporting years,\126\ the Commission observed employment
advertisements that reserved positions exclusively for Han
Chinese, including civil servant and private sector positions,
in contravention of Chinese labor law.\127\ Private and public
employers also continued to reserve some positions exclusively
for men, leaving non-Han women to face both ethnic and gender
discrimination in the hiring process.\128\
In a report published in April 2017, a U.S.-based Uyghur
rights organization documented employment advertisements from
various cities in the XUAR that discriminated against Uyghur
job applicants, noting that employment discrimination exists in
the fields of civil service, education, state-owned
enterprises, and private industry.\129\ The report stated that
in addition to ethnic discrimination, Uyghurs faced difficulty
finding employment due to language-based, religious, and gender
discrimination; a lack of social capital; and administrative
costs to employers due to government requirements to enforce
security measures for Uyghurs.\130\ Employers reportedly must
complete ``special registration procedures'' when hiring
Uyghurs and report regularly to public security officials on
Uyghur employees, especially since the July 2009 demonstrations
and riots in the regional capital of Urumqi.\131\
HASHAR
Reports emerged this past year that officials continued to
require Uyghurs to engage in hashar, a type of forced, unpaid
group labor for public works projects.\132\ In November 2016, a
Germany-based Uyghur exile organization published a report
compiling information on authorities' use of hashar as a means
of ``stability maintenance,'' particularly in southern parts of
the XUAR such as Kashgar, Aksu, and Hotan prefectures, and
Bayingol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture.\133\ According to a
February 2017 Radio Free Asia report, officials in Guma
(Pishan) county, Hotan, told residents that they had abolished
hashar, but also informed them they would require residents to
perform the same type of work they had performed under hashar,
such as flood management and tree planting.\134\ Forced labor
violates the International Labour Organization's Convention
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour.\135\
Language Policy and ``Bilingual Education''
During this reporting year, XUAR government authorities
expanded Mandarin-focused ``bilingual education'' in the
region, a policy that contravenes international law \136\ and
that a Uyghur rights advocacy organization criticized for its
emphasis on Mandarin-language education at the expense of other
languages as well as for the loss of Uyghur educators'
jobs.\137\ Under ``bilingual education,'' class instruction
takes place primarily in Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing
instruction in languages spoken by ethnic minority groups.\138\
In June 2017, education officials in Hotan prefecture, XUAR,
reportedly issued a directive further restricting the use of
the Uyghur language in schools through the secondary school
level, ``in order to strengthen elementary and middle/high
school bilingual education.'' \139\ The directive includes a
prohibition on Uyghur-only signage on school grounds, as well
as the use of Uyghur in schools' public activities and
educational management work.\140\ In March 2017, state media
announced that authorities would strengthen preschool
``bilingual education'' in the XUAR, by building or expanding a
total of 4,387 ``bilingual kindergartens'' and hiring 10,000
``bilingual teachers'' in 2017.\141\ The plans continued a
regional government initiative to expand ``bilingual
education'' at the preschool level between 2016 and 2020 using
central government funds.\142\ In addition, a Ministry of
Education and State Language Commission document issued in
March 2017 stated that the inability of some people in the
central and western parts of China to speak Mandarin could have
an impact on ``ethnic unity and harmony.'' \143\
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
Notes to Section IV--Xinjiang
\1\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of Finance, ``Report
on the Situation of the Implementation of the 2016 Budget for the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the 2017 Draft Budget for the
XUAR'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 2016 nian yusuan zhixing qingkuang he
2017 nian zizhiqu yusuan cao'an de baogao], reprinted in Ministry of
Finance, 9 January 17. See also ``China Offers Big Anti-Terror Rewards
in Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 22 February 17; Philip Wen, ``Terror Threats
Transform China's Uighur Heartland Into Security State,'' Reuters, 30
March 17.
\2\ Gabriele Battaglia, ``What Do Islamic State and Tibet Have To
Do With China's Crackdown in Xinjiang? '' South China Morning Post, 18
March 17.
\3\ James Leibold and Adrian Zenz, ``Beijing's Eyes and Ears Grow
Sharper in Xinjiang,'' Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, 23 December 16; ``New
Xinjiang Party Boss Boosts Surveillance, Police Patrols,'' Radio Free
Asia, 16 December 16; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ``Xinjiang's
Rapidly Evolving Security State,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief,
Vol. 17, Issue 4, 14 March 17, 22, 25.
\4\ James Leibold and Adrian Zenz, ``Beijing's Eyes and Ears Grow
Sharper in Xinjiang,'' Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, 23 December 16;
``Urumqi Municipality To Build 949 Convenience Police Stations on Big
Streets and in Small Alleys'' [Wulumuqi shi dajie xiao gang jiang jian
949 ge bianmin jingwuzhan], Xinjiang Net, reprinted in Xinhua, 27
October 16.
\5\ Edward Wong, ``Chinese Security Forces Rally in Xinjiang in a
Show of Power,'' New York Times, 20 February 17; Philip Wen, ``Terror
Threats Transform China's Uighur Heartland Into Security State,''
Reuters, 30 March 17; ``China Holds Mass Police Rally in Xinjiang as
Hundreds Sent to Anti-Terror `Frontline,' '' Reuters, 28 February 17;
Wang Na, ``Xinjiang Declares War on `Three Forces' in Strongest Voice''
[Xinjiang yi zui qiang yin xiang ``sangu shili'' xuanzhan], Tianshan
Net, 18 February 17.
\6\ Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ``Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving
Security State,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue 4,
14 March 17, 25-26; Philip Wen, ``Terror Threats Transform China's
Uighur Heartland Into Security State,'' Reuters, 30 March 17; ``Restive
Chinese Region Offers Rewards To Recruit More Police,'' Associated
Press, 7 March 17; Leng Shumei, ``Xinjiang County To Recruit More
Police Officers, Intensify Patrol Efforts,'' Global Times, 4 April 17.
\7\ Fuyun County People's Government, ``Fuyun County Explores
Establishment of `Double-Linked Households' Work Long-Term Mechanism''
[Fuyun xian tansuo jianli ``shuanglian hu'' gongzuo changxiao jizhi], 2
August 17; He Lijiang and Gu Jingjing, ``Dolatbagh Village, Kashgar
City, Actively Creates `Double-Linked Households' New Management
System'' [Kashi shi duolaitebage xiang jiji dazao ``shuanglian hu''
guanli xin changtai], China Internet Information Center, 25 November
16; Michael Clarke, ``China's Self-Defeating Counter-Terrorism Strategy
in Xinjiang,'' University of Nottingham, IAPS Dialogue, 16 February 17;
Nectar Gan, ``Passports Taken, More Police . . . New Party Boss Chen
Quanguo Acts To Tame Xinjiang With Methods Used in Tibet,'' South China
Morning Post, 12 December 16.
\8\ Lu Hang, ``Bayingol [Mongol] AP To Install `Beidou Positioning
System + Electronic License Plate' in Motor Vehicles'' [Bazhou jidong
che jiang anzhuang ``beidou dingwei + dianzi chepai''], Loulan News, 7
February 17; ``Vehicles To Get Compulsory GPS Tracking in Xinjiang,''
Radio Free Asia, 20 February 17; Li Ruohan, ``All Vehicles in Bayingol,
Xinjiang To Install Navigation System To `Safeguard Stability,' ''
Global Times, 20 February 17.
\9\ Nectar Gan, ``Passports Taken, More Police . . . New Party Boss
Chen Quanguo Acts To Tame Xinjiang With Methods Used in Tibet,'' South
China Morning Post, 12 December 16; ``The Extraordinary Ways in Which
China Humiliates Muslims,'' Economist, 4 May 17.
\10\ Nectar Gan, ``Passports Taken, More Police . . . New Party
Boss Chen Quanguo Acts To Tame Xinjiang With Methods Used in Tibet,''
South China Morning Post, 12 December 16; Edward Wong, ``Chinese
Security Forces Rally in Xinjiang in a Show of Power,'' New York Times,
20 February 17; Gabriele Battaglia, ``What Do Islamic State and Tibet
Have To Do With China's Crackdown in Xinjiang? '' South China Morning
Post, 18 March 17; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``Beijing's New Scorched-Earth
Policy Against the Uighurs,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol.
17, Issue 2, 6 February 17. See also Adrian Zenz and James Leibold,
``Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 14 March 17, 22; Eva Li, ``Show of Force
in Xinjiang Sends Hardline Message,'' South China Morning Post, 3
January 17.
\11\ Gabriele Battaglia, ``What Do Islamic State and Tibet Have To
Do With China's Crackdown in Xinjiang? '' South China Morning Post, 18
March 17.
\12\ James Leibold and Adrian Zenz, ``Beijing's Eyes and Ears Grow
Sharper in Xinjiang,'' Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, 23 December 16;
Philip Wen, ``Terror Threats Transform China's Uighur Heartland Into
Security State,'' Reuters, 30 March 17; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold,
``Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 14 March 17, 25.
\13\ Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ``Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving
Security State,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue 4,
14 March 17, 25.
\14\ Ibid. For more information on the recruitment of security
personnel to staff the stations, see, e.g., ``Summary of Collected
Information of Various Types of Recruitment in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region in 2017 (March Latest Version)'' [2017 nian xinjiang
weiwu'er zizhiqu ge lei zhaopin jianzhang xinxi huizong (3 yue zuixin
ban)], WeChat post, 20 March 17.
\15\ Nectar Gan, ``Xinjiang's Police Hiring Binge Comes From Party
Boss's Tibet Playbook,'' South China Morning Post, 13 August 17.
\16\ See, e.g., Eva Li, ``Show of Force in Xinjiang Sends Hardline
Message,'' South China Morning Post, 3 January 17; Tom Phillips,
``China `Anti-Terror' Rallies: Thousands of Troops on Streets of
Urumqi,'' Guardian, 28 February 17; ``China Stages Another Mass Anti-
Terror Rally in Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 19 February 17; ``Xinjiang Again
Holds Counterterrorism Activity, Uyghurs Say Aimed at Frightening
Them'' [Xinjiang zai gao fankong huodong weizu ren zhi zhi zai zhenshe
weiren], Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17.
\17\ Philip Wen, ``Terror Threats Transform China's Uighur
Heartland Into Security State,'' Reuters, 30 March 17; Tom Phillips,
``China `Anti-Terror' Rallies: Thousands of Troops on Streets of
Urumqi,'' Guardian, 28 February 17.
\18\ ``Xinjiang Again Holds Counterterrorism Activity, Uyghurs Say
Aimed at Frightening Them'' [Xinjiang zai gao fankong huodong weizu ren
zhi zhi zai zhenshe weiren], Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17; ``Xinjiang
Holds Collective Voice of the Sword Mass Rally, Stresses Fight Against
Three Forces'' [Xinjiang ban jiti fa sheng liang jian dahui, qiangdiao
daji sangu shili], Oriental Daily Net, 30 May 17.
\19\ Tom Phillips, ``China `Anti-Terror' Rallies: Thousands of
Troops on Streets of Urumqi,'' Guardian, 28 February 17.
\20\ Michael Clarke, ``China's Self-Defeating Counter-Terrorism
Strategy in Xinjiang,'' University of Nottingham, IAPS Dialogue, 16
February 17; Nectar Gan, ``Passports Taken, More Police . . . New Party
Boss Chen Quanguo Acts To Tame Xinjiang With Methods Used in Tibet,''
South China Morning Post, 12 December 16; He Lijiang and Gu Jingjing,
``Dolatbagh Village, Kashgar City, Actively Creates `Double-Linked
Households' New Management System'' [Kashi shi duolaite bage xiang jiji
dazao ``shuanglian hu'' guanli xin changtai], China Internet
Information Center, 25 November 16; Fuyun County People's Government,
``Fuyun County Explores Establishment of `Double-Linked Households'
Work Long-Term Mechanism'' [Fuyun xian tansuo jianli ``shuanglian hu''
gongzuo changxiao jizhi], 2 August 17.
\21\ Nectar Gan, ``Passports Taken, More Police . . . New Party
Boss Chen Quanguo Acts To Tame Xinjiang With Methods Used in Tibet,''
South China Morning Post, 12 December 16; He Lijiang and Gu Jingjing,
``Dolatbagh Village, Kashgar City, Actively Creates `Double-Linked
Households' New Management System'' [Kashi shi duolaite bage xiang jiji
dazao ``shuanglian hu'' guanli xin changtai], China Internet
Information Center, 25 November 16.
\22\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Police DNA Database Threatens
Privacy,'' 15 May 17; David Cyranoski, ``China Expands DNA Data Grab in
Troubled Western Region,'' Nature, Vol. 545, No. 7655 (24 May 17);
Matthew Brown, ``China Moves To Expand DNA Testing in Muslim Region,''
Associated Press, 16 May 17.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Says 5 Killed in Attack at
Communist Party Office in Xinjiang,'' New York Times, 29 December 16;
``Hotan Public Security Agencies Take the Initiative To Decisively
Attack and Kill 3 Dangerous Thugs'' [Hetian gong'an jiguan zhudong
chuji guoduan jibi 3 ming wei an baotu], Tianshan Net, 9 January 17;
``Killings in Xinjiang's Guma Sparked by Anger at Prayer
Restrictions,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February 17.
\25\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Says 5 Killed in Attack at
Communist Party Office in Xinjiang,'' New York Times, 29 December 16;
``Five Dead After `Terror Attack,' Explosion in China's Xinjiang,''
Radio Free Asia, 29 December 16.
\26\ ``Hotan Public Security Agencies Take the Initiative To
Decisively Attack and Kill 3 Dangerous Thugs'' [Hetian gong'an jiguan
zhudong chuji guoduan jibi 3 ming wei an baotu], Tianshan Net, 9
January 17; ``3 Terrorism Suspects Killed in Police Raid,'' Global
Times, 9 January 17.
\27\ ``Killings in Xinjiang's Guma Sparked by Anger at Prayer
Restrictions,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February 17. See also ``10 People
Hacked in Pishan County, Xinjiang, 5 Dead, 5 Injured, and 3 Thugs
Killed on the Spot'' [Xinjiang pishan xian 10 minzhong bei kan, 5 si, 5
shang, 3 baotu dangchang jibi], Radio Free Asia, 14 February 17; Teddy
Ng, ``Eight Killed in Xinjiang Knife Attack: Police Shoot Three
Attackers,'' South China Morning Post, 15 February 17.
\28\ ``Killings in Xinjiang's Guma Sparked by Anger at Prayer
Restrictions,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 February 17.
\29\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations
[Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qu jiduanhua tiaoli], issued 29 March 17,
effective 1 April 17; ``Xinjiang Rolls Out China's First Law To Purge
Religious Extremism,'' Xinhua, 30 March 17.
\30\ ``Xinjiang Rolls Out China's First Law To Purge Religious
Extremism,'' Xinhua, 30 March 17.
\31\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for
the ``PRC Counterterrorism Law'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu shishi
``zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa'' banfa], issued 29
July 16, effective 1 August 16, art. 40; Bai Tiantian, ``Xinjiang To
Confine Radicals in Solitary in New Anti-Terror Rule,'' Global Times, 2
August 16.
\32\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations
[Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qu jiduanhua tiaoli], issued 29 March 17,
effective 1 April 17, arts. 5-8, 16-29. See also PRC Counterterrorism
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan kongbu zhuyi fa], passed 27 December
15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 19, 28-30, 45, 80-82, 84;
``Xinjiang Rolls Out China's First Law To Purge Religious Extremism,''
Xinhua, 30 March 17.
\33\ See, e.g., Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Briefing: China's
New Counter-Terrorism Law and Its Human Rights Implications for the
Uyghur People,'' 1 February 16; ``Chinese Authorities Ban Muslim Names
Among Uyghurs in Hotan,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 September 15; ``Religious
Extremism Law Imposes New Restrictions on China's Uyghurs,'' Radio Free
Asia, 10 December 14.
\34\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Disclose Details of Terrorism
Convictions,'' 16 March 17. See also ``Supreme People's Court Work
Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao], 12 March 17.
\35\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Disclose Details of Terrorism
Convictions,'' 16 March 17.
\36\ Ibid.; Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' 10
April 17, 28-29.
\37\ Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' 10 April
17, 29. For information on China Judgements Online, see page 24 of
Amnesty International's report and Jiang Xingguang, ``China Judgments
Online Grows in Influence,'' China Legal Information Center, 6
September 16.
\38\ Amnesty International, ``China's Deadly Secrets,'' 10 April
17, 29.
\39\ Ibid., 34.
\40\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 283.
\41\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Reward Residents for `Tips on
Terrorism,' '' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 17.
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ Leng Shumei, ``Uyghur Teachers Caught Spreading Religious
Extremism,'' Global Times, 17 April 17. According to the Party-run
media outlet Global Times, which used the term ``two-faced,'' ``
`[t]wo-faced' teachers refer to those who pretend to support national
unity but secretly spread separatism and extremism.''
\44\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Reward Residents for `Tips on
Terrorism,' '' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 17.
\45\ Nectar Gan, ``Censure of Officials Sheds Light on Sweeping
Surveillance Measures in China's Restive Xinjiang,'' South China
Morning Post, 7 April 17. See also ``Xinjiang Holds 97 Cadres
Accountable: Village Party Secretary Doesn't Dare To Smoke in Front of
Religious Figure'' [Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: cun zhishu bu gan
dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in Guancha
Net, 9 April 17; ``One Hundred Xinjiang Officials Punished for
Ineffective Stability Maintenance'' [Xinjiang bai guan weiwen buli bei
chufen], Radio Free Asia, 10 April 17.
\46\ Li Caiyu, ``Xinjiang Official Demoted for Timidity in Fighting
Religious Extremism,'' Global Times, 11 April 17; ``Xinjiang Holds 97
Cadres Accountable: Village Party Secretary Doesn't Dare To Smoke in
Front of Religious Figure'' [Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: cun zhishu
bu gan dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in
Guancha Net, 9 April 17.
\47\ Li Caiyu, ``Xinjiang Official Demoted for Timidity in Fighting
Religious Extremism,'' Global Times, 11 April 17. See also ``Xinjiang
Holds 97 Cadres Accountable: Village Party Secretary Doesn't Dare To
Smoke in Front of Religious Figure'' [Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: cun
zhishu bu gan dang zongjiao renshi mian chouyan], Hotan Daily,
reprinted in Guancha Net, 9 April 17.
\48\ ``Uyghur Village Cadre Dismissed for Holding Islamic Wedding
Vows at Home,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 April 17; ``China Bans `Extreme'
Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang's Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 20
April 17; ``Xinjiang Holds 97 Cadres Accountable: Village Party
Secretary Doesn't Dare To Smoke in Front of Religious Figure''
[Xinjiang wenze 97 ming ganbu: cun zhishu bu gan dang zongjiao renshi
mian chouyan], Hotan Daily, reprinted in Guancha Net, 9 April 17.
\49\ ``China Official Admonishes Fellow Uighur Cadres for `Anti-
Terror' Failings,'' Reuters, 5 April 17; Mehmet Emin Bekri, ``Xinjiang
Kashgar Deputy Commissioner: Uyghur Cadres Must Take the Lead in
Counterterrorism and Stability Maintenance Work'' [Xinjiang kashi
xingshu fu zhuanyuan: weiwu'er zu ganbu zai fankong weiwen gongzuo
zhong yao da tou zhen], Kashgar Prefectural Party Committee
Communications Office WeChat Account ``Kashgar Zero Distance,'' March
2017, reprinted in The Paper, 5 April 17; ``Kashgar, Xinjiang High-
Level Official Accuses Uyghur Cadres of Not Doing Enough To Fight
Terrorism'' [Xinjiang kashi yi wei gaoji guanyuan zhize weiwu'er zu
ganbu fankong buli], Radio Free Asia, 5 April 17.
\50\ See, e.g., Peter Cai, ``Understanding China's Belt and Road
Initiative,'' Lowy Institute for International Policy, 22 March 17;
Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``End of the Road: One Belt, One Road and
the Cumulative Economic Marginalization of the Uyghurs,'' 6 March 17,
14, 18.
\51\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``End of the Road: One Belt, One
Road and the Cumulative Economic Marginalization of the Uyghurs,'' 6
March 17, 4, 6, 13, 17, 20-21, 23-26, 28-29, 31.
\52\ Peter Cai, ``Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative,''
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 22 March 17.
\53\ Ibid.
\54\ China Directory 2014 (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2013), 154.
\55\ China Directory 2012 (Tokyo: Radiopress, December 2011), 7,
17, 27.
\56\ Zhou Yu, ``Zhu Weiqun: Pay Attention to Ethnic and Religious
Issues in the Construction of the `Belt and Road' '' [Zhu weiqun:
guanzhu ``yidai yilu'' jianshe zhong de minzu zongjiao wenti], Yibada,
7 March 17.
\57\ See, e.g., Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch,
``Dispatches: China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,'' 24 April
17; Nectar Gan, ``Ban on Beards and Veils--China's Xinjiang Passes
Regulation To Curb `Religious Extremism,' '' South China Morning Post,
30 March 17; Darren Byler, ``Imagining Re-Engineered Muslims in
Northwest China,'' Milestones Journal, 20 April 17.
\58\ Zhou Yu, ``Zhu Weiqun: Pay Attention to Ethnic and Religious
Issues in the Construction of the `Belt and Road' '' [Zhu weiqun:
guanzhu ``yidai yilu'' jianshe zhong de minzu zongjiao wenti], Yibada,
7 March 17.
\59\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``End of the Road: One Belt, One
Road and the Cumulative Economic Marginalization of the Uyghurs,'' 6
March 17, 13, 17, 23, 28-29, 31.
\60\ Ibid., 4, 6, 13, 20-21, 23-26, 28-29.
\61\ ``Xinjiang Introduces Two Legal Regulations: Prohibit Parents
From Inducing or Forcing Minors To Participate in Religion, Prohibit
Religion Within Schools'' [Xinjiang chutai liang fagui: jinzhi jiazhang
youdao qiangpo weichengnian ren canjia zongjiao xuexiao nei jinzhi
zongjiao], Observe China, 12 October 16. See also ``China Targets
Parents in New Religion Rules for Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 11 October 16;
``Xinjiang Forbids Parents From `Luring' Children To Participate in
Religious Activities'' [Xinjiang jinzhi fumu ``yinyou'' zinu canjia
zongjiao huodong], Radio Free Asia, 12 October 16; Kavitha Surana,
``China Tells Citizens To Inform on Parents Who `Lure' Kids Into
Religion,'' Foreign Policy, 12 October 16.
\62\ ``Xinjiang Introduces Two Legal Regulations: Prohibit Parents
From Inducing or Forcing Minors To Participate in Religion, Prohibit
Religion Within Schools'' [Xinjiang chutai liang fagui: jinzhi jiazhang
youdao qiangpo weichengnian ren canjia zongjiao xuexiao nei jinzhi
zongjiao], Observe China, 12 October 16; ``China Targets Parents in New
Religion Rules for Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 11 October 16.
\63\ ``Xinjiang Introduces Two Legal Regulations: Prohibit Parents
From Inducing or Forcing Minors To Participate in Religion, Prohibit
Religion Within Schools'' [Xinjiang chutai liang fagui: jinzhi jiazhang
youdao qiangpo weichengnian ren canjia zongjiao xuexiao nei jinzhi
zongjiao], Observe China, 12 October 16. See also ``China Targets
Parents in New Religion Rules for Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 11 October 16.
\64\ ``Xinjiang Introduces Two Legal Regulations: Prohibit Parents
From Inducing or Forcing Minors To Participate in Religion, Prohibit
Religion Within Schools'' [Xinjiang chutai liang fagui: jinzhi jiazhang
youdao qiangpo weichengnian ren canjia zongjiao xuexiao nei jinzhi
zongjiao], Observe China, 12 October 16.
\65\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Extremism Regulations
[Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu qu jiduanhua tiaoli], issued 29 March 17,
effective 1 April 17; ``Xinjiang Rolls Out China's First Law To Purge
Religious Extremism,'' Xinhua, 30 March 17.
\66\ Ibid., art. 9(7-8, 10); Ibid.
\67\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``China's Codification of
Repression Continues With `De-Extremification Measures,' '' 6 April 17.
\68\ Zhao Yusha, ``Xinjiang Sets Up Local Committees To Better
Serve Religious Activities,'' Global Times, 22 November 16.
\69\ Ibid.
\70\ ``China Bans `Extreme' Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang's
Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 April 17. See also Sophie Richardson,
Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in
Xinjiang,'' 24 April 17.
\71\ ``China Bans `Extreme' Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang's
Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 April 17; Sophie Richardson, Human
Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in
Xinjiang,'' 24 April 17.
\72\ ``China Extends Ban on `Extreme' Uyghur Baby Names to Children
Under 16,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 June 17.
\73\ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``Beijing's New Scorched-Earth Policy
Against the Uighurs,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 17,
Issue 2, 6 February 17.
\74\ ``Under the Guise of Public Safety, China Demolishes Thousands
of Mosques,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 December 16.
\75\ Ibid.
\76\ Ibid.
\77\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Convert Uyghur Mosques Into Propaganda
Centers,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 August 17.
\78\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Sentence Uyghur Scholar to 10 Years in
Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 August 17.
\79\ Ibid.
\80\ Ibid. See also ``China Detains 12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on
Return to Xinjiang From Egypt,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 July 17.
\81\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Sentence Uyghur Scholar to 10 Years in
Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 August 17.
\82\ For information on official religious restrictions enforced
during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 287; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October
15, 126, 286; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 95, 169-70.
\83\ ``Muslim Uyghurs in China Fined, Sent to `Study Classes' for
Observing Ramadan,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 June 17; ``Restaurants Ordered
To Remain Open in Xinjiang Amid Ramadan Fast,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 May
17.
\84\ ``Restaurants Ordered To Remain Open in Xinjiang Amid Ramadan
Fast,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 May 17; ``Chinese Report Praises Religious
Freedom in Xinjiang, Muslim Restaurants Forced To Operate During
Ramadan'' [Zhongguo baogao shengzan xinjiang zongjiao ziyou musilin
canting zhaiyue bei po yingye], Voice of America, 2 June 17.
\85\ ``Stability Maintenance Level Is Raised in Urumqi, Xinjiang,
on the Eve of June Fourth, Entering a Neighborhood Is Like Visiting a
Prisoner'' [Liusi qianxi xinjiang wulumuqi weiwen shengji ru shequ ru
tanjian], Radio Free Asia, 31 May 17; ``Summary of Stability
Maintenance Work in Xinjiang During Ramadan in 2017'' [2017 nian guanyu
xinjiang zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo zongjie], Shida Education Net,
25 May 17.
\86\ ``On the Eve of Ramadan, 22 People in Xinjiang Detained for
Taking Part in Religious Activities'' [Musilin zhaiyue qianxi xinjiang
zai you 22 ren yin congshi zongjiao huodong bei zhua], Radio Free Asia,
26 May 17.
\87\ ``China Embeds Cadres in Uyghur Homes During Ramadan,'' Radio
Free Asia, 8 June 17.
\88\ ``Dozens of Ethnic Kazakhs Detained Amid Security Crackdown in
China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 August 17; World Uyghur
Congress, ``Press Release: WUC Calls on Chinese Authorities To Halt
Restrictions on Ethnic Kazakhs in East Turkestan,'' 11 August 17;
``Chinese Police Detain at Least 10 Ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang for
`Ties With Uyghurs,' '' Radio Free Asia, 19 June 17.
\89\ ``Muslims in Qitai County, Xinjiang, Required To Have a Permit
To Pray, 25 People Seeking Permit in One Village Are Detained''
[Xinjiang qitai xian musilin daogao xu chi xukezheng yi cun 25 ren
banli xukezheng beibu], Radio Free Asia, 5 August 17.
\90\ Ibid.
\91\ ``Ethnic Kazakh Imam Dies in Custody of Chinese Police in
Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 June 17; ``RFA Exclusive: Xinjiang
Ethnic Kazakh Imam Okan Sentenced to 10 Years, Imam Akemet Is
`Suicided' '' [RFA dujia: xinjiang hasake zu ahong aokan bei panqiu 10
nian ahong akemati bei ``zisha''], Radio Free Asia, 14 June 17.
\92\ ``Kazakh Man in Yili, Xinjiang, Secretly Sentenced to 10
Years' Imprisonment by Court For Online Post'' [Xinjiang yili yi hasake
nanzi wangshang fatie fayuan mimi panqiu 10 nian], Radio Free Asia, 15
June 17.
\93\ ``Ethnic Kazakh Imam Dies in Custody of Chinese Police in
Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 June 17; ``RFA Exclusive: Xinjiang
Ethnic Kazakh Imam Okan Sentenced to 10 Years, Imam Akemet Is
`Suicided' '' [RFA dujia: xinjiang hasake zu ahong aokan bei panqiu 10
nian ahong akemati bei ``zisha''], Radio Free Asia, 14 June 17.
\94\ ``Chinese Police Detain `More Than 100' Friends, Classmates of
Kazakh Custody Death Imam,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 July 17.
\95\ ``China Orders Xinjiang's Android Users To Install App That
Deletes `Terrorist' Content,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 July 17; Edward
Wong, ``Xinjiang, Tense Chinese Region, Adopts Strict Internet
Controls,'' New York Times, 10 December 16.
\96\ Edward Wong, ``Xinjiang, Tense Chinese Region, Adopts Strict
Internet Controls,'' New York Times, 10 December 16; Christian Shepherd
and Michael Martina, ``China Imposes Hefty Fines for Fake or Harmful
News in Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 8 December 16; ``Xinjiang Passes New
Regulations To Prevent and Punish `False' and `Harmful' Information on
the Internet'' [Xinjiang tongguo fangzhi wangluo ``xujia'' he
``youhai'' xinxi de tiaoli], Radio Free Asia, 12 December 16.
\97\ See, e.g., Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Working
Conditions Survey 2016,'' November 2016, reprinted in Committee to
Protect Journalists, 15 November 16.
\98\ Oiwan Lam, ``China's Xinjiang Residents Are Being Forced To
Install Surveillance Apps on Mobile Phones,'' Global Voices Advocacy,
19 July 17; India Ashok, ``What is Jingwang? China's Muslim Minority
Forced To Install Spyware on Their Phones,'' International Business
Times, 25 July 17; ``China Orders Xinjiang's Android Users To Install
App That Deletes `Terrorist' Content,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 July 17.
\99\ Oiwan Lam, ``China's Xinjiang Residents Are Being Forced To
Install Surveillance Apps on Mobile Phones,'' Global Voices Advocacy,
19 July 17; India Ashok, ``What is Jingwang? China's Muslim Minority
Forced To Install Spyware on Their Phones,'' International Business
Times, 25 July 17.
\100\ CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 289.
\101\ Beina Xu and Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations,
``Media Censorship in China,'' last visited 18 July 17.
\102\ ``Xinjiang PSB Astonishingly Calls Cell Phone VPN Software
Second-Class Terrorism'' [Xinjiang gong'an chu qizhao shouji fanqiang
ruanjian bei lie erji baokong], Voice of America, 23 October 16; Oiwan
Lam, ``Leaked Xinjiang Police Report Describes Circumvention Tools as
`Terrorist Software,' '' Global Voices, 26 October 16; ``Xinjiang
Police Classify Circumventing the Firewall as a `Terrorist' Activity''
[Xinjiang jingfang jiang wangluo fanqiang lie wei she ``baokong''
huodong], Radio Free Asia, 27 October 16; ``Man Held in China's
Xinjiang for Downloading `Terrorist' Circumvention Software,'' Radio
Free Asia, 28 October 16.
\103\ Ibid.
\104\ Zhao Zhiyun, ``Real-Name System Implemented for Telephone and
Internet Users'' [Dianhua he hulianwang yonghu shixing shiming zhi],
Xinjiang Daily, 30 September 16; ``Xinjiang Comprehensively Implements
Real-Name Registration for Mobile Phones and the Internet'' [Xinjiang
quanmian shishi shouji, hulianwang shiming dengji], Radio Free Asia, 3
October 16.
\105\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations To Prevent and
Punish the Spread of False Information on the Internet [Xinjiang
weiwu'er zizhiqu fangfan he chengzhi wangluo chuanbo xujia xinxi
tiaoli], issued 1 December 16, effective 10 December 16; Edward Wong,
``Xinjiang, Tense Chinese Region, Adopts Strict Internet Controls,''
New York Times, 10 December 16; Christian Shepherd and Michael Martina,
``China Imposes Hefty Fines for Fake or Harmful News in Xinjiang,''
Reuters, 8 December 16; ``Xinjiang Passes New Regulations To Prevent
and Punish `False' and `Harmful' Information on the Internet''
[Xinjiang tongguo fangzhi wangluo ``xujia'' he ``youhai'' xinxi de
tiaoli], Radio Free Asia, 12 December 16.
\106\ Christian Shepherd and Michael Martina, ``China Imposes Hefty
Fines for Fake or Harmful News in Xinjiang,'' Reuters, 8 December 16.
\107\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing
Committee, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations To Prevent and
Punish the Spread of False Information on the Internet [Xinjiang
weiwu'er zizhiqu fangfan he chengzhi wangluo chuanbo xujia xinxi
tiaoli], issued 1 December 16, effective 10 December 16, arts. 4,
13(4), 13(6).
\108\ See, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 172, 289;
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 287.
\109\ Edward Wong, ``Police Confiscate Passports in Parts of
Xinjiang, in Western China,'' New York Times, 1 December 16; ``China
Recalls Passports Across Xinjiang Amid Ongoing Security Crackdown,''
Radio Free Asia, 20 October 16; ``Shihezi, Xinjiang, Tightens Border
Controls Again, Public Security Requires Residents To Turn In
Passports'' [Xinjiang shihezi biankong zai shoujin gong'an yao jumin
shangjiao huzhao], Voice of America, 21 October 16.
\110\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled
in Xinjiang,'' 21 November 16; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ``Beijing's New
Scorched-Earth Policy Against the Uighurs,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 6 February 17. See also ``China:
Xinjiang Residents Told To Turn In Passports,'' Al Jazeera, 25 November
16.
\111\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled
in Xinjiang,'' 21 November 16.
\112\ Ibid.
\113\ Ibid.
\114\ PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa],
passed 29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 2. See also Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang,'' 21
November 16.
\115\ PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa],
passed 29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 15. See also Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang,'' 21
November 16.
\116\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2); United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 28 August 17. China has signed but
not ratified the ICCPR. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: Passports
Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang,'' 21 November 16.
\117\ ``Protests Continue in Kazakhstan Over China's Treatment of
Kazakhs,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 July 17; ``Dozens of Ethnic Kazakhs
Detained Amid Security Crackdown in China's Xinjiang,'' Radio Free
Asia, 1 August 17.
\118\ Ibid.
\119\ ``Uyghurs Studying Abroad Ordered Back to Xinjiang Under
Threat to Families,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 May 17. See also Jessica
Batke, ``China Is Forcing Uighurs Abroad To Return Home. Why Aren't
More Countries Refusing To Help? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14 August
17.
\120\ ``Uyghurs Studying Abroad Ordered Back to Xinjiang Under
Threat to Families,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 May 17; Jessica Batke, ``China
Is Forcing Uighurs Abroad To Return Home. Why Aren't More Countries
Refusing To Help? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14 August 17; ``China
Detains 12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on Return to Xinjiang From Egypt,''
Radio Free Asia, 24 July 17; Middle East Studies Association, ``Letters
on Egypt,'' 18 July 17.
\121\ ``Uyghurs Studying Abroad Ordered Back to Xinjiang Under
Threat to Families,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 May 17; ``Xinjiang Authorities
Sentence Uyghur Scholar to 10 Years in Prison,'' Radio Free Asia, 9
August 17.
\122\ ``China Detains 12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on Return to Xinjiang
From Egypt,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 July 17; Middle East Studies
Association, ``Letters on Egypt,'' 18 July 17. See also Jessica Batke,
``China Is Forcing Uighurs Abroad To Return Home. Why Aren't More
Countries Refusing To Help? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile, 14 August 17.
\123\ Amnesty International, ``Egypt: Further Information: More
Uighur Students at Risk of Forcible Return,'' 1 August 17; U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, ``USCIRF Condemns
Egypt's Deportation of Uighur Muslims to China,'' 3 August 17; Middle
East Studies Association, ``Letters on Egypt,'' 18 July 17.
\124\ Amnesty International, ``Egypt: Further Information: More
Uighur Students at Risk of Forcible Return,'' 1 August 17.
\125\ ``China Detains 12-Year-Old Uyghur Boy on Return to Xinjiang
From Egypt,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 July 17; ``Muslim Ethnic Minority
Students `Incommunicado' After Repatriation to China,'' Radio Free
Asia, 7 August 17.
\126\ See, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 290; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 289; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9
October 14, 168.
\127\ ``Wusu City, Xinjiang, Public Security Bureau Recruiting 110
Staff Members, Don't Miss the Registration Period!'' [Xinjiang wusu shi
gong'an ju zhaopin 110 ming gongzuo renyuan, buyao cuoguo baoming
shijian!], Wusu Online, reprinted in Sohu, last visited 20 April 17;
Alashankou City People's Government, ``Alashankou City Environmental
Protection Bureau Staff Recruitment Announcement'' [Alashankou shi
huanjing baohu ju zhaopin gongzuo renyuan gonggao], reprinted in
Huazheng Education, Xinjiang Branch, 4 April 17; Xinjiang Qilu Learning
and Education Consulting Center, ``Xinjiang Talent Market, Xinjiang
Talent Net Recruiting Information (January 20, 2017)'' [Xinjiang rencai
shichang, xinjiang rencai wang zhaopin xinxi (2017 nian 1 yue 20 ri)],
20 January 17; ``Urumqi Keyuan Gas Manufacturing Co., Ltd.'' [Wulumuqi
keyuan qiti zhizao youxian gongsi], Xinjiang Talent Net Service Center,
reprinted in FreeWeChat.com, 5 April 17; Shule County People's
Government, ``Recruiting Information for Various Types of Enterprises
in Shule County'' [Shule xian gelei qiye zhaopin xinxi], 23 March 17;
Xinjiang Jinhui Iron Pipe Co., Ltd., ``Xinjiang Jinhui Iron Pipe Co.,
Ltd., Recruitment Information'' [Xinjiang jinhui zhuguan youxian gongsi
zhaopin xinxi], 8 March 17; ``China Chemical Talent Net--Chemical
Recruitment--Xinjiang Chemical Recruitment--Urumqi Chemical
Recruitment--Xinjiang Poly-Environmental Protection Technology Co.,
Ltd., Recruitment'' [Zhongguo huagong rencai wang--huagong zhaopin--
xinjiang huagong zhaopin--wulumuqi huagong zhaopin--xinjiang juli
huanbao keji youxian gongsi zhaopin], China Chemical Talent Net, last
visited 20 April 17. For Chinese legal provisions that forbid
employment discrimination, see, e.g., PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5 July 94, issued and effective 1 January
95, art. 12; PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jiuye cujin fa], passed 30 August 07, issued and effective 1 January
08, art. 28.
\128\ ``Wusu City, Xinjiang, Public Security Bureau Recruiting 110
Staff Members, Don't Miss the Registration Period!'' [Xinjiang wusu shi
gong'an ju zhaopin 110 ming gongzuo renyuan, buyao cuoguo baoming
shijian!], Wusu Online, reprinted in Sohu, last visited 20 April 17;
Alashankou City People's Government, ``Alashankou City Environmental
Protection Bureau Staff Recruitment Announcement'' [Alashankou shi
huanjing baohu ju zhaopin gongzuo renyuan gonggao], reprinted in
Huazheng Education, Xinjiang Branch, 4 April 17; Xinjiang Qilu Learning
and Education Consulting Center, ``Xinjiang Talent Market, Xinjiang
Talent Net Recruiting Information (January 20, 2017)'' [Xinjiang rencai
shichang, xinjiang rencai wang zhaopin xinxi (2017 nian 1 yue 20 ri)],
20 January 17; ``Urumqi Keyuan Gas Manufacturing Co., Ltd.'' [Wulumuqi
keyuan qiti zhizao youxian gongsi], Xinjiang Talent Net Service Center,
reprinted in FreeWeChat.com, 5 April 17; Shule County People's
Government, ``Recruiting Information for Various Types of Enterprises
in Shule County'' [Shule xian gelei qiye zhaopin xinxi], 23 March 17;
Xinjiang Jinhui Iron Pipe Co., Ltd., ``Xinjiang Jinhui Iron Pipe Co.,
Ltd., Recruitment Information'' [Xinjiang jinhui zhuguan youxian gongsi
zhaopin xinxi], 8 March 17.
\129\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Discrimination, Mistreatment
and Coercion: Severe Labor Rights Abuses Faced by Uyghurs in China and
East Turkestan,'' 5 April 17, 3, 27-28. See also International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76,
art. 26.
\130\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Discrimination, Mistreatment
and Coercion: Severe Labor Rights Abuses Faced by Uyghurs in China and
East Turkestan,'' 5 April 17, 3-4, 33-34.
\131\ Ibid., 4, 33-34. For background on the July 2009
demonstrations and riots in Urumqi municipality, see CECC, 2009 Annual
Report, 10 October 09, 249-53.
\132\ World Uyghur Congress, ``Forced Labor in East Turkestan:
State-Sanctioned Hashar System,'' November 2016, 4.
\133\ Ibid., 2.
\134\ ``For Xinjiang's Uyghurs, `Hashar' by Any Other Name Still
Means Forced Labor,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 February 17.
\135\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30.
\136\ Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 92, art. 4.
\137\ Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Discrimination, Mistreatment
and Coercion: Severe Labor Rights Abuses Faced by Uyghurs in China and
East Turkestan,'' 5 April 17, 3, 20-21.
\138\ ``Tongue-Tied: Teaching Uighur Children Mandarin Will Not
Bring Stability to Xinjiang,'' Economist, 27 June 15; Uyghur Human
Rights Project, ``Uyghur Voices on Education: China's Assimilative
`Bilingual Education' Policy in East Turkestan,'' May 2015, 3-4, 10,
12, 16, 18, 21, 26-28. For Commission analysis, see ``Xinjiang
Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual
Education,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
\139\ ``China Bans Uyghur Language in Schools in Key Xinjiang
Prefecture,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 August 17.
\140\ Ibid.
\141\ ``Xinjiang To Strengthen Preschool Bilingual Education,''
Xinhua, 30 March 17.
\142\ ``Xinjiang To Strengthen Preschool Bilingual Education,''
Xinhua, 6 May 16.
\143\ Ministry of Education and State Language Commission, ``Plan
for the Implementation of the Project to Popularize the Written and
Spoken Forms of the National Common Language'' [Guojia tongyong yuyan
wenzi puji gongjian gongcheng shishi fang'an], 14 March 17, sec. 1(2).
Tibet
Tibet
V. Tibet
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama or His Representatives
There has been no formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's
representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government
officials since the ninth round of dialogue was held in January
2010.\1\ In its 2016 Report on Tibet Negotiations, the U.S.
State Department reiterated the long-standing position of the
U.S. Government that promoting substantive dialogue between the
Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives is
an ``important U.S. foreign policy objective'' and that
``resumption of dialogue and steps to redress Tibetan
grievances are critical to reducing the continuing high
tensions between Tibetans and Chinese authorities.'' \2\ On
February 3, 2017, the Party-run Global Times reported that Zhu
Weiqun, Chairperson of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference and a former senior Party official, said the Chinese
government would not engage in dialogue with what Zhu referred
to as an ``illegal group'' whose aim is to split China.\3\
Reincarnation and the 14th Dalai Lama
The Chinese central government maintains that only it has
the right to decide the Dalai Lama's successor.\4\ The 14th
Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who reached the age of 82 in July
2017,\5\ has said ``the person who reincarnates has sole
legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth
and how that reincarnation is to be recognized.'' \6\ The issue
of the current Dalai Lama's reincarnation garnered substantial
attention during this reporting year, prompted in part by the
Dalai Lama's travel to two places with significant historical
ties to Tibetan Buddhism--Mongolia in November 2016, and
Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, India, in April 2017--and
speculation that the Dalai Lama may be exploring possible
places for his reincarnation.\7\
While in Tawang, where the Dalai Lama gave teachings to
50,000 people, he said it was ``nonsense'' for the Chinese
government to claim that it has the right to decide his
successor.\8\ The Dalai Lama reiterated that whether the
institution of the Dalai Lama is still relevant, or if he
should be the last Dalai Lama, is something for the Tibetan
people to decide.\9\ He said he expects not only Tibetan
refugees, but also others across the Himalayan region,
including Tawang, to provide input into the decision regarding
whether the institution should continue.\10\ On August 9, 2017,
during a lecture in India, the Dalai Lama said that ``[s]ome of
the preparation for the future of the Dalai Lama institution
will begin in the next one or two years.'' \11\ He further
stated that people in India and Mongolia ``also have . . .
responsibility'' in this matter.\12\
Chinese authorities continued to expand the public profile
of their chosen Panchen Lama, 27-year-old Gyaltsen Norbu, whom
Party and government officials selected as the 11th Panchen
Lama in 1995, shortly after declaring the Dalai Lama's
recognition of then six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima to be
``illegal and invalid.'' \13\ According to observers, Gyaltsen
Norbu is likely to play a significant role in the Party and
government's selection of their endorsed successor to the 14th
Dalai Lama.\14\ In August 2016, the Global Times stated that as
Gyaltsen Norbu becomes more involved in religious, political,
and social affairs, he ``is expected to mitigate'' the
influence of the Dalai Lama.\15\ Chinese authorities abducted
Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his parents on May 17, 1995, three days
after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the reincarnation of the
10th Panchen Lama, and have refused to permit an independent
expert to visit him.\16\ The Panchen Lama and his family's
whereabouts remain unknown.\17\
In August 2016, for the first time, the U.S. State
Department addressed the Dalai Lama's reincarnation in its
annual Report on Tibet Negotiations, stating that as a matter
of the ``universally recognized right of religious freedom,''
the decision regarding the Dalai Lama's succession or
reincarnation ``must be reserved to the current Dalai Lama,
Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and the Tibetan people.'' \18\
Despite the harsh measures that the Chinese government and
Party have taken to try to undermine the stature of the Dalai
Lama in the eyes of Tibetans, Tibetan Buddhists continue to
revere him as their spiritual leader and take great risks to
access his teachings, possess an image of him, or express their
devotion in other ways.\19\ In December 2016, the Aba
Intermediate People's Court in Ma'erkang (Barkham) county, Aba
(Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP),
Sichuan province, reportedly sentenced at least eight Tibetans
in Aba (Ngaba) county, to prison terms ranging from 5 to 14
years for involvement in activities relating to the celebration
of the Dalai Lama's 80th birthday in July 2015,\20\ including
48-year-old Bonkho Kyi, whom authorities sentenced to 7 years
in prison reportedly for organizing a public picnic to
celebrate the Dalai Lama's birthday.\21\
Security, Surveillance, and Party Policy
The government and Party continued implementing repressive
policies in Tibetan autonomous areas \22\ of China through the
use of extensive and intrusive surveillance, stringent measures
that restrict Tibetans' fundamental rights, and pervasive
displays of police and military force, in what U.K.-based
professor Tsering Topgyal has described as the
``securitization'' of the region, Tibetan Buddhism, and Tibetan
culture.\23\ Chinese officials in the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR) announced in November 2016 that they were again extending
a grassroots surveillance program, first launched in October
2011, which involves the deployment of tens of thousands of
cadres to rural areas to monitor local Tibetans and deepen the
Party's penetration into villages, religious institutions, and
neighborhood committees, with the aim of preserving ``social
stability'' and fostering support for the Party.\24\ Officials
have also reportedly deployed similar methods in Tibetan areas
of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces.\25\
At various times during the year, the government and Party
continued to use large-scale displays of military and security
forces throughout Tibetan areas of China, reportedly unlinked
to any actual or tangible threat of violence, which
international human rights organizations described as an
attempt to intimidate Tibetans.\26\ Authorities intensified the
security presence during major religious festivals and
``sensitive'' dates, including the entire month of March
2017.\27\
New high-level political appointments in the TAR are
unlikely to lead to any changes in current policies or methods
of governance.\28\ In late August 2016, authorities announced
that the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee had selected
Wu Yingjie--an official linked to previous crackdowns who has
spent most of his career in the TAR--to be the new Party
Secretary of the TAR.\29\ In a speech Wu gave the following
month, he called for ``deepen[ing] the struggle against the
Dalai Lama clique,'' which he described as ``the highest
priority'' of the Party's ethnic affairs work.\30\ In January
2017, Tibetan official Qizhala (Che Dalha), the former Party
secretary of Lhasa municipality, TAR, became the governor of
the TAR.\31\
Chinese authorities continued to denounce the Dalai Lama as
a ``splittist'' \32\ or ``separatist,'' \33\ blaming him and
``hostile foreign forces'' for ``inciting separatism'' in
Tibetan areas of China,\34\ despite the fact the Dalai Lama has
stated repeatedly that he seeks genuine autonomy for Tibet, not
independence.\35\ In May 2017, the secretary of the TAR's
Commission for Discipline Inspection, Wang Yongjun, alleged
that some Party officials had donated funds to the Dalai Lama,
and thus ``severely undermine[d] the Party's fight against
separatism.'' \36\ State media reported in April 2017 that
authorities used polygraph tests to assess the capability and
``psychological fitness'' of 168 leading cadres (lingdao ganbu)
in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), an area
known as a stronghold of Tibetan identity and culture.\37\ The
International Campaign for Tibet described the use of
polygraphs to assess the political loyalty of Party officials
as indicative of ``an escalation of the [Party's] efforts to
assert its dominance'' amid ``a climate . . . of fear and
mistrust'' that the Party created.\38\
Self-Immolations
Self-immolations by Tibetans as a form of protest
reportedly focusing on religious and political issues continued
during this reporting year.\39\ As of August 21, 2017, there
were 5 known self-immolations in Tibetan autonomous areas of
China, 4 of which were confirmed to be fatal, bringing the
total number of such self-immolations by Tibetans living in
China to 144 since 2009, 127 of which were reportedly
fatal.\40\ This extreme form of protest and expression has
become less frequent in recent years, as the Chinese government
has continued to impose collective punishment on family members
and others close to self-immolators in an apparent effort to
deter self-immolations.\41\ Since 2009, many Tibetan self-
immolators have called for the long life of the Dalai Lama, his
return from exile, and freedom for Tibet.\42\
Chinese authorities responded as they have in other self-
immolation cases: Officials threatened and detained family
members and supporters, attempted to prevent images and videos
of the self-immolations from being circulated, and detained
those suspected of sharing information.\43\ As in previous
years, self-immolation protesters called for the Dalai Lama's
long life and return, and/or freedom for Tibet.\44\
On December 8, 2016, 31-year-old father of two
Tashi Rabten died after self-immolating in Maqu (Machu)
county seat, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province.\45\
Pema Gyaltsen, a 24-year-old unmarried farmer
from Xinlong (Nyagrong) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP,
Sichuan province, self-immolated on March 18, 2017, in
Ganzi county seat.\46\ Police reportedly took into
custody nearly 200 Tibetan bystanders, some of whom had
expressed solidarity with Gyaltsen.\47\ Reports
following his self-immolation indicated that it was
unclear whether he survived.\48\
Wangchug Tseten, a father of four in his 30s,
also from Xinlong, self-immolated in the Ganzi county
seat on April 15, 2017.\49\ Authorities reportedly
detained five Tibetans in connection with the self-
immolation, three for apparently being in possession of
Wangchug Tseten's mobile phone, and two others for
allegedly filming his protest.\50\ Wangchug Tseten
later died from his injuries.\51\
Chagdor Kyab, a 16-year-old student from Bora
township, Gannan, set himself on fire near Bora
Monastery on May 2, 2017.\52\ Chinese security forces
quickly extinguished the flames and removed Chagdor
Kyab from the scene.\53\ In the aftermath of the self-
immolation, authorities briefly detained his parents
twice, prevented relatives and friends from visiting
the family at their home, and barred monks from
performing religious rituals for Chagdor Kyab.\54\ He
later died from his injuries.\55\
Jamyang Losel, a monk in his early 20s, set
fire to himself in Jianzha (Chentsa) county, Huangnan
(Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, on May 19, 2017, and
died shortly thereafter.\56\ Authorities refused to
return his body to his family.\57\
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists
The Party and government continued to regulate Tibetan
Buddhism and its practices in an effort to strengthen their
control over Tibetan Buddhists, with the aim of transforming
Tibetan Buddhism, monasteries and nunneries, and monastics into
loyal supporters of the Party and country.\58\ One
international scholar has described the restrictions and
requirements placed on monastics and monasteries as a
``pervasive regime of control.'' \59\ Among the most
significant developments this past year with respect to the
right of religious freedom were the demolitions and expulsions
at the famous Tibetan Buddhist institutes Larung Gar and Yachen
Gar.\60\ [For information on the relevant law relating to
religious freedom in China, see Section II--Freedom of
Religion--International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demolitions and Expulsions at Two Famous Tibetan Buddhist Institutes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Larung Gar
In mid-July 2016, Chinese authorities in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, began the process of
demolishing dwellings and expelling monks and nuns at Larung Gar
Buddhist Institute, in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi TAP.\61\ The Seda
county government, reportedly operating under instructions from
``higher authorities,'' mandated that by September 2017, Larung Gar's
occupancy could not exceed 5,000 residents.\62\
In June 2017, a senior abbot at Larung Gar told the community that
since 2016, Chinese authorities had expelled ``more than 4,828 monks
and nuns'' \63\ and that ``4,725 monastic dwellings'' had been
demolished.\64\ Before the expulsions began in 2016, estimates
suggested that the population of Larung Gar, one of the world's largest
Buddhist institutes, was at least 10,000, if not higher--comprised not
only of Tibetan monks and nuns, but also thousands of Han Chinese
practitioners, as well as students from India and Western
countries.\65\ In March 2017, a senior abbot told the remaining
residents: ``Those who have left had never wanted to leave. All left
against their own wish.'' \66\ He also urged them not to protest what
he described as the ``implementation of Chinese government policy''
which he said came from ``senior levels of government.'' \67\ Sources
reported the expulsions and demolitions caused significant distress and
despair within the community,\68\ including the suicide of three nuns
in protest during the summer of 2016.\69\ In addition, Chinese
authorities across the TAR subjected monks and nuns expelled from
Larung Gar to periods of ``patriotic education'' lasting from several
weeks to six months upon arrival in their home localities, before
officials allowed them to return to their family homes.\70\
Official explanations of the measures taken at Larung Gar included
concerns about overcrowding, health and safety, and the desire to make
a `` `more orderly, beautiful' land.'' \71\ Some observers believe that
Chinese authorities' purpose in reducing the size of Larung Gar was to
contain and control its influence, and to further restrict religious
freedom.\72\ The popularity of Larung Gar among Han Chinese may also
have been a factor.\73\ According to the International Campaign for
Tibet and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD),
the expulsions and demolitions at Larung Gar were also driven by the
Chinese government's plans to increase business and tourism in the
area, which would further marginalize the religious community.\74\ A
Tibetan monastic instructor told a TCHRD source in late July 2017 that
``[m]ost of the people who now come to Larung Gar are tourists rather
than people who want to practice Buddhism.'' \75\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demolitions and Expulsions at Two Famous Tibetan Buddhist Institutes--
Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yachen Gar
Yachen Gar, located in Beiyu (Pelyul) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP,
Sichuan, had an estimated population of 10,000, comprised mainly of
nuns, before expulsions at Yachen Gar began in April 2016.\76\ By mid-
September 2016, authorities at the institute had expelled as many as
1,000 nuns who originally came from the TAR.\77\ Authorities reportedly
threatened family members of nuns at Yachen Gar from the TAR with
punishment if the nuns did not return to their place of household
registration (hukou).\78\ The demolition of approximately 200 dwellings
to accommodate new curb and sidewalk construction, in addition to other
construction projects, indicated that Chinese authorities were
preparing Yachen Gar for an influx of tourists.\79\ In August 2017,
Radio Free Asia reported that demolitions were continuing at Yachen
Gar.\80\ Chinese officials reportedly ordered the expulsion of 2,000
nuns and monks and the demolition of 2,000 houses by the end of
2017.\81\
Various human rights are implicated in the Chinese government's
demolitions and forced expulsions at the two Buddhist institutes.\82\
Six UN special rapporteurs jointly submitted a letter to the Chinese
government in November 2016, in which they wrote that ``grave concern
is expressed over the serious repression of the Buddhist Tibetans'
cultural and religious practices and learning in Larung Gar and Yachen
Gar.'' \83\ The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
described the destruction at Larung Gar as exemplifying the Chinese
government's ``desire to eviscerate the teachings and study of Tibetan
Buddhism that are integral to the faith.'' \84\ In addition, by
compelling relocation of monks and nuns from Larung Gar and Yachen Gar,
Chinese authorities also arguably violated their rights of freedom of
residence and movement.\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Movement
As in previous years, Chinese authorities tightly
restricted the freedom of movement of Tibetans, both
domestically and internationally, in contravention of
international human rights standards.\86\ Chinese authorities
continued to restrict access to the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR) for Tibetans not from the TAR.\87\ Moreover, in August
2017, the State Council announced that the government would cap
the permanent resident population in the central urban areas of
Lhasa municipality, TAR, at 500,000 by 2020.\88\ According to
Chinese census data, in 2010, there were 559,423 permanent
residents in Lhasa.\89\ In April 2017, authorities reportedly
required residents of Xinlong (Nyagrong) county, Ganzi (Kardze)
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, to
obtain three different permits--village, township, and county--
in order to travel to Ganzi township, the county seat of Ganzi
county, Ganzi TAP, after two Tibetans from Xinlong self-
immolated there within one month of each other.\90\ [For
information on international legal standards regarding freedom
of movement, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and
Movement--International Travel, Domestic Movement.]
The Chinese government severely restricts the ability of
Tibetans to travel abroad.\91\ It is very difficult for
Tibetans to obtain passports, and even if obtained, Chinese
authorities may easily confiscate or cancel them.\92\ Chinese
authorities made concerted efforts to prevent an estimated
7,000 Tibetan pilgrims from attending the Kalachakra ceremony
\93\ and teachings given by the Dalai Lama in Bodh Gaya,
India,\94\ in January 2017.\95\ The International Campaign for
Tibet described these efforts as ``the most systematic
crackdown so far linked to a Dalai Lama's teaching in exile.''
\96\
In October 2016, Chinese authorities began to confiscate
Tibetans' passports and ordered thousands of Tibetans who had
already managed to travel to Nepal and India on pilgrimage to
return to China.\97\ In late November, the Dalai Lama granted a
special audience and gave teachings in Dharamsala, India, to
over 1,000 Tibetans who were ordered to return to China.\98\
Chinese authorities threatened various punishments if pilgrims
disobeyed the order to return, including detention and loss of
pension and jobs for themselves or their family members; monks
were told they would not be permitted to return to their
monasteries.\99\
Chinese authorities labeled the Dalai Lama's Kalachakra
``illegal'' and reportedly prohibited Tibetans from sharing
news or organizing local gatherings related to the
teachings.\100\ Tibetan sources in Qinghai and Sichuan
provinces, nonetheless, told Radio Free Asia that Tibetans were
holding small gatherings to pray and to participate in the
Kalachakra teachings via the Internet.\101\
Freedom of Expression
Chinese authorities continued to detain and imprison
Tibetans for exercising their rights to freedom of expression
and opinion, and for engaging in solo peaceful protests.\102\
Several representative cases follow.
In November 2016, a court in Heishui (Trochu)
county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan province, sentenced Lobsang
Sonam, a 23-year-old monk from Kirti Monastery, to six
years in prison for sharing information and images
about Tibet with entities outside of China.\103\
Sonam Tashi a 20-year-old resident of Seda
(Serthar) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan, was
detained by police in January 2017 after engaging in a
peaceful solo protest during which he called for the
long life of the Dalai Lama and freedom for Tibet,
while dispersing leaflets as he walked along the
street.\104\ Police seized him quickly, and his
whereabouts are unknown.\105\
On February 25, 2017, public security
officials in Aba county, Aba T&QAP, detained Lobsang
Tsultrim, a young Kirti Monastery monk, following his
peaceful solo protest calling for the Dalai Lama's
return and freedom for Tibetans.\106\ As of August
2017, his condition and whereabouts were unknown.\107\
Authorities took Gedun, a young villager from
Shiqu (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP, into custody in
early March 2017, and reportedly severely beat him for
sharing photos of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan national
flag, and essays about the preservation of the Tibetan
language on the messaging service WeChat.\108\
Status of Tibetan Culture
China's 2016-2020 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP)
provides both that ``the cultural rights of ethnic minorities
shall be guaranteed'' and that ``[t]he right of ethnic
minorities to learn, use and develop their own spoken and
written languages shall be respected and guaranteed,'' echoing
provisions of China's Constitution, the PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law, and the PRC Education Law.\109\ Tibetan culture
and language face increasing pressure and marginalization,
however, as the Chinese government and Party continue to
promote Mandarin Chinese as the main language of instruction in
Tibetan areas.\110\ Given the inextricable link between
language, culture, and identity,\111\ and the need for Tibetan
language in order to access Buddhist texts,\112\ Chinese
authorities view Tibetan-language instruction as a potential
security issue--a force that could fuel ``separatism.'' \113\
Public security officials detained Tibetan language rights
advocate and entrepreneur Tashi Wangchug \114\ in January 2016
in Yushu (Kyegudo) city, Yushu TAP, Qinghai province, following
a November 2015 New York Times report and video of his efforts
to advocate for a genuine Tibetan-Mandarin bilingual education
system.\115\ Authorities subsequently indicted Tashi Wangchug
for ``inciting separatism,'' and he remains detained awaiting
trial.\116\
Despite the risks, Tibetans continue to organize Tibetan-
language literacy groups,\117\ and during this past year,
several open letters and essays written by Tibetans appeared
online expressing concern about the state of ``bilingual
education.'' \118\ A Washington Post reporter wrote that
several Tibetans he spoke with in Lhasa municipality, TAR, in
September 2016, expressed unhappiness that young Tibetans study
in Mandarin as their primary language of instruction, and study
and speak Tibetan as if it were a foreign language.\119\
Economic Development and Tourism
The Chinese government has long held the view that economic
development is the key to solidifying its control in
Tibet.\120\ The Commission, however, observed no evidence
during its 2002-2017 period of reporting that the Party or
government solicited systematic or representative input from
the Tibetan population on economic development in autonomous
Tibetan areas of China.\121\ Much central government investment
for development has targeted large-scale infrastructure
projects and government administration.\122\ Experts note that
Han Chinese have mainly benefited from the job opportunities
that these projects have created, because many Tibetans are
disadvantaged in competing with Han migrant workers, who
generally have higher levels of education as well as requisite
Mandarin skills.\123\ In September 2016, a TAR official told a
group of foreign reporters that the Chinese government's goal
was to turn Tibet into a ``world-class tourism destination.''
\124\ Millions of Chinese tourists travel to the TAR each year,
and the government is planning to attract more foreign visitors
to the TAR.\125\ The pressure placed on Tibetan culture,
livelihood, and identity by the influx of Han migrants and
tourists is substantial.\126\ In April 2017, reports emerged
that the Chinese government is considering making the entire
Tibetan plateau into a national park, which will be open mainly
to tourists, and will impact many Tibetan residents.\127\ In
July 2017, the China Daily reported that the government would
build China's first Mars simulation base in the Haixi Mongolian
and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, and that
it would ``be turned into a cultural and tourist experience
base.'' \128\
Tibet
Tibet
Notes to Section V--Tibet
\1\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report on Tibet Negotiations, P.L.
107-228 Section 613(b), of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2003,'' attached to letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant
Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 16, 1.
\2\ Ibid. See also ``US Committed to Tibetan Issue, Says
Tillerson,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Zee News, 8 May 17;
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Secretary Tillerson Says He Is
Committed To Promoting Dialogue on Tibet and Receiving the Dalai
Lama,'' 1 February 17. During his confirmation proceedings in the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC) in January 2017, Rex
Tillerson stated if confirmed as Secretary of State he would continue
to encourage dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama
and/or representatives of Tibet's ``government-in-exile.''
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Senate Confirms Terry Branstad as
U.S. Ambassador to China as He Commits To `Urge Chinese Authorities To
Engage in Meaningful and Direct Dialogue With the Dalai Lama,' '' 22
May 17. During Terry Branstad's confirmation hearing in the SFRC for
the position of U.S. Ambassador to China, he committed to ``urge
Chinese authorities to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with
the Dalai Lama and his representatives without preconditions to lower
tensions and resolve differences.''
\3\ Chu Xiaohui and Li Ruohan, ``Courting Dalai Lama Would Hurt US
Interest: Official,'' Global Times, 3 February 17. For more information
on Zhu Weiqun and his role in earlier dialogues with the Dalai Lama's
envoys, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 302, endnotes 43-
45; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 300.
\4\ Sui-Lee Wee, ``China Sticks to Right To Decide Reincarnation of
Dalai Lama,'' Reuters, 30 November 15. See also KJM Varma, `` `Dalai
Lama's Successor Must Have China's Endorsement,' '' Press Trust of
India, 9 April 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301-2; CECC,
2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189; ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet
2008-2009,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October
09, 38-39.
\5\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``A Brief Biography,''
last visited 14 May 17. According to biographical information on the
Dalai Lama's official website, he was born on July 6, 1935.
\6\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Reincarnation,'' 24
September 11. The statement was published initially with the title,
``Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso,
on the Issue of His Reincarnation.'' See also Melissa Locker, ``John
Oliver Had an Enlightening Talk With the Dalai Lama on Last Week
Tonight,'' Time, 5 March 17; ``Dalai Lama: Last Week Tonight With John
Oliver (HBO)'' [Video file], YouTube, 5 March 17, 9 min. 20 sec.; CECC,
2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 302.
\7\ Ellen Barry, ``Dalai Lama's Journey Provokes China, and Hints
at His Heir,'' New York Times, 6 April 17; Lucy Hornby and Amy Kazmin,
``Dalai Lama's Travel Plans Ignite Reincarnation Row,'' Financial
Times, 24 March 17; Edward Wong, ``Mongolia, With Deep Ties to Dalai
Lama, Turns From Him Toward China,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog),
30 December 16; Joseph Dussault, ``Why the Dalai Lama Is No Longer
Welcome in Mongolia,'' Christian Science Monitor, 26 December 16;
``Standardization of Terms Aimed at Reaffirming Sovereignty: Experts,''
Global Times, 18 April 17; ``A Himalayan Rivalry,'' Economist, 19
August 10. As the Economist notes, Tawang is an important center of
Tibetan Buddhism and the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama. Tawang is
located in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is a disputed
territory on the Indo-China border that the Chinese government claims
as ``South Tibet.''
\8\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``His Holiness the Dalai
Lama Gives Buddhist Teachings to 50,000 in Tawang,'' 8 April 17.
\9\ Sunil Kataria, ``Dalai Lama Says Tibetan People Should Decide
on His Succession,'' Reuters, 11 April 17. See also Office of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Reincarnation,'' 24 September 11. The
statement was published initially with the title, ``Statement of His
Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His
Reincarnation.''
\10\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``His Holiness the
Dalai Lama Gives Buddhist Teachings to 50,000 in Tawang,'' 8 April 17.
\11\ ``Dalai Lama Suggests Preparations of Finding His Successor
Will Begin in Next 1-2 Years'' [Video file], India Today Television, 9
August 17.
\12\ Ibid.
\13\ Guo Xin, ``It Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama
To Universally Identify the Reincarnated Soul Boy of the Panchen
Lama,'' People's Daily, 1 December 95 (translated in Open Source
Center, 1 December 95); ``China's Panchen Lama Calls for Patriotism,
Says Greed Taints Tibetan Buddhism,'' Reuters, 14 March 17; ``Dalai
Lama Rejects Communist Party `Brazen Meddling' in Tibetan Buddhist
Reincarnation,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1,
24 January 12, 3; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301. See also
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
``International Religious Freedom Report for 2015--China (Includes
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 10 August 16, 32. Despite the Chinese
government's denunciation of the Dalai Lama's selection of Gedun
Choekyi Nyima, the ``overwhelming majority of Tibetan Buddhists
recognize [Gedun Choekyi Nyima] as the 11th Panchen Lama.''
\14\ ``Dalai Lama: Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (HBO)''
[Video file], YouTube, 5 March 17, 9 min. 5 sec.; Simon Denyer, ``China
Prepares for Dalai Lama's Death by Looking to Its Own Top Tibetan
Cleric,'' Washington Post, 26 September 16; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``China Attempts To Legitimize Its Panchen Lama Through a Major
Speech as the Real Panchen Lama's Birthday Approaches,'' 21 April 15;
John Powers, The Buddha Party: How the People's Republic of China Works
To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 125. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16,
301-2. For more information on the Panchen Lama and China's likely
model for selecting the next Dalai Lama, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report,
31 October 08, 189.
\15\ Huang Jingjing, ``An Increasingly Active Panchen Lama Is
Expected To Mitigate Dalai's Influence,'' Global Times, 24 August 16;
Simon Denyer, ``China Prepares for Dalai Lama's Death by Looking to Its
Own Top Tibetan Cleric,'' Washington Post, 26 September 16.
\16\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``International Religious Freedom Report for 2015--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 10 August 16, 29;
International Campaign for Tibet, ``China Attempts To Legitimize Its
Panchen Lama Through a Major Speech as the Real Panchen Lama's Birthday
Approaches,'' 21 April 15; ``Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party `Brazen
Meddling' in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,'' CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3; UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: China (including Hong
Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions), adopted by the
Committee at its 1080th Meeting (30 September 2005), CRC/C/CHN/CO/2, 24
November 05, paras. 44-45. The report observed under paragraphs 44 and
45: ``The Committee notes the information provided about the Gedhun
Choekyi Nyima, but remains concerned that it has not yet been possible
to have this information confirmed by an independent expert . . .. In
particular, the Committee recommends that the State party: . . . e)
allow an independent expert to visit and confirm the well-being of
Gedhun Choekyi Nyima while respecting his right to privacy, and that of
his parents.'' CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301.
\17\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 35; CECC,
2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301. For more information about Gedun
Choekyi Nyima, see the Commission's Political Prisoner database, record
2004-00835.
\18\ U.S. Department of State, ``Report on Tibet Negotiations, P.L.
107-228 Section 613(b), of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2003,'' attached to letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant
Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 16, 2. For the full text of
the U.S. State Department's annual reports on Tibet negotiations from
previous years, see International Campaign for Tibet, ``State
Department Annual Reports on Tibet,'' last visited 15 July 17.
\19\ See, e.g., Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's
Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi
Jinping,'' February 2017, 86-87, 100; ``Tibetan Youth Detained, Warned
Over Dalai Lama Photo,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 June 17; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Pilgrims Compelled To Return From Dalai
Lama Teaching to Bodh Gaya, India; China Calls the Teaching `Illegal,'
'' 9 January 17; ``Tibetans in China Defy Warnings, Support the
Kalachakra,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 January 17.
\20\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Jails
Tibetans for Celebrating Dalai Lama's Birthday: Nine Tibetans Get
Varying Terms of 5 to 14 Years,'' 7 December 16. For more information
on eight Tibetans from Aba (Ngaba) county sentenced by the same court
and on the same date for celebrating the Dalai Lama's 80th birthday in
2015, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2008-
00632 on Tsultrim, 2011-00422 on Lobsang Khedrub, 2012-00222 on Lodroe,
2012-00261 on Bonkho Kyi, 2016-00212 on Argya Gya, 2017-00026 on
Drugdra, 2017-00027 on Lobsang Gephel, and 2017-00028 on Tsultrim.
\21\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Jails
Tibetans for Celebrating Dalai Lama's Birthday: Nine Tibetans Get
Varying Terms of 5 to 14 Years,'' 7 December 16. For more information
on Bonkho Kyi, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2012-00261.
\22\ For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China,
see CECC, ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' 22 October 09, 22-
24. In China there is 1 provincial-level area of Tibetan autonomy
(Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)), and there are 10 prefectural-level
areas of Tibetan autonomy and 2 county-level areas of Tibetan autonomy.
The area of the TAR (approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the
10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) (approximately 1.02 million
square kilometers), and the 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TACs)
(approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately
2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46
percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. Steven Marshall and Susette
Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation:
Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Self-
published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources.
Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region
(1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai
province: Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077
square miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075
square miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square
kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901
square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444
square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushul) TAP
(197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province:
Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles)
and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square
miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (153,870 square
kilometers, or 59,409 square miles), Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP
(86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles), and Muli (Mili) TAC
(11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province:
Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles).
The table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square
miles uses the formula provided on the website of the U.S. Geological
Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. For population data,
see Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China
[2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of
Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau
of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State
Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September
2003), Tables 10-1, 10-4. According to China's 2010 ethnic census data,
the total Tibetan population in China was 6,282,187. The Tibetan
population of the TAR (approximately 2.72 million), the 10 TAPs
(approximately 2.97 million), and the 2 TACs (approximately 0.096
million) totaled approximately 5.78 million Tibetans living in areas of
Tibetan autonomy. Approximately 0.498 million Tibetans lived outside of
the areas of Tibetan autonomy. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010
Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha
fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of
Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-2. When the Chinese government,
Party officials, and state-run media refer to ``Tibet,'' they generally
refer to the area of what is today the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds.
Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008), 71; Andrew Martin Fischer, The
Disempowered Development of Tibet in China (Lanham: Lexington Books,
2014), xix. Fischer explains that he, among others (including the
``Tibetan Exile Government'') use ``Tibet'' to refer to the TAR and the
Tibetan areas incorporated into Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan
provinces: ``Often known as `greater Tibet,' `cultural Tibet,' or
`ethnographic Tibet,' this region is about the size of western Europe
or about one quarter of China.'' See also CECC, ``Special Topic Paper:
Tibet 2008-2009,'' 22 October 09, 87, endnote 1.
\23\ Tsering Topgyal, ``The Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism in
Communist China,'' Politics and Religion in Contemporary China, Vol. 6,
No. 2 (2012), 232-33, 238-41; International Campaign for Tibet, `` `The
Teeth of the Storm': Lack of Freedom of Expression and Cultural
Resilience in Tibet,'' 14 June 15 (referring to the ``hyper-
securitization'' of Tibet); International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT
Inside Tibet: The Four Loves and the Enemy Within: New Ideological
Campaign in Tibet Reflects Heightened Agenda of Control in 19th Party
Congress Year,'' 20 April 17; Human Rights Watch, ``World Report
2017,'' 2017, 195; Yeshi Dorje, ``China Vows `Strike' Against Dalai
Lama as Tibetans Mark Uprising,'' Voice of America, 10 March 17;
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Extends Tibet
Surveillance Program for Sixth Year in Row,'' 30 November 16. See also
John Powers, The Buddha Party: How the People's Republic of China Works
To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 24; Ben Hillman, ``Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of
Regional Autonomy,'' in Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds., Ethnic
Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 22, 35, endnote 10. Hillman
writes, ``As a major source of Tibetan cultural identity, as a
competing source of legitimacy and authority, and as an occasional
vehicle for political mobilization, organized Tibetan Buddhism is
widely perceived as the greatest potential threat to Communist Party
rule in Tibetan areas.''
\24\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China Extends
Tibet Surveillance Program for Sixth Year in Row,'' 30 November 16; Ma
Jing, ``Tibet's Sixth Batch of Village-Based Cadre Teams Set Off for
the Grassroots'' [Xizang di liu pi zhucun gongzuodui chufa qu jiceng],
China Tibet Net, 26 November 16; International Campaign for Tibet and
International Federation for Human Rights, ``China's New Counter-
Terrorism Law: Implications and Dangers for Tibetans and Uyghurs,''
November 2016, 31-33, 53; Human Rights Watch, ``China: No End to Tibet
Surveillance Program,'' 18 January 16. In urban areas, authorities
continue to implement the ``grid management'' surveillance system. See
Ben Hillman, ``Unrest in Tibet: Interpreting the Post-2008 Wave of
Protest and Conflict,'' Dalny Vychod [Far East] Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2014),
7. Hillman notes that, ``In urban areas local authorities have divided
neighborhoods into grids, appointing staff to monitor each grid and to
report suspicious activities to the district administration or
police.'' See also Human Rights Watch, ``Relentless: Detention and
Prosecution of Tibetans Under China's `Stability Maintenance'
Campaign,'' May 2016, 18-20.
\25\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tightening of an Invisible
Net: New Security Measures in Eastern Tibet Heighten Surveillance,
Control,'' 16 February 16.
\26\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Cease Intimidation on Tibetan
Anniversary,'' 9 March 17; Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch,
``Dispatches: Intimidation as Governance in Tibet,'' 25 November 16;
International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: Tibetan New Year
Marked by Security Agenda; Mass Deployment of Troops for Prayer
Festival,'' 7 March 17; ``Chinese Security Forces Swarm Festival at
Tibetan Monastery,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 February 17; International
Campaign for Tibet (ICT) and International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH), ``China's New Counter-Terrorism Law: Implications and Dangers
for Tibetans and Uyghurs,'' November 2016, 10. As ICT and FIDH write in
their joint report on China's new counter-terrorism law, ``Despite the
absence of any violent insurgency in Tibet, an aggressive `counter-
terrorism' drive in Tibet with a strongly political dimension has
involved an expansion of militarization across the plateau. China's new
counter-terrorism law introduces further extra-judicial measures,
reinforcing the powers of local police and Party officials to impose
restrictive measures and use violence against individuals with
impunity. It also involves further controls over telecommunications,
internet and media.''
\27\ Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches:
Intimidation as Governance in Tibet,'' 25 November 16 (large-scale
military displays carried out across the plateau in November 2016);
``Chinese Security Forces Swarm Festival at Tibetan Monastery,'' Radio
Free Asia, 13 February 17; International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT
Inside Tibet: Tibetan New Year Marked by Security Agenda; Mass
Deployment of Troops for Prayer Festival,'' 7 March 17 (security forces
present in large numbers during a major religious festival at Kumbum
monastery in Qinghai province in February 2017); International Campaign
for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: The Four Loves and the Enemy Within: New
Ideological Campaign in Tibet Reflects Heightened Agenda of Control in
19th Party Congress Year,'' 20 April 17 (describing a military drill in
Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, on March 6, 2017, reportedly involving
more than 200 paramilitary police and soldiers and a wide range of
``advanced military vehicles''); Tenzin Monlam, ``Rebkong Under Heavy
Security Since Tibetan Uprising Anniversary,'' Phayul, 15 March 17;
``During the Sensitive Period in March, Multiple Places in Tibetan
Areas Under Strict Control and Surveillance'' [Sanyue min'ganqi zangqu
duodi bei yanguan yankong], Radio Free Asia, 14 March 17 (during the
``sensitive month'' of March, Chinese authorities employed heightened
security measures in Tibetan areas that had experienced the largest
number of self-immolations and protests). Several important and
``sensitive'' dates and anniversaries occur in March. These include
March 10, which marks both the 1959 ``Tibetan People's Uprising'' in
Lhasa and the start of widespread Tibetan protests in 2008, as well as
March 28, the official ``Serfs Emancipation Day,'' which marks the 1959
dissolution of the former Tibetan government in Lhasa--a holiday that
many Tibetans seek to avoid. Annual intensified security clampdowns
often begin at some point in February to include Losar, the Tibetan New
Year. ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 October 09, 56-65. March also contains
``sensitive'' anniversaries specific to certain locations. For example,
on March 16, 2008, a peaceful protest that began at Kirti Monastery in
Aba (Ngaba) county, Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous
Prefecture, Sichuan province, ended in bloodshed after Chinese security
forces opened fire, reportedly killing at least 15 Tibetans, and
injuring hundreds of others. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Solitary Tibetan Protests Continue in Ngaba To Commemorate
`16 March Massacre,' '' 21 March 17.
\28\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Party Boss in Tibet
Autonomous Region Associated With Hardline Campaigns, Anti-Dalai Lama
Struggle,'' 2 September 16; Yeshe Choesang, ``New TAR Party Chief Calls
for Deeper Criticism of Spiritual Leader in Tibet,'' Tibet Post
International, 3 September 16.
\29\ ``Wu Yingjie Appointed Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous
Region'' [Wu yingjie ren xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji], China Tibet
News Net, 29 August 16; Jayadeva Ranada, ``Extensive Profile on China's
New Tibet Party Secretary: Wu Yingjie,'' reprinted in MikelDunham
(blog), 24 October 16; International Campaign for Tibet, ``New Party
Boss in Tibet Autonomous Region Associated With Hardline Campaigns,
Anti-Dalai Lama Struggle,'' 2 September 16; Tshering Chonzom Bhutia,
``Does Tibet's New Governor Signal Change? '' The Diplomat, 19 January
17; Yeshe Choesang, ``New TAR Party Chief Calls for Deeper Criticism of
Spiritual Leader in Tibet,'' Tibet Post International, 3 September 16.
\30\ ``China Says Countering Dalai Lama Is Top Ethnic Priority in
Tibet,'' Reuters, 30 September 16.
\31\ Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, ``Does Tibet's New Governor Signal
Change? '' The Diplomat, 19 January 17. For more background on Qizhala,
see International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), ``Tibetan Becomes New Lhasa
Party Secretary; Updates on Leadership in Tibetan Areas and the Current
Climate in Lhasa,'' 13 December 2011. ICT notes that prior to Qizhala
becoming the Lhasa Party Secretary in November 2011--with the exception
of a brief stint as head of the TAR United Front Work Department
immediately preceding his being named Lhasa Party Secretary--Qizhala
had spent his whole career in Diqing (Dechen) TAP, Yunnan province. As
head of Diqing TAP, Qizhala was reportedly ``well-regarded'' by the
local Tibetans.
\32\ ``China Calls Dalai Lama's Kalachakra `Illegal,' Threatens
Punishment for Those Taking Part,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 January 17;
``China Warns India Over Invite to Dalai Lama to Buddhist Meet,'' Press
Trust of India (PTI), reprinted in Economic Times, 20 March 17.
\33\ ``China Calls Dalai Lama a `Separatist,' Says He Fled After
Failed Armed Rebellion,'' Press Trust of India (PTI), reprinted in
Hindustan Times, 8 April 17. See also ``China Calls Dalai Lama's
Kalachakra `Illegal,' Threatens Punishment for Those Taking Part,''
Radio Free Asia, 5 January 17. The Commission has observed that the
Chinese government appears to use the English terms ``splittist'' and
``separatist'' interchangeably as translations of the Chinese term
fenlie fenzi when referring to the Dalai Lama.
\34\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: Tibetan
New Year Marked by Security Agenda; Mass Deployment of Troops for
Prayer Festival,'' 7 March 17; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``International Religious Freedom
Report for 2015--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 10
August 16, 36; Chu Xiaohui and Li Ruohan, ``Courting Dalai Lama Would
Hurt US Interest: Official,'' Global Times, 3 February 17; Shubhajit
Roy, ``My Reincarnation Can't Be Born in Place With No Freedom: The
Dalai Lama,'' Indian Express, 26 May 17; Ben Hillman, ``Unrest in Tibet
and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,'' in Ethnic Conflict and Protest
in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West, Ben Hillman and Gray
Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 24, 34. See
also Ben Hillman, ``Introduction: Understanding the Current Wave of
Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang,'' in Ethnic Conflict and
Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West, Ben Hillman and
Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 3.
According to Hillman, ``[t]he Chinese government blames all of the
unrest and violence in Tibet and Xinjiang on separatists determined to
weaken and split China by fomenting instability.''
\35\ See, e.g., Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``His
Holiness's Middle Way Approach for Resolving the Issue of Tibet,'' last
visited 11 June 17; Tenzin Dharpo, ``Genuine Autonomy for Tibet,
Reiterates Dalai Lama in Arunachal Pradesh,'' Phayul, 5 April 17;
Shubhajit Roy, ``My Reincarnation Can't Be Born in Place With No
Freedom: The Dalai Lama,'' Indian Express, 26 May 17. See also
``Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 October 09, 7-8.
\36\ ``Some CPC Members Funding Dalai Lama: Official,'' Global
Times, 1 May 17; ``Leadership Biographies--Wang Yongjun'' [Lingdao
jianli--wang yongjun], TAR Commission for Discipline Inspection Net, 1
December 16; International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: Use
of `Lie-Detector' To Test Communist Party Members Indicates Escalation
of Control in Tibet,'' 15 May 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October
16, 302-3.
\37\ Song Zhiyong, ``[Ganzi] TAP Assessed the Capability and
Psychological Fitness of 168 Leading Cadres'' [Wozhou ceping 168 ming
lingdao ganbu nengli he xinli suzhi], Ganzi Daily, 7 April 17;
International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: Use of `Lie-
Detector' To Test Communist Party Members Indicates Escalation of
Control in Tibet,'' 15 May 17; International Campaign for Tibet,
``Tibetan Nun Self-Immolates in Kardze: Continued Resistance Despite
Chinese Crackdown,'' 4 November 11 (describing Kardze, in the Tibetan
area of Kham, Sichuan province, as a place ``where Tibetans have a
strong sense of Tibetan identity and resilient, nationalist spirit'').
See also Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Tibetans
Protest in Kardze During the Tibetan New Year,'' 8 March 09; Hannah
Beech, ``Burning Desire for Freedom,'' Time, 14 November 11; ``Chinese
Authorities Arrest a Young Monk in Tibet for Unknown Reason,'' Tibet
Post International, 17 May 16.
\38\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``ICT Inside Tibet: Use of
`Lie-Detector' To Test Communist Party Members Indicates Escalation of
Control in Tibet,'' 15 May 17.
\39\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 13-15; Sarah
Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
100. For information in recent Commission annual reports on Tibetan
self-immolation, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 300-4;
CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 172-75; CECC, 2013 Annual
Report, 10 October 13, 172-81; and CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October
12, 156-60. See also ``CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 January 17. The
Commission has posted on its website (www.cecc.gov), under Resources,
Special Topics, a series of lists relating to Tibetan self-immolations
focusing on political and religious issues.
\40\ This self-immolation total (144), as of August 21, 2017, does
not include the following six self-immolations/burnings (two of which
were possibly not self-immolations but deaths resulting from an
accidental house fire): Qinghai province property protests by females
Dekyi Choezom and Pasang Lhamo on June 27 and September 13, 2012,
respectively, and Konchog Tsomo in March 2013; by female Tashi Kyi in
Gansu province on August 28, 2015; and the April 6, 2012, deaths of a
Tibetan Buddhist abbot, Athub, and a nun, Atse, in a Sichuan house fire
initially reported as accidental and later as self-immolation. The
Commission continues to monitor reports on their deaths. ``CECC Update:
Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 10 January 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 298, 311,
endnote 5. The self-immolation total includes the five known self-
immolations that occurred during this reporting year and are discussed
in the text: Tashi Rabten (December 8, 2016), Pema Gyaltsen (March 18,
2017), Wangchug Tseten (April 15, 2017), Chagdor Kyab (May 2, 2017),
and Jamyang Losel (May 19, 2017). ``Tibetan Cuts Own Throat in Lhasa
Freedom Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 June 17. On June 23, 2017, a
Tibetan man in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, slit his
throat outside the Jokhang Temple, in a solo protest during which he
called for freedom for Tibet. A local Tibetan source told RFA that he
thought the man was ``unlikely to have survived.''
\41\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 14-15; Sarah
Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
100; Tsering Shakya, ``Transforming the Language of Protest,'' Self-
Immolation as Protest in Tibet Series, Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology
website, 8 April 12; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 298-99;
CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 172-78. Self-immolators who
survived have also faced punishment. On May 10, 2017, Lobsang Gyatso, a
19-year-old monk from Kirti Monastery, was released from Deyang prison
in Deyang municipality, Sichuan province, after serving five years on
an unknown charge following his self-immolation in 2012 in Aba (Ngaba)
county, Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan. For more
information on Lobsang Gyatso, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2017-00234.
\42\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 14; ``Nearly
Two Hundred Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze,'' Radio Free
Asia, 20 March 17; ``Special Report: Tibetan Self-Immolation--Rising
Frequency, Wider Spread, Greater Diversity,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 August 12, 4, endnote 18; CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 302.
\43\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 14-15;
``Tibetan Self-Immolator's Family Harassed, Visitors Restricted,''
Radio Free Asia, 10 May 17; ``Tibetan Monk Detained on Suspicion of
`Passing Information' Outside Protest Area,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 May
17; ``Tibetan Social Media Draw Chinese Police Attention After Self-
Immolations,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17.
\44\ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February
17, 14 (Tashi Rabten reportedly called for the Dalai Lama's long life
and that he be allowed to return); ``Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan
Self-Immolation of 2017,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 March 17 (Pema Gyaltsen
reportedly decried the absence of freedom in Tibet and called for the
Dalai Lama's return); Yeshe Choesang, ``Yet Another Layman Sets Himself
on Fire in Tibet To Protest China's Rule,'' Tibet Post International,
17 April 17 (Wangchug Tsetsen reportedly protested ``China's repressive
rule in Tibet''); ``Tibetan Teenager Stages Self-Immolation Protest in
Gansu,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 May 17 (Chagdor Kyab reportedly shouted
``Tibet wants freedom'' and ``Let His Holiness the Dalai Lama come back
to Tibet''); ``Tibetan Monk Dies After Self-Immolation To Protest
China's Rule in Tibet,'' Tibet Post International, 19 May 17 (Jamyang
Losel reportedly shouted for the Dalai Lama's return and protested
Chinese rule. The report also notes that most of the self-immolations
(since 2009) have involved calls ``for the return of the Dalai Lama and
freedom for the Tibetan people.''); CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October
15, 302.
\45\ 45 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human
Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 14;
``CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 10 January 17.
\46\ ``Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan Self-Immolation of 2017,''
Radio Free Asia, 19 March 17; ``Nearly Two Hundred Detained Following
Self-Immolation in Kardze,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17.
\47\ ``Nearly Two Hundred Detained Following Self-Immolation in
Kardze,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Security Crackdown Follows First Tibetan Self-Immolation in
2017,'' 28 March 17.
\48\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Security Crackdown Follows
First Tibetan Self-Immolation in 2017,'' 28 March 17; ``Young Farmer
Stages First Tibetan Self-Immolation of 2017,'' Radio Free Asia, 19
March 17.
\49\ ``Local Tibetans Summoned After Latest Self-Immolation,''
Voice of America, 18 April 17; Yangchen Dolma, ``Man Who Set Himself on
Fire in Kardze County of Eastern Tibet Dies,'' Tibet Post
International, 24 April 17; ``Five Detained Following Self-Immolation
in Kardze Town,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 April 17.
\50\ ``Five Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze Town,''
Radio Free Asia, 19 April 17. For more information on the Tibetans
detained in connection with the self-immolation of Wangchug Tseten, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2017-00303 on
Nyima Tsering, 2017-00304 on Konchog Gyaltsen, and 2017-00305 on
Tsering Gyatso.
\51\ Yangchen Dolma, ``Man Who Set Himself on Fire in Kardze County
of Eastern Tibet Dies,'' Tibet Post International, 24 April 17.
\52\ ``Tibetan Teenager Stages Self-Immolation Protest in Gansu,''
Radio Free Asia, 7 May 17.
\53\ Ibid.
\54\ ``Tibetan Self-Immolator's Family Harassed, Visitors
Restricted,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 May 17; Tibetan Centre for Human
Rights and Democracy, ``China Suspected of Using Torture on Self-
Immolator's Sister as Tibetan Monk Dies of Self-Immolation,'' 20 May
17.
\55\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``China
Suspected of Using Torture on Self-Immolator's Sister as Tibetan Monk
Dies of Self-Immolation,'' 20 May 17.
\56\ Ibid.; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young Tibetan Monk
Becomes the 150th Self-Immolator in Tibet,'' 23 May 17.
\57\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Young Tibetan Monk Becomes
the 150th Self-Immolator in Tibet,'' 23 May 17; ``Tibetan Monk Dies
After Self-Immolation To Protest China's Rule in Tibet,'' Tibet Post
International, 19 May 17.
\58\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 86-101; Elson Tong, ``Beijing's Panchen Lama Tells Monks
To Love the Party, Decries Commercialisation of Buddhism,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 13 March 17; John Powers, The Buddha Party: How the
People's Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 13, 14; CECC, 2016 Annual
Report, 6 October 16, 300-4.
\59\ John Powers, The Buddha Party: How the People's Republic of
China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 160.
\60\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Major Tibetan Buddhist
Institution Faces Further Demolitions,'' 29 March 17; ``China Steps Up
Demolition, Evictions at Larung Gar Buddhist Center,'' Radio Free Asia,
19 September 16; Edward Wong, ``China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of
Tibetan Buddhism,'' New York Times, 28 November 16; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is
Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13 March 17, 2-5; Edward
Wong, ``U.N. Human Rights Experts Unite To Condemn China Over
Expulsions of Tibetans,'' 27 February 17; Letter to the Ambassador and
Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of
China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special
Rapporteurs (each covering a separate area of human rights): the
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special
Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component
of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to
non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on minority
issues; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL
CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16.
\61\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Demolitions Begin at
Larung Gar, `A Monastery for the World,' as Religious Teachers Urge
Calm,'' 25 July 16.
\62\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Major Tibetan Buddhist
Institution Faces Further Demolitions,'' 29 March 17; ``Larung Gar
Expulsions Now Complete: Local Source,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 April 17.
According to RFA, the order apparently came from the central
government. The Sichuan provincial governor, Yin Li, and other Chinese
officials visited Larung Gar on March 30, 2017, and during a meeting
with the management committee of the institute, reminded them that
``higher authorities'' had ordered the expulsions and demolitions. See
also ``China Steps Up Demolition, Evictions at Larung Gar Buddhist
Center,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 September 16; ``Destruction at Larung Gar
Greater Than Earlier Reported,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17. Chinese
authorities had ordered Larung Gar to reduce its numbers in an earlier
campaign in 2001. In total, since 2001, more than 7,000 monastic
dwellings have been destroyed at Larung Gar.
\63\ ``Destruction at Larung Gar Greater Than Earlier Reported,''
Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17; ``Larung Gar Removals `Almost Complete,'
Senior Abbot Says,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 March 17; ``China Steps Up
Demolition, Evictions at Larung Gar Buddhist Center,'' Radio Free Asia,
19 September 16; Edward Wong, ``China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of
Tibetan Buddhism,'' New York Times, 28 November 16; ``China Reduces
Number of Larung Gar Dwellings Marked for Destruction,'' Radio Free
Asia, 17 March 17. A senior abbot said that the expulsions reportedly
began in 2014, when 600 monks and nuns were removed; in 2015, an
additional 1,600 monks and nuns were forced out. It is unclear who
ordered the earlier expulsions. The mandated ceiling of 5,000 monks and
nuns at Larung Gar by September 30, 2017, was contained in the Seda
(Serta) county order issued in June 2016. Human Rights Watch, ``Serta
County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,'' 9 June 16. See also CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 303-4.
\64\ ``Destruction at Larung Gar Greater Than Earlier Reported,''
Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow
of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural
Resilience,'' 13 March 17, 3; ``Larung Gar Removals `Almost Complete,'
Senior Abbot Says,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 March 17; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Security Crackdown Follows First Tibetan Self-
Immolation in 2017,'' 28 March 17; ``China Reduces Number of Larung Gar
Dwellings Marked for Destruction,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 17.
Initially Chinese officials had targeted 4,320 dwellings for
demolition, but the management committee of the institute had appealed
to authorities for fewer demolitions, and the target was subsequently
reduced by more than 1,000 homes. However, according to the June 22,
2017, report from Radio Free Asia, Chinese authorities had demolished
4,725 homes since 2016.
\65\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the
Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13
March 17, 1; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Demolitions Begin at
Larung Gar, `A Monastery for the World,' as Religious Teachers Urge
Calm,'' 25 July 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Major Tibetan Buddhist
Institution Faces Further Demolitions,'' 29 March 17; Edward Wong,
``China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,'' New York
Times, 28 November 16.
\66\ ``Larung Gar Removals `Almost Complete,' Senior Abbot Says,''
Radio Free Asia, 23 March 17.
\67\ Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Major Tibetan Buddhist
Institution Faces Further Demolitions,'' 29 March 17.
\68\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the
Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13
March 17, 3-5.
\69\ Free Tibet, ``Note Left by Larung Gar Nun Confirms Suicide,''
14 August 17; ``Tibetan Nun Commits Suicide at Buddhist Complex in
China's Sichuan Province,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 August 16; ``More
Suicides Reported in Protest of Destruction at Sichuan's Larung Gar,''
Radio Free Asia, 29 August 16; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Nuns Continue Suicide Protest Against Demolition of
Buddhist Institute,'' 1 September 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China:
1,000 Evictions from Tibetan Buddhist Centers,'' 14 September 16.
\70\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the
Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13
March 17, 4; ``China Reduces Number of Larung Gar Dwellings Marked for
Destruction,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 17; ``Larung Gar Evictees
Forced To Attend Political Classes Back Home,'' Radio Free Asia, 4
November 16. For more information on ``patriotic education,'' which
entails studying and expressing support for the Party and its policies,
denouncing the Dalai Lama, and recognizing the Chinese-appointed
Panchen Lama, see John Powers, The Buddha Party: How the People's
Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 88 (exiled monastics he has
interviewed ``overwhelmingly cite patriotic education as the most
aversive aspect of PRC rule''); Tsering Shakya, ``Transforming the
Language of Protest,'' Self-Immolation as Protest in Tibet series,
Cultural Anthropology website, 8 April 12; Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International Religious
Freedom Report for 2015--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau),'' 10 August 16, 36; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for
China's Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi
Jinping,'' February 2017, 95-96. See also ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet
2008-2009,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October
09, 33-36.
\71\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Demolitions Begin at
Larung Gar, `Monastery for the World,' as Religious Teachers Urge
Calm,'' 25 July 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China: 1,000 Evictions From
Tibetan Buddhist Centers,'' 14 September 16; International Campaign for
Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter
Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13 March 17, 12; Edward Wong, ``China
Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,'' New York Times, 28
November 16; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 303-4.
\72\ ``More Punishment for Tibetan Buddhists,'' New York Times, 5
December 16; Edward Wong, ``China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of
Tibetan Buddhism,'' New York Times, 28 November 16; Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, ``Undercover in Larung Gar: A Year After
Demolition, World's Largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute Sliced Like a
Melon,'' 11 August 17; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of
Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural
Resilience,'' 13 March 17, 1, 12-13. The New York Times Editorial Board
wrote, ``The effort to destroy Larung Gar is further evidence of the
government's insecurity and its fear of any movement, religious or
social, that it can't fully control.'' See also Tibet: Freedom of
Religion, Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 12 July
17, Testimony of Tenzin Dorjee, Commissioner, U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, 4. Commissioner Dorjee stated,
``Rigorous study and practice are very important to the Nalanda
Tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. The Chinese government seeks to strike
at the heart of Tibetan Buddhism by attacking the Tibetan religious and
educational institute of Larung Gar, . . ..''
\73\ Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 89-90. An estimated several million Han Chinese have
reportedly become followers of Tibetan Buddhism over the past decade,
and an estimated 10,000 Han Chinese are believed to have completed
studies at Larung Gar since its founding in 1980. See also Tsering
Topgyal, ``The Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism in Communist China,''
Politics and Religion in Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 234-
35. Earlier, in 2001, officials from Beijing ordered a reduction in the
number of monks and nuns at Larung Gar (also referred to as Serta
Institute), resulting in the demolition of approximately 2,000 homes.
Authorities also ordered reductions at Yachen Gar. At the time, Larung
Gar had 1,000 mainland and overseas Chinese among the 9,300 residents
at the institute. A middle-aged Han medical doctor said that Chinese
authorities told teachers from Larung Gar and Yachen Gar not to teach
Han Chinese Tibetan Buddhism, and that Chinese were ``forbidden to
follow or receive Buddhist talks from Tibetan lamas. So many Chinese
are coming to these areas where Tibetans usually live, but really the
authorities don't want us to have connections with any lamas here.''
\74\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the
Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13
March 17, 1, 5-7, 11, 12-13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy, ``Undercover in Larung Gar: A Year After Demolition, World's
Largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute Sliced Like a Melon,'' 11 August 17.
A Western researcher quoted in ICT's report who recently traveled to
the area said that many of the local Tibetans he spoke with ``believe
that behind the evictions and destruction is an interest in
transforming the now world-famous Buddhist institutes into a tourist
destination, which will further dilute the authentic culture.'' See
also Steve Shaw, ``China Tears Down the Tibetan City in the Sky,'' The
Diplomat, 3 August 17; ``Tibetans Forced From Their Land in Town Near
Larung Gar,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 August 16.
\75\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Undercover in
Larung Gar: A Year After Demolition, World's Largest Tibetan Buddhist
Institute Sliced Like a Melon,'' 11 August 17.
\76\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan
Buddhist Centers,'' 14 September 16.
\77\ Ibid.
\78\ Ibid.; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust
Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural
Resilience,'' 13 March 17, 4-5.
\79\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the
Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13
March 17, 1, 8, 11, 13. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China: 1,000
Evictions From Tibetan Buddhist Centers,'' 14 September 16.
\80\ ``Demolition of Tibetan Residences Underway at Sichuan's
Yachen Gar Buddhist Center,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 August 17.
\81\ Ibid.
\82\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan
Buddhist Centers,'' 14 September 16; Letter to the Ambassador and
Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of
China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special
Rapporteurs (each covering a separate area of human rights): the
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special
Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component
of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to
non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on minority
issues; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL
CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16.
\83\ Letter to the Ambassador and Permanent Representative,
Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United
Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special Rapporteurs (each covering a
separate area of human rights): the Special Rapporteur in the field of
cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and
sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur
on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard
of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the
Special Rapporteur on minority issues; and the Special Rapporteur on
freedom of religion or belief, AL CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16, 3; Edward
Wong, ``U.N. Human Rights Experts Unite To Condemn China Over
Expulsions of Tibetans,'' New York Times, 27 February 17.
\84\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, ``2017
Annual Report--China,'' April 2017, 35.
\85\ See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force, 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 26;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2,
13(1); Human Rights Watch, ``China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan
Buddhist Centers,'' 14 September 16. See also ``Former Larung Gar Monks
Ordered Out of New Homes,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 April 17. Authorities
in Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, subsequently ordered nearly
300 displaced monks from Larung Gar who had moved to a retreat center
in Daofu county to leave the center.
\86\ See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force, 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(2),
26; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2,
13(1), 13(2); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S.
Department of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2016--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 3 March 17, 90-
91; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit:
Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,''
February 2017, 96; Ben Hillman, ``Unrest in Tibet: Interpreting the
Post-2008 Wave of Protest and Conflict,'' Dalny Vychod [Far East], Vol.
4, Issue 1 (2014), 10, 12; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``International Religious Freedom
Report for 2015--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 10
August 16, 34; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human
Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 5
(describing the myriad rules and restrictions on movement both within
Tibetan areas of China and travel outside of China as having turned
Tibet into a ``giant open prison'').
\87\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``International Religious Freedom Report for 2015--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 10 August 16, 34. Ben
Hillman, ``Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,'' in
Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's
West, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2016), 30, 37-38, endnote 31. Hillman refers to the TAR travel
ban as an ``unwritten rule'' and a ``divide-and-rule tactic'' seen
elsewhere in China, which highlights the Party's ``zero tolerance for
associations that unite and coordinate people from different
localities.''
\88\ ``State Council Reply Regarding the Overall Urban Plan for
Lhasa Municipality'' [Guowuyuan guanyu lasa shi chengshi zongti jihua
de pifu], issued 30 July 17; ``State Council Approves City Plan for
Lhasa,'' 8 August 17; ``China To Limit Lhasa Population to 500k by
2020,'' Global Times, 8 August 17.
\89\ Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of
China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou
ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics,
National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic
Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic
Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10-1, 975; ``China To Limit Lhasa
Population to 500k by 2020,'' Global Times, 8 August 17.
\90\ ``Local Tibetans Summoned After Latest Self-Immolation,''
Voice of America, 18 April 17; ``Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan
Self-Immolation of 2017,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 March 17.
\91\ Human Rights Watch, ``One Passport, Two Systems: China's
Restrictions on Foreign Travel by Tibetans and Others,'' July 2015, 2,
15-17, 21; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S.
Department of State, ``International Religious Freedom Report for
2015--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 10 August 16, 34-
35.
\92\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across the
Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,'' 13
March 17, 18; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S.
Department of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2016--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 3 March 17, 91;
Human Rights Watch, ``One Passport, Two Systems: China's Restrictions
on Foreign Travel by Tibetans and Others,'' July 2015, 2, 15-17, 21.
\93\ ``China Calls Dalai Lama's Kalachakra `Illegal,' Threatens
Punishment for Those Taking Part,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 January 17. The
Kalachakra, or ``Wheel of Time,'' is ``a ritual that prepares devotees
to be reborn in Shambhala, a celestial kingdom which, it is said, will
vanquish the forces of evil in a future cosmic battle.''
\94\ Ibid. Bodh Gaya, India is believed to be the site where the
Buddha achieved enlightenment.
\95\ Annie Gowen, ``Hundreds of Tibetans Defy China, Gather at
Birthplace of Buddhism in India,'' Washington Post, 13 January 17;
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and International
Campaign for Tibet (ICT), ``Tibet Locked Down and Travellers Banned
During Sensitive Anniversary: Joint Statement by FIDH and ICT,'' 27
January 17; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of Dust Across
the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,''
13 March 17, 18. The Washington Post reported that in 2012, when the
last Kalachraka was held in Bodh Gaya, after an estimated 10,000
Tibetans traveled to India to attend, Chinese officials declared the
Kalachakra ``illegal,'' and detained many Tibetans for re-education
after they returned to China. See also Human Rights Watch, ``One
Passport, Two Systems: China's Restrictions on Foreign Travel by
Tibetans and Others,'' July 2015, 16.
\96\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Pilgrims Compelled
To Return From Dalai Lama Teaching in Bodh Gaya, India; China Calls the
Teaching `Illegal,' '' 9 January 17.
\97\ Ibid.; ``China Seizes Tibetans' Passports in a Bid To Block
Travel,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 November 16; ``Tibetans Ordered Home by
China Are Questioned by Police, Lose Their Passports,'' Radio Free
Asia, 23 January 17; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February
17, 64-68; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD),
``China Restricts Freedom of Movement of Tibetans Ahead of Dalai Lama's
Teachings,'' 24 November 16. TCHRD reported on 39 Tibetan pilgrims
traveling from China with Chinese passports who were detained by Nepal
police at the Nepal-India border for apparently not having visas to
travel to India. They had reportedly decided against applying for
Indian visas ``for fear of reprisals from the Chinese government,''
because if Chinese authorities saw Indian visas in their passports,
they could end up jailed after their return to China.
\98\ ``Dalai Lama Receives Tibetans Ordered Home by China,'' Radio
Free Asia, 2 December 16.
\99\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Pilgrims Compelled
To Return From Dalai Lama Teaching in Bodh Gaya, India; China Calls the
Teaching `Illegal,' '' 9 January 17; ``Dalai Lama Receives Tibetans
Ordered Home by China,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 December 16; ``Tibetans
Ordered Home by China Are Questioned by Police, Lose Their Passports,''
Radio Free Asia, 23 January 17; Annie Gowen, ``Hundreds of Tibetans
Defy China, Gather at Birthplace of Buddhism in India,'' Washington
Post, 13 January 17; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
and International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), ``Tibet Locked Down and
Travellers Banned During Sensitive Anniversary: Joint Statement by FIDH
and ICT,'' 27 January 17; ``Tibetan Pilgrims See Passports Destroyed on
Their Return,'' Radio Free Asia, 31 January 17.
\100\ ``Tibetans in China Defy Warnings, Support the Kalachakra,''
Radio Free Asia, 6 January 17; ``China Calls Dalai Lama's Kalachakra
`Illegal,' Threatens Punishment for Those Taking Part,'' Radio Free
Asia, 5 January 17; Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Jeffrey Knockel, and Lotus
Ruan, ``Tibetans Blocked From Kalachakra at Borders and on WeChat,''
University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab, 10
January 17.
\101\ ``Tibetans in China Defy Warnings, Support the Kalachakra,''
Radio Free Asia, 6 January 17. A source in Qinghai told RFA, ``In my
own village, people are engaged in virtuous activities such as fasting,
performing prostrations, and setting animals free . . .. The same
things are happening in other places, too . . .. Families are hosting
gatherings to recite mantras and other prayers, and this is being done
in secret as the monasteries and communities are being careful not to
do anything more openly.'' ``Support for the Kalachakra Spreads Among
Tibetans Living in China,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 January 17. A Tibetan
source in Sichuan said that local Tibetans had shared the Dalai Lama's
teachings on social media, and provided translation into the local
dialect. The source also said that ``several hundred elders'' gathered
to recite mantras and pray.
\102\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 12-20; Sarah
Cook, Freedom House, ``The Battle for China's Spirit: Religious
Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,'' February 2017,
100.
\103\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Human Rights
Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,'' 24 February 17, 13, 27; Yeshe
Choesang, ``Another Tibetan Monk Jailed Over Allegedly Sharing
Information on Tibet,'' Tibet Post International, 9 December 16. For
more information on Lobsang Sonam, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2017-00009.
\104\ ``Tibetan Protestor Detained, Missing in Serthar,'' Radio
Free Asia, 16 February 17. For more information on Sonam Tashi, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00132.
\105\ ``Tibetan Protestor Detained, Missing in Serthar,'' Radio
Free Asia, 16 February 17.
\106\ ``Tibetan Monk Detained in First Ngaba Protest This Year,''
Radio Free Asia, 27 February 17. For more information on Lobsang
Tsultrim, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-
00233.
\107\ ``Tibetan Monk Detained in First Ngaba Protest This Year,''
Radio Free Asia, 27 February 17.
\108\ ``Tibetan in Shiqu County, Gengdun (Gedun), Detained and
Beaten'' [Shiqu xian zangren gengdun bei bu shou ou], Radio Free Asia,
7 March 17; Free Tibet, ``Tibetan Man Arrested for Sharing Pictures of
the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Flag,'' 9 March 17; Tenzin Dharpo, ``Tibetan
Man Detained for Storing Photos of Dalai Lama, Tibetan Flag on
WeChat,'' Phayul, 8 March 17. For more information on Gedun, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00174.
\109\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2016-2020),'' August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua,
29 September 16, sec. IV; Clemence Henry, ``The Chinese Education
System as a Source of Conflict in Tibetan Areas,'' in Ethnic Conflict
and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West, Ben Hillman
and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 100;
PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March
93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 121; PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31
May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01,
arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Implementing the
PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05,
effective 31 May 05, art. 22. China's Constitution and the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority
languages. The State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to use and develop
minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by
promoting ``bilingual'' education and bilingual teaching staff.
\110\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Bilingual
Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan
Language With Mandarin Chinese,'' 14 April 17, 5-12; Tenzin Monlam,
``PEN International Calls Replacement of Tibetan Language With Mandarin
`Absurd,' '' Phayul, 5 May 17; Free Tibet, ``Tibetan Languages Face
Heavy Government Pressure Whilst Modernity Threatens Neglected
Dialects,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 5 March 17; Gray Tuttle, ``China's
Race Problem: How Beijing Represses Minorities,'' Foreign Policy, May/
June 2015; Edward Wong, ``China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With
Inciting Separatism,'' New York Times, 30 March 16.
\111\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Bilingual
Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan
Language With Mandarin Chinese,'' April 2017, 4; Khenpo Tsultrim Lodoe,
``An Urgent Call for the Protection and Preservation of Tibetan,''
translated in High Peaks Pure Earth, 15 September 14. Abbot of Larung
Gar Khenpo Tsultrim Lodoe wrote of the importance of the Tibetan
language, ``Language is the fundamental lifeline of a culture. It is
the reservoir of identity and the most precious gem of a nationality--
of a people.''
\112\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Bilingual
Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan
Language With Mandarin Chinese,'' April 2017, 3-4, 28-29, 84, 88.
\113\ Tsering Topgyal, ``The Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism in
Communist China,'' Politics and Religion in Contemporary China, Vol. 6,
No. 2 (2012), 238-40; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Shadow of
Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural
Resilience,'' 13 March 17, 16-17.
\114\ Tashi Wangchug's name also appears as Tashi Wangchuk in
English language reports on his case. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2016--China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau),'' 3 March 17, 83; Edward Wong, ``Rights Groups Ask China To
Free Tibet Education Advocate,'' New York Times, 18 January 17; Human
Rights Watch, ``China: Drop Charges Against Tibet Education Activist,''
15 January 17.
\115\ Edward Wong, ``China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With
Inciting Separatism,'' New York Times, 30 March 16; Edward Wong,
``Rights Groups Ask China To Free Tibet Education Advocate,'' New York
Times, 18 January 17.
\116\ Ibid.
\117\ Alak Dorshi, ``I Too Can Speak About Education,'' translated
in High Peaks Pure Earth, 14 April 17.
\118\ ``Tibetans in Chengdu Call for Bilingual Education for Their
Children,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 January 17. In January 2017, a Chengdu-
based Tibetan professor at Sichuan Normal University, and a member of
the regional Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
submitted a proposal to that body urging the creation of a bilingual
education system. She wrote that an estimated 100,000 Tibetans live in
Chengdu, including reportedly 2,000 school-age children, and there are
no schools that teach in the Tibetan language. ``An Open Letter to
Zhang Wenkui, Party Secretary of Tsolho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
From Tsering Kyi,'' translated by High Peaks Pure Earth, 11 April 17;
Alak Dorshi, ``I Too Can Speak About Education,'' translated in High
Peaks Pure Earth, 14 April 17.
\119\ Simon Denyer, ``Tibet Is Harder To Visit Than North Korea.
But I Got In and Streamed Live on Facebook,'' Washington Post, 16
September 16.
\120\ Gray Tuttle, ``China's Race Problem: How Beijing Represses
Minorities,'' Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015; International Campaign
for Tibet and International Federation for Human Rights, ``China's New
Counter-Terrorism Law: Implications and Dangers for Tibetans and
Uyghurs,'' November 2016, 53. See also Simon Denyer, ``China Says
Tourism Is Tibet's Best Hope. But Can Its Culture Survive the
Onslaught? '' Washington Post, 6 October 16; Dexter Roberts, ``Tibet
Can't Kick Its Subsidy Habit,'' Bloomberg Businessweek, 16 December 15.
\121\ See, e.g., Rinzin Dojree, ``China's Urbancide in Tibet,'' The
Diplomat, 17 March 17; Andrew Martin Fischer, The Disempowered
Development of Tibet in China (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), xxx
(noting that Tibetans ``have had little or no control over the main
policy levers driving economic development, the development of urban
areas and of infrastructure''). For information in recent Commission
annual reports on the Chinese Communist Party and government approach
to economic development in Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC,
2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 305-8; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8
October 15, 298-300; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 182-83;
CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 184; CECC, 2012 Annual Report,
10 October 12, 165-66; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 216-19;
and CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 222-24.
\122\ Gray Tuttle, ``China's Race Problem--How Beijing Represses
Minorities,'' Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015; Ben Hillman, ``Unrest in
Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,'' in Ethnic Conflict and
Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West, Ben Hillman and
Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 32. See,
e.g., Stephen Chen, ``China Plans World's Biggest National Park on
Tibetan Plateau,'' South China Morning Post, 22 April 17; Rinzin
Dojree, ``China's Urbancide in Tibet,'' The Diplomat, 17 March 17;
Dexter Roberts, ``Tibet Can't Kick Its Subsidy Habit,'' Bloomberg
Businessweek, 16 December 15; ``Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009,''
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 41-43.
\123\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016--China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 3 March 17, 95; Andrew Martin
Fischer, The Disempowered Development of Tibet in China (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2014), 31; Gray Tuttle, ``China's Race Problem--How
Beijing Represses Minorities,'' Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015; Ben
Hillman, ``Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,'' in
Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's
West, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2016), 26; ``China Defends Tibetan Development Plan,'' Voice of
America, 18 May 11; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy,
``Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of
Tibetan Language With Mandarin Chinese,'' 14 April 17, 12-13. See,
e.g., Simon Denyer, ``China Says Tourism Is Tibet's Best Hope. But Can
Its Culture Survive the Onslaught? '' Washington Post, 6 October 16.
\124\ Simon Denyer, ``China Says Tourism Is Tibet's Best Hope. But
Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught? '' Washington Post, 6 October
16.
\125\ Ibid. See also Stephen Chen, ``China Plans World's Biggest
National Park on Tibetan Plateau,'' South China Morning Post, 22 April
17.
\126\ Simon Denyer, ``China Says Tourism Is Tibet's Best Hope. But
Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught? '' Washington Post, 6 October
16; Simon Denyer, ``China's Tibet Tourism Statistics Just Don't Add
Up,'' Washington Post, 6 October 16; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6
October 16, 305-6.
\127\ Stephen Chen, ``China Plans World's Biggest National Park on
Tibetan Plateau,'' South China Morning Post, 22 April 17; International
Campaign for Tibet, ``Nomads in `No-Man's Land': China's Nomination for
UNESCO World Heritage Risks Imperilling Tibetans and Wildlife,'' 30
June 17, 2, 13-14; Leng Shumei, ``National Park To Be Built on Qinghai-
Tibet Plateau,'' Global Times, 24 April 17.
\128\ Wu Yan, ``First Mars Simulation Base To Be Built in Northwest
China,'' China Daily, 26 July 17.
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Hong Kong
During the Commission's 2017 reporting year, interference
by the Chinese central government in Hong Kong's political and
legal affairs, in particular with regard to the Hong Kong
judiciary's disqualification of six opposition lawmakers,
further undermined the ``one country, two systems'' policy
meant to ensure Hong Kong's autonomy as guaranteed under Hong
Kong's Basic Law. The March 2017 Chief Executive election was
not held by universal suffrage; the 1,194-member Election
Committee selected Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, the Chinese
government's preferred candidate, to be Hong Kong's fourth
Chief Executive. In August, the Hong Kong government
successfully appealed to increase the sentences issued to pro-
democracy activists through judicial review; some international
human rights organizations and local pro-democracy groups
asserted the prosecution of these cases was politically
motivated.
CHIEF EXECUTIVE ELECTION
Hong Kong's fifth Chief Executive (CE) election took place
on March 26, 2017.\1\ It was the first since the fall 2014 pro-
democracy protests and the June 2015 defeat of the Hong Kong
government's electoral reform proposal.\2\ The fall 2014
protests began after the National People's Congress Standing
Committee (NPCSC) issued an August 2014 decision restricting
the ability of candidates to freely run for CE.\3\ The 2017 CE
election was held under the same procedure as the 2012
election, as set forth in the 2014 NPCSC decision.\4\ The UN
Human Rights Committee (the Committee) has repeatedly urged
Hong Kong to enact reforms to implement elections by universal
suffrage \5\ in accordance with Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\6\ which applies to
Hong Kong under the Basic Law.\7\ During the fall 2014 pro-
democracy protests, the Committee reiterated its concerns over
restrictions on the ability of candidates to freely run for
election.\8\
In December 2016, approximately 107,000 electors voted to
elect most members of the Election Committee,\9\ which both
nominates candidates and elects the CE.\10\ The Election
Committee's 38 subsectors consist of members of trade and
business interest groups--including corporations--as well as
district and legislative councilors, religious bodies, and
national legislators.\11\ A majority of the Election Committee
is reportedly supportive of the central government and its
policies.\12\ In the December subsector elections, pro-
democracy organizations won a record high of 326 seats out of
1,194.\13\ Three candidates qualified \14\ to run in the CE
election: former Financial Secretary John Tsang Chun-wah;
former judge Woo Kwok-hing; and former Chief Secretary Carrie
Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor.\15\
As in the 2012 CE election,\16\ the Chinese central
government reportedly sought to determine the outcome of the
election by instructing Election Committee members to support
Lam, its preferred candidate, over other candidates \17\ and
declaring its power to disregard election results.\18\ In
February 2017, NPCSC Chairman Zhang Dejiang and other central
government representatives reportedly met with Election
Committee members in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province,
telling them the central government supported only Lam in the
election.\19\ Later in February, Hong Kong's first CE and
current Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Vice
Chairman Tung Chee-hwa reportedly said that the Chinese
government would not appoint anyone it deemed unacceptable.\20\
All 30 legal sector members of the Election Committee issued a
joint statement in response to Tung's remarks, condemning ``any
attempt to exert pressure or influence . . . [the] Election
Committee . . ..'' \21\ In March, Zhang reportedly asserted the
central government's ``right to step in'' to the CE election
\22\ and said the central government required the CE to ``love
the country and love Hong Kong.'' \23\ Other central government
officials reiterated the central government's interest in the
election, emphasizing the central government's ``substantive
power'' to appoint a CE \24\ who meets the central government's
criteria.\25\
On March 26, 2017, the Election Committee selected former
Chief Secretary Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor as the next CE; Lam
won 777 of 1,194 votes.\26\ Pro-democracy legislators,
activists, and international rights organizations criticized
the restricted nature of the election and the central
government's interference in the campaign,\27\ in part for
violating Hong Kong's Basic Law.\28\
BASIC LAW INTERPRETATION AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE
COUNCILORS
After pro-democracy candidates gained seats in the
September 2016 Legislative Council (LegCo) elections, and after
repeated warnings from the central government about the
unacceptability of calls for Hong Kong independence or self-
determination,\29\ the Chinese central government and Hong Kong
government sought to prevent opposition legislators from taking
office. During the October 2016 oath-taking ceremony for the
new LegCo, two ``localist'' legislators-elect, Sixtus
``Baggio'' Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching, altered their
oaths, swearing allegiance to the ``Hong Kong nation'' and
using what some considered to be profanity and a derogatory
term to refer to China.\30\ The Hong Kong government filed for
judicial review to disqualify the two from taking office.\31\
On November 7, 2016, the National People's Congress
Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued an interpretation of Hong
Kong's Basic Law, holding that oaths of office under Article
104 of the Basic Law are legal commitments to both Hong Kong
and China \32\ and prohibiting those whose oaths are determined
to be invalid from retaking the oath.\33\ The NPCSC issued the
interpretation, the fifth since 1997, without receiving a
request from the Hong Kong government or Court of Final
Appeal.\34\ The interpretation came while a Hong Kong court was
considering the Hong Kong government's case against
legislators-elect Leung and Yau.\35\ The Hong Kong judge
hearing the case ruled in the government's favor, finding that
Leung and Yau ``declin[ed] to take the LegCo Oath'' and
disqualifying the two.\36\ The judge held that his decision
would have been the same regardless of the NPCSC
interpretation.\37\ In August 2017, the Court of Final Appeal
rejected Leung and Yau's appeal.\38\
On December 2, 2016, Hong Kong officials filed a lawsuit to
disqualify four additional pro-democracy legislators--Nathan
Law Kwun-chung, Lau Siu-lai, Edward Yiu Chung-yim, and Leung
Kwok-hung (also known as ``Long Hair'')--asserting that their
previously accepted oaths were invalid.\39\ On July 14, 2017, a
Hong Kong court disqualified the legislators from office on
grounds that included violating Article 104 of the Basic Law
according to a retroactive application of the November 2016
NPCSC interpretation.\40\
Lawyers,\41\ legislators,\42\ and rights organizations \43\
strongly criticized the NPCSC interpretation. One legal
association contended that the NPCSC interpretation ``deeply
damaged the rule of law and Hong Kong's autonomy'' by
interfering in Hong Kong's domestic laws.\44\ The Hong Kong Bar
Association criticized the interpretation, arguing that the
NPCSC interpretation ``[gives] the impression that the NPCSC is
effectively legislating for Hong Kong.'' \45\ On November 8,
more than 1,000 lawyers and activists held a silent march to
protest the interpretation's infringement on the autonomy of
Hong Kong's legal system.\46\
GOVERNMENT LEGAL ACTION AGAINST POLITICAL OPPOSITION
The Hong Kong government continued to pursue legal cases
against participants in the 2014 pro-democracy protests and
members of the political opposition.\47\ The day after the
Chief Executive election, Hong Kong police charged nine protest
leaders, student activists, and politicians--including two
Legislative Councilors--in connection with the 2014
protests.\48\ Legislators, international rights organizations,
and Hong Kong and international scholars questioned the timing
of the announcement, suggesting that Hong Kong officials made
the decision for political reasons.\49\ The Hong Kong
government denied that there were political considerations or
that Carrie Lam was involved in the decision.\50\ In April
2017, police charged localist legislator Cheng Chung-tai with
desecrating the Chinese and Hong Kong flags \51\ during an
October 2016 LegCo session,\52\ when pro-government legislators
prevented Leung and Yau from retaking their oaths by walking
out of the LegCo chamber, after which Cheng turned the flags on
several legislators' desks upside down in protest.\53\ Also in
April, Hong Kong police charged Leung and Yau for ``unlawful
assembly'' in connection with an attempt to enter the LegCo
chamber in November 2016.\54\
This past year, the Hong Kong government successfully
appealed to increase the sentences issued to pro-democracy
activists through judicial review from the Court of Appeal in
Hong Kong. In August 2017, the Court of Appeal ruled in favor
of government prosecutors and sentenced pro-democracy leaders
Joshua Wong Chi-fung, Nathan Law Kwun-chung, and Alex Chow
Yong-kang to between six and eight months' imprisonment on
charges of inciting or participating in ``unlawful assembly''
for their activities during the 2014 protests outside of
government headquarters.\55\ A lower court had previously
sentenced Wong and Law to community service, which the two had
completed, and given Chow a suspended sentence.\56\ According
to the Hong Kong Legislative Council Ordinance, the prison
terms bar them from running in LegCo elections for five
years.\57\ The presiding judges stated that the sentences for
the three were meant to serve as a deterrent.\58\ During the
same week, the Court of Appeal decided in the government's
favor to lengthen the sentences of 13 pro-democracy activists
to between 8 and 13 months' imprisonment after a lower court
had sentenced them to community service on charges including
``unlawful assembly'' for storming the LegCo chamber to protest
a government development plan in June 2014.\59\ While the Hong
Kong government and two local legal organizations denied claims
of political interference in the judicial review of these
cases,\60\ some international human rights organizations and
local pro-democracy groups asserted that the prosecutions were
politically motivated.\61\ The UN Human Rights Committee noted
in its 2013 review of the Hong Kong government's compliance
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
that the ``unlawful assembly'' provisions within the Public
Order Ordinance under which the pro-democracy activists were
charged ``may facilitate excessive restriction to the Covenant
rights.'' \62\
PRESS FREEDOMS
Hong Kong journalists and journalists' organizations
reported a continued worsening of press freedom in Hong Kong in
this past year, noting concerns over self-censorship,
government restrictions on reporters, and the 2015 abductions
and disappearances of five Hong Kong booksellers by mainland
Chinese authorities. According to the Hong Kong Journalists
Association (HKJA), 72 percent of reporters surveyed felt that
press freedom in Hong Kong had deteriorated in 2016.\63\
Respondents reported concerns over self-censorship,
interference by media owners, and the 2015 abductions and
disappearances of five Hong Kong booksellers.\64\ The
international press freedom organization Reporters Without
Borders (RSF) announced in April 2017 that it would open an
Asia office in Taiwan, rather than Hong Kong, reportedly due in
part to fears over RSF staff safety.\65\ Hong Kong dropped four
places in RSF's World Press Freedom Index, to 73rd in the
world.\66\
The Hong Kong government continued \67\ to restrict the
ability of online media to freely report. In December 2016, the
Office of the Ombudsman called on the Hong Kong government to
grant access to government events and information services to
online-only media and criticized the government's failure to
provide such access since announcing a review of its policy in
2014.\68\ Also in December, Hong Kong officials prevented a
journalist for an online publication from reporting at the vote
count center for the Election Committee subsector
elections.\69\ In March 2017, the government banned online-only
media from reporting at Chief Executive election events.\70\
International and Hong Kong rights organizations criticized the
government's continued obstruction of online journalists.\71\
Macau
Macau's Basic Law does not provide for elections by
``universal suffrage,'' \72\ though its provisions ensure the
applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in Macau \73\ and guarantee Macau a
``high degree of autonomy'' within China.\74\ During the 2017
reporting year, the Commission did not observe progress in
Macau toward ``an electoral system based on universal and equal
suffrage . . .'' in line with the ICCPR,\75\ as recommended by
the UN Human Rights Committee.\76\ During the September 2017
Macau Legislative Assembly elections, pro-democracy legislators
won 4 seats out of 14 directly elected seats, making up a
minority in the 33-member chamber, where 12 legislators are
selected by professional sector associations and 7 are
appointed by Macau's Chief Executive.\77\
In December 2016, the Macau Legislative Assembly (AL)
passed revisions to the AL Electoral Law,\78\ including new
provisions requiring candidates and legislators to swear to
uphold Macau's Basic Law and declare their loyalty to the Macau
Special Administrative Region, and making those who ``do not
defend the Basic Law of [Macau] or are not loyal to [Macau] . .
.'' ineligible to be elected.\79\ The amendment gave the power
to determine candidates' eligibility to the Legislative
Assembly Electoral Affairs Commission, a Macau administrative
agency.\80\ The amendment came in response to the National
People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) November 2016
interpretation of Hong Kong's Basic Law.\81\ Three pro-
democracy legislators voted against the amendment, with one
asserting that localist political sentiments were not present
in Macau.\82\ Some legal experts and at least one pro-democracy
political organization criticized the amendment for threatening
Macau voters' rights to freely vote and run for election,\83\
in particular the lack of clearly defined criteria that would
prove a candidate's disloyalty to Macau or the Basic Law.\84\
The Macau Portuguese and English Press Association sought
clarification from the government over other provisions in the
revised law that define ``electoral propaganda'' and set
penalties for publishing such material prior to the beginning
of a campaign period.\85\ The Association raised concerns that,
due to the law's broad definition of ``electoral propaganda,''
election reporting could be penalized under the revised
law.\86\
RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL
During this reporting year, the Macau government continued
to deny entry to some pro-democracy politicians and activists
from Hong Kong. Macau's Internal Security Framework Law allows
authorities to refuse entry to non-residents ``considered
inadmissible or who constitute a threat to the stability of
internal security,'' but does not define inadmissibility or
what would pose a threat to Macau's security.\87\ Around the
time of Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Macau in October 2016,
Macau authorities prevented Hong Kong activists, a filmmaker,
and at least one politician from entering Macau, claiming they
threatened Macau's ``internal security.'' \88\ In December 2016
and January 2017, Macau authorities barred two former and one
current pro-democracy Hong Kong legislators, saying they
presented ``threats to Macau's internal security and
stability.'' \89\ After Macau authorities barred another Hong
Kong legislator from entering in April, a Macau pro-democracy
activist suggested that authorities wanted ``to prevent Hong
Kong activists from affecting the political atmosphere in
Macau.'' \90\ Around the time of a May visit to Macau by NPCSC
Chairman Zhang Dejiang, Macau authorities prevented at least
four members of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong from entering
Macau.\91\ Also in May, Macau authorities expelled two Hong
Kong activists after they entered Macau as tourists; police
reportedly asked the Hong Kong activists if they had had
contact with Macau pro-democracy activists.\92\ In August,
Macau authorities prevented four journalists from entering
Macau to cover the aftermath of a typhoon,\93\ and denied entry
to pro-democracy Hong Kong legislator Helena Wong Pik-wan.\94\
In February 2017, a Macau art gallery canceled a
performance by a Tibetan painter and advised him not to travel
to Macau, reportedly under pressure from the Macau government
over his art.\95\ The artist said a Chinese military official
contacted the gallery and warned that the artist was ``on a
blacklist'' prohibiting his entry into Macau.\96\
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
Developments in
Hong Kong and
Macau
Notes to Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Maucau
\1\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``Chief Executive
Election Result'' [Xingzheng zhangguan xuanju jieguo], 26 March 17.
\2\ James Pomfret and Clare Baldwin, ``Mystery Walk-Out in Hong
Kong Vote Brings Heavy Defeat for Beijing,'' Reuters, 18 June 15;
``Political Reform Rejected by Large 28:8 Margin'' [28:8 zheng gai da
bi shu foujue], Ming Pao, 18 June 15. See also Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa],
passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, annex I, instrument 2; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 325-26.
\3\ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and
on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 [Quanguo renmin daibiao
dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xianggang tebie xingzheng qu xingzheng
zhangguan puxuan wenti he 2016 nian lifa hui changsheng banfa de
jueding], issued 31 August 14, sec. 4; Michael Forsythe, ``U.N. Urges
China To Allow Free Elections in Hong Kong,'' New York Times, 23
October 14; Stephanie Nebehay, ``U.N. Rights Watchdog Calls for Open
Elections in Hong Kong,'' Reuters, 23 October 14.
\4\ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and
on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 [Quanguo renmin daibiao
dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xianggang tebie xingzheng qu xingzheng
zhangguan puxuan wenti he 2016 nian lifa hui changsheng banfa de
jueding], issued 31 August 14, sec. 4; Decision of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues
Relating to Universal Suffrage [Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu
xianggang tebie xingzheng qu 2012 nian xingzheng zhangguan he lifa hui
chansheng banfa ji youguan puxuan wenti de jueding], issued 29 December
07, para. 4; Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianggang
tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97,
art. 45, annex I, instrument 2.
\5\ UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Third
Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at its
107th session (11-28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3, para. 6. See
also UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General
Comment No. 25: The Right To Participate in Public Affairs, Voting
Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.7, 12 July 96, para. 21.
\6\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25.
\7\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianggang tebie
xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, art.
39. Article 39 of the Basic Law holds that ``[t]he provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . as applied
to Hong Kong shall remain in force . . ..''
\8\ Michael Forsythe, ``U.N. Urges China To Allow Free Elections in
Hong Kong,'' New York Times, 23 October 14; Stephanie Nebehay, ``U.N.
Rights Watchdog Calls for Open Elections in Hong Kong,'' Reuters, 23
October 14; Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and
on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 [Quanguo renmin daibiao
dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xianggang tebie xingzheng qu xingzheng
zhangguan puxuan wenti he 2016 nian lifa hui changsheng banfa de
jueding], issued 31 August 14.
\9\ Stuart Lau et al., ``Hong Kong Financial Secretary Tsang
Resigns, Paving Way for Tilt at City's Top Job,'' South China Morning
Post, 13 December 16; Joyce Ng et al., ``Pro-Democracy Camp Takes
Record Quarter of Seats on Election Committee That Will Choose Hong
Kong's Leader,'' South China Morning Post, 12 December 16. Three
subsectors--religious bodies, National People's Congress delegates, and
Legislative Councilors--separately chose a total of 166 Election
Committee members. Electoral Affairs Commission, ``2016 Election
Committee Subsector Elections--Facts and Figures,'' last visited 15
March 17; Electoral Affairs Commission, ``2016 Election Committee
Subsector Elections--Election Results,'' 12 December 16.
\10\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) [Di 569 zhang
xingzheng zhangguan xuanju tiaoli], amended 9 February 12, secs. 7, 16.
\11\ Ibid., Schedule; Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap. 542) [Di 542
zhang lifa hui tiaoli], amended 1 October 12, sec. 20; Electoral
Affairs Commission, ``2016 Election Committee Subsector Elections--
Facts and Figures,'' last visited 15 March 17.
\12\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2017--Hong Kong,'' last
visited 17 March 17; Ng Kang-chung and Gary Cheung, ``As Aspirants for
Hong Kong's Top Job Announce Their Bids, Focus Turns to Where Beijing's
Favour Lies,'' South China Morning Post, 17 January 17; Kelvin Chan,
``Hong Kong Set To Pick New Leader Anointed by Beijing,'' Associated
Press, 21 March 17.
\13\ Kris Cheng, ``Pro-Democracy Camp Wins More Than a Quarter of
Seats on Chief Exec. Election Committee,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 12
December 16; Joyce Ng et al., ``Pro-Democracy Camp Takes Record Quarter
of Seats on Election Committee That Will Choose Hong Kong's Leader,''
South China Morning Post, 12 December 16. Three members of the Election
Committee hold two seats each, reducing the number of members to 1,194.
Kris Cheng, ``Explainer: Why Hong Kong's Leadership Race Is Neither
Free, Fair, Nor Representative,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 27 February 17.
\14\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) [Di 569 zhang
xingzheng zhangguan xuanju tiaoli], amended 9 February 12, sec. 16(2).
\15\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``Three Validly
Nominated Candidates for Chief Executive Election'' [Xingzheng
zhangguan xuanju gong you san ming huo youxiao timing houxuanren], 1
March 17; Kris Cheng, ``Explainer: Why Hong Kong's Leadership Race Is
Neither Free, Fair, Nor Representative,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 27
February 17. A fourth candidate, Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, did not win
enough nominations to qualify. Ng Kang-chung and Jeffie Lam, ``Regina
Ip `Squeezed Out' of Hong Kong Chief Executive Race,'' South China
Morning Post, 1 March 17.
\16\ See, e.g., ``Beijing Lobbies in Push for a Leung Victory,''
South China Morning Post, 21 March 12; Keith Bradsher, ``Beijing
Switches Sides in the Race for Hong Kong's Chief Executive,'' New York
Times, 21 March 12.
\17\ See, e.g., John Lyons, ``Beijing Works the Phones in Secret
Push To Pick Hong Kong's Next Leader,'' Wall Street Journal, 28
February 17.
\18\ Tony Cheung and Emily Tsang, ``Beijing Has Last Word in Hong
Kong Leadership Race, Delegates Told,'' South China Morning Post, 5
March 17; ``Qiao Xiaoyang Says Central Government's Right To Appoint CE
Is Substantive, but Not Targeted at Anyone in Particular'' [Qiao
xiaoyang zhi zhongyang dui teshou renming quan shi shizhixing dan bu
zhendui teding na ren], Radio Television Hong Kong, 8 March 17.
\19\ See, e.g., ``In Recent Meeting With Pro-Establishment Camp in
Shenzhen, Zhang Dejiang Says Central Government Only Backs Carrie Lam,
Denies Handpicking'' [Jinri shenzhen wu jianzhi pai zhang dejiang cheng
zhongyang zhi cheng lin zheng fouren qindian], Ming Pao, 6 February 17;
``Information Confirms Zhang Dejiang Came South To `Secure Votes,'
Estimated Carrie Lam Still Has Not Reached Desired 700 Nominations''
[Xiaoxi zheng zhang dejiang nanxia ``gu piao'' liao lin zheng 700
timing wei dabiao], HK01, 6 February 17; ``Zhang Dejiang Meets Pro-
Establishment Election Committee [Members]; Central Government Only
Supports Carrie Lam'' [Zhang dejiang jian jianzhi xuan wei zhongyang
weiyi zhichi lin zheng], Sing Tao Daily, 7 February 17.
\20\ Gary Cheung et al., ``Beijing Won't Appoint Winner of Chief
Executive Race if It Finds Candidate `Unacceptable,' Elder Statesman
Tung Chee-hwa Warns,'' South China Morning Post, 22 February 17.
\21\ ``Legal Sector Election Committee Members: Deeply Concerned by
Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks, Any Use of Threats To Attempt To Influence
Nomination Could Constitute Incitement To Commit Crime'' [Falu jie
xuanwei: shenqie guanzhu dong jianhua yanlun renhe weixie shouduan tu
yingxiang timing huo goucheng shanhuo fanzui], Stand News, 23 February
17.
\22\ Venus Wu and Clare Jim, ``China Has the Right To `Step In' to
Hong Kong Election, Top Official Says,'' Reuters, 6 March 17.
\23\ Tony Cheung and Emily Tsang, ``Beijing Has Last Word in Hong
Kong Leadership Race, Delegates Told,'' South China Morning Post, 5
March 17.
\24\ ``Qiao Xiaoyang Says Central Government's Right To Appoint CE
Is Substantive, but Not Targeted at Anyone in Particular'' [Qiao
xiaoyang zhi zhongyang dui teshou renming quan shi shizhixing dan bu
zhendui teding na ren], Radio Television Hong Kong, 8 March 17.
\25\ ``Wang Guangya: Central Government's Interest in CE Election
Reasonable'' [Wang guangya: zhongyang guanzhu teshou xuanju
wukehoufei], Now News, 8 March 17.
\26\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``Chief Executive
Election Result'' [Xingzheng zhangguan xuanju jieguo], 26 March 17.
\27\ Demosisto, ``Response to the 5th Term Chief Executive
Election'' [Xianggang zhongzhi huiying di wu jie xingzheng zhangguan
xuanju jieguo], reprinted in Facebook, 26 March 17; Civic Party, ``Only
Through Perseverance Can We See Hope'' [Weiyou jianchi cai jian
xiwang], 26 March 17; Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Hong Kong's Non-
Election,'' 27 March 17; Freedom House, ``Hong Kong: Authorities Arrest
Pro-Democracy Activists, Roll Back Rights,'' 27 March 17; ``Residents
Hold Sit-In Outside Liaison Office, Protesting Interference in Hong
Kong Election'' [Shimin zhonglianban wai jingzuo kangyi ganyu xianggang
xuanju], Radio Free Asia, 2 April 17.
\28\ See, e.g., Civic Party, ``Civic Party Urges Central Government
To Cease All Talk of Handpicking'' [Gongmin dang cuqing zhongyang
tingzhi yiqie qindian yanlun], reprinted in Facebook, 21 February 17;
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianggang tebie
xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, arts.
22 (``No department of the Central People's Government and no province,
autonomous region, or municipality under the Central Government may
interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law.''), 45
(``The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by
universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.'').
\29\ See, e.g., Zha Wenye, ``Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of
the State Council: Resolutely Opposed to Any Talk or Action of `HK
Independence' '' [Guowuyuan gang'aoban: jianjue fandui renhe ``gang
du'' yanxing], Xinhua, 30 March 16, reprinted in Hong Kong and Macao
Affairs Office of the State Council, 31 March 16. See also CECC, 2016
Annual Report, 6 October 16, 328-29.
\30\ Alan Wong, ``At Hong Kong Swearing-In, Some Lawmakers Pepper
Their Oath With Jabs,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 12 October
16; Tony Cheung et al., ``Three Rejections and Multiple Deviations Mark
Hong Kong Legislative Council Swearing-In,'' South China Morning Post,
12 October 16.
\31\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``Government
Statement on Oath-Taking by Members-Elect of Legislative Council,'' 13
October 16; Stuart Lau et al., ``Hong Kong Government Fails To Block
Localist Duo From Retaking LegCo Oaths, but Wins Right To Seek Judicial
Review,'' South China Morning Post, 30 November 16; Kris Cheng, ``Gov't
Seeks Unprecedented Legal Challenge To Prevent Localist Lawmakers From
Retaking LegCo Oath,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 18 October 16; Ellie Ng,
``Gov't Asks Court To Remove Two Elected Localist Lawmakers From
Office,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 25 October 16.
\32\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Interpretation
of Article 104 of the ``Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China'' [Quanguo
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa'' di yibailingsi tiao
de jieshi], issued 7 November 16, 3; Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 4 April
90, effective 1 July 97, art. 158. Under Article 158 of the Basic Law,
the National People's Congress Standing Committee holds the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law.
\33\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Interpretation
of Article 104 of the ``Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China'' [Quanguo
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa'' di yibailingsi tiao
de jieshi], issued 7 November 16, 2(1, 4).
\34\ Progressive Lawyers Group, ``The Progressive Lawyers Group's
Submissions in Relation to the Interpretation by the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress on 7 November 2016,'' 8 November 16,
paras. 2, 3, 8; Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xianggang tebie xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 4 April 90, effective 1
July 97, art. 158. Article 158 stipulates that the National People's
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) may issue interpretations upon
request by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA), though the CFA
held in a 1999 case that the NPCSC has ``plenary and freestanding''
power to interpret the Basic Law, with or without referral from Hong
Kong courts. Cora Chan, ``Legal Limits on Beijing's Powers of
Interpretation? '' HKU Legal Scholarship Blog, University of Hong Kong
Faculty of Law, 3 November 16.
\35\ Joyce Ng and Tony Cheung, ``Beijing Pre-empting Court Ruling
on Oath-Taking Case Will Be First Such Instance Involving Basic Law
Interpretation,'' South China Morning Post, 30 November 16; Ellie Ng,
``Elected Localist Lawmakers Barred From Hong Kong Legislature as Gov't
Wins Legal Challenge,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 15 November 16.
\36\ In the High Court of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law List, No
185 of 2016, HCAL 185/2016 and Miscellaneous Proceedings, No 2819 of
2016, HCMP 2819/2016, 15 November 16, 108; Joyce Ng et al., ``Barred
Hong Kong Localists Vow To Keep Fighting After High Court Decision,''
South China Morning Post, 16 November 16.
\37\ Ibid., 120; Ibid.
\38\ ``By-Elections To Be Arranged According to Law'' [Yifa anpai
li hui buxuan], Hong Kong Government News, 25 August 17; ``Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal Rejects Appeal of 2 Disqualified Legislators-
Elect,'' Xinhua, 25 August 17; Christine Chan and James Pomfret, ``Hong
Kong Pro-Independence Duo Lose Appeal Over Council Seats,'' Reuters, 25
August 17.
\39\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``Government
Statement on Oath-Taking Matter'' [Tequ zhengfu jiu xuanshi shijian
shengming], 2 December 16; Huang Yongwen, ``DOJ Files Case Challenging
4 Legislators' Oaths, Saying Adding and Inserting Phrases and Saying
Oath Slowly Not Sincere'' [Luzhengsi rubing tiaozhan 4 yiyuan xuanshi
zhi jia cha juzi man su xuanshi fei zhencheng], Sing Tao Daily, 2
December 16; ``Leung Kwok-hung: Government Use of Public Funds To Strip
Democratically Elected Legislators of Status Is a `Coup' '' [Liang
guoxiong: zhengfu yong gong tang chiduo minxuan yiyuan zige shi
``zhengbian''], Stand News, 2 December 16; Zheng Lewei, ``DOJ Again
Files Case To Disqualify Four Legislators, Pan-Democrats Criticize CY
Leung for Declaring War on People of Hong Kong'' [Luzhengsi zai rubing
quxiao si yiyuan zige minzhu pai pi liang zhenying xiang gangren
xuanzhan], InMediaHK, 2 December 16; Helier Cheung, ``Hong Kong Moves
To Disqualify Pro-Democracy Legislators,'' BBC, 2 December 16.
\40\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Court of First Instance, Constitutional and Administrative Law
List, No 223-26 of 2016, HCAL 223-26/2016, and Miscellaneous
Proceedings, No 3378-79 and 3381-82 of 2016, HCMP 3378-79/2016, 3381-
82/2016, 14 July 17, 22, 34, 95-96, 141-42, 165, 182-83, 229; Elson
Tong, ``4 More Elected Pro-Democracy Lawmakers To Be Ousted Following
Hong Kong Court Ruling,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 14 July 17.
\41\ Ernest Kao, ``Lawyer Who Helped Draft Basic Law Says Beijing
Interpretation Has Destroyed `One County, Two Systems,' '' South China
Morning Post, 17 November 16; Ellie Ng, ``Court's Ambiguity Over
Beijing's Power To Interpret Hong Kong's Constitution Is `Worrying,'
Say Lawyers,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 16 November 16.
\42\ See, e.g., Claudia Mo, ``This Is the Beginning of the End of
Hong Kong,'' Guardian, 7 November 16; Joyce Ng and Josh Ye, ``Hong Kong
Localist Lawmakers Remain Defiant Over Beijing Basic Law Ruling,''
South China Morning Post, 7 November 16.
\43\ Human Rights Watch, ``Hong Kong: China Interferes in
Judiciary's Independence,'' 4 November 16; Amnesty International,
``2016 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in Hong Kong'' [2016
niandu xianggang renquan zhuangkuang baogao], 11 January 17, para.
1.1.3.
\44\ Progressive Lawyers Group, ``The Progressive Lawyers Group's
Submissions in Relation to the Interpretation by the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress on 7 November 2016,'' 8 November 16,
para. 2(3).
\45\ Hong Kong Bar Association, ``The Hong Kong Bar Association's
Statement Concerning the Interpretation Made by National People's
Congress Standing Committee of Article 104 of the Basic Law,'' 7
November 16.
\46\ Eric Cheung and Tom Phillips, ``Hong Kong: Lawyers and
Activists March Against Beijing `Meddling,' '' Guardian, 8 November 16;
Michael Forsythe, ``Beijing's Intervention in Hong Kong Election Could
Face a Hurdle: Local Courts,'' New York Times, 8 November 16.
\47\ See, e.g., Kong Tsung-gan, ``Overview of Prosecutions and
Lawsuits Brought by the Hong Kong Government Against Pro-Democracy
Leaders,'' Medium, 20 July 17.
\48\ ``Hong Kong Police Charge Occupy Protesters, One Day After
Beijing's Candidate Wins Top Job,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 March 17; Ellie
Ng, ``Hong Kong's Pro-Democracy Leaders Slam Post-Election Crackdown,
Accuse Gov't of Political Cleansing,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 27 March
17; Phila Siu and Kimmy Chung, ``Timing Under Debate as Nine Occupy
Participants Charged a Day After Carrie Lam Wins Chief Executive
Election,'' South China Morning Post, 28 March 17.
\49\ Freedom House, ``Hong Kong: Authorities Arrest Pro-Democracy
Activists, Roll Back Rights,'' 27 March 17; Amnesty International,
``Hong Kong: Charges Against Pro-Democracy Activists Latest Blow to
Right to Peaceful Protest,'' 27 March 17; Phila Siu and Kimmy Chung,
``Timing Under Debate as Nine Occupy Participants Charged a Day After
Carrie Lam Wins Chief Executive Election,'' South China Morning Post,
28 March 17; Scholars Alliance for Academic Freedom, ``Statement by
International and Hong Kong Scholars To Protest Against Hong Kong SAR
Government's Prosecution of Activist Scholars and Umbrella Movement
Participants'' [Guoji ji xianggang xuezhe kangyi xianggang tebie
xingzheng qu zhengfu qisu she yun xuezhe ji yusan yundong canyuzhe
shengming], last visited 31 March 17.
\50\ Hong Kong Information Services Department, ``DoJ Responds to
Media Enquiries,'' 27 March 17.
\51\ Chung-Tai Cheng, ``Facebook Post on Flag Desecration
Charges,'' Facebook, 10 April 17; Ellie Ng, ``Localist Lawmaker Says He
Faces Charges for Flipping Chinese and Hong Kong Flags,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 10 April 17.
\52\ Joyce Ng et al., ``19 Minutes of Chaos: Legco President Calls
Pro-Establishment Camp Walkout `Unfortunate,' Plans New Oaths for
Localists,'' South China Morning Post, 19 October 16.
\53\ Ibid.; Emily Tsang and Joyce Ng, ``The Eight Types of
Insincere Oaths, as Set Out by Former Beijing Official,'' South China
Morning Post, 9 November 16.
\54\ Youngspiration, ``We Will Not Surrender'' [Women juebu
touxiang], reprinted in Facebook, 26 April 17; Ng Kang-chung and Joyce
Ng, ``Disqualified Hong Kong Pro-Independence Lawmakers Yau Wai-ching
and Baggio Leung Charged With Unlawful Assembly,'' South China Morning
Post, 26 April 17; Benjamin Haas, ``Hong Kong Charges Pro-Independence
Activists Over China Protest,'' Guardian, 26 April 17; Ellie Ng, ``
`Absolutely Unreasonable': Ousted Hong Kong Lawmakers Vow To
`Fearlessly' Resist Political Oppression After Arrest,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, 26 April 17.
\55\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Court of Appeal, Application for Review No. 4 of 2016 (On
Appeal From ESCC No. 2791 of 2015) [Xianggang tebie xingzheng qu,
gaodeng fayuan shangsu fating, xingshi sifa guanxia quan, fuhe
shenqing, fuhe shenqing anjian 2016 nian di 4 hao (yuan dongqu caipan
fayuan xingshi anjian 2015 nian di 2791 hao)], CAAR 4/2016, 17 August
17, 7, 19-21, 174; Jasmine Siu, ``Occupy Activists Joshua Wong, Nathan
Law and Alex Chow Jailed for Up to Eight Months,'' South China Morning
Post, reprinted in CNBC, 17 August 17. See also Legislative Council of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Public Order Ordinance
(Cap. 245) [Di 245 zhang gong'an tiaoli], issued 17 November 67,
amended 29 June 17, sec. 18.
\56\ James Griffiths, ``Joshua Wong and Two Other Umbrella Movement
Leaders Jailed in Hong Kong,'' CNN, 17 August 17; Jasmine Siu, ``Occupy
Activists Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Alex Chow Jailed for Up to Eight
Months,'' South China Morning Post, reprinted in CNBC, 17 August 17.
\57\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap. 542) [Di 542 zhang lifa hui
tiaoli], issued 3 October 97, amended 26 June 17, sec. 39(1)(e)(i).
\58\ In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Court of Appeal, Application for Review No. 4 of 2016 (On
Appeal From ESCC No. 2791 of 2015) [Xianggang tebie xingzheng qu,
gaodeng fayuan shangsu fating, xingshi sifa guanxia quan, fuhe
shenqing, fuhe shenqing anjian 2016 nian di 4 hao (yuan dongqu caipan
fayuan xingshi anjian 2015 nian di 2791 hao)], CAAR 4/2016, 17 August
17, 14, 134.
\59\ Jasmine Siu, ``Protesters Who Stormed Hong Kong's Legislative
Council Given Jail Terms After Prosecutors Pushed for Tougher
Sentences,'' South China Morning Post, 16 August 17.
\60\ ``No Meddling in HK Courts: CE,'' Hong Kong Government News,
21 August 17; Hong Kong Department of Justice, ``Department of
Justice's Response to Queries on Two Court Cases,'' 21 August 17; Hong
Kong Bar Association and Law Society of Hong Kong, ``Joint Statement of
the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong in
Response to Criticisms of Judicial Independence in Hong Kong,'' 18
August 17.
\61\ Human Rights Watch, ``Hong Kong: Quash Convictions of Student
Leaders,'' 15 August 17; Jun Pang, ``10 Reactions to Hong Kong's
Jailing of Democracy Figures Joshua Wong, Nathan Law & Alex Chow,''
Hong Kong Free Press, 17 August 17; Freedom House, ``Hong Kong
Imprisons Democracy Activists,'' 17 August 17; Amnesty International,
``Hong Kong: `Vindictive' Jail Terms for Pro-Democracy Leaders,'' 17
August 17.
\62\ UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the
Third Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at
its 107th Session (11-28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3, 29 April 13.
See also Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245) [Di 245 zhang gong'an
tiaoli], issued 17 November 67, amended 29 June 17, sec. 18.
\63\ Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Press Freedom Shows
Slight Improvement, but Remains Abysmally Low,'' 6 April 17.
\64\ Jeffie Lam, ``Perception of Hong Kong Press Freedom Improves
Slightly but Situation Still `Worrying,' '' South China Morning Post, 6
April 17.
\65\ Chris Horton, ``Reporters Without Borders Picks Taiwan for
Asian Bureau,'' New York Times, 6 April 17; ``Reporters Without Borders
Scraps Hong Kong Plans To Open First Asia Office in Taiwan,'' Agence
France-Presse, reprinted in Hong Kong Free Press, 7 April 17.
\66\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2017 World Press Freedom Index--
Hong Kong,'' last visited 26 April 17; Kris Cheng, ``Hong Kong Falls 4
Places in 2017 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index; Taiwan
Freest in Asia,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 26 April 17.
\67\ See, e.g., CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 331.
\68\ Hong Kong Journalists Association, ``Ombudsman Considers
Government's Policy Towards Online Media Unfair,'' 6 December 16.
\69\ Tom Grundy, ``HKFP Reporter Denied Access To View Election
Vote Count, Days After Watchdog Slams Gov't Ban,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, 12 December 16.
\70\ Kris Cheng, ``Hong Kong Gov't Confirms HKFP and Other Digital
Media Will Be Barred From Covering Sunday's Election,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, 22 March 17.
\71\ Amnesty International, ``2016 Annual Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Hong Kong'' [2016 niandu xianggang renquan
zhuangkuang baogao], 11 January 17, 11-12; Hong Kong Journalists
Association, ``HKJA Criticizes Information Services Department for
Repeatedly Denying Online Media's [Right To] Report'' [Jixie qianze
zhengfu xinwen chu yizai jujue wangmei caifang], 28 February 17.
\72\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen tebie
xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99,
specifically arts. 47, 68 and annexes I, II.
\73\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aomen tebie
xingzheng qu jiben fa], passed 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99,
art. 40.
\74\ Ibid., arts. 12, 16, 22.
\75\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25(b). Article 25(b) of the ICCPR
guarantees the right ``to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . . ..''
\76\ UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the
Initial Report of Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at its 107th
session (11-28 March 2013), CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/1, 29 April 13, para. 7;
UN Human Rights Committee, Report on Follow-up to the Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/112/2, 8 December
14, 23.
\77\ Kris Cheng, ``Macau Election: Pro-Democracy Camp Maintains 4
of 33 Seats, With Youngest Ever Lawmaker Elected at 26,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 18 September 17; Kelvin Chan, ``Young Democracy Activist
Among Macau Election Winners,'' Associated Press, reprinted in ABC
News, 18 September 17.
\78\ Law No. 9/2016, Revision to Law No. 3/2001, ``Electoral System
of the Legislative Assembly of the Macau Special Administrative
Region'' [Di 9/2016 hao falu xiugai di 3/2001 hao falu ``aomen tebie
xingzheng qu lifa hui xuanju zhidu''], issued 28 December 16, effective
29 December 16.
\79\ Law No. 3/2001, ``Electoral System of the Legislative Assembly
of the Macau Special Administrative Region'' [Di 3/2001 hao falu
``aomen tebie xingzheng qu lifa hui xuanju zhidu''], issued 5 March 01,
amended 6 October 08, 10 September 12, 28 December 16, effective 29
December 16, arts. 6(8), 47-A.
\80\ ``Second Permanent Committee: If Candidates or Elected Persons
Violate Declaration Form's Contents, CAEAL Will Have Power To
[Disqualify]'' [Er chang hui: houxuanren ji dangxuanren wei
shengmingshu neirong xuanguanhui youquan DQ], All About Macau, 7
December 16.
\81\ Ellie Ng, ``Macau Proposes Measure Requiring Election
Candidates To Pledge Loyalty to Basic Law,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 26
November 16; ``Sonia Chan Fears Pro-Independence Surprises'' [Sonia
chan receia surpresas pro-independencia], Hoje Macau, 29 November 16;
Macau Government Information Bureau, ``Sonia Chan Hoi-fan: Introducing
Upholding of `Basic Law' and Pledging Allegiance to SAR To Improve
Electoral Law'' [Chen haifan: yinru yonghu ``jiben fa'', xiaozhong tequ
yi wanshan xuanju fa], 28 November 16. See also Daniel Beitler, ``Law
Revision Triggers Alarm Over Democratic Prospects,'' Macau Daily Times,
1 December 16.
\82\ Sofia Margarida Mota, ``Loyalty Pledge Worries Pro-Democrats''
[Juramento de fidelidade preocupa pro-democratas], Hoje Macau, 19
December 16; Ines Almeida, ``Trio `Out of Tune' in Chorus of Praise for
`Loyalty' '' [Trio ``desafinado'' no coro de elogios a ``fidelidade''],
Jornal Tribuna de Macau, 19 December 16.
\83\ Daniel Beitler, ``Law Revision Triggers Alarm Over Democratic
Prospects,'' Macau Daily Times, 1 December 16; New Macau Association,
``New Macau Association Protests Government's Use of Legislative
Assembly Electoral Law as Excuse To Restrict Freedom To Run for
Election'' [Xin aomen xueshe kangyi zhengfu ji xiuding lifa hui xuanju
fa xianzhi canxuan ziyou], reprinted in Facebook, 29 November 16; Liane
Ferreira, ``[Legislative Assembly] Candidates Will Have To Declare
Loyalty'' [Candidatos a AL terao de declarar fidelidade], Jornal
Tribuna de Macau, 25 November 16; ``MSAR Warns Against Pro-Independence
Sentiments'' [RAEM previne-se contra sentimentos independentistas],
Jornal Tribuna de Macau, 28 November 16.
\84\ Andreia Sofia Silva, ``NMA Wants Deputies To Reject Pre-
Analysis of Candidates'' [ANM quer que deputados recusem pre-analise
aos candidatos], Hoje Macau, 1 December 16; ``MSAR Warns Against Pro-
Independence Sentiments'' [RAEM previne-se contra sentimentos
independentistas], Jornal Tribuna de Macau, 28 November 16.
\85\ Law No. 9/2016, Alteration to Law No. 3/2001, ``Electoral
System of the Legislative Assembly of the Macau Special Administrative
Region'' [Di 9/2016 hao falu xiugai di 3/2001 hao falu ``aomen tebie
xingzheng qu lifa hui xuanju zhidu''], issued 28 December 16, effective
29 December 16, arts. 75-A, 188-A.
\86\ ``Association Questions Campaign Rules' Impact on Media
Coverage,'' Macau Daily Times, 6 April 17. See also Macau Portuguese
and English Press Association, ``Statement'' [Comunicado], reprinted in
Facebook, 20 April 17; ``Journalists Worried About Creation of `Climate
of Uncertainty' '' [Jornalistas preocupados com ``clima de incerteza''
instalado], Hoje Macau, 21 April 17.
\87\ Legislative Assembly of the Macau Special Administrative
Region, Internal Security Framework Law of the Macau Special
Administrative Region [Aomen tebie xingzheng qu neibu bao'an gangyao
fa], issued and effective 4 December 02, art. 17(1)(4).
\88\ Joao Santos Filipe, ``Authorities Deny Entry Into Macau to
Former Hong Kong Activist'' [Autoridades negaram entrada em macau a
antigo activista de hong kong], Jornal Ponto Final, 6 October 16; Owen
Fung, ``Macau Denies Entry to Hong Kong Activists and Filmmaker on Same
Day Thailand Deports Joshua Wong,'' South China Morning Post, 6 October
16; Chantal Yuen, ``Hong Kong Lawmaker Detained in Macau While
Attempting To Petition Chinese Premier,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 11
October 16; ``Roy Tam Blocked From Entering Macau'' [Roy tam impedido
de entrar em macau], Jornal Ponto Final, 11 October 16.
\89\ Zhen Shuji, ``Macau's Refusal To Let Two Former Hong Kong Pro-
Democratic Legislators Enter `Highly Irregular' '' [Aomen jujue liang
ming qian xianggang fanmin yiyuan rujing bei zhi ``feichang lipu''],
Radio France International, 1 January 17; ``Frederick Fung Barred From
Entering Macau, Said To `Threaten Internal Security and Stability' ''
[Feng jianji fu aomen bei ju rujing bei zhi ``weixie neibu bao'an
wending''], Stand News, 31 December 16; ``Slow Beat Refused Entry to
Macau: How Does One Person Celebrating the New Year Threaten Public
Security and Stability? '' [Man bi bei ju rujing aomen: yi ge ren
bainian dian weixie bao'an wending?], Apple Daily, 30 January 17.
\90\ Jeffie Lam, ``It's Unbelievable: Hong Kong Pan-Democrat Denied
Entry to Macau,'' South China Morning Post, 16 April 17.
\91\ ``Andrew Wan Refused Entry to Macau, Regina Ip Says Incident
Very Strange'' [Yin zhaojian bei ju rujing aomen ye liu shuyi dui
shijian gandao feichang qiguai], Radio Television Hong Kong, 30 April
17; ``In One Week, 4 Democratic Party Members Kept Out of Macau,
District Councilor Au Chun Wah and Staff Prevented From Entering''
[Minzhu dang yi zhou nei 4 ren zao jinzu aomen qu yiyuan ou zhenhua yu
zhiyuan bei ju rujing], Apple Daily, 6 May 17.
\92\ Kris Cheng, ``More Pro-Democracy Activists Ejected From Macau,
Hours After Successfully Entering as Tourists,'' Hong Kong Free Press,
9 May 17.
\93\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Hong Kong Journalists
Denied Entry to Macau,'' 28 August 17.
\94\ Karen Cheung, `` `This Is a Joke': Hong Kong Democratic
Lawmaker Helena Wong Latest To Be Denied Entry to Macau,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 30 August 17; ``Briefs: HK Lawmaker Denied Entry to
Macau,'' Macau Daily Times, 31 August 17.
\95\ Catherine Lai, ``Macau Gallery `Pressured' by Gov't Officials
To Cancel Tibetan Artist's Live-Painting Event at Opening,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 27 February 17.
\96\ ``Macau Gallery Cancels Tibetan Artist Event Amid Chinese
Pressure,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 March 17.
[all]