[Senate Hearing 114-567]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-567
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
114TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER; MR. PETER K. LEVINE; GENERAL
JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR.; GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA; GENERAL DARREN W. McDEW;
GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY; LIEUTENANT
GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER; ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON; MR. JOHN CONGER;
MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK;
MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER; HONORABLE MARCEL J. LETTRE II; MR. GABRIEL O.
CAMARILLO; MR. JOHN E. SPARKS; VICE ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD; HONORABLE
PATRICK J. MURPHY; DR. JANINE ANNE
DAVIDSON; AND HONORABLE LISA S. DISBROW
__________
FEBRUARY 4; APRIL 21; JULY 9, 14, 21, 23, 30; NOVEMBER 19;
DECEMBER 9, 15, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
24-274 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
_________________________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected]
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
february 4, 2015
Nomination of Honorable Ashton B. Carter to be Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 1
Statements of:
Lieberman, Honorable Joseph I., former U.S. Senator from
Connecticut.................................................... 7
Carter, Honorable Ashton B., to be Secretary of Defense.......... 9
april 21, 2015
Nomination of Mr. Peter K. Levine to be Deputy Chief Management
Officer, Department of Defense................................. 159
Statements of:
Levine, Peter K., Deputy Chief Management Officer, Department of
Defense........................................................ 162
july 9, 2015
Nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, to be
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................... 259
Statements of:
Dunford, General Joseph F., JR., USMC, to be Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................................... 264
july 14, 2015
Nominations of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, to be Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General Darren W. McDew,
USAF, to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command............. 373
Statements of:
Selva, General Paul J., USAF, to be Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 378
McDew, General Darren W., USAF, Nominee to be Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 379
july 21, 2015
Nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA, to be Chief of Staff
of the Army.................................................... 477
Statements of:
Milley, General Mark A., USA, to be Chief of Staff of the Army... 481
(iii)
july 23, 2015
Nomination of Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, USMC, to be
General and Commandant of the Marine Corps..................... 577
Statement of:
Neller, Lieutenant General Robert B., to be General and
Commandant of the Marine Corps................................. 580
july 30, 2015
Nomination of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN, to be Chief of
Naval Operations............................................... 663
Statements of:
Richardson, Admiral John M. USN, Nominee to be Chief of Naval
Operations..................................................... 666
november 19, 2015
Nominations of Mr. John Conger to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Mr. Stephen P. Welby to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering;
Ms. Alissa M. Starzak to be General Counsel of the Department
of the Army; and Mr. Franklin R. Parker to be Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs......... 735
Statements of:
Conger, Mr. John, to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, Comptroller........................................... 739
Welby, Mr. Stephen P., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering....................................... 740
Starzak, Ms. Alissa M., to be General Counsel of the Department
of the Army.................................................... 742
Parker, Mr. Franklin R., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs............................... 743
december 9, 2015
Nominations of Honorable Marcel J. Lettre II to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Mr. Gabriel O. Camarillo
to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs; Mr. John E. Sparks to be a Judge on the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd,
USN to be Admiral and Commander, United States Southern Command 859
Statements of:
Lettre II, Honorable Marcel J., to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence............................................... 863
Camarillo, Mr. Gabriel O., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs......................... 866
Sparks, Mr. John E., to be a Judge on the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces............................................... 867
Tidd, Vice Admiral Kurt W., USN, to be Admiral and Commander,
United States Southern Command................................. 868
december 15, 2015
Nominations of Honorable Patrick J. Murphy to be Under Secretary
of the Army; Dr. Janine Anne Davidson to be Under Secretary of
the Navy; and Honorable Lisa S. Disbrow to be Under Secretary
of the Air Force............................................... 959
Statements of:
Disbrow, Honorable Lisa S., Nominee, Under Secretary of the Air
Force.......................................................... 962
Davidson, Dr. Janine Anne, Nominee, Under Secretary of the Navy.. 963
Murphy, Honorable Patrick J., Nominee, Under Secretary of the
Army........................................................... 965
APPENDIX......................................................... 1105
NOMINATION OF HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
McCain (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
Also present: Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets this
morning to consider the nomination of Dr. Ashton B. Carter to
be the Secretary of Defense, and there are standard questions
that by committee rule that I would put forth to Dr. Carter at
this time.
Dr. Carter, in order to exercise its legislative and
oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee
and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to
receive testimony, briefings, and other communication of
information. Have you adhered to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Dr. Carter. I have.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Dr. Carter. No.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Dr. Carter. I will.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Dr. Carter. They will.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
[Pause.]
Chairman McCain. That concludes our routine questions that
we ask of the nominees.
Before the committee proceeds to the business before us
today, on behalf of all members of the committee, we would like
to extend our deepest condolences to the family of the brave
Jordanian pilot brutally murdered at the hands of ISIL [the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. Together with his
family, the Jordanian armed forces, and the people of Jordan,
we mourn the loss of a hero that has galvanized the Nation and
the world.
I hope this heinous crime finally leads us to put in place
what thus far has been lacking, a comprehensive strategy to
achieve the President's stated goal to degrade and destroy
ISIL. Let there be no doubt, we still do not have a viable
strategy to counter ISIL. If you are not winning in war, you
are losing.
America has no greater ally in the fight against terrorism
than Jordan, and as we made clear to King Abdullah in our
meeting yesterday. This committee's immediate concern is to
ensure Jordan has all the equipment and resources necessary to
continue taking the fight directly to ISIL. Many of us on this
committee will be sending a letter to the administration on
this urgent issue of concern, and we invite all of our fellow
committee members to join us on that letter.
I think there was a consensus on both sides yesterday after
the meeting with King Abdullah that we would send a letter out
this morning. That letter will be distributed to the members
for your perusal and signature so we can get that letter out as
soon as possible, and I thank all members of the committee for
their cooperation.
I would also like to add that if legislation is required in
order to achieve the goals that King Abdullah articulated to us
yesterday as absolutely necessary to defend his nation, we will
be considering that legislation as well as soon as possible,
and I thank all members.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to consider
the nomination of Dr. Ashton B. Carter to be Secretary of
Defense. At the outset, I would like to express my sincere
gratitude to Chuck Hagel for his years of service as an
infantry sergeant in Vietnam, as a United States Senator from
Nebraska, and as our Nation's 24th Secretary of Defense.
Chuck Hagel is a patriot and honorable public servant, and
during his leadership of the Pentagon, the men and women of our
armed services have had a true ally who always put their
interests first. This committee wishes Chuck the best in his
future endeavors.
Dr. Carter, even in the best of times, the position for
which you have been nominated is one of the most challenging in
Government. I would like to thank your wife, Stephanie, and
your children, Will and Ava, for being here today and for
loaning you to our Nation in service once again.
Dr. Carter is one of America's most respected and
experienced defense professionals. He has served as assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs; Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; and most recently as Deputy Secretary of Defense. In
these positions, I have known him and members of the committee
have known him to be an honest, hard-working, and committed
public servant.
I have had the opportunity to work together with Dr. Carter
on several issues of shared concern, especially trying to
reform the defense acquisition system, improving financial
management of the Department of Defense [DOD], and rolling back
sequestration. On these and other issues facing the Nation, we
all look forward to having you as our partner once more, Dr.
Carter.
But I must candidly express concern about the task that
awaits you if confirmed and the influence you would have on
some of the most critical national security issues facing our
Nation. Two of your predecessors, Secretary Robert Gates and
Secretary Leon Panetta, have severely criticized White House
micromanagement of the Defense Department and over-
centralization of foreign and defense policy.
According to numerous news reports, Secretary Hagel
experienced similar frustrations with the insular and
indecisive White House national security team over issues
ranging from ISIL to Ukraine, detention policy to
sequestration. Dr. Carter, I sincerely hope the President who
nominated you will empower you to lead and contribute to the
fullest extent of your abilities because at a time of
multiplying threats to our security, America needs a strong
Secretary of Defense now more than ever.
America is confronted today with a diverse and complex
range of national security challenges. Iran is on the march. In
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere across the Middle East, ISIL
continues to expand its influence and control of territory, as
the new Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency recently
testified to Congress.
A revisionist Russia and a rising China each, in their own
ways, present challenges to the liberal international order as
we have known it since the end of World War II, a system that
cherishes the rule of law, maintains free markets and free
trade, and relegates wars of aggression to their rightful place
in the bloody past.
Amid the present upheaval and conflict, American
disengagement can only produce more turmoil and increase in the
chance of large-scale American interventions at greater cost in
blood and treasure. That is why we need a coherent national
security strategy incorporating all elements of America's
national power to sustain and defend the international order
that has produced and extended security, prosperity, and
liberty across the globe.
But crafting a reality-based national security strategy is
simply impossible under the mindless mechanism of
sequestration. Despite the growing array of complex threats to
our security, we are on track to cut $1 trillion out of
America's defense budget by 2021. Readiness is falling across
the Services, and morale is falling right along with it.
Army and Marine Corps end strength is dropping dangerously
low. The Air Force is the oldest and smallest it has ever seen.
The Navy's fleet is shrinking to pre-World War I levels. Last
week, each of our Service Chiefs testified before this
committee that American lives are being put at risk due to
sequestration.
Sequestration represents a failure to meet our most basic
constitutional responsibility to provide for the common
defense. America's military can no longer be held hostage to
domestic political disputes, totally separated from the reality
of the threats we face.
More than 3 years after the passage of the Budget Control
Act, it is time to put an end to this senseless policy. Rolling
back sequestration is necessary to provide our military the
strategy-driven budget necessary to confront the threats we
face. But it will never be enough without reforming how the
Department procures major weapon systems.
Many of our military's challenges today are the results of
years of mistakes and wasted resources. For example, over here,
the Army's Future Combat System was initially estimated to be a
$92 billion project to modernize into a cohesive network new
Army vehicles and radios. But it more than doubled its price to
$200 billion without ever getting off the ground.
Secretary Gates and Congress wisely canceled Future Combat
Systems, but only after spending $20 billion with nothing to
show for it.
Between these four systems--Future Combat Systems,
expeditionary fighting vehicle, Comanche helicopter, and the
VH-71 presidential helicopter--we spent $40 billion with
nothing to show for it. That is $40 billion of training and
equipment our military doesn't have today to confront the
threats we face.
The problem continues today. The cost of the evolved
expendable launch vehicle has exploded from around $100 million
per launch to $400 million per launch over the last 15 years
after the Air Force allowed years of sole-source contracts
while, especially over the last few months, actively keeping
out any other companies from competing. Hopefully, this year,
we will see the Air Force certify a new entrant, and this
competition can finally bring down costs and end our reliance
on Russian rocket engines.
Like many programs that preceded it, LCS [the littoral
combat ship's] cost overruns followed predictably from a
chronic lack of planning from its very outset in three key
areas: undefined requirements, unrealistic initial cost
estimates, and unreliable assessments of technological and
integrated risk.
The Gerald Ford-class nuclear aircraft carrier was
originally supposed to cost $10.5 billion. It will now cost
$12.9 billion, a $2.4 billion increase, and we have no
assurance such increases will not plague the follow-on ships.
This is unacceptable.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was originally estimated to
cost around $220 billion to research and engineer and build
2,800 airplanes. Now we are going to spend more than $330
billion, a 50 percent increase, to buy 400 fewer airplanes.
Even more astounding than the amount of money squandered
and wasted is the fact that in each of the weapon systems cases
I have mentioned, no individual has been held responsible for
these massive cost overruns and egregious acquisition failures,
and the result has been the slow degradation of America's
defense technological advantage, which we will lose altogether
if we persist with business as usual in our acquisition
policies. This must change. It will be a priority for this
committee and for me personally to change it.
Dr. Carter, I look to you as a partner in all of these
endeavors. If confirmed, I hope you will provide independent
leadership and work closely with Congress on the issues that
matter most: crafting a coherent national security strategy to
meet today's threats, rolling back sequestration, continuing to
reform the defense acquisition process, modernizing our
military compensation system, and many others.
I thank you deeply for your willingness to serve once
again, and I look forward to your testimony today.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in extending our condolences to the family
of the brave Jordanian pilot and to the people of Jordan.
Let me welcome Dr. Carter and thank him for his willingness
to once again serve the Nation.
I also want to welcome Stephanie and Ava and Will and thank
them for their sacrifice and service to the Nation.
Let me also recognize my colleague and friend, Joe
Lieberman. Thank you, Senator, for being here today.
Dr. Carter is the former Deputy Secretary of Defense and
Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. You
are uniquely qualified to lead the Department of Defense at a
time when, as Henry Kissinger said last week here, the United
States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises
since the end of the second world war.
If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, you will be advising
the President, leading the Defense Department, and working with
our allies on a staggering number of complex international
challenges to our National interests.
Iran. While the Secretary of Defense is not a party to the
negotiations relating to Iran's nuclear program, the Secretary
will undoubtedly be responsible for any number of potential
contingencies relating to the consequences of different
outcomes of these negotiations. In the event of a breakdown in
the negotiations, the consequences could alter the face of the
region for generations and generations.
ISIL. ISIL's depraved and violent campaign in Iraq and
Syria to establish an extremist caliphate threatens to erase
borders, destabilize the region, and create a breeding ground
for foreign fighters willing to return to the West to carry out
attacks against United States interests. The Department must
provide critical leadership in a coalition effort that includes
Arab and Muslim states to degrade and defeat ISIL while being
careful to ensure that the United States does not end up owning
the conflict in Syria and elsewhere.
Afghanistan. The hard-won gains of the past decade are
significant but remain fragile. With Afghan security, the
Afghan forces are taking over responsibility for combating the
Taliban and securing Afghanistan. However, United States
forces, with our coalition partners, must transition to a more
limited mission of training and assisting the Afghan forces and
conducting counterterrorism operations. Yet it remains to be
seen whether conditions on the ground in Afghanistan will
improve sufficiently by the end of 2016 to warrant the pace of
further reductions under the current plan.
Ukraine. Russia's aggression against Ukraine challenges
order and progress in Europe. In the past few days, separatists
in Eastern Ukraine with substantial Russian equipment,
training, and leadership have abandoned any pretext of a
ceasefire and launched a broad offensive against Ukrainian
forces. The United States must determine how to best support
the Ukrainian forces and people in defending their country.
Cyber. For years now, we have devoted significant attention
to the looming and complex challenge of cyber warfare. The
attack on the Sony Corporation of America, however, was in
important respects a watershed event that should stimulate
fresh critical thinking.
This attack demonstrates that a relatively small and weak
rogue nation can reach across the ocean to cause extensive
destruction of a U.S.-based economic target and very nearly
succeed in suppression of freedom of expression through
cyberspace. The real and manifest advantages of the offense
over the defense in cyber warfare that enabled a militarily
inferior nation to strike successfully against the Homeland is
a new and worrisome factor for national security.
These issues are only a few of the external challenges
facing the Defense Department, but there are also significant
internal challenges that must be addressed.
Sequestration. Last week before this committee, General
Mattis said, ``No foe in the field can wreak such havoc on our
security that mindless sequestration is achieving today.''
General Odierno informed this committee that only one third of
Army brigades are ready to fight. General Welsh testified that
less than 50 percent of our combat squadrons are fully combat
ready.
Sequestration threatens not only our national security, but
risks damage to our public safety, health, transportation,
education, and the environment. While the Department manages
through these difficult fiscal realities, Congress must find a
balanced and bipartisan solution and repeal sequestration.
Rising costs. The chairman has alluded to this very
succinctly and very directly. Even without sequestration, the
Defense Department would have to tackle rising costs, including
personnel costs, which consume a third of the Defense
Department's budget.
Yesterday, this committee heard the testimony of the
Military Compensation and Retirement Committee. Their
recommendations are far reaching and would fundamentally change
military personnel benefits. But these recommendations must be
carefully considered because changes must occur to ensure the
Department can properly train and equip its fighting men and
women.
The other major cost driver in the Defense Department is
acquisition, and while the Department has implemented
significant acquisition reforms--many under your leadership--
defense acquisition still takes too long and costs too much. We
can and we should do more to streamline and improve the system.
Finally, but most importantly, if confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, you will be leading 1.3 million Active Duty military,
820,000 Reserve and Guard, and 773,000 civilians. They are
tired and overtaxed from a decade of war and years of fiscal
uncertainty.
They are wrestling with the same issues as civilian
society, issues like sexual assault and suicide. Yet they
committed to protecting this Nation and remain the finest force
in the world.
Dr. Carter, I look forward to discussing these and other
issues with you and thank you for your service.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator Reed.
I note the presence of our beloved friend and former
colleague, a member of this committee since the Coolidge
administration, and we are very happy to have him here this
morning, our beloved friend Joe Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman?
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, FORMER U.S. SENATOR
FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and it was a great
comfort to me when I arrived during the Coolidge administration
to find that you had already been here several years.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. I must say I am delighted to be here,
and it is really somewhat sentimental for me to be here. I
appreciate very much the opportunity.
It is a privilege for me to appear before the Senate Armed
Services Committee today to introduce Dr. Ash Carter. This is
not the first time I have had this privilege. In fact, it is
the third time.
The first was on March 26, 2009, when Ash was nominated to
be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. Second was on September 13, 2011, when he was
nominated to be Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Today, I suppose I could say I don't think I have ever been
so pleased to be asked to repeat myself as I am honored to have
been by Ash Carter to introduce him to you as President Obama's
nominee to be the 25th Secretary of Defense of the United
States of America.
Ash Carter graduated from Yale College summa cum laude with
a unique combination of majors, physics and medieval history.
During his time as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, he temporarily
resolved the question, which was on everyone's mind, I am sure,
about whether he was primarily a historian or physicist. He
earned a doctorate at Oxford in theoretical physics.
Nevertheless, to confound observers and prognosticators, he
went on to become the Chair of the International and Global
Affairs faculty at Harvard at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government and Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project at
the Kennedy School's Belfer Center.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, it would really be hard to find
someone to serve as Secretary of Defense who combines as much
practical Pentagon experience with so deep a background in
national security policy as Ash Carter. The fact that you have
convened this morning to consider his nomination means that the
talents and abilities of a brilliant and extraordinary
strategic thinker and public servant and administrator can
again be put to use for our Nation.
It also means, as you have said, that Ash Carter has again
chosen, with the support of his wife and family, to answer the
call to duty to serve our country. Over the past 30 years, Dr.
Carter has worked directly or indirectly for virtually every
Secretary of Defense, no matter the political party of the
Secretary. He knows the department he has been asked to lead
very well and, therefore, can begin leading it on day one.
From 1993 to 1996, Ash served as the assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy. During that time, he
worked on the landmark Nunn-Lugar Arms Control Program, and I
got to know him when we traveled together with Secretary of
Defense Bill Perry and Senators Nunn and Lugar to the former
Soviet Union to observe them destroying nuclear submarines and
dismantling missiles and missile sites as part of Nunn-Lugar.
I think we actually bonded personally at one dinner hosted
by the high command of the Russian military in which I believe
it is accurate to say that Ash and I were the only two members
of the American delegation to keep up with the vodka toasts of
friendship with our Russian colleagues.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. When I think back to those days and you
think of what is happening in Russia today and what Russia is
doing outside its borders, those memories are really quite
poignant. Too much has changed for the worse.
But in thinking about introducing Ash today, he has done so
much. It is important to note that he spearheaded some
developments during that period of time, particularly the
removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus, which, needless to say, have and continue to make our
world a lot safer than it would otherwise be.
Speaking of travel, Ash had the good judgment, Mr.
Chairman, to come with us several times to the Munich Security
Conference. I must say watching him there, I was impressed by
the range and depth of his relationships with the top level of
particularly military, but also foreign policy leaders of our
European allies in NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization].
I would say, and I would guess that members of the
committee would agree, that Ash Carter's most important
contributions during his past Pentagon service have been in
American lives saved on the battlefield. He was the driving
force in providing 6,500 MRAP [mine-resistant ambush protected]
vehicles to our troops in Afghanistan in record time, an action
that saved many lives and gave our troops the confidence that
there was someone in Washington who was working for them.
Ash Carter's fierce dedication to our warfighters is well
known and I think will be one of his greatest legacies. More
broadly, the improvements he brought about in the Pentagon
acquisitions process show his mastery of this complex and
critical field and will make him an excellent partner for you,
Mr. Chairman, in the continuing work that I know you, Senator
Reed, and this committee want to do to improve defense
procurement.
Dr. Carter's service on boards and commissions includes the
Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, the Secretary
of State's International Security Advisory Board, and the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States.
Ash Carter has been accurately described as a man for all
seasons, a man of enormous talents and experiences. It is also
true that he has made choices in his life about how he has used
his talents and experiences. He has chosen to go where his
intellect, his values, and his patriotism have called him.
We are fortunate, indeed, that President Obama has
nominated Dr. Carter to be our next Secretary of Defense. If I
may say so, the President is fortunate that he will have so
experienced a leader at the Pentagon and so wise an adviser in
the inner counsels of this administration. All of which
explains why I am so truly honored to introduce Ashton Carter
to this great committee at this time.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator
Lieberman. We are always glad to have you here, and if you
would like to take a seat on the dais, we welcome it.
Dr. Carter, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER, NOMINEE TO BE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
all the distinguished members of this committee. Thank you all.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you as President
Obama's nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
I am honored by his trust and confidence and also by the
prospect of serving once again the troops and the country that
I love so much.
If confirmed, I will take the office of Secretary of
Defense after one of our Nation's most honorable and
conscientious public servants, Chuck Hagel. I worked for
Secretary Hagel, and I have known him for decades, though not
over all of the many decades he served our country.
Among the many traits I admire in Secretary Hagel is the
tireless care with which he carried out the most solemn duty of
a Secretary of Defense, which is to the relatively few brave
young men and women who defend the rest of us.
I also thank Senator Lieberman for his warm and generous
introduction--as he noted, it is not the first time he has done
so--but especially for his service to this body and to the
Nation over many years. Thank you, sir.
My perfect wife, Stephanie, and wonderful children, Will
and Ava, are behind me, as they always are every day, and I
thank them.
The President frequently notes that America has the
greatest fighting force the world has ever known. To the men
and women of the Department of Defense who make it so and to
this committee, which watches over them, I pledge that if I am
confirmed as Secretary of Defense to keep faith with the
dedication that brought them into service, to ensure that their
training and equipment are as superb as they are; that the
well-being, safety, and dignity of each of them and their
families is fostered and respected; and that decisions about
when and where they are sent into harm's way are made with the
greatest reflection and care.
The principal reason that Stephanie and I made a U-turn in
our life to accept the offer of nomination is our respect and
devotion to them.
To the chairman, members of the committee, I will be brief,
if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, my responsibilities would
be to protect America and its friends and allies in a turbulent
and dangerous world. At the same time, I never lose sight of
the fact the United States remains the strongest, most
resilient, and most influential nation on earth.
We do, indeed, have the finest fighting force the world has
ever known. We have an innovative economy that has long set the
pace for the rest of the world. Our country has friends and
allies in every corner of the world, and our adversaries have
few. This is clear testimony to the appeal of our values, our
principles, and our leadership.
All this makes me proud and hopeful and determined to grab
hold of the bright opportunities in front of us, as well as to
counter the very real dangers we face. These dangers, as the
chairman has noted, include continuing turmoil in the Middle
East and North Africa and the malignant and savage terrorism
emanating from it; an ongoing war in Afghanistan; the reversion
to old-style security thinking in parts of Europe; the
longstanding tensions from the past and the rapid changes in
Asia, and the continuing need for the stabilizing role of the
United States in that region, which is so important to the
future; the continuing imperative to counter the spread or use
of weapons of mass destruction; and new dangers in new domains
like cyber, as noted by Senator Reed.
Strategy. Strategy needs to keep all these problems in
perspective and to craft lasting approaches to each of them.
I have promised President Obama that if I am confirmed I
will furnish him my most candid strategic advice. In
formulating that advice, I intend to confer widely among
civilian and military leaders, including on this committee,
experts, and foreign partners. When the President makes a
decision, I will also ensure that the Department of Defense
implements it with its long-admired excellence.
I will also ensure that the President receives candid
professional military advice. This is not only consonant with
the law, as written in this very committee, but with good
sense, since our military leaders possess wide and deep
experience and expertise.
The law also prescribes the chain of command, and if I am
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will be a stickler for the
chain of command.
I would also like to say a word about the defense budget.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I very much hope that
we can find a way together out of the wilderness of sequester.
Sequester is risky to our defense. It introduces turbulence and
uncertainty that are wasteful, and it conveys a misleadingly
diminished picture of our power in the eyes of friends and foes
alike.
I am not familiar with the details of the 2016 budget
submitted just a couple days ago, and if confirmed, I will come
back here for a full posture hearing to discuss them. But I
strongly support the President's request for relief from
sequester caps in 2016 and through the Future Year Defense
Plan.
If confirmed, I will do my part to assist the President in
working with Congress to resolve the overall issues of the
country's fiscal future, of which the defense budget is a part.
But I cannot suggest support and stability for the defense
budget without at the same time frankly noting that not every
defense dollar is spent as well as it should be.
The taxpayer cannot comprehend it, let alone support the
defense budget, when they read, as the chairman has noted, of
cost overruns, lack of accounting and accountability, needless
overhead, and the like. This must stop.
Every company, State, and city in the country has had to
lean itself out in recent years, and it should be no different
for the Pentagon. In this matter I know I am echoing Chairman
McCain, Senator Reed, and this committee, which has long called
for and taken concrete action on reform of acquisition and
other parts of the defense enterprise in the Weapon System
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and, before that, dating back to
the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
I began my own career in defense in connection with the
implementation of the Packard Commission's recommendations. The
issues and solutions change over time, as technology and
industry change. They extend from acquisition, which was
highlighted by the chairman, in programs like Future Combat
Systems and the presidential helicopter, which I canceled--I
signed the cancellation orders for in 2009--to the Ford
aircraft carrier, which Senator McCain also noted, which was
not satisfactorily solved and still not, its overruns. I agree
with the chairman in that regard. We have a lot of work to do.
The issues and solutions for acquisition reform change over
time, as technology and industry change, as I noted. They
extend from acquisition--and this is important--to all other
parts of the defense budget--force size, compensation, and
training, as well as equipment.
If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I pledge to make
needed change in the Pentagon, but also to seek support from
Congress because I know that in the end, Congress holds the
power of the purse. I look forward to partnership with this
committee in what can be a period of historic advance.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, thank
you. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to come before
you. If confirmed, I will seek out your thoughts, perspectives,
and combat experiences to help me do the best job.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Honorable Ashton B. Carter
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you as
President Obama's nominee to be Secretary of Defense. I am honored by
his trust and confidence, and also by the prospect of serving once
again the troops and the country that I love so much.
If confirmed, I will take the office of Secretary of Defense after
one of our Nation's most honorable and conscientious public servants,
Chuck Hagel. I worked for Secretary Hagel and have known him for
decades, though not over all of the many decades he has served our
country. Among the many traits I admire in Secretary Hagel is the
tireless care with which he carried out the most solemn duty of a
Secretary of Defense, which is to the relatively few brave young men
and women who defend the rest of us.
I also thank Senator Lieberman for his warm and generous
introduction--this is not the first time he has done so--and also for
his service to this body and to the Nation.
My perfect wife Stephanie and wonderful children Will and Ava are
behind me, as they always are, every day. I thank them.
The President frequently notes that America has the greatest
fighting force the world has ever known. To the men and women of the
Department of Defense who make it so, and to this committee which also
watches over them: I pledge if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense
to keep faith with the dedication that brought them into service, to
ensure that their training and equipment are as superb as they are,
that the well-being, safety, and dignity of each of them and their
families is fostered and respected, and that decisions about when and
where they are sent into harm's way are made with the greatest
reflection and care. The principal reason that Stephanie and I made a
U-turn in our life to accept the offer of nomination is our respect and
devotion to them.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I will be brief.
If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, my responsibilities would be
to protect America and its friends and allies in a turbulent and
dangerous world. At the same time, I never lose sight of the fact that
the United States remains the strongest, most resilient, and most
influential Nation on the face of the earth. We do indeed have the
finest fighting force the world has ever known. We have an innovative
economy that has long set the pace for the rest of the world. Our
country has friends and allies in every corner of the world, and our
adversaries have few: this is clear testimony to the appeal of our
values, our principles, and our leadership. All this makes me proud and
hopeful, and determined to grab hold of the bright opportunities in
front of us as well as to counter the very real dangers we face.
These dangers include continuing turmoil in the Middle East and
North Africa, and terrorism emanating from it; an ongoing war in
Afghanistan; the reversion to old-style security thinking in parts of
Europe; the longstanding tensions from the past and the rapid changes
in Asia, and the continuing need for the stabilizing role of the United
States in a region so important to the future; the continuing
imperative to counter the spread or use of weapons of mass destruction;
and new dangers in new domains like cyber. Strategy needs to keep all
these problems in perspective and to craft lasting approaches to each
of them. I have promised President Obama that if I am confirmed, I will
furnish him my most candid strategic advice. In formulating that
advice, I intend to confer widely among civilian and military leaders,
experts and foreign partners. When the President makes a decision, I
will also ensure that the Department of Defense implements it with its
long-admired excellence. I will also ensure that the President receives
candid professional military advice. This is not only consonant with
the law as written in this very committee, but with good sense, since
our military leaders possess wide and deep experience and expertise.
The law also prescribes the chain of command, and if I am confirmed as
Secretary of Defense I will be a stickler for the chain of command.
I'd also like to say a word about the defense budget. Mr. Chairman
and members of the committee: I very much hope that we can find a way
together out of the wilderness of sequester. Sequester is risky to our
defense, it introduces turbulence and uncertainty that are wasteful,
and it conveys a misleadingly diminished picture of our power in the
eyes of friends and foes alike. I am not familiar with the details of
the fiscal year 2016 budget submitted a few days ago, and if confirmed
I will come back here for a full posture hearing to discuss them. But I
strongly support the President's request for relief from the sequester
caps in fiscal year 2016 and through the future year defense plan. If
confirmed, I will do my part to assist the President in working with
Congress to resolve the overall issues of the country's fiscal future
of which the defense budget is a part.
But I cannot suggest support and stability for the defense budget
without at the same time frankly noting that not every defense dollar
is spent as well as it should be. The taxpayer cannot comprehend, let
alone support the defense budget, when they read of cost overruns, lack
of accounting and accountability, needless overhead, and the like. This
must stop. Every company, State, and city in the country has had to
lean itself out in recent years, and it should be no different for the
Pentagon. In this matter I am echoing Chairman McCain, Senator Reed,
and this committee which has long called for, and taken concrete action
on, reform of acquisition and other parts of the defense enterprise, in
the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and before that,
dating back to the Packard Commission and Goldwater-Nichols. I began my
own career in defense in connection with the implementation of the
Packard Commission's recommendations. The issues and solutions change
over time, as technology and industry change. They extend from
acquisition to all the other parts of the defense budget--force size,
compensation, and training as well as equipment. If confirmed as
Secretary of Defense, I pledge to make needed change in the Pentagon,
but also to seek support from Congress, because in the end I know that
Congress holds the power of the purse. I look forward to partnership
with this committee in what can be a period of historic advance.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the committee, thank you
for giving me the opportunity to come before you. If confirmed, I will
seek out your thoughts, perspectives, and combat experiences to help me
do the best job.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter.
We will have multiple rounds, but we will have short ones,
5 minutes, because that will give more opportunity for members
to ask questions.
In about an hour, Dr. Carter needs a short break. As we all
know, he is recovering from recent surgery. So we will take a
break then for as long as you need, and we will go into this
afternoon so that all members are able to ask sufficiently the
questions that they have.
To start with, Dr. Carter, members of this committee met
with King Abdullah yesterday. He made a graphic statement about
needing some weapons and the difficulties he is having with
those, and we will be signing a letter this morning. As I said,
it may require some legislation.
But are you aware of the problems that Jordanians are
having with acquiring some of the weapons that they need?
Dr. Carter. I am not, Mr. Chairman. I learned of them this
morning as well. If I am confirmed, I definitely want to find
out what they are and resolve them because we need partners on
the ground to beat ISIL, and the Jordanian people have clearly
reacted the way that encourages us to support them in combating
what is really a savage and nasty enemy.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Last week, General Mattis was before this committee. He
said in Afghanistan, we need to consider if we are asking the
same outcome there as we saw last summer in Iraq, should we
pull out all our troops on the administration's proposed
timeline, and the gains achieved at great cost against our
enemy in Afghanistan are reversible.
General Keane said all we accomplished in Afghanistan will
be at risk as it was in Iraq if the troops are pulled out not
based on the conditions on the ground. How can we not learn the
obvious and painful lessons from Iraq?
Do you have a position on the withdrawal from Iraq? Do you
believe that it should be calendar based as it is now, or
should we be looking at the conditions on the ground to base
those decisions?
Dr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, thank you and also thank you for
your consideration about the back. I appreciate that.
The campaign in Afghanistan has been close to my heart for
all the time that I have been associated with the Department of
Defense. I have been there a number of times. I think that
success is possible there but, as you indicate, requires the
United States to continue its campaign and finish the job.
I understand we have a plan. The President has a plan. I
support that plan. At the same time, it is a plan. If I am
confirmed and I ascertain, as the years ago by, that we need to
change that plan, I will recommend those changes to the
President.
Chairman McCain. All I can say is it is not a matter of
years. It is a matter of weeks, actually, because one of the
major withdrawals is going to start this coming June. I hope
that you will assess that as quickly and as carefully as
possible.
In his testimony to the committee this week, Dr. Kissinger
said, ``In the Middle East, a multiple of evils are unfolding
simultaneously. Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue
positions of power within other countries.'' Do you agree with
that?
Dr. Carter. Yes, I do.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe that we need to have a
strategy to combat ISIL and the continued successes in many
respects that they are achieving?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe we have a strategy at this
time?
Dr. Carter. I believe I understand our strategy at this
time, Mr. Chairman. I also have the intention, again if
confirmed, to make it my first priority to go there, to talk to
our leaders, military leaders there, to confer with you--
Chairman McCain. What do you understand the strategy to be?
Dr. Carter.--and to--I think the strategy connects ends and
means, and our ends with respect to ISIL needs to be its
lasting defeat. I say ``lasting'' because it is important that
when they get defeated, they stay defeated. That is why it is
important that we have those on the ground there who will
ensure that they stay defeated once defeated.
It is different on the two sides of the border. It is one
enemy, but it is two different contexts. Mr. Chairman, in Iraq,
the force that will keep them defeated is the Iraqi security
forces. That is our strategy is to strengthen them and to make
them that force.
On the Syrian side, not to take too long about it, we are
trying to build the force that will keep them defeated, and
that is going to be a combination of moderate Syrian forces and
regional forces.
Chairman McCain. It doesn't sound like a strategy to me,
but maybe we can flesh out your goals. It sounds like a series
of goals to me. Do you believe we should be supplying arms,
defensive arms to Ukrainians?
Dr. Carter. I very much incline in that direction, Mr.
Chairman, because I think we need to support the Ukrainians in
defending themselves. The nature of those arms I can't say
right now because I haven't conferred with our military leaders
or Ukrainian leaders. But I incline in the direction of
providing them with arms, including, to get to what I am sure
your question is, lethal arms.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One way to evolve a strategy is to first look at the
threat. The Middle East, do you believe the most immediate
threat there to United States interests and to the region is
ISIL?
Dr. Carter. I hesitate to say ISIL only because in the back
of my mind is Iran as well. I think that we have two immediate
substantial dangers in the Middle East. One is ISIL, and one is
Iran.
Senator Reed. In terms of our current military operations,
they are clearly directed at ISIL.
Dr. Carter. That is true.
Senator Reed. Is that the appropriate response at this
moment to the threats in the region?
Dr. Carter. It is.
Senator Reed. As you point out, there are two theaters. One
is Iraq, where we have more traction, and the other is Syria.
You would think in terms of responding to the threat that our
actions or our vigorous support of the current Iraqi Government
is appropriate in responding to this ISIL threat?
Dr. Carter. It is appropriate. As I said, whether and how
to improve it will be my first job if I am confirmed as
Secretary of Defense.
Senator Reed. One of the issues, particularly with respect
to Iraq, is that not only improvement, as you suggest in your
comments, the long-term defeat of ISIL rests not just on
military operations, but on political arrangements and what we
have witnessed in Iraq particularly was a political arrangement
that conscientiously and deliberately degraded the Sunni
population, at least that is their perception, and gave rise.
Would you acknowledge that part of our strategy has to be
constituting an Iraqi Government that is perceived by its own
people as being a bit fairer and inclusive?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely. That is what the previous
Government of Iraq did not do, and that was instrumental in
their military collapse.
Senator Reed. One of the issues that complicates--and you
pointed out in terms of around being a strategic issue for the
United States in the region is their relative influence in Iraq
and throughout the region was enhanced over the last several
years by the government in Iraq, by the Maliki Government. Is
that accurate?
Dr. Carter. That is accurate, yes.
Senator Reed. We are now in a position of trying to
essentially contain the regional ambitions of the Iranians and
kinetically defeat the Sunni radical Islamists. Is that the
strategy?
Dr. Carter. Yes, that sounds right.
Senator Reed. You understand that, and that, to you, is a
coherent strategy?
Dr. Carter. It is, yes.
Senator Reed. Now that means that you are prioritizing or
the Administration is prioritizing these actions you have
talked about and building over time a capability in Syria. In
terms of using your scarce resources in addressing the most
serious threats, is that a coherent response in your mind?
Dr. Carter. I think it is the beginning of a strategic
response. I think that, as I noted, on the Syrian side of the
border, the assembling of the force that is going to keep ISIL
defeated there, we are in an early stage of trying to build
that force. We are participating in the building of that force,
but I think it is fair to say that we are in an earlier stage
there.
On the Iraqi side, we have the existing Iraqi security
forces.
Senator Reed. Let me--
Dr. Carter. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Please.
Dr. Carter. If I can just note one other thing? It may be
something I missed in your line of questioning.
There is an issue looming over this, which is the role of
Iran, in the whole region, which is why I pointed that out at
the beginning. That is a serious complication.
Senator Reed. I agree. Let me turn to the issue of Ukraine,
which the chairman raised the issue of providing weapon systems
to defend or allow the Ukrainians to defend themselves. But
weapon systems have to be clearly differentiated from a
commitment of American military personnel. Would that be a
clear line of demarcation that you would draw?
Dr. Carter. Excuse me. I was suggesting the provision of
equipment to the Ukrainian military, yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter, for your
service.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Carter. I look forward to
supporting your confirmation and look forward to working with
you.
At a point some 2 or 3 years ago, the Pentagon, along with
the Administration, made a decision to rebalance to the Asia
Pacific. I want to ask you about that.
Would you agree that our challenges with regard to an
expansionist Russian agenda, the situation in Eastern Europe,
and other areas near the former Soviet Union have become more
challenging, and that also our challenges in the Middle East
are more problematic now than when the decision was made to
pivot to the Asia Pacific?
Dr. Carter. You are absolutely right. The issues in the
Middle East and in Ukraine have developed since we first
formulated that rebalance. That is true.
Senator Wicker. Tell me this, how do you understand, as a
prospective Secretary of Defense, the rebalancing to the Asia
Pacific will actually work? Can we afford to move resources
from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia Pacific, given the
circumstances that we see today in 2015?
Dr. Carter. Thank you. Thank you for that question.
The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as the term goes,
is in my eyes a commitment to continue the pivotal American
military role in the Asia-Pacific theater, which has kept peace
and stability there for decades now.
It has been that American underwritten peace and stability
in a region where there are still many historical animosities
and unhealed wounds of the past, it is that stability
underwritten by the United States that has allowed the Japanese
miracle, then the South Korean miracle, then the Southeast
Asian miracle, and today the Chinese and Indian miracle. It is
thanks to us that that environment has been created.
In a sentence, I think the rebalance is a commitment to
keep that going. Now you ask can we do that and keep our
commitments in the Middle East and to Europe at the same time?
My view is that we can and must. Let me say why that is
possible.
I think that while ISIL and events in Ukraine are terribly
important in their own regard and require a lot of attention
and take a lot of attention. They are on the television. They
are in the headlines and so forth. The Asia Pacific is not.
We have to remember that half the population of the world
and half of its economy is in that region, and our military
presence there, the naval presence, the air presence, our
allies and partnerships finding new allies, building new
partnerships, conducting exercises, those things can be done at
the same time that we are doing what we need to do in Ukraine
and that we are doing what we need to do in Iraq and Syria. I
think the world needs to know the United States can do more
than one thing at once and we can keep our commitments there.
Senator Wicker. Is it going to be necessary to move
resources from the Middle East and from concern over Europe and
Russia to the Asia Pacific, to move resources? Sounds like you
are proposing a continuation of longstanding, ongoing policy.
Dr. Carter. It is a longstanding, ongoing policy. But to
keep the American military predominance in the Asia Pacific
requires us continually to modernize and add to what we have
there. We are adding ships. We are adding electronic warfare.
That is, we are improving our forces qualitatively. We are
investing in them.
A new bomber, which is, importantly, intended for that
theater, which I think is very important. We are buying new
capabilities that won't necessarily have a role in the Middle
East or in NATO but are principally designed for that theater,
and I think we need to keep those investments going.
Senator Wicker. You don't advocate a diminishment of the
resources we are spending with regard to the Middle East or
Russia and Europe at this point, do you?
Dr. Carter. No. I think we need to keep our investments
going. When it comes to day-to-day deployments--I don't want to
get into too much detail here, but I am sure you know this.
When it comes to day-to-day deployments and the location of
ships and so forth, we do move back and forth between the Gulf
and the Pacific, and so there is some tradeoff there on a day-
to-day basis.
But in terms of our fundamental investments in new
capabilities and remaining ahead of any other military
opponent, including in Asia, and in building and strengthening
our alliances with Japan, with South Korea, with the
Philippines, with Australia, with Thailand, and new
partnerships with other countries like India, we need to keep
all that going. It is an important part of the world.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you and your family.
I also want to thank Secretary Hagel for his service as
Secretary of Defense and to our Nation. He took the point in
Vietnam. He took the point for our Defense Department, and we
are grateful for what he has done.
I was privileged to travel with some other senators
recently to the Middle East, and we talked to a number of the
Nations there. I just want to make sure that in your mind, do
you believe when we look at ISIL our goal should be to
eliminate them on a permanent basis?
Dr. Carter. Yes, I do.
Senator Donnelly. One of my concerns is time. What I mean
by that is when you look at the map of where they were a year
ago, where they are now, they have substantially grown.
We have windows that we are working in. When we look at our
plan, I am concerned about how when you look at the depth and
the size of our plan that what it really does, they have
30,000. We are talking hundreds. It gives them time to grow
even more, and you worry about a tipping point where X crosses
Y, and they become much more difficult.
What kind of time plan are you looking at to get movement
on this?
Dr. Carter. I think it is important to strike back at ISIL
as we are doing from the air, but to begin to retake territory
as soon as we can build the forces on the ground, which will be
local forces that are capable of sustaining defeat when we have
achieved defeat in a given location.
I hope that in coming months, and again, I am not in a
position to have any special information about this or talk to
our commanders or so forth. But it is my understanding that in
coming months, the Iraqi security forces, assisted by us, will
begin to take back territory from ISIL.
I think you are right that it is important to get that
territory back soon because you don't want them to settle in,
and you don't want the population to settle in to having ISIL
to rule them in their barbaric way.
Senator Donnelly. When we talked to the king yesterday and
to others in the region, what they said is we are not asking
you to fight our battle, but we need you as a partner, shoulder
to shoulder, to help us train, to help us plan, to help us
implement. Is that what you see our ground role as?
Dr. Carter. Yes, I think exactly right. You are referring
to the assistance we provide to the Jordanians, if I understand
the question? Absolutely.
Senator Donnelly. Right. And to the other nations that are
looking at the same thing.
Dr. Carter. That is right.
Senator Donnelly. Switching themes a little bit, one of the
things we had testimony on yesterday was in regards to DOD and
the VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] with drug formularies.
We lost 479 young men and women to suicide in 2013 who were in
the military. We lost 132 in combat. We don't want to lose any
more.
Part of what General Chiarelli was telling us is that with
the drug formularies, it causes dramatic change for those who
are coming off and going into the VA. All of a sudden, they
look up, they are being forced on different drugs and stuff. As
Secretary of Defense, are there things you can do to help us
with that?
Dr. Carter. I think there definitely are and must be. I
think the relationship between the Department of Defense and
the Department of Veterans Affairs has to be a relationship
like this because it is one soldier. They cross the boundary
from one to the other when they move and become a veteran, but
it is one soldier.
I am familiar, or that is I remember from years back when I
was in the Department, of this question of the different
formularies. DOD calls a drug one thing, and VA calls it
another thing, and they have one set of dosages, and the other
a different set.
We have to get these together. It is one patient. It is one
soldier.
Senator Donnelly. They get lost in the shuffle.
Dr. Carter. Exactly.
Senator Donnelly. It is at a most critical time to them
personally, and so your absolute commitment to that, and I know
it is, is going to be critical.
I wanted to ask you one other thing, as I am starting to
get a little short on time. That is your expertise in the
nuclear area, and I was wondering if you are familiar with a
report issued by Madelyn Creedon [Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Security Affairs] and Rear Admiral Peter J.
Fanta [Joint Chiefs of Staff]? They did a Department-wide
nuclear enterprise review. It is classified, but it is very
sobering.
I just want to make sure that--I didn't know if you had
seen it yet. If you have, will you take ownership of the issue
and ensure its findings are addressed?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
I have not had access to that particular report. But with
respect to the nuclear enterprise, I have a long history in
that regard and am a strong believer in a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear arsenal for the United States. That
encompasses both the nuclear weapons themselves and the
delivery systems of the Department of Defense and the command
and control systems for it.
I can well understand if they are calling attention to the
enduring need to make that a priority. That is another thing
that is not in the newspapers every day. Thank God, nuclear
weapons being used aren't in the newspapers every day. But it
is a bedrock of our security, and we can never forget that.
Continuing quality and excellence in the nuclear enterprise
is very important. I am committed to that.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chairman.
I want to thank you, Dr. Carter, for all your service to
the Nation and your willingness to serve again.
I would like to ask you about according to the Director of
National Intelligence [DNI], we know that at least 107
terrorists who were formerly detained at Guantanamo and then
released have been confirmed of reengaging in terrorism. In
fact, an additional 77 are also suspected of that. In fact, we
know that public reports tell us that at least two Guantanamo
detainees have also joined ISIL.
What I would like to ask you, number one, there were
reports that Secretary Hagel said that he was under pressure to
increase the pace of transfers of Guantanamo detainees by the
Administration. As you know, the statute says that you, as the
incoming Secretary of Defense, will have to make the
determination, and there is a whole set of factors. In
particular, you have to determine that actions that have been
or are planned to be taken will substantially mitigate the risk
of such an individual engaging or reengaging in any terrorist
or other hostile activity that threatens the United States or
United States persons or our interests or I would assume our
allies as well.
I would ask you, Secretary Carter--soon to be Secretary
Carter, thank you. But I would ask you to tell us and to make a
commitment to this committee that you will not succumb to any
pressure by this administration to increase the pace of
transfers from Guantanamo. Will you commit to that?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. I would also ask you to commit to this
committee that you will take with the utmost seriousness
because we had General Mattis before the committee the other
day, and he expressed deep concern over the notion that one of
our men and women in uniform could confront a terrorist that we
had previously captured and the implications to them, that you
will commit to this committee and to all of us that you will
not allow the release of someone that you think could reengage
in terrorism so that our men and women in uniform will be
confronted with them again.
Dr. Carter. I do, Senator. I understand my responsibilities
under that statute, and as in everything else I do, I will play
it absolutely straight.
Senator Ayotte. We appreciate that. That is very important
because we have seen an accelerated release of detainees. As
you know, there have been public reports about one of the
Taliban Five reengaging in terrorist activity. This is
something that I think is of utmost importance.
The last thing that one of our men and women in uniform
should confront is a terrorist that we had previously captured,
and I know you agree with me on that.
Dr. Carter. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up on the aid to
Ukraine, and I really appreciate the comments that you made
that you are inclined to support lethal aid to Ukraine. When we
met in my office, you had told me that you were actually there
and involved in the signing of the Budapest memorandum in 1994.
Is that right?
Dr. Carter. That is right.
Senator Ayotte. As you look at what is happening in Ukraine
and having been there for the signing of that memorandum, what
are the implications given that the Ukrainians gave up their
nuclear weapons in return for the assurances not only from the
United States of America, but Russia, who has clearly violated
blatantly the Budapest memorandum, if we don't support Ukraine,
given that we do not want more nuclear proliferation around the
world? I would assume that it would send the wrong message if
you give up your nuclear weapons and we don't provide you at
least defensive weapons, why would any country give up their
nuclear weapons again?
Could you tell me what you think about the violation of
that memorandum and the significance of it?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
It is a clear violation. I was there. I remember when that
agreement was signed in Budapest in 1994. As I think Senator
Lieberman said, I ran the Nunn-Lugar program during that
period, and I was in Ukraine the day the last nuclear weapon
rode across the border from Ukraine into Russia.
That agreement provided for Russia to respect the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, which it has obviously not
done, and that was part of the climate and context in which the
Ukrainians agreed to give up nuclear weapons in the first
place. By the way, the United States took on a commitment in
the very same agreement to respect, but also assure, as the
phrase goes, the ability of Ukraine to find its own way as an
independent country.
That is at stake today, and that is why I think I think
that we need to provide support to the Ukrainian government as
they try to maintain a position--find their own way in Europe.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. My time is up, but I also think
it is very important that we also buttress our NATO support for
the Baltics as well in all of this.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Dr. Carter.
As we met prior to this testimony, we covered a few issues,
and I am going to submit questions for the record since we
won't be able to cover all of them. They include military
sexual assault, issues concerning combat integration, military
compensation, cyber, Iran, and Syria. I will send those so you
can answer them in due course.
Specifically, let us focus a little bit on the military
sexual assault issue, which you know I am very passionate about
trying to solve this scourge. One of the concerns I have is
that last year we had 20,000 cases of sexual assault and
unwanted sexual contact within the military, and I would like
your view as to whether you believe that level of sexual
assault today is still the good order and discipline we would
want from our Services?
Dr. Carter. No, Senator. It is not. You used the word
``passion''. I have the same passion you do. This problem of
sexual assault is something that persists in our military. It
is widespread in our society, but it is particularly offensive
in the military community because the military ethos is one of
honor and trust. You have to trust the person who is, so to
speak, in the foxhole next to you. These are violations of
honor and trust.
Also in military life, we put people in positions, we put
them in situations of austere deployment, of a situation where
the hierarchy of military life is a necessity in battle, and
these also provide opportunities, this context, military
context for predators. It is more offensive in military life
even than in civilian life, and we have to root it out.
I know that many members of this committee, but you
especially, Senator, have led in that regard, and I am grateful
for the thoughts and, frankly, for keeping the heat on. If I am
confirmed, I will feel that heat, and I will understand it and
be with it.
Senator Gillibrand. The one statistic I was particularly
concerned about, the most recent report is that of all those
who were willing to report the assault openly were retaliated
against. Sixty-two percent of those who reported these crimes
were retaliated against, experienced some form of retaliation.
I am highly concerned that the military is still failing in
living up to their zero tolerance policy. Do you agree?
Dr. Carter. I do agree that retaliation is a dimension of
the problem that, to me at least, is becoming increasingly
apparent. This is a problem, if I may say, and you know this
because you have worked so hard on it, but that the more we dig
into it, the more dimensions of it we come to understand.
I think the idea that victims are retaliated against not
only by the hierarchy above them, but by their peers is
something that is unacceptable that we have to combat also. The
survey that you referred to indicated that that is widespread,
and we need to get at that.
Senator Gillibrand. I understand from your testimony that
you place a premium on the chain of command, and I fully
understand that for combat situations the chain of command is
not only essential, but necessary in every respect. I would
like you to, though, consider all options for how you can
reform the military justice system, to actually professionalize
it, make it more effective.
When our allies have reformed their military justice system
to guarantee more civil liberties and to professionalize it and
to take out biases, they have not seen diminution in the
ability to train troops, to instill good order and discipline
within the troops, and to do their jobs.
I would ask you that you would keep an open mind to look at
all possible solutions for improving our criminal justice
system within the military.
Dr. Carter. I will.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Another concern that I have is in terms of the issue of how
we can create opportunities for women in combat. One of the
issues that I have looked at is how are each of the Services
being able to open those positions, opening all positions to
women in combat. Because, as you know, in order to become
promoted within the military, oftentimes combat missions are
required and having certain roles that require combat is
required for promotion.
Are you committed to allowing women to serve in all
positions and to gender neutral standards for each of the
Services?
Dr. Carter. I am certainly committed to gender neutral
standards. What I do know is this, that the Services are
examining whether there are any positions in the military that
should not be open to women.
I strongly incline toward opening them all to women, but I
am also respectful of the circumstances and of professional
military judgment in this regard. I have not been involved in
those studies. If I am confirmed, I would want to confer with
our own leaders in the Department of Defense, with you and
others who have thought carefully about that problem, and try
to come to a view.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Dr. Carter, for being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Also, Senator Lieberman, thank you for joining us today.
As we sat down in my office the other day, one thing that,
hopefully, was very clear to you was my passion for the
National Guard and the Army Reserves and all Reserve members,
actually. We have spent a considerable amount of time talking
in this forum about sequestration and the effects on our
Services, not just our Active Duty Forces, but also those that
serve as wonderful ``weekend warriors''.
I would love for you to please address the panel and just
talk to us and explain to us those impacts that you have seen
regarding sequestration and how it has impacted those Reserve
and National Guard forces, please.
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator. By the way, thank you for
your own service. I appreciate it.
I begin by saying we owe a great debt of gratitude to the
Guard and Reserve for what they have done over the last 12-13
years. I know this from the time I was in the Department of
Defense previously and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were at
their peak. We couldn't have sustained the tempo of combat in
those two locations without the contributions of the Reserve
component of our military.
If there was ever a time when their value was made clear,
it has been in the last 10 to 12 years. They are impacted, as
every other part of the Defense Department is, by sequester.
That is the terrible thing about sequester. It hits everybody,
and it hits them hard, and it hits them soon, which means that
we don't have time to adjust.
I think the Guard and Reserve component have borne the
impact of sequester as all the rest of the departments have,
sad to say.
Senator Ernst. Thank you for that. I appreciate that.
If confirmed, we do have a number of rising threats that we
see all around the world and specifically in the Middle East
right now. Considering those threats, with many new possible
deployments coming up, then, if confirmed, how do we ensure
that our Guard and Reserve units then maintain their ability to
reinforce our Active Duty component as effectively as they have
in the past dozen years? How do we ensure that they are being
supported?
Dr. Carter. Thank you for that, and that is the key issue,
as you well know.
I think that the Reserve component forces need to be as
prepared to go into action, if they are called to go into
action, as any Active Duty element. You never want to send
anybody into harm's way on behalf of the United States who
hasn't had the training and isn't fully prepared and isn't
adequately equipped to do the job.
I think it is important that the Guard and Reserve are at a
state of readiness that is commensurate with the need we have
for them. One other thing I will add is that they also, not
incidentally at all, very importantly, play a role in
responding to disasters in our own country. That is another
important and, by the way, also amply demonstrated in recent
years attribute of having them.
Both for defensive or to civil authorities and for
deployment in a national security emergency, they need to be
fully ready when we need them.
Senator Ernst. Thank you much, Dr. Carter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, thank you so much for, first of all, all the
service you have given. Having such an esteemed senator
introducing you, that shows your intelligence there. Next of
all, willing to serve at this most difficult time. I appreciate
all of that because I know how difficult it is.
We had an unusual day yesterday, and we got to speak to
King Abdullah. Without revealing too much about it, I am sure
that you have been briefed on that. But the bottom line was
this. We are all concerned, I think, and our chairman has taken
the lead on this, how we are going to accelerate what we do and
what we think in this committee of quick we can get necessary
military equipment to the people willing to fight, and the
Jordanians are willing to fight.
About the red tape, I just couldn't believe what I heard
yesterday, all the red tape that they have to go through to get
something on the front lines to help them defend themselves. I
didn't hear so much they need our combat troops. They need our
expertise and our people in the right places to make sure we
are efficient.
They just need the weapons to do the job. Do you have
thoughts on that or how you can help us on that and break
through this gridlock?
Dr. Carter. I do. I don't know what you heard, but I could
well believe what you heard because I have a long experience of
frustration with getting equipment to the warfighter--our
warfighters, never mind partner warfighters--on time. This is
an element that is important when we talk about acquisition
reform. The cost control is very important, but also getting
things done.
When I was working on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it
was, even for Americans, assistance to our own forces way too
much red tape stood in the way. You had to constantly try to
cut through that.
I guess in the context of the Jordanian circumstance, which
I am not familiar with. I am sure you know more about it on the
committee than I would as a nominee, but I do read the
newspapers, and I understand the need. I can well believe that
it is slower than King Abdullah finds acceptable and that you
and I would find acceptable.
I guess all I can say is if I am confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, this is one I am pretty familiar with, and I would
work to get those things out there the way we did MRAPs.
Senator Manchin. It seems like the greatest challenge is
coming out of the State Department, and we are going to help
them work on that, I think. The chairman is committed to that,
and the ranking member and all of us are on the same page. This
is not a partisan thing. This is basically an American thing we
want to get done.
If I can go to that, basically, in the auditing, I am very
concerned about the cost of our military and if it is being
spent efficiently. There is not a person in West Virginia, not
a person in the country that won't sacrifice for a person in
uniform. Not one.
They will give up something. They will pay more taxes. They
will do whatever you ask them. But we have to make sure we are
spending it wisely, and I think that our chairman has been very
diligent on this for many, many years. I am concerned.
I am also concerned, we don't touch on this, is the size of
the staff. If you look at the size of the staff and how they
double and quadruple, and every time we get a new change, the
staff, and we don't talk about that. We just talk about our
readiness and having people be able to perform. But no one is
checking the staff sizes, and I am told from people on top,
they don't need these sizes. But no one can get rid of them.
Put them back where they are needed. Also using our Guard
and Reserves, but the staff size, that is something you will
have oversight on?
Dr. Carter. It absolutely will. I agree with you. We need
acquisition reform, but we need to reform lots of other things,
too. Overhead, headquarters staffs, lots of parts of the
Department, for just the reason you say.
Senator Manchin. Let me tell you why the audit is so
important and why I am so committed to having an audit of the
Defense Department. I think we can help you help yourself of
the institution.
The reason I say that is there is a lot of things that you
are doing that sometimes you don't ask for, you don't want.
There is equipment being sent your way. There are things being
produced in different parts of the country just because of who
we are, and we want to make sure that our people are getting
the jobs.
I agree to that, but I can tell you if there is something
we are building in West Virginia you don't need, I will be the
first to go and tell them we are going to find something else
to do. Because we are not going to force you to buy something
you don't need or don't want. I think we all have to bite the
bullet there, but we have to look at this, and we won't know
unless we have an audit.
I would hope that you are committed to helping us get that
audit and a complete transparency of what is going on. Also the
contractors, I have been here 4 years, and I cannot get an
accurate count of how many contractors that we have and what
branches.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
I am committed on the audit front. I understand what you
are saying about contractors and agree with that as well, and I
appreciate what you say about us working together to make sure
that we buy what we need and that we buy it well.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. We will have Senator Sullivan, and then we
will take a break after that. How long do you need?
Dr. Carter. Ten, 15 minutes.
Chairman McCain. Fifteen minutes, and then after that, the
next questioners would be Senator Heinrich and then Senator
Fischer, and then Senator Shaheen would be in line for the next
questioners after a 15-minute break. The committee will stand
in recess for 15 minutes after Senator Sullivan is finished
with his questions.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, I want to thank you for your service and
particularly, and you point out, your family, your wife and
kids. I know how much they go through in these hearings.
Sometimes it is tougher on them than it is on the nominee. I
want to thank them as well.
I wanted to start with just a little history and geography.
In 1935, General Billy Mitchell, often referred to as the
father of the Air Force, was testifying in front of Congress.
He said that, ``I believe that in the future, whoever holds
blank--this place--will hold the world. It is the most
important strategic place in the world. It is the most central
place in the world for aircraft, and that is true either of
Europe, Asia, or North America.''
Do you know what place General Mitchell was referring to in
his testimony in 1935?
Dr. Carter. I think, Senator, it was Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. Correct. It was Alaska.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Do you agree with General Mitchell?
Dr. Carter. I do. I would point out that one proof of what
he said, I suppose, is that your State is home to one of our
principal missile defense batteries, and the reason for that is
that it is kind of on the way to and from a lot of bad places.
Senator Sullivan. I look forward to hosting you in Alaska
soon to show you why General Mitchell was correct. But I want
to get actually to, if confirmed--
Chairman McCain. Excuse me. Senator Reed says maybe that is
why he was court-martialed.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. I think he may have had a drinking
problem, but I am not sure. His strategic assessment was still
very correct.
A tough part of your job is as a member of the President's
Cabinet. It is also a critically important part of the job, if
confirmed, is leveling with this committee. You are showing
your kind of straightforward approach, which I think is great,
but also with the American people. I think we all recognize
there are challenges, but in some ways when the President is
talking to the American people, his views seem to differ.
Let me give you a few examples. In his State of the Union,
he painted a what I would consider a benign, almost delusional
view of the world environment, with quotes like ``The shadow of
crisis is past.'' ``We are stopping ISIL's advance.'' ``We are
opposing Russian aggression.'' ``We have halted the progress of
Iran's nuclear program.'' These are all quotes from the
President to the American people.
Do you agree with his assessment in these areas?
Dr. Carter. I think that if I am confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, I am going to be confronting some of the most
challenging problems that we have had in our national security
in a very long time. My intention and my obligation will be to
help our President and help our country confront those problems
and provide the advice to the President that will help him deal
with, though we have many efforts and many successes because we
are in the indispensible Nation in this world, we have many
challenges.
I think my role for him, if confirmed, is to help him work
through these challenges.
Senator Sullivan. But again, just in terms of
straightforward approach, you have been watching the
international environment. Do you agree with what the President
was saying and telling the American people?
I think it is critical that he level, that you level, the
Administration levels with the American people on our
challenges. I will give you another example. He is talking
about ending combat operations in Afghanistan, and yet we are
going to maintain a robust CT [countererrorism] presence, which
I think is important.
But a robust CT presence is not ending combat operations.
Do you agree with what the President was saying in his State of
the Union on some of these specific quotes that I mentioned?
Dr. Carter. I certainly agree with the President's overall
thrust and----
Senator Sullivan. That we have a benign world environment
right now?
Dr. Carter. I would say the world continues to pose serious
challenges to international order and that the United States is
indispensible to the solution of those challenges is what I
would say.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. In the
hearings the last 3 weeks that the chairman has had, which have
been, I think, a great education for all of us, again, for the
American people. I think there was consensus that we certainly
need to work on all instruments of American power to integrate
those as part of a national strategy to address what I think
are significant challenges that the President has not laid out.
One of these instruments that we didn't have 10 years ago,
but there was common agreement on is energy and being once
again the world's energy superpower in terms of producing oil
and gas and renewables. Last week, the President took over 20
million acres of some of the most prospective lands in America
for oil and gas development off the table.
Do you agree that having energy and using that to help our
national security is important? Would you agree that taking
such huge areas of land off the table, billions, potentially
billions of barrels of oil, trillions of cubic feet of natural
gas, do you think that helps or undermines America's national
security?
Dr. Carter. I certainly think energy security is an
important part of national security, and I am incredibly
encouraged by the progress that the United States has made in
developing new resources, both oil and gas in recent years. I
think it is showing up in terms of our economy, and also it is
showing up geopolitically.
With respect to the particular issue you raise, Senator, I
am simply not knowledgeable about it and can't give you a
knowledgeable answer.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. I think those kind of actions
undermine our national security significantly.
Dr. Carter. I understand.
Chairman McCain. The committee will stand in recess for 15
minutes and then reconvene. The next questioners will be
Senator Heinrich, Senator Fischer, and Senator Shaheen.
[Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene at 11:19 a.m., the same day.]
Chairman McCain. The committee will reconvene, and we will
recognize Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome back, Dr. Carter. It has certainly been a pleasure
to work with you, and I just want to say it is really
refreshing to work with someone in this potential position who
has both your technical background and your ability to work
with people across the Services and with Congress. You seem to
balance those things remarkably well, speaking as an engineer
who struggles with that myself sometimes.
If I remember right, I believe you served as staff director
for the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the U.S. that released its report back in 2009, when I was
sitting on the House Armed Services Committee. I think that
report made some very important strategic recommendations.
In particular, I thought the idea that Los Alamos,
Livermore, Sandia, should be designated as national security
rather than nuclear weapons laboratories was a very important
recognition of how the threat environment that we face in the
world today has changed.
In addition, one of the things the commission recommended
was that the President issue an executive order formally
assigning the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, State,
Homeland Security, and the DNI joint responsibility for the
health of these laboratories, and you and I discussed this a
little bit when we met in my office recently.
I wanted to ask you, based on a recommendation from the
Strategic Posture Commission, what sort of joint responsibility
do you believe that the Department of Defense should have for
our National labs?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
I recall our conversation, and you are right. I was
executive director of the so-called Perry Schlesinger
Commission, which did make the recommendation you pointed to.
The National Laboratories, the so-called National
Laboratories of the Department of Energy actually are national
laboratories. I know this because when I worked in the
Department of Defense as acquisition executive, we used them a
lot. We asked them to do things because of their technical
excellence.
Those laboratories that were founded to serve the nuclear
arsenal of the United States and continue to do so now do lots
of other things for national security--for the Department of
Defense, for the Intelligence Community, for the law
enforcement community, the Homeland security community. I think
they call it ``work for others''.
Senator Heinrich. Exactly.
Dr. Carter. Which means other than the Department of
Energy. But it is important, and it was certainly valuable to
the Department of Defense when I was there to be able to get
that kind of technical excellence.
Senator Heinrich. I think one of the challenges has been
that originally work for others didn't really exist at the
National Labs. They were solely nuclear enterprises. As that
has become a larger and larger percentage of what they do, it
has been more challenging to sort of feed the underlying
foundational aspects of the lab, the overhead and other things.
What I would hope is that if you are confirmed, and I
certainly hope that you are, that I can count being able to
work with you to figure out if there is not a way we can
formalize that responsibility for the health of DOD and the
other agencies I mentioned, as well as for the long-term health
of those national security laboratories?
Dr. Carter. I understand. If I am confirmed, I look forward
to working with you on exactly that. I understand.
Senator Heinrich. I want to move back to Ukraine for a
minute, and we heard earlier about the issue of providing
additional defensive military equipment to the Ukrainians. We
have also heard a lot of testimony in recent weeks emphasizing
the importance of deterring additional Russian aggression in
the Baltics--in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--particularly by
continuing to position more NATO troops and equipment in those
places.
I just wanted to get your sense for are we doing enough in
that region to deter additional Russian aggression in the
Baltics?
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
I think it is very important that we do deter Russian
aggression in the Baltics. The Baltic states are part of NATO,
after all. It is a pretty big deal.
But to answer your specific question, are we doing enough?
I am familiar with what we are doing. I have not been in a
position to discuss it with our commanders there or any of the
European leaders and so forth. That is something that I would,
if I were confirmed, be a very early priority to see whether we
are, in fact, doing enough.
I know we are doing things. We are rotating forces in there
to serve as a warning and a tripwire that NATO really is there,
and I certainly support doing that. But everything we are doing
I am probably not aware of, and what more we can do I have not
investigated, but I promise if I am confirmed, I would. It is
very important.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, thank you for being here today. Thank you for
your service to our country.
Yesterday, we saw the Islamic State burn alive the pilot of
one of our key allies. In recent months, they have buried women
and children alive. They have crucified Christians. They have
beheaded Americans and citizens of our allies.
The leaders of the Islamic State, the ones who direct and
in some cases commit these atrocities, have critical knowledge
that we need to stop them. They know where hostages are being
held. They have information that would allow us to go after the
Islamic State's financial support. They know where other senior
leaders are. In short, they have a lot of intelligence value.
If American forces were to capture one of these leaders,
say, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or one of his senior lieutenants,
would you recommend that the President send him to Guantanamo
Bay so he could be fully interrogated for intelligence value?
Dr. Carter. I would certainly recommend that he be
interrogated for his full intelligence value. It would be a
legal determination about where he ended up and so forth. But I
think it is important that we get that intelligence value if we
do capture people like al-Baghdadi.
Senator Cotton. Would you recommend that he stay in
American custody or that he be transferred to the custody of an
ally?
Dr. Carter. As I sit here right now, I don't know enough to
answer that question. That would be a legal determination about
his ultimate disposition. I think the key from a Secretary of
Defense's point of view, prospective Secretary of Defense's
point of view would be let us get that intelligence.
Senator Cotton. Would you want to see him transferred into
the United States mainland, given his Miranda rights or
otherwise put in an Article III Federal court?
Dr. Carter. Again, I don't know enough to know what the
ultimate disposition would be appropriate. I do know that it
would be important to interrogate that individual. Whatever the
ultimate disposition or legal process was, it should make
provision for interrogation.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I want to move to the recommendations of the National
Defense Panel [NDP] for the overall military budget. The
National Defense Panel, as you know, is a bipartisan and
congressionally mandated panel that reviewed the 2014 QDR
[Quadrennial Defense Review].
That panel stated, ``Congress and the President should
repeal the Budget Control Act immediately and return as soon as
possible to at least the funding baseline proposed in Bob
Gates' FY [fiscal year] 2012 defense budget.'' The panel went
on to note that while even that amount would likely be
inadequate, it represents ``the minimum required to reverse
course and set the military on a more stable footing''.
Do you concur with the National Defense Panel's
recommendation that Bob Gates' fiscal year 2012 recommendation
for the coming fiscal year is the minimum funding baseline
needed for the Department of Defense?
Dr. Carter. The 2012 baseline, just to make sure I
understand correctly, would have removed $500 billion from the
defense plan at that time. A sequester would have removed twice
that.
I don't know what the National Defense Panel said, but I
would say that if what they were saying was that the sequester
level was unacceptable and that the level that Secretary Gates
recommended was the one that they supported, I actually
supported that, too, and continue to think that sequester is a
bad idea.
I am familiar with the results of the National Defense
Panel and its membership, which is very distinguished.
Senator Cotton. To be exact, Secretary Gates' fiscal year
2012 budget said in fiscal year 2016, the budget should be $610
billion. At sequester levels, it would be just under $500
billion. I believe the President recommended approximately $535
billion. This would be another $70 billion plus that the
defense panel recommends for the coming year.
Dr. Carter. I see what you are saying. Yes. That is
absolutely right, and I think the Defense Department budget has
been under pressure now for the last 3 or 4 years in a way that
I experienced the effects of firsthand, and they are damaging.
That is one of the reasons why I want to get back on track to
getting enough money for defense by getting rid of sequester.
Senator Cotton. While $535 billion or some congressional
number in that neighborhood might be better than $500 billion,
you think $610 billion, as recommended by that panel, is the
minimum necessary to put our military back on the right course?
Dr. Carter. I wouldn't say it is the minimum necessary to
get us back on the right course. We are obviously not going to
get that amount of funding. But I can tell you that the
Department of Defense can make good use of the funding the
President has requested.
I will say one other thing. If I am Secretary of Defense, I
would like to see more spending on defense. I am very open
about that. I want to get rid of sequester, and I would like to
see us spend more on defense.
I think that--and this may have been what the NDP was
getting at, we are having to accept risk in the execution of
our strategy as a result of our funding problems which I would
rather see us not accept.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your past service to this
country and for your willingness to continue to serve.
I want to talk a little bit about the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. I remember being at the Kennedy School when
you gave a very compelling presentation that showed retiring or
dismantling some of the weapons through the Nunn-Lugar program.
I continue to believe that this is one of the most serious
dangers we face, both in the United States and in the world,
particularly with terrorists like the Islamic State who seem to
be willing to do anything to achieve their ends.
I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how to
balance the need to address nuclear weapons and material that
is still out there with the effort of DOD to modernize our
weapon systems and where you see the priorities are and what we
need to do to address that?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
I think we need to do both and can do more in the way of
securing fissile materials and the other wherewithal of nuclear
weapons and also biological weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction around the world. I also believe that the United
States needs a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.
Because as much as we would like to see nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction rid from the earth, that
doesn't look like it is something that is going to happen soon.
It is important that the American deterrent that we provide to
our own country but also to friends and allies who rely upon
them is safe, secure, and reliable. I think we need to do both
and can do both.
Senator Shaheen. You wrote an article last year for Foreign
Affairs, entitled ``Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the
Troops What They Need,'' and you talked about two lessons from
Iraq and Afghanistan. First, that the Pentagon was not prepared
to fight a nontraditional enemy and, second, that the length of
those wars was underestimated, and there was little incentive
to pursue acquisitions tailored to the specific fights.
Can you talk about how, as Secretary of Defense, you would
avoid repeating those mistakes of the past two wars?
Dr. Carter. Yes, thank you, and this is something that I
have a lot of passion about, which is why I wrote that. The
experience that I had all too often in trying to support Iraq
and Afghanistan as the acquisition executive was that when the
troops said they needed something, the response of the
bureaucracy tended to be, ``Oh, we have one of those. We are
making one of those. We have one in progress. It will be
finished in 10 years.''
Incredibly, that is, in essence, the response that would
come back from the bureaucracy. We all recognize immediately
that that is nonsensical because they needed that equipment,
counter-IED [improvised explosive device] equipment, vehicles.
They needed it now, not 10 and 15 years from now.
Our acquisition system got in the habit, and I think the
chairman was referring to this earlier because it is a driver
of cost, but also this problem, got in the habit during the
Cold War of doing things very slowly. With the Soviet Union, we
always had plenty of time. There was the Soviet Union. It was
the Cold War. It would go on for a long time.
We would have programs that extended over 10 and 15 years.
You can't do that when you are in the middle of a war, and
people are dying and success depends upon your acting more
quickly. I obviously feel passionately about that. I think
anybody who observed that bureaucratic tendency would have the
same attitude I did, and we have to turn faster as a military.
It is one thing when you are in war, when you are in
competition with other countries that are using the global
technology base to advance their own military. If we are going
to continue to be the best military in the world, we can't make
steps in 15-year increments. We have to turn faster than that.
I think that is the larger meaning, and the meaning going
forward, the lesson, to use your word, of that experience.
Senator Shaheen. My time is almost over. But you and others
here today have talked about the importance of procurement
reform. I assume that that will be a top priority when you go
back to the Department, as it has been in the past?
Dr. Carter. It would. If I am confirmed, absolutely.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, I apologize for not having been here, and I
don't want to ask something that has been asked over and over
again. We have a conflicting meeting that is taking place right
now.
Everyone who has appeared before this committee has talked
about the mismatch that is out there, unprecedented mismatch,
and I am talking about all the Service Chiefs. I am talking
about the old-timers. You know, as you know, we had George
Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and Madeleine Albright. All of them
searched their memories and could not find a time in our
history when we had the level of threats that we are faced with
today and the limited resources we have.
That is the mismatch that they are talking about with the
things all over the world I mean that are taking place right
now. Do you agree with that?
Let me restate that. In the years that you have had such a
variety of experience, do you ever remember a time like this?
Dr. Carter. I think we are in a time where the number and
severity of the risks is not something I have seen before in my
life.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Even the President, after what
happened yesterday, I am sure, is not talking about junior
varsity anymore. We know that we have a really serious problem
with ISIL. We have been talking about the fact that they are
building a militia, and we now have seen the brutality and what
they are capable of.
I would like to have a stronger response from the President
when the disaster took place yesterday. I fail to see a
strategy in terms of dealing with ISIL, with that force that is
over there. Do you see a strategy, and where will you be on
this?
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
I can describe what I believe to be the strategy, and just
to revert to what you said at the beginning, when I started my
career in defense, it was a simpler world. There was one big
problem, which was the Cold War and nuclear disaster.
Senator Inhofe. Those were the good old days.
Dr. Carter. To get to your point, I assume that this is
what your other witnesses were saying, it is a much more
complicated world, much more many faceted and many more
problems and issues for the United States to take on. At the
same time, I believe we are up to it and that we are capable of
surmounting all these problems.
With respect to the strategy for ISIL, I would describe it
in the following way. Strategy is about connecting ends and
means, and the end here is the defeat of ISIL and the sustained
or lasting defeat of ISIL. To achieve that lasting defeat of
ISIL, we are trying to rebuild the morale and power of the
Iraqi military and the confidence of its government in a multi-
sectarian approach so that we don't revisit the Maliki
experience, which led to the disintegration of the Iraqi
security forces.
On that side of the border, the lasting defeat will be made
lasting by an Iraqi security forces and associated forces in
Iraq that are rebuilt.
One enemy, two locations. To get to the other location,
Syria, I believe the approach there similarly needs to be to
inflict a lasting defeat. In order to do that, we need a
partner, and we are trying to build that partner in terms of a
moderate Syrian force and local forces from the region that
can, with our air power and other kinds of assistance, inflict
defeat on ISIL and then make it a lasting defeat.
That is how I would characterize what I see. I am obviously
not in the counsels of Government, but that is what I infer.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and I appreciate that very much. Dr.
Carter, when you were in my office, we talked about having just
returned from Ukraine and also Lithuania. When I first walked
in, Senator Heinrich was talking about Lithuania, Estonia, and
that area. Their concern was that all of our attention seemed
to be in that part of the world, concentrated on Ukraine.
It is true. I happened to be there when they had their
election. For the first time in 96 years, they don't have a
Communist in their parliament in Ukraine. We have that problem
at the same time as the others you are addressing, and what do
you think about our European strength as it is right now?
Are we adequate? Are we becoming inadequate?
Dr. Carter. I think that our strength in Europe is our
alliance with NATO and the political solidarity that that
represents, which is very important when it comes to the Baltic
states, and also the response in Ukraine, which, while not a
NATO nation, is certainly a European nation, and European unity
is an important part of that. So one of our strengths is that.
Another strength, of course, is our military strength.
There I understand that we are adding forces, rotational forces
to the Baltic states as a presence there, as a deterrent to any
Russian kind of adventurism on the part of Russia in those
states. I certainly support that, and if I am confirmed, I
would want to look into what more we can do to do that.
I would also say I wish the European states--and many
Secretary of Defenses have said this over the years--were
investing more in their own defense.
Senator Inhofe. Lastly, I am out of time, but for the
record, if you would submit this for the record to me. In the
event we are able to get the perpetrator of the horrible crime
that took place, would you examine the expeditionary legal
complex that we have as a place to do our interrogation?
I heard your response to the first question, but will you
at least consider that?
Dr. Carter. Sure. I will learn more and respond.
[The information referred to follows:]
The appropriate disposition for a detainee is determined on the
basis of all the facts and circumstances, including the national
security interests of the United States and its allies and partners,
and the conduct the detainee has engaged in, consistent with U.S.
domestic law and international law. Depending on the circumstances,
detainees may be prosecuted in the United States, detained in their
home countries, or detained in a third country. The Department makes
assessments regarding the appropriate disposition of detainees on a
case-by-case basis.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Carter.
And thank Senator Lieberman for your continuing presence at
this hearing.
Dr. Carter, I appreciate your acknowledging at this hearing
the importance of and the seriousness of sexual assault in the
military, and in response to questions that have been submitted
to you, you have said that you would take a personal role in
addressing the prevention and dealing with this scourge in a
much better way. I will have a continuing interest in seeing
how you do in that regard.
I also agree with you that the security of our country is
very much dependent, I would say, on maintaining the stability
in the Asia-Pacific area. Of course, we need to continue our
commitment to the rebalance and at the same time be able to
deal with the instability in other parts of the world.
Now President Obama recently visited India and announced a
series of bilateral agreements with Prime Minister Modi. Can
you talk briefly about the future of the United States-India
relationship in the context of our rebalance commitment?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
The rebalance is a rebalance not only within Asia--I mean
to Asia, to the Asia-Pacific area, but within it. Our historic
focus has been East Asia, and I think that your question points
to the importance to pay greater attention to South Asia as
well.
India is, in my view, destined to be a strategic partner of
the United States. It is a large democracy, shares a lot of our
political values and values of pluralism. I think that destiny
will bring us together, but I am for hastening that.
In the military-to-military area and the defense
cooperation and technology cooperation areas, I think there is
a great deal that we can do with India. If I am confirmed, I
would take a strong interest in doing that.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Do you view U.S. energy security as a vital component to
our overall national security and clearly on the military side?
What role, if any, do you believe that the Department of
Defense has in supporting efforts to increase U.S. energy
security?
Dr. Carter. I think energy security is an important part of
national security, and the Defense Department does play a role,
not a central role, but a role in energy security. I think
every dollar we spend of the defense budget we need to be able
to justify on defense grounds, and we make some investments in
energy technology because they pay off for the defense budget
and for the soldier.
We make investments in batteries, for example, solar cells,
insulation, buildings, making them more energy efficient so we
can save money. In some ways, the Department of Defense, like
other large institutions in the country, is investing in energy
efficiency in the future. I think that is an important thing to
do.
Senator Hirono. DOD is the largest user of energy in the
Federal Government.
Regarding acquisitions, with your experience in the defense
acquisition process, including the time in which you led the
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Directorate at the
Pentagon, as you review our DOD acquisition program with its
various cost overruns, delays, et cetera, which others have
noted, including the chairman, what would be your first
priority to improve the acquisition process?
For example, would you look at the kind of contracts that
we enter into? Training, requirements, process--what would be
your first priority to improve in that area?
Dr. Carter. All of those are important. To take the point
you made about contract structure, contracts are a way of
providing incentives to industry, to control costs and meet
schedule. That is an important part of negotiating a strategy.
To get to your other suggestion, in order to negotiate
those contracts well, we need people on the Government side who
are capable, who understand acquisition and who understand
industry. I am in favor of reintroducing to the acquisition
system the role of the customer, which is the chiefs of the
military services. I think that has been a proposal made by
others with which I associate myself.
There is no one silver bullet. There are many things that
we need to do to improve acquisition.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your service and your
willingness to continue that service to our country.
I appreciated our frank conversation that we had in my
office the other day and look forward to many more in the
future. In that conversation and today also, you talk about the
deterrence, our nuclear deterrence in this country as being the
bedrock of our defense. I appreciate your views on that, and I
agree with your views.
We also talked about modernization and the importance of
modernization and how as a country we need to step forward and
really see that through if we are going to continue to enjoy
the security that we have as a country. Thank you for your
comments on that.
In 2013, you led the Strategic Choices and Management
Review, and in that review, one of the decisions was to reduce
major headquarters' budgets by 20 percent by 2019. That plan
was required in our NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
in fiscal year 2014. But the GAO [Government Accountability
Office] has issued several reports that really cast doubt on if
that is going to take place and even if we have an accurate
picture on what the full resources currently are that are
devoted to that headquarters staff.
A couple questions here. Will you, if confirmed, maintain
the goal of that 20 percent reduction in headquarters budget
and staff? How are you going to accomplish it if we don't have
any idea of what those numbers are?
Dr. Carter. I certainly think it is important to diminish
headquarters staff and other forms of overhead. I think the 20
percent goal was a sound one.
I do not know where it stands in terms of implementation
now. If I am confirmed, I will get back to that and try to meet
that goal because we just have to get rid of the overhead here
so that we can spend the dollars we have on the warfighter,
which is what it is all about.
Senator Fischer. Have you seen the GAO report questioning
if those numbers are even out there, if they are even
available? If you believe that, how are you going to get the
numbers?
Dr. Carter. I have not seen that GAO report, but I, if I am
confirmed, will find out where the Department stands in terms
of implementing that goal and, if they are off track, try to
get them back on track because I think it is a good goal.
Senator Fischer. Do you think now is the time that we
should look at elevating cyber to its own command, or even with
the commission that we had yesterday, there is a recommendation
in that commission for a joint readiness command. When we look
at overhead and administrative costs, what would be your
initial response to those that are promoting ideas for
additional commands?
Dr. Carter. I am all for paying much more attention to
cyber and think we need to do that. But the creation of new
commands and new headquarters in this budgetary environment is
something I think we need to look at very closely and very
cautiously.
Senator Fischer. As you know, our chairman, Senator McCain,
is interested, as we all are, in gaining more knowledge about
the information sharing with regards to our cybersecurity
threats. That is one area that I believe has broad support. We
know there is support not just from members of this committee
and members of Congress, but also the President has discussed
the need for information sharing on those cybersecurity
threats.
I agree that information sharing and better defense is a
first step. But do you think that we can achieve relative
cybersecurity simply by improving those defenses, or do we need
to perhaps go on the offense and impose more I guess you would
say visible costs with regards to our actions on cybersecurity?
Dr. Carter. I think both are important. We need to improve
our defenses, but we also need to improve our abilities to
respond. Those responses can be in cyberspace or in other ways,
but certainly they should include the option to respond in
cyberspace.
Senator Fischer. The option to respond, would you say that
would include demonstrating that we have the capability to do
so? Is that part of our deterrence when it comes to protecting
our country, our agencies, and private businesses when it comes
to cyber attacks?
Dr. Carter. I agree with you. I think deterrence requires
that a potential aggressor know that you have the capability to
respond, and they obviously can't know all the details of that
or they may be able to counter your response. But they
certainly should know that you can respond.
Senator Fischer. And would respond, if necessary?
Dr. Carter. And would respond, absolutely.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Dr. Carter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
So many questions, so little time. I want to associate
myself with the remarks of the chairman about the weapon
systems. You are in a special position because you have been in
the weeds, so to speak, on all of this in your previous
position, and we worked together on wartime contracting
reforms, which now are in the statutes. I know that you will be
aggressive about making sure that all of those provisions are
adhered to.
I also want to address a question to you for the record on
the murky line of responsibility on the building of
infrastructure during contingencies in theater while we are
fighting. I think what we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
through the special inspector general's reports is that this
line of passing back and forth responsibility for building
roads, building highways, building grids, building health
centers, building water systems, building power plants between
USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and
DOD has made it very difficult for us to really hold everyone
accountable that needs to be accountable for dramatic failures.
On that note, I wanted to specifically talk about special
inspector general's reports. Last week, I learned that for the
first time in 6 years, the special inspector general's reports
as to the way we are accomplishing our mission in Afghanistan
for training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces
and Afghan police was going to be classified by General
Campbell. This had never been done before.
Those reports are essential to robust oversight. I kicked
up dust last week about it, and on Monday, it was announced
that General Campbell was evidently reversing his decision in
some regard. I want to ask your commitment to make sure that
throughout the chain of command, there is an understanding that
the decision to classify is a very precarious decision because
if you don't do it when it needs to be done, it is a problem.
But if you overclassify, it removes the ability of us and the
taxpayers to hold the military accountable.
I wanted to bring that up to you and ask you for your
commitment in that regard.
Dr. Carter. I give that commitment.
Senator McCaskill. I also wanted to briefly talk about
sexual assault in the military. The report that came out in
December, while it still shows work to be done, I think it is
important that on the record we talk about the success that we
have had.
Reporting is up. We have gone from 1 in 10 victims coming
forward to 1 in 4 in a matter of a few years. Incidence is
down. Importantly, restricted reporting is up.
Maybe the most important information in that report that
hasn't gotten a lot of cover is that in anonymous surveys and
focus groups with victims, more than two-thirds of the victims
said they had complete confident in their commanders and how
they are handling these crimes and that they feel that their
privacy is being respected and that they are being supported.
That is huge, and I wanted to point that out because I do think
we are making progress.
But on retaliation, that same report, as Senator Gillibrand
pointed out, we still have a 62 percent rate of retaliation. If
you look at the report, you realize it is not retaliation by
the convening authority, by the command that is making the
decision as to whether or not to go to general court martial.
Rather, it is peer and low-level command that is causing the
problem.
In our reforms, we made retaliation a crime. We expect to
get a report on how many instances that crime has, in fact,
been pursued within the military justice system. The reforms,
obviously, just went into place a relatively short time ago.
What do you plan on doing in connection with this
retaliation problem and with this new crime within the military
justice system to pursue it?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, and thank you for everything you
have done. I have, from the outside looking in, observed and
admired the ideas and the energy and the commitment you have
shown to getting rid of this scourge of sexual assault, and so,
first of all, thank you for that.
With respect to retaliation, that is one of the dimensions
that I think the report you cite uncovered as very prevalent. I
think the 62 percent of victims were reporting experiencing
retaliation. As you say, not so much--although not to the
exclusion of, but not so much from the chain of command as from
peers and subordinates.
You are right. This is a crime, and its prevalence suggests
that we are not doing everything we can, that we need to do to
root out that crime.
If I am confirmed, you can count that I am attentive to
this issue of retaliation and determined to do something about
it, and I will look forward to working with you if I am
confirmed.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. I look
forward to working with you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter.
It is a pleasure to have you here. I appreciate your
willingness to be considered for this position. I appreciated
the visit we had in my office the other day, and you have
certainly proven yourself as someone who knows a lot about the
Department of Defense, having served at its highest levels as
Deputy Secretary in the past.
I want to talk about a few things. First, let us talk about
the F-35 for a minute. The F-35 is an amazing system, with
units at Hill Air Force Base that are set to be hosting the F-
35 starting this fall. It is a program, however, that has been
marred by some delays and some cost overruns, as you know.
As the Department of Defense looks at acquiring other new
weapon systems and equipment to make sure that we maintain our
technological advantage over our adversaries, I think it is
important not only to work time and cost efficiencies in
acquisition into the equation for such programs, but also to
integrate that with logistics and maintenance processes that
are absolutely essential to make sure that we get our money's
worth.
With a program like the F-35, the biggest single expenses
through the lifecycle isn't just acquiring it. It is also
maintaining it and making sure that we get our money's worth
out of it.
Given that the Department of Defense has been reforming the
acquisitions process in various ways for decades, what would
you do differently not only to improve that process, but to
make sure that acquisitions and development and logistics are
all aligned in a way that increases the lifecycle and increases
the efficiency and utility of these various weapon systems?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
It is exactly as you say. The lion's share of the cost of
any weapon system is not in buying it, but in having it. Which
is why, to get to the F-35 example that you cite, the
longstanding battle to control cost in the Joint Strike Fighter
program, which I have been part of but is still ongoing and has
to go on as long as that program is in existence--it is not
perfect yet, it is a long way from that--has to extend into the
sustainment phase of the aircraft.
We have worked on cost control in development. We have
worked on cost control in the production of the aircraft, and
we need to work on cost control in sustainment as well, exactly
as you say.
Senator Lee. Thank you. Thank you, and I appreciate your
thought on that especially because your experience gives you a
real strong ability to appreciate the nuances involved there.
General John Kelly, the commander of SOUTHCOM [United
States Southern Command], called last year's border crisis an
existential threat to the United States. Do you think that our
inability to adequately enforce security at our borders does
present a security threat to the United States, including a
security threat that could involve the possibility of
terrorists entering into our country without our knowledge?
Dr. Carter. I think control of our borders is an important
part of national security, yes.
Senator Lee. That is something that you would continue to
watch out for, if confirmed at this position?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Lee. It was reported on February 2nd, just a few
days ago, that Iran successfully placed another satellite into
orbit using a two-stage rocket. Do you think that continued
development of Iranian ballistic missile technology presents a
threat to the United States, and if so, what do you think we
ought to do about it?
Dr. Carter. I do. I think it is a threat not only to the
United States, but friends and allies in the region, and it is
just one of the things that Iran is doing that is dangerous.
With respect to ballistic missiles that could threaten the
United States, I think that is one of the reasons why we need
to keep our missile defenses, and especially our ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] defenses, current,
capable, and large enough in size to deal with both a
prospective Iranian threat and the also very real North Korean
ICBM threat.
Senator Lee. Thank you.
As has been noted in several capacities that you have had
within the Department of Defense, including most recently as
the Deputy Secretary, you have had to confront the issue of
sequestration. Now many of us, including myself, did not want
sequestration to hit. I voted against the Budget Control Act in
part because I didn't think that we ought to be putting this
burden disproportionately on the Department of Defense as we
were.
None of us wanted the super committee to not come up with a
solution even after that happened, and many of us hoped that it
wouldn't come to that. Of course, it did.
One of the lessons that I think we learned from 2 years ago
is that while it is good to hope for the best, we also have to
prepare for the worst. What can you do to make sure that we are
not caught flatfooted and that we are ready for anything that
we have to confront on that issue?
Dr. Carter. We need to continue to adapt our plans to the
resources we are given. My own view is that we have made
adaptations over the last few years to our strategy to
accommodate the budget squeeze that are getting to the limits
of what it is safe to do, and that is why I really want to see
an end to sequester.
We need to do more to spend the defense dollar better, and
I am all for that as well. But it is also basically the truth
that we are getting to the point where we have bent the
strategy, as the phrase goes, and I don't think it is safe to
keep bending it.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine, but before Senator Kaine, I
would like to announce that we will break after Senator Kaine
and then Senator Graham. There is a vote at 2:30 p.m. We will
reconvene at 2:45 p.m. for the benefit of the few remaining
Senators and any second round that any member wants. We
appreciate your patience, Dr. Carter.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr.
Carter, for your strong testimony today.
The chair and the ranking member in their opening comments
put the issues on the table, and I want to just focus on two of
them, the elimination of ISIL and Afghanistan. Senator Donnelly
asked if the elimination of ISIL should be the goal. We all had
the experience, as Foreign Relations Committee and SASC [Senate
Armed Services Committee] members yesterday, of visiting with
King Abdullah at a very emotional and difficult time.
I was struck by something he said to us. He said, look, we
need you desperately. However, this is a fight that is the
region's fight. If we are not willing to stand up against
extremism in the region, there is no amount of outside forces,
as powerful as they can be, who will be able to beat this
fight. He really took ownership of it in a way that I thought
was pretty courageous.
Do you think it is possible for the United States military
to eliminate ISIL on our own or even with other Western nations
if the region doesn't go all in to combat the homegrown
jihadism that is exemplified in its most brutal form by ISIL?
Dr. Carter. We have to have regional partners because we
have to make sure that the defeat inflicted upon ISIL is a
lasting defeat, and for that, there needs to be conditions
created where ISIL is now occupying territory that don't make
it a breeding ground for victory for that kind of, what is the
right word, malignant and vicious kind of terrorism.
The United States involvement is, I believe, essential. It
is necessary, but it is not sufficient to have lasting victory.
Senator Kaine. I would share your view, necessary,
essential, not sufficient. It is still my hope that the White
House will send to us a draft authorization for use of military
force. I think after the President's comments in the State of
the Union, that seems more likely. I don't think this is a war
that can be waged in perpetuity, without Congress weighing in
and putting our thumbprint on the mission and saying that if we
are going to ask people to risk their lives in the mission,
Congress is going to debate and vote and authorize it.
If we have that debate about the American role, one of the
things that I think is notable if, in fact, the region has to
go all in against the ISIL threat, so far 80 percent of the
airstrikes that have been carried out against ISIL have been
United States flown.
Jordan has been rock solid in doing a lot of airstrikes.
But the other nations in the region that seem to be directly
threatened by ISIL, much more directly even than we are
threatened by ISIL, I think have really not, other than being
associated with the coalition, I don't think they have really
stepped forward in showing--and been willing to show that they
are going all in against this threat, which should be an
existential one. I think that is going to be the subject of
some significant debate if we get into a discussion on
authorization.
Now second, Dr. Carter, on Afghanistan, I completely agree
with Senator McCain, the chairman's point in his opening. I
really hope we have a conditions-based strategy and not a
calendar-based strategy.
Now I think it is okay to have a plan, and you indicated a
plan is a plan. You can adjust the plan based on the current
reality.
Senator King and I were in Afghanistan in October and
talked with General Campbell, and it seemed like after those
discussions, the White House did adjust the plan once already.
There were some ideas about the way U.S. forces would be used
in calendar year 2015 that after hearing from General Campbell
and others, I think the White House adjusted the authorities
granted to U.S. troops during this calendar year, and I think
that was a conditions-based decision, which was good.
But I worry for the same reason that you do. We have, at
the expense of blood and treasure, achieved a lot in
Afghanistan. The Nation's life expectancy has gone from 44 to
61 in 10 years.
My back of the envelope math, I always say 30 million
people living on an average 17 years longer, that is 510
million years of human life. That seems like a pretty good ROI
[return on investment] to me, for as painful as it has been,
for as expensive as it has been. Why would we want to go
backward?
I think in Afghanistan that what we heard when we were
there was also a little bit of the Iraq worry. Wow, they have
taken their eye off the ball before because of things in Iraq
and pulled resources away and that this is the perception in
Afghanistan. Maybe this is getting ready to happen again, as
significant a threat as ISIL is and that we need to be at it.
In Afghanistan, they are a little bit nervous that the ISIL
threat will pull our attention away and that we could lose
these gains. I hope in your capacity in this new role, as you
dig into the plan, as you dig into the daily conditions, that
we will make the right decision about how to keep the progress
that we have gained in Afghanistan and that we won't let a day
on the calendar be the determinant of our policy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Do you want to respond to that, Doctor?
Dr. Carter. Two thousand one hundred and six Americans,
servicemembers have lost their lives in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan was the place from which the 9/11 attacks emanated,
and so I think finishing the job there is very important.
I have been part of that war in my previous time in the
Department. It was what I woke up to every morning, and so I am
very committed to success there. We have adjusted what we have
been doing continuously as we went along.
I don't have anything to add to what you said, except to
remind that the Afghan security forces are what we increasingly
have trained to provide security on Afghan territory. They are
going to need support after 2016.
In the President's budget, about which I will appear before
you in a few weeks, I understand that there is, if my memory
serves, $3.8 billion requested for the Afghan security forces
that carries through the end of 2016. Then a question will
arise, are we going to stick with them, the Afghan security
forces?
It is not just about troops, American troops. It is about
the overall commitment so that the Afghan security forces can
keep the peace there after 2016.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you.
The idea of Joe Lieberman introducing you is a risky
proposition, but we will see how that turns out.
[Laughter.]
Bottom line, do you agree with the following statement? The
only reason 3,000 Americans died on 9/11 is that the radical
Islamists who attacked us could not find a way to kill more of
us?
Dr. Carter. That is probably true.
Senator Graham. If they could, they would?
Dr. Carter. That is my guess.
Senator Graham. Yes, I don't think it is a guess. I think
it is a fact. Do you think ISIL represents a threat to our
Homeland?
Dr. Carter. I do.
Senator Graham. They say they want to attack us. There is
no reason to believe they are kidding, right?
Dr. Carter. I agree.
Senator Graham. The head of ISIL was in Camp Bucca, and he
said, ``I will see you in New York,'' when he was released.
Dr. Carter. Right.
Senator Graham. Everything they have said they would do,
they have done. One of the things they want to do is hit us. I
couldn't agree more with Senator Kaine about a regional buy-in.
If you don't get that, the structural problems really don't
change.
But it is just not about the region. The reason I am
worried about ISIL is because I think they want to hit us. They
have the best platform I have seen since 9/11 in Syria and Iraq
to attack the United States. They hold a large territory. They
are rich. They have a lot of crazy people under their control,
and they mean it when they say they want to hit us, and I want
to make sure they don't.
Do you think al-Nusra wants to hit us?
Dr. Carter. I do.
Senator Graham. They recruited a guy from Florida who was a
suicide bomber I think in Syria. He came back to Florida before
he actually became a suicide bomber. They are trying to hit us,
too.
Do you think AQAP [al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] wants
to hit us?
Dr. Carter. Very definitely.
Senator Graham. Very definitely. They are the people that
hit us in Paris.
Do you think the Iranians have to believe that a military
option is on the table during these nuclear negotiations?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. If they don't, we are making a huge
mistake, right?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Do you think the Russians are being
provocative at a time when the world is already in chaos?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you think that a cyber Pearl Harbor is a
potential threat we face?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. And we are not ready for it?
Dr. Carter. I agree with that also.
Senator Graham. Do you think China is intimidating their
neighbors?
Dr. Carter. Certainly trying to.
Senator Graham. Can you tell me in light of all of this,
why in the hell would Congress be devastating the military
budget? Can you explain that to me because I can't explain it
to myself?
Dr. Carter. No, I can't. No, I can't. As I am a
longstanding opponent, I am against sequester.
Senator Graham. Yes. I left out a bunch of threats because
I just have 5 minutes. Canada is in good shape, by the way. We
appreciate Canada being a good neighbor.
In 2017, the plan on the table now is to have 1,000 troops
left in Afghanistan, Kabul based. Do you agree with me, given
the conditions that exist in the region, the likelihood of a
reemergence of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups along the
Pakistan-Afghan border, we would be wise to have troops outside
of Kabul?
Dr. Carter. That is not the plan now, Senator.
Senator Graham. Can you please tell me why I am wrong? It
is the plan to go down to 1,000 by 2017. They increased the
number of troops in 2015, but it is the plan. If you are going
to be Secretary of Defense, you need to understand the plan.
The plan is to go to 1,000.
I think that is beyond unwise. That will destroy our
ability to see, hear, and listen to what I think is a
reemerging threat along the Afghan-Pakistan border. If I am
wrong about the plan, please correct me. This is something you
can go home and check out for yourself.
Dr. Carter. No, I think you are correct--I think you are
correct about the plan.
Senator Graham. Yes, that plan needs to change.
Dr. Carter. That is the understanding I have of the plan.
Senator Graham. If it doesn't, we are incredibly stupid as
a nation. I want to withdraw from Afghanistan responsibly. I
want lines of defenses over there so they don't come here.
Doesn't that make sense?
Dr. Carter. It does make sense.
Senator Graham. I am glad Afghans are living longer. I am
glad that Afghan girls are going to school. I am proud of what
we have accomplished. But I am worried about Americans living
longer. The reason I want to continue to invest in Afghanistan,
the reason I want to deal with ISIL and al-Nusra and all the
other groups is because they are trying to hit us.
Do you agree that the only way you can deter radical
Islam--you can't deter it, you have to prevent the attack
before it occurs?
Dr. Carter. Sir, I can't give a simple answer to that.
Senator Graham. They don't mind dying.
Dr. Carter. I think that a comprehensive counterterrorism
strategy begins foremost with defenses but has other dimensions
as well in terms of removing the conditions that create safe
havens and some of the ability for recruiting of terrorists. It
is a complex issue. But protecting ourselves needs to come
first.
Senator Graham. I will close with this. To me, it is not
complex. The only way you can keep them from coming back here
to America is to stay over there, disrupt their operations.
Keep them on the run. Do not let them gather strength. Make
them poor, on the run, and less entrenched.
I will end with this thought. Syria. How in the world are
we going to dislodge ISIL from Syria without a ground
component? I agree with Senator Kaine that that ground
component has to be regionally based.
We just came back from the region. People want to go in.
Saudi Arabia said you could have our army. The Emir of Qatar
said we will pay for the war, but you have to deal with Assad.
How can we train up a Free Syrian Army or send any other
force into Syria if we don't first deal with the Assad air
threat? How in the world could you train somebody to go fight
ISIL, and then one day they turn on Assad and not expect him to
kill them before they get the capacity to come after him one
day? How does this work without dealing with Assad?
Dr. Carter. Senator, let me say something about that. It is
a very important question. The situation in Syria is, as you
indicate, more than a problem of ISIL. It is a problem of the
Assad regime as well. The forces that we are supporting there
have, first and foremost, the job, as we have discussed here
this morning, of defeating ISIL.
But I believe that they also need to be creating the
conditions for the removal of Assad. That is a much more
complex task. I understand that. I am not trying to
oversimplify it. But I think that has to be at the end of the
road, and if that is what you are pointing to, I completely
agree with you.
Chairman McCain. Could I just say you really didn't
respond, in all due respect, Dr. Carter, to sending young
Syrians in, training them in Saudi Arabia and sending them in
to Syria to be barrel bombed by Bashar Assad. The morality of
that alone, much less the unworkability of it, is in
contradiction to everything the United States ever stood for or
fought for.
I hope you will rethink your answer to Senator Graham's
question. This idiocy of cooperating with the Iranians and also
taking ``ISIL first'', of which Bashar Assad is the father, is
nonsense and, as I say, immoral.
The committee will return at 2:45 p.m., since there is a
vote at 2:30 p.m. Members who seek a second round or those
members who have not had the opportunity to ask questions will
be allowed to at that time. We will stand in recess until 2:45
p.m.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee recessed, to
reconvene at 2:47 p.m., the same day.]
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Dr. Carter, for your patience.
As usual, with the efficiency of this well-oiled machine, we
have a vote now starting now, so we will be going back and
forth.
Senator King is here, and so I would like to recognize him
at this time.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, I am going to revisit a little bit of the
ground that we covered this morning. But I want to make a
suggestion. I would urge that you, upon your assumption of this
position, undertake an all-agency review of the policy with
regard to the leaving of Afghanistan and talk to General
Campbell, the military people, the intelligence people, and the
State Department. Because like many of the members here, I am
gravely concerned that we will miss an opportunity to preserve
what we have gained in Afghanistan.
I was going to say we are in danger of fumbling the ball on
the 5-yard line. I think a better example might be we are in
danger of throwing a pass when you have Lynch in the backfield
on the 1-yard line. But we have gained a lot, and to lose it in
the end because of an accelerated departure schedule that
doesn't really fit the requirements on the ground I think would
be tragic.
We have a partner that wants to work with us now. We have
the security forces that are standing up and taking casualties,
but they are going to need some additional support,
particularly in the authorities under our air system. I would
urge you to have such a review and to really be very strong
with the White House.
You mentioned that you will be candid. I hope you will be
candid to the point of being annoying. What is the worst thing
they can do? Appoint you to be Secretary of Defense. Please, I
think this is of some urgency.
Number two, in answer to a question, you mentioned that you
were inclined to support additional arms to Ukraine. I share
that position.
On the other hand, we don't live in a static world, and the
danger is we supply arms, Putin sees those arms and matches
them and raises us, to some extent. I wondered, with your
history of studying geopolitical issues, strategy, and the
like, if you could elaborate a little bit on that challenge?
If we could arm the Ukrainians and give them some strategic
advantage, I think that would be great. The problem is we can't
rely on the Russians not responding in some way, and then you
are in an escalation situation. Your thoughts, please?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
I like and remembered, and I think I have used
subsequently, your expression ``fumbling the ball on the 5-yard
line''. I was superseded by the Super Bowl metaphor, I
understand. But this is a war that we have carried all those
yards, and so I will--
Senator King. With some very substantial progress.
Dr. Carter. Yes. Very substantial progress. We now have a
partner in Ashraf Ghani that is very positive. I promise you I
will keep working at it, keep an open mind, and tell it like I
see it, yes, in Afghanistan.
With respect to Ukraine, you raise an excellent question,
and I think it is true that in strategy and working on these
international problems, you always have to ask yourself not the
next step, but what is the step after that? What happens after?
To your question, two observations, Senator. One is that I
think that much as I incline in the direction I indicated this
morning, the economic and political pressure on Russia has to
remain the main center of gravity of our effort at pushing
back, and the Europeans are critical to that. European
solidarity and NATO solidarity are critical in this regard, as
they are to all of European security and to dealing with the
problem of Putin.
The other thought that comes to mind is that this is, as I
consider what kinds of assistance we may give to the Ukrainian
military, one does need to think two and even three steps ahead
in this matter. Your point is very well taken, and I thank you.
Senator King. I would suggest an article in yesterday's
Financial Times. It talks about just this issue that I think
you would find interesting and informative. I am not expressing
a conclusion, but I just think we have to think hard about, as
you say, one, two, three, and four steps down the chess game.
A final point, and I am close to out of time. I want to
reiterate, I think Senator Shaheen mentioned, the chairman very
articulately and forcefully expressed the problem with
procurement and money. I am also focused on the problem with
procurement and time.
Senator Inhofe had a chart recently from DARPA [Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency] that showed in 1975 it took
about the same time to bring a new automobile, a new commercial
aircraft, and a military aircraft from concept to operation,
about 5 1/2, 6 years. Today, those lines have wildly diverged,
and the automobile is down to 2 years. Commercial aircraft is
up to about 7, but a military aircraft is up to 23 years.
That just won't do in terms of, you know, we are going to
be building obsolete technology. I would urge you, as you focus
quite rightfully on cost, to also look at how do we bring these
products to market, if you will, or to operability in a shorter
time? A, so we can meet the needs of the exigencies of the
moment, but also so that we are not getting obsolete technology
just because of the lapse of time.
I know you are aware of this. I just urge you to focus on
that as well as the cost.
Dr. Carter. I will do so, and I completely agree with you.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator King.
Dr. Carter, every member of this committee signed a letter
to Secretary Hagel and Secretary Kerry concerning this issue
that has been raised with you about the Jordanians and the
needs that they have. Believe me, every member that met with
King Abdullah was deeply moved by the requirements that he has
and his inability to do so.
Finally, on the issue of Ukraine, what does it take? Do
they have to send in hundreds of more tanks that the Ukrainians
have no weapons to defend themselves? There are 4,000 dead now.
How many more do you think before we at least do them what
seems to be common decency, giving them the ability to defend
themselves?
Certainly, Vladimir Putin has gone literally all in, and
there is some lessons of history, sir, that of dictators and
bullies who have troubles domestically have a history of
striking out and being more aggressive in order to divert
attention. This is reminiscent of the 1930s to me, and Neville
Chamberlain might be proud.
Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Carter.
First, I think it is very clear with the questions that are
being asked today, this hearing really isn't about Ash Carter.
I think there is a lot of confidence in your ability, and I
think there are few public servants as qualified as you for the
nomination. I think you and your family should be very proud.
I appreciate the time that you and I spent in my office. I
think that we have already several points of agreement, whether
it is acquisition reform, training, or modernization of
business practices in the Pentagon. I look forward to working
with you on that and making progress.
I also think that defense is an area where you even see in
the questions where there seems to be a consistent message from
most of the members up here about our concerns with the safety
and security of America and the need for us to work together on
a bipartisan basis. Because if we don't, we fail the thousands
of young men and women who volunteer to defend our freedom.
Before I get to a question, I do want to probably echo in
slightly different terms what Senator Sullivan said this
morning. There seems to be a disconnect between the reality of
the threat that we face right now and the way the President
portrays it in many instances, most recently with the State of
the Union.
We have Ukraine is ablaze. I think ISIL and al-Qaeda are
about as strong as ever. You have Chinese generals talking
about maybe wanting to settle some millennial scores with their
neighbors in the Pacific Rim.
We have a situation where I think Israel feels abandoned,
and I think the prime minister being called a coward by
somebody in the White House is unacceptable. We are at a very
dangerous time right now, I think. I believe that you said it
very well when you said the number and the severity of the
threats that we are facing is probably as great as our
lifetimes, as any time in our lifetimes.
I believe that you may go into your position maybe in a way
to where you can work with people in the White House and the
National Security Council to get them to work with you, to help
us address, I think, these safety and security problems across
the world.
My first question for you also goes back really to the
State of the Union, where the President seems to continue to
refuse to call the enemy what they are. How can we fight an
enemy with an administration that refuses to name them? A
President who refuses to recognize that there is a huge
difference between the Muslim religion and the Islamic
terrorists that we are facing today?
Do you agree with that strategy, or can you rationalize for
me why the President seems to continue that position?
Dr. Carter. Senator, I agree with you that there is a
difference between the Muslim religion and the kind of
extremism that leads to terrorism that is the threat and the
enemy that we are countering. If I understand the reference you
are making, it is to the President's statements of a few days
ago, which I interpreted as saying the same thing. Namely, it
is important for Americans to make a distinction and show that
they know how to make a distinction between the religion of
Islam on the one hand and extremists and terrorists on the
other.
I don't think, in my judgment, that is to minimize what is
one of the motivating ideologies of the enemies we face, which
they will say is tied to their Islamic religion. But I don't
think that we serve ourselves well as Americans by conflating
this kind of barbaric extremism with an entire religion.
Senator Tillis. I have another question. It really has to
do with you in relation to your predecessors.
Do you feel you can break through the barriers that Gates
and Panetta seemed to be very frustrated with? You and I talked
briefly about the book Secretary Gates wrote. They both seemed
to have a great deal of frustration in their time in the
position you will be confirmed with the White House national
security team and the Pentagon. They left, they seem to have
left in part in frustration with that.
I think Senator Gates in his book maybe even called it
``amateur hour at the National Security Council''. How are you
going to be different in relating to the Pentagon and the
President's national security team?
Dr. Carter. I intend to be what I have always been in all
the decades I worked in the Department of Defense, which is I
will be entirely straight and upfront with the President and
make my advice as cogent and as useful to him in making his
decisions as I possibly can.
That is what I can do. That is what I have pledged to do.
That is what I will do.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Reed [Presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Carter, I appreciated the opportunity to visit with you
last week, and one of the items that we discussed was the need
for the long-range strike bomber. In that regard, we discussed
the fact that it would probably be, what, 10 years from now
before, under the best circumstances, it may be operational.
Fair estimate of time?
Dr. Carter. Yes, although in answering your question, I am
mindful of what Senator King said just a few moments ago. I
would rather say ``as soon as possible''.
Senator Rounds. I understand. In the meantime, we have
challenges that have to be responded to with other existing
platforms. One of which, for conventional purposes, is the B-1B
bomber. I think right now we probably have 62 or 63 in our
fleet that are operational sometimes.
I am concerned about readiness right now, the mission
capabilities of those platforms because those are literally on
the front lines as we speak. Because of their capabilities or
multiple types of weapons to be delivered out of that same
platform, they are being utilized, and they are being worn out.
I think mission capability is somewhere under 50 percent,
and I don't have the exact number, but in terms of those
platforms. I would like you to talk just a little bit, and I
really would like to give you the opportunity to talk about
what sequestration has done in terms of mission capability, the
need that we have for that platform to get us to the next
generation of strike bombers, what your thoughts are on getting
back to where we need it, and what the appropriate number of
operational aircraft should be?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
You are right. I don't know the specific numbers on the B-1
at the moment. But in general, sequester has hit readiness very
hard.
In the Air Force, I know, for example, in the summer of
2013, I remember very vividly the Nellis training range, Air
Force's premier training range, closed in the summer. First
time in my entire professional life I had ever seen that.
The first victim of sequester has been readiness, and so I
can well believe it has affected the B-1, which is an essential
part of our arsenal, as you indicate.
Senator Rounds. In your role, and I believe that you will
be confirmed, what I am looking for is a commitment that these
men and women that are literally tasked with keeping these
aircraft operational, that they have your full support to get
the numbers back up to where they ought to be. Right now they
are taking out of the bone pile to literally harvest parts off
to keep those aircraft flying today.
There has to be a better way to do it. Then if we are going
to continue to do for the next perhaps 10 years, that you have
an understanding and a clear commitment that you are going to
help them get the parts necessary to keep these aircraft
flying.
Dr. Carter. I have the same understanding you do of the
problem, the same commitment you do, and the only thing I would
say is it is going to take more than my commitment. It is going
to take money also and ultimately relief from sequester to deal
with these kind of things. But I see the picture the same way
you do.
Senator Rounds. But you are prepared to step in and to
assist in making sure that those resources are available?
Dr. Carter. I am.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
We have concluded all the members present with the first
round, and I will defer any comments I have until the chairman
has a chance. Senator Wicker, you are recognized.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
How are you feeling, Dr. Carter?
Dr. Carter. Thank you for asking. I am fine. Appreciate it,
sir.
Senator Wicker. You are doing well, and we appreciate your
willingness to serve.
According to NATO guidelines, we ask our NATO allies to
devote at least 2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product]
to defense. This has been a stunning failure, actually. Only
four countries spent that much in 2013, Estonia, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Greece.
Do you have any ideas about how we can do better in this
regard?
Dr. Carter. Secretaries of Defense that I have served for
almost as long as I can remember have pleaded with the
Europeans to spend more on their own defense, our NATO allies.
With very few exceptions, those pleas have not been fully
heeded.
One doesn't wish adversity on anyone, but one would hope
that when they look at Russia, when they look at the Charlie
Hebdo incidents and so forth, that the European public will
come to share the view that they need to be part of their own
defense and continue to play the role that Europe has always
played, of being a partner with the United States in keeping
peace and order around the world.
I regret that they are not spending as much as they used
to. Again, I don't wish adversity upon anyone, but I hope that
what they see around them reminds everyone you don't get this
stuff for free. Security doesn't come for free. You have to pay
for it.
Senator Wicker. One would hope. I hope you will, going
forward, help us think of perhaps carrots and sticks and
incentives to have our allies shoulder their part of the
burden.
I was talking, we had a great discussion with General
Scowcroft the other day. I asked about what we would do about a
Russian invasion or incursion into the Baltics. We are a treaty
ally of Ukraine. We were unable to do anything. We were unable
to do anything when the Russians moved into Georgia.
But with a NATO ally, it really is different. General
Scowcroft mentioned tripwires, stationing troops in the Baltic
countries, both from the United States and from our NATO
allies. What do you think of that concept? Is it something you
have given any thought to, Dr. Carter?
Dr. Carter. I have, and it is one I support. I believe it
is the intention--again, I don't know this. I am not in these
deliberations. I think it is the intention behind the
rotational introduction of United States and other NATO forces
into the Baltic countries, to reinforce deterrence and to
reinforce the principle that this is NATO and that Article 5 of
the NATO treaty says an attack on one is an attack upon all.
Senator Wicker. Absolutely.
Dr. Carter. That is a very important principle, and we need
to stand behind that and show that we are going to stand behind
it. I think that is the meaning of the tripwire concept that
General Scowcroft was thinking of.
Senator Wicker. If we don't stand behind our word on that
article, then our word really does mean nothing.
Let me ask you this in conclusion. How was Cap Weinberger
to work for?
Dr. Carter. I enjoyed working for him. I was not at a very
senior level, but what I did for him was advise him on space,
missile defense, nuclear command and control, and the early
days in those days of what are called the continuity of
government efforts, which still continue. We were just
beginning to put them together at that time.
Senator Wicker. What do you think he would say about our
defense posture at this point?
Dr. Carter. Secretary Weinberger was an enormous backer of
defense spending and of the defense budget, and he was tireless
in explaining the need for an adequate defense. In that
respect, he was a lot of fun to work for.
Senator Wicker. Yes, he wouldn't be overly delighted with
sequestration and with the current funding level and proposed
funding level going forward?
Dr. Carter. Not at all.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Good luck to you, sir.
Dr. Carter. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Senator King?
Senator King. I went before the vote.
Senator Reed. This is the second round, Senator, if you
have additional questions.
Senator King. Oh, I am sorry. I was surprised to get called
upon so soon.
Let me go back to the question that we ended with about the
timing of weapon systems. You were one of the fathers of the
MRAP program, were you not? It seems to me that could be a
model for what we are talking about.
Could you share lessons learned in that project that might
be applicable to other procurement projects?
Dr. Carter. Yes, I think you put your finger on it, which
when you pointed to the critical variable in a program being
its duration. That is important for two reasons, and you
indicated this already, Senator, but just to reiterate. Time is
money. A 15-year program is going to cost more than a 10-year
program, the way we do things. Cost control, it is essential.
But the MRAP example points to something even more
important, which is technology changes very quickly. Our
enemies change very quickly today, and you don't have to be in
a war, which the MRAP example occasions, to understand that we
need to be able to turn the corner, add new technology to
systems, field new systems more quickly than our opponents are
doing the same.
If we have a 15-year timetable and we are competing with
any modern economy around the world, the same thing is going to
happen to you if you are a commercial company that has a 15-
year product cycle. You are going to lose.
I think it is very important not just for cost control, but
in order to remain the best military in the world that we turn
the technological corner more quickly. The MRAP example and the
war's example gave me at least a lot of ideas about how we can
do that even in peacetime.
Senator King. I think part of it is instilling a sense of
urgency in all the way up and down the line. I mean, the
accomplishments of this country during World War II under
extreme duress in terms of production were astonishing where I
live near Bath, Maine.
I can't remember the exact figure, but I think they turned
out a destroyer during World War II something like once every
17 days, which is unbelievable. Granted, it was a much simpler
machine then than now, and the story of the bombers in World
War II is also quite extraordinary.
I think there has to be a sense of urgency. We are if not
directly at war, we are certainly close to war footing on a
number of fronts, and that should inform. As you pointed out,
this isn't the Cold War, where you can do things with a 5-, 10-
, or 15-year lead time. Our asymmetric advantage is technology.
If we are unable to deploy that technology on a timely
basis, we are basically losing that advantage. I, again, very
strongly urge you to follow on that. By the way, Frank Kendall,
who is in your office, I think is a star, and I hope you are
going to keep him.
Dr. Carter. I can't resist seconding that emotion. Frank
was my Principal Deputy when I was Under Secretary, and we are
very lucky to have an acquisition executive like Frank.
Senator King. My philosophy of leadership, which applies to
this case, is hire good people and take credit for what they
do. Frank falls into that category.
Second question. How do we get more value out of our allies
in terms of support for the work that we are doing? I
understand that in many countries of Europe, defense as a share
of GDP is actually going down, which it is here, too. But it is
going to 2 and less than 2 percent.
Is that part of your mission is to encourage our allies to
contribute more to this what is really the common defense?
Dr. Carter. I think they need to spend more on their own
defense because their own defense is also our defense. That is
what being an ally is about. I would like to see them carry
their full weight of being an ally, and as I indicated earlier,
I don't see how any American can be satisfied with the general
level of defense spending among our European allies. I think it
should be higher.
Senator King. Finally, and I realize my time is running
short, but it seems to me that one of the great strategic
challenges of this moment is to enlist Muslim countries and
Arab countries in the fight against ISIL. They have to realize,
and I think the events of yesterday may be a galvanizing
factor, but they have to realize that this has to be their
fight.
If it is our fight, that is what ISIL wants. They want this
to be the West against Islam. But the fact that they did this
horrendous murder yesterday of one of their brothers, of a
Sunni Muslim, I hope will be a wakeup call to the Muslim world
that they have to deal with these guys most directly. Not
simply by holding our coat, but by contributing and being
involved on the ground, in the air.
This has to be their fight ultimately. It is not one that
we can carry on by ourselves.
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Chairman McCain [Presiding]. Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, thank you for joining us. I enjoyed having the
opportunity to visit with you in my office.
Dr. Carter. Thank you. Likewise.
Senator Cruz. I appreciate your many years of service to
our Nation.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. I appreciate your willingness to serve in
this incredibly important role at a time of great challenges,
great threats, and also at a time, unfortunately, when the
Defense Department faces significant challenges internally.
I have for some time been critical of the Obama
administration's foreign policy, that it has lacked a steady
mooring and a focus on the very real national security threats
facing the country. I would like to take the opportunity to
briefly discuss a few of those threats with you and get your
thoughts on them, and I want to start with the threat of Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons capability.
In your judgment, what would be the national security
implications to the United States if Iran were to acquire
nuclear weapons?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
In a phrase, ``exceptionally grave,'' and that is for two
reasons. First of all, they might use them. But second, their
having them is likely to stimulate yet others to get them. For
both those reasons, very grave.
Senator Cruz. Let us perhaps expand on each of them. What
is it about the regime and Iran that poses a significant threat
of their actually using nuclear weapons if they had them?
Dr. Carter. If you take at face value what they say, they
have the ambition to wipe off the map other states in the
region, namely Israel. They have a long history of behaving in
a disruptive way, of supporting terrorism, of trying to
undermine other governments of operating around the world.
I think they give abundant evidence that they are not the
kind of people you want to have having nuclear weapons.
Senator Cruz. Would you agree as well that with radical
religious extremism, ordinary notions of deterrence and cost-
benefit analysis don't always apply?
Dr. Carter. I am concerned that that is the case with
people who are extremists of that kind, yes.
Senator Cruz. Now, Dr. Carter, you also talked about the
threat of nuclear proliferation and in particular the threat
that other Middle East countries in response to Iran acquiring
nuclear weapons capability would then feel the need themselves
to acquire the same. For some decades it has been a matter of
pretty widespread public knowledge that the Nation of Israel
has nuclear weapons capability.
Yet throughout that time, Israel's Arab neighbors have
expressed no burning desire to acquire their own nuclear
weapons, apparently because they don't perceive any meaningful
threat that Israel would use those weapons in an offensive
manner. Yet the Arab neighbors of Iran are reacting
qualitatively different to the prospect of Khamenei and the
mullahs acquiring nuclear weapons.
They are saying, almost without exception, if Iran acquires
those weapons, they would immediately need to get their own.
What does that say about the judgment of Saudi Arabia and other
countries in the region about the magnitude of the threat posed
by Iran?
Dr. Carter. I think it tends to read for us what we were
just saying, namely the prospect of Iran having a nuclear
weapon is a pretty fearful matter, and you don't have to be
just an American or an Israeli to get that idea.
Senator Cruz. Would you then agree that the consequences of
getting these negotiations wrong that are ongoing or the
consequences of these negotiations facilitating and allowing
Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capability would be severe,
both from the perspective of the Middle East and our allies,
but also from the perspective of our own national security?
Dr. Carter. Yes, the negotiations have precisely the
opposite objective.
Senator Cruz. Let me ask you also briefly about ISIL. How
would you characterize our objective right now with regards to
ISIL?
Dr. Carter. To inflict a lasting defeat upon ISIL. I only
add the word ``lasting'' to reinforce the idea that once they
are beaten, they need to stay beaten, which means you need to
create the conditions in, in this case Iraq and Syria, so that
they stay defeated.
Senator Cruz. Okay. A final question. In your professional
judgment, what would be required militarily to destroy or, as
you put it, inflict a lasting defeat on ISIL?
Dr. Carter. Militarily, it would be the dismantlement of
their forces and their networks. To get to the point about
lastingly, there is a political ingredient of this, which I
need to add, which is to have them replaced in Iraq and in
Syria with a government that the people want to be part of, and
so they don't have to be governed by maniacs and terrorists.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Dr. Carter. My time has expired.
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your longstanding and extraordinarily
valuable service to our Nation.
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. I am prepared to overlook your
deserting the Kennedy School at Harvard to go to Stanford, and
I hope you will let us know if your back requires you to stand
up or take a break.
Dr. Carter. No, I am fine. Thank you for your
consideration.
Senator Blumenthal. I will take it out of my time.
I want to begin with a couple of brief questions, and I
hope I won't retrod the ground that you have already covered.
From the conversations we have had, I assume that you will
continue to back the current full support for two submarines a
year in the construction of our Virginia-class submarines, and
the ongoing R&D [research and development] and other programs
necessary for the Ohio-class?
Dr. Carter. I will, because undersea superiority is one of
our key advantages, and we need to pursue it.
Senator Blumenthal. It is one of those areas where, in a
sense, we need to be on a war footing because we need to be
prepared and ready, and the surveillance and intelligence
functions, as well as the deterrent capabilities, are essential
to our National defense. Am I correct?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me move to another area that is
very close to my heart, and I again want to thank our chairman,
Senator McCain, who joined with me in cosponsoring a measure,
the Clay Hunt Suicide Prevention Act. Suicide remains a
difficult and daunting, horrific problem not only among our
veterans--22 every day commit suicide--but also in our Active
military.
You and I have talked about this problem. I believe you are
very much attuned to it, and I am hopeful that you will
continue the military's commitment and the Department of
Defense's commitment to providing the mental healthcare that is
necessary to help our warriors deal with these invisible wounds
and demons that come back from the battlefield with them.
Dr. Carter. I am attuned to it, and they are our people,
and we need to care about them and care for them. Those who are
having these kind of thoughts need help.
Senator Blumenthal. On the issue of our veterans who have
suffered from post traumatic stress, as again you and I have
discussed, your predecessor, Secretary Hagel, worked with me,
responded to my urging him to establish a new policy guidance
on September 3, 2014, that finally directed proper
consideration of post traumatic stress by the Boards for
Correction of Military Records when considering upgrade
requests.
Post traumatic stress was unknown in the Vietnam and Korean
eras, not unknown because it didn't exist, but unknown because
it wasn't diagnosed. This new policy gives proper recognition
to a medical condition that simply was never diagnosed at the
time but may have caused less than honorable discharges.
I hope that, if confirmed, you will ensure full and
forceful implementation of this policy and continue outreach,
because it is so vitally necessary, outreach to anyone who may
be eligible to apply under the new guidelines.
Dr. Carter. I will. We have learned a lot about that,
sadly, in recent years and understand now a lot better that it
truly is a malady that we can and need to address.
Yes, and thank you for taking an interest in it, as you
have done about the welfare of the troops in so many other
ways. In the course of the war, I was always very grateful for
your attention to the well-being of the troops.
Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I should probably
stop there, but I do have a couple more questions. I really
appreciate your kinds words.
On the interoperability of the Department of Defense and
the Veterans Administration, I am the ranking member on the
Veterans Affairs Committee of the Senate, and I think there has
been an ongoing concern, you are aware of it, of the issues
relating to the integrated electronic health records,
integrated disability evaluation system, treating military
sexual trauma, other shared efforts that really involve a gap
between these two great departments, each with a vital mission.
I am hoping that you will continue the effort that your
predecessor, I think, believed was very important to close that
gap and make sure that there really is the kind of connection,
the vibrant, vital connection that is important to our troops
and then to our veterans.
Dr. Carter. I recognized that gap, and there is only one
soldier. There are two Cabinet departments. One soldier
shouldn't have to worry about two Cabinet departments.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. I would mention to my
colleagues we are now into the second round of questioning. In
deference to Dr. Carter's health, I would request that we be as
succinct as possible, but I want everyone to have a chance to
continue questioning, if you are all right, Doctor?
Dr. Carter. I am, sir. Absolutely.
Chairman McCain. I will forego.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. I will just pass.
Chairman McCain. All right. Next is Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. I would like to discuss the transfer of
five Taliban commanders at Guantanamo Bay for Private Bowe
Bergdahl. Knowing what we now know about the attempted
recidivism of one of those Taliban members, as well as the
ongoing investigation into Bowe Bergdahl's conduct in
Afghanistan, do you think that it was a correct decision to go
forward with that transfer?
Dr. Carter. First of all, I don't know the circumstances. I
have read the newspaper reports, but I don't have any other
information about these individuals.
What I do know is this. I wasn't in Government at the time
the decision was made, but I have read the letters from all the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to Senator Levin on this matter, all of
whom express support for the decision. I don't want to speak
for any of them, but just speaking for myself, it really boiled
down to one thing, which you very much from your own
distinguished service understand.
Just to say it, it is that we have for decades and decades
and decades gone back decades and decades and decades in time
to battlefields to bring home our fallen. It is a sacred duty
to bring back our fallen.
That was the motivation that the chiefs cited as motivating
their support for the Bergdahl decision. It obviously was a
difficult decision to make because of the five people that you
now cite. But they supported the decision, and based on what I
know about the circumstances as they were known at the time, I
would have supported the decision as well.
Senator Cotton. I opposed it then, and I would oppose it
now. We didn't leave Bowe Bergdahl behind. The thousands of
soldiers who went after him trying to find him who faced enemy
fire trying to locate him were not leaving him behind.
You are right that they tell every soldier, sailor, airman,
and marine that they won't leave us behind. But that doesn't
mean they will trade five stone-cold Taliban killers for us.
When this transfer happened, Congress was not notified as
required by the law. Can you assure us that in the future,
Congress will always receive advance notification, as required
by law, for future releases of Guantanamo prisoners?
Dr. Carter. I can assure you we will always abide by the
law. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Cotton. There have been media reports, most
recently from Secretary Hagel himself, that he received White
House pressure to sign off on the certification that Guantanamo
detainees could be released. There have been reports that Leon
Panetta even declined to release these five specific Taliban
members at Guantanamo Bay.
Can you talk to us about how you might resist such pressure
if you receive it from the White House when it comes to
Guantanamo Bay releases?
Dr. Carter. I sure can. I am going to call it straight. I
have an obligation under the law with respect to the risk
associated with transfers of detainees, and I intend to
discharge that responsibility in a very straight-up way.
Senator Cotton. Shifting to Bowe Bergdahl, my understanding
is the investigation is still ongoing into his conduct in
Afghanistan. Is that your understanding?
Dr. Carter. That is my understanding from the newspapers,
but I don't have any inside information.
Senator Cotton. If confirmed, can you assure us that that
investigation will proceed without unlawful command influence
at any level?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Cotton. I would like to shift briefly to Russia and
Ukraine and the implications for the Baltic states. Right now,
there is fighting going on in Ukraine, much of it is over the
so-called Minsk line where the forces were supposed to be
separated since September.
One technique that Russia used in Crimea, then they used in
Eastern Ukraine is the so-called ``little green men''. By most
reports, these are Russian special operations forces, who are
operating in advance in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
If Russia has uniformed soldiers operating on foreign
territory without insignia, would that be a violation of the
Geneva Conventions?
Dr. Carter. What it is, I just don't know the international
legal answer to the question you are posing, Senator. But what
I do know is that is what they have been doing, and I don't
know. I think the little green men are part of the big lie, the
big Putin lie, where he is clearly violating the sovereignty of
a neighboring country and then pretending it isn't him and
pretending it isn't Russia.
As far as I understand, it very clearly is Russia. It seems
to me that is very important. I don't know the legal part of
it, but the common sense answer is he has violated Ukrainian
sovereignty.
Senator Cotton. I believe there is a strong case that it
would violate the Geneva Conventions to have soldiers operating
without insignia. Since you said earlier that you would support
putting NATO forces in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, I would
say I support that as well, especially recon forces who might
be on the lookout for little green men.
Thank you.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Dr. Carter, you have spoken quite effectively about the
need to address runaway costs, needless overhead, waste at DOD.
I want to touch on the fiscal impact of operating the
Guantanamo detention facility.
Maintaining the prison at Guantanamo is costing American
taxpayers almost $5 billion since it opened in 2002, an average
of $493 million every year for the last 5 years. In fact, in
2014, we spent more than $3 million per Guantanamo detainee.
That compares to about $78,000 per prisoner a year that we
use to house hardened criminals in the Florence, Colorado,
supermax prison. Do you intend to review the cost effectiveness
of continuing to operate the facility at Guantanamo versus
placing high-risk detainees that need to continue to be
detained in a more fiscally responsible setting?
Dr. Carter. Senator, I understand the cost numbers that you
are citing. They broadly correspond to what I understand. I
think the issue that Guantanamo will ultimately boil down to is
what do you do with the people at Guantanamo that they need to
be incarcerated. If not Gitmo, where are they going to be
incarcerated? That is a fundamental question that is a very
difficult one.
It is partly a legal one and partly a practical one, and I
don't know everything I would need to know about that. But I
hope that as time goes on and engaging with members of this
committee, many of whom know much more about this subject than
I do, that we can discuss what might be done with these people
because what is plain as day is that they need to be
incarcerated, as you indicated, in a supermax-type place.
Senator Heinrich. Yes, I appreciate that, and I look
forward to working with you on that.
As someone who helped draft the Nunn-Lugar legislation,
which I think was one of the high water marks for legislation
in the last decades, what is the right approach to preserving
that nonproliferation infrastructure in the current
environment?
Dr. Carter. The Nunn-Lugar program, since those days, has
moved on to other very important missions. It is less focused
on Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union than it
once was. It is now focused globally.
It has picked up a big focus on biological weapons, which
are also very fearsome weapons, as well as nuclear weapons. It
still has a role to play in keeping us safe.
It is one of those ways that the Defense Department can act
in its long-term interest to head off threats that were they to
occur and materialize would be much more dangerous and much
more costly to have to counter than if we can stop them from
developing in the first place.
Senator Heinrich. I appreciate that.
Back in 1995, we had our Nation's first nuclear posture
review. At that time, there was some talk about potentially
transitioning to a monad where land-based missiles and bombers
might not be utilized.
We have moved away from that, obviously, in recent years to
the more traditional triad. What are your thoughts on the
nuclear triad today, given today's global security environment?
Is that something you intend to continue to look at? Do you
think it is meeting the deterrent requirements that we have,
and just generally, what are your thoughts on it?
Dr. Carter. I think it is meeting our deterrent
requirements. I think those deterrent requirements are going to
be with us as far into the future as I can see, and that is why
having a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal and all the
parts of that that are necessitated is a foundational
responsibility of the Department of Defense.
It is not in the newspapers every day. It is not, you know,
as apparent, I suppose, to many citizens. But it is
foundational to our security.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Dr. Carter.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the chair.
I want to thank you, Dr. Carter, for being in such a
lengthy hearing and answering so many of our questions. We
really appreciate it.
I wanted to follow up on Russia, and specifically in your
advance policy questions, you had stated that Russian
deployment of weapon systems that violate the INF [Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces] treaty would pose an increased threat to
the United States and our allies in Europe and Asia. You have
also written that Russia should return to compliance with the
INF treaty in a verifiable manner.
I think one of the problem we are facing as we look at the
challenges we face, Russia is developing a new mobile nuclear
ground-launched cruise missile, which is in direct violation of
that 1987 treaty, which was likely in development even during
the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] negotiations,
which not only all the behavior we have seen in Ukraine, but
this makes it harder for us to have these types of
conversations with Russia and be able to trust anything that
they say.
What steps should we be taking in response to Russia's INF
violation?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
My answer is not based on any inside information or
intelligence information, just to be clear, but it is, I am
told, quite clear that Russia has violated the INF treaty. To
the question what are we going to do about it? I think you have
to remind Russia that this was a two-way street.
That we signed a treaty that said you are not going to do
this, and we are not going to do it either. If you don't want
to have that treaty, why then you are absolved from your
restrictions under that treaty, well, we are, too. What might
we do, therefore, in a military sense to respond to this
development if it continues on the part of Russia?
I think that there are defensive steps that we can take.
There are deterrent steps that we can take, and there are
counterforce steps that we can take. We have military options,
too, if they really want to get into this kind of game.
Obviously, the judgment behind the INF treaty was that we both
be better off if we didn't do this. That is why we agreed.
But these are always two-way streets, and I think they need
to be reminded it is a two-way street.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I appreciate that very much, Dr.
Carter.
I wanted to follow up on two areas. First, on the
Guantanamo Bay discussion, one of the things that I think is
important for people to understand is that we are not at the
moment talking about transfers. We are talking about releases,
and I think that is an important distinction. Something,
obviously, as Secretary of Defense, you should be looking at,
as we talked about earlier, making sure that people can't be in
a position to reengage.
One country in particular I want to ask you about, and that
is Yemen. Last year, I had an amendment that passed on a
bipartisan basis that would have prohibited transfers to Yemen.
The situation has gotten markedly worse since that amendment
passed in this committee. It did not get in the final bill.
I have 10 pages of incidents in Yemen, and obviously, the
recent issues with the Houthis, the takeover of the government,
as well as suicide attacks, et cetera. Do you think it is
advisable or would you recommend transferring any of these
detainees to Yemen?
Dr. Carter. That doesn't sound very sensible in the
environment in which we are facing ourselves, no.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. Thank you.
I also wanted to follow up, in our office discussion, we
had talked about the A-10. One thing I had asked of you that I
hope you will do when you are confirmed, and that is, I have
opposed the Air Force's decision to retire the A-10,
particularly from what I have heard from our men and women on
the ground and the fact that it is the best close-air support
platform for our men and women in uniform.
We have heard from the association that represents 3,300
serving, separated, and retired JTACs [joint terminal attack
controller]. That is the Tactical Air Control Party
Association, and what they have said about the A-10, ``We
believe that F-15, 16s, and B-1s cannot replicate the CAS
[close air support] capabilities of the A-10. And we know from
combat experience that the elimination of the A-10 before a
viable replacement achieves full operational capability will
cost American lives.''
I asked you in my office, and I would like you to confirm
again that you are willing to sit down with some of our members
of this association who, as you know, are the ones on the
ground calling in the strikes and working with our men and
women in uniform. They work with all of our platforms.
Dr. Carter. I remember very clearly. I have the letter that
you gave me from them, and absolutely, I will.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. This is really important.
I have one other follow-up request that you had graciously
agreed to in the office as well, and I think that Senator King
from Maine will appreciate this as well, and that is that you
agreed to come to New Hampshire. We, of course, at that point
will obviously love to show Dr. Carter the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Senator King. In Maine, you mean? The one in Maine?
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. Where so many of the wonderful workers are
from New Hampshire.
Senator King. Thank you.
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I would look forward to that.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Dr. Carter.
Dr. Carter. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. It is not necessary, Doctor.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Again, thank you, Dr. Carter, for being here today.
As a military, we have moved a very long ways away from
using the old compass and map. Many of our systems now are very
heavily networked. We rely very much on technology for our
weapon systems, for our command and control systems, and that
is really our primary tools for achieving dominance over our
adversaries on the battlefield.
But what we are seeing now is cybersecurity threat, cyber
attacks that are looming out there. A number of countries out
there, including Russia, China, North Korea, probably many
others, have very sophisticated means of attacking networks.
How do you see that impacting our acquisition strategy as we
move forward, and how do we best protect our equipment, protect
our personnel moving forward?
Dr. Carter. I think you said it exactly the way I see it.
You understand, but perhaps others around the country don't
understand that not only is our civilian infrastructure
susceptible to cyber attack, but we have to be concerned about
our military infrastructure because exactly as you say, there
is no point in having planes and ships and armored vehicles in
today's world if the network is itself vulnerable.
I think, and I hope I can work together, if I am confirmed,
with this committee on improving our cyber defenses, many
aspects of cyber. But one is the defense of our own networks in
the Department of Defense. That is not where it should be in
terms of making them immune to attack by a potential enemy that
would impair our own forces engaged with that enemy.
I agree with you entirely.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you. We rely on networking so
very much, from the simple ordering of a part for a Humvee to
targeting enemy on the battlefield. It goes from every level,
from your squad level all the way up through the ranks.
Do you have an opinion on this? Just your opinion because
it is more than just the military and the Department of Defense
and our network security. We could look at attacks to our
financial institutions, to our utilities as being a security
risk for the United States also.
Do you have an opinion on where the Federal Government
should be in regards to protecting our national security
interests versus the privacy of individuals out there that
might be using the network?
Dr. Carter. I do. I have some understanding of that issue,
and I would say that the Federal Government does have a role in
protecting the country from cyber attack in the same way that
it has a role in protecting the country from other kinds of
attack. I think it can do a lot more to exercise that
responsibility without causing concerns over invasions of
people's privacy and so forth.
For example, the Government can share information and
knowledge it has collected about threats to private networks
with those private parties, provided the proper legal
safeguards are provided, which have less to do with privacy
than they do with things like antitrust and other aspects that
are important.
I think that the Government can sponsor and conduct R&D
that improves the tradecraft in network defense for the good of
the country. I think there is a lot we can do, and we are not
anywhere near where we should be as a country.
I think if we were as unprotected in some other domain that
was more familiar to ordinary people, they would be clamoring
for us to do more. I think if people fully understand what you
understand about how vulnerable we are in cyberspace, they
would want us to do more, not in any way that compromised
anybody's privacy, but they would want us to be doing a lot
more than I believe we are doing now.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think this
will continue to be a vexing problem for us moving forward. It
is a situation we are dealing with in many of our separate
committees. But I do appreciate your opinion very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, I wanted to go back to the
issue of Iran for a moment. Under the chairman's leadership, we
have had some tremendous witnesses over the last 3 weeks
testifying on strategic challenges and how to think through
them.
Dr. Kissinger's testimony in particular was very powerful,
and he said, as we kind of struggle with these, ``we''
collectively in the legislative branch, executive branch, these
strategic issues and challenges, that we need to ask ourselves
questions. The first one, and I think in his view the most
important one, was what do we seek to prevent, no matter how it
happens and, if necessary, alone?
I will repeat that. What do we seek to prevent, no matter
how we prevent it, and, if necessary, alone? In your view,
would preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon fall into
that first category that Dr. Kissinger laid out?
Dr. Carter. Yes. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you.
Second, I want to get back to the issue we were talking
about a little bit earlier, this issue of kind of being
straight up with not only Congress and the American people on
our challenges. I think you have been doing that today in your
testimony.
Again, I have some doubts that that is happening at the
highest levels. The President's mention in his State of the
Union referring to 9/11 and then saying ``The crisis has
passed.'' I don't think most Americans would agree with that.
But the discussion today about ISIL and you were talking
about lasting defeat, it really is actually Islamic extremism
and the threat it poses to the United States and our citizens.
What, in your view, is the timeline? Because I think this is an
issue that really hasn't been discussed.
Some people think that we are going to declare victory next
year, 2 years? There have been others who have been saying, no,
this is much more like the Cold War. Former CENTCOM [United
States Central Command] commander General John Abizaid talked
about ``the long war''.
Where do you see this kind of defeat playing out? If it is
going to take a long time, maybe a generation, shouldn't we be
preparing the American people for that, as opposed to saying,
oh, we are going to defeat ISIL within a year?
Dr. Carter. I certainly hope that we defeat ISIL quickly,
but that won't be a lasting defeat necessarily, unless we have
a political dimension to that defeat as well as a military
defeat. That won't be the end of terrorism, Islamist
extremism's terrorism.
Our experience has been this is a movement that changes and
morphs and moves around the world. One would like to hope that
at some point its inherent unattractiveness would cause it to
burn out, but we can't be confident of that.
Senator Sullivan. How do you think we should be thinking
about it from a time standpoint?
Dr. Carter. I think we need to be thinking about terrorism,
more generally, as an enduring part of our national security
mission. I believe that Secretaries of Defense, many in the
future, even if Islamist extremism, which I certainly hope
burns itself out at some point, will always be facing the
problem of the few against the many.
There are aberrant people out there, and technology in
today's world gives smaller and smaller groups of people and
even individuals destructive power that they would never have
had in previous eras. It is going to be the job of our security
authorities--defense, law enforcement, homeland security, and
everything--to protect our people against these people,
whatever their thinking.
They may not be thinking in the ISIL way. They may have
something else on their mind. Or nothing at all on their minds.
But I do think it is going to be a continuing part of the human
condition and of defending our people.
Senator Sullivan. I want to just ask one final question. I
think one thing that is going to be very important is to
continue a very strong focus on training. Severe, hard training
for our troops.
As you know, in periods of drawdown or changes, as a
country, historically, we haven't always done this well. We
talked about this. When you are an infantry officer in the
Marine Corps, you are strongly encouraged to read this book
called ``This Kind of War''. I encourage you or your staff to
take a look at it. It is called ``a study in unpreparedness,''
and it shows what happens when you have troops that are not
trained.
If confirmed, you are obviously going to have a myriad of
responsibilities, pressures on you. I would like to get a
commitment that you will keep as certainly one of your top, if
not top priorities this issue of training--hard, severe
training. Because as you know, the best way to ultimately take
care of the troops is to make sure that they are ready to
fight, destroy the enemy, and come home safely.
Can we get that commitment from you?
Dr. Carter. You absolutely have it. I just would say your
authoritativeness on that exact subject is very much
appreciated and respected.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carter, I know we are trying to get you out. I will be
very brief, but I did want to come back to an issue that you
and I had a chance to talk about briefly when you came in to
see me, about the importance of our public shipyards and the
good work that they do. Senator King, I know Senator Ayotte,
and I are all very proud of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and
that you were issued an invitation to visit, which I would
second.
We would love to have you come up. While you are at it, you
can come to Pease Air National Guard Base and see the home of
the new KC-46 air refueling tanker, which we are also very
proud of.
One of the challenges of sequestration is the impact on not
just our men and women serving in uniform, but also on our
civilian workforce. Can you talk about the threats that is
posed by the uncertainty, especially for the engineers, the
scientists, the mathematicians that we are going to need to
continue to fill those civilian jobs to keep our shipyards at
their highest level of efficiency and production and all of our
depots as well?
Dr. Carter. Yes. Thank you.
I do want to take the opportunity to express my gratitude
for what our civilian members of our Department of Defense do.
A lot of people have the image of the civilian as a bureaucrat
sitting behind a desk somewhere, and that is an issue we also
need to get at because there is that, too, and that is costly
in headquarters and overhead and so forth.
But most of DOD civilians are not sitting behind a desk.
They are actually doing maintenance work and repair work that
actually needs to get done. They are not a waste. They are
there doing something essential.
I think that sometimes we talk about them as though we
don't appreciate them, and I think we do need to appreciate
them. Even as we cut down, as I believe we need to do, the
overall number of civilians in the Department of Defense, I
think you do that by getting rid of the overhead and the
unnecessary layers and offices and so forth.
But I don't think anybody ought to be talking about
somebody who fixes and maintains an essential piece of
equipment. We ought to be giving our thanks to those folks for
what they are doing for the country.
Senator Shaheen. Are you concerned about the impact that
sequestration might have on our ability to continue to maintain
those civilian workers who have the backgrounds that we need to
continue to do those jobs?
Dr. Carter. Yes. Because one of the things that sequester
does because it hits fast and hard is cause managers in defense
to take away dollars from exactly that kind of work, and it
gets back to the readiness issue.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Dr. Carter, sorry I had to step out. I had
another committee meeting. If this question has been asked, I
apologize.
In your response to some of the written questions submitted
to you, there was a concern expressed over the size of our
naval fleet and how it has reduced in numbers. In your
response, you commented that you can't just look at the
absolute number of ships to determine what our capabilities
are.
My question for you is what can you share with us that
should make us feel okay with some reduction in the fleet, if
you believe that that is okay as a long-term position?
Secondly, what do you think the long-term plan should be for
our naval readiness?
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
It is true that, as you say, that you have to look at
quality and not just quantity. I mean, that said, I think the
Navy's shipbuilding plan calls for it to increase the number of
ships, not to decrease the number of ships. I certainly think
that is important.
Our Navy is the paramount navy of the world, and that is
one of the things that makes us a global power. It is what
allows us to be present when things break somewhere. Whether it
be a conflict or a natural disaster, you see the Americans show
up first in either case. Why do they do that? One of the ways
they do that is through the Navy.
I have a strong interest in maintaining not just the
quality, but the quantity as well. Obviously, this gets back to
the budget and how many dollars we have. Another reason why we
need to have enough dollars.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
I have another question and final question. It relates to a
report I am expecting the Secretary of the Air Force to submit
to Congress, saying that they are going to be pulling out the
Air Force assets from Pope Field. You and I touched on this
briefly when we met.
I think the result of that is going to be the Army
requiring planes to be flown in to support training exercises
there. I am more worried about Pope Field, going forward. It
looks like the current course and speed, it could wither away,
and I think it is an important strategic asset.
Rather than ask you to take a position on this decision, I
would like to get your commitment once you are confirmed to
meet with me and others who have a concern with this not as a
North Carolina issue, but as a perhaps not a good strategic
decision. Walk through this and see if either I can be
convinced that it is the right decision or you can be convinced
it may be something we have to rethink. I would appreciate your
commitment to doing that.
Dr. Carter. Absolutely, you have that.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. I am told that Senator Lee is on his way.
Is his staffer here?
[Pause.]
Chairman McCain. From the airport?
Senator Tillis. Pope Field.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. I just don't think we can hold up the
witness. Can I just say we intend to receive as many written
questions as necessary by the end of business today. You can
review them and have your answers returned so that we can get
your confirmation to the floor early next week.
If not, as you know, the week after that, we are in a
recess. We will try and get it accomplished.
I heard a door close. Yes, go ahead, Jack.
Senator Reed. I just simply want to thank Dr. Carter for
his service to the Nation, for his testimony today, and thank
the chairman for an extremely thoughtful hearing and a very
productive hearing.
Thank you.
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. I just can't hold the witness any longer.
[Pause.]
Senator Tillis. Senator McCain, I think he is running
around the ante room to this entrance here. I would expect him
to pop through in about 10 seconds.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee, welcome.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You have been very patient today and answered a lot of
questions, and I just wanted to talk to you briefly about
religious freedom within the military. I think the ability to
believe according to one's own belief system and to express
those views appropriately is of utmost importance to the morale
of all of our service men and women and to their families.
I think it is also something of a pillar of our society,
something that we have always expected would be tolerated is a
diversity of religious viewpoint and religious expression.
Certainly one's religious freedom should never be curtailed
merely because one decides to serve one's country in the
military.
I was concerned late last year to hear about a situation in
the Army in which a chaplain in the course of some suicide
prevention training was reprimanded for sharing his faith,
talking about how his faith played a really important role in
his personal recovery from depression.
My understanding is that he was reprimanded despite the
fact that the Army itself, of course, recognizes the importance
of spiritual wellness and the importance that faith can play in
a person's life in dealing with mental health issues of all
kinds and an Army that has affirmed the important role that
chaplains tend to play in our armed services.
Congress, of course, has acted several times in recent
years to prioritize protection of religious freedom and
religious expression within the armed services, respecting the
necessity, of course, of maintaining good order and discipline
and making sure that those things aren't ever compromised.
What is your view on religious freedom and freedom of
religious expression within the military? What will you do, if
you are confirmed as Secretary, to make sure that those rights
are respected and that the obligations imposed by Congress on
the military are honored?
Dr. Carter. I do think it is important, and I don't think
there is any inherent conflict between religious freedom and
religious expression and good order and discipline. We can have
both.
I don't know anything about the particular case you
adduced, but that this idea of having both and that they are
not in inherent conflict with one another I think is extremely
important and one that if I am confirmed in this job, I would
want to see to it that no one thought that there was an
inherent conflict between those two.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I know those
who serve us certainly appreciate that as well.
I appreciated what I heard you say earlier. I think it was
in connection with a question asked by Senator Ernst regarding
the valuable contributions of our National Guard and our
Reserve units in combat. I hope that as the Services continue
to reassess their force mixture that those sentiments that you
expressed very well will continue to be at the forefront of
your mind and that you will be conscious of those things.
As I look at the Guard units in my home State of Utah,
those Guard units have served us very well, and a lot of our
servicemembers who serve in our Guard units have been deployed
many, many times just over the last few years. They have served
exceptionally well, and I hope you will continue to recognize
them, their contributions, and to utilize them appropriately.
Dr. Carter. I will. You just said it very well. They have
really come through for us.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much.
Dr. Carter. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is
rapidly expiring.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Doctor, as I mentioned, we will try to ask our members to
get in any written questions they have for you by noon tomorrow
so that you will have time to return those either before the
weekend or just after.
We will see, talk to the Majority Leader to see if we can't
get your nomination to the floor so that you can get to work.
We thank you for your patience today and thank you for your
appearance and thank you for your willingness to continue to
serve this Nation.
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to the Honorable Ashton B.
Carter by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-
Nichols Act or special operations provisions at this time. The success
of our Armed Forces since the enactment of these provisions amply
demonstrates that they have served the Department and our Nation well.
duties of the secretary of defense
Question. Section 113 of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense (DOD).
Subject to the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense,
under section 113, has authority, direction, and control over DOD.
Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your
ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. No.
Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. At this time, I believe that the authorities in section 113
for the position of Secretary of Defense are appropriate.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have spent more than 3 decades working on defense and
national security issues, both in and out of government. Most recently
I served in two senior positions in the Department, including as the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As Deputy Secretary of Defense
I served as the Department's Chief Operating Officer with management
over the Department's budget and civilian military personnel. During my
tenure as Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I
had responsibility for the department's efforts to accelerate the
production of urgent operational need such as MRAPs which saved
countless lives in Afghanistan, increase the taxpayer's buying power,
and strengthen the Nation's defense against emerging threats.
Previously, in the 1990s, I served as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy where I was responsible for a
variety of strategic issues. Between my periods of government service I
have served in a variety of academic and government advisory roles
focused on national security and defense issues.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical
issues relating to threats to national security and ensuring that the
Armed Forces are prepared to deal with these threats.
In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next
Secretary of Defense?
Answer. The challenges include preserving and enhancing the finest
fighting force in the world and taking care of their families;
providing a strategic perspective to the threats and opportunities in
the world; and implementing significant reforms that are crucial in a
time of budget uncertainty.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing these challenges
by consulting with the civilian and military leadership of the
Department, seeking the perspective of our partners, allies and
friends, working closely with my interagency partners, seeking the best
ideas from outside the government, and working closely with this
committee and Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. The top priorities are to ensure the security of the
American people, defend our vital interests, and fight and win our
Nation's wars.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
performing their command function.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. My understanding of these laws and my experience leads me
to believe that they establish a clear and effective chain of command,
which is an essential element to successful military operations.
Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
civilian control of the military?
Answer. In my view, these provisions significantly enhance civilian
control of the military and place the President and the Secretary of
Defense in position to best exercise civilian control of the military
by occupying the top positions in the military chain of command.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority outside the chain of command
established under title 10, United Sates Code?
Answer. I believe that U.S. military forces normally should operate
under the chain of command established under title 10. However, today's
threats are such that there may be circumstances involving certain
sensitive operations where an exception to that chain of command may be
appropriate to provide military support to the head of a non-DOD U.S.
department or agency. It is my understanding that only the President
may approve such an exception, as also provided in section 162 of title
10. If confirmed, I will consider these situations very carefully and
provide the President with my best advice regarding where an exception
to the established chain of command may be appropriate.
advice of the service chiefs and the combatant commanders
Question. Section 151 of title 10, United States Code, provides, in
part, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense and that if any member of the Joint Chiefs
submits to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or
advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the
Chairman, the Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same
time he provides his own advice to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, United
States Code, provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the
operational requirements of their commands.
What is your understanding and assessment of the distribution of
responsibilities and authorities for providing uniformed professional
military judgment, advice, and opinions to the President, National
Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department?
Answer. Based on my understanding of the law and my experience, I
believe the distribution of responsibilities and authorities for
providing professional military judgment, advice, and opinions is
adequate and functioning well.
Question. What changes in law, if any, do you think may be
necessary to ensure that the views of the Service Chiefs and of the
combatant commanders are presented and considered?
Answer. Based on my understanding of the law, and my experience, I
do not recommend any changes to the law.
use of military force
Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should
participate in potentially dangerous situations is one of the most
important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities
have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decisionmaking for such
situations.
In your view, what factors should be considered in making
recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
Answer. The factors that should be considered are: the necessity of
removing a critical threat to the U.S. Homeland and citizens and its
allies and friends; the prospects and strategy for achieving lasting
success through the use of force; complementary employment, as
appropriate, of other instruments of national power; and the assistance
as appropriate of allies and partners.
national security budget reductions
Question. The 2011 Budget Control Act established discretionary
budget caps to realize nearly $1 trillion in budget savings spending
over 10 years. Half of those budget cuts are to national defense
discretionary accounts.
Do you believe that defense spending reductions of this magnitude
can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national
security?
Answer. No. During my tenure as Deputy Secretary and Acquisition
Executive the Department developed a comprehensive strategy. I said
then, and I will reiterate now, that the strategy is not executable
under the sequestration-level budget caps of the Budget Control Act.
Question. How would you assess the national military strategy to
deal with the changed budget environment?
Answer. Any strategy must continue to protect and advance this
Nation's interests, within the resources the Nation is willing to
commit to national defense. If confirmed, I will seek a balance between
maintaining an agile and ready force to address today's demands while
investing in the capabilities we need to address future challenges.
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of DOD funding?
Answer. The measure must be, can the Department meet the security
challenges of today, while also investing adequate resources to prepare
for future security challenges, both the expected and the unexpected.
Question. If confirmed, and given this era of budget austerity, how
will you prioritize the objectives of meeting ongoing operational
commitments around the world, re-setting of the force, and investing in
the future force?
Answer. There has to be a balance. The Department should have
sufficient capacity to deal with the wide range of challenges we face,
yet not maintain more capacity than we can afford to modernize and keep
ready, given that we also have a responsibility to the force of the
future.
readiness of the armed forces
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. I believe that readiness has been especially affected by
sudden and uncertain budget reductions. Readiness is essential to our
security and to ensure troops sent in to conflict are fully prepared.
The Service Chiefs testified last week before this committee that there
have been some readiness gains over the last year, but that there are
still critical readiness deficits in many areas. Any readiness gains
over the last year appear to me to be extremely fragile and will
certainly reverse without sufficient resources.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
Department's readiness reporting and monitoring systems, such as the
Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)? In you view, does DRRS
provide civilian and military leaders with the information necessary to
make informed resource and operational decisions?
Answer. The readiness systems in place provide senior leaders with
the information they need to determine which forces are ready to deploy
considering a variety of mission criteria. These systems contain
current and historical readiness data from the tactical to the
strategic level. In my view, the DRRS does provide the necessary
information to make informed resource and operational decisions.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose
making to the Department's readiness systems to ensure timely and
accurate information is available for decisions on commitment of
military forces and to judge the impact of budget conditions on the
readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. The Department's readiness reporting systems, the DRRS in
particular, contain a variety of readiness resourcing and capability
data that is useful for senior leaders to gain an understanding of our
operational vulnerabilities and shortcomings.
Question. If confirmed, to what key indications and indicators of a
``hollow'' or unready military will you pay closest attention? What are
the most dangerous risks or consequences associated with a ``hollow''
or unready force in your opinion?
Answer. Key elements of readiness include the quality of our
military personnel and the status of their individual training in the
military specialties, the manning and training of the units in which
they serve to meet the mission essential tasks they are given, and the
availability of their required equipment from basic small arms to major
platforms. This individual and unit readiness must be assessed against
the requirement of the contingency plans of the combatant commanders. I
have always paid considerable attention to these elements and I will
continue to do so if confirmed as this is an essential obligation of
leaders to the forces we send in harm's way.
audit readiness
Question. DOD remains unable to achieve a clean financial statement
audit. The Department also remains on the Government Accountability
Office's list of high risk agencies and management systems for
financial management and weapon system acquisition. Although audit-
readiness has been a goal of the Department for decades, DOD has
repeatedly failed to meet numerous congressionally directed audit-
readiness deadlines.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's
efforts to achieve a clean financial statement audit?
Answer. My understanding of the Department's efforts is that the
Department has made progress in the last 5 years following the
strategic plan and priorities established early in this Administration.
If confirmed, I will get a detailed assessment from my Chief Financial
Officer, and hold him responsible and accountable for making
auditability one of my top business reform priorities.
Question. Do you believe that the Department is likely to meet the
current 2017 statutory objective for ensuring that its financial
statements are validated as ready for audit?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to inform
Congress on the 2017 objective after I have the results of the ongoing
military departments' audits.
Question. What is the likeliness that this audit will produce a
clean opinion? In your view, how long is it likely to be from the time
when the Department certifies its financial statements as ``ready for
audit'' to the time when the Department achieves a clean audit opinion?
If confirmed, what specific actions would you propose taking to promote
compliance with the statutory objective?
Answer. Experience throughout the government, with agencies that
are far smaller and less complex than DOD, demonstrates it takes
several years to move from an initial audit to a clean opinion. So I do
not think it is realistic to expect that a first year audit of the
entire Department will produce a clean opinion. If confirmed, I will
continue to make this a high priority and hold our senior leaders,
civilian and military, accountable for positive progress towards a
clean opinion.
Question. What is your understanding of what the validation of
audit readiness means? What steps will the Department go through to
validate its financial statements as ready for audit and when will
these steps be taken?
Answer. My understanding is that a validation of audit readiness is
an independent assessment to ensure key elements required by a
financial audit are in fact part of the day-to-day processes and
internal controls and can be demonstrated to show they are compliant
with accounting standards. If confirmed, I will develop a complete
understanding of the department's validation of audit readiness in
order to hold the Chief Financial Officer responsible and accountable
to monitor key critical path milestones so the Department is ready for
audit in fiscal year 2018.
Question. What steps do you believe that Congress and/or the
Department should take if the Department fails to meet the statutory
objective, given that the current administration will not be in office
in 2017?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to do everything I can to position
the Department to comply with the statutory guidance. The Chief
Financial Officer should lay out a clear set of interim critical path
milestones and ensuring those gates are met. If confirmed, I will
ensure that this receives an appropriate priority and that
accountability is instilled into the performance appraisals of senior
leaders. I believe Congress should continue to provide constructive
oversight to ensure full understanding of the Department's direction
and progress and to help when applicable.
Question. In your view, what evidence, if any, can we point to
today that provides Congress and taxpayers confidence that the
Department's resources are being spent appropriately given its
inability to pass a financial statement audit?
Answer. The Department continues to meet the mission of defending
our country's basic values with a world-class military. It trains and
equips our men and women to carry out critical missions to protect us
and our allies around the world. While the department currently falls
short of having a clean audit of our financial statements, we do
receive positive audit opinions on a significant amount of our
resources, and there are numerous controls in place to ensure taxpayer
resources are spent as intended by the Congress. Independent of
auditability, the department has a detailed track of where the money
goes and what it supports. If confirmed, I intend to demonstrate to the
taxpayers that DOD is a good steward of our resources and worthy of
their confidence.
department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
Question. DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have in
recent years increased collaboration to support servicemembers as they
transition to veteran status. This support includes access to health
and mental health care, improved disability evaluation, and
coordination of compensation and other benefits.
If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that the DOD and VA fully
cooperate with each other to develop simplified processes to achieve
seamless transition as servicemembers move to veteran status?
Answer. We must be unwavering in our commitment to our veterans and
their families. DOD and the VA continuously collaborate to better
support transitioning servicemembers. This effort includes the
Transition Assistance Program to ensure our servicemembers receive the
skills and tools necessary for a successful transition from Active Duty
to civilian life. In addition, I am aware that the two Departments have
improved information sharing, such as timely availability of Service
Treatment Records to VA and enhanced sharing of health information, and
are working toward greater interoperability of their records systems.
If confirmed, I will continue to direct those responsible in DOD to
work toward a seamless transition from recovery to reintegration or
transition for our servicemembers, especially those who are wounded,
ill, or injured.
integrated disability evaluation system
Question. The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES)
integrates the DOD and VA disability systems to improve and expedite
processing of servicemembers through the disability evaluation system.
Servicemembers continue, however, to experience lengthy delays getting
their disability ratings. Although DOD has shown progress in meeting
IDES timeliness goals, IDES casework remains backlogged in the VA's
portion of the system.
What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
improve the IDES?
Answer. DOD must continually evaluate its disability evaluation
system to identify and implement process improvements. A key initiative
underway is the development of a DOD Disability Evaluation System (DES)
IT system to provide new capabilities to support end-to-end DES case
management--tracking, reporting, and electronic case file transfer. We
need to continue to work with VA to ensure our IT systems for
evaluating and compensating disabled servicemembers and veterans are
interoperable.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the VA Secretary to
ensure both DOD and VA meet or exceed timeliness goals through each
phase of the multi-step disability evaluation process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to engage directly with the
Secretary of the VA and at DOD with senior leaders in the Services. I
will direct the DOD to collaborate with our VA partners to identify
necessary changes and appropriately address them. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the DOD maintains an effective joint and integrated
disability program.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. What is your assessment of the Department's progress on
implementing recent legislative changes intended to prevent and respond
to sexual assaults in the military?
Answer. First, I want to make clear that I consider sexual assault
absolutely and without exception unacceptable. It is reprehensible in
any aspect of society but particularly consequential in the military,
which must operate quickly with complete trust and delegates so much
authority to commanders and where missions often require long
deployments in austere environments. I understand the Department is
implementing many new provisions of law, mandating many changes in
programs and procedures. I am told that implementation of the
provisions in the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 is ongoing. I believe DOD
needs to do better in its prevention efforts and in responding to the
needs of survivors compassionately, quickly and effectively.
My understanding is the Department is also working on the
implementation of the relevant Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
NDAA for fiscal year 2015 sections, which were enacted in December
2014. If confirmed, I will personally continue to make this a top
priority and continue the collaboration with Members of Congress, which
is crucial in identifying issues and crafting solutions.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take a personal role in assessing
these issues and holding people accountable for outcomes. I am aware
that training exists for all servicemembers, at all levels, and it is
tailored specifically to resonate within each Service and rank's
culture. I will continue to assess the effectiveness of this training,
and ensure adjustments are made as necessary. It is my understanding
that the investigators in recent years have largely changed from an
incident-focused investigation to an offender-focused investigation,
which emphasizes that an offender's behavioral history may extend
beyond the confines of any one particular incident. I am also aware
that the relevant agencies have developed training that helps
investigators better understand the impact of trauma on memory. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues to work to
refine and improve training.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
Services, and military commanders in particular, to hold assailants
accountable for their acts?
Answer. A top priority of DOD must be to hold assailants
appropriately accountable for their acts. This must be carried out by
the Services and military commanders.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
of proposals to remove from military commanders' disposition authority
over violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including
sexual assaults?
Answer. Leaders have offered thoughtful perspectives on both sides
of this issue. As a matter of first principle, I believe that the
Secretary of Defense and other leaders need to be able to hold everyone
in an organization accountable. I understand the Department is
concerned that this change could tell commanders that it is not their
job to root out the evil of sexual assault. I further understand that a
congressionally-mandated independent panel found no evidence that
removing commanders from the process would improve accountability of
offenders or reporting by victims. If confirmed, I will take a direct
personal role in this issue.
Question. What is your assessment of the results of the recently
reported survey of military members on the prevalence of sexual assault
in the Armed Services?
Answer. The existence of sexual assault within our ranks is deeply
disturbing and the conduct is utterly unacceptable. The Department must
continue its work to eliminate sexual assault. The incidence of sexual
assault and the percentage of victims who are retaliated against or
concerned about retaliation remain unacceptably high. I am particularly
concerned by the finding that a substantial portion of victims
perceived some level of retaliation associated with their sexual
assault report, including alienation and other forms of social
ostracism from their peers. This destroys good order and discipline and
fosters a climate that is inconsistent with the dignity and respect
that our servicemembers deserve.
Question. What is the status of the review of the Manual for
Courts-Martial directed by Secretary Hagel and when do you anticipate
the Department will provide a report on this review to this committee?
Answer. I understand that at Secretary Hagel's direction, the DOD's
Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) is conducting a comprehensive
review of the military justice system. It is my understanding that the
MJRG will issue two reports, one in March 2015 recommending changes to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and one in September 2015
recommending changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial. If confirmed, I
anticipate directing the relevant DOD components to review the reports
and recommendations for appropriate action, and if necessary, proposed
legislation.
Question. Secretary Hagel conducted a weekly oversight review to
ensure continued progress on implementing legislative changes intended
to combat sexual assault. If confirmed, what actions will you take to
ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and
respond to sexual assaults?
Answer. If confirmed, my personal involvement will be frequent and
regular, which will guide the Department to adapt its sexual assault
policies and systems with agility. If confirmed, I plan to continue
this personal commitment to eliminating sexual assault in our ranks and
restoring victim confidence in our response system. I recognize that it
will be critical to work closely with Congress and Service leaders to
deliver consistent and effective prevention initiatives to influence
behavior with the goal of eliminating the crime of sexual assault
across the Department.
Question. What is your assessment of the military's protections
against retaliation for reporting sexual assault?
Answer. Based on the recent report to the President, they are not
adequate. The report underscores the need to better understand the
complex ways in which the retaliation manifests itself, and to ensure
that victims of sexual assault have choices in the form of assistance
they engage to address this behavior. If confirmed, this effort will be
a priority of mine.
Question. What is your assessment of military programs for the
prevention of domestic abuse, including spousal rape?
Answer. The Department is committed to addressing the prevention of
and response to domestic abuse, including spousal rape, which is a
serious public health issue. The Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is a
comprehensive Department-wide program that provides victim advocacy and
counseling for victims and offender treatment programs. FAP utilizes
evidenced-based programs to address domestic abuse, and works in
collaboration with Command, medical, legal, and law enforcement to
support victims of domestic abuse and child abuse and neglect. FAP
collaborates closely with the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office and shares best practices on victim assistance.
role of national guard and reserves
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve
components' size and force structure, including mix of capabilities and
capacities, to meet the requirements of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and the current National Military Strategy?
Answer. The seven Reserve components have proven essential during
13 years of war and natural disasters at home. I understand that
questions about the size and makeup of the Active component and Reserve
component are currently under consideration as the Department continues
to implement the new defense strategy and respond to the current fiscal
environment. If confirmed, I will insure that the Military Departments,
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the combatant commanders
work closely together to determine the most effective mix and makeup of
Active, Reserve, and Guard personnel to maximize the value of these
organizations in a way that is balanced against needs.
Question. In your view, what is the definition of ``operational
Reserve'' when referring to the Reserve components?
Answer. In my view, the term ``operational Reserve'' refers to our
need to have a Reserve component that is made ready and available to
operate in peacetime, in wartime and in support of civil authorities.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of how the
concept of an ``operational Reserve'' is currently used by the
Department for Reserve component sizing, force structure, readiness
reporting and evaluation, and resourcing? If confirmed, what changes,
if any, would you propose regarding the use of the concept of an
``operational Reserve'' with respect to the Reserve components?
Answer. The National Guard and Reserve is a critical source of many
of the capabilities required in ongoing operations and contingency
surge requirements. As an operational Reserve the Reserve component
would make certain capabilities available on a continuing basis and
others to augment and reinforce the Active components when mobilized
over time.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to
the realization of the Reserve component as an ``operational Reserve''?
If confirmed, what actions would you propose taking, if any, to deal
with these challenges?
Answer. In my view, some of the most significant challenges in
employing the Total Force are declining resources and the subsequent
impacts on the Services' abilities to man, train and equip the Force.
If confirmed, I will insure the Service Chiefs, the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau and the combatant commanders work together to
balance the Total Force.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of current
statutory authorities for the mobilization and utilization of members
of the Reserve component? If confirmed, what changes in law would you
propose, if any, to make Reserve component mobilization and utilization
more efficient and effective or to enhance their ability to perform
various national security or domestic support to civil authorities
missions?
Answer. Current statutory authorities make the Reserve component an
accessible force. If confirmed I will insure the Service Chiefs, the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the combatant commanders review
lessons learned after over a decade of unprecedented mobilization to
determine if changes are needed to make mobilization and utilization of
our Reserve component more efficient and effective. Key considerations
in this review are early notification for deployments, mobilization
lengths, dwell-to-mobilization targets and predictability for the
service personnel, families and employers.
active duty and reserve component end strength
Answer. The Department is implementing its 5-year plan to reduce
Active Duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017, and
the Reserve components by another 21,000 over the same period. These
cuts do not include any additional personnel reductions that could
result from sequestration or any agreement to avoid sequestration.
Do you agree with this plan to reduce Active Duty and Reserve
component end strengths?
Answer. My understanding is that these planned reductions reflect
an effort to balance the capability, capacity, and the readiness
impacts of budget reductions with the requirements of the defense
strategy.
Question. How will these reductions impact the Armed Forces'
ability to meet national defense requirements?
Answer. Fiscal uncertainty and new operational demands driven by
unforeseen world events have the potential to jeopardize the Services'
ability to both provide ready forces for today's fight and guarantee
ready forces for tasked operational plans.
Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you
envision if the Department is required to operate under the budget caps
for fiscal year 2016 as currently set out in law?
Answer. If sequester returns in 2016, I believe the Services may be
compelled to implement additional force structure reductions. The
consequences of sequestration have been significant for the Joint Force
and its ability to meet our strategic objectives. The Department needs
to continually examine the force structure and personnel levels
required to meet our national security objectives.
Question. In your view, what tools do the Department and Services
need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of
these require congressional authorization?
Answer. My understanding is that Congress has supported the
Department with the force shaping tools necessary to meet the drawdown
under its current plan. However, further budget reductions would make
it necessary to revisit the size of all components of the Total Force--
Active Duty, Reserve component, DOD civilians, and contractors.
Consequently, future assessment may require us to request additional
congressional authorization for force shaping tools.
women in the military
Question. Do you believe that the services are conducting
appropriate and objective evaluations to inform decisions on the
integration of women into previously closed units and military
occupations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Services and U.S. Special
Operations Command have been conducting evaluations in accordance with
their respective implementation plans. If confirmed, I will closely
monitor their progress and ensure they stay on track and meet the
Department's timelines. If I receive requests for exception to policy,
I will carefully consider them when the time comes.
Question. In your view, should the Military Selective Service Act
be amended to require females to register for possible military
service?
Answer. I understand a recent law requires the Department to
provide an analysis of the constitutionality of continued application
of the Military Selective Service Act to only men.
Question. In your view, and if the Military Selective Service Act
is so revised, in a future exigency in which the Nation may need to
implement a draft, are there any reasons why qualified males and
females should not be subject to the draft?
Answer. Given that the Armed Forces have waged the longest
continuous conflict in our history with an All-Volunteer Force, and the
fact that most military career fields are now open to women, a review
of the military selective service act would be prudent. This is not
solely a Defense issue, but rather part of a much broader national
discussion.
costs of medical care
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of the
Department's rising health care costs on military readiness and overall
national security?
Answer. In a constrained fiscal environment, if confirmed, I will
seek a balanced approach to control rising health care costs by
continuing to drive greater efficiencies within the system and to
pursue reasonable health benefit reforms that offers exceptional value
to our beneficiaries.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to mitigate the
effect of the Department's rising medical costs on DOD's budget top-
line while simultaneously implementing programs to improve health
outcomes and to enhance the experience of care for all beneficiaries?
Answer. Controlling health care costs is a priority for the
Department. In recent years, additional emphasis was placed on
achieving savings and efficiencies within the operational environment
of the Military Health System (MHS). However, these internal savings
initiatives are not enough to curb the projected increase in health
care costs for the Department in the coming years. In addition to
internal savings, I understand that DOD is trying to reform TRICARE
into a more integrated health care system, which is less complex and
provides greater choice and value to our beneficiaries.
The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission
report provides another set of proposals that require careful review
and consideration. If confirmed, I will work with Congress on all
responsible efforts to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of
the health system.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to create a value-based
military health system--a system that creates value for beneficiaries
and the Department by ensuring the delivery of quality health care and
improving health outcomes for beneficiaries at reasonable costs to
beneficiaries and DOD?
Answer. A value-based military health system starts with the
department's ability to meet the DOD mission. Unlike civilian
healthcare systems, the primary mission of the MHS is to ensure a
medically ready force and a medical force that is ready to carry out
its wartime mission. The Army, Navy, and Air Force medical services
maintain that primary mission through the Military Treatment Facilities
(MTFs). The MTFs alone cannot provide the care for all beneficiaries
and therefore the TRICARE program is a critical component to the
integrated health system.
defense health agency
Question. In 2013, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you signed a DOD
directive that chartered a new Defense Health Agency (DHA) to reform
the governance and management of the Military Health System.
What efficiencies and related savings have resulted from
establishment of the DHA?
Answer. Although it's still in its infancy, the DHA stood up ten
shared services and I understand it is reducing performance variation
across the MHS. The DHA was critical to facilitating a coordinated
implementation of the MHS Review, which focused on access to care,
quality, and patient safety. The DHA's focus on business process
reengineering is looking to achieve a net savings in such areas as
pharmacy operations, health information technology and medical
logistics. Another goal is to improve coordination of care in our
largest health care markets, now being governed as enhanced multi-
service markets.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure continued progress
towards making the military health system a more efficient health care
delivery system while improving health outcomes for beneficiaries?
Answer. The MHS, like most other health care systems in this
country, needs to provide efficient, quality health care that is safe
and effective, whether delivered on a battlefield or in one of our
hospitals. If confirmed, I will direct those responsible to look for
ways to improve not only the efficiency and performance of the system,
but I will insist that critical medical capabilities are ready to
support our warfighters anywhere and anytime.
integrated electronic health record (ehr)
Question. Last year, DOD published a RFP for a modern EHR with
plans to award a contract in 2015 with an estimated total life cycle
cost of over $11 billion.
Considering the many problems the Department has experienced with
its existing EHR and its failure to deploy a modern EHR over many years
despite strong congressional support, do you have confidence that the
Department will finally be successful with this effort?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the program status
since leaving the Department, but, if confirmed, I will direct those
responsible to keep me fully informed of its status.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure this
procurement comes in on time and on budget without any waste of
taxpayers' money?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that our EHR solution meets the
needs of our servicemembers while providing maximum value for the
taxpayer. The timely and cost-effective acquisition and deployment of a
new, modern EHR system is one of the department's top priorities in the
health care area.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the VA secretary to
ensure DOD and VA will seamlessly share real-time health information
electronically?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully intend to personally continue the
close collaboration that has been ongoing between the DOD and VA, and
will personally engage with Secretary McDonald. Interoperability of our
medical records system with theirs will be essential to the success of
the EHR solution.
health care quality and access to care in the military health system
(mhs)
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take with respect to
each of the following:
Eliminating performance variability throughout the MHS;
Answer. I am aware that the MHS Review ordered by Secretary Hagel
demonstrated that there is performance variability both among and
within our Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). We need to develop a
more robust enterprise-wide capability to establish common performance
measures, identify associated standards, monitor performance relative
to those standards, and mitigate critical deficiencies. I understand
the Department has begun to create these capabilities, and I will make
it a priority to oversee their successful implementation.
Question. Improving health outcomes of the Department's
beneficiaries in the direct and purchased care components of the MHS;
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct that the MHS has a well-
developed performance management system that permits data-driven
decisions. Leaders will be held accountable for continuous improvement
of outcomes in both the direct and purchased care systems.
Question. Delivering quality health care at lower cost to create
value for beneficiaries and the Department; and
Answer. Improved readiness, better care and better health outcomes
for our beneficiaries while operating the MHS more efficiently and at
lower cost will create better value for those we serve as well as the
taxpayers. The MHS should continue the enterprise management reforms to
standardize business and clinical processes with a goal to optimize
utilization, effectiveness and reduce variability.
Question. Promoting transparency of information that will help
beneficiaries become more involved in making their healthcare
decisions.
Answer. The department has developed a plan to increase
transparency throughout the MHS for beneficiaries and key stakeholders.
If confirmed, I will ensure that those directly responsible will review
this plan and its implementation to make certain the Department and the
MHS has met its obligation to meet the information needs of
beneficiaries so that they can make important decisions about their
healthcare.
mental health care
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater and to servicemembers and families upon return to home station
locations with insufficient community-based mental health resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to reduce the stigma
associated with seeking mental health care, encourage help-seeking
behavior and increase the use of available resources among
servicemembers and their families. This would include an integrated
approach for ongoing mental health research, prevention, and evidence-
based treatment efforts that will continue to allow the Department to
provide high-quality, timely mental healthcare services. Finally, I
will continue to work with the VA and Department of Health and Human
Services to coordinate mental health initiatives on behalf of
servicemembers, Veterans and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that robust
mental health resources are available for Guard and Reserve members and
their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure those directly responsible
remain committed to ensuring the Reserve components receive all medical
and mental health resources necessary to meet their needs and promote
smooth re-integration. This begins with ensuring pre and post-
deployment health and mental health assessments with prompt referral
for those identified as having needs. Additionally, I will ensure those
directly responsible work with the VA leadership to improve processes
for ``hand-offs'' to prevent lapses in services. I will continue to
assess the adequacy of family support/re-integration programs that are
vital to support servicemembers and their families who are facing
mental health problems.
suicide prevention
Question. If confirmed, how would you maintain a strong focus on
preventing suicides in the Active and Reserve components and in their
families?
Answer. DOD has a strong and longstanding relationship with public
and private partners and has recently adopted the National Strategy for
Suicide Prevention, which is being integrated into the Department's
strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure those directly responsible
support all efforts to examine gaps and overlaps in efforts across the
Department to ensure we provide the best policies and programs to both
prevent suicide and build resilience.
personnel and entitlement costs
Question. What do you believe to be an appropriate percentage of
the Department's budget for military personnel costs?
Answer. While military personnel costs have historically been
roughly one-third of the Department's overall budget, pegging these
costs to a specific percentage of the budget is not a useful metric for
managing the force or executing the national defense strategy. The
Department must maintain the force at sufficient levels with the right
capabilities to meet the national defense strategy. Providing an
appropriate pay and benefits package is essential to this task, but
compensation and benefit costs must be balanced with readiness and
modernization requirements to ensure we maintain the highest quality,
ready, and modern military force now and for the future.
Question. If this percentage remains constant as overall defense
spending flattens, or even declines in real terms, what would be the
impact on the size of the force and the Department's ability to execute
the national defense strategy?
Answer. If overall defense spending flattens or declines in real
terms, military personnel costs will increase as a percentage of the
budget in the short-term and, therefore, require larger reductions to
readiness and modernization. In the longer-term, additional force
reductions will likely be required to balance the program. The
resulting smaller force would create additional risk to meet our
security challenges.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact on other areas of
the Department's budget if military personnel costs continue to rise
while the overall defense budget remains flat, or even declines in real
terms?
Answer. If military personnel costs were to continue to rise within
a flat budget, consuming ever larger portions of that budget, the
Nation will face the prospect of a hollow force--with resulting
decreasing capability and readiness and a dwindling technological edge
on the battlefield.
Question. What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if
any, to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. Personnel costs are a significant portion of the Defense
budget. During the past several years the Department engaged in a
number of broad-based reviews in search of efficiencies and generated
proposals to reduce spending. The Congress, too, created the Military
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission in search of ways
to attract and retain the quality people we need while controlling
these personnel and entitlement costs. If confirmed, I will seek ways
to keep our current and future force and our defense program in balance
within the resources Congress provides.
recommendations of the military compensation and retirement
modernization commission
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal
year 2013 established a commission to review all elements of the
military compensation and retirement systems and to make
recommendations to modernize those systems to ensure the long-term
viability of the All-Volunteer Force, enable a high quality of life for
military families, and to achieve fiscal sustainability for the
compensation and retirement systems. That Commission will release its
report on January 29, 2015.
If confirmed, what will be your plan to review the report and to
provide recommendations to the President?
Answer. I appreciate the difficult task that was presented to the
Commission. If confirmed, I intend to carefully review and evaluate the
Commission's recommendations on reforming military compensation and
retirement.
Question. Will you instruct the Department to take the Commission's
recommendations into consideration within the base budget request for
fiscal year 2017?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Department to fully
consider the recommendations of the Commission in future budgets.
religious accommodation in the military
Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. The current DOD policies appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion by all servicemembers. The Department respects,
and supports by its policy, the rights of individuals to express their
own religious beliefs, including the right to hold no religious
beliefs.
Question. Do you agree that the primary role of the chaplaincy is
to provide for the free exercise of religion by all servicemembers and
that chaplains are sufficiently trained to perform or provide for this
constitutional right in today's pluralistic military community? If not,
why not?
Answer. The Service Chaplaincies advise and assist commanders in
the discharge of their responsibility to provide for the free exercise
of religion in the context of military service and to assist commanders
in managing Religious Affairs. Chaplains also serve as the principal
advisors on all issues regarding the impact of religion on military
operations. I believe Military Chaplains should be sufficiently trained
to carry out their assigned duties.
Question. Do you believe it is the role of the chaplaincy to
provide for the religious and spiritual well-being of all members of
the Armed Forces, regardless of their faith beliefs?
Answer. In today's pluralistic military environment, the
Chaplaincies of the Military Departments recruit, access, train, and
equip chaplains with the knowledge and skill to balance their own faith
practices with their role in assisting commanders in providing for the
free exercise of religion and spiritual well-being of all
servicemembers, including those who may hold different or no religious
beliefs.
Question. Do you believe that current policies provide sufficient
guidance to chaplains who conduct non-religious command training where
attendance is required or encouraged to allow chaplains to discuss
their religious faith anecdotally and respectfully in a pluralistic
setting to support the training objectives?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD policies provide sufficient
guidance to chaplains concerning respectful incorporation of religious
and belief principles that support training objectives in a pluralistic
setting. Such policies also protect the right of a chaplain to refuse,
without any adverse action, this type of duty if it is contrary to his
or her conscience, moral principles or religious beliefs.
strategy
Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR,
U.S. forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a large-
scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or impose
unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.''
In your opinion, is the QDR's force sizing construct an adequate
approach given the dynamics of the current and projected geostrategic
and fiscal environments?
Answer. The 2014 QDR envisioned a complex and variable security
environment coupled with fiscal uncertainty. Therefore, it directed the
Department to size and shape the Joint Force to respond to a wide range
of challenges. At the fiscal year 2015 President's budget level, the
force planning construct depicts the challenges that the Department
must be prepared to respond to and frames its efforts to deliver agile,
technologically advanced forces of sufficient size to defend our Nation
and secure our interests globally while preventing America's
adversaries from achieving their objectives. However, as underscored in
the QDR, the force planning construct cannot be fully resourced at
sequestration-level funding, casting significant doubt on the
Department's ability to implement its overall defense strategy at that
reduced budget level.
Question. In your view, are the services currently adequately sized
to meet the requirements of the QDR and current National Military
Strategy?
Answer. U.S. forces remain able to prevail in more than one
conflict at a time, but at higher levels of risk given the cumulative
effects of reduced funding, an uncertain budget process, and unrealized
force structure and compensation savings. The force will need to become
smaller and more efficient over the next 5 years to offset the costs of
gradual modernization and improved readiness. Provided sequestration is
avoided, the QDR indicated that the Joint Force will remain able to
defeat a regional adversary while denying the objectives of, or
imposing unacceptable costs upon, a second aggressor. In addition, the
force will remain able to conduct sustained, distributed
counterterrorism operations and protect the Homeland. However, the QDR
also indicated even in the best case, the margin for error in executing
the defense strategy is smaller than it has been in many years and
requires close cooperation between the administration and Congress to
realize necessary savings in force structure and compensation reform to
ensure that the strategy can be implemented.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to manage the risk
associated with the demands placed upon the Department by the National
Security Strategy, the requirements of the National Military Strategy,
the geostrategic environment, U.S. international security commitments,
and the availability of military capability in an era of declining
resources?
Answer. Risks associated with the demands upon the Department must
be managed by striking a balance between force capacity, readiness, and
modernization in order to be prepared for an uncertain and complicated
future. In some cases, and in line with the 2014 QDR, capacity will be
reduced to allow for necessary modernization and readiness. The
Department plans to continue several internal measures to manage risk,
including developing innovative business practices, capabilities, and
operational concepts; revising and updating operational plans;
enhancing collaboration with allies and partners; reviewing overseas
access and basing agreements; resetting the force after two wars; and
striving for efficiencies and compensation reform. A return to Budget
Control Act-level funding in fiscal year 2016 would increase risks,
prolong readiness recovery, and delay necessary modernization programs.
Question. In your view should we accept higher risk with current
strategy, change the strategy, or increase resources to increase or
preserve military capability and capacity?
Answer. The Department concluded that the fiscal year 2015 budget,
combined with Congressional support for the Department's proposed
reforms, will enable our military to execute the current strategy. If
sequestration level cuts return in fiscal year 2016 or if we do not
gain congressional support for proposed force structure reductions and
compensation reforms, we may need to revisit the strategy as updated in
the 2012 QDR.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of excess
capacity or capabilities, if any, relative to the National Military
Strategy? In your view, if there is excess capacity or capability
relative to the strategy should it be reallocated across services to
reduce risks in areas for which there are gaps?
Answer. The 2014 QDR assessed that after more than twelve years of
conflict and amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force was out of
balance with respect to capability, capacity, and readiness. As those
wars have come to a close, the Department has sought to return these
Services to a sustainable budget level and end strength. Looking
forward, the Department, with congressional assistance, needs to
continue the process to ensure we deliver agile, technologically
advanced, ready forces of sufficient size to defend our Nation and
secure our interests while evolving threats and challenges.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.
national military strategy and stability operations
Question. In light of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the growth of
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its control over
large areas of Syria and Iraq, and a more muscular China, do you
believe that the current National Security Strategy and National
Military Strategy should be updated to more accurately account for a
changed global security environment?
Answer. Although it is impossible to predict exactly how challenges
will develop, we must continue to reexamine global threats to ensure
our resources match the threats and opportunities ahead.
The 2010 National Security Strategy is undergoing a necessary
revision, to be released in early 2015. Any revisions should address
the challenges to the international order and stability that are posed
by Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and the
growth of ISIL, recognizing that the United States is strongest when it
employs all elements of national power to address security threats in a
coordinated fashion. The United States welcomes the rise of a
prosperous, peaceful, and stable China that respects international law
and settles disputes without the threat or use of force. The National
Military Strategy should be revised to align with the 2015 National
Security Strategy, once it is released.
Question. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance called for
U.S. forces to be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other
stability operations if required, and to retain and continue to refine
the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have
been gained over the past 10 years of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. At the same time, the Strategic Guidance states that,
``U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged
stability operations.''
In your view, how should strategic guidance for the DOD manage risk
and articulate the types of missions or operations U.S. forces will or
will not be expected to execute?
Answer. The Department's strategic guidance documents--especially
the QDR and National Military Strategy--need to identify the kind of
security environment that we anticipate in the future and seek an
appropriate balance between capability, capacity, and readiness. As a
full spectrum force and a global leader, the U.S. military should
continue to be prepared to execute missions in the national interest
across the threat spectrum. A full spectrum, ready and modern Joint
Force is the best risk mitigation measure.
Question. In your view, what are the appropriate roles and
responsibilities, if any, of DOD and between DOD and other departments
and agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of
stability operations?
Answer. Because of its unique capabilities, the Department should
support other U.S. Government departments and agencies in the planning
and execution of stability operations efforts. History has shown that
coordinated and integrated interagency and international efforts are
essential to successful stability operations. Under the right
circumstances, the Department should conduct stability operations
activities to establish security, restore essential services, repair
and protect the most critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian
assistance. As security and public order are established or restored,
the Department should transition responsibility to other agencies,
foreign governments, or international governmental organizations.
Question. If confirmed, in developing the capabilities necessary
for stability operations, what adjustments, if any, would you propose
making to prepare U.S. forces to conduct stability operations without
detracting from their ability to perform combat missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the requirements for U.S.
forces to conduct stability operations successfully without detracting
from or degrading their ability to perform combat missions. After
nearly 2 decades of serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and
elsewhere, United States forces have made great strides in their
abilities to conduct stability operations under difficult
circumstances. If confirmed, I would seek to maintain the stability
operations expertise the Department has gained, and ensure that the
Military Departments have the mechanisms necessary to expand their
capacities when required.
Question. In your view, does the U.S. Government need to define or
reallocate responsibilities and authorities among Federal agencies, and
establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
Answer. Our efforts abroad over the past 13-plus years highlight
the importance of collaborative and coordinated planning with
interagency and international partners, which is fundamental to the
successful management and effectiveness of stability operations. As we
have seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it takes a robust interagency
effort, as well as international participation, to develop institutions
that can contribute effectively to peace, security and stability. If
confirmed, I would review the Department's policies and procedures with
respect to stability operations and make appropriate recommendations to
ensure our success, both as a department and as part of the U.S.
Government as a whole.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to improve U.S. Government approach to planning, resourcing, and
conducting stability operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other departments and
agencies to explore opportunities to integrate and coordinate the full
range of available interagency stabilization tools and make appropriate
recommendations.
strategy in iraq and syria
Question. On 10 September 2014, President Obama said ``Our
objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL
through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.''
What criteria do you believe should be used to evaluate whether or
how much ISIL is degraded and what is your assessment of the progress
to degrade ISIL in Iraq and in Syria?
Answer. The United States is at the beginning of what could be a
long campaign to degrade and inflict a lasting defeat on ISIL. DOD's
contributions are one part of a whole-of-government strategy and an
effort that includes many of coalition partners to create both the
political and military conditions needed for success. Ultimately the
Iraqis must offer a national program of reform and reconciliation in
order for the Iraqi Security Forces to succeed. The coalition effort
must also involve strengthening and working with the Iraqi Security
Forces and affiliated Kurdish and tribal elements, who are critical to
inflict a lasting defeat of ISIL. If confirmed, I will consult closely
with my military commanders, civilian advisors, foreign partners,
interagency counterparts and Members of Congress to examine progress
and offer my best strategic advice to the President on this complex and
vitally important campaign.
Question. Do you believe the strategy against ISIL needs to include
both conventional and counterinsurgency elements given that ISIL has
demonstrated significant conventional and insurgency capabilities?
Answer. Yes. I believe that a strategy for countering ISIL must
bring to bear all elements of national power, including military force
as well as diplomatic, intelligence, economic, humanitarian assistance,
and other key tools. Many of these tools are important in a
counterinsurgency as well as a conventional campaign. If confirmed, I
would continue to support a whole-of-government approach.
Question. What does the end state President Obama has declared to
be the objective of our operations--``ultimately destroy ISIL''--look
like in your opinion?
Answer. I believe that ISIL must no longer be a threat to Iraq, the
region, the United States, and our partners.
Question. A large part of the support for ISIL and other extremist
groups like al Nusrah by the local Syrian population is based on the
fact that these groups pledge to go after President Assad, to remove
him from power.
Is removing Assad part of the current United States strategy in
Syria? If not, what is your assessment of the impact of not going after
Assad on our ability to work with the Syrian population to counter ISIL
and other extremist groups like al Nusrah?
Answer. As the President has said, Assad has lost legitimacy and
cannot be a part of the long-term future of Syria. However, the most
immediate threat to United States national interests is ISIL--and there
is no sustainable solution in Syria without addressing the threat of
ISIL. If confirmed, I will consult with my military commanders,
civilian advisors, interagency partners, foreign counterparts and
Members of Congress to formulate by best strategic advice for the
President.
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 authorizes assistance in
Iraq to ``local security forces with a national security mission''
including ``tribal security forces or other local security forces.''
How important do you consider arming of the Sunni tribes in Anbar
province to degrading ISIL and how do you assess progress to date?
Answer. Political inclusion in Iraq is a key element of countering
ISIL in a lasting way. Integrating Sunni tribal fighters into the Iraqi
Security Forces and enabling them to combat ISIL is therefore important
to ultimately defeating ISIL. I have not been briefed in detail on this
effort. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the Department of
State, coalition partners, and the Government of Iraq to encourage
efforts to arm and integrate Sunni tribal forces into the Iraqi
Security Forces to fight ISIL.
afghanistan strategy
Question. What lessons should we learn from the experience of a
calendar-based drawdown of United States troops in Iraq as they apply
to executing the drawdown of United States and international troops in
Afghanistan?
Answer. Each country has a unique set of underlying governance,
security, and cultural circumstances. With the United States-
Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement in place, and with the support
of the Afghan Government, the Department's train, advise, and assist
mission with the Afghan security forces is intended to help ensure
continued progress in developing Afghanistan's security capabilities
and preserve the security gains we have made collectively. Based on
what we have learned in Iraq, progress on political reform is key to
this effort. I believe that the new government in Kabul will be the
biggest driver in whether Afghanistan has a positive future. I welcome
that President Ghani has stated that a continued United States and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence is an important
component of his strategy for Afghanistan. That provides a key
foundation for the transition to a robust, sustainable security
relationship in the future. I am mindful of the new and dynamic global
threat environment, and you can be assured that if there are
instructive lessons from Iraq or anywhere else that are relevant to
Afghanistan, I will always take them into account in the advice I offer
to the President.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the United States strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. The next 2 years represent an important transition period
from more than a decade of war toward an enduring defense relationship
with an Afghan partner that is capable of providing for its own
security and preventing al Qaeda and other extremists from threatening
United States interests. The NATO-led train, advise, and assist mission
and the United States counterterrorism mission are cornerstones within
our overall strategy that will provide the Afghans an opportunity to
make progress on the security situation in Afghanistan, and serve as a
balance against terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory. If
confirmed, I will continue to seek the advice of our military
leadership and partners.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the campaign
in Afghanistan?
Answer. Over the last 13 years, our campaign in Afghanistan has
placed constant pressure on al Qaeda and prevented Afghanistan from
being used to launch terrorist attacks against the United States
Homeland. The United States Government has supported the Afghan people
and protected United States national interests by helping Afghanistan
strengthen the capacity of its security forces. The Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) have continued to progress, and have proven
increasingly capable in leading operations and prevailing over
insurgents. Although I am encouraged by the positive strides made in
Afghanistan, it is clear that much work remains to be done. We must
stay engaged with our Afghan partners and support them, as they own the
fight. This must be an interagency and international effort - with
appropriate funding for the ANSF as well as economic and diplomatic
support for the Afghan people.
Question. If reports of ISIL operating in southern Afghanistan are
true, and ISIL is fighting with the Taliban, how should that affect the
United States strategy for Afghanistan?
Answer. I support the President's strategy to degrade and
ultimately destroy ISIL, wherever it may attempt to establish a
foothold. I am aware of recent press reporting that ISIL is attempting
to recruit militants in Afghanistan and is considering expansion to the
region. If confirmed, I will learn more about these developments and
will work with the Afghan Government and our coalition partners to
address all terrorist threats to United States personnel in Afghanistan
and to prevent any terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to threaten
the United States and our allies and partners.
Question. If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan
degrade in 2016, would you consider recommending to the President
revisions to the size and pace of the drawdown plan announced by the
President in order to adequately address those security conditions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your opinion, should the authorities granted to the
commander of United States forces in Afghanistan take into account the
security conditions on the ground faced by United States troops?
Answer. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will take seriously
my responsibility to ensure that our commander in Afghanistan has the
authority needed to execute the missions directed by the President
effectively, and that these authorities allow U.S. forces to take the
appropriate measures to protect themselves.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective ANSF?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess this issue firsthand but my
assessment has been positive. I will ensure that the Department
continues building the ANSF's institutional capabilities, and I will
work with our allies and partners to retain critical coalition support
to the ANSF where capability gaps remain, particularly in the areas of
close air support, intelligence, special operations, sustainment, and
Afghan security ministry capacity.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
would you make for addressing those challenges?
Answer. I understand that the main challenges to address with the
ANSF are fielding and integrating capabilities such as close air
support, special operations, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; and developing the capacity of the Ministries of
Defense and Interior to manage planning, programming, budgeting,
logistics, force generation and force sustainment. Corruption and the
flow of funding from illicit narcotics is also a significant challenge
that requires an international and interagency response. If confirmed,
I will assess our progress in helping the ANSF develop these areas and
will focus on solutions to identified gaps.
Question. What are the key enablers in security force capabilities
that need to continue to be developed to ensure the long term efficacy
of the ANSF against the Taliban and other extremists and when do you
forecast those capabilities will be in place?
Answer. I understand that the NATO Resolute Support mission places
a high priority on developing the ANSF's capability to provide fire
support from the air, and on developing organic airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to maintain
advantages over the Taliban and other extremists.
Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF
at 352,000 personnel?
Answer. Based on the information available to me and given
Afghanistan's current security challenges, I support the current
authorized level of 352,000 ANSF personnel and will work with Congress
to ensure that our efforts to sustain this force are appropriately
resourced. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department will continue to
work with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to determine
the timing for reducing the ANSF to an appropriate size, given
available resources, capabilities, and the magnitude of the threat.
Question. Do you agree that any reductions in the ANSF from this
352,000 level should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan at
the time those reductions would be expected to occur?
Answer. Although the security condition on the ground will be a
critical factor in determining any future reductions in the ANSF, we
must also look closely at the Afghan ability to sustain the ANSF
financially. My understanding is that current Resolute Support mission
efforts are focused on optimizing the effectiveness of the ANSF force
structure while increasing the Afghan capability to sustain that
structure. I believe we have an obligation to the Afghan people, our
allies, and United States taxpayers, to ensure that the ANSF is a
combat-effective, sustainable, and affordable force in the long-term.
reconciliation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and
other insurgent groups?
Answer. The United States supports an Afghan-led political peace
process in which all opposition groups, including the Taliban, engage
in a dialogue about the future of their country. I believe the United
States should continue to support President Ghani's efforts to engage
in peace talks, as long as any outcome of reconciliation includes that
the Taliban and other armed groups end violence, break ties with al
Qaeda, and accept Afghanistan's constitution--including its protections
for women and minorities.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
be taking to help advance the reconciliation process?
Answer. President Obama has made clear that an Afghan-led peace and
reconciliation process is the surest way to end the violence and ensure
lasting stability for Afghanistan and the region. It is my
understanding that President Ghani is putting considerable effort into
re-energizing reconciliation and is reaching out to regional partners
and the international community to take part in the process. I believe
the United States should support these new initiatives and, if
confirmed, I look forward to engaging with my Afghan counterparts on
how DOD can best support reconciliation efforts.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process?
Answer. Afghanistan's neighbors should play constructive and
supportive roles in an Afghan-led reconciliation process, since a
stable and peaceful Afghanistan will promote long-term stability and
prosperity for the entire region. I hope signs of improved Afghanistan-
Pakistan relations provide fresh opportunities for Pakistan to
reinforce President Ghani's efforts toward peace talks between the
Afghan Government and the Taliban.
united states strategic relationship with pakistan
Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic
interest between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. Counterterrorism cooperation remains a critical shared
strategic interest. Pakistan still faces a real and potent threat from
several militant groups within its borders, such as the Pakistani
Taliban, responsible for the recent school attack in Peshawar.
We also share Pakistan's strategic interest in improved relations
between Islamabad and Kabul. I believe that the United States and
Pakistan should continue to work to promote peace and reconciliation in
Afghanistan and to improve regional security.
Question. In what areas do you see United States and Pakistani
strategic interests diverging?
Answer. It is important that the United States continues to engage
with Pakistan in areas where our strategic interests diverge, including
the direction of Pakistan's nuclear program and its tolerance of
terrorist organizations like the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e Taiba.
In addition to threatening United States forces in Afghanistan, these
groups threaten regional security, endanger the prospects of a
political settlement in Afghanistan, and undermine Pakistan's own
stability. I understand that Pakistan has pledged to target all
militant groups operating within its borders, including the Haqqani
Network and Lashkar-e Taiba. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
Department holds Pakistan to this pledge, and works against actors who
are exploiting Pakistani territory to destabilize the region.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of
military-to-military relations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work on improving our
relationship with Pakistan by collaborating where our strategic
interests converge and engaging where they diverge. Moving forward, I
believe it is in the United States' interest to expand counterterrorism
cooperation with Pakistan in our fight against al-Qaeda, and to counter
any emerging threats. Additionally, I would seek to facilitate
cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encourage
communication between Pakistan and India, as these relationships will
continue to be vital to stability in the region.
united states assistance to pakistan
Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has
provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In your view, how effective has the assistance and other support
that the United States has provided to Pakistan been in promoting
United States interests?
Answer. I understand that since last summer, Pakistani forces have
been clearing militants from their strongholds along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. Pakistan's military has been able to carry out these
operations at a more effective pace and scale in part thanks to United
States reimbursements for Pakistan's operational expenses.
Additionally, I understand United States security assistance programs
have provided the Pakistan military with many of the tools necessary to
conduct successful operations in this region. Continued U.S. support
will remain critical to the success of these efforts.
Question. Do you support conditioning United States assistance and
other support to Pakistan on Pakistan's continued cooperation in areas
of mutual security interest?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult within the Department and the
United States interagency on how best to incentivize Pakistani action
that is in the mutual interest of the United States. The United States
and Pakistan do work together on common objectives, and I believe we
should carefully examine the impact of conditions on Pakistani
cooperation. If confirmed, I will evaluate what additional support
would be appropriate from the U.S. Government.
libya
Question. Following the evacuation of the United States Embassy in
Tripoli on July 26, 2014, there is no longer an active American
presence in the country and the situation in country remains dire.
What role, if any, should the United States have in Libya moving
forward?
Answer. The United States has a national security interest in a
stable Libya and in preventing its use as a terrorist safe haven. The
United States should assist the ongoing United Nations-led political
process to bring moderate Libyans into a unity government and bring an
end to the conflict--which exacerbates the terrorist threat--and take
measures to prevent terrorists from using Libya as a safe haven. When
circumstances allow, the United States should once again consider
supporting official Libyan security forces and their development.
u.s. marine corps support to the state department embassy evacuations
Question. The Accountability Review Board for Benghazi supported
the ``State Department's initiative to request additional marines and
expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program--as well as
corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also
recommended that the State Department and DOD identify additional
flexible MSG structures and request further resources for the
Department and DOD to provide more capabilities and capacities at
higher risk posts.'' The NDAA for fiscal year 2013 authorized up to
1,000 additional marines in the MSG program to provide the additional
end strength and resources necessary to support enhanced Marine Corps
security at United States embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic
facilities.
In your view, should the current arrangements between the
Department of State and U.S. Marine Corps be modified?
Answer. I understand that DOD has taken measures to expand the
Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program, and has taken the additional step
of creating the MSG Security Augmentation Unit, which may be used to
provide additional security at diplomatic facilities as threats change.
In 2013, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and the Department of State (DOS)
signed a new Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Marine Security at DoS
facilities. I understand that DOD and DOS are reviewing policies,
programs, roles, and responsibilities--including the MSG program--to
maximize the protection of our overseas diplomatic facilities and
personnel, and would support this review if confirmed.
Question. In your view, would it be beneficial to the security of
diplomatic facilities, many of which house U.S. military personnel, to
have appropriate DOD personnel to assist in the conduct of
vulnerability assessments of such facilities?
Answer. Yes. To that end, the Department has directed its
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to conduct planning and
coordination with Chiefs of Mission at high-threat, high-risk posts
identified by DoS. The GCCs are also directly engaged with the Chiefs
of Mission to plan and coordinate response options. Likewise, GCC
Security Assessment Teams have deployed to numerous high threat posts
such as Baghdad and Sana'a to help Embassy staff with their security
and evacuation planning. I would review these issues if confirmed and
offer my best recommendation.
al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to the United States?
Answer. AQAP poses a significant terrorist threat to the United
States Homeland and United States interests in the Middle East. Since
2009, AQAP has attempted at least three attacks on the United States,
including through the use of sophisticated concealed explosive devices.
Additionally, AQAP attack plotting led to the temporary closure of
several United States Embassies in the Middle East in August 2013.
Question. What is your assessment of the current United States
strategy to counter AQAP, specifically in Yemen?
Answer. Countering AQAP should be a top priority for the U.S.
Government. The United States counterterrorism (CT) strategy in Yemen
focuses on a mix of partnership activities and limited direct action
against those who threaten the United States. The United States
Government, in partnership with its allies and the Yemeni Government,
have made a number of important gains against AQAP, including the
removal of numerous AQAP leaders and the disruption of plotting against
the United Sates, although AQAP remains resilient and we must maintain
our vigilance in addressing this threat. If confirmed I intend to
receive a detailed briefing to inform my assessment.
yemen
Question. What are United States national security interests in
Yemen?
Answer. Our primary national security interest in Yemen is to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP and eliminate the ungoverned
territory that AQAP or any hostile group may seek to exploit to
threaten the United States, our regional interests, and those of our
partners. We also have an interest in a stable government in Yemen, and
support a responsible transition to an inclusive and capable government
that helps achieve those objectives.
Question. What is your assessment of United States strategy in
Yemen to date?
Answer. I believe that although the United States Government has
helped the Yemeni Government build the capabilities of its security
forces, the political instability that has long plagued Yemen--
particularly in recent weeks--hinders Yemen's ability to respond the
threat posed by AQAP.
Question. What are the implications of recent events in Yemen for
United States counterterrorism policy both in Yemen and globally?
Answer. Continued political turbulence in Yemen risks further
hindering Yemeni efforts against AQAP and enabling AQAP to continue to
plot attacks and recruit operatives in Yemen's ungoverned spaces.
AQAP's claim of responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris
demonstrates that AQAP continues to pose a threat to the United States
and its allies and partners. The political situation in Yemen is
difficult and fluid, and it remains to be seen how this will affect our
relationship with the Yemeni Government. Nevertheless, I believe the
United States should continue to maintain pressure on AQAP by using all
necessary means to eliminate terrorist threats to our national
security.
north africa
Question. In recent years, there has been a growth of terrorist
networks, capabilities, operations, and safe havens throughout North
and East Africa, including groups that have the intention to target
United States and western interests. In the face of growing instability
and threats, the U.S. counterterrorism effort in the region has been
described as an ``economy of force'' effort.
Do you agree with that characterization of the situation in North
and East Africa and the United States counterterrorism efforts to
combat the related threats?
Answer. I would characterize United States counterterrorism efforts
in North and East Africa as working by, with, and through our allies
and regional partners. In North Africa, the United States works with
allies such as the French and regional partners such as Tunisia, Niger,
and Chad. Specifically, DOD has supported their combined operations
against groups such as al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and al-Murabitun. In East Africa, the United States has
continued training, equipping, and enabling the African Union Mission
to Somalia troop contributing countries in their efforts to stabilize
Somalia and counter the threat posed by al-Shabaab.
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.
counterterrorism strategy in the region?
Answer. I understand the current United States strategy seeks to
prevent and disrupt terrorist plots that threaten United States
interests at home and abroad, while helping the Yemeni government build
its own CT capabilities to combat AQAP over the long run. I am aware
that the United States has removed several key AQAP operatives from the
battlefield and disrupted AQAP plots. In 2012, Yemeni forces, with
training and advisory support from the Department, succeeded in driving
AQAP from large areas of Yemen. However, I believe the turbulent
political situation in Yemen will complicate these efforts, and will
require adapting the strategy to these changes.
Question. In your view, is the U.S. military allocating adequate
resources to effectively address the terrorism threat in the region?
Answer. In my view, given the counterterrorism challenges we face
in numerous areas, United States military resources are adequately
balanced to meet the many competing counterterrorism requirements in
North and East Africa.
Question. General Rodriguez noted in his March 2014 testimony that
``North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the
current conflict in Syria.''
What is your understanding of the foreign fighter flow from North
Africa to the conflict in Syria and Iraq?
Answer. I believe foreign fighters pose a threat to the United
States, and that this threat is exacerbated by the ongoing political
and security instability in Libya. If confirmed, I will focus attention
on the foreign fighter flow as the Department works with regional
partners in North Africa to address the challenge posed by the
terrorist safe haven in Libya and broader counterterrorism issues.
Question. In your view, is it likely that many of these fighters
will eventually return home from Syria and Iraq to North Africa and
continue their fight against regional governments?
Answer. There is a real possibility that as we address the
situation in Syria and Iraq, some of these fighters may choose to
return home to North Africa. This could pose a serious challenge for
our regional partners. These returning fighters will have the benefit
of training and combat experience. It is therefore important that the
United States continue its close collaboration on counterterrorism with
our partners in North Africa so that they are prepared to respond in
the event that the fighters decide to take up arms upon their return.
We must also work closely with the neighbors of Syria and Libya to
build up their security capabilities to counter instability and the
negative regional impact it could cause. If confirmed, I would ensure
that DOD supports the diplomatic efforts to secure a political solution
in Libya, work closely with Libya's neighbors to ensure regional
stability, and maintain an active and robust counterterrorism presence
in the region.
collaboration between the defense department and the intelligence
community
Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
and operational--between DOD and the Intelligence Community has grown
increasingly close. On one hand, seamless collaboration is a vital
component of effective and rapid responses to non-traditional threats,
and bringing together the strengths of the full spectrum of defense and
intelligence missions creates opportunities for solutions to complex
problems. On the other hand, such collaboration--without effective
management and oversight--risks blurring the missions of agencies and
individuals that have cultivated distinct strengths or creating
redundant lines of effort.
What are your views regarding the appropriate scope of
collaboration between DOD and the Intelligence Community?
Answer. Collaboration between DOD and the Intelligence Community
(IC) is an essential element for supporting our national security
objectives. For example, DOD depends on capabilities provided by the IC
to support weapons systems acquisition and to enable military
operations. The IC depends on capabilities provided by DOD to support
special forces. This collaboration is essential to make progress toward
dismantling and strategically defeating al Qa'ida, to counter the
proliferation of WMD, to defend against space and cyber threats, and to
operate in denied areas.
Question. In your view, are there aspects of the current
relationship between the Department and the Intelligence Community that
should be re-examined or modified?
Answer. I am not aware of any specific areas requiring immediate
modification, however, if confirmed, I will look for opportunities to
build on the existing strong relationship.
russia
Question. Crimea was formally annexed when President Putin signed a
bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014,
and Russia continues to fuel instability in eastern Ukraine despite a
ceasefire agreed to in September 2014.
How effective do you assess the sanctions of the United States and
the European Union have been in deterring additional aggression by
Russia?
Answer. United States and European Union sanctions, combined with
declining oil prices, have significantly impacted the Russian economy
and highlight the consequences of Russia's actions in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, despite these costs, Russia has not abided by its
commitments in the Minsk agreements and is continuing to foment
instability in eastern Ukraine. If confirmed, I would work with U.S.
departments and agencies to review and adjust our sanctions regime as
appropriate.
Question. In your opinion, what other specific actions has the
United States taken that have helped to deter additional Russian
aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. The United States has taken action, both bilaterally and
within the NATO Alliance, with the goal of deterring additional Russian
aggression and reassure European Allies. These include the
establishment of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which
provides an enhanced rotational presence in Europe; support to United
States allies and partners in the region; and increased training and
exercises. If confirmed, I plan to take a close look at what additional
actions we might take to deter Russia and impact Putin's calculus.
Question. In your opinion, what steps have proven or are likely to
prove most effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I would take a close look at what actions may
have worked best, and what additional actions we might take, to deter
Russia from aggression in Eastern Europe.
Question. Do you believe that Moldova and Georgia are at a
heightened state of vulnerability given Russian willingness to take
aggressive action in Ukraine?
Answer. Yes. Russia has long fomented ``frozen conflicts'' in
Moldova and Georgia in order to limit their freedom of action and
hinder their Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Following Russia's actions in
Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have increased their
efforts to deepen cooperation with the United States and NATO.
Question. Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called
``hybrid'' and combine hard power with soft power, including elements
such as lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special
forces, extensive information operations, withholding energy supplies
and economic pressure.
If confirmed, what elements should make up the strategy you would
recommend to counter this ``hybrid'' approach?
Answer. Through the European Reassurance Initiative and the NATO
Readiness Action Plan, the United States is supporting our Allies and
partners in Eastern Europe with training activities, rotational
presence, and capacity-building programs. These efforts focus on making
our allies and partners more resistant to asymmetric threats;
demonstrating United States resolve to support European and global
security; and deterring Russian aggression. If confirmed, I would seek
opportunities to support and work with our Allies and partners in
creating more activities, training, and exchanges that build their
resistance to asymmetric, or hybrid, methods of coercion.
Question. In light of Russia's actions in 2014, what do you believe
are appropriate objectives for United States-Russian security
relations?
Answer. As I understand the situation, DOD suspended military
cooperation with Russia as a result of its occupation and attempted
annexation of Crimea. Russia's behavior is inconsistent with that of a
responsible, global stakeholder, and I support this response. If
confirmed, I would be open to seeking measured avenues that allow more
productive engagement with Russia, but only on issues where we have a
clear national interest.
nato alliance
Question. The reemergence of an aggressive Russia has resulted in
NATO developing the Readiness Action Plan that NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg called ``the biggest reinforcement of our collective
defense since the end of the Cold War.'' NATO also continues to be
central to our coalition operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, even
as many NATO members have significantly reduced their national defense
budgets in response to economic and fiscal pressures.
In your view, particularly in light of the Russian Federation's
aggression against Ukraine, what are the major strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance in the coming years?
Answer. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect
and defend its territory and populations against attack, as set out in
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The best way to protect our
populations and territories is to cooperate with Alliance partners to
deter challenges to our security from emerging; to effectively manage
challenges when they do emerge; and to be prepared to mount a strong
defense if deterrence fails. When allies feel threatened--as many do as
a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine--it is important for
the Alliance to carry out the necessary training, exercises, and
planning and to provide visible reassurance to vulnerable Allies in
order to reinforce confidence in Article 5 and sustain Alliance
solidarity. NATO must also remain prepared to undertake its other
``core tasks'' of crisis management and cooperative security, drawing
on its unique political and military capabilities to prevent and
respond to crises and to work with partners and other international
organizations to address threats that emanate from outside Alliance
territory.
Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
5 years?
Answer. NATO's greatest opportunities lie in how it deals with the
expanding range of challenges it will face over the next five years.
While I cannot predict all the challenges the alliance will face,
NATO's ability to respond effectively and with resolve against Russia's
aggression; to counter non-state actors that threaten the alliance and
its periphery, such as ISIL; and to manage the transition in
Afghanistan will be critical over the next 5 years. Managing these
myriad challenges will require the political will, solidarity, and
adequate defense investment to fulfill the vision of the Wales Summit.
Ensuring that happens will be NATO's greatest challenge over the next 5
years.
Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending
by some NATO members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack
critical military capabilities? If so, what steps, if any, would you
recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in Alliance
capabilities?
Answer. The United States should be concerned about continued
reductions in defense investment by our Allies, particularly the NATO
Allies that have been our most reliable partners for managing global
security issues. These capabilities can be costly, but we need to
ensure that in the future the United States is not the only Ally with
such capabilities. That means holding Allies to the Defense Investment
Pledge they agreed to at the Wales Summit and working with Allies on
defense planning to ensure they maintain the specific capabilities that
are needed.
Question. What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in
addressing the threat posed by ISIL and in addressing the problem of
illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea?
Answer. NATO nations have a vested interest in defeating ISIL, both
to promote stability in the Middle East and to eliminate the threat
posed by ISIL to NATO nations and partners. If confirmed I would work
with NATO Allies to appropriately scope our collective efforts. To
date, NATO nations have committed forces to counter ISIL under
unilateral and multilateral efforts. On illegal Mediterranean
immigration, NATO should continue its efforts to share information
gained through maritime situational awareness operations. If Allies
agree, NATO could also help address regional security crises and
instability, or humanitarian crises, which are often associated with
displaced populations and flows of refugees.
Question. The concept of defense cooperation between NATO members
was emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012.
What areas or projects would you recommend, if confirmed, that NATO
nations cooperate in to improve NATO alliance capabilities?
Answer. Cooperation among allies on capabilities is increasingly
important in light of the worldwide challenges and the fiscal straits
facing allied nations. If confirmed, I would work to ensure allies
honor their recent Summit pledge to move toward the two percent defense
spending target, which also called for focusing those resources on
specific alliance capability needs, such as command and control and
joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you envision further
enlargement of NATO in the coming years?
Answer. The door to Alliance membership remains open to those
European nations deemed ready for membership by the 28 allies. The
United States and our allies, through Partnership for Peace and other
Partner programs, work with candidates to help prepare for membership,
such as through improving military capabilities and interoperability.
If confirmed, I would ensure DOD is working both at NATO and
bilaterally to ready candidates to be considered for membership.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance for as long as nuclear
weapons exist. The Alliance's nuclear force is an effective deterrent.
Allies reaffirmed this stance at the Wales Summit last September, and I
support the conviction that NATO must maintain the full range of
capabilities necessary to maintain Alliance security, based on an
appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense
capabilities.
Question. Turkey continues to be a gateway for foreign fighters
proceeding to and from Syria and Iraq.
What steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to encourage Turkey
to address this threat?
Answer. The threat posed to the United States and the west by
foreign fighters moving in and out of Syria--many of whom transit
through Turkey--remains a concern. If confirmed, I would continue to
support United States interagency efforts to assist Turkey in
disrupting this threat--including strengthening the Department's
partnership on this issue with the Turkish military--as well as to
assist the source countries for foreign fighters around the world in
doing more to identify and halt potential violent extremists before
they travel.
kosovo
Question. Approximately 700 United States troops remain in the
Balkans as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to
Kosovo in 1999 and today is comprised of over 4,600 personnel from 30
countries. Spikes in violence in 2011 required the deployment of the
NATO operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 600 soldiers
to bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required
in both the military and political realms before further troop
reductions can be made.
What major lines of effort do you think are required to further
reduce or eliminate United States and NATO presence in Kosovo?
Answer. The key line of effort that will define United States and
NATO presence in Kosovo is the continued normalization of relations
between Serbia and Kosovo, under the EU facilitated dialogue that led
to a normalization agreement in April 2013. A further line of effort is
the transition of the Kosovo Security Forces into a Kosovo Armed Force
that integrates the various ethnic communities of Kosovo and
contributes to the strength of national governing institutions.
Question. In your view, can the European Union play a more
significant role in Kosovo?
Answer. The EU plays a significant role in Kosovo as one of the
three major guarantors of Kosovo's peace and stability, along with the
Kosovo national police and NATO's Kosovo Force. The EU-facilitated
political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, along with the reforms
and concessions the EU requires of Serbia as it seeks EU membership,
are major factors contributing to the normalization process between
Kosovo and Serbia. This active engagement by the EU has been an
essential part of the progress made to date.
special operations forces
Question. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs mandated significant growth in our
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support
their operations. The most recent QDR released in 2014 QDR capped this
growth at 69,500, approximately 2,500 below the original planned
growth.
In light of the increase in terrorist threats worldwide, do you
believe the revised end strength for SOF is sufficient to address such
threats?
Answer. Since 2001, the Department has continuously examined the
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) force structure to ensure that
there are adequate SOF capabilities and capacities to meet the
worldwide terrorist threat. The Department has invested in SOF
readiness and modernization efforts to meet emerging requirements and
to address the needs of the future security environment. If confirmed,
I would work closely with my interagency counterparts to develop
options for the best use of these capabilities and with those
responsible in the department to examine this issue further.
Question. SOFs are heavily reliant on enabling support from the
general purpose force.
In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient
enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose
forces and that such capabilities will remain available to SOFs?
Answer. I believe that it is important for our SOFs to receive
excellent support from the Services. If confirmed, I would work closely
with those responsible in the Department to ensure the Department
achieves an appropriate balance.
combating terrorism
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
and associated forces to the United States Homeland, U.S. interests
overseas, and western interests more broadly? Which al Qaeda affiliates
and associated forces are of most concern?
Answer. Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents continue to pose
a significant threat to the United States, its interests, and the
interests of our key western allies. The recent attacks in Paris, which
have been linked to AQAP demonstrates this fact.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role in
the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism?
Answer. DOD has a two-fold role in carrying out the President's
guidance contained in the 2011 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism. First, the Department's principal function in support of
this strategy is to work with key partners around the globe to build
their own capacity to take action against terrorist groups and networks
both internally and within their particular regions. Capacity building
efforts are part of a broad multi-departmental and multi-agency effort
in support of the strategy's long-term goal to advance effective
democracies. Second, the Department actively works to prevent terrorist
network attacks by collecting and sharing intelligence with key
partners, conducting information operations, and, when appropriate,
conducting U.S. operations to capture or kill terrorists who pose a
continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.
Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
departments and agencies?
Answer. In the decade following the events of September 11, the
U.S. Government learned many lessons relating to the value of active
cooperation and sharing among the various departments and agencies. DOD
has internalized many of these lessons as part of our institutional
culture; it routinely coordinates and collaborates with other Federal
departments and agencies to combat terrorist networks and threats to
U.S. interests. Success in today's complex threat environment requires
an interagency approach.
Question. In your opinion, how does the fighting between ISIL and
al Qaeda for preeminence among terrorist organizations alter the nature
or scope of the global security threat as it relates to violent
extremists? What elements of our strategy best take advantage of the
infighting between major terrorist groups?
Answer. The fighting between ISIL and al Qaeda for preeminence of
the global jihadist movement does not significantly alter the scope of
the threat posed to the Homeland, our overseas bases, and our deployed
personnel. We must remain vigilant against all threats to the United
States Homeland, overseas infrastructure, and interests, and we must
remain flexible to meet the threat posed by either ISIL or al Qaeda,
and potentially other violent groups as necessary. However, there
exists the potential that competition between the groups could escalate
the threat we face, as each group increases external plotting efforts
in an attempt to bolster their credentials within the global jihadist
movement.
As opportunities may emerge for the United States to further
disrupt their activities. I would direct the Department to monitor
these opportunities and recommend steps to address them as needed.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan NDAA for fiscal year
2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes
the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
facilitating military operations by U.S. SOFs to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. It is my understanding that section 1208 authority is an
effective tool to support U.S. SOFs conducting counterterrorism
operations. If confirmed, I would look for ways to maximize our return
on the investments we are able to make in support of partner forces
under section 1208 authority.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
What are your views on the role the United States plays in the
prevention of mass atrocities and genocide?
Answer. The United States can help prevent mass atrocities and
genocide worldwide. That role is consistent with our values, and is in
our national security interest. The military has unique capabilities to
counter atrocities; in a recent example, United States air strikes
helped protect Yezidi refugees on Mount Sinjar in Iraq. There is more
to atrocity prevention than use of military force, however. For
example, adequate warning mechanisms and international pressure,
including sanctions, can also help prevent atrocities and genocide.
Question. What are your views on the adequacy of the Department's
tools and doctrine for contributing to this role?
Answer. I believe the Department has effective tools and doctrine
to help deter both mass atrocities and genocide. These tools include
providing humanitarian assistance and helping secure territory to
protect civilians. If confirmed, I would continue to look for ways to
enhance the tools and doctrine available to us in preventing mass
atrocities and genocide.
united states force posture in the asia pacific region
Question. The Defense Department's January 2012 strategic guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century'',
states that ``while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to
security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region.'' Likewise, the 2010 report of the QDR states that the
United States needs to ``sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific
alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and
ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,'' and that, to
accomplish this, DOD ``will augment and adapt our forward presence'' in
the Asia-Pacific region.
What does the ``rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region'' mean to
you in terms of force structure, capabilities and funding?
Answer. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as announced by
the President, incorporated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and
reinforced by the 2014 QDR, has resulted in a significant rebalancing
of U.S. force structure and capabilities to this region, commensurate
with its vital importance to U.S. security interests and global peace
and prosperity. As we plan for the future, we will need to prioritize
investments in advanced capabilities that are critical for the future
operational environment. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
ongoing efforts to increase DOD presence in the region and invest in
and deploy critical advanced capabilities.
Question. If sequestration cuts move forward as planned beginning
in fiscal year 2016, do you feel DOD has adequate resources to
implement the January 2012 strategic guidance?
Answer. If we return to sequestration-level cuts in fiscal year
2016, we will face significant risks across the board, and may have to
reassess the defense strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with Congress to help solve this pressing problem.
Question. What do you see as the United States security priorities
in the Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. First and foremost, we must work tirelessly to protect
security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which is vital to
the prosperity of all Pacific nations, including the United States. The
United States faces a range of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region,
including provocations by the DPRK and the growth of its ballistic
missile programs, the emergence of new technologies intended to prevent
open access to the air and maritime domain, widespread natural
disasters and transnational threats, and territorial disputes.
To address these challenges, I believe the Department must continue
to modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships, which provide a critical
role in underwriting regional security. The Department should also
continue to strengthen our ability to deter threats to the U.S.
Homeland and our allies and citizens overseas, enhance United States
force posture and capabilities in the region, work with China to
encourage greater transparency about how it will use its growing
military capabilities; and encourage the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes in accordance with international law.
Question. Do you believe that it is a ``necessity'' to rebalance
the United States military toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. The United States has been--and always will be--a
Pacific nation, due to both our geography and our critical interests in
the region. The Asia-Pacific region is home to over half of the world's
population, half of the world's GDP, and nearly half of the world's
trade. It is also home to some of the world's fastest growing economies
and largest democracies.
The United States military presence has played a vital role in
undergirding peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region for over 60
years. Our presence deters potential adversaries; protects core
principles, such as freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts; and reassures key allies and partners. I believe this
presence is critical to the continued security of the region and the
future prosperity of the United States and our allies and partners.
Question. Do continuing operations in the Middle East hamper this
pivot?
Answer. It is important to continue to advance the force structure
changes, new forces station plans, improvements in advanced weapon
systems, and other measures that make up the military aspects of the
rebalance, as well as to continue the political and economic aspects,
even as U.S. forces respond to other global contingencies.
Question. Why, if at all, do you believe it is important for the
United States military to maintain and even augment its forward
presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and what are the advantages to
having a forward presence?
Answer. It is critical for the United States military to evolve its
forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region to respond to the changing
strategic environment. If confirmed, I will continue ongoing efforts to
achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and
politically sustainable force posture in the Asia-Pacific in order to
reassure allies and partners and deter aggressive acts by adversaries.
I believe that improving access and presence enables building regional
partner capacity that is a force multiplier for U.S. military forces in
the event of a contingency or humanitarian crisis in the region.
Question. Secretary Hagel has said that the Army could ``broaden
its role,'' after more than a decade of continuous operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, ``by leveraging its current suite of long-range
precision-guided missiles, rockets, artillery and air defense systems''
to build a modern coastal defense force that could contribute to
operations in anti-access/area-denial environments.
Do you concur that U.S. defense policy would be served if the Army
were to adopt such a mission? What do you see as possible obstacles to
the Army taking on such a mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support Army's ongoing efforts to
improve its integrated air and missile defense capabilities. In the
coming years, the drawdown in Afghanistan will allow the Army to focus
on resetting, to look forward to new missions, and to invest in
innovative technologies and concepts of operations that will contribute
to the resiliency of the joint force.
Question. Are you confident the Guam Distributed Laydown Plan can
be executed at the cost estimate and under the political assumptions
previously presented by the Department?
Answer. The Joint Force is developing Guam into a strategic hub for
the region. Following the submission of the Guam Master Plan to
Congress in July 2014, execution of the Guam program is moving forward.
I understand that the new plan is comprehensive, but I am not fully
briefed on the updated details at this time. If confirmed, I will
direct that efforts continue within the Department to scrutinize costs
and program execution, as well as to engage with my Japanese
counterparts on their continued contributions.
Question. Do you see value in the Department conducting another
East Asia Strategy Report, as was last done in the late 1990s?
Answer. Yes, I believe it is in the Department's interest to
clearly articulate our priorities and security objectives in this vital
region of the world. The report required section 1251 of the NDAA for
fiscal year 2015 provides the Department with the opportunity to
address these issues.
Question. Do you see a need for enhanced United States security
engagement in the Indian Ocean, and if so, in what areas and with whom?
Answer. Yes. The Indian Ocean is one of the world's busiest trade
corridors and the United States and our regional partners have a shared
interest in ensuring safe and secure access to its maritime routes. As
Asian economic growth continues to increase traffic in the Indian
Ocean, it will increase the potential for threats in the region,
including piracy, extremist attacks, or illegal trafficking. The United
States has a strong interest in working with long-time allies and
partners such as India and Australia to combat these threats, while
also increasing security assistance and military-to-military engagement
with other strategically positioned states such as Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and the Maldives.
china
Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding
economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how does
that growth influence the United States security posture in the Asia-
Pacific region?
Answer. China's economic growth can be a positive force in the
Asia-Pacific region, and the United States and many countries in the
region welcome China's economic rise. However, China's increasing
military might, in the absence of greater transparency from China, is
causing rising concern throughout the region and must be closely
watched. China's military expenditures continue to grow annually at
double-digit rates even as China asserts territorial and maritime
claims in ways contrary to international norms. These developments are
spurring other Asia-Pacific countries to modernize their militaries and
causing increased demand in the region for security cooperation with
the United States.
The United States should continually evaluate our force posture and
capabilities in order to sustain peace and stability in the region. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States remains the
preeminent military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to
sustain the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity.
Question. As China continues to invest in capabilities designed to
deter or deny United States military forces seeking to operate in the
Western Pacific, are you confident that the United States is investing
in the right programs, posture, and operational concepts to sustain a
favorable military balance with China?
Answer. It is necessary for the United States to continue to
monitor closely trends in Chinese military modernization, strategy,
doctrine, and training, and in concert with allies and partners, to
adapt investment programs, posture, and operational concepts to
maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment and a
favorable military balance with China.
Question. What can the United States do, both unilaterally and in
coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing
challenge posed by China in the East and South China Seas?
Answer. As a Pacific nation, the United States has a vested
interest in maintaining peace and stability, the free flow of commerce,
and freedom of navigation and overflight in the East and South China
Seas. United States security presence, including our strong alliances
and partnerships, as well as our force posture and capabilities, have
protected these interests and helped maintain maritime stability for
more than 60 years.
The United States must continue to encourage China to clarify its
claims in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. We
should also reaffirm our strong commitment to our allies and partners
and the need for all parties to develop confidence-building measures
that will increase transparency and reduce risk.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States sustains
its ability to deter aggression and coercion and maintain free and open
access to the maritime domain in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end,
I will continue the Department's efforts to modernize U.S. security
alliances and partnerships, enhance U.S. force posture, and update our
military capabilities.
Question. United States-China military-to-military dialogue has
been strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and
maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by
China's propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in
an apparent effort to influence United States actions, although there
is some evidence that the relationship is improving.
What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of
sustained military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. It is profoundly in the United States' and China's
interests that we find ways in the overall relationship, as well as in
the military-to-military relationship, to increase cooperation where
our interests overlap and to manage our differences where we disagree.
In recent years, the Department's sustained and substantive dialogue
with the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has enabled both the
United States and China to reduce the risk of misperception and
miscalculation, as well as to deepen practical cooperation in areas
ranging from humanitarian assistance to military medicine. In addition
to making investments that ensure our technological advantages in all
domains, the military-to-military relationship is an important
component in managing competition.
I believe we should continue to use our military engagement with
China to establish deeper cooperation where there is clear, mutual
benefit and to enhance dialogues to reduce risk and manage our
differences. As the Department continues to develop the military-to-
military relationship with China, it will be important to also adapt
forces, posture, and operational concepts in cooperation with our
allies and partners to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific
region.
Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the
quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what
changes would you suggest and, given Chinese resistance to military-to-
military dialogue, how would you implement them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to strengthen the United States-
China military-to-military relationship in ways that best serve the
interests of the United States and our allies and partners. Military-
to-military ties are beginning to demonstrate positive outcomes. China
is devoting more attention to operational safety and preventing
incidents that could seriously harm the overall relationship. If
confirmed, I will continue to pursue a sustained, substantive dialogue
that aims to reduce risk and manage our differences, while building
concrete, practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest.
north korea
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. The United States-ROK alliance continues to be the critical
linchpin to deterring North Korean aggression and maintaining stability
on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea remains one of the most intractable security problems
for the United States and our allies and partners in the region. North
Korea continues to take actions that are destabilizing for the region,
including its December 2012 missile launch, February 2013 nuclear test,
series of short-range ballistic missile launches in 2014, and its
recent cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment.
The limited information we have on Kim Jong Un, his regime, and
North Korea's motivations also add to my concern. Despite the recent
signals from both North and South Korea about openness to inter-Korean
engagement, the United States should remain vigilant against the strong
possibility that North Korea will use brinkmanship and provocations to
try to coerce the United States and its allies and partners back into
negotiations on its own terms. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
United States-ROK Alliance continues to strengthen alliance
capabilities to counter North Korea's increasing missile and nuclear
threat.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities clearly present a serious and direct
threat to United States forces postured in the Asia-Pacific region as
well as to our regional allies and partners. These capabilities,
although untested at longer ranges, could also pose a direct threat to
the United States. Moreover, North Korea's history of proliferation
activities amplify the dangers of its asymmetric programs.
If confirmed, I will ensure that we draw upon the full range of our
capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, these threats.
Question. In your view, what additional steps should the United
States take to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat
and dissuade North Korea from its continued pursuit of ballistic
missile technology and to stop or slow North Korean proliferation of
missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen our
strong defense posture against the North Korean ballistic missile
threat. This includes supporting our current efforts to increase the
number of ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska, enhancing
DOD's ability to highlight and disrupt the illicit proliferation
networks that North Korea uses, and promoting cooperation with partners
to interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of transporting items of
proliferation concern.
Question. What is your view on Kim Jong Un's proposal to cease
future nuclear tests in exchange for the United States cancelling
annual military exercises in 2015 with South Korea?
Answer. I believe the United States annual combined exercises with
the Republic of Korea, including Key Resolve and Foal Eagle during the
first part of 2015 and Ulchi Freedom Guardian during the summer of
2015, are routine, transparent, and defensive exercises that are meant
to strengthen military readiness and Alliance preparedness. There is no
equivalence between conducting these exercises and North Korean nuclear
tests, which are violations of United Nations Security Council
resolutions.
india
Question. What is your view of the current state of the United
States-India security relations?
Answer. India and the United States have built a strong strategic
partnership. India is an important net provider of security in the
region, and a partner on issues ranging from maritime security to
humanitarian assistance to broader regional stability. The past decade
has been transformative in the United States-India relationship, and we
are seeing greater convergence in our interests and concerns than ever
before, particularly between our rebalance to Asia and India's ``Act
East.'' Strengthening the United States-India defense relationship was
a priority for me as Deputy Secretary of Defense and, if confirmed, I
will continue to prioritize the steady growth of this relationship.
Defense plays a vital role in United States-India relations, which
includes a robust series of military exchanges and exercises, a strong
track record on defense trade, and increasingly close consultations on
regional security issues. DOD also remains committed to technological
cooperation with India through the Defense Technology and Trade
Initiative (DTTI), under which the President announced four pathfinder
projects, a working group on aircraft carrier cooperation, and the
possibility of cooperating on jet engine technology. As Deputy
Secretary of Defense, I launched DTTI, now led by Under Secretary Frank
Kendall. If confirmed, I will lean-forward to expand DTTI with
additional co-production and co-development activities.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to find ways to strengthen
our military-to-military relationship by expanding the scope and
complexity of our exercises, and ensure the consistency of our
engagement. I will prioritize exchanges at all levels of our military,
and encourage frequent high-level visits. I will also build upon the
progress achieved under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative
(DTTI). This includes pursuing additional opportunities for co-
production/co-development projects, developing the defense trade
relationship into increasingly sophisticated areas, and encouraging
broader defense S&T engagement with India. Finally, I will continue to
look for ways to expand upon our maritime security relationship and
identify specific areas for increased cooperation, including in the
Asia-Pacific.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India
and China and how does that relationship impact the security and
stability of the region?
Answer. As with the United States and China, India's relationship
with China displays both cooperative and competitive aspects. It is
hampered by a trust deficit stemming from China's long-time, close
relations with Pakistan; a long-time border dispute; and on-going
competition for resources. Efforts to mitigate this mistrust are
further complicated by a growing competition for influence in the South
and Southeast Asian regions, a trade imbalance in China's favor, and
recent Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean region.
Despite these factors, the two countries often find common ground
in international groupings, such as the BRICS and G20, due to shared
interests and a desire to shape the international system to ensure
their respective domestic development and economic growth. This
cooperation helps to maintain stability in Sino-Indian ties and
preclude more overt security competition. The United States, India, and
China all have an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of
the region and a rules-based order.
department of defense counternarcotics activities
Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs
flowing toward the U.S. On an annual basis, DOD's counter narcotics
(CN) program expends nearly $1 billion to support the Department's CN
operations, including building the capacity of U.S. Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign governments, and
providing intelligence support on CN-related matters and a variety of
other unique enabling capabilities.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in counterdrug
efforts?
Answer. DOD should continue to play an important role in
identifying counter narcotics networks and supporting the interdiction
of illicit drugs entering the United States. In addition, DOD should
continue to support U.S. law enforcement and partner nations'
enforcement capabilities by facilitating training, providing equipment,
and improving infrastructure that strengthens their operational reach
and their own sustainment capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that the United States broadly, and the
U.S. military more narrowly, has been effective in achieving its
counterdrug objectives?
Answer. The United States has supported the interdiction of
hundreds of tons of illegal drugs by law enforcement personnel
annually. The United States has also, through multi-agency efforts, put
pressure on major drug trafficking organizations and their leaders. The
Department's efforts to build the counter narcotics capacity of partner
nations' security forces also contribute to counterdrug objectives by
strengthening security institutions and by equipping and training
security personnel to disrupt, degrade, and deter drug trafficking
networks in both source and transit countries.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the
United States?
Answer. I believe that the United States, along with other
countries, should continue to assist other nations in the fight against
drug trafficking by supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of these
nations to disrupt and degrade narcotics trafficking networks.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a
debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern
their nations and provide opportunities for their people. DOD is by no
means the U.S. Government's law enforcement agency, but it does bring
unique enabling capabilities to our Nation's Federal law enforcement
agencies. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 expanded several of the
Department's primary counterdrug authorities to include ``countering
transnational organized crime (TOC)'' as an approved activity to
reflect the increasingly diverse nature of these illicit, global
networks.
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime recognizes that TOC has expanded in size, scope, and influence
over the past 20 years, and now poses a significant and direct threat
to national and international security. The Strategy, with amplifying
implementation guidance, calls for combatting networks that pose a
strategic threat to U.S. interests, and ultimately aims to reduce TOC
networks from a national security threat to a manageable public safety
problem.
Question. What role, if any, should the Department play in
combatting transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime declares TOC a threat to national security, and calls on the U.S.
Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools of national power
to combat TOC and related threats. Although DOD does not serve as the
lead for combatting TOC, it can provide unique and critical support to
U.S. law enforcement efforts. Specific DOD capabilities include
military intelligence support and counter-threat finance support,
training of foreign partners, and detection and monitoring. The
expanded authorities provided by Congress in the NDAA for fiscal year
2015 provide additional opportunities for DOD to support efforts to
counter illicit networks and to contribute further to the achievement
of U.S. Government objectives.
counter threat finance
Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun
investing more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money
associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking, but the
opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are
not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to them.
Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation
routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production
of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant
national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting
these threats.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely
heavily on licit and illicit funding sources to support their
activities. I believe it is essential to engage all available tools to
track and halt the flow of money and to fight our adversaries' ability
to access and use global financial networks. Although DOD is not the
lead agency for Counter-Threat Finance (CTF). CTF can be important to
achieving DOD goals. I am aware that the Department works with other
departments, agencies, and partner nations to provide planning, network
analysis, and intelligence analysis.
Question. Are you aware of any policy, legal authority, or resource
shortfalls that may impair U.S. counter threat finance efforts?
Answer. I understand that the Department has concerns that we do
not have enough fidelity on the sources of corruption that can impact
our ability to achieve our goals in partner nations and, in non-
terrorism cases, there are still difficulties fully sharing relevant
information between law enforcement and intelligence entities.
Question. In your view, how should DOD coordinate and interface
with other key agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the
Intelligence Community, in conducting counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. I am aware that DOD works with other U.S. Government
departments and agencies, including the Department of the Treasury and
the Intelligence Community, on counter-threat finance efforts to limit
our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.
central america and mexico
Question. During a March 13, 2014, Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing, General John Kelly, Commander of United States Southern
Command, stated that the ``unprecedented expansion of criminal networks
and violent gangs is impacting citizen security and stability in the
region'' which has led the United Nations to characterize Latin America
``the most unequal and insecure region in the world.'' Despite this
reality and the region's proximity to the U.S. Homeland, DOD efforts in
the region have routinely been plagued by resource shortfalls, which
have only been exacerbated by sequestration. To this point, General
Kelly stated before the committee: ``the severe budget cuts are now
reversing the progress and forcing us to accept significant risks.
Because of asset shortfalls, we're unable to get after 74 percent of
suspected maritime drug trafficking. I simply sit and watch it go by.''
General Kelly went on to state that ``the cumulative impact of our
reduced engagement won't be measured in the number of canceled
activities and reduced deployments, it will be measured in terms of
U.S. influence, leadership, relationships in a part of the world where
our engagement has made a real and lasting difference over the
decades.''
Do you share General Kelly's concerns about the impact of DOD
resource shortfalls to our operations and security interests in the
region?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What are your views on the threats posed by transnational
criminal organizations in this region and their impact on U.S. security
interests?
Answer. Transnational criminal organizations have become entrenched
in places like the Northern Triangle of Central America, where they
take advantage of weak government institutions, endemic corruption,
large under-governed spaces, and the lack of viable economic
opportunities. Many of our partners in the region are challenged to
control the influence of transnational criminal organizations, which
present a real threat to stability and expose vulnerabilities to the
southern approaches to the United States.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's role and current
activities in Mexico and Central America?
Answer. DOD supports the broader U.S. interagency effort to promote
security and stability in the region. The Department's security
cooperation activities in Central America focus on professionalization,
respect for human rights, building capacity of local security forces,
including maritime, and facilitating internal defense institutional
reform efforts that will help those governments plan, resource, and
maintain enhanced capabilities. The Department contributes to efforts
to help Mexico address internal and transnational security challenges,
as well as to support Mexico's growing regional and international
defense leadership role.
Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to DOD's current
role and activities in this region?
Answer. If confirmed, I would direct my team to examine whether
there is more DOD could do to support U.S. strategies to address the
root causes of insecurity in the region. Steps the U.S. Government can
take include supporting efforts to strengthen government institutions
and fight corruption, develop infrastructure, address control of under-
governed spaces and help diminish criminal organizations. Lasting
solutions will require an interagency approach by the United States and
will require the United States to cooperate and coordinate with other
partners in the region.
cuba
Question. On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced changes
in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Cuba which
includes the easing of several longstanding restrictions.
Would you recommend the establishment of military-to-military
engagement between the United States and Cuba? If so, what, if any,
prerequisites should there to their establishment?
Answer. I believe that with the recent efforts to begin normalizing
relations with Cuba there is an opportunity to consider carefully
whether to expand defense relations. If confirmed, I would examine this
issue carefully and work to ensure any military-to-military engagement
is nested within a larger, comprehensive U.S. Government engagement
strategy.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. It is critical to draw lessons learned from Afghanistan and
Iraq. A key lesson is that strategy requires a close integration of
military, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic elements and the full
range of American power. Increased collaboration, transparency, and
communications among the interagency are important. If confirmed, I
will focus on maintaining and improving these relationships to ensure
that interagency collaboration is as effective as possible.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. Given the complexity and scope of the national security
challenges we face, a whole-of-government approach is essential to our
success in order to harness the full capabilities of all U.S.
departments and agencies. We must work with interagency partners to
evaluate continually the effectiveness of our coordinated efforts and
make adjustments where necessary. We must also acknowledge that every
tool is not appropriate for every task.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
contingency operations?
Answer. We must have a rigorous approach to capturing our lessons
learned and including them in our professional military education
system and doctrine review process. If confirmed, I would keep these
principles in mind as I work with the military departments and the
combatant commands to maintain and cultivate enduring and agile
partnerships with key departments and agencies across government.
strategic reviews
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD
processes for analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting results for each
of the following strategic reviews:
The Defense Strategy Review (section 118 of title 10, United States
Code, as amended by Public Law 113-291);
Answer. The purpose of the QDR is to articulate the Nation's
defense strategy in support of the President's National Security
Strategy. DOD is tasked, per Title 10 U.S.C. Section 118, with
conducting a comprehensive examination of the national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies
with a view toward establishing a defense program for the next 20
years. In my experience, effective QDRs incorporate inputs from various
stakeholders, both within and outside the Department, and provide
effective guidance to develop U.S. military force structure, plans, and
programs.
Question. The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10,
United States Code);
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepares the
National Military Strategy (NMS) in order to assist the President and
Secretary with unified strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The
Chairman uses a robust Joint Strategic Planning System to develop the
NMS and biennially submits the strategy to the Armed Services
Committees of the House and Senate. The strategy specifies military
objectives, strategic and operational missions required to achieve
those objectives, and the necessary capabilities to carry out each
mission. The NMS also describes the strategic and operational risks
associated with accomplishing the strategy.
Question. Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10,
United States Code); and
Answer. The Global Defense Posture annual report to Congress,
authored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordination
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offers an operational view of the
Department's military personnel and facilities, and assesses changes to
overseas posture required to meet evolving security environment and
strategic priorities outlined in documents such as the QDR. DOD global
posture decision-making processes continually review the appropriate
mix of deployed and forward stationed U.S. forces, the distribution of
enduring locations, and status of international agreements to meet
national security requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure this
thorough process continues to meet the Congressional intent.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to change title 10, United States Code, and to improve DOD's
processes for analysis, policy formulation, and decision making
relative to each review above?
Answer. I have no specific recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Members of Congress to ensure
that these reviews continue serving the needs of both DOD leaders and
Congress.
tactical fighter programs
Question. Based on the current defense strategy, defense planning
scenarios, and force-sizing construct, what are your views on the
ability of the Department to meet combatant commander requirements with
regard to fighter force capability and capacity now and into the
future?
Answer. U.S. fighter forces currently enjoy technical superiority
and will continue to contribute to the overall success of our forces.
Other nations are making significant investments in modernizing their
fighter fleets and in building advanced air defenses. The U.S. must
maintain the ability to control the air space in any current and future
operations.
The largest and most costly modernization effort we will face over
the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program
to upgrade our tactical aviation forces to fifth generation
technologies.
Question. Based on current and projected threats, what are your
views on the continued requirement for and timing of this program?
Answer. While the F-35 program has experienced a number of program
delays and other significant acquisition issues, when fielded it will
provide a significant edge in the number of high capability aircraft.
The 5th generation technology that is the backbone of this system will
be required for success in future conflicts.
Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of
the JSF program that we have seen over the past several years will be
sufficient to avoid having to make major future adjustments in either
cost or schedule?
Answer. The restructuring initiated in 2010 put the F-35 program on
better footing. However, a program of this scope and importance
requires continued aggressive management attention.
Question. Are there any initiatives you would propose to help
reduce operating and support costs for the JSF program?
Answer. There are many factors that drive the operating and support
costs for a weapons system like the F-35. Aggressive management of
these initiatives will be required because the operating and support
costs will be a major part of the JSF's overall cost. I understand that
the F-35 program is undertaking a number of reliability and
maintainability initiatives that are focused on improvement in those
areas.
strategic bomber
Question. Secretary Hagel said on January 13, 2015, ``I think the
Long-Range Strike Bomber is absolutely essential for keeping our
deterrent edge.''
What are your views on the requirement for this capability, and how
to acquire such a platform while providing the best value for the
American taxpayer?
Answer. I believe the Department requires global power projection
capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict in order to deter and
dissuade potential aggressors. To maintain these capabilities, the Air
Force requires a new generation of stealthy, long-range strike aircraft
that can operate at great distances, carry substantial payloads, and
operate in and around contested airspace. If confirmed I will work with
the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
to ensure that the program will provide best value for the American
taxpayer by ensuring the program is based on mature technologies and
through program competition across a highly capable industrial base.
navy shipbuilding
Question. Today's Navy is at its smallest size in decades and could
decline further without additional urgent shipbuilding recapitalization
efforts. Over the past several years, successive Chiefs of Naval
Operations have concluded that the Navy requires a fleet of at least
306 ships to perform its mission. The Navy's current naval battle force
is only 289 ships, and will not be at the 306 level until sometime
after 2020.
What are your views regarding the CNO's conclusions about the
appropriate size and composition of the fleet, and the adequacy of the
Navy's current and projected plans to achieve a fleet with that number
of ships?
Answer. A strong and capable Navy is essential to meet our Nation's
strategic requirements across the spectrum of operational demands.
Therefore the Navy needs a broad set of capabilities among the mix of
ships in its inventory. Ship count is only one metric to measure to
evaluate fleet effectiveness. If confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that
the appropriate force structure requirements are fully identified and
supported.
Question. At about that same time (2020) the Navy will need to
begin acquiring the Ohio Replacement Ballistic Missile Submarines
(SSBNs). The new Ohio class boats are projected to cost well over $10
billion per ship and the Navy has publicly indicated it cannot afford
to buy both the new SSBNs as well as procure at least nine other ships
annually.
Do you believe the Navy can meet its goals for the size of the
fleet in the current budget climate particularly in light of the Ohio
Replacement Program?
Answer. Procurement of the Ohio Replacement SSBN, as well as
recapitalization of the other elements of the nuclear triad, poses
significant resourcing challenges to the DOD. The Ohio Replacement
Program will present unique constraints on the Navy's shipbuilding
plan, particularly if the DOD is required to be funded at the levels
specified in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have stated that recapitalizing
our ballistic missile submarine force is the top shipbuilding priority
for the Navy and have taken steps to reach the affordability targets of
the Ohio Replacement Program. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy
and the Congress to manage the impact of this critical endeavor on the
rest of the shipbuilding programs and ensure naval forces are
structured to meet our national defense needs.
Question. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Nation procured the initial
Ohio SSBN submarines within the Navy's shipbuilding (SCN) account, do
you believe using the SCN is possible for Ohio replacement or is a new
method needed?
Answer. I believe the important decision is to make the commitment
to modernizing the ballistic missile submarine fleet. It is a vital
component of our nuclear deterrence strategy. The Department needs
adequate resources for modernization in order to ensure we can make the
orderly transition to this new generation ballistic missile submarine.
Which account it is funded in is of lesser importance. It makes the
most sense to include the Ohio Replacement in the shipbuilding account,
but this is a decision that can be made in the future.
To maintain a Navy fleet with roughly 300 ships would require an
annual new construction build rate of about 10 ships per year, assuming
ship service lives of 30 years. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget
request included only 7 new construction ships.
Question. Do you believe that the Navy's goal can be achieved
without recapitalizing the fleet at a larger rate? If not, will you
recommend to the President that he significantly increase funding
levels for the Navy to support both:
(1) buying ships at an annual rate of at least 10 new ships per
year; and
(2) in particular replacing our Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN)?
Answer. I understand DOD remains committed to sustaining the force
structure required to maintain our Nation`s security, and that
recapitalization of the Nation`s sea-based strategic deterrent is
critical to this mission. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to
reduce risk in their force structure with particular focus on Ohio-
class replacement submarines and other high priority ships.
Question. The Navy has in recent years proposed the long-term lay
up of CG-7 class cruisers and LSD-41 class amphibious ships in order to
achieve manpower cost avoidance savings and stretch out the life of
these ship classes in order to defer new build replacement ships.
Congress has consistently rejected the Navy's proposal noting the
Navy's initial investment of more than $11.6 billion in the nine CG/LSD
ships and the fact these ships are very unlikely to return to service
after a lengthy layup approaching 5 years in some cases. Retiring these
ships before the end of their planned service life creates unnecessary
and unaffordable future shipbuilding requirements.
What are your views on the Navy's proposed plan to lay up in a
reduced operating status both CG-47 class and LSD-41 class ships?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy
and other Department leadership to better understand and assess how the
Navy would execute the proposed plan, to ensure that it appropriately
balances the needs of current readiness, modernization and future force
structure to make the best use of existing assets.
Question. Would you support modernizing these ships within the
Navy's SCN account to ensure they can serve out their full service
lives?
Answer. The SCN account, like virtually all modernization accounts,
is under enormous pressure to finance the shipbuilding program the
Nation needs. Difficult tradeoff decisions have been made and will need
to be made in the future. It is important that the Congress and the
Department find a way to move forward on the appropriate funding.
aircraft carriers
Question. DOD has repeatedly reaffirmed, despite budget pressures,
that the United States is committed to maintaining a fleet of 11
nuclear powered aircraft carriers (CVNs), and maintaining carriers on
patrol in the Persian Gulf. Yet, in the Department's fiscal year 2015
budget request only 10 carriers were funded. We also understand carrier
deployments have been extended for as long as 9 months. The NDAA for
fiscal year 2015 reiterated the statutory requirement for the
Department to maintain not less than 11 carriers.
If confirmed as Secretary of Defense will you ensure the Department
adheres to the statute requiring that the Navy shall include not less
than 11 operational carriers?
Answer. I understand that the Department has reported that if it is
forced to operate at sequestration level funding, it would have to seek
relief from the 11-carier requirement.
Question. Can you articulate for this committee your views on the
number of CVNs that need to be maintained, and whether naval forward
presence, particularly in areas such as the Persian Gulf, should be
maintained and can be maintained without an urgent recapitalization of
the fleet?
Answer. I understand that a sizable carrier force is required to
support our current strategy and provide sufficient carrier strike
groups to meet overseas presence requirements. If confirmed, I will
work with the Navy to ensure that we resource a sustainable level of
presence that continues to support our Nation's strategic goals.
future role of the army
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 directed the establishment
of a National Commission on the Future of the Army to review the size
and structure of all three components of the Army: regular Army, U.S.
Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The Commission will also
consider and evaluate key policies concerning the make-up, training and
the distribution of Guard resources across the states. Additionally,
the commission will review the Army's Aviation Restructure Initiative
which recommended the transfer of National Guard Apache helicopters to
the regular Army. The legislation allows the Army to transfer 48 Apache
helicopters in fiscal year 2016.
What are your views regarding the National Commission on the Future
of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the commission as
enacted by law.
Question. In your view, what are the key factors in determining the
role of the Active and Reserve components in their support of the
National Military Strategy?
Answer. In my previous time in the Department I have seen the value
of the operational contributions of all components. Their response in
crisis has been and will be a Total Force response. The key factor is
insuring the Total Force has the appropriate mix to support the
requirements to the combatant commanders.
Question. General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, has
stated that the Army will continue to be an indispensable part of the
joint force and that there is a synergy that is gained of all the
services in order for the military to meet the Nation's needs. He has
also said the Army provides more than Brigade Combat Teams--the Army is
the largest contributor to SOFs and it provides a broad range of
essential services to combatant commanders to include intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance; air and missile defense; logistical
support; and signal communication support.
In your view, what are the most important considerations or
criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
strategy and resources?
Answer. Our national security requirements are the most important
considerations when aligning the Total Army's size, structure, and cost
with strategy and resources.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of
security strategies and the likely availability of resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review how the Department should align
the Army's size and structure to the strategy in the same way that it
would align those of any other component of the Joint Force: based on
appropriate security environment, examining the demands of the missions
that are most relevant to that component, and then determining how best
to provide the capabilities required to accomplish those missions. If
confirmed, I will work closely with military and civilian leaders to
balance maintaining the skills needed to meet our most pressing
national security demands within the limits of acceptable risk and
within existing resources.
army force structure
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 called for
the reduction of Army end strength and force structure over the next 5
years to 490,000 personnel and eight fewer combat brigades. The Army
has accelerated these plans and intends to reduce endstrength to
490,000 by the end fiscal year 2015. Additionally, the Army intends to
reduce endstrength to 450,000 Active, 315,000 Army National Guard, and
195,000 Army Reserve with even more severe reductions possible. Senior
Army and National Guard leadership has testified that the Army will
assume medium-to-high risk to meet the requirements of the National
Security Strategy at these levels.
In your view, can the Army's Active component end strength be drawn
down below the announced and planned reduction to 450,000? If so, what
in your view would be the impact on strategic risk, if any, and, in
your view would that strategic risk be acceptable or unacceptable?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the level of funding specified
in the Budget Control Act, and the appropriate levels for the total
force army. I share the concern by our Army, Army Reserve and the
National Guard leaders of the risks inherent in the sequester funding
levels.
Question. How do you define the resulting strategic risk?
Answer. A strategic risk would be a lesser ability to support the
highest priorities in our national defense strategy.
Question. If confirmed, what size or force structure changes, if
any, would you propose for either the Army Reserve of the Army National
Guard?
Answer. The Active and Reserve components of the Army must be sized
and shaped to support our strategy. The Army National Guard provides
critical capabilities to the Governors and States, while also retaining
capacity to support vital Federal missions. The Army Reserve is also a
key partner with the Active Army and the Army National Guard for
Homeland support and warfighting missions. I understand that the Army
Commission will examine some of these areas and if confirmed will look
forward to their recommendations.
army modernization
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
record with respect to equipment modernization?
Answer. This record is mixed, and I believe it can be improved.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to ensure that the
Army achieves a genuinely stable, achievable, and affordable
modernization strategy and program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Army's modernization
strategies to ensure that stable and affordable modernization programs
are adopted and implemented. I will stress the continued need for Army
programs that incorporate practical and realistic development
strategies, affordable and technically feasible requirements and
sufficient and stable resources.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
Army's capabilities portfolio review process and its current
modernization priorities and investment strategy?
Answer. I have not examined any recent changes the Army may have
introduced so I am unable to assess the Army's specific processes for
reviewing military requirements or establishing modernization
priorities.
Question. What actions, if any, would you take to sustain the
momentum of these reviews in stabilizing the Army's modernization
strategy and priorities?
Answer. If confirmed I will support the Army's efforts to improve
its modernization strategy and priorities.
unfunded priorities
Question. Section 1003 of Public Law 112-239 (NDAA for fiscal year
2013) expressed the sense of Congress with respect to the annual
submission by the Service Chiefs and Commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command of their critical unfunded priorities that are not
included in the President's annual budget request.
If confirmed, will you allow the Service Chiefs and Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command to comply with this sense of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
ballistic missile defense
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 expresses the Sense of the
Congress that it is a national priority to defend the U.S. Homeland
against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack (whether
accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).
Do you concur with Congress on this fundamental point?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support each of the following steps--currently
planned by DOD--for improving the capability of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense System to meet evolving ballistic missile threats (if
not, please explain why):
(1) Correct the problems associated with recent flight test
failures;
Answer. Yes.
(2) Enhance homeland defense sensor and discrimination
capabilities;
Answer. Yes.
(3) Redesign the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, including realistic
testing; and
Answer. Yes.
(4) Design a next generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicle to take
full advantage of improvements in sensors, discrimination, kill
assessment, battle management, and command and control, including the
potential to engage multiple objects?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Forward deployed United States military forces, and our
regional allies and partners, face a growing regional ballistic missile
threat, especially from nations such as North Korea and Iran. The
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is intended to provide
increasing levels of defensive coverage of NATO Europe against Iranian
ballistic missiles, including an Aegis Ashore site in Romania in 2015
and one in Poland in 2018.
Do you agree that it is a priority to defend our forward-deployed
forces, our allies, and partners from the threat of regional ballistic
missiles?
Answer. Yes. Our deployed forces as well as our allies and partners
in the Middle East and in the Asia/Pacific region are within range of
hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
I agree that the United States must prioritize capabilities to
deter regional adversaries from launching a ballistic missile attack
and to defend against such an attack if necessary.
Question. Do you believe that the current phased and adaptive
approach to regional missile defense is appropriate to meeting the
operational needs of our regional combatant commanders, given the
threat and current resource constraints?
Answer. Yes. I understand the current United States policy is to
develop regional approaches to ballistic missile defense in Europe, the
Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region that are tailored to the
unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.
I believe that such approaches provide the best option for managing
our own high-demand, low-density ballistic missile defense forces and
for developing allied and partner ballistic missile defense capacity in
support of Combatant Commander requirements.
Question. Do you believe the EPAA schedule is achievable and
appropriate for defending NATO Europe against the current and projected
threat from Iranian regional ballistic missiles?
Answer. I believe the three phases of the EPAA were constructed to
allow the United States to deploy existing or new capabilities in time
to meet the projected threat from Iran. If confirmed, I will review the
progress on this effort with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Question. Do you agree that the United States should encourage our
regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense
capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the
burden on U.S. forces and requirements?
Answer. I understand that building international cooperation and
seeking appropriate levels of partner contributions are key tenets of
our regional ballistic missile defense policy. I also understand that
over time we have developed substantive ballistic missile defense
relationships with our allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East,
and the Asia-Pacific region, which have led to advances in fielding our
own capabilities as well as those of our allies and partners.
I view continuing these partnerships as critical to developing
effective security architectures that deter and, if necessary, can be
used to defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack.
Accordingly, if confirmed, I will promote strong bilateral and
multilateral ballistic missile defense cooperation in these key regions
of U.S. interest.
space
Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
ensure access to space. As a Nation heavily dependent on space assets
for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets
became a U.S. national priority.
Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
space assets should be a national security priority?
Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness is important to understand
and characterize the space environment, detect interference with space
systems, and enable timely attribution and response. Equally important
is the protection of our space capabilities.
Question. In your view, should China's continued development of
space systems inform United States space policy and programs?
Answer. Yes. China is rapidly developing space capabilities of its
own that both mirror United States capabilities and could threaten our
access and use of space for national security purposes. If confirmed, I
will review the Department's efforts to address China's developments in
space, and will coordinate closely with other United States departments
and agencies.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to National
Security Space Policy and Programs?
Answer. The National Security Space Strategy clearly highlights the
growing challenges in the space domain. If confirmed, I will insist on
policies, programs, and other measures that ensure U.S. warfighters can
continue to depend on having the advantages that space confers.
Question. What role do you believe offensive space control should
play in National Security space policy and programs?
Answer. Offensive space control, in addition to other elements of
national power, should be carefully considered in protecting our forces
from threats posed by an adversary's space-enabled capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the overall
management and coordination of the national security space enterprise?
Answer. Yes. I understand that the Department's recent strategic
portfolio review of space highlighted challenges with our overall space
posture. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to make
adjustments to address those challenges.
Question. What is your view on weapons in space?
Answer. The United States depends upon space capabilities to enable
operations in all domains. Other nations are working to challenge those
capabilities as well as to field their own. If confirmed, I intend to
work with Congress to determine the best way to defend U.S. space
systems and to deny those advantages to those who would use space to
target U.S. warfighters.
Question. The administration is proposing to free up 500 MHz of
spectrum for broadband use, a candidate portion of which includes the
band 1755-1850 MHz, which is used heavily by DOD and other national
security agencies.
Do you support this initiative?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support section 1602 of P.L. 106-65, which
requires the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that any alternative band or bands
to be substituted for spectrum currently used by DOD and other national
security agencies provide ``comparable technical characteristics to
restore essential military capability that will be lost as a result of
the band of frequencies to be so surrendered''?
Answer. Yes. This provision is necessary to ensure that the
Department maintains access to spectrum necessary to operate critical
military capabilities. Preserving this provision is essential to the
ability of DOD to continue to successfully contribute to the
President's broadband goals, especially given the increased focus on
spectrum sharing.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to comply with section
1602 in light of the 500 Mhz initiative?
Answer. I understand Secretary Hagel recently signed, along with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Commerce, certification for the 1755-1780 MHz frequency bands that were
auctioned as part of the Advanced Wireless Service 3 (AWS-3). I will
ensure that any future auctions involving spectrum used by the
Department are certified in accordance with P.L. 106-65, section 1062.
Question. Do you intend to insist that DOD be compensated fully for
the cost of relocating, if required to do so?
Answer. Yes, I intend to insist that DOD be compensated fully for
the cost of relocating, if required to do so in accordance with section
1062.
Question. How do you propose the Department make more efficient use
of communications spectrum through leasing of commercial satellites?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the DOD Chief
Information Officer to continue to leverage the efforts which the DOD
and commercial satellite communications providers are already pursuing
to more effectively and efficiently utilize the communications
spectrum. Based on that review, I will determine if additional
opportunities should be pursued.
Question. Do you support more competition in the launch of DOD
payloads?
Answer. I have been, and continue to be, whenever possible, a
staunch advocate for competition across all of the Department's
acquisition programs. Regarding space launch for national security
space (NSS) missions, I fully support competition and, if confirmed,
will review provisions for competition of future NSS launch missions.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to encourage new
entrants to the medium and heavy lift launch of DOD payloads while
balancing affordability, mission assurance, and maintaining the
viability of the existing launch provider?
Answer. Mission assurance remains the cornerstone of the
Department's approach to space launch for NSS missions. If confirmed, I
will encourage competition from new entrants by ensuring the Department
has a clear understanding of the certification process and by making
every effort to certify all capable new entrants as quickly as
possible.
Question. Do you support commercial hosting of DOD payloads and if
so how?
Answer. The Department should explore and consider the full range
of options. Commercial hosting may help diversify the space
architecture, improve mission assurance and potentially reduce costs of
U.S. Government space-based capabilities. If confirmed, I will explore
the full range of options, including commercial hosting, for providing
future space-based capabilities when appropriate.
Question. What is your long-term vision and support for the Space
Based Infrared Sensing system?
Answer. I understand the Department is executing a comprehensive
Analysis of Alternatives for the SBIRS follow-on capabilities. If
confirmed, I will assess the alternatives and recommendations with the
objective of affordably providing and assuring critical missile warning
and battlespace awareness capabilities.
Question. What is your long term vision and support for the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency system?
Answer. I believe that AEHF is a critical component of the
Department's Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
capability. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure the Department
provides the needed NC3 capability for the President.
Question. Do you support splitting the systems sensors up to lower
overall cost of the system?
Answer. I support exploring the full range of approaches to
reliably and affordably providing space-based capabilities
cyber deterrence
Question. Do you believe we are deterring and dissuading our
adversaries in cyberspace?
Answer. An effective deterrence strategy requires a range of cyber
policies and capabilities to affect a state or non-state actors'
behavior. In addition to continuing efforts to improve U.S. cyber
defenses and cybersecurity capabilities, the United States should
continue to respond to cyber-attacks against U.S. interests at a time,
in a manner, and in a place of our choosing, using appropriate
instruments of U.S. power and in accordance with applicable law. The
U.S. Government should continue to combine its cyber and non-cyber
capabilities into a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy. If
confirmed, I will do all that I can to contribute to the development
and execution of that effort.
Question. Do you agree that, consistent with section 941 of the
NDAA for fiscal year 2014, there is a need for an integrated policy to
deter adversaries in cyberspace and that the President should promptly
provide that policy to Congress as specified in law?
Answer. Deterrence cannot be achieved through cyberspace alone, but
requires a multi-faceted effort across the totality of the U.S.
Government's instruments of national power, including network defense
measures, economic actions, law enforcement actions, defense posture
and response capabilities, intelligence, declaratory policy, and the
overall resiliency of U.S. networks and systems. If confirmed, I will
ensure that DOD is in full compliance with its reporting requirements
to this committee and to the Congress as a whole.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
reduce the frequency and severity of cyber intrusions from the Chinese
Government?
Answer. This is a serious problem and the Department should
continue to take strong actions to address China's use of cyber theft
to steal United States companies' confidential business information and
proprietary technology. I am aware that the Administration has raised
this as an issue of concern with the highest levels of China's
government. If China does not take meaningful action to curb this
behavior, it will undermine the economic relationship that benefits
both our Nations. Such activity undercuts the trust necessary to do
business in a globally connected economy. Further, military involvement
in such theft raises additional concerns that misunderstandings about
China's intentions could result in unintended escalation between our
countries. The U.S. Government should continue to use all instruments
of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic, to prevent and respond to these intrusions.
Question. What agencies should the Department coordinate with in
tracking and eliminating cyber threats?
Answer. I believe a whole-of-government approach is required to
address the cyber threats we face now and will increasingly face in the
future. DOD must continue to work closely with the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Justice (specifically FBI), and
the Intelligence Community, as well as with other Federal partners, to
identify, mitigate, and defend against cyber threats.
reporting and sharing of information on intrusions into operationally
critical contractors
Question. What are your views on the conclusions of the Senate
Armed Services Committee's report: Inquiry Into Cyber Intrusions
Affecting U.S. Transportation Command Contractors, 113th Congress, 2nd
Session?
Answer. Although I have not had the opportunity to fully review the
report, I understand that the Senate Armed Services Committee's inquiry
into cyber intrusions affecting U.S. Transportation Command contractors
contained important findings that the Department takes very seriously.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, Departments and
Agencies, and the private sector to strengthen the Department's
information sharing processes and to protect the Department's ability
to execute its mission.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the
communication gaps that exist between TRANSCOM and the various
investigating agencies are closed?
Answer. The Department's ability to execute its mission depends
greatly on the integrity of our networks and the networks of our
private sector partners. If confirmed, I will work to improve
information sharing between the relevant investigative agencies and
U.S. Transportation Command.
act of war in cyber
Question. What do you believe would constitute an act of war in
cyberspace?
Answer. Cyber-attacks can affect our critical infrastructure, the
national economy, and military operations. I believe that what is
termed an act of war should follow the same practice as in other
domains, because it is the seriousness, not the means, of an attack
that matters most. Whether a particular attack is considered an ``act
of war,'' in or out of cyberspace, requires a determination on a case-
by-case and fact-specific basis. Malicious cyber activities could
result in death, injury or significant destruction, and any such
activities would be regarded with the utmost concern and could well be
considered ``acts of war.'' An attack does not need to be deemed an
``act of war'' to require a response.
Question. Does North Korea's attack on the Sony Corporation of
America--a costly destructive attack on a United States company--rise
to the level of an act of war? If not, why not?
Answer. To my knowledge, the damage caused by this cyber-attack
consisted of the deletion of data, the destruction of some Sony network
infrastructure, and the unauthorized disclosure of personal
information. While serious and deserving of a response, this does not
seem to me to rise to the level of an ``act of war.''
china's aggressive theft of united states intellectual property
Question. A recent report by the National Counterintelligence
Executive confirmed the widespread belief that China is engaged in a
massive campaign to steal technology, other forms of intellectual
property, and business and trade information from the United States
through cyberspace. The previous Commander of U.S. Cyber Command has
referred to this as the greatest transfer of wealth in history and,
along with others, believes this is a serious national security issue.
Do you believe that China's aggressive and massive theft of
technology in cyberspace is a threat to national security and economic
prosperity?
Answer. Yes. The theft of intellectual property through cyber means
is a clear threat to the economic prosperity from which the Nation
derives its national security. Our competitive economic advantage and
our military technological advantage rest on the innovations of a
highly knowledge based U.S. industry. Any nation-state that engages in
the theft of our intellectual property through cyber means jeopardizes
both our national security and economic prosperity.
Question. The Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon NDAA for
fiscal year 2015 authorized the President to impose sanctions, pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.), on persons determined to knowingly request, engage in, support,
facilitate, or benefit from economic or industrial espionage in
cyberspace against U.S. persons.
What are your views on the potential impact of this legislation?
Answer. Addressing cyber threats requires a whole of government
approach, which coordinates and integrates all the instruments of
national power. Cyber legislation is an important part of this effort.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress on
appropriate legislation to address a broad array of cybersecurity
issues.
Question. What additional steps do you believe are needed to deter
China from such activities in the future?
Answer. We need to continue to use all the instruments of national
power to deter this kind of behavior, including diplomatic, financial,
network defense, law enforcement, and counterintelligence. I concur in
the administration's approach of raising this as an issue of concern at
the highest levels of the Chinese government. I also support the State
Department's efforts to work with like-minded countries to make China's
leadership increasingly aware that elements of their government and
military are on the wrong side of an emerging norm of responsible
behavior in cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Department's interagency partners to explore what additional whole-of-
government approaches might help deter this unacceptable behavior.
dod's role in defending the nation from cyber attack
Question. What is your understanding of the role of DOD in
defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
role distinct from those of the homeland security and law enforcement
communities?
Answer. The Defense Department is responsible for defending the
Nation from all attacks, including those that occur in cyberspace. DOD
is also responsible for defending its own networks against cyber-
attacks. DOD plans, coordinates, and conducts cyber operations to
ensure the reliable operation of and to defend DOD systems and
infrastructure. If directed, DOD can conduct cyber operations to defend
the Nation, defend military networks, and support military operations
in all domains. If required, DOD may provide support to the private
sector and State and local governments.
The Defense Department also works closely with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DoJ) in their
missions. DHS is the lead agency for protecting, mitigating, and
recovering from domestic cyber incidents. DoJ investigates, attributes,
disrupts, and prosecutes cybercrimes that fall outside of military
jurisdiction and provides domestic response to national security
incidents.
next challenges in growing operational cyber capabilities
Question. DOD, in a significant milestone in the maturation of the
cyber warfare mission, is successfully organizing and training
personnel for units to conduct military operations in cyberspace.
What challenges does the Department face in developing the command
and control, operational planning, mapping and situational awareness,
battle damage assessment, tools and weapons, and infrastructure
capabilities necessary to conduct large-scale operations in cyberspace?
Answer. I understand that DOD is in its third year of building a
Cyber Mission Force. This force is intended to defend DOD networks,
defend the Nation from cyberattack, and provide full-spectrum
cyberspace options for the combatant commands. I am aware of several
challenges that should be addressed to ensure the Department can
conduct military operations in cyberspace, among them effective command
and control, and meeting the challenge of effectively incorporating
National Guard teams.
iran
Question. Negotiations on the Iran nuclear program have been
extended with a deadline now of March 1, 2015, for agreement in concept
with 4 months after that to finalize a comprehensive agreement.
What are the elements of a nuclear agreement with Iran that you
consider critical to ensuring that it is a ``good'' deal for U.S.
national security interests?
Answer. In my view, a ``good'' deal is one that resolves the
international community's concerns with Iran's nuclear program and
prevents it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The best way to do that is
through a comprehensive solution that, when implemented, will ensure
that, as a practical matter, Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and
that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively and verifiably peaceful. Any
deal must effectively cut off the four pathways Iran could take to
obtain enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon including a uranium
pathway, through its activities at Natanz and Fordow; a plutonium
pathway, through the Arak heavy water reactor; and a potential covert
pathway. It must include tight constraints and strict curbs on Iran's
nuclear program. And finally, it must require robust monitoring and
transparency measures to maximize the international community's ability
to detect quickly any attempt by Iran to break out overtly or covertly.
Any sanctions relief in exchange should be phased and tied to
verifiable actions on Iran's part. Such relief should be structured to
be easily reversed so that sanctions could be quickly re-imposed if
Iran were to break its commitments.
Question. If Iran is allowed to maintain a monitored and limited
uranium enrichment program, do you believe that other states in the
region will want to develop enrichment programs of their own and what
is your rationale for that view?
Answer. Yet another reason to ensure that Iran does not obtain a
nuclear weapon is to prevent proliferation in the region. States
seeking to develop enrichment programs of their own in pursuit of
nuclear weapons would face significant costs, in crippling sanctions
and political and diplomatic isolation. The United States has a
longstanding framework for providing alternative mechanisms to ensure
that states have access to the benefits of civil nuclear energy without
the need to pursue enrichment.
Question. With the international community focused on the Iran
nuclear negotiations, in your opinion, has there been a neglect of
countering Iranian malign activities in the region to include support
for Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the West Bank, and Hezbollah in Lebanon
and Syria? How do you think those threats should be addressed?
Answer. Countering Iranian destabilizing activities must be an
important priority. Regardless of the outcome of nuclear negotiations,
I firmly believe that the United States must also counter these
destabilizing regional activities, including Iran's support to
terrorists and militant groups. If confirmed, I would work to ensure
the Department is focused on these issues.
Question. If the tide of ISIL is pushed back in Iraq and Syria,
what, if, any, friction points do you anticipate between United States
and Iranian interests in those two countries to come to the forefront?
In your opinion, what is the best way to manage those friction points
should they emerge?
Answer. In Syria, I believe that Iran's continued support for Assad
and instability will cause continued friction between the United States
and Iran. The United States has an interest in a stable, united, and
inclusive Iraq with support from all of Iraq's communities. I have
concerns about the sectarian nature of Iran's activities in Iraq. The
United States must continue to make clear to the Iraqi Government that
Iran's approach in Iraq undermines the needed political inclusion for
all Iraqi communities, which is required to ultimately defeat ISIL.
Question. On March 2012, President Obama said he would ``keep all
options on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran.''
Do you agree with the President's view that ``all options should be
on the table'' to prevent a nuclear Iran?
Answer. Yes. I strongly support the President's view that all
options should be on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran.
nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the
continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and
security of the stockpile?
Answer. The greatest challenge will be achieving and maintaining
the necessary balance among three critical nuclear areas to allow
continued certification that our nuclear weapons remain safe, secure,
and effective. First, is the capability to continue to provide the
science and engineering needed to assess an aging stockpile without
underground testing. Second, is maintaining and strengthening the
ability to extend the life of the warheads through a program of
component refurbishment, replacement or rebuilding. The final area is
sustaining and modernizing the aging infrastructure that provides the
materials, components, and testing facilities essential for tomorrow's
nuclear enterprise.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. I support the President's policy of maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons
exist, and agree that funding the sustainment and modernization plan is
a critical national security priority. As indicated in the report
prepared pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2010,
this includes sustaining and modernizing nuclear weapon delivery
platforms, sustaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons
stockpile, and modernizing the nuclear weapons complex.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
Treaty limits for either the deployed or non-deployed stockpile of
nuclear weapons?
Answer. The President has stated that we can meet our current
objectives with a reduced force structure. Any consideration of further
nuclear weapon reductions below New START treaty limits should focus on
measures that will maintain or strengthen deterrence of potential
adversaries, assurance of our allies and partners, and strategic
stability.
Question. What role does the Nuclear Weapons Council play in
helping to establish key stockpile stewardship goals and modernization
objectives?
Answer. I previously chaired the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
which facilitates cooperation and coordination, seeks consensus, and
sets priorities between the two departments (DOD and Department of
Energy), as they fulfill their dual-agency responsibilities for nuclear
weapons stockpile management. The NWC works toward jointly agreed to
priorities and strategies for weapon life extension programs, stockpile
stewardship, and infrastructure modernization objectives. The NWC
priorities and strategies in turn provide requirements for both
departments to formulate budgets and develop implementing plans to
achieve our Nation's goals of a safe, secure and effective stockpile.
Question. Do you support a more active role of the Office of Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) in ensuring the programs within
the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration are appropriately tailored for the best investment of
funds possible to achieve a safe, effective and reliable nuclear
weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes.
current nuclear forces
Question. Section 1052 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 established
a ``Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control
and Communications System''. You have had a long and active history in
this area of DOD.
What do you see as the most pressing challenges in nuclear command,
control, and communications from a policy and acquisition perspective?
Answer. Nuclear command and control must be an enduring priority of
which one challenge is to sustain existing capabilities until new,
modernized capabilities can be fielded. Another challenge is providing
an assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear command, control and
communications (NC3) system that takes advantage of the technological
advances of modern communication capabilities while at the same time is
secure and hardened against attacks ranging from cyber to the most
severe kinetic attacks.
Question. What do you see as the most pressing challenges in
overall national leadership communications from a policy and
acquisition perspective?
Answer. One challenge is to sustain existing capabilities until
new, modernized capabilities can be fielded. Another challenge is
providing an assured, survivable and enduring communications capability
that allows senior defense advisors to communicate with the President,
the combatant commands and strategic allies during normal day-to-day
operations and during national crises from a fixed, mobile or airborne
location. The ability to provide our national leadership secure,
reliable voice, video and data communications is a critical capability.
Question. Will you actively support section 1052 and in an ex
officio capacity attend meetings when possible?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In 2014, Secretary Hagel has conducted an assessment of
the state of nuclear deterrence operations of DOD.
Do you agree with its findings?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to receive a full briefing about
this important assessment.
Question. Will you actively support the findings and their
implementation?
Answer. I look forward to fully reviewing these findings, if
confirmed, and taking appropriate steps to ensure the U.S. maintains
the capability to carry out the nuclear deterrent mission.
nuclear modernization
Question. The President's June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy
affirmed that the United States will maintain a nuclear triad, noting
that ``Retaining all three TRIAD legs will best maintain strategic
stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical
problems or vulnerabilities.''
Some commentators suggest it will be financially challenging for
the current and future administrations to fulfill nuclear modernization
commitments over the next 10 to 20 years. Yet, as Deputy Secretary of
Defense, you noted in August 2013, ``nuclear weapons . . . are not a
big swinger in our budget. That's just a fact.''
Do you share Secretary Hagel's view that our nuclear deterrent ``is
DOD's highest priority mission?''
Answer. Yes.
Question. Will you provide us your commitment to ensure that DOD,
working closely with the Department of Energy, will make every effort
to invest what is needed to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad,
and to address the recent recommendations of the DOD Nuclear Enterprise
Review?
Answer. Yes.
russian violation of the 1987 inf treaty
Question. During testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee on December 10, 2014, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Brian McKeon, told the panel that ``if Russia does
not return to compliance, our end will be to ensure that Russia gains
no significant military advantage from its violation.''
In your view, what are the consequences for U.S. national security
of Russia's actions in violation of its obligations under the INF
Treaty?
Answer. I believe that the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty contributes to the national security of the United States and
its allies and partners. I also believe the INF Treaty contributes to
Russian national security. Russian deployment of weapon systems that
violate the INF Treaty would pose an increased threat to the United
States and our allies in Europe and Asia.
Question. What military advantage, if any, did Russia gain by
acting in violation of its INF obligations?
Answer. We must ensure that Russia does not gain a military
advantage. Russia should return to compliance with the INF Treaty in a
verifiable manner.
Question. What do you believe would be appropriate responses for
the United States to take in order to: (1) convince Russia to return to
compliance with the INF Treaty, or (2) ensure that United States
national security is maintained if Russia does not return to
compliance?
Answer. The United States should consider a comprehensive strategy
of diplomatic, economic, and military responses that address both of
these goals. Russia's continued disregard for its international
obligations and lack of meaningful engagement on this particular issue
require the United States to take actions to protect its interests and
security as well as those of its allies and partners. United States
efforts should continue to remind Russia why the United States and
Russia signed this treaty in the first place and be designed to bring
Russia back into verified compliance with its obligations. I believe
that any United States responses should be designed to make the United
States and our allies and partners more secure by negating any
advantage Russia might gain from deploying an INF-prohibited system.
The range of options we should look at from the Defense Department
could include active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-
launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent
intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and
countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces.
U.S. responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to
compliance our responses will make them less secure than they are
today.
Question. How long do you believe we should wait to see if Russia
returns to compliance?
Answer. I support the current efforts focusing on convincing Russia
to return to verifiable compliance and preserving the viability of the
INF Treaty, which I believe continues to serve U.S. and allied
interests. Such efforts must be allowed to produce the desired effect.
If Russia does not return to verifiable compliance, I support a path
that ensures that Russia gains no significant military advantage from
its violation of its INF Treaty obligations.
Question. What does Russia's INF violation suggest to you about the
role of nuclear weapons in Russian national security strategy?
Answer. Russia's INF Treaty violation is consistent with its
strategy of relying on nuclear weapons to offset United States and NATO
conventional military superiority.
medical countermeasures initiative (mcmi)
Question. The administration has produced an interagency strategy
for the advanced development and manufacture of medical countermeasures
(MCM) to defend against pandemic influenza and biological warfare
threats. In this strategy, DOD will be responsible for the rapid
development and manufacture of medical countermeasures to protect U.S.
Armed Forces and DOD personnel.
Do you support this interagency strategy and the MCM Initiative
and, if confirmed, would you plan to implement them?
Answer. Yes.
defense acquisition reform
Question. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)
was designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a
sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the
acquisition process.
What are your views regarding WSARA since its implementation in
2009?
Answer. In my view, WSARA enacted a number of steps to improve
weapons system acquisition, which has contributed to improving trends
in the Department's acquisition performance.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. In my judgment, more should be done to link and streamline
these three processes and, if confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with those responsible in the department and the committees to
drive the necessary improvements. All three must be closely coordinated
as the problems and the resulting solutions change over time. This is
not a static system and we must all remain open to continuous
improvement. In the requirements area we need to insure they are
feasible and disciplined and not subject to constant change and that we
don't initiate programs that are unaffordable. As we move into the
acquisition phase, we need to push to field the initial system within
five years and avoid delays by constantly adding capabilities that
could be done thru block improvements later. Time is money. We must
incentivize industry to control costs and likewise incentivize the
government acquisition workforce to do the same. Those responsible for
budgeting, particularly the Service Chiefs, need to be engaged in all
three processes. And we should strengthen accountability in all phases
and at all levels.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition
accountability?
Answer. As before, more can be done here as well. There are two
basic challenges in improving accountability. First is an overly
complex acquisition system that distributes authority across too many
offices and individuals; and second, assignment policies in the
government rotate senior program managers and officials too frequently.
If confirmed, I will engage our department leaders in addressing these
challenges and also work with the Congress to both obtain your ideas
and to push thru the required fixes. We must also insure our industry
partners achieve this increased level of accountability.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. The constrained budget environment facing the Department
puts enormous pressure on the Department to continually strive to
control costs and reexamine all areas of the budget for affordability.
Even before the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011 I strongly
believed that unacceptable cost growth in individual programs had to be
reversed. If confirmed, in addition to the improvements I cited in
earlier answers, I will insure the Department ensures programs are
affordable to buy and operate, and that programs are managed so as to
stay affordable as they progress through the life cycle.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. If confirmed, I would emphasize the need for continuous
improvement addressing the challenges identified earlier as well as
ensuring all aspects of WSARA and the Department's ongoing work with
the Better Buying Power initiatives continue to be implemented as
broadly as possible. I would welcome the opportunity for the Department
to work with Congress where new legislative measures, or relief from
existing legislative constraints, would improve acquisition
performance.
reliability of weapons systems
Question. The Department's process for procuring major weapons
systems places insufficient emphasis on reliability and maintainability
and, therefore, produces systems that are increasingly costly to
operate and sustain. Given that these ownership costs comprise most of
a given weapons systems' overall lifecycle cost, these increased costs
could undermine considerably the Department's ``buying power.''
How would you ensure that the defense acquisition system produces
more reliable weapons systems?
Answer. I recognize that a strong emphasis on reliability is
critical to achieving affordability. A disciplined approach to life
cycle reliability in acquisition policy must continue and we need to
use sustainment affordability caps when appropriate. If confirmed, I
will ensure that our acquisition programs address reliability and
maintainability through appropriate requirements and sound engineering
practices at each stage of a weapon system's development.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend the
Department take to drive down sustainment costs?
Answer. It is important to influence system designs that address
key drivers of sustainment costs early in the development process, and
to have program managers include sound sustainment strategies early in
a system's life cycle. The Department has established sustainment
affordability caps under the Better Buying Power initiatives to drive
that process with its Program Managers.
If confirmed, I will emphasize those elements in our acquisition
programs such as requirements, design, contracting strategies, and
sustainment strategies which drive down sustainment costs.
excessive concurrency in major defense acquisition programs
Question. Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major
automated information systems have experienced excessive cost-growth
and schedule delays. In some instances, this appears to be the result
of excessive concurrency between development and production. It also
appears that the Department lacks the ability to identify, price, and
therefore effectively manage program risk, (e.g., technological,
developmental, integration, and manufacturing risk)
What specific changes need to be made in the acquisition system to
ensure the delivery of MDAPs and major information systems on time and
on budget?
Answer. Comprehensive changes in acquisition practice have been
made in recent years via WSARA and BBP. But more needs to be done, and
the measures needed will change over time as technology, industry, and
budgets change. Skilled and experienced acquisition professionals,
reduction of paperwork and overhead, and effective contract incentives
are enduring keys to cost and schedule control.
Managing concurrency and other program risks is a fundamental
challenge of acquisition program management. The department needs to
ensure its acquisition professionals have the experience, tools, and
good judgment needed to make data-driven decisions appropriate to the
risks they face leading these programs in order to properly plan
programs.
services contracting
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. I believe DOD must manage its total force of military,
civilian, and contractor personnel in a way that avoids inappropriate
or excessive reliance on contractor support for basic Department
functions.
Question. Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on
contractor support for military operations?
Answer. Based on my experience, I do not believe the Department is
too reliant on contractor support for military operations.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
should take to mitigate such risk?
Answer. Over-reliance on contractor support may lead to an
unbalanced total force that sub-optimizes the civilian and military
contribution, a loss of government-held corporate knowledge, and the
potential for contractors inappropriately exercising authority in
performance of inherently governmental functions or those closely
associated with inherently governmental functions.
Active management of the total force is necessary to mitigate these
risks. Decisions on how to cost-effectively meet requirements should
take into account the management of all three components of the total
force.
Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has issued guidance on roles and
responsibilities for planning for and managing contractors on the
battlefield. I believe that investments made in the Department's
acquisition workforce, as well as the implementation of recommendations
made by the Commission on Wartime Contracting and the GAO, have
improved the Department's ability effectively to plan for and manage
contractors on the battlefield. I believe that the combatant commanders
recognize that contractors are their responsibility as part of the
total force.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. I believe appropriate requirements definition and increased
oversight are critical to improve management of contractors on the
battlefield. The heightened focus on services acquisition reinforces
this with proper planning, management, training, and oversight tools.
efficiency in department operations
Question. In your view, what latitude must be given to the Joint
Chiefs to enact cost-saving reforms?
Answer. The Military Service Chiefs of Staff already have broad
latitude to develop, propose and implement cost-saving measures across
the spectrum of doctrine, organizational structure, and personnel to
and with their Military Department Secretaries, the Combatant Commands,
and the Secretary of Defense. I will continue to encourage them to
bring forward cost-saving reform ideas even if those ideas challenge
the current structures and arrangements of the Department as a whole.
As in the past, I value the Chiefs' unswerving focus on the essential
missions of the Department, and the perspectives that motivation
brings.
Question. Do you support the administration's request for the
authority to conduct additional Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) to
eliminate unneeded facilities?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what would be your priorities in carrying out a
round of BRAC?
Answer. Should Congress authorize the Department to carry out
another BRAC round, I would direct it to focus on efficiency and
consolidation rather than transformation. BRAC 2005 was skewed by the
fact that a large number of its recommendations were focused on
transformation, had high upfront costs, and were never expected to
yield savings. However, those recommendations that were focused on
efficiency had impressive payback and accounted for a small portion of
the costs--much like the 1993 and 1995 rounds. If confirmed, this is
the approach I would direct the Department to adopt.
unified command plan
Question. There has been much discussion about streamlining the
current Unified Command Plan.
What are your views on the ability of the current Unified Command
structure to address emerging global, regional and ethnic threats and
the potential need to reduce the number of the geographic commands or
their staffs to help reduce overhead costs?
Answer. In my view, the current Unified Command structure is quite
capable of addressing a range of emerging threats and challenges.
Effective United States responses to such varied challenges as the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and Ebola, demonstrate the
flexibility of the current structure. However, the Department
periodically reviews the Unified Command Plan to ensure its structure
is optimized for emerging threats and challenges. As such a review is
underway now; it would be premature to speculate on the types of
changes that will be reflected in its final recommendations on the
structure.
Question. What is your opinion of the critique that geographic
combatant commands have made U.S. foreign policy ``too militarized''?
Answer. I am sensitive to this critique, but understand that some
degree of tension is inevitable in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy
objectives. As long as the United States maintains forward presence
around the world, we will continue to rely on our military leadership
to build meaningful relationships with their counterparts. These
relationships are essential to our continued forward presence in
peacetime, building partner capacity with key allies and partners, and
to our ability to secure access in the event of a contingency, from
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to combat operations.
Provided our activities are well coordinated with other stakeholders
within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there is no reason why
both military and other foreign service professionals cannot contribute
to the same U.S. objectives.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
Unified Command Plan? In your view, is there a need to undertake a
major reevaluation toward modification of the current Unified Command
Plan? If so, explain why?
Answer. The Unified Command Plan establishes the combatant
commands' missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of
responsibility (when applicable). In my view, the established, periodic
review cycle of the Unified Command Plan should be maintained.
Question. In your view, are their opportunities for greater
effectiveness and efficiencies in the consolidation of the roles and
responsibilities two or more current geographic combatant commands,
such as U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command? If not, please
explain why.
Answer. The Department reviews the Unified Command Plan
periodically to ensure its structure is optimized for emerging threats
and challenges, and for effective and efficient distribution of roles
and responsibilities among combatant commands. Such a review is
underway now; it would be premature to speculate on the types of
changes that will be reflected in the final structure.
proliferation of joint task forces
Question. There is a trend of continued proliferation of task
forces, including joint task forces, in support of geographic combatant
and functional commands. Some of these joint headquarters are temporary
or for a short duration, but others evolve into enduring long term and
larger force structure.
What is your understanding and assessment of DOD's policy guidance
for oversight of the number, scope of operational responsibility and
authority and duration of joint task forces?
Answer. I understand that the Department's policy guidance for
oversight of joint task forces that support combatant commands is
established and exercised through the global force management process.
Through this process, combatant commanders request authorities and
forces to support their operational requirements and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluates such requests and makes
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. I have been away from the
department for some time and therefore unable to make a specific
assessment of the current policy and guidance.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your plan to evaluate and
manage task forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I would remain committed to the best use of
resources in the pursuit of the department's priorities and objectives
and would scrutinize recommendations to standup and/or continue support
for enduring joint task forces.
test and evaluation (t&e)
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to ensure that
the Department as a whole and each of the Services specifically
maintains its testing organizations, infrastructure, and budgets at
levels adequate to address both our current and future acquisition
needs?
Answer. I recognize the critical role that test and evaluation
provides to the acquisition process.
Question. A natural tension exists between major program objectives
to reduce cost and schedule and the T&E objective to ensure performance
meets specifications and requirements.
What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the
desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform
adequate testing?
Answer. I don't believe these objectives are necessarily
incompatible. Adequate testing prior to committing to production is
essential to discover performance problems that can take even more time
and money to rectify before proceeding.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we
should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been
demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
suitable, and survivable?
Answer. It may be necessary to field a system prior to operational
testing in cases where it is necessary to fill a critical capability
gap identified in ongoing operations. Even then, testing should be
accomplished to ensure basic operational performance and system safety.
Question. Congress established the position of Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on
matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As
established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with
Congress, consistent with the statutory independence of the office.
Do you support the continued ability of the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation's to speak freely and independently with the
Congress?
Answer. Yes.
funding for science and technology (s&t) investments
Question. Do you support increasing DOD's S&T investments?
Answer. I support investment in S&T to develop and deliver near-
term capabilities and maintain long-term options for the Department.
However, the investment in S&T must be balanced with modernization,
operational, and personnel accounts within the Department.
Question. How will you assess whether the science and technology
investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs
of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and
others to assess the adequacy of the science and technology portfolio
to provide the most affordable military advantage to our warfighters.
Question. What specific technological areas should the Defense
Department prioritize for investment in order to develop next
generation operational capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review changes to the investment
portfolio that have occurred since I left, and I will prioritize
efforts to provide substantial capability advances or those that impose
disproportionate cost to adversaries.
Question. Given limited resources, what technological areas can be
de-emphasized in order to free resources to support priority areas?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to review the
entire investment portfolio in R&D and if required adjust the
investment, to favor new, unique capabilities that could provide an
operational advantage to our forces. Technologies that can be obtained
from commercial sources should be de-emphasized for S&T investments by
the Department.
Question. Are you satisfied with the quality of the DOD research,
laboratory, and engineering workforce and infrastructure, especially
relative to its industry and academic peers, and global competitors?
How do you plan to maintain that quality in the future?
Answer. The subject of DOD laboratory quality, both for personnel
and infrastructure, has been studied over the past several decades.
Scientists and engineers play a very important role in our overall
national security and accessing and retaining top talent is a priority
for the DOD. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in his efforts to
assess the current quality of our science and engineering workforce,
and determine what changes, if any, are needed to maintain the proper
quality.
Question. What specific goals will you set for the recently
announced Defense Innovation Initiative? What metrics will you use to
assess the success of this initiative?
Answer. I understand the Defense Innovation Initiative is pursuing
creative ways to sustain and advance our military dominance in the 21st
century. If confirmed, I will review this initiative in detail and if
necessary work with Deputy Secretary Work to refine goals and metrics.
defense industrial base
Question. The latest QDR addressed the need for strengthening the
defense industrial base. Specifically, it said: ``America's security
and prosperity are increasingly linked with the health of our
technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic
advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent,
realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and
capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases--a strategy
that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology,
as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.''
What is your understanding and assessment of the current state of
the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. The Department relies on an industrial base that is now far
more global, commercial, and financially-complex than ever before. I am
concerned about what impacts further defense budget cuts would have on
the ability of the industrial base, particularly small firms, to
provide the broad range of products and services that the Department
and our Nation need. While only a small fraction of our industrial base
capabilities may be at risk, in some key industrial capabilities vital
to our future national security the United States is in danger of
losing essential domestic sources, or going down to a single qualified
source.
Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense
industry?
Answer. I support the review of each proposed merger, acquisition,
and teaming arrangement on its particular merits, in the context of
each individual market and the changing dynamics of that market. I
believe the government must be alert for consolidations that eliminate
competition or cause market distortions that are not in the
Department's best interest.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. Foreign investment can play an important role in
maintaining the vitality of the U.S. defense sector through capital
injection, the introduction of innovative technologies, and
facilitating interoperability with our coalition partners. However,
foreign investment can also expose the U.S. defense sector to a number
of risks associated with supply assurance, product integrity, and
technology transfer. Therefore, I support policies that encourage
foreign investment when it is consistent with the national security
interests of the United States.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any do you believe DOD should
take to most effectively and efficiently manage risk and ensure the
continued health of the U.S. defense industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department proactively
monitors the defense industrial base to identify risks and mitigate
those risks when necessary. During my time as the Under Secretary of
Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Deputy
Secretary, the Department took steps to improve and preserve
competition in defense procurements, and I would support the creation
or continuation of competitive opportunities.
reset and reconstitution funding
Question. The Department has a substantial backlog of maintenance
availabilities due to the high tempo and demand of more than a decade
of combat operations. Senior DOD officials have testified that they
will require 2-3 years of additional funding to restore readiness
through reset and reconstitution of their equipment and personnel.
Do you agree with the assessment that the DOD will need 2-3 years
of additional funding for reset and reconstitution?
Answer. I understand that the cumulative effect of more than a
decade of war has placed a significant strain on the Department's reset
and reconstitution requirements. The current level and diversity of
global operations has added to this strain and must be part of the
reset calculus. If confirmed, I would review the reset and
reconstitution funding and assumptions.
Question. If confirmed, how will you balance maintenance and reset
requirements with fiscal realities and future risk in developing your
budget request?
Answer. Maintenance and reset of DOD's current equipment would be a
priority for me in order to restore and preserve long-term readiness. .
If confirmed, I would work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, and others to assess the
appropriate balance of resources and risk.
operational energy
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy
Plans and Programs published a policy that any alternative drop-in
replacement fuel procured for DOD-wide use and distribution within the
Class III (Bulk) supply chain must compete with petroleum products and
any awards will be based on the ability to meet requirements at the
best value to the government, including cost.
What is your view of this policy?
Answer. This policy was issued while I was Deputy Secretary, and I
believe it is the right approach, and it is consistent with section 316
of NDAA for fiscal year 2015. As the Department allocates limited
resources to ensure warfighting capability, it should only buy large
volumes of alternative fuels when they are cost-competitive with
petroleum products.
Question. What is your assessment of section 526 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 and how it should apply to
military operations of DOD?
Answer. My understanding is that section 526 prevents Federal
agencies from entering into contracts to procure alternative or
synthetic fuels that have higher greenhouse gas emissions than
conventional petroleum. This provision has not restricted the
Department from purchasing the bulk fuel needed to support worldwide
military operations.
Question. Considering the potential of further cuts to Defense
budgets and the importance of energy security, do you believe DOD
should jointly invest with other government agencies in the
construction of a commercial biofuels refinery?
Answer. Over the long-term, I believe the Nation will benefit from
a competitive, domestic renewable fuels industry, and, as a major
consumer of liquid fuels, the Department would benefit from such
competition. I am aware the DOD has partnered with the Departments of
Energy and Agriculture and the private sector to accelerate the
development of cost-competitive advanced alternative fuels for both the
military and commercial transportation sectors but I am not current on
how those partnerships are performing.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for
Defense investments in and deployment of energy technologies?
Answer. Consistent with the need to increase military capabilities,
reduce risk, and mitigate costs through our use and management of both
operational and facility energy, I would prioritize improvements to
both operational effectiveness and efficiency--improving the energy
performance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and military bases;
reducing the vulnerability of our energy supply chains; and
diversifying the kinds of energy used by the Department.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
u.s. security commitment to taiwan
1. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six
Assurances form the cornerstone of United States-Taiwan relations and
affirms our commitment to maintain Taiwan's self-defense capability.
How do you and the administration plan to continue to implement our
policy under this framework?
Dr. Carter. I am firmly committed to maintaining Taiwan's self-
defense capability, consistent with our one-China policy, which is
based on the three joint United States-China communiques and the Taiwan
Relations Act. This is a policy that has endured across multiple
Administrations of both Republicans and Democrats, and has served as an
important element of our approach to the Asia-Pacific region for more
than thirty-five years.
Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, the
Department of Defense should continue to evaluate Taiwan's defense
needs and provide defense articles and services necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The United
States should also maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force
or coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and
economic system, of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will ensure
that the Department continues to work closely with our partners on
Taiwan, and with Congress, to fulfill these obligations and thereby
support the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
2. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what do you believe should be the
priorities for United States military assistance to Taiwan?
Dr. Carter. I believe the Department should prioritize continuing
to assist Taiwan's effort to incorporate asymmetric concepts and
capabilities into its defense. The United States should encourage
Taiwan to prioritize investments in infrastructure and weapon systems
that are survivable, and able to capitalize on Taiwan's natural
advantages. Furthermore, I believe the Department should continue to
focus on defense cooperation in support of Taiwan's transformation to a
volunteer force, assisting it improve doctrine, training, and
readiness. The Department of Defense should work with Taiwan to support
its defense transformation and identify procurement priorities that
enable it to deter aggression, resist coercion and maintain stability
across the Taiwan Strait.
chinese military coercion
3. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, over the last several years, China
has engaged in coercive diplomacy to achieve its political and
territorial aims in the East and South China Seas. The administration
has responded with efforts to build partner capacity and strengthen
regional institutions, but this will take years if not decades to bear
fruit. Beyond private diplomacy with the Chinese, which appears to be
insufficient, what steps do you believe we should take to deter Chinese
assertiveness in the short- and medium-term?
Dr. Carter. The United States has a strong interest in maintaining
peace and stability, the free flow of commerce, and the freedom of
navigation and overflight in the East and South China Seas. In addition
to diplomacy to resolve territorial disputes peacefully and in
accordance with international law, the United States should deter
assertiveness in the region with a robust force posture, sustained
presence, and commitment to building the capacity of its partners and
allies. The United States also should encourage China to be more
transparent about how it will use its growing military capabilities.
The United States should also continue to modernize and strengthen its
security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Philippines, and Thailand. The United States should also deepen
relationships with and among its partners in South and Southeast Asia
to build capacity and reduce vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I will
continue to prioritize our investments in posture, presence, and
partnership capacity in the Asia-Pacific region to deter aggression and
underwrite peace and stability.
4. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, do you share the view that China's
actions have violated United States national interests in the Freedom
of Navigation, the free flow of commerce and the peaceful settlement of
disputes in accordance with international law?
Dr. Carter. The United States has a longstanding national interest
in preserving the freedom of navigation, and in the peaceful settlement
of disputes in accordance with international law. I am concerned that
recent Chinese actions, including its unilateral and uncoordinated
announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that
overlapped the previous existing ADIZ in the East China Sea, its
unilateral promulgation of fishing regulations covering much of the
South China Sea, its pursuit of land reclamation activities in the
South China Sea, and its use of economic pressure on other claimants,
has raised regional tensions and complicated efforts to peacefully
manage and resolve territorial disputes. The United States should
remain committed to the preservation of the freedom of navigation, and
all the other rights provided under international law. If confirmed, I
would carry forward that commitment, and I would work to ensure that
disputes are addressed in a manner that both reflects that commitment
and that serves the goal of resolving disputes peacefully. This
approach would apply to my dealings with China and with all other
countries.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
national security resource mismatch
5. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of our force
structure and readiness given the current and expanding global security
environment?
Dr. Carter. The Joint Force has been engaged in uninterrupted
warfare for over 13 years, while the changing security environment has
generated greater demand for forces across the globe. The 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review assessed that the future security
environment will continue to be volatile and dynamic. The high tempo of
operations, coupled with constrained resources and disruptive budget
actions that led to reduced readiness and force structure pressures in
recent years, has challenged the Services in their efforts to
reconstitute full-spectrum readiness. If sequestration returns in FY
2016 and beyond, the Department's readiness could deteriorate even
further.
6. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how do you plan to
shape our military to ensure we can deter and/or defeat today's and
tomorrow's threats?
Dr. Carter. The Department must rebalance the Joint Force to ensure
it remains modern, capable, and ready for today's requirements and an
uncertain future. The 2014 QDR outlined specific steps for the
Department to take to adapt, reshape, and rebalance our military in
order to sharpen our ability to address threats across the spectrum,
from ongoing terrorism challenges to potential nation-state adversaries
with a full range of technologically advanced capabilities. If
confirmed, I will actively guide the Department's efforts to achieve
the right balance of capability, capacity, and readiness in the Joint
Force to address today's threats while setting the foundation to meet
future challenges.
military compensation and retirement modernization commission report
7. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what are your thoughts on
maintaining an All-Volunteer Force and how these recommendations could
impact retention and recruiting?
Dr. Carter. The All-Volunteer force has successfully supported our
national security requirements particularly during the last 13 plus
years of combat. I am aware the White House and the Department's senior
civilian and military leadership are examining each of the Commission's
specific proposals in detail. If confirmed, I will review the
Commission's recommendations and the Department's analysis and provide
my views to the President as required in the legislation. I will ensure
that the Department's review focuses on the potential impact the
Commission's recommendations could have on the long-term viability of
the All-Volunteer Force, of which recruiting and retention are
essential elements. I look forward to working with the Committee on
these issues.
8. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how would you ensure
we will not break faith with the men and women who serve in uniform and
their families?
Dr. Carter. The men and women of our uniformed force and their
families deserve our respect and committment. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department's detailed review and my input to the President
on the specific proposals of the Commission provides for their needs. I
am mindful of our obligations to both the current force as well as the
future force and I am committed to ensuring that any change to the
retirement system will retain the option to ``grandfather'' currently
serving members.
9. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what direction will
you give your team regarding the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
(OSD) assessment due in April?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will direct the Department to carefully
review and evaluate the Commission's recommendations to ensure they
sustain the All-Volunteer Force, provide the benefits to our
servicemembers that are required, and achieve fiscal sustainability. I
look forward to working with the Committee in this regard.
islamic state strategy
10. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, would you recommend
placing boots-on-the-ground to Congress and the administration to deal
with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) threat, if required?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I would, in close consultation with our
senior military leaders, provide the President with my best strategic
advice as to how to most effectively counter the ISIL threat. In
formulating my advice, I will not hesitate to consider all options.
guantanamo bay naval base
11. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how much risk would
you accept to American lives when considering releasing detainees from
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO)?
Dr. Carter. Congress has set a clear standard for the Secretary of
Defense, and I will follow it faithfully if confirmed. I will not, and
cannot, approve a transfer unless I determine that actions have been,
or will be taken, to substantially mitigate the risk of the detainee
engaging in terrorist or other hostile activity that threatens the
United States. The law also requires that the Secretary of Defense
determines it is in the national security interest to approve the
transfer. If confirmed, I will take this obligation seriously and
closely examine every proposed transfer to ensure that these conditions
are met.
12. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what is your position with regard
to the President's policy of trying detainees in civilian courts versus
military commissions?
Dr. Carter. I understand the Administration's policy to be that the
determination of whether to try detainees in civilian courts versus
military commissions is made on a case-by-case basis. If confirmed, I
will support this policy and make my recommendation based on the
circumstances of a particular case, in consultation with my senior
military, legal, and other advisors.
military lending act
13. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
proposed draft regulations, under the Military Lending Act (MLA), to
require lenders to verify against DOD's own database the military
status of customers. Currently, such verification is voluntary by
lenders, used to verify a customer's claim to military status. Under
the proposed regulation, lenders would be required to verify military
status whether claimed by the customer or not. What plans are in place
to ensure that DOD's database will be able to handle the great increase
in inquiries so that it is available at all times and that it is
accurate so that credit-worthy customers--both military and non-
military--will not be held up from getting timely access to loans for
which they qualify?
Dr. Carter. I am not fully informed on this issue at this time, and
am reluctant to express an opinion on this matter until I have more
information. If confirmed, I will ensure those responsible for this
area provide me with the required information so I can provide you the
thoughtful response you deserve.
14. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, when Congress passed the MLA in
October 2006, it was targeting certain loans, such as payday loans, tax
refund anticipation loans, military installment loans, and car title
loans, based on DOD's August 2006 study, ``Report on Predatory Lending
Practices Directed at Members of the Armed Forces and Their
Dependents.'' DOD adopted implementing regulations that covered the
loans identified in its report. In its current proposal, DOD cites
evidence and data that payday loans and title loans are being designed
to circumvent the regulations and are harming our military personnel
and their families. In such circumstances, it makes sense to adjust the
regulations. What is the evidence of harm or circumvention behind the
elements of the proposal that would reach beyond those predatory loans
to mainstream products, such as credit cards, student loans, car
refinance loans, and other such loans offered by banks and credit
unions that are not affected by current MLA regulations?
Dr. Carter. I am not familiar with the details of this issue at
this time, and am reluctant to express an opinion on this matter until
I have more information. I am committed to ensuring the Department is
vigilant in guarding its servicemembers against unfair and predatory
lending practices that could harm them or their families. If confirmed,
I will ensure those responsible for this area provide me with the
required information so I can address any issues. The Department
clearly has an interest in helping to protect servicemembers from
fraudulent lending practices.
15. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, DOD, in its proposed new
regulations to the MLA, indicates that it wants credit cards to
continue to be available to military personnel and their spouses. To
what extent has DOD conducted an analysis as to whether the terms of
its proposed new Military Annual Percentage Rate--which is different
from the Annual Percentage Rate calculations for non-military
families--will restrict the access to credit cards by military
personnel and their spouses?
Dr. Carter. I am not familiar with the specific details of the
proposed regulation at this time. I am committed to ensuring the
Department is vigilant in guarding its servicemembers against unfair
and predatory lending practices that could harm them or their families.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department has an appropriate
analysis of the impacts of any such regulations.
taiwan
16. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, Taiwan is currently planning to
develop its Indigenous Defense Submarines (IDS) program. What is your
opinion and position on Taiwan's IDS program?
Dr. Carter. I understand that Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine
(IDS) program is a recent concept put forward by Taiwan's Navy to
design and build a submarine domestically. Taiwan has publicly
requested international support for its program, but to my knowledge,
it is still in the process of developing a basic design and determining
what the submarine's missions or desired capabilities would be. If
confirmed, I will direct DOD to continue to consult closely with Taiwan
on this matter, and will assess the program as it progresses.
17. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what can the administration do to
assist Taiwan in improving its undersea self-defense warfare
capability?
Dr. Carter. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the
administration can assist Taiwan by evaluating the projected threat
from China, consulting closely with Congress, and providing
recommendations on defense articles and services appropriate for
Taiwan, particularly in the undersea domain.
I am aware that the Department has identified a number of areas
where Taiwan could invest in asymmetric, innovative capabilities to
improve its ability to operate in the undersea domain. For example, the
Department has recently delivered P-3C long-range patrol aircraft to
Taiwan. The Department has also provided support to Taiwan's
capabilities for using sea mines, which are particularly cost effective
defensive weapons.
If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work with Taiwan
as develops its requirements to determine what support the Department
could provide.
18. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
indicates that to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character is
the policy of the United States. How do you and DOD under your
leadership plan to continue to implement the U.S. policy under the Act?
Dr. Carter. I am firmly committed to maintaining Taiwan's self-
defense capability, consistent with our one-China policy, which is
based on the three joint United States-China communiques and the Taiwan
Relations Act. I believe the Department should continually evaluate,
assess, and review Taiwan's defense needs, while also providing defense
articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to deter threats. The
United States should also maintain the capacity to resist any resort to
force or coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social and
economic system, of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will ensure
that the Department will continue to work closely with our partners on
Taiwan to bolster their military preparedness, sustain the credibility
of Taiwan's deterrent, and support military modernization efforts.
19. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, how do you define the priorities
for United States military assistance to Taiwan?
Dr. Carter. I define priorities for United States military
assistance to Taiwan based on an evaluation and assessment of its
requirements to maintain a credible defense and deterrent. Taiwan faces
a much larger adversary who is spending 14 times more on defense.
Because of the growing military threat, the Department's should
encourage and continue to assist Taiwan in its effort to incorporate
asymmetric concepts and capabilities into its defense. As Taiwan
transitions to a volunteer force, the Department should also help
Taiwan improve its doctrine, training, reserves, and readiness.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
humanitarian operations in kurdistan region of iraq
20. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, what more can DOD do to support
humanitarian operations and assistance in the Kurdistan region?
Dr. Carter. DOD should support humanitarian operations when the
Department has a unique capability to contribute to the U.S.
Government's response. If confirmed, I will assess humanitarian
operations and assistance in the Kurdistan region, and will ensure that
the Department is poised to consider options to support the
Administration's whole-of-government effort to provide humanitarian
assistance to the Kurdistan region.
21. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you return to
this committee with additional options on how DOD can assist the nearly
1.6 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) currently
located in the Kurdistan region?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
military benefits
22. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, defense commissaries are an
integral part of life for deployed troops. Recently, the Defense
Commissary Agency (DECA) initiated an acquisition strategy to
transition delivery of produce to the Asia-Pacific region that
eliminates the current second destination transportation policy and
moves to an Free on Board (FOB)-destination model. According to
detailed market study, this transition threatens the availability,
quality, and price of the food available at overseas commissaries. Last
year, your predecessor testified to this committee that there would be
no cuts to overseas commissary benefits, yet DECA has acknowledged that
this move will increase costs to patrons. Is it your position that
commissary costs should rise for deployed troops in the Asia-Pacific
region?
Dr. Carter. I understand that the Department is looking at how to
make the defense commissary system more efficient and effective. If
confirmed, I will look for ways to achieve these goals for the
commissaries while remaining mindful of the impact on their customers
who are our service personnel active and retired and their families
both at home and deployed.
23. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, should this policy transition be
delayed while a study mandated in the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) studies the cost impacts to our troops of this
proposal?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will review the current status and
determine if such a delay would be warranted.
taiwan
24. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, United States policy towards Taiwan
is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. This important legislation
forms the legal basis for United States military sales to Taiwan, which
should be determined based on Taiwan's defensive needs. In light of the
People's Republic of China's naval modernization and growing cross
strait military imbalance, is it critical that we continue to implement
this longstanding commitment?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
25. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, what will be your priorities in
terms of military assistance to Taiwan?
Dr. Carter. The Department should continue to focus on defense
cooperation in support of Taiwan's transformation to a volunteer force,
assisting it improve doctrine, training, and readiness. Further, the
Department should also work with Taiwan to support its defense
transformation and identify procurement priorities that enable it to
deter aggression, resist coercion and maintain stability across the
Taiwan Strait.
26. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, Taiwan currently operates four
diesel submarines, two of which were acquired from the U.S. Navy former
Guppy II-class vessels delivered in 1973. Taiwan has expressed strong
interest in acquiring modern defensive diesel submarines, and in an
effort to boost their asymmetric undersea capabilities, they recently
announced plans to kick off the IDS program. Do you believe it is in
our interest for Taiwan to acquire new submarines? If so, what can we
do to assist Taiwan?
Dr. Carter. I understand that Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Submarine
(IDS) program is a recent concept put forward by Taiwan's Navy to
design and build a submarine domestically. I also understand that
Taiwan is still in the process of developing a basic design and
determining what the submarine's missions or desired capabilities would
be. If confirmed, I will direct DOD to consult closely with Taiwan on
its efforts to boost its asymmetric undersea capabilities, and assess
what support would be appropriate.
north atlantic treaty organization
27. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, the United States has faced
tremendous difficulty in the past rallying consensus and participation
by our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Afghanistan.
Collective action is inherently complex. Consensus-building often
results in delayed military action. How difficult will it be to achieve
consensus at NATO on next steps against ISIL?
Dr. Carter. I believe the United States and NATO have a shared
interest in defeating ISIL. I understand that NATO leaders affirmed at
the September 2014 NATO Summit that NATO would cooperate in several
areas through the NATO-Iraq partnership, and explore NATO roles to
coordinate humanitarian assistance and to share information and
intelligence. If confirmed, I will seek to build on this cooperation,
assess obstacles to achieving greater consensus, and work closely with
our NATO Allies to address the common threat of ISIL.
28. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, each member of NATO has its own
unique geopolitical, economic, and energy interests. As such, what is
your assessment of where Russia's invasion of Ukraine stands as a test-
case for NATO's effectiveness and relevancy in a post-9/11 world?
Dr. Carter. Although NATO does not have a formal treaty obligation
to Ukraine, NATO's response to Russia's aggressive actions have shown
the shared commitment of NATO to promote its shared values and to
enlarge the zone of peace, security, and stability in Europe. If
confirmed, I will work with NATO to reassure our Allies and respond to
the challenge from Russia.
29. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, what approach would you suggest for
the so-called ``grey'' states that are not in NATO but are intent on
resisting Russian hegemonic advances such as Ukraine and Moldova?
Dr. Carter. I reject the notion that Russia should be afforded a
``sphere of influence.'' If confirmed, I will continue to encourage
United States partners, such as Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, to build
their security capacity and military interoperability with NATO.
30. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, according to NATO guidelines,
member countries should spend at least 2 percent of their Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. Only four countries spent that much
in 2013: Estonia, Greece, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Are there any carrots and sticks we can use to encourage all members of
the alliance to make the necessary investments toward their national
security?
Dr. Carter. At the September Wales Summit, the Allies pledged to
increase defense investment. If confirmed, I will work personally to
encourage all Allies to meet that pledge. I would underscore the shared
threats NATO members face, and the critical need to continue to invest
in defense capabilities to strengthen the Alliance. I would urge Allies
with larger economies to invest in military capabilities that that can
be used to impose costs on any opponent with minimal cost and risk to
Alliance forces. For Allies with smaller economies, I would encourage
them to invest in capabilities that are needed by the Alliance, and in
which they may have a comparative advantage.
combatant commander requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance
31. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, our combatant commanders are
demanding increasing amounts of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR), and emphasizing persistence surveillance. That
persistence comes at significant cost, and in certain regions of the
world many ISR needs are going unmet. Further, most of the U.S. manned
and unmanned aerial assets have durations of 8 to 24 hours, making long
range/long endurance capability extremely difficult if not impossible
in many theaters of operation.
I am aware that in June 2014, United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM) issued a Joint Emerging Operational Needs Statement for long
endurance ISR (AF-0005) ISR. It is my understanding a Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum of December 22, 2014,
acknowledged the capability gaps outlined in the Joint Emergent
Operational Needs (JEON) as valid and tasked the Battlespace Awareness
group to consider solutions and report back by April 30, 2015.
Recent press reports reveal that the Air Force is managing a
program known as Orion unmanned aerial system (UAS), which has proven
significant endurance capability far beyond currently available air
assets. Orion was selected in 2009 as a Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD), a process in which several of the combatant
commands voted for Orion. This result was reflected in the President's
Budget under the MAGIC (Medium Altitude Global ISR and Communication)
program within Air Force Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E).
If confirmed, will you direct DOD to brief the appropriate
Congressional committees on DOD's plans to continue Orion platform
development and speed operational test and evaluation of such a
platform in order to meet urgent, and rapidly growing, combatant
command requirements for additional long range/long endurance ISR
capability?
Dr. Carter. The Department has invested significant resources over
the past decade to meet critical intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance needs through Quick Reaction Capabilities, Joint Urgent
Operational Needs and flexible, responsive, programs of record. If
confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate congressional committees are
briefed on combatant command requirements, and the broad spectrum of
both airborne and space-based ISR assets, including ORION, to provide
long-range/long-endurance ISR capability.
syria
32. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, it is my understanding that the
Free Syrian Army utilizes a secure mobile wireless network known as the
Free Syria Network for communications purposes. I also understand that
DOD and agencies within the Intelligence Community may have utilized
this system to successfully communicate with the leadership of the Free
Syrian Army. If confirmed, will you direct the appropriate entity
within DOD to brief the appropriate Congressional committees on the
efficacy of the Free Syria Network and, if appropriate, DOD's plans to
protect, and potentially expand and enhance, this critical
communications tool for the Free Syrian Army?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will support briefings to appropriate
congressional committees on the details of the Department of Defense's
train-and-equip program in Syria to include those aspects outlined in
your question.
seapower
33. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, I have the honor of serving as
Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee this Congress. Should you be confirmed, I look forward to
working with you on Navy and Marine Corps priorities during the months
to come.
In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented numerous cuts in response
to sequestration. This included cancellation of five ship deployments
and the delayed deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle
East. Since 2013, we've witnessed the rise of ISIL, the deteriorating
situation in Yemen, Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe, and a
belligerent North Korea. The world is more dangerous today than it was
in 2013.
What is your view on how sequestration would threaten the Navy and
Marine Corps' ability to decisively project power abroad?
Dr. Carter. The Seapower Subcommittee has a long and productive
history in providing for a strong Navy and Marine Corps. If confirmed,
I look forward to working with you as Chairman of the Subcommittee and
the other members of the Subcommittee in furtherance of this goal. A
return to sequestration could have a serious effect on the Navy's and
Marine Corps' ability to project power. Both Services could become
smaller, less ready, and less modern. The shipbuilding industrial base,
a critical component of sea power, could suffer, and deployments would
be borne by a smaller Marine Corps, which could be stretched thin.
34. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the
impact sequestration would have on our amphibious forces and our Navy
and Marine Corps' ability to execute DOD's pivot to Asia-Pacific?
Dr. Carter. A return to sequestration could negatively affect the
Navy and Marine Corps' ability to support DOD's rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific region. Both services could necessarily be smaller, less ready,
and less modern, resulting in fewer forces available to support
operations in this vital region. These forces are a key component of
our forward regional presence in support of our allies and partners.
35. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, certain sectors of the defense
industry--such as shipbuilding--are extremely capital intensive. Our
fiscally constrained environment threatens to close production lines
that would take years to restart. Given your prior experience as Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, what is
your vision on how best to maintain the vitality of the industrial base
given our current budget environment?
Dr. Carter. A healthy industrial base is critically important to
the Department's long-term success. The keys to maintaining the world's
finest fighting force are high-quality people who have constant and
realistic training and are equipped with cutting-edge technology. The
Department must be prepared to act if key parts of the industrial base
are threatened. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
actively monitors the industrial base to identify risks and to preserve
critical capabilities.
walter reed disposition
36. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, the NDAA for fiscal year 2015
identified 13.2 acres, including the American Institute of Pathology
building, of the former Walter Reed Army hospital site that would be
ideal for medical research purposes. The Senate Armed Services
Committee and I continue to believe that it is in the best interest of
the taxpayer to convey this building to a research institution,
especially when one considers the millions of dollars spent in recent
years to update and renovate the facility, as well as the future
economic impact of medical innovation.
Unfortunately, I learned this week that--despite a letter I
received from the Secretary of the Army stating the Army's intent to
expeditiously transfer the land to a children's research facility--the
parcel of land at Walter Reed may be transferred to the State
Department. It would be an incredible waste of taxpayer dollars to
allow the State Department to spend tens of millions of dollars to tear
down a world class research building, which is ready for a new tenant
immediately, in order to build an undefined, unplanned foreign embassy
at some undetermined date in the future.
What are your views as to how the land should be dispersed?
Dr. Carter. I do not have sufficient information to answer this
question at this time. It is my understanding that the Department has
been working this matter with the State Department, public health
advocates including Children's Hospital, and the District of Columbia.
If confirmed, I will ensure that effort is concluded without
unreasonable delay, consistent with the requirements of the
legislation.
37. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you direct DOD
to provide the Senate Armed Services Committee and other appropriate
Congressional committees with an explanation as to the holdup of the
Walter Reed land transfer to a medical research entity?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate
congressional committees are provided with the Department's plans and
the timing for the disposition of Walter Reed, including any transfer
to a medical research entity.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
military housing at camp humphreys, korea
38. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, United States Forces in Korea are
engaged in a massive realignment that will result in the consolidation
of U.S. Forces onto fewer, larger installations. One such installation
is United States Army Garrison Camp Humphreys. I am concerned about
reports of the potential housing shortage at Camp Humphreys that could
result in both long bus rides for children attending new schools on
post, and a failure to meet the Commanding General's goal for 40
percent of accompanied families to live on-post.
I have received information that suggests despite the fact that
some current housing facilities are slated for demolition, there is no
final agreement for on-post family housing because DOD has not approved
a special on-post Overseas Housing Allowance District despite the
inclusion of this districting in the solicitation for bids.
I understand that in your last tour in the Pentagon you were
involved in the family housing situation at Camp Humphreys. If my
information is correct, do you know why the on-post housing contract is
still delayed?
Dr. Carter. I am very aware of the importance of Camp Humphreys to
our posture on the Korean Peninsula. At this time, I am not familiar
with the current status of the on-post housing contract at Camp
Humphreys, including why it may have been delayed. If confirmed, I will
review this matter and take appropriate action and ensure you get a
prompt answer to your question.
39. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, will you provide your assurance
that soldiers and their families will have the on-post housing they
deserve as the military relocates to Camp Humphreys?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the on-post housing
at Camp Humphreys meets operational requirements and provides quality
residences for as many of our soldiers and their families as possible.
40. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, do you know whether a contract has
been awarded for the construction of on-post housing at Camp Humphreys?
If so, has construction begun? If not, why not?
Dr. Carter. I am not privy to the construction schedules at this
time. If confirmed, I will review the Department's plan for meeting
Camp Humphrey's on-base housing requirements and ensure you receive
full and timely answers to your questions.
department of defense budget
41. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if the President's Budget Request
for DOD is funded at the $499 billion level mandated by the
congressional budget caps instead of the $585 billion requested, what
will be the breakdown of cuts to each Service by program, project, and
activity (PPA)?
Dr. Carter. Should Congress appropriate the Department's full FY
2016 request while failing to amend the Budget Control Act (BCA), my
understanding is that the mechanical sequestration process would then
cut any funding provided above the BCA caps in a mindless across-the-
board fashion. I further understand that the Department is preparing a
report to the Congress on those potential impacts. The only discretion
in that event would be how the President exercised his authority to
exempt the military personnel accounts from those across-the-board
cuts.
Should the Congress chose to appropriate only the amount allowed by
the BCA for FY2016, the Congress would make its own decisions on how to
reduce the Department's budget. My hope is that we would not face this
alternative but, if we do, that those actions would be taken in
consultation with the Department.
afghanistan
42. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, in the advance policy questions,
you were asked if you would consider recommending to the President
revisions to the size and pace of the drawdown in Afghanistan if the
security conditions on the ground deteriorate in 2016. You answered
yes. What specific conditions on the ground in Afghanistan would cause
you to recommend to the President a change to the size and pace of the
drawdown?
Dr. Carter. Should security conditions in Afghanistan degrade such
that the efficacy of the United States strategy is in doubt, or result
in a significant increase in risk to our people there, I would consult
with my senior military and civilian advisors and provide my best
strategic advice to the President about the need for any changes to the
size or pace of the drawdown.
readiness deficits
43. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you write that there ``are still critical readiness
deficits in many areas.'' Based on your prior service in DOD and your
preparation for this hearing, can you provide more details on those
readiness deficits?
Dr. Carter. It is my understanding that the Services are working to
rebuild core skill sets and reorient their manning, training and
equipping processes in order to broaden their readiness profile after
years of operational commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Their progress to date does not undo the loss of full-spectrum
readiness across the Department. These institutional readiness deficits
took years to create, were exacerbated by the sequester level funding
and, as such, will take years to remedy. Their progress to date has not
reversed the loss of full-spectrum readiness across the department
affecting all services and all force elements.
ohio replacement program
44. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the Chief of Naval Operations has
testified that maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent is his number one priority. The Navy will be challenged to
recapitalize our ballistic missile submarines, known as the Ohio
Replacement Program, within historic levels of shipbuilding funding.
What is your position on the importance of the Ohio Replacement Program
and how DOD should fund it?
Dr. Carter. The Ohio Replacement Program is a vital component of
our nuclear deterrence strategy. The Ohio Replacement Program will
present challenges to the Navy's shipbuilding plan, particularly in the
years after 2020. The Department needs adequate resources for
modernization in order to insure we can make the transition to the new
generation ballistic missile submarine. Which account it is funded in
is of lesser importance. It makes the most sense to include the Ohio
replacement in the shipbuilding account but this is a decision that can
be made in the future. If confirmed, I will work within the Department
and with the Congress to explore options to address this challenge.
sexual assault
45. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, over the last 3 years, numerous
provisions have been enacted to reform the military justice system and
to improve the armed services' ability to combat sexual assault. If
confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the timely, full, and robust
implementation of all sexual assault provisions in previous years'
NDAAs?
Dr. Carter. Yes. If confirmed, I plan to continue the Department's
efforts to effectively implement each provision. I recognize that it is
critical to work closely with Congress, so that legislative efforts and
the Department's initiatives are consistent and complement each other.
auditing the pentagon
46. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, ensuring DOD achieves full
auditability has been a major priority of mine since coming to the
Senate. Every dollar wasted is a dollar we don't have to provide our
troops with the training and equipment they need to protect themselves
and accomplish their missions. However, the Pentagon's audit timeline
and structure continue to evolve and experience delays. If you are
confirmed, do you commit that you will make achieving audit milestones
and objectives a major priority?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will make this a high priority and hold
our senior leaders, civilian and military, accountable for making
progress towards a clean opinion. DOD must demonstrate that internal
controls are in place to prevent waste and provide a level of
confidence to the taxpayers that we are good stewards of their funds. I
understand that the Department is following the audit strategy it has
outlined to the Congress. If confirmed, I intend to keep Congress
apprised of the Department's progress.
47. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, do you commit to achieve current
timelines for auditability?
Dr. Carter. Yes. I am committed to the current timelines for
getting the Department under audit. Keeping this initiative on track is
an important priority. If confirmed, I will stress to the Department's
senior military and civilian leaders, to including the Secretaries of
Military Departments and defense agency heads, the importance of
meeting our obligations on auditability.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
russia intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty
48. Senator Cotton. Dr. Carter, as you are no doubt aware, last
year the United States State Department in its annual Arms Control
Compliance Report stated that Russia had violated the terms of
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As a member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I've reviewed the evidence and
Russia is clearly in violation.
Earlier this year, before the House Armed Services Committee, the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Brian McKeon,
stated that DOD was considering responding to the violation by
developing and deploying increased defensive capabilities to counter
the non-compliant missile, counter-force capabilities to prevent cruise
missile attacks; and counter-vailing strike capabilities. Do you agree
with Secretary McKeon? Isn't this the minimum we should be doing?
Dr. Carter. The United States goal should be to convince Russia to
return to compliance with the INF Treaty in a verifiable manner. If
Russia refuses to return to compliance, the United States should
prevent Russia from achieving a military advantage from its violation.
Potential military responses are a critical component of a strategy
directed towards convincing Russia to return to compliance with the INF
Treaty or, if Russia does not return, denying it significant military
advantage from violating the Treaty.
I agree that DOD should consider a range of options, including
active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise
missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range
ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike
capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. U.S. responses must make
clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance our responses
will make them less secure than they are today.
49. Senator Cotton. Dr. Carter, General Breedlove, the United
States European Command (EUCOM) Commander stated last year that ``A
weapon capability that violates the INF that is introduced into the
greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that will have to be
dealt with. It can't go unanswered.'' Do you agree?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
russia open skies treaty
50. Senator Cotton. Dr. Carter, I am a member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in addition to this committee. I have become
concerned with Russian misuse of the Open Skies Treaty. Have you
reviewed any of the assessments of this treaty and its potential
national security implications?
Dr. Carter. I have not had the opportunity to familiarize myself
with the assessments to which you refer.
51. Senator Cotton. Dr. Carter, are you aware that the Commander of
EUCOM non-concurred last summer when the administration sought to
approve the use of a new sensor over Europe but the Commander's
concerns were ignored and the sensor was approved anyway?
Dr. Carter. No, I am not aware of the situation you mentioned.
52. Senator Cotton. Dr. Carter, would you please commit to promptly
reviewing the assessments of the commanders of United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), EUCOM, and United States Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) as to the Open Skies Treaty and let me know, within the next
2 weeks, if you agree or disagree with their assessments of the
potential harms to our European allies and the United States?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I would ensure a prompt review is
conducted of any concerns expressed by combatant commanders regarding
the Open Skies Treaty.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
strategic location of alaska
53. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, in a week or two, the Army will
be conducting force reduction and realignment listening sessions across
country. Two of these sessions will be conducted in Alaska; one on
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and the other Fort Wainwright. Given
our strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific and a renewed focus on the
Arctic, do you believe that the forces in Alaska are uniquely suited to
help address strategic needs in our Pacific Pivot and new Arctic
Strategy?
Dr. Carter. Yes, United States forces in Alaska play a critical
role in our posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
54. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, can I have your assurance that
decisions are not made to eliminate units which are best positioned to
quickly and effectively respond to threats in the Pacific Region in
strategically important places like Alaska?
Dr. Carter. Any changes to United States force posture need to
ensure that the United States can continue to quickly and effectively
respond to threats in the Pacific Region.
55. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, should the Army decide to
eliminate one or both brigade combat teams (BCT) in Alaska, how do you
expect Kim Jong-un to react to this news?
Dr. Carter. An important purpose of United States force posture in
the Pacific Region is to deter aggression on the Korean Peninsula. That
should be clear to the government of the DPRK.
56. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, how would Vladimir Putin view it?
Dr. Carter. An important purpose of our posture in the Asia Pacific
region is to deter aggression by any power, including Russia.
57. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, how about our friends and
partners like Japan, Korea, and Singapore, how would they interpret it?
Dr. Carter. An important purpose of our posture is also to assure
our friends and partners, such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore, that the
United States is fully committed to the security of the Asia-Pacific
region.
russian arctic actions and lack of united states action
58. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, recent news articles have
reported increased Russian involvement in the Arctic. This involvement,
which some have called the militarization of the Arctic, includes
creation of a new Arctic Command, the construction of as many as 13 new
airfields and 10 air-defense radar stations, an increase in Russian
Long-Range Air Patrols, continued investment in the world's largest
ice-breaker fleet, and the recent activation of an Arctic Brigade.
Additionally, Russia has made several large territorial claims into the
Arctic, including the expressed desire to expand its Arctic borders by
more than 460,000 square miles. Meanwhile DOD has issued a 16-page
Arctic Strategy; just 13 pages if you don't count the cover, the
forward, and the 1-page map. How are we not falling behind in the
Arctic?
Dr. Carter. The U.S. approach to the Arctic should support our core
objectives to ensure security and promote defense cooperation. If
confirmed, I will direct our combatant commanders and Services to
regularly review the security environment to ensure the U.S. is
investing in required capabilities in a timely manner.
59. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what is your 50-year vision for
the Arctic?
Dr. Carter. My 50-year vision is for an Arctic region that remains
stable and free of conflict, where nations continue act responsibly in
a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy
resources are developed in a sustainable manner that respects both the
fragile environment and the interests and cultures of indigenous
peoples. Although the Arctic Ocean may be ice-free for several months
during the summer by 2065, it will still be ice-bound during the long,
dark polar winter. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency
partners to support the work of the Arctic Council during the upcoming
U.S. Chairmanship to lay the foundation for addressing the enduring
challenges to human and environmental safety and security in the
region.
60. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what resources do we need as a
Nation to effectively project power into the Arctic Region?
Dr. Carter. To effectively project power into the Arctic Region,
the United States needs to maintain the aircraft necessary to patrol
our skies and respond to Russian long-range aviation when our
sovereignty is challenge. Given that the Arctic is frozen much of the
year, submarines are also vital to our power projection capability. DOD
is able to accomplish its mission against existing threats in current
Arctic conditions with its current capabilities. At some point in the
future, the United States will also need ships capable of operating in
the marginal ice zone or near ice in the summer months when the Arctic
is accessible. If confirmed, I will continue to assess those needs to
determine what resources the U.S. requires.
arctic collaboration
61. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, besides our participation on the
Arctic council, how can we more effectively collaborate with Arctic
nations?
Dr. Carter. The United States can work to advance its defense and
security partnerships with partners in the Arctic through engagement in
international venues such as the International Maritime Organization,
where a Polar Code for Arctic shipping is under development, and the
new Coast Guard Arctic Forum. The U.S. can also seek to enhance
research and academic collaboration through institutions like the new
Coast Guard Center for Arctic Study and Policy, and the International
Arctic Research Center at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. The
United States should continue to work with its Arctic partners through
the Northern Chiefs of Defense Conference to bolster security and
defense cooperation. The U.S. can also seek additional opportunities
for business collaboration through the new industry-led Arctic Economic
Council. Finally, the United States can also take a leadership role in
promoting the rules that underpin the freedom of the seas and provide
legal certainty on the world's oceans, including exercising
internationally recognized navigation and overflight rights in the
Arctic Ocean, as appropriate.
62. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, how can we improve military-to-
military relations with our arctic friends and partners?
Dr. Carter. The U.S. can improve military-to-military relations
with its Arctic friends and partners by working with them to confront
the same challenges the United States faces: Arctic operations are
expensive and can be dangerous for military forces that are unprepared
for the austere operating environment.
For example, the United States can participate in Arctic search and
rescue exercises in collaboration with the Coast Guards and Navies of
other Arctic friends and partners. A combination of at-sea interaction
and in-port engagements that address common challenges such as
communications, situational awareness, and cold weather operations can
improve interoperability and strengthen military-to-military
relationships. Another avenue to improve military-to-military relations
is through collaborative Arctic research with organizations. Finally,
militaries should continue to exchange concerns and lessons learned in
forums such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, and through joint
exercises.
army role in asia
63. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, last year at the annual
Association of the U.S. Army conference, Secretary Hagel has said that
the Army could ``broaden its role,'' after more than a decade of
continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, ``by leveraging its
current suite of long-range precision-guided missiles, rockets,
artillery, and air defense systems'' to build a modern coastal defense
force that could contribute to operations in anti-access/area-denial
environments. Do you concur that such a capability would offer benefits
for United States defense policy in the Asia-Pacific and other maritime
theaters?
Dr. Carter. I support the Army's ongoing efforts to improve its
integrated air and missile defense capabilities. The coming years will
allow the Army to focus on resetting and looking forward to greater
investment in Asia-Pacific missions, including building partner
capacity of counterpart forces in that region.
chinese coercion
64. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, over the last several years,
China has engaged in coercive diplomacy to achieve its political and
territorial aims in the East and South China Seas. The administration
has responded with efforts to build partner capacity and strengthen
regional institutions, but this will take years if not decades to bear
fruit. Beyond private diplomacy with the Chinese, which appears to be
insufficient, what steps do you believe we should take to deter Chinese
assertiveness in the short and medium term?
Dr. Carter. The United States has a strong interest in maintaining
peace and stability, the free flow of commerce, and the freedom of
navigation and overflight in the East and South China Seas. In addition
to diplomacy to resolve territorial disputes peacefully and in
accordance with international law, the United States should deter
assertiveness in the region with a robust force posture, sustained
presence, and commitment to building the capacity of its partners and
allies. The United States also should encourage China to be more
transparent about how it will use its growing military capabilities.
The United States should also continue to modernize and strengthen its
security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Philippines, and Thailand. The United States should also deepen
relationships with and among its partners in South and Southeast Asia
to build capacity and reduce vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I will
continue to prioritize our investments in posture, presence, and
partnership capacity in the Asia-Pacific region to deter aggression and
underwrite peace and stability.
65. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, do you share the view that
China's actions have violated United States national interests in the
Freedom of Navigation, the free flow of commerce, and the peaceful
settlement of disputes in accordance with international law?
Dr. Carter. The United States has a longstanding national interest
in preserving the freedom of navigation, and in the peaceful settlement
of disputes in accordance with international law. I am concerned that
recent Chinese actions, including its unilateral and uncoordinated
announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that
overlapped the previous existing ADIZ in the East China Sea, its
unilateral promulgation of fishing regulations covering much of the
South China Sea, its pursuit of land reclamation activities in the
South China Sea, and its use of economic pressure on other claimants,
has raised regional tensions and complicated efforts to peacefully
manage and resolve territorial disputes. The United States should
remain committed to the preservation of the freedom of navigation, and
all the other rights provided under international law. If confirmed, I
would carry forward that commitment, and I would work to ensure that
disputes are addressed in a manner that both reflects that commitment
and that serves the goal of resolving disputes peacefully. This
approach would apply to my dealings with China and with all other
countries.
american energy
66. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, 10 years ago, we would have never
expected the United States to be in the current position as an energy
superpower. How do you foresee the United States utilizing this power
to our advantage abroad?
Dr. Carter. The profound changes in the global energy market, and
the United States' increasing role as an energy superpower, are
significant developments in the global landscape. They present a range
of opportunities and challenges, which influence the international
security environment and the Department's ability to fulfill its global
responsibilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
accounts for the security implications and possibilities of this
critical but volatile market in its strategic calculus and works with
the U.S. interagency and our international partners to leverage it
properly.
67. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Carter, what actions will DOD take to
ensure we maintain this role and what can Congress do to help maintain
this power as well?
Dr. Carter. Although the Department is not the lead agency for
energy policy, I do support a whole-of-government approach for U.S.
national security that factors in energy use and production.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
u.s. global role
68. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, in discussing the foreign interests of
the United States, early U.S. Presidents like Washington and Jefferson
warned against entangling the United States in the business of other
nations. I'd like to get your thoughts on what you believe the role of
the U.S. is, as a global superpower, and how we can balance this status
while not becoming overly involved and burdened in situations that do
not impact our Nation's security?
Dr. Carter. The United States continues to be the preeminent global
superpower and remains the strongest, most resilient, and most
influential Nation on the face of the earth. We have allies and friends
in every corner of the world and our adversaries have few: this is
clear testimony to the appeal of our values, our principles, and our
leadership. However the world continues to be dangerous place: turmoil
in the Middle East and North Africa, an ongoing war in Afghanistan, the
reversion to old-style thinking in parts of Europe, and the long-
standing tensions from the past and the rapid changes in Asia. This
calls for the continuing need of the stabilizing presence of the United
States throughout the world, while working closely with our allies and
partners to address threats to U.S. interests.
69. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, where do you believe DOD should be
reprioritizing its focus, either programmatically or geographically, in
order to maximize attention to its primary responsibility of securing
the freedoms and rights of U.S. citizens?
Dr. Carter. I believe DOD priorities should include preserving and
enhancing the finest fighting force in the world and taking care of
their families; providing a strategic perspective to the threats and
opportunities in the world; and implementing significant reforms that
are crucial in a time of budget uncertainty. From a programmatic
perspective, DOD should protect and prioritize investments in
innovative technology and operational concepts to maintain the most
advanced capabilities in the world.
national guard
70. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, how do you plan to build
upon the combat experience gained by National Guard and Reserve units
and take advantage of the cost-benefits of the Reserve Forces
identified by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) reports in order to preserve combat power for
the military, especially while adjusting to potential budget
constraints?
Dr. Carter. Each component is critical to the total force. If
confirmed, I will review the reports and ensure that all force
structure decisions take into account the comparative cost, capability,
and operational capacity and experience of each component to attain the
best force mix.
71. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, as you know, the Army's Aviation
Restructuring Initiative (ARI) calls for the transfer of all Apache
attack helicopters from the National Guard to Active Army. There are
thousands of men and women in the National Guard currently assigned to
the Apache battalions, many who have years of combat experience and
decades of training with this equipment. Are you concerned that we are
losing a valuable national security asset that we already have in these
personnel by carrying out this initiative?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed I will review the Army's Aviation
Restructuring Initiative (ARI) as well as take into account the
recommendations of the Army Commission established by the Congress to
review this issue and make independent recommendations
72. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, do you have any concerns that this
initiative would reduce the strategic depth of the Army aviation?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed I will review the Aviation Restructuring
Initiative and look forward to receiving the views of the Army, the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Council of Governors and
the results of the Army Commission.
air force
73. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, at the end of last year, the Air Force
announced that if it was not authorized to retire weapons systems (the
A-10) as requested in the fiscal year 2015 Budget Request, there would
be a shortfall of maintainers to train and transition into new
equipment, which could potentially delay Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC) for new weapons systems (F-
35). To what extent are you aware of this issue, and how do you intend
to address any Air Force maintainer shortfall if confirmed?
Dr. Carter. I am not fully informed on this issue. If confirmed, I
will direct the Secretary of the Air Force to address this issue and
develop a solution as necessary.
strategic forces
74. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, the United States Government last year
accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty, something that has been
largely suspected for some time. What do you believe should be an
appropriate response to Russia's violation of this treaty from DOD and
the United States Government as a whole?
Dr. Carter. In response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty,
the United States should consider a comprehensive strategy of
diplomatic, economic, and military responses. Russia's continued
disregard for its international obligations and lack of meaningful
engagement on this particular issue require the United States to take
actions to protect its interests and security as well as those of its
allies and partners. United States efforts should continue to remind
Russia why the United States and Russia signed this treaty in the first
place and be designed to bring Russia back into verified compliance
with its obligations. I believe that any United States responses should
be designed to make the United States and our allies and partners more
secure by ensuring that Russia does not gain any significant military
advantage from deploying an INF-prohibited system.
The range of options we should look at from the Defense Department
could include active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-
launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent
intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and
countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces.
United States responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not
return to compliance our responses will make them less secure than they
are today.
75. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, do you believe that the United States
should undertake any further nuclear forces reductions while Russia is
still in violation of this or any other treaty?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I would assess the current situation,
consult with my senior military advisors, and recommend a course of
action.
76. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, Secretary Hagel spoke recently about
the importance that our Nation's nuclear deterrence still plays in U.S.
security and in support of the new long-range strike bomber project.
Many of us support the nuclear deterrence mission and want to ensure
that future modernization and acquisition projects are executed in the
most cost- and time-efficient manner, and that the viability of
deterrence missions are not jeopardized by cost overruns and delays. If
confirmed, how do you plan to address the modernization and acquisition
needs of our strategic deterrence while guaranteeing their budgetary
viability?
Dr. Carter. A safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent is
essential to national security, and, if confirmed, ensuring the
viability of plans for its future needs will be a priority for me.
cybersecurity
77. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, many of us are concerned about the
improved abilities of both state and non-state actors to conduct cyber-
attacks against government and non-government entities alike. What, in
your opinion, is necessary for DOD to deter and defend against these
attacks, and how should the United States calibrate responses to cyber
attacks?
Dr. Carter. Defending against cyber-attacks requires a whole of
government effort. DOD employs an array of techniques and capabilities
to defend its own networks while providing support to other departments
and agencies as appropriate. Greater resiliency for DOD networks and
systems and more robust information sharing will be crucial to
defending against these attacks.
The U.S. should calibrate responses to cyber-attacks by
establishing all the facts and conducting case-specific analysis,
determining an appropriate proportional response, and should consider
the broader strategic context, security, and foreign policy
considerations of any attack and response.
78. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, when would you consider a cyber attack
to be an act of war?
Dr. Carter. Cyber-attacks can affect our critical infrastructure,
the national economy, and military operations. I believe that what is
termed an act of war should follow the same practice as in other areas,
because it is the seriousness, not the means, of an attack that matters
most. Whether a particular attack is considered an ``act of war,'' in
or out of cyberspace, requires a determination on a case-by-case and
fact-specific basis. Malicious cyber activities could result in death,
injury or significant destruction, and any such activities would be
regarded with the utmost concern and could well be considered ``acts of
war.'' An attack does not need to be deemed an ``act of war'' to
require a response.
islamic state of iraq and syria
79. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, do you believe that President Bashar
Assad has to be removed, either peacefully or by force, from power in
order to protect the United States from the threats emanating from this
conflict?
Dr. Carter. Assad has lost all legitimacy and cannot be part of the
future of Syria. A stable Syria will require both defeating ISIL and a
political transition in which Assad is removed from power.
80. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, one of the enduring images that many
Americans have seen from the conflict in Iraq and Syria are of ISIS
fighters parading through urban streets or in desert convoys in United
States-made armored vehicles captured from surrendering Iraq Security
Force units. Recently, the United States has sent hundreds of Mine-
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Iraqi and Kurdish forces,
and the Iraqi Government has requested armored vehicles and equipment,
such Abrams tanks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV). If confirmed, what will you recommend the United States do to
ensure that such lethal equipment does not end up in the hands of ISIS
fighters, and that the United States is not inadvertently arming ISIS
in Iraq?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts of
the Department of Defense to train, advise, and assist the Iraqis to
reconstitute a credible and combat capable security force. Cohesive,
well-trained, well-led and properly supported forces reduces the risk
that those forces will surrender or abandon the equipment the U.S. has
given them. I will also ensure that DOD uses all appropriate end use
monitoring tools and practices.
81. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, what role should DOD play in
disrupting the flow of foreign fighters flowing into and out of the
conflict in Syria and Iraq?
Dr. Carter. United States military action, in concert with
coalition partners, can have an impact on ISIS's capabilities and
reduce its ability to flow fighters in and out of Syria. I believe it
is important that the United States continue its close collaboration
with other governments to stop the flow of foreign fighters into the
region. If confirmed, I will focus attention on the foreign fighter
flow, and their support networks, and assess what changes may be
needed.
82. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, do you believe that the U.S. military
action against ISIS can be successful at defeating the threats to our
country if the United States and international community are not able
to significantly stop the flow of fighters, funds, and weapons into
this conflict?
Dr. Carter. No.
north atlantic treaty organization
83. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, at the NATO summit in Wales last
September, NATO members agreed to reverse trends in declining defense
spending and maintain a defense budget of 2 percent GDP, a spending
level that, as you know, has been a NATO goal for over a decade but few
countries have achieved. Do you believe that it is in the interests of
the United States as a deterrent to Russian aggression for our NATO
allies to reverse declines in defense spending and work towards meeting
these goals?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
84. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what will you do to
assist and encourage NATO members to prioritize defense spending in
their own countries to meet the Russian threat?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of strong
U.S. leadership within the NATO, including for collective defense
planning. I will urge Allies with larger economies to invest in
military capabilities that that can impose costs on any opponent with
minimal cost and risk to Alliance forces. For Allies with smaller
economies, I will encourage them to invest in capabilities that are
needed by the Alliance, and in which they may have a comparative
advantage.
afghanistan
85. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the quality
and capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the
relationship between the political leadership and the military
leadership in Afghanistan?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will assess these issues first hand,
but my assessment based on public information has been that President
Ghani has a positive relationship with both military leaders and the
Afghan forces, and that the ANSF have steadily improved. It appears
that the ANSF are increasingly effective at leading operations and
prevailing over insurgents with limited assistance from U.S. and
coalition partners.
I understand the relationship between the ANSF and Afghan political
leadership has significantly improved since President Ghani took
office. I believe President Ghani has embraced his role as commander-
in-chief, and has demonstrated his commitment to focus on improving
ANSF effectiveness and security for the people of Afghanistan.
86. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, if the ANSF fails to provide security
for the country as expected during the U.S. drawdown, what threats to
the United States do you believe could develop in Afghanistan?
Dr. Carter. The objective of strengthening the ANSF's ability to
provide security is to protect the Afghan people and to ensure that
Afghanistan is never again a base for attacks upon the United States.
If confirmed, I will be committed to countering the al-Qaeda threat in
the region and addressing any other terrorist elements in Afghanistan
that pose a threat to our nation.
yemen
87. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, the Yemeni Government has collapsed
and a strong possibility exists of full-scale civil war there as al
Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Shiite rebels backed by Iran, and
the remnants of the government all fight for control of territory and
authority. What do you identify as the greatest threat to the United
States stemming from the conflict in Yemen?
Dr. Carter. AQAP in the Arabian Peninsula poses the greatest threat
to United States interests from the conflict in Yemen. Therefore, the
primary United States national security interest in Yemen is to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP. Continued political instability in
Yemen also risks our joint efforts with the Yemenis to combat AQAP.
88. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, do you believe that there are any
necessary changes to the administration's current strategy to protect
the United States from threats growing there?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will assess the current strategy and
make any recommendations I believe are needed. I do not have any
recommendations at this time based on the information currently
available to me. I understand that United States counterterrorism
strategy in Yemen focuses on a mix of partnership activities and
limited direct action against those who threaten the United States. The
United States Government, in partnership with its partners and the
Yemeni government, have made a number of gains against AQAP, including
the removal of numerous leaders and the disruption of plotting against
the United Sates. AQAP remains resilient and the political instability
that has long plagued Yemen--particularly in recent weeks--hinders
Yemen's ability to respond to the threat posed by AQAP. If confirmed, I
intend to receive a detailed briefing to inform any changes I would
recommend.
western hemisphere
89. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, what threats to United States national
security do you see developing out of Latin and South America and do
you believe any changes need to be made in U.S. policy towards that
region to address these threats?
Dr. Carter. I believe that threats developing out of Latin and
South America include weak governmental institutions, corruption,
under-governed spaces, transnational crime, narcotics, and natural
disasters. These threats could increase instability in the region and
threaten U.S. interests. To address these threats, I understand the
Department of Defense, in support of the broader U.S. interagency
effort, is focused on defending the southern approaches to the United
States, strengthening hemispheric security, and encouraging further
defense integration and collaboration on regional and global security
affairs. If confirmed, I will assess these efforts and, if necessary,
recommend changes to our strategy.
90. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, do you believe that United States
national security would benefit from increased ISR assets in the United
States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of operation?
Dr. Carter. ISR continues to be in high demand in each Combatant
Commander's Area of Responsibility, including in United States Southern
Command. If confirmed, I will evaluate requests for ISR in the context
of needs across all the Combatant Commands.
taiwan
91. Senator Lee. Dr. Carter, as you know, the United States for
decades has benefited from a strong security and economic relationship
with Taiwan. If confirmed, what would you do to carry on and enhance
the execution of U.S. policies that assist in maintaining Taiwan's
self-defense capabilities?
Dr. Carter. I am firmly committed to maintaining Taiwan's self-
defense capability. The Taiwan Relations Act states that ``the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability'' and will ``maintain the
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan.'' If confirmed, I will ensure
that the Department of Defense is continually engaged in evaluating,
assessing, and reviewing Taiwan's defense needs, while also providing
defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to deter
threats. I will also ensure that the United States maintains the
planning and posture to resist any coercion against Taiwan. If
confirmed, I will also ensure that the Department will continue to work
closely with our partners on Taiwan to bolster their military
preparedness, sustain the credibility of their deterrent, and support
their military modernization effort.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
military compensation and retirement modernization commission report
92. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, do you have any concern that the
removal of all attack aviation from the Army National Guard through the
Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative will reduce the Army's
operational combat depth?
Dr. Carter. The Army National Guard has been and will continue to
be a crucial component of the total aviation force and the total army.
If confirmed, I will review the Aviation Restructuring Initiative and
work with the Department of the Army and the Chief of the National
Guard bureau to understand and assess its impact on capabilities both
in the active and reserve component. I also look forward to reviewing
the recommendations of the Army Commission established by the Congress
with your sponsorship.
93. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, given the overwhelming success of
the operational Reserve model in Iraq and Afghanistan according to
commanders in the field, how do you intend to maintain combat, combat
support, and combat service support operational experience in the
Reserve components during a time of lower operational demand?
Dr. Carter. The use of the Reserves during the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan was a major factor in the Department's success. The CJCS
and Service Chiefs have highlighted leader development as a key to
sustaining the lessons learned from the last 13 years of war. Our
Defense and Service institutions must ensure that we capture lessons
learned and continue to grow leaders armed with that knowledge and
shared experience. Another key element to maintaining operational
experience is to retain the key officers and enlisted personnel with
combat experience as well as ensure sufficient funding and readiness
for the Reserve Component to meet operational requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
military lending act protections for servicemembers
94. Senator Reed. Dr. Carter, last November, 40 Senators wrote to
Secretary Hagel in strong support of the proposed Military Lending Act
(MLA) rule. If and when confirmed, will you work to ensure that the
Department of Defense produces a final MLA rule that, like the proposed
one, robustly enhances protections for servicemembers and their
families and imporves military readiness?
Dr. Carter. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure the final Military
Lending Act rule supports robust protections for servicemembers and
their families.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
integration of women
95. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, in 2013, DOD announced the
elimination of the direct combat exclusion policy and plans to more
fully integrate women into all occupational fields by 2016. Do you
commit to work with the Services to keep this effort moving forward and
keep Congress apprised of DOD's process?
Dr. Carter. Yes. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the
Department's progress to ensure we meet our timelines and I will keep
Congress apprised of our progress.
96. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, I understand that the Services and
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are studying whether to open
all previously closed units and military operations to women and will
have to submit specific requests if they wish to keep units or
operations closed. What criteria will you and DOD use when evaluating
any such requests to ensure consistency across DOD?
Dr. Carter. In accordance with the 2013 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule rescission memo, all requests for
exceptions to policy must be narrowly tailored and based on a rigorous
analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge, skills, and abilities
needed for the position. If confirmed, and if I receive requests for
exception to policy, I will carefully consider them in this light.
biofuels
97. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, last September, the Departments of
Navy, Energy, and Agriculture awarded contracts to three companies to
construct and commission bio-refineries to produce drop-in biofuels to
help meet transportation needs. Can you speak to the strategic
importance of the military transiting away from a strict dependence on
petroleum to biofuels?
Dr. Carter. Over the long-term, I believe the Nation will benefit
from a competitive, domestic renewable fuels industry, and, as a major
consumer of liquid fuels, the Department would benefit from such
competition. Similarly, the certification and qualification of
alternative fuels for our equipment mean the Department will be better
positioned to acquire and use a variety of fuels, as needed, to
accomplish the mission.
defense industrial base
98. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, when you served as Deputy
Secretary of Defense, you said that ``(s)maller firms, start-ups, and
new entrants provide needed new technology, new face, and new ideas to
the defense industry,'' and that ``a key part of our defense industrial
strategy is to encourage new entrants (that) offer competition, renew
and refresh the technology base, and ensure that defense is benefiting
from the main currents of emerging technology.'' You added ``we must
accordingly work constantly to lower barriers to entry.'' What do you
have planned to ensure a culture of embracing small start-ups and new
entrants?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I would support policies that remove
barriers to commercial technology utilization. I would also ensure that
the Department has aggressive outreach to the small business community
and other innovative firms. If confirmed I would direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to
develop and implement policies that achieved these goals.
berry amendment and buy american act
99. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, last November the DOD Inspector
General (IG) filed a report on the Army's compliance with the Berry
Amendment and Buy American Act. The IG recommended that the Services
perform training for their contracting officers on the details of these
purchasing requirements. What can DOD do to ensure that both
contracting officers and the industry have a mutual understanding and
appreciation for these extremely important laws?
Dr. Carter. Although I am not familiar with the IG report, I know
the Department has a number of learning tools available to assist the
acquisition workforce in understanding all statutory requirements. If
confirmed, I would direct the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to report to me on the steps that have been
taken and on any recommended improvements to enhance the training for
government contracting officers to enhance their understanding and
trust of their industry partners.
100. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, what steps have been taken thus
far to address the concerns raised in the IG report?
Dr. Carter. I am not familiar with the IG report or the steps that
have been taken to address the concerns raised in the report. If
confirmed I will ascertain what steps have been taken and respond
appropriately.
small business innovation research
101. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, I know you have been a strong
supporter of small business and the Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) program. As you know, the SBIR Reauthorization Act that was
signed into law 3 years ago requires DOD to use SBIR technology to the
greatest extent practicable and requires the Secretary to establish
goals and incentives for using SBIR technology. How will you ensure
that these provisions are fully implemented?
Dr. Carter. Before I left the Department as Deputy Secretary of
Defense, I approved the interim version of DOD Instruction 5000.02
``Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,'' that included SBIR
goals and incentive provisions. I understand that those provisions are
also included in the recently approved final version of this
Instruction. If confirmed, I will direct the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to oversee the implementation
of this important initiative, and to ensure I am kept apprised.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
military compensation and retirement modernization commission report
102. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Carter, I have been concerned by what
appears to be a haphazard approach from DOD to reforming pay and
benefits. Last week, the Military Compensation and Retirement
Modernization Commission released its report with a series of
recommendations. At the same time DOD sent us back the same proposals
it sent us last year, but with some changes. I was concerned last year
about how DOD's recommendations would impact lower enlisted troops and
their families. How do you see these two sets of recommendations and
how do you ensure we continue to support lower enlisted troops and
their families?
Dr. Carter. I appreciate the difficult task that was presented to
the Commission. If confirmed, I intend to carefully review and evaluate
the Commission's recommendations on reforming military compensation and
retirement and will ensure I meet the deadlines established in the law
for my input to the President. I was not privy to the details of the FY
2016 budget prior to my confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I will be
prepared to comment on the FY 2016 budget proposals at the posture
hearing the Committee is planning in early March.
cyber
103. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Carter, I want to be helpful to DOD in
recruiting the best talent and acquiring the best tools for our cyber
mission. What do you think are our two most important cyber needs for
the next 5 years?
Dr. Carter. The most important aspect of the Department's strategy
for countering these threats is manning, training, and equipping a
cyber-force that can fulfill its missions. If confirmed, I look forward
to working closely with the Committee on this issue. A top priority is
recruiting and retaining the most highly skilled professionals, which
is challenging because cyber is a highly technical domain. In addition,
DOD must work in closer partnership with the Intelligence Community,
the Department of Homeland Security, and other government agencies to
identify cyber threats, deter attacks, and improve defenses for our
networks.
104. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Carter, how will you incorporate cyber
forces, especially in the National Guard, into our Homeland defense
strategy?
Dr. Carter. DOD is in its third year of building a Cyber Mission
Force of approximately 6,000 personnel. I believe that the National
Guard and Reserve are a tremendous resource of talent and of surge
capacity for DOD, and these skilled personnel can contribute greatly to
the cyber mission. It will be critical to recruit the right talent, and
we must take a strategic approach to leveraging our National Guard and
Reserve forces as part of our overall structure. DOD is already using
some Guard and Reserve personnel in the cyber mission area, and they
have proven to be of tremendous value enhanced by their civilian
skills. The Guard and Reserve should be part of the Cyber Mission Force
and also create additional Cyber Protection Teams to augment Service
capacity. This expertise and support should be made available to the
States in traditional missions like responding to natural disasters as
well as less traditional missions in cyberspace. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
Services, and the States through the Council of Governors to ensure the
National Guard and reserve forces cyber capabilities are sufficiently
augmented and incorporated into the Department's force planning
construct.
105. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Carter, please provide your thoughts
on the relationship between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and DOD in terms of global cyber-security roles and responsibilities.
Dr. Carter. The Department of Defense has the responsibility to
defend the Nation from attack in cyberspace. This cyber mission
necessitates a close partnership with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in its role of protecting U.S. critical infrastructure,
securing non-Department of Defense unclassified government networks,
and coordinating the national protection from, prevention of,
mitigation of, and recovery from cyber incidents. The Department of
Justice, with the FBI, is also a critical member of this operational
partnership and all three Departments work closely together in an
effective operational cybersecurity partnership.
Cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government approach, and DOD
synchronizes its international engagement with its interagency
partners. DOD joins DHS and other Departments and agencies in whole-of-
government dialogues around the globe, and DOD and DHS work closely
together to build robust international relationships that reflect and
promote our core commitments and common interests in cyberspace.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
nuclear enterprise review
106. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Carter, following up on my questions in
the hearing, if confirmed, will you commit to reading the Creedon-Fanta
Nuclear Enterprise Review report and getting back to the committee with
your views and whether you agree with its findings?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
national guard
107. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you work to
maintain the National Guard as an operational Reserve?
Dr. Carter. The National Guard and Reserve are a critical source of
many of the capabilities required in ongoing operations and contingency
surge requirements both abroad and at home. As an operational Reserve,
the Reserve components need to make certain capabilities available on a
continuing basis and others to augment and reinforce active components
when mobilized over time. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the
Guard and Reserve components are supported so that they are ready to
operate in peacetime, in wartime and in support of civil authorities.
defense manpower data center
108. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Carter, what is your approach to the
administration of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), specifically
regarding adequate staffing, funding and data security, in order to
maintain and increase the accuracy, reliability, and integrity of the
DMDC database?
Dr. Carter. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) systems and
information are critical to ensuring eligibility and providing benefits
to all DOD personnel, and also provide the vital interface to operate
numerous other DOD-wide systems, including physical security,
healthcare, and personnel security programs. The Department has an
obligation to provide these capabilities, to ensure the data security,
and to protect the privacy of these information systems. If confirmed,
I will work closely with Congress to ensure that DMDC has the necessary
resources to execute its mission.
109. Senator Donnelly. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you commit to
providing me and the committee with information on DOD's plans to
address the capabilities of the DMDC, particularly its capability to
assist in the effort to ensure that servicemembers eligible for
Servicemember Civil Relief Act benefits and protections can be
proactively identified in a timely and accurate manner?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
missile defense
110. Senator Hirono. Dr. Carter, I understand that DOD is
systematically implementing upgrades to the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense system, including sensor and discrimination improvements.
Within this area of improvement is the planned Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR) to improve defense of the United States
against a long-range North Korean missile threat. While DOD is
improving our overall Homeland missile defense capability, I want to
ensure that Hawaii is well protected - especially as North Korea
continues to evolve its capabilities. If confirmed, will you commit to
looking into our capability to defend Hawaii against such a North
Korean threat, and keeping me informed of the progress in this
important area?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
retention of women in the military
111. Senator Hirono. Dr. Carter, women are a great asset both to
the diversity of our military and to its success. This past October the
military appointed its third female four-star officer. While that is a
fact to be celebrated, women leave the service at a rate nearly twice
that of men. As we have seen with other types of diversity within the
military, retention of women for senior leadership positions has a
significant influence on the success through mentoring of junior female
military members. If confirmed what measures will you consider for
increasing retention of women in the military and achieving the
diversity needed to mentor future female leaders?
Dr. Carter. I believe that the Department of Defense must compete
for the best and brightest talent our Nation has to offer as it expands
opportunities for all qualified individuals at all levels through our
most senior general and flag officers. If confirmed, I will continue to
emphasize the need for retaining a high quality and diverse force in an
environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that
prevent servicemembers from rising to the highest level of
responsibility possible.
mental health care for veterans
112. Senator Hirono. Dr. Carter, a memorandum published by the
Secretary of Defense on September 3, 2014, implemented new policy
guidance to be used in the respective Services' review of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)-related discharge upgrade requests.
The memorandum also called for ``a public messaging campaign by the
Services'' in order to ensure outreach and notification. Should you be
confirmed, are you committed to continuing this policy and outreach
directive so that Vietnam veterans diagnosed with PTSD who received
less-than-honorable discharges be allowed liberal consideration for a
discharge upgrade?
Dr. Carter. If confirmed, I will continue to work with all parties
concerned to ensure that veterans of all periods of service receive a
fair hearing and obtain appropriate relief. We will also continue to
work with Veterans and Military Support Organizations and legal service
providers to ensure veterans receive assistance in the review process.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
athletic footwear for new recruits
113. Senator King. Dr. Carter, on April 25, 2014, Acting Deputy
Secretary of Defense Christine Fox confirmed in a letter that DOD's
athletic footwear policy for recruits would be modified to include the
following provision:
``As Berry Amendment-compliant shoes come on the market, we will
assess them for cost and durability to ensure they are comparable to
other models available to recruits. If one or more Berry Amendment-
compliant shoe models correspond to a shoe type category, only these
shoes will be made available for purchase using the one-time cash
allowance.''
Do you commit that, if confirmed, DOD's athletic footwear policy
for new recruits will remain consistent with the provisions of Acting
Deputy Secretary Fox's April 25, 2014, letter?
Dr. Carter. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
national nuclear security administration
114. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Carter, the Congressional Advisory Panel
on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise released its final
report in November 2014. After considering a number of alternative
leadership structures, the panel concluded the current structure with a
``separately-organized'' National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) is fundamentally flawed. The panel recommended amending the NNSA
Act to replace the separately-organized NNSA with a new Office of
Nuclear Security (ONS) within the Department of Energy (DOE) charged
with performing the missions currently performed by NNSA. The panel's
objective was to enable an Energy Secretary who sets the policy and a
Director of ONS who is fully empowered to implement the policy.
Based on your many years of experience with the nuclear weapons
complex, what thoughts do you have on improving the existing governance
structure of DOE's Nuclear Security Enterprise?
Dr. Carter. I believe DOD can work effectively with the Department
of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)
under the current structure or an alternative arrangement as long as
DOE/NNSA continues to execute its primary mission of warhead and
infrastructure life extension programs that meets DOD military
requirements. If confirmed, I will direct the consistent engagement
with senior leadership through the interagency process of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, which is charged to manage the nuclear weapons
stockpile and maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
islamic state
115. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Carter, 2 weeks ago, former national
security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee about the Islamic State and the three civil wars
that were essentially raging in the Arab world today. Brzezinski
explained: ``I think getting involved in the internal dynamics,
religious conflicts, sectarian animosities of the region is a
prescription for a protracted engagement of the kind that can be very
destructive to our national interests.''
How important is it that the fighting on the front lines against
the Islamic State be conducted by the Iraqis and other regional, Arab
members of the coalition and not the United States?
Dr. Carter. To inflict a lasting defeat on ISIL, it is very
important that regional coalition partners, including Iraq, be fighting
on the front lines. Building the capacity of these local security
forces must be a central part of the U.S. strategy. The Iraqi Security
Forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni tribal elements, are on
the front line force in the current fight. If confirmed, I will support
the effort to train, equip, advise, and assist local forces to enhance
their ability to defeat ISIL.
national labs
116. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Carter, beyond current and future life
extension programs (LEP), do you believe a sustained funding commitment
is necessary at our national laboratories to preserve the intellectual
infrastructure and sustain the scientific base of the weapons program?
If so, how do you propose formalizing this commitment?
Dr. Carter. The Department of Energy National Laboratories are
important to the Department of Defense's technology base and laboratory
enterprise, particularly with respect to the science and engineering
that underpins the Nation's nuclear weapons program. If confirmed, I
will work with the Secretary of Energy and the President to ensure that
the unique capabilities of the national laboratories are maintained and
available to DOD in support of national defense missions.
______
[The nomination reference of the Honorable Ashton B. Carter
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 7, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
Ashton B. Carter, of Massachusetts, to be Secretary of
Defense, vice Charles Timothy Hagel.
------
[The biographical sketch of the Honorable Ashton B. Carter,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Ashton B. Carter
Education:
Oxford University
1976-1979
Ph.D., Theoretical Physics
Senior Scholar, St. John's College
Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear
Physics
University of Edinburgh
Fall, 1974, no degree
Yale University
1972-1976
B.A., summa cum laude
Honors in Medieval History
Honors in Physics
Phi Beta Kappa
Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European History
Employment Record:
Senior Executive, Markle Foundation (2014-present)
Stanford University (2014-present)
Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution
Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies
U.S. Department of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense (2011-2013)
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (2009-2011)
Harvard University
Chair, International and Global Affairs Faculty
John F. Kennedy School of Government
2006-2009 (leave of absence 2009-2011)
Harvard University
Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International
Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
1996-2009
Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford
Universities
Co-Director (with William J. Perry)
1997-2009
U.S. Department of State
Senior Advisor to the North Korea Policy Review
1998-2000
U.S. Department of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy
1993-1996
Harvard University
Director, Center for Science and International Affairs
1990-1993
Harvard University
Professor, and Associate Director, Center for Science
and International Affairs
1988-1990
Harvard University
Associate Professor
1986-1990
Harvard University
Assistant Professor
1984-1986
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Research Fellow, Center for International Studies
1982-1984
U.S. Department of Defense
Program Analysis and Evaluation
1981-1982
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress
International Security and Commerce Program
1980-1981
Rockefeller University, New York
Research Associate
1979-1980
Oxford University
Physics Instructor (``Tutor'' in the Oxford system)
Quantum Mechanics and Relativity
1977-1979
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Experimental Research Associate
1976
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
Experimental Research Associate
1975
Honors and Awards:
Henry L. Stimson Pragmatist and Idealist Award, Stimson
Center, 2014.
W. Stuart Symington Award, Air Force Association, 2014.
Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of Defense
(awarded five times), 1994, 1995, 2010, 2012, and 2013.
Joint Distinguished Service Medal, from the Chairman and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013.
Nunn-Lugar Award, Nuclear Threat Institute, 2011.
Defense Intelligence Medal, from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, 1998.
Forum Award, American Physical Society, 1988.
Ten Outstanding Young Americans, United States Jaycees,
1987.
Senior Scholar, St. John's College, 1978-1979.
Best participant prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear
Physics, 1978.
Rhodes Scholar, 1976.
See above under ``Education.''
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by the Honorable
Ashton B. Carter in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Ashton Baldwin Carter (Ash Carter).
2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of Defense.
3. Date of nomination:
January 7, 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 24, 1954, Philadelphia, PA.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married. Wife: Stepanie DeLeeuw Carter.
7. Names and ages of children:
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
Abington High School, Abington, PA, 1968-1972, High School Diploma
1972.
Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1972-1976, B.A. 1976.
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, Fall, 1974, no
degree.
Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1976-1979, D. Phil.,
1979.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Self-employed, Ashton Carter LLC--Sole proprietorship, Washington,
DC, 2014-Present.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2011-2013; U.S. Department of
Defense--Washington, DC.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics,
2009-2011; U.S. Department of Defense--Washington, DC.
Chair, International & Global Affairs faculty, 2006-2009 (on leave
of absence 2009-2011); John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University--Cambridge, MA.
Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs,
1996-2009; John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University--
Cambridge, MA.
Co-Director (with William J. Perry), Preventive Defense Project,
1997-2009; Harvard & Stanford Universities--Cambridge, MA.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member, National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations
(2012-2013).
Member, President's Management Council (2011-2013).
Member, White House Government Accountability and Transparency
Board (2011-2013).
Chair, National Security Strategy and Policies Expert Working
Group, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States, 2008-2009.
Member, Department of Defense Agency Review team, Obama-Biden
Transition, 2008-2009.
Co-Chair, Review Panel on Future Directions for DTRA (Defense
Threat Reduction Agency) Missions and Capabilities To Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 2007-2008.
Member, International Security Advisory Board to the Secretary of
State, 2006-2008.
Member of National Security Advisory Group to Senator Tom Daschle,
then Senator Reid, chaired by William J. Perry, 2005-2008.
Co-Chair, with Ronald Lehman, of Policy Advisory Group to Senator
Richard Lugar, 2005-2008.
Member National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science and
Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2001-2003.
Member, National Missile Defense White Team, 1998-2009.
Member, Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of
Defense, 1998-2002.
Member, Defense Science Board, 1991-93, 1997-2001.
Member, Defense Policy Board, 1997-2001.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,
U.S. Department of Defense, 1993-1996.
Member, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International
Security and Arms Control, 1990-1993.
Member, Sandia National Laboratory, President's Advisory Council,
1992-93.
Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Advisory
Panel on START Verification Technologies, 1991-92.
Member, National Academy of Sciences Panel on National Security
Export Controls, 1990-91.
Member, National Research Council Naval Studies Advisory Committee
on the Future of the Aircraft Carrier, 1990-91.
Member, White House, President's Council of Advisers on Science and
Technology, Panel on National Security, 1990-91.
Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on New Scenarios and
Intelligence, 1990.
Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment Advisory
Panel on START Verification Technologies, 1989-90.
Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff Advisory Group on the Future of U.S.-
Soviet Military Relations, 1988-89.
Member, Commission on The Presidency and Science Advising, 1988.
Consultant, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of
State, 1986-1988.
Member, Advisory Panel on Military Uses of Space, Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1985-86.
Analyst, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Pentagon, 1981-1982.
Analyst, International Security and Commerce Program, Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1980-1981.
Experimental Research Associate, Brookhaven National Laboratory,
1976.
Experimental Research Associate, Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory, 1975.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
a. Senior Executive, Markle Foundation, New York, New York, 2014-
Present.
b. Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution and Lecturer,
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford
University, 2014-Present.
c. Advisor, Box Inc., 2014-Present.
d. Advisor, Palo Alto Networks, 2014-Present.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
a. Aspen Strategy Group, 1997-2009 (now emeritus member).
b. Council on Foreign Relations, 1989-present.
c. Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989-present.
d. American Physical Society, 1976-present.
e. American Association of Rhodes Scholars, 1977-present.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
a. List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
b. List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
c. Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
(1) Henry L Stimson Pragmatist and Idealist Award, Stimson
Center, 2014.
(2) W. Stuart Symington Award, Air Force Association, 2014.
(3) Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of Defense
(awarded five times), 1994, 1995, 2010, 2012, and 2013).
(4) Joint Distinguished Service Medal from the Chairman and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013.
(5) Nunn-Lugar Award, Nuclear Threat Institute, 2011.
(6) Defense Intelligence Medal, from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, 1998.
(7) Forum Award, American Physical Society, 1988.
(8) Ten Outstanding Young Americans, United States Jaycees,
1987.
(9) Senior Scholar, St. John's College, 1978-1979.
(10) Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear
Physics, 1978.
(11) Rhodes Scholar, 1976.
(12) Summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate, Yale University,
with honors in medieval history and physics (B.A. 1976).
(13) Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European History, Yale
University, 1976.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Publications. Books.
Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Editor (with
John P. White) and author of three chapters. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2001.
[translated into Chinese, Military History and Translation Office,
MND, ROC, 2002].
Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. With
William J. Perry.Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999.
[translated into Russian by arrangement with Brookings Institution
Press, 2003]
[translated into Arabic by arrangement with Brookings Institution
Press, February/March 2002]
[translated into Chinese, CIP, 2000]
[translated into Korean, Bestun Korea Agency, 2000]
Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds. Editor with
Graham Allison, Steven E. Miller, and Philip Zelikow. Cambridge, MA:
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993.
A New Concept of Cooperative Security. With John D. Steinbruner and
William J. Perry. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992.
Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing
World. With John Alic, Lewis Branscomb, Harvey Brooks and Gerald
Epstein. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a
Disintegrating Soviet Union.With Kurt Campbell, Steven Miller and
Charles Zraket. Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International
Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991.
Ashton B. Carter on Arms Control. Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, January 1990.
Managing Nuclear Operations. Editor (with John Steinbruner and
Charles A. Zraket) and author of three chapters. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1987.
Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space. Washington, DC: Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1984.
Ballistic Missile Defense. Editor (with David N. Schwartz) and
author of two chapters. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1984.
MX Missile Basing (with Classified Annex). Author of chapters on
``Launch Under Attack''; ``Ballistic Missile Defense''; ``Air Mobile
Basing''; ``Land Mobile Basing''; and (with Theodore Postol) ``Command,
Control, and Communications''.Washington, DC: Office of Technology
Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1981.
Articles
``Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops What They
Need'' Foreign Affairs, (January/February 2014), pp. 101-112.
``Super Hercules in the Himalayas: How the United States is
Strengthening Defense Ties with India.'' Foreign Policy, (20 November
2013), online.
``Managing Defense Spending Through `Better Buying Power', Not
Sequestration.'' Defense One, (13 November 2013), online.
``Running the Numbers on MRAPs, Reliable Data Proves the Vehicles
are Worth the Money.'' With J. Michael Gilmore. Foreign Affairs, (9
October 2012).
``The Pentagon is Serious About Saving Money.'' The Wall Street
Journal, (21 September 2012).
``A Law to Strengthen our Cyberdefense.'' With Jane Holl Lute, The
New York Times, (2 August 2012).
``Restoring Affordability.'' Defense News, (19 July 2010).
``The Way Forward on Missile Defense.'' With Michele Flournoy. The
Wall Street Journal, (17 June 2010).
``Defense Management Challenges for the Next American President.''
Orbis, A Journal of World Affairs, (Winter 2009).
``Report of the Strategic Security Studies Issues Delegation to
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.'' With William Perry, Joseph
Prueher, Robert Blackwill, Stephen Orlins, David Lampton, Kurt
Campbell, Ashley Tellis, Evan Medeiros and Jan Berris. Harvard Belfer
Preventative Defense Project, (July 2008).
``After the Bomb.'' With William J. Perry and Michael M. May. The
New York Times, (12 June 2007), A-24.
``The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast
in an American City.'' With Michael M. May and William J. Perry. Report
based on April 19, 2007 workshop hosted by the Preventive Defense
Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, (31 May 2007).
``China on the March.'' With William J. Perry. The National
Interest, no. 88 (March-April 2007), 16-22. ``How Washington Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love India's Bomb.'' Foreign Affairs
(foreignaffairs.org), (10 January 2007).
``China's Rise in American Military Strategy.'' With William J.
Perry. In China's March on the 21st Century: A Report of the Aspen
Strategy Group, Kurt M. Campbell and Willow Darsie, eds. Washington,
DC: The Aspen Institute, (2007), 107-117.
``Plan B for Iran: What if Nuclear Diplomacy Fails?'' With William
J. Perry. Report based on May 22, 2006 workshop hosted by the
Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities, (10
September 2006).
``The Case for a Preemptive Strike on North Korea's Missiles.''
With William J. Perry. TIME (time.com), (8 July 2006).
``America's New Strategic Partner?'' Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4
(July-August 2006), 33-44.
``If Necessary, Strike and Destroy.'' With William J. Perry. The
Washington Post, 22 (June 2006), A-29.
``Toolbox: Containing the Nuclear Red Zone Threat.'' With Stephen
A. LaMontagne. The American Interest 1, no. 3 (Spring 2006), 28-40.
``A Fuel-Cycle Fix.'' With Stephen A. LaMontagne. The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (January-February 2006), 24-25.
``The U.S. Military: Under Strain and at Risk.'' With William J.
Perry (chair), Madeleine K. Albright, Graham T. Allison, Samuel R.
Berger, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Thomas E. Donilon, Michele A. Flournoy,
John D. Podesta, Susan E. Rice, Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Wendy R.
Sherman, Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall and James B. Steinberg
(members). National Security Advisory Group, (January 2006).
``Origins of the Nunn-Lugar Program.'' Presentation to the
Presidential Conference on William Jefferson Clinton, Hofstra
University. (11 November 2005).
``Interim Report on Nuclear Threat Reduction and the Fuel Cycle.''
Memo to Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. With Ronald Lehman II (co-chair, with Ashton Carter), Robert
Einhorn, Alan A. Foley, Arnold Kanter, David Kay, Susan Koch, Lawrence
Scheinman, and William Schneider, Jr (members). Policy Advisory Group
on Nonproliferation, (1 July 2005).
``Worst Weapons in Worst Hands: U.S. Inaction on the Nuclear Terror
Threat since 9/11, and a Path of Action.'' With William J. Perry
(chair), Madeleine K. Albright, Graham T. Allison, Samuel R. Berger,
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Thomas E. Donilon, Michele A. Flournoy, John D.
Podesta, Susan E. Rice, Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Wendy R. Sherman,
Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall and James B. Steinberg (members).
National Security Advisory Group, (July 2005).
``Worst People and Worst Weapons.'' Statement before The 9/11
Public Discourse Project's Hearings on ``The 9/11 Commission Report:
The Unfinished Agenda.'' (27 June 2005).
``A Failure of Policy, Not Spying.'' The Washington Post, 5 April
2005, A-23.
``Conversations with The Forum: Perspectives on Preemption and
National Security.'' Interview with Dr. Ashton Carter. The Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 9-12.
``The Essential Features of a Focused Strategy to Deal with the
Proliferation Challenge: What Has Been Done and What Is to Be Done?''
In The Challenge of Proliferation: A Report of the Aspen Strategy
Group, Kurt M. Campbell, ed. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2005,
141-152.
``How to Counter WMD.'' Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September-
October 2004), 72-85.
``Overhauling Counterproliferation.'' Technology in Society: An
International Journal--Special Issue: Technology and Science: Entering
the 21st Century, George Bugliarello and A. George Schillinger, eds.,
26, nos. 2/3 (April/August 2004), 257-269.
``Good Nukes, Bad Nukes.'' With Arnold Kanter, William J. Perry,
and Brent Scowcroft. The New York Times, (22 December 2003), section A,
31.
``The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism.''
Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness, Arnold M. Howitt and
Robyn L. Pangi, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, (2003),17-36.
``A Dedicated Organization in Congress.'' With Gerald L. Epstein.
Science and Technology Advice for Congress, M. Granger Morgan and Jon
M. Peha, eds. Washington, DC: RFF Press, (2003), 157-163.
``The Korean Nuclear Crisis: Preventing the Truly Dangerous Spread
of Weapons of Mass Destruction.'' Harvard Magazine, (September-October
2003), 38-41.
``An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity,
Commitment.'' With William J. Perry (chair), Madeleine K. Albright,
Samuel R. Berger, Louis Caldera, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Michele A.
Flournoy, Alfonso E. Lenhardt, John D. Podesta, Gen. John M.
Shalikashvili, and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall (members). National
Security Advisory Group, (July 2003).
``A Prescription for Peace.'' Review of No More Killing Fields:
Preventing Deadly Conflict by David A. Hamburg. Science, (30 May 2003),
1374.
``Alternatives to Letting North Korea Go Nuclear.'' Testimony
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. (6 March 2003).
``The Loose Nukes Crisis in North Korea.'' Memorandum to the Senate
Democratic Leadership from the National Security Advisory Group. With
William J. Perry (chair), Madeleine K. Albright, Samuel R. Berger,
Louis Caldera, Wesley Clark, Michele Flournoy, Alfonso E. Lenhardt,
John D. Podesta, John Shalikashvili, and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall
(members), (5 March 2003).
``A Scary Thought: Loose Nukes in North Korea.'' With William J.
Perry and John M. Shalikashvili. The Wall Street Journal, (6 February
2003), A-18.
``The Crisis Last Time.'' With William J. Perry. The New York
Times, (19 January 2003), section 4, 13.
``Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in
Countering Terrorism.'' With Lewis M. Branscomb, Richard D. Klausner,
et al. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, (2002).
``Nuclear Over North Korea: Back to the Brink.'' The Washington
Post, (20 October 2002), B-1 & B-5.
``Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age.'' With Zoe
Baird, James L. Barkdale, Philip Zelikow et al. (The Markle Foundation
Task, Force on National Security in the Information Age). Markle
Foundation, (October 2002).
``Throw the Net Worldwide.'' The Washington Post, 12 June 2002, A-
31. ``Counterterror's Management Style.'' The New York Times, (8 June
2002), A-27.
``Trip Report: Nunn-Lugar Sites in Russia. A memo to colleagues of
the Preventive Defense Project.'' (3 June 2002).
``A New Era, A New Threat.'' With Richard Lugar. Financial Times,
(23 May 2002), 15.
``Understanding Terrorism: A Harvard Magazine Roundtable.'' With
Eva Bellin, Philip B. Heymann, David Little, Louise M. Richardson and
Jessica E. Stern. Harvard Magazine (January-February 2002), 36-49.
``The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism.''
International Security 26, no. 3, (Winter 2001/02), 5-23.
``How Ridge can secure the homeland.'' The Boston Globe, (4 October
2001).
``National Security Strategy.'' In American Military Strategy:
Memos to a President, Philip D. Zelikow, editor. New York, NY: W.W.
Norton & Company, (2001), 33-48.
``National Innovation to Combat Catastrophic Terrorism.'' In
FirePower in the Lab: Automation in the Fight Against Infectious
Diseases and Bioterrorism, Scott P. Layne, Tony J. Beugelsdijk, and C.
Kumar N. Patel, eds. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, (2001), 187-
191.
``Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative.'' With L. Celeste
Johnson. In Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready?,
Henry Sokolski and James M. Ludes, eds. Portland, OR: Frank Cass
Publishers, (2001).
``Keeping America's Military Edge.'' Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1
(January-February 2001), 90-105.
``Adapting U.S. Defence to Future Needs.'' Survival 41, no. 4
(Winter 1999-2000), 101-123.
``Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative to a `Revolution in
Counterproliferation Affairs.' '' With L. Celeste Johnson. National
Security Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3 (Summer 1999), 88-90.
``Defining NATO's Purpose.'' With William J. Perry, and Hilary D.
Driscoll. In NATO at Fifty: Perspectives on the Future of the Atlantic
Alliance, Susan Eisenhower, ed. Washington, DC: The Center for
Political and Strategic Studies, (1999).
``Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger.'' With John M.
Deutch and Philip Zelikow. Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November-December
1998), 80-94.
``Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy.'' With
John M. Deutch and Philip Zelikow. Preventive Defense Project
publications, vol. 1, no. 6, Center for International Security and
Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, (October 1998).
``Grand Terrorism: A New Threat to National Security.'' Peter L.
Hays et al., eds. Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction. New York: McGraw-Hill, (1998).
``Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security
Relationship Between Ukraine and NATO.'' With Steven E. Miller and
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall. Cambridge, MA and Stanford, CA: Preventive
Defense Project publications 1, no. 4 (1998).
``Move Closer to China, Not Far, for Security.'' With John M.
Deutch and William J. Perry. USA Today, (11 June 1998).
``The Content of U.S. Engagement with China.'' With William J.
Perry. Cambridge, MA and Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project
publications 1, no. 2 (July 1998).
``NATO After Madrid: Looking to the Future.'' With Coit D. Blacker,
Warren Christopher, David A. Hamburg, and William J. Perry. Cambridge,
MA and Stanford, CA: Preventive Defense Project publications 1, no. 1
(June 1998).
``No Nukes? Not Yet.'' With John M. Deutch, Wall St. Journal, (4
March 1997).
``The Imperatives for Cooperation.'' With Janne E. Nolan, John D.
Steinbruner, Kenneth Flamm, Steven E. Miller, David Mussington, and
William J. Perry. In Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the
Twenty-first Century, Janne E. Nolan, ed. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, (1994). .
``Cooperative Security and the Former Soviet Union: Near-Term
Challenges.'' With Steven E. Miller. In Global Engagement: Cooperation
and Security in the Twenty-first Century, Janne E. Nolan, ed.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, (1994).
``Export Control Reform in High Technology.'' Statement to the
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Field Hearing, no.
57 (13 August 1993), 160-170. Washington: USGPO, (1993).
``The Role of Intelligence in Managing Proliferation.'' With Robert
D. Blackwill. In New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy,
Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds. New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, (1993).
``Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the Former Soviet Union.'' Arms
Control Today 22, no. 1 (January-February 1992).
``Technical Demarcations for ASAT and BMD Systems.'' With Donald L.
Hafner and Thomas H. Johnson. In Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of
Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race,
Bhupendra Jasani, ed. New York: Taylor& Francis, (1991).
``Emerging Themes in Nuclear Arms Control.'' Daedalus 120, no. 1
(Winter 1991).
``New Scenarios for American Defense.'' Defense Science Board,
report of the Scenarios and Intelligence Task Force, (September 1990).
``New Thinking and American Defense Technology.'' With William J.
Perry. Report of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government. (August 1990).
``Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.'' In A Primer for the
Nuclear Age, Graham T. Allison et al., eds. Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, CSIA Occasional Paper, no. 6 (1990).
``Testing Weapons in Space.'' Scientific American, (July 1989).
``Underlying Military Objectives'' and ``Limitations and Allowances
for Space-Based Weapons.'' In Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM
Treaty Regime into the 21st Century, An American Academy of Arts and
Sciences Study, Antonia Chayes and Paul Doty, eds. Pergamon-Brassey,
(1989).
``Telecommunications Policy and National Security.'' In Changing
the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and
Regulation in Communications, Robert Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, (1989).
``Permitted and Prohibited Space Testing Under the ABM Treaty.'' In
Technologies for Security and Arms Control: Threats and Promises, ed.
Eric H. Arnett. American Association for the Advancement of Science,
(1989).
``Analyzing the Dual Use Technologies Question.'' Harvard
University, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program Discussion
Paper 89, no. 5 (1989).
``A New Era in Science Advising.'' Science and Technology Advice to
the President, Congress, and Judiciary, William T. Golden, ed.
Pergamon, (1988).
``Nuclear Command and Control: The Next Thirty Years of
Technological Change.'' With John S. Quilty and Charles A. Zraket. In
The Future of Nuclear Weapons: The Next Thirty Years. Los Alamos
National Laboratory, (1988).
``The Structure of Possible U.S.-Soviet Agreements Regarding
Missile Defense.'' In On the Defensive?: The Future of SDI, Joseph S.
Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, eds. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, (1988).
``Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (with others)''. American
Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Cornell University Peace Studies
Program, (January 1987).
``Current and Future Military Uses of Space.'' In Seeking Stability
in Space: Anti Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime, Joseph
S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, eds. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, (1987).
``Interpreting the ABM Treaty: Agreed Limitations on Military
Activities in Space.'' Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Pugwash
Conference on Science and World Affairs, Gmunden am Traunsee Austria,
(1-6 September 1987).
``Military Uses of Space.'' In The High Technologies and Reducing
the Risk of War, H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. Pagels, eds. Annals of
the New York Academy of Sciences 489, (1986).
``The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems.'' Daedalus (Spring
1985).
``Command and Control of Nuclear War.'' Scientific American
(January 1985).
``Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible.''
International Security 10, no. 4, (Spring 1984).
``CP Violation in 8-Meson Decays.'' With A.I. Sanda, Physical
Review D 23, no. 7 (April 1981): 1567-1579.
``CP Nonconservation in Cascade Decays of B Mesons.'' With A.I.
Sanda. Physical Review Letters 45, no. 12 (September 1980): 952-954.
``Perturbative QCD in a Covariant Gauge.'' With C.H. Llewellyn
Smith. Nuclear Physics, B162 (1980):397-439.
``Weak D I= 1/2 Rule and the Dynamical Higgs Mechanism.'' With
Heinz Pagels. Physical Review Letters 43, no. 25 (December 1979): 1845-
1847.
``Polarization of Prompt Muons Produced at Rt = 2.15 GeV/c by 400-
GeV Proton Interactions.'' With M.J. Lauterbach, et al. Physical Review
Letters 37, no. 21 (November 1976): 1436-1438.
``Polarization of Prompt Muons.'' With R.K. Adair, et al. Physical
Review Letters 36, no. 17 (April 1976): 1011-1013.
``Production of Prompt Muons in the Forward Direction by 400-GeV
Proton Interactions.'' With R.K. Adair, et al. Physical Review Letters
35, no. 24 (December 1975): 1613-1616.
``Quarks, Charm and the Psi Particle.'' Yale Scientific. 50 no. 1
(October 1975).
``CIA: Victimized?'' Yale Daily News (January 22, 1975)
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have delivered a large number of speeches in my capacity as
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Technology & Logistics, and, previously, as Chair of the
International and Global Affairs Faculty at Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government. Since leaving the DOD in 2013, I have delivered one formal
speech, the Fubini Lecture indicated below and several times have
delivered informal remarks. In these cases, I have delivered these
speeches using no notes, or using hand-written notes that have not been
archived. Almost all of those speeches are derived from, or form the
basis of, written publications or testimony, and their content can be
found in my response to the previous question.
1. Remarks to Steel Tube Institute of America, Coral Gables,
Florida. 17 November 2014.
2. Remarks to JMI Equity CEO Conference, Baltimore, MD. 2 October
2014.
3. Remarks to Barclays Geopolitical Risk and Defense Policy
Roundtable, Washington, DC. 7 September 2014.
4. Remarks at Aerospace Corporation Board Dinner, Rancho Palos
Verdes, California. 12 June 2014.
5. Fubini Lecture, MIT-LL. Boston, MA. 29 May 2014.
6. Remarks at Ashton Carter's official farewell ceremony. Pentagon.
2 December 2013.
7. Troop Talk at U.S. Consulate. Herat, Afghanistan. 14 September
2013.
8. Remarks at the Combined Federal Campaign Kickoff Ceremony.
Pentagon. 05 September 2013.
9. Remarks at the Medal of Honor Ceremony for Ty Carter. Pentagon.
27 August 2013.
10. Remarks at the Aspen Security Forum. Aspen, CO. 18 July 2013.
11. Remarks on Defense Priorities in an Era of Constrained Budgets
at the Center for a New American Security. Washington, DC. 12 June
2013.
12. Remarks at Christine Fox's Farewell Ceremony. Pentagon. 25 June
2013.
13. Remarks at Air Force Secretary Michael Donley's Farewell
Ceremony. Pentagon. 21 June 2013.
14. Remarks at the OSD Junior and Senior Enlisted Service Members
of the Year. Pentagon. 19 June 2013.
15. Remarks at the Pentagon Presidential Rank Awards Ceremony.
Pentagon. 18 June 2013.
16. Remarks at the SOUTHCOM 50th Anniversary Ceremony. Doral,
Florida. 4 June 2013.
17. Remarks on Better Buying Power at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Washington, DC. 23 May 2013.
18. Remarks to the Aerospace Industries Association Board of
Governors. Washington, DC. 23 May 2013.
19. Troop Talk at Camp Lemmonier. Djibouti, Djibouti. 11 May 2013.
20. Remarks at the EUCOM Change of Command Ceremony, Stuttgart,
Germany. 10 May 2013.
21. Remarks at the Public Service Recognition Week Award Ceremony.
Washington, DC. 8 May 2013.
22. Remarks at the National Press Club. Washington, DC. 7 May 2013.
23. Remarks at the NOIA Eisenhower Awards. Washington, DC. 18 July
2013.
24. Remarks at the 2013 Ronald Reagan Missile Defense Award
Ceremony. Washington, DC. 23 April 2013.
25. Remarks on the U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC. 8 April 2013.
26. Remarks at the U.S. Embassy. Seoul, South Korea. 18 March 2013.
27. Remarks at the National Defense University Foundation Tribute.
Washington, DC. 13 March 2013.
28. Remarks on Sequestration at the McAleese/Credit Suisse investor
conference. Washington, DC. 12 March 2013.
29. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference. Munich, Germany. 2
February 2013.
30. Remarks at the F-35 Lightening II Change of Command Ceremony,
Washington, DC. 6 December 2012.
31. Remarks at the Cooperative Threat Reduction Symposium.
Washington, DC. 3 December 2012.
32. Remarks at the Von der Heyden Fellows Program Endowment Fund
Lecture Series at Duke University. Durham, NC. 29 November 2012.
33. Remarks at Center for Nonproliferation Studies Advisory Board
Meeting. Washington, DC. 15 November 2012.
34. DOD News Briefing on Better Buying Power 2.0 with Deputy
Secretary Carter and Under Secretary Kendall from the Pentagon. 13
November 2012.
35. Remarks at New York City's Veterans' Day Parade Opening
Ceremony. New York, NY. 11 November 2012.
36. Remarks at 57th Annual DOD Distinguished Civilian Award
Ceremony. The Pentagon. 7 November 2012.
37. Troop Talk at Minot Air Force Base. Minot, North Dakota. 2
November 2012.
38. Remarks to L-3 Communications Board of Directors. Arlington,
Virginia. 24 October 2012.
39. Remarks at the AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition. Washington,
DC. 24 October 2012.
40. Remarks aboard the USS Eisenhower. 19 October 2012.
41. Remarks at a Base in Southwest Asia. 17 October 2012.
42. Remarks at the North American Forum. Ottawa, Canada. 13 October
2012 (off the record; not for attribution).
43. Remarks at Defense Attache Association. Washington, DC. 11
October 2012.
44. Remarks at Aspen Institute Roundtable Luncheon. Washington, DC.
10 October 2012.
45. Remarks at Navy's 237th Birthday Celebration. Pentagon
Auditorium. 9 October 2012.
46. Remarks to USAF Cadets: ``On Strategy and Leadership.'' United
States Air Force Academy. 4 October 2012.
47. Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Washington, DC. 3 October
2012.
48. Remarks at the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Program
Transition Ceremony. The Pentagon. 1 October 2012.
49. Remarks at Raytheon Workforce Town Hall. Tucson, Arizona. 26
September 2012.
50. Remarks at White House Rhodes Scholar Event. The White House.
Washington, DC. 24 September 2012.
51. Remarks at Combined Federal Campaign Kickoff. The Pentagon. 24
September 2012.
52. Remarks at the Department of Defense's National POW/MIA
Recognition Day Ceremony. 21 September 2012.
53. Remarks at the Politico Pro Defense Forum, Washington, DC. 20
September 2012.
54. Remarks at the Annual Air & Space Conference and Technology
Exposition. 19 September 2012.
55. Remarks at Partnership for Public Service Sammies Gala.
Washington, DC. 13 September 2012.
56. Remarks at Council of Chief Executives Dinner. The Four
Seasons, Washington, DC. 12 September 2012.
57. Remarks at Rhode Island Business Leaders Day. Hart Senate
Office Building, Washington, DC. 12 September 2012.
58. Remarks at APEX SES Orientation Program. The Pentagon. 12
September 2012.
59. Remarks at NDU Economics and National Security Symposium. Fort
McNair, Washington, DC. 6 September 2012.
60. Remarks at Award Ceremony for Jo Ann Rooney. The Pentagon. 4
September 2012.
61. Remarks at Joint Staff Global Readiness Conference. The
Pentagon. 23 August 2012.
62. ``The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense
Perspective.'' The Asia Society, New York, NY. 1 August 2012.
63. Remarks at OSD Junior/Senior Enlisted Service Members of the
Year Ceremony. The Pentagon. 31 July 2012.
64. Remarks to Troops at Camp Humphreys. 26 July 2012.
65. ``Toward a Joint Vision for U.S.-lndia Defense Cooperation.
Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry. New Delhi, India. 23
July 2012.
66. Remarks aboard the USS Blue Ridge, Yokosuka, Japan. 23 July
2012.
67. Remarks aboard the Battleship Missouri. 18 July 2012.
68. Address to NATO Parliamentary Assembly Members. The Pentagon. 9
July 2012.
69. Remarks at Foreign Defense Attache Reception. The State
Department. Washington, DC, 28 June 2012.
70. Remarks at Al Volkman Retirement Ceremony. The Pentagon. 25
June 2012.
71. Remarks at CTBT Workshop. Hay Adams Hotel, Washington, DC. 22
June 2012.
72. Remarks at Joint Base Charleston. Charleston, SC. 18 June 2012.
73. Remarks at Presidential Rank Award Ceremony. The Pentagon. 5
June 2012.
74. ``Cybersecurity and Its Role in National Defense.'' Address at
West Point Senior Cyber Security Conference. United States Military
Academy. West Point, NY. 4 June 2012.
75. ``Budget Priorities for 21st Century Defense: A Conversation
with Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.'' The American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC. 30 May 2012.
76. Keynote Address at PenFed Night of Heroes Gala. Ritz Carlton,
Washington DC. 24 May 2012.
77. Address to Senior Executive Service Town Hall on Achieving
Audit Readiness. The Pentagon. 23 May 2012.
78. Remarks at BENS Annual Washington Forum. Grand Hyatt,
Washington, DC. 22 May 2012.
79. Remarks to the Aspen Group U.S.-lndia Dialogue. Riggs Library.
Washington, DC. 12 May 2012.
80. Remarks at Rep. Adam Smith District Day. Library of Congress,
Washington, DC. 10 May 2012.
81. Address at NDU Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Fort McNair, Washington, DC. 9 May 2012.
82. Remarks at the Spirit of Service Ceremony. The Pentagon. 9 May
2012.
83. Remarks at Vanguard Executive Development Program. The
Pentagon. 3 May 2012.
84. Remarks at Navy Office of General Counsel Conference.
Alexandria, Virginia. 2 May 2012.
85. Remarks at Sam Nunn/Bank of America Policy Forum Lunch.
Atlanta, Georgia. 16 April 2012.
86. Remarks at Farewell Ceremony for David Van Buren. The Pentagon.
23 March 2012.
87. Remarks at Farewell Ceremony for Regina Dugan. The Pentagon. 23
March 2012.
88. Remarks at Institute for Defense Analysis Lunch Colloquium.
Alexandria, Virginia. 20 March 2012.
89. Remarks at APEX SES Orientation Program. The Pentagon. 19 March
2012.
90. Remarks to Harvard Zuckerman and Gleitsman Fellows. The
Pentagon. 13 March 2012.
91. Remarks at NDIA Dinner. Army-Navy Club. Washington, DC. 12
March 2012.
92. Remarks at 50th Annual U.S. Senate Youth Program Reception. The
Pentagon. 9 March 2012.
93. Remarks at Credit Suisse/McAleese Conference on 2013 Defense
Programs. Arlington, Virginia. 8 March 2012.
94. The Paul C. Warnke Lecture on International Security: ``Defense
Strategy and Budget Priorities for the 21st Century.'' The Council on
Foreign Relations. New York, NY. 6 March 2012.
95. Remarks at the ARPA-E Innovation Summit. Gaylord Convention
Center, National Harbor, Maryland. 29 February 2012.
96. Keynote Address at the RSA Conference. San Francisco,
California. 28 February 2012.
97. Remarks at Combined Federal Campaign Award Ceremony. The
Pentagon. 17 February 2012.
98. Remarks at Atlantic Council Dinner. Metropolitan Club,
Washington. DC. 15 February 2012.
99. Remarks at CNAS 5th Anniversary Celebration in honor of William
J. Perry. The W Hotel, Washington, DC. 31 January 2012.
100. Remarks at Professional Services Council Meeting. The Four
Seasons Georgetown, Washington, DC. 30 January 2012.
101. Remarks at the Major Budget Decisions Media Briefing. The
Pentagon. 26 January 2012.
102. Remarks at Colonel Ronald F. Lewis Promotion Ceremony. The
Pentagon. 20 January 2012.
103. Remarks at Enduring Security Framework Executive Steering
Group. Washington, DC. 19 January 2012.
104. Remarks at Farewell Ceremony for Gordon Heddell. The Pentagon.
13 January 2012.
105. Remarks at the Defense Strategic Guidance Media Roundtable.
The Pentagon. 5 January 2012.
106. Remarks at Defense Industrial Base Task Force Meeting.
Aerospace Industries Association, Arlington, VA. 22 December 2011.
107. Iraq End of Mission/Return of the Colors. Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland. 20 December 2012.
108. OSD Senior/Junior Enlisted Service Member of the Year Awards
Ceremony. The Pentagon. 2 December 2011.
109. Remarks at VADM Thompson Retirement and DLA Change of Command
Ceremony. Fort Belvoir, VA. 18 November 2011.
110. Welcome Ceremony Remarks. Pentagon Auditorium. 9 November
2011.
111. Remarks at 55th Annual DOD Distinguished Civilian Awards. The
Pentagon. 4 November 2011.
112. Remarks at Afghan Strategic Review Panel. Crystal City,
Virginia. 26 October 2011.
113. Remarks at AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon. 11 October 2011.
114. ``Defense Budgets, American Power, and the National Security
Industrial Base.'' Remarks at the Brookings Institution. 15 July 2011.
115. Remarks at Heritage Foundation Conference, ``The Pentagon
Efficiency Initiative: Enough to Stave Off More Defense Cuts?'' 20
April 2011.
116. ``Doing More Without More: Obtaining Efficiency and
Productivity in Defense.'' Remarks at the Center for a New American
Security.`` 22 February 2011.
117. Remarks at Aviation Week's R&D Technology & Requirements
Conference. Washington, DC. 16 February 2011.
118. ``The Defense Industry Enters a New Era.'' Remarks to Cowen
Investment Conference, New York, NY. 9 February 2011.
119. Remarks at Center for American Progress Conference, ``A $400
Billion Opportunity: 10 Strategies to Cut the Fat out of Federal
Procurement.'' 16 November 2010.
120. ``Acquisition Process.'' Remarks before the Air Force
Association Conference. 15 September 2010.
121. ``Remarks at Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Gaylord
Convention Center, Washington, DC. 4 May 2010.
122. Remarks at Defense Logistics Modernization Conference. Center
for Strategic and International Studies. 2 April 2010.
123. Remarks at 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security
Strategy and Policy, ``Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power in the 21st
Century.'' 20 January 2010.
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Ashton B. Carter
This 13th day of January, 2015
[The nomination of the Honorable Ashton B. Carter was
reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on February 10, 2015,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 12, 2015.]
NOMINATION OF MR. PETER K. LEVINE TO BE DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT
OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin,
Donnelly, Hirono, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. All right, Peter. We have done enough
schmoozing.
This committee is always gratified to be in a position to
help the Senate confirm nominees that previously distinguished
themselves as esteemed members of its staff. That is why I am
especially delighted to welcome Peter Levine who appears before
us today as the President's nominee to serve as Deputy Chief
Management Officer [DCMO]. I would also like to welcome his
wife Mary Ellen and his son Daniel. We thank you both for
lending Peter to his country in service once again.
Having served as staff director and before that as general
counsel to the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC], Peter
has gained keen insight into how the Department of Defense
[DOD] operates and how it is managed. He has an in-depth
understanding of the challenges that confront its senior most
managers and ensuring that the Pentagon provides our Nation's
defense effectively and responsibly. Peter also knows how
inherently challenging the position of DCMO is. He has seen how
the Department does business, especially in the area of
financial improvement and business transformation, critical
areas over which the DCMO has a critical oversight role.
Peter, the task lies ahead of you. Few people outside
Washington truly appreciate the challenge that the Department
faces in the area of management, business transformation, and
financial management. Measured by dollars, people, or global
missions, the Department of Defense is quite possibly the
largest, most complex single organization in the world. With
this size and complexity comes difficulties in management. The
Comptroller General, Congress' independent watchdog, has
continually listed DOD as high risk and vulnerable to fraud,
waste abuse, and mismanagement.
The Department of Defense is unique in that it is the only
large Federal agency that cannot even undergo a financial
statement audit of its balance sheet. This committee, with Mr.
Levine's help, has spent a great deal of time and energy
working on specific challenges at DOD in the areas of weapon
systems acquisition, business transformation, IT [information
technology] system implementation, financial management, and
supply chain management. To date none of these risk areas have
been removed from GAO's [the Government Accountability Office]
high risk list, but I am optimistic that with Mr. Levine's
leadership and partnership with this committee we will make
great progress which will benefit both the warfighter and the
taxpayer.
While efforts to improve business systems, cut costs, and
find waste at the Department of Defense are used to identify
savings, it is also to gain knowledge and understanding about
how the Department works. Former Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates said back in 2011, ``The current apparatus for managing
people and money across the DOD enterprise is woefully
inadequate.'' That came from the Secretary of Defense at the
time. He went on to say it was, ``nearly impossible to get
accurate information and answers to questions such as how much
money did you spend and how many people do you have.''
Secretary Gates also mentioned that the result of these
shortfalls in information was that he could not measure results
or make judgments about priorities for the military. There is
something very wrong when the Secretary of Defense cannot get
answers to simple questions or know how or whether the agencies
under his control achieve their intended results.
Fixing these weaknesses and improving the management of the
Pentagon is not the job of any one person. All Pentagon leaders
must be invested in this work from the Secretary on down, and
Congress must never forget its critical role in this area. But
this work goes directly to the heart of what the Deputy Chief
Management Officer is all about, empowering the Secretary of
Defense with timely and accurate information to assess whether
the Department is achieving its goals, streamlining bureaucracy
and cutting through red tape to enable the Military Services to
put their full effort toward achieving their missions, not
filling out paperwork, and holding leaders accountable for
failing to change or adopt better practices, while at the same
time rewarding managers who learn from mistakes and succeed in
transformation.
Peter, this is no small task, but I assure you that, if
confirmed, you will have a committed partner in this committee.
Again, I thank the witness for his willingness to serve and
look forward to hearing from the witness on this important
matter.
This committee has the well-deserved reputation for acting
99 percent of the time in a bipartisan fashion. A lot of that
comes from the interaction between the staffs on both sides of
the aisle, no matter who is in the majority. Peter, over many
years as service to Senator Levin as well as other members of
this committee, you have made a significant contribution to
maintaining that environment of bipartisanship, not to mention
though, however, that you and I have had spirited conversations
on occasion in the past.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
echo your comments about the spirit that Peter has helped keep
alive, and I know he will continue to do that at the Department
of Defense.
I want to welcome Peter and Mary Ellen and Daniel. Thank
you very much.
One indication of success that the people that you led are
strongly behind you--literally they are because the entire
Democratic PSM [professional staff members] staff is here for
this hearing to cheer you on and secretly send messages to you
so that you get the answers right.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. The chairman has gone into great detail and
very accurate detail about the incredible contributions you
have made to the committee. You originally came in 1996. You
have been the general counsel, the staff director. You have
been a trusted advisor to Senators on both sides of the aisle.
You have been a mentor to the professional staff. You have made
us all a little wiser and a little better prepared to face the
challenges of a very difficult and dangerous world.
Many of the pieces of legislation that you worked with have
profoundly reshaped the Pentagon, and there is a lot more that
has to be done. You have been a major force in developing
Government-wide procurement reform initiatives--for the
Pentagon, I should say--including the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. That was really due to your
staff efforts with the leadership of Senator Levin and Senator
McCain. This was a tribute to their vision, as well as your
efforts.
You have developed mechanisms to streamline the
Department's workforce to help the Pentagon to maintain this
workforce. You have also led efforts in the Senate to combat
waste, fraud, and abuse in the Pentagon acquisition, stretching
back to your days not just on this committee but when you were
on the Government Affairs Committee.
We will miss you, your knowledge of the laws, your
analytical ability, your determination, your professionalism.
But we will recognize that we are benefiting and the Pentagon
is benefiting and the Nation is benefiting from those skills in
your new position as Deputy Chief Management Officer for the
Department of Defense.
The DCMO position is charged with improving the management
of the Department of Defense and it does need improvement. As
such and especially in these constrained budget times, you will
be challenged to support warfighters while making very
difficult choices about eliminating low priority functions,
cutting costs, but maintaining capacity and, in fact, enhancing
capacity. Those are very difficult, in fact sometimes
contradictory, challenges. You will be charged with leading the
modernization efforts, and we have every confidence you will do
it well as you have done everything well.
We look forward to working with you.
Again, let me thank the chairman for scheduling this
hearing. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Before your statement, as you know, there are standard
questions that have to be answered for the record, which I will
go into now.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress be able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Mr. Levine. I have.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Levine. I have not.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Levine. I will.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Levine. I will.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Levine. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Levine. I do.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Levine. I do.
Chairman McCain. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER K. LEVINE, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY CHIEF
MANAGEMENT OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Levine. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the
committee, first let me thank you for those very generous
remarks that you made at the outset.
You are absolutely right about the challenges, management
challenges, facing the Department of Defense. As I, if
confirmed, take those on, it will be a great comfort to know
that this committee is supportive of that effort.
It is my pleasure to appear before you today as the
President's nominee for the position of Deputy Chief Management
Officer of the Department of Defense. I would like to thank the
President, Secretary Carter, and Deputy Secretary Work for
selecting me for this position.
I would also like to thank my wife Mary Ellen and my son
Daniel, both of whom are with me today. I mention them for all
their love, support, and understanding over the years, and I
would not be here without them.
This committee established the DCMO position in an effort
to address the broken business practices and bureaucratic
inefficiencies that caused DOD management programs and support
functions to take too long, cost too much, and produce less
than optimal results.
I believe that an active DCMO, with the support of the
Secretary, Deputy Secretary, can make a real difference. If
confirmed, I will strive to institute more effective management
practices and take on the waste and inefficiency that
needlessly squander the taxpayers' money and the Department's
resources.
Mr. Chairman, it has been my privilege and honor to serve
on the staff of the Armed Services Committee for almost 20
years. I could not have asked for a more rewarding place to
work, for better people to work with and for, or for a better
learning experience. I thank all of you, members and staff, for
that.
I know that I have more to learn, but if confirmed, I will
bring a piece of the Armed Services Committee with me to the
Department of Defense.
That concludes my opening statement, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levine follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Peter Levine
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee--Thank you
for scheduling this hearing. It is my pleasure to appear before you
today as the President's nominee for the position of Deputy Chief
Management Officer (DCMO) of the Department of Defense.
I would like to thank the President, Secretary Carter, and Deputy
Secretary Work for the confidence they have shown in selecting me for
this important position. I would also like to thank my wife Mary Ellen
and my son Daniel, both of whom are here with me today, for their
understanding and support over the years. I would not be here without
them.
This committee established the DCMO position in an effort to
address the broken business processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies
that cause DOD management programs and support functions to take too
long, cost too much, and produce less than optimal results. The
committee also expected the DCMO to help the Department develop and
implement the sound business systems and practices that will be needed
to produce an auditable financial statement.
I understand that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the
DCMO to conduct a review of the organizations and business processes of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the defense agencies,
with the objective of streamlining organizations and improving business
processes. I do not believe that there are any significant management
processes in the Department of Defense that cannot be streamlined and
made more efficient.
Making process improvements will be difficult and time-consuming
and may require changes to the culture of the Department. However, I
believe that significant improvements are not only possible, but
essential to enable the Department to reduce the size and composition
of its management headquarters and achieve needed savings without
creating bottlenecks that would undermine the mission. If confirmed, I
will devote my fullest effort to this project.
Mr. Chairman, it has been my privilege to serve on the staff of the
Armed Services Committee for almost twenty years. I believe that this
committee is unique in the Senate because of its productivity, having
produced a National Defense Authorization Act every year for the last
53 years. It is unique because of its tradition of bipartisanship, with
Members and staff on both sides working together to solve common
problems. And it is unique because of its dedication to a common
purpose--doing what is best for our men and women in uniform and the
national defense.
If confirmed, I pledge to bring this spirit of productivity,
bipartisanship, and dedication to our men and women in uniform with me
to the Department of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I look forward
to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
The issue of continuing interest to this committee, as you
know, is the inability of the Department of Defense to pass a
financial statement and audit. The current audit deadline is,
starting in 2017, that DOD will be audit-ready. Do you think
that is going to be the case?
Mr. Levine. Mr. Chairman, I have always tried to be honest
with members of this committee and give my best assessment, and
I have always been skeptical that the 2017 deadline will be met
and I cannot change my stripes just because I am sitting down
here at the witness table.
Chairman McCain. Why do you think that they have never been
able to do that? People ask me that all the time.
Mr. Levine. Looking at the problem of an auditable
financial statement for the Department of Defense, you have to
keep in mind that it is the biggest entity in the world. We
have hundreds of millions of transactions every year and
billions of historic transactions. An individual taxpayer or a
small business may be able to put their receipts in a shoebox
and add them at the end of the year and balance their books,
but an entity the size of the Department of Defense simply
cannot do that. We have to have systems and processes in place
that work and that produce good financial information, and when
we get those systems and processes in place, it will not only
provide us an auditable financial statement, but it will answer
that question that Secretary Gates had about why he cannot get
good answers to his questions when he needs to make a decision.
I think we have made significant progress really going back
to when Deputy Secretary England took this on as a challenge in
about 2005 when he became Deputy Secretary. I think that Mr.
Hale as Comptroller continued that effort, and I think that it
is now foreseeable to me that we can get to an auditable
financial statement. I just do not believe we will make it by
2017.
Chairman McCain. As you remember, a couple years ago, as
part of not the Department of Defense but my role--and I was a
member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations--we
discovered that the Air Force spent over $1 billion, many years
of mismanaging what was supposed to be a commercial, off-the-
shelf system. It was known as the expeditionary combat support
system [ECSS]. No one was held responsible. What do I tell the
taxpayers at the next town hall meeting that we wasted $1
billion on a program that never even begun at all, and no one
was held responsible? What is your solution to that?
Mr. Levine. Senator, first I worked with your staff on that
review.
Chairman McCain. I remember.
Mr. Levine. I share their views and your views of that. It
is absolutely unacceptable. What I will say is the failures
that you identified in your report on ECSS, lack of planning,
lack of a firm requirement, changing requirements, lack of
commitment to the commercial nature of the system, are systemic
problems that we have in the acquisition of business systems
for the Department of Defense, and we created the DCMO in part
to make sure that that does not happen.
Chairman McCain. I take it that one of your priorities is
going to be to hold people responsible because just your
appointment is not going to eliminate those.
Mr. Levine. It will be one of my jobs to review business
system programs for the Department of Defense to make sure that
they are doing the planning that they need to do, that they
have the governance processes to make sure this does not happen
again.
Chairman McCain. Does that mean you are going to hold
people accountable?
Mr. Levine. Senator, the people that need to be held
accountable do not actually report to the DCMO. So it will be
the job of----
Chairman McCain. Will you identify them?
Mr. Levine. Yes. Yes, Senator, I will help identify people
who need to be held accountable. I think that is a fair--yes.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
In a recent audit, GAO noted that a majority of major IT
programs did not--and we know how important in this day and age
IT programs are--establish baseline costs and schedule
estimates within 2 years of program initiation. In fact, it
took over 5 years and nearly half a billion dollars to be spent
before baseline costs and schedule estimates were created for
12 major IT systems.
Is the IT system issue not of highest importance?
Mr. Levine. I will make it an issue of the highest
importance. Yes, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Do you think you can fix the problem?
Mr. Levine. I think we can do far, far better than we have
done, and we need to do far, far better than we have done.
Chairman McCain. Will you have the confidence of the
Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Levine. I believe that I will, yes.
Chairman McCain. Good.
As you know, from time to time, as a member of the staff of
this committee, we have been frustrated with sometimes the lack
of complete and timely information from the Department of
Defense, and I hope that you will also make sure that we do
receive that information in a timely and accurate fashion.
Mr. Levine. I have shared that frustration, and I will do
my best to be as responsive as possible. I certainly understand
the problem.
Chairman McCain. Some of your comments I will keep on
record to provide to you in case we do have difficulties in
that area, Peter.
Mr. Levine. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. It was my beloved friend, Morris Udall,
who once said the politician's prayer is that the words that I
utter today be tender and sweet because tomorrow I may have to
eat them. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, Peter, thank you for your service to Congress.
You were there in 2008 when this office was created.
Briefly, can you give an assessment of what it has done
positively and where are still the failings that it has not
lived up to?
Mr. Levine. This committee was responsible for creating the
position of DCMO, and it was created for the reasons that
Senator McCain laid out in his opening statement, because the
committee did not believe that Department was paying enough
attention to the management issues that end up leading to waste
and inefficiency and costing the Department so much money. It
actually started with an amendment by Senator Byrd to create a
second Deputy Secretary who was going to be a Deputy Secretary
for management, and it evolved to where the Deputy Secretary
would be the CMO [Chief Management Officer] and he would be
assisted by a DCMO.
The idea was to elevate the issue of management within the
Department and give it top level attention so that we could
address some of these problems that just seemed to go on from
year to year to year and never be solved.
There has been only one DCMO to date, one Senate-confirmed
DCMO to date. I think she worked hard. I do not think she had
the support at the top level of the Department that she needed
to really take on some of these bigger problems. I have been
assured that I will have that support, and I hope to have that
support and I hope to take on the big management problems that
have been of concern to this committee for so long.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator McCain alluded to in his questions about the IT
systems. The Pentagon is the biggest enterprise in the world,
but there are lots of big companies that are audited every year
and they are pretty complicated and complex. I guess it begs
the question, what can you learn from the private sector, not
just studying them but adopting some of their mechanisms,
getting advisors coming in who are management experts to tell
you how you should do things differently at the Pentagon?
Mr. Levine. We need to do all of that. There are some
mechanisms in the Department for doing that. There are some
authorities we have given the Department to do that kind of
thing, and the Department has not taken full advantage of the
authority it has in that regard. We will want to bring in
expertise from the private sector and do whatever we can to
draw on that.
Senator Reed. I know the Secretary has a business sort of
advisors group. I do not know the official title.
Mr. Levine. The Defense Business Board.
Senator Reed. I would assume you are going to be looking to
them or work closely with them for advice and insight.
Mr. Levine. My understanding is that they are available to
assist in these areas and to provide advice, and I hope that we
will be able to draw on that advice. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. One aspect too here of the auditability and
everything is that sometimes the fault is not in our stars but
in ourselves, and some of the congressional requirements that
we place make it very difficult to manage. Are you going to
look also at the structures we give you to operate? We do not
have the same type of capital budget, for example, in the
Pentagon that you find in most big, private enterprises. Are
you going to be able to give us advice too about what changes
we should make?
Mr. Levine. Senator Reed, I think there is an awful lot
that can be done to improve the way the Department works
without legislation. I think there are lots of ripe targets
there. If I identify something that does need legislation or an
area where we do need congressional help, of course I will come
back to you and ask for that.
Senator Reed. Just the final point and more of a comment
than a question. Information technology is so critical to
businesses today to be agile, to be proficient and productive,
and some of the systems that you are operating are antiquated,
to be kind.
Mr. Levine. I am hearing about COBOL-based systems and
FORTRAN-based systems. Yes.
Senator Reed. That is encouraging because those are the
last computer languages that I learned in 1967 and 1969. So
there is a place for me over there programming FORTRAN and
BASIC.
[Laughter.]
Maybe I will withdraw the question.
[Laughter.]
But you know, you are right. You are looking at systems
which are 20 years out of date, and the irony, of course--at
least the perception that I have--is in the 1950s and 1960s and
1970s, the Pentagon was where the really spectacular
information technology breakthroughs and automation were going
on. It was business that was trying to catch up, and now it is
completely reversed.
Mr. Levine. Particularly in the area of business systems,
all of the initiative is now on the private sector side. You
are talking about accounting systems or purchasing systems or
personnel systems, those kinds of IT systems. The key is in
order to make use of those, you need to address the problems
that Senator McCain referred to earlier with the ECSS system
where we tried to buy a commercial system but then we refused
to change our processes. We ended up having to hire a squadron
of computer programmers to try to reinvent a system that was
working perfectly well in the commercial sector. What we need
to do is to change our business processes so that they make
sense and that they can be appropriately automated rather than
automating an old process that really is not very efficient in
the first place.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Again, thank you for
your service and your personal support systems in Congress.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, Peter, I find it difficult to believe the many,
many years that I have personally had the honor of working with
you I never met any of your family before. Mary Ellen, it is
really nice to meet you. For the benefit of my fellow Senators
up here, Daniel is at Harvard in computer science right now and
he made a real sacrifice to be here today. You will be very
much rewarded to know how much everyone thinks of your daddy
because I do not recall anyone at any of these hearings who is
more loved than he is.
In fact, the chairman said that 99 percent was nonpartisan
in his past and talked about a few spirited conversations. I
cannot remember any spirited conversations in the past that you
and I have had.
Chairman McCain. Peter can.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. No. That he and I have had. I understand
that.
Even at the time with the Big 4, I remember 2 years ago
with the Big 4, we got to know each other pretty well. It was
really a great experience.
Anyone, if you just listen today to all of these people
that are running for President of the United States, when they
talk about the military and they talk about the Department of
Defense, they talk about the Pentagon, they talk about waste,
fraud, and abuse. In fact, that term was made by Senator Reed a
minute ago. We hear a lot about that, and it is a very popular
thing. But it seems like no one has ever really done anything
about it maybe because we have never had anyone in this new
position. I think the world of Beth McGrath, but she did not
have the background that you do.
Now, you have been in the trenches. You know these problems
that exist. It is going to be a real tough thing for you to do.
In reading the mission statement here, it said in 2008 DOD
formally chartered the office of DCMO to better synchronize,
integrate, and coordinate the business operations of the
Department and ensure the optimum alignment and all that stuff.
If there is anyone who has a background that is more conducive
to that, it would be you.
In your opening statement, you said that reductions should
not take the form of across-the-board cuts. Cutting personnel
without improving management processes or divesting functions
will result in fewer people to do the same work, creating
bottlenecks and backlogs that are counterproductive to the
mission of the Department.
I think everyone knows the easy thing to do is the meat axe
approach. Then it is somebody else's problem. But you are going
to have to--and you have already done this--deal with OSD [the
Office of the Secretary of Defense], deal with the combatant
commands. When they come and testify here or the ones that we
talk to in the field, and they talk about what they could do,
sometimes it is just not something that is really easy in our
system.
Does anything come to your mind now on how you are going to
be able to focus these cuts and these efficiencies that we are
depending upon you to do that specifically you are going to
dive right in? You know the job, and you know about this from a
position of knowledge. What are you going to be doing?
Mr. Levine. Senator, you know I have never shied away from
taking on a difficult problem. If confirmed, in the near future
I will have about a year and a half to work with, and I figure
I have to take on some very specific targets to identify five
or six priorities to go after. The Deputy Secretary has already
asked the DCMO to review the organization of OSD and to look
for places where we have redundant or superfluous
organizations, and we will continue that. I have a couple of
areas that I want to look at specifically.
I think the acquisition decision-making process is
incredibly inefficient, and it has to be improved and it is not
only too costly but it slows things down in a way that is
counterproductive.
I think that the civilian personnel system can be
dramatically improved. We need to streamline processes and we
need to look at organizations and make that process more
efficient and less costly.
There are several others like that, but I think that what I
am going to have to do is to target specific issues and go
after them and I intend to do that.
Senator Inhofe. In a comment you made--I do not know if it
was a response to a question or your opening statement. I
cannot remember, but you talked about the one person who was
predecessor in this job sometimes may not have had the support
of the top management. I am going to ask you that if you run
into that, you can come to us because I do not recall having
heard from that office before that there were some problems. I
would say this--and I think everyone here looking at it up here
at this table--that if you are not getting the full support,
there is one thing you can do about it and that is come to us
and we will make sure you do get the full support. Is that all
right?
Mr. Levine. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I think that that is
something that will help as I have to work with under
secretaries and tell them that we are going to have to take on
issues in their organizations or chiefs or deputy chiefs of
staff. If they understand that the committee stands behind that
and really wants these efficiency measures and really wants to
make improvements necessary, that will be very helpful. Thank
you.
Senator Inhofe. That is good because they are going to have
to know that we are behind you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was looking at the advance policy questions that have
been submitted to you, and the first question is what is your
understanding of the relationship between the Deputy Chief
Management Officer and each of the following. I noted that
there were at least 14 sets of individuals and their offices,
everybody from the Secretary of Defense to the business
transformation offices of the Military Departments. That is a
lot of people that you are attempting to work with to do the
kinds of modernization that you have told us you want to do.
How many people do you have in your office to help you deal
with 14 individuals and offices?
Mr. Levine. I cannot remember. I think the staff of the
DCMO is about 100 people.
What I would say is, first of all, in listing all those
people that the office has to deal with, your staff was very
good and very thorough in putting together those advance policy
questions.
Second, I do think I have something of an advantage in
taking it on in that from my work with the committee, I already
know all those people that I will have to interface with and
have worked with them over the years. I think that that will
put me in a position to do that.
Senator Hirono. I think those relationships are critical
because anytime that you are dealing with folks who are already
in place who are supposed to be doing many of the things that
you are doing within their own Services, without that kind of
relationship, they do not necessarily have to listen to you. I
commend you for that.
Now, going to acquisition reform, you said that it
obviously needs to be much more efficient and less costly, and
you said you would target specific issues in the area of
acquisition reform and go after those. Could you tell us what
your first specific target issue for acquisition reform would
be?
Mr. Levine. I need to be careful here because the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics
is the acquisition policy official for the Department of
Defense. The DCMO has a role here, as in other areas, in
looking at process. We had a GAO report that the committee
received recently that indicates that for a program manager of
a major program in the Department to get a milestone decision
can take 2 years and 2,000 man-hours. They may have to go to
200 different offices to get their approval. That kind of
process where you have to go to all these different offices--
the program managers should not have to do that. They are
spending all their time briefing people and changing slides to
get approval rather than working on the substance of the
program. I think that process--without changing the acquisition
policy, which this committee will do, the Under Secretary for
Acquisition Technology will decide what the policy is. The
process can be significantly improved, and I hope to work with
Frank Kendall and others in the Department to do that.
Senator Hirono. I am really hopeful that you will be able
to move the ball because I know that the chairman has had all
kinds of questions, as have many of us, regarding acquisition
reform. It is not exactly transparent. For example, if you
would be looking at things like contracts, the kind of
contracts we put in place, the requirement process. Would you
agree that the more specific we are as to what it is we want,
that would limit the changes that we make that just add to the
cost? There is a whole range of things that are very specific
to the acquisition process, complicated as it is.
Mr. Levine. Yes, Senator. There are a whole range of things
like that that need improvement. This committee has made
significant strides in the past, and I understand that the
chairman has made it a priority to address that issue again
this year. I know it continues to be a priority for the
Department, and I will make whatever contribution I can if
confirmed.
Senator Hirono. We have had questions relating to
cybersecurity. I think that is one of these most vulnerable
areas of vulnerability across departments. Can you talk a
little bit more about how you would make sure that DOD
addresses is cybersecurity needs in an appropriate way?
Mr. Levine. I should defer that question to my son who is
the IT expert in the family.
[Laughter.]
The DCMO works closely with the Chief Information Officer
(CIO), of the Department who really is more the technology
person, the IT technology side. The DCMO is more on the
business process side. If confirmed, I would work closely with
Terry Halvorsen, who is the Chief Information Officer of the
Department and is heavily focused on cybersecurity issues. One
of the things that you look at in the chaotic systems
environment the Department has where we have so many different
systems run by so many different people is that that presents
too many targets. One of the things that Mr. Halvorsen is
working on is streamlining that system, consolidating, which
not only enables you to be more efficient and have a better
business process but also should enable a more secure
environment.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Levine, I understand that you have been here for a long
time, a lot longer than I have been. It would appear to me that
before you would have made a major change moving from this side
to that side, that you would have had a number of conversations
with the individuals who will employ you and you would have had
discussions about your capabilities and your ability to
actually get the job done. I would like to explore just a
little bit.
You have indicated that, number one, as the DCMO you are
going to be responsible for the processes, but I am just
curious. In the discussions that you have had to convince you
to want to do this job in the first place and one that I
suspect might make you more frustrated than a former Governor
coming into the U.S. Senate is----
[Laughter.]
Senator Rounds.--what did you receive in terms of an
assurance of resources available to you, the assurances
themselves that you would have the ability to get in and
actually look at the different processes, open access, and
finally your access to the guys who can hire and fire and make
a difference? What types of discussions and where are you at
right now in that process?
Mr. Levine. When the Deputy Secretary, Secretary Work,
talked to me about the job and asked me if I would do it, I
said, so you want to make me the most unpopular person in the
Pentagon. He said, yes, and I will be right there with you.
That was the assurance that I needed that he understood that
what the DCMO has to do is to go into basically other people's
rice bowls and tell them they are not doing it right and they
need to do it differently, and that is never going to be
something that is popular in any organization and certainly not
an organization like the Pentagon. He understands that that is
what the DCMO needs to do and he said he stands fully behind it
and will be absolutely supportive of it.
I did not get any assurance of more resources, and I do not
think that that would have been an appropriate--if there is
some specific project that needs something, we will try to find
resources within the Department and available resources. But I
think that building a new office or a new bureaucracy is not
the way you fight bureaucracy. We need to make use of the
resources we have and not create some new structure to try to
do that.
Senator Rounds. Do you believe the resources that are
available to you will be capable? Do you have the resources
available to make a dent?
Mr. Levine. Senator, I do not believe that the resources of
the DCMO office alone are sufficient. I do not think that any
one office could be sufficient for that. What I believe is that
with the commitment of the Deputy Secretary, I will be able to
draw on other offices in the Department and other expertise in
the Department. For example, if we are going to look at
acquisition, we are going to have to work with the acquisition
people, with Frank Kendall and his organization, and the
Service acquisition executives and their organizations. They do
have expertise, and we are going to have to draw on that
expertise. We are going to have to draw on expertise from the
private sector through the Defense Business Board and other
mechanisms that are available to do that. I think there are
mechanisms to provide the support that we need and to provide
the resources we need, but I do not think the answer is to
build a huge new office.
Senator Rounds. You indicated that when we talk about the
chain of command, specifically you felt comfortable coming back
to us. Do you think that under the current chain of command and
the responsibility that you have to those individuals that will
be your superiors, that you have access and that you believe
you can come directly to this committee and ask for the
resources or the assistance to get something done?
Mr. Levine. I think that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
understand very well where I am coming from and the background
that I have and understand the relationship I have with this
committee and look at that as a positive rather than a
negative. Yes, I do think that is the case.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. So many questions, so little time.
Mr. Levine. Senator, it is very strange to see you all from
this side.
Senator McCaskill. I can imagine.
Mr. Levine. I am seeing you face to face for the first
time, rather than seeing the back of your heard.
Senator McCaskill. I can imagine. My swivel, where I go
first to Jason and then to Peter--I do not know how this is
going to work out.
First, I want to talk about the audit stuff. I was really
disappointed when I found out in March that they have pulled
the clean audit finding from the Marine Corps.
Mr. Levine. Yes, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. People that have been at this longer
than I have, but I have certainly since the day I got here
tried to figure out, coming in as a former auditor, how in the
world we had gotten to the point that the Department of Defense
was incapable of being audited.
My false sense of optimism that the Marine Corps had
finally come up with a clean audit, to now have it pulled
because we found out about these suspense accounts at the
Department of the Treasury, and now not only do we not have a
clean audit of the Marine Corps, that is going to call into
question the ability of us to get clean audits anywhere.
Briefly, can you give me any sense of what we can do about
fixing this suspense account problem at the Department of the
Treasury for all of these commingling of funds that sound like
to me funds that are looking for an appropriation but have not
found them?
Mr. Levine. Senator, I do not know the answer to that.
Now, I do know that one of the even more troubling things
about the Marine Corps audit is that I believe that it was a
2011 clean audit that got the clean opinion, which means that
we have done 2012, 2013, and 2014, and now we are told that we
have the problem. Not only is the 2011 audit not good, but that
means that the subsequent audits would not be good either. I do
not know why it took us 4 years to get to the point where that
problem was discovered.
Senator McCaskill. Could you find the answer to that
question?
Mr. Levine. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I will look into
that and get back to you on that.
Senator McCaskill. I would really like to know the answer
to that because the fact that it took them years--I cannot
figure out why this is so hard.
Mr. Levine. It seems to me that if there was a problem with
the 2011 audit, we should have known that in 2012, and we would
have been working on it for 3 years by now and figuring out how
to get traceability and fix it. We should not be hitting the
point in 2015 where we learn about the problem. All I can say
is I do not understand it, and if confirmed, I will look into
that and get back to you about it.
Senator McCaskill. I also want to make a comment that I am
hopeful that no matter who gains the White House in 2016,
regardless of which party, that I am hopeful that the work that
you have done on this committee will serve you well and
hopefully the next commander in chief would want to utilize
continually your expertise that you have. You just start so
much further down the line than anybody else who would take
this job because of your incredible working knowledge of the
labyrinth that is the process of acquisition and how they spend
money and the way they mess it up. I just hope that you stick
around.
I know you cannot get this done in a year and a half, but I
am still going to keep banging about this contractor manpower
thing. We had the hearing back in 2012. You remember it. In
July of last year, I sent a letter to the Department asking for
specific information about the implementing of a department-
wide contractor manpower reporting application. We have to know
what we are buying through contractors, and we need to know it
department-wide. We cannot evaluate whether or not we are
getting a good deal with contractors or a bad deal with
contractors if we do not even know how many contractors we
have. I really would like you and would like a commitment from
you today that you would at least help me figure out what the
stall is here. Why is this so hard? If you would comment on
that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Levine. Yes, Senator. We have this requirement for a
contractor inventory, for an inventory of the service
contractors working for the Department. I know this is an issue
that is important to Senator Manchin as well.
There is an inventory system in place. It does produce a
number. I checked yesterday and I was told that the number of
service contractors we currently have working for the
Department of Defense is 629,000. In fact, it was not just
629,000. It was 629,000 and so many hundred and such. It was a
very precise number.
The problem, now that I have told you that there is a
number, is accuracy as with so many of the Department systems.
Contractors are hard to count, and the universe of contractors
is hard to define because when you are doing service contracts,
we have times when we hire service contracts by the person, and
so we have a number of people. You also have places where you
hire for a result. If you have an elevator maintenance
contract, you do not care whether you have six people working
on it or five. You are contracting to have the elevator
operating. We have places where it is easier to count and
places where it is harder to count.
We have different systems of counting in the different
Military Departments. The Army has a system where they go out
and they put as a term of all their contracts with service
contractors, you have to tell us how many people you working on
it. The other Military Departments have a conversion factor
where they say we are spending this number of dollars. We
figure it must be this number of people.
The number sounds very precise, but it is a lot less
precise than it sounds because of the techniques that they use
to gather that information.
Senator McCaskill. Exact numbers may not be as important as
the ability to compare apples to apples, branch to branch,
Service to Service, whether or not we are getting value. If the
elevator operators that are maintaining elevators in the Army
are making three times as much as the elevator operators that
are maintaining elevators for the Navy, we need to know that.
That is why this inventory is so important.
Mr. Levine. You need to have more information, not just
about how many you have but how you are hiring them and whether
you are hiring them in the right way. Yes, Senator, I agree.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. Get to work. We will be watching.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator King, can you follow that act?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Peter, I would like to talk about two versions, one about
personnel and the other about purchasing and contracts, which
we have been talking about.
Often I think it is as much about process as it is policy.
An example of this is personnel management. What do you think
about human resources [HR] reform within the Department of
Defense, and what can Congress do to help facilitate more
efficient HR practices?
Mr. Levine. The Defense Business Board reported earlier
this year that the human resources area is an area where they
think that there are significant efficiencies that can be
achieved by the Department, that it is an area where we have
too many layers of management, too many managers with a small
span of control. You have one person, for example, managing
three people, and those people managing five people. You have
too many layers of middle management. That is something we are
going to have to look at.
We are also going to have to look at efficiencies of
specific processes. We have a civilian hiring process, and I am
told it takes at least 6 months and maybe 8 months or more to
hire a single individual to work at the Department of Defense.
That is just crazy. You lose some of the most talented
individuals you are trying to hire because you cannot offer
them a job even though you know you want them to come work for
you.
Senator King. This is a problem throughout Government.
Mr. Levine. It is a problem throughout Government.
Senator King. When you layer on the security clearance
part, it could go up to 2 years.
Mr. Levine. Yes. The security clearance is hard to deal
with. There are changes that we are looking at in that area
that this committee has asked the Department to look at with
what is called a continual security clearance process.
But I think there are significant improvements also that
can be made in the hiring process, and this relates to the
issue of sort of too much bureaucracy. If you add in extra
layers, then your different human resources offices spend time
negotiating with each other instead of getting the job done,
and we need to cut out some of those middle boxes and simplify
the process.
Senator King. I take it that you see this as part of your
responsibility to build a team to tackle this particular
problem?
Mr. Levine. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator King. We have talked about contracting and
procurement. I have a modest suggestion that I utilized when I
was Governor, which is pick some typical cases. Take five or
six different cases from the mundane--you know, Fort Bragg
needs five new sinks in their kitchens to acquisition of a tank
or something larger--and ask your people to prepare a
chronology of all the steps necessary so that you can see it.
Rather than talking in the abstract, you are saying, okay, why
did it take 12 approvals to buy a sink? The same thing with
services. I have found they can blow the smoke at you when you
are talking in generalities, but when you say why did it take
this long to get this printer in this office--specific cases.
I used to also call the 800 numbers for the public and see
who answers, how long does it take, what do they tell you. I
will never forget calling the tourism office in Maine.
Everything went fine until they said we will send you a
brochure in 3 to 6 weeks and it was June. In 3 to 6 weeks in
Maine, the summer is over.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. The point is you learn from reaching into in
a direct kind of way. I hope you will try out some of those.
Mr. Levine. Senator, I am going to have to chose my targets
carefully with a limited amount of time, but one of the targets
I hope to chose is the acquisition process and particularly the
acquisition milestone decision-making process that we use for
major weapon systems. I think you are exactly right, that what
we are going to need to do is we hear that program managers
have to go to 200 different offices we are going to have to
document for several programs.
Senator King. Take a real life case.
Mr. Levine. It may be one from each of the services or
something. Who is it you have to go to? What does this process
actually look like when you diagram it so that we can say you
cannot do that anymore. It cannot be that complicated.
Senator King. This may be a moment in time where the stars
are literally aligned, starting with the chairman of this
committee to Ash Carter to Frank Kendall to you. That is a very
special constellation of people who are very aware of this
problem and that it has to be addressed. We may not have an
opportunity like this for years. I hope that you will be a real
irritant on this subject. As I mentioned to you yesterday, you
do not want to look back 10 years from now and say, gee, I wish
I had pushed on this.
Mr. Levine. Senator, some people tell me I am too good at
being an irritant. But, yes, I will do my best.
Senator King. I had that experience once in a court where I
said, Judge, I do not want to beat my head against a stone
wall. He said, Attorney King, I know of no one in Maine better
qualified for that. [Laughter.]
I appreciate your willingness to take this on, and I do
hope you will view this as an extraordinary opportunity.
Working with a great team, and with the support of this
committee, I think some good things can be done for America
both in terms of security and in terms of our taxpayers. Thank
you.
Mr. Levine. I appreciate that. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. An incredibly wise judge.
Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. First of all, Peter, I am so thrilled that
you are going to be nominated for this. I have been so
impressed with your work on SASC. The Department is very
fortunate to have someone of your caliber to go over and serve
there. I am really enthusiastically looking forward to voting
for you and I am very glad that you have translated your
service in the Senate over to help and take that knowledge over
to the Department of Defense.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, and thank you to your family for
all the sacrifices they have made over the years for many of us
on SASC and all the questions we have asked. We appreciate it.
I know that many of the questions that I had have already
been asked, I am looking forward to your spending some time on
the high risk list that GAO puts together and really focusing
on that and trying to address some of those concerns. I know
that that has already been directed at you.
Mr. Levine. Yes, Senator. That will be a priority.
Senator Ayotte. One of the things I think we have struggled
with here and thought about is just the size of management and
headquarters organization at the Department of Defense. It has
really grown fairly significantly over the last 15 years. Given
the challenges that we are facing in terms of resourcing and
what we need to do to defend the Nation, I wanted to get your
thoughts on how the size, the composition at the Department of
Defense management headquarters--what thoughts you have to make
that more efficient. Is it the right size or should we be
looking at shifting what happens there?
Mr. Levine. Senator, I think that, first of all, it cannot
be the right size. We have to make it more efficient. We have
to make it smaller. We have to find cuts. I think that is hard
to do. It is hard to get your arms around management
headquarters at the Department. You have shifting definitions.
I know there is a case that Senator McCain was concerned about,
for example, where the Air Force claimed to have downsized some
of its headquarters, and apparently they moved something to a
separate command or created a separate command to do it. That
kind of thing does happen, you know, changing definitions so
you do not have to change the numbers.
I believe we have to change the processes. We have to
change the structures, and we have to find things that we have
been doing that we can either do better or not do at all. That
to me is the core is to take on those issues. But we have to
get smaller.
Senator Ayotte. Terrific.
I think so too especially as you look at just the growth in
the size and obviously the priorities that we need to have and
what we are trying to accomplish. I think all of us are looking
forward to working with you I in this new position, and I look
forward to enthusiastically supporting you. Thank you for your
willingness to do this. I appreciate it.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator. I, of course, can come talk
to you anytime if you have specific concerns in these areas as
we go forward.
Senator Ayotte. Terrific. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, Mr. Levine, Peter for me, thank you for the service
you have given to this body in the Senate and to this committee
for many, many years. We really, all of us, I think in a
bipartisan way leaned on you pretty heavy, and you did a great
job.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Manchin. I want to thank you for taking that
experience level that you have to this next level. You could
have very easily have taken another path. But staying in what
you know and what you have been able to do over the years,
knowing our concerns, means a great deal to all of us on this
committee, and we thank you on behalf of the committee.
Let me just say that, Peter, every time we have talked and
we get the money crunch, it is all a reduction of staff. I
always hear about reduction of staff. We throw the frontline
soldier out there first. I know you have heard the concerns we
have had, and you and I have talked about contracting,
procurements, all the things and the waste that we have. There
is not a person who does not want to defend this country and
make sure that we support our troops.
With that being said, I have been particularly concerned
with the growth of the headquarters staff. Every time we talk
about reduction of staff, no one ever talks about headquarters
staff in light of the drawdown of what we are talking about in
the military services. It is sometimes hard to get visibility
as to whether their cuts to headquarters staffs are actually
creating more efficient organizations or simply reshuffling the
deck chairs on the Titanic.
Is that something in your bailiwick that you will be able
to get a hold of?
Mr. Levine. It will be, Senator. The Deputy Secretary has
asked the DCMO office, as I understand it, to review the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, which is I guess--I do not know
the number--somewhere in the order of 2,000-3,000 people and
figure out where there can be cuts made. Now, that is civilian
personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is
one of the misleading things about management in headquarters
is that, of course, there is contract support and there are
other support elements in there that you do not see on the
surface. But I expect it is something that we will look at
actively and see where we can bring it down. Not just the
Office of the Secretary of Defense because one of the problems
with the Department is we have so many different management
headquarters, and we need to focus on all of them.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say this. I do not want to
take a lot of time. You know, when you look at the support and
look what is going on, we spend--what--$600 billion, $650
billion on defense right now. When you look at all the other
countries combined and where we are--we are a superpower and we
want to remain that superpower and we want to make sure that
our people are the best trained, best equipped, and have the
latest technology. We are always on the vision of the cutting
edge of what is the next technology we need to keep world
peace. I am in favor of every bit of that.
I have to look people in the eye in West Virginia and
basically say, well, we have to cut here, here, and here
because we had to spend here, here, and here. Efficiencies.
Without the audits, without knowing what is going on, without
proving business decisions, running an organization, the
largest in the world, the size of the Pentagon, it is going to
take tough management. Someone is going to bite the bullet
here.
When you come back to us and say, listen, we have looked at
everything humanly possible and with all of our incurred costs,
we just cannot, that is fine. But if there are ways to run it
better--and that is where I think there is more efficiencies to
be gotten out of this, that is what I am looking for.
Mr. Levine. Yes, Senator. You have had the testimony before
the committee of the Service Chiefs telling you that with the
sequestration level budgets, we do not have the money to
support the force structure we have now. Absolutely, wherever
we can find efficiencies, wherever we can get savings from the
infrastructure and the support services, we need to do that.
Senator Manchin. When I look at the Guard, being a former
Governor--and I know Senator King being a former Governor--we
are really fond of our Guard because of what we ask them to do
every day. This is not the Guard that we knew. This is not the
Guard of 20 years ago. This is a whole different Guard. They
are going on the front lines prepared, ready to go. I do not
know why we do not utilize them more for cost savings than
going into the contracting route that we have gone. That just
does not make any sense to me. I am anxious to get that report.
I know that Senator McCaskill asked you about that.
Mr. Levine. Yes. Of course, you have the Independent
Commission on the Army which will be looking at that issue and
coming back to you within the next year or so.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. I have one final question. Senator McCain and
I were talking back forth about how we have told the Pentagon
to get an audit. The question is there are agencies--and
Senator McCain reminded me--Homeland Security has a private
outside auditor that comes in. But I think we are jumping over
a basic question which is can the Department of Defense be
audited? Has anyone ever asked the outside experts to come in
and just answer the first question, i.e., yes, it can be
audited but you have to have these changes, these changes,
these changes, these changes? I think we have assumed it is
auditable, and then you have not been able to do it. It is
frustrating. Will one of the first questions you ask be, can we
audit this place?
Mr. Levine. Back in 2001 or 2002, I helped write a piece of
legislation, advised the committee on a piece of legislation
which said essentially do not even try to audit the Pentagon
right now. What it said is you need to determine that you are
at a state where your books and records are in a good enough
shape that it is worth hiring an auditor and spending the money
on an auditor before you plunge money into that because right
now they are so bad that you are just sending good money after
bad. You cannot do it right now.
There is now a process, which we have in law and it has
been in law for several years, which says the Department has to
assert that they are audit-ready before they can spend money
for auditors. They are now reaching a point where they are
willing to make those assertions. As I say, there has been a
definite progress over that period of time. We are not where we
need to be.
Frankly, I think that one of the things that the committee
needs to think about and the Department needs to think about is
if I am right and we do not make the 2017 deadline, how do we
keep that pressure on after 2017 because the 2017 deadline has
put some real pressure on the Department to make improvements.
But you have to think, okay, so if you get to 2017 and it did
not happen, how do we make sure that the same pressure remains
on in 2018 and we do not just say, well, we blew it, now we are
going to give up and go home because we cannot afford to do
that.
Senator Reed. Just a final quick point. I thank the
chairman for his indulgence.
That process is sort of self-certification. We are ready.
Mr. Levine. Right.
Senator Reed. Would it not make sense to have a private
auditor to come in and say, yes, they are ready, we have looked
at it, the systems are in place, et cetera? Because I think
some of the problems are, ala the Marine Corps, we are ready.
Mr. Levine. The Comptroller is working with major
accounting firms on that exact process. In fact, one of the
issues they have had over time is they have to have audit firms
consult with them on that issue. They are also going to have
independent audit firms come in and help in the audit when it
takes place. They have to make sure they get them lined up so
that they are not all conflicted out because they have to have
both audit firms to advise them and audit firms to conduct the
audit. But, yes, they are doing that.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Just to pursue that line again, I see
nothing wrong with bringing in an outside auditor to look at
the whole situation and see if they cannot do the auditing. The
Department of Homeland Security somehow was able to get
audited--they are a pretty big organization--by an outside
auditor. They have been screwing around for 15 years now.
Mr. Levine. We have to get it done. I agree with you,
Senator.
Chairman McCain. An outside auditor I think is at least an
option that we ought to explore or even try.
I congratulate you again on your appointment. We look
forward to working with you. I want to assure you the next
hearing will not be nearly as pleasant as this one was.
[Laughter.]
We congratulate you and also appreciate you very much, and
congratulations to your wonderful family.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:32 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Peter K. Levine by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense and
each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all programs
and activities of the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the Deputy
Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is responsible and accountable to the
Secretary in the performance of his duties. In addition, as a result of
a recent reorganization within the staff of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the DCMO is directly responsible to the Secretary for
the management and support of the OSD staff; the management and
protection of the Pentagon reservation; and selected intelligence
oversight matters.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., the Deputy Secretary
of Defense serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the
Department of Defense. Section 132a provides that the DCMO shall assist
the Deputy Secretary in the performance of his duties as CMO. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense has delegated duties and authorities to the
DCMO to assist in effectively and efficiently organizing the business
operations of the Department.
Question. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee
(DBSMC).
Answer. I understand that section 901(c) of the Carl Levin and
Howard P. `Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2015 repealed the requirement for the DBSMC. The functions of the
DBSMC have been absorbed as a part of the Deputy's Management Advisory
Group (DMAG). Business reform, DOD strategy and budget discussions are
all subjects of the DMAG. The DMAG is co-chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and includes as members the Under Secretaries of the military
departments, the military vice chiefs, and key OSD staff. If confirmed,
I would serve as a voting member of the DMAG and would be responsible
for bringing business management agenda items to the DMAG.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management
(Comptroller).
Answer. The DCMO works with the Comptroller to improve the
financial management of the Department and move toward an auditable
financial statement by improving the business systems and processes of
the Department.
Question. The Other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The DCMO works with the Under Secretaries to review and
improve key business processes, modernize business systems, and
implement Department-wide management initiatives. The DCMO is currently
working with the Under Secretaries to carry out the Business Process
and Systems Review (BPSR) directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The DCMO works with the Assistant Secretaries to modernize
and improve the business systems and processes of the Department of
Defense.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Secretaries
of the military departments to ensure that the business management and
modernization objectives of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense are carried out by the military departments.
Question. The Chief Management Officers of the Military
Departments.
Answer. The Under Secretaries of the military departments serve as
the CMOs of their respective organizations and, as such, have
enterprise responsibility for overseeing business operations within
their departments. The Office of the DCMO interacts routinely with
these officials on business transformation initiatives. If confirmed, I
expect to work closely with the CMOs of the military departments to
carry out the business management and modernization objectives of the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary.
Question. The Investment Review Boards of the Military Departments.
Answer. The DCMO provides direction and guidance to the pre-
certification authorities of the military departments to ensure the
consistency and rigor of the investment management process throughout
the Department. The Defense Business Council, which is co-chaired by
the DCMO and the CIO, reviews of the results of the service investment
reviews.
Question. The Comptrollers of the Military Departments.
Answer. The DCMO works with the Comptrollers of the military
departments to modernize financial systems and processes, and ensure
that business modernization efforts within their areas of
responsibility are carried out in a manner consistent with the goals
and objectives established by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary.
The DCMO also serves as a member of the Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness Governance Board. In this capacity, the DCMO works with the
Comptrollers of the military departments to further their efforts
toward achieving financial audit readiness.
Question. The Business Transformation Offices of the Military
Departments.
Answer. The Under Secretaries of the military departments, in their
capacity as CMOs, oversee the business transformation offices (BTOs) of
their respective departments. The DCMO works with the CMOs and the BTOs
to ensure that the military departments carry out the business
management and modernization objectives of the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary.
Question. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
Answer. The DCMO responds to inquiries and recommendations of the
Government Accountability Office and the DOD Inspector General relative
to defense business operations and the operation of the Office of the
DCMO.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. The DCMO receives legal advice and guidance from the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense on matters relating to
defense business operations and the operation of the Office of the
DCMO.
Question. The Directors of the Defense Agencies.
Answer. Under a recent OSD reorganization, the DCMO is responsible
for two Defense Agencies, the Washington Headquarters Service and the
Pentagon Force Protection Agency. The DCMO works with other Defense
agencies to further the Department's business transformation goals.
duties of the deputy chief management officer
Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Deputy
Secretary of Defense serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of
the Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary is to be assisted in
this capacity by a Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO). The NDAA for
fiscal year 2015 includes several changes to the CMO and DCMO structure
scheduled to take effect in 2017.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the CMO and DCMO of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the CMO and DCMO, as
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, are to: (a) ensure that the
Department can carry out its strategic improvement plans; (b) ensure
that the core business missions of the Department are optimally aligned
to support the warfighting mission; (c) establish performance goals and
measures for improving and evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of the Department;
and (d) develop and maintain a Department-wide strategic plan for
business reform. In general, the duty of the DCMO is to assist the CMO
in carrying out those objectives and, if delegated, assume primary
responsibility for those functions. As a result of a recent OSD staff
reorganization, the DCMO is also accountable to the Secretary of
Defense for the effective organization and operation of the OSD staff;
the effective operation and protection of the Pentagon reservation; and
for the execution of select intelligence oversight responsibilities.
Question. What specific duties and responsibilities do you expect
the Deputy Secretary to assign to you in your capacity as DCMO?
Answer. I understand that the Deputy Secretary has directed the
DCMO to conduct a review of the organizations and business processes of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the defense agencies,
with the objective of streamlining organizations and improving business
processes. I expect that the Deputy Secretary may also direct the DCMO,
in coordination with the CMOs of the military departments, to ensure
that similar reviews are conducted by the military departments. If
confirmed, I expect to play a key role in these efforts.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
Answer. For the last 18 years, I have served on the staff of the
Senate Armed Services Committee as minority counsel, General Counsel,
and Staff Director. In this capacity, I have helped to advise committee
members on defense management issues, including the committee's
oversight of DOD business systems and processes. I have also
participated in committee reviews of previous efforts to streamline
business processes and achieve management efficiencies in OSD and the
military departments. Through this work, I have developed a familiarity
with key DOD organizations and business processes and I have worked
closely with DOD leaders responsible for managing and overseeing those
organizations and processes. I believe that the knowledge and
experience I have gained through my work for the Armed Services
Committee provides a solid foundation for the work I will be asked to
perform as DCMO.
Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources
and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the
Department of Defense?
Answer. I do not believe that any one component of the Department
of Defense has the resources, knowledge, and capabilities necessary to
carry out the comprehensive business transformation that the Department
needs. However, I believe that the DCMO, with the support of the Deputy
Secretary, has both the capacity to bring together needed resources,
knowledge, and capabilities from key organizations throughout the
Department and the authority to direct those resources as necessary to
carry out the business transformation effort.
Question. What role do you believe the CMO and DCMO of the
Department of Defense should play in the planning, development, and
implementation of specific business systems by the military
departments?
Answer. I believe that the military departments should retain full
responsibility for planning, developing and implementing their own
specific business systems. Oversight for the acquisition of new
business systems has been delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, not the DCMO. The role of
the CMO and the DCMO is to ensure that the military departments conduct
appropriate business process reengineering before acquiring new systems
or modernizing existing systems, that appropriate governance processes
are in place to keep the customization of commercial, off-the-shelf
business systems to a minimum, and that new and existing business
systems of the military department are consistent with the business
enterprise architecture of the Department of Defense. The CMO and the
DCMO can also play an important role in identifying gaps and
deficiencies in the business systems and processes of the military
departments and components and ensuring that the military departments
and components work to address those gaps and deficiencies in an
expeditious manner.
Question. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined
decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an
advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?
Answer. I understand that the DCMO has some statutorily-assigned
decisionmaking authorities, particularly in the investment review
process conducted pursuant to section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C.. The
DCMO may be assigned additional decisionmaking responsibilities by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, I believe that the DCMO can only
be effective if he works closely with the Deputy Secretary and has the
full support of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the DCMO?
Answer. I believe that the two major challenges facing the DCMO
are: (1) to help the Department achieve the management efficiencies and
savings that it will continue to need in an austere budget environment;
and (2) to help the Department implement the business systems and
processes needed to produce a clean audit and provide senior managers
with sound information on which to base management decisions.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. With regard to the first challenge, if confirmed I expect
to play a key role in carrying out the review of management
organizations and processes directed by the Deputy Secretary. This
review provides an important opportunity to streamline management
organizations, align resources with priorities, and improve business
processes throughout the Department. It should also provide an
opportunity to identify and address DOD business processes that have
become dysfunctional--taking too long, costing too much, and producing
less than optimal results. It is my hope that this review will not only
result in significant savings, but also in more effective management
and improved outcomes.
With regard to the second challenge, the military departments and
defense agencies have already committed to major investments in new
business systems. In the limited time remaining in this Administration,
dramatic changes of course for these investments would probably be
counterproductive. However, I believe that that the DCMO can help
optimize ongoing investments by enforcing the investment review process
and ensuring that the military departments and defense agencies
continue to reengineer and improve their business processes, institute
appropriate governance structures to minimize customization of
commercial, off-the-shelf systems, and take full advantage of the
capabilities of their new and existing business systems.
priorities
Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed,
with respect to issues which must be addressed by the DCMO?
Answer. My top priorities, if confirmed, will be to address the two
major challenges addressed in response to the previous question:
achieving management efficiencies and improving the business systems
and processes of the Department.
management goals
Question. If confirmed, what key management performance goals would
you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to
judge whether you have accomplished them?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to focus on maintaining and
improving support to the Department in its business operations while
reducing the overall cost of those operations. I would expect to
develop standards or metrics based on savings and on customer-oriented
results per unit of cost expended to achieve the results. I understand
that the ongoing benchmarking initiative implemented by OMB contains
some relevant metrics that could serve as examples, such as the cost of
human resource support per population supported.
Question. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) makes the
Deputy Secretary of Defense--as the Chief Management Office (CMO) and
Chief Operating Officer (COO)--responsible for improving the management
and performance of the department. The Deputy Chief Management Officer
(DCMO) serves as the agency Performance Improvement Officer under
GPRAMA and is to advise and assist the CMO in areas such as performance
planning and measurement.
If confirmed, what actions would you and your office take to
prioritize as well as improve DOD's ability to plan for and manage
achievement of performance goals across the department?
Answer. I understand that Office of the DCMO has started to reform
performance goals to ensure they are more appropriately aligned to the
Department's objectives. I am not yet in a position to judge the
effectiveness of that effort. If confirmed, I expect to use my role as
the DCMO and as a member of the DMAG to advocate alignment of measures
to the Department's priorities.
Question. As required by GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, the
Administration has established certain cross agency priority goals,
such as benchmarking of mission support operations, cybersecurity, and
security clearances, to which DOD must contribute.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that DOD is
contributing to government-wide success on cross agency priority goals?
Answer. I understand that one of the duties of the DCMO is to serve
as the Department's representative to the President's Management
Council, which has responsibility for cross-agency priority goals. If
confirmed, I expect to coordinate DOD support for appropriate cross-
agency goals to ensure the success of both the Department and the
success of the broader Federal agency community.
Question. In July 2008, DOD issued its first Strategic Management
Plan, which was intended to serve as the department's highest-level
plan for improving defense business operations. This plan and its
subsequent iterations were to outline DOD's priority business goals,
objectives, measures, and initiatives, and advance the department's
performance management activities. They were also to be aligned with
the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Performance Budget. However,
DOD's Strategic Management Plan has not fully met these expectations
nor does it fully meet the GPRAMA requirement of an Agency Strategic
Plan to be issued by 2014.
If confirmed, what actions would you and your office take to ensure
the timely development of a department-wide strategic plan that can
effectively improve business operations while support the warfighter
during an environment of continued budget austerity?
Answer. I understand that work is underway on a revised Agency
Strategic Plan that more closely conforms to the GPRAMA requirements.
If confirmed, I will work with the Department to complete this plan and
improve the Department's ability to objectively assess its performance
and ensure that resources are applied to key challenges.
staffing and resources
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2014 contains a provision
requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for streamlining
Department of Defense management headquarters by reducing the size of
staffs, eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions that provide
little or no addition value, and consolidating overlapping and
duplicative program offices.
GAO has recently reported that ``DOD's data on its headquarters
personnel lacked the completeness and reliability necessary for use in
making efficiency assessments and decisions.'' Further, that ``DOD did
not have an accurate accounting of resources being devoted to
management headquarters to use a starting point for tracking reductions
to such headquarters.''
In your view, is the GAO correct? If so and if confirmed, what will
you do to address these issues?
Answer. I believe that the GAO conclusions quoted above are
correct. As I understand it, the statutory baseline for measuring the
size of DOD management headquarters was established in the 1990s and
was not as clearly defined as it should have been even then. With the
extensive changes to DOD organizational structures that have taken
place over the last two decades, measurements against the original
baseline would probably not be meaningful even if they were possible.
In my view, the meaningful measurement of DOD streamlining efforts
will require the establishment of a new baseline that is relevant to
the Department's current management structure. It is my understanding
that, as a part of the review directed by the Deputy Secretary, the
DCMO has begun to collect data that could be used to establish such a
baseline. If confirmed, I will endeavor to carry forward this process.
Question. What is your view on reductions to the size and
composition of Department of Defense management headquarters?
Answer. I believe that significant reductions to the size and
composition of DOD management headquarters are not only possible, but
essential. Ideally, cuts should be made not only at headquarters, but
through entire management processes. However, I do not believe that
reductions should take the form of across-the-board cuts. Cutting
management personnel without improving management processes will result
in fewer people to do the same work, creating bottlenecks and backlogs
that are counterproductive to the mission of the Department.
I do not believe that there are any significant management
processes in the Department of Defense that cannot be streamlined and
made more efficient. Making process changes will be difficult and time-
consuming and may require changes to the culture of the Department of
Defense. However, significant improvements can and should be made to
enable the Department to reduce the size and composition of its
management headquarters and achieve savings without undermining the
mission.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
ensuring savings are achieved?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to help direct the Deputy
Secretary's initiative to streamline the management processes of the
Department of Defense. This initiative should provide an opportunity to
achieve the reductions in the size and composition of DOD management
headquarters described above.
Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense can achieve
significant additional savings in this area?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What types of expertise do you believe the office of the
DCMO needs to effectively carry out its mission?
Answer. The DCMO needs expertise in business systems, business
process reengineering, business case analysis, and program assessment.
It also needs personnel with a thorough understanding of the
organization and business processes of the Department of Defense.
Question. What mix of employees, contractors, and individuals
detailed from other organizations inside and outside the Department of
Defense should the DCMO rely upon to provide it with needed expertise?
Answer. I understand that the office of the DCMO has some organic
capacity and some contractor support in each of the areas described in
response to the previous question. To successfully streamline the
Department's management processes, the office will need to draw on
other centers of expertise in the Department and to partner with the
principal offices responsible for the management processes under
consideration.
Question. Do you believe the Office of the DCMO has the staffing
and resources needed to effectively carry out its mission?
Answer. I do not believe that any one component of the Department
of Defense has the resources, knowledge, and capabilities necessary to
carry out the comprehensive business transformation that the Department
needs. However, I believe that the DCMO, with the support of the Deputy
Secretary, has both the capacity to bring together needed resources,
knowledge, and capabilities from key organizations throughout the
Department and the authority to direct those resources as necessary to
carry out the business transformation effort.
under secretary of defense for business management and information
Question. The Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 converts the Deputy
Chief Management Officer (DCMO) to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Business Management and Information, who will also serve as the Chief
Information Officer. This new position, to begin in February 2017, is
expected to provide greater authority to supervise management of
business operations and systems.
What are your views on this new Under Secretary of Defense for
Business Management and Information position?
Answer. I support the legislation. I believe that the merger of the
DCMO position with the CIO position will serve to strengthen both
positions. In my view, however, the title and responsibilities of the
position are less important to the success of the mission of the office
than the alignment of the position with the Deputy Secretary and the
Deputy Secretary's ongoing support for, and engagement in, that
mission.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities prior to the
implementation of the new position in February 2017, and what actions
would you take and what resources would you need to achieve those
priorities?
Answer. I understand that some preliminary planning and guidance
will be needed before February 2017 to ensure that the new position can
get off the ground in a timely and effective manner. If confirmed, I
will work to identify the necessary steps and ensure that they are
completed.
Question. The Government Accountability Office reported in December
2007 on key strategies for implementing Chief Operating Officer (COO)/
Chief Management Officer (CMO) positions in government, which includes
defining the specific roles and responsibilities of the COO/CMO
position, and ensuring that the COO/CMO has a high level of authority
and clearly delineating reporting relationships, among other
strategies.
What do you believe would be the most effective approach to
implementing the Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and
Information position, and what additional resources or flexibilities
would be needed to do so?
Answer. I believe that the alignment of the DCMO and, in the
future, the Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and
Information with the Deputy Secretary of Defense is the most promising
approach to ensure the success of the position.
I am not aware at this time of any additional resources or
flexibilities that will be needed to implement the position of Under
Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information. If I
become aware of any such requirements, I will work with the committee
and the Department to address them.
business enterprise architecture and transition plan
Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the
Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise
architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its
business systems and processes.
What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the
implementation of the business enterprise architecture and transition
plan required by section 2222?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has chosen to
implement the requirement for a business enterprise architecture and
transition plan through a ``federated'' approach in which the DCMO is
responsible for developing and maintaining the top level architecture,
while leaving it to the military departments to fill in most of the
detail.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of DOD's
comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan?
Answer. While the Department has made considerable progress in
refining its business enterprise architecture since the enactment of
section 2222, I do not believe that the business architecture and
transition plan developed by the Department is as mature as Congress
hoped it would be when the provision was enacted. In particular, I do
not believe that the current transition plan provides the comprehensive
roadmap needed for the replacement, upgrade, or decommissioning of
legacy business systems that are outdated, duplicative, or unreliable.
Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated,
enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the
successful transformation of DOD's business systems?
Answer. I believe that the Department can make, and has made,
significant progress by developing more limited plans that have helped
to guide specific portfolios of business systems. However, I do not
believe the Department will ultimately be able to complete the
transformation process without a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-
wide approach--regardless whether that approach takes the form of a
single plan or the federated plans currently envisioned by the
Department.
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely
and accurate financial and business information in managing operations
and holding leaders accountable?
Answer. DOD leaders are called upon to make business decisions on a
day-to-day basis--for example, decisions on whether to hire additional
employees, whether to extend contracts, whether to reduce the number of
managers in an organization, or whether to enter into multi-year
contracts. On occasion, they must make much larger decisions--for
example, decisions on whether to shut down a command and realign its
functions, whether to rely on the active force or the Reserves to
perform a mission, or whether to upgrade an existing weapon system
instead of acquiring a new one. Financial and business data is crucial
to all of these business decisions, and in my view, better data is
likely to result in better decisions.
Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that
reliable, useful, and timely financial and business information was not
available for these purposes?
Answer. I do not think that the Department can afford to be
paralyzed by the inadequacy of its financial and business information.
A decision not to act--for example, a decision not to reform a
defective business process or consolidate duplicative organizations--is
every bit as much of a decision as the decision to act. I believe that
DOD managers have a responsibility to make use of the best business and
financial data available, even if that data is less than perfect, and
exercise their best judgment on a case-by-case basis.
Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial
and business information available to DOD managers?
Answer. The quality of financial and business information available
to DOD managers should improve as the Department's business systems and
processes improve. Sound controls, improved interfaces, and the
elimination of unnecessary manual transmission of data should improve
data quality. Business process reengineering should result in data that
is more relevant to the tasks to be performed.
Although the DCMO is not directly responsible for the acquisition
of new business systems, the DCMO can contribute to the improvement of
business systems and processes through the ongoing investment review
process and the business transformation process launched by the Deputy
Secretary.
Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
assuring that appropriate business process re-engineering efforts
associated with business system programs have been undertaken?
Answer. One of the key responsibilities of the DCMO is to ensure
that appropriate business process re-engineering efforts are undertaken
before any new business system is acquired or any existing business
system is upgraded. Business process reengineering is not a one-time
effort, and there is also much that the DCMO can do to ensure
continuing reengineering efforts to optimize the fielding of business
system programs and to ensure that their capabilities are fully
realized. If confirmed, I will take these responsibilities very
seriously.
Question. What metrics do you believe should be used to ensure that
the business process supported by the defense business system program
is or will be as streamlined and efficient as practicable?
Answer. I understand that there is a body of practice in the
commercial sector that can be brought to bear on the question of
measuring the success of a defense system business program in improving
the business process. Examples of these metrics include reduced
processing time; improved accuracy of information; better
responsiveness to customers and overall reduction in cost of
operations.
Question. What metrics do you believe should be used to ensure that
the need to tailor commercial-off-the-shelf systems to meet unique
requirements or incorporate unique requirements or incorporate unique
interfaces has been eliminated or reduced to the maximum extent
practicable?
Answer. I understand that there is a body of practice from the
commercial sector that would suggest appropriate metrics to include
measures of requirements stability, numbers of ``RICE'' objects (the
reports and extensions that have to be configured), and actual numbers
of interfaces. Loss of control of these elements would suggest either a
weak management structure, or alternatively, a bad initial assessment
of the applicability of a commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) product. To
avoid unnecessary and expensive customization of COTS business systems,
the Department needs not only sound metrics, but also effective
governance systems.
Question. Section 2222 requires that the DBSMC review and approve
all major defense business system modernization programs to ensure that
they are in compliance with the Department's business enterprise
architecture and transition plan.
What is your understanding of the extent to which the process for
the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) review and
approval has ensured that business system modernization programs are
fully coordinated with the business enterprise architecture and
transition plan, as intended?
Answer. As indicated above, I do not believe that the current
business enterprise architecture and transition plan is as
comprehensive as Congress intended it to be. I do not have any reason
to believe that the investment review process has failed to coordinate
business system modernization programs with the architecture, but that
coordination has probably not been as helpful as it might have been,
had the architecture been more complete.
Question. How meaningful do you believe DBSMC review and approval
has been?
Answer. I believe that the DBSMC review and approval process has
contributed to the Department's understanding of its business systems
programs and provided a useful incentive for business process
reengineering. However, I am concerned that the current low thresholds
for DBSMC review may have contributed to a review and approval process
that has failed to recognize its full potential. If confirmed, I plan
to review this issue and seek appropriate changes.
Question. Do you believe that the DBSMC has the expertise and
resources needed to conduct a meaningful, independent review of
proposed business system modernization programs, or is the DBSMC
reliant on the representations made by the military departments and
their program managers?
Answer. I believe that the DBSMC has important expertise and
resources, and can draw on other resources of the Department, for this
purpose. However, I am concerned the current low thresholds for DBSMC
review may have resulted in a tendency to rely too much on
representations made by the military departments and their program
managers.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
or changing the DBSMC review process?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to review the DBSMC process and look
for opportunities to make the process more rigorous.
comptroller general high risk list
Question. The Department of Defense remains on GAO's High Risk List
in the following areas:
(1) Business Transformation
(2) Business Systems Modernization
(3) Support Infrastructure Management
(4) Financial Management
(5) Supply Chain Management
(6) Weapon System Acquisition
(7) Contract Management
What is the role of the DCMO for enabling DOD to be removed from
the GAO High Risk list in each of these areas?
Answer. The DCMO is the senior official of the Department of
Defense with primary responsibility for business transformation. This
transformation will require an enduring effort over a period of years.
If confirmed, I plan to give the effort my highest priority.
Individual business systems modernization programs are carried out
by the military departments and defense agencies. Through the
investment review process, the DCMO exercises considerable influence
over these programs. If confirmed, I will emphasize the need for
continued business process reengineering to optimize the fielding of
business system programs and to ensure that their capabilities are
fully realized.
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the senior official
of the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for financial
management. The DCMO can contribute to the financial management effort
by working to improve the business systems and processes of the
Department, so that the financial data generated by those processes is
more timely and reliable. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with
the Comptroller in the effort to move the Department toward an
auditable financial statement.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics is the senior official of the Department of Defense with
primary responsibility for support infrastructure management, supply
chain management, weapon system acquisition, and contract management.
The DCMO can contribute to improved management in these areas by
working with the Under Secretary to assess existing management
practices and identify areas for potential streamlining and
reengineering. If confirmed, I will actively look for opportunities to
improve these management processes.
financial management
Question. What is your understanding of DOD's efforts and progress
toward the goal of being able to produce auditable financial
statements?
Answer. I have long been skeptical of the ability of the Department
to achieve the statutory timeline for producing auditable financial
statements. However, I believe that the Department has made
considerable progress toward this objective and is much closer to being
able to produce auditable financial statements today than it was five
years ago.
Question. What is your assessment of the current version of the
Financial Improvement Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan prepared by the
Department of Defense?
Answer. I believe that the FIAR plan has steadily improved over the
years. While I am sure there are still gaps and inconsistencies in the
FIAR plan, I believe that it largely serves its purpose by providing
helpful guideposts for the Department's efforts to achieve auditable
financial statements.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
improve the FIAR plan?
Answer. This is an issue that I will review closely, if confirmed.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
Department's efforts to produce auditable financial statements?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the senior
official of the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for
financial management. The DCMO can contribute to the financial
management effort by working to improve the business systems and
processes of the Department, so that the financial data generated by
those processes is more timely and reliable. I understand that the DCMO
also plays a role in the governance process for the FIAR plan. If
confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Comptroller in the effort
to move the Department toward an auditable financial statement.
Question. Do you believe that the Department is likely to meet the
current 2017 statutory objective for ensuring that its financial
statements are validated as ready for audit?
Answer. I have long been skeptical of the ability of the Department
to achieve the statutory timeline for producing auditable financial
statements. Senior officials of the Department have expressed a greater
degree of optimism that this timeline can be met. If confirmed, I will
work with them to understand whether or not this optimism is realistic.
Regardless whether the statutory objective is achieved, I believe that
it has served a useful purpose by prompting aggressive action by the
Department to make improvements to business systems and processes
without which an auditable financial statement would not be possible.
Question. What is the likeliness that this audit will produce a
clean opinion? In your view, how long is it likely to be from the time
when the Department certifies its financial statements as ``ready for
audit'' to the time when the Department achieves a clean audit opinion?
If confirmed, what specific actions would you propose taking to promote
compliance with the statutory objective?
Answer. I do not believe it is likely that the first round of
audits is likely to produce a clean opinion. As I understand it,
financial audits are a learning process through which the Department
expects to identify continuing deficiencies in its financial data,
which can then be remedied. Based on discussions with financial
professionals, I believe that it could take several cycles before the
Department achieves a clean audit opinion. If confirmed, I will work
with the Comptroller to identify steps that the Department can take to
improve its business systems and processes, so that those systems and
processes can produce the quality of financial data needed to produce a
clean audit.
Question. What is your understanding of what the validation of
audit readiness means? What steps will the Department go through to
validate its financial statements as ready for audit and when will
these steps be taken?
Answer. As I understand it, validation of audit readiness means
that Department has performed an internal test to assure itself that
appropriate controls are in place and functioning prior to asserting
readiness for inspection by an external auditor. I understand that the
Department already has taken action to validate preparation for audit
including the hiring of qualified financial process consultants to help
review internal controls; testing of financial systems in accordance
with the GAO's Federal Information Systems Audit Controls Manual
(FISCAM) and developing associated corrective action plans; and
conducting trial runs of audits in assessable areas. I understand these
internal validation checks will continue as the Department seeks to
achieve full audit readiness.
Question. How will the costs and delays of implementing major
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems in the Department affect its
ability to achieve an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR)?
Answer. I understand that the military departments and defense
agencies have been working on back-up plans to ensure that they are
able to produce auditable data in areas where ERPs and other upgraded
business and financial systems have not yet been fielded. These plans
appear to include building new controls into existing business
processes and measures to ensure data traceability in legacy business
systems. If confirmed, I will work with the Comptroller to understand
the efficacy of these interim measures.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal year
2010 and fiscal year 2013 require that DOD validate the audit readiness
of DOD's Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) by September 30, 2014.
Why has the Department missed this audit deadline?
Answer. The Department validated the audit readiness of its
Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA) prior to September 30, 2014, but
was unable to validate its SBR by that time. The difference between the
SBA and the SBR is that the SBA includes only current-year budgetary
activity, while the SBR also reflects prior-year transactions.
As I understand it, the Department has determined that its business
systems and processes are now capable of producing auditable financial
data on ongoing transactions. However, the Department concluded that it
would be prohibitively expensive to fully document earlier
transactions, which were conducted in legacy systems without
appropriate controls.
Section 1005 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2013, which established the 2014 objective, also directed the
Department to avoid ``an unaffordable or unsustainable level of one-
time fixes and manual work-arounds'' in its effort to meet that
objective. For this reason, I understand that the Department chose to
take a more affordable and sustainable path to a full SBR audit by
rolling in the audit over time, covering a longer period of budget
activity with each successive year.
business process and systems review
Question. In August 2014, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed
the Deputy Chief Management Officer and Chief Information Officer to
co-lead a review of business processes and the supporting information
technology systems within the organizations of the Principal Staff
assistants (PSA) and their associated defense agencies and field
activities. This review is intended to provide the PSAs with
information that will help them clarify whether their organizations are
aimed at department-wide outcomes as well as identify resources
allocated to outcomes, obstacles to achieving those outcomes, and
activities that might be improved or eliminated. This effort has
already identified potential savings.
If confirmed, what actions would you and your office take to ensure
that the potential savings from these business process and system
reviews are achieved?
Answer. As I understand it, the DOD Business Process and Systems
Review (BPSR) process will take place in two phases. The first phase
will identify potential changes to DOD organizations, activities, and
processes that could yield savings. The second phase will further study
those organizations, activities, and processes to quantify the
potential savings and establish a plan of action for achieving those
savings. I understand that the first phase of the BPSR process has been
completed for some OSD organizations and their associated defense
agencies and field activities. The DCMO and the CIO are currently
working to initiate the phase 2 process for those organizations and
activities, and to schedule phase 1 reviews for the additional OSD
organizations and activities. If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue
this process.
Question. What other DOD components--beyond the reviews of
headquarters and Office of the Secretary of Defense entities already
underway--could benefit from a similar review to identify potential
savings from, among other things, improving or eliminating activities?
Answer. I believe that every management headquarters element of the
Department of Defense, including at a minimum the organizations and
entities listed in section 904 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2014, could benefit from a review to identify
potential savings through changing or reducing the size of staffs,
eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions that provide little
or no added value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative
programs and offices.
Question. What role should Congress play in the reduction of
personnel or the divesting of owned or leased facilities that might
result from this review?
Answer. Congress plays an important role in prompting the
Department of Defense to do the hard work of conducting management
reviews to identify potential savings through reductions in personnel.
Congress also plays an essential role in providing the authority to
achieve needed efficiencies by reducing personnel and divesting owned
or leased facilities that are excess to needs.
I believe that significant reductions to the size and composition
of workforce are possible. However, I do not believe that reductions
should take the form of across-the-board cuts. In my view, cutting
personnel without improving management processes or divesting functions
will result in fewer people to do the same work, creating bottlenecks
and backlogs that are counterproductive to the mission of the
Department.
business transformation
Question. Since 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has designated the Department of Defense's approach to business
transformation as ``high risk'' due to its vulnerability to waste,
fraud, abuse and mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that
the Department has not implemented leading performance management
practices for Federal agencies in the area of business transformation.
GAO also found that DOD's performance measures are ``not clear,
comprehensive, or aligned with its strategic goals.''
Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define
roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key
positions and governance entities?
Answer. I understand that the Department has continued to refine
its governance processes, including making more explicit the role of
the DCMO in business management transformation. The Deputy Secretary
has reshaped the structure and functions of the Deputy's Management
Advisory Group (DMAG), to include making the DCMO a full member of that
body. If confirmed, I will review this issue and determine whether
further action is necessary.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should
take to achieve this objective?
Answer. If confirmed, I review this issue and determine whether
further action is necessary.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more
clearly define the Department's strategic planning process, including
mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans;
monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress,
on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?
Answer. I understand that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
recently undertaken a series of reforms to improve the strategic
planning process, including the reshaping of the DMAG. If confirmed, I
will work with the Deputy Secretary and others to identify and pursue
potential improvements to these processes.
acquisition of major automated information systems
Question. A number of the Department's Major Automated Information
Systems are over budget and behind schedule. GAO recently reported that
even new programs are failing to establish initial baselines for cost,
schedule, and performance.
What is your assessment of the extent of the problems the
Department faces in its acquisition of Major Automated Information
Systems?
Answer. It is my understanding that virtually every DOD acquisition
of a major business system has suffered from cost overruns, schedule
delays, customer resistance, and failure to meet performance
requirements. In some cases, the Department has been able to work
through these problems, but in other cases the problems have become so
extreme that they have led to system failure and program cancellation.
Question. What do you see as the root causes of these problems?
Answer. In my view, there are three closely related root causes for
most of these failures: failure of leadership, failure of planning, and
failure to perform adequate business process engineering. Too often,
the Department has sought to address deficiencies in its business
systems by acquiring commercial solutions without adequately
understanding its own business processes and planning the changes that
will be needed to implement commercial solutions.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the DCMO in the
management and oversight of Major Automated Information Systems?
Answer. Although the DCMO is not directly responsible for the
acquisition of new business systems, the DCMO plays a key role in the
management and oversight of business systems through the ongoing
investment review process. The role of the DCMO is to ensure that the
military departments and defense agencies conduct appropriate business
process reengineering before acquiring new systems or modernizing
existing systems, that appropriate governance processes are in place to
keep the customization of commercial, off-the-shelf business systems to
a minimum, and that new and existing business systems of the military
department are consistent with the business enterprise architecture of
the Department of Defense. The DCMO can also play an important role in
identifying gaps and deficiencies in the business systems and processes
of the military departments and defense agencies, and ensuring that
they work to address those gaps and deficiencies in an expeditious
manner.
geographic and functional combatant command mission and headquarters-
support costs:
Question. In May 2013 and June 2014, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported on the considerable growth that has occurred over
the last several years in the mission and headquarters-support costs of
the geographic and functional combatant commands. GAO found that the
commands do not conduct comprehensive, periodic evaluations that would
help them ensure that they are properly sized and structured. As a
result, there is little assurance that these commands can manage
resources efficiently and meet their assigned missions. Through its
Business Process and System Reviews of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and associated defense agencies, the Office of the Deputy Chief
Management Officer has identified opportunities for savings through
restructuring and reorganizing resources to ensure that they are
properly aligned with desired outcomes.
What is your understanding and assessment of the GAO's findings as
well as the potential savings already identified as part of the
Business Process and Systems Reviews currently underway?
Answer. I am aware that the GAO found considerable growth in the
size and cost of the combatant commands over the last decade. I
understand that GAO identified some steps that the Department has taken
to control those costs, but concluded that more could be done in this
regard. I am not aware that the BPSR review process has been extended
to the combatant commands.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that the geographic and
functional combatant commands be subject to such reviews? If so, what
actions would you propose or take to require and implement such
reviews?
Answer. I am in general agreement with the findings and
recommendations of the two GAO reports referenced. I believe that every
management headquarters element of the Department of Defense, including
the combatant commands, could benefit from a review to identify
potential savings through changing or reducing the size of staffs,
eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions that provide little
or no added value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative
programs and offices. I do not have a position as to whether the BPSR
process is the best mechanism conducting such a review of the combatant
commands.
Question. In your view, how might the results of such reviews, if
conducted, be used to improve the strategic analysis and decision
making processes associated with the Unified Command Plan?
Answer. I believe that the Unified Command Plan should be informed
by a sound understanding of the existing organizations and capabilities
of the combatant commands. In advance of conducting a review, I do not
believe it is possible to determine how that review would improve the
processes referenced.
dod conference policies
Question. What role will you play, if confirmed, establishing DOD
conference approval processes?
Answer. I understand that the DCMO is responsible for the overall
DOD conference approval policy. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that this policy appropriately balances the benefits of DOD presence at
appropriate conferences with the need to be judicious in expending the
Department's resources, consistent with applicable legal requirements.
Question. How will you assess the impact of these policies on the
missions of DOD organizations and the value of the policies relative to
the costs of their implementation?
Answer. I believe that many conferences have a genuine professional
value in terms of peer exposure, training, and professional growth.
Examples include professional conferences for accounting and finance;
for the medical community; and for the scientific community. I am also
concerned that the DOD conference approval process could be interpreted
to extend to important meetings that are not conferences at all. If
confirmed, I expect to work with the functional communities within the
Department to ensure that the conference policy does not unnecessarily
detract from the missions of DOD organizations and the development of
DOD personnel.
Question. The GAO recently recommended that ``the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretaries of the military departments, in
coordination with the Office of the DCMO, to establish time frames for
providing conference review and approval decisions based on applicants'
needs.
Do you agree with this recommendation? Why or why not? How would
you develop the time frames that GAO recommends?
Answer. I agree with the recommendation. If confirmed, I will work
with involved stakeholders to address concerns about the timeliness of
the review and approval process.
services contracting
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. Contractors have always played a valuable role in
supporting the operations of the Department of Defense. However, I
believe that there are areas in which the Department has become so
reliant on contractors that it risks losing the organic capability to
manage its own operations.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
should take to mitigate such risk?
Answer. I believe that it is important that government officials
remain accountable and responsible for the actions taken by Federal
agencies, including those listed in the question. In my view,
responsibility and accountability are possible only if the government
retains not only final decisionmaking authority, but also the organic
capability to fully understand the range of options available and to
make informed choices among them.
Question. What advantages do you see in using contractors to
perform functions for the Department of Defense?
Answer. I believe that the use of contractors to perform commercial
and industrial functions can leverage private sector capabilities to
improve efficiency and lower costs. With regard to the performance of
core government functions, contractors can and do support decision-
making by providing knowledge and expertise that would not otherwise be
available to the Department of Defense.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the DCMO?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
8(a) direct awards to native community-owned contractors
1. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, in March 2015, the Department of
Defense (DOD) issued a report to Congress ``Assessment of Justification
and Approval Requirements Implemented Under section 811 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 (section 811).'' The
report found that in fiscal year 2014 no 8(a) sole-source contracts
were awarded that required an 8(a) justification and approval. DOD
stated it cannot conclude the cause for this decline. There have been
numerous reports from firms that the decline in awards is due to
scrutiny on the firms themselves, not the sole-source contracts that
could be awarded to these firms. How would you encourage DOD to work
more effectively with Native community-owned contractors, particularly
regarding 8(a) sole-source contracts?
Mr. Levine. It is my understanding that the Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA) requires the use of competitive contracting
throughout the Federal procurement system, subject to certain
exceptions. While the Department of Defense may use sole source
contracts in appropriate circumstances, these circumstances are an
exception to the general preference of the use of competitive
procedures. For this reason, the Department does not generally
encourage the use of sole source contracts of any kind.
The DCMO is not an acquisition official, and if confirmed, I would
not be in a position to establish acquisition policy for the Department
of Defense. However, I would expect DOD acquisition officials to work
with Native community-owned contractors to grow the over-all level of
contracting by ensuring that: (1) these firms are aware of, and
prepared for, opportunities to compete for DOD contracts, including in
competitions limited to 8(a) firms; and (2) they understand the
exceptions to the Competition in Contracting Act and the circumstances
in which it might be appropriate for the Department to award a sole-
source contract.
2. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, the March 2015 DOD report listed
10 instances of guidance issued regarding the implementation of section
811. Can you please provide a copy of each communication?
Mr. Levine. The Department has provided me with the attached
implementing documents highlighted in the Department's Report to
Congress on section 8135(a) of the 2015 Consolidated Appropriations
Acts. These documents include an interim FAR rule effective March 16,
2011; a final FAR rule effective April 18, 2012; a memo from Director
for Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy issuing guidance to the
Military Departments and Defense Agencies; and other guidance documents
issued by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. [See Appendix
A]
3. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, has the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued any guidance to the Department of
Defense or other agencies regarding section 811 and can you provide
this guidance?
Mr. Levine. The Department informs me that under the leadership of
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the FAR Council held three
Tribal consultation and outreach meetings to discuss rulemaking
associated with section 811. The meetings took place during October
2010 in Washington, DC; Albuquerque, NM; and Fairbanks, AK; and were
publicized in the Federal Register on August 31, 2010 (75 FR 53269).
The FAR Council analyzed the comments provided at the public meetings
and published an interim FAR rule, with a request for requesting public
comments, in the Federal Register on March 16, 2011 (76 FR 14559) to
implement section 811 in the FAR. The interim rule encouraged agencies
to maximize the effective use of competition by making certain that
contracting officers provide a proper justification and obtain approval
before awarding a sole-source contract over $20M as required by section
811. After extensive analysis of public comments received in response
to the interim rule, the FAR Council subsequently published a final FAR
rule in the Federal Register on April 18, 2012 (77 FR 23369), that made
no changes to the interim rule.
4. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, the March 2015 DOD report states
the Army issued guidance to the Principal assistants Responsible for
Contracting and policy chiefs. According to the report, the guidance
highlighted the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] case and ``the
need for additional scrutiny''. What date was this guidance issued?
Mr. Levine. The Department informs me that the acting Deputy
assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) issued this guidance in a
memorandum entitled ``Extensive Use of High Dollar, Sole-Source 8(a)
Contracts'' on January 5, 2011.
5. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, a January 2011 Army memorandum,
``Extensive Use of High Dollar, Sole-Source 8(a) Contracts'' noted,
``Pending issuance of an interim or final rule on this subject, I
expect you to scrutinize all proposed awards of sole-source 8(a)
contracts . . . [emphasis added]'' The memorandum indicates that the
additional scrutiny was required in absence of formal FAR guidance. Do
you think the ``additional scrutiny'' requested by this memo has
remained in effect, despite clear guidance of the action required to
issue an 8(a) sole-source award greater than $20 million?
Mr. Levine. The Department informs me that this guidance is no
longer in effect.
6. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, since the FAR Council has issued
formal guidance regarding section 811, do you believe it is appropriate
for the Army and other agencies to rescind any guidance that required
increased scrutiny of such contracts that could be interpreted as
anything other than the now implemented justification and approval
process?
Mr. Levine. The DCMO is not an acquisition official, and if
confirmed, I would not have any role in this issue. However, since the
Army memo was predicated on the lack of FAR guidance once the guidance
was issued it would appear that the Army guidance should no longer be
necessary.
7. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, section 811 does not prohibit
direct awards greater than $20 million. How would you encourage such
awards, when appropriate, to Native community-owned contractors given
the additional scrutiny experienced by these firms?
Mr. Levine. As indicated above, it is my understanding that the
Department does not generally encourage sole-source contract awards of
any kind. Although the DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not
set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense, I would expect
the Department to encourage competitive awards to Native community-
owned contractors and to ensure that such contractors are aware of the
circumstances in which it might be appropriate to award sole-source
contracts.
8. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, section 811 only requires a
justification and approval of 8(a) sole-source awards. Do you believe
it is appropriate for DOD contracting officers to issue such awards
provided a justification and approval is performed?
Mr. Levine. While the DCMO is not an acquisition official and does
not set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense, I believe
that it is appropriate for a DOD contracting officer to award an 8(a)
sole-source contract upon the issuance of a justification and approval
in accordance with the requirements of section 811.
9. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, would you support a requirement to
require a justification and approval for any sole-source contract
greater than $20 million that is not currently subject to a
justification?
Mr. Levine. I am not aware of significant categories of sole-source
contracts in excess of $20 million that are not subject to a
requirement for justification and approval. While the DCMO is not an
acquisition official and does not set acquisition policy for the
Department of Defense, it seems to me that a requirement for
justification and approval of any such category of contracts would be
consistent with the competition policy established in CICA.
10. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, would you support a repeal of
section 811?
Mr. Levine. The DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not
set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense. However, I
believe that, consistent with the general preference for competition in
Federal procurement, all significant categories of sole-source
contracts should be subject to a requirement for justification and
approval. For this reason, I do not see the need for repeal of section
811.
11. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, would you support an increased
threshold for contracts subject to an 8(a) justification and approval?
Mr. Levine. It is my understanding that most categories of sole-
source contracts are subject to a much lower dollar threshold for
justification and approval than the $20 million threshold set in
section 811. For this reason, while the DCMO is not an acquisition
official and does not set acquisition policy for the Department of
Defense, I do not see the need for an increase to the $20 million
threshold.
12. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, would you consider other changes
that could reduce potential inappropriate scrutiny of Native community-
owned contractors receiving sole-source awards, while ensuring value to
the taxpayer?
Mr. Levine. The DCMO is not an acquisition official and does not
set acquisition policy for the Department of Defense. However, I
believe that all categories of sole-source contracts should be subject
to careful scrutiny to ensure that they are properly justified, in
order to ensure value to the taxpayer. Subject to this general rule, I
do not believe that Native community-owned contractors receiving sole-
source awards should be subject to additional, inappropriate scrutiny.
13. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, do you think section 811 applied
more scrutiny to 8(a) sole-source contracts than sole-source contracts
covered by the Competition in Contracting Act?
Mr. Levine. I am not aware of any independent reports or reviews
that address this issue. In the absence of such a report or review, I
do not feel that I have the information needed to answer this question.
14. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Levine, does section 811, similar to the
Competition in Contracting Act, allow for the approval of a
justification for an 8(a) sole-source to be approved by someone other
than the Head of Agency and can the Head of Agency have the legal
ability to delegate the approval authority for an 8(a) justification?
Mr. Levine. It is my understanding that section 811 allows the
approval authority for sole-source contracts to be delegated to the
same levels of officials as the Competition in Contracting Act. In
particular, section 811(a)(2) provides that a justification and
approval must be ``approved by the appropriate official designated to
approve contract awards for dollar amounts that are comparable to the
amount of the sole-source contract.'' Section 811(c)(3) defines
``appropriate official'' to mean the same officials to whom approval
authority may be delegated under CICA. Consequently, I do not believe
that there is any difference between the two statutes on this point.
APPENDIX A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Peter K. Levine follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 4, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Peter K. Levine, of Maryland, to be Deputy Chief Management Officer
of the Department of Defense, vice Elizabeth A. McGrath.
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Peter K. Levine, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Peter Levine
Education:
Harvard Law School
September 1980 to June 1983
J.D., magna cum laude
Harvard College
September 1975 to June 1979
A.B., summa cum laude
Employment Record:
Senate Armed Services Committee
Staff Director
March 2013 to January 2015
General Counsel
January 2006 to March 2013 and May 2001 to
January 2002
Minority Counsel
January 2002 to January 2006 and August 1996
to May 2001
Office of Senator Carl Levin
Counsel
January 1995 to August 1996
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee
Counsel
January 1987 to January 1985
Crowell & Moring
Associate
September 1983 to January 1987
Summer Associate
June 1982 to August 1982
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
Summer Associate
June 1981 to August 1981
Honors and Awards:
Editor, Harvard Law Review, 1982 to 1983
Phi Beta Kappa, 1979
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Peter K.
Levine in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Peter Levine.
2. Position to which nominated:
Deputy Chief Management Officer, Department of Defense.
3. Date of nomination:
March 4, 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
July 29, 1957; Santa Monica, California.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mary Ellen Myers (Levine).
7. Names and ages of children:
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
Harvard Law School, 1980 to 1983, J.D., 1983.
Harvard College, 1975 to 1979, B.A., 1979.
University High School, Los Angeles, CA, 1972 to 1975, graduated
1975.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2013-2015.
General Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2001-2002, 2007-
2012.
Minority Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee, 1996-2001, 2003-
2006.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Counsel, Office of Senator Carl Levin 1995-1996.
Counsel, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 1987-
1994.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
American Bar Association (member).
District of Columbia Bar (member).
Montgomery Sycamore Island Club (member).
Mohican Hills Pool Association (member).
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
February 20, 2014: $100 to Daniella Levine Cava for Dade County
Commissioner.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Peter K. Levine.
This 13th day of March, 2015
[The nomination of Mr. Peter K. Levine was reported to the
Senate by Chairman McCain on April 30, 2015, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 23, 2015.]
NOMINATION OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, TO BE CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and
Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to consider
the nomination of General Joseph Dunford to be the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Dunford is certainly no stranger to the members of
this committee. We have known him as Commandant of the Marine
Corps and our commander in Afghanistan and many posts before
that. He is a warrior and a leader of the highest quality, and
we are grateful for his 38 years of distinguished service.
We are also thankful for the sacrifices General Dunford's
family has made over the years and their willingness to lend
him to the Nation in service once again. As is our tradition,
at the beginning of your testimony, we welcome you, General
Dunford, to introduce the members of your family joining you
this morning. I would, however, like to take this moment to
express our special thanks to your wife, Ellyn. We know how
much of your husband's service and his future absence will rest
on you and we honor the sacrifices you are making through your
continued support to our Nation, not to mention the downgrade
in your residence that will be part of this.
[Laughter.]
The next Chairman will have to prepare our military to
confront the most diverse and complex array of global crises
since the end of World War II.
In Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL's) terrorist army has continued to succeed on the
battlefield, including taking Ramadi and other key terrain in
Iraq, capturing over half the territory in Syria, and
controlling every border post between Iraq and Syria. The lack
of a coherent strategy has resulted in the spread of ISIL
around the world to Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, and even to
Afghanistan where I visited last weekend.
There, our troops are supporting our Afghan partners in
sustaining a stable and democratic future. But even as ISIL and
the Taliban threaten this future, the President remains
committed to a drastic reduction in U.S. presence at the end of
2016 before the Afghan government and security forces are fully
capable of operating effectively without our support. This
would create a security vacuum, and we have seen what fills
similar kinds of vacuums in Syria and Iraq. Given your
experience in Afghanistan, General Dunford, we will be
interested to hear your thoughts about the appropriate U.S. and
coalition presence going forward.
Meanwhile, Iran continues to threaten peace and stability
across the Middle East through its support of terrorist
proxies, pursuit of nuclear weapons, and development of
missiles needed to deliver them to targets far beyond its
shores.
In Europe, Vladimir Putin's Russia continues its onslaught
in Ukraine. But even as Russian troops and equipment execute
this neo-imperial campaign to undermine Ukraine's government
and independence, the United States has refused Ukraine the
weapons it needs and deserves for its defense.
In the Asia-Pacific, China is continuing a pattern of
destabilizing behavior, its reclamation and militarization of
vast land features in the South China Sea, its continued
military buildup designed to counter U.S. military strengths,
and its blatant and undeterred cyber attacks against the United
States. While our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has shown some
successes, especially in deepening of our alliances, this
policy has not deterred China from its increasingly assertive
course.
Yet, while worldwide challenges like these grow, the
Defense Department has grown larger but less capable, more
complex but less innovative, more proficient at defeating low-
tech adversaries but more vulnerable to high-tech ones. Worse,
the self-inflicted wounds of the Budget Control Act and
sequestration-level defense spending have made all of these
problems worse.
Army and Marine Corps end strength is dropping dangerously
low. The Air Force is the oldest and the smallest that it has
ever been. The Navy's fleet is shrinking to pre-World War I
levels. With the present operational tempo and drastic
reductions to defense spending, we will continue the downward
spiral of military capacity and readiness that will compromise
each service's ability to execute our Defense Strategic
Guidance at a time of accumulating danger to our national
security.
Budget cuts have also slowed critical modernization
priorities, imperiling our Nation's ability to preserve its
military technological advantage. This is not just about the
weapons systems we hear the most about; fighter aircraft,
submarines, or armored vehicles. These are important, but
budget cuts also threaten our ability to seize the future and
make vital investments in cyber, space, and breakthrough
technologies such as directed energy, autonomous vehicles, and
data analytics.
The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
stated that even if the Defense Department receives the
additional $38 billion above the budget caps that the
President's Defense Budget requests, our military would still,
quote, ``remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in
our ability to execute the defense strategy.'' More worrisome,
every one of our military service chiefs, yourself included,
has testified that continued sequestration-level defense
spending puts American lives at greater risk. Unless we change
course, eliminate sequestration, and return to strategy-driven
defense budgets, I fear our military will confront depleted
readiness, chronic modernization problems, and deteriorating
morale.
No matter how many dollars we spend, we will not be able to
provide our military the equipment they need with a broken
defense acquisition system that takes too long and costs too
much. With this year's National Defense Authorization Act, this
committee has embarked on a major effort to reform this system,
including ways to empower our service leaders to manage their
own programs in exchange for greater accountability. General
Dunford, we are very interested in hearing your views about
improving the defense acquisition system based on your years of
service.
Finally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the
principal military advisor to the President. More than ever, we
need an honest and forthright leader that offers his best and
unvarnished military advice. The President will not always take
your advice, but it is my hope that he will always have an
appreciation of the military dimensions of the difficult
problems our Nation confronts with you at his side.
Thank you for your willingness to serve once more. We look
forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming General Dunford and to take this
opportunity to thank him for his extraordinary service to the
Nation. During his 38 years of military service, General
Dunford has served with courage and distinction, and I am
confident he will continue to do so as the next Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Finally, let me also recognize and thank his family. Ellyn,
thank you. Patrick, thank you for being here today. I know Joe
and Kathleen wanted to be here, but they are serving elsewhere.
But thank you very much for what you have done to serve the
Nation and the Marine Corps.
Last week, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Dempsey, released the 2015 National Military
Strategy. In his forward, General Dempsey stated that the
current ``global security environment is the most
unpredictable'' he has seen during his military service and
that ``global disorder has significantly increased while some
of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode.''
Without question, the United States faces a wide range of
challenges around the world. If confirmed as the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will be advising the President
and the Secretary of Defense on these complex international
issues facing our national interests.
Possibly the gravest and most complex issue for the next
Chairman will be countering the security threat from ISIL in
Iraq and Syria and its spread beyond the Middle East region. As
the President said earlier this week, our counter-ISIL campaign
will be long-term and employ all elements of American power,
including military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic.
If confirmed, General Dunford, you will be responsible for
advising on the U.S. military's role in supporting our broader
counter-ISIL campaign, including denying ISIL safe havens and
building the capacity of local forces to counter ISIL, with
training, assistance, and air support from the international
coalition. The success of these efforts will ultimately depend
on a broader, complementary effort to address the conditions
that gave rise to ISIL and allowed it to thrive. I look forward
to hearing your views on the situation in Iraq and Syria and
your thinking on the most effective role the military can play
in supporting efforts on the diplomatic front.
Regarding Iran, while there remains no clear outcome to the
P5 Plus 1 negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, no matter
what happens, the Department of Defense will play a key role in
reaffirming our shared priorities with our partners in the
region, confronting common threats, and working to de-escalate
or, where possible, resolve these threats.
General Dunford, if confirmed, you will also bring
invaluable experience to oversight of the Department's missions
in Afghanistan where you have led the U.S. and coalition forces
with distinction. While the Afghan Security Forces have fought
courageously against Taliban attacks, more needs to be done to
build the Afghan forces? capabilities and deny any safe haven
for extremists. The next Chairman will play a critical role in
the President's review later this year of the size and
footprint of U.S. forces in Afghanistan for 2016 and beyond.
Another security challenge going forward will be deterring
additional Russian aggression toward Ukraine and its European
neighbors and reinforcing the Minsk ceasefire accords. Congress
has made clear its support of military assistance to Ukraine,
including defensive weapons, to help the Ukrainian people
defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will be
interested in your views of the security situation in Ukraine
and what additional steps you would recommend for assisting
Russia's neighbors in protecting themselves from the kinds of
hybrid warfare tactics employed in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
Our men and women in uniform remain the committee's top
concern, and I know they are your top concern also. Our Armed
Forces are nothing without its people, and the Department
continues to juggle the twin goals of providing a high quality
of life through fair pay and compensation and exceptional
service through adequate levels of training and equipping. In
my view, it is incumbent on Congress and the Nation to provide
a sufficiently sized, trained, and equipped military of the
necessary quality of character and talent to meet national
defense requirements. Sometimes that means making hard choices,
especially in the budget constrained environment we find
ourselves.
To that end, as you well know from your time as Commandant,
the Department and Congress have for several years considered
various proposals for changes in compensation and health care
to slow the growth of personnel costs so that those savings can
be redirected to buy back readiness and modernization benefits.
I would be particularly interested in your views on such
proposals and the impact if such changes are not enacted.
Now, during consideration of the fiscal year 2016 National
Defense Authorization Act, this committee had a robust debate
on how best to fund defense programs. I have repeatedly stated
that sequestration is not the approach that we need to address
our Nation's fiscal challenges, and more pointedly, it
undermines our national military readiness. Defense budgets
should be based on our long-term military strategy--that is the
point the chairman made very eloquently--not sequestration-
level budget caps. Even a 1-year increase in OCO spending does
not provide DOD with the certainty and stability it needs when
building its 5-year budget. As a consequence, this instability
undermines the morale of our troops and their families who want
to know that their futures are planned for more than 1 year at
a time and the confidence of our defense industry partners we
rely on to provide the best technologies available to our
troops. I hope you will share your thoughts on this topic with
the committee today.
General Dunford, thank you again for your willingness to
serve our Nation. I look forward to discussing these issues.
Chairman McCain. General, before your statement, there are
standard questions that the committee always asks of military
nominees. So we have always done that, and so I would like to
proceed with that before your testimony.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
General Dunford. I have, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if these views differ from the
administration in power?
General Dunford. I do, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Dunford. I have not.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Dunford. I will, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Dunford. I will, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Dunford. They will.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General Dunford. I do, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Dunford. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much for complying with
that formality. Thank you. Please proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, TO BE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am truly
honored to be nominated as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I want to thank the President and the Secretary of
Defense for their confidence me, and I want to recognize
General Dempsey and his wife Deanie for their extraordinary to
our Nation, our men and women in uniform and our military
families.
Joining me today is my wife Ellyn and our son Patrick. Our
son Joe and Kathleen were not able to be here. Ellyn has been a
great mother to our children and has served as a tireless
advocate for military families. I refer to her as the MVP in
the family. Her sense of humor, flexibility, and endurance have
been tested in over 30 years as a military spouse, and I would
not be here today without her love and support.
I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your
commitment to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Due
to your support, they comprise the most well trained, well
equipped, and capable military force in the world.
As I appear before you this morning, I am mindful of the
complexity and volatility of the current security environment.
Chairman, you mentioned that. This committee is also well aware
of the pressing challenges we face in Europe, the Pacific, the
Middle East, Africa, space, and cyberspace. While dealing with
these and other issues, we also face the need to restore
readiness and modernize the joint force in the context of
fiscal challenges and budget uncertainty.
If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary of Defense and
the President with my best military advice in a full range of
military options for addressing the current and future
challenges to our national security.
When asked, I will provide the Congress with my best
military advice. When delivering best military advice, I will
do so with candor.
I will also work with the Joint Chiefs, our civilian
leaders, and members of the committee to maintain a joint force
that is capable of securing our national interest today and
tomorrow.
Most importantly, if confirmed, I will dedicate myself to
properly leading, representing, and keeping faith with the men
and women in uniform and our civilian workforce who volunteer
to serve our Nation.
Thank you again for allowing me to appear this morning, and
I am prepared for your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, General.
The day before yesterday, we received testimony that so far
with $500 million committed, there have been 60 individuals who
have been trained to go into Syria and fight against the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). What do you know about
that particular situation?
General Dunford. Chairman, what I know is that we have got
Major General Mike Nagata who has been working that for some
months. Those numbers are certainly much less than what he
estimated. The feedback I have received is those numbers are
largely attributable to the vetting process, that they think
they have learned some things during the process of these first
60. They have made some other contacts. But, frankly, Chairman,
until I have an opportunity to get on the ground and speak to
the commanders, what I really know about that now is
secondhand.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe that we should be getting a
pledge from these recruits that they will only fight against
ISIS and not Bashar Assad?
General Dunford. Chairman, what I understand right now is
that we do not have the authority to take action against
Assad's forces. So unless that policy would change, then that
pledge would be required.
Chairman McCain. Given your experience in the military, do
you think it is a good idea to train people and send them into
a conflict to be attacked and barrel-bombed by another entity
and not defending them?
General Dunford. Chairman, I do not. If we train those
individuals and they go back into Syria to fight, then I think
we need to--if we expect them to be successful, we need to
provide them with enabling capability that will allow them to
be successful.
Chairman McCain. In other words, prevent them from being
barrel-bombed by Bashar Assad, which is routine now?
General Dunford. I think, Chairman, we need to provide them
with a full range of capability for them to be successful.
Chairman McCain. I recently was over in Afghanistan over
the Fourth of July, and there is great concern both amongst our
military and with Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah and other Afghans
about the present proposal to have our force in Afghanistan
down to a, quote, embassy-centric force by 2017, meaning that
we would be giving up or turning over our bases in Bagram,
Kandahar, and a force that is only based in the U.S. embassy. A
great concern was voiced concerning this plan or articulated,
announced plan by the President of the United States.
As you know, the Taliban did not respect the non-fighting
season. As you know, the Afghan casualties are extremely high,
higher than they have ever been. We now have ISIS getting a
hold, and we also have the Iranians providing Taliban with
weapons.
Is this a wise decision on your part to have a calendar-day
withdrawal of American troops rather than a conditions-based
withdrawal? Given your background and experience there, I think
you are probably pretty well qualified to make that judgment.
General Dunford. Chairman, I am aware of the consequences
of our mission, the importance of our mission in Afghanistan,
and clearly I also have a degree of personal commitment, having
spent time there. I can assure you, if I am confirmed, I will
provide advice to the President that will allow us to meet our
desired end state, and I think that that will be based on the
conditions on the ground, as you have articulated.
Chairman McCain. Rather than a calendar-based decision.
General Dunford. Chairman, my experience has been that
sometimes the assumptions that you make do not obtain
particularly with regard to time, and that is certainly the
case in Afghanistan.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
In Ukraine, it is obvious that the Russians continue their
military buildup. I was in eastern Ukraine and watched the
surveillance video that was made by the Ukrainians showing the
gradual buildup of Russian forces inside Ukraine.
Do you believe that we should give the Ukrainians with the
counter-battery systems with which to defend themselves from
mass Russian artillery and rocket strikes, and should we
provide them with Javelin or tube-launched, optically-tracked,
wireless-guided (TOW) anti-tank missile systems to defeat the
Russian T-90 tank parades?
General Dunford. Chairman, from a military perspective, I
think it is reasonable that we provide that support to the
Ukrainians. Frankly, without that kind of support, they are not
going to be able to protect themselves against Russian
aggression.
Chairman McCain. General Dunford, I just would like to
repeat again my appreciation for your service, and I am
confident that you will serve with distinction. You are the
principal military advisor to the President of the United
States, and that is a unique role as designed in the 1947 act I
believe. So I hope that you will keep in mind your obligation
to the President but also to the men and women who are serving
who we may have to send into harm's way and make sure they are
provided with the best capabilities.
Finally, I hope in answer to some of these questions,
because I have run over time, you will talk about the
devastating effects of sequestration on our ability to defend
the Nation. Maybe you will just make a brief comment on that
now.
General Dunford. Chairman, I have dealt with the issue of
sequestration as a service chief, and quite frankly, if we go
into sequestration, we will be unable to support the current
strategy that we have to protect our Nation. Quite honestly,
the readiness of the joint force and modernization of the joint
force will suffer, what I will describe and without
exaggeration, catastrophic consequences.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, General Dunford.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Once again, thank you, General, for your service and your
sacrifice.
Following a bit on Senator McCain's final question about
sequestration, the administration--and Secretary Carter made
this clear--has adopted an anti-ISIL campaign with nine lines
of effort, two principally controlled by the Department of
Defense. Are you comfortable with that overall approach at this
point?
General Dunford. Senator Reed, I am comfortable with that
overall approach.
Senator Reed. The other lines of effort are controlled by
other elements of the Government, State Department, Homeland
Security, et cetera. Apropos of Senator McCain's question about
effects of sequestration on the Department of Defense, are you
concerned that these partners in this effort could be hamstrung
just as much as you would be if the Budget Control Act (BCA)
went into effect for them?
General Dunford. Senator, very much so. I would say that
not only do we just represent two of the nine lines of effort,
but we cannot be successful in either Iraq or Syria or,
frankly, in any of our other endeavors with out a whole-of-
government approach.
Senator Reed. Let me just ask you since you are the expert.
You were in Afghanistan. We had a significant military effort,
but we also had a significant civilian agency effort, the State
Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug
Enforcement Administration, all of these agencies. I would
assume you considered them to be integral and essential parts
of your effort, and without them or without their ability to
provide resources, you could not have accomplished what you
did. Is that fair?
General Dunford. Sir, I think it is absolutely fair.
Although we have challenges remaining, I think we have
accomplished quite a bit over the last few years, and from my
perspective, that is because we have been able to integrate the
capabilities of those organizations that you mentioned. In
particular, I think the relationship that we have with the
State Department in Afghanistan was absolutely critical to our
success.
Senator Reed. One of the most difficult issues you face is
building the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and this
has been an endeavor frankly that we have tried for a long
time. Do you have any sort of sense at this juncture of what we
can or should be doing differently of how do we do this? We
have heard colleagues come before the committee--your
colleagues--and suggest that there are gaps of leadership at
the upper levels. Just your perspectives on a length of time
and the efforts we have to undertake to get a credible Iraqi
force in the field, which will secure the country.
General Dunford. Sir, with the caveat that I have been away
11 months, but certainly, if confirmed, will go back almost
immediately, the areas of most concern were intelligence,
logistics, special operations capability, and the aviation
capability, and then more broadly the ministerial capacity.
Frankly, our estimates always were that that was a long-term
endeavor. It would take years to grow the kind of capacity that
we have in this country, and frankly, what we are not trying to
do is develop the capability that we have in this country,
something far less than that, but the ability at the
ministerial level, at the minister of defense and the minister
of the interior to support tactical-level organizations. So I
think continue to stay the course in the plan that General
Campbell has and recognizing that is going to require continued
resources and patience is the way for us to be successful.
Senator Reed. Now, I focus for a moment--I know your
practical experience is Afghanistan and other places, but in
Iraq there are the same capability problems. Does your analysis
apply there also in terms of the long-term need to build up the
Iraqi Security Forces and ministries?
General Dunford. Senator, it does. In some ways the
situation is the same. There are also some vast differences. I
think one of the biggest challenges in Iraq has been when Prime
Minister Maliki was there, he eliminated many of the capable
quality leaders that were in the Iraqi Security Forces. So I
think at the tactical level, it is fair to say today the Afghan
forces actually have some pretty solid leaders. We have seen
them. We have developed them. They have gone to our schools. I
feel pretty good about where we are with the Afghan leaders. I
think we have some work to do to rebuild the Iraqi Security
Forces, frankly to get them back to perhaps where they were a
few years ago.
Senator Reed. There is one other aspect--in fact, there are
many aspects of the situation in Iraq, but one is this tension,
sectarian and geographic tensions in the country. But our
policy is to support a unified government in Baghdad and work
with them so that they are able to integrate their ethnic
communities. Is that the approach that you think makes much
sense?
General Dunford. Senator, that is going to be very
difficult to do, but at this point I believe that is the best
prospects for long-term success is a unified, multi-sectarian
government in Iraq. Frankly, if confirmed, if at any point I no
longer believe that is possible, then my advice to the
President will be adjusted accordingly.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir, and again, thank
you for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In responding to one of the chairman's questions, you were
talking about you did not have the authority to go after Assad.
Is that not what you said that you do not have the authority to
go after Assad?
General Dunford. Senator, my understanding is that we do
not have the legal authority at this time to go after the Assad
regime, and it is also the policy of the administration not to
go after the Assad regime militarily.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I think for the record I would
like to have you expand a little bit on that as to whether or
not it would be desirable for you to have that authority.
[The information follows:]
President Assad's policies contributed to the rise of ISIL and
motivate some members of ISIL today. However, the current military
campaign in Syria is designed to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL,
not the Assad regime. If our policy changes, I will be prepared to
provide a range of military options in support of broader political
efforts to resolve the conflict.
Senator Inhofe. We have been talking for a long time and
with you also at these hearings about the amount of risk that
we are at right now. You were quoted as saying our combatant
commanders face increasing risk. So we are talking about the
risk that is out there. You know, risk equals lives. We talk
about this in all these areas.
But how do you define too much risk? Are we there yet?
General Dunford. Senator, I believe today we are capable of
providing adequate security to protect our national interests.
I also believe that we are at the razor's edge, and that has
certainly been a subject of testimony several times before this
committee is that our readiness level is at the point right now
where were we to go below this level, we would have to adjust
the ends of our strategy. We would no longer be able to support
our strategy.
Senator Inhofe. That is similar to the responses we get,
whether it is General Odierno or any of the rest of them. They
are very much concerned about the level of risk that we are
accepting now that we never had to accept in the past.
In the Ukraine--I am particularly sensitive to that. I
happened to be there when they had the election that resulted
in, for the first time in 96 years, no communists serving in
their parliament.
We talked about what they really should be having there.
Are there obstacles, if you were to make that determination, as
to giving them more to defend themselves, the things that we
agree that they should have? Is there an obstacle that we could
help with, or do you think you have that authority now?
General Dunford. Senator, from a military perspective,
additional capability to the Ukrainians would clearly help them
to deal with both the separatist and the Russian threat in the
Ukraine. There are some policy issues associated with that that
do not fall into the Department of Defense (DOD) and military--
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that and I appreciate
that answer.
Kind of the same thing with the Kurds. Now, they have a
need for, I guess, anti-armor, mine-resistant ambush protected
(MRAP) vehicles, and a lot of these things. I get two
conflicting stories, one from some of the top people in charge
saying that by sending through Baghdad, you have a problem in
getting it up to the fight. Yet, I heard just yesterday from
someone who is charge that that problem has been resolved now.
Is that really resolved? Do we have a problem getting the
equipment that they need up there and those fighters to
effectively fight?
General Dunford. Senator, I watched carefully the hearing
on Tuesday and the exchange that took place on this particular
issue. You know, I have been briefed that in fact the issues
have been resolved and the support is getting to the Kurds
right away. But this would be one of those issues that, if
confirmed, again Iraq, Afghanistan, and places where our young
men and women are in harm's way would be the first places I
would go to visit. This issue, because it is so important,
would be one issue that I would look into personally.
Senator Inhofe. Good. I appreciate that.
In this morning's ``The Hill,'' General Petraeus had a
couple quotes in there, and I will just read these. He said we
can schedule an end to our role in that--talking about
Afghanistan--in that nation's conflict, but we cannot schedule
an end to the war there or an end to the threat from Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State, or other extremist elements of the global
jihad. Going to a zero option next year would be playing
roulette with Afghanistan's future.
Is Petraeus right?
General Dunford. Sir, I think he is absolutely right with
regard to the war would continue whether or not we are there or
not, and I think you can assume that the war would get worse
were our presence not to be there. Again, my assessment is that
our presence ought to be based on the conditions on the ground,
and I will certainly go over there and check those as soon as--
and if confirmed.
Senator Inhofe. Very good. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, ISIS with regard to Iraq and Syria. Would you
generally ascribe to the fact that in Iraq it is going to
require the Iraqis to have the will to fight to meet ISIS in
Iraq and be successful?
General Dunford. Senator, our current campaign is dependent
on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces to deal with
ISIL.
Senator Nelson. Go over to Syria. Now, that is a
hodgepodge. How much do you think that the Assad regime staying
in power would complicate the issue of us being able to take
down ISIS in Syria?
General Dunford. Senator, my assessment is it plays a
significant role. I think Assad's brutality to his people was
certainly the primary factor giving rise to ISIS is at least
one of the assessments, and I ascribe to that particular
assessment. I think his remaining in power has certainly
continued to inflame people and gives ISIS the recruits and the
support that they need to operate inside of Syria.
Senator Nelson. I agree with that.
Then the question is, when do we really press to have some
kind of political settlement for Assad to exit? Do you have any
thoughts on that?
General Dunford. Senator, I do not. I am not involved in
the dialogue today in that regard. The political resolution is
one of the lines of effort that is part of our overall
strategy. While I do not know, I would assume that today that
issue is being addressed, and certainly if confirmed, I expect
to be part of those conversations and know a bit more than I do
today.
Senator Nelson. General, someone of your stature is going
to be very comforting to us to have the confidence to know that
those very tough decisions that will be made with regard to
limiting the effectiveness and ultimately defeating ISIS will
be made with you sitting there at the table giving counsel.
If you just look at a map of who is in control of Syria in
the different geographical areas of Syria, it is a mess. How
you bring order--thank you. Senator McCaskill has shown this is
Syria and the different colors representing the different
entities that in fact are in control in that geographic area.
So it is comforting to know that you are going to be there
giving your wise counsel.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Dunford, with regard to the Budget Control Act,
which includes the sequester, the Budget Committee, the Armed
Services Committee, with a bipartisan strong vote, has voted
out legislation that will add, I believe, $23 billion above
last year's spending for the Defense Department. I believe the
Appropriations Committee has already voted out that same
spending level, and it is on the floor.
The problem is that the commander in chief, the President
of the United States, is insisting on blocking that bill,
encouraging Democrats to filibuster it until there is an
agreement to spend an equal amount on non-defense. I just
believe that the fact that we have a crisis internationally and
we need to spend more on defense does not require that this
Nation spend more on non-defense. So that is the difficulty we
face. You will be seeing more of that, I guess, as time goes
by.
General Dunford, with regard to Iraq and this ISIS
situation, is it not true that the threat in Iraq is not just a
threat to Iraq but it implicates the national security
interests of the United States and that we have a national
security interest in blocking a takeover of Iraq by this
extremist group ISIS that chops off heads and does other
extreme things?
General Dunford. Senator, I would agree that the issue of
ISIS has both regional issues--it is creating regional
instability, but absolutely we have U.S. national interests in
a stable Iraq that is not a sanctuary for extremists.
Senator Sessions. So I think it is a mistake sometimes to
just sit back and say, well, we are going to wait on the Iraqi
army to get its act together. We have trained the Iraqi army
for over a decade. They have battalions and companies and
organizations. They are not well led, and their morale is not
good. But they have an army. The question is can we help
encourage them to be more effective in fighting back against
ISIS. Would you not agree?
General Dunford. I do agree with that, Senator. I would
just say, despite the challenges, we have had, as you know,
some thousands of men and women from the United States Central
Command that have been in Iraq and conducting strikes into
Syria over the last year. Despite the challenges in pretty
difficult conditions, I think they have had some
accomplishments over the past year that we can be proud of.
Clearly we are going to do more. I think Secretary Carter made
that clear on Tuesday. Clearly we need to do more to assist the
Iraqis in moving forward, and I think that is the plan.
Senator Sessions. Well, the President's press conference 2
days ago did not encourage me and did not clarify in my mind
that we have a good strategy for Iraq. Frankly, I think General
Dempsey and Secretary Carter following up on that were not very
persuasive either in convincing me or the American people that
we have a good plan.
Now, based on your experience, is it not a fact that if we
had a limited number, just five, special forces embedded with
an Iraqi battalion of 600, that that can give confidence to
that battalion, help improve their morale, and help them be
more effective on the battlefield?
Senator Sessions. Senator, it has been my experience that
when U.S. forces have accompanied Iraqis--or for that matter,
my experience in Afghanistan--that those units are more
effective.
Senator Sessions. Well, General Dempsey said he has not yet
recommended that we embed a limited number, a very small
number, of such forces in the Iraqi army, but he would do so if
he thought it was appropriate. Do you not think it is time for
us to maybe move from being in Baghdad in headquarters and
actually move out to help provide this kind of confidence, the
air cover, the direction of munitions, giving confidence of
resupply and American commitment? Is it not time for us to move
forward in that direction?
General Dunford. Senator, without appearing to be evasive,
what I really would like to do, if confirmed, is have the
opportunity to get on the ground, speak to the commanders, and
frankly provide a more comprehensive recommendation to how we
can move the campaign forward in Iraq without focusing on one
or another of the factors.
Senator Sessions. Well, I hope you will do that quickly.
Just one more thing. Senator McCain warned yesterday that
we could be facing the same situation that he warned about Iraq
in 2011 when we pulled out prematurely. Now we are going to be
facing this decision in Afghanistan. I hope that you will be
clear and firm in your recommendation to the President if you
believe this plan we have today, date-specific withdrawal, is
in error, and I hope you will do that. Will you do so if you
think it is in error?
General Dunford. I will do that, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
My good friend and colleague, Senator Sessions, and I have
worked together on matters of fiscal accountability and trying
to spend less money, but I have a different take than he does
on where we are in terms of the military budget.
I cannot figure out any reason why we would be putting the
$40 billion increase into the war fund instead of into the base
budget. I cannot think of any reason to do that other than one
of misleading the American people about whether or not we are
balancing something because that is the only place they can put
the money and not have to pay for it. So they put it there so
it did not have to be paid for and completely short-changed
national security for our country in the form of cybersecurity,
port security, airport security, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), all of
which I know you would acknowledge, General Dunford, is a very
important part of the role of keeping America safe. Would you
agree with that?
General Dunford. Senator, I would absolutely agree that all
those organizations play an inextricable role in keeping us
safe.
Senator McCaskill. Let us make very clear, if in fact we go
down this path of pretending we are balancing something by
putting it in a fund that we do not have to pay for, will in
fact the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds, or the war
fund as I like to call them--will they do anything to avoid the
force structure cuts that are looming across our Nation if we
do not get off of this path of misleading the American people
about what we are balancing?
General Dunford. Senator, I think all of the service chiefs
that have to balance a budget and certainly me included where I
sit right now would much prefer that money to be in the base
budget because that provides a degree of predictability that we
can get after the two main issues that we have to deal with.
One is modernization of force, and the other is to get the
readiness back to a level that we are comfortable with.
Senator McCaskill. So the cuts that we have seen this week
that General Odierno announced--they are a drop in the bucket
as to what is coming if we continue on this bizarre idea of
putting all of this money in the war fund as opposed to in the
base budget where force strength belongs. Correct?
General Dunford. If the budget level goes below what has
been requested in the President's Budget 2016, there will be
significant additional cuts made.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
You know how hard we have all worked on the problem of
sexual assault in the military. I am pleased that the incidents
are down. I am pleased that reporting is up. I am pleased that
the efforts that are being made to measure victim satisfaction
with command look good. I think it is too early to declare
success, obviously. We have a lot more work to do.
But the thorny problem that remains, General, and one that
I really want to make sure you have at the top of your list is
retaliation. I know that there have been some initiatives
begun, but I would like to see a written plan from you as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with all of the chiefs signing off
on what is your path to getting at this culture. The problem is
not, based on the survey, the command. The problem is primarily
lower level command, unit command, and peer-to-peer, not that
there may not be some outliers there, but that is the bulk of
the problem. That is a culture issue, and that means from the
top.
I am disappointed that we have not had more prosecutions.
Retaliation is a crime. I know it is new. I know people might
be very reluctant to bring somebody up on those charges because
of what that might mean within their unit. But that is where
you guys come in. I would like a commitment from you today that
you would be willing to put a plan in writing that we could
follow.
General Dunford. Senator, I would make that commitment. I
think you have correctly identified peer retaliation as the
real issue that we are trying to grapple with in the wake of
the Research and Development (RAND) report. I can assure you
that the leadership across the Department has been carefully
looking at that issue in an effort to set the right command
climate where retaliation is unacceptable.
Senator McCaskill. I will put a question for the record
about the unused building report that Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) pointed out in
Afghanistan. I know there was an investigation. You, of course,
were not found to be a problem in this, but it is a problem the
investigation found no problem and in reality there was a huge
problem, that somebody signed off on a building for $36 million
that is never going to be used and is sitting empty. We have
got to make sure we avoid that.
My final question is--if you do not have time to do it
now--I am just about out of time. I want to make sure that we
get your take on ISIS in Afghanistan. I know they are trying to
move everywhere. Obviously, this is a Shia-Sunni issue and that
is something that is prevalent throughout the region. With your
experience in Afghanistan, are you comfortable that we have a
handle on what ISIS is trying to do in Afghanistan?
General Dunford. Senator, what I know from General
Campbell's reports and intelligence is that we have seen a
number of Taliban rebrand themselves as ISIS. But beyond that,
I do not have a good feel at this time for the depth of the
problem, but certainly it would be one of the issues I would
look into if confirmed.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. General Dunford, I think you are just the
man for the job, but let me tell you you have got a lot of
crises to preside over. I would simply ask you, during the
course of your term in office, tell us what you need. Come back
to us and be honest and tell us what our men and women in
uniform need to succeed and get the job done because I do not
think we are quite there.
I was privileged to lead a bipartisan delegation of House
and Senate Members over the past week to Ukraine. We met with
President Poroshenko in Kiev, and he is grateful for the $300
million that this Government provided in military assistance
during the past year. He also mentioned the need for Javelin
anti-tank missiles. I think your testimony earlier today is
that that is a reasonable request on the part of the president
of Ukraine, and it will be necessary for him to get those in
order for him to defend his country. Was that your testimony?
General Dunford. Senator, it was. From a military
perspective, those kinds of capabilities in my judgment would
be necessary for him to deal with both Russian aggression and
the separatism issue that he is dealing with in Ukraine.
Senator Wicker. Separatists that are backed by the Russian
hierarchy.
Would you also agree that it is unacceptable that this
month's transfer of 100 armored Humvees to Ukraine took over a
year to process due to bureaucratic delays at DOD and State?
General Dunford. Senator, if it took a year to do that, it
would be unacceptable. I am not personally aware of that issue.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, look into that for us.
I also led the delegation to Helsinki for the The
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
parliamentary assembly. Before the delegation left--before the
Russian delegation left en masse because of a dispute over five
delegates being on the European Union (EU) sanctions list--the
head of the delegation, Nikolay Kovalev, said that Russia's
neighbors have no reason to be threatened by Russia. Now, of
course, Russia has--under Mr. Putin's leadership, Russia has
twice invaded neighbors, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine last year. We
see now that there is a Russian official investigating the
legality of Mr. Kruschev's transfer of Crimea back in the day
saying that this perhaps was not an invasion because Crimea was
never legally transferred to Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
It concerns me that this same official is now investigating
whether the transfer of the Baltic States, whether the giving
of independence to the Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia, was also legal. Perhaps that was not legal at all,
this Russian official suggests.
We can get to the issue this way. I just want to ask you
this about our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
commitment. I can envision a situation where there are small
jurisdictions within Latvia that have a majority of Russian
speakers, small jurisdictions within Estonia that have a
majority of Russian speakers. A pretext of a plebiscite is
created at that point. I realize I am posing something to you
that is hypothetical, but in light of pronouncements from
officials in the Russian Federation, I think it is something to
be concerned about.
Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke to this committee earlier this
year and said we need to create a trip wire in the Baltics and
that this trip wire should communicate clearly to Russia that
NATO will not tolerate violations of the territorial integrity
of our allies.
What do you think of this idea and can you highlight to
this committee the steps DOD needs to take under leadership to
send a credible message that this sort of pretext by the
Russian Federation would absolutely not be tolerated by the
United States and our NATO allies?
General Dunford. Senator, I think our experience in Ukraine
and in the other examples that you used highlights the fact
that we need to update our deterrence and response model to
deal with the kind of threat that we have today, which has been
described as a hybrid threat from Russia, which combines
political instruments, unconventional warfare, as well as
support for separatists in these countries. Quite frankly, that
needs to be a priority. You are asking what should the
Department do. We frankly need an effective deterrent model for
the 21st century to deal with the kind of threats that we are
now seeing in Russia because, quite frankly, I think that kind
of asymmetric threat is one we will continue to see in the
future and certainly we are going to continue to see that in
the European context.
Senator Wicker. Would an incursion of Russian troops or
Russian-back separatist troops in small jurisdictions of
Russian-speaking majorities within Latvia and Estonia--would
that be completely unacceptable to this Government?
General Dunford. From a policy perspective, Senator, I
cannot answer that. From a personal perspective, it certainly
looks like a violation of sovereignty to me.
Senator Wicker. Under article 4 of NATO, in my view it
would be absolutely unacceptable. We need to make it clear.
This administration needs to make it clear. This Congress needs
to make that we will do what is necessary to prevent this sort
of idea from ever being considered in the first place.
General Dunford. Senator, I agree with that, and I think
this also applies to the cyber threat as well, again, the idea
of deterrence in response to a changing threat in the 21st
century, and I think we need to update our models for both.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your service to our great country,
your family's dedication and sacrifice they have made with you
I know over the years.
Sir, I am sure you have had the opportunity to form
opinions on what our threats have been and what our threats are
today. What would you consider the greatest threat to our
national security?
General Dunford. My assessment today, Senator, is that
Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security.
Senator Manchin. Would you want to elaborate on that to a
certain extent?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, in Russia we have a nuclear
power. We have one that not only has the capability to violate
the sovereignty of our allies and to do things that are
inconsistent with our national interests, but they are in the
process of doing so. So if you want to talk about a nation that
could pose an existential threat to the United States, I would
have to point to Russia. If you look at their behavior, it is
nothing short of alarming.
Senator Manchin. I have been very much concerned about the
same issue. I think we have talked about it briefly before when
you visited my office. But I have been told by major scholars
that the Cold War is colder today than it was when it was
declared because of the lack of communications, the lack of
inter-party affiliations. Do you find it to be true, and can
you change that course in your new position?
General Dunford. Senator, certainly the relationship of
Russia a few years ago, if you recall--we actually were
including them in NATO meetings and so forth, and those kinds
of exchanges have stopped. From my perspective, my role would
be even as the relationship is challenged and even with the
difficulties that we face right now, I think it is important
that we attempt to maintain a military-to-military
relationship, an effective military-to-military relationship,
with our Russian counterparts to the extent possible to
mitigate the risk of miscalculation and begin to turn the trend
in the other direction in terms of trust.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, General.
Also, going back to Iraq--it has been spoken previously,
but could you find yourself at some time recommending to the
President for a three-state solution in Iraq versus staying the
course of a united Iraqi government?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, from my perspective, I can
imagine two states in Iraq. I have difficulty imagining a third
separate state given the lack of resources that would be
available to the Sunni. Frankly, I think if it was in thirds
without a Federal Government, I think we would have some
difficulty, the same difficulty that we have today exacerbated
by the fact that there is not a central government.
Senator Manchin. Basically you are acknowledging that the
Kurds are strong, prepared, ready to go if they were given that
opportunity?
General Dunford. Senator, you know, again it is probably
out of my lane to talk about what the organization of Iraq
might be in the future. But I think from just a pure economic
resources and governance perspective, the Shia and the Kurds
are certainly much more equipped to set up a separate state
than the Sunni would be at this time.
Senator Manchin. I know it has been spoken about also, the
mistake of us leaving Iraq, pulling our troops out when we did.
Did we have an option to stay?
General Dunford. Senator, I was not involved in the
discussion at that time. The assessment of the administration
at that time was we did not have an option to stay.
Senator Manchin. So basically those of us who believe that
maybe there could have been some forces left there or basically
the evaluation Maliki was not doing his job, once we went down
the path of democracy democratizing that country, we did not
have the option to go back and stay there.
General Dunford. Given what we were demanding of the
Iraqis, they were not meeting our demands. I am not sure I
would say that meant we had no option to stay.
Senator Manchin. I have spoken many times about the lack of
an audit. The only agency in the Federal Government that we do
not audit is the Pentagon. Defense. The Marines have made an
effort. I will say they have made more of an effort than any
other branch of the military to do an audit, but it has not
been fulfilled.
What would your commitment be, sir, for us to have an
audit, especially for us to know about our contractors, how
much money we spend on contractors, how many contract forces
that we have doing the job that I believe maybe our military
and definitely our National Guard could be supporting in that
effort that we are not doing today?
General Dunford. Senator, we cannot be effective as a
warfighting organization and we certainly cannot be efficient
with the taxpayers? dollars if we do not have an effective
audit. As you alluded to, we worked that pretty hard in the
Marine Corps. I worked it both as an assistant Commandant and
then over the last year as the Commandant. We did make a
significant amount of progress. We were able to get to the
point where we could internally audit all of the resources that
were directly under the cognizance of the Marine Corps with
some database challenges outside. But I can assure you that, if
confirmed, you will have my commitment to continue to press
hard in that direction and to support the efforts across the
Department to make sure that we can come to you with a clean
audit.
Senator Manchin. General, I again want to thank you. You do
have my support and I think the confidence of the American
people, definitely the West Virginians. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. General, I just want to thank you for all
that you have done for the country, and I think that you will
do a tremendous job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I
want to thank Ellyn and your family for what they have done for
the country and continue to do. We appreciate it.
I wanted to also add my support to what Senator McCaskill
said about the issue of retaliation. I think this is a very
important issue as we focus on the work that we have done in
this committee to eliminate and to work to prevent sexual
assault in the military and to support victims and to hold the
perpetrators accountable. So I think that is excellent. I look
forward to seeing that proposal from you.
I wanted to ask about the situation, as we look at Iran and
their support for regional terrorism. How would you assess
Iran's current activities and where are they engaging in
support either directly or through proxies for efforts that are
undermining security in the region?
General Dunford. Senator, Iran is clearly a malign
influence in the most destabilizing element in the Middle East
today. They are providing support to the Huthis down in Yemen.
They obviously provide support. Hezbollah is a clear malign
influence in Lebanon. There are indications they are involved
in Syria, and certainly they are involved and trying to expand
their influence into Iraq. They are creating I think--they are
exacerbating at least the Sunni-Shia sectarianism across the
region.
Senator Ayotte. I want to follow up more on that, but I
also want to ask you. I saw reports that they were also engaged
in supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan more now. Is there
anything you can share with us on that?
General Dunford. Senator, I have seen those same reports,
and from my perspective, what I have seen in the reports is
that they have provided some support to the Taliban in an
effort to counter ISIL.
Senator Ayotte. Do you believe, as we think about your
experience--I know you commanded troops in Iraq. But certainly
Iran has the blood of American soldiers on its hands for the
explosive materials that they provided to the Shia militias in
Iraq that killed many of our men and women in uniform. So do
you think, as we look at the situation in Iraq and what is
happening with the Shia militias you referred to, how could
they be a malign influence in the longer-term solution in Iraq?
General Dunford. Senator, they clearly could be a malign
influence, which is why I believe we should not provide any
support to those forces unless they are directly under the
Iraqi Government and not provided support by the Iranians.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I wanted to also ask you about the situation on cyber
because the FBI Director--we have received briefings on the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) breach, but the FBI
Director has said that he believes this is an enormous breach.
Millions and millions of individuals who provided background
information have been breached. Director Clapper has said that
they believe it is the Chinese who have done this breach.
When we look at the threats facing our Nation, how grave do
you think the cyber threat is? Also, how would you assess our
current posture with the Chinese and how we should be
addressing the situation?
General Dunford. Senator, I would agree with you. The cyber
threat is clearly very significant. Frankly, every week we
learn a bit more about the OPM breach. My number one concern,
obviously, as a service chief is for the data and the wellbeing
of the men and women whose data that is having been
compromised.
One of the challenges is, of course, attribution. But from
my perspective, if confirmed, my role will be to provide the
President with a full range of options to deal with these cyber
attacks, which is what the OPM breach was.
Senator Ayotte. So I know that Senator Manchin had asked
you what you believe our gravest national security threat was,
and you identified Russia. Certainly we have seen this
aggression by Putin in Russia certainly invading other
countries essentially.
But what is it--as you look at the National security
situation, you think about immediate threats to the country,
what keeps you up at night the most?
General Dunford. Senator, what keeps me up at night the
most is our ability to respond to the uncertain. I am very
confident--very confident--in the joint force today and our
capabilities and capacities to deal with the challenges that we
have today, albeit we need improvement in cyber, other
capabilities, but on balance, the force that we have today is
able to deal with the challenges that we know. There is very
little residual capacity. This is the issue that has been
discussed many times before this committee and that you have
had some personal engagement on. It is the readiness to respond
to the uncertain, frankly, that keeps me up at night as a
service chief and certainly one that would keep me up at night
were I to be confirmed as the Chairman.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. I appreciate this hearing.
Thank you, General Dunford, for your service. I am grateful
for your wife and children being here with you. We all know you
serve together.
I want to continue along the line that Senator Ayotte
started with with Iran. We are expecting a potential nuclear
agreement between P5 Plus 1 as early as today. Are you
concerned that lifting sanctions on Iran might allow that
country to invest more money in terrorist activities in the
Middle East, and what can we do to address those concerns?
General Dunford. Senator, there is no question that signing
an agreement will change the dynamic in the Middle East. The
first thing I guess I would say is that, if confirmed, I know I
would have the responsibility to develop options for the
President to deal with the changing dynamic.
With regard to increased resources for malign activity, I
think it is reasonable to assume that if sanctions are lifted,
the Iranians would have more money available for malign
activities. But I would probably say that regardless of whether
there is an agreement or not, my expectation is that Iran will
continue the malign activity across the Middle East that we
have seen over the past several years.
Senator Gillibrand. I also want to continue the line
started by Senator McCaskill about retaliation. Senator
McCaskill was correct when she said this is something we are
all very concerned about, and she said it is not just peer-to-
peer. She mentioned unit commanders. I want to be specific
about this issue so you know the problem you are dealing with.
So 53 percent was peer-to-peer retaliation, but 35 percent
was adverse administrative action. 32 percent was professional
retaliation, and 11 percent was punishment for an infraction.
So you have to recognize some of this retaliation is being
perceived by survivors to be done by unit commanders or someone
within the chain of command because administrative retaliation
or perceived administrative retaliation or professional
retaliation is serious. So there is still a climate issue that
the chain of command is responsible for, particularly unit
commanders and lower level commanders, that is not getting the
right message.
In fact, the recent RAND survey said that 60 percent of
women who said they experienced sexual discrimination or some
kind of negative behavior came from their commanders, their
unit commanders. So you have to recognize there is a climate
issue that is not being adequately addressed. So when you do
your report for this committee, I would like you to look at
that issue as well.
You also have the challenge that in the reported cases, 1
in 7 of the perpetrators who were alleged have committed rape,
sexual assault, or unwanted sexual contact was also in the
chain of command. So you have a challenge with lower level
commanders that is not yet being addressed that I would like
your report to cover as well.
Somewhat related, I want to talk about combat integration.
I strongly believe that we should have standards that meet the
needs of each position and then allow anyone in who meets those
standards to compete. You have not been very vocal on this
issue, but if confirmed, you will be one of those individuals
who are advising the Secretary of Defense about whether the
services should receive any exceptions to policy.
Do you expect the services, especially the Marines, who I
assume you have been tracking most closely, to ask for
exceptions?
General Dunford. Senator, I am not able to answer that
question right now, and I can just explain the process in the
Marine Corps. We have looked at this issue pretty hard. As you
know, we put together a task force that is just completing. In
fact, they will stand down this week. I expect the data that we
have collected over the past 18 months in a very deliberate,
responsible way to be available to me in the August-September
time frame. We will meet the timeline established by Secretary
Panetta and General Dempsey in a letter from 2012.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
Will you be looking across the services to see if one asks
for exception in a position whose equivalent another service
does not request an exception for? Will you be doing a
comparison between services?
General Dunford. Senator, my understanding of the way it
will work now, again, if I am confirmed, sitting as the
Chairman, is that I will have a responsibility to look at each
one of the requests on its own merits and make a recommendation
to the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
Then with my remaining 30 seconds, I want to address cyber.
We are constantly being confronted by our need for a capable
cyber force. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and the services have
been building out those capabilities, but there is still work
to be done. How do you envision the force, and what do you see
the role as the Reserve component?
General Dunford. Senator, I envision the force, as you
mentioned--it is certainly going to grow, and I would support
the plans that Admiral Rodgers--and I think he has testified
here before the committee. I think he is setting the right path
in terms of growing the capacity of the cyber force.
The Reserve component is going to be very important. In
fact, in many cases and certainly as a service chief who looked
at this, some of the skill sets that are unique to cyber are
available to us in the Reserve Force. We need to figure out a
way to maximize and leverage those capabilities.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Dunford, for your many years of service
to this country and to the men and women under your command. I
would like to also thank your family, your wife, your son who
is present today, and your niece who is here as well. So thank
you, sir.
I was pleased to see that you listed modernizing the
nuclear enterprise among the top challenges that you do expect
to face in your response to the committee's advance questions.
You also described our nuclear deterrent as the Nation's top
military priority.
Do you believe it is critical that we maintain the full
triad of our delivery vehicles?
General Dunford. Senator, given the nature of the threat
today, I do believe that.
Senator Fischer. Do you support a bomber leg of the triad
that is armed with both the gravity bombs and the cruise
missiles?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Fischer. The gravity bombs, as you know, and the
cruise missiles--they are entirely different capabilities. So
one does not make the other redundant. Is that correct?
General Dunford. It is, Senator, and my understanding of
the issue is it adds a degree of complexity for the threat and
gives us a greater assurance of being able to deliver, should
that be required.
Senator Fischer. Great. Thank you.
As you know, modernization has been delayed and deferred
for some time, and we are now at a point where the life of the
delivery systems cannot be extended any further. As Deputy
Secretary Work put it recently, the choice right now is
modernizing a losing deterrent capability in the 2020's and the
2030's .
Some have argued that these bills are simply too large and
we cannot afford to retain our nuclear deterrent. But,
according to the Department's calculation, at its peak the
nuclear mission would be about 7 percent of the nuclear budget.
I think it is a little confusing when we hear about our
deterrent described as unaffordable, and to me the alternative,
letting that deterrent age out--that has the unaffordable cost
to us.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
General Dunford. Senator, I would say I would pose the
question--you know, some people would ask whether we can afford
it. I would probably flip that around and say I think we need
to think about how we will fund it. It is a capability that is
required. Again, we have identified that as the number one
capability that we need to have to protect the Nation, and
nuclear weapons certainly create an existential threat. So for
me, it is a question more of how do we work together moving
forward to fund this as opposed to whether or not we can afford
to do it.
Senator Fischer. That is 7 percent of the budget at its
peak, though, and being the number one priority, should that
not be what we fund first?
General Dunford. Senator, frankly, it is more complicated
to me than that, and I have some experience with that inside
the Department of the Navy. When I looked at the Ohio class
replacement, as an example, and what that would do to
pressurize the shipbuilding account, we would have to make some
very difficult decisions inside the Department from a
capability perspective. So while it is clear that that is the
priority, it is not an issue of exclusivity. So balanced
capabilities is what the joint force needs, and so I think we
need to approach it from that perspective.
Senator Fischer. Fair enough.
I also appreciate the connection that you made between the
modernization and the reductions to the hedge of our non-
deployed weapons. I think that this linkage is often
overlooked, and I think it is based on simple logic. If you
have a modern stockpile and you have a responsive
infrastructure, you do not keep as many spares. I think you are
more insulated as well from what is happening in the world. You
are more insulated from those surprises and also from technical
failure.
But to be clear, do you believe that it would be premature
to make any significant changes to the hedge before we have a
modern stockpile and before we have a responsive
infrastructure?
General Dunford. Senator, my understanding at this time
from the briefings I received is that would be the most prudent
course for us to take.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
With respect to further nuclear arms reductions, do you
believe that any reductions below the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) force levels must be achieved through
a negotiated treaty and also be verifiable?
General Dunford. Senator, I do. I do not believe we ought
to take unilateral action in that regard.
Senator Fischer. Should non-strategic nuclear weapons be
included as well?
General Dunford. Senator, I would like to take that
particular question for the record.
[The information follows:]
New START does not include any limitations on nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Any change to our nuclear deterrence posture, including both
strategic and nonstrategic forces, must maintain strategic stability
and sustain effective deterrence with the current strategic
environment, and must also protect our ability to hedge against future
technical and geopolitical changes. I agree that any future negotiated
treaty must be verifiable. Given the current environment, we must also
ensure existing arms control obligations are being met before
concluding additional arms control agreements.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Do you agree that any arms control negotiations must take
into account Russia's current behavior, especially its
compliant record. You mentioned at the beginning that you feel
that Russia is our greatest threat.
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to also thank General Dempsey and his family for
everything they have done for the country.
General Dunford, you and your family--thank you very, very
much for stepping up to the plate. We are really in your debt.
As you know and we have discussed in the past, I believe
one of the greatest threats to our troops is when they find
themselves in a personal place where they start to think about
something like suicide. We lost over 400 young men and women in
the past year. I know you have worked very hard in this area.
You have done a lot of rigorous screening in the Marine Corps.
Will you have that same screening used across the branches
when you look at recruits and early on in their careers?
General Dunford. Senator, one of the thoughts I had as a
service chief was to ensure that once we identified a better
way to screen, as you said, and identified people at risk and
take appropriate action, that we would share that as best
practices across the services. I would certainly look to
facilitate that if confirmed.
Senator Donnelly. Then the other question I wanted to ask
you in this area is a lot of times, in talking to the parents,
there has been a stigma for the young men and women to seek
help. I know that you are committed to removing that stigma.
Are we going to make sure that everybody knows, look, it is a
sign of strength to try to get some help, to talk to somebody,
as opposed to any weakness?
General Dunford. Senator, absolutely. You know, this is one
of those areas where you are never complacent, you are never
satisfied with where you are. But I would tell you this. I
really believe this: Over the past probably 5 or 7 years, the
issue of stigma as it associates with suicide has changed
dramatically. Even the way we deal with families in the wake of
suicide, if you think about where we were a decade ago, is
completely different. I do think the command climate is much
more receptive to somebody today seeking help than it was in
the past and making sure that help is accessible and, where
appropriate, anonymous. But, again, I am not suggesting that we
are satisfied with where we are, but I do believe we have made
a lot of progress in that particular regard.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Last week, I was on a trip led by Senator Kaine. We went to
Iraq and met with a number of our forces there, some of the
leadership. One of the greatest concerns was the Iraqi troops,
and when you look at the number of ISIS fighters in Ramadi
compared to the Iraqi troops, it was a very sparse number of
ISIS fighters, but they won the day anyhow because the Iraqi
troops turned and left.
I know that that has to be a focus of the leadership of the
Iraqi forces. Are we going to send the message that the only
way through Ramadi is through Ramadi; that there is no back
door anymore in these kind of efforts?
General Dunford. Senator, again, you have been on the
ground more recently than me now, and I know you have talked to
the commanders there. I did have an opportunity to listen to
General Austin the other day, and I have seen General Terry's
plan, and I think they have made it very clear to the Iraqi
Security Forces how important Ramadi is. In fact, they have
been working hard over the last couple months to set the
conditions for the Iraqis to be successful in Ramadi. It
probably is one of those issues where it is a tactical action
to go back in Ramadi, but there is no question in my mind that
from an information operations perspective and frankly from a
perception of the campaign, it is a strategic action. I think
the Iraqis understand that.
Senator Donnelly. One of the other groups we met with--and
I know the marines have shed so much blood and treasure in
Anbar Province over the past years. We met with a lot of the
Sunni tribal leaders, and they said, look, we are still united
with you but we need to know that you are in this, that you
care, that you will be there. I mentioned this the other day to
Secretary Carter and General Dempsey. One of the council
members from Haditha said, we have got people eating grass in
our town now. These are people who worked with the United
States. They are now eating grass. There is no milk for our
children. We need you to help in this humanitarian crisis.
So I think we not only have to win the battles, we have to
re-acquire the hearts and minds of the people there. They said,
if you do, we will move these folks out. I just wanted to get
your views on that.
General Dunford. Senator, I agree, and I think with regard
to Anbar, I have got both a personal and a professional stake,
having lived in the province for a year and developed
relationships with some of the people in the Anbar Province. I
could not agree with you more that their confidence in our
commitment, their trust in our commitment will absolutely have
an impact on the success of our campaign not only from the
military perspective, but from the perspective of the people's
willingness to support us.
Senator Donnelly. The last thing I wanted to mention is
Syria. It appears that the plan we have right now is really no
plan. You know, we have talked about buffer zones when we were
in Saudi Arabia--Chairman McCain with a group of us. We talked
about creating no-fly zones there. So we seem to be in search
of a plan. My fear is that Assad is going to fall, and we are
hearing that from a lot of folks in the area that he is on very
shaky ground right now. Do we then look up the next day and see
a race between ISIS and al-Nusra to take over the rest of the
country, which is a nightmare scenario at that point? So you
are stepping into a real challenging position, but I think one
of the very, very front on the lens is Syria is going to
change. It is going to change quickly, and we had best be
prepared for that change and be ahead of it or else we are
going to look up and an entire country is going to be gone.
Thank you.
General Dunford. Thanks, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. General Dunford, thank you for being here
today. Thank you for your years of service. Mrs. Dunford, thank
you for your years of service.
General Dunford, you said earlier that you believe Russia
is the gravest threat that the United States faces. I take it
that is because, in large part, Russia is the only country with
a nuclear capability to destroy the United States and our way
of life?
General Dunford. That is one of the reasons, Senator, and
of course, that is combined with their recent behavior.
Senator Cotton. Given that Russia, according to the
administration, is currently in ongoing violation of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, do you believe the United
States should consider withdrawing from that treaty?
General Dunford. Senator, I would like to take that for the
record.
[The information follows:]
We view Russian violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaty with great concern. But it is not yet time to consider
withdrawal. Our goal remains to return Russia to compliance and
preserve the viability of the Treaty. At the same time, we must not
allow the Russian Federation to gain a significant military advantage
through their violation of an arms control treaty. It is my
understanding, the Department is developing and analyzing potential
response options for the President, and will consult with our Allies.
Senator Cotton. Okay. We would like to hear a response to
that for the record because as it currently stands, Russia and
the United States are the only parties to the treaty, and
Russia is violating it. It means that the United States is the
only country in the world prohibited from developing missiles
with a range of 500 to 5,000 kilometers.
The President currently has a proposal to preposition some
equipment in our eastern NATO allies? countries as a response
not just to the capability that Russia has but also the
intention they have displayed to put stresses on our alliance.
I find that proposal somewhat underwhelming, although a step in
the right direction. Are there barriers to stationing troops in
those countries up to the battalion or even brigade level?
General Dunford. Senator, I think that proposal is part of
a wide range of activities. One is to have infrastructure that
we can support deployments. The other is to preposition
equipment so we can rapidly move forces into Europe. Then the
other piece of it is actually rotational forces, as you are
suggesting. So I think rotational forces are envisioned as part
of the whole package that Secretary Carter announced at the
defense ministerial in NATO a month ago.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I would like to move now to Iran. As far as I know, there
has still not been an announced nuclear agreement with Iran.
But under any such agreement, Iran will probably get a signing
bonus of billions and billions of dollars. How do you expect
Iran will use that signing bonus?
General Dunford. Senator, again, from the outside looking
in, there are two challenges they have. One is their economy
internally and the disaffection of the Iranian people as a
result of that economy, and the other is that they use
resources that they have available to support their malign
activity across the region.
Senator Cotton. So you believe that at least part of that
money can go to terrorist organizations they support like
Hezbollah, as well as to destabilize governments in the Middle
East like support for the Huthis in Yemen or Shiite militias in
Iraq.
General Dunford. Senator, I think it is reasonable to
assume that.
Senator Cotton. Does the United States have the military
capability to destroy Iran's nuclear program?
General Dunford. My understanding is that we do, Senator.
Senator Cotton. You have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do
you know how many soldiers, marines underneath your command
were killed by Iranian activities?
General Dunford. Senator, I know the total number of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that were killed by
Iranian activities, and the number has been recently reported
as about 500. We were not always able to attribute the
casualties that we had to Iranian activity, although many times
we suspected it was Iranian activity, even though we did not
necessarily have the forensics to support that.
Senator Cotton. So about 500 confirmed, but many more
suspected killed in action and even more wounded in action.
You have a reputation for being particularly thoughtful
when you deal with the families of fallen servicemembers. What
would you say to family members of a soldier, sailor, airman,
or marine that was killed by Iranian activity if we make a
nuclear agreement with Iran before they change their behavior
in the region?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, what I would say is that my
expectation is that regardless of there being an agreement or
not, Iran will continue to be a malign force and influence
across the region. Then if confirmed as the Chairman, I will
make sure that our leadership has a full range of military
options to deal with Iranian activity.
Senator Cotton. It has been reported that your nickname is
``Fighting Joe.'' Is that correct?
General Dunford. Senator, actually it is not one I use.
Senator Cotton. But it is one that has been given to you.
Correct?
General Dunford. Senator, perhaps by my wife.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Do you care to tell us the origin of that
nickname given to you that you choose not to use?
General Dunford. Senator, I would prefer to talk about that
in private, if you do not mind.
Senator Cotton. So I have heard it reported that it was
because of your activities as a commander in the early days of
the Iraq war as an infantry officer.
Given whatever budget agreement we reach, it will probably
be inadequate to meet the forces that we face and the long-term
modernization needs that we have, whether it is the long-range
strike bomber or the F-35, the Ohio class replacement
submarine. Are you worried about the next generation of
infantrymen in the Marine Corps and the Army, that we are going
to be taking money from our ground troops to put in major
capital investments, which are clearly needed?
General Dunford. Senator, I am concerned, and I think it is
broader than just the infantry piece. I mean, I think
experience tells us we need a balanced inventory of
capabilities and capacities in the joint force to be
successful.
When I answered the question of Senator Ayotte earlier when
she asked me what kept me up at night, I talked about the need
to respond to the uncertain. What concerns me are people who
actually think they know what the future is going to look like
because our experience tells us we do not. So having a full
range of capabilities that includes effective marines and
soldiers from my perspective is the prudent thing to do.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
In your long and distinguished career, I think we put
ground forces at a minimum into Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Somalia,
the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq again, and there is no doubt
that we may be called upon again in the future. So I hope in
your tenure that even if you do not want to be called
``Fighting Joe,'' that you will be on the lookout for all the
Fighting Joes in the Marine Corps and the Army so the country
will have them ready to serve once again.
General Dunford. I will do that, Senator. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. The committee will not review how the
Senator from Arkansas got his nicknames here in the Senate.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Dunford, to you and your family.
General Dunford, with the President's recent announcement
about 500 more advisors going into the anti-ISIL mission in
Iraq and Syria and in the region, we are now up to 3,500 troops
that are serving abroad in that battle serving as advisors, as
trainers, special forces coordinating air campaigns, conducting
ground strikes. The war passed its 11-month anniversary
yesterday. 2 days ago, General Dempsey was here and testified
that he believed in a mission of this complexity, it was likely
to be a multiyear effort that would require a sustained
commitment by the United States to defeat ISIL.
Do you think it would be received positively by the troops
who we are asking to deploy far from home and risk their lives
if Congress were to have a debate and authorize and affirm the
U.S. mission against ISIL?
General Dunford. Senator, I do think it would be positive
from a couple perspectives. One, the reason you mentioned is--I
think what our young men and women need--and it is really all
they need to do what we ask them to do--is a sense that what
they are doing has purpose, has meaning, and has the support of
the American people. So that is the first reason.
But I also think that there is a second benefit from such a
debate, and that is to send a clear and unmistakable message to
our adversaries and to our allies that we are committed to this
endeavor.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General.
With respect to the anti-ISIL effort, I want to pick up on
something Senator Reed was talking about earlier. The whole-of-
government approach, as you referred to it, has sort of nine
lines of effort, and just for the record--I think we know
these, but for everybody there--supporting effective governance
in Iraq, denying ISIL safe haven, building partner capacity,
enhancing intelligence collection on ISIL, disrupting ISIL
finances, exposing ISIL's true nature, disrupting the flow of
foreign fighters, protecting the homeland, and humanitarian
support. Those nine lines--two are purely DOD, denying ISIL
safe haven and building partner capacity. The DOD has a piece
of some of the others, but the others are generally non-DOD.
You have testified that you think the effect of sequester
on the DOD mission could be catastrophic. But given the fact
that seven of these line items are non-DOD, would you agree
that the allowance of sequester cuts to come back full force
October 1 would also significantly hurt the other seven lines
of effort, which are critical to defeating ISIL?
General Dunford. Senator, I do. If you just do not mind, I
would just like to talk about the relationship between the two
lines of effort in the DOD and the other seven because I think
it highlights the issue.
Senator Kaine. Please.
General Dunford. From my perspective, the two lines of
effort that we have right now--one, deny sanctuary and to build
partnership capacity in both Iraq and Syria--really are buying
time and space for those other seven lines of effort to work.
But to be quite honest, you know, I do not see how we can have
an enduring success unless those other seven lines of effort
are addressed, and they are, in the final analysis, more
important.
I think the military lines of effort will set the
conditions for those other seven lines of effort to be put into
effect, but I certainly cannot see us being successful without
all of them being properly resourced. When you talk about
threat finance, when you talk about moving foreign fighters,
and as importantly, when you talk about the State Department's
efforts to negotiate to develop effective governance in both
Iraq and Syria, those are going to be very important actions to
be taken for us, again, to have enduring stability in the
region so we can actually deal with this issue once and for
all.
Senator Kaine. I think there has been some suggestion that
if we fix sequester for defense, that is all that we need to
do. But even for important defense priorities like defeating
ISIL, the testimony you have just given about the connection
between non-defense investments and defense investments in
defeating ISIL is really important. I will just note, by my
count, 95 of 100 Senators are now on record either by voting in
the budget or voting in the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) or in their public statements for supporting the notion
that sequester should be fixed both for defense and non-defense
accounts. It is my hope that we will do that.
With respect to training and equipping opposition in the
anti-ISIL battle, just two items. Senator McCain first raised
in September in a hearing--I think it was in this room--the
question of if we train folks to fight ISIL in Syria and they
get attacked by the Assad regime, will we protect them? He
still has not gotten an answer to it. He asked it again
yesterday. So by my count, September to now, that is 9 months
without a clear answer.
We were told in theater last week that the current rules of
engagement still would prohibit U.S. effort to support U.S.-
trained anti-ISIL fighters in Syria if they come under attack
by the Assad regime. I have asked questions for the record to
get that clarified, and I would like to know if that is in fact
the policy, if DOD intends to change the policy, when they will
change the policy, and if not, what do we need to do to change
the policy because I do not believe we should be sending U.S.-
trained folks into a theater of war without giving them a
guarantee that they will be protected. Those questions will be
record questions from the hearing 2 days ago, but I just want
to let you know that those are coming and we view that as a
very important matter.
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General and Ms. Dunford, I want to thank you for your
service to the country taking on this new responsibility. I
certainly know that marines all over the country, whether on
active duty or retired, take great pride in the fact that you
are only the second marine ever nominated for this post. I know
your career has exemplified the values of honor, courage, and
commitment that are the values of the Marine Corps. I certainly
plan on voting for you with enthusiasm and encourage my
colleagues to do so as well. So we look forward to seeing you
tomorrow night at the parade.
I wanted to ask a few questions about the military
relationship with the Congress, even though your role is going
to be principal advisor to the President.
First, in the area of force posture, this committee
occasionally weighs in through the NDAA and other means on key
force posture issues, number of ships, basing of troops,
aircraft like the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt (A-10).
When this happens, how important is it that the military follow
the defense guidance of the Senate or the Congress?
General Dunford. Senator, I think it is very important,
given how explicit it is in the Constitution what the
responsibilities of the Congress are in that regard.
Senator Sullivan. So let me provide a couple examples. So
let us say there was an amendment from the chairman and it was
about the number of aircraft carriers, passed unanimously
through the committee, votes on the Senate floor. Do you think
the CNO should say, well, the chairman does not know that much
about the Navy anymore, we are going to blow that advice in the
NDAA off? Is that an appropriate role for the military?
General Dunford. If Congress passes a law, Senator, it
would not be appropriate to ignore it.
Senator Sullivan. So how about an NDAA amendment that says
it is the sense of Congress, in support of the President's
rebalance in the Asia-Pacific strategy, to increase forces in
the Pacific Command Area of Repsonsibility (PACOM AOR)? Is it
appropriate to ignore that or even significantly decrease
forces? What do you think our response to that should be if
that is happening?
General Dunford. Senator, first, obviously, the sense of
Congress ought to inform all the actions--
Senator Sullivan. There is a recent amendment that says
exactly that.
General Dunford. Right.
Senator Sullivan. Let me provide a second area that we have
talked about a little bit in terms of emerging threats. You
know, sometimes the Department of Defense civilian and military
officials, because there are so many threats out there, miss
certain threats. Let me provide an example of one that
everybody seems to be focused on with the exception of the
Department of Defense.
You may have seen ?Newsweek? this week had a cover story on
the Arctic and what they called ?In the Race to Control the
Arctic, the U.S. Lags Behind.? It is a very long article. It
talks about how this is the world's newest great game,
Kipling's term for the struggle between major powers to
dominate the earth's remote but very strategic places. It talks
about how the Russians are very, very aggressively moving
military forces into the Arctic, serious military exercises,
and how, whether it is the Coast Guard or the Secretary of
Defense saying this new kind of geopolitical cold war the U.S.
is in danger of losing. We are not even in the same league as
the Russians. We are not even playing this game at all. So I
think it is safe to say the Department of Defense has been
asleep at the switch on this.
Congress has been more attuned to this issue. In this
year's NDAA, there is a section that requires the Department of
Defense to provide Congress with a military strategy, given the
new threat levels, and an Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the Arctic
based on the increased interests and threats.
Does it make sense to cut any of America's limited number
of cold weather-trained warriors in the Arctic before this
congressionally mandated strategy is completed?
General Dunford. Senator, I guess I am not sure which
forces you are alluding to be cut.
Senator Sullivan. Well, there are only certain forces in
the Arctic right now. They are all in Alaska.
General Dunford. Senator, I would like to take that for the
record. I am not aware of the full range of decisions that are
being made right now and what the implications are.
[The information follows:]
The Department's 2013 Arctic Strategy is aligned with the 2013
National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Our current capabilities and
posture protect U.S. interests, and we are evaluating requirements
against the evolving security environment to ensure we continue to meet
our global defense responsibilities. Further development of cooperative
strategic military partnerships with, for example, Norway and Canada,
will underpin the Department's balanced approach to a region that is
receiving increased attention.
The reduction of cold weather trained personnel is a result of the
ongoing need to balance the growing importance of Arctic security with
current operational priorities and resource constraints. DOD has a wide
range of capabilities that can be deployed with proper preparation in a
variety of operating environments, including the Arctic. As we continue
to review requirements, we will review DOD's recent Arctic Strategy as
well. If confirmed as Chairman, I will meet the NDAA mandate to provide
Congress with a military strategy for the Arctic.
We are and will continue to train and operate regularly in the
Arctic to meet our primary objectives of ensuring security, supporting
safety, and promoting defense cooperation while preparing for a wide
range of challenges and contingencies.
Senator Sullivan. General, I mean, I think it is important
to recognize, you know, it is hard to figure out appropriate
force levels and capabilities in the Arctic without having a
plan. We have mandated the desire and need for a plan, and I
think we are getting a little bit of the cart before the horse,
cutting forces before we even know what our plan is. But we
certainly recognize that there is an increased threat. Congress
has, and we hope the DOD will recognize it is as well.
General Dunford. Senator, if confirmed--I know I have had
some conversations with both the current Chief of Naval
Operations and Commandant of the Coast Guard about the
implications for the Arctic. The commitment I would make to you
is that we will, in fact, develop an appropriate role for the
military in support of our economic and political interests in
the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Dunford
and Mrs. Dunford and your family, for your service.
I just wanted to pick up very briefly on the issue of
sexual trauma in the military and the concerns about
retaliation. I think that you had noted that you would
determine the root causes and continue to work to ensure that
the culture does not support retaliation.
I would ask you to have a sense of urgency as you respond
to this committee on how you are going to address and resolve
the issue of retaliation because even as we downsize our
military, it is even more important that our troops? morale
remain strong and that there is cohesion, and there could not
be strong morale or cohesion if some of your troops are
encountering sexual assault and harassment and retaliation. I
just wanted to make that point.
Could you share very briefly your views on the rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific?
General Dunford. Senator, I can. It is absolutely critical
that we do that, given both the demographics in Asia but also
our economic future. So there is no question about it. That is
going to require us to modernize our alliances, and I think you
have seen some progress in that regard, our relationship with
South Korea, our relationship with Japan, our relationship with
the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Australia have all been
adjusted here in recent months. I think we have an
unprecedented level of exercises and engagement right now in
the Pacific again to assert our influence and to provide a
stabilizing presence.
The most important thing I think the rebalance to the
Pacific does is it provides a security infrastructure within
which we could advance our National interests. That is what has
existed for the past 7 years, and I think the rebalance to the
Pacific, as we know it today, is designed to modernize that
security infrastructure and make sure it is in place so that
just as we protect our National interests over the past 7
years, we can do that in the indefinite future as well.
Senator Hirono. I just got information on the cuts that
will happen to Pacific Command (PACOM) as a result of the
budget necessities. I am glad to know that General Odierno did
say that the cuts were with regard to the importance of a
rebalance, and therefore, we want to make sure--and this is
something that I know that Senator Sullivan shares with me--
that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific remains a very strong
commitment on our part.
You mentioned that Russia is the greatest threat to our
National security. Where would ISIL, China, and North Korea
fall with regard to our National security dangers?
General Dunford. Senator, if I had to rack and stack them
today, I would have Russia down as number one. I would have
China down as number two.
Senator Hirono. Could you explain why briefly?
General Dunford. Sure. Russia, of course, because of
nuclear capability and their aggression.
China because of their military capability, their growing
military capability, and their presence in the Pacific and our
interests in the Pacific. So it is a relationship between their
capabilities and our interests. It does not necessarily mean
they are a current threat. It does not mean they view China as
an enemy. But, again, as someone in uniform, I get paid to look
at both somebody's intent and their capabilities. So when I
look at Chinese capabilities relative to our interests in the
Pacific, I would have to consider China as an area of concern
for security, again as distinct from a threat.
Clearly, North Korea with ballistic missile capability and
the potential to reach the United States and attack the
homeland is high on that list.
Then ISIL.
But, you know, Senator, I just want to make it clear. As I
go down that list and prioritize, I do not view that meaning
that we can attack those issues in sequence or that a
prioritization of one at the expense of the other is
necessarily something we would have to do at this particular
time. All four of those security issues are ones that require
the Department to look at. They all create a challenge that
needs to be addressed.
Senator Hirono. That is why we live in very complicated
times.
I would like to focus on our distributed laydown in the
Pacific. Specific to Japan, I am aware of the concerns of the
Okinawan population and of their leadership's desire to halt
construction of the Futenma replacement facility. Can you
characterize our relationship and the challenges for relocating
our forces from and within Japan? Because that is very much a
part of the rebalance that we are committed to.
General Dunford. Senator, thanks. I recently did visit
Japan. I was encouraged by my visit. I met with a number of
their senior leaders, to include the minister of defense. I
received nothing but their full commitment to continue with the
Futenma replacement plan. So my sense is that the Japanese
Government is committed to that. They recognize that that is
important for us to continue with the preferred laydown that
you alluded to. So my sense right now is that our relationship
with the Japanese and their stated commitment--we are in a
pretty good place with regard to the Futenma replacement
facility.
Senator Hirono. Do you view the Okinawa situation as mainly
a concern that should be dealt with within Japan and their
government?
General Dunford. Senator, we--and I specifically now talk
about the marines in Okinawa. We need to be good neighbors and
set the conditions for a positive relationship with the
Okinawan people. So I think we can make a contribution. But at
the end of the day, the issue of the Futenma replacement
facility from my perspective is in fact an internal Japanese
political issue that has to be worked by the Japanese
Government.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. General Dunford, welcome to you and your
family. In your written testimony, you state, as Senator
Fischer pointed out, that our nuclear deterrent is the Nation's
top military priority. That leads me to a specific question
related to how we plan for that priority over time.
The health of our Nation's whole nuclear weapons complex is
critical to our nuclear deterrent. One of the things you wrote
in your written testimony is that we must recruit and train our
next generation workforce capable of certifying stockpile
requirements and to modernize the nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
Can you share with me your thoughts specifically on LDRD,
or laboratory-directed research and development, and the life
extension programs that are going on at our National labs and
their role in achieving recruitment and retention of that next
generation nuclear workforce?
General Dunford. Senator, that is an issue that in my
current capacity I frankly have not developed any level of
expertise, and I would like to take that one for the record.
[The information follows:]
While I am not familiar with these programs in my current capacity,
I understand the warhead Life Extension Programs and LDRD represent the
broad nature of the workload at the Department of Energy's national
security laboratories. These programs are necessary to deliver near-
term warhead commitments while advancing science and technology for
future national security needs. Furthermore, they contribute towards
maintaining a steady, sustainable, and meaningful workload for the
laboratories and are critical for attracting and retaining the highly
technical workforce required to sustain our Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Senator Heinrich. That would be fine. I look forward to
engaging you on that in the future. I think it is going to be
really important for us to view some of the particulars of how
we manage the labs and particularly the things that bring
people into the pipeline at the front end with the greatest
amount of expertise and then they stay in those positions, rise
up through the labs, and provide the continuity that it is
going to take to make sure that we have the kind of modern
deterrent that we need.
I want to focus my next question on some of the challenges
here at home. In my view, defense innovation is moving too
slowly, oftentimes in cycles that last years, while commercial
innovation can be measured in cycles of months.
This committee included a section in this year's NDAA to
authorize funding, about half of which would be dedicated for
directed energy to accelerate the fielding of a variety of
important offset technologies including, in addition to
directed energy, things like low-cost, high-speed munitions,
cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, and
intelligence data analytics.
What role do you think the development of these new
technologies like directed energy and robotics will play in our
National security posture? What steps should we take to develop
and deliver operationally useful systems more quickly?
General Dunford. Senator, in my capacity as the Chairman,
if I am confirmed, I view the future of the joint force as
being one of my critical responsibilities. A key piece of that
is making sure we keep apace of innovation so that we not only
get better at doing what we are doing today, but we find
fundamentally different ways to do things in the future that
are more effective and they maintain our competitive advantage.
So I think what you are outlining is certainly an area of
concern for me. Even as a service chief, I would tell you that
over the past decade our efforts at innovation probably were at
a lower priority than they ought to be, and we have, over the
past year, tried to energize that. I would certainly bring that
same focus and attention if I was confirmed as the Chairman.
Senator Heinrich. I appreciate that.
One other challenge at home here is that the Air Force's
remotely piloted aircraft career field is under really severe
strain, largely through increased combatant commander
requirements, insufficient personnel policy actions to improve
manning levels, and just the basic reality that the Air Force
is losing more remotely piloted aircraft pilots than it is
training. We have heard from Secretary James and General Welch.
They have assured this committee that they are dedicated to
resolving the shortfall, but I also want to get your commitment
to helping resolve this issue. So if confirmed, I would just
ask that you make that a priority.
General Dunford. Senator, I would maybe just comment
quickly that those men and women that are in that field
represent a core capability in the joint force, and their
effectiveness, their morale, their willingness to continue to
serve is absolutely important. I have spoken to General Welch
about this particular issue, but I will certainly reinforce the
efforts of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the
Secretary of the Air Force to make sure that those individuals
are appreciated and that they have a climate within which they
want to remain airmen.
Senator Heinrich. I appreciate that deeply. I think it is
an area where we are seeing some severe strains and where folks
really need our support. So thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Good morning, General Dunford. Thank you
for your service and for your family's longtime serving our
Nation.
I leaned over to Senator Sullivan during some of your
comments, and I also thoroughly appreciate your precise answer
to questions. It is refreshing to get that in the committee.
I would like to go back to a question or build on a
question that Senator Sessions asked of you, and it had to do
with the plus-up of spending and the use of OCO as a way. But
we all know that that is not the best way to do what you need
to do, primarily for the purposes that you pointed out, the
certainty. It still does not give you long-term certainty.
But my question to you is have you given thought to how you
could potentially use this funding, although it is not a long-
term commitment, to take the edge off of sequestration and any
ideas on precisely how you would?
General Dunford. Senator, we started to look at that, and
it would really require a change in the rules for using OCO for
us to be able to do that. Right now, if you gave us OCO, given
the current rules, we would not be able to use it in the places
where we most need it. Much of the money that we requested, in
addition to the BCA level in the President's Budget for 2016,
was really focused on modernization. That is the thing that has
suffered the most over the last 2 years, in addition to
readiness. So we have looked at it, but there are some very
practical limitations in our ability to apply OCO to some of
the areas that we need it applied to.
Senator Tillis. Will you be making specific recommendations
for things that we need to look at to make sure you get the
most productivity you can out of it?
General Dunford. Senator, I will certainly do that through
the Secretary of Defense as he works this issue.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
I wanted to go back to also questions that were asked about
Afghanistan and Iraq. I visited both countries and spoke with a
number of people while we were there. It seems like in
Afghanistan we have got the right mix. We have got them in the
right roles and the Afghanis have proven that they can fight
successfully.
In Iraq, I understand what you said about some of the
political decisions of the past administration have caused a
problem. Those structural issues have to be addressed.
But have you given any thought to, assuming that you get to
the point to where you have the right command infrastructure
among the Iraqis, what we may need to actually create a
credible, trained, effective fighting force for the Iraqis
beyond the 3,000 currently present troops?
General Dunford. Senator, you know, I can address that
conceptually in terms of their ability to develop combined arms
and in terms of their ability to develop institutional training
and in terms of their ability to develop the capacity at the
ministerial level to support tactical-level forces. But
frankly, it has been a few years since I have been on the
ground in Iraq, and what I would like to do is take the
opportunity, if I am confirmed, to visit Iraq, talk to the
commanders on the ground and again develop a comprehensive
recommendation that would help us to move the campaign forward.
Senator Tillis. On the flip side, I know the Afghanis have
made a lot of progress, but I think they still rely on us
heavily for our train, advise, and assist role and our
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities in the region. I know that I have heard you say we
cannot have a calendar-based approach towards reduction in
forces. But the sense that I got when I was in Kabul was that
those who are very much in touch with the situation on the
ground now think that it would be a very bad idea to
substantially reduce our current presence over the near term.
Now, I assume that that is because they are looking ahead to 12
months, 18 months from now and saying we are still not going to
at a place where the Afghanis can be completely independent. Do
you share that view?
General Dunford. Senator, what I can tell you is the
assumptions that we made in the recommendation that was
delivered in December of 2013. So it is now some 19 months ago.
Some of the assumptions affected the timeline. We certainly did
not expect there to be as much of a delay in the elections
process of 2014, and there was. That was a great distracter in
our efforts to develop ministerial capacity. When I was on the
ground, it was very difficult to get my counterparts to focus
on some of the practical side of growing ministerial capacity
when they were involved in a very real challenge of providing
security for the election. So it delayed our efforts in growing
ministerial capacity.
There have been other areas where we made some assumptions
about things that could be done within a certain period of time
that we actually did not in the event get done during that
window of time.
So from a distance now--and again, another area where I
would go over and talk to General Campbell and General Austin
down at Central Command, if confirmed, immediately. From a
distance, it certainly makes sense to me that the timeline that
we originally identified in 2013 as being possible has probably
been affected by the political events inside of Afghanistan and
other events associated with the enemy.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, General Dunford. I look forward
to supporting your confirmation.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, General, and thank you to your
family who are here today for their service as well.
I want to begin with what you assessed as the primary
threats from Russia and China and talk about a weapons platform
or system that has not been raised today, our submarine force.
I recognize that is not immediately part of your background,
but obviously a grave responsibility, if you are confirmed. I
certainly am going to strongly support your confirmation as the
next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Ohio replacement program is critical to our nuclear
deterrence, and the cost of that program has been estimated in
the range of $100 billion. The Navy has said that it cannot pay
for it out of its Navy budget. I am wondering whether you will
consider and whether you will support looking at the Defense
Department budget as a whole to fund the Ohio replacement
program, which I am assuming you agree is critical to our
nuclear deterrence.
General Dunford. Senator, thanks.
First, I do agree it is critical. It is the most survivable
part of the triad and a critical capability for us to
modernize.
I am very familiar with the budgetary implications of the
Ohio class replacement on the Department of the Navy's long-
range shipbuilding plan. What I can tell you with a degree of
surety is that were we to fund the Ohio class replacement out
of the Department of the Navy, it would have a pretty adverse
effect on the rest of the shipbuilding plan, and the estimates
are somewhere between two and a half and three ships a year.
Again, we are not anywhere near where we need to be right now.
So the 30-year shipbuilding plan was intended to get us where
we need to be.
So I do think a broader mechanism for the Ohio class
replacement makes sense. Otherwise, we are going to have some
pretty adverse effects on the Navy. As I mentioned a couple
times in testimony today, one of my perspectives coming into
this role would be, if confirmed, is that we need to have some
balance, and that includes a balanced Navy. So as important as
the Ohio class replacement is, the United States Navy, in terms
of the forward presence they provide, in terms of their
warfighting capability, has many other capabilities that are
critical to our Nation as well. It would be difficult to
balance those were the Ohio class replacement to be paid for
within the current Department of the Navy's projected
resources.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for that answer, General. I
am hoping that you would agree with equal surety that the
continuing program to build two subs a year, two Virginia class
subs a year, should continue as planned right now.
General Dunford. Senator, here is where I defer to my
partner, the Chief of Naval Operations. But that is certainly
his plan, and I trust his judgment in that regard.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Going to another area that I do not think has been raised
yet, I know of your very passionate and admirable commitment to
the men and women who are our greatest asset in the United
States Armed Forces, their wellbeing and their welfare. I hope
that you can commit that you will continue the effort to
coordinate better with the Veterans Administration for men and
women who are leaving active duty on everything from transfer
of medical records to drug formularies to a range of issues. I
do not need to expound on them for you, but I hope that you
will focus and continue those efforts.
General Dunford. Senator, absolutely. Just so you know, I
view keeping faith with our men and women in uniform as one of
the primary responsibilities of leadership, and that is both
when they are in uniform and when they are out of uniform. We
have an expression, you know, certainly in the Marine Corps
that once a marine, always a marine. From my perspective, once
you have served our country, the service and support that you
should get in return as part of that bargain that we make with
young men and women who enlist is something that is pretty
sacred. I absolutely will continue to support the efforts to
make sure that the health care transition that our young men
and women make when they are in uniform to the Veterans
Administration is as seamless as possible. I think we owe them
that.
Senator Blumenthal. One last question, General. Your
predecessor, General Dempsey, has stated repeatedly--and I am
quoting--we have the capability to use a military option if the
Iranians choose to stray off the diplomatic path. End quote.
My question to you is are you satisfied that our Nation has
done enough to prepare militarily for the option--and the
President has said that all options should be on the table--if
necessary, to use a military option there, as much as we all
may wish that the negotiations should succeed?
General Dunford. Senator, my understanding today is that we
have both the plans in place and the capability in place to
deal with a wide range of eventualities in Iran.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dunford, congratulations on your nomination and
thank you for your 38 years of distinguished service and your
leadership as Commandant of the Marine Corps. Our Nation is
fortunate to have a military leader such as you serving at a
time of great peril.
I want to ask a question of you that is the same question I
asked your predecessor, General Dempsey. If the objective were
to destroy ISIS, not to weaken them, not to degrade them, but
to utterly destroy them within 90 days, what would be required
militarily to accomplish that objective?
General Dunford. Senator, my assessment is that it would
not be possible to destroy ISIL within 90 days, and I also do
not believe that we can develop an enduring solution simply
with military force against ISIL although I do think the
military aspect of the campaign is critical.
Senator Cruz. Well, if the time frame I have suggested is
not feasible, let me ask you a follow-up question which is what
would be required to destroy ISIS and what time frame is
necessary. Specifically if that were the objective, what would
be required to accomplish it militarily?
General Dunford. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will
continue to look at this issue, but my perspective today is
that this is a long-term endeavor. This is on the order of
years not months in order to defeat, destroy in your words,
ISIL.
Senator Cruz. What would be required to do that in whatever
time period is necessary?
General Dunford. From a military perspective, the two
things that we are doing I think we would need to continue to
do, and that is, to take action to deny ISIL sanctuary wherever
it may take root both in Iraq and Syria and elsewhere. That
would require us to build local forces, build partnership
capacity, if you will, of the local forces that would be the
real defeat mechanism for ISIL in the respective countries,
given the way that it is spread right now. You would have to
have effective governance so that you had the conditions set
for long-term stability where ISIS could not then get traction
again in the future. It would have to address the foreign
financing of ISIS, where they get their money, as well as their
economic assets within each one of those countries. You would
have to address the movement of foreign fighters back and
forth. Probably as importantly, the one thing we need to do,
Senator, is we need to undermine the narrative of ISIL and
discredit the narrative of ISIL.
Senator Cruz. In your personal judgment, are you concerned
about the rules of engagement for our current use of airpower,
that it is overly constraining the effectiveness?
General Dunford. Senator, I am not. One of the reasons is
when we go to war, we go to war with our values, and we conduct
proportionality in the planning and discrimination in
execution. The thing that we are doing now is ensuring that we
do not have civilian casualties. I think that, frankly,
supports our narrative and gives us the credibility we need to
be successful long term in this campaign.
Senator Cruz. In recent days, the administration has
informed Congress that we are arming the Kurds. This is
something I have called for for a long time. I spoke this week
with a senior Kurdish leader who reported that the commanders
on the ground of the Peshmerga are not confirming that. What
can you tell this committee about the extent to which we are
providing serious arms to the Kurds and it is actually getting
to them rather than being bogged down in Baghdad?
General Dunford. Senator, first, I would agree with you.
The most effective ground forces both in Syria and Iraq today
are in fact the Kurds.
My understanding is that the issues associated with
supporting the Kurds have been addressed, and they are now
getting the material support that they need, as well as the
training that they need. If I am confirmed, I will certainly,
as a matter of priority, go over there, visit, and make sure
that I am able to make my own personal assessment based on the
facts on the ground.
Senator Cruz. Will you commit to providing this committee
with specific details in terms of what is being done to arm the
Kurds?
General Dunford. I will do that, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Let me ask concerning Iran. If Iran were to
acquire nuclear weapons, what is the National security risk in
your judgment to the United States of that occurrence?
General Dunford. Senator, I think it is significant,
particularly if accompanying that is intercontinental ballistic
missile technology. It is a significant threat to our Nation.
It is also a destabilizing action in the Middle East. I think
we can expect a proliferation of nuclear arms as a result of
Iranian possession of nuclear weapons.
Senator Cruz. So, General, my final question. I am
concerned about morale in the military. We have discussed in
this hearing how the world is getting more and more dangerous,
and yet at the same time, I think we are dramatically
undermining our readiness, our ability to defend this Nation.
The ?Military Times? did a survey where in 2009 they asked
soldiers whether overall the quality of life is good or
excellent. 91 percent said yes. In 2014, that number had
dropped from 91 percent to 56 percent. Likewise, they asked
whether the senior military leadership has my best interest at
heart. In 2009, 53 percent agreed. In 2014, that had dropped in
half to roughly 27 percent.
Do you share the concerns about declining morale in the
military, and if so, what do you see as the causes of it and
the proper approach to fix it?
General Dunford. Senator, thanks for the question.
First of all, with regard to the morale of our force, it is
clearly one of the things that distinguishes us. I was able to
say in my opening statement that we have the most capable
military force in the world today, and that clearly is rooted
in the men and women that we have in uniform and their
willingness to do what we have asked them to do in the last
decade. It is not something I would be complacent about.
I do have concerns as a service chief about how hard we
have been running our men and women over the last few years. As
an example, Senator, we had had a plan where we wanted to have
a 1-to-3 deployment-to-dwell ratio. That means our forces would
be deployed about 7 months, home for 21 months. That allowed us
to get adequate training. It allowed us to take care of
families, allowed the marines to kind of be what I describe as
a sustained rate of fire. Many of our units now inside the
Marine Corps are at or below a 1-to-2 deployment-to-dwell rate.
So they are home for less than twice as much time. So they will
be deployed for 7 months, home less than 14 months, and back
out again, and that continues on and certainly has an effect on
the families and, again, our ability to train across the range
of military operations.
If I am confirmed, Senator, this is absolutely going to be
one of the areas that I focus on. I think I have a
responsibility to lead the young men and women in uniform. I
think I have a responsibility to represent them, and when I say
represent them, that means to articulate to our leadership,
both here on the Hill, as well as the executive branch, what
material support, what leadership, what resources they need to
remain the finest fighting force in the United States.
It bothers me greatly if our young men and women do not
have confidence in their senior leadership, and I can tell you
that every day when I wake up, if I am confirmed, that will be
an issue of priority for me, that that will be exactly what I
seek to do is gain the trust and confidence of our young men
and women and let them know that they are in fact properly
represented back here Washington, D.C., and that we as leaders
recognize that we are asking them to do a lot. They do not ask
much more in return than to have the wherewithal to accomplish
the mission with minimal loss of life or equipment. I will
commit to you that is exactly what I will do.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Has sequestration not bred uncertainty
which has contributed to this drop in morale?
General Dunford. Chairman, thanks. I should have mentioned
that when I talked about how busy the forces are. There is a
tremendous amount of angst across the force, and a large part
of that is driven by the uncertainty about how big the force
will be, what will happen to their particular careers, and will
we have the equipment necessary to accomplish the mission. So I
do think, Chairman, that sequestration is a factor.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan had one follow-up
question, and then we will turn to Senator Shaheen.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I just wanted to get back to the issue of the
military's role in relationship with Congress. Do you think it
is an important role that we have to make sure that our
services do not replicate missions and core competencies,
particularly in an austere budget environment like we have
right now?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Let me just provide a quick example. I
believe one of the core competencies that the Army has is
large-scale airborne units that can deploy in a moment's notice
anywhere in the world. Do you think that is one of their core
competencies?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. A few months ago, a military general
testified in front of one of the subcommittees here about
putting troops and helicopters on naval shipping for, quote,
expeditionary maneuver throughout the Pacific. What service's
core competency would you associate that mission with?
General Dunford. I would associate that with the United
States Marine Corps, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So if I told you that was an Army general
describing the Army's new Pacific Pathways strategy, would that
surprise you?
General Dunford. It would not, Senator. I have seen that
description in the open source.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that costly new Army mission
is a redundant mission to the United States Marine Corps?
mission, and is that a good use of America's taxpayer and
military spending?
General Dunford. Senator, given the shortfall of the
amphibious lift--I am speaking now as a service chief--I think
the priority ought to go to the United States Marine Corps.
Senator Sullivan. Would be it an appropriate role of this
Congress to try to limit such redundancies by making sure
military funding goes to core competencies like much-needed
Army airborne brigades in the Asia-Pacific and the Arctic as
opposed to redundant activities like troops and Army
helicopters on naval shipping?
General Dunford. Senator, I do agree that the Congress has
a critical role in ensuring that we have a proper division of
labor within the Department of Defense and that the joint
capabilities and capacities that we have are right-sized.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you for that single follow-up
question.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
getting back so late. I was in an Appropriations markup.
But, General Dunford, thank you very much to you and your
family for your service in the past and for your willingness to
continue to serve. I have to say after watching you before the
crowd of New Hampshire business folks and hearing from them,
how impressed they were. I look forward to the impression that
you are going to make as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
I wanted to follow up on Senator Wicker's questions about
Europe and the concerns in Europe because I recently returned
from a visit to Poland and to Latvia where I saw the NATO
exercises in Latvia at Adazi Base and heard extreme concern
about the potential for Putin to engage, as you pointed out, in
an asymmetric instigation in the Baltics and in other eastern
European countries. I am concerned about the failure to date of
Europe to commit to the 2 percent of their Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for defense spending and wonder if you have
thoughts about what more we might be able to do to encourage
them to ante up.
General Dunford. Senator, I do think it is important that
our NATO partners bear their share of the burden. That is an
issue that I know Secretary Carter and his predecessors all
addressed. They came out of the Wales conference with a
commitment for all those nations to meet that 2 percent.
From my perspective, given the shortfall of capabilities
and capacities in Europe in areas like intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, defensive cyber capabilities,
strategic lift, and so forth, I think it is going to be
absolutely critical for our partners to develop those
capabilities and capacities.
I would also add that I have seen firsthand in my previous
assignment in Afghanistan when our NATO partners are properly
resourced, they do have capabilities and capacities that can be
integrated to great effect. So I do think the alliance, were it
to be properly resourced, can be a very effective force for
stability in Europe, as well as for out-of-Europe operations.
Senator Shaheen. I agree and hopefully we will see that
commitment followed through on because clearly the threat from
Putin and from Russia continues, and our eastern European
allies are very concerned about that.
I want to ask you about--you talked about the deployment
pressures on our military. I wonder if you could give me your
perspective on the appropriate active-to-Reserve ratio and the
importance of the National Guard and Reserve and continuing the
military mission that we have in this country.
General Dunford. Senator, I can. Of course, one of the
things we have to do when we talk about using the Reserve and
the Guard is balance the concerns of employers, concerns of
families with the willingness and the desire frankly for the
Guard and Reserve to continue to serve in what is more of an
operational or strategic sense. What I mean by that is there
was in the past the sense that the Guard and Reserve would be
something--in the case of a major war, we would mobilize the
Guard and Reserve. I think we found today, particularly with
the size of our U.S. military force and our commitments to the
Guard and Reserve, is much more operational in that they are
useful and necessary on a day-to-day basis.
My sense is as a service chief--and I will certainly look
at the implications across the other services if I am
confirmed--is about once every 4 years is a reasonable time for
a major deployment, although in many cases, depending on what
their employment is and so forth, individuals can be available
on a much more routine basis. But for whole units, probably
about 1 to 4 years, 1 year deployment and mobilization and then
4 years back focused on their families and employers, seems to
be sustainable. But, again, if I am confirmed, I will certainly
consult with the appropriate leadership in the Guard and
Reserve to make sure that I have a full appreciation for their
challenges, as well as the other service chiefs.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. We have seen in New
Hampshire the significant contribution of the Guard and the
integration, particularly with the air refueling, of active
duty and Guard in providing that mission. So I think it is very
important.
Let me ask you if you would commit to two things. One is in
2013, the Department announced the elimination of the direct
combat exclusion policy and announced plans to fully integrate
more women into all occupational fields. I hope that you will
continue that effort and see it through. As we know, women are
making up a greater percentage of our military these days, and
making sure that they have the ability to compete in all areas
I think is significant.
The other question. I noticed this week that the Navy
announced that they have tripled the maternity leave policy for
women serving in the Navy, and I would urge you to consider
that across all branches of the military. Again, as women are
making up more of our troops, I think it is important to
address the family issues that they have, and certainly
maternity leave is a big part of that. So I hope you will do
that.
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator. I will look at both of
those issues.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General, I think you are an outstanding choice. The
President could not have chosen a better person to be Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So congratulations to you and
your family for a lot of great service. The best is yet to
come.
When it comes to stopping ISIL--that is the stated goal is
to degrade and destroy--what if we fail in that goal? What can
America expect?
General Dunford. Senator, if we were to fail in stopping
ISIL, I think you will see an expansion of ISIL not only across
the Middle East but outside the Middle East. We have,
obviously, seen now elements of ISIL in the Maghreb all the way
over to Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. So they are an expanding power, as we
speak?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, I think they are expanded
in terms of geographic location. I have not yet concluded that
they are expanded in terms of capability.
Senator Graham. Got you. But I remember when we were
talking in the office, you said if we do not stop these guys,
we can expect a tsunami of ISIL and their sympathizers. Is that
fair?
General Dunford. Senator, I think it is fair. That is
exactly what I said, and I stand by that comment.
Senator Graham. So at the end of the day, I do not want the
tsunami to come, so we are going to have to stop these guys.
Is it fair to say that Iraq and Syria need to be viewed as
one battle space when it comes to ISIL or to stop them in Iraq
if you do not address their presence in Syria?
General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator. The enemy does not
respect the boundaries that we see on the map.
Senator Graham. Can you envision a scenario where you have
a regional army made up of Arabs and maybe Turkey that would go
into Syria and fight ISIL alone, leaving Assad off the table?
Would they join up for such a fight?
General Dunford. Senator, it is hard for me, watching the
politics from the outside right now, to see that degree of
integration, given the divergent interests that those countries
have. But I can certainly see where that would be an effective
way to deal with this is to have a regional army that would be
willing to deal with ISIL.
Senator Graham. Right. But my question is if you did not
put Assad's removal on the table, it would be hard to get them
to join up just to fight ISIL because they are worried about
Syria becoming a puppet of Iran.
General Dunford. That is right, Senator. Most of the
countries that you spoke about all have a shared goal of
removing Assad from power.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that Assad's
presence is sort of a magnet for Sunni extremists?
General Dunford. I think if not the proximate cause of the
ISIL movement, certainly one of the primary drivers of the ISIL
movement was the abuses of the Assad regime.
Senator Graham. If we go down to a thousand Kabul-centric
U.S. forces in 2017 in Afghanistan, do we substantially lose
our counterterrorism mission?
General Dunford. My assessment is we would have a
significant degradation of our counterterrorism mission in
Afghanistan, were we to do that.
Senator Graham. Would we lose our eyes and ears along the
Afghan-Pakistan border that we enjoy today?
General Dunford. We would, Senator.
Senator Graham. Would in your view that create a lot of
risk to the gains we have achieved over the last decade if we
did not have those eyes and ears and counterterrorism forces?
General Dunford. Senator, there is no question it would
create risk.
Senator Graham. When it comes to 60 Free Syrian Army troops
being trained under the current regime, would you agree with me
it is going to be very hard to recruit people to go into Syria
if you do not promise them protection from Assad because if
they get any capability at all in fighting ISIL, Assad would
assume that capability would be turned on him one day and he is
not going to sit on the sidelines and watch a force mature and
develop without hitting them? Does that make sense to you?
General Dunford. I agree with that assessment, Senator.
Senator Graham. So the most logical consequence of training
a force to go into Syria to fight ISIL alone is that Assad will
see them as a threat to his regime and most likely attack.
General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator.
Senator Graham. It would be very, I think, immoral to put
someone in that position knowing that is coming their way with
some capability to defend themselves. Does that make sense to
you?
General Dunford. Senator, my assessment is that if we train
moderate Syrian forces, the new Syrian army, then we ought to
also provide them with the wherewithal to be successful.
Senator Graham. If this war in Syria continues the way it
is going for another year, do you worry about stability in
Jordan?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you worry about stability in Lebanon?
General Dunford. I do, Senator.
Senator Graham. So the consequences of going into Syria
with a regional force and all of the problems associated with
it have to be balanced against the consequences of ISIL
surviving and thriving.
General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator.
Senator Graham. In your view, over the long haul, is it in
America's national security interest to do things necessary to
degrade and destroy ISIL?
General Dunford. I do believe that is absolutely in our
National interest to do that, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that whatever regional
army we may form, there are certain American capabilities that
would be outcome determinative in any fight against ISIL, and
it would be in our National security interest to provide those
capabilities?
General Dunford. I agree with that, Senator, particularly
in the case of aviation, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and probably special operations capabilities.
Senator Graham. Finally, if a soldier or a member of our
military falls in Iraq or Syria trying to destroy ISIL, would
you agree with me that they died protecting their homeland?
General Dunford. I would, Senator.
Senator Graham. That is the reason some of them may have to
go back.
General Dunford. Senator, there is no question in my mind
that the young men and women that we have deployed right now,
the 3,500 that are inside of Iraq and those that are in the
surrounds working through CENTCOM in this campaign, are
protecting our Nation.
Senator Graham. God bless them. God bless you. Best of
luck.
General Dunford. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed. General, on behalf of Chairman McCain, let me
thank you for your testimony, thank you for your service and
the service of your family.
Also on behalf of the chairman, I will now adjourn the
hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to General Joseph F. Dunford,
Jr., USMC by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. On previous occasions you have answered the Committee's
policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, the last time being in connection with your recent nomination to
be Commandant of the Marine Corps. You indicated that you did not see a
need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your
last confirmation hearing?
Answer. No.
Question. In light of your experience as Commandant of the Marine
Corps, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If
so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?
Answer. I do not currently anticipate the need to modify the
Goldwater-Nichols Act.
duties
Question. Based on your experience as Commandant of the Marine
Corps, as Commander of United States Forces and the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and as Vice Director of
Operations for the Joint Staff, what recommendations, if any, do you
have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in section 152
through 155 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the
Department of Defense (DOD), that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and
operation of the Joint Staff in general?
Answer. I do not presently have recommendations to change the law
or regulations.
relationships
Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish
important relationships between the Chairman and other officials.
Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must have a close
working relationship with the Secretary of Defense. Under Title 10, the
Chairman is assigned several duties that guide this relationship to
include serving as the principal military advisor to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman
also performs other duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The National Security Advisor.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the National
Security Advisor to ensure that our military efforts and options are
synchronized with civilian efforts across the government. Since the
Chairman is also the principal military advisor to the National
Security Council and Homeland Security Council, I also will work with
the National Security Advisor to inform and implement Presidential
decisions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Existing directives grant the Deputy Secretary of Defense
full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any
matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As a result, I
expect the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary will
be similar to that of relationship with the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Current DOD directives and Title 10, U.S. Code establish
the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within
their respective areas. In carrying out their duties, they may issue
instructions and directive memoranda to implement policies approved by
the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all
DOD components. When directed by the President and Secretary of Defense
or when carrying out their responsibilities, Under Secretaries
typically transmit communications to commanders of the unified and
specified commands through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. The DOD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer
of the Department of Defense consistent with Title 10, U.S. Code,
Section 140. The DOD General Counsel generally is responsible to
oversee legal services, establish policy, and administer the DOD
Standards of Conduct Program. The DOD General Counsel also establishes
policy and positions on specific legal issues and provides advice on
significant international law issues raised in relation to major
military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, or the legality of
weapons reviews. Communications between the combatant commanders and
the DOD General Counsel are normally transmitted through the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office of the DOD General Counsel
works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to cooperate with and provide
support to the Department of Defense Inspector General as required. The
Department of Defense Inspector General performs the duties, has the
responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in the Inspector
General Act of 1978.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs the duties
prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other
such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of
the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice
Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until
a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If
confirmed, I intend to discuss potential duties with the Vice Chairman
as part of our close working relationship. I have not yet determined
any additional duty assignments that I would to assign the Vice
Chairman beyond those prescribed in law.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries are the heads of their respective military
Departments and are responsible for, and have the authority necessary
to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments. Title 10, U.S.
Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction
and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority
of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments
are responsible for administration and support of forces that are
assigned to unified and specified commands. The Chairman advises the
Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and
budget proposals of the Military Departments conform to priorities in
strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of
the Combatant Commands. The Secretaries of the Military Departments
also are responsible for such other activities as may be prescribed by
law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the
operational chain of command as a result of the reforms of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, but this change does not diminish their
importance with respect to Title 10 responsibilities. The Chiefs of
Staff of the Services serve two significant roles. First, they are
responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their
respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the
Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can assure the preparedness of
his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense
and the President. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Chiefs are advisers to the President, National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their
respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important
role in shaping military advice and developing our joint capabilities.
If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Service Chiefs
to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to fight our wars
and conduct joint military operations around the world. By law, and to
the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as
spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing
their activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant
commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as
directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication
between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capability and to
provide support. If confirmed, I also will ensure that I consider and
work to de-conflict any issues or decisions than span multiple
combatant commands.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of
the Department of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard
officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all
policies, programs and plans affecting more than half a million Army
and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves
as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the
principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard
issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's
official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants
General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing
matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of
homeland defense and civil support missions.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces--Afghanistan.
Answer. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the
principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the National Security Council, he is not in the chain of command of
the Commander, U.S. Forces--Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The Commander,
USFOR-A reports to the Commander, USCENTCOM, who, in turn, reports
directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting relationship is
prescribed in 10 USC Section 164(d)(1). The Commander, USFOR-A does not
have a formal command relationship with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, but he coordinates with him through the Commander,
USCENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USFOR-A sends his advice
and opinions related to Operation Resolute Support to the Commander,
USCENTCOM, who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.
major challenges
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you expect to face if you are confirmed?
Answer. The current security environment is extraordinarily complex
and volatile. We face challenges from state actors including Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea. We are also engaged in a long-term fight
against violent extremist organizations. We are in the midst of a
critical transition in Afghanistan. While dealing with these issues, we
face the need to modernize the Joint Force in the context of fiscal
challenges and budget uncertainty. Particular areas of concern are our
cyber capabilities, space capabilities, modernizing the nuclear
enterprise, and assuring all domain access for the Joint Force. We must
navigate this environment while maintain our flexibility to deal with
the unexpected.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. First, I will energize our efforts to develop a framework
for deterrence that will address the full range of threats that we face
in the 21st Century. I will also work closely with the services and
combatant commanders to ensure we strike the right balance between
dealing with current operations, being prepared for the uncertain, and
developing the Joint Force of the future. Given the nature of the
challenges we confront, it will also be critical that we enhance our
integration with other elements of the Interagency in partnership with
Congress.
priorities
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified in the section above, would you set for your term as
Chairman?
Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on contributing to the
development of a comprehensive and sustainable Interagency strategy to
address the challenges associated with violent extremism. I would also
be decisively engaged in restoring the readiness of the Joint Force.
Finally, I would focus on shaping the capabilities and capacities of
the future Joint Force with a particular focus on leader development.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
performing their command function.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes. The chain of command runs from the President to the
Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the
commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will continue to
inform decisions as appropriate and transmit directions as directed.
However, there will be no ambiguity about the chain of command: the
combatant commanders receive their orders from the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority outside the chain of command
established under title 10, United States Code?
Answer. The Armed Forces should ordinarily operate under the chain
of command established in Title 10. In the case of certain sensitive
military operations, it may be appropriate for the President to
establish other temporary command relationships. However, in all cases
U.S. Armed Forces supporting such operations are still governed by the
law of armed conflict, remain accountable to the Title 10 chain of
command, and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for
disciplinary matters. If confirmed, I would provide the President with
my best military advice regarding any operation in which an exception
to the established chain of command may be warranted.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military
personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in
title 50, United States Code? Do you believe any modifications to these
authorities are necessary?
Answer. Title 50 of the U.S. Code tasks the Secretary of Defense to
ensure that the military departments maintain sufficient capabilities
to collect and produce intelligence to meet requirements of the DNI,
Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and COCOMs. Title 50 of the U.S. Code also
authorizes the Secretary to use such elements of the DOD as may be
appropriate for the execution of the national intelligence program
functions described in section 3038 of title 50. While I believe that
our military forces are generally most effective when they operate
under a military chain of command, there are circumstances in which
exceptions to this general rule are appropriate; authorities and
agreements exist to facilitate the granting of such exceptions. In some
cases, the Secretary of Defense may approve this exception and in other
cases only the President has approval authority. I believe the current
authorities strike the appropriate balance between enabling DOD to
operate within its independent Title 50 authorities, providing
necessary and appropriate support to other agencies of the U.S.
government under Title 50, and ensuring critical oversight of sensitive
operations.
Advice of the Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and Chief of
the National Guard Bureau
Question. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman
for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational
requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for
the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice
or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or
opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that
advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the
President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.
What changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you think may be
necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs,
combatant commanders, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are
presented and considered?
Answer. I do not see a need to change section 151 or 163.
officer management issues
Question. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you would
have significant responsibilities with regard to joint officer
management policies.
Answer. If confirmed, what modifications would you make to provide
the Department of Defense and the military services the force
management tools necessary to meet the needs of the 21st century joint,
all-volunteer force?
The Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services already possess a
wide range of force management tools which provide ample flexibility in
meeting the needs of the 21st century joint, all-volunteer force.
However, if confirmed, I will continue to examine the joint operational
and strategic environment to determine if there are opportunities for,
or capability gaps that require, reform to make the Joint Force even
more capable of meeting both today and tomorrow's needs.
Question. Do you believe the current DOD and service procedures and
practices for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by
the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of the military
departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make
informed decisions?
Answer. In conjunction with existing statutes, the current
Department and Service policies provide a sound framework for the
Services' evaluation of the qualifications, previous performance, and
potential of their officers. I believe these frameworks provide the
necessary information to allow the Services to make sound decisions
regarding the promotion and utilization of each Service's officers.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and
reasonable for the officers involved?
Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and
reasonable for the officers involved.
Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint
officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers
are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership
experience and professional development?
Answer. I feel the current combination of Joint Professional
Military Education and requisite experience gained through joint
assignments, training, and exercises adequately prepares officers to
operate effectively at both the strategic and operational level in
steady-state and wartime conditions. Therefore, I do not currently
recommend any modifications to the requirements for joint officer
qualification.
Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification
requirements on the ability of the services to select the best
qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that
will satisfy service-specific officer professional development
requirements?
Answer. It is certainly challenging for Services to ensure that
officers are adequately prepared to operate effectively as senior
leaders in both the Service and joint environment. Although satisfying
qualification requirements may curtail the time available for the
Services to develop their officers' Service-specific skill sets,
current requirements produce a cadre of well-rounded and competitive
officers, who are capable of integrating Service functions with
national directives in both strategic and operational environments. In
my opinion, officers with these capabilities possess the greatest
potential for success in positions of senior leadership. As such, they
are the most qualified, and hence most competitive, for promotion.
Question. In 2008, Congress created the requirement that the Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be selected by a
board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. This process
remains the only joint duty officer position specifically selected by a
selection board from among qualified officers of the Armed Forces.
Do you consider the selection process required by section 156 of
title 10, United States Code, to be an efficient and effective process
for selecting officers from among the services to serve in this joint
position?
Answer. Based on available information, I believe the selection
process for the position of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is an efficient, equitable, and effective means
to select an officer for this position from a pool of talented judge
advocate leaders across the Services.
Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint
officer selection board process that could improve the processes for
selection of officers in the military services?
Answer. I'm not aware of any lessons that could improve the
processes for selection of officers in the military service. The
process to select the legal counsel to the CJCS was informed by service
processes.
Question. Would you support expanding the process used to select
the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other
joint billets? Why or why not?
Answer. I do not see a need to expand our selection process to
other joint billets as currently established processes used to select
general/flag officers to joint positions are sound. First, our process
for identifying officers gives the Combatant Commander and the Chairman
flexibility. We can select from across the Services (to include the
Coast Guard) and the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components to ensure we
get the right individual with the appropriate skills and experience.
Second, the current process is efficient in that it gives the commander
and other senior leaders an opportunity to quickly review a slate of
nominated officers, and conduct interviews as necessary. Finally, our
process is extremely responsive to emerging or unexpected requirements.
We can quickly alert the Services to identify eligible personnel,
select candidates, nominate them, and have them in position in as
little as 90 days, if necessary.
headquarters streamlining
Question. The Senate reported Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters
functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.
If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what
would be your role in identifying and implementing streamlining and
reductions in the Joint Staff?
Answer. The current Chairman directed an enterprise-wide functional
review with a detailed evaluation of tasks and activities associated
with primary Joint Staff directorates. This review identified a range
of potential areas for reduction, realignment, or elimination within
the staff, and some of the recommendations have already been
implemented. I would continue to use this functional review as a
roadmap to quantify the efficiency of past actions and spur
organizational streamlining by reducing, realigning or eliminating
redundant or conflicting requirements.
Question. What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you
consider to be the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions?
Answer. There are a number of potential areas for consolidation or
reduction. For example, the Joint Staff J6 is currently working with
the U.S. Army Information Technology Agency (ITA), the Washington
Headquarters Services (WHS), and the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) to determine which IT functions can be consolidated within the
Pentagon to improve our IT capabilities while reducing costs and
unnecessary redundancies. Further areas for efficiencies include
consolidating support functions common to the Joint Staff directorates
and eliminating duplicative functions accomplished by the OSD, Joint
Staff and Defense Activities.
Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff has functions that
overlap with the Department of Defense and the military departments,
what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy?
Answer. The first, and most important step, would be to determine
whether those functions are currently codified in statute. Some
duplicative efforts may be due to the responsibilities being laid out
in law with some respective pieces executed by the Department, some by
the Joint Staff, and some by the military departments. Consolidation
and reduction of redundancy may require legislative changes. Second, I
would recommend a combined review by the OSD, the Services, and the
Joint Staff to determine the most appropriate ways to reduce, realign,
or eliminate duplicative functions.
training and assignment of general and flag officers
Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general and flag
officers have advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical
disciplines?
Answer. Yes. Rigorous and deliberate Service accession, training,
and development processes generate the technical and scientific
capability needed in sufficient numbers to meet DOD needs. I will work
closely with and support the Service Chiefs and other leaders to
continue to ensure we maintain an appropriate pipeline of specialized,
technical officer talent.
Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills
appropriate to ensure that the Department and the services can execute
complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly changing technological
threat environment, and make informed investment decisions? If not,
what will you do to address this deficiency?
Answer. I believe the Department has grown, and continues to grow,
world-class, technically-astute officers who are ready to take on the
challenges inherent in a rapidly changing and technical acquisition
environment. While the Services vary with respect to their use of
officers in acquisition, each Service tailors officer career paths to
meet their particular mission priorities, to include successfully
executing critical major acquisition programs. Each Service has career
path models that are appropriately aligned with their force management
process.
Question. In your view do current general and flag officer
assignment policies provide and incentivize qualified officers to serve
in acquisition programs? Do tour lengths for those assignments enable
and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs?
If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the
effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties?
Answer. Yes. Senior officers are assigned with adequate tenure and
are empowered to effectively manage their programs. The Services
demonstrate flexibility in adjusting tour lengths to match logical
progression points in acquisition programs. That said, I will support
the Service Chiefs, Service acquisition executives, and OSD leaders in
their efforts to ensure we continuously improve the development and
assignment of highly-motivated and qualified officers in acquisition
positions.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Department of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the military services have in place sufficient
training and resources to provide general and flag officers, and Senior
Executive Service employees the training they need to make informed,
ethical decisions? If not, what actions would you take, if confirmed,
to address your concerns?
Answer. Yes. I judge that sufficient training and resources are in
place to achieve the desired outcome. The ability to make ethical
decisions based on the shared values of the profession of arms is
identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders
throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service
developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is laid at the outset of
an officer's career and is further developed and reinforced in formal
education and training settings throughout their progression through
the ranks.
Question. It has been observed that despite numerous changes in the
law, the requirements and the process for attaining joint officer
qualifications is still beset by systemic challenges. Some of these
challenges appear to force the services to make officer assignments to
``check the box'' for joint qualifications at the cost of depriving the
services of flexibility to assign officers to other career enhancing
and professional development opportunities. Officers not assigned to a
designated joint billet on an operational staff receive joint credit
while other officers supporting the same joint commander do not receive
joint credit unless they submit a package to have their assignments
qualify for joint service. As operational tempo remains high and as end
strength continues to decline to historically low levels, some
exceptionally qualified officers will be unable to serve in qualifying
assignments to earn joint credit because the Nation demands they
perform other critical duties. As a result those officers may be
disadvantaged professionally as compared to their peers for promotion
eligibility. Given the substantial resources invested in the developing
officers to serve successfully in, and to support or lead joint forces,
more must be done to improve the joint qualification system or to
replace it with a system that is more effective.
If confirmed, I will work to identify inequities or inefficiencies
in the current system and implement change where appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to review the
joint qualification requirements to ensure that the qualification
process is matched to the increasingly joint service environment in
which many officers serve throughout their careers?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we have a process in place
to continuously review our qualification process and drive appropriate
revisions.
Question. Should the formal requirement for joint qualifications be
eliminated as a consideration for promotions and assignments?
Answer. No. I believe we need to continue to ensure that our future
senior leaders are well prepared to operate within both the Services
and the joint environment in steady-state and wartime conditions. This
is best accomplished through a continued mixture of mandatory formal
professional military education and hands-on experience in positions
dealing with both joint and Service matters.
security strategies and guidance
Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range
and diversity of threats to national security we face today?
Answer. The range and diversity of potential threats is increasing.
We face both state and non-state adversaries who are more capable in
terms of military capabilities, and more empowered by the diffusion of
technology. Both types of adversaries are developing new ways to
counter our traditional military advantages.
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took
into account a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources.
With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of
Defense as a result of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance
still valid?
Answer. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review superseded the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance, and provided new DOD guidance for
capabilities, capacity, and readiness. We cannot execute the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review with an additional $500 billion in cuts as
the result of the Budget Control Act further exacerbated by
Sequestration.
Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of
ISIL have occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in
January 2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate for the
threats we face today or do you think an update is warranted?
Answer. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review superseded the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance. This QDR did not fully anticipate growing
Russian aggression, the emergence of the ISIL threat, and the increase
in cyber intrusions.
Question. In your view, are our defense strategy and current
establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces
properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
Nation faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. I believe our defense strategy is sound but we must
continually adapt it to address emerging threats and a dynamic
strategic landscape. I also believe that the current defense
establishment is effective with an appropriate distribution of roles
and missions. I am concerned with the readiness of the force today and
I believe we need to review the capabilities and capacities that will
be needed to meet future security challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense
establishment?
Answer. The defense establishment is extremely complex. If
confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs, combatant commanders,
and Joint Staff to identify needed change to the capabilities,
structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment. Our cyber,
space, and nuclear capabilities will be areas of particular emphasis.
strategic risk
Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength increase strategic
risk?
Answer. Reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength must be
considered in the context of the current security environment and our
military objectives. If confirmed, I will be decisively engaged in
ensuring that we have a clear understanding of risk as we make changes
to the capabilities and capacities of the Joint Force.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army and
Marine Corps' decision to reduce active end strength to 450,000 and
182,000 soldiers respectively by the end of 2017?
Answer. I am confident that the Marine Corps can meet its
requirements at 182,000. If confirmed, I will work to better understand
the requirement for Army end strength.
Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to the
Secretary of Defense and the President to include an assessment of risk
and proposed actions to mitigate risk.
Question. Upon issuance of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the
fiscal year 2015 budget reduced projected defense budgets by $113
billion over five years. What was the incurred strategic risk of this
reduction relative to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance?
Answer. Overall, the strategic and military risk to our ability to
accomplish the objectives laid out in the QDR and DSG have increased. I
would be happy to discuss the details of this increased risk in a
classified venue.
chairman's risk assessment
Question. In his 2013 risk assessment, Chairman Dempsey identified
for the first time six National Security Interests that were derived
from four enduring interests contained in the 2010 National Security
Strategy. The April 2013 assessment identified several areas of broad
and significant risk to national security as a result of current budget
issues.
How would you characterize the trends of risk in these areas
(whether they are increasing or decreasing)?
Answer. Overall, both strategic risk and military risk are
increasing. I would be happy to discuss risk further in a classified
venue.
Question. What is your current assessment of the risk to combatant
commanders in their ability to successfully execute their operational
plans?
Answer. In an unclassified response I cannot go into much detail.
Generally, however, our combatant commanders face increasing risk.
transformation
Question. Military ``transformation'' has been a broad objective of
the Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War.
In your view, what does military ``transformation'' mean?
Answer. Military transformation involves leveraging new concepts,
organizational constructs, or technologies to fundamentally change the
way we fight. In the end, transformation is about innovating to
maintain a competitive advantage.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress
made by the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Joint Staff, toward transforming the Armed Forces?
Answer. Transformation is more of a journey than a destination. We
can never be satisfied with our progress. I believe we need to energize
our Joint exercise and experimentation efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish
during your term as Chairman regarding military transformation in the
future?
Answer. If confirmed, I would develop a detailed concept for Joint
exercises and experimentation. My initial assessment, from the
perspective of a service chief, is that our operational tempo over the
past decade has adversely impacted us in this area.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role
in transformation? If so, in what ways?
Answer. I believe, consistent within the statutory responsibilities
of the Chairman, that the Joint Staff has a leading role in the
transformation of the Joint Force.
military capabilities in support of defense strategy
Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the
necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014
QDR? Where are areas of higher risk?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense to
ensure that the committee continues to receive a quarterly report in
response to this question. I will personally engage in this area.
Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities
to decisively win in future high-end engagements?
Answer. I believe so from the perspective of my current assignment.
I believe this is an area that requires continuous review.
Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR,
American forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a
large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or
impose unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.''
In your opinion, does the Department's force sizing construct
provide adequate capability to address the country's current threat
environment?
Answer. Yes, the force sizing construct, with its emphasis on a
range of military options, provides adequate capability to address the
country's current threat environment should deterrence fail.
Question. Are the services adequately sized to meet this construct?
The Services are currently able to provide forces to support the
construct to ``defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-
phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or impose unacceptable
costs on--another aggressor in another region.'' Resource constraints,
however, have eroded readiness and extended the timeline by which
forces can be made available to fulfill combatant commanders' requests
and respond to emerging requirements.
Question. What will you advise if the Department cannot meet the
demands placed on it?
Answer. I would advise we carefully prioritize the most important
missions necessary to meet our military objectives and protect our
national security interests. I will also provide the Secretary of
Defense and the President with a clear articulation of risk.
future army
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of January 2012
articulated the need to shift strategic emphasis toward the Asia-
Pacific region while continuing to engage in the Middle East.
Do you agree that future high-end military operations, as
envisioned by the DSG, will primarily be naval and air engagements such
that the Army will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and
cost of the number and equipment its combat formations?
Answer. We cannot predict where or when we will be asked to fight.
Hence, we need a full-spectrum, balanced military force capable of
responding to various threats to our national security.
Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations
or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
strategy and resources?
Answer. In my view, our Nation requires an Army able to conduct
full spectrum operations as part of the Joint Force. The Army is
realigning and resizing consistent with the 2014 QDR. I believe that is
appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of
security strategies and the likely availability of resources?
Answer. As force structure changes are made within both the active
and reserve components, we will continue to assess the impact of these
changes and make adjustments as necessary to ensure we maintain the
health of the force, retain an effective balance of active and reserve
forces, and continue to meet the needs of our strategy.
defense reduction
Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the
following budget reductions on the military, their capability,
capacity, and readiness?
Answer.
Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion
The abrupt, deep cuts resulting from the Budget Control Act forced
our military to make topline-driven decisions, such that we now have a
strategy with little to no margin for surprise. Therefore, we are
operating at higher levels of risk to our defense strategy. To limit
adverse consequences, we need the certainty of a more predictable
funding stream, time to balance force structure, modernization,
compensation, and readiness, and the flexibility to make trade-offs.
Sequestration in fiscal year 2013
The sequestration cuts in fiscal year 2013 reduced already-strained
readiness, which takes resources, principally time and money, to
restore. To date, sequestration has resulted in cuts to training,
exercises, deployments and maintenance, in civilian furloughs and a
hiring freeze, and in disruptions to modernization and force morale. If
sequester continues, our military will be forced to make sharp cuts
with far reaching consequences, including limiting combat power,
further reducing readiness, and rewriting our defense strategy. We are
doing what we can to support our all-volunteer force, as well as
protect necessary funding for our deployed forces and nuclear
enterprise.
Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the
fiscal year 2015 budget, in line with the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review
The fiscal year 2015 budget request assumes higher risks in some
areas, but this budget helps us to remain the world's finest military--
modern and capable even while transitioning to a smaller force and
resetting readiness over time. The $115 billion reduction refers to the
difference between the PB15 (FYDP) submission and the BCA sequestration
levels across fiscal year 2015-19. Funding to the sequester levels
removes the flexibility to respond to emergent challenges (i.e.,
increasingly contested space and cyber domains, a resurgent Russia, the
Ebola response, and the rise of ISIL), while also being able to execute
our defense strategy.
Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps starting
in fiscal year 2016 onward
Question. If sequester level cuts return in fiscal year 2016, then
we will see further increased risks and fewer military options to
defend our Nation and its interests. The impact of sequestration and
other budget constraints will further reduce unit readiness. The
effects caused by deferred maintenance will impose significant strain
on long-term institutional readiness. Ultimately, reduced readiness
(i.e., reduced training cycles, deferred maintenance, and the
continuing pace of current operations) will damage the credibility and
the morale of our military.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control
Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 budget
resolution passed by the Senate and House of Representatives do not
assume this but instead provides $38 billion of the necessary spending
through OCO budget.
Should this funding not be available, what recommendations would
you have, if confirmed, for how the Department of Defense should manage
the $35 billion in cuts for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. Ongoing cuts will threaten our ability to execute the
current defense strategy. Our military remains hopeful that Congress
can once again come together in a manner that avoids the abrupt, deep
cuts of sequestration. We will continue to reduce costs through
efficiencies and reforms, but an fiscal year 2016 budget at BCA cap
levels will create risks requiring a new defense strategy. Should we be
cut $35 billion in fiscal year 2016, we will be forced to further
reduce the size of the force, delay readiness restoral, and reduce
modernization and investment programs.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on readiness?
Answer. These cuts would have a dangerous impact on readiness and
future force generation capability of the Department, which are
critical to our ability to execute the defense strategy. Losing $35
billion from the fiscal year 2016 defense budget would force us to
mortgage ongoing readiness recovery efforts, equipment recapitalization
and force modernization in favor of supporting currently deployed and
next-to-deploy forces, all within a context of expanding global
threats. We rely on sufficient and predictable resourcing to ensure our
military readiness and ability to meet additional operational demands.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have to military capabilities?
Answer. Quite simply, these cuts would make our military smaller
and less capable. We would be forced to disproportionately reduce
funding for operations and maintenance, procurement, RDT&E, and
military construction. Fiscal year 2016 cuts would increase risk,
prolong readiness recovery, and delay necessary modernization programs.
Funding for hundreds of program line items, large and small, will be
significantly reduced. Cuts in funding for research and development
will ultimately slow discovery and advancement, erode the technological
superiority enjoyed by U.S. forces and translate into less desirable
military outcomes in future conflicts.
readiness funding
Question. Given the reductions in readiness funding, what is your
assessment of the current readiness of the Armed Forces to meet
national security requirements across the full spectrum of military
operations?
Answer. The Joint Force's overall readiness remains at levels
posing significant risk to our ability to execute our National Military
Strategy. While specific details cannot be addressed in this
unclassified forum, it is understood that sequestration exacerbated an
already declined state of readiness fueled by sourcing over a decade of
exceptional demand. The Bipartisan Budget Act restored some resources,
and provided much needed fiscal certainty and stability, thereby
preventing further decline in readiness. The Department has since
experienced minor Service readiness gains, which show continued promise
as long as funding and commitments remain constant. However, this
recovery is fragile. Recent gains are dependent on a combination of
recovery time paired with sufficient and predictable resourcing
allowing the Services to rebuild the necessary capabilities for full
spectrum operations.
Question. What is your assessment of the near term trend in the
readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. If current funding levels prevail, I expect the
Department's readiness to remain at significantly-less-than-optimal
levels for the foreseeable future. Any additional operational demands
and/or a loss of resourcing will introduce a significant amount of risk
to ongoing military operations, limit military options the Department
can offer to respond to emerging crises, and increase the Department's
risk in meeting the requirements of our National Security Strategy.
Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration
given the impacts we have already seen to DOD readiness in fiscal year
2013?
Answer. Sufficient and predictable resourcing is absolutely
critical to restoring the Joint Force's ability to provide the full
range of military capabilities at a sufficient capacity required to
meet the challenges posed by today's dynamic international environment.
Current funding and OCO allow the Department to conduct operations at
their present level of commitment. However, recovering to the readiness
posture needed to sustain these operations, meet additional
commitments, and restore our comparative advantages through
modernization will only come from a robust and predictable funding
profile. Without adequate funding, maintaining current operations will
come at the expense of long-term development and sustainment efforts,
thereby exacerbating our readiness challenges.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods
currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of
military equipment?
Answer. The method for funding equipment maintenance is
requirements-driven based on a variety of factors to include: force
structure, operations tempo, schedule, nature and usage rate of the
equipment, and safety. The Services develop detailed maintenance plans
that balance operational availability to the warfighter with
maintenance requirements. However, perturbations in the budget process
and funding uncertainties will have a negative effect on the workload
scheduling at Service depots. These negative effects ripple beyond the
current year and can extend for months and even years.
Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last
several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to
reduce this backlog?
Answer. The Services have relied upon OCO funding to supplement
their equipment maintenance backlogs over the past several years. This
is because OCO was used for deliberate reset of equipment used to
support OIF and OEF combat operations. Also in the past, baseline
funding of maintenance accounts has been at levels below the Services'
enduring requirements. While some level of backlog is normal in the
repair cycle process, shortfalls in baseline funding cause increased
maintenance backlog and drive greater future funding needs. We need
consistent and predictable base budget funding to reduce the
maintenance backlog.
Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance
backlog in order to improve readiness?
Answer. It requires continuous attention. The accumulation of
backlog or deferred maintenance beyond what is manageable may not be
immediately apparent, but it reduces readiness. These manifest as
reduced equipment availability rates, less reliable systems, and
shortened service life.
Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding two or three
years after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all
equipment is reset?
Answer. It remains very important. OCO has been a necessary funding
source to conduct ongoing operations and restore equipment readiness
for future operations. The Services have done well in prioritizing
their equipment for reset and filling shortfalls in deployed and
deploying units. However, much work remains to reduce the accumulated
backlog of scheduled and deferred maintenance. As our operations tempo
remains high, this funding is necessary to fully restore equipment
readiness levels to support the National Security Strategy.
Question. In years past, Congress has based additional readiness
funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists.
However, in recent years those lists have either been nonexistent or
have arrived too late in our markup process.
Do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a
timely manner beginning with the fiscal year 2017 budget request?
Answer. I will always strive to be compliant with Congressional
direction.
defense acquisition reform
Question. Congress is considering a number of acquisition reform
measures designed to reduce the costs and development timelines of
major systems, and to streamline access to innovative commercial
technologies and systems.
What are your views regarding acquisition reform and the need for
improvements in the Defense acquisition process?
Answer. I am a strong proponent of acquisition reform based upon
the following key principals:
a. The responsibility and authority for acquisition system
outcomes should be clearly identified within the DOD;
b. The requirements' sponsor should be an integral part of
delivering needed capability and remains accountable throughout the
acquisition process, and;
c. There is a continued effort to reduce overhead and increase
efficiencies across defense acquisition.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. I would work with the Department leadership and the
Congress to bring about necessary reform.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is warranted given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. I am concerned that acquisition, procurement, and
operations and support costs will continue their historic growth
profiles, further exacerbating shortfalls under a sequestered budget.
Although recent cost and schedule trends have shown improvement, we
will continue to scrub our processes, including our warfighter
requirements, to ensure they are aligned with strategy and available
resources.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. I will partner with Secretary Carter to refine our
processes, and work closely with our combatant commanders and the
Services to mitigate cost growth on our highest priority investments. I
will continue to drive the requirements process to consider cost-
informed performance tradeoffs to assist in mitigating cost and
schedule growth perturbations across our investment accounts and
advocate for versatile capabilities that are both affordable and
sustainable.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and
prioritized?
Answer. As the Department's senior validation authority for joint
military requirements, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
continues to make improvements to the Joint Capability Integration
Development System (JCIDS). These refinements to JCIDS ensure the
appropriate rigor in validating realistic, technically achievable,
prioritized, and cost-informed requirements. If confirmed, the
necessary refinements to the requirements process will continue during
my tenure as Chairman.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that resources are programmed for acquisition programs that are
consistent with their cost estimates and schedules?
Answer. If confirmed, I will participate in the Department's
program and budget process, and advocate for major system resource
allocation consistent with the Secretary's cost and schedule position.
Question. What should the role of the combatant commanders, Service
Chiefs, Service Acquisition Executives, and Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics be in the acquisition process?
Answer. The role the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs play
today in the requirements generation process is crucial to the success
of the acquisition process. Likewise, their proactive engagement with
the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) and the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) throughout the
acquisition life-cycle ensures that major systems stay relevant, timely
and cost-effective. USD(AT&L)'s role in reviewing Service plans at
discrete milestones associated with major Department resource
commitments ensures programs are affordable and executable, and that
they follow sound business and risk management practices. This role
should continue in conjunction with the efforts of the Service
Acquisition Executives.
Question. Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that
should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or Service Secretaries in the
acquisition process?
Answer. I am supportive of current efforts that would provide
additional authority and accountability to the Services as long as it
does not undermine the statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of
Defense. Any potential changes should hold the Services accountable and
streamline the bureaucratic processes involved.
tactical fighter programs
Question. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the
largest and most expensive acquisition program in the Department's
history, and was formally initiated as a program of record in 2002,
with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the U.S. The program has
not yet completed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase,
and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after
its inception. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be
procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total
quantity buy.
The requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years
ago; do you believe that requirement is still valid in light of
countervailing pressure to reduce force structure to conserve resources
and to improve capability to respond to prospective adversary
technological advances and increased capabilities with regard to
establishing contested combat environments, combined with updated
threat assessments and an evolving national defense strategy?
Answer. With projected adversarial threats challenging our current
capabilities in coming years, the Joint Strike Fighter is a vital
component of our effort to ensure the Joint Force maintains dominance
in the air. Given the evolving defense strategy and the latest Defense
Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest strategic
foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number.
Until the analysis is complete, we need to pursue the current scheduled
quantity buy to preclude creating an overall near-term tactical fighter
shortfall.
Question. Do you believe the Nation can afford to procure these
aircraft at a cost of $12B to $15B per year for nearly the next 20
years for an aircraft design that will be 30 years old at the
completion of the program procurement phase?
Answer. Fifth-generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35, are
critical as we contend with the technological advancements of near-peer
competitors. We must ensure that we do not allow shortfalls in fighter
capability or capacity to develop. The Department has been working
diligently to make the overall cost per F-35 more affordable.
Additionally, there will continue to be critical updates throughout the
life cycle of the F-35 that will ensure the platform maintains a
tactical advantage.
Question. Do you believe the Department's current and planned force
mix of short-range fighters and long-range strike aircraft, whether
land- or maritime-based, is sufficient to meet current and future
threats around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific
theater of operations where the ``tyranny of distance'' is such a major
factor?
Answer. The Department continually assesses our ability to meet
current and future threats, especially concerning short-range fighters
and long-range aircraft. Over the past three years, DOD has made
significant progress in developing new alliance initiatives, securing
new rotational access for U.S. forces, and enhancing both the quantity
and quality of U.S. forces and capabilities in the Pacific region. The
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region is an important component of our
effort to ensure we are postured to address the ``tyranny of distance''
and succeed militarily if required.
Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying
S. 1376, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,
would require the Secretary of Defense to assess the current
requirement for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter total program of record
quantity, and then to revalidate that quantity or identify a new
requirement for the total number of F-35 aircraft the Department would
ultimately procure.
What will be your role in assisting the Secretary to revalidate the
F-35 total program quantity?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advise the Secretary as he assesses
the delicate balance of the capacity and the capabilities of the future
Joint Force. This advice will be informed by the extent to which the F-
35 program conforms to the priority requirements identified by
combatant commanders and the Department's strategic plans.
Question. The Air Force has proposed several times over the last
decades to retire the A-10 close air support aircraft fleet, but each
time Congress has rejected the proposals due to lack of a sufficient
replacement capability. The Air Force's latest proposals to retire the
fleet in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 were again rejected by Congress.
Do you believe a need exists for a dedicated capability to provide
close air support for American troops in close quarters battles?
Answer. I believe America's troops in close quarters battles must
have effective close air support.
Question. What will be your role in ensuring our land forces
receive the air support they'll need to survive and succeed while
fighting the nation's land battles?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense concerning our ability to deliver effective air support to
the Joint Force.
The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F-
35 would be the nation's last manned fighter aircraft.
Question. Do you believe this to be true?
Answer. While robotic and autonomous systems technology has
advanced greatly over the past decade, I believe it is premature to
rule out manned fighter aircraft without a more thorough analysis of
the technologies currently available, as well as those likely to be
available in the future. Decisions about future platforms should also
take into consideration the threats our aircraft will face and their
required missions.
Question. If so, what will be your role in leading capabilities and
requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat
systems in the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to lead the ongoing
development of a joint concept for robotics and autonomous systems.
This concept will establish a vision to establish capability
requirements and to guide the subsequent development, fielding, and
employment of robotics and autonomous technology in the Joint Force.
Question. If not, how do you see the future balance developing
between manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Department's future
force structure?
Answer. I expect that the rapid growth in robotic and autonomous
systems technology we have seen in the past decade will only increase
in the coming years for all weapons systems, not only combat aircraft.
With this growth will come opportunities for increased capability
across the Joint Force through the complimentary use of manned and
remotely operated systems. The Joint Staff is currently developing a
Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems that will help guide
the Joint Force as it incorporates these new technologies and
determines how to balance manned and remotely operated systems to
maximize effectiveness.
space
Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
ensure access to space. As a Nation heavily dependent on space assets
for both military and economic advantage, the United States has to make
protection of space assets became a national priority.
Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
space assets now has the appropriate level of national security
priority?
Answer. No. Both are in need of attention in order to securely and
effectively project U.S. military power.
Question. In your view, how should China's continued development of
space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
Answer. China is rapidly developing space capabilities of its own
that both mirror U.S. capabilities and could threaten our access and
use of space for national security purposes. If confirmed, I will
review our efforts to address China's developments in space, and will
coordinate closely with the Secretary of Defense.
Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National
Security space policy and programs?
If confirmed, I will continue to review our policies and programs
to ensure U.S. warfighters can continue to depend on having the
advantages that space confers.
access to radio frequency spectrum
Question. What actions would you take to ensure that the Department
continues to have access to radiofrequency spectrum that is necessary
to train and to conduct its operations?
Answer. Overall, it is recognized that electromagnetic spectrum
superiority is essential to all joint operations, and spectrum has
become increasingly important to the Department's missions. Spectrum is
also critical to the economy of the nation. If confirmed, I will
continue to work diligently with the Interagency and industry on
spectrum sharing in order to ensure that the Department maintains
assured access to the spectrum necessary to train and conduct
operations, while enabling access for commercial broadband.
Additionally, Public Law 106-65 (National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000) requires the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that any
alternative band or bands to be substituted for spectrum currently used
by DOD provide ``comparable technical characteristics to restore
essential military capability that will be lost as a result of the band
of frequencies to be so surrendered.'' Preserving this provision is
absolutely necessary to ensure that DOD maintains access to spectrum
necessary to operate critical military capabilities.
strategic systems
Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
rest of the DOD commitments?
Answer. The strategic, operational and fiscal environments we face
pose significant challenges for the Department of Defense. The
modernization of strategic delivery systems and the sustainment of the
strategic nuclear enterprise are important to maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I support the continued
investment in sustainment and modernization as a priority for defense
spending. I am, of course, concerned about the impact of future budget
resource reductions on our ability to meet these requirements.
Therefore, if confirmed, I plan to continue to request budget
certainty, stability, and flexibility to ensure we continue to
modernize and sustain our nuclear capabilities, while balancing DOD
priority commitments.
Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and
replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?
Answer. Yes.
missile defense in the boost phase
Question. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) mission is to develop,
test, and field an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system
to defend the United States and its allies against all ranges of enemy
ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. While MDA is conducting
research into next generation laser concepts that could be mounted on
high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, there is no program of record
designed to intercept missiles during the boost phase of flight, when
they are potentially most vulnerable.
Do you agree with the Commander of Northern Command, when he said
on April 7, 2015, referring to missile threats that ``we need to be
able to start knocking them down in the boost phase . . . and not rely
on the midcourse phase where we are today?''
Answer. Yes. We should continue to support research and design
efforts to defeat threats in the boost phase if operationally,
technically and economically practical. Current capabilities are
limited to denial in the midcourse and beyond phases; we need to look
for solutions across the entire ballistic missile kill chain. The
science shows a ballistic missile is comparatively easy to detect and
track while boosting. Further, countermeasures on a missile, such as
decoys designed to distract defensive systems, are not typically
deployed until after the booster burns out. As such, boost-phase
intercept is an attractive missile defense alternative.
Question. Would you support an increase in the priority of
technology investments to develop and deploy a boost phase airborne
laser weapon system for missile defense in the next decade, if
technically practicable?
Answer. Yes, but only if operationally, technically and
economically practical. The current budget supports pursuit of a laser
demonstrator. A laser potentially would be capable of acquiring,
tracking, and eventually destroying an enemy missile at a much lower
cost than existing systems.
dod's cooperative threat reduction program
Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is
focused historically on accounting for, securing or eliminating Cold
War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and materials in the states
of the former Soviet Union, has started to expand its focus to other
countries. With this expansion the CTR program is widening its focus to
biological weapons and capabilities including biological surveillance
and early warning; and encouraging development of capabilities to
reduce proliferation threats.
Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S.
government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
Department?
Answer. I understand that the Departments of State, Energy, and
Defense in conjunction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the
Combatant Commands, make extensive efforts to conduct both formal and
informal coordination across the different WMD threat reduction efforts
on a regular basis. These efforts also include placement of DTRA
liaison officers at U.S. Embassies where significant activities take
place.
Question. About 60 percent of CTR resources are proposed for
biological programs.
With the very real threat of chemical weapons use and/or
proliferation as we saw in Libya and are seeing in Syria, why is there
such a large percentage of resources directed toward biological issues?
Answer. The DOD CTR Program remains postured to eliminate state-
based WMD programs, including chemical weapons programs, if
opportunities arise. At the same time, current scientific, economic,
and demographic trends are magnifying the risks posed by outbreaks of
infectious diseases of security concern, whether they are the result of
a laboratory accident, a bioterror attack, or natural transmission.
Such events are difficult to contain, pose a high threat to the health
of U.S. citizens, drain economic resources and can potentially
undermine geopolitical stability. As seen with the Ebola Virus Disease
outbreak, due to the ease and speed of global travel, a bio-incident
anywhere in the world may lead to dangerous regional and global
security consequences when states are unable to provide basic services
for their citizens, potentially creating environments enabling
terrorists to act with impunity and increasing the risk of pathogens of
security concern being stolen or diverted due to insecure storage.
prompt global strike
Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the
United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike
prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike
capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global
strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
security in the near future?
Answer. Future circumstances may require the capability to address
high value, time sensitive, and well-defended targets from outside the
range of current conventional technology. I support the continued
exploration of alternatives to existing strike system technologies and
operational concepts to address these threats. The joint requirements
process will continue to evaluate the alternatives to make informed
recommendations for capability development balancing potential
operational employment against costs.
Question. What approach (e.g. land-based or sea-based or both) to
implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if
confirmed?
Answer. I would expect to continue support of a sea-based approach
as articulated in established joint requirements. If confirmed, I will
monitor the review of potential alternatives that support this
capability.
Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
capability?
Answer. In an unclassified response, I cannot go into much detail.
If confirmed, I will seek to better understand and identify the
capability improvements necessary to address any intelligence gaps
discovered in the development this requirement.
nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the
continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges, if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and
reliability of the stockpile?
Answer. To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, we must
prudently manage our stockpile and related warhead Life Extension
Programs. Our success in executing these programs will largely depend
on our people and our infrastructure. We must recruit and retain our
next-generation workforce capable of certifying the stockpile without
underground testing. We must maintain and modernize the nuclear weapon
infrastructure to ensure we have the full range of capabilities
available to produce components required for our Life Extension
Programs.
Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing? What
considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?
Answer. Any decision to resume underground nuclear testing should
not be taken lightly. I would strongly consider recommendations from
the Department of Energy and the National Laboratory Directors before
making my recommendation to the Secretary and President. If confirmed,
I am committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the
critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the
safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile without underground
testing if practicable.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. Yes, funding the President's plan for sustaining and
modernizing our nuclear weapons delivery platforms, sustaining a safe,
secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, and modernizing the
nuclear weapons infrastructure is a critical national security
priority. Our nuclear deterrent is the nation's top military priority.
The President's plan for modernizing the complex aligns funding with
this priority.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
Treaty limits in the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes, I believe it is prudent to consider options for future
reductions below New START Treaty limits, both in the deployed
stockpile and in non-deployed weapons. However, I strongly believe that
any further reductions should be accomplished ``hand-in-hand'' with
Russia and focus on measures that will maintain or strengthen
deterrence of adversaries, assurance of our Allies and partners, and
strategic stability.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the non-
deployed hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. I support reducing the size of the stockpile consistent
with deterrence objectives and warfighter requirements. The United
States retains a force of non-deployed nuclear warheads to hedge
against technical failure and geopolitical developments that might
alter our assessment of U.S. deployed force requirements. Completion of
life-extension programs that improve safety, security and reliability
of the stockpile and infrastructure modernization efforts that improve
responsiveness may provide opportunities to change the non-deployed
hedge while still effectively managing stockpile risk.
countering the islamic state of iraq and the levant in iraq & syria
Question. To ``degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group
known as ISIL'' the Department of Defense seeks to deny ISIL safe-haven
and build partner capacity.
If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate ISIL
degradation and what is your assessment of the progress to degrade ISIL
in Iraq and in Syria?
Answer. I view ISIL's inability to hold key terrain and lines of
communication, and ISIL's failure to resupply or refit its fighters as
indicators of degraded capability. I would additionally consider the
rate at which ISIL recruits and replaces fighters on the battlefield. I
would also view large groups of displaced persons returning to their
homes and working to restore their former way of life, in cities like
Tikrit, as another positive indicator of degraded ISIL influence. DOD
will continue to work closely with the U.S. Intelligence Community,
using its databases and analytic tools to run assessments on these and
other indicators as necessary.
If confirmed, I will visit the region to make a personal assessment
of our progress in degrading ISIL in Iraq and Syria.
Question. A large part of the support for ISIL and other violent
extremist groups like al Nusrah by the local Syrian population is based
on the fact that these groups seek to remove President Assad from
power.
What limitations, if any, do we face by failing to have the removal
of Assad as an objective in Syria?
Answer. President Assad's policies contributed to the rise of ISIL
and limits effective C-ISIL operations in Syria today.
Question. In Iraq, what is the importance of arming the Sunni
tribes in Anbar province to degrading ISIL and how do you assess
progress to date? What is your understanding of the current plan to
train and equip Sunni fighters to help in the campaign against ISIL?
Answer. Support to Sunni tribes is an important component of the
effort to defeat ISIL. Sunni tribal fighters have the potential to be a
credible ground force, and are necessary to protect Iraqis in Anbar and
other Sunni-dominant areas. PM Abadi and the GoI have made some
progress in mobilizing Sunni tribes, supported by our efforts at
airbases like Al Asad and Al Taqaddum. Much additional work remains.
Question. What is your assessment of the fall of Ramadi to ISIL
last month and what adjustments, if any, to U.S. and coalition strategy
do you believe need to be made?
Answer. Ramadi was a tactical setback, and it shows that ISIL is an
agile and adaptive adversary. CENTCOM and the Iraqis have learned from
this setback, and are adjusting the implementation of the strategy
accordingly. If confirmed, I'll review the military campaign to make
sure it will allow the non-military lines of effort the time and space
they need to succeed. This will be a long campaign.
Question. What is your assessment of the coalition air campaign in
Iraq and Syria and what adjustments, if any, do you think need to be
made?
Answer. The Coalition air campaign is making some progress toward
degrading ISIL's military capabilities and disrupting key ISIL enablers
like oil production and communications. These efforts limit ISIL's
freedom of movement, constrain its ability to recruit and reinforce its
fighters, and impede its command and control. Coalition air support has
enabled some key achievements for local forces, including ISF efforts
to clear Tikrit and the recent success of anti-ISIL forces who took
control of Tal Abyad. The air campaign is creating time and space for
our ongoing diplomatic and political efforts and the development of
credible ground partners in Iraq and Syria.
If confirmed, I will consult with commanders on the ground and make
recommendations on how to improve our effectiveness.
Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi
security forces to respond to the threat posed by ISIL and other
security challenges?
Answer. Our strategy is dependent upon having a trained, capable,
and motivated partner on the ground. We have seen that with effective
training, equipping, command and control, and Coalition air support,
Iraqi and Kurdish forces can fight and achieve success against ISIL.
However, it will take time to repair the damage caused by sectarian
policies and corrosive leadership and to build the capability and
capacity of our Iraqi partners on the ground. If confirmed, one of my
first trips will be to Iraq to assess the current situation for myself.
Question. What lessons do you assess need to be taken from the
fighting in Tikrit in March and April of this year?
Answer. We learned that Iraqi forces supported by Coalition air
power have the potential to achieve success against ISIL. Iraqi leaders
learned that Iranian support comes with conditions, and that there is
no substitute for U.S. power.
Question. Does the current troop limitation of 3,100 give U.S.
commanders, in conjunction with Iraqi security forces, Kurdish
Peshmerga, tribal and local security forces, and coalition partners, in
Iraq enough capability to successfully degrade and ultimately destroy
ISIL?
Answer. I think our troop levels, including the recent addition of
another 450 troops in al Taqqadum, is sufficient for us to advance the
strategy's two military lines of effort in the near term. However, as
conditions change on the ground, it may become necessary to adjust how
we implement the military campaign. In the long term, the success of
our advisory forces' efforts must be matched by the commitment and
capacity of credible Iraqi ground partners in order to degrade ISIL.
Our Iraqi partners must own this fight, and we must continue to enable
their forces.
Question. What do you see as the principle role or roles of the
Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq?
Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation is the Department's
primary interlocutor for traditional security assistance and
cooperation, in support of the U.S. Embassy. OSC-I, along with the
Foreign Military Sales program, enables military programs to enhance
the professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces.
Question. What is your assessment of the success of the current
strategy against ISIL?
Answer. We are only in month nine of a long campaign, but we have
seen that well-led and determined Iraqi forces supported by Coalition
air power potentially can have success against ISIL. Iraqi and Kurdish
forces in Iraq and Syria have repelled ISIL advances in several towns,
halted their advances following large-scale attacks, and cleared and
secured lines of communication, which disrupts ISIL's ability to
replenish combat power and supplies.
Militarily, we are making moderate progress. ISIL has lost ground
overall since the beginning our campaign. However, the current strategy
depends on the development of reliable ground partners and on progress
toward inclusive political systems in Iraq and Syria. If we get an
indication that the other lines of effort cannot make the necessary
progress, we should re-examine the strategy. Any enduring solution to
the challenge that ISIL and other VEOs pose requires a generational
effort, and our military efforts must be part of a whole of government
approach.
Question. Do you assess that the training and equipping of Syrian
opposition fighters by the United States and coalition partners under
section 1209 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA will produce enough fighters
to make a strategic difference on the battlefield in Syria?
Answer. The outcome of the T&E program remains to be seen, but we
face significant challenges in recruiting and vetting suitable
volunteers at the scale necessary to have strategic effects. If
confirmed, I plan to visit the region and assess our approach in Syria
to develop a better understanding of this immensely complex and
challenging situation.
Question. In your view, what military support, if any, will the
Syrian opposition fighters who receive support under section 1209 of
the fiscal year 2015 NDAA need from the United States and coalition
partners when they return to Syria?
Answer. We will provide equipment, such as basic military gear,
some mobility assets in the form of trucks and vehicles, and small arms
and ammunition so that they can better defend themselves. The United
States is committed to the success of the personnel we train, and we
have legal and ethical responsibilities to support them. We are still
considering the full complement of assistance we might provide to the
T&E forces.
Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-
combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and
post-combat operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. Iraq demonstrated that decisions about the drawdown and
post-combat operations in Afghanistan should be based on conditions on
the ground, with the flexibility to make adjustments as those
conditions evolve. In addition, the drawdown from Iraq shows that
whole-of-government cooperation is required to sustain security gains.
We learned that U.S. forces can only mitigate the effects of security
threats that are fueled by underlying political or sectarian problems.
Ultimately, it is critical to have credible and capable local partners.
afghanistan campaign
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the Resolute
Support mission in Afghanistan?
Answer. The initial forward momentum of the Resolute Support
mission has been stymied by delays in forming the full new 25-member
Afghan cabinet. In general, the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF) are better trained and equipped than insurgent forces,
and continue to demonstrate tactical proficiency as they work together
across the security pillars. The ANDSF's most critical gaps remain in
aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all linked to the
ANDSF's targeting capability. These gaps will endure for some time,
even with the addition of key enablers. RS advisors are also working to
address developmental shortfalls in the areas of logistics, medical
support, and counter-IED exploitation.
Question. In May of 2014 President Obama said `` . . . by the end
of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in
Kabul . . . ''
What is your understanding of what military forces comprise a
``normal embassy presence''?
Answer. A normal embassy presence will have counter-terrorism and
security operation components; it will consist of a Defense Attache
Office, an Office of Security Cooperation, and a special operations
element. A deliberate and measured transfer of enduring security
cooperation activities is required to maintain continuity of ANDSF
development and maintain our relationship with Afghanistan as an
enduring counter-terrorism partner. Planning for this presence is
underway at CENTCOM and its size will depend upon factors such as
security force assistance objectives, ANDSF capabilities, Afghan
government requests, and force protection concerns.
Question. What lessons should we learn from the experience of a
calendar-based drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq as applied to the
drawdown of U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan?
Answer. We have learned that transitions must be conducted in a
manner that properly balances our end state with conditions on the
ground.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. I support our overall approach in Afghanistan. If
confirmed, I will visit Afghanistan to make an assessment of our
current progress toward achieving our objectives. That visit will
inform any recommendations I may make for changes to our strategy.
Question. What is the effect of ISIL operations in Afghanistan and/
or coordination with the Taliban for the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan?
Answer. ISIL is a competitor with other groups that have
traditionally operated in Afghanistan, which may result in increased
violence between the various extremist groups. The Taliban has declared
that it will not allow ISIL in Afghanistan. The coalition and the
Afghan government are closely watching ISIL's attempt to expand its
reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ANDSF, National Directorate of
Security (NDS), and Afghan political leadership are also collaborating
closely to prevent this threat from expanding.
Question. If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan
degrade in 2016, would you recommend to the President revisions to the
size and pace of the drawdown plan in order to adequately address those
security conditions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Should the authorities granted to the commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan take into account the security conditions on the
ground faced by U.S. troops?
Answer. Yes.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)
and what recommendations would you make to address challenges to
building ANSF capacity?
Answer. My assessment is that the ANDSF are strong at the tactical
level and still needs assistance at the corps and institutional levels.
They still need help in developing the systems and processes necessary
to run a modern, professional army and police force. They also need
sustained support in addressing capability gaps in aviation,
intelligence, sustainment, and special operations. To address these
gaps, our advisory mission and mentorship will continue to be vital.
Our advisors are at the security ministries, at the army corps level,
and in the police zones--those remain our main efforts.
Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF
at 352,000 personnel and, if so, what factors influence your
recommendation about the proper size of the ANSF?
Answer. Yes, for the near-term the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
Afghan National Police (ANP) are the right size and possess the right
capabilities to address the security situation in Afghanistan. Long-
term, we will need to evaluate and assess the threat and security
situation, and work with the Afghan government to right size the force
to a level consistent with its long term security requirements and
funding limitations.
reconciliation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and
other insurgent groups?
Answer. The United States should continue to support a political
process that enables Afghans to sit down with other Afghans to
determine the future of their country.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
take to advance the reconciliation process?
Answer. We remain strongly supportive of an Afghan-led and Afghan-
owned reconciliation process whereby the Taliban and the Afghan
government engage in talks toward a settlement to resolve the conflict
in Afghanistan.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process?
Answer. We believe regional partners have an important role to play
in ensuring a stable, democratic Afghanistan. We have encouraged
stronger ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan and have been pleased
with their recent bilateral efforts to address their security concerns.
An audit report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised concerns about Department of Defense
plans to purchase PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan
Special Mission Wing and recommended suspending the contracts for these
purchases. The Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Training Mission--Afghanistan/ Combined Security
Transition Command--Afghanistan did not concur with the SIGAR's
recommendation on contract suspension.
Question. What is your assessment of current plans to equip the
Afghan Special Mission Wing with PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?
Answer. These programs are long term and are moving in the right
direction and will have a significant impact on ANDSF's ability to
provide security to Afghanistan. If confirmed, however, I will assess
all options to support the Special Mission Wing (SMW). With the ANDSF
assuming full responsibility for security, and an associated
significant decrease in coalition air support, the demand for air
support in the form of ISR, airlift, aerial fires, and CASEVAC is
likely to increase significantly.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact to effectiveness of
current Afghanistan counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts of
the PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?
Answer. Both the Mi-17s and PC-12s have enhanced the ANDSF's
capability to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations. The Mi-17 fleet remains the workhorse of the Afghan Air
Force (AAF), conducting personnel transport, CASEVAC, resupply, close
combat attack, aerial escort, and armed overwatch missions. The SMW
uses its Mi-17 helicopters to provide Afghan special forces with
medium-lift air assault, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and quick
reaction force capabilities. The PC-12 aircraft is Afghanistan's first
fixed-wing ISR platform, and it has expanded the SMW's capability to
locate and identify threats using enhanced video and other intelligence
collection capabilities. These platforms have improved the SMW's
ability to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield, provide
mission overwatch during the infiltration and exfiltration of forces,
and gain access to areas prohibitive of vehicular traffic. Both of
these aircraft provide the ANDSF with increased capabilities to
overmatch the Taliban.
u.s. strategic relationship with pakistan
Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
with regard to Pakistan?
Answer. The key U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan are 1)
preventing al-Qaeda's resurgence in Afghanistan and Pakistan to limit
its ability to attack the homeland, 2) preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and technology, and 3) promoting regional stability
(including a peaceful outcome in Afghanistan).
Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic
interest between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. The United States and Pakistan share the common strategic
interests of defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist threats, ensuring
regional stability, and furthering the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons and technology. We also share the goal of a stable peaceful
Afghanistan.
Question. In what areas do you see U.S. and Pakistani strategic
interests diverging?
Answer. Areas of divergent interest with Pakistan include our views
on the use of proxies and the importance of a positive and stable
Pakistan-India relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
military relations?
Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is fundamental to our vital
national security interests. We will need to continue cooperation with
Pakistan to defeat al-Qaeda, support Pakistan's stability, and achieve
a lasting peace in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would continue to
evaluate the specifics of the relationship based on my assessment of
our shared interests with Pakistan and its effectiveness of achieving
our shared goals. I will continue to evaluate the efficacy of the mil-
to-mil cooperation we have with Pakistan and identify ways in which we
can work with Pakistan to enhance regional stability.
u.s. assistance to pakistan
Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has
provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
As U.S. troop presence draws down in Afghanistan, what
recommendations, if any, would you have regarding the reduction or
cessation of Coalition Support Funds that currently reimburse Pakistan
for military support in connection with U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan?
Answer. Pakistan has been, and remains, the largest recipient of
CSF. It is in our interests to have an enduring partnership with
Pakistan. As our mission in Afghanistan transitions, there remains a
need for our mutually beneficial relationship. If confirmed, I will
provide military advice and recommendations regarding our support for
their operations based on my assessment of Pakistan's effectiveness and
the larger strategic environment. .
Question. In your view, how effective has the assistance and other
support that the United States has provided to Pakistan been in
promoting U.S. interests?
Answer. Our assistance has enabled operations in Afghanistan and
operations against al-Qaeda and helped secure our strategic interests.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Pakistani military to
ensure that they continue to do more.
Question. Do you support conditioning U.S. assistance and other
support to Pakistan on Pakistan's continued cooperation in areas of
mutual security interest?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. The current relationship appears to have improved since the
election of President Ghani. It is clear that security in Afghanistan
and Pakistan are linked. Both sides are working to ensure that concrete
steps are taken to enhance their bi-lateral relationship and
cooperation.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's cooperation with
the United States in counterterrorism operations against militant
extremist groups located in Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in our
operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Their
actions in North Waziristan and other areas of western Pakistan have
disrupted groups that are a threat to U.S. personnel and objectives in
Afghanistan. We will continue to work with Pakistan to do more.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to maintain
transit and provide security along the ground lines of communication
(GLOCs) through Pakistan?
Answer. The GLOCs are open and Pakistan's support has been
commendable. We currently rely on multiple lines of communication, to
include the Pakistani GLOCs to support operations in Afghanistan and do
not foresee any issues that would constrain our ability to operate.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to counter
the threat improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack
the network, go after known precursors and explosive materials?
Answer. Pakistan recognizes that improvised explosive devices (IED)
are a shared problem. They suffer significant casualties within
Pakistan due to IED attacks. We are making progress in the area of
counter-IED cooperation, and Pakistan is taking demonstrable steps to
disrupt the IED network, to include placing new restrictions on the
distribution of precursor materials and hosting regional discussions to
discuss the IED problem with international partners. More progress
needs to be made though, particularly as it relates to interdicting
explosives through increased border security.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the military and political
threat posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran, the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, is both a
regional and global security threat. Iran attempts to export its
influence and protect its governing regime through support for proxy
terrorist groups like Hezbollah; weapons trafficking; ballistic missile
procurement and advancement; and maritime assets that threaten and
harass international waters in the Straits of Hormuz and beyond.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat of Iran's influence
in Iraq to U.S. interests?
Answer. Iran's goals and actions are inconsistent with our
interests. Iran's goal in Iraq is not to build an inclusive government;
rather, it is to create a compliant, Shia-dominated buffer state.
Question. In your view, what are the risks, if any, associated with
reducing U. S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. Reducing our presence in the Middle East could leave space
for Iran to pursue its hegemonic goals. U.S. military presence gives
credibility to the military options in the Middle East that both
demonstrate our commitment to our regional security partners and deters
Iran from employing its large conventional army or ballistic missiles
and from interdicting the Strait of Hormuz. Nothing we say can match
the message we deliver with our military presence or lack thereof.
Question. Negotiations on the Iran nuclear program have been
extended with a deadline now of June 30, 2015 to finalize a
comprehensive agreement. What are the elements of a nuclear agreement
with Iran that you consider critical to ensuring that it is a ``good''
deal for U.S. national security interests?
Answer. A good deal rolls back Iran's nuclear program; provides the
international community with unprecedented access and transparency into
Iran's nuclear facilities and nuclear supply chain; and preserves
critical sanctions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles. A
finalized deal based on the 02 April political framework satisfies all
three of these criteria and clearly makes it more difficult for Iran to
move towards a nuclear weapon.
Question. If Iran is allowed to maintain a monitored and limited
uranium enrichment program, do you believe that other states in the
region may seek to develop enrichment programs of their own and why or
why not?
Answer. Any response I would make at this time would be
speculation. If confirmed, I will make an assessment based on
intelligence and my engagement with regional partners.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering Iran's
support of international terrorism?
Answer. The DOD's role is to deter and counter Iran's support of
international terrorism and support our interagency partners' efforts.
We deter Iran through our own responsive military presence in the
Middle East and through defensive infrastructure and tactics for both
ourselves and our allies. To counter Iran, we enable our partner
nations through counter terrorism training and equipment sales, multi-
national exercises, and information sharing, which when combined help
to both weaken terrorist groups and Iran's ability to support them.
the 2001 authorization for use of military force
Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), including with
respect to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant?
Answer. The United States is in an armed conflict against al-Qaeda
and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group
that (1) is an organized armed group that has entered the fight
alongside al-Qaeda and, (2) is a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These
are the same terrorist threats that carried out the grievous attacks on
U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal
basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these
threats. Since September 2014, the Administration has stated that the
2001 AUMF is interpreted to permit the use of military force against
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL, previously known
as al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been subject to the use of force under the
AUMF since at least 2004, when it entered the conflict against the
United States and joined Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization. While
there are tensions between ISIL and parts of bin Laden's al-Qaeda
network, ISIL views itself as the true executor of bin Laden's legacy
of global jihad, and continues its violent campaign against the United
States, its citizens, and interests.
Question. What factors govern Department of Defense determinations
as to where the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant
to the AUMF?
Answer. The May, 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governs
direct action against terrorist targets located outside the United
States and areas of active hostilities. This document establishes the
procedures necessary for the DOD to conduct these types of military
operations. The PPG and its underlying operational plans provide clear
standards and procedures for DOD concerning where, how, and against
whom military force may be used. The DOD meticulously adheres to the
formalized procedures of the PPG to ensure that decisions in these
counter-terrorist operations are informed by sound military and policy
advice, and are based the most up-to-date intelligence and the
expertise of our national security professionals. Senior commanders,
with the advice of their legal counsel, carefully review all operations
for compliance with U.S. and international law before a decision is
rendered by the Secretary of Defense or the President.
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary
and appropriate?
Answer. In its current form, the 2001 AUMF provides the necessary
and sufficient authorities to counter al-Qaeda and its associated
forces. Furthermore, the 2001 AUMF and the 2002 AUMF provide statutory
authority for the current operations against ISIL.
islamic state in iraq and the levant (isil)
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by ISIL to
the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more
broadly?
Answer. ISIL is currently focused on strengthening and expanding
its self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria and, to a lesser extent,
on strengthening its affiliates in Libya and Nigeria. If ISIL were to
refocus its efforts on attacking the U.S. homeland or other Western
countries, it would have access to a pool of operatives from which to
draw. ISIL already poses a threat to the U.S. and Western interests
abroad, particularly U.S. persons traveling in the region.
Question. How would you describe the U.S. strategy to counter ISIL?
Answer. We have a whole-of-government strategy. The ``ends'' are
defined as degrading ISIL over the course of 36 months and ultimately
defeating ISIL, in coordination with the international coalition. Nine
lines of effort across the USG constitute the ``ways'' in which we will
achieve that objective, including supporting effective governance in
Iraq, disrupting ISIL's finances, disrupting the flow of foreign
fighters, and protecting the homeland. DOD is responsible for two of
those lines of effort: to deny ISIL safe haven and to build partner
capacity. The Department's ``means'' include: kinetic strike
operations, advise/assist operations, training/equipping efforts, and
our military posture in the region.
The military campaign, as one component of the broader strategy,
provides time and space for progress along the other lines of effort,
particularly the development of inclusive and legitimate governments in
Iraq and Syria.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of that
strategy in achieving its objectives?
Answer. We are seeing some military progress, but it is early in
the campaign. In both Iraq and Syria, ISIL's ability to mass and
maneuver forces is degraded, its leadership cells are pressured, and
its command-and-control and supply lines are being severed. We have
reduced ISIL's ability to produce, process, and transport oil. However,
challenges remain, and this will be a long campaign.
The current strategy depends on the development of reliable ground
partners and on progress toward inclusive political systems in Iraq and
Syria. If we get an indication that the other lines of effort cannot
make the necessary progress, we should re-examine the strategy. Any
enduring solution to the challenge that ISIL and other VEOs pose
requires a generational effort, and our military efforts must be part
of a whole of government approach.
Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to
implementing the strategy to counter ISIL?
Answer. Poor governance and sectarian divisions create the greatest
challenge to our efforts to counter ISIL. Political systems that foster
inclusive and legitimate governance remain the most likely path to
enduring stability and security in Iraq and Syria over the long-term.
Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend be made
to the strategy to counter ISIL?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the military lines of effort to
ensure that they are providing the time and space necessary for the
non-military lines of effort to succeed. I also will evaluate the
efficacy of our efforts to train and equip security forces in Iraq and
Syria, and assess whether we can make adjustments to increase their
effectiveness. A final area I would examine is whether and how we would
need to adjust our efforts to respond to ISIL's shifting geographic
reach to confront ISIL not only where it exists today, but also where
it is most likely to take root in the future, As with any strategy, I
expect that continued assessment and refinement of both the strategy
and its implementation is ongoing. As a key component of the overall
strategy, we will continue to adjust implementation of the military
campaign based on changes on the ground in Iraq and Syria.
al qaeda
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
and its affiliates to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and
Western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
Answer. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to pose a threat to
the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more
broadly despite ongoing counterterrorism (CT) pressure and competition
from ISIL. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the
affiliate of most concern.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?
Answer. We seek a stable Yemen, with an inclusive and legitimate
government, that is willing and able to confront violent extremist
organizations. Continued instability in Yemen not only imposes
significant humanitarian costs on civilians, it also enables AQAP to
thrive--a group which poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland--and
allows groups to threaten freedom of navigation in the Gulf,
particularly in the Bab al Mandeb Strait.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. strategy in Yemen to
date?
Answer. Our current U.S. strategy in Yemen is founded upon three
related pillars: (1) support political transition, namely National
Dialogue, Constitutional reform, and Elections, (2) provide continued
economic and humanitarian assistance, and (3) lay the groundwork for
security reform, specifically counterterrorism capacity building,
border security, and critical infrastructure protection. The first step
is for political parties to return to negotiations and establish a
legitimate government. That would enable the United States to resume
cooperation with the Yemen government in the future, particularly on
countering AQAP. At this time we are challenged to conduct effective CT
operations.
Question. What are the implications of recent events in Yemen for
U.S. counterterrorism policy both in Yemen and globally?
Answer. The current turmoil in Yemen has hampered DOD CT operations
against AQAP. Although, the United States still maintains a diminished
capability. Prior to a Houthi takeover, DOD worked with the Republic of
Yemen Government (RoYG) military units to combat the significant
terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from AQAP. However,
security concerns in Yemen led to an evacuation of all U.S. personnel,
hindering efforts to combat AQAP. AQAP continues to pose an immediate
security threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States. When the
political and security situation allows, DOD will resume our
counterterrorism partnership with the Yemeni government.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness and
capability of coalition operations led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen?
Answer. Coalition airstrikes are slowing Houthi expansion in Yemen.
Saudi-led Coalition operations can be sustained at least in the near
term. However, these operations have not compelled the Houthis to
withdraw from cities they captured earlier this year nor deterred
Houthi attacks along the Saudi border.
somalia and al shabab
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab?
Answer. Al-Shabaab is primarily a threat in Somalia, Kenya, and
other regional countries. It specifically targets countries providing
forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as
government facilities and Western targets in and around Mogadishu.
Question. In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. Al-Shabaab does not pose a direct threat to the U.S.
homeland or Europe at present. Nevertheless, the group poses an ongoing
threat to U.S., Western, and other allied interests in East Africa, to
include Somalia and Kenya.
Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy
in Somalia and the role of DOD in that strategy?
Answer. The current U.S. strategy on Somalia that was put in place
in May 2014 focuses on two main security lines of effort: (1) Continued
support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to stabilize
the short term security situation and (2) Promoting Somali security
sector reform by expanded support to the Somali National Army, to
advance longer term security and stabilization. DOD had an integral
role in developing the strategy and we are playing an important role in
its execution. These security efforts promote the stabilization of the
political and economic situation which allows for the creation of
responsive and functioning governmental institutions at the federal,
regional, and local level.
Question. What role should DOD play in building the capacity of the
Somali national military forces?
Answer. DOD continues to work closely with our colleagues at the
Department of State to build the capacity of Somali security services
that are loyal to the federal government and are composed of a mixture
of clans and regional backgrounds. We intend to increase our support to
the Somali National Army in the next year, with programs designed to
provide equipment and logistics capacity to units of the Somali
National Army to support their continued efforts alongside the African
Union Mission in Somalia to defeat al-Shabaab.
al-qaeda in the islamic maghreb (aqim)
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
affiliated groups pose a local and regional threat. AQIM will likely
continue to target Malian government and military targets and
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA) forces and
facilities, as well as pursue kidnapping for ransom tactics in Niger
and Mali.
Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. No, AQIM does not presently pose a direct threat to the
U.S. homeland. We see no indications the group views conducting attacks
outside North Africa and the Sahel as a priority in the near term.
Question. What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out
actions threatening U.S. interests?
Answer. AQIM has the capacity to threaten U.S. and Western
interests within North and West Africa, where it has conducted or
attempted attacks in several countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria, and
Mauritania). The group will likely continue to bolster its ties to al-
Qaeda-associated terrorist groups throughout the region to influence
and support attack planning.
Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent
expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's
capacities and aims?
Answer. AQIM's expansion in northern Mali has increased its freedom
of movement and enabled it to institute its own severe brand of sharia
in territories it controls, implementing policies that are particularly
brutal for women. AQIM remains capable of conducting small-scale
improvised explosive device (IED), indirect fire (IDF), and mortar
attacks against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
(MINUSMA) and Malian interests in the north.
libya
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Libya?
Answer. Libya's civil war has created a security vacuum and the
country will remain volatile in 2015. Two rival governments are seeking
to establish legitimacy, and their aligned militias are vying for
control of territory and key infrastructure. ISIL also has declared the
country part of its caliphate, and ISIL-aligned extremists are trying
to institute sharia in parts of the country.
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. strategy with
regards to Libya and the role of DOD in that strategy?
Answer. The United States maintains a national interest in
stabilizing Libya and preventing terrorists from using it as a safe
haven. The United States and our allies are supporting the United
Nations-led efforts to help the warring Libyan factions reach a
political solution by forming a national unity government. Currently,
the role of DOD in the U.S. strategy is to leverage military
relationships with regional partners to encourage support for a
political solution. A unity government containing both secularists and
Islamists provides the best the long term partner to counter VEOs in
Libya. Should diplomatic efforts to form a unity government succeed,
the United States will be prepared to revisit security assistance
efforts for the legitimate Libyan security forces.
Question. How would you assess its effectiveness in achieving its
objectives?
Answer. Political reconciliation has yet to materialize. Libya's
political landscape is severely fragmented and the country is in the
midst of civil war. The UN-led negotiations have so far failed to gain
traction, however negotiators remain optimistic that an agreement can
be reached and a unity government formed.
Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to
implementing the strategy and protecting U.S. interests in Libya?
Answer. The greatest impediment to advancing U.S. goals in Libya is
the severe fragmentation of Libya's political and security landscape,
which has significantly complicated the negotiations. Libya has
disintegrated into a complex mix of rival political factions, tribes,
militias and other armed groups, interspersed with local and foreign
extremists. Competition between these rival groups poses a challenge to
building enduring political consensus, while violent extremists exploit
this window of uncertainty to compromise regional stability.
north africa
Question. In recent years, there has been a growth of terrorist
networks, capabilities, operations, and safe havens throughout North
and East Africa, including groups that have the intention to target
U.S. and Western interests. In the face of growing instability and
threats, the U.S. counterterrorism effort in the region has been
described as an ``economy of force'' effort.
Do you agree with that characterization of the situation in North
and East Africa and the U.S. counterterrorism efforts to combat the
related threats?
Answer. North and East Africa are important areas in our fight
against extremists. Multiple different terrorist networks are indeed
active in North and East Africa, as well as West Africa. These networks
have primarily local ambitions--seeking increased influence over
resources or territory, and threatening the stability of our regional
partners and safety of civilians on the ground. Some have, at times,
also demonstrated a willingness to target U.S. and Western interests.
AFRICOM is continually working to identify, prioritize and target these
networks, in partnership with host nations.
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.
counterterrorism strategy in the region? In your view, is the U.S.
military allocating adequate resources to effectively address the
terrorism threat in the region?
Answer. DOD assets have been allocated based on the level of threat
and the potential for collaboration with partner nations. Based on that
criteria, our current allocation of resources appears appropriate,
however if confirmed, I will consider whether additional investments
are required in order to stem the growth of violent extremism in the
region.
Question. General Rodriguez noted in his March 2014 testimony that
``North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the
current conflict in Syria.'' What is your understanding of the foreign
fighter flow from North Africa to the conflict in Syria and Iraq?
Answer. North Africans make up the vast majority of foreign
fighters entering Iraq and Syria; however, increasingly many are
choosing to remain in North Africa, and join the ISIL affiliate in
Libya. Tunisians provide the largest contingent of foreign fighters to
Syria and Iraq, followed by Morocco, Libya, and Algeria.
Question. In your view, is it likely that many of these fighters
will eventually return home from Syria and Iraq to North Africa and
continue their fight against regional governments?
Answer. Yes, it is likely that North African foreign fighters will
eventually return home to conduct attacks in their home countries;
however, it is currently unknown if these individuals would be tasked
by ISIL to conduct attacks or if it would be of their own accord.
russia
Question. Crimea was formally annexed when President Putin signed a
bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014,
and Russia continues to fuel instability in eastern Ukraine despite a
ceasefire agreed to in September 2014.
How effective do you assess the sanctions of the U.S. and the
European Union have been in deterring additional aggression by Russia?
Answer. Sanctions alone are unlikely to deter future Russian
aggression; deterring combined Russian-separatists actions against
Ukraine requires a whole of government approach that is aligned with
our NATO allies and friends in Europe. However, U.S. and EU sanctions
have had an impact on Russia's economy and send a clear signal to
Moscow that aggression against Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
integrity entails costs.
Question. What other specific U.S. actions helped to deter
additional Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. Congressional support for the European Reassurance
Initiative has enabled DOD, via Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR), to
conduct military exercises and training on land, in the air and at sea,
while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe; and increase the
responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce NATO by pursuing the
prepositioning of equipment and enhancing reception facilities in
Europe. Our bilateral efforts as well as our continued support of NATO
adaptation measures all support the goal of deterring additional
Russian aggression. Senior defense and diplomatic officials travel and
consult with our allies and friends to affirm Alliance resolve and
bolster approaches to deter Russian aggression.
Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most
effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate current measures
and take a close look at potential adjustments and adaptations. Of key
concern to me is wisely channeling U.S. military efforts and resources
to ensure our allies and partners are militarily capable and
interoperable.
Question. Are you concerned that Moldova and Georgia may be at a
heightened state of vulnerability given Russian willingness to take
aggressive action in Ukraine?
Answer. Yes. Russia has demonstrated both in Georgia in 2008 and
Ukraine today its willingness to use force, violate sovereignty, and
exploit the vulnerabilities of these fragile democracies to achieve its
strategic objectives. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine all contain Russian
occupied separatist regions that the Kremlin exploits for its own
purposes.
Question. Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called
``hybrid'' and combine hard power with soft power, including elements
such as lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special
operations forces, extensive information operations, withholding energy
supplies and economic pressure.
If confirmed, what steps would you recommend as part of a strategy
to counter this ``hybrid'' approach?
Answer. We need to remain alert to Russian strategic intent and
capabilities--and their integration of military and non-military tools
in the gray space. Most importantly, we must lead in order to maintain
Trans-Atlantic resolve to resist Russian coercion now and in the
future. I will continue to emphasize efforts and investments that
enable our allies and friends to defend against a range of threats--and
to do so collectively. Increasingly, there is a non-military dimension
to security that requires whole-of-government and multinational
approaches. Military power is just one aspect of these approaches.
Question. In light of Russia's actions in 2014, what do you believe
are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations?
Answer. Cooperation with Russia in areas of mutual interest within
the military sphere remains possible if Russia assumes the role of a
responsible international actor moving forward, not isolated and moving
backward as it is today. If confirmed, my intent for the military-to-
military relationship is to reduce the chances of miscalculation or
escalation through professional, candid communications and behaviors.
nato alliance
Question. The reemergence of an aggressive Russia has resulted in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developing the Readiness
Action Plan that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called ``the
biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the
Cold War.'' NATO also continues to be central to our coalition
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, even as many NATO members have
significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to
economic and fiscal pressures.
How important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national security
interests?
Answer. The Alliance is essential to our national security. The
bedrock of NATO's collective defense obligation is Article 5, but
NATO's importance extends beyond Article 5. NATO has been fundamental
to sustaining Trans-Atlantic unity, prosperity and security. This has
enabled Europe to contribute to security and prosperity on a global
basis. The Alliance maintains a persistent air, land, and maritime
presence in and around the territories of our European allies,
demonstrating a commitment to defend its territory against any
aggression. NATO is a fundamental contributor to international order.
NATO conducts military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the
Mediterranean Sea, and off the Horn of Africa to support stability to
those areas. NATO also assists nations in North Africa and the Middle
East to develop local capabilities to stem the growing instability and
transnational threats in and around their countries and to prevent
those threats from spreading to Europe or threatening the U.S.
homeland.
Question. In light of the Russian Federation's aggression against
Ukraine, what do you see as the major strategic objectives of the NATO
Alliance in the coming years and what are the greatest challenges in
meeting those objectives?
Answer. NATO must affirm Trans-Atlantic Unity by adapting its
collective defense against state and non-state threats across a broad
spectrum. NATO's unity is fundamental, and that requires us to be
attentive to the challenges confronting all members. The Russian
Federation's aggression in Ukraine consolidated attention on the
Alliance's clearest responsibility, which is to protect and defend its
territory and populations against attack, per Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. NATO must also remain prepared and continue to
undertake its other ``core tasks'' of crisis management and cooperative
security. Violent extremist non-state actors and Russian coercion and
subversion in ``gray space'' test the Alliance's ability to adapt
Article V to these challenges. As Allies, we must thereby ensure that
the Defense Investment Pledge at the 2014 Wales Summit meets these
challenges and threats.
Question. What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in
addressing the threat posed by ISIL and in addressing the problem of
illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea?
Answer. A unified Europe can and must do more than one thing at a
time. But NATO must be judicious about prioritizing its engagement
given limited resources to address the threats and challenges to the
southern and eastern flanks.
Information sharing is a useful contribution NATO could make to
counter ISIL and/or to support Mediterranean Allies and friends
managing border security and immigration challenges..
Question. The concept of defense cooperation among NATO members was
emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012.
What areas or projects would you recommend, if confirmed, that NATO
nations cooperate in to improve NATO alliance capabilities?
Answer. Cooperative efforts among Allies on developing capabilities
have become increasingly important in light of the worldwide challenges
and the fiscal straits facing many Allied nations. If confirmed, I
would use my office to influence Allies to implement Wales Summit
pledge to move toward the two percent defense spending target as soon
as possible. In doing so, I would encourage Allies to focus their
resources on specific Alliance capability needs, such as developing
command and control and joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance and maintaining and improving readiness and
interoperability.
Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you envision further
enlargement of NATO in the coming years?
Answer. Enlargement should be reserved for those candidates deemed
ready to accept the obligations of membership, who are prepared to make
the necessary reforms that further NATO's principles, and who
contribute to the unity and security of the Alliance.
Question. Turkey continues to be a gateway for foreign fighters
proceeding to and from Syria and Iraq.
What steps would you recommend to encourage Turkey to continue to
address the threat posed by foreign fighters proceeding to and
returning from Syria and Iraq?
Answer. Turkey acknowledges the foreign terrorist fighter threat
and is taking steps to bolster its law enforcement and border security
efforts, including increased monitoring, border security, and counter-
illicit finance measures. If confirmed, I would support the
Department's contributions to interagency support of Turkish enhance
border security enhancements, to include strengthening critical
information sharing with the Turkish military. Moreover, I would
support international efforts to help source countries identify and
disrupt foreign fighter transit through Turkey.
Question. At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, NATO leaders
declared their ``aim to move towards the 2 percent guideline [of GDP
for defense spending] within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO
Capability Targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.''
In your view, what impact have national defense budget cuts had on
the capabilities of the NATO alliance, and what do you believe needs to
be done to address any capability shortfalls?
Answer. National defense budget cuts and fiscal austerity measures
by our Allies have limited their ability to address long standing
Alliance capability shortfalls such as in joint intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance. These capabilities can be costly, but
we need to ensure that in the future the United States is not the only
Ally with such capabilities. The rhetoric of the Wales Defense
Investment Pledge must be matched by real resources to build
capability. The United States is committed to working with Allies on
defense planning to ensure they maintain or develop the specific
capabilities that the Alliance is lacking.
Question. What are the greatest military capability shortfalls that
you see in the NATO alliance?
The most significant shortfalls that I see in the Alliance are:
cyber defense, defense institution-building, enabling capabilities such
as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air-to-air
refueling and strategic lift. The Alliance places heavy reliance on the
United States to provide these limited but high-demand capabilities.
Other Allies should be encouraged to develop these capabilities through
national and multinational investment.
Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending
by some NATO members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack
critical military capabilities? If so, what steps, if any, would you
recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in Alliance
capabilities?
Answer. The United States is engaged in political, diplomatic and
military channels to address continued reductions in defense investment
by our Allies. We are particularly focused on NATO Allies that have
been our most reliable partners for managing global security issues and
those with the largest Gross Domestic Products. Alliance capability
shortfalls will increase as national defense spending decreases. Most
Allies have gone as far as they can go in wringing out efficiencies in
their defense spending. The key step for addressing capability
shortfalls is to arrest the decline in national defense investment and
move to meet the Defense Investment Pledge made at the 2014 Wales
Summit.
Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
five years?
Answer. The greatest opportunity and challenge are the same:
adapting NATO to better meet current and future security challenges
while preserving Trans-Atlantic unity. The events in both Europe and
the Middle East have provided the catalyst for adapting NATO's
political, military and institutional processes and focus. NATO
leaders--including our President--have committed to this adaptation
which will make NATO more responsive and ready to face, or deter,
challenges. Following thru on this adaptation is the greatest
opportunity for NATO; gaining the consensus to do this in a focused,
proactive manner is the greatest challenge.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. The 2010 Strategic Concept for the Alliance states NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Further, the 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, the DDPR,
concluded NATO's current mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile
defense capabilities remains appropriate. I concur with both of these
judgments by the Alliance. Finally, in the context of recent Russian
behavior, including their development of dual capable intermediate-
range missile systems that directly threaten our NATO allies, now is
not the time to eliminate a capability that has been an effective
centerpiece of Alliance cohesion, resolve and deterrence for decades.
u.s. force posture in europe
Question. The Department of Defense continues to review its force
posture in Europe to determine what additional consolidations and
reductions are necessary and consistent with U.S. strategic interests.
How would you define the U.S. strategic interests in the European
area of responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. As the National Security Strategy states, the United States
maintains a profound commitment to a Europe that is free, whole, and at
peace. According to the National Military Strategy, NATO's collective
security guarantees are strategically important for deterring
aggression, particularly in light of recent Russian aggression on its
periphery.
Question. Do you believe that additional consolidation and
reductions of U.S. forces in Europe are consistent with U.S. strategic
interests in that AOR given the increase in Russian aggression in the
last 15 months?
Answer. Yes. The current U.S. footprint in Europe--including the
recent changes announced by Secretary Carter--supports garrison
operations, training facilities and power projection capabilities for
operations inside and outside the AOR. However, the credibility and
effectiveness of our response to Russian aggression in the East depend
not only on the operational scale and geographic scope of our
operations, but also on their longevity. If confirmed, I will seek to
ensure the persistent, appropriate level of rotational presence is
retained in Europe to effectively assure allies and deter Russian
aggression.
u.s. force posture in the asia-pacific region
Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense
Guidance.
Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?
Answer. Yes. I am satisfied with our Rebalance efforts to date. The
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region has resulted in a significant
adjustment in U.S. force structure and capabilities. As indicators of
our success, we have negotiated new comprehensive force posture and
access agreements with key allies and partners to support broader U.S.
goals and objectives in the region. We have strengthened our alliances
and greatly expanded partnerships with countries like Singapore,
Vietnam and India. We have moderated tensions in East and South China
Sea maritime disputes and reinforced our position as the security
partner of choice for most nations in the region. An added benefit of
these strengthened ties is the commitment of military forces and assets
of several countries to the anti-ISIL coalition.
Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what specific
capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities?
Answer. The United States faces a range of challenges in the Asia-
Pacific region, including provocations by the DPRK and the growth of
its ballistic missile programs; China's development of new technologies
intended to prevent open access to the air and maritime domain;
widespread natural disasters and transnational threats; and territorial
disputes. Going forward, we must prioritize investments in advanced
capabilities that are critical for the future operational environment.
I will support the ongoing efforts to increase U.S. military presence
in the region and invest in and deploy critical advanced capabilities.
I believe we must not only continue to modernize U.S. alliances and
partnerships, which provide a critical role in underwriting regional
security, but also help grow the ISR, HADR and maritime security/domain
awareness capacities of our allies and partners in the region. The
Department must continue to enhance U.S. force posture and capabilities
and work with China to encourage greater transparency about how it will
use its growing military capabilities.
Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated
with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to
the Pacific?
Answer. If we return to sequestration-level cuts in Fiscal Year
2016, we will face serious risks across the board, and may have to
reassess the rebalance strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Department and Congress to help solve this pressing
problem.
Question. As the United States realigns its forces in the Asia-
Pacific Theater, do you believe we have the air and maritime lift
required to support the distribution of Marines across North and
Southeast Asia?
Answer. No. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Services and the U.S. Pacific Command to address this challenge.
kosovo
Question. Approximately 700 U.S. troops remain in the Balkans as
part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to Kosovo in 1999
and today is comprised of over 4,600 personnel from 30 countries.
Spikes in violence in 2011 required the deployment of the NATO
operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 600 soldiers to
bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required in
both the military and political realms before further troop reductions
can be made.
What major lines of effort do you think are required to further
reduce or eliminate U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo?
Answer. Continued progress in the EU implementation of the April
2013 accord between Serbia and Kosovo will go a long way to stabilizing
the Western Balkans and ending Kosovo's ethnic partition thus setting
the security conditions appropriate for further reducing or eliminating
U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo.
Question. In your view, can the European Union play a more
significant role in Kosovo?
Answer. The EU plays a significant role by contributing to the
security of Kosovo through its European Union Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo (EULEX-Kosovo) in addition to ongoing efforts to implement the
2013 Accord. The EULEX mission supports Kosovo on its path to a greater
European integration in the rule of law area by investigating,
prosecuting and adjudicating sensitive cases using its executive powers
as well as by monitoring, mentoring, and advising local counterparts in
the police, justice and custom fields to achieve sustainability and EU
best practices in Kosovo. The EU's active engagement has helped
facilitate political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and will
continue to be an essential part of progress.
security situation on the korean peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula and of the threat posed to the United States
and its allies by the current state of North Korea's ballistic missile
and nuclear weapons capabilities?
Answer. North Korea remains one of the most challenging security
problems for the United States and our allies and partners in the
region. North Korea continues to take actions that are destabilizing
for the region, including its December 2012 missile launch, February
2013 nuclear test, series of short-range ballistic missile launches in
2014, and the cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment.
North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capabilities clearly present a serious and direct threat to U.S.
forces postured in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to our regional
allies and partners. These capabilities could eventually pose a direct
threat to U.S. territory. Moreover, North Korea's history of
proliferation amplifies the dangers of its asymmetric programs.
The US-ROK alliance continues to be the linchpin to deterring North
Korean aggression and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the U.S.-ROK Alliance continues to
strengthen alliance capabilities to counter North Korea's increasing
missile and nuclear threat. I will also ensure that we draw upon the
full range of our capabilities to deter, defend, and respond to North
Korean ballistic missile and WMD threats.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen our
strong defense posture against the North Korean ballistic missile
threat. This includes enhancing DOD's ability to highlight and disrupt
the illicit proliferation networks that North Korea uses, and promoting
cooperation with partners to interdict vessels and aircraft suspected
of transporting items of proliferation concern.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of transfer of
wartime operational control from the U.S. to the ROK?
Answer. At the 2014 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, SecDef
Hagel and ROK Minister of Defense Han decided that in light of the
evolving security environment in the region, we will implement the ROK-
proposed, conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime OPCON.
The ROK will take wartime OPCON when critical ROK and alliance
military capabilities are secured and the security environment in the
region is conducive to a stable wartime OPCON transition.
china assertiveness
Question. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and
maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China
Sea, affected security and stability in the region?
Answer. China's actions in the South and East China Seas, as well
as its rapid military modernization and growing defense budgets, have
led many in the region--including the United States--to question its
long-term intentions. It has still not clarified its expansive 9-Dash
Line claim, and it continues to conduct large scale land-reclamation
activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been
destabilizing.
china mil-mil
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-
China military relationship and your views regarding China's interest
in and commitment to improving military relations with the United
States?
Answer. I view the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship as
a critical component to our overall bilateral relations. It allows us
to increase cooperation on areas of mutual interest and reduces risk as
our forces come into closer contact. The Chinese leadership has
expressed the view that the military-to-military relationship is useful
as vehicle for stability in the overall bilateral relationship. The
relationship has room for improvement.
Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance
of sustained military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. As an enduring Pacific power, the United States has a clear
interest in sustaining military-to-military contacts with China. I will
continue to seek a mil-mil relationship that builds sustained and
substantive dialogue, practical cooperation in areas of mutual
interest, and mitigates the risk of miscalculation.
anti-access/area denial
Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the
emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries
and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the
U.S. military's freedom of movement and action in certain regions. Do
you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a
concern?
Answer. Yes. One of the keys to our nation's success is our ability
to rapidly project power around the globe. Our power projection
capability is essential to deterring our adversaries and maintaining
global stability. Russia, Iran, and China are developing technologies,
most notably missiles, designed to limit U.S. military's freedom of
movement. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure that we
sustain our ability to project overwhelming combat power into any
theater at a time of our choosing.
Question. If so, what do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces need to
be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to
all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?
Answer. The United States is committed to keeping the global
commons, especially maritime, free. We will continue to invest in the
personnel and technological advantages that will allow us to meet that
commitment, especially to counter anti-access and area denial
capabilities of our potential enemies. However, any discussion of
specific actions and investments associated with our counter A2AD
strategy and capabilities are more appropriate for discussion in a
classified forum.
Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
process of transforming the U.S. Armed Forces' capability and capacity
to meet new and emerging threats.
Answer. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging
threats, what are your goals regarding transformation of the U.S.
military?
Question. If confirmed, I would develop a detailed concept for
Joint exercises and experimentation. My initial assessment, from the
perspective of a service chief, is that our operational tempo over the
past decade has adversely impacted us in this area.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
Question. Despite the ongoing drawdown in Afghanistan, demand for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of
every kind remains very high due to the enhanced situational awareness
and targeting capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of
the geographic combatant commands still have validated ISR requirements
that are not being met.
What is your assessment of the Department's current disposition of
ISR assets across the various combatant commands?
Answer. Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. The
Services are operating at maximum capacity; therefore, sourcing for new
requirements is a zero sum game. Assets are primarily reallocated from
other combatant commander operations to meet new demands.
The Department's allocation strategy remains focused on leveraging
our ISR capabilities to maximize effects. To support counter-terrorism
and force protection, we have allocated nearly 90 percent of our
remotely-piloted full-motion video assets to USCENTCOM, with the
remaining sourced primarily to USAFRICOM. In USEUCOM and USPACOM's
sensitive reconnaissance operations areas, we have leveraged assets
with standoff capabilities to maximize indications and warning
collection.
Question. As our forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, should
existing ISR assets be re-postured to support combatant command needs
in other regions, or can we afford to reduce ISR capacity?
Answer. The Department continually evaluates our capabilities
against evolving combatant command requirements, ensuring a balance
across operational, force management, and institutional risks. When
appropriate, ISR assets can be repostured to support emerging combatant
commander needs across other regions. For example, within the last
year, we shifted some ISR from Afghanistan to monitor ISIL activity in
the Middle East. Additionally, we made the challenging decision to
return medium-altitude ISR capacity to a steady-state 60 flights a day,
from an almost continual surge of 65, reducing risk to the long-term
sustainability of the USAF's unmanned pilot force.
Question. Most of the highest-value ISR assets acquired after 9/11
are aircraft that were not designed to be survivable in high-threat air
defense environments, although in some cases unmanned aerial vehicles
were designed to be deployed in large numbers in the expectation of
substantial combat attrition.
Do you believe that the Department needs a major shift towards ISR
platforms that are survivable in high-threat situations, or merely an
augmentation of the capabilities we now have, with the assumption that
air superiority can be gained rapidly enough to operate today's assets
effectively?
Answer. We have learned a great many ISR lessons from more than ten
years of conflict. It is in the best interest of the United States to
invest in ISR platforms, sensors, and communications capabilities
designed to penetrate and survive in high-threat and denied
environments; not just in the air domain, but in space, surface, and
sub-surface domains as well. These systems also offer the potential to
improve pre-conflict warning. These capabilities are expensive to
develop and field, but are a necessary component of balanced efforts to
maintain our warfighting advantages. However, existing ISR systems
remain very relevant for today's operations and future scenarios;
particularly in support of ongoing counter-terrorism missions. So the
right path appears to be augmenting the capabilities we have today to
fill critical capability and capacity gaps.
aircraft carrier-launched unmanned systems
Question. The Navy's current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop
an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR
mission.
Given the combat radius of the planned carrier air wing, are you
concerned the carrier will lack the ability to project power at
relevant distances given emerging anti-access/area-denial threats?
Answer. Yes. That's why it's critical that we continue to develop
concepts and capabilities that will allow us to maintain a competitive
advantage in an A2AD environment.
special operations forces
Question. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs have mandated significant growth
in our special operations forces (SOF) and enablers that directly
support their operations. The most-recent QDR released in 2014 capped
this growth at 69,500, approximately 2,500 below the originally planned
growth.
In light of the growing global terrorism threat, do you believe the
currently planned end-strength for SOF is sufficient to meet global
requirements?
Answer. The last two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) directed
significant growth in our special operations forces (SOF) along with
enablers that directly support their operations. We will continue to
carefully balance the need for further growth in SOF with our need to
address other capability demands in light of increased budgetary
pressures.
Question. SOF are heavily reliant on enabling support from the
general purpose force. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you
believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the
general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available
to special operations forces?
Answer. Special operations forces depend on general purpose forces
for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and medical evacuation. I believe
that we have sufficient and trained general purpose forces to support
high priority special operations missions.
international peacekeeping contributions
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to
consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff
officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more
women I should note--to UN peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more
military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in
support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. I believe we should focus on how best to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations. Deliberate
and strategically crafted placements of personnel to key positions
within the UN can advance U.S. influence and interests.
Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
United Nations?
Answer. Over the past year the Joint Staff has provided multiple
officers to the UN to include the head of the UN's military planning
service. The recent administrative waiver extension provided by the UN
to the United States will help ease future assignments, when warranted.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. Military power is necessary, but not sufficient to achieve
our national security objectives. The non-military dimensions of
national security are increasing in their importance. Our adversaries
understand this and have adapted to challenge us outside or short of
our military redlines. Whereas the U.S. military provides a range of
options to employ force, our diverse civilian partners provide potent
and diverse options to exert and sustain American influence. Much of
the incremental progress bringing civil and military capacities
together in the field is waning. Agencies and Departments must
deliberately and jointly invest in civil-military strategy, doctrine,
training and operations to meet the tests of this era, whether State-
based coercion in ``gray space,'' non-state violent extremism, or cyber
threats to our homeland and overseas interests. If confirmed, my
military advice to the President, NSC and Congress will reflect the
need to invest, apply and sustain deliberate civil-military approaches
to national security.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. It begins with leadership. If confirmed, I will consult
early and often with Secretary Carter, other members of the NSC and
Congress to understand specific ways the Joint Force can support or
enable the non-military dimensions of our national security. My focus
will remain on the military instrument of power. I will establish
expectations that the Joint Staff parallel my efforts by pursuing a
more collaborative and engaged posture in NSC fora and with
departments, agencies and the private sector.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
contingency operations?
Answer. The Department's Joint Force Development process that takes
observations from operational practice, joint training and concept
development, analyzes them, and synthesizes them into Joint Doctrine
for the operational preparation and employment of the force. As an
example, the current average age of the Department's 81 Joint Doctrine
publications is about 2 years old, a refresh rate that is about 3-times
faster than it was in the years after 9/11. We should look at making
doctrine more adaptable to the dynamic environment and accessible to
the joint force. But we must also infuse learning into our joint
education and joint exercise programs to ensure that its impact is
aligned at the strategic, operational and tactical echelons within OSD,
the Military Departments and Services, combatant commands and defense
support activities.
Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical
level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than
on a regional basis (e.g. international terrorists departing Mali for
safe havens in Libya).
How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in
individual countries can best be coordinated in the interagency arena?
Answer. Combatant commanders develop Theater Campaign Plans and
Functional Campaign Plans that address regional and trans-regional
issues. They seek input from interagency partners in the development of
these plans to de-conflict and complement efforts. We need to change
our paradigm. The State Department has initiated regional, functional
and country strategies and supporting processes. DHS is maturing its
scenario-based planning process. Our military paradigm needs to shift
from expecting others to integrate into military plans and processes.
This reinforces the tendency for DOD to become the option of first
resort and the default integrator. We need to be more engaged with OSD
to support and influence foreign affairs and homeland security planning
and resourcing processes and integrate those into military plans and
processes.
responsibility to protect
Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ``responsibility
to protect'' (R2P)--that is, the responsibility of the international
community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by
encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states
build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national
authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Department of Defense names ``preventing human
suffering due to mass atrocities'' as one of a long list of potential
contingencies that DOD might be called on to address. DOD has begun to
explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering ``mass atrocity
prevention and response operations'' (MAPRO).
Question. In your view, how high a priority should the
``responsibility to protect'' be for the U.S. Government as a whole?
Answer. My role is not to set policy priorities but rather to
design and employ the military instrument in support of policy
decisions. The military instrument can be used to meet many priorities
as directed by the President. The U.S. military has often taken an
active role in helping to prevent and responding to mass atrocity
situations.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in
fulfilling the responsibility to protect?
Answer. The role of DOD is to support the broader U.S. government's
response in any situation as part of a whole-of-government approach.
DOD should provide options, assess the risk associated with those
options, and execute selected options as needed.
Question. In your view, what is the proper application of R2P
doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria?
Answer. We incorporate R2P considerations, and civilian security
considerations more broadly, when we weigh the acceptability and
feasibility of our military strategies, whether in Syria or elsewhere.
The U.S. Government is working with allies and partners and with the
Syrian opposition to provide humanitarian assistance within Syria and
across the region. Since fiscal year 2012, the United States has
provided over $4.4 billion in aid to help the victims of this conflict,
including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter. Of
that, over three quarters of a billion dollars have already been spent
in fiscal year 2015.
operation observant compass & the lord's resistance army
Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support
them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)--including Joseph
Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational
concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are
trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of
California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical
support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and
intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations
continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations,
thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.
In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?
Answer. Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS has four main objectives:
1) Increase protection of civilians affected by the LRA
2) Promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of LRA fighters
3) Remove Joseph Kony and LRA leaders from central Africa
4) Increase humanitarian access and provide relief
Our African partners, with DOD and interagency assistance, have
made progress in achieving these mission objectives.
Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of
support to this mission?
Answer. I am sensitive to the resource constraints we face,
especially in the Africa area of operations, and am open to exploring
other options to achieve our stated policy goals. I recommend
resourcing at a level appropriate to the threat the LRA poses to our
national interests in the region.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries'' in the Western
Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the
strategy is ``enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law
enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime integrates all elements of our national power to combat
transnational organized crime and related threats to national
security--and urges our partners to do the same. The strategy seeks to
reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to
a manageable public safety concern in the U.S. and strategic regions
abroad.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role
within the President's strategy?
Answer. The Department of Defense provides support to other U.S.
government agencies who lead our efforts to combat transnational
organized crime.
Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support
to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters
related to transnational organized crime?
Answer. Consistent with current and recently expanded authorities
provided in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA, the Department provides unique
capabilities that support U.S. law enforcement and Intelligence
Community activities as part of a whole-of-government approach to
address the national security threat posed by transnational criminal
organizations. Intelligence support, counter-threat finance support,
building partner capacity, and detection and monitoring are specific
DOD capabilities which support the interagency and partner nations.
mass atrocities prevention
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
Among interagency partners, what is DOD's role in addressing
atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or
responding to atrocities?
Answer. DOD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass
Atrocity Response Operations. Based on this doctrine, atrocity
prevention and response is now incorporated into DOD plans and planning
guidance. In addition, DOD has conducted a comprehensive review of
training in this area and is working to strengthen the capacity of UN
peacekeeping operations to respond to atrocity situations.
Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort
so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?
Answer. Yes, DOD has developed planning processes toward this
effort. All DOD components have been directed to integrate atrocity
prevention and response into their policies and plans. Specific plans
are further developed and implemented at the Geographic Combatant
Command level, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the interagency as appropriate.
Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?
Answer. Assad's actions against his own people have harmed
civilians and undermined security in Syria and the region, with over
two hundred thousand combatant and non-combatants deaths and over four
million displaced.
counter threat finance
Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun
investing more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money
associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking, but the
opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are
not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to them.
Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation
routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production
of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant
national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting
these threats.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. Many terrorists, criminal networks, and other adversaries
who threaten U.S. strategic interests rely heavily on licit or illicit
financial networks to support and sustain their operations. DOD policy
is to work with other U.S. government entities and partner nations to
effectively deny, disrupt, degrade, and defeat our adversaries' ability
to access and utilize financial resources. If confirmed, I will review
our level of integration across the interagency and with our foreign
and institutional partners with the goal of maximizing cooperation and
effectiveness in countering these activities and networks.
Question. Are you aware of any policy, legal authority, or resource
shortfalls that may impair U.S. counter threat finance efforts?
Answer. Lack of sufficient insight and fidelity on the sources of
corruption in partner nations can hinder our ability to achieve counter
threat network goals. Additionally, in non-terrorism cases, there is
room for improvement with respect to the full and timely sharing of
relevant information between law enforcement and intelligence elements
in a timely manner.
Question. In your view, how should the Department of Defense
coordinate and interface with other key agencies, including the
Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community, in conducting
counter threat finance activities?
Answer. The Department should, and currently does, use its unique
capabilities to augment and support the efforts of other U.S.
government entities, including the Department of Treasury and the
Intelligence Community. The result is a well-coordinated, capable, and
robust counter threat finance posture. If confirmed, I will continue to
remain fully engaged in the interagency process to diminish adversary
use of both licit and illicit financial networks.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your current assessment of this authority?
Answer. Section 1208 funding allows the U.S. government to reduce
our reliance on unilateral Direct Action operations and increase the
role of our foreign partners in combatting terrorism around the globe.
It is an effective Advise and Assist program that can be rapidly
established to advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives in areas that
do not possess the will or capacity to fight terrorism. It can serve as
a bridging solution to future programs focused on building partner
nation capacity.
active-duty and reserve component end strength
Question. Last year DOD announced its 5-year plan to reduce active-
duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017 and the
reserve components by another 21,000 over the same period. These cuts
do not include any additional personnel reductions that could result
from sequestration or any agreement to avoid sequestration.
What is your view of the role of the reserve components as the
active components draw down?
Answer. As an integral part of our Total Force, the Reserve
Components provide much of the operational capability and strategic
depth needed to meet our nation's defense requirements. The drawdown of
both active-duty and reserve end strength requires us to rebalance some
capabilities between the active and reserve components to maintain the
force structure required by our National Military Strategy. This
balance between components provides us with the agility to meet
strategic objectives while managing our current fiscal constraints. I
see the Reserve Components as continuing to provide much of the
operational capability needed to support current operations while
maintaining the strategic depth required in responding to the more
demanding global contingencies. Our nation's investment in the Reserve
Components has generated a well-trained, fully integrated, and capable
force that will continue to fulfill these roles. In addition, we will
continue to capitalize upon the broad skills and experience our Reserve
Component servicemembers bring to the force from their civilian
occupations.
Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you
envision if the sequester continues into 2014 and beyond?
Answer. PB16 FYDP manning levels already reflect the maximum
acceptable risk in executing our defense strategy. If sequestration
continues, we will further reduce total personnel numbers, known as
end-strength, consistent with the numbers we have provided since the
Strategic Choices Management Review (SCMR) of 2013-2014. These numbers
were highlighted by all of the Service Chiefs in their combined
testimony to the SASC on January 28, 2015.
Question. In your view, what tools do DOD and the Services need to
get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these
require Congressional authorization?
Answer. The Department and Services' current force management tools
provide adequate flexibility to enable the drawdown to authorized
Service end strengths, and, at present, the Services do not seek
additional authorities in this regard.
religious guidelines
Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations
around the world where they must engage work effectively with allies
and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be
different than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is
not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their
culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and
beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views
can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential
skill to operational effectiveness.
In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the
military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and
other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without
impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious
belief?
Answer. Yes. I believe current policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion, including individual expressions of
belief, without impinging on those who have different, or no, religious
beliefs. Department of Defense policy regarding religious
accommodation, set forth in DODI 1300.17, affirms the rights of
individuals to express their sincerely held beliefs, whether they be
matters of conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs. The
Department of Defense places a high value on the rights of individuals
to do so, or not do so. This is held in balance with the need of the
Military Departments to maintain military readiness, unit cohesion, and
good order and discipline.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes. The current policies regarding religious accommodation
provide a clear means by which individual expressions of belief,
including apparel, grooming and worship practices, can be considered by
commanders. Denial of religious accommodation requests may only occur
when it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. Unit cohesion and good
order and discipline are compelling interests, but they must be
preserved in the least restrictive manner that is practicable for
mission accomplishment.
Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and
respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and
beliefs in a garrison environment contribute in a positive way to
preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments? Would a
policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith and
beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work
and operate in a pluralistic environment?
Answer. In my view, a military climate that welcomes and respects
open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison
can positively prepare U.S. forces to be effective in overseas
assignments. In a world that appears to be increasingly committed to
expressing religious belief, possessing this skill is necessary to not
only understand our adversaries, but also understand our partner
nations (consistent with the National Strategy on Integrating Religious
Leader and Faith Community Engagement into U.S. Foreign Policy). Any
policy that discourages open discussion diminishes our ability to
develop these skills. However, there must be clear guidance about the
importance of mutual respect and trust.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. In 2014, there was what the Department described as an
``unprecedented 53 percent increase in victim reports of sexual
assault. In fiscal year 2014, victims made 4,660 Unrestricted Reports
and 1,840 initial Restricted Reports of sexual assault. Also in fiscal
year 2014, the Department saw the number of victims who converted
Restricted Reports to Unrestricted Reports increase from an average of
15 percent to 20 percent. According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace
Study approximately 72 percent of servicemember victims who indicated
they made a sexual assault report said they would make the same
decision to make a report if they had to do it over again. The Rand
Study also indicated the percentages of active duty personnel who
experienced unwanted sexual assault declined in 2014, from 6.1 percent
to 4.3 percent for women and from 1.2 percent to 0.9 percent for men.
The Department also concluded the estimated gap between reporting and
prevalence of sexual assaults was at the narrowest point since the
Department began tracking this data.
What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. The Department's response to sexual assault continues to
improve, but work remains. The Services have developed a number of
reforms and policy changes designed to increase victim confidence and
enhance access to victim advocacy and legal support. To reinforce these
changes, as the Services have instituted unique training for
investigators and prosecutors who handle sexual assault crimes. They
have also increased bystander intervention training and sexual assault
awareness across the entire force.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. Victim care remains a top priority for the Department. We
face the same challenges that society faces in dealing with incidents
of sexual assault--balancing care to victims with prosecuting
offenders. Unrestricted reporting automatically initiates a criminal
investigation. After learning some victims were choosing to forego
support services rather than initiate an investigation, the Department
offered the restricted reporting option. Offering both forms of
reporting provides a means to protect a victim's privacy while also
providing access to medical care and support services.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD
oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and service
policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?
Answer. The Department has put a considerable amount of effort into
the development of policies and procedures designed to address sexual
assault. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office provides
oversight for sexual assault policy and works with the Services to
execute their prevention and response strategic plans. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff's partnership with OSD provides the operational perspective to
the sexual assault program in support of initiatives to improve
oversight and accountability.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these observed changes in
sexual assaults have occurred?
Answer. Establishing an appropriate culture where victims are
treated with dignity and respect starts at the top. Commanders are
accountable for what happens in their units and they set the leadership
tone. Commanders are crucial to our ability to effect institutional
change and leaders at all levels must foster a command climate where
sexist behavior, sexual harassment and sexual assault are not condoned
or ignored.
Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who
report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for
reporting. If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of
retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?
Answer. First of all, any form of retaliation goes against our core
values and has no place in our military. While the latest surveys
confirmed that victims perceive retaliation, the data did not provide
the depth needed to understand this challenging problem or to develop
appropriate solutions to the problem of peer retaliation. If confirmed,
I, along with the Joint Chiefs, will continue to support efforts to
better define the problem and determine root causes. I will also
continue to work to ensure that the joint force culture is one of
respect and that retaliation is not tolerated, especially among peers.
Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in
our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to
increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?
Answer. In order to increase reporting of sexual assaults by
military victims, we must improve victim confidence in our ability to
respond to incidents of sexual assault. We must also establish a
climate in which victims are treated with dignity and respect, and
where any form of retaliation or reprisal is unequivocally
unacceptable. If confirmed, I will continue the partnership with OSD to
assess current programs and develop initiatives to enhance support
services and improve our systems to hold perpetrators appropriately
accountable.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military
commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department's
policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be
prosecuted?
Answer. I support the Department's current policy. The Uniform Code
of Military Justice operates as both a criminal justice system and a
critical component of a commander's authority to maintain good order
and discipline. I believe our military members and national security
will best be served by retaining the military commander's key role in
the military justice decision process. While I greatly value the legal
analyses and recommendations provided by our highly proficient judge
advocates, and fully expect all leaders in the Services to take the
greatest advantage of this expertise, I firmly believe the military
commander's role is indispensable in the prosecutorial process.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. As you know, the Department in January rescinded the
policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have
the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and
has given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. The Services are in the final stages of validating their
standards. In my current capacity, I have been involved in the process.
Military Department Secretaries must certify that their standards are
gender-neutral and in compliance with all applicable Public Laws by 30
Sept. If confirmed, I will be engaged in the development and
implementation of standards that affect joint warfighting.
Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and
will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?
Answer. Yes. The Services and USSOCOM worked with various
scientific and research agencies to ensure the standards are current,
occupationally valid and tied to the operational requirement.
Preserving readiness is a key tenant of the guiding principles
established in the Jan 2013 memorandum.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements?
Answer. Yes. Decisions to open positions will be based on rigorous
analysis of the Services and USSOCOM integration studies and the
recommendations of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. As the senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense,
I will provide sound advice from a Joint operational perspective to
ensure that we preserve unit readiness and maintain the best qualified
forces to meet mission requirements.
Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about
assigning women to what are currently male-only combat units.
To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem in the
implementation of this policy?
Answer. As with any institutional change, we can expect there will
be concerns from a variety of sources. I respect the concerns of our
military families, but I do not see this as a problem as we implement
the policy. Women are already serving in units that provide direct
support to combat units.
Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if
confirmed to address it?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to engage with military
families our servicemembers to discuss their concerns and explain our
policies.
military health care reform and modernization
Question. Congress authorized the Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 to conduct a review of the
military compensation and retirement systems and to make
recommendations to modernize those systems. The Commission released its
report in January 2015.
What is your view of the Commission's findings regarding the
military health system?
Answer. I agree with the Commission that DOD needs to continue to
improve the military health care system. I also believe the health care
reforms proposed in the fiscal year 2016 budget are a good first step
and offer servicemembers, retirees, and their families more control and
choice over their health care decisions. I'm open to working with
Congress to develop additional reform proposals for consideration in
the fiscal year 2017 budget.
Question. Do you believe the Department's fiscal year 2016 proposal
to consolidate TRICARE adequately addressed the Commission's findings
on military health care?
Answer. Yes. The TRICARE proposal in the President's Fiscal Year
2016 budget more effectively achieves the aim of providing family
members and retirees with greater choice and control over their
healthcare decisions without the risk of an untested, and potentially
infeasible, overhaul of the Military Health System. If confirmed, I
will work closely with DOD leadership and Congress to ensure the
proposal is implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Question. What is your view of the Commission's recommendation to
establish a Joint Readiness Command?
Answer. I agree with the Commission's overall objective of
protecting medical readiness across the joint force including
establishment of essential medical capabilities (EMCs). However, a new,
four-star readiness command is not necessary as the Department has
sufficient processes and governance structures in-place to identify,
track, and measure the readiness status of enterprise wide and Service
specific EMCs.
Question. What is your assessment of progress the Defense Health
Agency has made to create efficiencies and generate cost savings by
combining the medical support functions of the Services?
Answer. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) will reach Full Operational
Capability (FOC) on 01 October 2015 and I am told they are on track to
meet this goal. Once FOC, DHA will receive a Combat Support Agency
Review Team Assessment (CSART) from the Joint Staff NLT 2017 to
determine its responsiveness and readiness to support the operating
forces.
Question. Do you believe the Defense Health Agency should be
replaced with a new combatant command, a Unified Medical Command?
Answer. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) will reach Full Operational
Capability (FOC) on 01 October 2015 and I believe it is premature to
make a determination if DHA is able to meet its mission. As a Combat
Support Agency (CSA), DHA will receive Combat Support Agency Review
Team Assessment (CSART) in early 2017 to determine its responsiveness
and readiness to support the operating forces. In addition, in my role
as the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, I was directly
involved in Department's review of the Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission recommendations. As such, I agree
with the Secretary's assessment of not supporting creation of an
additional new four-star combatant command for the purpose of ensuring
joint medical readiness.
wounded warrior support
Question. Servicemembers wounded and injured in combat operations
deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
duty, successful transition from active duty when appropriate, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
What is your assessment of the progress made by the Department of
Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to
improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and
injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. DOD, the VA, and the Services have made considerable
progress in ensuring the Nation's wounded, ill, and injured recovering
servicemembers (RSMs), their families, and caregivers receive the
support they need for recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The
NDAA for fiscal year 2008 directed DOD to improve the care, management,
and transition of recovering servicemembers. It established the office
now known as Warrior Care Policy (WCP) to develop policies for the
Department and provide the oversight of those policies to ensure proper
execution and outcomes. The policy and oversight areas for WCP include
the Recovery Coordination Program, the Integrated Disability Evaluation
System, the Military Adaptive Sports Program, Operation Warfighter, the
Education and Employment Initiative, and the Caregiver Support Program.
The Department continuously evaluates our wounded warrior and
caregiver programs, and implements improvements. We are incorporating
lessons-learned and best practices to update policies and programs to
improve support for RSM and their families.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. The recovery care coordinators are a crucial resource for
Wounded Warriors and their families, and we must continue to fund and
evaluate the effectiveness of this resource over time. The Joint Staff
conducted a thorough review of the Service's policies and procedures
related to returning our Wounded Warriors to service, and found that
all Services were operating within OSD guidance. We provided
constructive feedback to OSD which will allow the Services to retain
flexibility to develop programs unique for their Service needs and
culture, while also providing guidance that better supports Wounded
Warriors. This guidance provides clarity on how to navigate the
``reassignment and retraining'' process if they desire (and qualify
for) continued service. If confirmed, I am committed to continued
improvement on our efforts and results with regards to the care and
support of our Wounded Warriors and their families.
Question. What is your assessment of the need to make further
improvements in the Integrated Disability Evaluation System?
Answer. The Department continuously evaluates IDES to identify
improvements. DOD has implemented several actions that have resulted in
the IDES reaching a critical milestone in timeliness and overall
servicemember satisfaction. As of May 2015, Active Component case
timeliness averaged 223 days against a 295-day goal, Reserve Component
timeliness averaged 298 days against a 305-day goal, and 87 percent of
servicemembers expressed overall satisfaction with the IDES process. If
confirmed, I will ensure my staff and I support improvements to the
Disability Evaluation Process that benefit both our servicemembers and
the Department.
suicide prevention and mental health resources
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee.
In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the reserve components?
Answer. Suicide prevention is an important responsibility I share
with the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs. We have joined forces
with agencies across DOD and Interagency, the White House and civilian
sector to better understand the factors leading to suicide and refine
our prevention programs. As leaders, we have the responsibility to not
only seek to build strong and resilient individuals, but also to grow
strong and resilient organizations.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. Adequate mental health staffing must remain a priority to
ensure the highest delivery of mental health services. I support
several initiatives underway to improve access to mental health care,
increased provider availability, and more effective recruitment and
retention of mental health providers. The continued embedding of Mental
Health personnel across the deployed force is critical with required
in-theater periodic mental health assessments. These initiatives in
conjunction with the cooperative efforts underway between the VA and
DOD work to ensure continuity of mental health care for deployed and
returning servicemembers. It is imperative that these efforts continue
to address the long-term mental health needs of servicemembers and
their families.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military
quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of
intense downward pressure on budgets?
Answer. I don't have any recommendations for enhancement at this
time. If confirmed, I will continue to engage in the maintenance and
development of effective quality of life programs.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the active
and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. Every family has unique needs, requiring a flexible and
responsive network of services to deliver support at the right time,
using the most effective methods. From pay and benefits, to deployment
forecasting to wellness plans, military families have valid concerns
that should be addressed. Our research indicates that military families
are most concerned about pay and benefits, including retirement. Other
critically important issues are health care, education, and housing.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. If confirmed I will continue to work with the Services to
meet the changing needs of our military families. Community-based
partnerships will be key to improve education, employment, and wellness
support for current and transitioning members. The Services have also
adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled transition support, and
invested in world-class health care for our wounded. Family support
programs that are flexible, responsive, and communicate and coordinate
with interagency and non-governmental family services are critical to
meet the enduring needs of our servicemembers and their families,
whether they live on, near, or far from military installations. Working
together with the Services, we can find efficiencies and enhance the
accessibility of support when and where it is needed and at the right
level.
I remain committed to building and retaining ready, resilient
servicemembers and families. Readiness/retention efforts must look
beyond reactive financial incentives to emphasize total servicemember
and family wellness.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. We must continue outreach, education, awareness, and
engagement strategies to promote servicemember and family readiness
programs within the Reserve Component. Since 2008, the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program has led our support efforts with this population,
providing access to deployment cycle information, resources, programs,
services, and referrals to more than 1.53 million servicemembers and
their families. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program eases
transitions for servicemembers and families as they move between their
military and civilian roles. Our geographically diverse populations are
also supported by Department of Defense Military One Source Consultants
that works to build capacity to identify and meet evolving needs at the
local community level. To augment and enable that local support,
Military OneSource provides support to military families, military
leadership, and military and civilian service providers through
delivery of information, referrals, specialty consultations and non-
medical counseling.
operational energy budgeting
Question. Since Congress created the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs, much
progress has been made in a few short years in these programs.
In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the Department needs
to improve the incorporation of energy considerations into the
strategic planning and force development processes?
Answer. The Joint Staff and Combatant Commands will continue to
analyze, evaluate, and assess where increased energy demand necessary
for improved combat capabilities intersects with operational energy and
energy security constraints or vulnerabilities. We will further refine
and improve plans, strategy, procurement, force development and
policies regarding energy considerations as it relates to mission
success.
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the
Department should increase funding for operational energy requirements,
energy efficiency, alternative energy, and renewable energy
opportunities?
Answer. I am mindful of our need to increase military capability,
reduce risk, and mitigate operational costs through our use and
management of energy. As a result, I believe that we should make
additional investments to increasing both operational effectiveness and
efficiency. This will be accomplished by improving the energy
performance of aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and military bases,
reducing the vulnerability of our energy supply chains, and
diversifying the kinds of energy accessible to our combatant
commanders. Additional funding applied towards alternative energy
solutions for contingency operations would be particularly welcomed
given ongoing and anticipated operational requirements.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including
previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. I support accession to the Convention. Being a party to the
Convention enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing
freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force
posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world's largest
maneuver space. Access would strengthen the legal foundation for our
ability to transit through international straits and archipelagic
waters; preserve our right to conduct military activities in other
countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) without notice or
permission; reaffirm the sovereign immunity of warships; provide a
framework to counter excessive maritime claims; and preserve or
operations and intelligence-collection activities. Joining the
Convention would also demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law,
strengthen our credibility among those nations that are already party
to the Convention, and allow us to bring the full force of our
influence in challenging excessive maritime claims. Finally, it would
secure for us a leadership role in shaping and influencing future
maritime developments.
Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who
assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
United States?
Answer. There are significant national security impacts from
failing to join the Convention. By remaining outside the Convention,
the United States remains in scarce company with Iran, Venezuela, North
Korea, and Syria, and foregoes the most effective way to counter
undesirable changes in the law or to exercise international leadership.
By not acceding to UNCLOS we deny ourselves the ability to challenge
changes to international law as a result of the practice of nations at
the local, regional, or global level. As some states seek to interpret
treaty provisions in a manner that restricts freedom of navigation,
U.S. reliance on customary international law as the legal foundation
for our military activities in the maritime becomes far more vulnerable
and needlessly places our forces in a more tenuous position during
operations. Moreover, by failing to join the Convention, some countries
may come to doubt our commitment to act in accordance with
international law.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime
disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility
and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we
do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes
are resolved peacefully, countries adhere to the rule of law, and all
nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our
leverage by not signing up to the same rule book by which we are asking
other countries to accept. As for the Artic, the other Arctic coastal
nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the
importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the
Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended
continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a
significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of the
Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS.
We must put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and
effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who
are parties to the Convention.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Recent Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Syria
highlight the need for a continued detention capability for both
interrogation and law of war detention.
What recommendations do you have for ensuring that the Department
of Defense maintains sufficient detention capabilities for capture
operations against ISIL and other affiliated terrorist groups to remain
a viable option?
Answer. The United States needs a viable detention capability to
support our counterterrorism strategy. If confirmed, I will work with
civilian and military leadership to ensure our commanders on the ground
have the capability to lawfully detain as part of capture operations.
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.
offset technologies
Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key
technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional
forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-
based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our
emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological
superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the
United States once again focus on offsetting the technology advantages
being gained by our adversaries.
Which technology priorities do you believe the Department of
Defense should be pursuing to maintain the military technological
superiority of the United States?
Answer. To offset advances in anti-access and area-denial weapons
and other advanced technologies that are proliferating around the
world, the Department will identify, develop, and field breakthroughs
in cutting-edge technologies and systems--especially from the field of
robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive
manufacturing.
Question. What strategies would you recommend that Secretary Carter
implement to develop these technology priorities?
Answer. I strongly support Secretary Carter's vision and strategy
as captured in the Defense Innovation Initiative. This multi-faceted
effort recognizes that more than just developing new technology
priorities is required, and acts as the organizing and integrating
construct weaving cutting-edge technology recommendations developed by
our long-range research and development planning program into new
innovative operational concepts. We must also make sure that our
investments in operational concepts and human capital proceed apace
with our efforts to pursue innovative solutions through technological
means. Our greatest asset will remain our servicemembers.
Question. What role do the services have to play in their
development?
Answer. The Services will have a key role, as part of the Defense
Innovation Initiative team and as the Department's primary
organizations for developing and acquiring weapons systems. The
Services identify combinations of new and existing technologies that
are necessary to project power globally, and to prevent the erosion of
our technological superiority in other areas. Ultimately, the Services
integrate technology, training, and operational concepts to produce
capabilities and generate fielded forces for the combatant commanders.
science and technology
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the
warfighter.
What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning
technologies effectively from research programs into programs of
records?
Answer. There are three challenges that I see in in transitioning
technologies effectively into programs of record. The first is
establishing a compelling case and the necessary ``head-room'' in the
budget. The second is maintaining momentum in the program and budgeting
process given the competing and evolving strategic demands placed on
the U.S. military. The third is achieving the promise of the research
technology in a timely manner at a reasonable cost.
Question. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what steps
will you take to ensure that the services are benefitting more quickly
and directly from the research being performed by the defense research
enterprise?
Answer. As the primary advocate for warfighter requirements, I will
ensure that the resourcing and acquisition processes are well-informed
on the priority and timing of capability needs. I will also continue to
use the Chairman's Gap Assessment and the Chairman's Program
Recommendation to communicate directly to Secretary Carter my thoughts
on promising research being performed by the research enterprise.
Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems,
especially in areas such as mobile communications, computing, and
robotics, are keeping pace with global and commercial technological
advances? If not, what do you suggest that the Department do to keep up
with the pace of global technological change?
Answer. I believe the Department is challenged keeping pace with
global and commercial technology advances. The Secretary's Defense
Innovation Initiative is focusing the Department on maintaining our
military's technological edge in an increasingly competitive technology
environment.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
force structure and deterrence
1. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, does our military have the
force structure, training and equipment to meet requirements in the
National Military Strategy?
General Dunford. My initial assessment is yes. However, if Budget
Control Act level cuts return, we will need to reassess our ability to
execute the strategy with an acceptable level of risk
2. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, in your opinion, why is the
United States being challenged around the globe?
General Dunford. The United States is being challenged because our
comparative military and technological advantages over adversaries are
eroding. Moreover, the pace and diffusion of technology advancement
makes it easier for both state and non-state actors to challenge us.
3. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, does our military have the
capability and credibility to deter aggression around the globe?
General Dunford. Yes. I believe the Services have maintained our
military capabilities to provide credible deterrence against potential
aggressors across the globe. However, the capabilities of potential
aggressors are expanding and modernizing. We need to update our
deterrence model for emerging threats, which are more asymmetric and
hybrid in nature. We must now focus on resetting and reconstituting
capabilities that have degraded over the past fifteen years, while also
incorporating new capabilities so we can continue to provide a credible
deterrent.
4. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, do you believe our potential
adversaries have that perception?
General Dunford. Yes, I do, although it is certainly difficult to
know exactly how potential adversaries view our capabilities and
credibility. As we develop an effective deterrence model, understanding
and shaping the perceptions of adversaries about our capabilities and
credibility must be a major component.
afghanistan and iraq
5. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, are their benchmarks
established to determine if conditions on the ground dictate the time
and level of a withdrawal of U.S. forces?
General Dunford. Yes, in Afghanistan we continually validate our
assumptions and assess the conditions on the ground using eight
``Essential Functions'' as our benchmark and the overall security
environment with the country and within the year. These functions
identify the areas where Coalition efforts support the Afghan security
institutions to more effectively enable Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces. Over time, ANDSF will require less U.S. participation
to train, advise, and assist Afghan security institutions as they build
sustainable capabilities.
If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan degrade against
these benchmarks, I will continue to reassess the size and pace of the
drawdown plan and provide my best military advice to the President and
the Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, I will visit Afghanistan to make an assessment of our
current progress. That visit will inform any recommendations I may make
for changes to our strategy.
6. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, how do we avoid the same
mistake we made in Iraq?
General Dunford. Iraq demonstrated that decisions about the
drawdown and post-combat operations in Afghanistan should be based on
conditions on the ground, with the flexibility to make adjustments as
those conditions evolve. In addition, the drawdown from Iraq shows that
whole-of-government cooperation is required to sustain security gains.
U.S. forces can mitigate the effects of security threats that are
fueled by underlying political or sectarian problems, but ultimately,
it is critical that we have credible and capable local partners and an
enduring political solution.
arming the kurds
7. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, if confirmed, will you take
steps to ensure the Kurds receive weapons and equipment they need to
fight ISIL?
General Dunford. Yes.
8. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, will you also look into the
process used to approve which weapons are giving to the Kurds and
report back to this committee any issues with the process,
recommendations on how to improve the process, and status of the Kurds
receiving the equipment they need to fight ISIL?
General Dunford. Yes.
taiwan
9. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, the Taiwan Relations Act and
the ``Six Assurances'' affirm our commitment to maintain Taiwan's self-
defense capability. What is your view towards this longstanding policy?
General Dunford. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.
remains firmly committed to make available to Taiwan such defense
articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. It has been
over 35 years since the TRA was enacted, and we will continue to
support Taiwan through the robust unofficial relationship contemplated
in the TRA. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo on
either side of the Strait, and we support peaceful resolution of cross-
Strait differences in a manner acceptable on both sides.
10. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, what do you believe are the
priorities for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?
General Dunford. The priority for U.S. military assistance to
Taiwan is to provide defensive systems and capabilities in order for
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity. This long-
standing policy contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability
across the Taiwan Strait by providing Taiwan with the confidence to
pursue constructive interactions with the PRC.
11. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, due to Taiwan's geo-strategic
position and close bilateral cooperation, Taiwan can potentially play
an important role in our re-balance to Asia strategy. Do you plan to
help improve Taiwan's asymmetric capability to deter potential threats
from the PRC?
General Dunford. The U.S. conducts robust security cooperation with
Taiwan, and both sides carefully examine Taiwan's defense needs. Cost-
effective, asymmetric capabilities are important for Taiwan to maintain
a sufficient self-defense capability.
12. Senator Inhofe. General Dunford, do you believe Taiwan should
be invited to participate in regional maritime security and
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations?
General Dunford. The U.S. military has deepened and expanded its
cooperation with Taiwan's military in recent years and HA/DR is one of
many important areas in which this has occurred. Going forward, we will
continue to evaluate every opportunity for Taiwan's participation,
based on specific training objectives.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rodger F. Wicker
russia and eastern europe
13. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, last week I met with President
Poroshenko in Kyiv. While he is grateful for the $300 million in
military assistance authorized in our Senate-passed National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), Poroshenko told me that Ukraine urgently
needs Javelin anti-tank missiles to counter Russian advances in the
East. Would you agree with me that the United States not providing
defensive arms to Ukraine could send a message to Putin about a lack of
resolve on Ukraine from the administration?
General Dunford. The U.S. is delivering substantial security
assistance and training, which demonstrates resolve. Defense
institution building is essential. From a purely military perspective,
enhancing Ukraine`s capabilities to deal with Russian aggression would
help Ukraine protect its sovereignty.
14. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, would you also agree that it's
outrageous that this month's transfer of 100 armored Humvees to the
Ukrainians took over one year to process due to bureaucratic delays at
DOD and State?
General Dunford. We must improve our processes and increase
efficiency. In this case, the White House announced approval of the
transfer of 30 armored and up to 200 unarmored HMMWVs to Ukraine on 11
March 2015. Ukraine took delivery of 30 armored HMMWVs later that month
and 100 unarmored HMMWVs on 16 July 2015. One hundred additional
unarmored HMMWVs will be delivered based on Ukraine's schedule. These
are provided as Excess of Defense Articles which means the country
determines the number, and pays for delivery and any refurbishment.
15. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, earlier this year, former
national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed to this
committee the creation of a ``tripwire'' in the Baltics that
communicates clearly to Russia that NATO--in particular, the United
States--will not tolerate violations of the territorial integrity of
our allies. Can you highlight to this committee the steps the
Department of Defense (DOD) should take to send a credible message to
Russia about our red-lines in Eastern Europe?
General Dunford. We must continue to take actions to deter Russian
aggression and remain alert to its strategic capabilities. Most
importantly, we must also help our allies and partners resist and
defend against Russian coercion now, and over the long term. I will
continue to emphasize a package of security cooperation, rotational
presence, and deterrence measures. These measures will further affirm
alliance intent and capability to deter and defeat asymmetric threats.
I will continue to evaluate current measures and recommend or make
appropriate adjustments.
16. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, for too long, Europe has
relied on the American taxpayer for their security. According to NATO
guidelines, member countries should spend at least 2 percent of their
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Only four countries spent that
much in 2013-Estonia, Greece, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. Given the fragility of the economies of many European states,
how would you engage and encourage our NATO allies to live up to their
commitments to invest in their militaries?
General Dunford. If confirmed, I would encourage my Allied
counterparts to invest in specific capabilities that address both the
Alliance needs and support to their nations' defense modernization
efforts.
sequestration
17. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, in fiscal year 2013, the Navy
implemented numerous cuts in response to sequestration. This included
cancellation of five ship deployments and the delayed deployment of a
carrier strike group to the Middle East. Since 2013, we've witnessed
the rise of ISIL, the deteriorating situation in Yemen, Russia's
aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea. The world
is more dangerous today than it was in 2013. What is your view on how
sequestration would threaten DOD's ability to decisively project power
abroad?
General Dunford. Funding to sequester levels removes flexibility to
respond to emergent challenges while maintaining our forward presence
to deter threats sequestration will require that we develop a new
strategy. If sequester continues, our military will be forced to make
cuts with deep and enduring consequences. These consequences include
limiting combat power, limiting decisive power projection abroad,
reducing the size of our military units and further reducing readiness.
We will incur significant risk to mission and risk to force. Our
ability to maintain present commitments to allies and partners will be
degraded.
18. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, what is your assessment of the
impact sequestration would have on our amphibious forces and DOD's
ability to execute DOD's pivot to Asia?
General Dunford. A return to sequestration would necessitate a
revision of the Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial Defense
Review. It would also compel me to revise the national military
strategy. Funding cuts would force us to further delay or cancel
critical warfighting capabilities to amphibious capabilities include
amph reduce readiness of forces needed for steady-state and contingency
response operations, and further degrade warfighting capacity and
capability. Sequestration presents serious risk to executing the
military aspects of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and supporting
our contributions to other aspects of the rebalance. Sequestration
level cuts would compel us to re-evaluate our Asia Pacific rebalance in
a way that emphasizes budgets above national interests, regional goals,
and military missions.
19. Senator Wicker. General Dunford, certain sectors of the defense
industry-such as shipbuilding-are extremely capital intensive. Our
fiscally constrained environment threatens to close production lines
that would take years to restart. Given your prior experience
Commandant of the Marine Corps, what is your assessment of the risks to
DOD industrial base given our current budget environment?
General Dunford. The current budget environment creates significant
risk to the industrial base. The volatility and unpredictability
affects the quality of the workforce and creates inefficiencies for
industry that ultimately affect our buying power.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
u.s. army force structure adjustments (fiscal years 2016-2017):
20. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, do
U.S. Army Force structure reductions in Alaska make strategic sense,
especially given an increasingly aggressive Russia and China, an
unpredictable North Korea, and the need to reassure our Arctic and
Pacific allies against these threats?
General Dunford. The department faces numerous pressing challenges
across the globe, to include the Arctic and Pacific. Force structure
decisions are informed by strategy, but intrinsically tied to fiscal
realities. As a result of the current fiscal environment, the
Department has been forced to make difficult choices that affect our
force posture. The Army force structure reduction in Alaska were made
in that context.
21. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion,
should the U.S. Army reduce the ONLY ABCT in the Pacific AOR and does
doing so hurt the credibility of-or entirely undermine-the Obama
administration's strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region?
General Dunford. The Army has been constrained by the requirement
to reduce overall force structure. The reduction of the ABCT in Alaska
is part of their solution to that requirement. To mitigate, they have
reorganized in order to effectively meet PACOM requirements with
sufficient capabilities on a smaller scale.
22. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, do these large Army
reductions in the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) make the
Rebalance more rhetoric than substance?
General Dunford. The Army has reorganized in light of force
reductions to effectively meet PACOM requirements with sufficient
capabilities on a smaller scale. The reductions do not affect the level
of U.S. engagement in the Pacific AOR. The Rebalance is about more than
force structure: it includes an increased footprint, expanded
agreements, enhanced partnerships, and economic development in the
region. These factors, combined with the sustainment of capabilities
necessary to meet PACOM requirements, ensure a substantive effort.
23. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion,
what alternatives should the U.S. Army have considered, as opposed to
reducing strategically-important forces in Alaska and Hawaii?
General Dunford. The Army states that they considered all possible
options to retain its warfighting capability with a trained and modern
force. The reductions are designed to maintain the proper balance
between force structure, readiness, and modernization. The Army's
stationing plans are designed to leverage existing installation
capabilities, minimize future construction costs, and posture the force
to support the defense strategy.
24. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what is the exact number of
soldiers that will be reduced in Alaska and can you provide an
installation-specific profile of how many soldiers will reduced from
each installation and how many soldiers will remain following the
reductions?
General Dunford. I understand that the Army is planning to reduce
2,704 soldiers in Alaska. Fort Wainwright will be reduced by 73
soldiers and maintain authorization for 6,223. Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson will be reduced by 2,631 and maintain authorization for
1,895 soldiers. I will continually look across the Joint Force to
ensure each service is best postured to support combatant commands in
the present, while simultaneously equipping and training to counter
future threats.
25. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, specifically, what elements
of are being reduced in Alaska and specifically what elements are being
kept?
General Dunford. I understand the Army plans to reduce the 4th
Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division at Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson to an infantry battalion task force and maintain a Striker
Brigade Combat Team at Fort Wainwright.
26. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what are the exact dates
that these reductions in Alaska officially begin and end?
General Dunford. Reductions are scheduled to be complete by the end
of fiscal year 2017.
27. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what specific cost/strategic
factors did the United States use to make this decision and can you
provide all of that information to me?
General Dunford. It is my understanding the Army used a
comprehensive analysis of mission requirements and installation
capabilities that included public participation. Total Army Analysis,
Focus Area Review Groups and Military Value Analysis were used to
determine necessary reductions. For specific details, I defer to the
Chief of Staff of the Army.
28. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what will be the remaining
combat elements of the 4-25 ABCT, what missions will they be capable
of, and what missions will they no longer be capable of?
General Dunford. The 4-25 ABCT will become an infantry battalion
task force, which includes engineer, field artillery, and support
elements. This task force will allow USARPAC to retain an airborne
capability for rapid deployment.
29. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in terms of threats in the
region and the AOR, including North Korea, China, and Russia, what are
the specific risks that the U.S. Army is assuming in relation to each
of these threats, and in your personal opinion, is the U.S. Army
accepting too much risk?
General Dunford. Any assessment of military risk must include
analysis of all Joint Force capabilities. However, as long as we do not
return to BCA-level funding, the Army assesses that it will have the
necessary force structure to counter these regional threats. The Army
used extensive analysis including Total Army Analysis (TAA) and
Military Value Analysis (MVA) as well as COCOM component input to
arrive at a force structure to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill
strategic requirements and world-wide operational demands.
30. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, if confirmed, would you want
to have a say in the highly strategic force structure decisions of each
Service? Do you believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) should have a say and did the current CJCS-or the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF)-weigh into this recent Army decision?
General Dunford. In accordance with Title 10, I will advise the
Secretary on the extent to which Service program recommendations and
budget proposals conform with the priorities established in strategic
plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the
combatant commands. In addition, if in my judgment these priorities and
requirements are not being met, I will provide alternative program
recommendations.
31. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion,
given what the Russians are doing and the importance of the Rebalance,
shouldn't both the SECDEF and the CJCS weigh into decisions like this
one, which involve key national security priorities?
General Dunford. In accordance with Title 10, I will advise the
Secretary on the extent to which Service program recommendations and
budget proposals conform with the priorities established in strategic
plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the
combatant commands. In addition, if in my judgment these priorities and
requirements are not being met, I will provide alternative program
recommendations.
32. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, if confirmed, would you
advise the SECDEF to have input in force structure decisions that
affect our national security, like those in the Arctic?
General Dunford. Yes. In accordance with Title 10, I will advise
the Secretary on the extent to which Service program recommendations
and budget proposals conform with the priorities established in
strategic plans and with the priorities established for the
requirements of the combatant commands. In addition, if in my judgment
these priorities and requirements are not being met, I will provide
alternative program recommendations.
33. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion,
are the U.S. Army's reductions in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017
more driven by Sequestration or the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)?
General Dunford. The Army's reduction to 980,000 Soldiers (450,000
Active, 335,000 National Guard, and 195,000 Reserve) reflects their
assessment of the minimum force necessary to execute the defense
strategy as outlined in the 2014 QDR that end strength was informal by
the resources available. Should fiscal year 2016 be funded at BCA
sequestration levels, programmatic decisions will be driven by
sequestration, which, as you know, is a fiscal topline not based on
strategy. At sequestration funding levels, as stated in the QDR, Army
end strength would go down to:
(1) Active duty end strength, 420,000;
(2) Army National Guard, 315,000;
(3) Army Reserves, 185,000.
34. General Dunford, in the U.S. Army's decision, what, if any,
thought was given to the recent actions of President Putin and the
Russians in the Arctic and how heavily were his recent aggressive
actions weighed?
General Dunford. I will defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army for
specifics on how Russian activities weighed into the decisions. If
confirmed, I will work with leaders to maintain a full range of options
to protect our interests in the Arctic. Any future force structure
reductions or realignments will be evaluated against the ever-evolving
security environment to ensure we consistently meet our global defense
responsibilities.
35. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, recently, General Brooks,
U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) alluded that he could respond to
contingencies in the South China Sea, specifically at Fire Cross Reef,
utilizing the 4-25 ABCT and could do so ``tonight.'' Following these
reductions, would this still be a true statement?
General Dunford. I am not familiar with General Brooks' specific
comments. However if confirmed as Chairman, I will continually look
across the Joint Force to ensure each service is best postured to
support Combatant Commands in the present, while simultaneously
equipping and training to counter future threats.
36. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, how do these reductions in
Alaska impact the response to a Korean Peninsula contingency and what
specifically is that impact?
General Dunford. Although this action may change the sourcing
allocation for our plans, we have the necessary forces and capabilities
to respond to a treat on the Korean Peninsula.
37. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, how do these reductions in
Alaska impact the Army's ability to quickly respond to contingencies in
the Arctic?
General Dunford. The Armed Forces possess sufficient capabilities
to respond to a wide-range of contingencies across the globe, including
the Arctic. U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command, as the
combatant commands with geographic responsibility for the Arctic
region, are continually assessing the security environment to ensure we
can meet assigned or potential missions.
38. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, how much excess facility
capacity will Fort Richardson have after the 4-25 ABCT is reduced and
specifically what excess facilities will those be?
General Dunford. This analysis is ongoing and will incorporate a
number of strategic factors. When complete, the final force structure
results will inform the amount of excess infrastructure capacity
generated. As part of a Joint Base, the force structure decision
calculus is conducted by the Army while the Air Force, as the lead
Service for Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, will make the facility
decisions.
39. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, will the reduction of the 4-
25 negatively affect the DOD/VA Joint venture hospital on Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER)?
General Dunford. The withdrawal of the U.S. Army's 4th Brigade,
25th Infantry Division will not affect the DOD/VA joint venture
hospital at Joint Base Elmendorf -Richardson. The reduction in active
duty forces and families should increase the hospital's available
capacity, enabling more Veterans to receive medical care at the medical
facility.
40. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, how much input did U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM) have in the U.S Army's decision to reduce
forces in Alaska and Hawaii and what specifically was that input and
how heavily was it weighed?
General Dunford. It is my understanding that USPACOM was
represented by U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) throughout the process that
determined the recently announced Army Force structure decisions.
41. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, how much input did U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) have in the U.S Army's decision to reduce
forces in Alaska and what specifically was that input?
General Dunford. EUCOM, as represented by USAREUR, participated in
the Army's comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force
structure decisions. Their input, like that of every other geographic
combatant command, helped inform a decision to best posture a smaller
Army to fulfill strategic priorities, including the Asia-Pacific
rebalance and world-wide operational demands.
42. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, I have been told that the
final decision to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii came down to
tradeoff between those forces and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat
Team in Vicenza, Italy. Is this accurate, and if so, specifically what
strategic considerations (location, deterrence, proximity to threats,
access to nearby or organic lift, and capabilities) went to making this
decision?
General Dunford. I do not have insight at this level of detail
about the force structure decisions of the other services. I defer to
Chief of Staff of the Army.
43. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, how much input did U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have in the U.S Army's decision to reduce
forces in Alaska and what specifically was that input?
General Dunford. NORTHCOM, as represented by ARNORTH, participated
in the Army's comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force
structure decisions. Their input, like that of every other geographic
combatant command, helped inform a decision to best posture a smaller
Army to fulfill strategic priorities, including the Asia-Pacific
rebalance and world-wide operational demands.
44. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extent was the U.S
Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska coordinated with Alaska
Command (ALCOM) and what concerns were raised/mitigated from this
coordination?
General Dunford. ALCOM, a sub-command of NORTHCOM, as represented
by ARNORTH, participated in the Army's comprehensive process that
facilitated the recent force structure decisions. Their input, like
that of every other geographic combatant command, helped inform a
decision to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic
priorities, including the Asia-Pacific rebalance and world-wide
operational demands.
45. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extend was this
decision coordinated with the Air Force side of JBER and what concerns
were raised/mitigated from this coordination?
General Dunford. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, like the other 29
installations at which substation Army forces are stationed, helped
inform and facilitate the Army's decision process through participating
in two environmental and socio-economic analyses, providing input to
the Military Value Analysis and facilitating ``listening sessions'' for
installation communities. Commands were solicited to ensure the
accuracy of data and HQDA awareness of issues and concerns associated
with their installations. While analysis focused on potential losses at
the former Fort Richardson, it considered impacts to Joint-Base
Elmendorf-Richardson as a whole.
46. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extent were our
South Korean Allies consulted on the U.S Army's decision to reduce
forces in Alaska?
General Dunford. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army to
characterize any engagement with our Allies regarding their decision to
reduce forces in Alaska.
47. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, if so, what were their
concerns and how much were those concerns weighed?
General Dunford. I defer to Chief of Staff of the Army.
48. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extent were our
Japanese Allies consulted on the U.S Army's decision to reduce forces
in Alaska?
General Dunford. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army to
characterize their engagement with our Allies regarding the decision to
reduce forces in Alaska.
49. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, if so, what were their
concerns and how much were those concerns weighed?
General Dunford. I defer to Chief of Staff of the Army.
50. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extent was section
1043 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016 considered in the U.S Army's
decision to reduce forces in Alaska?
General Dunford. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army on how/
if Section 1043 informed their decision to reduce forces in Alaska. If
confirmed as Chairman, I will pay close attention to what is required
to meet our strategic military objectives in the Arctic, including
consideration of how we best posture forces in and around that region.
I will seek to ensure a balanced approach to the posturing of our
global forces.
51. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, is
it strategically wise to reduce forces in the Arctic before we have a
new Arctic strategy and OPLAN?
General Dunford. The reduction of personnel in Alaska, as well as
elsewhere, is a result of the need to balance current operational
priorities and resource constraints. These force structure decisions
best posture a smaller Army to meet global commitment. The Department
is continually reviewing the security environment and operational
requirements in the Arctic and will reprioritize resources as needed. I
look forward to participating in this process.
52. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extent was section
1262 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 considered in the U.S Army's
decision to reduce forces in Alaska?
General Dunford. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army on how/
if section 1043 informed their decision to reduce forces in Alaska. If
confirmed as Chairman, I will pay close attention to what is required
to meet our strategic military objectives in the Arctic, including
consideration of how we best posture forces in and around that region.
I will seek to ensure a balanced approach to the posturing of our
global forces.
53. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, to what extent were
Alaska's, and specifically JBER's organic strategic airlift and close
proximity to large and robust training areas, weighted in the U.S
Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska?
General Dunford. The Army considered all possible options to retain
its warfighting capability, to include strategic airlift and training
area location. Ultimately, these reductions are designed to maintain
the proper balance between force structure, readiness, and
modernization. The Army's stationing plans are designed to leverage
existing installation capabilities, minimize future construction costs,
and posture the force to support the defense strategy.
54. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what countries has the 4-25
ABCT worked closely with and possibly trained with and what is the
impact of this reduction on the military-to-military relationships with
those countries following the reduction of this unit?
General Dunford. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army for any
specific details on the 4-25 ABCT's training history.
55. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, following the Air Force's
initial decision to remove a squadron from Eielson, senior Air Force
officials soon went up to Fairbanks and North Pole communities to
explain the decision. When will this be done in the case of Fort
Richardson and who will be sent?
General Dunford. Engaging our communities on basing decisions is
important. I understand the Department of the Army conducted extensive
community outreach. I defer to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the
specifics of the community engagement plan.
56. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what impact has the Army
assessed will occur to the greater Anchorage housing market and to the
greater Anchorage economy as a result of the decision to reduce the 4-
25 ABCT?
General Dunford. Analysis of the Anchorage housing market and
greater economy was part of the Army's overall analysis in determining
force structure changes. I defer to the Department of the Army to
provide specific detail regarding your request.
57. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, will installations with
reductions be allowed to access DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA)
funds to mitigate the effects of these reductions?
General Dunford. If an Army installation is selected for reduction,
impacted areas may qualify for assistance from OEA. I understand the
Army intends to distribute letters and brochures to the most impacted
areas, based on job loss, and that OEA will consider all applications
for assistance.
58. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what effects with the U.S.
Army's reductions in Alaska have on U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) and
USARAK's headquarters?
General Dunford. I defer to the Department of the Army for specific
detail on impacts to the HQ reduction. I am aware that the Army's force
structure analysis included Total Army Analysis (TAA), Military Value
Analysis (MVA), as well as environmental and socio-economic analysis.
59. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in what way does the U.S.
Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska impact Alaska-based joint
training exercises such Red Flag-Alaska, Northern Edge, and Alaska
Shield?
General Dunford. The U.S. Army's decision to reduce forces in
Alaska could potentially limit their ability to operate the Joint
Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC). The JPARC provides joint combined
arms training support to all of the Services for exercises such as Red
Flag-Alaska, Northern Edge, and Alaska Shield.
60. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, before you are confirmed,
can you please provide the Military Value Analysis (MVA) Model and the
Total Army Analysis used to make all of the Army's fiscal year 2016-
2017 force structure decisions?
General Dunford. I will work with Army leadership to ensure the
committee has access to the documents necessary for the committee to
provide oversight.
61. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, can you provide more
information on the U.S. Army's possible desire to convert at National
Guard brigade at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) to Styker brigade?
General Dunford. The decision to convert a National Guard brigade
to a Stryker Brigade rests with the Department of the Army. They can
provide the best information regarding any planned force structure
change.
62. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, if confirmed, do you pledge
to ensure that the U.S. Army is completely transparent about the entire
fiscal year 2016-2017 force reductions and makes all the documents used
to make all of these decision available to Congress?
General Dunford. If confirmed, I will work with the Army leadership
to provide requested information regarding the fiscal year 2016-2017
force reductions to Congress.
63. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, if confirmed, do pledge to
fully review the Army's reductions decisions, especially in light of
the emerging concerns in the Asia-Pacific, the Arctic and given that
there is a pending Arctic strategy?
General Dunford. Yes.
64. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, as the Army has told me that
they hope to reverse the decision in Alaska. If confirmed, will you
work with me, and them, to bring all the U.S. Army forces back to my
State and the Arctic?
General Dunford. If confirmed, I will work with all the Services to
determine the right size, capabilities, and posture to best support our
National Security.
marine corps in alaska
65. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, what opportunities and
challenges would exist to either permanently stationed marines in
Alaska, specifically at JBER--or developing rotational forces at JBER--
as a part of the Rebalance from Okinawa?
General Dunford. The state of Alaska, and specifically Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson, is important to our nation's security in
protecting the homeland and projecting power in the Pacific and beyond.
As the global security environment evolves, we will continue to assess
the optimal strategic footprint across the services in the PACOM AOR.
u.s. security commitment to taiwan
66. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, The Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) and the ``Six Assurances'' form the cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan
relations and affirms our commitment to maintain Taiwan's self-defense
capability. How do you and the administration plan to continue to
implement our policy under this framework?
General Dunford. The U.S. remains firmly committed to supporting
Taiwan within the overall framework of our one-China policy, based on
the three joint U.S.-China communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. We
also remain committed to the Six Assurances. Accordingly, we will
continue to promote cross-Strait stability by ensuring that Taiwan
maintains a sufficient self-defense capability.
pacific pathways
67. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, in your personal opinion, in
a budget constrained environment, can we afford to have an Army mission
in the Pacific that is redundant with another service's longstanding
mission?
General Dunford. The Army's mission in the Pacific remains a
critical component of the Joint Force's broader mission and presence.
Each service provides unique, valuable capabilities in executing joint
responsibilities in the region based on national strategic interests.
68. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, is Pacific Pathways
redundant with the mission of the U.S. Marine Corps?
General Dunford. When it comes to increasing U.S. presence in the
Pacific for peacetime engagement or the maintenance of forces to
support the execution of contingency plans, the United States Army
remains a critical component. Their efforts in the Pacific are
consistent with broader department efforts and support combatant
commanders requirements.
the need for strategic lift in the pacific aor
69. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, you have said in multiple
forms (hearings, public speaking engagements, answers to Advanced
Policy Questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)) that
lift capacity to support the shifting laydown of forces in the Pacific
theater will be insufficient and constitutes a major concern for you.
In your response to the committee's questions, you stated that you
``look forward to working with the Services and the U.S. Pacific
Command to address the lift needs in the Pacific.'' If confirmed, what
are some of the ways you would consider to address this pending
shortfall?
General Dunford. The Pacific force laydown is a challenge
exacerbated by the fact that we have a shortfall of amphibious lift to
meet global demand whether it is support to peacetime or contingency
operations. I will work with the Secretary of Defense to ensure the
department's priorities reflect the lift requirements in the pacific. I
will also support efforts to work with our allies and partners to
advance initiatives that mitigate this challenge.
70. Senator Sullivan. General Dunford, as Admiral Roughead
testified to this committee in April, do you believe we should also
consider moving additional naval and maritime assets forward into the
theater to support our peacetime and contingency lift?
General Dunford. Yes, we should continue to consider how we can
best posture our naval assets in the Pacific. The movement of forces
around the Pacific is a challenge given the tyranny of distance, and
this challenge is exacerbated by a shortfall of amphibious lift to meet
global demand, whether in support of peacetime or contingency
operations. We continually evaluate our force posture in the Pacific
theater, and all theaters, based on global threats.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
test and training ranges
71. Senator Lee. General Dunford, one of the most important, yet
often overlooked, assets DOD is our test and training ranges. Many of
these are located in western states and are utilized by all branches of
the military, as well as other Federal agencies, to train members on a
variety of threats and environments and to research and test new
systems vital to the future of our national security. In order to adapt
their training to the rapidly changing spectrum of threats facing the
military, it is imperative that we work to modernize our training
ranges and protect these assets from issues like encroachment and
cumbersome environmental regulations. What is your assessment of the
state of our military test and training ranges, and do you agree that
we need to modernize and prioritize our military readiness against
future threats?
General Dunford. Yes. Test and training ranges are critical assets
for enabling our nation's military to prepare and respond flexibly
across the wide range of potential threats, both now and in the future.
Currently, many of our weapons systems exceed the contiguous space
capabilities that our U.S. ranges can support. In addition, meeting the
Department of Defense's Endangered Species Act (ESA) responsibilities,
along with competition for frequency spectrum, will continue to
challenge our management of test and training ranges. Modernization of
our ranges to assure military readiness is critical to addressing
threats posed by our adversaries.
national guard and reserve units
72. Senator Lee. General Dunford, you have been a combat commander
in Iraq and Afghanistan, what is your assessment of the performance of
our National Guard and Reserve units in these conflicts?
General Dunford. Throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
our Reserve Component forces performed admirably. Our Reserve Component
forces were an integral part of our operations in both theaters and
they often brought unique civilian skills that proved invaluable on the
battlefield.
73. Senator Lee. General Dunford, if confirmed, how do you plan to
build upon the combat experience gained by National Guard and Reserve
units and take advantage of the cost benefits of the Reserve Forces
that have been identified by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and CAPE
reports in order to preserve combat power for the military, especially
while adjusting to potential budget constraints?
General Dunford. The National Guard and Reserves are integral to
our operational force and our strategic reserve. The challenge we face
is striking the right balance between what is needed in the active
component to meet emergent or short-notice requirements and what can be
maintained in the reserve components and activated as required. The
studies conducted by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and CAPE will
certainly help inform these decisions. If confirmed, I will work with
the Services to leverage the capabilities and experience inherent
within our reserve components.
acquisitions
74. Senator Lee. General Dunford, one of the topics of great
concern to this committee has been reforming the acquisition process in
DOD to streamline efforts and find savings, especially for big-ticket
acquisitions that have experienced major cost overruns in the past.
Equally important to better allocation of funding and resources across
DOD is ensuring that weapon system sustainment concerns are addressed
beginning in the acquisitions process and aligned throughout the
system's entire lifecycle. I am pleased by steps that the Air Force has
taken to bring sustainment issues into the acquisition process and look
forward to seeing those efforts continue. If confirmed, what ideas do
you have for acquisition and sustainment efforts to increase the total
life-cycle efficiency and decrease overall costs of weapons systems?
General Dunford. I am an advocate of the Air Force's ``Bending the
Cost Cure-Weapon System Sustainment Initiative'' focused on
significantly reducing weapon system sustainment cost growth and the
Navy's ground-breaking work in the field of renewable energy to power
``the Great Green Fleet'' driven by 50-50 blends of biofuels.
We need to press forward on efforts to promote commonality across
weapons systems where it makes sense, establish competition at all
phases of the acquisition cycle, and demand the incorporation of life-
cycle efficiency considerations into the basic DNA of every weapon
system we build.
isis/syria/iraq
75. Senator Lee. General Dunford, the stated objective of the
United States in the conflict against ISIS is to defeat the group and
leave a stable, unified government in Iraq and a post-Assad state in
Syria. Some of my colleagues earlier this week discussed with Secretary
Carter and General Dempsey the viability and appropriateness of
supporting the modern borders of Iraq and Syria given the region's
cultural, religious, and tribal histories. While I do not think it is
the role of the United States to partition and re-draw borders on the
other side of the world, I am also greatly concerned that we could be
ineffectively employing our national security resources by continuing
to support governing constructs that may be flawed in the first place.
You have extensive experience in Iraq and in the Middle East. Do
you believe that in order to protect Americans from the terrorist
threats that are physically or ideologically generated in this region
that we must absolutely continue supporting the concept of an Iraqi and
Syrian state as currently drawn?
General Dunford. Protecting American citizens, our homeland, and
our interests abroad will remain our top priority. Supporting the
current strategy to defeat ISIL, which assumes Iraq and Syria as nation
states, is our best option to mitigate threats in the region. If, in
the future, I assess that Iraq and/or Syria are not viable as nation
states, I will adjust my best military advice accordingly.
76. Senator Lee. General Dunford, how significant of an investment
in forces, funding, and time would be necessary to overcome the
sectarian divisions that exist inside and outside of these borders?
General Dunford. Ultimately, the solution to overcome sectarian
divisions must come from the leaders and communities within the region.
No amount of U.S. investment alone will be sufficient.
77. Senator Lee. General Dunford, Secretary Carter stated on
Tuesday to this committee that the Department of Defense is currently
training only 60 Syrian rebels under the $500 million program
authorized last year, with the goal of graduating thousands of recruits
by the end of the year. How would you define success in this program,
and specifically what do you view as the timeline for achieving
success?
General Dunford. The Syria train and equip program is a long-term
effort that is only one component of our broader approach. The impact
of the T&E program remains to be seen, but we currently face
significant challenges in recruiting and vetting suitable volunteers at
the scale necessary to have strategic effects. If confirmed, I plan to
visit the region and assess our approach in Syria to develop a better
understanding of this immensely complex and challenging situation.
78. Senator Lee. General Dunford, what will you do to ensure that
the weapons and training we supply are not used by or to the advantage
of ISIS and other extremist forces that share a common enemy with the
groups we are supporting in Syria?
General Dunford. The first step is to accurately identify those
groups with whom we wish to train. Next, we need to ensure a stringent
and rigorous vetting process to better understand the backgrounds and
motivations of those we are training. Last, we must have a well-
designed end use monitoring program, in order to verify our equipment
is being used according to U.S. objectives and our high standards of
battlefield conduct.
iran/p5+1
79. Senator Lee. General Dunford, the P5+1 negotiations on the
Iranian nuclear program have passed two deadlines for a final deal, and
concerns exist over the ability of any deal under the parameters of the
framework released earlier this year to prevent Iran from achieving a
nuclear weapons capability in the future. What impact will Iran
maintaining a path to a nuclear weapon capability, or the lack of
sufficient verification and inspection agreements, have on our
strategic posture in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area and the
actions of Arab countries?
General Dunford. If Iran maintains a path to a nuclear weapon
capability it would have a destabilizing impact within the region and
constitute a threat to our national interests.
border security
80. Senator Lee. General Dunford, last year, the commander of U.S.
Southern Command, General John Kelly, stated that the security along
our southern border and the migration crisis were existential threats
to U.S. national security. In addition to the drugs and crime that can
enter into the United States from the Southern border, we know that
terrorist organizations have connections with drug cartels and other
contacts in that region. Are you concerned about the security threats
that are presented by unsecure borders, and what is your overall
assessment of security in the western hemisphere?
General Dunford. I appreciate the complexity of securing borders as
vast as ours and recognize the challenge they present. I am concerned
about the security of our borders. Within the Western Hemisphere, we
have seen the negative influence of Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCOs) on security and the rule of law, especially in
Mexico and Central America. While there is always a potential for
convergence between violent extremists (VE) and Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCO) in the Western Hemisphere, TCOs are motivated by
profit and the ability to operate unimpeded by law enforcement. Within
our hemisphere, TCOs generally understand that supporting terrorists or
terrorist activities would bring increased U.S. attention and negative
impacts to their operations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
sigar unused building report in afghanistan
81. Senator McCaskill. General Dunford, in May, the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a
report on a 64,000 square foot regional headquarters built in
Afghanistan at a cost of $36 million that was never occupied. Its
findings implicated a senior Army general who ignored requests to
cancel the construction, and also the Army's own investigation of the
matter. SIGAR recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the
senior Army general who conducted the investigation ``in light of his
failure to carry out a fulsome investigation in compliance with General
Dunford's orders.'' This investigation was ordered by you while serving
as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). While SIGAR did not find any fault
with your actions, as the officer who ordered the investigation you
ultimately signed it. General Dunford, given SIGAR's findings, are you
concerned that the investigation into this matter was inadequate?
General Dunford. No. However, I fully recognize the necessity for
the military to be effective stewards of the resources we are provided.
This facility was constructed prior to my assumption of command. When I
became aware of the issue, I directed an investigation. The
investigation did not find criminal behavior, but rather identified
incorrect assumptions made in a combat environment. We should and must
learn from these incorrect assumptions. I am committed to responsible
stewardship of both the resources Congress appropriates and taxpayer
trust.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
isil/iraq
82. Senator Shaheen. General Dunford, what is your assessment of
the effectiveness of the current collation air campaign against the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)?
General Dunford. From a military effectiveness perspective,
coalition airstrikes since August 2014 have blunted ISIL's initiative,
removed a number of ISIL leaders, and degraded the ability of the group
to operate openly in Iraq and Syria. ISIL's total area of influence in
Syria remains largely unchanged as the group has offset the losses of
Kobane and territory in Raqqah province with gains in As Suwayda, the
Damascus countryside, and Homs Province.
Coalition airstrikes have also degraded ISIL's capability to mass
and stage fighters, forcing the group to rely more heavily on
asymmetric terrorist tactics such as suicide attacks, car bombs, and
assassinations.
83. Senator Shaheen. General Dunford, what do you assess would be
the impact on the campaign of deploying U.S. forward air controllers to
Iraq to call in close support during combat?
General Dunford. Employing Forward Air Controllers or accompanying
Iraqi ground forces in the past has, in my experience, made those units
more effective at the tactical level. Adjustments to our military
support campaign will further enable Iraqi forces to gain the skill and
confidence necessary for improved combat effectiveness.
84. Senator Shaheen. General Dunford, do you favor this shift in
policy?
General Dunford. If confirmed, I would take an early opportunity to
get on the ground to speak to commanders so I could provide a more
comprehensive recommendation as to how we can support our broader
campaign objectives in Iraq.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
defense manpower data center
85. Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, the Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC) is an important resource for ensuring that servicemembers
receive the benefits and protections they are entitled to under the
law. The use of the DMDC system has been designated as a resource to
enhance compliance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). In
view of the growing importance of the DMDC for a wide variety of
purposes, what steps has the Department taken to strengthen the
capabilities of the DMDC?
General Dunford. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) plays a
vital role in ensuring our servicemembers, retirees, and their family
members receive all the entitlements and benefits provided under the
law. The department has taken steps to strengthen the DMDC, for
example, when DOD saw the use of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
(SCRA) database increased from approximately 490 million searches in
2012 to over 2.9 billion searches in 2014, DOD provided additional
resources to improve the SCRA website to meet this demand. I am
confident the Department will continue to provide DMDC the necessary
resources to carry out its critical mission.
servicemembers civil relief act (scra) and military lending act (mla)
86. General Dunford, are the staffing, funding, and security levels
appropriate to ensure the accuracy, reliability and integrity of the
SCRA and MLA database systems?
General Dunford. It is my understanding that the SCRA and MLA
database systems are appropriately staffed, funded, and secured to
ensure the accuracy, reliability, and integrity of the systems.
87. Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, if there are shortfalls in
maintaining and improving the SCRA and MLA databases, what are your
requests to bring them to a level you feel would place them at the
highest levels of accuracy, reliability and integrity?
General Dunford. I am not aware of shortfalls in maintaining the
SCRA and MLA databases.
88. Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, how is the Department
ensuring that the SCRA and MLA databases provide adequate protection of
servicemembers' personal information?
General Dunford. The SCRA and MLA databases conform to all federal
requirements for the protection of personal information. Protections
include Information Assurance certification and accreditation of the
SCRA and MLA databases, encryption of traffic to and from the
databases, best practices for data security and data retention, and
protection of information as required by the Privacy Act of 1974.
89. Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, how is the Department
ensuring that the SCRA and MLA databases have the capability to provide
timely and accurate data to enable servicemembers eligible for SCRA
benefits?
General Dunford. The Department maintains the SCRA and MLA
databases with near real-time data supplied directly by the Military
Services. The SCRA and MLA databases are publicly accessible and
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (barring periodic maintenance),
which allow the Department to meet the highest standards for providing
timely and accurate verification data.
90. Senator Donnelly. General Dunford, does the SCRA and MLA
databases have the capability to prevent delays with military consumers
seeking credit or receiving their benefits?
General Dunford. The SCRA and MLA databases are publicly accessible
24 hours a day, 7 days a week (barring periodic maintenance). Those
seeking to determine eligibility for benefits or seeking credit may use
the SCRA or MLA databases to verify status anytime with the most up-to-
date information
______
[The nomination reference of General Joseph F. Dunford,
Jr., USMC, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 21, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment in the United
States Marine Corps to the grade indicated while assigned to a
position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 152 and 601:
To Be General
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 3240.
------
[The biographical sketch of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.,
USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC
Source of commissioned service:
Platoon Leaders Class (PLC)
Educational degrees:
Saint Michael's College, BA, 1977.
Georgetown University, MA, 1985.
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, MA, 1992.
Military schools attended:
Basic Officer Course, 1977.
Infantry Officer Course, 1978.
U.S. Army Ranger School, 1980.
Amphibious Warfare School, 1984-1985.
U.S. Army Airborne School, 1987.
Static Line Jumpmaster School, 1988.
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1991-1992.
U.S. Army War College, 1998-1999.
Capstone, 2005.
Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander, 2007.
Pinnacle, 2009.
Senior Executive EEO Seminar, 2010.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2nd Lt.................................... 8 Jun 77
1st Lt.................................... 8 Jun 79
Capt...................................... 1 Feb 82
Maj....................................... 1 Jul 89
Lt. Col................................... 1 Sep 94
Col....................................... 1 Oct 99
Brig. Gen................................. 1 Jan 05
Maj. Gen.................................. 2 May 09
Lt. Gen................................... 8 Aug 08
Gen....................................... 23 Oct 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct 14............................. Present Commandant of the Marine
Corps (Gen.)
Feb 13............................. Aug 14 Commander, International
Security Assistance
Force--Afghanistan; and
Commander, United
States Forces--
Afghanistan (Gen.)
Dec 12............................. Feb 13 Special Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff (Gen.)
Oct 10............................. Dec 12 Assistant Commandant of
the Marine Corps (Gen.)
Sep 09............................. Oct 10 Commanding General, I
Marine Expeditionary
Force; and Commander,
U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Central Command
(Lt. Gen.)
Aug 08............................. Aug 09 Deputy Commandant for
Plans, Policies, and
Operations (Lt. Gen.)
Jun 07............................. Aug 08 Vice Director for
Operations, J-3, Joint
Staff (Brig. Gen.)
Jul 05............................. Jun 07 Director, Operations
Division, Plans,
Policies and Operations
(Brig. Gen.)
Jul 04............................. Jun 05 Assistant division
Commander, 1st Marine
Division (Brig. Gen./
Col.)
May 03............................. Jul 04 Chief of Staff, 1st
Marine Division (Col.)
May 01............................. May 03 Regimental Commander,
5th Marines, 1st Marine
Division (Col.)
Jun 99............................. May 01 Executive Assistant to
the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and Chief,
Global and Mulitlateral
Affairs Division, J-5,
Joint Staff (Col./Lt.
Col.)
Mar 96............................. Jul 98 Commanding Officer, 2d
Battalion, 6th Marines,
2d Marine Division (Lt.
Col.)
Jul 95............................. Mar 96 Executive Officer, 6th
Marines, 2d Marine
Division (Lt. Col.)
Dec 92............................. Jul 95 Senior Aide-de-Camp to
the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (Lt. Col./
Maj.)
Jun 92............................. Dec 92 Commandant of the Marine
Corps Staff Group
(Maj.)
Jun 88............................. Jun 91 Marine Officer
Instructor, College of
the Holy Cross (Maj./
Capt.)
Jul 87............................. Jun 88 Plans Officer, 2d Air
Naval Gunfire Line
Company, 2d Force
Service Support Group
(Capt.)
May 85............................. Jul 87 Company Commander, Rifle
Company, 3d Battalion,
6th Marines, 2d Marine
Division (Capt.)
Dec 81............................. Jul 84 Head, Reserve, Retention
& Reenlistment Unit;
Admin Officer,
Headquarters Marine
Corps (Capt./1st Lt.)
Nov 80............................. Dec 81 Aide-de-Camp, 3d Marine
Amphibious Force (1st
Lt.)
Mar 78............................. Nov 80 Company Commander;
Executive Officer;
Platoon Commander; S-
Liaison Officer,
Company K, 3d
Battalion, 1st Marines,
1st Marine Division
(1st Lt./2nd Lt.)
Jul 77............................. Feb 78 Student, The Basic
School, Quantico,
Virginia (2nd Lt.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, International Security Feb 13-Aug 14 General
Assistance Force--Afghanistan and
Commander, United States Forces--
Afghanistan.
Special Assistant to the Chairman, Dec 12-Feb 13 General
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Vice Director for Operations, J-3, Jun 07-Aug 08 Brigadier
Joint Staff. General
Executive Assistant to the Vice Jun 99-May 01 Colonel/
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Lieutenant
Staff; Chief, Global and Multilateral Cololonel
Affairs Division, J-5, Joint Staff.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operational assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, International Security Feb 13-Aug 14 General
Assistance Force--Afghanistan;
Commander, United States Forces--
Afghanistan.
Chief of Staff; Assistant Division Jun 04-Mar 05 Brigadier
Commander, 1st Marine Division General/
Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Colonel
Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division Mar 04-May 04 Colonel
Operation Iraqi Freedom II.
Regimental Commander; Chief of Staff, Jan 03-Oct 03 Colonel
1st Marine Division Operation Iraqi
Freedom/Enduring Freedom.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Decorations and Badges:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Decorations Quantity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Distinguished Service Medal....................... 1
Defense Superior Service Medal w/bronze oak leaf cluster.. 2
Legion of Merit w/Combat V................................ 1
Defense Meritorious Service Medal......................... 1
Meritorious Service Medal................................. 2
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal.................. 4
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal................... 1
Combat Action Ribbon...................................... 1
Presidental Unit Citation-Navy............................ 1
Joint Meritorious Unit Award.............................. 2
Navy Unit Commendation.................................... 1
Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation........................ 1
National Defense Service Medal............................ 2
Afghanistan Campaign Medal................................ 1
Iraq Campaign Medal....................................... 2
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal............... 1
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal..................... 1
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon............................. 7
NATO Medal-ISAF Afghanistan............................... 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General Joseph
F. Dunford, Jr., USMC in connection with his nomination
follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
3. Date of nomination:
21 May 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
23 December 1955; Boston, Massachusetts.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Ellyn A. Dunford (Maiden name: Ellyn A. Sartucci).
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Member, Marine Corps Association.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Awarded Colonel Donald Cook Award for Citizenship, from St.
Michael's College, Vermont.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
This 23rd day of May, 2015
______
[The nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC was
reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 23, 2015,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2015.]
NOMINATIONS OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND GENERAL DARREN W. McDEW, USAF, TO BE
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed,
McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Please take seats, gentlemen, and we'll
begin the hearing. And thank you.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
consider the nominations of General Paul Selva to be the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Darren McDew
to be the Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
We welcome you here this morning, as well as members of the
Selva and McDew family. As is our tradition, at the beginning
of your testimony, we welcome each of you to introduce the
members of your family joining you this morning. We know the
sacrifices your families make, and we're grateful to them for
their continued support to our Nation.
Please proceed, General Selva.
General Selva. Senator McCain, I'd like to introduce you to
my wife, Ricki, who's sitting right behind me. She's been with
me for every day of my 35-year career. In fact, we are
classmates from the U.S. Air Force Academy. She wore the
uniform of our Air Force for 9 years. She's probably the only
person in the world that can give me the kind of feedback I
need when I stray from centerline. And she is a lifelong
friend, and I love her for being by my side.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, General. And welcome.
General McDew.
General McDew. You know, they trained me to do this, and
the first thing I did was not do it.
[Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed.
Behind me I have the folks that have been behind me for a
long, long time. First, my beautiful wife, Evelyn, who's been
with me for 40 years. We've been married for 31, we've known
each other for 40. We have been blessed to have two children,
who continue to grow our family. We have my favorite daughter,
Keisha. We also have our son, Keith, our daughter-in-law,
Becca, and the most wonderful human in the world, our grandson,
Henry, who's 5 weeks old--5 months old this week. But, also
behind me----
Chairman McCain. Henry looks pretty healthy to me.
[Laughter.]
General McDew. And if he could just play, here, with my
uniform, he'd be fine, but, otherwise, he'll probably sleep.
We also have behind us a very close friend and colleague,
Dr. William R. Sutherland. I call him ``my buddy, Bert.'' My
buddy, Bert, has pinned on every rank since colonel, and he's
been a colleague, a friend, and a mentor. And I thank all of
them for being here today and as they've been along the way.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. We are so pleased to see the
families here today.
General Selva and General McDew, you come before this
committee today amid a sweeping transition in military
leadership that will take place over the coming months. In
addition to your nominations, this committee is currently
considering the nominations of a new Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, new Service Chiefs for the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps, and potentially others in the near future. This
team of military leaders will be soon--will soon be responsible
for preparing our military to confront the most diverse and
complex array of global crises since the end of World War II.
The list of challenges for our national security is as
daunting as it is drearily familiar: the rampage of ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] terrorist army, Iran's
pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for its destabilizing
proxies, revisionist Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and China's
continued military buildup and aggressive behavior towards its
neighbors. And yet, while worldwide challenges like these grow,
the Defense Department has grown larger but less capable, more
complex but less innovative, and more proficient at defeating
low-tech adversaries but more vulnerable to high-tech ones. And
worse, the self-inflicted wounds of the Budget Control Act and
sequestration-level defense spending have made all these
problems worse.
Over the past 4 years, we've seen drastic reductions to
defense spending that have cut Army and Marine Corps end
strength dangerously low and slowed critical modernization
priorities across the Services, placing at risk our Nation's
military technological superiority. At the same time, our
military has maintained an accelerated operational tempo and,
as a consequence, entered a dangerous downward spiral of
military capacity and readiness that risk compromising each
Service's ability to execute our defense strategic guidance at
a time of accumulating danger to our national security.
The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
stated that, even if the Defense Department receives the
additional $38 billion above the budget caps that the
President's defense budget requests, our military would still
``remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable of risk in our
ability to execute the defense strategy.'' More worrisome,
every one of our military Service Chiefs has testified that
continued sequestration-level defense spending puts American
lives at greater risk. Unless we change course and return to
strategy-driven defense budgets, I fear our military will
confront depleted readiness, chronic modernization problems,
and deteriorating morale. No matter how many dollars we spend,
we won't be able to provide our military the equipment they
need with a broken defense acquisition system that takes too
long and costs too much. For example, an Army study looked at
the time it would take to go through all of the AT&L
[Acquision, Technology, and Logistics] reviews and buy nothing.
What was the answer? Ten years. Ten years to buy nothing. Our
adversaries are not shuffling paper, they're building weapon
systems, and it's time for us to do the same.
General Selva, if confirmed as the next Vice Chairman, in
addition to your many responsibilities supporting the next
Chairman, you would serve as the chairman of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and an executive member of the
Defense Acquisition Board. In these--in this combination of
roles, you will have a critical role in the defense acquisition
system, from identifying and approving joint requirements to
assessing cost, schedule, and performance. Members of this
committee will be very interested to hear your thoughts on
acquisition reform. In particular, we will be interested to
hear your views on how we fix blurred lines of accountability
inside the defense acquisition system that allow its leaders to
evade responsibility for results. This is the central problem
this committee is trying to address in the acquisition reforms
adopted in the Senate's defense authorization bill. There are
diverse views on acquisition reform, but one thing is for sure:
The status quo is unacceptable. And we need a Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs who recognizes that.
General McDew, as the Commander of Air Mobility Command,
you are well aware of the challenges facing TRANSCOM [United
States Transportation Command] in projecting and sustaining
forces around the world amid ongoing budget cuts. But, TRANSCOM
isn't just providing capability to support other commands in
confronting escalating global threats. Some of these threats
are aimed at TRANSCOM itself. For example, just last year, this
committee conducted an exhaustive investigation of the
cyberthreats facing TRANSCOM. The report documented at least 20
advanced cyberintrusions targeting TRANSCOM contractors, all
attributed to China. That's because, according to the Pentagon,
Chinese military analysts have identified logistics and
mobilization as potential U.S. vulnerabilities, and their
military doctrine advocates targeting these networks to impact
our ability to operate during the early stages of conflict.
Given TRANSCOM's dependence upon the private sector and the
fact that the vast majority of their business is conducted on
unclassified networks, there's still important work left to be
done to enhance the Defense Department's ability to share
information with its critical transportation contractors and
assist them in detecting and mitigating cyberattacks.
General Selva, General McDew, we thank you for--both for
appearing before us today. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming General Selva and General
McDew. Thank you for your service and for your sacrifice, and
also for your families' service and sacrifice.
Let me, too, welcome Ricki, and thank you, ma'am, for your
service as well as your support.
General McDew, your wife, Evelyn--Evelyn, hello--and Keisha
and Keith and Becca and, the most important person here, who
just left, Henry.
I also want to commend Keith for his service in the Coast
Guard. Thank you for your service.
Finally, Dr. Sutherland, thank you for being here, also.
The United States, as the Chairman indicated very astutely,
faces challenges across the globe that are unprecedented in
nature. And, if confirmed, you'll both be playing an important
role in addressing these complex international issues.
Last week, we had General Dunford before the committee, the
designated-to-be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he
testified that the threats confronting the United States are
multifaceted and varied, they include the campaign against ISIL
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]; building local forces to
counter ISIL; deterring additional Russian aggression toward
Ukraine and its European neighbors; our rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific theater; and how best to address sequestration and the
ongoing fiscal challenges of the Department. General Selva, if
confirmed as Vice Chairman, you'll be working closely with
General Dunford to address each of these issues. We're looking
forward to your views on all the issues that I've mentioned and
that the Chairman has mentioned.
In addition, if confirmed, you will assume a number of
distinct responsibilities as the Vice Chairman. In the past,
the Vice Chair has been an integral participant in the
interagency process, working closely with senior policymakers
within the Department and at the National Security Council on
critical national security issues. Additionally, the Vice
Chairman oversees the Joint Retirement--Requirements Oversight
Council, JROC, which is charged with reviewing requirements for
acquisition programs to ensure they are reasonable and
necessary. And finally, as a senior member of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, the Vice Chairman plays a central role in
ensuring the United States safely maintains its nuclear weapons
stockpile. And I look forward to hearing more from you, General
Selva, about how you'll prioritize and execute all these
responsibilities as Vice Chairman.
General McDew, you've been nominated to be Commander of
TRANSCOM. It encompasses the Air Force's Mobility Command, the
Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Army's Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command, and is really the backbone
of our strategic mobility. And, for the past several years,
TRANSCOM has played a critical role in supplying our operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as bringing home our troops
and equipment after deployments.
Given the myriad of national security challenges facing the
United States and the long-term effects of sequestration on our
defense budget, we will certainly look to your views on the
challenges TRANSCOM must tackle in this environment. And, as
the Chairman indicated, one of those challenges is
cyberintrusions. It will become more of a problem as the days
go on, rather than less of a problem. And your views are
absolutely critical, and your actions will be critical, going
forward.
So, Mr. Chairman, again, let me join you in welcoming our
nominees and thanking them for their service.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
I'd like to mention to the witnesses, we have standard
questions that are asked of all military nominees. I would now
like to read them to you.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even
if those views differ from the administration in power?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
[Both witnesses answered in the negative.]
Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines
established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communications, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial in providing such documents?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Thank you very much.
General Selva, and then General McDew, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, NOMINEE TO BE VICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Selva. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, it's a great honor to
appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to become
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
First, I want to thank all of you for your undying support
for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen
who guard our liberty every single day, specifically those who
serve today in TRANSCOM.
Leading the men and women of Transportation Command has
been a distinct honor, and I have no doubt that they are
representative of the servicemembers across our institution who
are the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped, and most-capable
military in the world.
I would like to acknowledge and congratulate my close
friend and colleague, General Darren McDew, testifying beside
me today. I can think of no person more qualified to lead the
men and women of TRANSCOM. I wish him and Evelyn the greatest
of success, subject to your confirmation.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the senior
leadership in the Department of Defense (DOD), the combatant
commanders, our friends, allies, and partners around the world,
key members of the executive branch and the interagency process
and Members of Congress, including this committee, to address a
wide spectrum of challenges confronting our Nation. We are
increasingly at risk in space, across the networks of
cyberspace, and face a cast of regional and near-peer
competitors who are fielding increasingly sophisticated
conventional and nuclear arsenals. While these threats
represent a clear and present danger to our security, we
continue to front--to confront violent extremists, such as
ISIL, who shock the very core of our beliefs and threaten to
further destabilize a very strategic reason--region that
includes several of our key allies.
Effectively confronting these threats, as diverse as they
are, requires a whole-of-government approach. Our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen truly are the
heart and soul of our competitive advantage, and they are far
more effective when the full weight of our country's power is
working in unison. If confirmed, I look forward to being an
advocate for those men and women who wear the uniform of our
Nation, and their civilian counterparts in our Department.
Lastly, I want to say that I am humbled by the President's
nomination and the Secretary's confidence in putting me before
this committee as the nominee to be the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I'm grateful for the opportunity to
appear before you today, and look forward to working with you,
subject to your confirmation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Selva follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Paul J. Selva.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it's a great honor to appear
before you today as President Obama's nominee to become the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
First, I want to thank all of you for your undying support for our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen who guard our
liberty every single day, specifically those who serve today in the
United States Transportation Command.
Leading the men and women of Transportation Command has been a
distinct honor and I have no doubt that they are representative of the
servicemembers across our institution who are the best trained, best
led, best equipped and most capable military in the world.
I would like to acknowledge and congratulate my close friend and
colleague, General Darren McDew, testifying beside me today. I can
think of no person more qualified to lead the men and women of the
United States Transportation Command, and I wish him and Evelyn the
greatest of success, subject to your confirmation.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the senior leadership
in the Department of Defense, the combatant commanders, our friends,
allies and partners around the world, key members of the Executive
Branch and the interagency process and members of Congress, including
this committee to address a wide spectrum of challenges confronting our
nation.
We are increasingly at risk in space, across the networks of
cyberspace, and face a cast of regional and near-peer competitors who
are fielding increasingly sophisticated conventional and nuclear
arsenals. While these threats represent a clear and present danger to
our security, we continue to fund--to confront violent extremists such
as ISIL who shocked the very core of our beliefs and threatened to
further destabilize a very strategic reason--region that include
several of our key allies.
Effectively confronting these threats, as diverse as they are,
requires a whole of government approach. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines and Cost Guardsmen truly are the heart and soul of our
competitive advantage, and they are far more effective when the full
weight of our country's power is working in unison.
If confirmed, I look forward to being an advocate for those men and
women who wear the uniform of our Nation and their civilian
counterparts in our department.
Lastly, I want to say that I am humbled by the President's
nomination and the Secretary's confidence in putting me before this
committee as the nominee to be the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I'm grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today and
look forward to working with you, subject to your confirmation.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General McDew.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DARREN W. McDEW, USAF, NOMINEE TO BE
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General McDew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. It is,
indeed, a great honor for me and my family to sit before you
today.
For 31 years, Evelyn and I have treated every single person
that we've had the privilege to lead in our commands as an
extension of our family. If confirmed, we look forward to
welcoming the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coastguardsmen of Transportation Command to our extended
family.
Before I go any further, I also owe a debt of gratitude to
my esteemed colleague, General Paul Selva, for his support of
Air Mobility Command and his dedicated leadership of
Transportation Command. I have no doubt that, if confirmed,
General Selva's service as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
will benefit our Nation.
Members of the committee, thank you for your steadfast
support of 118,000 men and women of Air Mobility Command. They
are our Nation's finest. I hope I have the opportunity to tell
you more about them during questioning.
If confirmed, I am excited to continue working with the men
and women of TRANSCOM--Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian, as well as the vast network of commercial carriers
that support American forces worldwide. These unheralded
professionals are the business end that project military power
around the globe. I cannot overstate the importance of the
often thankless work accomplished at TRANSCOM, and I am humbled
to be considered to be their commander.
Members of the committee, I am committed to working with
you and other committees to ensure our servicemembers and
civilians have everything needed to support and defend the
United States of America. If confirmed, I will provide the
leadership the men and women of Transportation Command expect
and deserve. I appreciate the trust and confidence the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Dempsey have
placed in me by considering me for this position.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman and the members of the committee,
for continuing--for conducting this hearing. And I look forward
to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you very much, General. Thank
you.
General Selva, we had a hearing with the prospective
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff a few days ago, as you
know, and one of the many members--I believe it was Senator
Manchin--asked the prospective Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
General Dunford, what he believed was the greatest threat that
the United States faces in the world today. And, to the
surprise of some, General Dunford responded: Russia. What is
your opinion on that response to that question, General?
General Selva. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would put the
threats to this Nation in the following order: Russia, China,
Iran, and North Korea, and all of the organizations that have
grown around the ideology that was articulated by al-Qaeda
early in the turn of this century. And that's not to say that
each or any of those present a clear and present danger today.
But, in that order, you see the countries that are peer and
near-peer competitors who are developing conventional and
nuclear weapons that match our own. You see opaque governments
that have ideologies that we don't agree with. And you see the
broad base of terrorist threats that might threaten our
interests abroad, our--
Chairman McCain. I got all that.
General Selva.--abroad, and our Homeland.
Chairman McCain. I got all that. What--your--you agree with
General Dunford that the first would be Russia?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Because?
General Selva. Because Russia possesses the conventional
and nuclear capability to be an existential threat to this
Nation, should they choose to do so.
Chairman McCain. And you place ISIS last of those four
priorities?
General Selva. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman McCain. Because?
General Selva. Because right now ISIS does not present a
clear and present threat to our homeland and to the existence
of our Nation. It is a threat we must deal with, and we must
help our regional partners deal with, but it does not threaten
us at home.
Chairman McCain. Does it threaten us at home when these
young men who have gone to Iraq and Syria and become
radicalized and then return to the United States, that the
Director of the FBI and the Director of Homeland Security have
said is a direct threat to the United States? That's their
testimony.
General Selva. Yes, sir. I would agree with their
assessment. However, I would qualify it with the following.
Those do not present an existential threat to the existence of
the Nation. ISIL does not possess the tools or the capabilities
to threaten the existence of the United States as we know it.
Chairman McCain. I would like your and General McDew's
comments and assessment of the effects of sequestration on our
ability to defend the Nation, and its effect on the risk to the
men and women who are serving, and the effect on their morale
as they face this uncertainty that is dictated by
sequestration. Beginning with you, General Selva.
General Selva. Mr. Chairman, I think sequestration presents
a direct threat to the morale of our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines, who deserve the best-maintained and best equipment
available to fight the threats that face this Nation. And, as
we see the effects of sequestration and the potential declines
in the defense budget affecting readiness, they affect our
ability to train those young men and women to do their work,
they affect our ability to maintain and reset the equipment
that they have been using for the better part of the last
decade and a half in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they affect our
ability to retain the best of those soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines as they make the decision on whether or not they
believe they have the full support of the Nation in the work
that they do to defend our freedom and liberty every day.
So, I do believe sequestration has readiness impacts, it
has impacts on our ability to maintain the force, and it has
impacts on our ability to sustain the morale of the men and
women who have committed to defending our freedom and liberty
around the world.
Chairman McCain. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding is a bandaid.
General Selva. Sir, I believe the OCO funding is a 1-year
incremental fix to a long-term problem that we all need to
address together. And, if confirmed, I look forward to working
with this administration, with this Congress, and with this
committee, and others, to try and find a long-term solution to
that problem.
Chairman McCain. General McDew. First, the answer on the
greatest threat, and then the second, if you would.
General McDew. One of the greatest threats that faces our
Nation is our ability to deal with the cyberthreat. I will
separate it slightly from the other discussion that you were
having with General Selva, and focus on one that impacts
Transportation Command and our network more readily today, and
that is our ability to figure out how we will continue to work
with commercial industry that we're required to work with, and
need to work with. Ninety percent of our work is done on the
commercial networks, and that is a threat that I have got to
face, going forward, if confirmed.
Chairman McCain. It's an interesting perspective. So, right
now there is the possibility that adversarial nations could
shut down your business?
General McDew. There is always that threat that adversarial
nations could shut down our Nation. But, what I--and I think
this is something that the entire Nation and a lot of folks in
the whole-of-government----
Chairman McCain. But, particularly, your ability to get
things to the warfighters.
General McDew. Senator, that threat is there. I believe
that TRANSCOM has put some things in place to make that less
likely. But, as we go forward, the threat only gets worse. Our
ability to deal with it must evolve, and we have to find ways
to do better with it, going forward.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both, gentlemen, for your testimony.
And, General Selva, getting to one of your specific roles
as Vice Chairman--that's the Council of--for the Command and
Control--National Leadership Command and Control Council of
Nuclear Weapons--can you comment about that? It appears that
this issue, particularly over the last several years with our
land-based forces, has become even more prominent with respect
to not just aging infrastructure, but leadership issues, a
whole host of issues. Can you just comment upon how you
perceive your role and what you will do?
General Selva. Senator, I believe the statutory roles that
are defined for the Vice Chairman with respect to management of
the Nuclear Weapons stockpile, the Nuclear Leadership Command
and Control Network, as well as the National Deterrence
Oversight Panel, are fairly clear. They require me to be able
to assert with confidence that we have a safe, secure, and
reliable arsenal that is connected to our leadership by a
reliable, secure, and resilient command-and-control network,
and that that puts the President of the United States, as the
authority for use of those weapons, in direct control of the
decisions that would accrue to our nuclear weapons inventory.
And so, I look forward to working with this committee, if
confirmed, to make sure that all the legs of our nuclear triad
and all of the capabilities that make our nuclear deterrent
believable and ready are in place to give us that capability.
Senator Reed. Looking forward, there's going to have to be
a significant recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise, both
land, air, and sea bases. Do you think we're fully prepared for
that, in terms of--particularly in terms of the issues the
Chairman raised about sequestration and these budgets?
General Selva. Senator Reed, I've only been recently
studying the issues that accrue to the nuclear weapons
enterprise as it relates to the nominations for this new
position. To be honest, I haven't had the time to look at all
of the detail that would be required to answer that question. I
would look forward to answering it in a classified environment
with a lot more detail.
Senator Reed. But, I would assume your initial impression
is that we have a big bill to pay, going forward, to maintain
our current strategic dominance.
General Selva. Yes, sir. My understanding is that the
current weapons stockpile and the current delivery platforms
require significant maintenance and upgrades. But, I'm also
aware of the requirement to invest in the long-range strike
bomber, the Ohio-class replacement, and potentially a follow-on
intercontinental ballistic missile, to keep all three legs of
our nuclear triad viable.
Senator Reed. Let me switch gears, General McDew. You've
really, I think, in your questions with the Chairman and your
opening statement, put your finger on the cyber issue. It seems
to me that that's the first stage of any conflict today, which
would be a cyberattack. In fact, it's unclear when you cross
the line into something that's a probing action or an act of
war. Not only do you have to maintain the infrastructure of
DOD, but you have numerous contractors. Can you comment on the
challenge that you have with some of your contractors to
maintain their cybersecurity, and the steps you're taking to
ensure that, if they were compromised, it wouldn't cascade into
your system?
General McDew. Senator, I am beginning to understand the
vastness of the network. I am more familiar with the Air
Mobility Command portion and its contractors. However, in some
of the study that I've done so far, which has not been in great
depth, I see that TRANSCOM has put some things in place in
their contracting system to allow the contractor to show
assuredness of their network and to provide for requirements to
report intrusions in their network. Those are, I think, very
beneficial. I think, if confirmed, I will want to look deeper
into that and to see where we can strengthen those places where
we can.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Selva, a final question. And just--you will also,
as the JROC Chair, have a great deal to do about acquisition
policy. Can you--general comments about the efforts underway to
engage the Services more actively in acquisition?
General Selva. Senator, I'm aware that there is an active
effort inside the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to
reinvigorate the relationship with the stakeholders who bring
requirements to the table, and to look at the authorities and
responsibilities for actually delivering the military
capabilities as an outcome. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with that body and with this committee as we continue
the process of looking at the duplication of effort that might
exist across the enterprise, and to come back to you with any
potential legislative proposals that might be required to
remove requirements that are currently articulated in statute.
That is the extent to which I've studied that process.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me mention something that's not very often talked
about. I have briefly mentioned it to each one of you. The fact
that the airlines are anticipating hiring about 20,000 pilots
over the next 7 years due to the mandated retirement age of 65.
In fact, I authored the amendment that raised it from 60 to 65.
Maybe we should have put it at 70. It would have maybe put off
that problem. But, it is a serious thing. RAND [Research and
Development Corporation] did a release--a study that the
airlines have an average of 2,000 per year over the next 10
years, and that they will be upwards of 5,000 after that. That
compares, over the last 10 years, to 1,500. So, this is
something that's out there. And it's something that we--first
of all, I'd like to ask each one of you, consider this a
problem, do you have any ideas right now that might help
alleviate it?
General Selva. Senator, the problem of pilot inventory in
this Nation, I believe, is going to become a readiness issue
over time. It's--it is not upon us, but it is approaching
quickly.
Three dynamics play out that cause that to happen. First is
the exponential expansion of the airline industry,
internationally, which places a huge demand on the pilot
inventory in the United States as the preference to have an
English-speaking pilot in the cockpits is internationally
known. The second, as you mentioned, is the approaching age of
retirement for many of our pilots. The third is the decline in
production of military pilots that are a preference across the
network. And so, each of those three will conspire over time to
place heavier demands by the industry on the military inventory
of pilots that are their preference.
And so, working with the airlines on innovative ways to
bring civilian-educated pilots out of our higher learning
institutions directly into commercial air service is one of the
initiatives that we've begun working with the airline industry.
Senator Inhofe. Well, yes. I understand. This is not--right
now, we're putting out the fires that are burning today, but
this is something that we know is coming. I've talked to
General Welsh about this several times, and he agrees that the
logical place for them to go is going to be going to the
military. We spend the money training them. The--I guess, the
cost of getting a pilot to an F-22 capability is about $9
million. And so, this is a huge issue that's--it's--I'd suggest
it's here. Any further thoughts on that, General McDew?
General McDew. Senator, the one thing I would add is that,
although the numbers don't say that it's here with us today,
the discussion is in our cockpits today. There is not a pilot
that serves anywhere in any capacity across our Nation that
doesn't understand--
Senator Inhofe. But----
General McDew.--the demand.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. We tried something a year ago, when we
stood down 17 combat-coded squadrons. That was supposed to be
til the end of the year, which would have been 6 months. Then,
3 months later, they changed their mind and then stood them up
again. It's my understanding that that actually costs more than
what was saved during that 3-month period. I don't--I'm not
asking you if you were aware of that, but, nonetheless, it's
something I believe.
I--let me throw out three ideas here and just have you,
maybe for the record, comment on each one of them.
First of all, the idea the--of the cost of the training, $9
million to get a pilot up to that--those standards, and the
fact that, with their aviation bonuses over the next 9 years
amount to $225,000. So, those are two things that we have to
face as a reality.
The second thing that, to me, from my personal
conversations with pilots, is the fact that they're not flying
the sorties that they were flying before. They want to fly. And
it used to average about six sorties a week, and now it's down
to about three, from what we've found out. And then the
additional duties, since we've downsized, a lot of the pilots
are doing things that were heretofore not done by pilots.
So, on those three issues, any comments you want to make
now are fine, but why don't you--for the record, if the two of
you would respond to those as problems that are there.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Inhofe. What are we doing to address the upcoming pilot
shortage--both within DOD and outside DOD?
General Selva and General McDew. In 2014, the AF stood up a Total
Force Aircrew Management division to seek efficiencies and ways to
better utilize Active Duty, Air National Guard and AF Reserve aircrew.
Additionally, the Air Force developed the Total Force Aircrew
Management Amplified Affiliation Program, which was implemented in
March 2015 to encourage separating pilots to affiliate with the ANG and
AF Reserve.
Working outside of the DOD, the Air Force developed the National
Pilot Sourcing Forum (NSPF) to foster collaboration between the Total
Force and Major Airlines on a quarterly basis. This Forum works to find
ways to best utilize this ``National Asset'' from recruitment to
production through retirement.
Senator Inhofe. What factors will lead to pilots departing the
service--pay, training, flying hours, deployments, family, etc.?
General Selva and General McDew. Pilots leave the service for many
of the same reasons as other career fields. One of the biggest reasons
we see them leaving today is the increased OPTEMPO of a smaller force.
As the administrative and personnel functions of the military have been
reduced, increased additional duties and non-flying duties have been
added. More non-flying duties coupled with insufficient flying/training
opportunities and increased deployments (which restrict training to all
mission sets) make job satisfaction and quality of life reduced.
Finally, the outside active duty opportunities are growing every day to
include flying for the airlines.
Senator Inhofe. Are bonuses enough to keep our pilots in our
military?
General Selva and General McDew. No. Bonuses alone are not enough.
The Aviator Bonus has historically proven to be an effective tool to
assist with pilot retention, but monetary compensation is not the only
factor for separating from the military. The new dynamics of increased
OPSTEMPO, manpower shortages, an improving economy, and major airline
hiring, all influence servicemember retention decisions. Current bonus
caps also restrict the services from increasing incentives, which
limits flexibility in reducing the influence of greater compensation
outside of the service. Bonuses themselves are not a sole solution, but
can reduce some of the causal factors for separation.
Senator Inhofe. How do the flying hours our pilots are getting
today compare a decade ago? How do they compare with our Allies and
adversaries?
General Selva and General McDew. The United States Air Force
currently flies approximately 2.0 million flying hours per year,
including all training and operational missions. However, these flying
hours vary a great deal depending on weapon system type, pilot end-
strength, numbers of squadrons/aircraft, and operations tempo.
In fiscal year 2004, the Total Force ``peacetime training hours''
were programmed at 1.7 million flying hours. The same Total Force
``peacetime training hours'' in fiscal year 2014 were programmed at 1.2
million flying hours.
The table below provides a breakdown of these averages by requested
weapon system type and provides the average of annual flying hours per
pilot from fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2014:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY04 FY14
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mobility: 360 230
Tanker: 405 200
Bombers: 200 225
Fighters: 205 160
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Average Flying Hours per Pilot USAF:
Average 223
European Allies:
Average 183
Russia:
Average 120
China:
Average 110
Senator Inhofe. Are our pilots getting enough flight hours and
training to remain fully combat ready in all the mission areas?
General Selva and General McDew. Yes. There are many factors that
influence a pilot being fully combat ready. Our peace time flight hours
are designed to provide training opportunities to achieve full spectrum
readiness, while deployed contingency flying may provide only a partial
opportunity to train to the designed capability of the weapon system
and crew. A balance of training opportunities, and adequate resources,
in relation to peacetime and contingency flying is necessary for the
Air Force to improve readiness.
Senator Inhofe. Are you also going to have issues with aircraft
maintenance manning shortfalls?
General Selva and General McDew. The United States Air Force
requires approximately 3,000 additional maintainers to meet readiness
requirements based on current force structure projections. Retention of
legacy aircraft is driving additive maintenance manpower requirements
to beddown the F-35 and support legacy maintenance shortfalls. F-35
Phase I Manning Plan meets Initial Operational Capability requirements;
however, subsequent F-35 growth (new unit standups) are at risk.
Additive force structure requirements vice unit conversions compound
the challenge of providing experienced maintainers to meet F-35 and
legacy maintenance manning requirements.
Completed actions to date to alleviate the maintenance manning
shortfall include:
Moved 39 Active Association Active Duty (AD) maintenance
personnel to F-35 bases.
Transferred 18 A-10s to Backup Aircraft Inventory,
enabling 130 A-10 maintenance personnel to move to F-35 bases.
Established 2-year contract maintenance for F-35 Aircraft
Maintenance Unit (AMU) at Luke AFB.
Converting F-16 maintainers to F-35 at Hill AFB, UT in
fiscal year 2015/2016.
Then the last thing I wanted to mention is--General McDew,
in your written testimony, you talked about infrastructure
shortfalls, and you didn't say anything about that in your
abbreviated testimony. Is there anything you want to mention
about the infrastructure problems that we're having right now?
General McDew. Senator, I have to get a little bit more
depth, but one of the concerns I have is the ability to
recapitalize the infrastructure, both on the sea, air, and
land. There are considerable things that will need to be
addressed over the next 5 to 10 years that will be problematic
if we hit sequestration as we know it.
[The information referred to follows:]
I am aware of several infrastructure issues that could impact
TRANSCOM, and if confirmed, I will continue efforts across the
Combatant Commands, the Services, other agencies as applicable, and
industry to find long term solutions.
In terms of port infrastructure, my biggest concern is Military
Ocean Terminal--Concord (MOTCO). As the main strategic seaport for
shipping ammunition to the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of
responsibility (AOR), no other port on the West Coast can meet MOTCO's
ammunition throughput capacity. Much of MOTCO's infrastructure dates
back to World War II. Although substantial funding has been programmed
to address major deficiencies, additional infrastructure projects are
still needed to address remaining deferred maintenance issues and
maintain operational readiness.
Additionally, while en route infrastructure has improved over the
last few years, there remain key infrastructure shortfalls in the
European Command (EUCOM) and PACOM AOR which could hinder strategic
mobility operations. My intent is to advance efforts underway to
highlight these shortfalls in the posture planning efforts and
budgetary processes in order to enhance the ability to rapidly respond
globally.
I am also concerned with continuation of aircraft modernization
efforts to replace aging components in the existing organic fleet. The
vast majority of the air refueling fleet is over 50 years old and
vulnerable to potential fleet wide maintenance issues due to aging.
Bringing the new KC-46 on line as scheduled is essential to help
mitigate this vulnerability.
With respect to sealift, the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), the key
first response strategic sealift component for moving U.S. Army and
U.S. Marine Corps units to the fight, must also remain ready to meet
the needs of Geographic Combatant Commands. As 1.6 million square feet
of RRF roll-on/roll-off capacity ages out of service in the next 10
years, an executable recapitalization plan must be in place to ensure
long-term viability of surge sealift.
DOD uses a combination of self-deployment, trucks, and rail to get
equipment to ports of embarkation. The primary issue with surface moves
supporting full scale deployment operation is a large portion of the
current fleet of commercial chain tie-down railcars is facing age-
mandated retirement before 2020.
Finally, one of the greatest challenges to our Nation is the
existing cyber threat to logistics and mobility systems including
supporting infrastructure. The ever present risk posed by our
cybersecurity vulnerabilities across this complex and interdependent
enterprise requires responsive, reliable and resilient joint deployment
and distribution command and control capabilities. These essential
capabilities enable TRANSCOM the freedom to operate as needed on all
networks across the joint deployment and distribution enterprise to
meet mission objectives.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Appreciate that very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Selva and your family, thank you very much. General
McDew and your family, thank you very much. Both of you are
very lucky guys to have such wonderful families.
General Selva, last week a new study showed that suicide
attempts are most common in the newest enlisted soldiers who
have never been deployed. In June, the Los Angeles Times
brought attention to an unbelievable statistic. For women ages
18 to 29, women veterans have committed suicide at a rate
nearly 12 times the rate of women non-veterans of the same age.
And so, this--these are folks who were Active Duty not too long
before that time. And I want to know, if you're confirms, will
you prioritize mental health as a critical readiness issue?
General Selva. I will, Senator, and I look forward to
working with this committee to make sure that we have the
mental health providers that are available to our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, particularly those in crisis. So,
subject to your confirmation, I commit to doing so.
Senator Donnelly. And how will you work to reach female
servicemembers who face unique stressors, as well as also young
enlisted troops who confront and worry about things like stigma
regarding mental health care?
General Selva. Senator, I believe that there should be no
stigma attached to a soldier, sailor, airmen, or marine who has
the courage to seek mental health care when they're in crisis.
I will do everything in my power, in this job and any other
job, to make sure that we try to remove that stigma from our
military.
Senator Donnelly. Okay. I would also encourage you to keep
in mind some of the unique challenges that our female
servicemembers face every single day.
In regards to what Senator McCain said before about General
Dunford's testimony regarding Russia as perhaps the most
dangerous threat to our country, there's recent reports that
just came out about a directed energy weapon they've developed.
This is incredibly troubling. It can disable sophisticated
guidance systems, navigation systems, communications systems.
And I was wondering if there has been any discussion as to how
to counter this threat at this time?
General Selva. Sir, in the position I hold at TRANSCOM, I'm
not aware of any conversations, but I will endeavor, if
confirmed, to get briefed up on any----
Senator Donnelly. If you could, that would be very, very
helpful, because it, from the description, seems to be an
incredibly troubling and dangerous weapon that is being worked
on right now.
Second is--and you're with Transportation Command--but,
second is in regards to North Korea. I was recently there,
and--not in North Korea, but in South Korea--met with the
leadership there and met with some of the leaders in China to
talk about this threat. And I'd like to get your perspective of
how you assess that threat from North Korea, and what plans
you're aware of right now to deal with it.
General Selva. Senator, North Korea represents one of those
opaque governments that we have very little visibility into.
So, assessing the intentions of the North Korean government is
something that requires a very careful intelligence analysis of
what we can learn about the country. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Office of Defense Intelligence, as
well as the interagency and the Intelligence Community, to try
to unpack the threat that is North Korea, not only from a
perspective of their capabilities, but of their intentions.
Senator Donnelly. General McDew, I was in Iraq a few weeks
ago with a group led by Senator Kaine, who's sitting next to
me. And one of the things we talked about was with some Sunni
tribal leaders. And one of them was from Haditha. And he said
that his city was surrounded, at the present time, by ISIS,
that many of the people who live there were eating grass
because there is no food coming in, that babies were not able
to get milk, and that the population was in an extraordinarily
dire situation. We had discussed with the military there about
having an airlift come in to Haditha. It was mentioned, in
testimony here about a week or so ago by one of the witnesses,
that, ``Well, the Iraqi air force has the ability to put a C-
130 in there, but they have not.'' And you will be in TRANSCOM.
And so, I would ask you to take a look at this particular
problem. I would love to discuss it further with you in the
next few days. But, we have people who are starving, in effect,
and we have the ability to try to do something about it.
Last, I would like to mention to you, General McDew, about
the breach that we saw at OPM [the Office of Personnel
Management]. It began in May 2014 with hackers using a
contractor's compromised username and password. And you had
mentioned about working with our commercial partners and
civilian partners. I think it's critical, in your position
coming up, to make sure to work with them to harden their
networks, to harden their abilities. And I was wondering if you
could talk to me a little bit about appropriate measures you
think we need to take, moving forward.
General McDew. Senator, if confirmed, I will do all the
things that you suggest. It is a threat that we must deal with.
And I believe TRANSCOM has done some things to date that are
foundational. We would just try to extend those and strengthen
them.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Selva, as you know, the Department is currently
building a cyber mission force of about 6,000. Overall, how do
you measure things like readiness or force structure adequacy
when we're largely unable to do those conventional net
assessments of our adversaries' capabilities?
General Selva. Senator, I think the first measure of our
readiness in the cyberdomain is our ability to defend the
networks that allow us to provide command and control of our
military. And, as a result of that work, the cyber mission
teams and the cyber protection teams have been put in place to
protect those networks that our combatant commanders depend on
to execute command and control over their fielded forces.
I think three things have to accrue to cyber on a broader
sense. The first is our ability to attribute whether or not the
cyberintrusion is criminal activity, amateur hackers, or
sponsored nation-state activity, because that then will
condition the response of the Nation. Will we respond to the
Nation-state, will we respond to the criminal threat, or will
we respond to the amateur hacker? And I think that will
ultimately be the measure of the wisdom of how we have put
together the cyberprotection teams on the cyber mission force.
Putting a number of 6,000 against it may or may not be the
right measure. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
Admiral Mike Rogers, in his roles in the National Security
Agency as well as U.S. Cyber Command, to try to get to that
definition and continue to advocate the capability that will
allow us to defend our cybernetworks.
Senator Fischer. And as you look at those different threats
and the sources of the--those different threats, how are you
willing to step forward, I guess, to look at developing a
policy in what our response should be to each of those threats?
And again, when you look at the size of the force, with 6,000,
do you differentiate within that cyber mission force the
direction that each of those members will take once the threat
is identified, the source of that threat is identified?
General Selva. Senator, I think----
Senator Fischer. But, my real question is, What are we
going to do with policy?
General Selva. Senator, that was exactly where I was
headed, which is, in the absence of statutes that define the
responsibilities and authorities of our law enforcement
agencies and our military capability to react in cyber, we run
into those policy questions as a consequence of the nature of
the threat. And so, I think one of the more powerful things we
can do is to put the power of statute behind those authorities
and responsibilities so that we can define the lanes in the
road and allow law enforcement to work those issues that are
uniquely law enforcement, and allow the military to respond to
those military threats that emerge in cyber. And I look forward
to be--to working with the committee on those kinds of policies
as we move forward on this issue.
Senator Fischer. I look forward to working with you on
those issues, as well, because I think cybersecurity in all
realms is a priority of this country, and should be, and we
need to take action on it.
When General Rodriguez stated that Libya-based threats to
the U.S. interests are growing and that Libya is emerging as a
safe haven where terrorists are able to train, where they're
able to rebuild with impunity, I think all of us on the panel
realize that was the case, but my question to you is, Do you
think that we are doing enough to prevent those terrorist
groups from establishing these safe havens in Libya? And, down
the road, what are the lessons that we've learned from our
experiences in Syria with regards to what is now happening in
Libya?
General Selva. Senator, I'm aware of the work we're doing
with our allies, partners, and friends across all of North
Africa to look at the growing threat from al Qaeda and al
Qaeda-related terrorist organizations. I have not had an
opportunity to dive into some of other issues that are going on
right now in the ungoverned regions in Libya, specifically.
But, I think the lesson of the last decade and a half is, in
areas that are poorly governed or ungoverned, those radical
elements are given the freedom to develop their violent
capabilities and to inflict damage on U.S. interests and our
citizens abroad. And the extent to which those areas are left
ungoverned, they have the freedom to do that. So, I look
forward to working with Dave Rodriguez and his team in AFRICOM
[United States Africa Command], and Congress and the committee,
to look at opportunities to continue to counter those threats
across North Africa.
Senator Fischer. When we look at the time that we've
watched Syria fall into chaos and again become a training
ground for terrorists, and we compare that to what's happening
in Libya, though, what--at what point do you say, ``Enough.
This is--it is time now for the United States to step
forward?'' What have we learned in Syria?
General Selva. Senator, I think the policy of the United
States is an issue that we ought to discuss about our position
in the--in regards to all of the parties that are fighting in
Syria. And we have to make a decision. And that decision
shouldn't be the consequence of one person's opinion, but the
collected opinions of the people who have studied the area. And
so, I worry a little bit that we not jump to a conclusion on
what the best outcome would be for Syria, that--but we take a
reasoned approach to our national interests in the region and
to the stability of the region, writ large, with respect to all
of the parties that are now fighting in Syria.
Senator Fischer. I know you served at SAC [Strategic Air
Command], and you've recently been at STRATCOM [United States
Strategic Command]. I welcome you back anytime so we can
continue our discussion on the need for modernization of our
triad.
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Selva, the conflict in Syria has
been going on for 4 years.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses. Congratulations on your
nominations.
Just to pick up on Senator Fischer, I also agree that the
policies around cyber is really important for us to continue to
dialogue about. We had testimony within the last year, I think
it was from Admiral Rogers--it was somebody connected with
Cyber Command--and the testimony was, with respect to a
particular cyberattack, if there was this kind of cyberattack,
it could lead to war. And so, my followup question is, Well, so
then a cyberattack, in and of itself, is not war? It's some
prewar kind of an attack? And then the answer to that was
pretty hazy. I have been on this committee for 2\1/2\ years
now. I don't really have an understanding for what our
cyberstrategy is. Do we have a line by which we would say a
cyberattack constitutes war? Do we have a clear doctrine for
the kind of response that we should make to cyberattack? What
is the policy with respect to cyberdeterrence, cyberdefense,
and then offensive use of cyber so that--this is not really
sort of TRANSCOM. I'm not directing a question to you. But,
it's more to colleagues on the committee. I think we need to
educate ourselves more and challenge our military brass to
understand what the current dimension of cyberstrategy is. I
appreciate Senator Fischer's questions in that regard.
A compliment to each of you with respect to TRANSCOM. I
think TRANSCOM is a great example of integration. I mean,
TRANSCOM is cross-service. It is public and private. You
probably do as good a job of--at balancing Active, Reserve, and
Guard as any of the components of the military. Senator
Donnelly and I were in Iraq, and the folks flying us around in
C-130s were--I think they were Pennsylvania air reservists on a
4-month stint. And that's pretty common. I hope that, in your
new role, General McDew, as the head of TRANSCOM, and General
Selva, taking that lesson from TRANSCOM to the Vice position
with the Joint Chiefs, I hope you'll take that--the lessons of
that kind of integration--public/private, cross-service, Guard/
Active/Reserve--and spread how that can be done more generally
throughout the DOD [Department of Defense]. If you want to just
comment upon that, I'd love to hear what you have to say.
General Selva. Senator, I appreciate the compliment to
TRANSCOM. It is true that the Command absolutely depends on the
total force and the contribution of our commercial partners to
our strategic lift around the world. If confirmed for the job
as Vice Chairman, I look forward to bringing some of those
lessons into the Joint Staff and into the interagency. And I
look forward to working with this committee and finding ways to
make that possible.
Senator Kaine. General McDew?
General McDew. If you allow me, Senator, just to brag on
the men and women of the--my current command, Air Mobility
Command, they do it better than anyone, because they've lived
through this together since 1968. We have had these bonds and
these alliances and--with the Guard and Reserve--and we cannot
operate without them.
Senator Kaine. General Selva, the military leadership at
the Pentagon that gets over the finish line on audited
financial statements, they'll have a star put on the sidewalk
up here. I hope that you're going to be part of the team that
gets us there. We've got a 2017 date by which we're supposed to
be there. This is a question that Senator Manchin has been a
real bird-dog about, always asking about it. Talk to us about
the status of the move toward audited financial statements for
the Department of Defense (DOD). Because it sure makes it a lot
easier for us to advocate, for example, about sequester relief
if we know that we are on a path to be able to do that.
General Selva. Senator, from my position at TRANSCOM, we
are one of the combatant commands that will have to assert our
audit readiness as a consequence of managing a working capital
fund that moves all of our equipment and personnel around the
world. From that perspective, I can tell you, we're making
significant progress towards audit readiness: towards being
able to account for every dollar that we spend.
Across the Department, I'm going to need some time to take
a look at where each of the individual Services are, but I will
continue to be an advocate, across the enterprise, that we be
prepared for our audit readiness deadline of October 2017. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with all of the Service
Chiefs and Secretaries to make that happen.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
And just one last comment. I think we're about 24 hours
into the Ramadi campaign in Iraq, and it's going to be a real
test of the training and the work we've done with the Iraqi
military and Sunni leaders in the last year, the success of
this campaign. And I just know that we're all thinking about
that and monitoring the success of that mission carefully.
Thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you both for your service. Thank you also
to your families for their backing of you, and their sacrifice.
It is greatly appreciated, and it does not go unnoticed.
Let me just begin. I find it interesting that both of you
have--or that you have identified, General Selva, in your
opening comments or in response to the Chairman, the list of
where you see our greatest threats. I'm just going to identify
that, in the new national military strategy, General Martin
Dempsey, current Chairman, describes the need to counter
revisionist states that threaten international peace and
security. The strategy identifies Russia, China, Iran, and
North Korea as the four principal revisionist states. General
Dempsey also writes that the U.S. military advantage has begun
to erode and that future conflicts will come more rapidly, last
longer, and take place on a more technically challenging
battlefield.
In which areas--General Selva, in which areas has the U.S.
military advantage begun to erode, if you agree with his
statement? Where would you recommend that DOD focus its
investments in response to this erosion?
General Selva. Senator, I think there are four principal
areas where that erosion has started to take place. The first
is space. Up until the turn of this decade, the United States
had pretty much dominance in space. That's no longer true.
Across the networks of cyberspace, we see intruders and nation-
states acting to counter our capability to provide the command
and control for our military that gives us the speed of
decision on the modern battlefield. Then, I'd--it wouldn't be
fair not to highlight the fact that our opponents are look--and
our potential adversaries are looking for asymmetries across
our conventional and nuclear capabilities. As they detect and
act against those asymmetries, they erode the capability that
we have within our current force structure to react to threats
that might emerge.
So, I would place the four in about that order.
Senator Rounds. Okay.
General McDew, you identified cyber as being an item of
major concern. I agree with your assessment. I'm just curious,
though, it--with regard to whether we're talking about policy
or as we talk about statutory assistance, if you've looked at,
and you've begun, the process, where do you see the most
important statutory changes, if any, that DOD would be required
to make recommendations with regard to cyber capabilities and
operations? Are there specific statutes that you've identified
yet in your review?
General McDew. Senator, I have not had that level of depth
to have specific statutes. But, if confirmed, I will endeavor
to do so.
Senator Rounds. General Selva?
General Selva. Senator, the only area that, as the TRANSCOM
commander, that I looked for increasing capabilities is the
ability--having looked into contract law and the imposition of
specific requirements for reporting on intrusions to work
across the interagency, to make sure that any location, any
organization that received a notification of an intrusion into
a commercial or military network had an affirmative obligation
to report that intrusion so that we could defend the networks
that make us successful. That authority is tied up in a variety
of statutes that prevent agencies from speaking to each other
clearly across law enforcement and the military.
Beyond that, I have not spent the time and effort yet to
work with Admiral Rodgers at Cyber Command to look at the
broader national issue of cyberdefense.
Senator Rounds. Okay.
You identified, as one of those four existential threats,
the country of Iran. In your view, is Iran still the leading
state sponsor of terror?
General Selva. Yes, sir, they are.
With the proposed nuclear treaty or nuclear agreement which
was announced this morning, if Iran is provided economic
sanctions relief, do you believe Tehran would use some of these
funds to enhance its military capabilities in support for
terrorist organizations?
General Selva. Senator, I haven't yet had the opportunity
to study the entire agreement, but, on its face, what I've
heard from the press, the immediate lifting of sanctions or the
sequential lifting of sanctions will give Iran the access to
more economic assets with which to sponsor state terrorism,
should they choose to do so. And I think we need to be alert to
that possibility. And, as the military, we have an obligation
to provide the President with a full range of options to
respond. So, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Department to examine those issues more deeply.
Senator Rounds. How do you respond to any additional
Iranian aggression that may be forthcoming with their
additional capabilities for procuring weapons?
General Selva. Senator, absent the actual context of that
specific intervention and that specific sponsorship of
terrorism or other malign activities, it's difficult me--for me
to actually give you an answer to that question, other than to
say we need to have a range of available options with which to
respond, whether it's militarily, diplomatically, economically,
or otherwise.
Senator Rounds. But, you clearly recognize that the
additional threat would now exist.
General Selva. Absolutely.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, both of you all, for your service. And also,
congratulations on your nominations. And I'm looking forward to
working with you in the future.
Let me just say--and maybe, General Selva, if I may ask
this question, because I think both of you have answered, and
General Dunford answered the question I asked last week and
Senator McCain just asked again--the greatest threat--and I
think you all identified Russia--is that opinion held by most
of our military higher echelon, if you will?
General Selva. Senator, I believe it is, but I would
actually quote an article I read early this morning from Dr.
Andy Krepinevich. A quote in the article said that, over the
better part of the last decade and a half, and in the years
that preceded it, this Nation was able to look at the threats
to our security through a periscope. And today we find
ourselves having to analyze them through a kaleidoscope. And
so, as each facet of the threat becomes apparent to us, we have
to have the capability to react. And so, my reaction to the
four major threats to the security of the United States comes
from a military perspective. I'm not necessarily indicating
that any of those states has a current intent to attack the
United States.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
General Selva. But, all of them have the capability. And
so, we need to be ready to respond.
Senator Manchin. I've had the opportunity to have some
dialogue with some of the people that were concerned about the
relationships of the United States and Russia. And with that
being said, could you comment on the state of the
relationships, the dialogue going on, and what you would do to
either improve, change, or have a different direction?
General Selva. Senator, I haven't personally been involved
in the dialogue, so it wouldn't be fair for me to comment on
the dialogue itself, but what I will say to you----
Senator Manchin. Do we have one, of your knowledge?
General Selva. Yes, sir. And what I will say to you and the
committee is, if confirmed for the position of Vice Chairman, I
think it is very important that our senior military leaders
maintain an open dialogue with the senior military leaders of
competitor nations so that we can minimize the chance of
miscalculation or missteps in any military operation anywhere
in the world. That goes for Russia and China, specifically, and
for any other country that might wish us ill. We need to open
those dialogues to make sure that we--
Senator Manchin. What I'm--and we're speaking about Russia
being our greatest challenge right now, and the greatest
threat, or possible threat, because of their capabilities. With
that being said, I've spoken to some people from that arena,
and they're telling me that the Cold War is colder today than
it was when it declared.
General Selva. Senator, I don't know that to be true or
false, other than that they have said it. But, what I will tell
you is that my experience is that the dialogue between senior
leaders across our militaries has been open and frank. That
helps us avoid miscalculation, and--
Senator Manchin. I'm just saying we're not hearing an awful
lot of dialogue about this relationship or lack of a
relationship. And now, when two of our top people who basically
are on the verge of being nominated to lead our military forces
have identified it, and not hearing anything before, I think it
kind of caught a lot of us by surprise, if you will--
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin.--that that would be your direction.
With that being said, I know the Iran nuclear deal we just
talked about, it was revealed today that we have tentative
agreement on that. I think, when we asked for your response on
policy, you said--when we asked what would be a good deal for
the U.S. from a security standpoint, your response was
``Important outcomes includes rolling back Iran's nuclear
program, providing the international community with necessary
access and transparency while preserving the sanctions imposed
on conventional arms and ballistic missiles.'' And I believe
some of those, conventional arms and ballistic missiles, have
expired terms on them at time--do you consider that a concern
or a problem?
General Selva. Senator, my understanding is that those
sanctions have a 5-year and an 8-year term, having read the
open press this morning. I haven't seen the details of the
agreement and how those sanctions will be rolled back. But, it
is my understanding, within the agreement, that there are snap-
back provisions, that if we find Iranian behavior not to
comport with the agreement, that we can snap back the original
sanctions. What I don't know is whether that applies to the
conventional weapons and the ballistic missile technologies.
So, if confirmed, I'm committed to taking a much deeper look at
the text of the agreement to determine where our maneuvering--
Senator Manchin. One final question I have. Shortly after
the fall of Ramadi, Secretary Carter stated the Iraqi forces
showed no will to fight despite vastly outnumbering ISIS
fighters. There is at least one group in Iraq that I have no
doubt has the will to fight, and that are the Kurds. And we've
spoken about that. Are there ways to empower the Kurds and the
Sunnis to engage and to help them without undermining, I guess,
the one-country solution or one-state solution, if that's our
policy?--which I'm not certain I agree with, but, for the sake
of discussion, if you would have any comment on that.
General Selva. Senator, our policy is to continue to work
through the government in Iraq to empower all of the parties in
Iraq that are willing to fight against ISIL and to defend Iraqi
sovereignty. I would need more time to be able to examine the
issue of whether or not supporting one party over the other
makes more sense, or not. If confirmed, I look forward to doing
so.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
My time is expired.
General Selva. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. TRANSCOM is
always very exciting to me. I am a transporter and a
logistician, so I appreciate your service, especially in that
area, very, very much.
General McDew, I'd like to start with you. Senator Kaine
had pointed out the fact that TRANSCOM does work between the
National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserves, Active Duty component,
and many, many contractors, wonderful civilians who fill in
those gaps. So, I would just like to visit with you a little
bit about your thoughts on the role of the National Guard in
supporting TRANSCOM's mission to provide full-spectrum mobility
solutions and enabling capabilities. And, obviously, I have
strong opinions there, but I'd like to hear yours, General
McDew.
General McDew. Senator, I believe we may share the same
opinion.
Senator Ernst. I think so.
General McDew. I am a strong supporter, and I am a huge
fan, of our National Guard and Air Force Reserves. We could not
operate without them. It is vital to the defense of this Nation
and vital to everything we do in the transportation business. I
can't imagine doing it without them.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. And do you see that there are
ways that we could further enhance working with our Reserve and
our National Guard units? Is there a way to complete that
bridge that we have existing out there?
General McDew. I believe, Senator, that we need to continue
to look at the authorities which our guardsmen and reservists
come to work under, look at the different statuses they work
in, and see where those can be streamlined. We also need to be
very careful, though, that we understand and fully appreciate
the differences between the Active Duty, the Guard, and the
Reserves, and work with employers to ensure that that remains
as strong as we think it ought to be.
Senator Ernst. That's exceptional. I appreciate that very
much. And you brought up a great point that we don't often
discuss is our employees that do see us gone for an extremely
long periods of time, whether it's just from a 2-week annual
training period or an IDT [inactive duty training] weekend to
the year-long deployments that we have seen overseas. But, I do
believe that the National Guard and Reserve components within
transportation are essential to supporting any mission that we
have overseas. And so, I thank you for that. I'd like to thank
our employers out there for being willing to support our men
and women that serve in uniform in a Reserve and Guard status.
General Selva, of course, let's go back to U.S. TRANSCOM,
as well. And what lessons learned, significant events, are you
taking forward from TRANSCOM into the Vice Chair's position?
What are some of the greatest assets that you will bring
forward, having those types of responsibilities with TRANSCOM?
General Selva. Senator, I think the greatest lesson I carry
forward into any job is the dedication of our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, and coastguardsmen, and all of
their civilian counterparts, both in and out of government, to
get the job done. They depend on us for sound leadership and
for advocacy. And so, what I will take into the position as
Vice Chairman, if confirmed, is that--that undying obligation
to be an advocate for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and coastguardsmen who lay their lives on the line for all of
us every day.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
I just want to score again--or underscore again what some
of the conversation has been today with regards to the Iran
deal. And while we continue as legislators to work through what
this deal entails, as well, I did hear you say, General Selva,
that you do believe that Iran with potential nuclear
capabilities is a great threat to the United States. Is that
correct?
General Selva. Iran with nuclear capabilities would be a
threat to our regional partners, to our allies, our friends,
and to the United States. And so, the extent to which this
agreement forestalls their ability to build a nuclear weapon, I
think we ought to look at all of the provisions therein to make
sure that we're ready to respond for whatever else might come.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
And again, as well, with sanctions relief providing
approximately $100 billion to Iran, I also believe that this
would serve Iran's purpose of funding proxies throughout that
region and being a state sponsor of terrorism. So, I do have
great concerns with this deal. I have great concerns with Iran,
overall, as well as a number of issues that we have worldwide.
But, that's for yet another day.
Thank you, General Selva. Thank you, General McDew. I
appreciate your service very much to our Nation.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank our witnesses for their service.
And, General Selva, you and I have met before. You are a
extraordinarily thoughtful and straightforward officer, and I
hope to encourage you, in your new position, which is one of
the most important in our government, where you will be
directly advising the President, particularly the--being on the
Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. Will you
be straightforward, honest, and courageous in providing your
best advice, and not be intimidated by the circumstances that
surround your being in that position?
General Selva. I will, Senator. That's the only person I
know how to be.
Senator King. Well, I certainly hope so, because in
situations like this, policymakers don't need ``yes'' men, they
need criticism and straightforward advice. And I certainly hope
that you're prepared to provide that. That, to me, is really
the fundamental responsibility of this position.
To go to a more specific question, we had a--an explosion
in Afghanistan a few days ago. Apparently over 30 people were
killed. Do you have a view of the security situation in
Afghanistan, and what we can and should do in order to maintain
the progress that's been made in that country?
General Selva. Senator, it's been some time since I
traveled to Afghanistan, but my overall impression is that the
Afghan national security services, both their military and
their national police, are making progress. And they are
confronting the Taliban, insurgents, and terrorists where they
present themselves. And so, my view is that we need to empower
them to continue that work. They have taken ownership of the
sovereignty of the country of Afghanistan, and that is the
place where we want them to be. And so, I think we need to be
careful about the assumptions we made, relative to the
timelines for their willingness and ability to manage their own
sovereignty. And that goes to the stability of the government
and the central government's command and control over those
forces. And I think that's the place we need to go, it's to
think that through in that domain.
Senator King. So, I take it your advice would be that our
disengagement should be based upon conditions on the ground and
not arbitrary dates in a calendar.
General Selva. Senator, I believe that's true.
Senator King. Thank you. I hope you will pass that advice
on in the strongest possible terms.
We've talked a lot about cyber this morning. And I think
there's plenty of responsibility to be spread around. I think
it's one of the great disappointments of my 2\1/2\ years here
that we have not yet brought significant cyber legislation to
the floor of the U.S. Senate. And when we have a catastrophic
breach, to go home to our constituents and say, ``Well, we
couldn't do it because four different committees had authority,
and we really just couldn't get our act together,'' that's not
going to be satisfactory to the people of the United States.
So, certainly there needs to be action here in Congress. And
hopefully that will be forthcoming this year.
On the other hand, it seems to me that we need to be
thinking about doctrine and the development of a doctrine of
cyber, which we don't seem to have now, other than defense. And
in my view, the--there has to be an offensive capability which
our adversaries understand, and understand will be applied. The
only good thing about the theory of deterrence and the mutually
assured destruction which applied to our nuclear posture for 70
years is that it worked. And it just seems to me logical that
if our policy is strictly defensive, we're like a guy in a
fight who won't be allowed to punch. Eventually, you're going
to lose that fight. I would urge you to think about this. And
I'd appreciate your thoughts. Assuming we can identify it's a
state actor, not an amateur hacker or a criminal conspiracy,
but a state actor, it seems to me there has to be some price to
be paid. Would you agree, General?
General Selva. I do agree, Senator, and I look forward to
working with the committee, if confirmed, to examine the
doctrine for the offensive use of cyber capabilities, both as a
deterrent and as an offensive weapon in warfare.
Senator King. And I hope not only with the committee and
with Congress, but also with that all-important Deputies
Committee of the National Security Council. That's where it
seems to me this policy has to emanate, and then we can work it
over here.
General McDew, I assume you agree?
General McDew. I do agree, Senator, in that the role of
attribution--the interesting part, for me, as I evolve my
knowledge of the cyberthreat, is that it is such a low cost of
entry, and so much damage can be wielded from it.
Senator King. Without consequence.
General McDew. Right.
Senator King. And we need to be talking about--there need
to be consequences.
Well, I hope you gentlemen will pursue that, because right
now we're playing defense, and we're not winning very--we're
not getting very far. We're getting--it's getting more and more
serious, and we are facing a catastrophic attack, in my view,
akin to the next Pearl Harbor. Both we in Congress and the
administration have to be thinking about a more comprehensive
doctrine and not just talking about how do we work together for
defensive purposes.
Again, gentlemen, thank you very much.
General McDew, I understand your early flying career took
place at Loring Air Force Base in northern Maine, and delighted
to have you before us.
Congratulations on your nominations. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service, and congratulations
on your nomination.
General McDew, I just want to add a compliment. At least in
my career, I've had the opportunity to work with some of the
TRANSCOM military members and, you're correct, I think, in many
ways, unheralded workhorse for the U.S. military in many ways
behind the scenes. So, I just want to commend all of your
members on a great job, and want to commend your families for
their service, as well.
General Selva, I just wanted to touch briefly--it's
obviously getting a lot of press right now--on Iran. And in one
of the most powerful testimonies we had in front of this
committee in the last half year was Henry Kissinger, who came
in and talked to this committee about devising strategy. And
one of the things he mentioned, that one of the most important
things we need to ask ourselves as we're putting together
strategy is, What do we seek to prevent as a country, no matter
how it happens, and, if necessary, alone? Kind of his top
strategic thought for this committee.
I had asked Secretary Carter, during his confirmation
hearing, if he thought preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon would fall into that category? What do we seek to
prevent, no matter how it happens, and, if necessary, alone? He
said yes, absolutely. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon. Now, that was during his confirmation testimony. It'll
be interesting to see if he still believes that, given the
agreement that's been announced. If--do you agree with him on
that?
General Selva. I agree with Dr. Kissinger, that if we can
find no allies, partners, and friends to help us achieve the
results that we believe are important, we have to be willing
and able to go it alone.
Senator Sullivan. But, do you think that preventing Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon falls into that category, like
Secretary Carter did in his confirmation hearing?
General Selva. Senator, I agree that preventing the
Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon is a critical national
interest.
Senator Sullivan. So, if this agreement, once we unpack it,
allows for a pathway to develop a nuclear weapon after 10 or 15
years, would you disagree with it----
General Selva. I will reserve----
Senator Sullivan.--in your personal view?
General Selva. I will reserve judgment until I've had the
opportunity to look at the entire agreement.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I'm just posing a hypothetical. In
your personal view, if the agreement, in 10 to 15 years, allow
the Iranians to have a pathway to obtain a nuclear weapon, do
you think that's in the national interest of the United States?
General Selva. Then we will have to have the capability to
address that eventuality when it's presented, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. You're not answering my question,
General.
General Selva. Sir, I am opposed to the Iranians possessing
a nuclear weapon.
Senator Sullivan. In 15 years?
General Selva. Ever.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
General Selva. Because--
Senator Sullivan. So, if this agreement allows that in 15
years, you would think that's not in the interest of the United
States?
General Selva. Correct.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Let me ask a question. You know, you've spent a lot of
time, in your career, in the Asia-Pacific. This committee's
been very interested in the rebalance strategy. The NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] that just passed with
bipartisan numbers had a strong provision in supporting the
President's Asia-Pacific rebalance. The countries that you
actually mentioned as the top threats are all in the Asia-
Pacific. And what we were trying to do in that--in the NDAA is
provide additional credibility to the President. In that kind
of defense guidance from Congress, should DOD be listening to
Congress?
General Selva. Senator, I think the Department always has
an obligation to listen to the will of Congress.
Senator Sullivan. So, if there's provisions in the NDAA
that say we should not be decreasing, but increasing our force
posture in the Asia-Pacific to enhance and provide credibility
to the President's Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy, the DOD
should be doing that?
General Selva. To the extent that supports our national
objectives globally, yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. If it seems that we're not doing this, if
you're confirmed, will you work with this committee to make
sure that DOD is implementing Congress' defense guidance to
increase forces in the Asia-Pacific?
General Selva. Senator, I will commit to you and to any
Member of Congress to work with Congress to make sure that we
have a balanced approach to the reaction that we have to have
to the fiscal environment we live in. If that means we have to
adjust our force structure on any part of the globe, I'll make
sure that I articulate the position that the Services and the
combatant commanders have taken in making that happen.
Senator Sullivan. But, Congress said we need to be
increasing forces in the Asia-Pacific. Should DOD be doing
that, given that that's what we're saying here, in terms of our
constitutional oversight role for the defense of the Nation?
General Selva. Sir, the extent to which Congress funds the
capabilities and provides the Department the flexibility within
those funds to make the will of Congress happen, yes, sir, we
should.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here today and for your
willingness to continue to serve.
I want to just follow up a little bit on the cyber
comments--discussion that has been made this morning, because I
notice that we are opening a Silicon Valley outreach office,
called the Defense Innovation Unit, experimental. I wonder if
you could speak to what the goal of that office is.
General Selva. Senator, I'm not aware of the detail of that
specific office, but I am aware of broad outreach across the
Department to try and examine opportunities to better
understand our capacity to defend and protect the networks that
are represented across all of our infrastructure, commercial
and military, in cyber. I look forward to actually digging into
that particular issue a little bit, if confirmed for the
position of Vice Chairman.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I appreciated the opportunity for us to talk a little bit
before this hearing. And one of the things that we talked about
when we met, General Selva, is the challenge that we're facing
from Russia, and that one of the areas where it's a real
problem is the Russian propaganda campaign that, particularly
in eastern Europe, in the Baltics, they are dealing with. So,
can you tell me what we're doing to respond to that Russia
propaganda campaign, and whether you believe the DOD is
coordinating as--in the best way to address that with the
Department of State?
General Selva. Senator, subject to our meeting, I did a
good bit more research on that subject, and it is my
understanding that there is an operational and tactical-level
capability inside the Department to react to propaganda
campaigns against our allies, partners, and friends. But, that
is done in close collaboration with the Department of State and
their broader responsibility for public diplomacy.
Senator Shaheen. And so, do you have thoughts about whether
there are more efforts that can be undertaken, where we can,
not only cooperate more closely, but be more proactive in our
response to what Russia is doing?
General Selva. Senator, I think we need to evaluate each of
the situations where the Russians are imposing their will on
their close neighbors, some of whom are our allies, and make
sure that we are, in fact, telling the truth when Russian
intervention threatens the security of those sovereign states.
Senator Shaheen. General Selva and General McDew, as you're
both aware, one of the real costs within DOD is for energy.
And, as you're--you have an overlapping responsibility for
TRANSCOM, can you talk--I guess, General McDew, I will go to
you first--about efforts to reduce energy use across the
Department and why that's important?
General McDew. As the largest user of energy in the Federal
Government, it is very important that we get our act together
on how we do that. Our chief scientist and several people in my
command, in Air Mobility Command, have worked with TRANSCOM and
the Department of Transportation at a lot of--a number of
initiatives, from how we fly our routes, how we configure our
airplanes. We have done a number of initiatives to take weight
off airplanes. It seems like not a big deal, but if you talk
about 1 or 2 percent on an airplane that flies as often as we
fly, it becomes actually significant. Flying in formation with
another airplane, and all the things we can do to take the
guesswork out of some of the things we do, there's more than
that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, talk, if you will, about the
targeted savings that we're looking for--that we saw last year,
that we're looking for this year, and what potential you think
there is in the future.
General Selva?
General Selva. Senator, I would point out two within the
transportation enterprise. First is an initiative to more
effectively package the commodities that we ship over the
ocean. The normal process, years ago, had us at about a 55-
percent utilization rate of the space in the containers that
travel over ocean. We have raised that metric to 85 percent,
and are on a pathway to raise it to 90 percent, by volume. The
same has been applied to our aircraft, where we build the cargo
loads to a higher density. We have combined that with an
algorithm that tells us where it's the cheapest to buy the fuel
that we carry. All in combination, those initiatives, have
yielded about a billion and a half in savings over the last 18
months.
Senator Shaheen. So, it's significant to the Department.
General Selva. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Let me also--I only have a little time
left, but I understand, General McDew, that you have experience
flying the KC-135s, and you may be aware that Pease Air Base in
New Hampshire is the first base to receive the new KC-46A
aerial refueling tankers. We are a lot proud of that. I wonder
if you could talk about the importance of that program and also
its future role in supporting military operations around the
world.
General McDew. Absolutely, Senator. The unit at Pease has a
strong history in air refueling and will be a valuable partner
for decades to come. I have personally been to that unit. I
have flown with members of that unit, and I've known that unit
for a long time. The KC-135 has been the backbone of our air-
refueling fleet for decades, and will be for decades to come.
The KC-46 will bring new capabilities and a younger airplane to
the fight. And it is great to have Pease partner. You have
embraced our airmen, our Active Duty airmen who have joined
that unit, and we can't thank you enough for the work that's
done at Pease to bring on that airplane.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I think it's a great
model for integration between Active Duty and the Guard. And
hopefully we will continue to see the role of the KC-46 be more
prominent as we look at what's happening around the world.
Thank you both very much.
Chairman McCain. Thank you for that commercial, General
McDew.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank both of you for being here
and for your service to the Nation.
Following up on that commercial very much, I wanted to ask
you right now, as I understand, with Pease and the 157th
receiving the first National Guard unit to receive the basing
of the KC-46A, there actually is the Site Activation Task Force
right now at Pease, today, and that means approximately 60
subject-matter experts from the National Guard Bureau Air
Mobility Command and the Program Office at Wright-Patterson are
at Pease to prepare for the arrival of the KC-46A. I just want
to ask both of you--General Selva, General McDew--is Pease
still scheduled to receive 12 primary aircraft in December
2017?
General McDew. Absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
Pease ANGB is still programmed to receive the first KC-46 aircraft
in February 2018. Barring any further changes to the aircraft delivery
schedule, Pease is slated to receive its 12th aircraft by the end of
fiscal year 2018.
General Selva. I will echo my colleague. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Well, that's terrific. And they're ready to
receive them, and looking forward to it. So, we're glad that
the Site Activation Task Force is there today.
In addition to that, you've spoken, General McDew, about
having actually flown with the 157th and the outstanding work
that they've done for the Nation. And one of the things that's
important is the strategic location of Pease in the Northeast,
and the ability that we've been able to provide that support
for TRANSCOM. And so, one of the things that I think makes it
strategic is also the facilities that we have there.
General Selva and General McDew, do you believe it's
important to maintain the existing facilities, including
specifically the aircraft parking ramps, to support the day-to-
day operations and contingency operations supporting TRANSCOM
in the Northeast from Pease?
General Selva. Senator, as the combatant commander
responsible for managing air refueling, the ability to deploy
from, and employ from, sufficient ramp space that has hydrant
refueling capable of handling tankers is a strategic asset up
and down the eastern seaboard. Pease is one of several
locations that has that capability, but it is one we use
significantly.
Senator Ayotte. General McDew, do you think it's important
that we maintain that, especially with the basing of the new
KC-46A at Pease?
General McDew. I do, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I appreciate it, General.
I also wanted to follow up on some of the cyber questions
that you've been asked. And what is it that we're seeing, in
terms of TRANSCOM, with additional cyberattacks? What do you
believe are the biggest challenges for this area of command
which is so critical to everything else we do in our ability,
obviously, to defend the Nation?
General Selva. Being in the awkward position of having the
sitting TRANSCOM Commander and the nominated TRANSCOM Commander
at the table, let me open.
As a consequence of the work that this committee did in
addition to work that the Intelligence Community had been--had
ongoing on the threats to TRANSCOM, we've actually completely
rewired the way we do cyberdefense and cyberhygiene within the
Command. So, we have put our forces, essentially, on the
offense, looking for people that are intruding into the
network. And the extent to which those are in law enforcement
issue, we have a liaison from the FBI and local law enforcement
in our headquarters that attends to those parts of the issues.
We have members of the intelligence community that provide the
liaison into the interagency intelligence community if it's an
intelligence issue. And then we have the capacity to turn those
intrusions over to Cyber Command for our cyber mission team to
begin defensive, and potentially offensive, action, if
required. We exercised that in a recent exercise. Without
getting into the classified results, we had a pretty good
outcome with the Red Team trying to attack our networks. So,
management of our cybercapability to do the command and control
work that we do across such a broad network is incredibly
important to us.
Senator Ayotte. Is that model that you've talked, which
sounds like a very important model, and obviously I'm glad to
hear you're seeing some success with it--is that something that
we're going to see, now that you're nominated to be the Vice
Chairman, being implemented in other commands?
General Selva. Senator, we've taken all the benchmarks from
that set of lessons learned and shared them with all the other
combatant commanders and with CYBERCOM. I will commit, if
confirmed to becoming the Vice Chairman, to make sure that all
the combatant commanders continue to share those kinds of
lessons learned and improve our cyberdefense capability.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I think that's really important. I
appreciate it. And I want to thank both of you for your
service--and your family--to the Nation. We deeply appreciate
it.
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Would the Senator from Maine have any
additional comments about the criticality of Pease Air Force
Base to western civilization as we know it?
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I was just going to comment that if I were
running out of fuel over the North Atlantic, I would want the
Maniacs from 101st Air Refueling Wing in Bangor to come and----
Chairman McCain. Ah, I see. I thank the Senator from Maine.
Senator King. There are other air refueling wings in New
England. I'm glad--I appreciate the chairman's opportunity to
make that point.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, and thank you to your families,
as well, for their extraordinarily valuable support and
service.
I want to talk about a subject that has not been covered so
far, small business set-asides. I'm a strong supporter of small
business set-asides and the American shipping industry and our
country's domestic merchant marine sector. A number of
constituents of mine have raised this issue with me, saying
that DOD has moved away from the dedicated service contract
model, and started using a new system, called Universal Service
Contracts, to transport goods via ocean from the U.S. mainland
to U.S. military installations around the globe. My constituent
has raised concerns with TRANSCOM regarding the statutory
requirement to use small businesses and mandatory small
business preferences, but those concerns have not been met. I
suspect others have raised similar kinds of concerns from other
States. And so, I'm going to ask you whether, if you're
confirmed, you will work with my office to ensure that the
statutory requirement to use small business and mandatory small
business preferences is complied with.
General McDew. Senator, I will do so, if confirmed.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you aware of this change of policy?
General McDew. I am not aware of that one, Senator,
specifically.
Senator Blumenthal. Could you look into it and get back to
me?
General McDew. I can, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
USTRANSCOM is an advocate for small business utilization and as of
the end of the fiscal year 2015 second quarter, has already surpassed
the fiscal year 2015 Small Business goal of 15 percent (of prime
contracts), established by the Department of Defense and as required by
the Small Business Act, by achieving 22.17 percent small business
utilization. Additionally, USTRANSCOM is fully compliant with Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) small business requirements, as evidenced
by the ``Highly Satisfactory'' rating assigned following a May 2014
Small Business Administration (SBA) Surveillance Review.
USTRANSCOM's number one priority is readiness and the readiness of
the global distribution enterprise to extend America's helping hand or
project combat power, anywhere, anytime. USTRANSCOM has moved some
efforts previously accomplished under a dedicated service model to the
USC-7 contract when circumstances warranted, such as where a
significant change in cargo volume occurred and dedicated service was
no longer feasible. The work performed under the USC-7 contract is in
full accordance with the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 644(a)),
the FAR, and all other laws and regulations. USTRANSCOM will continue
to evaluate whether requirements are appropriate for set aside under
the USC-7 contract in accordance with the Small Business Act.
If confirmed, I will look into how USTRANSCOM accomplishes small
business awards and will ensure that USTRANSCOM continues to follow the
law that applies to use of small businesses.
Senator Blumenthal. And, if confirmed, what steps or policy
changes can you take to ensure that small businesses, in fact,
have a fair shot at doing business with TRANSCOM?
General McDew. Senator, I've been a proponent and advocate
for small businesses for my entire career. I will pledge to
you, if confirmed, I will look deeply into this. And I can't
imagine us having a process that discounts small businesses, so
I'll have to see how we can encounter small business.
Senator Blumenthal. What changes or policies in the course
of your commitment, your past commitment--and I welcome it--
have you seen DOD undertake? What kinds of initiatives?
General McDew. I can--well, other than the fact that I can
tell you DOD measures how often we actually contract with small
businesses in several different categories, there is a grade
for an organization inside, at least I'm familiar right now,
the Department of the Air Force, on how we do with small
businesses. So, I am very--I'm somewhat surprised by your
comments right now, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I hope that it is a surprise that
is based on a misunderstanding that can be easily corrected.
And I welcome your comments. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service, along with your
families.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, I would declare the hearing
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to General Paul J. Selva,
USAF by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. In connection with your recent nomination to be
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command you answered the Committee's
policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. You indicated that you did not see a need for modifications to
Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your
last confirmation hearing?
Answer. No.
Question. In light of your experience as Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, do you see any need for modifications to
Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be
appropriate?
Answer. No. I do not presently foresee the need to make any
modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
duties
Question. Based on your experience as Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, what recommendations, if any, do you have for
changes in the duties and functions set forth in section 154 of title
10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of
Defense, that pertain to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?
Answer. At present, I do not recommend changes to the law or
regulations.
joint requirements oversight council
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as
the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which
has the responsibility to review and validate Service requirements. Are
there any recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its
authority or the requirements process?
Answer. No, I do not believe any additional authorities or process
changes required at this time.
Question. Has the `trip-wire' process, to bring troubled programs
back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to
mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program
faced a Nunn-McCurdy review, been regularly employed on large programs
that have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays?
Answer. Yes. The JROC ``trip-wire'' process was put in place to
address potential program difficulties prior to triggering a Nunn-
McCurdy breach and subsequent review. A 2012 Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) guidance update incorporated
additional unit-cost criteria in order to address schedule and quantity
trip-wire criteria. It has been employed on several occasions to review
and adjust requirements on large programs when appropriate to avoid
follow-on Nunn-McCurdy breach criteria.
Question. Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance
or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?
Answer. Yes, the JROC has altered or revalidated requirements as a
result of such reviews. Example programs include the warfighter
information network--tactical (WIN-T), advanced anti-radiation guided
missile, and the E-6B Block 1.
Question. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)
required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are
conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the
requirements development and approval process. Such analyses enhance
DOD's understanding of what performance factors are the critical ones
driving costs and schedules. What is your view of the modifications to
the JROC process made by WSARA?
Answer. The modifications resulting from the 2009 WSARA have
benefited JROC deliberations and the supporting JCIDS process. The
continuing refinements to JCIDS, the most recent review and update
completed in February 2015, ensure the continued focus on trade-off
discussions and resulting requirements validation decisions.
Question. What additional steps do you believe that Congress or DOD
should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and
performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an
appropriately early point in the acquisition process?
Answer. The Department routinely evaluates opportunities for trade-
offs among cost, schedule, and performance for major weapons systems.
As an example, in 2012 the Department revised the JCIDS instruction to
ensure the JROC reviews a system's Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to
inform and shape Milestone A activities. As further steps are
warranted, I will adjust the JCIDS policy and process and work with
USD(AT&L) accordingly.
Question. Are there any other recommendations that you would make
to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?
Answer. No. At this time, I do not have any recommendations
regarding modifications to the JROC or its authorities and the
requirements process. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on the
statutory responsibilities and authorities to ensure the appropriate
rigor in validating realistic, technically achievable, prioritized, and
cost informed requirements.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the
DOD acquisition process?
Answer. I would judge the effectiveness of the JROC by how
successfully it works in coordination and partnership with the leaders
and primary stakeholders in the requirements, acquisition, and
resourcing processes to deliver capability to the warfighter within
cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Over the past few years,
the coordination between these processes and leaders has improved, and
if confirmed, I intend to continue this close coordination.
Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the
JROC in the future?
Answer. My vision is for the JROC to play a key role in developing
the future joint force by providing a rigorous requirements basis,
consistent with statutory responsibilities, to aid senior leader
decision-making. If confirmed, I will ensure the development of a
superior joint force remains a priority.
Question. Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to
understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-service
collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take
advantage of related acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. One of the major responsibilities of the JROC process
is to promote Service collaboration on joint requirements and raise
awareness across the force on opportunities to modify or adapt related
acquisition programs.
Question. What principles guide your approach to inviting, and
helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in
the JROC?
Answer. Inclusiveness and frank discussions of key issues will
guide my approach in my role as the chair of the JROC and requirements
process leader. The recently updated JROC charter details roles and
responsibilities of the Council, its subordinate boards, and other
organizations with equity in JCIDS.
Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee's report to accompany
the fiscal year 2016 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense to
revalidate the total program of record buy quantity of each variant of
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. How do you see the JROC's role in this
revalidation process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service and
Program Sponsor principals as well as the Department's acquisition
professionals to assess and validate joint military requirements
identified by combatant commanders. I will take a deliberate look at
balancing the capacity and the capabilities of the future Joint Force,
including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.
joint capabilities integration and development systems (jcids)
Question. What is your perspective on the responsiveness of the
JCIDS process in addressing joint capabilities needs?
Answer. I believe JCIDS is very responsive when addressing joint
capability needs, whether in the normal course of the deliberate review
and validation lane or when evaluating joint urgent or joint emergent
operational needs. In addition to having urgent/emergent lanes within
the process, the requirements process is flexible and the timeline to
review and validate requirements has been tailored for additional
timeliness when necessary in the past. If confirmed, I will ensure it
continues to be flexible in its execution when appropriate.
Question. What level of involvement in the joint requirements
process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs?
Answer. I believe the combatant commands are key customers of, and
stakeholders in, the requirements process. Combatant commands
participate at every level, to include the JROC, Joint Capability
Board, Functional Capability Boards and associated working groups. The
recently updated JROC charter details the roles and responsibilities of
the JROC, its subordinate boards, and other organizations with equity
in JCIDS. If confirmed, I will ensure that combatant commands continue
to play the appropriate role in the requirements process.
Question. Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what
are your views on the how it could be improved to make the process more
responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a
fiscally constrained budget environment?
Answer. No, not at this time. The Department recently updated JCIDS
guidance documents and adjusted the JCIDDS process. If confirmed, I
will monitor the changes put in place and adjust the process when and
where necessary.
Question. The requirements development process is not a stand-alone
process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the
acquisition and budgeting processes. What steps are needed to better
align the requirements development process with the acquisition and
budgeting processes to make for a more efficient and effective process
for delivering capabilities?
Answer. Continued collaboration between the requirements' process
stakeholders and DOD leadership will be needed to more efficiently and
effectively deliver capabilities to the war fighter. There have been
substantial improvements in recent years, which if confirmed I intend
to continue, such as quarterly leadership forums among the Vice
Chairman, Under Secretary for AT&L, and Director of CAPE.
acquisition reform and acquisition management
Question. What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)?
Answer. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009
has been instrumental in avoiding the high cost of fixing problems late
in the acquisition process. WSARA also jump-started acquisition reform
within Department and initiated a mindset of continuous process
improvement as exemplified by Secretary Carter's Better Buying
Initiatives that I strongly endorse.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in
the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements
have been established?
Answer. I believe that the JROC continues to play a key role in
requirements oversight and portfolio management, maintaining visibility
into acquisition programs developing capability solutions to meet
validated/established requirements. There may be cases where validated
requirements need to be reviewed and revalidated based on new
conditions such as technology challenges, fiscal constraints, or
changes in the threat environment. If confirmed, I will ensure the
requirements process remains flexible and responsive to address
requirements reviews as needed.
Question. What role if, any, do you believe the JROC should play in
reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other
acquisition programs?
Answer. The JROC already plays a role in reviewing the progress of
major defense acquisition programs. The JROC considers the progress of
programs in the yearly Chairman's Gap Assessment and Chairman's Program
Recommendation. The JROC also receives yearly Portfolio Review
assessments which include a review of major acquisition programs
conducted by the Functional Capability Boards.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition
management processes?
Answer. No, I do not see a need for any change.
Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration
Steering Boards in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?
Answer. When proactively utilized by the Service Acquisition
Executive, Configuration Steering Boards have been highly effective in
preventing cost-growth and identifying opportunities for requirements
relief.
Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between
Configuration Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for
acquisition programs?
Answer. The Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) are responsible
for reviewing acquisition programs on a regular basis to address issues
causing hurdles to their success in delivering capability to the
warfighter. The CSBs should continue to propose requirements reviews/
changes to the applicable requirements validation body, to include the
JROC. If confirmed, I will ensure the requirements process remains
flexible and responsive to address those CSB-recommended reviews/
changes needing JROC validation in a timely manner.
Question. What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for
Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule,
and performance objectives?
Answer. I believe that the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for designated
programs provide the necessary review for cost, schedule, and
performance issues as needed.
Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between the
JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy
requirements?
Answer. The JROC supports USD(AT&L) in the Nunn-McCurdy process as
detailed in the statutory language. As the validation body, the JROC
reviews the program requirements to determine whether program
continuation is essential to national security. If confirmed, I will
ensure the JROC and the JCIDS process continues to provide prompt and
robust support to the Nunn-McCurdy process and the designated lead
official.
urgent needs processes
Question. In your view, what specific steps should the Department
take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?
Answer. I believe the Department has taken robust action over the
past several years to better manage the joint urgent needs process.
Examples are the updated JCIDS and acquisition guidance that governs
the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), Joint Emergent Operational
Needs (JEONs), and component-specific urgent operational needs
processes. Another example is the focus of the Warfighter Senior
Integration Group (W-SIG) to facilitate delivery of solutions to
validated JUONs/JEONs/component-specific urgent operational needs.
Question. What is your sense of where the DOD might consolidate
urgent needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be
achieved through such consolidation?
Answer. My sense is that DOD is making good progress in
consolidating urgent needs entities/processes and focusing remaining
resources in improving delivery of validated urgent operational needs.
Question. Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to
integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual services'
processes? If so, please explain?
Answer. No. I believe there is an appropriate distinction between a
component-specific urgent operational need and a Joint Urgent/Emergent
Operational Need. If confirmed, I will maintain awareness of the
processes and propose changes when and where appropriate.
nuclear weapons council
Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, you will to serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC)?
Answer. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is
vital to ensuring our Nation's survival and central to the
responsibilities of the NWC. I will work closely with the other NWC
members to develop a plan for the Nuclear Enterprise to ensure the
appropriate capabilities are available to sustain our nuclear arsenal
for the long term.
Additionally, I will work with the other NWC members to modernize
our aging nuclear facilities, invest in human capital, accelerate
dismantlement of retired warheads, and improve our understanding of
foreign nuclear weapons activities.
Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the
organization, structure, or function of the NWC?
Answer. USC Title 10 Section 179 sets forth the organization,
structure and function of the NWC. While I am aware of the recent
Congressional advisory panel that reported on this subject in detail, I
have no recommendations at this time. However, if confirmed, I will
work with the NWC chairman and other members to assess the
organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where warranted,
provide recommendations for change to increase effectiveness and value
in support of the nuclear mission for national security.
space program management
Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space
programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties.
In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with
establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining
control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If
confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining
these requirements. How in your view can or should the space systems
requirements process be improved?
Answer. It is my understanding that in order to address the
specific issue of space systems the Joint Capabilities Integration
Development System (JCIDS) has been updated to allow for more trades
between cost, performance, technology, and risk. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with my
counterparts in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure future space
systems have robust and achievable requirements.
Question. In general, space programs take many years to move from
conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the
satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are
launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to
terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious
cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as
sunk costs are never fully amortized. How in your view can this cycle
be addressed?
Answer. I believe one means of minimizing the use of outdated
technology is to allow for technology insertion points into the
acquisition process, balanced with limits on any requirements creep
that could possibly derail the capability from achieving its core
functionality. This allows for newer technology to influence the
development program at specific points in the procurement of the space
system enterprise.
nuclear weapons
Question. If confirmed you will continue to be a member of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear
Security Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program.
What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship
Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed
from a DOD perspective?
Answer. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with
the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental
tools needed to enable the continued certification of the nuclear
weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for
nuclear weapons explosive testing. The Secretaries of Defense and
Energy are required by statute to certify annually to the Congress the
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
I believe these goals are appropriate and the program is effective,
as evidenced by our ability to certify the stockpile for over 20 years
without the need for underground testing. That said, while the National
Nuclear Security Administration has made significant investments in the
tools and facilities that have made this possible, we must now leverage
those investments and turn our attention to executing Life Extension
Programs so we can sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile for
the future. If confirmed, I will work across the interagency to ensure
an appropriate balance between Life Extension Programs and science-
based stockpile stewardship.
Question. In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program
providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of
the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are
needed?
Answer. Yes. I believe the Stockpile Stewardship Program provides
the requisite tools, as attested to by the directors of the nuclear
weapons design laboratories in their annual assessment letters.
Question. Do you believe the Administration's 1251 report sets
forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear
weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?
Answer. Yes, the Administration's section 1251 report describes an
appropriate roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms,
including the steps necessary to modernize the aging infrastructure of
the nuclear weapons complex. This plan represents a strong commitment
to the nuclear mission and is an important element of assurance that
the U.S. deterrent remains strong. Additionally, this plan reflects the
work of the Nuclear Weapons Council in developing a responsible and
affordable long-term plan for the Nuclear Enterprise.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. Yes, full funding of the 1251 report is a critical national
security priority. The President's fiscal year 2016 Budget Request
includes a significant commitment from the Department of Defense to
modernize the nuclear weapons complex and support the long-term plan
for extending the life of our enduring stockpile. If confirmed, I will
support the continued modernization and sustainment of our nuclear
weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of
nuclear weapons?
Answer. It is my view that any reductions in the numbers of
deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, either strategic or non-
strategic, would need to be negotiated in a manner that strengthens
deterrence of potential adversaries, maintains strategic stability with
Russia and China, and assures our allies and partners. The timing and
size of reductions, if any, would have to be closely coupled to the
status of the modernization effort. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and
capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent.
cybersecurity
Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee's inquiry into U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) determined that TRANSCOM was
subjected to many cyber intrusions that were not reported. TRANSCOM
also suffered from a lack of awareness by other law enforcement and
national security agencies regarding cyber intrusions on TRANSCOM
contractors as well as misunderstandings by TRANSCOM personnel on the
rules and processes for sharing cyber intrusion-related information
with necessary officials.
Have you reviewed this report?
Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report. Cybersecurity has long
been a high priority for USTRANSCOM, and we immediately went to work to
address the findings identified in the report.
Question. What actions did TRANSCOM take in response to the Senate
Armed Services Committee report's findings?
Answer. TRANSCOM worked with OSD and the Joint Staff to implement
the recommendations. We established a Cyber Mission Analysis Task Force
which used incident scenarios to refine the implementation actions.
These actions included updating our critical contractors list and
sharing it with the Defense Cyber Crime Center; enhancing our
relationship with key mission partners, including the FBI and the DHS;
encouraging our commercial partners to participate in the Defense
Industrial Base Cybersecurity and Information Assurance Program; and
engaging in professional associations, such as the National Defense
Transportation Association. In addition, the command standardized cyber
defense contracting language according to DOD acquisition guidelines
and adopted widely-recognized standards from the National Institutes of
Standards and Technology.
Question. Do you feel that the Department of Defense is responding
appropriately given recent events such as the threat nation intrusions
into databases on U.S. personnel including DOD employees?
Answer. Yes, I do. We continue to support key interagency partners
in recovery and mitigation actions and we have increased our internal
focus on strengthening cyber readiness and enforcing basic cyber
hygiene. Additionally, protection of personal information has been part
of our recurring operations security training for many years now. With
respect to the recent intrusions, the Department has used a variety of
means, including town hall meetings, to proactively inform our people
how they can protect themselves from possible identity theft.
Question. What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, as the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that DOD reduces
the risk of cyber intrusions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Department's partnership
with other U.S. agencies to defend the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests
from cyber-attack. Foremost, the DOD must continue to implement current
initiatives in the DOD Cyber Strategy, including developing a ready and
capable Cyber Mission Force and associated cyber workforce. Next, we
must continue to improve our network security architecture and shift
the focus from protecting service-specific networks to securing the DOD
enterprise in a unified manner through the deployment of the Joint
Information Environment. Additionally, I will focus on requirements for
new weapon systems to be designed and developed to operate and survive
against capable cyber adversaries. Finally, because the DOD cannot
guarantee that every cyberattack will be denied successfully, I will
ensure our forces train to operate within a degraded cyber environment.
Question. Do you believe that the current posture of the Department
of Defense is sufficient to deter adversaries in cyberspace?
Answer. Cyber deterrence is complex and challenged by the number of
actors and diversity of their capabilities and motivations. Effective
cyber deterrence requires both policies and capabilities that are
aligned with all the elements of our national power. The Department
must continue to develop capabilities to attribute and deter
cyberattacks from both state and non-state actors.
Question. Do you believe a robust offensive cyber capability is
required to counter the activities of our adversaries and hold their
cyber-enabled capabilities at risk?
Answer. Yes. One of the tenets of the Department's cyber strategy
is the ability to provide the President a variety of cyber options, to
include offensive options when directed. The Department, in conjunction
with other interagency partners, must provide those capabilities should
the need arise.
relationships
Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish
important relationships between the Vice Chairman and other officials.
Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Vice Chairman performs duties assigned to him and other
duties as assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary
of Defense. In the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice
Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman
until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability
ceases. These duties include providing military advice to the Secretary
of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also provide the Secretary of Defense
advice upon the Secretary's request in his capacity as a military
adviser.
Question. The National Security Advisor.
Answer. The Vice Chairman works closely with the Chairman and the
National Security Advisor to ensure that military efforts and options
are synchronized with other department and agency efforts across the
government. When performing the duties of the Chairman, the Vice
Chairman serves as an advisor to the National Security Council and
works with the National Security Advisor to inform and implement
Presidential decisions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy
Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary
of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the
Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is
authorized to act.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense are the principal staff
assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to
their functional areas, and they exercise policy and oversight
functions within their respective areas. In carrying out their duties,
the Under Secretaries issue instructions and directive memoranda to
implement the Secretary's approved policies. When carrying out their
responsibilities as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense,
Under Secretaries typically transmit communications to commanders of
the unified and specified commands through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. If the Chairman is absent or disabled, they can
communicate through the Vice Chairman as necessary.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. The DOD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer
of the Department of Defense, and generally is responsible to oversee
legal services, establish policy, and administer the DOD Standards of
Conduct Program. The DOD General Counsel also establishes policy on
specific legal issues and provides advice on significant international
law issues raised in relation to major military operations, the DOD Law
of War Program, or the legality of weapons reviews. Communications
between the combatant commanders and the DOD General Counsel are
normally transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The office of the DOD General Counsel works closely with the Office of
Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Department of Defense Inspector General.
Answer. The Department of Defense Inspector General performs the
duties, has the responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in
the Inspector General Act of 1978.
The Vice Chairman must cooperate with and provide support to the
Department of Defense Inspector General as required.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned
by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When
there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence
or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and
performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or
the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to a
close working relationship with the Chairman.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries are the heads of their respective military
Departments and are responsible for, and have the authority necessary
to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments. Subject to the
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support
of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. When the
Chairman is absent or his office is vacant, the Vice Chairman advises
the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations
and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform to priorities
in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements
of the Combatant Commands. The Secretaries of the Military Departments
also are responsible for such other activities as may be prescribed by
law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Vice Chairman has a close, collaborative relationship
with the Service Chiefs. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the
Service Chiefs are not in the operational chain of command. However,
this change does not diminish their importance with respect to their
Title 10 responsibilities. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services serve
two primary roles. First, they are responsible for the organization,
training, and equipping of their respective Services. They cooperate
with and support the combatant commanders to assure the preparedness of
assigned forces for missions as directed by the Secretary of Defense
and the President. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Chiefs are advisers to the President, National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their
respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important
role in shaping military advice and developing our joint capabilities.
The Vice Chairman works closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill war-
fighting and operational requirements.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. The commander of a combatant command is responsible to the
President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of
missions assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary
with the approval of the President. Additionally, the Chairman serves
as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the
President or Secretary of Defense when directed by the President. When
there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or
disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when
interacting with the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman should
work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their war-fighting
capabilities and provide other support and coordination as required.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of
the Department of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard
officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all
policies, programs and plans affecting Army and Air National Guard
personnel. Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau is the principal adviser to the Secretary
of Defense on National Guard matters. He also serves as the principal
adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard and
Air National Guard issues. The National Guard Bureau Chief also serves
as the department's official channel of communication with both the
Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific
responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National
Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.
The Vice Chairman works closely with the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau to provide support as required.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.
Answer. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman are not in the chain of
command of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The
Commander, USFOR-A reports to the Commander, USCENTCOM, who, in turn,
reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Commander, USFOR-A
does not have a formal command relationship with the Chairman or the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he coordinates with the
Chairman through the Commander, USCENTCOM on a regular basis. The
Commander, USFOR-A sends his advice and opinions related to Operation
Resolute Support to the Commander, USCENTCOM, who, in turn, presents
them to the Chairman. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman
or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts
as Chairman when interacting with the Commander, U.S. Forces--
Afghanistan.
major challenges
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you expect to face if you are confirmed?
Answer. The most significant challenge I expect to face, if
confirmed, is the combination of a highly complex and volatile security
environment, a Joint Force coming off a fourteen year war footing, and
continued fiscal uncertainty. We must simultaneously contend with both
near-peer (and rising near-peer) states as well as with increasingly
capable and global non-state actors who seek to threaten the U.S.
homeland, our interests, and our allies. Meanwhile we are working to
rebuild the capacity, capability, and readiness of our Joint Force.
Furthermore we must do this with one hand tied behind our back without
the predictability of an annual base budget and without the authority
to implement necessary and cost-saving reforms within the Department.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and
interagency leadership and with the Congress to identify, communicate,
and manage the operational and fiscal risks while continuing to
advocate for the authorities and resources needed to develop and field
a Joint Force capable of meeting the demands of the Nation today as
well as prepare for future threats.
priorities
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified in the section above, would you set for your term as Vice
Chairman?
Answer. My priorities will be focused on developing necessary
capabilities, concepts, and forces to defend the Nation in the 21st
Century. This includes modernizing our aging nuclear enterprise,
protecting our assured access to space, protecting DOD cyber networks
and developing offensive cyber options for the President. It also
includes supporting the Defense Innovation Initiative and supporting
Secretary Carter's Force of the Future Initiative to develop and care
for the best All Volunteer Force the world has ever seen.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
performing their command function.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes. The law is clear that the chain of command runs from
the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of
Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Military doctrine
reflects these command relationships. If confirmed, I will enable the
decision-making process and transmit orders as directed.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority outside the chain of command
established under title 10, United States Code?
Answer. U.S. military forces should normally operate under the
chain of command established in Title 10. There may be times, such as
in the case of certain sensitive military operations, where it may be
appropriate for the President to direct other temporary command
relationships. However, in all cases U.S. armed forces supporting such
operations remain bound by the law of armed conflict, are accountable
to the Title 10 chain of command, and are subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice for disciplinary matters.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military
personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in
title 50, United States Code? Do you believe any modifications to these
authorities are necessary?
Answer. Under Title 50, the Secretary of Defense is charged with
ensuring that the military departments maintain sufficient capabilities
to collect and produce intelligence to meet requirements of the DNI,
Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and COCOMs. Title 50 further authorizes the
Secretary to use such elements of the DOD as may be appropriate for the
execution of the national intelligence program functions described in
section 3038 of title 50. As a general rule, our military forces are
most effective when they operate under a military chain of command.
However, there are circumstances in which exceptions to this general
rule would permit our forces to be employed more effectively. There are
existing authorities and agreements to facilitate the review and
approval of such exceptions. I have no recommendations for changes to
this framework at this time.
advice of the service chiefs, combatant commanders, and chief of the
national guard bureau
Question. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman
for the combatant commanders, especially on the operational
requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for
the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice
or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or
opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that
advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the
President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.
What changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you think may be
necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs,
combatant commanders, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are
presented and considered?
Answer. I presently do not see a need to change section 151 or 163.
officer management issues
Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you
would have significant responsibilities with regard to joint officer
management policies.
If confirmed, what modifications would you make to provide the
Department of Defense and the military services the force management
tools necessary to meet the needs of the 21st century joint, all-
volunteer force?
Answer. The Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services have
worked over the past 10 years to develop force management tools to meet
the challenges of the 21st century joint force. If confirmed, I will
take every opportunity to examine the strategic environment to ensure
that the tools remain relevant.
Question. Do you believe the current DOD and service procedures and
practices for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by
the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of the military
departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President can make
informed decisions?
Answer. The current procedures and practices provide the Department
and the Services the policies and procedures to identify officers for
future leadership positions. The Services' evaluations of the
qualifications, previous performance, and potential of their officers
provides the information to make informed decisions regarding the
promotion and utilization of the Services' officers.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and
reasonable for the officers involved?
Answer. I believe the procedures and practices are fair and
reasonable for the officers involved.
Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint
officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers
are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership
experience and professional development?
Answer. I believe the requirement for officers to be educated,
trained and oriented in joint matters through challenging joint
experiences appropriately prepares officers for the challenges at both
the strategic and operational level. I currently do not recommend any
modifications to the joint officer qualification requirement.
Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification
requirements on the ability of the services to select the best
qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that
will satisfy service-specific officer professional development
requirements?
Answer. Although there is limited time to meet the developmental
requirements, the Services have proven they are able to develop their
officers' and provide a cadre of well-rounded and competitive officers
capable of integrating service functions at both the strategic and
operational level. I believe the end result provides the Department
with officers who possess the greatest opportunity in senior leadership
positions.
Question. In 2008, Congress created the requirement that the Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be selected by a
board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. This process
remains the only joint duty officer position specifically selected by a
selection board from among qualified officers of the armed forces.
Do you consider the selection process required by section 156 of
title 10, United States Code, to be an efficient and effective process
for selecting officers from among the services to serve in this joint
position?
Answer. Yes. The selection process for this unique statutory
position is efficient and effective.
Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint
officer selection board process that could improve the processes for
selection of officers in the military services?
Answer. My understanding is the lessons gleaned from the joint
board process are specific to the joint environment and therefore would
not apply to Services' officer selection.
Question. Would you support expanding the process used to select
the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other
joint billets? Why or why not?
Answer. We have a codified process which allows the Department to
select qualified officers into established joint positions. Expanding
our selection process, at this time, is unnecessary. Established
processes used to select general/flag officers to joint positions are
sound. The process for identifying officers gives the Combatant
Commander and the Chairman flexibility. We can select from across the
Services (to include the Coast Guard); Active, Guard, and Reserve
Component, to ensure we get the right individual with the right skills
and experience. The process also gives the commander and leadership an
opportunity to quickly review a slate of nominated officers, and
conduct interviews as necessary. Finally, the process is extremely
responsive to emerging or unexpected requirements. We can quickly alert
the Services to identify eligible personnel, select, nominate and have
them in position in as little as 90 days if necessary.
headquarters streamlining
Question. The Senate reported Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters
functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.
Answer. If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law,
what would be your role in identifying and implementing streamlining
and reductions in the Joint Staff?
If confirmed, I will engage with the Chairman and Joint Staff to
consider organizational streamlining by reducing, realigning, or
eliminating redundant or conflicting requirements.
Question. What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you
consider to be the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions?
Answer. An example of consolidation efforts that I would consider,
if confirmed, is the potential consolidation of IT services and
maintenance activities within the Pentagon to reduce costs and
unnecessary redundancies. The Joint Staff J6 is currently working with
U.S. Army Information Technology Agency (ITA), Washington Headquarters
Services (WHS) and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to
identify potential consolidation options. Additional potential areas
for consolidation or reduction that I would consider, if confirmed,
include the consolidation of support functions within Joint Staff
directorates and the elimination of duplicative functions accomplished
by the OSD, Joint Staff and Defense Activities.
Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff has functions that
overlap with the Department of Defense and the military departments,
what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy?
Answer. First we will have to determine if duplicative or redundant
functions are directed by statute. Some duplicative responsibilities
are laid out in law with some portions executed by the Department, some
by the Joint Staff and some by the military departments. Legislative
changes may be required to consolidate and reduce redundancies. A
combined review by the OSD, Services and the Joint Staff may be the
best course of action to identify duplicative functions to reduce,
realign, or eliminate.
training and assignment of general and flag officers
Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general and flag
officers have advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical
disciplines?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff continues to work closely with the
Service Chiefs and other leaders to ensure an appropriate pipeline of
specialized, technical officer talent is available with the right-
skilled and experienced leadership. We also have a rigorous and
deliberate Service accession, training and development processes
generate the technical and scientific capability needed in sufficient
numbers to meet DOD mission needs.
Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills
appropriate to ensure that the Department and the services can execute
complex acquisition programs, adapt to a rapidly changing technological
threat environment, and make informed investment decisions? If not,
what will you do to address this deficiency?
Answer. While the Services vary with respect to the use of military
in acquisition, each Service tailors officer career paths to meet
Service mission priorities, which includes successfully executing
critical major acquisition programs. I believe the Department has, and
continues to grow, world-class, technically astute officers ready to
take on the challenges of a rapidly changing technical and acquisition
environment. Each Service has career path models that are appropriate
and aligned with their force management process.
Question. In your view do current general and flag officer
assignment policies provide and incentivize qualified officers to serve
in acquisition programs? Do tour lengths for those assignments enable
and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs?
If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the
effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen communication
processes between Vice Service Chiefs, Service Acquisition Executives
and OSD leadership to make sure we continuously improve our policy,
development and assignment of top motivated, qualified military
personnel in Defense Acquisition. Senior officers are assigned with
adequate tenure to effectively manage their programs and the Services
demonstrate flexibility in adjusting tour lengths to logical
progression points in acquisition programs.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Department of Defense, the
Joint Staff, and the military services have in place sufficient
training and resources to provide general and flag officers, and Senior
Executive Service employees the training they need to make informed,
ethical decisions? If not, what actions would you take, if confirmed,
to address your concerns?
Answer. Yes. The ability to make ethical decisions based on the
shared values of the profession of arms is identified as a specific
Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is
common to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical
foundation is laid at the outset of an officer's career and is further
developed and reinforced in formal education and training settings
throughout their progression through the ranks. If confirmed, I will
ensure these high standards are upheld.
Question. It has been observed that despite numerous changes in the
law, the requirements and the process for attaining joint officer
qualifications is still beset by systemic challenges. Some of these
challenges appear to force the services to make officer assignments to
``check the box'' for joint qualifications at the cost of depriving the
services of flexibility to assign officers to other career enhancing
and professional development opportunities. Officers not assigned to a
designated joint billet on an operational staff receive joint credit
while other officers supporting the same joint commander do not receive
joint credit unless they submit a package to have their assignments
qualify for joint service. As operational tempo remains high and as end
strength continues to decline to historically low levels, some
exceptionally qualified officers will be unable to serve in qualifying
assignments to earn joint credit because the Nation demands they
perform other critical duties. As a result those officers may be
disadvantaged professionally as compared to their peers for promotion
eligibility. Given the substantial resources invested in the developing
officers to serve successfully in, and to support or lead joint forces,
more must be done to improve the joint qualification system or to
replace it with a system that is more effective.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to review the joint
qualification requirements to ensure that the qualification process is
matched to the increasingly joint service environment in which many
officers serve throughout their careers?
Answer. Developing officers to successfully serve in or lead joint
forces is very important and worth the resources invested. Services
must actively manage the officers' careers to ensure the most talented
officers obtain the joint qualification. Officers who do not develop
these skills, no matter how exceptional their performance at the
tactical level, are not adequately prepared to accept challenging joint
assignments when compared to their peers. The joint officer
qualification process provides a tested and flexible means to ensure
officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the
operational and strategic levels. The current process also already
includes the means for officers in non-joint operational assignments to
receive credit toward joint qualification if their duties lead to the
acquisition of significant experience in joint matters. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure the joint officer qualification requirements,
process, and resource investments continue to deliver the Joint Force
necessary to meet the demands of the Nation.
Question. Should the formal requirement for joint qualifications be
eliminated as a consideration for promotions and assignments?
Answer. No. I believe we need to continue to ensure our future
senior leaders are well-prepared to operate in challenging joint
environments. The promotion requirement incentivizes both the Service
and the officer to obtain joint experience.
security strategies and guidance
Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range
and diversity of threats to national security we face today to national
security?
Answer. The range and diversity of threats are increasing. Both
potential state and non-state adversaries are projected to possess
increased military capabilities, and will continue to benefit from the
rapid diffusion of technology. Likewise, future adversaries are also
developing new ways to counter our traditional military advantages.
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took
into account a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources.
With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of
Defense as a result of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance
still valid?
Answer. If sequestration proceeds we receive less funding, then we
will be forced to make further decisions with regard to capabilities,
capacity and readiness--which will result in increased risk for our
combatant commanders. Sequestration will have a direct impact on the
readiness of the Joint Force to execute operations and support the
goals outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of
ISIL have occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in
January 2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate for the
threats we face today or do you think an update is warranted?
Answer. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review provide broad guidance to meet the full
range of potential threats, from high-end state adversaries to non-
state organizations. As threats evolve, it is appropriate to review the
assumptions made in formulating a strategy. If confirmed, I will work
with the Joint Staff and the Department to determine the necessity for
an update to the strategic guidance.
Question. In your view, are our defense strategy and current
establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces
properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
Nation faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. With planned, stable funding, I am confident we will be
able to balance capability, capacity, and readiness. If BCA returns,
the Services will have to make additional cuts to their forces,
impacting capabilities, capacity and readiness, leading to increased
risk to meeting current and future security challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense
establishment?
Answer. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, I would focus on finding the
balance between capacity, capabilities, and readiness for the Joint
Force in order to best prepare for current and future threats. Our
cyber, space, and nuclear capabilities will be an area of particular
emphasis.
strategic risk
Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength increase strategic
risk?
Answer. Army and Marine Corps forces are an important part of our
ability to respond to multiple, simultaneous, or near-simultaneous,
crises and to deter conflicts. Our soldiers and Marines also play a key
role in reassuring our allies and shaping conditions overseas through
security cooperation activities. End strength levels must be considered
in light of these missions, the strategic environment, readiness
levels, and operational tempo.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army and
Marine Corps' decision to reduce active end strength to 450,000 and
182,000 soldiers respectively by the end of 2017?
Answer. I believe that any change in end strength needs to be
understood in terms of risk. Reducing our Army and Marine Corps end
strength increases risk and may impact our ability to shape world
conditions, assure allies, and deter conflicts. However, I believe our
current strategy is still achievable at these end strengths, though at
increased risk. Any further cuts though, would dramatically increase
our strategic risk.
Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. I believe we would have to prioritize what we are asking
our forces to do on a daily basis. For some missions, we should look to
our allies and partners to help mitigate risk. In other missions, we
would need to look for different ways to operate. Ultimately,
consistent with our funding levels, we need to align resources to
counter our most dangerous threats.
Question. Upon issuance of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the
fiscal year 2015 budget reduced projected defense budgets by $113
billion over five years. What was the incurred strategic risk of this
reduction relative to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance?
Answer. A reduction on defense resources in an increasingly complex
strategic environment will introduce strategic risk to our defense
strategy (both the QDR and DSG). I am happy to discuss further details
in a classified venue.
chairman's risk assessment
Question. In his 2013 risk assessment, Chairman Dempsey identified
for the first time six National Security Interests that were derived
from four enduring interests contained in the 2010 National Security
Strategy. The April 2013 assessment identified several areas of broad
and significant risk to national security as a result of current budget
issues.
How would you characterize the trends of risk in these areas
(whether they are increasing or decreasing)?
Answer. Overall, strategic and military risk trends are increasing.
I would be happy to discuss risk in a classified venue.
Question. What is your current assessment of the risk to combatant
commanders in their ability to successfully execute their operational
plans?
Answer. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into much
detail. Generally, our combatant commanders face increasing risk,
especially if BCA goes back into effect. We ask a lot of our
commanders, and we must be prepared to resource them appropriately. I
will say that all military operations entail risk, but we are committed
to providing the President a range of options given any threat to U.S.
interests.
transformation
Question. Military ``transformation'' has been a broad objective of
the Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. In your view, what does
military ``transformation'' mean?
Answer. Military transformation means building a Joint Force that
is intellectually and organizationally capable of seizing and
capitalizing on emerging technological or organizational opportunities,
not just adapting or reacting to conditions that the world presents.
Military transformation is realized over time through constant
innovation in our organizational structures, doctrine, education,
leader development and material capabilities.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress
made by the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Joint Staff, toward transforming the Armed Forces?
Answer. My understanding is that we are making progress, but there
is more work to be done. We are continuing the implementation of the
Joint Operational Access Concept, a concept that provides a framework
to ensure the Joint Force can continue to conduct operations to gain
access based on the requirements of the broader mission despite growth
of anti-access and area-denial threats. We're also making progress in
the Joint Information Environment, implementing innovation change
across the Department that enhance mission effectiveness and cyber
security. Ultimately, our goal is a versatile, responsive, decisive,
and affordable Joint Force.
Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish
during your term as Vice Chairman regarding military transformation in
the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe we should be selective in the
capabilities we choose to reconstitute as we draw down in Afghanistan,
while ensuring that lessons learned over a decade of war are retained.
As we get smaller, we must become increasingly versatile, agile and
opportunity-seeking. I intend to use my role in the JROC and innovation
initiatives to advance this transformation.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role
in transformation? If so, in what ways?
Answer. I believe the Joint Staff has an increasingly important
role to play in developing a common understanding of future challenges
and how the Joint Force must evolve for success in the future operating
environment. To this end, the Joint Staff has a number of useful and
unique mechanisms at its disposal. These include military strategy
development, joint concepts, war gaming, future joint force
requirements, and joint training. I see the Joint Staff increasingly as
an aligning mechanism across all the different Joint Force development
processes in the department.
military capabilities in support of defense strategy
Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the
necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014
QDR? Where are areas of higher risk?
Answer. In an unclassified forum I am reluctant to go into much
detail. The Joint Staff and the Services constantly review our
capability portfolios in order to ensure we can achieve our objectives
against potential adversaries. The committee receives a quarterly
classified report that details gaps in our current military plans.
Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities
to decisively win in future high-end engagements?
Answer. I believe future engagements may be characterized by
increasingly sophisticated adversaries employing advanced weapons and
challenging the access and advantages in space and cyberspace that U.S.
forces currently enjoy. The 2014 QDR calls for continued investment in
new systems and development of operational concepts to address these
evolving threats. The recently released National Military Strategy
reinforces the QDR's guidance; prioritizing investments to counter
anti-access area denial threats, as well as space, cyber, and hybrid
threats.
Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR,
American forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a
large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or
impose unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.''
In your opinion, does the Department's force sizing construct
provide adequate capability to address the country's current threat
environment?
Answer. Yes, the force sizing construct, with its emphasis on a
range of military options, provides adequate capability to address the
country's current threat environment. This particular excerpt applies
to situations where deterrence has failed. The first portion of the
force sizing construct states that the U.S. military will be ``capable
of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained,
distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions,
deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and
engagement.'' The construct involves more than just capability, it also
provides a framework to evaluate capacity and readiness. To this end,
we need support from Congress to ensure that we have sufficient
resources to conduct a wide spectrum of missions globally, while
maintaining a thoughtful balance of capability, capacity and readiness
to respond to a crisis and win decisively.
Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR,
American forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a
large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or
impose unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.''
Are the services adequately sized to meet this construct?
Answer. I believe the Services are able to provide forces to meet
the construct. Resource constraints have eroded the readiness of the
joint force, however, and extended the timelines to make forces
available to respond to combatant commander needs. Lack of reliable
funding levels hinders our ability to field trained, read forces to
meet combatant commander demand.
Question. What will you advise if the Department cannot meet the
demands placed on it?
Answer. I would advise that we carefully prioritize the most
important missions necessary for meeting our military and defense
objectives and for protecting our national security interests. I would
also advise that we consistently work with Congress to ensure the
Department has sufficient resources to meet the demands the Nation
places upon it.
future army
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of January 2012
articulated the need to shift strategic emphasis toward the Asia-
Pacific region while continuing to engage in the Middle East. Do you
agree that future high-end military operations, as envisioned by the
DSG, will primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army
will have difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of the
number and equipment its combat formations?
Answer. Looking only at current threats in a particular region as a
way to justify force structure is unwise. We must have a robust and
capable military ready to respond to multiple threats. The Army has,
and will always have, an essential role in the Asia-Pacific region as
well as in the rest of the world. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, I
would support the Chairman in seeking a fully-trained joint force ready
to defend our national security wherever it is threatened.
Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations
or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
strategy and resources?
Answer. Our Nation needs an Army that conducts full spectrum
operations as part of the joint force. It must be appropriately sized,
structured, and equipped to in order to defend the Nation and defeat
our adversaries. The Quadrennial Defense Review deemphasized long
duration stability operations and reinforced the importance of
defeating and denying the objectives of an adversary. The Army
continues realigning and resizing consistent with this guidance.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of
security strategies and the likely availability of resources?
Answer. The Department has assessed our ability of all Services to
execute the defense strategy with their programmed force structure,
including the Army. We can execute our strategy at current funding
levels with acceptable risk. With the Army, and all of the Services, we
must continually assess threats and make adjustments to ensure we have
a healthy force, with the right mix between the active and reserve
components.
defense reduction
Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the
following budget reductions on the military, their capability,
capacity, and readiness?
Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion
Answer. The initial Budget Control Act resulted in an immediate and
substantial reduction to the Department's topline and forced our
military to make difficult resource decisions, such that we now have a
strategy with little to no margin for surprise. The BCA reduction
translates to increased risk to our strategy, across the board.
Question. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013
Answer. Due to the nature of sequestration, the fiscal year 2013
cuts reduced already-strained readiness. To date, sequestration has
resulted in cuts to training, exercises, deployments and maintenance,
all of which have a negative impact on force morale. Further, the
sequester reductions disrupted modernization efforts and resulted in
civilian furloughs and a hiring freeze.
Question. Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the
fiscal year 2015 budget, in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 budget request assumes higher risks in
some areas, but this budget helps us to remain a modern and capable
military even while transitioning to a smaller force and resetting
readiness over time. The $115 billion reduction refers to the
difference between the PB15 (FYDP) submission and the BCA sequestration
levels across fiscal year 2015-19. Funding to the sequester levels
would result in reduced force structure, decreased readiness funding,
exacerbating the existing readiness shortfalls, and reductions to
modernization efforts. It would erode our ability to respond to
emergent challenges (i.e., increasingly contested space and cyber
domains, a resurgent Russia, the Ebola response, and the rise of ISIL),
and our ability to execute the defense strategy.
Question. Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps
starting in fiscal year 2016 onward
Answer. If sequester level cuts return in fiscal year 2016, then we
will see increased risks and fewer military options to defend our
Nation and its interests. The impact of sequestration and other budget
constraints will further reduce unit readiness and disrupt
modernization. The effects caused by deferred maintenance, and lost
training will impose significant strain on long-term institutional
readiness. Ultimately, reduced readiness (i.e., reduced training
cycles, deferred maintenance, and the continuing pace of current
operations) will damage the effectiveness, credibility and the morale
of our military. Continued sequester cuts will create a situation where
our defense strategy may no longer be viable.
Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the
Budget Control Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year
2016 budget resolution passed by the Senate and House of
Representatives do not assume this but instead provides $38 billion of
the necessary spending through OCO budget. Should this funding not be
available, what recommendations would you have, if confirmed, for how
the Department of Defense should manage the $35 billion in cuts for
fiscal year 2016?
Answer. We remain hopeful that Congress can halt the abrupt, deep,
and blunt cuts of sequestration and we will continue to reduce costs
through increased efficiency and reforms, some requiring Congressional
support. But an fiscal year 2016 budget at BCA cap levels will create
risks requiring us to revisit the defense strategy. With a $35 billion
cut in fiscal year 2016, we will be forced to further reduce the size
of the force, delay readiness restoration, and reduce modernization and
investment programs.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on readiness?
Answer. The loss of $35 billion from the fiscal year 2016 defense
budget would gravely undercut the Department's readiness and future
force generation capability. We would be forced to mortgage readiness
recovery, equipment recapitalization, and force modernization in order
to support currently deployed and next-to-deploy forces. Placing all of
this in the context of expanding global threats, we would be unable
execute the defense strategy. Sufficient and predictable resourcing is
critical in our ability to maintain both military readiness and to meet
additional operational demands.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have to military capabilities?
Answer. Because of the nature of the sequester mechanism, funding
for operations and maintenance, procurement, RDT&E, and military
construction suffer disproportionately. The result of these cuts would
be a military that is smaller and less capable. While our military
would continue to provide presence and respond to crises, the fiscal
year 2016 BCA cuts would increase risk, prolong readiness recovery, and
delay necessary modernization for hundreds of programs, large and
small. Cuts in funding for research and development would erode the
technological superiority enjoyed by U.S. forces and increase risk in
future conflicts.
readiness funding
Question. Given the reductions in readiness funding, what is your
assessment of the current readiness of the Armed Forces to meet
national security requirements across the full spectrum of military
operations?
Answer. The current readiness of the Joint Force poses significant
risk to our ability to execute the National Military Strategy.
Sequestration exacerbated the existing state of poor readiness as a
result of over a decade of exceptional demand in defense of the Nation.
The Bipartisan Budget Act restored some resources, and provided much
needed fiscal certainty and stability, thereby inhibiting any further
readiness decline. Fully restoring readiness of the Armed Forces to
meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of
military operations requires readiness recovery time coupled with
sufficient and predictable resourcing.
Question. What is your assessment of the near term trend in the
readiness of the Armed Forces?
Answer. Near-term trends will remain significantly-less-than-
optimal for the foreseeable future unless and until Congress provides
sufficient and predicable funding and the authorities for the
Department to implement critical cost-saving reforms. The loss of
additional resourcing and/or the advent of increased operational
demands would introduce a significant amount of additional risk to
ongoing military operations.
Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration
given the impacts we have already seen to DOD readiness in fiscal year
2014?
Answer. It is critical to find a permanent solution to
sequestration and to provide the Department with sufficient and
predictable resourcing in order to restore the Joint Forces' ability to
provide the full range of sufficient military capabilities. The present
approach of augmenting base budget with OCO funds is unsustainable and
will prevent the Department from fully recovering, meeting additional
commitments, and restoring our comparative advantage through
modernization. Without a sufficient and predictable funding profile,
current operations can only continue at the expense of long term
development and sustainment efforts, further complicating existing
readiness challenges.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods
currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of
military equipment?
Answer. Service methods for funding equipment maintenance
continually assesses the requirements of post-conflict reset-- a
combination of balancing reset, unit readiness and the sustainment of
core capabilities--and developing detailed maintenance plans that
balance operational availability with maintenance requirements.
However, starts and stops in the budget process and funding
uncertainties have a negative effect on the workload scheduling at
Service depots. These negative effects ripple beyond the current year
and can extend for months and even years.
Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last
several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to
reduce this backlog?
Answer. Without consistent and predictable base budget funding at
requested levels, the Services will continue to rely on OCO to maintain
equipment readiness. Inadequate funding of enduring and contingency
sustainment requirements results in increased maintenance backlog.
Equipment maintenance funding is driven by unit readiness requirements
and based on a variety of factors to include force structure,
operations tempo, schedule, nature and usage rate of the equipment, and
safety. The Services used OCO funding for reset of equipment in support
of OIF and OEF combat operations. In the past, this resulted in funding
of baseline sustainment accounts at levels below Service enduring
requirements.
Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance
backlog in order to improve readiness?
Answer. It requires continuous attention to ensure the accumulation
of backlog does not grow beyond what is manageable. Excessive backlog
can eventually lead to reduced equipment availability rates, less
reliable systems, and potentially shortened service life. OCO funding,
beyond the end of combat operations, and adequate funding of Service
baseline budget levels are important if we are to improve the trend in
equipment readiness.
Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding two or three
years after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all
equipment is reset?
Answer. It remains critically important to maintain funding levels
well beyond cessation of current operations to fully restore equipment
readiness and support the National Security Strategy. In the near to
mid-term, OCO dollars for enduring requirements and equipment reset is
necessary for Joint Force readiness. OCO is still required to
adequately address maintenance, repair and overhaul requirements.
Question. In years past, Congress has based additional readiness
funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists.
However, in recent years those lists have either not been provided or
have arrived too late in our markup process. Do you agree to provide
unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner beginning with
the fiscal year 2017 budget request?
Answer. Should the Services have such priorities, the process
allows the Joint Chiefs to make recommendations that are responsive to
Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. Should I be
confirmed, I will support the use of this process when warranted.
defense acquisition reform
Question. Congress is considering a number of acquisition reform
measures designed to reduce the costs and development timelines of
major systems, and to streamline access to innovative commercial
technologies and systems. What are your views regarding acquisition
reform and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition
process?
Answer. I believe that acquisition reform in the Department should
be based upon the following key principals:
a. The responsibility and authority for acquisition system outcomes
should be clearly identified within the DOD;
b. The requirements' sponsor should be an integral part of
delivering needed capability and remains accountable throughout the
acquisition process, and;
c. The effort to reduce overhead and increase efficiencies across
defense acquisition should be continued.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process B requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. The Department's acquisition processes are constantly
evolving in order to reduce overhead, increase efficiencies, and remain
agile and responsive to the needs of our warfighters. The Department
regularly reviews and updates the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) and has recently incorporated many ``Better
Buying Power'' initiatives. If confirmed, I would strongly support the
Department's acquisition reform vision.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is warranted given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. It's my understanding that recent cost and schedule trends
show improvement, but I am still concerned that acquisition,
procurement, and operations and support costs will continue their
historic growth profiles. This growth will further exacerbate
shortfalls under a sequestered budget and threaten our ability to meet
our partner and ally security guarantees.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use the JROC to scrub weapon system
requirements and consider cost-informed performance tradeoffs early and
often to drive out requirements-related weapon-system cost growth. I
will also advocate for versatile future capabilities that are both
affordable and sustainable as a hedge against legacy weapon systems'
cost growth.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and
prioritized?
Answer. As the lead of the Department's senior validation body, I
would ensure the JROC continues to make adjustments and improvements to
the JCIDS process as appropriate. A major review and update was just
completed in Feb 2015. The update continues to focus appropriate rigor
in validating realistic, technically achievable, prioritized, and cost-
informed requirement.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that resources are programmed for acquisition programs that are
consistent with their cost estimates and schedules?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate in the Department's resource
allocation process for major system resource funding that is consistent
with the Secretary's cost and schedule position.
Question. What should the role of the combatant commanders, Service
Chiefs, Service Acquisition Executives, and Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics be in the acquisition process?
Answer. Service Chiefs and combatant commanders play a vital role
in requirements generation and are pivotal to acquisition process
success. Their engagement with the Service and Defense Acquisition
Executives during the acquisition life-cycle of a weapon system also
prevents requirements growth. USD (AT&L)'s role in reviewing Service
plans at discrete milestones associated with major Department resource
commitments ensures programs are affordable and executable, and that
they follow sound business and risk management practices.
Question. Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that
should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or Service Secretaries in the
acquisition process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the idea of new roles and
responsibilities. I believe that any change should not undermine the
statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. However, I am
supportive of changes that promote Service accountability in the
acquisition process and further streamline the bureaucratic processes.
tactical fighter programs
Question. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the
largest and most expensive acquisition program in the Department's
history, was formally initiated as a program of record in 2002, with a
total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the U.S. The program has not
yet completed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, and
is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its
inception. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be
procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total
quantity buy. The requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly
20 years ago; do you believe that requirement is still valid in light
of countervailing pressure to reduce force structure to conserve
resources and to improve capability to respond to prospective adversary
technological advances and increased capabilities with regard to
establishing contested combat environments, combined with updated
threat assessments and an evolving national defense strategy?
Answer. The F-35 remains an integral part of the Department's
future capabilities portfolio as we prepare for contingencies. In many
of the scenarios we may face, the advanced capabilities of the Joint
Strike Fighter are essential. If confirmed, I will support ongoing
analysis looking at whether 2,443 is the right number of aircraft, but
I do not anticipate reductions to the required capacity at this time.
Question. Do you believe the Nation can afford to procure these
aircraft at a cost of $12B to $15B per year for nearly the next 20
years for an aircraft design that will be 30 years old at the
completion of the program procurement phase?
Answer. I believe the Department cannot allow shortfalls in fighter
capability or capacity to develop. Fifth-generation fighter aircraft,
including the F-35, are critical as we contend with the technological
advancements of near-peer competitors. We have been working diligently
to make the overall cost per F-35 more affordable. Additionally, there
will continue to be critical updates throughout the life cycle of the
F-35 that will ensure the platform maintains a tactical advantage.
Question. Do you believe the Department's current and planned force
mix of short-range fighters and long-range strike aircraft, whether
land- or maritime-based, is sufficient to meet current and future
threats around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific
theater of operations where the ``tyranny of distance'' is such a major
factor?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support continual assessments to
assure our ability to meet current and future threats, including those
concerning short-range fighters and long-range strike aircraft. To
ensure we are postured to address the ``tyranny of distance'' and
succeed militarily, the DOD, over the past three years, has made
significant progress in developing new alliance initiatives, securing
new rotational access for U.S. forces, and enhancing both the quantity
and quality of U.S. forces and capabilities in the Pacific region.
Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying
S. 1376, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,
would require the Secretary of Defense to assess the current
requirement for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter total program of record
quantity, and then to revalidate that quantity or identify a new
requirement for the total number of F-35 aircraft the Department would
ultimately procure. What will be your role in assisting the Secretary
to revalidate the F-35 total program quantity?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman, in consultation
with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), in advising the
Secretary in the review of the level of capability and capacity
required to fulfill the established joint military requirements. This
advice will ensure the appropriate balance is struck consistent with
the level of priorities identified by the defense strategy and
combatant commander requirements.
Question. The Air Force has proposed several times over the last
decades to retire the A-10 close air support aircraft fleet, but each
time Congress has rejected the proposals due to lack of a sufficient
replacement capability. The Air Force's latest proposals to retire the
fleet in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 were again rejected by Congress. Do
you believe a need exists for a dedicated capability to provide close
air support for American troops in close quarters battles?
Answer. No. The interoperable underpinning of joint requirements
enables effective close air support utilizing a range of multi-role
aircraft. Lessons from the last fourteen years of combat have
institutionalized tactics, techniques and procedures integrating a
number of manned and unmanned systems supporting these missions.
Translating these lessons into joint requirements continues to advance
our ability to provide close air support with advanced sensors and
precise lethality of our weapon systems.
Question. What will be your role in ensuring our land forces
receive the air support they'll need to survive and succeed while
fighting the nation's land battles?
Answer. If confirmed, in consultation with the advisors to the
JROC, I will ensure the appropriate capabilities are identified,
assessed, and approved to meet the requirements of our land forces. I
will also recommend alternative program recommendations and budget
proposals, where necessary, to achieve this end.
Question. The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he
believed the F-35 would be the nation's last manned fighter aircraft.
Do you believe this to be true?
Answer. Despite the rapid advance of robotic and autonomous
technologies over the past decade, I believe that the intellect and
judgment of the human pilot remain integral to the combat capability
provided by fighter aircraft. Decisions about future platforms will be
informed by human and systems capabilities as well as mission
requirements.
Question. If so, what will be your role in leading capabilities and
requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat
systems in the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, in my role as Chairman of the JROC, I will
identify, assess and approve opportunities for increased employment of
unmanned systems across the Joint Force. This includes leveraging
validated capabilities identified in the Joint Concept for Robotics and
Autonomous Systems now in development. I will also work with industry,
science and technology, and academia to identify emerging technologies
and align them with Joint Force requirements.
Question. If not, how do you see the future balance developing
between manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Department's future
force structure?
I believe that the continued growth in robotic and autonomous
systems technology will significantly impact the ongoing development
and fielding of all future weapons systems, not just combat aircraft.
The Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous Systems currently under
development will help incorporate these new technologies to maximize
the effectiveness of the Joint Force.
space
Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
ensure access to space. As a Nation heavily dependent on space assets
for both military and economic advantage, the United States has to make
protection of space assets became a national priority.
Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
space assets now has the appropriate level of national security
priority?
Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to
operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment. It is
vital that the U.S. protect national space assets to maintain the
benefits and advantages dependent on our access to space.
Question. In your view, how should China's continued development of
space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
Answer. China is rapidly developing space capabilities of its own
that mirror U.S. capabilities and could threaten our access and use of
space for national security purposes. If confirmed, I will review the
U.S. Military's efforts to address China's developments in space, and
will coordinate closely with the Secretary of Defense.
Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National
Security space policy and programs?
Answer. The National Security Space Strategy clearly highlights the
growing challenges in the space domain. If confirmed, I will insist on
policies, programs, and other measures that ensure U.S. warfighters can
continue to depend on having the advantages that space confers.
access to radio frequency spectrum
Question. What actions would you take to ensure that the Department
continues to have access to radio frequency spectrum that is necessary
to train and to conduct its operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Interagency and industry
partners on spectrum sharing in order to maintain DOD's assured access
to the spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations while also
enabling access for commercial broadband. I will also continue to
support Public Law 106-65 (National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000), which requires the Secretaries of Commerce and
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that
any alternative band or bands to be substituted for spectrum currently
used by DOD provide ``comparable technical characteristics to restore
essential military capability that will be lost as a result of the band
of frequencies to be so surrendered.'' This provision is necessary to
ensure that DOD maintains access to spectrum necessary to operate
critical military capabilities.
strategic systems
Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
rest of the DOD commitments?
Answer. Yes, I am concerned that in the current budget environment
completing these modernization programs will be a challenge. If
confirmed, I will give full attention to these programs as they develop
and mature. Modernizing the strategic delivery systems and sustaining
the strategic nuclear enterprise are vital to maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, which is essential to
deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies. As with any
funding choices, we will make decisions that balance fiscal prudence
with appropriate risk to provide the best possible capabilities.
Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and
replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Section 1052 of the fiscal year 2014 NDAA established a
``Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and
Communications System''.
What do you see as the most pressing challenges in nuclear command,
control and communications from a policy and acquisition perspective?
Answer. Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is an
enduring priority where we face the challenge of sustaining existing
capabilities until new, modernized capabilities can be fielded. We must
provide an assured, survivable and enduring NC3 system that
simultaneously takes advantage of modern communication capabilities
while remaining secure and hardened against attacks ranging from cyber
to the most extreme kinetic attacks.
Question. What do you see as the most pressing challenges in
overall national leadership communications from a policy and
acquisition perspective?
Answer. Providing our national leadership with secure, reliable
voice, video and data communications is a critical capability. This
capability must be assured, survivable and enduring; allowing senior
defense advisors to communicate with the President, the Combatant
Commands and strategic Allies during normal day-to-day operations and
during national crises from a fixed, mobile or airborne location. The
major challenge from both a policy and acquisition perspective is to
sustain existing capabilities until new, modernized capabilities can be
fielded.
Question. If confirmed will you actively support section 1052 and
work with outgoing Vice Chairman Winnefeld to understand the importance
of this Council in ensuring the President has at all times control of
nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed will you agree to attend meetings as a
member listed in its statue?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In 2014 Secretary Hagel has conducted an assessment of
the state of nuclear deterrence operations of the Department of
Defense.
Do you agree with its findings?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the conclusion of both the internal and
external reviews that while our nuclear forces are currently meeting
the demands of the mission with dedication, significant changes are
required to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the force
in the future.
Question. Will you actively support the findings and their
implementation
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will devote significant attention to
the state of our nuclear deterrence enterprise and will ensure the
appropriate corrective actions are implemented.
missile defense in the boost phase
Question. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) mission is to develop,
test, and field an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense system
to defend the United States and its allies against all ranges of enemy
ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. While MDA is conducting
research into next generation laser concepts that could be mounted on
high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, there is no program of record
designed to intercept missiles during the boost phase of flight, when
they are potentially most vulnerable. Do you agree with the Commander
of Northern Command, when he said on April 7, 2015, referring to
missile threats that ``we need to be able to start knocking them down
in the boost phase . . . and not rely on the midcourse phase where we
are today?''
Answer. Yes. Ballistic missiles are easier to detect and track in
their boost phase, and typically countermeasures such as decoys are not
deployed until after booster burnout. These factors make boost-phase
intercept an attractive option to investigate.
Question. Would you support an increase in the priority of
technology investments to develop and deploy a boost phase airborne
laser weapon system for missile defense in the next decade, if
technically practicable?
Answer. MDA's budget supports design of a laser demonstrator that
is potentially capable of acquiring, tracking, and even destroying an
enemy missile. This is an approach that we've studied for many years
and, if it proves out, could potentially, come at lower cost than the
existing system of kinetic interceptors. However, leap-ahead technology
must be paired with corresponding evolutions in doctrine, policy,
concepts of operations, and other non-materiel considerations to be
militarily useful.
dod's cooperative threat reduction program
Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is
focused historically on accounting for, securing or eliminating Cold
War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and materials in the states
of the former Soviet Union, has started to expand its focus to other
countries. With this expansion the CTR program is widening its focus to
biological weapons and capabilities including biological surveillance
and early warning; and encouraging development of capabilities to
reduce proliferation threats.
Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S.
government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
Department?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) Program informally and formally coordinates on a regular basis
with the Combatant Commands, other DOD partners, interagency partners
including the Departments of State and Energy, and international
partners on CTR Program WMD threat reduction efforts. Part of this
interagency coordination includes placing Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) liaison officers at U.S. Embassies where programs are
highly active to further enhance coordination of activities in country
and in the immediate regions where engagements occur. Additionally, in
order to eliminate duplication of efforts, ensure safety and security
is being considered in health capacity building programs, and work
together to develop effective and sustainable detection and reporting
systems, CTR is working very closely with USG civilian agencies to plan
and execute efforts that both meet threat reduction goals and
contribute to the Global Health Security Agenda objectives.
Question. About 60 percent of CTR resources are proposed for
biological programs.
With the very real threat of chemical weapons use and/or
proliferation as we saw in Libya and are seeing in Syria, why is there
such a large percentage of resources directed toward biological issues?
Answer. The DOD CTR Program is designed to posture the United
States to eliminate state-based WMD programs, if and when opportunities
emerge. At the same time, numerous scientific, economic and demographic
trends are increasing the risks that infectious diseases outbreaks pose
to U.S. and global security, to include through natural transmission,
bioterror attacks or laboratory accidents. Such outbreaks challenge our
ability to protect the health of U.S. armed forces, U.S. citizens at
home and abroad, and U.S. allies, drain economic resources, and
ultimately risk undermining geopolitical stability. The Ebola Virus
Disease outbreak demonstrated how, in an interconnected global
environment, a bio-incident anywhere in the world can lead to dangerous
consequences when governments are unable to provide basic health and
diagnostic Services for their population. This creates environments in
which destabilizing outbreaks can potentially provide terrorists with
opportunities to gain access to deadly pathogens for their purposes due
to insecure storage. For this reason, the percentage of funding devoted
by the CTR Program at this time to reduce biological threats in the
most vulnerable locations worldwide is appropriate.
prompt global strike
Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the
United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike
prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike
capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global strike
capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in
the near future?
Answer. The Joint requirements process has identified the emerging
challenge of high value, time sensitive, and defended targets that
exist outside the range of conventional weapons systems. I support the
continued evaluation of alternative technology and concepts that
balance the potential operational employment against costs and the
priority of this capability requirement.
Question. What approach (e.g. land-based or sea-based or both) to
implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist acquisition officials in
identifying the appropriate solutions to validated Joint military
requirements. Unless an appropriate alternative is presented, I would
expect to support a sea-based approach to fulfill this requirement as
previously identified by the JROC.
Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
capability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead periodic reviews of joint
military requirements and assessments of Combatant Commander integrated
priority lists to identify, assess, and approve the doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy improvements necessary to close any intelligence
gaps discovered in the development this requirement.
nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the
continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges, if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and
reliability of the stockpile?
Answer. Our ability to sustain a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile rests largely on our people and our infrastructure. As a
significant wave of personnel begins to retire over the next decade, we
must recruit and retain the next-generation of nuclear weapons stewards
capable of certifying the stockpile without underground testing. At the
same time, we must remain vigilant about recapitalizing and modernizing
the infrastructure we need to design and produce components required
for our Life Extension Programs, even as we continue operations in
aging facilities.
Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing? What
considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?
Answer. Our current nuclear stockpile is assessed as effective. It
is certified and does not require further nuclear testing. I am
committed to working with the Department of Energy to maintain the
critical skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the
safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile without underground
testing if practicable.
However, the stockpile is aging. I understand there are, and will
always be challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging
on the stockpile. I would strongly consider recommendations from the
Department of Energy and the National Laboratory Directors before
making any recommendation to the Secretary and President regarding a
need to resume underground testing.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the non-
deployed hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons?
Answer. Our non-deployed nuclear weapons stockpile allows us to
manage risks of technical failures in our stockpile and changes in the
geopolitical environment. Implementation of the 3+2 Strategy for
nuclear weapons modernization will enable further reductions in the
number of hedge warheads required. Furthermore, modernization of key
production facilities will improve the responsiveness of the nuclear
weapons infrastructure and may provide opportunities to make additional
adjustments to the non-deployed hedge stockpile. I am committed to
reducing the size of the stockpile to the lowest level consistent with
deterrence objectives and warfighter requirements.
countering the islamic state of iraq and the levant in iraq & syria
Question. To ``degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group
known as ISIL'' the Department of Defense seeks to deny ISIL safe-haven
and build partner capacity.
If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate ISIL
degradation and what is your assessment of the progress to degrade ISIL
in Iraq and in Syria?
Answer. I view degraded capability as an inability to hold key
terrain and influence population centers. As anti-ISIL forces in both
Iraq and Syria gain momentum and achieve tactical and operational
successes, I would consider ISIL's failure to resupply or refit its
fighters as additional indicators. Large groups of displaced persons
returning to their homes in Tikrit and working to restore their former
way of life serve as an example. By leveraging the resources of the
U.S. Intelligence Community, the DOD will continue to analyze and
assess ISIL capabilities, while identifying additional indicators of
degradation.
Progress is being made. However, we must continue to exercise
patience during the long campaign to degrade ISIL, and understand that
our efforts cannot exceed those of our partnered ground forces in Iraq
and Syria.
Question. A large part of the support for ISIL and other violent
extremist groups like al Nusrah by the local Syrian population is based
on the fact that these groups seek to remove President Assad from
power.
What limitations, if any, do we face by failing to have the removal
of Assad as an objective in Syria?
Answer. While seeking a negotiated political settlement is U.S.
policy, the immediate objective is countering ISIL in both Syria and
Iraq. Transition of power from the Assad regime may have implications
and negative consequences on Syrian and regional stability, so it is
important that we continue to work with our regional partners to
counter both the threat of ISIL as well as sequencing an orderly
transition from the Assad regime.
Question. In Iraq, what is the importance of arming the Sunni
tribes in Anbar province to degrading ISIL and how do you assess
progress to date? What is your understanding of the current plan to
train and equip Sunni fighters to help in the campaign against ISIL?
Answer. Sunni tribal mobilization is an important component of the
counter-ISIL fight. They are a credible ground force we have only begun
to empower, and they are necessary to protect Iraqis in Anbar and other
Sunni-dominant areas. I understand PM Abadi and the GOI continue to
make marginal gains mobilizing Sunni tribes, but much work remains. We
must continue to pressure the GOI to embrace the integration of these
tribes into Iraqi Security Forces' efforts. U.S. and Coalition support
at airbases like Al Asad and Al Taqaddum are enhancing these efforts.
Question. What is your assessment of the fall of Ramadi to ISIL
last month and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the
U.S. and coalition strategy, if you are confirmed?
Answer. Ramadi was a tactical setback, and I certainly expect
setbacks, as well as gains, over the course of a 36-month campaign to
degrade ISIL. Despite tactical or operational shifts in either
direction, I believe our strategy remains the correct one. This is a
whole-of-government strategy and, at times, may require an adjustment
to the military campaign to allow the non-military aspects of the
strategy the time and space required to succeed.
Question. What is your assessment of the coalition air campaign in
Iraq and Syria and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the
air campaign, if you are confirmed?
Answer. ISIL's critical enablers are its ability to move rapidly
through ungoverned regions and their ability to generate revenue, both
of which are degraded and disrupted by the Coalition air campaign. The
air campaign also creates time and space for local ground forces to
develop their capability as legitimate security forces. Anti-ISIL
forces' successes, including the recapture of Tal Abyad, were enabled
by Coalition strikes.
The legitimacy of the Coalition and the success of the air strikes
are also dependent on our commitment to minimize collateral damage. I
support tactical patience and commander's decisions to withhold
munitions in situations where strike effects could be detrimental to
local forces or civilian populations. We should continue to avoid the
trap of pursuing short-term tactical gains over the long-term strategic
effects of losing the support of our partners in both Syria and Iraq.
Question. Does the current troop limitation of 3,100 give U.S.
commanders, in conjunction with Iraqi security forces, Kurdish
Peshmerga, tribal and local security forces, and coalition partners, in
Iraq enough capability to successfully degrade and ultimately destroy
ISIL?
Answer. Yes, I believe our current troop levels are sufficient to
advance the military lines of effort in the near term. I understand our
strategy depends on a credible ground force in Iraq, and our
commitments must align with the capability and pace of our Iraqi
partners. Iraqis must own this fight, and we may require adjustments in
our troop commitments to continue to enable their forces over the long
term.
Question. What do you see as the principle role or roles of the
Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq?
Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation is the Departments
primary interlocutor for traditional security assistance and
cooperation in support of the U.S. Embassy. OSC-I supports the
development of military programs to improve the professionalization of
the Iraqi Security Forces in concert with providing warfighting
capability through the Foreign Military Sales program.
Question. What is your assessment of the success of the current
strategy against ISIL?
Answer. We are seeing some successes, but we need to take a long
view and understand that there will be both successes and failures
early in the campaign. In both Iraq and Syria, ISIL's ability to
conduct massed offensive operations is degraded, its leadership cells
are pressured, and its command-and-control and supply lines are being
severed. We have reduced ISIL's oil production, processing and
transportation infrastructure. We continue to work the military lines
effort with our coalition partners and in conjunction with all lines of
effort in the strategy.
Question. Do you assess that the training and equipping of Syrian
opposition fighters by the United States and coalition partners under
section 1209 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA will produce enough fighters
to make a strategic difference on the battlefield in Syria?
Answer. From my understanding, it's too early to tell. The number
of Syrians who are currently volunteering to participate in the Syria
Train and Equip program is growing. The current number of trainees is
small but are properly vetted and have objectives that match our own.
Larger numbers of unknown or unqualified trainees would not necessarily
be better and might work counter to our interests. It will take time to
establish a credible partner on the ground in Syria and we are
continuously making adjustments based on our lessons learned as we
progress.
Question. In your view, what military support, if any, should the
Syrian opposition fighters who receive support under section 1209 of
the FY2015 NDAA need from the United States and coalition partners when
they return to Syria?
Answer. The U. S. is committed to their success. We will be
providing basic equipment such as military gear, mobility capabilities
such as trucks and vehicles, and small arms and ammunition. If
confirmed, I will examine the full range of support that we can provide
our T&E forces as the program progresses.
Question. What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-
combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and
post-combat operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. I think an important lesson we can take from our Iraq and
Afghanistan experiences is that withdrawal decisions must be
conditions-based. I also think we have learned that a military solution
alone does not guarantee success. Governance and economic development
are required to sustain military and security gains. When security
threats are fueled by underlying political or sectarian problems U.S.
troops can only address the effects, not the cause.
afghanistan campaign
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the Resolute
Support mission in Afghanistan?
Answer. Overall, the Afghanistan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF) continue to grow their tactical proficiency. However,
the lack of a Minister of Defense has had a negative impact on the
Resolute Support mission. Critical gaps still remain in aviation,
intelligence, and special operations, all impacting the ANDSF's
targeting capability. These gaps will remain for some time, even with
the addition of key enablers. RS advisors continue to address
developmental shortfalls in the areas of logistics, medical support,
and counter-IED exploitation.
Question. In May of 2014 President Obama said `` . . . by the end
of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in
Kabul . . . ''
What is your understanding of what military forces comprise a
``normal embassy presence''?
Answer. A normal embassy presence will have a counter-terrorism and
security component consisting of a Defense Attache Office and a
Security Cooperation Office under a Senior Defense Official with a
military reporting chain through CENTCOM. CENTCOM is still planning for
the Security Cooperation Office-Afghanistan. Its size will depend upon
factors such as security force assistance objectives, ANDSF
capabilities, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)
requests, and force protection concerns.
Question. What lessons should we learn from the experience the
drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq as applied to the drawdown of U.S. and
international troops in Afghanistan?
Answer. The transfer of security cooperation activities should be
deliberate and measured.
``Time'' allows for the ownership of the tactical fight to be
transferred from coalition forces to the ANDSF; allowing the coalition
to focus on issues, critical to the long term viability of the force.
The ANDSF continues to prove that they are capable of executing the
tactical fight; however, sustainment and institutional development are
critical to their long term success.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. Not at this time, but if confirmed I will continually
assess and offer recommendations as that strategy unfolds.
Question. What is the effect of ISIL operations in Afghanistan and/
or coordination with the Taliban for the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan?
Answer. The coalition and the Afghan government have closely
watched ISIL's attempt to expand its reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The potential emergence of ISIL has sharply focused the ANDSF, NDS, and
Afghan political leadership, which are collaborating closely in order
to prevent this threat from expanding. We will continue to support
Afghanistan's security through our strategic partnership. It is
important to note, ISIL is a competitor with other groups in
Afghanistan, which may lead to increased violence between extremist
groups.
Question. If security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan
degrade in 2016, would you recommend to the President revisions to the
size and pace of the drawdown plan in order to adequately address those
security conditions?
Answer. We must be willing to reevaluate assumptions of previous
recommendations and assess the conditions on the ground as the drawdown
takes place. If confirmed, I will collaborate with CENTCOM to assess
conditions on the ground and will modify my input to the Chairman's
recommendations to the President accordingly.
Question. Should the authorities granted to the commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan take into account the security conditions on the
ground faced by U.S. troops?
Answer. Yes. Protecting the force is an inherent responsibility of
command.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF)
and what recommendations would you make to address challenges to
building ANSF capacity, if confirmed?
Answer. Based on my interaction with the Joint Staff subject matter
experts, it is my understanding that the ANDSF are tactically capable,
but continue to be challenged at the Corps and Ministerial levels. We
assess the ANDSF's capabilities, capacities, and morale will be
sufficient to set the conditions for Afghan-led and Afghan-owned
reconciliation talks. The ANDSF still need assistance with enablers and
related systems and processes necessary to run a modern, professional
army and police force. In particular, they need sustained support for
capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, sustainment, and special
operations. To address these gaps, our advisory mission and mentorship
at the security ministries and at the corps and police zone level
remain vital.
Question. Do you support plans for building and sustaining the ANSF
at 352,000 personnel and, if so, what factors influence your
recommendation about the proper size of the ANSF?
Answer. Yes, at least for the near term. Although we've made
important gains, GIRoA and the ANDSF will continue to face threats from
external regional actors and internal threats from a resilient
insurgency. The current ANDSF Plan of Record supports the need for
352,000 ANDSF along with 30,000 ALP at least through 2018. Evaluating
the security situation (and prior assumptions) is continual and drives
my recommendations on ANDSF size. Committed contributions from partners
are also important. Afghan and NATO goals remain generally congruent
regarding the denial of terrorist safe havens.
reconciliation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and
other insurgent groups?
Answer. The United States supports an Afghan-led political process
to determine the future of their country. Our relationship with
Pakistan as a key stakeholder in the region can also have a positive
impact. As part of the outcome of any process, the Taliban and other
armed Afghan opposition groups must end violence, break any
associations with international terrorism, and accept Afghanistan's
constitution, including its protections for women and minorities.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
take to advance the reconciliation process?
Answer. We remain strongly supportive of an Afghan-led and Afghan-
owned reconciliation process where the Taliban and the Afghans engage
in direct talks to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. In President
Ghani's inauguration address, he called on the Taliban to enter
political talks, and has made reconciliation central to his foreign
policy. We can also continue to encourage stronger ties between
Afghanistan and Pakistan--and have been pleased with their recent
efforts to address their shared security concerns.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in the reconciliation process?
Answer. Regional partners have an important role to play in
enabling a stable, democratic Afghanistan, and our relationship with
Pakistan as a key stakeholder in the region can have a positive impact.
We continue to encourage all regional partners to support President
Ghani's reconciliation efforts. We are in close communication with
President Ghani on these matters and we remain committed to supporting
his efforts toward peace.
u.s. strategic relationship with pakistan
Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
with regard to Pakistan?
Answer. Our strategic interests and national security goals remain
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda (and other potential
transnational insurgent threats) and to prevent the return of safe
havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also have an interest in a
stable Pakistan and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and
technology.
Question. What would you consider to be areas of shared strategic
interest between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. The U.S. and Pakistan share the common goals of eliminating
Al Qaeda (and other potential transnational insurgent threats),
promoting regional stability and the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons and technology.
Question. In what areas do you see U.S. and Pakistani strategic
interests diverging?
Answer. We diverge from Pakistan in their policy on leveraging non-
state, extremist proxies to attain their national security objectives
and in their perception of Indian intentions in the region. Our
bilateral interests with Pakistan can also be made more complex by
Pakistan's deepening ties with China.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
military relations?
Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is important to our vital
national security interests in the region and will remain so for the
foreseeable future. We will need to continue cooperating with Pakistan
on defeating transnational insurgent threats, supporting Pakistan
stability, and reaching a lasting peace in Afghanistan. We should
continue mil-to-mil cooperation to improve on ways we can assist
enhanced border security and stability, consistent with Leahy
considerations.
u.s. assistance to pakistan
Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
military assistance to Pakistan. In addition, the United States has
provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
As U.S. troop presence draws down in Afghanistan, what
recommendations, if any, would you have regarding the reduction or
cessation of Coalition Support Funds that currently reimburse Pakistan
for military support in connection with U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan?
Answer. It is in our best interest to have a long term strategic
partnership with Pakistan. Coalition Support Funds are a mechanism to
advance our security interests with and through Pakistan, however the
funding needs to be tied to a broader set of expectations and outcomes,
not just ongoing border operations in Pakistan.
Question. In your view, how effective has the assistance and other
support that the United States has provided to Pakistan been in
promoting U.S. interests?
Answer. U.S.-Pakistan mutually agreed security objectives include
improving Pakistan's capacity to counter militancy, developing a
stronger bilateral defense relationship, and fostering a better
relationship between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. In support of
these objectives, U.S. security assistance has enhanced the Pakistan
Military's ability to attack militants, terrorists groups, and other
transnational threats. U.S. assistance has bolstered Pakistani
capability while also preserving the mil-mil relationship that is a key
component of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership.
Question. Do you support conditioning U.S. assistance and other
support to Pakistan on Pakistan's continued cooperation in areas of
mutual security interest?
Answer. Yes. It is important that we maintain a strategic
relationship with Pakistan, not a ``transactional'' one, as we
condition our assistance.
Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. There is some potential for a more constructive ``new
normal'' going forward. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have
improved since the election of President Ghani in Afghanistan. Although
gradual, the two sides continue to work to improve border coordination
and establish standards for information sharing, communication, and
complementary operations near the border.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's cooperation with
the United States in counterterrorism operations against militant
extremist groups located in Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan's cooperation on counterterrorism has not always
met our expectations, particularly their policy of leveraging proxies
to advance national security objectives. Since 2009, Pakistan has
undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations
in the northwest, namely the Swat, North and South Waziristan, Mohmand,
and Bajaur with mixed results. Security assistance, Coalition Support
Funding reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and
Afghan forces have helped enable these operations. It is in our
interest that Pakistan continues this campaign as effectively and
comprehensively as possible.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to maintain
transit and provide security along the ground lines of communication
(GLOCs) through Pakistan?
Answer. We have received support from Pakistan in the use of their
GLOCs. Currently we rely on multiple GLOCs, including Pakistan's to
support our operations in Afghanistan. We do not anticipate any GLOC
problems in the foreseeable future.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to counter
the threat improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack
the network, go after known precursors and explosive materials?
Answer. Pakistan suffers significant casualties as a result of IED
attacks. They are taking concrete steps to disrupt the networks,
placing new restrictions on the distribution of precursor materials and
providing Regional Leadership on the issue. We continue to encourage
and pressure them to do more.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the military and political
threat posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran's authoritarian regime poses both a regional and
global security threat. The world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism
seeks to export its revolutionary ideology in the Middle East through a
large conventional army; terrorist proxies; weapons trafficking;
ballistic missile proliferation; and maritime weapons and threats to
the Strait of Hormuz. Through its emergent nuclear and established
cyber programs, Iran can threaten and undermine the international
institutions and conventions that underpin global security. The Supreme
Leader will continue to take advantage of opportunities to enable
Iran's domestic, hardline political factions' malign policies that
value regime survival over international integration.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat of Iran's influence
in Iraq to U.S. interests?
Answer. Iran's ambitions in Iraq are not to help create a
sovereign, functional government. Iran wants to influence Iraq through
the lens of a Shia-dominated buffer state. Currently, Iran is using its
influence vis-`-vis Shia militias to offset ISIL behavior. This comes
with the risk that one day these militias could possibly threaten Iraqi
or U.S. forces. In the future, expect Iran to utilize its political and
military instruments of power to control Iraq along sectarian lines.
Question. In your view, what are the risks, if any, associated with
reducing U. S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. Real or perceived U.S. disengagement from the Middle East
could create opportunity for Iran to increase its support to terrorist
organizations. Right-sized U.S. military presence in the Middle East
demonstrates not only a commitment to the region, but a commitment to
our regional security partners. As a result, a continued U.S. military
presence in the region will further deter Iran from conducting
nefarious activities such as blocking the Strait of Hormuz or
threatening other Gulf States. Finally, a continued U.S. military
presence in the region is the single most important indicator of our
overall commitment to a secure, peaceful and prosperous Middle East.
Question. Negotiations on the Iran nuclear program have been
extended with a deadline now of July 7, 2015 to finalize a
comprehensive agreement.
What are the elements of a nuclear agreement with Iran that you
consider critical to ensuring that it is a ``good'' deal for U.S.
national security interests?
Answer. From a security standpoint, important outcomes include
rolling back Iran's nuclear program providing the international
community with necessary access and transparency, while preserving the
sanctions imposed on conventional arms and ballistic missiles.
Question. If Iran is allowed to maintain a monitored and limited
uranium enrichment program, do you believe that other states in the
region may seek to develop enrichment programs of their own and why or
why not?
Answer. Saudi Arabia's and other Gulf countries' decisions on
whether or not to enrich uranium are not solely tied to a deal with
Iran; under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories are
allowed enrichment programs as part of a peaceful nuclear program.
Unlike Iran, which endures sanctions, isolation, and economic distress
due to a covert attempt intent on developing nuclear weapons, our Gulf
partners could choose to pursue nuclear energy in compliance with the
NPT. The U.S. military will continue to provide options in support of
the overall U.S. strategy.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering Iran's
support of international terrorism?
Answer. DOD's role is to support an interagency and regional effort
to deter and counter Iran's support of international terrorism. We
deter Iran by maintaining a responsive military capability in the
region and ensuring a robust defensive infrastructure for ourselves and
our allies. To counter Iran, we work by, with, and through partner
nations by conducting counter terrorism training, providing equipment
sales, participating in multi-national exercises, and sharing
information. When combined, these efforts--along with those of our
partners--help to weaken terrorist groups and hinder Iran's ability to
support them.
the 2001 authorization for use of military force
Question. What is your understanding of the scope and duration of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), including with
respect to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant?
Answer. There is an ongoing armed conflict between the United
States and Al Qaeda, including its associated forces. Al Qaeda's
associated forces are those groups that (1) are an organized armed
group that has entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda and, (2) is a co-
belligerent with Al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners. The AUMF enacted following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 remains the legal basis under U.S.
domestic law for use of military force against these threats. Since
September 2014, the Administration has applied the 2001 AUMF for the
use of military force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL, previously known as Al Qaeda in Iraq). ISIL has been subject to
the use of force under the AUMF since at least 2004, when it entered
the conflict against the United States as part of the Al Qaeda
organization. Despite internal power struggles within ISIL and other
factions of the Al Qaeda network, ISIL asserts that it is the true heir
to bin Laden's legacy of global jihad, and continues its unlawful
campaign against the United States, its citizens, and interests.
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism
operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary
and appropriate?
Answer. Yes. The 2001 AUMF provides the necessary authorities to
counter Al Qaeda and its associated forces, including ISIL. With
respect to ISIL, the 2002 AUMF provides additional statutory authority
for the current operations against ISIL both in Iraq and, to extent
necessary to achieve the purposes of that AUMF, in Syria.
islamic state in iraq and the levant (isil)
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by ISIL to
the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more
broadly?
Answer. ISIL does pose a threat to the homeland as well as to U.S
and Western interests abroad. ISIL is focused on strengthening its
self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria as well as expanding into
other areas in the Middle East and Africa. In so doing, ISIL is
integrating foreign fighters that could attempt to return to their
countries as operatives. In addition, ISIL sympathizers pose a risk
should they heed ISIL calls to conduct attacks against the U.S and the
West.
Question. How would you describe the U.S. strategy to counter ISIL?
Answer. Our strategy is a whole-of-government and regional approach
to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. Our strategy leverages capable
ground partners supported by an International Coalition. The nine lines
of effort serve as a guide to achieve this objective, and include:
supporting effective governance in Iraq, disrupting ISIL's finances,
disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, and protecting the homeland.
DOD is only primarily responsible for the military campaign to deny
ISIL safe haven and build partner capacity. Coalition kinetic strike
operations, advise/assist operations, training/equipping efforts, and
posture in the region combine to achieve these lines of efforts. The
military campaign provides time and space for progress in the other
lines of effort, particularly inclusive governance.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of that
strategy in achieving its objectives?
Answer. We are seeing limited but steady success, and we need to be
patient as there will be both successes and failures throughout the
campaign. In both Iraq and Syria, ISIL's ability to conduct massed-
offensive operations is degraded, its leadership cells are pressured,
and its command-and-control and supply lines are being severed. We have
degraded ISIL's oil producing, processing and transportation
infrastructure. We continue to work with our coalition partners along
several lines of effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We must
also be wary of ISIL's destabilizing potential outside of Iraq and
Syria and leverage our regional partnerships accordingly.
Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to
implementing the strategy to counter ISIL?
Answer. Conflicting interests on the ground and rampant
sectarianism combined with poor governance and disenfranchised
populations are the greatest challenges to defeating ISIL. Only through
governments that foster inclusive and legitimate governance, as well as
through robust commitments from regional and international
stakeholders, will the strategy be successful.
Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend be made
to the strategy to counter ISIL, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Chairman's assessment of
the military lines of effort to ensure that they are providing the time
and space necessary for the non-military lines of effort to succeed. I
also will work to identify additional opportunities to bolster our
ongoing efforts to train and equip security forces operating in Iraq
and Syria, and recommend adjustments to increase their effectiveness if
necessary. Finally, I would look for opportunities to combat ISILs
trans-regional reach and influence to complement the efforts in Iraq
and Syria. Continued assessment and refinement are paramount to any
strategy and its implementation.
al qaeda
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
and its affiliates to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and
Western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
Answer. Despite ongoing counterterrorism (CT) pressure and
competition from ISIL, Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to threaten
the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more
broadly. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the affiliate
of most concern.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?
Answer. The 2015 National Security Strategy states ``the U.S. has
no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. Yet, our
obligations do not end at our borders.'' The continued presence of AQAP
in Yemen and the emergence of ISIL present threats to our homeland and
to the American people. We act in Yemen in the interest of our
security.
Question. What is your assessment of current U.S. strategy in
Yemen?
Answer. I believe the U.S. should continue its policy of support to
the Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG) in combatting terrorism and
addressing instability within its borders. The U.S. requires a stable
and reliable partner in order to accomplish its counterterrorism
objective of countering AQAP and violent extremist organizations. We
seek stability in Yemen through: 1) political transition, namely
National Dialogue, Constitutional reform, and Elections; 2) continued
economic and humanitarian assistance; and 3) security reform,
specifically counterterrorism capacity building, border security, and
critical infrastructure protection.
Question. What are the implications of recent events in Yemen for
U.S. counterterrorism policy both in Yemen and globally?
Answer. I believe the current conflict in Yemen has hampered some
CT operations, but the U.S. still maintains a capability, albeit
diminished, to counter AQAP. AQAP remains an immediate threat to Yemen,
the region, and the United States. When the political and security
situation allows, I believe we should resume our previous partner-based
DOD counterterrorism activities with the Yemeni government.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness and
capability of coalition operations led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen?
Answer. Saudi-led Coalition operations can be sustained at least in
the near term. Airstrikes are slowing Huthi expansion in Yemen, but
have not prevented Huthi attacks along the Saudi border nor forced the
Huthis to withdraw from cities they captured earlier this year.
somalia and al shabab
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab?
Answer. Al-Shabaab poses a threat to countries providing forces to
AMISOM such as Kenya. The group also targets Somali government
facilities and Western targets in and around Mogadishu.
Question. In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. Al-Shabaab does not currently directly threaten the U.S.
Homeland or Europe. The group continues to pose a threat to U.S.,
Western, and allied interests in East Africa, to include Somalia and
Kenya.
Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy
in Somalia and the role of DOD in that strategy?
Answer. The U.S. strategy on Somalia was implemented in May 2014.
It has two major security components: (1) Supporting the African Union
Mission in Somalia to stabilize security in the short term, and (2)
Expanding support for the creation and training of the Somali National
Army, which will provide long term stability and security. DOD
contributes significant assets towards the U.S. strategy's success.
Question. What role should DOD play in building the capacity of the
Somali national military forces?
Answer. The Department of State has been leading efforts to create
Somali security services that are loyal to the federal government and
representative of the ethnic and clan diversity in Somalia. I believe
DOD should continue to support that effort through building partner
capacity, logistics, and encouraging joint operations with the African
Union Mission in Somalia.
al qaeda in the islamic maghreb (aqim)
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
affiliated groups continue to target local and regional government and
Western interests. The group poses a threat to the Malian government
and military targets, and Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in
Mali (MINUSMA) forces and facilities, and U.S. and Western persons in
Niger and Mali, who are vulnerable to kidnapping for ransom.
Question. In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United
States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational
area?
Answer. AQIM does not pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.
The group currently does not view conducting attacks outside North
Africa and the Sahel as a priority.
Question. What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out
actions threatening U.S. interests?
Answer. AQIM is able to threaten U.S. and Western interests within
North and West Africa, where it has conducted or attempted attacks in
several countries to include Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Mauritania. AQIM
will likely strengthen its ties to other Al Qaeda-associated terrorist
groups in the region to influence and support attack planning.
Question. In your view, what has been the impact of the recent
expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's
capacities and aims?
Answer. AQIM has increased freedom of movement throughout the
region and implemented its own brand of sharia in the breakaway
northern territories in Mali. AQIM uses small-scale improvised
explosive device (IED), indirect fire (IDF), and mortar attacks to
further conduct attacks in northern Mali to expel Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
libya
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Libya?
Answer. Libya currently has two governments competing for control,
and their aligned militias are struggling to establish dominance of the
country. However, at this point neither government is capable of
providing domestic security or addressing transnational threats, such
as terrorism or the ongoing migration crisis.
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. strategy with
regards to Libya and the role of DOD in that strategy?
Answer. I believe the U.S. maintains a national interest in
stabilizing Libya and impeding extremists from using it as a refuge.
The U.S. and our allies support the United Nations-led efforts to help
the opposing Libyan groups reach a political resolution by establishing
a national unity government. The role of DOD in the U.S. strategy is to
use military relationships with regional partners to increase support
for a political solution. Should diplomatic efforts to form a unity
government succeed, I believe the U.S. should be prepared to revisit
security assistance programs for legitimate Libyan security services.
Question. How would you assess its effectiveness in achieving its
objectives?
Answer. Libya's political landscape is fragmented and the country
is embroiled in a civil war. UN-led negotiations have yet to yield
lasting results. I believe the DOD's role in a political solution is
necessary, but alone it is not enough to drive resolution.
Question. What do you assess to be the greatest impediments to
implementing the strategy and protecting U.S. interests in Libya?
Answer. I believe the greatest obstruction is the severe division
of Libya's political and security landscape, which has seriously
complicated negotiations. Libya has degenerated into a complex mix of
competing political factions, tribes, militias and other armed groups
which are intermixed with local and foreign extremists. These
influences continue to make protecting U.S. interests in Libya
difficult.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to the U.S. and our
allies from terrorist groups, including ISIL, in Libya.
Answer. Extremists and terrorists from Al Qaeda -affiliated and
allied groups are using Libya's permissive security environment as a
safe haven to plot attacks, including against Western interests in
Libya and the region. ISIL considers Libya a key part of its caliphate
and ISIL-aligned extremists are trying to institute sharia law in parts
of the country.
north africa
Question. In recent years, there has been a growth of terrorist
networks, capabilities, operations, and safe havens throughout North
and East Africa, including groups that have the intention to target
U.S. and Western interests. In the face of growing instability and
threats, the U.S. counterterrorism effort in the region has been
described as an ``economy of force'' effort.
Do you agree with that characterization of the situation in North
and East Africa and the U.S. counterterrorism efforts to combat the
related threats?
Answer. Diverse and active terrorist networks in North and East
Africa (as well as West Africa) are seeking to influence local
resources and territory. Some have, at times, also demonstrated a
willingness to target U.S. and Western interests. These groups threaten
the stability of our regional partners and safety of local civilians.
AFRICOM, in partnership with host nations and interagency partners, is
working to identify, prioritize, and target these networks.
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.
counterterrorism strategy in the region? In your view, is the U.S.
military allocating adequate resources to effectively address the
terrorism threat in the region?
Answer. I believe the U.S. military is allocating adequate
resources based on the level of threat and the potential for
collaboration with capable partner nations. If confirmed, I will
continuously evaluate the adequacy of our strategy and allocation of
resources, especially following changes in local threat levels and when
new opportunities for potential collaboration with our partners arise.
Question. General Rodriguez noted in his March 2014 testimony that
``North Africa is a significant source of foreign fighters in the
current conflict in Syria.'' What is your understanding of the foreign
fighter flow from North Africa to the conflict in Syria and Iraq?
Answer. The largest portion of foreign fighters entering Iraq and
Syria come from North Africa, specifically Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and
Algeria. Many of the fighters however are now choosing to stay in North
Africa and join the ISIL affiliate in Libya instead.
Question. In your view, is it likely that many of these fighters
will eventually return home from Syria and Iraq to North Africa and
continue their fight against regional governments?
Answer. Yes, many Northern African foreign fighters will likely
return home to conduct attacks in their home countries. We do not know
if these fighters are being tasked by ISIL to attack Western of U.S.
interests or whether, having been radicalized by ISIL are acting on
their own accord.
russia
Question. Crimea was formally annexed when President Putin signed a
bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014,
and Russia continues to fuel instability in eastern Ukraine despite
signing ceasefire agreements in September 2014 and February 2015.
How effective do you assess the sanctions of the U.S. and the
European Union have been in deterring additional aggression by Russia?
Answer. I believe sanctions by themselves are unlikely to deter
future Russian aggression. Deterring combined Russian-separatists
actions against Ukraine requires a whole of government approach in
concert with Europe and NATO. Nevertheless, it's my understanding that
U.S. and EU sanctions have impacted Russia's economy and I believe they
send a clear signal to Moscow that aggression against Ukraine's
sovereignty and territorial integrity entails costs. With the EU's
recent decision to extend sanctions for an additional six months, the
United States and EU have made clear that sanctions will not be lifted
until Minsk is fully implemented. I believe these actions have
contributed to deterrence.
Question. What other specific U.S. actions helped to deter
additional Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. Congressional support for the European Reassurance
Initiative has enabled DOD, via Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR), to
conduct military exercises and training on land, in the air and at sea,
while sustaining a rotational presence across Europe; and increase the
responsiveness of U.S. forces to reinforce NATO by exploring
initiatives such as prepositioning of equipment and enhancing reception
facilities in Europe. Our bilateral efforts as well as our continued
support of NATO adaptation measures all support the goal of deterring
additional Russian aggression.
Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most
effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the effectiveness
of our current measures and I will remain alert to potential
adjustments. Of key concern to me is wisely channeling U.S. military
efforts and resources to ensure our allies and partners are militarily
capable and interoperable.
Question. Are you concerned that Moldova and Georgia may be at a
heightened state of vulnerability given Russian willingness to take
aggressive action in Ukraine?
Answer. Yes. Russia has demonstrated both in Georgia in 2008 and
Ukraine today its willingness to use force and exploit the
vulnerabilities of these fragile democracies to achieve its strategic
objectives. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine all contain Russian occupied
separatist regions that Russia could potentially exploit for its own
purposes.
Question. Russian tactics in eastern Ukraine have been called
``hybrid'' and combine hard power with soft power, including elements
such as lethal security assistance to separatists, the use of special
operations forces, extensive information operations, withholding energy
supplies and economic pressure.
If confirmed, what steps would you recommend as part of a strategy
to counter this ``hybrid'' approach?
Answer. I believe we must continue to take actions which deter
Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and
most importantly help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion
over the long term. I will continue to emphasize training activities,
rotational presence, and capacity-building to make our partners more
resilient against asymmetric threats and demonstrate U.S. resolve.
Question. In light of Russia's actions in 2014, what do you believe
are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations?
Answer. Although we disagree with Russia's recent conduct against
its neighbors and will continue with our efforts to deter future
actions, I will leave open the possibility for collaboration with
Russia in areas of mutual national security interests. If confirmed, I
will also keep lines of communication with my Russian counterpart open
as a means for crisis management.
nato alliance
Question. The reemergence of an aggressive Russia has resulted in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) developing the Readiness
Action Plan that NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg called ``the biggest reinforcement of our
collective defense since the end of the Cold War.'' NATO also continues
to be central to our coalition operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere,
even as many NATO members have significantly reduced their national
defense budgets in response to economic and fiscal pressures.
How important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national security
interests?
Answer. The Alliance is critical to our national security
interests. This involves both Article 5 and other non-Article 5 related
NATO operations. NATO maintains a persistent air, land, and maritime
presence in and around the territories of our European allies,
committed to defend its territory against any aggression. But it
efforts extend beyond Article 5 with military operations supporting
stability in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean Sea, and off the
Horn of Africa. NATO is also assisting nations in North Africa and the
Middle East to develop local capabilities to counter growing
instability and transnational threats to prevent those threats from
spreading to Europe.
Question. In light of the Russian Federation's aggression against
Ukraine, what do you see as the major strategic objectives of the NATO
Alliance in the coming years and what are the greatest challenges in
meeting those objectives?
Answer. As a result of Russia's aggressive actions, NATO has
refocused its attention on the Alliance's Article 5 responsibilities to
protect and defend its territory and populations against attack.
Concurrently, NATO must also continue to perform its other ``core
tasks'' of crisis management and cooperative security. Among the
challenges to achieving these objectives are: first, declining national
defense budgets that result in capability shortfalls; and second, the
required adaptation of NATO's institutional processes to the changing
European security environment.
Question. What do you see as the proper role, if any, for NATO in
addressing the threat posed by ISIL and in addressing the problem of
illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea?
Answer. Due to its long-standing partnerships and experience with
Defense Capacity Building missions, NATO has the potential to play a
role in addressing both issues. Within Iraq, NATO could provide expert
advice and capacity-building support to the Government of Iraq in areas
such as security sector reform and the development of a national
security strategy. To address illegal immigration across the
Mediterranean Sea, NATO could potentially support efforts of the
Mediterranean Allied nations and the European Union by sharing
information gathered through its maritime operations in the
Mediterranean Sea.
Question. The concept of defense cooperation among NATO members was
emphasized at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012.
What areas or projects would you recommend, if confirmed, that NATO
nations cooperate in to improve NATO alliance capabilities?
Answer. Cooperation among Allies on developing capabilities
provides a cost effective approach to addressing global challenges. If
confirmed, I would urge Allies to increase their defense investments in
both national and multinational projects and areas that address
Alliance capability needs, such as developing command and control and
joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and maintaining and
improving readiness and interoperability. In support of that objective,
I would also encourage Allies to honor their recent Summit pledge to
achieve the two percent defense spending target.
Question. Turkey continues to be a gateway for foreign fighters
proceeding to and from Syria and Iraq.
What steps would you recommend to encourage Turkey to continue to
address the threat posed by foreign fighters proceeding to and
returning from Syria and Iraq?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's
contributions to interagency support of Turkish efforts to enhance
border security, to include strengthening critical information sharing
with the Turkish military. Moreover, I would support international
efforts to help source countries identify and disrupt foreign fighter
transit to Turkey.
Question. At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, NATO leaders
declared their ``aim to move towards the 2 percent guideline [of GDP
for defense spending] within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO
Capability Targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.''
In your view, what impact have national defense budget cuts had on
the capabilities of the NATO alliance, and what do you believe needs to
be done to address any capability shortfalls?
Answer. There is a direct correlation between national defense
budget cuts and increased Alliance capability shortfalls, such as in
joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. To arrest this
negative trend, Allies need to be held to the Defense Investment Pledge
they agreed to at the Wales Summit. If confirmed, I will work with
Allies on defense planning to ensure they maintain or develop the
specific capabilities that the Alliance is lacking.
Question. What are the greatest military capability shortfalls that
you see in the NATO alliance?
Answer. The most significant shortfalls are in so-called enabling
capabilities such as joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, air to air refueling and strategic lift. These limited
capabilities are the ones that the Alliance places heavy reliance on
the United States to provide. If confirmed, I would encourage Allies to
invest in developing these capabilities through national and
multinational efforts.
Question. In light of the reductions in national defense spending
by some NATO members, are you concerned that the Alliance will lack
critical military capabilities? If so, what steps, if any, would you
recommend be taken to address potential shortfalls in Alliance
capabilities?
Answer. I am concerned about continued reductions in defense
investment by our Allies because Alliance capability shortfalls will
increase as national defense spending decreases, thus requiring a
greater reliance on U.S. capabilities. The most effective step to
counter these potential capability shortfalls is to arrest the decline
in national defense investment and move to meet the Defense Investment
Pledge that was agreed upon at the NATO Summit in Wales.
Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
five years?
Answer. NATO's evolving security environment, highlighted by the
events witnessed in both the Middle East and Europe, has made it
necessary for NATO to adapt its political, military and institutional
processes and focus. Our President and other NATO leaders have
committed to this adaptation that will make NATO more responsive and
ready to face future challenges. This commitment to adaptation provides
the greatest opportunity for NATO; gaining the consensus to do this in
a focused, proactive manner will be the greatest challenge.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. The 2010 Strategic Concept for the Alliance states NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Allies reaffirmed this stance with both the 2012 NATO Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review and the 2014 Wales Summit. I support NATO
maintaining the full range of capabilities necessary to ensure Alliance
security, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and
missile defense capabilities.
u.s. force posture in europe
Question. The Department of Defense continues to review its force
posture in Europe to determine what additional consolidations and
reductions are necessary and consistent with U.S. strategic interests.
How would you define the U.S. strategic interests in the European
area of responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. Europe is the home of most of our willing and capable
Allies and partners. Our immediate security interests include helping
Europe defend against potential security threats from Russia and
violent extremists from the south as well as continued strategic
interest in reassuring our Allies and partners of the United States'
unquestionable commitment to NATO.
Question. Do you believe that additional consolidation and
reductions of U.S. forces in Europe are consistent with U.S. strategic
interests in that AOR given the increase in Russian aggression in the
last 15 months?
Answer. Yes. Regarding facilities, we are maintaining a strong
commitment to security and stability in Europe as the Department gains
efficiencies through the Secretary's directed European Infrastructure
Consolidation. Regarding forces, our focus on rotational presence is
consistent with our strategic interests and existing resource
constraints. However, the credibility and effectiveness of our response
to Russian aggression in the East depend not only on the operational
scale and geographic scope of our operations, but also on their
persistence and longevity. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the
persistent, appropriate level of rotational presence is retained in
Europe to effectively deter Russian aggression.
u.s. force posture in the asia-pacific region
Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense
Guidance.
Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?
Answer. Yes. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as announced
by the President, incorporated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance,
and reinforced by the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, has resulted in
a significant rebalancing of U.S. force structure and capabilities to
this region, commensurate with its vital importance to U.S. security
interests and global peace and prosperity. As we look ahead, we will
continue to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region for positioning our most
advanced capabilities that are critical for the future operational
environment. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ongoing
efforts to increase the Department's presence in the region and invest
in and deploy critical advanced capabilities.
Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what specific
capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities?
Answer. First and foremost, we must work tirelessly to protect
security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which is vital to
the prosperity of all Pacific nations. The U.S. faces a range of
challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including provocations by the
DPRK and the growth of its ballistic missile programs, the emergence of
new technologies intended to prevent open access to the air and
maritime domain, widespread natural disasters and transnational
threats, and territorial disputes.
To address these challenges, I believe the Department must continue
to modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships, which provide a critical
role in underwriting regional security. The Department should also
continue to strengthen our ability to deter threats to the U.S.
homeland and our allies and citizens overseas, enhance U.S. force
posture and capabilities in the region, specifically in terms of
intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and missile
defense, work with China to encourage greater transparency about how it
will use its growing military capabilities; and encourage the peaceful
resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international
law.
Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated
with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to
the Pacific?
Answer. Yes. As stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the
United States has prioritized its ability to maintain peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region through presence and power
projection. The Department remains committed to the rebalance despite
the challenges of fiscal uncertainty and ongoing operations in the
Middle East. U.S. long-term economic and security interests are
inextricably linked to developments in the Asia-Pacific region, and the
Department will continue to prioritize investments in those
capabilities most relevant to the region.
Question. As the United States realigns its forces in the Asia-
Pacific Theater, do you believe we have the air and maritime lift
required to support the distribution of Marines across North and
Southeast Asia?
Answer. I believe we will need more lift in certain contingencies,
but we have enough capacity for a range of scenarios. That said, it is
critical for the U.S. military to evolve its forward presence in the
Asia-Pacific region to respond to the changing strategic environment.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services and U.S.
Pacific Command to address this challenge.
kosovo
Question. Approximately 700 U.S. troops remain in the Balkans as
part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that first deployed to Kosovo in 1999
and today is comprised of over 4,600 personnel from 30 countries.
Spikes in violence in 2011 required the deployment of the NATO
operational Reserve Force battalion of approximately 600 soldiers to
bolster KFOR and maintain a secure environment. Progress is required in
both the military and political realms before further troop reductions
can be made.
What major lines of effort do you think are required to further
reduce or eliminate U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo?
Answer. Continuation of the EU's implementation of the 2013
Brussels Accord between Serbia and Kosovo is a fundamental line of
effort, necessary to stabilizing the Western Balkans and setting the
conditions for improved security and follow-on troop reductions.
Question. In your view, can the European Union play a more
significant role in Kosovo?
Answer. The EU already plays a significant role in fostering
improved security and stability in Kosovo through its European Union
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX-Kosovo). EULEX is part of the EU's
broader effort to promote peace and stability in the Western Balkans
and supports Kosovo, as they adopt and implement necessary reforms on
its path toward a greater European integration.
security situation on the korean peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula and of the threat posed to the United States
and its allies by the current state of North Korea's ballistic missile
and nuclear weapons capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities present a serious and direct threat to
U.S. forces postured in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to our
regional allies and partners. These capabilities could eventually pose
a direct threat to United States territory. Moreover, North Korea's
history of proliferation amplifies the dangers of its asymmetric
programs. If confirmed, I will ensure that the U.S.-ROK Alliance
continues to strengthen alliance capabilities to counter North Korea's
increasing missile and nuclear threat. I will also ensure that we draw
upon the full range of our capabilities to protect against and respond
to North Korean ballistic missile and WMD threats.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen our
strong defense posture against North Korea. This includes supporting
our current efforts to increase the number of ground-based interceptors
in California and Alaska, enhancing the Department's ability to
highlight and disrupt the illicit proliferation networks that North
Korea uses, and promoting cooperation with partners to interdict
vessels and aircraft suspected of transporting items of proliferation
concern.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of transfer of
wartime operational control from the U.S. to the ROK?
Answer. At the 2013 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, then-
Secretary of Defense Hagel and ROK Minister of Defense Han decided that
in light of the evolving security environment in the region, we will
implement the ROK-proposed, conditions-based approach to the transition
of wartime OPCON. The ROK will take wartime OPCON when critical ROK and
alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment
in the region is conducive to a stable wartime OPCON transition.
china assertiveness
Question. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and
maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China
Sea, affected security and stability in the region?
Answer. China's actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific
region, and subtly undermine the regional order that has sustained 70
years of security and prosperity in the Asia Pacific. For example, its
claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with
international law. The international community continues to call on
China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China
has responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts on a pace and
scale far surpassing other claimants that will allow it to position
military forces astride vital international sea lanes.
Through a persistent military and law enforcement presence and the
announcement in November 2013 of a new Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea, China continues to engage in actions
that appear designed to challenge Japan's administration of the Senkaku
Islands.
china mil-mil
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-
China military relationship and your views regarding China's interest
in and commitment to improving military relations with the United
States?
Answer. Regarding our military-to-military (mil-mil) relations with
China, it is profoundly in our shared interests that we find ways to
increase cooperation where our interests overlap and to manage our
differences where we disagree. In recent years, the Department's
sustained and substantive dialogue with the Chinese People's Liberation
Army (PLA) has enabled both the United States and China to reduce the
risk of misperception and miscalculation, as well as to deepen
practical cooperation in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to
military medicine. In addition to making investments that ensure our
technological advantages in all domains, the military-to-military
relationship is an important component in managing competition.
Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance
of sustained military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. At their most basic level, U.S.-China defense contacts and
exchanges provide opportunities to establish and maintain open lines of
communication that will be essential to managing a crisis or preventing
unintended escalation. The military-to-military relationship also
allows us to explore and expand cooperation in areas of mutual
interest, as well as manage security competition and other frictions in
the relationship in a way that supports overall stability. Our high-
level leadership and policy interactions have allowed us to address
with China at the strategic-level differences in areas such as nuclear
and strategic stability, operations and standards in the space, cyber
and maritime domains, and regional security issues such as Afghanistan,
North Korea, South and East China Seas, and others.
anti-access/area denial
Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the
emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries
and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the
U.S. military's freedom of movement and action in certain regions. Do
you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a
concern?
Answer. Emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities (A2AD)
are a concern. China is developing missiles and other military
technologies that are intended to limit U.S. military's freedom of
movement in the Western Pacific. Russia is developing its A2AD
capabilities, including missiles, in order to constrain U.S. and Allied
freedom of movement on its periphery. Iran maintains a layered A2AD
capability through the employment of road mobile ballistic missiles, an
integrated air defense system, anti-ship cruise missiles, and naval
assets stationed in the Persian Gulf.
Question. If so, what do you believe the U.S. armed forces need to
be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to
all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?
Answer. As the President outlined in the 2015 National Security
Strategy, the U.S. is committed to freedom of navigation and the safety
and sustainability of maritime environment. The Department will
therefore invest in critical personnel and technological advantages to
meet the President's commitment, especially to counter anti-access and
area denial capabilities of our potential enemies. Details of specific
actions and investments are more appropriate for a classified
discussion.
Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
process of transforming the U.S. armed forces' capability and capacity
to meet new and emerging threats.
Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging
threats, what are your goals regarding transformation of the U.S.
military?
Answer. My goals would include addressing emerging threats through
capability and capacity advancement across the spectrum of defense
activities. The Department is exploring new ``offset strategies''--
combinations of technologies, operational concepts, and organizational
constructs to meet these challenges which we can discuss in a
classified setting. If confirmed, I will also emphasize the development
of a new model for deterrence in the 21st Century to ensure that
emerging domains--such as cyber--are incorporated into our thinking.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
Question. Despite the ongoing drawdown in Afghanistan, demand for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of
every kind remains very high due to the enhanced situational awareness
and targeting capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of
the geographic combatant commands still have validated ISR requirements
that are not being met.
What is your assessment of the Department's current disposition of
ISR assets across the various combatant commands?
Answer. The Department has insufficient ISR assets to meet the
global demand. Meeting new requests required reallocating assets from
other Secretary of Defense-approved operations. The Department must
therefore allocate ISR assets to meet our highest priorities. To
support counter-terrorism operations, we have allocated 90 percent of
our remotely-piloted full-motion video assets to USCENTCOM in support
of our counter-terrorism operations, with the remaining sourced
primarily to USAFRICOM. We are leveraging other assets with increased
standoff ranges and enhanced defensive capabilities to support
USEUCOM's indications and warning collection requirements and to
support USPACOM's sensitive reconnaissance operations areas.
Question. As our forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, should
existing ISR assets be re-postured to support combatant command needs
in other regions, or can we afford to reduce ISR capacity?
Answer. To ensure a balance across operational, force management,
and institutional risks, the Department continually evaluates our
capabilities against evolving combatant command requirements. When
appropriate, we can reposition ISR assets to support emerging needs
across other regions. For example, within the last year, we sourced
nearly all of our current ISR for Syria and Iraq from operations in
Afghanistan. Additionally, we made the tough decision to return Air
Force MQ-1 and MQ-9 capacity to a steady-state 60 flights a day,
reducing risk to the long-term sustainability of the USAF's unmanned
pilot force.
Question. Most of the highest-value ISR assets acquired after 9/11
are aircraft that were not designed to be survivable in high-threat air
defense environments, although in some cases unmanned aerial vehicles
were designed to be deployed in large numbers in the expectation of
substantial combat attrition.
Do you believe that the Department needs a major shift towards ISR
platforms that are survivable in high-threat situations, or merely an
augmentation of the capabilities we now have, with the assumption that
air superiority can be gained rapidly enough to operate today's assets
effectively?
Answer. I believe we should invest in ISR platforms, sensors, and
communications capabilities designed to penetrate and survive in high-
threat and denied environments, across all domains. It is faulty to
assume we will rapidly gain superiority in the air or other domains in
future conflicts. We must find the right balance of ISR capabilities.
Future scenarios will require assets capable of penetrating and
surviving in high-threat and denied areas. While these capabilities are
expensive to develop and field, they are a necessary component of
balanced efforts to maintain our strategic advantage.
aircraft carrier-launched unmanned systems
Question. The Navy's current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop
an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR
mission. Given the combat radius of the planned carrier air wing, are
you concerned the carrier will lack the ability to project power at
relevant distances given emerging anti-access/area-denial threats?
Answer. Yes. That is why it is important for the Department to
continue development of concepts and capabilities that allow us to
project power when faced with an A2AD environment to maintain
competitive advantage.
special operations forces
Question. The 2006 and 2010 QDRs mandated significant growth in our
special operations forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support
their operations. The most-recent QDR released in 2014 capped this
growth at 69,500, approximately 2,500 below the originally planned
growth. In light of the growing global terrorism threat, do you believe
the currently planned end-strength for SOF is sufficient to meet global
requirements?
Answer. Any changes to end-strength, whether conventional or
special operations forces (SOF), require continual analysis to meet
current and predicted threats while informed by fiscal realities.
Question. SOF are heavily reliant on enabling support from the
general purpose force. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you
believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the
general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available
to special operations forces?
Answer. I firmly believe that we have trained general purpose
forces for these missions and we will continue to have this capability
going forward.
international peacekeeping contributions
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to
consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff
officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more
women I should note--to UN peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more
military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in
support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. The Department should focus its contributions to the UN in
areas that will help make systemic changes to increasing the
effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations. Select
placements of personnel to key positions within the UN can help
facilitate this objective.
Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
United Nations?
Answer. Over the past year we have provided multiple officers to
the UN to include the head of the UN's military planning service. The
recent administrative waiver extension provided by the UN to the U.S.
facilitates future assignments. If confirmed, I will explore methods to
be more responsive to requests for personnel support to multilateral
institutions.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. The military element of national power will always be
critical, but achieving lasting national security objectives requires
an integrated whole of government approach. We have learned a great
deal about this over the past decade and our capabilities for
interagency collaboration have progressed substantially. If confirmed,
I will work to ensure we do not lose that ability as we refocus on full
spectrum proficiency.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. If confirmed, my focus must remain on the military
instrument of power but I will ensure the Joint Staff remains
collaborative and engaged with the interagency and private sector. I
want to maximize interagency partners' integration into our training
and education programs, in order to strengthen the relationships that
are essential when facing a national security challenge.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
contingency operations?
Answer. Joint Doctrine must adapt quickly to innovation in the
dynamic environment of current operations. In turn, we must infuse
doctrine quickly into the education and joint exercise programs. We
have made great strides in this over the last decade. If confirmed, I
will ensure the Department's Joint Force Development process analyzes
lessons learned from operational practice, joint training and concept
development and moves them rapidly into Joint Doctrine for the
operational preparation and future employment of the force.
Question. Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical
level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than
on a regional basis (e.g. international terrorists departing Mali for
safe havens in Libya).
How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in
individual countries can best be coordinated in the interagency arena?
Answer. Our performance in crisis situations rests on how well we
collaborate on a routine basis. Therefore, I support a whole-of-
government planning, operations and resourcing framework to ensure our
country plans are mutually-reinforcing. The military develops Theater
Campaign Plans and Functional Campaign Plans that address regional and
trans-regional issues. We seek input from interagency partners in the
development of these plans to de-conflict and complement efforts. State
is beginning to develop Joint Regional Strategies to address regional
foreign policy priorities and drive country strategies. This new
regional perspective will improve our ability to coordinate The
Department's plans with State's plans.
responsibility to protect
Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ``responsibility
to protect'' (R2P)--that is, the responsibility of the international
community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by
encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states
build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national
authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Department of Defense names ``preventing human
suffering due to mass atrocities'' as one of a long list of potential
contingencies that DOD might be called on to address. DOD has begun to
explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering ``mass atrocity
prevention and response operations'' (MAPRO).
In your view, how high a priority should the ``responsibility to
protect'' be for the U.S. Government as a whole?
Answer. The United States does not currently view the
``responsibility to protect'' as a legal basis for the use of military
force. Without legal standing, it is not a practice to rank order by
priority. However, the Department undertook an active role and remains
prepared to act, if directed, to help prevent and respond to mass
atrocity situations.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in
fulfilling the responsibility to protect?
Answer. The use of military force is only one instrument of
national power. The role of the Department is to support our
government's decided response in any situation as part of a whole-of-
government approach. The Department should provide options and provide
the risk assessment of those options for our political leaders' use in
their decision making.
In your view, what is the proper application of R2P doctrine with
respect to the situation in Syria?
Answer. It would be a political vice military decision to use R2P
as a basis for intervention. However, the U.S. Government continues
working with its allies, partners, and with the Syrian opposition to
provide humanitarian assistance within Syria and across the region. The
United States already has provided over $4.4 billion in aid since
fiscal year 2012 to help the victims of the conflict, including
emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter. The U.S.
Government has spent over three quarters of a billion dollars in fiscal
year 2015.
operation observant compass & the lord's resistance army
Question. Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces
(UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support
them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)--including Joseph
Kony--continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian
populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational
concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are
trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of
California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical
support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and
intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations
continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations
personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations,
thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.
In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?
Answer. It is my understanding that Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS has
four main objectives:
1) Increase protection of civilians affected by the LRA
2) Promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of LRA fighters
3) Remove Joseph Kony and LRA leaders from central Africa
4) Increase humanitarian access and provide relief
With U.S. government assistance, our African partners are making
considerable progress achieving these mission objectives.
Question. Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of
support to this mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for the Department to
continue resourcing this operation at a level appropriate to the threat
the LRA poses to our national interests in the region.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National
Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as ``an
abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,'' and
stated that ``rising drug violence and corruption are undermining
stability and the rule of law in some countries'' in the Western
Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the
strategy is ``enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law
enforcement.''
What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime integrates all elements of our national power to combat
transnational organized crime and related threats to national
security--and urges our partners to do the same. Ultimately, the
strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime from a national
security threat to a manageable public safety concern in the U.S. and
in strategic regions abroad.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role
within the President's strategy?
Answer. The Department of Defense provides a valuable supporting
role to other U.S. government agencies with the lead to combat
transnational organized crime.
Question. In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support
to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters
related to transnational organized crime?
Answer. The Department provides unique capabilities to address the
national security threat of transnational criminal organizations by
supporting U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community as part
of a whole of government approach, consistent with current and recently
expanded authorities provided in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA.
Intelligence support, counter-threat finance support, building partner
capacity and detection and monitoring are specific Department
capabilities which support the interagency and partner nations.
Question. President Obama identified the prevention of mass
atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as
well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study
Directive 10.
Among interagency partners, what is DOD's role in addressing
atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or
responding to atrocities?
Answer. The Department has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting
Mass Atrocity Response Operations. Based on this doctrine, atrocity
prevention and response is now incorporated into military plans and
planning guidance. In addition, the Department has conducted a
comprehensive review of training in this area and is working to
strengthen the capacity of UN peacekeeping operations to respond to
atrocity events.
Question. Has DOD developed planning processes toward this effort
so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?
Answer. Yes, the Department has developed planning processes toward
this effort. All DOD components have been directed to integrate
atrocity prevention and response into their policies and plans.
Specific plans are further developed and implemented at the Geographic
Combatant Command level, in coordination with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
Question. In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?
Answer. The situation in Syria is truly tragic considering the
estimates of over two hundred thousand combatant and non-combatants
deaths, with over four million displaced. There is no military solution
in Syria when the violence occurs due to a brutal regime that attacks
its own citizens. There can be no peace in Syria with Asad in power,
only a negotiated political settlement will solve Syrian crisis.
counter threat finance
Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have begun
investing more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money
associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking, but the
opportunities for tracking and degrading illicit financing flows are
not yet matched by the effort and resources devoted to them.
Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation
routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production
of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant
national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting
these threats.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. The Department's policy is to work with other U.S.
government entities and partner nations to effectively deny, disrupt,
degrade, and defeat our adversaries' ability to access and utilize
financial resources. If confirmed, I will work to further integrate our
efforts with those of the interagency, intelligence community, and our
foreign and institutional partners to more effectively counter threat
finance activities and networks.
Question. Are you aware of any policy, legal authority, or resource
shortfalls that may impair U.S. counter threat finance efforts?
Answer. Lack of sufficient insight and fidelity on the sources of
corruption in partner nations can hinder our ability to achieve counter
threat network goals. Additionally, in non-terrorism cases, there are
still difficulties sharing timely and relevant information between law
enforcement and intelligence elements.
Question. In your view, how should the Department of Defense
coordinate and interface with other key agencies, including the
Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community, in conducting
counter threat finance activities?
Answer. The Department should, and currently does, augment and
support the efforts of other U.S. government entities, including the
Department of Treasury and the Intelligence Community, with its unique
capabilities to conduct counter threat finance capabilities. The result
is a well-coordinated, capable, and robust counter threat finance
posture. If confirmed, I will continue to remain fully engaged in the
interagency process to diminish adversary use of both licit and illicit
financial networks.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. Section 1208 funding is a good tool enabling the U.S.
Government to leverage our foreign partners and reduces U.S. unilateral
Direct Action operations to combat terrorism. 1208 funding allows the
U.S. to quickly advance counterterrorism objectives in areas that would
otherwise allow terrorism to go unchecked. The U.S. can build on
programs to transition into building partner capacity so that foreign
partners can deny terrorists a safe haven within their sovereign
country.
active-duty and reserve component end strength
Question. Last year DOD announced its 5-year plan to reduce active-
duty end strengths by over 100,000 servicemembers by 2017 and the
reserve components by another 21,000 over the same period. These cuts
do not include any additional personnel reductions that could result
from sequestration or any agreement to avoid sequestration.
What is your view of the role of the reserve components as the
active components draw down?
Answer. As the total force draws down, the role of the Reserve
Component will continue to be critical in meeting the requirements of
our National Military Strategy. Because much of the Total Force's
essential capabilities reside in the National Guard and Reserves, we
simply cannot meet our global commitments without them. However, I
cannot stress enough that we need both statutory authorities and a
reliable funding stream to maintain the readiness of our active duty
component and assured access to our trained and ready reserve
components. Without assured access, we cannot adequately program and
properly plan for integrating and employing this critical asset in
support of our national interests.
Question. What additional military personnel reductions do you
envision if the sequester continues?
Answer. The PB16 FYDP manning levels reflect the maximum acceptable
risk in executing our defense strategy. If sequestration continues, we
will further reduce total personnel end-strength consistent with the
2013 Strategic Choices Management Review and subsequent SASC testimony
by the Service Chiefs.
Question. In your view, what tools do DOD and the Services need to
get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these
require Congressional authorization?
Answer. I believe the Department and Services' force management
tools are flexible enough to drawn down to authorized Service end
strengths. I know of no request for increased tools or authorities at
this time.
religious guidelines
Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations
around the world where they must engage effectively with allies and
with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different
than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is not a
purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their
culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and
beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views
can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential
skill for operational effectiveness.
In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the
military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and
other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without
impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious
belief?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Defense is committed to
accommodating the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without
impinging on those who have different beliefs or no religious belief.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes. Law and policy accommodate individual expressions of
belief as long as they do not impact mission accomplishment, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion.
Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and
respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and
beliefs in a garrison environment contribute in a positive way to
preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments? Would a
policy that discourages open discussions about personal faith and
beliefs be more or less effective at preparing servicemembers to work
and operate in a pluralistic environment?
Answer. In my view, it is important to have a military climate that
welcomes and respects open and candid discussion about personal
religious faith. Expressing personal belief in a manner that is
respectful of other's views helps strengthen cohesion within a unit. At
the same time, it helps U.S. forces to develop a deeper awareness and
understanding of other perspectives, which is important in overseas
assignments. Policies that discourage open discussion would be short-
sighted in their understanding of the world in which we live.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. In 2014, there was what the Department described as an
``unprecedented 53 percent increase in victim reports of sexual
assault. In fiscal year 2014, victims made 4,660 Unrestricted Reports
and 1,840 initial Restricted Reports of sexual assault. Also in fiscal
year 2014, the Department saw the number of victims who converted
Restricted Reports to Unrestricted Reports increase from an average of
15 percent to 20 percent. According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace
Study approximately 72 percent of servicemember victims who indicated
they made a sexual assault report said they would make the same
decision to make a report if they had to do it over again. The Rand
Study also indicated the percentages of active duty personnel who
experienced unwanted sexual assault declined in 2014, from 6.1 percent
to 4.3 percent for women and from 1.2 percent to 0.9 percent for men.
The Department also concluded the estimated gap between reporting and
prevalence of sexual assaults was at the narrowest point since the
Department began tracking this data.
What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. We have taken strong action to address the climate within
the military and to bring perpetrators to justice. We hold commanders
accountable for both. We have made progress but must continue to work
hard, particularly in reforms designed to improve victim confidence,
enhance access to victim advocacy and legal support. The Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs are committed to the safety of our men and
women and will not relax our comprehensive efforts to combat sexual
assault.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. The unrestricted and restricted reporting options were
designed to assist victims. Because unrestricted reporting
automatically initiates a criminal investigation, some victims were
choosing to forego support services rather than initiate an
investigation. The restricted reporting option allows a victim access
to medical care and support services without initiating an
investigation. Offering both forms of reporting provides a means to
protect a victim's privacy and time to cope with the trauma of sexual
assault.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD
oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and service
policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?
Answer. The Department has provided close oversight and strong
support to the Services. The collaboration between the OSD Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office and Services led to many
advancements, including the development of metrics which will not only
improve oversight but will also help better understand the
effectiveness of our response efforts.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these observed changes in
sexual assaults have occurred?
Answer. The chain of command is fundamental of our military
culture. Our ability to effect institutional change rest with leaders
at all levels but starts with the commander. Commanders are accountable
for what happens in their units and must foster a command climate of
dignity, respect and trust where sexist behavior, sexual harassment and
sexual assault is not condoned or ignored.
Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who
report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for
reporting. If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of
retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?
Answer. Any form of retaliation goes against our core values. The
Department is focused on this issue and working to understand what
causes this problem and develop solutions. If confirmed, I will work
with the OSD and the Services to ensure our servicemembers understand
that our culture fosters dignity and respect and retaliation is not
tolerated.
Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in
our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to
increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?
Answer. We must improve victim confidence in our ability to respond
to incidents of sexual assault, and in their well-being after an
incident. If confirmed, I will continue to work hard with OSD to assess
current programs and best practices that build victim confidence in our
systems and our ability to hold perpetrators appropriately accountable.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military
commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department's
policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be
prosecuted?
Answer. I value the legal analyses and recommendations of our
military judge advocates. However, I firmly believe the military
commander's role is indispensable in the military justice process. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice a criminal justice system, but it is
also a critical aspect of a commander's authority to maintain good
order and discipline. I believe our servicemembers and our national
security are best served by retaining the military commander's key role
in the military justice decision process.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. The Department, in January 2014 rescinded the policy
restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the
primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has
given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. The Services are in the final stages of validating their
standards. Military Department Secretaries must certify that their
standards are gender-neutral and in compliance with all applicable laws
by 30 Sept. If confirmed, I look forward to working with OSD and the
Joint Chiefs to monitor the effectiveness of the standards.
Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and
will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?
Answer. Yes. Our success is contingent upon establishing a ready
and capable military force. Our standards must prepare us to meet any
contingency.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements?
Answer. All decisions impacting our armed forces should be based on
a complete analysis of mission requirements.
Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
ensure decisions are made that reflect joint operations requirements.
Question. Some family members have expressed concerns about
assigning women to what are currently male-only combat units.
Answer. I believe our final standards, along with sound leadership,
will address any concerns .
Question. To what extent do you believe that this will be a problem
in the implementation of this policy?
Answer. I do not believe this will be a problem that will impact
implementation.
Question. If it is a problem, what steps would you take if
confirmed to address it?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take every opportunity to ensure our
military family members concerns are addressed.
military health care reform and modernization
Question. Congress authorized the Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 to conduct a review of the
military compensation and retirement systems and to make
recommendations to modernize those systems. The Commission released its
report in January 2015. What is your view of the Commission's findings
regarding the military health system?
Answer. I agree with the Commission that the military must continue
to improve the military health care system. The health care reforms
proposed in the President's fiscal year 2016 budget are a good first
step and offer servicemembers, retirees, and their families more
control and choice over their health care decisions. As we prepare the
fiscal year 2017 budget, we will work with Congress to determine if
additional reform proposals are needed.
Question. Do you believe the Department's fiscal year 2016 proposal
to consolidate TRICARE adequately addressed the Commission's findings
on military health care?
Answer. Yes. The Department's fiscal year 2016 proposal to
consolidate TRICARE effectively provides family members and retirees
with greater choice and control over their healthcare decision without
the risk of an untested, and potentially infeasible, overhaul of the
Military Health System. If confirmed, I will work closely with
Department leadership and Congress to ensure the proposal is
implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Question. What is your view of the Commission's recommendation to
establish a Joint Readiness Command?
Answer. A new, four-star readiness command is not necessary as the
Department has sufficient existing processes and governance structures
to identify, track, and measure the readiness status of Department-wide
and Service-specific essential medical capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of progress the Defense Health
Agency has made to create efficiencies and generate cost savings by
combining the medical support functions of the Services?
Answer. I have been briefed that the Defense Health Agency (DHA) is
on track to reach Full Operational Capability on 1 October 2015. In
order for the DHA to be successful, the difference between policy and
execution must be clear to the Services, Combatant Commands, and Joint
Staff. This clarification and along with the DHA's ability to meet its
assigned mission essential tasks will be validated by the Joint Staff
NLT 2017 when a Combat Support Agency Review Team Assessment (CSART) is
conducted by the Joint Staff.
Question. Do you believe the Defense Health Agency should be
replaced with a new combatant command, a Unified Medical Command?
Answer. No. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) will reach Full
Operating Capability (FOC) on 01 October 2015 and it is premature to
make a determination if the DHA will meet mission demands. As such, I
agree with the Secretary Carter's assessment that an additional four-
star command for the purpose of ensuring joint medical readiness is not
required now.
wounded warrior support
Question. Servicemembers wounded and injured in combat operations
deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
duty, successful transition from active duty when appropriate, and
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
What is your assessment of the progress made by the Department of
Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to
improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and
injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. The establishment of the Warrior Care Policy (WCP) Office
is probably one of the most significant improvements we've made in
support of our wounded, ill, and injured recovering servicemembers
(RSMs). The WCP is solely focused on developing policies for the DOD
and provides oversight to ensure proper execution and outcomes.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. Although the Services and Department have made strides in
caring for many different aspects/needs of wounded, ill, and injured
recovering servicemembers (RSMs), more can be done with regards to
standardizing policy across the Services (related to retention). There
needs to be more clarity or communication of the procedures and
processes which each Service has when a servicemember desires to return
to active duty.
Question. What is your assessment of the need to make further
improvements in the Integrated Disability Evaluation System?
Answer. My understanding is the Department makes every effort to
improve our key processes and IDES is one of those areas. In the last
few years, DOD has identified and executed numerous improvements that
have resulted in achieving higher servicemember satisfaction as well as
more timely processing. As a result, as of May 2015, Active Component
case timeliness averaged 223 days with a goal set at 290 days. The
Reserve Component has achieved a 298 days metric while the goal is 305
days. Servicemember satisfaction is at a new high of 87 percent. I
believe we are moving in the right direction and if confirmed will
continue to make improving this process a priority.
suicide prevention and mental health resources
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee.
In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the reserve components?
Answer. Preventing suicide among members of the Armed Services is
one of the most important challenges we share with the Services. We
have joined forces with agencies throughout DOD and civil society to
better understand the factors leading to suicide. We are shaping policy
to foster a culture of Total Force Fitness that enhances wellness,
promotes resilience, and sustains a military force fit in mind, body,
and spirit. In addition to educating the force on suicide prevention,
we are providing additional training and support to our first
responders (chaplains, senior enlisted leaders, legal counsel, and
mental health providers) to ensure that they are as equipped as
possible to prevent suicides.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. I believe we reduce the stigma associated with
servicemembers seeking mental health care. I also believe that
prevention by early intervention for both servicemembers and their
family is a key component of mental health care. Additionally, having
adequate care providers at the appropriate locations for servicemembers
to seek out support is critical. Specifically, I continue to support
embedding mental health personnel across the deployed force and the
requirement of an in-theater periodic mental health assessment for all
servicemembers deployed. The long-term mental health of our
servicemembers and their families cannot be understated and if
confirmed I will continue making progress in supporting them in this
area.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military
quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of
intense downward pressure on budgets?
Answer. One of the chief priorities within military quality of life
that I would like to see pursued, is a greater focus on program
evaluation and outcomes. The Military Family Readiness Counsel was
established in 2008 specifically to evaluate and assess the
effectiveness of the quality of life and family readiness programs, and
the Joint Staff participates in this venue. We need to see more
concrete recommendations from this body to the Secretary of Defense on
how utilize evidence to improve our social support programs, especially
in light of downward pressure on budgets.
family readiness and support
Question. Military members and their families in both the active
and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. I consider pay, benefits and retirement on of the top
issues for servicemembers and their families. This has been an intense
area of examination and discussion within the recent Military
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) efforts
and among the Services. A family's finances have a direct impact on the
stress level and readiness of the servicemember and their families.
Changes are coming with the introduction of the new blended retirement
package. We need a plan to communicate the value of this new retirement
system and educate our members on the financial decisions they must
make as the changes are implemented.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. I understand that the Services have already made plans to
adjust for force size and rotation, and family readiness is a
responsibility of each Service; however, we can encourage more
collaboration with community-based organizations to maximize non-DOD
resources. Family support programs that are flexible, responsive, and
communicate / coordinate with interagency and non-governmental family
services will be critical in meeting the needs of our servicemembers
and their families. The Department can find efficiencies within its own
programs through better evaluation practices, and we can also enhance
the accessibility to DOD and Non-DOD support programs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. Over the past fourteen years of war, one of the best
support programs developed for the reserve component (RC) families has
been the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP). The YRRP continues
to evolve and change with the deployment operational tempo and fiscal
constraints, but if confirmed I am committed to ensuring that its
essential services receives proper funding to meet the unique needs of
our RC community.
operational energy budgeting
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the
Department needs to improve the incorporation of energy considerations
into the strategic planning and force development processes?
Answer. Our ability to project and sustain power depends on the
assured delivery of energy. Through the Joint Staff's and Combatant
Commands' operational experience, campaign analyses, and wargames, we
have demonstrated the tradeoffs and risks that accompany our need for
large amounts of energy. To increase warfighting effectiveness, we will
continue to analyze and improve the broad energy enterprise through
overarching policy and strategy, global posture, acquisition
management, and force development.
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe the
Department should increase funding for operational energy requirements,
energy efficiency, alternative energy, and renewable energy
opportunities?
Answer. We must continue to take a balanced approach to improve our
warfighting capabilities from an operational energy perspective while
reducing risk and cost. Energy enables operational capability with
improved range, endurance, and force reliability, therefore we should
make additional investments to improve the energy performance of our
weapon systems, equipment, and their modifications; our enduring and
non-enduring installations; by reducing energy supply-chain
vulnerabilities; and by increasing energy security through
diversification.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including
previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes. The United States is a maritime Nation and joining the
Convention will enhance our capability and credibility in ensuring
freedom of the seas for both military and economic activities on, under
and above the world's oceans. The Convention's various navigational and
overflight provisions provide global mobility for our Armed Forces.
Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who
assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
United States?
Answer. Our non-party status diminishes our influence in defending
the Convention's existing norms that enable the access, mobility, and
sustainment of our military forces and commercial fleet. I also
detracts from our ability to lead developments in the maritime domain,
and enables emerging powers to advance their contrary interpretations
of the Convention. As the global security environment changes, it will
become increasingly important for the United States, as the world's
foremost maritime power, to use all elements of national power and lead
from inside the framework of the Convention rather than observe from
the outside.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime
disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
Answer. Accession would improve our ability to shape the outcome of
ongoing and emerging maritime disputes. Our position to influence these
key interests is diminished when we seek to enforce the Convention's
navigation and over flight rights guaranteed to all nations when we are
one of a very small group of nations that is not a party. In the
Arctic, we are the only Arctic nation that is not a party to the
Convention. As a non-party to the Convention, the United States cannot
utilize the Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition
of its ECS.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Recent Department of Defense operations in Iraq and Syria
highlight the need for a continued detention capability for both
interrogation and law of war detention.
What recommendations do you have for ensuring that the Department
of Defense maintains sufficient detention capabilities for capture
operations against ISIL and other affiliated terrorist groups to remain
a viable option?
Answer. I believe that the Department will continue to require a
detention capability. If confirmed, I will advocate to civilian and
military leadership to provide commanders on the ground the ability to
lawfully detain as part of future capture operations.
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.
offset technologies
Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key
technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional
forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-
based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our
emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological
superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the
United States once again focus on offsetting the technology advantages
being gained by our adversaries. Which technology priorities do you
believe the Department of Defense should be pursuing to maintain the
military technological superiority of the United States?
Answer. As anti-access and area-denial weapons and other advanced
technologies proliferate, the Department will likely turn to
breakthrough technologies in the fields of robotics, autonomous
systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive manufacturing to
restore our military advantage.
Question. What strategies would you recommend that Secretary Carter
implement to develop these technology priorities?
Answer. The purpose of the Defense Innovation Initiative strategy
laid out by Secretary Carter is to develop our future technology
priorities. Complimenting this effort by the warfighters is the
development of new innovative operational concepts. If confirmed, I
will make sure that the investments in operation concepts and human
capital--as our greatest asset will always be our servicemembers--
proceed apace with our efforts to pursue innovative solutions through
technological means.
Question. What role do the services have to play in their
development?
Answer. By identifying, experimenting, and wargaming combinations
of new and existing technologies necessary to project power globally,
the Services in partnership with the Defense Innovation Initiative team
will help steer the development of future technology priorities.
science and technology
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the
warfighter. What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning
technologies effectively from research programs into programs of
records?
Answer. Moving an advanced technology from a research program into
a program of record requires carving out room in the budget based upon
a compelling need. Once in the budget, maintaining momentum with a
particular technology is challenging as it must continue to compete
against other ``good ideas'' year after year in our resourcing process.
The final challenge, ensuring an advanced technology meets its promise
in a timely and cost-effective manner as we transition the technology
into a warfighting capability.
Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what
steps will you take to ensure that the services are benefitting more
quickly and directly from the research being performed by the defense
research enterprise?
Answer. In my roles as a Defense Innovation Initiative ``core
group'' member and Chairman of the JROC, I will ensure that the
resourcing and acquisition processes are well-informed on the priority
and timing of capability needs. In collaboration with the Chairman, I
will also continue to use the Chairman's Gap Assessment and the
Chairman's Program Recommendation to communicate directly to Secretary
Carter my thoughts on promising research performed by the research
enterprise.
Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems,
especially in areas such as mobile communications, computing, and
robotics, are keeping pace with global and commercial technological
advances? If not, what do you suggest that the Department do to keep up
with the pace of global technological change?
Answer. Keeping pace with global and commercial technology is
challenging the Department. If confirmed, I will support the
Secretary's Defense Innovation Initiative to focus the Department on
maintaining our military's technological edge in an increasingly
competitive technology environment.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
dismantlement of retired nuclear warheads
1. Senator Cotton. General Selva, in your responses to the advance
questions to the committee regarding your priorities for the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC), you indicated that accelerated dismantlement of
retired warheads was among those top priorities. If our modernization
commitments were falling behind, would you agree that fully funding
those commitments is a higher priority than accelerating dismantlement
of current warheads?
General Selva. Yes.
2. Senator Cotton. General Selva, in his testimony before this
committee, General Dunford, the nominee to be the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, called Russia an existential threat. Do you agree with
General Dunford's assessment, and if you do, do you still think that
accelerating dismantlement should be a priority?
General Selva. Russia's nuclear capability does pose an existential
threat to the United States. Accelerating dismantlement is a priority,
as long as it does not constrain the resources and infrastructure
required to meet U.S. nuclear weapons employment planning, achieve
deployed stockpile requirements, and address stockpile aging and life
extension program needs.
distributed common ground/surface system-army (dcgs-a)
3. Senator Cotton. General Selva, in your role as the Chairman of
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), you have stated to the
committee that the JROC ``trip-wire'' process has altered performance
or procurement quantities after programmatic reviews. One particular
program, the Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Army (DCGS-A) has
been going down the wrong road for too long. Are you aware that DCGS-A
has serious capability gaps, and that the Army's leadership has
consistently downplayed warfighter concerns?
General Selva. The Joint Staff carefully monitors all major weapon
systems development to ensure not only the Services', but Joint Forces'
requirements are thoroughly considered in future system development.
4. Senator Cotton. General Selva, what will you do, as JROC
chairman, to ensure that DCGS-A meets real world requirements as
testified by the warfighter?
General Selva. The Joint Staff expends considerable effort to
ensure Service provided capabilities meet warfighter requirements. On 7
July 2015, the JROC validated the conversion of the DCGS-A Capability
Development Document (CDD) to an Information System (IS) CDD. The
approved CDD includes an Ease of Use/Usability Key System Attribute
(KSA). The Ease of Use/Usability KSA provides a way to ensure
warfighter requirements are met.
5. Senator Cotton. General Selva, would you be willing to update
the guidance from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System and direct the program to reassess requirements based on
warfighter input?
General Selva. The JCIDS guidance documents are updated regularly
to support deliberate, emergent and urgent requirements. The last
formal review and update to the JCIDS guidance documents, to include
the JCIDS Manual, was completed in February 2015. Corrections and
amplifying details to these guidance documents are maintained in an
online resource and will be incorporated in a future formal review and
update.
6. Senator Cotton. General Selva, Army Secretary John McHugh has
readily admitted that on major acquisitions the Army scorecard is 0-26.
What will you do to ensure that the entrenched bureaucracy that has
produced this record will adopt reform and adopt commercial off-the-
shelf systems such as Palantir?
General Selva. On 7 July 2015, the JROC validated the Information
System (IS) Capability Development Document (CDD) for DCGS-A and
endorsed the Army acquisition strategy featuring open competition for
future capabilities. DCGS-A already leverages numerous commercially
available products from over 40 vendors and has committed to continue
to incorporate commercial products that are available and meet
requirements.
The Army and Palantir entered into a Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement (CRADA) in May 2012 with the objective of
collaboratively developing and demonstrating new technologies.
7. Senator Cotton. General Selva, critics within the Army
bureaucracy describe Palantir as a ``front-end'' or user interface
analytical solution, but I know that to be untrue. Are you aware that
Palantir is in fact a complete solution for data integration?
General Selva. Palantir is a commercial off the shelf data analysis
tool with software specialized for visualization of different types of
data in support of situational awareness, network link analysis, and
targeting analysis support. It provides some of the capabilities
resident in three of the nine components of DCGS-A, but I do not
believe it can replace DCGS-A.
8. Senator Cotton. General Selva, are you aware that the Army has
used time and resources to fight against Palantir while persisting with
DCGS-A with its record of failure and wasted taxpayer dollars?
General Selva. The Army has adopted an open source acquisition
model and invited commercial vendors with capabilities that resolve
known gaps to participate. The Army and Palantir entered into a
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) in May 2012 with
the objective of collaboratively developing and demonstrating new
technologies that are relevant to the warfighter and U.S. Army Programs
of Record (PORs) with the intent to enhance operational capabilities.
9. Senator Cotton. General Selva, more than 30 Army units, most of
them Brigade and above representing half of the total Army, have
requested the comparable system Palantir since 2009. Commanders and
warfighters are sending a clear message that has not been heard by the
Army leadership. An April 2012 Army Test and Evaluation Command Report
cited that 96 percent of surveyed warfighters stated, ``Palantir is
effective in supporting my mission.'' Shouldn't we procure programs
like Palantir's that exceed the performance and expectations of an
internal build like DCGS-A?
General Selva. From 2011 thru April 2015, 19 deploying Army units
have submitted 28 requests for commercial, advanced analytic
capabilities to augment DCGS-A. All but three of those 19 have been
provided Palantir capability. Three units were not approved due to a
change in mission, receipt of an updated version of DCGS-A, or
insufficient time remaining in their deployment to procure Palantir
software/hardware and train the unit.
10. Senator Cotton. General Selva, at the end of the day, the true
test for any capability is user adoption, so why would you expect the
Army to force an inferior, failing, over-priced program on the
warfighter, especially when it has consistently been the solution of
choice for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and
the financial sector?
General Selva. The Army is not forcing a particular system,
application, or capability on its units. In fact, senior Army
leadership provided written guidance stating, ``units in combat
currently depend on a diverse range of systems . . . these include the
Army's current enterprise intelligence system, DCGS-A, and Palantir . .
. '' The Army has reviewed and assessed every operational requirement
for Palantir and provided requesting units with Palantir if validated
by Army G3/5/7. DCGS-A provides an extremely large and diverse set of
Intelligence tools across a broad range of intelligence disciplines,
and relies heavily on soldier feedback to ensure warfighter
requirements are met.
______
[The nomination reference of General Paul J. Selva, USAF,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 21, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment in the
United States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned
to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:
To Be General
General Paul J. Selva, 5397
------
[The biographical sketch of General Paul J. Selva, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Paul J. Selva, USAF
General Paul J. Selva is commander, U.S. Transportation Command,
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. USTRANSCOM is the single manager for
global air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense.
General Selva graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980,
and completed undergraduate pilot training at Reese AFB, Texas. He has
held numerous staff positions and has commanded at the squadron, group,
wing and headquarters levels. Prior to his current assignment General
Selva was the Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois.
General Selva is a command pilot with more than 3,100 hours in the
C-5, C-17A, C-141B, KC-IO, KC-135A and T-37.
Education:
1980 Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Engineering,
U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.
1983 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, AL.
1984 Master of Science in Management and Human Relations,
Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas 1992 Air Command and Staff
College, Maxwell AFB, AL., distinguished graduate.
1992 Master of Science in Political Science, Auburn
University, Montgomery, AL.
1996 National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense
Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, VA.
Assignments:
1. June 1980-July 1981, student, undergraduate pilot training,
Reese AFB, Texas.
2. July 1981-December 1984, co-pilot and aircraft commander, 917th
Air Refueling Squadron, Dyess AFB, Texas.
3. January 1984-December 1988, co-pilot, aircraft commander,
instructor pilot, and flight commander, 32nd Air Refueling Squadron,
Barksdale AFB, LA.
4. January 1989-July 1991, company grade adviser to Commander,
Strategic Air Command, later, manager of offensive aircraft systems and
executive officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Resources,
Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, NE.
5. August 1991-July 1992, student, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell AFB, AL.
6. July 1992-June 1994, instructor pilot and flight commander, 9th
Air Refueling Squadron, later, Commander, 722nd Operations Support
Squadron, March AFB, CA.
7. June 1994-June 1995, Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron,
later, Deputy Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, CA.
8. July 1995-June 1996, National Defense Fellow, Secretary of
Defense Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, VA.
9. July 1996-August 1998, assistant to the Director, Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, DC.
10. August 1998-July 2000, Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis
AFB, CA.
11. July 2000-June 2002, Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB,
WA.
12. June 2002-June 2003, Vice Commander, Tanker Airlift Control
Center, Scott AFB, IL.
13. June 2003-November 2004, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control
Center, Scott AFB, IL.
14. December 2004-August 2006, Director of Operations, U.S.
Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL.
15. August 2006-June 2007, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters
U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.
16. June 2007-October 2008, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters
U.S. Air Force, and Director, Air Force QDR, Office of the Vice Chief
of Staff, Washington, DC.
17. October 2008-October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
18. October 2011-November 2012, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces,
Joint-Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.
19. November 2012-May 2014, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott
AFB, IL.
20. May 2014-Present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott
AFB, IL.
Summary of Joint Assignments
1. September 1996-August 1998, Assistant to the Director, Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington,
D.C., as a lieutenant colonel.
2. November 2004-July 2006, Director of Operations and Logistics,
U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill., as a brigadier general.
3. October 2008-October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general.
4. May 2014-Present, Commander U.S. Transportation Command, Scott
AFB, Ill.
Flight Information
Rating: Command pilot
Hours flown: More than 3,100
Aircraft flown: C-5, C-17A, C-141B, KC-IO, KC-135A and T-37.
Major Awards and Decorations
Defense Distinguished Service Medal.
Distinguished Service Medal.
Defense Superior Service Medal.
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters.
Defense Meritorious Service Medal.
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters.
Air Force Commendation Medal.
Air Force Achievement Medal.
Joint Meritorious Unit Award.
Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf clusters.
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star.
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze stars.
Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star.
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Armed Forces Service Medal.
Effective Dates of Promotion
Second Lieutenant, May 28, 1980.
First Lieutenant, May 28, 1982.
Captain, May 28, 1984.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General Paul
J. Selva, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Paul J. Selva.
2. Position to which nominated:
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Date of nomination:
21 May 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
27 September 1958, Biloxi, MS.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Ricki S. Selva (maiden name: Smith).
7. Names and ages of children:
None.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Air Force Association--Member.
Airlift Tanker Association--Member.
National Defense Transportation Association--Member.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testfy upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
General Paul J. Selva, USAF
This 5th day of May, 2015
______
[The nomination of General Paul J. Selva, USAF was reported
to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 23, 2015, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 2015.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to General Darren W. McDew,
USAF by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. At this point, I don't see the need for any significant
changes. Over the last three decades Goldwater-Nichols has led to an
unprecedented level of integration and cooperation among the Services.
This has not only yielded a far more effective fighting force, it has
positioned us well to maintain that effectiveness as we face an
increasingly constrained fiscal environment and diverse array of
threats. However, to build on this success and guarantee a cadre of
joint officers in the future I do believe we need to continually review
joint officer requirements to ensure we are building the most qualified
joint forces for the future.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. JPME is essential to building a cadre of joint
professionals prepared to meet the challenges of the future strategic
environment. Expanding access to JPME to the Total Force community
through advanced learning technologies is one area for consideration.
If confirmed, I will work with Congress, the Secretary of Defense and
other senior leaders of our military to ensure Goldwater-Nichols
continues to meet the needs of our armed forces, and will support any
changes to the legislation that might become necessary.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U. S. Transportation Command?
Answer. The Commander, United States Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM), is responsible for providing air, land and sea
transportation for the DOD, in peace, crisis and war. USTRANSCOM
depends on three Component Commands to accomplish this mission: Air
Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). The
Commander is assigned multiple responsibilities in the Unified Command
Plan (UCP) to include: the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) mission to
improve the worldwide DOD distribution system; DOD single manager for
global patient movement; Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) mission
to synchronize planning for worldwide distribution operations; and
facilitating the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters for
combatant commanders through its Subordinate Command, the Joint
Enabling Capabilities Command. The USTRANSCOM team employs a mix of
active and Reserve military members, government civilians and
commercial industry partners to execute the Command's missions in
support of the full range of military operations.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. Throughout my 33 years in uniform, I have had held numerous
positions in and out of the Department of Defense that have prepared
me, if confirmed, to perform the duties as the Commander of USTRANSCOM.
I was fortunate enough to be selected to spend a year as a Secretary of
Defense Corporate Fellow at Sun Microsystems. During that year in the
Silicon Valley, I was exposed to companies with reputations for
insightful long-range planning, organizational and management
innovation, and implementation of new information and other
technologies.
As the Director of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the
Air Force, I was responsible for providing trusted counsel to the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and all other principal
military and civilian leaders of the Department of the Air Force
concerning Public Affairs activities to assist in building public
support and achieving the Air Force core competencies. I became adept
at working with the civilian press, DOD and Congressional inquiries.
While still at the Pentagon, I was chosen as the Vice Director for
Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff. In this role, I helped
provide strategic direction, policy guidance, and planning focus to
develop and execute the National Military Strategy. Through the
Director, I enabled the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
provide military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense and
the National Security Council.
Finally, I served as Commander of the 18th Air Force which I was
responsible for providing worldwide rapid, global mobility and
sustainment for America's Armed Forces through airlift, aerial
refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and contingency response. This
position directly led to my selection as Commander, AMC. I command over
118,000 Airmen from across our Air Force, Active, Reserve, and Air
National Guard who provide worldwide cargo and passenger delivery,
aerial refueling, special air mission and aeromedical evacuation. This
includes the crucial role of humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief to victims of natural disasters both at home and around the
world.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U. S. Transportation Command?
Answer. As the current AMC Commander I am aware of the breadth of
USTRANSCOM's worldwide responsibilities. If confirmed, I will engage
with all of USTRANSCOM's component commands, DOD agencies, and our
commercial partners to guarantee I fully understand the range of
challenges they face in order to accomplish USTRANSCOM's crucial
mission.
relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish
important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe
your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S.
Transportation Command to the following offices:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and
authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his
designated representative in the Secretary's absence. As such, the
USTRANSCOM Commander will report to and through the Deputy Secretary
when serving in that capacity. The Deputy Secretary also is the Chief
Management Officer of the Department, responsible for optimizing the
business environment across the Defense enterprise. USTRANSCOM strongly
supports these optimization efforts as we strive to improve our support
to the other Combatant Commands and Defense agencies in a cost-
effective and operationally efficient manner.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange
information with DOD components, including Combatant Commands, which
have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination
and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In addition, as the Distribution Process Owner, the
USTRANSCOM commander receives oversight from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in his role as the
Defense Logistics Executive via the Defense Logistics Board. This
relationship works very well. If confirmed as a combatant commander, I
look forward to the continuing collaboration.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. As specified in title 10, the Chairman is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves
as an advisor, and is not, by law, in the chain of command, which runs
from the President through the Secretary to each Combatant Commander.
The President normally directs communications between himself and the
Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of
the Joint Chief of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and
allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key
responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant
commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed, I
will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense fully informed
regarding USTRANSCOM matters.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. Although the Vice Chairman does not fall within the
Combatant Command chain of command, he is delegated full power and
authority to act for the Chairman in the Chairman's absence. If
confirmed as a Combatant Commander, when he is representing the
Chairman, I will keep the Vice Chairman informed as I would the
Chairman.
Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in
managing the Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall
within the Combatant Commander's chain of command. However, he enables
important decisions to be made as the Combatant Commander's staff
interacts with the Joint Staff. The Director is also a key interface
with Office of the Secretary of Defense Principals and interagency
leadership, and can assist combatant commanders working issues below
the Chairman's level.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Each Service Secretary is responsible for equipping,
training, maintaining and administering forces belonging to that
Service. Close coordination with each Service Secretary providing
forces to USTRANSCOM is essential to ensure that there is no
infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service
Secretary.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and
equip their respective forces. No Combatant Commander can ensure
preparedness of assigned forces without the full cooperation and
support of the Service Chiefs and their respective Reserve Components.
As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a
lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and
judgment the Service Chiefs provide is an invaluable resource for every
Combatant Commander. If confirmed, as Commander USTRANSCOM, I will
continue my predecessors' frank and productive dialogue with the
Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. USTRANSCOM's primary mission is to support each of the
combatant commanders in accomplishing the responsibilities they are
assigned in the Unified Command Plan. Given the complexity of today's
security environment, it is essential that all the combatant commanders
work together to execute U.S. national security policy. If confirmed, I
will continue to build upon the trust and mutual support my
predecessors have fostered with the other Combatant commanders.
major challenges and priorities.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, U.S. Transportation Command?
Answer. Currently, the Command's number one priority is
``Readiness'' for the enterprise. USTRANSCOM has the capability to meet
existing surge requirements; however, major future challenges may erode
our key, asymmetric military transportation and logistics advantages.
These challenges include: maintaining assured Command and Control (C2)
in a contested cyber domain; impending mobility capability degradation
due to reduced budgets, a shrinking force structure, diminished cargo
volumes, and increasingly dynamic commercial market trends; and, also,
growing peer and near-peer adversary's anti-access and area denial
capabilities.
Additionally, USTRANSCOM focuses on providing both effective and
efficient transportation solutions for all its customers. Future budget
challenges may reduce Enterprise readiness and flexibility,
subsequently degrading the Defense Transportation System to be less
responsive and less resilient. While these challenges are formidable,
given the talents of the USTRANSCOM team, they are not insurmountable.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow combatant
commanders to assess risk from these challenges and collaboratively
develop mitigation strategies to ensure USTRANSCOM will meet its steady
state and surge requirements. I will advance USTRANSCOM's cyber
defenses to protect DOD networks and systems, partnering with other
U.S. government departments, agencies, and the private sector to
improve our cyber security. To overcome readiness challenges, we will
work within the constraints of Public Law and National policy to
leverage operations and implement transportation solutions that
preserve readiness for both our organic forces and the critical surge
capacity provided by commercial transportation providers.
In order to ensure our global distribution network, I will work
with USTRANSCOM's commercial partners and the interagency to continue
USTRANSCOM's global efforts to secure diplomatic and physical accesses
to ground and airspace infrastructure for logistics. I will work to
improve USTRANSCOM's global ability to deliver to the point of need in
the most effective and cost-effective ways possible--projecting
American influence and power when and where our national interests
dictate. This includes collaboratively developing, in concert with our
fellow Combatant Commands, Services and agencies, innovative concepts
and capabilities to overcome the anti-access/area denial efforts of our
peer and near-peer adversaries.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately become familiar with the
all aspects of the defense transportation enterprise with a focus on
preserving readiness of the Defense Transportation System to meet
national objectives and to support the Joint Force into the future.
Always mindful of our obligation to make the most of our existing
resources, I intend to seek process improvement and enterprise
synchronization efforts through relationships within the Department,
across the U.S. Government, and with commercial and international
partners.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Commander, U. S. Transportation
Command?
Answer. As Commander, I will focus on operating a Combatant Command
with global responsibilities in a challenging environment of declining
budgets, smaller forces, reduced resources, and global rebalance of
force posture. I will ensure synchronization of the entire Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise--a vast network of organizations
both in and out of the Department of Defense that relies heavily on
commercial partnerships with industry. Additionally, I will address the
challenges with operating aging transportation fleets and port
infrastructure worldwide.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the focus on preserving
readiness and aligning resources for mission success and to further
enhance USTRANSCOM's operational resiliency. USTRANSCOM has made great
strides in improving economies and efficiencies. I will continue this
work by managing readiness, cost, and time variables to deliver
effective and efficient deployment and distribution solutions
commensurate with assigned authorities and available resources. While
the near future poses many challenges, we must balance costs and
benefits, matching our actions to available resources in the near term
and adapting our efforts for greater economies and efficiencies in the
long term.
experience in managing logistics operations
Question. You have served as the Commander of the Air Mobility
Command.
What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more
complete understating of the logistics operations of the other
component commands of the U. S. Transportation Command?
Answer. As the current AMC Commander, I am aware of the missions,
roles and responsibilities of the elements of the USTRANSCOM team. If
confirmed, I will make it a priority to better understand the
capabilities and challenges of the component commands. I will engage
with the component commanders, DOD agencies, and commercial partners to
address the issues they face, work together to resolve logistics
challenges, and to better accomplish USTRANSCOM's vital worldwide
mission.
civil reserve air fleet
Question. The military services rely heavily on the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement its organic airlift in order to meet its
wartime and peacetime transportation requirements.
What is your assessment of the CRAF's ability to meet requirements
to transport any equipment, materials, or commodities for the use of
U.S. military operations and respond to a humanitarian disaster?
Answer. Our commercial partners are an integral part of providing
global air mobility assets to support military operations and response
to humanitarian disasters. The combined capability of military and
commercial lift gives us the ability to transport any equipment,
materials, personnel, or commodities the warfighter will need to
execute their mission to any point on the globe. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business
relationships remain solid and the contracts continue to support DOD
requirements.
Question. Do the changes in the commercial airline industry,
characterized by bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-
range aircraft, impact the future viability of the CRAF?
Answer. The commercial airline industry is a dynamic market and
always has been. We have adapted to carriers' fleet changes and
benefited by having a commercial augmentation capability ready to
answer the call when needed. It is an accurate assessment that there
are fewer carriers now in the CRAF program than there have been in the
last decade. I have met with several airline executives over the past
15 months, and they have all said they will continue to support the DOD
and CRAF program because it is the right thing to do for our Nation. As
we drew down forces from Afghanistan, carriers made expected
adjustments to capacity to right size their fleets for the new business
environment. Through Air Mobility Command`s sponsored research,
conducted as part of an extensive CRAF Study, we foresaw these changes
and have adapted the program. Based on these efforts, we are confident
the CRAF program will remain viable and capable to meet operational
requirements in the future.
Question. Do you think it is important to maintain an adequate
industrial base for CRAF carriers?
Answer. Yes. CRAF provides a capability no other nation can
replicate and ensures we can meet national requirements that our
organic assets alone cannot provide in times of crisis or conflict. It
is critical we maintain both an organic airlift capability and
commercial augmentation capability that is ``ready'' to answer the call
when the next crisis arises. It is important that our CRAF partners
sustain necessary capacity to provide the support we foresee to support
the National Defense Strategy.
Question. How much should we be relying on CRAF to meet our
peacetime and wartime airlift requirements?
Answer. The CRAF program is a critical component in this Nation's
ability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment in times of crisis and
peace. Because of the CRAF program, we can deploy forces more rapidly
and more efficiently than any other nation in the world. In peacetime,
this workload changes from year-to-year due to dynamic customer
requirements. Our forecast requirements are expected to be much lower
starting in fiscal year 2016 compared to the past 13 years, which will
impact both military and commercial capacity. We will continue to
strive for the balance between military and commercial capacity while
trying to garner more business into the Defense Transportation System
through such recent changes as competitive rates for Foreign Military
Sales and non-DOD U.S. Government organizations.
Question. What changes, if any, do you think need to be made to
CRAF--authorities, requirements, composition?
Answer. AMC, in coordination with USTRANSCOM, chartered a study of
the CRAF program to look at these specific issues. Throughout the
study, we engaged industry experts for their advice on where the
airline industry is headed and what to expect. The study team provided
recommendations to senior leadership and industry executives, which we
expect to implement in Fiscal Year 2016. Additionally, USTRANSCOM has
begun an Integrated Airlift Management (IAM) approach to balance
commercial and organic workload and associated risks. This approach
ensures active and reserve component readiness through execution of the
flying hour program, provides appropriate commercial airlift
augmentation opportunities to retain necessary commercial airlift
capacity, reduces the long-term cost of sustaining the organic airlift
fleet by placing the minimum time on airframes necessary and supports
``global agility'' by creating a buffer capacity for adaptable military
response to priority, short-notice missions. I am confident that these
changes will help to maintain the program's viability despite the
decrease in available business.
Question. According to the Comptroller General, ``DOD does not use
its process for monitoring flying hours to determine when it will
exceed required training hours and allocate eligible airlift missions
to CRAF participants. Therefore, it cannot determine whether it is
using CRAF to the maximum extent practicable. As a result, DOD may be
using its military fleet more than necessary--which officials say is
less economical--while risking reduced CRAF participation.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO Report 13-564, ``DOD Needs to Take Steps to Manage Workload
Distributed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet,'' Page 9, Government
Accountability Office, June 2013, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
655338.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you agree with GAO's conclusion with regard to flying hours for
CRAF?
Answer. There is a balance between ensuring sufficient training for
crews, much of which comes from operational missions, meeting the needs
of the combatant commander and balancing the use of organic versus
CRAF-provided airlift.
I agree with the need to maintain readiness of all assets required
to support national security, including all military and commercial
airlift capabilities.
Question. If so, what steps would you take to better manage these
training hours?
Answer. AMC recently created a process that surveys the number of
crew members per flying unit and applies seasoning model criteria that
ensure aging rates and specific flying currency requirements are met.
The output of that model is then put into our commanders' apportionment
and allocation process which balances readiness against actual
combatant commander and mission requirements directing the excess to
our commercial partners. This Total Force effort has proven successful
in responding to the readiness needs of all assets used to support the
defense transportation system.
In addition, TRANSCOM has created a readiness and distribution
allocation process that looks across all transportation modes to
balance readiness needs. One outcome of this process has been an effort
to begin buying commercial airlift using forecasts.
Question. Also, according to GAO, the number of carriers and
aircraft for cargo in CRAF appear to be dropping from 175 in 2011 to
162 aircraft in 2013--this is in Table 1 on page 16. \2\ More recent
documents show this may be as low as 144 as of late last year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO Report 13-564, ``DOD Needs to Take Steps to Manage Workload
Distributed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet,'' Page 16, Government
Accountability Office, June 2013, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
655338.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why is the number of aircraft participating in CRAF dropping? At
what level does CRAF become at risk for being too small to meet the
military's airlift needs.
Answer. We do not measure the capability of the CRAF fleet based on
number of aircraft, but rather the capacity those aircraft provide.
Under the new Defense Strategy, the Wide Body Equivalent (WBE)
requirement for cargo aircraft in the long range international segment
of CRAF is 144 and for passenger aircraft it is 104 WBE. At these
levels, the CRAF program is not at risk for meeting our military
airlift needs.
cybersecurity
Question. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) must communicate
over the unclassified Internet with many private-sector entities that
are central to DOD's force generation and deployment operations--in the
transportation and shipping industries in particular. Much of the rest
of the critical communications and operations of the Defense Department
can be conducted over the classified DOD internet service, which is not
connected to the public Internet and is therefore much more protected
against eavesdropping, espionage, and/or disruption by computer network
attacks.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's inquiry into U.S.
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) determined that it was subjected to
many cyber intrusions that were not reported. USTRANSCOM also suffered
from a lack of awareness by other law enforcement and national security
agencies regarding cyber intrusions on USTRANSCOM contractors as well
as misunderstandings by USTRANSCOM personnel on the rules and processes
for sharing cyber intrusion-related information with necessary
officials.
Have you reviewed this report?
Answer. Yes, I have reviewed the report and from my experience as
the AMC Commander I understand the importance of Cyber security related
to our ability to project forces in support of global requirements.
Question. Are you concerned about the level of reporting of cyber
events by command contractors or other U.S. Government agencies to
USTRANSCOM?
Answer. I am concerned, and if confirmed, I will continue to build
upon the plan of action resulting from the Senate Armed Services
Committee report and the resulting Cyber Mission Analysis Task Force
held 14-15 April 2015 at Scott Air Force Base. Information sharing
across the inter-agency process is key for USTRANSCOM to continuously
assess risk to our operational missions. Communicating our need to be
informed about cyber intrusions with our commercial contractors is
essential. We will continue to address our concerns through contract
language and forums such as the Defense Industrial Base and the
National Defense Transportation Association's cyber security group.
Question. Do you feel that the Department of Defense is responding
appropriately given recent events such as the threat nation intrusions
into databases on U.S. personnel, including DOD employees?
Answer. I believe the Department's response has been holistic in
nature, continuing our focus on strengthening cyber readiness,
enforcing cyber discipline among our users, and providing emphasis and
education regarding protection of personal information. The recently
published DOD cyber strategy provides an appropriately broad approach
for protecting the Department's information within our systems and
networks, as well as defending the U.S. homeland and national
interests, and providing the President with cyber options necessary to
support potential military operations. As we learn more with concerning
these intrusions, we must continue to inform our people with regard to
prudent mitigation actions.
Question. What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, as
Commander, USTRANSCOM, to ensure that DOD reduces the risk of cyber
intrusions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support efforts to implement
the Department's Cyber Strategy, support movement of our critical
information towards swift realization of the Joint Information
Environment, and continue our efforts across the inter-agency process
to address the need to share information concerning commercial provider
cyber intrusions, enabling us to address mission assurance on multiple
fronts from a cyber-perspective.
Question. Do you believe that the current posture of USTRANSCOM and
the Department of Defense is sufficient to deter adversaries in cyber
space?
Answer. As in any domain, and especially in cyber, we must
continuously assess our ability to maneuver, as an enabler to
successful operations. In cyberspace, the cost of entry for an
adversary is relatively low when compared with the domains of air,
land, sea, and space. In addition, the ability of an adversary (state
or non-state), to acquire ever-evolving and sophisticated technical
capabilities increases almost daily, and our ability to attribute an
adverse cyber action is very difficult. As a result, the ever-
increasing cyber threat becomes potentially more complex and
potentially dangerous on a daily basis. Therefore, we must continue to
press forward with our ability to detect, deter, protect, and when
necessary, respond with appropriate authority in this domain.
Question. What do you believe are the critical needs of USTRANSCOM
for cyber security?
Answer. USTRANSCOM relies upon the integrity of the information
exchanged between military and commercial partners in its role as the
distribution process owner for the Department. Our ability to command
and control is highly dependent upon getting the right information to
the right people at the right time, while protecting it from our
adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue the important efforts to
protect the command's information equities by working closely with our
agency and commercial providers to further define roles,
responsibilities, relationships and authorities for cyber security and
to build trust and enhance information sharing.
Question. How important is it that USTRANSCOM be aware of cyber
intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors into the networks
of airlines, shippers, and other defense contractors that enable
TRANSCOM operations?
Answer. Compromise of a commercial partners' networks by an APT, is
a potential cyber security issue that provides insight into USTRANSCOM
operations. Awareness of these intrusions is paramount so that we can
mitigate their operational impacts. Commercial partners are integral to
our mission and ability to provide volume, velocity and efficiency of
operations. Vulnerabilities within any organization's infrastructure,
including cyber vulnerabilities, are a risk for all mission partners.
Question. When USTRANSCOM becomes aware of an APT intrusion into an
operationally critical contractor, what steps should the command take
to determine whether operational plans should be adjusted to mitigate
the risk of the intrusion affecting military operations?
Answer. As a result of the report and the Cyber Mission Analysis
Task Force, USTRANSCOM has developed a mission risk assessment process
that will enable us to consider appropriate operational and technical
mitigation actions when we are made aware of such intrusions. The level
of reporting continues to be a concern and is key to our ability to
assess potential operational impact. USTRANSCOM has overcome some of
these challenges with its cyber contract language and partnering
efforts. If confirmed, I will continue to work with all stakeholders,
government, military, and commercial partners to continuously assess
our ability to adjust to cyber-attacks, including APT intrusions.
personally-owned vehicle transportation issues
Question. Last year, USTRANSCOM awarded a contract to ship
privately-owned vehicles for servicemembers, the Global Privately Owned
Vehicle Contract III, to a company without prior experience in this
area. This award was followed by a protest from the incumbent
contractor. During the summer peak moving season, the new contractor
was late in delivering several hundred vehicles late and, in some
cases, the vehicles of servicemembers were damaged. USTRANSCOM took an
active role in increasing oversight and creating task forces to address
the problems related to the change in contractors.
What lessons has USTRANSCOM learned from this experience to prevent
the reoccurrence of these problems in the future?
Answer. USTRANSCOM originally planned for a contract transition
during the non-peak season. Due to multiple protests the contract
transitioned with no overlap and at the beginning of the 2014 peak
season. This experience confirmed that the ideal transition time is in
the winter months. In the future USTRANSCOM will consider the impact of
unexpected extensions of the transition timeline when determining the
contract transition period.
Question. Under the current contract, Global Privately Owned
Vehicle Contract III, how is USTRANSCOM able to hold contractors
accountable for poor performance? What changes, if any, would you
implement to improve accountability?
Answer. The contract contains several performance objectives, with
the primary performance measure being on-time delivery. If the
contractor does not deliver a vehicle within the required delivery
date, they will incur a monetary reduction ranging from as low as $30/
day per vehicle up to the entire transportation cost of a vehicle if it
is delivered 60 or more days late. In addition, the contractor must
also pay inconvenience claims directly to the customer for rental cars,
lodging, etc. required as a result of a late delivery. TRANSCOM
continues to seek ways to improve accountability, such as increasing
the number of Contracting Officer Representatives (COR)s and
supplementing COR training.
Question. Given the fact that servicemembers today are more likely
to be married with dependents, what else should USTRANSCOM do to reduce
the impact of a lost vehicles or delayed deliveries on military
families?
Answer. USTRANSCOM will continue to partner with the Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the business
process owner for the Global Privately Owned Vehicle Contract III. SDDC
maintains a continuous dialogue with the Service Headquarters in order
to ensure visibility of their servicemember concerns and remediation of
those concerns. Since servicemember entitlements for inconvenience have
not been adjusted for many years, it is time to evaluate and consider
entitlement changes due to financial impact to the servicemembers.
support of troops in afghanistan
Question. Earlier this year the President stated his intention to
keep 9,800 U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan instead of the originally
planned force level of 5,500.
What do you see as the major challenges to USTRANSCOM and the
services for maintaining this higher troop level?
Answer. The capacity of the Afghanistan distribution network has
diminished since our peak in 2010-11 when we supported a force of
approximately 100,000. The current transportation network of air and
surface lines of communication remains robust and more than capable of
supporting the 9,800 U.S. Force structure in Afghanistan.
USTRANSCOM, as the Department of Defense distribution process
owner, is compelled daily by the nature of our customer base, to view
requirements through the joint lens. As active members of the Joint
Team, Service requirements are communicated and met through a healthy
variety of Joint efforts. Although Service challenges exist, none have
proven too difficult for the Joint Team, through healthy communications
and cross-seam coordination, to resolve.
Question. How will you ensure that our deployed troops in
Afghanistan receive the support they require as the Department's
attention turns towards other national security situations elsewhere in
the world?
Answer. USTRANSCOM is the world-wide distribution process owner,
and delivers passengers and cargo daily to U.S. force locations
regardless of the size of force or the remoteness of their location.
USTRANSCOM delivers everywhere, to everyone, all the time. With this in
mind, globally integrated operations between the Department of Defense,
Department of State and other federal agencies will be required to
maintain complex political and military relationships. These
relationships, as well as those of partner nations, support the lines
of communication which provide USTRANSCOM the flexibility and agility
to meet ongoing and emergent requirements.
peacetime-wartime logistics management
Question. Our transportation and logistics systems have been
significantly altered over time to reduce organic military air and
sealift capacity and rely on commercial aircraft and sealift as well as
commercial supply chains to deliver spare parts to deployed forces.
This was done to reduce costs as well as increase buying power and
flexibility for the military.
How does TRANSCOM plan for the risk that this change in providing
equipment and logistics to deployed forces thousands of miles away in
potential combat zones?
Answer. Commercial providers help mitigate risk of access to
challenging theaters such as Afghanistan through their ability to
leverage intermodal networks--the Northern Distribution Network (NDN),
which is primarily commercial, is a good example of mitigating risk to
access Afghanistan by surface means in case the Pakistan ground lines
of communication (PAK GLOC) is not available.
When deploying and sustaining forces in a combat zone, where the
threat level prevents commercial assets from delivering to those
locations, in general, commercial providers would move requirements to
enroute locations, and military assets would move those requirements
into the theater of operations in order to mitigate the risk to
commercial providers while leveraging their capabilities.
Question. How does TRANSCOM utilize commercial partners for
logistics in a wartime environment? How do you plan to balance
logistics capacity between commercial and military logistics systems?
Answer. When operating in a non-permissive (wartime) environment,
USTRANSCOM has an outstanding track record of balancing commercial and
organic logistics systems. In general, commercial providers move
requirements to enroute locations outside of the threat environment,
and military assets move those requirements into the theater. This
practice has proven to be cost effective while meeting Combatant
Commander needs and also ensures commercial providers assume minimal
risk in transporting military cargo and personnel.
Question. The military relies on an extensive network of logistics
facilities overseas to support our deployed forces. These overseas
depots enable our deployed forces to remain on station longer without
having to be supported directly from CONUS. These depots are in host
nations, which are U.S. friends and allies.
What is the resiliency of these overseas depots, particularly in
places near ongoing political instability?
Answer. USTRANSCOM does not own or operate overseas depots.
However, as the Distribution Process Owner and Global Distribution
Synchronizer, USTRANSCOM does collaborate closely with Geographic
Combatant Commands, Military Services, Defense Logistics Agency, and
other strategic partners to develop and maintain an agile, secure and
resilient distribution network to support and sustain overseas depots.
We constantly monitor the operational environment and respond to
challenges, as appropriate, with the use of alternate distribution
routes and logistics nodes to ensure the continued viability of those
depots.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S.
Transportation Command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
kc-46a
1. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, I recognize that U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) will
be making decisions regarding how to meet refueling needs in light of
the U.S. Air Force's planned retirement of the KC-10, and potential
delays in the KC-46A procurement schedule. Do you anticipate
reassignment and continued use of any KC-135 displaced by KC-46A
delivery will be necessary to meet refueling demands?
General McDew. The United States Air Force (USAF) will re-address
the KC-135 retirement flow in combination with a potential KC-10
retirement flow in a future Program Objective Memoranda (POM) cycle.
Although overall air refueling capability includes some risk, I am
confident that the KC-46 development and delivery schedule along with
disposition of the KC-135 fleet will continue to meet all USTRANSCOM
mission requirements.
2. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, in assessing current and
future refueling demands and the possible need for KC-135 capabilities,
can you please address these three requirements: Regional Air Refueling
Receiver Demand requirements within CONUS; support of the Air Bridge to
Europe; and support of the overall ``pivot'' to the Pacific theater and
Asia?
General McDew. Our aerial refueling capabilities are not solely
dedicated to specific regions or missions sets; however, they are
managed holistically in an effort to respond expeditiously and
effectively to support all Combatant Command requirements. These
requirements include CONUS Refueling Receiver Demand and support to
deployment bridges to both Europe (eastbound) and Asia (westbound). The
FY 2016 President's Budget includes an end-state fleet of 479 tanker
aircraft to meet air mobility operational requirements with moderate
risk. The development and delivery of the KC-46 combined with the
capabilities of the existing tanker fleet will reduce risk in aerial
refueling capability and ensure the ability to meet all worldwide
commitments.
arctic
3. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, as you know, the Arctic is
emerging as a strategic region of the world for vessel commerce as well
as the production of oil, gas, and minerals. TRANSCOM is tasked with
the coordination of people and transportation assets to allow the
United States to project and sustain forces, whenever, wherever, and
for as long as they are needed. How important is the Arctic to U.S.
national security interests and what role do you think TRANSCOM will
play in future Arctic operations?
General McDew. The United States is an Arctic Nation with
permanent, vital national security interests in the Arctic Region.
USTRANSCOM will play an increasingly important role in the Arctic
Region as commercial sealift vessels, scientific operations, and
national defense assets transit the Arctic Region. To the extent
military cargo workload permits, USTRANSCOM supports U.S. security and
economic interests in the Arctic and other navigable areas around the
globe to assure freedom of navigation in support of United States
interests.
4. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, do you believe we currently
have the resources and capabilities needed to ensure the nation's
military presence in the Arctic?
General McDew. USTRANSCOM has sufficient resources to support the
current military presence and similar levels of effort for future
contingencies in the Arctic. As demands change, we will continue to
engage with United States Northern Command, European Command and
Pacific Command to ensure we have adequate resources to meet those
requirements.
5. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, I am concerned that the U.S.
Coast Guard now only has one operational heavy icebreaker in its fleet.
Russia currently has six heavy icebreakers and another currently under
construction. Do you have any concerns about TRANSCOM's ability to
project and sustain forces in the Arctic based on the current
composition of the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreakers?
General McDew. The United States has enduring national, strategic,
and economic interests in the Arctic. United States Northern Command
establishes requirements for USTRANSCOM's transportation and
distribution capabilities in the Arctic. Although current icebreaker
resources meet projected near-term requirements, USTRANSCOM supports
DOD and DoT efforts to ensure future access and freedom of navigation
throughout the Arctic region.
6. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, New York's 109th Airlift Wing
is home to the only LC-130 Ski Birds in the U.S. Air Force. Their
unique ability to provide air lift on snow and ice has made them a
valuable resource for the National Science Foundation supporting
science missions in Greenland and Antarctica. Based on the current
types of threats you see in the Arctic, how important is this type of
air lift capability to the future success of TRANSCOM in Arctic?
General McDew. The ski-equipped LC-130s from the 109th Airlift Wing
in Schenectady, NY, does indeed provide our Nation a very unique
capability. Their ability to operate on the snow and ice makes them one
of only a few organizations in the world capable of airlifting assets
in and out of the Artic. The capabilities provided by the 109th Airlift
Wing will continue to be of value to the USTRANSCOM mission.
7. Senator Gillibrand. General McDew, do you think we will need
more of this capability in the future as our as our Arctic presence
increases?
General McDew. Based on current requirements in the Arctic, I have
no reason to believe USTRANSCOM needs more of this capability at this
time. Should USTRANSCOM be called upon in the future to provide an
increased level of support in the Polar Regions, I would advocate for
the resources needed to ensure we provide the appropriate level of
support.
------
[The nomination reference of General Darren W. McDew, USAF,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 4, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United
States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a
position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., section 601:
To Be General
General Darren W. McDew, 9277
------
[The biographical sketch of General Darren W. McDew, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of General Darren W. McDew, USAF
General Darren W. McDew is Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott
Air Force Base, Illinois. Air Mobility Command's mission is to provide
rapid, global mobility and sustainment for America's armed forces. The
command also plays a crucial role in providing humanitarian support at
home and around the world. The men and women of AMC active duty, Air
National Guard, Air Force Reserve and civilians--provide airlift,
aerial refueling, special air mission and aeromedical evacuation.
General McDew was commissioned in 1982 following his graduation
from Virginia Military Institute. He began his flying career at Loring
Air Force Base, Maine. His staff assignments include serving as a
member of the Air Force Chief of Staff Operations Group, Air Force aide
to the President, and Chief of the U.S. Air Force Senate Liaison
Division, Washington, D.C. and the Director of Public Affairs, Office
of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. As part of the
Joint Staff at the Pentagon, General McDew also served as Vice Director
for Strategic Plans and Policy. He has served as the Vice Commander of
the 18th Air Force, Scott AFB, Illinois, and has commanded at the
squadron, group and wing levels as well as an Air Force direct
reporting unit. He has deployed in support of ongoing operations in
Central and Southwest Asia as an air expeditionary group commander and
later as the Director of Mobility Forces. Prior to his current
assignment, General McDew was the Commander of the 18th Air Force,
Scott AFB, Illinois.
Education
1982 - Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering, Virginia
Military Institute, Lexington 1985 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell
AFB, AL.
1994 - Master of Science degree in aviation management, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University 1995 Air Command and Staff College, by
correspondence
2000 - Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellowship, Sun Microsystems
Inc., Palo Alto, Calif.
2003 - National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs, Syracuse University, NY.
2005 - Leadership Development Program, Center for Creative
Leadership, Greensboro, N.C.
2008 - Senior Joint Information Operations Applications Course, Air
University, Maxwell AFB, AL.
2008 - Air Force Enterprise Leadership Seminar, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC.
2011 - Department of Defense National Security Studies Program,
Defense Policy Seminar, Elliott School of International Affairs,
Washington, DC.
2012 - Joint Task Force Commander Training Course, Colorado
Springs, CO.
2013 - Pinnacle Course, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC.
2013 - Joint Force Air Component Commander Course, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, AL.
2014 - Leadership at the Peak Course, Colorado Springs, CO.
2014 - Cyberspace Operations Executive Course, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, AL.
Assignments
1. October 1982-October 1983, Student, undergraduate pilot
training, Williams AFB, AZ.
2. March 1984-June 1989, Standardization and Evaluation Copilot,
Aircraft Commander, Instructor Pilot and Flight commander, 42nd Air
Refueling Squadron, Loring AFB, ME.
3. July 1989-June 1992, Combat Crew Training School examiner and
Instructor Pilot, Assistant Deputy Wing Inspector and Wing Executive
Officer, 93rd Bomb Wing, Castle AFB, CA.
4. July 1992-April 1994, Rated Force Planner, Directorate of
Personnel Plans; member, Air Force Chief of Staff Operations Group,
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.
5. April 1994-June 1996, Air Force aide to the President, White
House, Washington, DC.
6. October 1996-June 1997, Assistant Operations Officer, 14th
Airlift Squadron, Charleston AFB, SC.
7. June 1997-June 1999, Commander, 14th Airlift Squadron,
Charleston AFB, SC.
8. August 1999-July 2000, Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow,
Sun Microsystems Inc., Palo Alto, CA.
9. July 2000-January 2002, Commander, 62nd Operations Group,
McChord AFB, WA (September 2001--December 2001, Commander, 60th Air
Expeditionary Group, Southwest Asia).
10. January 2002-July 2003, Commander, 375th Airlift Wing, and
Installation Commander, Scott AFB, IL.
11. July 2003-January 2005, Chief, U.S. Air Force Senate Liaison
Division, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC.
12. January 2005-July 2006, Commander, 43rd Airlift Wing, and
Installation Commander, Pope AFB, NC. (January 2006-May 2006, Director
of Mobility Forces, Southwest Asia).
13. July 2006-November 2007, Vice Commander, 18th Air Force, Scott
AFB, IL.
14. November 2007-February 2009, Director of Public Affairs, Office
of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, DC.
15. February 2009-December 2010, Vice Director for Strategic Plans
and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, DC.
16. December 2010-August 2012, Commander, Air Force District of
Washington, Andrews AFB, MD.
17. August 2012-April 2014, Commander, 18th Air Force, Scott AFB,
IL.
18. May 2014-present, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB,
IL.
Summary of Joint Assignments
1. April 1994-June 1996, Air Force aide to the President, Mite
House, Washington, DC, as a major.
2. February 2009-December 2010, Vice Director for Strategic Plans
and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, DC, as a major
general.
Flight Information
Rating: command pilot.
Flight hours: more than 3,300.
Aircraft flown: T-37B, T-38A, KC-135A/R, C-17A, C-141B, C-9, C-21,
C-130E/H, and UH-I N.
Major Awards and Decorations
Distinguished Service Medal.
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster.
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters.
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters.
Army Commendation Medal.
Air Force Achievement Medal.
Joint Meritorious Unit Award with oak leaf cluster.
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with nine oak leaf clusters.
Air Force Organizational Excellence Award with three oak leaf
clusters
Combat Readiness Medal with three oak leaf clusters.
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star.
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.
Kosovo Campaign Medal with bronze star.
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal.
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.
Armed Forces Service Medal.
Effective Dates of Promotion
Second Lieutenant May 15, 1982.
First Lieutenant May 15, 1984.
Captain July 13, 1986.
Major March 1, 1994.
Lieutenant Colonel Jan. 1, 1997 Colonel April, 2000.
Brigadier General Sept. 2, 2006.
Major General Dec. 9, 2008.
Lieutenant General Aug. 6, 2012 General May 5, 2014.
(Current as of November 2014).
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General Darren
W. McDew, USAF in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Darren W. McDew.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Transportation Command.
3. Date of nomination:
4 June 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
29 September 1960; Rantoul, IL.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Evelyn K. McDew (maiden name: Massenburg).
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
N/A.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
N/A.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Life Member, Air Force Association.
Life Member, Daedalians.
Air Force Sergeants Association.
American Association of Retired Persons.
National Society of Black Engineers.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Boys and Girls Club Hall of Fame.
National Society of Black Engineers Lifetime Achievement Award.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
General Darren W. McDew
This 7th day of May, 2015
[The nomination of General Darren W. McDew, USAF was
reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 23, 2015,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 2015.]
NOMINATION OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 21, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Ayotte, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Reed,
McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
consider the nomination of General Mark Milley to be the Chief
of Staff of the U.S. Army.
We welcome you, General Milley, as well as members of the
Milley family. As is our tradition, at the beginning of your
testimony, we invite you to introduce the members of your
family who are joining you. We know the sacrifices your family
has made, and we are grateful to them for their continued
support of our Nation.
General Milley. Thank you, Chairman McCain, and thank you,
Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee for the privilege and opportunity to
appear before you today.
I also appreciate the confidence of the President of the
United States.
Chairman McCain. General, I was going to----
General Milley. Oh, I am sorry, sir.
Chairman McCain.--ask if you would like to introduce your
family. First, Senator Reed and I have to emote for a while.
General Milley. In that case, I shall introduce my family.
[Laughter.]
My wife is here, Hollyanne, off to my left over here
sitting next to General Richardson, and my son and daughter are
not here. They are both working. My son Peter is down in Texas
working in the oil industry, and my daughter is also working in
the oil industry and she is based out of Chicago. I am very,
very fortunate to have Hollyanne by my side for the last 30
consecutives years of service.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, General, and thank you.
You come before this committee as part of a major
transition of American military leadership. If confirmed as
Army Chief of Staff, you will serve alongside a new Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and new Service
Chiefs for the Navy and Marine Corps.
As part of this team, you will lead an Army of volunteer
soldiers that has proven itself time and again over a decade of
war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army has endured 70 percent of
the casualties in those wars, and as we all know, the untold
sacrifices of our soldiers and their families did not end with
their mission.
As our Nation confronts the most diverse and complex array
of global crises since the end of World War II, the next Chief
of Staff of the Army will be responsible for ensuring the total
Army--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--remains the most decisive land
force in the world. Unless Washington wakes up to the damage
being done to our military right now by drastic reductions in
defense spending, the Army will be forced to carry out its
mission with fewer dollars, fewer soldiers, and aging
equipment.
Over the past few years, the Army's end strength has been
reduced from a peak of 570,000 Active Duty personnel to 490,000
troops this year. Just last week, the Army announced it would
cut an additional 40,000 troops over the next 2 years, reducing
its end strength down to 450,000. If defense spending cuts
continue, there is even talk that the Army could shrink to
420,000 troops. What is worse, only one-third of the Army's
brigade combat teams are ready for deployment and decisive
operations. In short, the Army is facing a downward spiral of
military capacity and readiness that increases the risk that,
in a crisis, we will have too few soldiers who could enter a
fight without proper training or equipment.
We are not cutting the Army because the world has become
safer or threats to our security have been reduced. In fact,
the opposite is true. As you have stated, General Milley, this
is a budget-driven force level reduction, and it rested on a
series of assumptions, that we were getting out of Iraq and
Afghanistan and stepping back from the Middle East more
broadly, that Europe was secure, and United States forces could
depart the continent, and that there was no need for
significant deployments to Africa. Instead, we have seen the
rise of ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant],
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the outbreak of Ebola, and the
growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region.
I think you would agree, General, that when our assumptions
about the world change, we must either adapt our conclusions to
the new realities or scale back our ambitions to meet our
reduced means. Instead, the administration and many in the
Congress are trying to have it both ways: asking our soldiers
to take on a growing set of missions with fewer and fewer
resources. This is not just about reversing the effects of
sequestration. It is about replacing the arbitrary spending
cuts on defense that were imposed under the Budget Control Act
of 2011. That is the only way we will get back to a truly
strategy-driven defense budget.
While I believe there is no strategic rationale for the
Army's end strength to fall below its pre-September 11 level of
490,000 troops, in recent years, the Army's headquarters and
administrative staff have grown at the same time it has cut
brigade combat teams. That too is wrong, and it only hurts the
Army's credibility. This committee is embarking on a multiyear
effort to make major reductions in headquarters and
administration across the Department of Defense. If confirmed,
General, I want you to be a relentless partner in this effort.
Another priority for the next Army Chief of Staff is
modernizing the force. The Army faces an enormous challenge in
replacing, repairing, and reconditioning its equipment after 14
years of sustained combat. At the same time, the Army must
continue to modernize to meet future threats. Programs like the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
aim to enhance tactical mobility, command and control, medical
evacuation, and other critical combat functions while
significantly improving the protection and safety of our
soldiers.
Accomplishing these goals will require additional
resources, to be sure. Perhaps more importantly, it requires
the Army to learn the lessons of its failed acquisition
programs, a record that has been particularly dismal. From
Comanche to Crusader, Future Combat System to the Ground Combat
Vehicle, billions of dollars have been wasted on programs that
never became operational. These and other failures also reflect
the inefficiency and dysfunction that have crippled our defense
acquisition system more broadly: unwarranted optimism of cost
and schedule estimates, funding instability, requirements
creep, immature technology, excessive risk-taking, and
concurrency between testing and production.
There are diverse views on acquisition reform, but one
thing is for sure: the status quo is unacceptable. To provide
our soldiers the equipment they need to defend the Nation, we
simply cannot continue to have blurred lines of accountability
and evasions of responsibility inside the defense acquisition
system. That is why in this year's National Defense
Authorization Act, this committee adopted reforms to increase
the role of the Military Services in the acquisition process
and to create new mechanisms to ensure accountability for
results. Among these reforms is an enhanced role for the
Service Chief s. The Army must ensure that its acquisition
programs stay on schedule, within cost, and perform to
expectations. If that does not happen, General, we will be
calling you.
General, thank you again for appearing before this
committee today, and we look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
join you in welcoming General Milley this morning. I would like
to thank him for his many years of service to out Nation and to
the Army and for his willingness to continue to serve. General
Milley is joined this morning by his wife Hollyanne. Thank you,
ma?am, for your service to the Nation and to the Army. I also
wanted to acknowledge Mary and Peter and wish them well.
General Milley, if confirmed, you will oversee the Army
during a time when the United States faces a multitude of
challenges abroad. While the conflict areas around the world
continue to increase, the amount of resources devoted to the
Army continue to decrease. Earlier this month, it was announced
that over the next 2 years, the Army would convert two infantry
brigade combat teams to battalion task forces. These changes
were necessary in order for the Army to continue to reduce its
end strength, with a final goal of 450,000 soldiers by the end
of fiscal year 2017. In addition to these reductions, the Army
also intends to cut approximately 17,000 civilian personnel,
although it is my understanding that the Army has not
identified which installations will be impacted by these
reductions.
If sequestration funding levels remain in place, the
situation becomes much more ominous for the Army. Without any
relief from the budget caps, the Army will need to reduce its
end strength further to a level of 420,000 soldiers in the
coming years. General, I hope you will share with us your views
today on how to manage these reductions, if in fact they are
called for, and what, if any, impact these reductions would
have on the readiness of the Army.
In addition to managing end strength reductions, the Army
is grappling with how to modernize the force and increase
readiness levels. In recent years, the Army has had to make
tough choices on its major modernization programs. As the Army
Equipment Modernization Strategy, released in March 2015,
acknowledges, ``The Army cannot afford to equip and sustain the
Total Army with the most modern equipment; therefore, we must
acknowledge fiscal realities and we will selectively modernize
equipment and formations.''
At the same time, the Army continues to cope with reduced
readiness levels. General Odierno, the current Chief of Staff
of the Army, testified before the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense in March of this year that readiness
levels are at historically low levels. Specifically he stated
that ``today, only 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when
our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent.''
General Milley, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on
how the Army can make targeted investments in modernization
while also restoring readiness levels.
The National Guard, has always been an integral component
to our Nation's defense. In fact, today they are probably more
integral than at any time in our history. They serve as the
first line of defense when there is a natural disaster at home,
and they perform a vital homeland security mission. Without
question, the role of the National Guard and Reserve component
played in both Afghanistan and Iraq was critical to our success
on the ground.
However, as the Army draws down and resources become more
limited, there has been tension between the Active and Reserve
components, the most notable example being the Army
restructuring initiative. To ensure that the Army does not make
any irrevocable force structure changes, last year, Congress
created the National Commission on the Future of the Army to
undertake a comprehensive review of the size and force
structure of the Army. The commission has been working
diligently meeting with stakeholders, performing site visits,
and conducting hearings in order to provide their report to
Congress by February 1, 2016.
General Milley, if confirmed, you will be working with
General Grass, Chief of the Army National Guard Bureau, and I
look forward to hearing from you on how you envision the
relationship between the Active Army and the National Guard and
Reserve components and what, if anything, can be done to
strengthen that relationship.
Finally, I have repeatedly stated that sequestration is a
senseless approach to addressing our Nation's fiscal challenges
and it undermines our national security and our military
readiness. Defense budgets should be based on a long-term
military strategy, not sequestration-level budget caps. the
chairman has made this point eloquently and consistently. I
hope you will share your thoughts on this topic with the
committee today.
Again, General, thank you for your service.
Chairman McCain. General, there are standard questions that
are asked of all military nominees, and I would like to proceed
with those before your opening statement.
The questions are as follows.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
General Milley. I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
General Milley. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Milley. I have not, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Milley. I will, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Milley. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Milley. Yes, they will, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General Milley. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Milley. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you. Welcome and please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY
General Milley. Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member
Reed and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee for the privilege and opportunity to appear before
you today. I appreciate the confidence the President of the
United States and the Secretary of Defense have shown by
nominating me to be the next Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
Thank you all for your continued and unwavering support and
commitment to the soldiers and civilians and families of what
is your Army. As your Army is the strength of our Nation, our
soldiers are the strength of our Army, and all of their
families are the strength of our soldiers.
Likewise, my family has been my strength throughout my
life. Both my mother and father served our Nation in World War
II as part of the greatest generation, with my mother attending
the medical needs of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
from the Pacific at a military hospital near Seattle, WA, while
my father served with the 4th Marine Division in the Central
Pacific, making the assault landings on Kwajelein, Saipan,
Tinian, and the bloody battle of Iwo Jima as a young 19- and
20-year-old.
Sadly, my mother passed over 20 years ago and my father
passed just last April, a week shy of his 91st birthday. I am
absolutely sure that they are both very proud from above of
their soldier son and will always be a source of leadership and
guidance for me in the years ahead.
I am also unbelievably lucky to have by my side, as I
previously introduced, for the last 30 consecutive years of my
service the most dedicated and strongest woman in the world, my
wife Hollyanne. She, like my parents, is a constant source of
inspiration and love. For many years, during seven contingency
deployments on various operations and thousands of days of
training, Hollyanne has essentially been like so many Army
spouses, a single parent, who has raised two wonderful children
who are now young adults, our daughter, Mary Margaret, and our
son Peter, who unfortunately could not be with us today. It is
for them and for all of our children and the future generations
that I and all of us in uniform continue to serve and are
willing to go into harm's way to give our todays for their
tomorrows.
I would like to just take a moment to recognize Hollyanne
as a representative of all the Army families, of all the Army
spouses, and for their incredible resilience, service and
sacrifice.
I would also like to congratulate my predecessor, General
Ray Odierno, and his wife Linda, who have given over 39
consecutive years of distinguished service to our great Nation.
I want to personally thank them both for their tremendous
leadership as our Chief of Staff and leading spouse. Our Nation
has been well served by this selfless soldier and his entire
family.
Chairman, Senators, service in the U.S. Army is a
privilege. It is a distinct privilege. It is not a right. It is
a privilege and it is earned the old-fashioned way, through
hard work and meeting exacting standards of discipline and
excellence.
Your Army's contract with the American people is a combat-
ready force built around our Nation's most valuable asset, our
sons and daughters who become soldiers of character and the
best trained and best equipped Army in the world. Our
fundamental task is like no other. It is to win and to win in
the unforgiving crucible of ground combat. There are many other
tasks and roles and missions that your Army can do as part of
our joint force, and we perform those every day in support of
our Nation's interest. We assure allies. We deter adversaries.
We shape outcomes and build partner capacity and provide
foundational capabilities to enable other joint forces in a
variety of ways. We have provided needed help to victims of
disaster.
Our reason for being, our very reason for being at the very
core of what it means to have an Army, it is to win and to win
decisively in ground combat against the enemies of our country
so that American citizens can enjoy life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Every year, 120,000 of America's sons and
daughters raise their right hand to take an oath of allegiance
to serve our Nation in the uniform of your U.S. Army. In
return, we make the commitment to develop them as soldiers, as
leaders, and importantly as citizens. These soldiers are the
core of our All-Volunteer Army, made up of three components:
the Active, the National Guard, and the Reserve. We are a total
Army. We are in fact one Army. We are America's Army. All of us
from private to general come from the people, and we are
dedicated to give our life and our limb to serve the people. We
do it with great pride and a cause that transcends ourselves.
I have huge confidence in our Army today. I have served in
it in both peace and war. Right now, we have the most skilled
and combat-experienced Army in the Nation's history. In this
time of increasing instability, of increasing uncertainty
throughout the globe, we must squarely face and solve
significant challenges as, Chairman, you mentioned, in
manpower, readiness, and modernization.
If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, I look
forward to working with this committee to get the Army the
resources it needs. I also pledge to be a careful steward on
behalf of the American taxpayer whom we recognize we all serve
as well.
Finally, if confirmed as Chief of Staff, I want to ensure
that the Army meets the expectations of the American people.
The American people have expected your Army to fight and win
our Nation's wars at any time, any place, and your soldiers are
ready to do that today, as we have done for 240 consecutive
years.
Today we have a great Army and we stand on the shoulders of
those who came before us. It would be a tremendous honor to
lead our soldiers of today as their Chief of Staff. I thank
each of you, without whom we would not even have an Army.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, General. Thank you for your
strong statement.
As you know, last week there were four unarmed marines and
one sailor in Chattanooga, TN, who were murdered. What steps do
you believe should be put in place immediately to improve the
security of Army personnel in the United States, especially at
facilities like recruiting stations?
General Milley. Senator, first as a son of someone who
served in the 4th Marine Division, I want to publicly extend my
condolences to the families of the four marines and one sailor
who were killed. It is a horrible tragedy.
Force protection is a key task for any commander, as it is
for all of the leaders in the Army and throughout the military.
Specifically, there is a wide variety of both active and
passive measures. As you may know, Admiral Gortney, Commander
of NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command], issued out some increased
force protection measures, which I will not discuss publicly
exactly what those are.
From my view, there is a variety of both active and
passive. From the passive standpoint, there is a variety of
hardening things we can do, bulletproof glass, et cetera.
Actively we can increase patrols, work closely with the law
enforcement.
As far as arming recruiters go, I think that is complicated
legally, and there are issues involved throughout the country,
but we will have to come to grips with that, and it certainly
should be----
Chairman McCain. The legal part of it can be resolved. Do
you think that they should, under certain conditions, be armed?
General Milley. I think under conditions, both on military
bases and in out-stations, recruiting stations, Reserve
centers, that we should seriously consider it. In some cases, I
think it is appropriate.
Chairman McCain. As regards Afghanistan, should we withdraw
according to a preordained calendar-based plan or a condition-
based plan?
General Milley. I am in favor of a conditions-based plan.
Chairman McCain. Which right now would you say that the
situation would warrant evaluation and revision of the
President's plan by 2017 to have an embassy-based force?
General Milley. Right now, I think talking with John
Campbell, General Campbell, the Commander of the force in
Afghanistan, it is my understanding that the plan is
continually under review and that we will execute based on
conditions on the ground.
Chairman McCain. That is your view.
General Dunford has testified before this committee that
even with the $38 billion addition, that our Nation's military,
``would remain at the lower ragged edge of manageable risk in
our ability to execute the defense strategy.'' Do you agree
with that?
General Milley. I do with respect to the Army as we look
out, and I concur with General Odierno's assessment.
Chairman McCain. That we would be at the lower ragged edge?
General Milley. I would probably agree with that, yes,
Senator. Then I think he testified to significant risk, and if
we go to 420,000, as Senator Reed mentioned earlier, we would
be shifting into high risk.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe that we should arm the
Ukrainians with counter-battery systems with which to defend
themselves from Russian artillery and rocket strikes?
General Milley. Senator, I think providing nonlethal
equipment is already being done, and I think lethal equipment--
--
Chairman McCain. I am asking about lethal equipment.
General Milley. Yes. Lethal equipment I think is something
we should consider, and I would be in favor of lethal defensive
equipment.
Chairman McCain. In your view, do we have a strategy to
defeat ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]?
General Milley. Senator, there is a strategy. I think you
are familiar with the nine lines of effort. The military has
two. Currently there is a strategy.
Chairman McCain. That strategy also applies to Syria?
General Milley. Syria is part of the overall strategy with
respect to ISIS, as I understand it.
Chairman McCain. You believe that we do have a strategy to
defeat ISIS.
General Milley. I think there is a strategy, yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you think it will defeat ISIS?
General Milley. Right now, the way the strategy is laid
out, as I understand it, is that it is going to take a
considerable amount of time, measured in years, to defeat ISIS
if we execute the strategy as it is currently designed.
Chairman McCain. Maybe you could tell me a little bit about
that strategy because the President said they have not
developed it yet.
General Milley. As I understand it, there are nine lines of
effort. The two that concern the military are providing a
variety of enabler capabilities to the Iraqi military and also
to provide security force assistance and building partner
capacity with the Iraqi military.
Chairman McCain. In your experience, do you believe that we
need forward air controllers?
General Milley. In my experience, having forward air
controllers forward with units provides more effective close
air support.
Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you, General, and thank you
for your service. We look forward to moving forward with your
nomination. Congratulations, and all of us would also agree
that your predecessor is also an outstanding soldier. I thank
you.
General Milley. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, General Miley--Milley, for your
testimony. I get confused because up our way it is usually
``Miley.'' I do not know what happened.
General Milley. That is in Rhode Island, Senator.
Senator Reed. I know. You are from Massachusetts, I know.
[Laughter.]
Forgive me if I mispronounce things.
General Milley. As long as we both like the Red Sox, we are
good, sir.
Senator Reed. We like the Red Sox and the Bruins. Well, I
will stop right there and ask a service question, General.
You are facing force reductions, 450,000 Active Forces,
which leads to the question of how do you ensure that you can
meet all the requirements that are facing the Army. Several
possibilities that you can comment on--is a much smoother
closer integration with National Guard and Reserve Forces so
they can come into the fight earlier. That is one. Two,
obviously, continuing to operate jointly and train jointly with
the Marine Corps, which is a way to augment land forces. Three,
to continue or to increase, in fact, joint operations with
foreign militaries that are our allies. Could you comment on
those approaches? Will that in any way help sort of offset the
decline in manpower?
General Milley. Well, first, Senator, I think that the
reduction in manpower down to 450,000 for the Active Force,
920,000 or 980,000 overall for the total force--and I agree
with the current Chief of Staff's assessment that places the
Nation at significant risk, given our global commitments. In
order to mitigate that risk, incorporating elements of the
National Guard and Reserve component are key, and then working
with allies is fundamental. I think all of those are necessary
to mitigate some of the risk.
Senator Reed. Specifically with respect to the National
Guard, what is your approach? You know, we speak of one Army,
and frankly, looking back 30 or more years, it is now much more
one Army than it was previously. What are you going to do to
make sure that is more than rhetoric, that there really is one
consistent Army--National Guard and Reserve, Active Force?
General Milley. We are already doing many things. As the
Commander of Forces Command, I have got training readiness,
oversight for the Guard and actual command of the Reserves.
There are many thing we are doing right now. We integrate at
both of our combat training centers down at Fort Polk, LA, and
out in California National Training Center. We are fully
integrated with Reserve component and National Guard elements.
Integration of those forces is key, and we will sustain that
and increase that over time.
The second big one I think is we have partnerships. All of
our Active Component forces are partnered with National Guard
units, and they are fully integrated for home station training
and support each other.
Senator Reed. One of the areas of concern--and this has
been led by Senator McCain's efforts over many years--has been
acquisition reform. He, frankly, indicated a long litany of
major systems where the Army could not get off the drawing
board literally. There are proposals today to involve the
chiefs more directly not only with authority but
responsibility.
Can you comment about the acquisition process and what you
would like to do as Service Chief in making it more effective?
General Milley. Thanks, Senator.
In my view, I think the Service Chiefs should have an
increased role across the entire acquisition process where we
are responsible for and held accountable for linking the
requirements, which we do play--the Service Chiefs play a role
in that right now. We are not or the Service Chiefs are not as
engaged as could be with respect to the resources and decisions
of actual acquisition. Those three pieces, linking resources,
the requirements, and the actual acquisition--in my view the
Chiefs should have increased authority to link all three of
those throughout the entire process. Not just the inputs of
requirements but also the outputs of acquisition.
Senator Reed. Just a final point very quickly is that we
have consistently pointed out that readiness is being
challenged in terms of brigades when 30 percent of our Army
brigades are ready to go, and that is way below. That requires
some either massive budget relief or internal reallocation of
resources. If you do not get the budget relief, what kind of
resources are you prepared to reallocate to get training done?
General Milley. Really, there are three pieces, three
levers that any Chief of Staff can use. One is end strength.
The other is modernization, and the other is readiness. Our
obligation as an Army or any service is to ensure that we have
ready forces. There is no soldier, sailor, airman, or marine
who should ever go into harm's way not fully manned, equipped,
well let, et cetera. No one should ever go in harm's way
unready. Readiness is the number one priority. It is my number
one priority, if confirmed, and it will remain the number one
priority.
That leaves only end strength and modernization. Right now,
the Army has taken a lot of cuts in modernization over time,
and then we have end strength. If confirmed, I am going to have
to take a hard look to make sure that we balance those three
components as we go forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for being here today.
When we met earlier this month you mentioned two of your
priorities. As you just said, the first one was readiness, and
you also said investing in future needs.
Do you believe that the future needs will require the Army
to primarily focus on modernizing its current capabilities, or
do you see a shift to new missions and new capabilities? I know
there has been a lot of talk about the Army's role in coastal
defense. Where do you see that headed?
General Milley. Thanks, Senator.
As you said, two priorities exist for any Chief of Staff
really. One is maintaining readiness of the force. Second is to
posture the force to be ready at some point in the future. The
period of time that I would be looking at in the future, if I
were confirmed, would be the 2025-2030-2035 timeframe. Right
now our modernization strategy is to incrementally improve
existing systems. That is okay for right now. There are a wide
variety of emerging technologies that we may or may not have
military application 15 to 20 years from now. We are going to
take a look at those. We are going to explore all of those, ask
the right questions and see which ones of those apply to ground
forces. Many already apply to air and naval forces. Emerging
technology is an area we are going to take hard look at,
Senator.
Senator Fischer. Do you see a shift, though, to any new
missions that are going to be necessary for the Army to
acquire?
General Milley. I think the fundamental missions that
currently exist in the variety of strategic documents that are
out there will remain consistent, and I do not see a
fundamental shift in the mission for the Army.
Senator Fischer. Even with the advancement of new
technologies by people who are not our friends? Do you see the
Army playing any role in that on new missions?
General Milley. The only one that is coming to mind right
now is cyber. We definitely have increased our capabilities in
cyber across the joint force, and the Army is building a cyber
force. We are going to continue to look at that because that is
critical for the defense of the Nation and for the Army's
capabilities.
Senator Fischer. As the current Commander of the Army's
Forces Command (FORCECOM), I know that you are responsible for
providing Army units so you can fulfill the combatant
commanders' requirements. We heard a little bit about the force
reduction and the impact that that may have. Right now, are you
able to fulfill the combatant commanders' requirements? Where
will it be when we look at a force that is reduced to 450,000?
General Milley. As Commander of FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces
Command], right now we are able, Senator, to fulfill the
combatant commanders' requests for forces that have come in. As
we continue to draw down to 450,000 by 2017-2018, I think we
are going to incur increased risk, as the current chief has
mentioned, at the end of it, it will be significant risk.
We will have to see. We do not know what the future
requirements are going to be. Senator McCain mentioned you got
issues in eastern Europe. You got issues with ISIS. There is a
wide variety of other security challenges around the world. If
demand continues to increase that it has in the last year,
unanticipated demand, then I think we will have to reassess our
risk assessment.
Senator Fischer. SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] is
one of the combatant commands that you support as well. I have
been concerned that reductions across the services are going to
impact the conventional force enablers that our special ops
guys rely upon. How do you work with them to manage that
collateral damage that reductions are going to have on their
capabilities?
General Milley. We are very, very closely tied as you might
imagine, with Special Operations Command. 80 percent of U.S.
special operations comes from the Army. We are very closely
tied at Fort Bragg. FORSCOM headquarters is also the
headquarters for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. We
are joined at the hip.
One of the big lessons learned that has come out of the
last 10 to 15 years of conflict has been the synergistic effect
that we have gotten from the interdependence of both
conventional and special operations. We will continue to work
with them very, very closely. We have them integrated in all of
our major exercises at the combat training centers. We work
with them on acquisition development, and obviously, we provide
a wide variety of enablers that support special operations. We
will keep that linkage. That will not break.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your
commitment to making sure that our military men and women are
able to perform the missions that they are given. Thank you.
General Milley. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General. I want to thank you for your service to
our country and to your family's support of that service you
have given us.
Sir, you and I have had a good conversation on quite a few
things, and I will ask you the same question I have asked most
of our conferees. What do you consider the greatest threat that
the United States of America faces?
General Milley. As a soldier----
Senator Manchin. The national security for our country.
General Milley. As a soldier, as a military officer, I
would have to say that it is Russia, and let me explain that
and why. Russia is the only country on Earth that retains a
nuclear capability to destroy the United States. It is an
existential threat to the United States. It has capability.
Intent? I do not know. The activity of Russia since 2008
has been very, very aggressive. They have attacked and invaded
Georgia. They have seized the Crimea. They have attacked into
the Ukraine. That is worrisome. I would put Russia right now
from a military perspective as the number one threat.
I would also add China, North Korea, and ISIS, along with
Iran, including the recent agreement that was signed the other
day. Those countries--I would not put them in any particular
order. Each in their own different way represents security
threats to the United States.
Senator Manchin. Also, we talked about the obstacles that
you are facing or that we are facing by using the National
Guard to the full extent, especially the day-to-day operations.
If you could expand on that. What are the obstacles that
prevent the Army from using its Army National Guard to the
extent that they should be, as well trained as they are today?
General Milley. As you know, Senator, the National Guard
has been key over the last decade and a half and have served
very proudly and honorably in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and
they are fully integrated in a lot of our training operations
here in the continental United States. It would help if we had
greater access to the Guard. Right now, the Guard has state
partnership programs overseas with a wide variety of countries.
There is a lot of exercises in support of combatant commanders
that we could use Guard Forces for. Its operations, current
operations. Some are peacekeeping, peace enforcement such as
Kosovo and the Sinai. Others are more active in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Fundamentally access to the Guard is key.
That all links back to the budget. Right now we can only
pay for bringing Guard units, mobilizing them, bringing them on
under OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding, and many
of these operations are, in fact, exercises for the COCOMs
[combatant commands] and they are not covered with OCO funding.
Access and funding.
Senator Manchin. I am sure we look forward to working with
you on making that available because I think our Guard could be
used more effectively than what they are right now, other than
private contractors that we are using. That would bring me
right up to the auditing. What is your understanding of where
the Army stands in terms of being ready for a full audit by the
end of fiscal year 2017?
General Milley. I have been briefed that both as a FORSCOM
Commander but also through the pre-confirmation hearing
preparation and briefings I got from the Army staff that the
Army is on track and will be ready for the full auditing in
2017.
Senator Manchin. If confirmed, will you make improving the
Army's acquisition system a priority?
General Milley. Absolutely.
Senator Manchin. I think you would understand the concerns
that we have with the procurement system that we have right
now, and it does not seem to work very functionally as far as
effective or cost-effective especially. Changing those
systems--again, it all ties back to the auditing as quickly as
that can be done.
Also, do you have any idea on the amount of contractors
that we have or the Army is using--contract forces?
General Milley. I do not know right this minute Army-wide.
I do know, for example, I recently commanded in Afghanistan and
there were one and a half contractors to every soldier that was
deployed over there. The amount of contractors that we use is
significant. I can get you the exact number.
Senator Manchin. If you could, sir, I would appreciate that
because I think the cost of the contractors versus using our
own National Guard and Reserves--it makes more sense to use, in
my estimation, people in uniform versus people that basically
have been in uniform and left for the higher pay that the
contractors are receiving. That is the rub I have had all
along. If you could help with that, I would appreciate it.
General Milley. Absolutely. We will do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
According to United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), which does
not break out the numbers by Service, as of August 17, 2015, there are
10,917 United States contractors in country and another 7,016 Other
Country Nationals for a total of 17,933 contractors.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, and I want to thank your family for
their service as well to our Nation.
I wanted to follow up. You confirmed today what General
Dunford had also testified to this committee before, that
Russia is our greatest national security threat. I noticed also
in your advance policy questions that you stated unambiguously
that the Army in Europe does not have what it needs. What does
EUCOM [U.S. European Command] need that it does not have, and
how important is this as we think about Russia as the most
significant threat that we are facing?
General Milley. I think there are two parts to that. One is
to assure our allies, and the other is to deter Russian
aggression. I think in both cases additional ground
capabilities are necessary. The Army is already moving out on
that to place activity sets over there and preposition
equipment to either reinforce capabilities that are there,
forces that are there, or to use that equipment for a variety
of exercises. There are a lot of tools in the kit bag we can
use, but I do think we need to increase ground forces on a
temporary rotational basis in order either to deter Russia or
assure our allies.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I wanted to follow up. You, in answer to Senator Manchin,
had talked about access to the Guard. One of the things that we
have seen is a program with the Air Force that is called Total
Force Enterprise Active Associate Unit. In other words, it is
total force. At Pease in New Hampshire, we have had an Active
Duty association between Active Duty Air Force and our Guard
there that has been really effective.
I wanted to ask you if that is something that you would
take a look at as actually actively partnering certain units
together to have these Active Duty associations because I think
this model--the Air Force has had some good success with it and
recognizes, as well, as you have already indicated today, we
would not have been able to fight the wars in Iraq or
Afghanistan without the Guard and Reserve. Being able to
actually do some training and work together with certain units
I think makes some sense. I wanted to get your thought on that
and if that is something you would look at as a possibility.
General Milley. It is, Senator. In fact, I met with your
TAG [Adjunct General] from New Hampshire, along with all the
other TAGs east of the Mississippi, about--I guess it was--6-8
weeks ago, and they brought that up. I am going to try to take
a look at that and see where it applies to the Army, if that
Air Force model can apply for greater and fuller integration.
As you know, the Guard and Reserve were integrated under
General Abrams when he was Chief of Staff right following
Vietnam. The Abrams doctrine has served the Nation well, and we
intend to fully implement that.
Senator Ayotte. Well, certainly it is a total force needs
in terms of what we need to do to defend the Nation. I
appreciate your careful examination of that program which has
been very successful at Pease.
I wanted to also follow up, General. How important is
effective and reliable air missile defense to Army operations?
Because one thing that has been brought to my attention, we
have the Patriot. Thirteen of our allies also rely on the
Patriot to protect their forces. Some of our allies have more
modern and advanced versions of the Patriot than our troops
have. I do not agree with that, and I think this committee very
clearly in the defense authorization--actually the Army
requested $106 million for Patriot improvement to upgrade our
use of the Patriot, and that was actually accepted by this
committee.
I wanted to get your sense based on your service in the
Army. What is your assessment of the Patriot air missile
defense system, and do you fully support the improvement
funding that the Army requested for this? How important is this
to our troops?
General Milley. Well, Senator, let me take the last part
first, how important it is. To my knowledge--I am not a
military historian, but I do not think the U.S. Army has come
under enemy air attack consistently since the invasion of
Normandy, and that is because of two things. One, we have the
most dominant Air Force, both naval aviators and the U.S. Air
Force pilots and capabilities. We want to retain that forever.
The other piece is because we have a very robust air defense
capability that is capable of shooting down incoming aircraft.
Since the modern development of missile technology, that is
another component. We have come under missile threat. We were
under missile threat in the first Gulf War and even in the
second Gulf War. Patriot plays a key role in not only acquiring
and then destroying incoming fixed-wing aircraft, but also in
intercepting and destroying incoming missiles. Patriot is a
very, very key system to the air defense of our allies and our
own soldiers on the ground.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General, to you and your family for your service.
I appreciated the great conversation we had last week, and
should you be confirmed, I look forward to, of course, working
with you during your tenure.
I know that you realize, General, the importance of MILCON
[military construction] funding for readiness, particularly for
Hawaii in light of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. In fact,
I spent some 4 hours at Schofield Barracks recently and saw the
direct effect on facilities there when MILCON funding is cut or
deferred. Should you be confirmed, I hope you will work with
USARPAC [U.S. Army, Pacific] to ensure that their facilities
are maintained and modernized where appropriate so that our
troops have the facilities necessary to efficiently perform the
important tasks we ask of them.
General Milley. I will certainly do that, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
I also know that you share my view that the rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific is more than just rhetoric. The Navy's
intentions, for example, are to place 60 percent of its ships
in this area of responsibility. What do you see as the major
components of our rebalance strategy?
General Milley. Well, I think that right now, as I
mentioned earlier, two of that list of threats that were asked
to me of Senator Manchin included both China and North Korea.
The United States Army plays a key role. Eight of the 10
largest armies in the world are in the Pacific. Clearly, Navy
and Air Force and Marines are fundamental to success for U.S.
national security in the Pacific, but the Army is too. We
currently have forward-deployed forces in Korea that have made
a significant contribution to keeping the peace for the last 60
years since the end of the Korean War. We also have forces, as
you are well aware in Alaska, at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in
Washington State, and most importantly, in the State of Hawaii.
There is a considerable amount of Army capabilities in the
Pacific that play a key role in supporting Admiral Harris as
the combatant commander and supporting Admiral Harris' PACOM
[U.S. Pacific Command] strategy.
Senator Hirono. Well, we recognize that because of the
budget issues that certain force reductions were inevitable,
sad to say. Of course, while unfortunate, I do appreciate the
consideration that was given to the rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific and Hawaii's strategic location and the decisions that
were made regarding the cuts to our Army.
Can I expect that, if confirmed, you will continue to give
ample consideration to our strategic position--and that, of
course, includes Alaska--and to the importance of the
rebalance?
General Milley. Absolutely, Senator. As we go forward,
balancing of the disposition of the Army forces in accordance
with the National strategy and balancing that against risk is
the key task for the Chief of Staff and I will take that.
Senator Hirono. This committee has spent considerable time
on the issue of sexual assault in the military, and it still,
of course, occurs and harassment persists in our military. From
your testimony and our meeting, I know you find it totally
unacceptable as well.
However, while efforts are being made to support and
encourage victims to come forward, we are becoming more aware
of the problem of retaliation.
Can you share with us some of your specific plans to reduce
not only sexual assault but also to stop the further abuse by
retaliation?
General Milley. Well, Senator, as you mentioned, sexual
assault is just--there is no place for it at all in a
disciplined military force. 2 years ago, there were, I think it
was, 24,000 reports of sexual assault. That is an Army corps.
It is wrong. It is just not acceptable and we cannot accept
those kinds of casualties. Really that is what they are.
Victims become casualties. We cannot accept a corps? worth of
casualties and think we are going to have a ready Army that can
deal with the threats that were mentioned earlier. It is
unacceptable.
The Army has done a lot over the last many years here, and
there has been some progress. It is not nearly enough, and I am
fully committed, if confirmed as Chief of Staff, to continue to
work the entire problem of sexual assault and bring that to
zero.
Retaliation is a problem that has recently surfaced in the
last year or so. I saw the recent study which indicated that 60
percent of victims report that they have been retaliated
against, some by chain of command, others by peers. I think
that by chain of command retaliation, we can get after that
pretty fast through a variety of tools and holding commanders
accountable. Peer-on-peer is a little bit more complex, and I
am going to have to study that to figure out exactly what
techniques can be used to eliminate peer-on-peer retaliation.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. This will be an ongoing area of
concern for many of us on this committee. Thank you for
whatever can do to improve the situation vastly. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Milley. It is great to have you in front
of the committee today. I want to thank your wife for being
here as well. Thank you for the support that you have given
over 34 years or 30 years for your husband. Thank you.
I will not ask about the National Guard. We have had some
very in-depth discussions in my office, and I thank you for
your willingness to work with our wonderful National Guard and
all of those great young men and women that provide a great
support system to our Active component members. Thank you for
that.
I just wanted to mention we do have--you mentioned the ties
between our Active component and the Guard, and we do have our
second BCT [brigade combat team] from Iowa, the Iowa Army
National Guard, rotating through JRTC [Joint Readiness Training
Center] right now. We do appreciate that partnership.
I want to tag on with a little bit on what Senator Hirono
had also brought up, was the cases of sexual assault in the
military. I was at the West Point Board of Visitors meeting
yesterday, and this is a topic that we discussed. You have over
34 years of experience in the Army, and so you have seen a lot
of changes through the years. When it comes to sexual assault
and the way the Army reports this, prosecutes this, we have
seen some changes in recent years. I would like your takeaway
from what we have seen just in the last few years. With those
changes, what do you see? Is it improving? The areas where you
think we have seen the most impact. If you could just expound
on that a little bit please.
General Milley. Thanks, Senator.
As I mentioned, there has been some improvement. It is not
good enough, though, but there has been some improvement over
the last couple of years. We know that the prevalence of
incidents appears to be down and the numbers of reporting is
up. It indicates some shift in trust to the chain of command.
I think the key is to prevent and/or intervene upfront, and
that comes with a change of culture and fully educating the
force, a wide variety of training. If an incident does occur,
though, the first responsibility for that chain of command is
to protect that victim and then investigate fully with
professional investigators, CID [Army Criminal Investigation
Division] investigators, and then hold those perpetrators
accountable. I think the entire key is within the hands of the
chain of command, and that is staff sergeants and platoon
sergeants up through first sergeants and company commanders,
all the way up through general officers. All of us have to be
fully engaged in order to get after that.
A couple of things over 35 years that I have used and seen
and have emphasized.
One is the role of the commander, absolutely fundamental.
An engaged commander makes the difference between success and
lack of success.
Second I would say is operate in buddy teams. There is
great value in operating and using buddy team approaches like
you would in combat.
Third is control of the terrain, which is the barracks. We
cannot necessarily control outside the forts, but we surely as
commanders can control the barracks. Maintaining good order and
discipline is fundamental to the barracks. Lastly is alcohol.
We know that in many, many cases of sexual assault, alcohol is
a contributing factor. Maintaining good order and discipline
again in the proper use of alcohol is fundamental.
I think commanders and the chain of command, the sergeants
and the captains and the colonels and the generals, are
fundamental to getting after sexual assault and bringing it to
an end in our Army.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that very much. I do see where
we seem to have a lower level of incidents. We have a very,
very long way to go with this.
One of the points that we raised yesterday at West Point
with the Board of Visitors is that it is really difficult when
you have someone like yourself or even me with a lot of gray
hair standing there telling these young soldiers do not do
this, do not do this. I think where we can see a lot of shift
in the culture and the environment is when their peers are
stepping up and saying do not do it. We have talked about ``not
in my squad.'' I think that is an important step.
We have a long ways to go, General. I look forward to
working with you on this very important topic and protecting
our sons and daughters as they serve. Thank you very much.
General Milley. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley, first I want to commend you on your
statement. I think it is one of the best statements I have ever
heard about the role and mission of the Army. It should be
required reading I think for every member of the Army today.
One of the questions you answered to the chairman was that
would you commit to provide your personal views, even if those
views differ from the administration in power. You said yes to
that question. I want to underline the importance of that
question. All of your experience, all of your knowledge, all of
your wisdom that you have accumulated over the years are of no
value if you do not share them. You will be operating in the
highest levels of our Government in a situation that often can
be intimidating. I want to encourage you to remember that
question, and when in doubt, speak up. You are where you are
because of your knowledge and experience, and you have to share
it and sometimes share it aggressively. I hope you will
remember that question and remember the commitment you made. I
think you have a great deal to offer this country, and I just
want to be sure it gets to the table.
General Milley. Senator, I guarantee that. I have been in a
lot of combat, and I will be intimidated by no one.
Senator King. I believe that, having met you, General.
A more specific question. Are the Iraqi Security Forces
willing to fight?
General Milley. When we left in 2011--I was not there in
2011 but was there shortly before that--and the Iraqi Security
Forces were willing to fight. In the years between 2011 and
today, their chains of command have been decimated and they
were not getting proper pay and training went down the tubes.
Bottom line is that if 3 or 4 years go by and you lack
training, you lack money, you lack equipment, you lack spare
parts, and most importantly you lack a competent, capable,
committed leadership, then you can certainly understand why
units fell apart last year during the ISIS offensive.
I think there is nothing inherently prohibiting the Iraqi
Security Forces from a will to fight with the exception of a
lack of proper leadership. That is fundamental from where I
sit, and I would like to get a trip over there and talk to our
commanders on the ground, talk to General Austin, talk to
General Clark, and others. My assessment is they have the
potential and the capability to fight, but they must be led
just like any army must be led to close with and destroy the
enemies of their country.
Senator King. It seems to me that when we think about the
strategic challenges of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Ukraine,
all of those are local troops with United States support in one
way or another. One of the key challenges is how do you teach
the will to fight. How do you train? Have we learned that? Are
we at a place where we know what the pressure points are to
develop, for example, the command mentality that is necessary?
Because we are in a series of disputes around the world, none
of which involve directly many, if any, U.S. troops. We are at
the mercy of how these local people perform. I am wondering
about the Army's sort of thinking about how to do training.
That may be one of the most essential tasks that the new Army
has.
General Milley. We in the Army think that we do know how to
develop leaders. The Army does many, many things and does many
things well, but we definitely produce lots of good leaders
throughout our force on a day-to-day basis. We know also how to
do that with other armies, with foreign armies, specifically as
you mentioned, both Afghanistan and Iraq. We think we can do
that.
Well, how do you do that? Leaders have to have confidence
in their personal skills and their competence. That is
fundamental. No soldier is going to follow a leader who is
constantly lost, who is incompetent, who is a cement head out
there and does not know how to shoot, move, communicate, and
bring fire on the enemy. No soldier is ever going to follow
that leader. Competence is key and teaching them the military
skills necessary at the level they are at.
The other piece is the leader has to demonstrate compassion
and love for their soldiers. If they see a leader who does not
actually care for them, they are not going to follow him.
The third piece I think is a committed leader, a leader who
is committed to the cause for which they fight.
If those three elements are combined together in Iraqi
leadership at the small unit tactical level and at the
strategic level, then I think the Iraqi Security Forces have a
good chance of prevailing.
Senator King. A year or so ago, Senator Kaine and I were in
Lebanon, and we saw the training program that involves bringing
foreign officers to the United States and also providing the
kind of training that you are talking about. That struck us as
a very cost-effective technique, particularly bringing them
here because they get a lot from their peers when they are at
Fort Benning or at Fort Hood or wherever they are. Is that a
program that you think should be continued, strengthened,
emphasized?
General Milley. Yes, I so, Senator, absolutely. It has been
valuable in the past over many, many decades with many armies
around the world, and doing foreign military exchange and our
education system is value added for foreign armies.
Senator King. I am a little bit over time, but a very short
question. How long would it take us to go from a 450,000 back
to, say, 550,000 if, God forbid, circumstances required it?
What is the lead time?
General Milley. Yes, I would have to take that one for the
record for the analysis and get back to you. I would like an
opportunity to study that.
To build a brigade, for example, a brigade combat team,
call it 3,500-4,000 soldiers--it depends on the type of brigade
you have. To build that from scratch is about a 3- or 4-year
period to really get them certified and ready to engage in
ground combat operations. To regenerate that force from 450,000
to 550,000--it can be done, but it is not going to be done in a
very, very short amount of time.
[The information referred to follows:]
It would take three to five years to grow the Active component back
to 550,000 with sufficient funding for incentives and recruitment.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your testimony and thank you for
coming by to see many of us before the testimony.
I want to ask you about the National Commission on the
Future of the Army, which was established by the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2015 [NDAA], and the Army's
Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).
The National Commission's mandate is to evaluate future
missions, evaluate the force mix of the total Army, and
evaluate whether combat aviation assets from the Army National
Guard should be transferred to the Army.
I understand from sources within the Pentagon that the Army
intends to implement certain elements of the Army's ARI as
early as October 1st of this year. As I expressed to you,
making these irreversible force structure changes to the Guard
before we have had a chance to see what the Commission has to
say about ARI would not be advisable and does not make sense to
me. The intent of Congress was clear. There should be no
transfers of helicopters away from the Guard until Congress
receives and reviews the findings of the Army Commission.
As such, I would like to know your opinion of the ARI plan,
which would remove all combat aviation from the Army National
Guard. Do you support halting transfers of helicopters away
from the Guard until the Army Commission reports back in
February of next year?
General Milley. Thanks, Senator.
It is my understanding that the transfer by October is in
accordance with last year's 2015 NDAA, and the 2016 NDAA and
the one that is under debate right now is the one that is
talking about halting them. The Army is actually executing
their last written order, which was last year's authorization,
as I understand it. I will look into that, though.
As far as do I support it or not, there are puts and takes
to this ARI thing. I think the National Guard has some good
points. The National Guard makes some points that they are
concerned that it is a slippery slope. I am going to take
combat capabilities away from them and they will not be able to
be the strategic and operational Reserve. Fair enough.
There are also key points on the Army side. One is fiscal.
There is a billion-dollar a year savings and $12 billion over
time. I think that is not insignificant given the current
crunch with sequester, et cetera. Most importantly, I think
there is a readiness issue. If we do not execute this ARI, then
I think three of the divisions, the 1st Infantry Division, the
10th Mountain Division, 25th Division in Hawaii, are not going
to have armed reconnaissance capability, and we are going to
blind 3 out of the 10 Active Duty division commanders with
inability to be able to see a battlefield if they were thereby
committed.
On balance, I would favor the transfer. However, I am going
to await the results of the Commission and I am going to pay
attention to their recommendations very closely. I will remain
continually engaged with the Guard and try to do the right
thing for the total Army.
Senator Wicker. Well, I am glad to know you are going to
await the findings of the Commission.
I would just say to you a couple of things.
From my conversations with many of our people in the Guard,
they believe that for many of the States, such as Mississippi,
our program would be set back for a decade. It would take us 10
years to get over the loss of these Apaches, and I think would
do great harm to what we have had over the past, and that is
that the Active Army and the National Guard units have operated
seamlessly as one team since September 11 and it has been good
for the country. I think it is unfortunate that policy fights
and distrust between the Guard and Active Army have become
prevalent over the past five years.
What is your assessment of the current relationship between
the Army and the Army National Guard? Will you acknowledge that
the relationship has deteriorated to a point where actually it
is unseemly?
General Milley. Well, Senator, as Commander of Forces
Command, I deal with the National Guard and the U.S. Army
Reserve on a frequent basis. I am coming at this from an
operational force point of view, from the fielded forces. I do
not see that friction in the fielded forces. We train together.
We operate together. We have partnerships together. I have
commanded National Guard forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Wicker. You do not see that in the field.
General Milley. I do not see that in the field. That is
correct.
Senator Wicker. You see it here in the city, do you not?
General Milley. Maybe some things happen when people come
to Washington, DC. I do not know. Perhaps there is tension----
Senator Wicker. I have heard that.
General Milley. As I understand it, there is tension here
amongst some of the senior leaders. I will work, along with
General Grass and General Kadavy, to patch up whatever issues
there are.
From a personal perspective, I think there is one Army.
That is it. There is one Army. We all wear the same uniform and
it says U.S. Army on our chest, and that is the way we have to
approach it. The U.S. Army cannot conduct combat operations in
a sustained way overseas without the use of the National Guard
and the Reserve. We just cannot do it. We can do short-term
operations, but sustained ops cannot be done without the Guard
and Reserve. It is one Army. They are critical to our success.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very much for that. This
conversation will continue. We had it privately in my office.
We are discussing it publicly today. I think we can acknowledge
that the National Guard is a very integral part of what your
mission will be. I hope these issues can be resolved in a
mutually satisfactory manner.
Thank you very much for your service.
General Milley. Thanks, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you and your family for all you have done
for our country. Thanks for taking the time to come to my
office. I just wanted to follow up on that discussion.
In regards to military suicides, we talked about the
importance of pushing situational awareness down the chain of
command. When I met with the Israeli Defense Forces, they said
what was critical in reducing suicides was pushing it down the
chain of command so the squad leader, the platoon leader, who
could identify it right on the spot, could help. I was
wondering what your plans are to make sure that at the squad
level, the platoon leader, the leaders of those squads and
platoons are aware of the challenge and are ready to try to
help in eliminating it.
General Milley. Thanks, Senator.
I have been in command a lot, and suicide is a horrible,
tragic thing to see in a unit. The effects, obviously, on the
family, the unit, et cetera are just like you would have a
killed in action in combat. It is terrible. It is horrible.
I think in terms of how we get after it, situational
awareness is key. Because the Army has done a lot over the last
couple years to increase situational awareness of the signs and
the symptoms and then the techniques of intervention, our
numbers have dropped considerably in suicide. That is one point
is to continue sustaining and actually increasing situational
awareness.
The second is to continue to reduce the stigma. Behavioral
health, mental health--my view is there but for the grace of
God, go I. The human psyche is a very fragile thing, and any
one of us, regardless of how many patches or Ranger tabs or
anything else anyone has, is not so hard, not so tough that
they cannot break under a certain, correct combination of
stressors and pressures. We have to be alert to those signs and
symptoms, and we have to reach out and be literally our brother
and sister's keeper.
That attitude has to happen throughout the force. It has
happened considerably better than it was in previous years. In
the last few years, it has improved significantly, and that is
what I think is contributing to the reduction in suicides is
the increase in situational awareness, the reduction of stigma,
and then the intervention on the part of junior soldiers at the
most junior level.
Senator Donnelly. Well, I would encourage you in your new
position to really birddog this and to make sure that the squad
leaders and the platoon leaders know, hey, let us know if you
see something going sideways for one of the guys, one of the
men and women, let them know there is no stigma and that they
should get help. I know you will do that.
I wanted to switch to Iraq. I was there recently, met with
your folks, our whole team. It was right before the push into
Ramadi and Fallujah began. The discussion was just as you said.
It is a question of good leadership for the ISF, the Iraq
Security Forces. As opposed to this plan or that plan, I would
love to hear your unvarnished advice on what you think our role
should be in helping the ISF, the Iraqi Security Forces, get
their leadership back together. What can we do best to help
them do that?
General Milley. Senator, I would like also the opportunity
to get over and visit and talk to the guys on the ground to
answer that question in a more informed and holistic sort of
way.
Based on what I know now and my own experience in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, there is a wide variety of things we need to
and should do to help the Iraqi Security Forces in our ``advise
and assist'' levels of effort. As I understand it, the
constraint right now is not so much on what we are doing, but
on the amount of trainees the Iraqi Security Forces are
providing for our trainers to do. Maintaining a robust train,
advise, and assist effort, Security Forces assistance effort,
with the Iraqi Security Forces over a considerable length of
time is going to go a long way to shoring them up.
What Senator McCain mentioned earlier about JTAC's [joint
terminal attack controller] forward I think is something that
should be seriously considered to improve the effectiveness of
the enablers, the close air support that is being provided. I
think advisors going forward with units again is something that
should be seriously considered. However, there are lots of
issues with that with security of our people and the risk
associated with it, et cetera.
Bottom line is there are things we can do. I would like an
opportunity, though, Senator, to talk that over with commanders
on the ground and give you a more informed answer at a later
date.
Senator Donnelly. Great.
I am about out of time. I would just ask you to remember in
regards Iraq--and I know you will--when you said the Army's
mission is to win. We have to win there too in order to have
success in Syria and to help the Iraqi Forces have that kind of
leadership.
The last thing I will say is our Article 5 responsibilities
under NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] with Latvia,
Estonia, Lithuania. In Korea, their motto is ``fight tonight.''
We have to make sure we have the same kind of readiness in
those areas because we have the same obligations to those
countries. They have said they would stand with us. We need to
do the same for them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley and Mrs. Milley, congratulations. Thank you
for your service.
General Milley, I want to start maybe with going back to
something that the chairman mentioned in his opening comments.
Incidentally, I am sorry I had to step out. I have a competing
committee meeting over in Judiciary that I have to go back to.
We have sequestration, which I think to a person we all
recognize is devastating. We have to get rid of it. It is bad
policy. It should have never been implemented.
What are your thoughts, though, about ways that we can save
money? In new your position--and I look forward to supporting
you in this nomination. What areas in your opinion do we have
the opportunity to bend the cost curve or increase
productivity, and how would you go about doing that in your new
role?
General Milley. I think there are at least three areas that
should be seriously considered. Senator McCain has already
referenced them. One is I think we have to take a hard look at
overhead. The Army, but not just the Army, the military across
the board, all the services, to include Department of Defense
are a very, very large organization with a big bureaucracy with
a significant overhead.
Second is acquisition. As already previously mentioned,
there is a considerable amount of cost, and in many cases
waste, in the acquisition process. We need to get that under
control.
A third and final piece that I think is worth taking a look
at, there is a wide variety of emerging technologies that
could, in the out-years, 15-20 years from now, lend itself to
automated processes and reducing either manpower or manpower
costs, compensation costs, over time.
Those would be three pretty big areas that I would want to
take a look at if confirmed.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
We have Russia creating a looming threat in Europe. We have
the Pacific and China's expansion or, I should say, increased
activities there. We have the ongoing war in the Middle East,
the fight against Islamic extremism.
General Odierno, I believe said that a 50-brigade Army
should be adequate to keep these threats in check. Now we are
on a trajectory for about a 33-brigade Army. Do you think that
managing or facing those threats is possible with a 33-brigade
Army?
General Milley. Senator, are you talking Active brigades?
Are you talking the total Army brigades? Because right now,
total Army, we have 60 brigades today. We have 32 in the Active
component today. The plan that was announced a week or 2 ago
will take us down to 30 brigades, Active component, and we will
lose 2 out of the Guard. The bottom line is----
Senator Tillis. That was the Active, the 33 brigades.
General Milley. I think from a total Army perspective, we
have adequate capacity, numbers, of brigade combat teams to
handle the contingencies that are currently on the books. If we
do not drop below the 980 force, we have adequate capacity,
size, but that is with significant risk. That risk is incurred
in terms of time, the time to the fight, the time to mobilize
Guard units, the time to get them trained, certified, et
cetera, and get them to the fight. Then it is also significant
risk and potential casualties.
The second piece is not just capacity but capability, the
readiness of the force and how capable it is to handle that
type of fight, which is a different fight than what we have
been dealing with for the last decade and a half.
We have got a ways to go in terms of improving our
readiness with respect to the higher end type of combat
operations.
Senator Tillis. General Milley, I just want to close by
saying I look forward to you being in this role. You were one
of the first people to reach out to me back before I was even
sworn in to offer information and help me ramp up. You were
very generous with your time when I spent several days down at
Fort Bragg, and you have been up here several times. I know you
to be a very approachable, direct person. I think you are going
to be a great addition as the Chief of Staff.
Thanks again to you and your family.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you. As everyone has expressed, we
appreciate you coming by our offices and a chance to visit one
on one, and I certainly appreciated that.
I want to talk about the cuts and sequestration and the
issue that we have in front of us in the next 90 to 120 days
here in Congress.
The installation-level cuts that the Army announced earlier
this month are based, of course, on us shrinking to 450,000
soldiers. As you know and have talked about this morning, there
is a significant risk that these cuts will not be the last. If
Congress does not provide some relief from sequester-level
caps, the Army will be forced to cut an additional 30,000
Active Duty soldiers.
This year, the Republicans are attempting to get around the
statutory budget caps by using the Overseas Contingency
Operations, or the war fund, which does not have to be paid
for. It can be put on a credit card. Would you buy back force
structure using this war fund?
General Milley. Senator, we would prefer, if possible, the
budget be in the base. As the recipient of the money, we will
take the OCO if that is the only mechanism that we can in order
to sustain readiness, end strength, and modernization.
Senator McCaskill. Let me ask one that I think is even more
difficult because then it kind of tramps on whether or not the
OCO is being used appropriately because there is also an
obligation you have to only use the Overseas Contingency fund
for what it was designed to be and that is, an off-the-budget,
unpaid-for, on the credit card to be used in an emergency for
the purposes of a contingency operation. That is why it is
called the Contingency Operations.
In your advance policy question for this hearing, you noted
that our technological advantage over current and potential
adversaries are at risk. We invested in the base budget in
technology and research for decades to get us to the point that
we are today where we are the most technologically force in the
world. If we want the young men and women we will send to war
in the future to have the same advantages that the men and
women have today with our technological superiority, can you
make long-term research and development investments using a
fund that was designed only to apply to a contingency?
General Milley. I would have to get back to you on the
actual legal use of that fund relative to long-term research. I
think the answer would be no. I think OCO funds are
specifically targeted to named operations, overseas contingency
operations. I would have to get back to you to see if that
could be used. I do not think it could, but I will check and
get back to you, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
No. Legally, we can only use OCO funds in this manner if
appropriated for this purpose by Congress. Current OCO rules and
practices stipulate that research and development funds are for
projects required for combat operations in the theater that can be
delivered in 12 months. In this context, 12 months is considered to be
a short-term effort.
Senator McCaskill. The frustrating part of this is the only
difference between the commitment to put this $40 billion in
the budget between my friends and colleagues and us on this
side of the aisle is the willingness to acknowledge that we are
spending the money, is the willingness to say this belongs in
the base budget, let us put it in the base budget, let us not
use an artifice, a gimmick, phoniness, to pretend that somehow
we are not making an investment in the base needs of our
military but rather in an overseas contingency operation.
It remains a great frustration to me and one that I am
hopeful that we can work out so that we do not go down this
path and create this precedent that I think is very dangerous
for the long-term stability of our military and you all's
abilities to do your jobs in terms of planning and coordinating
and having what you need going forward. I just think it is a
very, very irresponsible precedent.
On sexual assault, I know that several members have talked
about it to you already. I do want to mention I know you are
getting after the retaliation. I will continue to monitor that.
I want to mention briefly at the end of my time the
incredible training that is going on at Fort Leonard Wood for
the investigators of sexual assault. This is a special set of
training that must occur, and I would like your commitment. The
forensic experimental trauma interview is now being trained
throughout the military and frankly in the civilian world. The
expertise that has been developed at the fort on this is
unparalleled in terms of how you get after a sexual assault
investigation, particularly interviewing a victim. I would like
your commitment to familiarize yourself with that training and
a commitment that you will continue to fight for the adequate
funding so we can actually get these perpetrators behind bars
so they are not, in fact, besmirching the amazing and wonderful
military that we have in this country.
General Milley. I will absolutely take a deep look at that.
As I understand it from reports I have, it is the best practice
and it leads the Nation in its skills.
Senator McCaskill. It does. It does, in fact.
My thanks to you and your family for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley, good to see you. Thank you for your 35
years of service and to your family who I know has sacrificed a
lot.
I wanted to talk--I have a number of questions, as you can
imagine--about the Army's decision to cut 40,000 troops
recently. I know that you were not in the ultimate
decisionmaking but you are going to be tasked with implementing
this and maybe relooking at it. I would appreciate some of your
thoughts and views.
You know, General Dunford last week talked about the
importance of the military and DOD [Department of Defense]
focusing on and implementing the defense guidance from the
Congress. I gave examples of if the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] was told by Congress 11 carriers we need or the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, we need A-10s, even though the
service does not like it, they do it.
One of the things that I am concerned about is in the
current NDAA, we have a lot of focus on the Pacific rebalance,
and there is very strong language, very directive language. The
U.S. forces under the OPCON [Operational Command] of PACOM
[U.S. Pacific Command] should be increased. Any withdrawal of
the U.S. forces outside the continental U.S. Asia-Pacific
region would therefore seriously undermine the rebalance. A lot
of focus on the rebalance. It was put in there to provide
credibility to strategy that this Congress bipartisan supports.
I have been quite concerned that the Army's decision pretty
much ignores this. With all due respect to Senator Hirono, I do
not think the decisions were inevitable. As a matter of fact, I
think that what was just announced takes a huge chunk, not only
increasing forces, not only keeping them the same, but dramatic
increase. As a matter of fact, of the 40,000, a huge proportion
was from the Asia-Pacific region.
The idea of fighting tonight, maintaining the rebalance--I
think it is all undermined. I think it is dramatically
undermined. I think our allies are going to see it undermined.
Do you think that the President's rebalance strategy has
been undermined by dramatically reducing forces despite this
Congress' defense guidance to the Department of Defense to not
do that?
General Milley. I do not think it has necessarily been
undermined, Senator. From an Army perspective, about 20 percent
of the Army's combat power is in the Pacific, even with the
reductions.
More to your point, though, I agree that the Sense of
Congress should absolutely inform decisionmaking, and we should
take that seriously and I think we will.
Senator Sullivan. It does not look like you did in this
case.
General Milley. Well, as you know, I was not in this----
Senator Sullivan. I know. Again, General, I have the utmost
respect for you. I am talking about the Army's decision which
now you are going to have to defend. The Department of Defense,
the Army did not--did not--abide by the defense guidance of
Congress. Period. If they read that NDAA amendment.
General Milley. I will take a hard look at the entire
issue, and I look forward to working with you on it. I do
think, Senator, that the Army has substantial capabilities
committed to the Pacific.
Senator Sullivan. They have been significantly increased in
the last 2 weeks, according to this decision. The only airborne
combat brigade in the entire Asia-Pacific has now been gutted.
General Milley. I would say that the airborne brigade was
brought down to a battalion task force with the specific intent
and design that it could be reversed if funding becomes
available over the next couple of years. That brigade does not
go to a battalion, I do not think, until late 2016 or 2017. It
is designed to go to a battalion task force with the intent of
reversing it if funding is made available.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think our allies were supportive
of this? I mean, the idea of fighting tonight in Korea--that
BCT was the Reserve cavalry for any contingency in Korea that
can get there in 7 hours, a very capable, mountain, cold
weather unit. Do you think that our capability in Korea has
been decreased by this decision?
General Milley. The Army, Marines, both have significant
ground capabilities that are positioned throughout the
continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Fort Lewis,
Washington, and Okinawa that can respond. We think that it is a
capable response to mitigate the threat given the current
situation.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I will have more questions
in the second round. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking
Member, for this hearing.
Thank you so much, General Milley, for your service. Thanks
to your family. You have done extraordinary things, and I am so
grateful that you are continuing to serve our country.
I want to talk a little bit about combat integration. I
want to
applaud the Army for taking steps towards eliminating combat
exclusion policies for women by opening up over 20,000 combat
engineer and associated skill positions to female soldiers in
June.
As you look at the positions that still remain closed, what
reasons might there be for the Army to ask for an exception to
policy for a position?
General Milley. The only reason at all, Senator--and there
has been no decision yet, but everything revolves around
standards and readiness. The military occupational specialties
that remain closed currently are infantry armor, some forward
observers in the field artillery, and then special operations,
special forces.
There is a gender integration study ongoing right now by
Training and Doctrine Command. There is a similar study ongoing
by the Marines. They are both crosswalking their data. I expect
to see that information, if I am confirmed, probably in
September/October and will have to make a decision or a
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense whether to seek a
waiver or not. I will take a hard look at all that data and
make that call at that time.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, we have seen the success of the
cultural support teams in Afghanistan and how vital women were
to those missions to gather vital intelligence as to where
terrorists were, where weapons were being housed from women and
children in those homes. I do hope you will focus every effort
to make sure our best and brightest and all of our best and
brightest are serving.
I was concerned about the recent news regarding the eight
women who failed the first phase of the Army Ranger School for
the second time due to their inability to accomplish
subjectively evaluated leadership tasks. These women were
already officers, ranging from captains to majors with years of
leadership experience. Why do you think that class of women--
why do you think these women were in such a historically high
attrition rate? Do you find it alarming that the U.S. military
academy at West Point is graduating leaders who, after 5 to 6
years of service, are not able to complete leadership tasks
that are successfully accomplished by specialists and private
first classes?
General Milley. Senator, Ranger School is a very, very hard
course, male, female, no matter who you are. That is a hard
course with a high attrition rate. The women that failed--one
of the key tasks that they failed were patrolling tasks,
leadership skills, which because they are not in the infantry
already, they have had a limited opportunity to train to those.
I expect that those skills would improve over time. Right now
we have three women who are in the mountain phase, as of
yesterday anyway--still in the mountain phase of Ranger School,
and we are observing that to see how that goes.
The broader issue of women in the infantry, women in armor,
et cetera--again, there is a very detailed study going on. I
want to take a hard look at all that and make sure that the
standards are being met in the readiness force.
As to whether women can fight or not, there is no doubt. I
have seen it personally, up close and real. There is no doubt
in my mind that women can engage in ground combat with the
enemies of our Nation because they have done it. They have been
doing it for 10 years.
Senator Gillibrand. I also want to associate myself with
the remarks from Senator Ernst, Hirono, and McCaskill about
sexual assault in the military and how important it is for this
committee that we solve that problem.
I do want to just note one thing from your testimony.
Retaliation is not a new issue. In fact, we have been measuring
retaliation over the last several years because of our DOD
surveys. One of the biggest challenges we have and why Senator
McCaskill raised it is this year's survey--62 percent of
survivors were retaliated against, perceived retaliation,
because they reported these crimes. That is the same statistic
as 2 years ago. It is the same as the 2012 survey. We have a
real challenge here with retaliation.
To be clear, the retaliation is fairly diverse. 62 percent
is--53 percent is social retaliation, peer-to-peer. 35 percent
is administrative action. 32 percent is professional
retaliation. 11 percent is punishment for an infraction. If you
look at all those factors, 35, 32, and 11, arguably more than
half of the retaliation is through the chain of command. Please
do study that because there is an issue of perception by female
members of the military of discrimination. They said in 60
percent of sexual harassment cases and sexual discrimination
cases, it came from the immediate commander. You are talking
about unit commanders who are perhaps creating a toxic climate.
That command climate really needs to be looked at aggressively
to make sure that these female soldiers know that they can
succeed and that their immediate supervisor does not have it
out for them.
General Milley. I will make that a focus area, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee?
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Milley, for your service to our country
and for your willingness to be considered for this position.
I really enjoyed our visit last week when we met and
enjoyed getting to know you a little bit better.
I want to first join my colleagues in condemning the
deplorable attacks against our servicemembers in Chattanooga
last week. I pray for the friends and family members and the
colleagues of the five servicemembers who lost their lives, and
I pray for a quick recovery for those who were injured.
The attacks in Chattanooga last week were the latest in a
string of deadly assaults on military personnel in facilities
in the United States, including Fort Hood and the Navy Yard, as
well as a number of attacks that were planned but that, quite
fortunately, were disrupted before they could be carried out.
In the coming months, I hope our military leaders and Congress
can work together and work in an efficient, effective manner to
figure out how we can better protect our men and women in
uniform from these types of attacks in the future.
One of the concerns that I have heard repeatedly from
servicemembers in Utah and elsewhere is that they feel
inadequately informed by military leadership about some of the
persistent threats against themselves, their families, and the
facilities where they happen to work. They see threats on the
news or through social media, but they do not feel like they
have been given enough information about what is being done to
protect them or proper guidance on how to protect themselves at
or away from their workplace.
General, what is your assessment of how such information is
being disseminated through the Army and, if confirmed, what you
might do to improve the effectiveness of information and
guidance that is coming from Army leadership on these threats
to our Homeland and to our servicemembers in particular?
General Milley. Senator, unfortunately, in today's world,
there is no rear area in this battle against the terrorists of
ISIS or any other terrorist organization. The rear area of the
United States is, in fact, vulnerable, and we have to do a
better job at making sure that vulnerability assessments,
information awareness is out there with our soldiers and their
families. There is no doubt in my mind we have to increase that
throughout the force, throughout the total Army, and indeed,
throughout the entire military, those things like what to look
for, signs, indicators of warnings, of reconnaissance and
surveillance by the enemy, by the terrorists on a particular
compound or against a particular person.
Unfortunately, though, a lot of these type of attacks are
very ambiguous. This one in Chattanooga may or may not have had
recon ahead of time or any kind of indicators ahead of time,
may or may not have been a lone wolf. We do not know yet. It is
too early in the investigation. A lot of times, these things
are very ambiguous. Both active and passive defensive measures
at all of our installations, with all of our families, with all
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is going to be a
necessary requirement in the current environment.
Senator Lee. Thank you. I appreciate your insight on that.
I next wanted to follow up on some questions that Senator
Wicker asked and some comments that he made.
Among the most contentious issues in this committee over
the past 2 years has involved the Army's Aviation Restructuring
Initiative. Now, I understand the Army has been put in a
difficult position by budget reductions, and over the past
several years has been exploring a number of options to
maximize combat power while at the same time figuring out how
to cut costs.
Congress has similarly been taking a hard look at this,
which is why the Commission on the Structure of the Army was
established in the NDAA.
If confirmed, will you commit to thoroughly reviewing the
Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative and working closely
with Congress, once the Commission report is delivered next
year, to help us figure out the best path forward on
restructure issues?
General Milley. I absolutely will, and I look forward to
reviewing that Commission report.
Senator Lee. What do you think are the biggest threats
that, should you be confirmed, you will have to prepare the
Army to address in the coming decade?
General Milley. I think the Army's fundamental mission of
engaging in ground combat, winning in ground combat--I think
that mission remains sound, and I anticipate that mission will
remain so in the future.
Senator Lee. The three key tasks in the national security
documents that are out there is to assure our allies, deter
opponents, and if necessary, fight and win on the ground. All
of those are going to be challenges in the years ahead as we go
forward.
Thank you very much. I see my time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you talked about budget constraints and looking at
ways to reduce those. One that you did not mention is making
sure there is no overlap in terms of core competencies and
missions. I am assuming you think a core competency of the
Army--I certainly do--is the airborne brigade task force, the
ability to deploy anywhere on a moment's notice, kick in the
door.
General Milley. Airborne operations are a core competency
in the U.S. Army. That is correct.
Senator Sullivan. One of the things that I have been
somewhat concerned about is when you look at the Army's Pacific
Pathways mission--my office has been asking the Army for weeks
now on what the costs of that are. We have not been able to get
any answers on that. To me, do you see the value, in terms of
our Nation's defense, of BCT with regard to the Army or putting
soldiers on naval shipping with helicopters and doing
expeditionary maneuvers throughout the Pacific? What is a
higher value for the Army?
General Milley. I think they are both of value to the Army.
I do think that Army forces on shipping and moving them around
the Pacific has been done really for over a century. That is
how the Army moves, by air and by ship.
Senator Sullivan. You do not see that as redundant to the
Marine Corps' mission in the Asia-Pacific?
General Milley. No, not at all. The reason I say that is
because they complement each other, but the Marine Corps core
competency is amphibious assault not just movement by sea. What
we are really talking about for Pacific Pathways is the
strategic movement of Army forces over the ocean. We are not
using any gray hulls anyway to do that. We are using black and
green hulls to do that.
Senator Sullivan. If you had to choose, though, in austere
budget times, would the Army want to focus on airborne core
competencies or a mission that in some people's view looks
somewhat redundant to another service's?
General Milley. Well, frankly, Senator, the Army has to do
both.
Senator Sullivan. No, but I am just asking if you had to
choose. In this kind of austere budget, you have to choose.
General Milley. We have to be able to do both. We have to.
We do not have a choice. We have to maintain both capabilities,
forced entry capability for vertical insertion airborne
assault, and we have to be able to move forces, both air and
sea, to reinforce in a variety of contingencies.
Senator Sullivan. We would appreciate it--I would
appreciate if we can get some numbers on the Pacific Pathways
in terms of costs.
General Milley. Sure, absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army plans to conduct three Pathways per year, with a projected
estimated total cost of $45 million per year or an estimated average
cost of $15 million per Pathway.
Senator Sullivan. I want to turn to another issue, kind of
emerging threat issues. You and many others who have testified
have talked about Russia as a principal threat, and certainly
that is the case in the Ukraine.
I want to emphasize and talk a little bit more about the
Arctic. You have probably seen in the last just few weeks there
have been articles. I just got this in the airport today.
Russia has made military buildup in the Arctic a strategic
priority. There is article after article about the Russians
moving huge force posture, huge force structure, four new BCTs,
big operations that nobody is even aware of that are taking us
by surprise all through the Arctic.
You have probably seen this map that has new airfields, 11
new airfields, 40 Arctic icebreakers, some nuclear-powered. The
United States has these forces here. That is it. This recent
decision we are going to remove a key capability of these and
we have this as our strategy. This is the 2013 DOD Arctic
Strategy. It mentions climate change five times and in a
footnote mentions Russia. This is a joke of a strategy.
I think during our deliberations for the NDAA, the Congress
recognized that this is a serious issue, a serious new threat
environment. We had an amendment that came through the NDAA
that focused on our interest in the Arctic, the need for a much
broader assessment, for a much more serious look in terms of
OPLANS [Operation Plan in Complete Format], in terms of a
military strategy. That passed unanimously.
What I was wondering, when you look at--so the Secretary of
Defense has to put forward this strategy within the next year.
Our most capable Arctic forces, before we even do the analysis,
before we do the planning, before we do the OPLAN, we are going
to remove the most capable, indeed the most lethal Arctic
warriors that we have. General, it takes a long time to become
proficient in the Arctic.
I am wondering what your thought on that is, and if
confirmed, I think it make sense to do the analysis first, to
do the OPLAN first, to do the strategy first before we move any
force structure. Would you commit to work with this committee
to hold off on moving Arctic forces, particularly given the
dramatic threat increase until after the Secretary of Defense
and others have put together an Arctic Strategy, has defense
guidance from this committee and this Congress? Do you think
that that is the most logical way to do the planning?
General Milley. I appreciate that, Senator. I agree with
you. I think that having an OPLAN first and then figuring out
your task organization second is the right sequence, and I
think that is in fact what is about to happen. I think as you
already mentioned, the Arctic OPLAN, the Arctic Strategy is
going to get reviewed by OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense], and General Dunford mentioned that the other day.
Senator Sullivan. Well, there is no OPLAN [Operation Plan
in Complete Format]. There is no strategy unless you want to
call this a strategy. I mean, there is a lot of work that needs
to be done.
General Milley. There is a lot of work that needs to be
done, and it is under review, as I understand it. I think you
asked General Dunford to produce an OPLAN, and I think he
committed to doing that and I look forward to participating in
that and will work with that over the course of the next year.
The forces in Alaska do not get reduced, according to the
decision I think I heard, until end of 2016 and 2017. An OPLAN
first, reduction of forces second if still required. I will
work with you on that.
Senator Sullivan. Good, because to me, again, I think it
makes strategic sense to put together the plan, see what the
combatant commanders need in terms of troops, see what the new
threat level is, and then make the plan on troop levels once
you are informed by a real strategy, not a 13-page document.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. General, I just would like to say that
Senator Sullivan raises this whole issue of the Arctic and the
recent Russian moves in that region. We need to pay a lot more
attention to it. We see our friends in Norway, in particular,
but also Sweden, Finland, those nations there that are
experiencing things like Russian overflights and Russian
submarine activities and other--I believe that the Russians
have--what is it, Senator Sullivan, 50-some icebreakers?
Senator Sullivan. Close to 40.
Chairman McCain. Close to 40 icebreakers. I think we have
one. Is that correct?
Senator Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. We have got a very full agenda, but the
Arctic I think is another area that we have to be concerned,
particularly given Russian behavior. Even Sweden, which is
traditionally, as we know, a very neutral nation, has become
extremely concerned about Russian activity in their territorial
waters. As we see climate change--as we see areas of the Arctic
opening up to being areas of navigation, this is an area that I
hope we will spend some time on. I thank Senator Sullivan for
his attention and involvement in what is, I view, a looming
situation with Russia.
I thank you, General.
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Mark A. Milley, USA
by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provisions?
Answer. I do not currently anticipate the need to modify the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Question. If so, what modifications do you believe would be
appropriate?
Answer. I do not currently anticipate the need to modify the
Goldwater-Nichols Act.
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 3033 of title 10, United States Code, establishes
the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief
of Staff of the Army?
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the senior military officer of
the Army. In addition to his role as an advisor, the Chief of Staff is
responsible for the effective and efficient functioning of Army
organizations and commands in executing their statutory missions. The
Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him as a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under section 151 of title 10.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the
Secretary of the Army to prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the senior military advisor
to the Secretary of the Army and the senior military officer of the
Army and all its components. I would expect the Secretary of the Army
to assign me the following duties:
(a) Preside over the Army Staff;
(b) Transmit the plans and recommendations of the Army Staff to
the Secretary of the Army and advise the Secretary of the Army on those
plans and recommendations;
(c) Act as the agent of the Secretary of the Army in carrying into
effect the plans and recommendations of the Army Staff that the
Secretary of the Army has approved;
(d) Perform other duties assigned by the President, Secretary of
Defense or the Secretary of the Army;
(e) Represent the Army in areas related to my functions and
responsibilities, including to the public and the Department of Defense
as the Army's military representative to appropriate Department of
Defense councils;
(f) Communicate and advocate for Army policies, plans and programs
to external audiences, including Congress, interagency partners,
foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and the public;
(g) Assist the Secretary of the Army in fulfilling his compliance
functions, including directing the Inspector General to perform
inspections and investigations as required; and
(h) Assist the Secretary of the Army in the performance of the
following acquisition related functions:
a. The development of requirements relating to the defense
acquisition system;
b. The coordination of measures to control requirements creep
in the defense acquisition system;
c. The development of career paths in acquisition for military
personnel; and
d. The assignment and training of contracting officer
representatives when such representatives are required to be members of
the armed forces because of the nature of the contract concerned.
(i) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide
independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, Congress,
National Security Council and the President. To the extent such action
does not impair my independence in my performance as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the Army informed
of military advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff render on matters
affecting the Army. I would inform the Secretary of the Army of
significant military operations affecting his duties and
responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense;
(j) Represent Army capabilities, programs, policy, and
requirements in Joint forces;
(k) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and
activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution
of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
(l) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army
Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the
Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I am privileged to have over 35 years of service in our
Army, during which I have commanded at every level from Platoon to U.S.
Army Forces Command including command of the 10th Mountain Division and
the III Armored Corps. Of note, I had the honor to lead soldiers in
combat as a Captain and Major along with combat leadership as a Brigade
Commander, Division Deputy Commander, and Corps Commander. With service
in Special Forces and conventional units, as well as operational
experience in a variety of contingencies around the globe, I have a
comprehensive perspective of the Army, its processes and capabilities.
My experience includes operations in the Sinai, Somalia, Panama, Haiti,
the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, along with tours in Korea and
Columbia. I have participated in Humanitarian Service, Peacekeeping,
Peace Enforcement and multiple combat operations. During my most recent
deployment, as the Commanding General of III Corps and ISAF Joint
Command, I had the opportunity to apply the full range of Army, joint,
combined and coalition capabilities in complex environments on my third
tour in Afghanistan while commanding all the ground forces in combat
and security force assistance operations. Additionally, I have
considerable experience on the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary
of Defense Staff where I saw firsthand the importance of teamwork
across the Department of Defense and working with Congress. Finally, as
the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command, I am responsible
for the training and readiness of the entire U.S. Army's Operational
Force based in the Continental United States, which includes most of
the Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve and Active component Regular
Army--roughly about 70-80 percent of the Total Army. If confirmed, the
combination of all of these assignments as well as the honor of serving
closely with our dedicated soldiers, will enable me to lead our Army as
it meets our Nation's requirements in a complex world.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the
Army?
Answer. If confirmed, my tenure as Chief of Staff will be marked by
continuous self-assessment of my ability to perform my duties. As I
believe necessary, I will employ measures that will improve my ability
to lead the Army. It is essential in this complex environment that we
continue to learn and adapt to ensure that our skills remain current
and able to meet our future challenges.
Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign
to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff of the Army, I would ensure
the Vice Chief of Staff is responsible for providing me advice and
assistance in the execution of my duties, specifically with regard to
manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements
and programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and
readiness. I will review other duties and responsibilities for the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army as appropriate after discussions with him
and the Secretary of the Army.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
with:
a. The Secretary of Defense.
The Chief of Staff of the Army must have a close working
relationship with the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will be
responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the
Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with
the Secretary of Defense's guidance and direction. If confirmed, as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser
to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the policies
established by his office. In coordination with the Secretary of the
Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating
the views of the Army.
b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises
such power as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. If confirmed, I
will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and his deputy,
through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in
accordance with the Secretary's guidance and direction. Also, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with
the Deputy Secretary in articulating the views of the Army. I will work
closely with all to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance
with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
c. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries
perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue
guidance and instruction as approved by the Secretary of Defense--and
in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the Military Departments. If
confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will
communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the
Army. I will work closely with the Under Secretaries to ensure that the
Army is administered in accordance with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's guidance and direction.
d. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control
of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the
strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed forces;
advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets
that the combatant command commanders identify; develops doctrine for
the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of
functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for
representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of
the United Nations; and performs such other duties as the law or the
President or Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the
Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President,
the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to
assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed,
and as appropriate, I will also provide advice in addition to or in
disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a
close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and I will
communicate directly and openly with him on any policy matters
impacting the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.
e. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Chairman
in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the
President. If confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to ensure that the Vice Chairman receives my frank
views and opinions to assist him in performing his responsibilities.
f. The Chiefs of the Other Services.
If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be
my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions
with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing strong
working relationships with these colleagues, if I am confirmed.
g. The Combatant Commanders.
The combatant commanders are responsible to fight our wars and
conduct joint military operations around the world. Title 10, U.S.
Code, section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction
and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority
of the combatant commanders, the Service Secretaries are responsible
for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified
and specified commands. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the
combatant commanders in performing these administrative and support
responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships
with the combatant commanders and I will communicate directly and
openly with them on matters involving the Department of the Army and
Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting the combatant
commands.
h. The Army Component Commanders of the Combatant Commands
The Army component commanders of the combatant commands exercise
command and control under the authority and direction of the combatant
commanders to whom they are assigned and in accordance with the
policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense. The
combatant commanders normally delegate operational control of Army
forces to the Army Component Commander. The Secretary of the Army
generally delegates administrative control of Army forces assigned to
the combatant commander to the Army component commander of that
combatant command. The Army Component Commander is responsible for
recommendations to the Joint Force Commander on the allocation and
employment of Army forces within the combatant command. If confirmed, I
will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders and Army Component
Commanders in performing these responsibilities.
i. The Secretary of the Army.
If confirmed, I will establish a close, direct, and supportive
relationship with the Secretary of the Army. Within the Department of
the Army, my primary responsibilities as Chief of Staff are to perform
all duties assigned to me by the Secretary and to serve as the
Secretary's principal military adviser. My responsibilities would also
involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary and
supervising the implementation of the Secretary's decisions through the
Army Staff, commands, and agencies. My actions would be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for
appropriately informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and about significant military operations, to the
extent this would not impair my independence in performing my duties as
a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I look forward to
working closely and in concert with the Secretary of the Army to
establish the best policies for the Army, taking into account national
interests.
j. The Under Secretary of the Army.
The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's senior civilian
assistant and principal adviser on matters related to the management
and operation of the Army. The Under Secretary of the Army performs
such duties and exercises such powers as prescribed by the Secretary of
the Army. The Under Secretary's responsibilities require him, from time
to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If
confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary and to the Under
Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure
that the policies that the Office of the Secretary of the Army
establishes are implemented properly. I will communicate openly and
directly with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army
Staff, commands, and agencies.
k. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal advisor
and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will establish and
maintain a close, professional relationship with Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army.
l. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require them to issue
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with the
Assistant Secretaries in order to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we address
the Army's day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements.
m. The General Counsel of the Army.
The General Counsel is the legal counsel to the Secretary of the
Army and the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. The
duties of the General Counsel include coordinating legal and policy
advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest
to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on
any legal question or procedure, other than military justice matters,
which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
General Counsel to assist in the performance of these important duties.
n. The Inspector General of the Army.
The Inspector General reports to the Secretary of the Army and is
responsible for inspections and certain investigations within the
Department of the Army, such as inquiring into and reporting to the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff regarding discipline,
efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing assessment of
command, operational, logistical, and administrative effectiveness; and
serving as the focal point for the Department of the Army regarding
Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal
investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy.
If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with the Inspector General of the Army to ensure effective
accomplishment of these important duties.
o. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to the
Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the Department
of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal advice directly
to the Chief of Staff and to the Army Staff in matters concerning
military justice; environmental law; labor and civilian personnel law;
contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and the worldwide
operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff does not
appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal
authority to remove her. This enables The Judge Advocate General to
provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will establish and
maintain a close, professional relationship with The Judge Advocate
General as my legal advisor and I will assist her in the performance of
her important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.
p. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau heads a joint activity of
the Department of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard
officer responsible for formulating, developing, and coordinating all
policies, programs, and plans affecting more than half a million Army
and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves
as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the
principal advisor to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard
issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's
official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants
General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing
matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of
homeland defense and civil support missions. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
Chief, National Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we
deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements facing the Army.
q. The Director of the Army National Guard.
The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the
Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the
National Guard Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If
confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to foster an
environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the
National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal together with
the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing
the Army to sustain and improve the Army National Guard's operational
capabilities.
r. The Chief of the Army Reserve.
Appointed by the President, the Chief, Army Reserve is the advisor
to the Chief of Staff of the Army on Army Reserve matters, and is
responsible for justifying and executing the Army Reserve's personnel,
operation and maintenance, and construction budgets. As such, the
Chief, Army Reserve is the director and functional manager of
appropriations made for the Army Reserve in those areas. In addition,
the Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for managing the Army Reserve's
Full Time Support Program and submitting an annual report on the state
of the Army Reserve through the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary
of Defense. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close,
professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal
together with the Army's day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements in order to sustain and improve the Army Reserve's
operational capabilities.
vision for the future
Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
The U.S. Army is and must remain the world's premier ground combat
force capable of conducting sustained campaigns on land to achieve U.S.
National Security objectives and remain true to our national values.
The Army is the force, an all volunteer force, uniquely capable of
winning a decision favorable to the U.S. In order to sustain our edge
over any adversary, the U.S. Army must be lethal, agile, adaptive,
innovative, and expeditionary; armed with leader, technological and
training overmatch. Additionally, the Army, combined with the effects
of the Navy, Air Force, Marines, Cyber, Space, and Special Operations
Forces, must present our opponent with overwhelming simultaneous
multiple dimension problems that paralyze and cause his defeat.
Question. Given your vision, is the Army ready to meet current
demands from combatant commanders, downsize the force, modernize and
improve readiness while transforming? How will you balance these
competing demands?
Answer. I recognize, in the face of increasing demands and
declining resources, we will be forced to assume risk in some areas. If
confirmed, I will ensure we make those hard decisions through a
rigorous and deliberate process with the assistance and input of
Congress. I am concerned that the Army has been required to assume
future risk by underfunding modernization, and if confirmed, I will
work to ensure that the Army has the resources to meet the current
demands of the combatant commanders while transforming and modernizing
to be successful in the future.
I have no illusion that balancing competing demands to fulfill the
National Security Strategy and the combatant commander's requirements
while significantly downsizing the force in a fiscally constrained and
uncertain environment will be exceptionally difficult. However the
Army, as we have for 240 years, will meet the challenge with innovative
and adaptive leadership and with disciplined and committed soldiers. If
confirmed, readiness will remain an inviolate benchmark and #1
priority--no American soldier must ever deploy to combat unready. It is
my solemn commitment that our troops will be rigorously trained,
possess the best equipment and be led by leaders of character,
competence and courage.
Question. Across the continuum of conflict, as described in the
National Military Strategy in what areas is the Army currently best
prepared for? Is this where the Army needs to be given emerging and
future threats?
As the Nation's principal ground military force, the Army has the
obligation to be ready to conduct sustained land operations across the
spectrum of conflict and win in ground combat. We cannot allow
ourselves to focus too narrowly on any one scenario. Right now, the
U.S. Army is highly skilled in counterterrorist and contingency
operations along with advisory skills and building partner capacity.
Given emerging and future threats, we will need to sustain our
counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, advisory, and build partner
capacity skills while rebuilding our combined arms conventional
warfighter skills for offense, defense, and stability. Further, we must
improve our mission command, aviation, fire support, engineer, and
sustainment skills. Lastly, we must develop our cyber force to a much
higher level of capability. If confirmed, I will continually assess and
collaborate with the other Service Chiefs and adapt the Army to first
meet current needs and position itself for the future.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, ISIS and radical violent
extremist organizations currently challenge the United States each in
their own way and will likely continue for some time into the future.
These security challenges exist within a wider context of rapid
technological change, significant demographic change, global economic
uncertainty, and geostrategic power shifts of historic proportions.
Right now the level of uncertainty, the velocity of instability, and
potential for significant inter-state conflict is higher than it is has
been since the end of the Cold War in 1989-91. These challenges and
global context unfold while the U.S. is likely to continue fiscal
uncertainty and the U.S. Army will continue to shrink. However, as a
result of the global situation, the demand for ground forces will
continue to increase even more so since many of our longstanding allies
have significantly reduced their military forces over the last 25
years. Maintaining both capacity and capability in all three components
of the U.S. Army in a rapidly changing and volatile security and fiscal
environment will be our greatest challenge while simultaneously
posturing the Army for the future beyond 2020. The next four years will
bring to the forefront the challenge of maintaining tactical and
operational advantage over our adversaries. The Army currently benefits
from an overmatch that enables a historically small number of soldiers
to accomplish significant operations while minimizing casualties. This
advantage has a shelf life; the technologies that gave us the advantage
today are increasingly available to state and non-state adversaries at
dramatically lower cost than even a decade ago. As that overmatch
degrades, the risk to soldiers increases. Maintaining readiness in the
near term and retaining capacity while creating capability for the mid
and long term will be the Army's greatest challenge given the threat,
global context, and domestic fiscal environment.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Recognizing the environment we are in, I see two near term
imperatives for the Army. First, we must build and maintain readiness
across the Total Force. This readiness must reflect both sufficient
capacity to meet the demand for Army forces and proficiency in the
multitude of capabilities that enable the Army to accomplish its
diverse missions. Second, we must plan and invest for the future. I see
this done through a deliberate science and technology strategy that
seeks to exploit research that has the potential for leap ahead
capabilities in the areas of ``shoot, move, communicate, and mission
command.''
If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress and
address these challenges. We will continue to refine and update our
training programs to ensure all our soldiers are fully prepared to
deploy to combat. We will continue to review our reset, force
modernization and acquisition programs in order to more efficiently
meet the needs and requirements of today and the future threat. I will
work closely with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army and
the combatant commanders to identify those capabilities needed to
provide depth and versatility to the joint force in order to provide
more effective and flexible forces for employment. I will continue to
review and adjust leader development programs in order to develop
thinking, adaptable, agile decision makers necessary to operate in an
increasingly complex and unpredictable environment. I will review our
soldier and Family Programs to ensure we are meeting their needs.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would impede the
performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time-lines
would you establish to address these problems?
If confirmed, I will vigorously uphold the standards expected by
the American people and undertake a deliberate review of key policies
to ensure that the Army is meeting its current responsibilities and is
postured to meet the challenges of the future. I will work to maintain
open lines of communication with this committee, and Congress writ
large, so that I might benefit from the collective wisdom and
experience.
I will also remain committed to improve, and if necessary,
establish management systems that provide good stewardship of the
precious, limited and valuable resources that the American people have
given us to accomplish our mission.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to establish
Army priorities within the guidelines of the President and Secretary of
Defense. Within that framework, my #1 priority, if confirmed, will be
readiness across the Total Force. When the Nation calls, the Army must
be ready with soldiers that are confident they are well trained, well
armed, and well led. At the same time, our #2 priority is to invest in
the technologies, organization, and doctrine that will allow us to
maintain overmatch against future adversaries while retaining the
ability to adapt to unforeseen challenges. Additional priorities will
include:
Keep faith with the All Volunteer Force.
Maintain our values and close relationship with the
American People.
Protect the Force--Our most valuable asset is our
people--soldiers, families, civilians--and each deserve to be treated
with dignity and respect and be afforded the best quality of life and
an equal opportunity to excel based on their merit.
Develop leaders of character, competence and resilience
that are fit, agile, adaptive, and innovative.
organize, train, and equip responsibility
Question. The Chief of Staff is responsible for organizing,
training and equipping forces provided to fleet and component
commanders, including the prioritization of funding and effort to meet
these needs in the near term, while developing capabilities for the far
term.
How would you characterize your experience in force management and
capability requirement decisions?
Answer. While leading Forces Command it is my job to ensure that
the Army is able to provide a sustained supply of highly capable land
forces to combatant commanders. In that role, I became intimately
familiar with both the combatant commanders' requirements and the Army
forces ready to meet them. Additionally, my time serving on the Joint
Staff and as the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
provided me significant experiences with the longer term challenges
facing our military and the critical investment decisions that must be
made now to ensure we have the capabilities we will need in the future.
Question. What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing,
training and equipping the Army?
Answer. A decade and a half of war has taught us that the Army must
continually adapt to the missions assigned and the operating
environment. The Army will continue to innovate as we did in Iraq and
Afghanistan, focusing our efforts on what soldiers and commanders need
to accomplish their missions. Our organizational structures need
agility in order to meet the combatant commanders' request for forces;
our training must be realistic so that it meets the unique needs of the
units' assigned mission, while developing the skills to fight and win
future wars as part of the Joint Force. We need to procure equipment
that is technologically feasible so that we can quickly and cost
effectively provide incremental improvements to the field.
There are a wide variety of emerging technologies that may have
significant impact on ground warfare including technologies in
communications for mission command, robotics, nano-technologies, human
performance, explosives and propellants, hypersonics, directed energy,
cyber, protective materials for personnel and equipment, and a variety
of developments in weapons technologies. All of these and more are
areas of innovation the Army will explore in depth to assess
applicability at affordable cost.
security strategies and guidance
Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range
and diversity of threats to national security we face today?
Answer. The range and diversity of potential threats is increasing
concurrent with increasing instability in many parts of the world. Our
adversaries--both state and non-state--recognize the limits of our
capabilities and capacity. Both state and non-state adversaries have
employed novel capabilities, created by combining increasingly
available military and commercial technologies. Accordingly, our
enemies are increasingly using ``hybrid'' warfare methods that blend
aspects of conventional and irregular warfare. This creates ambiguity
and achieves adversary gains below the threshold that has historically
triggered a U.S. or Allied military response. However, given the
increased uncertainty, and velocity of global instability converging
with rapid technological, demographic, economic, and geo-strategic
power shifts, it is my view that significant conflict with adversary-
state or non-state actors threatening vital U.S. interests is
increasing in all likelihood.
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took
into account a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources.
With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of
Defense as a result of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance
still valid?
Answer. No. The additional cuts imposed by sequestration would
impose a significant departure from the level of resources that the
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) assumed. Sequestration will force the
Army to reduce end strength, readiness, and nearly halt modernization.
The consequences of these forced actions would degrade our ability to
provide the trained and ready forces that the DSG requires and increase
risk to the point where the U.S. Army could not fulfill the missions
assigned to us in our National Security strategic guidance documents.
In short, our ways and means will be significantly out of balance with
our stated ends, which will increase risk to an unacceptable level for
the Nation. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to
properly balance the national strategic ends-ways-means in order to
maintain National Security risk at acceptable levels.
Question. In your view, as the Defense Strategic Guidance was
issued in January 2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate
for the threats we face today or do you think an update is warranted?
Answer. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was based upon a number
of assumptions, such as the duration of conflicts, the contributions of
our allies, and the nature and location of future threats. Some of
these assumptions now appear optimistic, particularly in light of the
rise of ISIL, a resurgent Russia, Iran's actions in the Middle East,
and challenges in the Pacific region. If confirmed, I will provide my
best military advice to inform policy and guidance as we move forward
to confront current and future threats.
Question. In your view, is our defense strategy and current
establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
Military Departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces
properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
Nation faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. I believe the structure of the defense establishment and
the roles and missions of the services are sound. In my view, we need
to continually reassess our defense strategy in order to update it to
account for the changing security environment. Resourcing levels must
also remain predictable and aligned with our national objectives. I am
concerned that we may underestimate the degree of readiness, end
strength, and modernization required to confront current and future
security challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a deliberate strategic
assessment to identify any needed changes to the Total Army's
capabilities, structure, roles, and missions. Such assessments will
also evaluate capacity. In doing so, I will work with the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services Chiefs, and combatant commanders along
with both the Secretary of the Army and Defense to ensure the Army is
the right size, with the right structure, and doing the right mission
to protect the Nation.
military capabilities in support of defense strategy
Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the
necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2015 National Military
Strategy? Please identify areas of higher risk.
Answer. The defense strategy provides that the Army, as part of the
Joint Force, has to accomplish three tasks. The first priority is to
defend the homeland; the Army can meet our responsibilities in this
mission set. The second task is build security globally. While we have
the capability required, increasing demand for Army forces, while our
force is getting smaller, strains capacity. We remain engaged in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, Europe, the greater Middle East, Africa,
South America, and the Pacific region. The stress of increased missions
on a smaller force is something I am especially concerned about. Tempo
will likely increase given the instability around the world and the
reduction of defense spending by our allies and partners. Lastly, the
defense strategy tasks the Army to project power and win decisively.
Here, the risk is significant and trending higher as we train our
decisive action capability and meet warplan requirements with a
smaller, less resourced force.
Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities
to decisively win in future state to state conflict?
Answer. The 2014 QDR was based on a set of facts and assumptions
that did not include the current situation in Eastern Europe and
Russia, the rise and spread of ISIS along with the disintegration of
the nation-state in the Middle East, and the increasing military
capability and foreign policy assertiveness of China. In short, the
world has become more uncertain and unstable since the 2014 QDR was
written and consequently we need to review the global assumptions and
calculations embedded in the 2014 QDR in order to ensure the
capabilities and priorities align to the realities of the emerging
situation.
Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR,
American forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a
large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or
impose unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.''
In your opinion, is the Army adequately sized to meet the
Department's force sizing construct in order to address the country's
current threat environment?
Answer. The current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray
Odierno, has testified that the Army size in PB16 of 450,000 Regular
Army, 335,000 Army National Guard, and 195,000 U.S. Army Reserve is
adequate to meet the demands of the current and future threats but at
``significant risk.''
If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure, and
tempo in our Army Force Generation rotational model to meet global
demands as they change. I will continually evaluate the size and
capability of the Total Army against emerging threats and provide
candid assessments on our risk to our senior civilian leadership
including the President, The Secretary of Defense, The Secretary of the
Army, the National Security Council, and Members of the U.S. Congress.
Question. If the Army cannot meet the demands placed on it, how
will you address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, if I ever believe that in my professional
military judgment that the Army cannot meet the demands in place, I
will inform the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of the
Army, the Secretary of Defense and, if necessary, in my role as a
member of the Joint Chiefs, the President. As a Nation, we must build
our strategy based on the threat, resources available, and tolerance
for risk. I will always provide my candid best military advice to
protect our Nation.
sequestered budget control act discretionary caps starting in fiscal
year 2016 onward?
Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the
Budget Control Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year
2016 Budget Resolution passed by the Senate and House of
Representatives do not assume this, but instead provides $38 billion of
the requested spending through the Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) budget.
Should this OCO funding not be available, what recommendations
would you have, if confirmed, for how the Army should manage additional
cuts for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. This $38 billion constitutes the difference between the
Fiscal Year 2016 President Budget request for Base requirements and the
BCA funding level for DOD ($538 billion-$500 billion). The Army's
portion of this $38 billion is $6 billion ($126 billion-$120 billion).
For comparison, the fiscal year 2015 Base funding level is $120.6
billion, an amount that has created resourcing and readiness challenges
this year.
The President's Budget request represents the minium resources
necessary for the Army to support the National Security Strategy. A
sequestered level budget will further reduce readiness and disrupt
modernization efforts. Should the government not provide the $38
billion through additive OCO funding or another source, the Army would
have no alternative than to further reduce structure, unit readiness
and will all but stop investment in its Research, Development and
Acquisition programs. The Army already reduced its force structure and
military endstrength to the extent possible in fiscal year 2016.
Impacts to readiness will include cancellation of home-station
training, reduced maintenance and upkeep of facilities infrastructure;
reduced logistics and maintenance readiness and IT & Cyber security
would be further marginalized. The Army would reduce its investment
account funding by approximately 12 percent of its requested amount,
spread across its RDTE and procurement accounts.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on readiness for the Army?
Answer. The Budget Control Act degrades Army readiness. In the
context of increased, unforecasted global demand, it creates the single
greatest risk by undermining the Army's ability to provide the
necessary capacity and capabilities for contingency operations, forcing
the Army to ration readiness. Regardless of funding levels, if
confirmed, I will keep training opportunities at our Combat Training
Centers (CTCs) a priority. The trade off will mean significant
reductions to home-station training, except for brigades going to CTCs,
which will compound the readiness reductions. Subsequent decisions to
commit Army forces will come with high risk and force senior leaders to
choose between: committing Army units at lower readiness levels or
delaying military operations. Long term consequences of underfunding
are significant as operational readiness requires a cumulative
investment and consistent funding. The Army needs consistent and
predictable funding year after year to ensure it maintains a level of
readiness commensurate with the current operational demands; we don't
have the luxury of long train-up times to react to the emerging and
immediate contingencies in the current security environment.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on Army capabilities?
Answer. Sequestration-level cuts leave the Army unable to meet
Defense Strategic Guidance, including our ability to shape and prevent
conflict in Europe and the Pacific and to deter adversaries across the
globe.
Budget Control Act funding reductions will require the Army to
further reduce force structure and end strength, and readiness levels
and further delay modernization. My concern is the smaller force will
lack the capacity to meet the Nation's security needs as currently
outlined in the National Defense Strategy. Furthermore, modernization
reductions will diminish equipping capacity and capability well into
the future.
headquarters streamlining
Question. The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters
functions of the Department of Defense and the Military Departments.
If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what
would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying
and implementing reductions in the Army headquarters?
Answer. Over the course of the last two years, the Army assessed
all of its Department Headquarters functions as required by the
Department of Defense. Planning and implementation for reductions is
already well underway. Associated with these reductions, each element
of the Headquarters has closely examined the functions they perform
with an eye towards streamlining, modernizing or eliminating the
function. Should legislation impose further reductions, I would expect,
if confirmed as Chief of Staff, that I would play a key role in
advising the Secretary of the Army where I believe we can and cannot
accept additional risk in our key Headquarters missions.
Question. What areas and functions, if any, do you consider to be
priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Army?
Answer. As a result of continued downward trends in our funding,
the Army has, over the last four years, made great strides in
eliminating unnecessary functions and organizations. I am proud of what
the Army has been able to accomplish despite losing billions of dollars
of base budget funding. Having said that, there are always ways to
streamline processes and functions. If confirmed, I will continue to
push for smarter ways of doing business in order to apply maximum
resources toward increased readiness. In pursuing these opportunities,
the Army needs to go where the best value lies, examining each
situation with a clear-eyed cost/benefit perspective. If confirmed, I
intend to continue reducing Headquarters size and functions in order to
optimize the tooth-to-tail ratio in favor of combat power in the
Operating Force.
Question. To the extent that the Army has functions that overlap
with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other Military
Departments, what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing
redundancy?
Answer. The Army cannot avoid making tough choices in this budget
environment. If confirmed, my priorities will be the readiness of our
forces and the care and support of our soldiers, their families and our
great civilian workforce. If another element of DOD can better
accomplish a function currently performed by the Army, then I will so
advise the Secretary of the Army. Similarly, if a function currently
performed by another element of DOD can be better performed by the
Army, it should be looked at as well. The Army cannot afford to be
bound by the way functions and processes have been performed in the
past and must make the best decisions for our Nation and our Armed
Forces.
Question. Given the plan the Army announced on July 9, 2015, to
downsize the regular Army by 40,000 soldiers, is headquarters
downsizing a component of this plan? If so, what are the goals?
Answer. The reduction of headquarters is part of the Army
downsizing; the planning and implementation of this is well underway.
The goal is to reduce all 2-star and above headquarters, both military
and civilian, as directed by the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I
plan to further review this plan and continue to streamline
headquarters strengths in order to retain as much combat power as
possible and further reduce the Army's tooth-to-tail ratio.
international partnerships
Question. Interactions between the land forces of different
countries are often negotiated at the Chief of Staff level, including
international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges,
and protocols for operations.
If confirmed, how do plan to ensure the U.S. Army continues to
build strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit
opportunities in international cooperation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize our support to the combatant
commanders as well as other international engagement programs. These
include bilateral staff talks with more than two dozen allies and
partners; adequate resourcing for our regionally aligned forces to
participate in international exercises; sustaining foreign student
attendance at the War College and Command and Staff College and other
professional military education; maximizing U.S. participation at their
schools through the Schools of Other Nations Program; continuing to
expand the Military Personnel Exchange Program; and continuing to
invest in the Army's Foreign Area Officer program. Maintaining strong
allied partnerships will be one of my goals as Chief of Staff and I
recognize that Allies are key to the long-term national security of the
United States.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with
international military leaders, forums, and processes?
Answer. At almost every rank over the course of my 35 year career,
I have had the opportunity to work closely with our international
partners during exercises and contingency operations and developed
insights into foreign militaries and processes. As a Captain, I worked
closely with the Columbian Army for nearly eight months. As a Special
Forces Captain I worked closely with indigenous forces in Somalia. As a
Major, I was the S-3 Operations Officer for 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain
Division, during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and worked with
multiple allied partners to include Argentinean leaders and those from
six Caribbean nations. As a Lieutenant Colonel Battalion Commander in
Korea, I worked closely with the 1st ROK Division along the DMZ. As a
Colonel in command of the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, I worked
closely with multiple armies in Afghanistan, to include international
NATO Partners and the Afghan National Security Forces. In Iraq, in
command of the same brigade, I worked closely with United Kingdom and
Polish Forces, along with Iraqi Security Forces. As Deputy Commanding
General for Regional Command-East in Afghanistan, I worked closely with
multiple NATO allies, our Afghan Partners, and Pakistani military. As
the Commanding General of ISAF Joint Command in Afghanistan, I was
responsible for the planning and operations of coalition partners
across the country. The coalition included over approximately 50
nations and my staff included senior leaders from many of these
countries allowing me to incorporate several staff systems from partner
nations. Most recently, as the Commanding General of United States Army
Forces Command, I visited the United Kingdom and observed their force
generation processes and operational systems and have had visits from
several other key allies including Japan. If confirmed, I plan to
continue to work closely with our international partners and allies
throughout the world.
joint operations
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with other
Services' capabilities including how they organize, train and equip
their forces?
Answer. During my 35 years in uniform and through multiple joint
assignments in addition to seven contingency deployments, I have had
the opportunity to serve with and develop deep appreciation for the
other Services' unique capabilities. I have worked very closely with
the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard over many years in
multiple capacities. If confirmed, I look forward to deepening my
understanding by working closely with the fellow Service Chiefs as part
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to
increase Joint interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve
cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed?
Answer. The Army is actively involved in joint concept development,
war-gaming, and experimentation, all designed to improve cross-domain
capability and capacity. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
sufficient resources are applied to implement change and enhance joint
interoperability. This is a key task--the Army will always operate as
part of the U.S. Joint Force.
united states force posture in the asia-pacific region
Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense
Guidance.
Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?
Answer. Yes, I am satisfied with the Army's rebalance efforts to
the Asia-Pacific region to date and I will continue to emphasize the
importance of the Asia-Pacific region if confirmed. Approximately 20
percent of the Active Army is assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. This
includes one Corps Headquarters, two Division Headquarters, five
Brigade Combat Teams and one Armored Brigade Combat Team's worth of
equipment prepositioned on the Korean Peninsula. We are replacing
forward stationed units with ready rotational units. For example, the
Army is providing USPACOM with rotational forces, such as Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense missile batteries and an Armored Brigade Combat
Team. Shaping activities such as Pacific Pathways builds partner-nation
capacity and multinational interoperability while also enhancing U.S.
Army unit readiness and fostering an expeditionary mindset across the
force. Both the size and importance of the Asia-Pacific region defines
an integrated multi-service approach as a near imperative. Consistent
with the Army's Regionally Aligned Forces policy, the Army's current
force posture in the Asia-Pacific ensures that it is prepared to set
the theater, shape the security environment and respond to
contingencies across the full range of military operations in support
of the combatant commander and National Strategic objectives.
Question. What do you see as the United States security priorities
in the Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what
specific Army capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those
priorities?
United States security priorities in the Asia-Pacific over the next
several years are to maintain a credible deterrent posture and provide
reassuring military presence in the region in order to maintain
regional stability. The United States should also work to strengthen
and advance alliances and partnerships, continue to mature our military
relationships, and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. We must work
with our interagency and multinational partners to bring about the
verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. I also
believe that the United States should continue to mature its strategic
relationship with India, and work with our interagency and
multinational partners in the region to counter transnational threats.
The Army contributes to rebalancing these priorities with a variety
of Army Forces committed to the region in Korea, Japan, Hawaii, Alaska,
and at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, along with rapid deployment
capabilities in the Global Response Force. Through routine exercises
and engagements such as Pacific Pathways and forward deployed forces in
the Republic of Korea and Japan, the Army assures allies, deters
adversaries and remains capable of responding to contingencies if
required.
Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated
with sequestration threaten the Army's ability to execute the rebalance
to the Pacific?
Answer. Yes, budget cuts and resource constraints associated with
the Budget Control Act and sequestration require the Army to reduce
force structure, limit training and curtail modernization programs. The
United States will continue to maintain a robust military footprint and
pursue international agreements in key locations, to include the Asia-
Pacific. Even in smaller numbers, the presence of soldiers is a strong
security guarantee to U.S. allies and partners. Further, initiatives
like Pacific Pathways demonstrate the United States' commitment to its
Allies and partners by establishing a dynamic presence in the region. I
am confident that our partners in the region want us to stand by our
commitments to them.
russia
Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most
effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. To best deter Russian aggression, the United States must
continue to work with allies using all the elements of national power.
Militarily, I think it prudent for the Army to continue to work with
NATO to strengthen its European posture and demonstrate the combined
ability to respond with capable ground forces in Eastern Europe through
a variety of exercises and prepositioning equipment contingency stocks.
If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army supports NATO and EUCOM
efforts to maintain and adapt capabilities, readiness, and
responsiveness in our commitment to the sovereignty and security of
every ally. In my view, we should also continue to fund European
Reassurance Initiative at current or increased levels.
Question. What is the Army doing to help NATO? What more can the
Army do?
Answer. The Army is supporting NATO with a number of initiatives.
First, the Army demonstrates the United States' continued commitment to
NATO through Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) actions and exercises
designed to deter further Russian aggression and reassure NATO Allies
and partners by maintaining a persistent Army presence in Central and
Eastern Europe. Second, the Army uses European Reassurance Initiative
(ERI) funds to increase the Army's presence and improve military
infrastructure on NATO's eastern flank (to include the creation of a
complete armored brigade combat team equipment set). Third, the Army
supports NATO's Readiness Action Plan (RAP) with forces for the NATO
Response Force (NRF). Last, the Army has a forward 2-star command post
to assist USEUCOM in force employment and mission command of OAR
exercises.
To do more, the Army can expand its support of OAR with additional
rotations, leverage future ERI investments such as additional
prepositioned equipment sets, and enhance the NRF by providing
enablers. Like USPACOM, resource limitations have also affected the
Army's support to USEUCOM. The Army can provide more support to Europe
by redistributing forces from other theaters, or improve the readiness
of uncommitted forces that could respond to Europe. Funding for
increased readiness (through ERI) would allow the Army to increase the
number of rotational forces. Specifically, the Army could increase the
number of exercises and deploy staff expertise to augment our Allied
and U.S. headquarters in Europe. Finally, establishing OAR as a ``named
operation'' could allow funds to be used to pay for mobilization and
deployment of Army National Guard to Europe as part of an overall
program to use conventional ground forces to deter Russian aggression.
Question. Does the Army, as part of a combined joint force, have
what it needs in Europe?
Answer. No, because of security condition changes in Europe, the
current United States Army posture does not support a comprehensive
response according to necessary timelines. However, working with
USEUCOM, we are in the process of addressing this posture shortfall and
European Reassurance Initiative funding is critical to supporting that
effort.
china
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the
United States-China military relationship?
Answer. The United States-China military-to-military relationship
is important to the overall bi-lateral relationship. The current state
of United States-Sino military relations is stable with elements of
both cooperation and competition.
Question. What are your views regarding China's interest in, and
commitment to, improving military relations with the United States?
Answer. I am of the opinion all countries act in what they define
to be in their national interests. In this respect, I believe China
recognizes that it is in its interest to have a positive relationship
with the United States military. I support those actions that lead to
improved United States-China relations, of which the military plays a
part. If confirmed, I am committed to improving military-to-military
relations with China. Improved United States-China military-to-military
relationships can increase that stability and reduce miscalculations
during any crisis or incident situation.
Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance
of sustained military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. The purpose of sustained military-to-military relations
with China is to enable a stable, secure, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
region in which the United States, as an enduring Pacific power, is a
key leader. This is of particular significance to our five treaty
partners in the region, and the relative importance of the region to
the U.S. in economic, diplomatic, and military terms.
I believe we should continue to use our military engagement with
China to establish deeper cooperation where there is clear, mutual
benefit and to enhance dialogues to reduce risk and manage our
differences.
Question. What role do you see for the Chief of Staff of the Army
in this process?
Answer. If confirmed, my primary role will be to provide trained
and ready forces to the combatant commander. Beyond that, the Chief of
Staff of the Army's responsibilities include Army to Army engagements,
both with China as well as with our treaty allies and partners in the
region. As the Department continues to develop the military-to-military
relationship with China, it will be important to also deepen
cooperation with our allies and partners to maintain a stable and
secure Asia-Pacific region.
strategic leadership
Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and
assigned group of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank
of general officer within the Army?
Answer. Developing strategic thinkers, planners, and leaders is one
of the most important things we do, and is grounded in the best
possible training, education, and experiences. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Secretary of the Army to make appropriate
investments in our officer corps to ensure we provide opportunities for
advanced civil schooling, training with industry, joint assignments,
multinational experience, and other broadening assignments.
offset technologies
Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key
technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional
forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-
based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our
emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological
superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the
United States once again focus on offsetting the erosion of our
technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries.
Which technology priorities do you believe the Army should be
pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the
United States?
Answer. I understand the concept of the Third Offset Strategy,
emphasizing advanced emerging technologies to maintain a qualitative
edge over any opponent and I strongly support the Secretary of
Defense's Defense Innovation Initiative. The Army's technology
priorities enable our future land combat role in the joint fight and
align to the Army Operating Concept. If confirmed, my priorities will
be to look at increased range and effectiveness; increased use of
autonomy to augment existing capabilities; and technology and
approaches that drive down the cost of our systems. Specifically, the
Army will explore emerging technologies in:
Robotics
Autonomous systems
Cyber
Big Data
IT/Communications/Mission Command
Human Performance
Directed Energy weapons/Railguns
Advanced explosives and propellants
Nano technology/miniaturization
Additive manufacturing and 3D printing
Advanced materials for mobility and protection
Question. What strategies would you recommend be implemented to
develop these technology priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Army's long range thirty-
year planning process and determine if our current investment
strategies are appropriate for the future or need to be adjusted.
Question. What role should the Army play in their development?
Answer. The Army must remain globally aware of where and what
technology is being developed and be ready to refine, leverage, adapt
and/or acquire those that are necessary to retain dominance. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Army remains a proponent for the
development of these needed technologies--whether they are developed
within our own Science and Technology laboratories/Engineering Centers,
our sister Service/Agency labs, academia, industry or by our allies.
modernization
Question. Is the Army fully modernized to execute its Operating
Concept ``Win in a Complex World''?
Answer. The Army equipment modernization program is designed in
conjunction with the Army Operating Concept to enhance the lethality,
mobility, and protection for all of our units and to give them the
situational awareness they need in the future. Today, the Army
continues to balance requirements for end strength, current readiness,
and modernization under the Budget Control Act by accepting risk in
equipment modernization. The Army cannot afford to fully equip and
sustain the Total Army with the most modern equipment; therefore, we
acknowledge fiscal realities by selectively modernizing equipment and
formations across the Total Army.
The Army will mitigate future risk to our forces and mission
accomplishment through sustained S&T investments, leveraging our
current fleets by investing in incremental improvements, and building
new by exception. Given fiscal constraints, the Army will likely have
to continue to delay our next generation of platforms until they are
cost effective and affordable in order to sustain readiness of the
force, and maintain sufficient capacity to meet the demands of our
National Security Strategy and combatant commanders' requirements.
Question. If it is not, are current acquisition plans adequate to
achieve this goal?
Answer. The Army continues to develop acquisition strategies to
address the gaps and required capabilities that support the Army
Operating Concept (AOC). The acquisition strategies are dependent on
stable and predictable resources. Approval of funding levels programmed
for this requirement will determine how soon we can meet the approved
AOC. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to facilitate
support for the resourcing and acquisition efforts needed to enable
implementation of the AOC.
Question. Does the Army have adequate funding for needed research,
development test and evaluation?
Answer. The Army has been forced to make some difficult decisions--
balancing force structure, operational readiness, and modernization.
Given these three requirements, modernization is the near-term offset
for the other two. Within the modernization accounts, I fully support
the Army's continued investment in science and technology. Given the
fiscal realities facing the Department, I believe that this strategy of
spending our diminished modernization budget on science and technology
is appropriate as the seed corn that will enable the Army to maintain
the overmatch it has today.
Question. Is the Army at risk of being out matched by superior
capabilities and weapons?
Answer. Proliferation of advanced technologies and information
operations are leveling the playing field and the Army is at risk of
being matched by near-peer competitors in the outyears. Additionally,
the proliferating commercially available technology is increasingly
user-friendly and has empowered the individual, providing access to
capabilities that were once the exclusive domain of countries and their
militaries.
science and technology
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the
warfighter.
What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning
technologies effectively from research programs into programs of
records?
Answer. In my view, the current acquisition system has not evolved
sufficiently to keep pace with technological advances in the defense
industry and the pace of the global commercial market. The rates of
technological advancement and associated adaptation in today's
environment have increased exponentially. I think it is prudent and
necessary to adapt our acquisition system and procurement policies
accordingly. I look forward to working with OSD and Congress in this
important area.
Question. As the Chief of Staff, what steps will you take to ensure
that the services are benefitting more quickly and directly from the
research being performed by the defense research enterprise?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Army's long-range planning
process and will encourage this process to look holistically at
incorporating the capabilities being developed within the broader
defense research enterprise as part of the Army strategy. As necessary,
in conjunction with the other Service Chiefs, I will pursue
recommendations that will enable the Department to take advantage of
advanced technologies and make the process more timely and effective.
Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems,
especially in areas such as mobile communications, computing, and
robotics, are keeping pace with global and commercial technological
advances As you know, robust investment in S&T underpins technological
advances in our military capabilities and is vital for maintain our
military technological superiority over emerging adversaries.
Answer. I concur that robust investment in S&T underpins
technological advances in our military capabilities and is vital to
maintaining technological superiority. While keeping pace with advances
in technology is critical in some areas, there are steps to help offset
advances in other areas. The Army leverages the latest commercial
technologies and invests in critical enabling technologies that are not
available off-the-shelf. The Army has protected its S&T investments in
this fiscally challenging environment. If confirmed, I will continue to
support a robust S&T investment.
Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess
whether the Army is investing adequately in S&T programs?
Answer. The Army measures how well S&T transitions into a program,
which provides some indication of whether we are investing our dollars
wisely. If confirmed, I will require our S&T community to appropriately
address the most critical needs of our Army and establish firm metrics
to ensure our soldiers dominate the battlefield.
Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment
level for basic research programs?
Answer. The Army's investment in basic research helps to
investigate fundamental science that can be used to develop novel and
innovative capabilities that benefit the Army. The Army included $425.1
million for basic research in the Fiscal Year 2016 President's Budget
request. This is approximately 19 percent of the Army's S&T budget. I
have been advised that a reasonable range of investment levels for
basic research is approximately 16-20 percent of the Army S&T budget
and if confirmed, I will continue to support strong basic research.
Question. What tools would you use to ensure that appropriate
technologies are transitioning quickly into programs of record?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the LIRA (Long-Range Investment
Requirements Analysis) which maps resources to requirements, programs,
S&T and logistics. This planning tool, which looks out over 30 years,
was designed to ensure that a defined plan with resources is in place
to connect our valuable S&T efforts into our programs at the quickest
point possible. I will ensure the LIRA provides a systematic planning
of technology insertion into programs of record.
technical workforce
A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense today is
an impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent
to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers.
Question. In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active
Duty Army personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers
within the Army research and acquisition system?
Answer. My view is that Active Duty Army personnel trained and
working as scientists and engineers in Army research and acquisition
can help operationalize technologies from a soldier's perspective. The
cost, however, requires the Army to commit to advanced civil education
for these personnel to ensure necessary professional qualifications.
The benefit, in my view, outweighs the cost.
Question. How would you ensure that directors of labs in your
service have the tools they need to dynamically shape their S&T
workforce?
Answer. I understand that Congress has already provided significant
tools to the Army that enables the directors of the labs to shape their
science and technology workforce through various National Defense
Authorization Act authorities. Those authorities allow additional
capabilities such as direct hire authority for qualified science and
engineering candidates and managing performance through alternative
personnel systems. If confirmed, I will encourage and support
appropriate additional authorities the Army may require.
test and evaluation issues
Question. Are you satisfied with the Army's test and evaluation
capabilities, including workforce and infrastructure?
Answer. Based on what I know now, the Army has sufficient
infrastructure and the appropriate workforce to provide services to all
test customers. In my view, test and evaluation is critical to ensuring
the Army continues to reduce program life-cycle cost, as well as to
ensure future weapon systems are suitable, survivable and effective to
improve the capabilities of soldiers. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Army test and evaluation community and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense test and evaluation leadership to ensure the
Army's test and evaluation infrastructure maintains necessary test
capabilities and processes.
Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Army should be
developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. I have been advised the Army is investing in new test
capabilities to support unmanned and autonomous systems, survivability,
hypersonics, directed energy and cyber. The Army is also examining
opportunities to upgrade existing test capabilities to reduce high-cost
drivers to make current testing methods more efficient. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the Army test and evaluation community and in
concert with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense test and evaluation leadership to ensure the
Army's test and evaluation infrastructure maintains necessary test
capabilities and processes.
Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD
developmental and operational testing organizations with respect to
testing of Army systems?
Answer. It is my understanding that by law, OSD developmental and
operational test and evaluation organizations are responsible for
overseeing all major defense acquisition programs, major automated
information systems, and other acquisition programs. The OSD testing
organizations ensure appropriate testing is being conducted and that
the right questions at the each level have been asked and answered.
recruiting and retention
Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Army's success
in recruiting the highest caliber American youth for service and
retaining the best personnel for leadership responsibilities?
Answer. The key to successful recruiting is explaining the Army in
a manner that resonates with ``today's'' talented youth. Serving on a
cohesive team with trusted professionals could be one of the most
important things they ever do is a key message to today's youth who
want to serve a purpose greater than themselves. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Secretary of the Army to ensure sustaining the
All-Volunteer Force remains a strategic imperative for our Army.
Question. What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure
that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact
the overall readiness, recruiting, retention, and morale of soldiers?
Answer. We must ensure that soldiers have the time and resources to
prepare for and recover from their operational missions. With an
appropriately sized force we can ensure soldiers have adequate dwell
time between deployments. Additionally, quality leadership, training,
meaningful work, and just compensation contribute to overall readiness,
recruiting, retention, and soldier morale. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Secretary of the Army to provide the necessary
resources to commanders so they can ensure overall readiness,
recruiting, retention and morale of their soldiers.
Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department's
proposals aimed at slowing the growth of personnel and health care
costs will have on recruiting and retention in the Army?
Answer. I need to study the longer-term institutional implications
of the personnel and health care costs, to include how these may affect
recruiting and retention. On health care, we must continue to find ways
to deliver high quality healthcare to our soldiers and families in
effective and economical ways without degrading readiness.
Question. The Army requested a provision for enhanced recruiting
authorities for the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization
Act. What programs does the Army plan to implement and what specific
recruiting needs will those programs address?
Answer. No response required; question withdrawn.
Question. If confirmed, will you review the Department of the Army,
to include the Army National Guard, use of sports marketing and
advertising purchases as a means of recruitment?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Army and the Director of the Army National Guard to review sports
marketing and advertising to ensure our expenditures in this area are
effective, efficient, and ethical in recruiting the high quality
soldiers we need.
military compensation
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military
compensation?
Answer. My sense is that current military compensation is adequate.
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to re-evaluate
and assess compensation to ensure we sustain a high quality All-
Volunteer Force.
Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the
rising cost of personnel?
Answer. Controlling the rising cost of personnel will require a
holistic look at how we compensate our personnel (both monetary and
non-monetary). What I know is that we must continue to provide fair
compensation to our soldiers that is competitive with other
opportunities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
the Army to establish a total compensation package that is competitive
and maintains a high quality All-Volunteer Force.
Question. Do you support the Department's compensation and health
care proposals?
Answer. Yes, I support the Department's plans for recommendations
that preserve compensation, health care, and quality of life for
soldiers, retirees and their families. I think it is important to honor
our previous commitments to serving soldiers and veterans.
Question. What is your assessment of military compensation as
compared to civilian compensation?
Answer. Military compensation, in general, is adequate, when
compared to civilian compensation. However, the nature of the work and
the sacrifice demanded from our soldiers and their families does not
compare to the civilian sector. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Secretary of the Army, to ensure the Army can continue to attract
our Nation's top talent and compensate them appropriately.
Question. What areas of military compensation, if any, do you
believe warrant improvement or modernization?
Answer. I am interested in the details of the Military Compensation
and Retirement Commission, specifically the reforms for blended
retirement options. Whatever decisions are made must be accompanied
with a robust training and education program so that our soldiers can
make informed financial decisions for themselves and their Families. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army and the
other Service Chiefs to implement any final decisions.
education for soldiers
Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the
ability of career-oriented servicemembers to transfer their earned
benefits to spouses and dependents.
Answer. What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI
Bill on recruiting and retention of soldiers?
Answer. I think the Post 9/11 GI Bill is a valuable incentive and
helps the Army attract and retain quality soldiers.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the
transferability option on retention and career satisfaction of
soldiers?
Answer. I believe a soldier's ability to transfer his/her Post 9/11
GI Bill benefit helps the Army retain quality mid-grade and career
soldiers.
Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits
are to young soldiers, and what trends do you see in the Army's ability
to pay for such programs at current levels over the FYDP?
Answer. The ability to educate our soldiers is an important benefit
and I believe it's one of the primary reasons our young Americans join
the military. It is a key benefit and incentive to sustain the All
Volunteer Force. There are several education benefits available, of
which tuition assistance is one. In today's era of reduced budgets, we
must balance benefits against the money available. If confirmed, I will
strive to ensure we balance the benefits desired by soldiers with the
funding provided to us by the Congress.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current
eligibility criteria for tuition assistance?
Answer. Tuition Assistance is both a valuable benefit to our
soldiers and our Army and evidences our commitment and investment in
their future. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
the Army to explore potential improvements and ensure policy changes do
not adversely affect the force.
Question. Do you believe that tuition assistance should be used to
enhance a soldier's career while he or she is in the Army?
Answer. Absolutely. Tuition assistance is a valuable benefit to our
soldiers and our Army and supports our culture and beliefs in life-long
learning.
Question. Do you agree with the Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission that tuition assistance should be
limited to courses and education that contribute to a soldier's
professional growth?
Answer. In principle, I generally agree; however, I am concerned
about too narrow a scope in defining ``courses and education that
contribute to a soldier's professional growth.'' The Army's current TA
policy requires soldiers to first meet with a counselor in order to
establish a degree plan before taking courses and receiving benefits;
continued TA benefit receipt is contingent upon working toward that
degree plan. We want all our soldiers to aspire to be lifelong
learners.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. As you know, two years ago, the Department rescinded the
policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have
the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and
has given the Military Services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The services have opened a large number of
positions to service by women and continue to work to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in the development
of these standards?
Answer. My basic position is that all people should be afforded
equal opportunity to rise in accordance with their merit. Currently,
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is working to validate the
standards for all Army occupations. If confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of the Army and the other Services Chiefs to ensure that the
Army has the appropriate mental and physical standards for all military
occupations.
Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and
will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?
Answer. Yes, I am committed to ensuring the standards are realistic
for every occupation and that soldiers have the opportunity to serve to
their full potential. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Secretary of the Army and the other Service Chiefs to ensure that the
standards are realistic and will preserve and enhance military
readiness and mission capability.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements, and that assignment decisions
should be made solely on the basis of a servicemember's ability to meet
validated gender-neutral occupational standards?
Answer. Yes, positions should be opened based on validated military
requirements, tied to specific capabilities, skill sets, and
established gender-neutral standards.
Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to
ensure decisions are made based on validated military and force
readiness requirements.
Question. To what extent is the Army coordinating with the Marine
Corps in this effort? Are results from the assessments being shared
between services?
Answer. The Army and the Marine Corps have collaborated and shared
information on their efforts. It is my understanding that the Army has
shared results with all the Services when preparing the recommendations
to open positions, units or occupations.
Question. If the Marine Corps were to make the decision to not open
all positions as of January 1, 2016, what effect, if any, will that
have on the Army's decision?
Answer. If the USMC decides not to open all positions, and if I am
confirmed, I will work closely to understand the other Services'
position and rationale in order to provide a fully informed
recommendation to the Secretary of the Army. That said, my
recommendation to the Secretary of the Army will be based on my best
military judgment about what is best for the Army. My recommendation
will be based on standards and readiness requirements.
Question. What is your position on whether the Selective Service
Act should be opened to all genders if the decision is made to open all
units on January 1, 2016?
Answer. I believe in maintaining the All-Volunteer Force and that
we must do everything in our power to preserve it. The opening of
previously closed positions to women is a step in the right direction
for women who can meet the physical and mental standards. If confirmed,
I will review if there is a need to change the Selective Service Act
and provide my military advice to the Secretary of the Army.
force management
Question. Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental
reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based
structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades
are supposed to be just as, or more, capable than the divisional
brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of
equipment--such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment.
To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned
modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully
equip this force as required by its design have slipped to 2019.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity
transformation strategy?
Answer. My understanding is the Army has completed modular
transformation of combat and support brigades. Modular Transformation
reorganized the Army's Operating Force from large division-sized
formations designed to defeat traditional threats in conventional
campaigns to more versatile and deployable brigade-sized units designed
to support joint force requirements for full spectrum operations.
Importantly, modularity has allowed the Army to organize as we fight,
and standardized our brigade combat teams into three configurations--
Armored, Infantry, or Stryker, and established adaptive, Joint Task
Force capable headquarters at the 2-star level.
Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you
propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?
Answer. The Army is constantly changing. If confirmed, I will
continue to assess the requirements of the national strategy against
known and emerging requirements and threats to ensure the Army provides
the best force structure (both capacity and capability) to support
combatant commanders and the Nation.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting
units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?
Answer. I commanded modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) of all
types in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The modular BCTs have greater
utility across a broader range of military operations than those of
previous brigade designs. In Iraq and Afghanistan, modular BCTs were
effective during both combat and stability operations and far better at
integrating the capabilities of other tactical elements of the Joint
Force. Command and control functions are streamlined through the
permanent task organization of critical core components such as
engineer, field artillery, and military intelligence. Additionally, the
standardized designs facilitated transitions and streamlined logistics.
Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular
design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit
employment to improve performance or reduce risk?
Answer. Currently, I have no proposals to change the Army's modular
designs. As a matter of routine, the Army analyzes and assesses
requirements, threats, performance and risk the optimal force mix and
equipment, spread across the Total Force. The results of this analysis
will continue to inform Total Force Policy, design and structure. If
confirmed, I will continually review the designs of our units to ensure
the proper force mix delivers the right capability at the right time to
the combatant commanders.
Question. With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force
structure design, General Dempsey's June 2011 pamphlet titled ``CSA's
Thoughts on the Army's Future,'' directs the Army to assess the
feasibility of adding a third maneuver battalion to each heavy and
infantry brigade.
What is your understanding and assessment of the need to add a
third maneuver battalion to the modular heavy and infantry brigades?
Answer. Adding a third maneuver battalion to our brigade combat
teams increases the Army's operational capability and flexibility and
is the direct result of the lessons of 14 years of war and operations
around the world. The change makes the brigade more lethal, flexible,
and agile. The reorganization also represents a transition to a force
that is prepared to effectively operate across a broader range of
potential missions.
Question. If confirmed, will you continue to implement the decision
to add a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat
brigades? What force structure or capabilities would you propose to
reduce in order to increase maneuver forces within the combat brigades?
Answer. Yes, conversion will continue and is planned to be complete
in the Active Component by the end of fiscal year 2015. The addition of
the third maneuver battalion is nearly complete in the Active Component
and will begin next year for the Army National Guard. I believe the
third maneuver battalion in a Brigade Combat Team provides the combat
power necessary to dominate the battlefield at the tactical level.
Question. How will you manage this given the current drawdown of
the Active Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess combatant commander
requirements to ensure that we provide the best possible mix of
capabilities within our end strength to support the National Military
Strategy. The addition of a third maneuver battalion has been underway
for years, and as a result, our brigade combat teams (BCTs) are more
capable. Recent force structure reductions will diminish the aggregate
capacity of the Army without affecting the remaining BCT's capability.
aviation restructuring initiative
Question. The Aviation Restructuring Initiative is intended to
fully modernize Total Army Aviation by 2028 and reorganize by 2019. Is
this effort on track? If not, what challenges do you face?
Answer. The Aviation Restructuring Initiative is on track to ensure
our Total Army Aviation Force is fully modernized, ready, and tailored
to meet mission demand in all three components. However, fiscal and
resource constraints have limited the Army's flexibility.
Any significant changes to the proposed realignment of aircraft and
units, or an increase in Army Acquisition Objectives will have an
adverse effect on unit readiness, modernization programs, and industry
partners. Current and projected Army force structure and funding levels
and current Congressional appropriations allow us to keep the best,
most modern aircraft; standardize the structure of our aviation
brigades; and balance the capabilities across the components.
total army end strength
Question. Is the Total Army large enough to execute the National
Military Strategy?
Answer. The current CSA has testified ``yes, but with significant
risk.'' The level of resourcing provided under the President's Budget,
the Army has sufficient capacity, although the ability to execute the
strategy depends on more than end strength alone. Maintaining adequate
readiness and capability are also necessary components. Readiness,
capacity, and capability require sufficient, predictable budgets to
plan against.
Question. Is an Active Duty Army of 450,000 large enough to execute
all potential missions for the operational force while maintaining
required capabilities in the institutional force?
Answer. A 450,000 Active Army, 980,000 Total Army force provides
the minimum capacity to execute the missions envisioned in the current
national strategy at significant risk, while maintaining the required
level of generating forces in the institutional Army. The risk to the
force and missions increases if assumptions in the Defense Strategic
Guidance (regarding the duration of conflicts, the contributions of our
allies, and the nature and location of future threats) are invalidated.
Question. Can the Active Duty Army successfully execute its mission
at an end strength of 420,000?
Answer. The U.S. Army cannot execute the missions currently
assigned in the National Security strategic guidance documents if the
total Army is reduced to 920,000 (420,000 Active Component, 315,000
ARNG, 185,000 USAR).
the national commission on the future of the army
Question. Will you be prepared to receive and act on
recommendations from the national commission in 2016?
Answer. Yes.
``institutionalizing'' support for irregular warfare
Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has
been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
and stability type operations--all of which are areas that place a high
premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a
rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then
sustainable, senior leaders have stressed the need for the Department
to ``institutionalize and finance'' the support necessary for the
irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last
several years and will be needed in the future.
What, in your view, does it mean to ``institutionalize''
capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the
Army?
Answer. The Army is institutionalizing capabilities and support for
Irregular Warfare through the development of appropriate doctrine,
organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) across the Army. Building on our
experience of the last 14 years, Irregular Warfare has been
institutionalized into doctrine, leader development and individual and
collective training. The DOTMLPF-P is an ongoing and standing process.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts
to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
Answer. The last 14 years has demonstrated the Army's ability to
identify and adapt needed capabilities. A key component to
institutionalizing any capability is to appoint a lead office with
responsibility and authority for its oversight. The Army has
established the following leads for the core activities constituting
Irregular Warfare:
1) The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (counterterrorism,
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense)
2) The U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute (stability operations)
3) TRADOC's Combined Arms Center (counterinsurgency, security
force assistance, asymmetric warfare).
The Army also serves as the Executive Agent for the Joint Center
for International Security Force Assistance which supports the Joint
Force. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Stability Operations
Lessons Learned and Information Management System ensure that the
capabilities and skill sets developed over the last 14 years of
conflict remain relevant. If confirmed, I will continue to assess our
progress and make any necessary adjustments going forward.
Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to
institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to
overcome them?
While force structure and program changes may be necessary, they
are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full institutionalization.
The greater challenge may be found in changing Army culture, attitudes,
management, and career path requirements and choices, for example
through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and personnel
policies.
Answer. Fiscal uncertainty and the subsequent need to downsize
remain the biggest obstacles to institutionalize and support these
capabilities. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force
structures increase, the Army has to assess which of these capabilities
it must retain and at what level. Finding the right balance is a
challenge. Maintaining our doctrine and lessons learned databases is
achievable, but retaining all of the necessary force structure will be
more challenging. The Army requires consistent, on-time funding to
maintain readiness, achieve efficiencies, and ensure that the Total
Force is prepared to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance and win in a
complex world.
Question. In your view, what are the most important changes, if
any, that might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in
support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for
irregular warfare in the Army?
Answer. The most important changes are how we educate our leaders
about the conduct of Irregular Warfare, to include Counterinsurgency
(COIN), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counterterrorism (CT), Foreign
Internal Defense (FID), Stability Operations (SO), and Security Force
Assistance (SFA). Through our professional military education, we must
maintain competent and committed leaders of character with the skills
and attributes necessary to meet the warfighting challenges of a
complex world.
Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular,
counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not
mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and
ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of
operations.
If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize and allocate the
Army's efforts and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for
major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes
support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
Answer. Current global instability reinforces that irregular,
asymmetric and hybrid threats will continue to be central to the future
operating environment. Consequently, in accordance to the Army
Operating Concept, we must train and educate our leaders to operate
effectively in the spectrum of conflict against multiple conflict
forms. In the training environment, we are replicating those threats
and conditions to ensure the Army is able to operate in the
increasingly complex global security environment. We maintain a
responsive training system underpinned by a robust lessons learned
process and professional military education that incorporates both
regular and irregular war to ensure the Army is ready. In light of
changing threats and the evolving operating environment, we
continuously review all areas in the span of DOTMLPF-P to ensure the
Army remains well set to face emerging challenges. This ensures the
Army is able to respond rapidly to crises and skillfully transition
between types of military operations as the threat changes.
equipment repair/reset
Question. In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not
only prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also
improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential
contingencies?
Answer. From my understanding, the Army requested the funding it
needs to restore combat capability to the equipment returning from
Afghanistan, commensurate with the Army's enduring need for this
equipment.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. From my understanding, our repair depots are meeting our
rebuild and repair requirements.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
available for operations and training?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the Army's current capacity to
repair and replace equipment and make recommendations if necessary. The
Army will continue to explore new technologies and emerging methods to
fix equipment and support logistic operations.
Question. What impact is this level of funding likely to have, if
any, on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland
Defense and support to civil authorities' missions?
Answer. Support to the homeland is the Total Army's highest
priority. Homeland defense and support to civil authorities centers on
the Army National Guard but utilizes assets from all components. Since
the Army National Guard is a component of the Total Army, it will be
affected by decreases in the levels of funding. Decreased funding will
have a negative impact on the Total Army (Active, National Guard, and
USAR) readiness levels with decreased capability to respond to Homeland
Defense and Support to Civil Authorities.
special operations enabling capabilities
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander of
USSOCOM to address the enabling requirements of Army SOF throughout the
deployment cycle?
Answer. The Army works closely with the Joint Staff and USSOCOM in
the Global Force Management process to ensure resources are provided to
Geographic Combatant Commanders in accordance with Department of
Defense priorities. Additionally, Army SOF and conventional
interoperability training remains a top priority at the Combined
Training Centers to ensure units maintain the level of shared
understanding developed throughout the last 14 years of conflict. We
value our relationship with USSOCOM and continue to evaluate the way we
support all Geographic Combatant Commands. The continued refinement of
the Regionally Aligned Force concept and establishment of a Department
of the Army level liaison cell within USSOCOM should optimize the
support the service can provide. Sustaining the close relationship that
conventional forces and SOF have developed during combat operations
over the past decade and a half is a key training priority.
Question. Do you agree that Army special operations personnel
should be managed by U.S. Special Operations Command? Please explain.
Answer. No, the Army has considerable interaction with the U.S.
Special Operations Command related to the assignment and development of
its personnel. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army
to ensure current personnel management policies related to all
combatant commands are adequate.
active army readiness
Question. Does the Army have adequate readiness levels? If not,
why?
Answer. As a result of the Budget Control Act and increased global
demand, the Army implemented a sustained readiness approach to maintain
a contingent response capability and fulfill current requirements. With
the implementation of the Budget Control Act, the Army has only been
able to sustain approximately one-third of the Regular Army (Active
Component) at acceptable combat readiness standards. Our objective is
to maintain two-thirds of the Active component at combat ready
standards. Similarly, we have not been able to maintain Army National
Guard units at acceptable levels of readiness. The principal driver for
this status is inadequate funding to maintain appropriate levels of
capacity, readiness, and modernization.
Question. What must be done to improve readiness levels of the
Active Army?
Answer. Consistent and predictable funding is necessary to restore
the appropriate balance between modernization, procurement, end-
strength and force structure. This will stabilize the resource elements
of Army Readiness: Manning, Equipment, Sustainment, Training and
Installation Support. This stability coupled with continued gains in
training proficiency over time will allow the Army to address current
global demand, while maintaining the readiness required to support
National Military Strategy contingency requirements.
Question. What percentage of Active Army units must be fully ready?
Answer. Readiness requirements are determined across the Total
Force based on time, capacity, and capability--against planning
contingencies, combatant command requirements, and resources. Because
of the constrained fiscal environment, only about 30 percent of Army
brigades are at acceptable levels of combat readiness. The U.S. Army
BCT combat readiness rate should be between 60-70 percent.
Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed
and non-deployed units?
Answer. All Army units and soldiers actively supporting combatant
commands deploy at the highest levels of assigned mission readiness.
Outside of deployed forces, the Army has had to focus resources on a
small number of non-deployed brigade combat teams and enabling forces
for the global response force. For those non-deployed units at lower
readiness levels, it will take longer to get them ready to get to the
fight, potentially losing opportunities with rapid deployment, or
sending those units quickly but less ready and risking higher
casualties.
118. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is
acceptable?
Answer. The CSA, GEN Odierno, has testified that currently the Army
provides a sufficient amount of forces to fulfill all the requirements
of the Defense Strategic Guidance but at ``significant risk'' due to
readiness. Given current readiness levels and uncertain global demands,
if confirmed, I will assess our readiness levels closely as our #1
priority and provide candid military advice on our capability to meet
requirements.
Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to
respond to an attack or another contingency?
Answer. Global demand for Army forces continues to consume
resources needed to rebuild Army readiness required for contingency
plans. Iraq and Afghanistan are not the sole source of demand.
Reductions in planned demand have been supplanted by growth in un-
forecasted global requirements. With decreasing force structure
capacity and resources, the Army prioritizes readiness efforts for
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere at the expense of the non-deployed
force readiness. The Army will need more time to ready and deploy
additional forces to meet contingencies, potentially incurring higher
casualties or jeopardizing mission accomplishment.
reserve components as an operational reserve
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
Reserve components in regard strategic depth?
Answer. I am mindful that, as established in federal statute, the
purpose of our Reserve Components--the Army National Guard of the
United States and the United States Army Reserve--is to provide trained
units and qualified persons for Active Duty whenever more units and
persons are needed than can be provided by the Regular Army. As such,
our Reserve Components fulfill many operational demands as well as
providing strategic depth. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure the
Total Army is ready to meet the needs of combatant commanders.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a
relevant and capable operational Reserve?
Answer. As resources and opportunities for training and operational
deployments decrease, our principal challenges for preserving the
Reserve components as an operational Reserve are retaining relevant
operational experience and readiness. Both the Army National Guard and
the U.S. Army Reserve are critical to the Nation's defense to provide
strategic depth and as an operational Reserve. I am, therefore, deeply
committed to maintaining their readiness as a top priority.
Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the
Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. Combat missions are conducted by all types of units from
all three of our components--Regular Army, Army National Guard, and the
U.S. Army Reserve. The Army must retain the authority to integrate
personnel and units from all three components to provide our Joint
force commanders with the best Army force mix for the job at hand. In
some cases, depending on the types of units required and the specific
mission, our Reserve and Guard forces can effectively fulfill early
deploying requirements. In other cases, they are better suited for
providing operational and strategic depth. The optimal role for Reserve
component forces will depend on the specific mission requirement
generated by the combatant commanders and requires careful analysis of
mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and significantly, the time
required to respond to the combatant commander requirement.
Answer. No. The Nation needs the flexibility to employ personnel
and units from all three components to fulfill the operational demands
of our state governors and combatant commanders.
Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year
mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of
the all-volunteer Reserve force?
Answer. Soldiers, families, and employers have shown strong support
for the one year mobilized to five years at home rotation rate goals as
established by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, mobilization
experience from the last decade substantiates this as well. The
viability of the All Volunteer Force is inextricably linked across all
components. Sustainment of the All Volunteer Force across all three
Army components--Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army
Reserve--is critical to the long term security of the United States. If
confirmed, I will remain committed to ensure the operational tempo of
all three Army components is structured at a pace to sustain the All
Volunteer Force.
Question. Advocates for the National Guard and Reserve assert that
funding levels do not meet the requirements of the Reserve components
for operational missions.
Do you agree that the Army's Reserve components are inadequately
resourced, particularly in view of the commitment to maintaining an
operational Reserve?
Answer. No, but I do agree that the spending caps under the Budget
Control Act have placed significant downward pressure on our budget
such that a number of hard choices have been made and will need to be
made if relief does not come. Most of those hard choices have been
disproportionately taken in the Total Army by the Active Component. In
fact, as Total Army resources have been reduced since 2011, the
proportional share of available Total Army resources allocated to our
Reserve and Guard forces has increased. According to Army projections
for fiscal year 2021, Reserve and Guard shares of the Army budget will
have increased by 12.7 percent and 27.8 percent, respectively, since
fiscal year 2001. Resourcing of any Army component or any Army program
is a reflection of the total resources provided to Department of the
Army to fulfill its statutory and strategic roles and responsibilities.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our Reserve Components are
resourced to provide the Army both operational Reserve and strategic
depth as we train to confront current and future threats.
national guard
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in
the global and domestic roles and missions of the Army National Guard
and the National Guard Bureau in the last decade?
Answer. The Army National Guard of the United States remains one of
two viable and important reserve components in the Army. As the Army's
global and domestic roles and missions change, the personnel and units
from all three components will be employed to meet demand. The
experiences of the last decade illustrate this. We have learned that
``reserve'' is no longer solely defined by geography, but also includes
both capacity and response time.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
commitment to fully fund Defense Department requirements for Army
National Guard equipment?
Answer. PB16 funds Total Army endstrength of 980,000. General
Odierno assesses this is as ``significant risk'' and sufficient to
fulfill the 2012 DSG but at ``significant risk.'' PB16 does not fully
fund modernization. These shortages are shared across the Total Force.
At this time, the Army cannot afford to fully fund requirements, to
include equipment for any of the components--Regular Army, Army
National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. If confirmed, I will work to
balance forces, readiness, and modernization across the Total Army to
best fulfill our responsibilities within the Defense Strategy given the
resources we are given.
Question. In your view, do Army processes for planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution sufficiently address these
requirements for National Guard equipment?
Answer. Requirements for National Guard equipment and the two other
Army components are driven by the process of ``Total Army Analysis'' of
how the Army will fulfill the National Military Strategy. The challenge
is managing risk by balancing forces, modernization, and readiness
across all components to fulfill Army roles and responsibilities for
national defense.
The PPBE process is adequate for the Total Force to include the
National Guard. What is lacking is sufficient funds for all the
components. Shortages reflect resourcing shortfalls vice processes.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that these equipment
needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced
through the Army budget process? In your view, what is the appropriate
role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of
the Army to fulfill the strategic and fiscal guidance provided by the
President and the Secretary of Defense within the resource levels
provided. Federal statute clearly defines the advisory role of the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Director of the Army National
Guard, on behalf of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is a full
participant in the discussions and deliberations of how we equip the
Army and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of the
National Guard to meet the Total Army resourcing challenges.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role and
authority of the Director of the Army National Guard, and, in your
view, how does this compare with the role and authority of the Chief of
the Army Reserve?
Answer. The Chief of the Army Reserve is also the Commanding
General of U.S. Army Reserve Command, and exercises command authority
over all U.S. Army Reserve personnel and units assigned to the command.
As such, the Chief of the Army Reserve can more readily adapt Army
Reserve forces and programs to dynamic strategic and fiscal guidance.
The Director of the Army National Guard on the other hand does not
command the Army National Guard. By law, when not federalized,
personnel and units of the Army National Guard are controlled by the
Governors of the 54 states and territories to which they are
apportioned. When federalized, they usually fall under the command of
the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, before they are provided to a
combatant commander in response to a request for Army forces. The
Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau in the performance of his or her duties.
family readiness and support
Question. Soldiers and their families in both the Active and
Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for soldiers and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to maintain Family readiness
by fully supporting the important range of services and programs that
provide soldiers peace of mind that their Families are being cared for
during long deployments, changes of station and continued times of high
operational tempo. At issue here is adequacy of funding to enable our
support. I will sustain the Army's commitment to a high quality of life
for soldiers, families and civilians. Our program for this is Total
Army Strong, which provides commanders the ability to tailor services
and programs to meet the needs of local military community.
Programs and services such as the Exceptional Family Member Program
(considers family members with special needs during the assignments
process), Child Development Centers (provides soldiers with affordable,
quality day care), and the Financial Readiness Program (offers soldiers
financial counseling throughout their careers) are just a few examples
of the different ways the Army enables soldier and family readiness.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of future reductions in end strength?
Answer. If confirmed, my goal would be to maintain an Army of
strong and resilient soldiers and families. I would, however, as a
result of the Army's upcoming end-strength reductions, focus on the
Army's Soldier for Life (SFL) initiative that emphasizes the Army's
commitment to those who serve from the day the recruit reports for duty
through transition and continued service as a veteran. The SFL program
will provide many opportunities for soldiers and families leaving the
Army as a result of the drawdown.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military
quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of
intense downward pressure on budgets?
Answer. With the restructuring of the Army and the current fiscal
climate, if confirmed, I would apply resources to programs and services
that have the greatest impact on sustaining soldier and family
resilience and thereby Army readiness. I would also look to partner
with the other Military Departments and local communities to assist the
Army in ensuring availability of key programs as reasonable cost to all
soldiers and families, and to strengthen the Army's Soldier for Life
initiative. If confirmed, I would also want to hear from our soldiers
and families about those programs that are most important to them and
those services that they need but we are not providing.
suicide prevention
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's suicide prevention
program?
Answer. We need to do more for our soldiers and family members when
it comes to preventing suicide and mitigating the factors of suicide
and other high risk behaviors. Our Ready and Resilient efforts deliver
training, tools, and resources to improve soldiers performance,
strengthen their resilience and make them stronger and the Army has
made good progress in the last few years. However, more work needs to
be done. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to
continually assess this program to ensure we are meeting the needs of
our soldiers and that we continue to understand the myriad of causes
that lead to self-harm. I am committed to prevention and intervention
to help soldiers who are suffering and risk harm to self.
Question. In your view, what role should the Chief of Staff of the
Army play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides and to increase
the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, my role is to work with the Secretary of the
Army to provide policy and resources to Commanders to help them prevent
suicides and increase resiliency in the force. In my view, suicide
preventions continue to be a priority mission for all commanders and
soldiers.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that soldiers and their family
members have access to quality mental health care. As one of my
priorities, the Army will continue to make quality behavioral health
care available in innovative ways, such as embedded providers with
combat units in theater and at home station. We will continue to lead
the DOD in placing providers where soldiers' families can also easily
access mental health care. It is critical that soldiers view seeking
mental health care as a sign of strength. I will maintain the focus on
mental health care and take every opportunity to improve on the gains
made in the past several years.
medical care for wounded soldiers
Question. Is the Army adequately resourced to provide all needed
combat medical support in our active theaters?
Answer. At the current rate of combatant commander demand, we are
adequately resourced to provide the needed combat medical support in
our active theaters. The nature of the strategic environment requires
the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force
requirements. It has taken years to achieve the medical size,
structure, and capability required. Total Army Analysis has resulted in
a medical force sufficient to support combatant commands, that best
meets guidance under established resource constraints, and that
fulfills the roles and missions we ask of these key battlefield
enablers.
Question. Is the Army adequately resourced to care for soldiers in
the continental United States and overseas garrisons?
Answer. Current funding levels provide adequate resources to
sustain medical readiness and provide quality healthcare for soldiers
worldwide. Army Medicine continues to seek efficiencies and
opportunities to collaborate with other services, the Veteran's
Affairs, and the private sector to minimize costs. The successful
transition to a System for Health is vitally important to the survival
of Army Medicine as an affordable and viable means to maintain the
force.
Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded
personnel who have separated from Active service?
Answer. The Army's primary system to assist our wounded personnel
separating from Active service is through the Soldier for Life
Transition Assistance Program (SFLTAP). This program provides points of
contact for assistance once out of the military. For the population
consisting of the most seriously wounded soldiers, they may qualify for
the Army Wounded Warrior Program, whose cadre maintains contact with
seriously injured veterans to provide a continuum of care and support
as well as smooth transition to the Department of Veteran Affairs. We
also refer Wounded Warriors who qualify to the Veterans Affairs
Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment program that further assists
in the transition process.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
or to civilian life?
Answer. Warrior care will remain an Army priority; it is an
enduring mission and our sacred obligation. The Army will remain
committed to ensuring our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers have the
best health care possible to either successfully remain on Active Duty
or transition from Military Service and into communities as productive
Veterans. Additionally, we will continue our collaboration efforts with
Veterans Affairs to facilitate the seamless transition for our Wounded.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
disability evaluation system?
Answer. The Army is committed to ensuring that all soldiers receive
the care they need and the benefits they have earned through their
selfless service. It is my understanding that the disability evaluation
system (DES) is approaching a steady state balance, as soldier
disability cases are completed at a rate equal to or greater than cases
being enrolled on a monthly basis. Collaboration between the Physical
Disability Agency, Medical Command/Office of the Surgeon General and
the Veteran's Affairs, and the application of increased manpower and
resources have dramatically improved capacity, created efficiencies and
reduced timelines. Average time of completion for Active and Reserve
Component Soldier cases now meets and exceeds OSD Warrior Care Policy
goals. The DES Dashboard provides transparency and predictability for
soldiers, families and commanders and soldiers are increasingly
satisfied with their understanding of the process and the amount of
time it takes to complete DES. My assessment is that maintaining
timelines and improvements will require continued commitment of
resources in order to care for our most precious asset--our soldiers.
If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring we sustain our progress
and continue to improve where possible.
Question. Is the Total Army Health care system adequate to meet the
health care needs of soldiers, families and retirees?
Answer. Army Medicine is well prepared to support the health care
needs of soldiers, families and retirees. The Army direct care system
is made up of 32 primary military treatment facilities and smaller
clinics across our camps, posts and stations. There is also care
available through TRICARE contracts near military bases. In addition,
beneficiaries may access care through non-contracted providers in the
areas not supported by TRICARE contracts. There are also virtual
resources available to beneficiaries, such as nurse advice line, that
supplement face to face care.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. The Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Annual Report
on Sexual Assault in the Military reflects that substantiated reports
of sexual assault in the Army resulting in preferral of court-martial
charges increased by 56 percent from 272 reports in fiscal year 2013 to
424 reports in fiscal year 2014.
What is your assessment of this report?
Answer. Any sexual assault in the U.S. Army is unacceptable. Recent
survey data estimates that the prevalence of sexual assault in the
military is decreasing. At the same time, reports of sexual assault
have seen unprecedented increases in the last three fiscal years. The
Army views these results as indicators of a continued growing trust and
confidence in our system, as more victims are reporting. However, if
confirmed, this issue will have my full attention and continued intense
focus on this issue by commanders at all levels.
Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults
in the Army?
Answer. Sexual assault has no place in our Army and I am personally
committed to its elimination. Sexual assault not only has a long-
lasting effect on the individual victim, but it also erodes unit
readiness and command climate. If confirmed, this issue will have my
full attention.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. As I said earlier, any sexual assault is unacceptable. I
see some positive progress and have been told the Army Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program is moving in
the right direction. However, I also believe that there is still much
work to be done. We must continue to increase reporting and eradicate
prevalence. We must focus on the issue of retaliation to ensure that
victims feel safe in reporting and that we have established a command
climate that demands dignity and respect for all soldiers, civilians
and family members. This issue will have my personal attention.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. Protecting and supporting the victim of sexual assault is
imperative. Though Army policy favors unrestricted reporting as a
bridge to offender accountability, I understand that some victims do
not want an investigation for a variety of personal reasons. In those
instances, restricted reporting is a vital avenue to allow these
soldiers to obtain advocacy, medical, mental health, and legal
services. If we do this right, the services and support provided to
victims who initially make a restricted report will provide those
victims with the confidence to convert to an unrestricted report. I
believe that allowing victims options and multiple avenues for
reporting sexual assault has been and will remain critical to our
progress.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Commanders and anyone in a leadership position must set,
teach, and enforce the best possible standards for supporting victims
of sexual assault. Specifically, committed, engaged leadership and
grass-roots prevention campaigns at the squad leader level are critical
to providing the necessary support to victims of sexual assault.
Commanding officers are also responsible for setting positive command
climates that not only help prevent the crime of sexual assault but
also provide a safe environment where victims feel confident coming
forward to report. The entire chain of command is absolutely critical
in creating a climate that prevents sexual assault, protect the
victims, and hold the perpetrators fully accountable in accordance with
appropriate legal processes. Our current focus is on the challenge of
retaliation. Commanders must have visibility of any potential
retaliation or reprisal and must monitor investigations to ensure
appropriate accountability.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army
resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. The Army provides several resources to aid victims of
sexual assault, including local Medical Treatment Facilities, Sexual
Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs), Victim Witness Liaisons (VWLs),
family advocacy, social services, chaplain services, and legal
services. Army psychiatric counselors and chaplains are confidential
counseling channels.
The Army has transformed response services over the past years,
including professionalizing the Sexual Assault Response Coordinators
and Victim Advocate education, implementing the Special Victim Counsel
(SVC) program, and establishing one-stop shops for victims in SHARP
Resource Centers. The U.S. Army Medical Command sexual assault medical
management team is designed to provide immediate and long-term patient
care, which includes assessment and treatment of acute medical
injuries, assessment of risk for pregnancy, options for emergency
contraception, assessment of risk of sexually transmitted infections,
including HIV prophylaxis, to necessary follow-up care and services.
All patients are offered a referral to behavioral health at their first
medical encounter and are encouraged to receive psychological care and
victim advocacy support. In addition, there are long-term care plans
tailored to meet the individual's patient's medical and behavioral
health care needs.
The Army SVC Program makes available to all sexual assault victims
a specially trained and certified military attorney to represent the
victim during all phases of a case, including investigation, military
justice and administrative proceedings. The SVC is also a legal
assistance attorney who provides both independent representation to the
victim in the military justice context, and help with any legal issues
the victim might have. This allows victims to form an attorney-client
relationship with one attorney to whom they can turn for all their
legal needs. To provide maximum coverage across the force and
facilitate face-to-face communication between the SVC and victim, the
Army maintains approximately 75 SVC stationed at 35 locations. I
believe this is the right model for the Army and adequately protects
the legal interest of sexual assault victims.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed
locations?
Answer. The Army has made significant, measurable progress to
prevent sexual assaults both at home and in deployed locations, but
there is much more work to be done. I have been and will remain
committed to combating this serious crime. If confirmed, I will build
on the hard work that has been done and will ensure that Army leaders
and soldiers across all our formations know that preventing sexual
assault is one of my highest priorities.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Army to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual
assault?
Answer. The Army has one of, if not the best training programs for
sexual assault investigators in the Nation. The basic two-week course
is taught by nationally recognized civilian experts in trauma, alcohol
facilitated sexual assaults, and the psychological effects of sexual
assault. Course instructors also include experts in the medical aspects
associated with child sexual assault, and renowned civilian police
experts from highly regarded special victim investigative units.
Additionally, I have been informed that the course's lead instructor,
Mr. Russ Strand, developed the Forensic Experiential Trauma Interview
(FETI) technique. This innovative interview technique has been crucial
to obtaining thorough and detailed testimonial evidence from victims of
sexual assault, thereby setting the stage for successful prosecution.
Mr. Strand was recognized with the Visionary Award by the Ending
Violence Against Women International Association for his work on this
advancement. Furthermore, the sexual assault investigation course and
training are being taught to civilian law enforcement agencies, and
college campus police, throughout the United States and Canada. The
training has been nominated for the 2015 International Association of
Chiefs of Police/Thomson Reuters Award for Excellence in Criminal
Investigations. I have been informed that over half of the Army
investigators in the field have received this training, and are
employing its principles and processes daily, worldwide. Follow-on
training courses focus on domestic violence, child abuse and advanced
forensic crime scene processing. As a result, the Army's investigators
bring unmatched investigative capabilities to the installations'
special victim teams. Furthermore, it is my understanding that the Army
has resourced its Criminal Investigation Command, with 30 specially
trained, expert civilian Sexual Assault Investigators (SAIs), and
stationed them at key locations around the world. Each SAI brings the
wealth of his/her training and expertise to every sexual assault
investigation. Additionally, the SAIs use their knowledge and expertise
to mentor less experienced investigators. Working hand-in-hand with
specially trained sexual assault prosecutors, the special victim
capability teams on each Army installation work tirelessly to ensure
that all available evidence is collected and recorded to ensure
successful prosecutions.
The military justice system has undergone the most comprehensive
revision since its implementation more than 50 years ago. Time is
needed to implement and assess these changes. The training and
resourcing of specially-selected and trained investigators and
prosecutors has been a focus of Army efforts and has resulted in
improved proficiencies for accountability. If confirmed, I will ensure
that the Army continues to focus on these critical functions.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?
Answer. I firmly believe the role of the commander is central to
sexual assault prevention within the military including those behaviors
and actions that could lead to sexual assault. The commanding officer
of every unit is the centerpiece of an effective and professional
warfighting organization. They are charged with building and leading
their teams to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the
highest level of trust throughout their unit.
Commanding officers are responsible for setting and enforcing a
command climate that demands dignity and respect for all soldiers.
Trust in the commander and fellow soldiers is the essential element in
everything we do. Developing this trust, dedication, and esprit de
corps is the responsibility of the commanding officer. They do this by
setting standards, training to standards, and enforcing standards that
clearly demonstrate intolerance to sexual assault. If confirmed, I will
ensure standards for sexual assault prevention are met.
Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who
report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for
reporting. If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of
retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?
Answer. The issue of professional or social retaliation is deeply
concerning and the Army has been working proactively to address what is
a complex and challenging aspect of changing a culture. Past efforts
have included the expedited transfer program and the implementation of
the Special Victim Counsel. Most recently, the Army has spoken with and
surveyed victims, implemented policy to prohibit retaliation, developed
training to assist soldiers in identifying and preventing retaliation,
and implemented policy to investigate and monitor all allegations of
retaliation.
Based on recent surveys, the Army has sharpened its focus on
addressing retaliation. The Army has implemented policy, adapted
training, and begun collecting data for analysis. Committed, engaged
leadership and grass-roots prevention campaigns at the squad leader
level are critical to solving the problem of retaliation.
Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in
our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to
increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?
Answer. Recent survey data shows the Army is making significant
progress in strengthening the Army culture in order to reinforce
positive command climates where victims: are encouraged to report
sexual assaults; know they will receive the best medical care and
support services; their incidents will be thoroughly investigated by
independent law enforcement experts in coordination with specially
trained and selected Special Victim Prosecutors; and feel confident
that offenders will be held appropriately accountable.
Indicators of this progress include a significant decrease in
prevalence, particularly for female soldiers, combined with an
unprecedented increase in reporting. In the past year, the Army also
experienced the highest conversion rate from restricted to unrestricted
reports (triggering command notification and law enforcement
investigation) since the inception of restricted reporting in 2005. The
Army has also seen a substantial increase in the percentage of male
victims reporting, an encouraging trend in one of the most challenging
aspects of this fight given the complex nature of male on male assault.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military
commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department's
policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be
prosecuted?
Answer. The Commander is responsible for everything the unit does
and fails to do. This responsibility cannot be overstated. I strongly
support the Department's current policy. The Uniform Code of Military
Justice operates both as a criminal justice system and a critical
component of a commander's authority to maintain good order and
discipline. I believe our soldiers and national security interests are
best served by retaining the military commander's key role in the
military justice decision process. While I greatly value the advice and
recommendations of our highly proficient judge advocates, I firmly
believe the military commander's role is indispensable in the
prosecutorial process. With this responsibility comes accountability. I
also strongly support holding those few commanders who fall short of
their responsibilities accountable for their actions or inaction.
When a unit enters combat, success is directly dependent on the
Commander's ability to enforce his or her orders and standards. The
Commander's authority to refer charges to court-martial, especially for
the most serious offenses such as sexual assault, is essential.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army?
Answer. I am encouraged by the progress the Army has made, but
there is much more work to be done. If confirmed, I am committed to
sustaining the momentum and progress. We have focused significant
efforts on senior leadership engagement to address this cultural issue.
To achieve continued progress we will place additional emphasis on
junior leader/first line leaders taking ownership and helping to
achieve the culture of dignity and respect required to eradicate sexual
assault in our Army.
Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent
legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of Army
commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases, including cases where
prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors?
Answer. The Army is in the process of implementing all the
requirements of the fiscal year 2014 NDAA concerning sexual assault and
the capability of Army commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases. It
is too soon in the process to evaluate the effects of all of the
changes. The Army, like the other Services, will be carefully studying
the effects, both intended and unintended, of all of the rapid and
robust changes to the military justice system over the past few years
and we will share our observations with Congress.
religious guidelines
American military personnel routinely deploy to locations around
the world where they must engage and work effectively with allies and
with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be different
than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is not a
purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their
culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and
beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views
can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential
skill to operational effectiveness.
Question. In your view, do policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. A number of religious (and belief) accommodation
protections are afforded to soldiers beginning with the First Amendment
and proceeding through title 10, DOD Directives, and Army policies.
Yes, I believe our current protections appropriately balance the Army's
compelling interest in unit cohesion and good order and discipline, on
the one hand, and soldiers' adherence to their religious beliefs, on
the other.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes, current law and policy appropriately balance unit
cohesion and good order and discipline with individual expressions of
belief. Leaders at all levels develop soldiers to embody Army values,
which emphasize the importance of treating others with dignity and
respect. These values help create a culture of respect for the
religious rights and expressions of others, including those who hold to
no religious beliefs.
Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and
respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and
beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to
preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments?
Answer. It has been my experience that being tolerant and accepting
of differences is a virtue valued by our soldiers, and I believe this
has been the case since our Nation's founding. America's soldiers are
diverse. Treating others respectfully clearly has a positive impact on
operations within or outside of our Nation.
Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about
personal faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing
servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment?
Answer. In my opinion, denying varying attitudes or opinions does
not provide an opportunity to work through any differences that may
exist. The Army develops leaders and builds teams. Part of that process
involves respecting each other's values and beliefs as Americans,
without forcing others to accept those values or beliefs.
Question. In your view, when performing official military duties
outside a worship service, should military chaplains be encouraged to
express their personal religious beliefs and tenets of their faith
freely, or must they avoid making statements based on their religious
beliefs?
Answer. As I understand current legal protections, all
servicemembers' beliefs and the expression of those beliefs are
protected. When opinions are expressed, religious or otherwise, in
thoughtful consideration of those hearing the discussion or comment, an
opportunity for meaningful dialogue is opened. All soldiers must treat
each other with dignity and respect within The Army Profession.
Question. Do you believe chaplains should be tasked with conducting
non-religious training in front of mandatory formations, even if they
may be uniquely qualified to speak on the particular topic, such as
suicide prevention or substance abuse? If so, do you believe guidance
provided to those chaplains on what they should and should not say with
respect to their faith is adequate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of the Chief of
Chaplains, the member of the Army Staff charged with advising me on
these and other matters. Chaplains serve in two distinct roles as
officers in our Army, both as staff officers and religious leaders.
Chaplains have historically maintained a balance in both of those roles
and in their functions of providing religious support and advising
commanders. If confirmed, I will review the guidance on this topic and
assess if it is adequate.
joint officer management
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System?
Answer. Without question, Goldwater-Nichols has brought a joint
mindset to military operations and in doing so improved the Department
of Defense. Clearly collaboration among Services has improved. If
confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to determine to
what extent Goldwater-Nichols supports the Force of the Future and
what, if any changes might be needed.
Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are
needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Army
officers?
Answer. While I do not now see any urgent need for change, if
confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to determine to
what extent the current laws and regulations support the Force of the
Future in a changing environment.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to
general officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional
demands of Army line officers?
Answer. Yes, in my judgment, it is important that Army General
Officers be joint qualified.
Question. If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements
for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military
officers are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific
leadership experience and professional development?
Answer. I feel the joint requirements are adequate today and, if
confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to manage the
officer corps so as to preserve the joint qualification process in the
future.
Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification
requirements on the ability of the services to select the best
qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that
will satisfy service-specific officer professional development
requirements?
Answer. I feel the joint requirements are adequate today and help
identify the best officers for promotion. If confirmed, I will work
with the Secretary of the Army to manage the impacts on the officer
corps.
Question. Do you think a tour with a combatant command staff should
count toward the Joint tour requirement?
Answer. Yes. Combatant commanders are inherently joint and provide
a rich professional experience.
department of the army civilian personnel
Question. The committee continues to have an acute interest in the
Department of Defense civilian and contractors who support our
soldiers.
What is your assessment of the current morale of the Department of
the Army civilian and contractor workforces?
Answer. The Army civilian workforce has been nothing short of
stellar and steadfast in support of our Army at war. That said, I am
concerned with the impact on morale of several years of pay freezes, a
year without performance bonuses, two rounds of furloughs, and messages
about downsizing. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Army to ensure we maintain visibility on morale of our workforce.
Maintaining positive civilian morale is as important as soldier morale
to the readiness of the Total Force.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate proper balance of
manpower between Department of the Army for uniformed personnel,
civilian Department employees, and contractor personnel?
Answer. The appropriate balance should reflect the primacy of the
warfighter; the Army needs sufficient civilian employees and contract
support to ensure the most efficient and effective use of uniformed
personnel. That differs at each echelon of command and by installation
and organization. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Army to ensure we maintain an appropriate balance of manpower which
provides the Nation the most effective use of all available resources.
Question. What workforce flexibilities do you consider necessary
for the Department of the Army to better manage its workforce?
Answer. The Army requires greater flexibility from Recruiting and
Accession to Development, Employment, and Transition to better manage
its workforce. If confirmed, I'll work closely with the Secretary of
the Army to examine the policies and resources required to obtain this
flexibility that allows us to retain top talent.
Question. How will you manage the further reduction of civilian
employees?
Answer. As needed, the Army will continue to promote voluntary
measures as much as possible to reduce the civilian workforce. Commands
are encouraged to use reshaping tools such as release of temporary
employees, not extending temporary and term employees, separation of
highly qualified experts (HQE), separation of re-employed annuitants,
attrition, management-directed reassignments, hiring controls, the
Department of Defense Priority Placement Program and Voluntary Early
Retirement. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army to
manage reductions in a responsible and compassionate manner.
acquisition
Question. Has acquisition as currently conducted provided the Army
weapons, equipment and supplies effectively and in a cost efficient
manner?
Answer. The defense acquisition system needs to improve in
timeliness and cost effectiveness in order to provide our soldiers with
the systems, technologies, and equipment to dominate our adversaries.
Question. Does the current acquisition system ensure the Army is
fully modernized in a timely manner?
Answer. The complexity of processes and rules in the defense
acquisition system limit flexibility and add time and cost to the
process of developing and fielding new warfighting capabilities. While
all involved strive to ensure our soldiers have the best equipment, the
acquisition process could be simplified and streamlined while retaining
emphasis on sound program planning and risk mitigation. To achieve this
goal and ensure our systems can be developed and fielded more quickly,
we must reduce redundant documentation, provide more flexibility to
program managers, and place greater emphasis on sound acquisition
planning. This will inject much-needed agility and flexibility into the
process while maintaining robust oversight of taxpayer dollars.
Question. Should the Chief of Staff of the United States Army have
the authority and responsibility to control Army acquisition programs?
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army plays a critical role in the
development of Service requirements and the allocation of funding
necessary to successfully develop and field programs. The operational
experience and leadership of Service Chiefs are invaluable to
generating and stabilizing achievable requirements and ensuring the
resources necessary to achieve these capabilities. Additionally, the
Service Chiefs are ideally positioned to provide strategic priorities
and areas of emphasis in the development of warfighting capabilities
that respond to current and emerging operational threats. If confirmed,
I will work with the Secretary of the Army to explore opportunities for
an increased role in the acquisition process in order to drive
requirements, resources, and acquisition to ensure our soldiers have
the best possible equipment in a timely manner.
Question. How will you meet your responsibilities to ensure Army
acquisition programs stay on schedule, within cost and perform to
expectations?
Answer. Achievable and affordable requirements, as well as stable
and predictable funding, are critical to the success of acquisition
programs. As a representative of our soldiers' needs, if confirmed, I
will work to validate and prioritize realistic requirements and request
stable and sufficient funding be provided to successfully meet our
capability gaps. This role is especially important during times of
decreased budgets, such as now, when the Department must implement
investment decisions with limited resources. Additionally, acquisition
programs cannot be successful without a trained, professional, and
experienced workforce. If confirmed, I will promote the qualifications,
expertise and capability of the acquisition workforce by focusing on
the recruitment, development, and retention of individuals with
critical acquisition skill sets in order to provide the Army essential
capabilities for continued success.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Inhofe
readiness of the force
1. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, how do lower readiness levels
and a smaller force impact our ability to deter aggression?
General Milley. In order to deter aggression, our capability and
capacity to rapidly deploy and conduct combat operations to defeat
enemy objectives must be understood and believed by our opponents.
Readiness is the core requirement, which underpins deterrence of
rational opponents. High readiness will result in an increased
likelihood of deterrence. Size, skills, capability and capacity are
required to deter rational adversaries. Lower readiness levels and a
smaller force decrease the likelihood of deterrence and increase the
likelihood of aggression with respect to rational actors.
2. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, if a major or even minor
contingency operation were executed today given the Army's current
state of readiness and current global commitments, is it possible the
Army would have to send forces into combat that are not fully trained
and ready?
General Milley. The possibility that the Army would have to send
forces into combat that are not fully trained depends greatly on the
nature of the contingency, combatant commander timelines, and national
priorities on our ability to re-allocate forces. Given current
readiness levels and uncertain global demands, if confirmed, I will
assess our readiness levels closely as my top priority. I will provide
candid military advice on our capability to meet requirements to avoid
having to send forces into combat that are not fully trained and ready.
3. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, should the United States be
postured to fight two Major Contingency Operations simultaneously? What
is the impact of only being postured to fight one Major Contingency
Operation?
General Milley. Yes, the U.S. should be postured to fight two major
contingency operations simultaneously, which is in accordance with the
2014 QDR. The 2014 QDR asserts that U.S. forces must be capable of
defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale, multi-phased campaign
and denying the objectives of--or imposing unacceptable cost on--a
second aggressor in another region. Being postured to fight two major
contingency operations simultaneously prevents potential adversaries
from exploiting a crisis to pursue their objectives and allows us to
mitigate the risk of unanticipated crises and requirements. Being
postured to fight only one major contingency operation could force
undesirable choices between vital national interests and leave the
U.S., allies, and partners at risk.
4. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, does priority for readiness,
training and equipment go to deployed/forward stationed forces followed
by forces getting ready to deploy? If so, how does that impact the
readiness of follow on forces back in the U.S. and their ability to
respond to unforeseen crisis?
General Milley. All Army units and soldiers actively supporting
combatant commands deploy at the highest levels of assigned mission
readiness. Outside of deployed forces, the Army has had to focus
resources on a small number of non-deployed brigade combat teams and
enabling forces to preserve a small contingency response capability.
For non-deployed units at lower readiness levels, it takes longer to
get them ready to respond to an unforeseen crisis, undermining the
advantages of rapid deployment.
force structure
5. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, the Army recently announced its
plan to cut 40,000 soldiers, many having served multiple combat tours
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will announce specifics on a cut of 17,000
civilians from its ranks in Sep. Is this the correct size for our Army
given threats around the world and demands for ground forces
everywhere?
General Milley. This personnel drawdown supports the President's
Fiscal Year 2016 Budget and is part of the Army's effort to rebalance
endstrength, readiness, and modernization efforts to shape a 980,000
Total Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR). This force is
capable of supporting the Defense Strategy, but at a ``significant''
level of risk. I believe that a 1.045M Total Force (490,000 AC, 350,000
ARNG, and 205,000 USAR) at a level of funding adequate to balance end
strength, readiness, and modernization could better address an
increasingly unpredictable future security environment.
6. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, there are currently just over
20,000 soldiers in South Korea alone. If the Army had to respond to a
Korea scenario today given its reduced readiness and force structure,
would the Army be able to source all its combat ready forces from the
U.S. or it have to take forces from other theaters such as EUCOM and
CENTCOM, who are already short of forces and resources?
General Milley. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review the forces
required in the event of a Korea contingency. However, it is my current
understanding, in the event of crisis or conflict in Korea, we would
first deploy ready units not already committed to other operations in
other theaters. The sourcing of forces for contingency operations (such
as the Korea scenario) is dependent on the state of readiness and
commitment of all forces in the Army inventory at the time of
execution. The possibility exists that the Army would have to draw
forces away from other combatant commands, such as EUCOM or CENTCOM, in
order to respond to a Korea scenario.
7. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, how do you see the three
components of the Army contributing most effectively to this Nation's
land power requirements? How important is it to balance the three
components?
General Milley. Balancing the three distinct and equally important
components of the Total Army is critical. The optimal blend of each
component will depend on the specific mission requirement generated by
the combatant commanders and requires careful mission analysis and,
significantly, the time required to respond to the combatant
commanders' requirement. If confirmed, I will assess the Total Army
force structure and recommend adjustments as necessary.
8. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, do you believe our Army has the
force structure, training and equipment to meet all the requirements in
the National Military Strategy today?
General Milley. As outlined in the 2014 QDR, the Army (as part of
the Joint Force) has to accomplish the three tasks of the defense
strategy: defend the homeland, build security globally, and project
power and win decisively. The Army has the force structure, training,
and equipment to accomplish the first mission, but the second and third
missions present growing challenges. The Army has the capability to
build security globally, but ongoing force reductions place a greater
strain on that capacity. Emergent demands and decreased resources may
change underlying assumptions, increasing risk to our ability to
project power and win decisively as our capacity and resources continue
to decrease.
9. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, do you think the Army is
accepting too much risk given the growing instability around the globe?
General Milley. I concur with GEN Odierno's assessment that a
980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR) will be
capable of executing the defense strategy outlined in the 2014 QDR at a
``significant'' level of risk. The 2014 QDR, however, did not account
for the growing instability that we now see in Russia's aggression in
the Ukraine, the rise of ISIL, the Ebola crisis, and increasing
challenges in the Pacific region.
10. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, how will you know when our
military has accepted too much risk?
General Milley. I will know we have accepted too much risk when the
risk to mission or risk to force is unacceptable. If the Army's
capacity (i.e., number of troops available) is insufficient to meet the
National Security and combatant commander requirements, to include war
plan contingencies, we have reached an unacceptable level of risk to
mission. If the Army has the capacity, but not the capability (i.e.,
skills and readiness) and is not resourced to fix that shortfall before
deploying the force, we will have reached an unacceptable level of risk
to the force. In either case, I will know our Nation has accepted too
much risk.
11. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, what are the indicators that
you look for?
General Milley. Indicators I look for include the capacity and
capability of the force to accomplish the mission. Capacity is measured
by the force's size; capability by its skill and readiness, where
readiness is a function of manning, training, equipping, and leading. A
decrease of any of these indicators illustrates or creates increased
risk. Additionally, any change in the global security environment
(e.g., increasing instability or volatility) is an indicator of risk.
Lastly, any increase in our adversaries' relative capability or
capacity is an indicator of increasing risk.
security of the force
12. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, what are your thoughts
regarding the security status of Army personnel serving at locations
both on and off-post?
General Milley. Force protection is a key task for any commander,
and there are a wide variety of active and passive measures commanders
can employ. In all environments, leaders must balance force protection
with mission accomplishment. As with everything that we do, Army
leaders at all levels conduct risk analysis to ensure that we mitigate
risk as low as possible while still maintaining the ability to
accomplish our missions. For example, commanders can harden structures,
e.g. bulletproof glass, increase patrols, and coordinate closely with
federal and civilian law enforcement. It is especially necessary to
reevaluate all measures due to the recent shootings in Tennessee, as
DOD is currently doing.
13. Senator Inhofe. General Milley, do we need to reassess our
security levels, rules of engagement, training requirements, ability to
increase manning of armed security personnel, and authorization for
military personnel to carry government firearms both concealed and
openly carry to and from duty?
General Milley. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with OSD to assess
all those factors. The Army is currently evaluating our options for
increasing the security posture of our personnel to include both active
and passive security measures. Arming well-trained soldiers would fall
into the active measure category while increasing additional security
layers to facility access points qualify as passive measures. Any
option considered must comply with existing law. Whichever option we
decide upon must take into consideration not only the safety and
security of our soldiers but the communities in which they work.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
shortfalls in europe--deterring putin
14. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, in your advance policy question
responses, you stated that the Army in Europe does not have what it
needs. Specifically, what does EUCOM need that it does not have?
General Milley. EUCOM needs additional assets, permanent or
rotational, to deter Russian aggression and assure allies. The Army is
in the process of placing activity sets and pre-positioned equipment in
Europe manned with forces rotating on a temporary basis to assist with
this mission. I have been briefed that EUCOM is estimating it needs
additional armor, sustainment, engineering, intelligence, medical,
fires, and signal; furthermore EUCOM may require additional military
police assets. If confirmed, I will continue to work with EUCOM to
further develop these requirements.
nh army national guard military construction
15. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, in times of fiscal strain, one
of the first things that gets cut or delayed is military construction.
The problem is that these cuts exact a growing readiness toll over
time. For that reason, I continue to be troubled by the condition of
New Hampshire Army National Guard readiness centers--a trend that I
know is reflected around the country. However, the condition of
readiness centers in New Hampshire is particularly unacceptable.
According to the Army National Guard Readiness Center Transformation
Master Plan final report to Congress last year, the average condition
index (CI) of New Hampshire Army National Guard readiness centers is
Poor (64 out of a 100 scale), ranking New Hampshire 51 out of the 54
states and territories evaluated nationwide.
In total, the New Hampshire Army National Guard has 1 readiness
center rated `Fair', 12 rated `Poor', and 3 rated `Failing'.
The Manchester readiness center was constructed in 1938 and does
not comply with building code standards--as well as life, health,
safety and Anti-terrorism Force Protection standards. Members of the
New Hampshire Army National Guard--and servicemembers like them around
the country--deserve better.
I am pleased that the Department is finally requesting funding for
New Hampshire Army National Guard vehicle maintenance shops in Hooksett
and Rochester for fiscal year 2017, as well as readiness centers in
Pembroke and Concord for fiscal years 2018 and 2020, respectively.
Considering the poor state of New Hampshire Army National Guard
facilities, it is essential that these projects not be postponed and
that they go forward as currently scheduled.
When confirmed, will you examine the allocation of military
construction dollars not only between the Active and Reserve component,
but also the allocation among the state Army National Guards to ensure
the optimal allocation?
General Milley. Yes, if confirmed, I will examine the allocation of
military construction resources across the Total Army, to include New
Hampshire Guard facilities.
endstrength reductions--strategic rationale?--how many involuntary
separations?
16. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, under the current plan, the
Army will have to cut about 40,000 Active Duty soldiers in the next
couple of years in order to reach an Active Duty endstrength of 450,000
soldiers. In your responses to the advance policy questions, you said,
``Right now the level of uncertainty, the velocity of instability, and
potential for significant inter-state conflict is higher than it has
been since the end of the Cold War in 1989-91.'' You also note that,
``the demand for ground forces will continue to increase even more so
since many of our longstanding allies have significantly reduced their
military forces over the last 25 years.''What is the strategic
rationale for cutting the size of our Active Duty Army by 40,000
soldiers (8 percent) in the next two years?
General Milley. The Army was forced to make reductions as a result
of the Budget Control Act. Within those resource constraints, the Army
developed a plan to maintain a balance between endstrength, readiness,
and modernization. The reductions were informed based on a
comprehensive analysis of mission requirements and installation
capabilities.
17. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, if defense sequestration is not
reversed and the Army must go down to 450,000 or even 420,000 Active
Duty soldiers, how many well-performing non-commissioned officers and
officers will have to be involuntarily separated (given pink slips)?
General Milley. The Army anticipates that as it reduces from
490,000 to 450,000 in the Active Component, it will have to
involuntarily separate approximately 15,000 Noncommissioned Officers
and Officers. If the Army is directed to go to 420,000, it will have to
involuntarily separate an additional 13,000 Noncommissioned Officers
and Officers (28,000 total).
18. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, we talk about not breaking
faith with our soldiers. When we give a well-performing soldier who has
deployed (often multiple times) a pink slip simply to meet a budget-
drive endstrength reduction, I think that is breaking faith.I hope
Congress will provide the funding necessary to maintain the Army
endstrength our national security interests require. When confirmed,
will you work to minimize the use of involuntary separations of well-
performing soldiers?
General Milley. Yes.
poor army readiness
19. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, in your responses to the
advance policy questions, you said that ``only about 30 percent of Army
brigades are at acceptable levels of combat readiness.'' You note that
number should be between 60-70 percent.What is the primary reason for
this poor readiness, and what can Congress do to help improve Army
readiness?
General Milley. The primary reason is the budget reduction driven
requirement to make unforecasted trade-offs between endstrength,
readiness, and modernization and resulting budget uncertainty. Congress
can assist by providing the predictable funding necessary to restore
the appropriate balance between modernization, endstrength, and
readiness.
20. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, what is the optimal balance
between having the number of personnel the Army needs and having the
right equipment to achieve today's strategy?
General Milley. The optimal balance, informed by resourcing, weighs
readiness, modernization, and endstrength against National Security
Requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure no soldier is deployed in
harm's way without the proper training and equipment. Right now, within
PB16, the Army can, with ``significant risk,'' field a 980,000 Total
Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR). If the current
Budget Control Act funding levels remain in place, I will have to work
with the Secretary of the Army to reduce the Army, perhaps to 920,000
Total Army (420,000 AC, 315,000 ARNG, and 185,000 USAR) in order to
ensure we have the right balance of readiness, modernization, and
endstrength.
21. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, there has been discussion
recently about the balance between light infantry forces, medium
forces, and heavy forces. In view of requirements and likely missions
in the future, what do you believe is the optimal balance of these
types of forces?
General Milley. The Army continually reassesses mission
requirements to inform decisions regarding force structure. If
confirmed, I will review the COCOM operational planning requirements to
ensure the Army has the appropriate force mix.
army modernization programs
22. Senator Ayotte. General Milley, how should the Army balance
developing and fielding new systems such as the Future Fighting Vehicle
versus modernizing existing systems such as the Abrams tank and the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
General Milley. Deployed soldiers must always have the most
advanced capabilities available while the Army must also prepare for
future threats. To accomplish this, the Army modernization strategy
mixes limited development of new capabilities with incremental upgrades
to existing platforms while also investing in key enabling technologies
to support future efforts.
In the current fiscal environment, the Army's Combat Vehicle
Modernization Strategy focuses on cost-effective replacement of
obsolete vehicles, maintenance and improvement of proven platforms to
ensure relevance, and aggressive pursuit of technology development to
fill anticipated capability gaps. Until resources are available to
fully develop a Future Fighting Vehicle, the Army will continue Science
and Technology investment in Infantry Fighting Vehicle enabling
technologies while focusing its vehicle modernization efforts on
procurement of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle and incremental
upgrades to the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker families of vehicles.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
drawdown in forces
23. Senator Ernst. In light of troop reductions and growing
threats, what recommendations do you have for developing the Army of
the future that allows fighting units to be scalable and expeditionary
for a variety of missions?
General Milley. The U.S. Army is and must remain the world's
premier ground combat force, capable of conducting sustained campaigns
on land to achieve U.S. National Security objectives while remaining
true to our national values. Individual and collective training creates
capable formations and develops leaders as the source of future
flexibility. Army units are designed to be scalable and expeditionary
in order to execute a variety of missions. The Army traditionally task
organizes forces based on mission analysis and deploys/employs only
those units necessary for mission accomplishment. Brigade Combat Teams,
for example, can be task organized by capability, by capacity, or by
function to execute a variety of missions, from support and assistance
to major combat operations. If confirmed, I will continually assess and
collaborate with the other Service Chiefs and adapt the Army to meet
current needs and position itself for the future.
24. Senator Ernst. How will a reduction in forces affect readiness
in the future?
General Milley. The National Military Strategy requires the Army to
simultaneously defend the homeland, assure our allies, deter
adversaries and, when required, defeat one regional aggressor and deny
an aggressor in another region. Lower readiness levels, constant demand
and a smaller force will erode readiness for surge missions. The Army
is prioritizing current operations and shaping over-surge capacity. As
a result, senior leaders responding to future contingencies will soon
be forced to decide between committing forces at lower readiness levels
and partially incurring higher casualties, or delaying the deployment
of forces to build readiness, jeopardizing mission accomplishment.
25. Senator Ernst. In conversations with soldiers from the non-
commissioned officer to field grade levels, I am told our soldiers are
concerned with the operational tempo of the Active Duty force. Some of
these soldiers claimed Army leaders were failing soldiers by not
scaling the amount of requirements to the reduced size of the force.
How will you ensure unit commanders are accurately portraying their
ability to accomplish assigned tasks and protecting the long-term
readiness of the force?
General Milley. The Army relies on the Commander's Unit Status
Report (USR) to show the unit's ability to accomplish assigned tasks.
This report requires standard entries which indicate unit readiness
trends over time and also allows the commander to raise any concerns.
Long-term readiness trends of the force are reflected in performance
trends at Army training venues, like maneuver combat training centers.
The Army strives to communicate combatant command operational tempo
with the Joint Staff and OSD so that we can prioritize missions for a
decreasing Army force. Finally, the Army has multiple forums to
synchronize, manage and distribute mission assignments across the
force. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Secretary of
Defense, and Congress on balancing demand with the supply of Army
forces. I will also personally stress to our commanders that I will
accept nothing less than their honest assessments on the USR.
worldwide threats
26. Senator Ernst. If Russia represents our greatest threat, what
recommendations would you offer to deter Russia and reassure allies?
General Milley. I would recommend that our Army continue to support
the combatant commander's plans and requirements by increasing our
posture on NATO's eastern flank, providing additional rotational forces
and prepositioned stocks, and building additional combat power
capacities to support multilateral training exercises and enable rapid
force projection. In my judgment, only a strong posture and close
cooperation with regional allies will provide this level of both
assurance and deterrence. Continued funding of the European Reassurance
Initiative is critical to effect this and support the combatant
commander's strategy.
27. Senator Ernst. During your testimony, you said that Russia was
the greatest existential threat to the United States. How will you
improve the Army's support to U.S. Army Europe with respect to
enhancing military intelligence support to operations and force
protection?
General Milley. The Army currently provides military intelligence
support, including counterintelligence force protection, at the
strategic level with intelligence personnel assigned to the United
States Army NATO Brigade and the 650th Military Intelligence Group
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; and at the operational
level through the assignment to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) of the
66th Military Intelligence Brigade. The 66th has the ability to
downward reinforce tactical units operating within EUCOM area of
responsibility, and is currently doing so in the form of
counterintelligence support to the units forward deployed to the
Baltics in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Additionally, the
Army has regionally aligned the 4th Infantry Division with EUCOM, which
provides additional intelligence support and analytic capacity to EUCOM
through reachback and through a forward deployed detachment of
intelligence officers and analysts in Germany. Finally, the 902nd
Military Intelligence Group, part of the Army Intelligence and Security
Command, provides general support to counterintelligence efforts as
required. If confirmed, I will assess whether this level of support
meets the combatant commander's needs.
28. Senator Ernst. During your testimony, you said that Russia was
the greatest existential threat to the United States. How will you
enhance the Army's support to U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) with respect
to enhancing USAREUR's ability to reassure our allies and deter Russian
aggression through the training of Ukrainian forces?
General Milley. While the Army is enhancing the U.S. Army Europe's
(USAREUR) efforts to build Ukrainian capacity within their National
Guard security forces through a moderate training and equipping
package, we will remain prepared to increase our assistance to Ukraine
by providing similar support to the Ukrainian armed forces, if
authorized. These efforts, if expanded beyond their police-like
National Guard, will certainly improve their interoperability with NATO
and build capacity to protect their borders and defend their
sovereignty, assuring our allies and further deterring Russia. If
confirmed, I will work closely with USAREUR to ensure we are poised to
provide ready forces at the right time to meet emerging requirements.
29. Senator Ernst. As the Army considers sending a second brigade's
worth of equipment to Europe that would be solely for contingencies as
well as dedicating the entire 4th Infantry Division to rotating in and
out of Europe for training, exercises and partner activities, how will
you balance the threat posed by Russia with the possible need to place
United States troops further forward in the fight against ISIL in Iraq?
General Milley. While the Army remains committed to meeting the
emergent demands of both combatant commanders, budget cuts and force
structure reductions present the Army with significant challenges given
declining resources and force structure. At a 980,000 Total Army
(450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR) and structure levels, we
can satisfy demand and meet the strategy at significant risk. At lower
budget levels at a 920,000 Total Army (420,000 AC, 315,000 ARNG, and
185,000 USAR), we face an unacceptable risk to these strategies. In
either case, the threats posed by Russia and ISIL require different
Army capabilities. The Army's support to EUCOM focuses on our armored
formations and building regional interoperability and multilateral
training, while the current counter-ISIL strategy requires more agile
and light units trained for advise and assist missions. If confirmed, I
will work with both combatant commanders to ensure we prudently manage
risk at whichever end strength the budget allows and provide trained
and ready forces to meet their differing requirements.
small arms weapons and ammunition modernization
30. Senator Ernst. The primary weapon system of the soldier is used
to accomplish the Army's mission to engage and destroy our Nation's
enemies in close combat. Despite this, and 14 years of lessons learned
in thousands of ground combat engagements with the enemy across the
globe, the Army has not prioritized the development and fielding of new
small arms weapons. In general, the rifles, pistols, and machine guns
in the Army provide generally the same capabilities with respect to
lethality, range, and reliability as they did decades ago. While minor
modifications have been made to some M4 carbines, these were only
accomplished after great resistance by the Army and did not address
lethality and range of the weapon. How will you seek to prioritize the
modernization of the Army's small arms weapons?
General Milley. The Army developed a Small Arms Weapon Strategy in
2014 to ensure our modernization programs provide our soldiers the most
capable weapons in combat. As you mentioned, all of our current M4
carbines will be upgraded to M4A1's by 2022. The Army is also
conducting a comprehensive Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study
that addresses several criteria, to include lethality, range, and
reliability. This study will determine a feasible, suitable, and
acceptable ammunition configuration in order to develop and implement a
small arms strategy that ensures overmatch at the lowest tactical level
in 2025 and beyond. Finally, we must ensure our simulators and
simulations accurately reflect current small arms capabilities to
ensure our training is both effective and realistic. If confirmed, I
will look holistically at our modernization efforts.
31. Senator Ernst. According to a 2013 RAND study, which was
conducted on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development (G-
8), RAND found that the Army dismounted squad had ``the least amount of
decisive advantages with respect to current and foreseeable threats.''
How will you seek to modernize the Army's small arms weapons and
ammunition inventory for our maneuver squads?
General Milley. Army Training and Doctrine Command is now
conducting a Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study, with the
Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, leading the
study. The USMC and SOCOM are participating as well. Completion of the
study is expected by Second Quarter fiscal year 2017.
The study is investigating emerging and future ammunition
capabilities to ensure continued overmatch for the dismounted
individual soldier, fire team and squad to 2025 and beyond considering
both current and emerging threats. The Army will use this foundation to
inform and update our Soldier Weapons Strategy.
The study evaluates conventional and non-conventional calibers used
in carbines, rifles, and light or medium machine guns. This evaluation
includes existing small arms ammunition system capabilities, commercial
off-the-shelf capabilities, and emerging and developmental small arms
ammunition capabilities. The study also includes an extensive review of
previous ammunition studies by the Army and USMC dating from 2006,
operational lessons learned collected by the Army, USMC, SOCOM, and
other joint and coalition forces, and Army post-combat surveys and
reports.
If confirmed, I will work with the Committee to address any
concerns with the Army's small arms strategy.
32. Senator Ernst. Specifically what new materiel technologies is
the Army pursuing in small arms to increase range and lethality of the
Army's small arms weapons?
General Milley. The Army is funding research to develop and
demonstrate technologies to increase small arms range and lethality.
These investments will provide the soldier the ability to provide
variable effects (from non-lethal to lethal) in a single cartridge at
ranges greater than currently available. The investments should also
yield new ammunition with reduced weight and signature, improved
terminal performance, and increased soft and hard target penetration.
The Army is also developing an advanced fire control capability that
rapidly and accurately determines the range of a target, sensors that
can measure local and downrange conditions, and ballistic sensors to
reduce trajectory errors.
33. Senator Ernst. According to U.S. Special Operations Command,
Lessons Learned/Operational and Strategic Studies Branch, special
operations servicemembers felt that, ``In Afghanistan, a more rural
environment, the majority of effective fire is received at greater than
300 meters. So, when in the open, and engaging targets at a distance,
most prefer the SCAR-H with the 7.62 ammunition, but when operating in
tighter spaces, the M4A1 is still the preferred weapon.'' Do you concur
with this assessment of Special Forces engaged in ground combat in
Afghanistan that an assault rifle which uses a larger caliber round
than the 5.56mm EPR would provide greater effects on targets located at
greater ranges than 300 meters?
General Milley. Yes, a larger caliber such as 7.62mm provides
greater effects at greater range. Although, the caliber of ammunition
and target range are important to the effects on a target, there are
other factors too. The Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting
a Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study, with the Maneuver Center
of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, leading the study. The results
of the study are important to informing future decisions regarding the
right mix of ammunition and weapons platforms needed to engage
different types of targets at varying ranges across diverse operational
environments. I have been advised that the Army will use the results of
the study to determine the best caliber and other weapons
characteristics to best achieve the desired target effects at various
ranges.
34. Senator Ernst. According to U.S. Special Operations Command,
Lessons Learned/Operational and Strategic Studies Branch, special
operations servicemembers felt that, ``In Afghanistan, a more rural
environment, the majority of effective fire is received at greater than
300 meters. So, when in the open, and engaging targets at a distance,
most prefer the SCAR-H with the 7.62 ammunition, but when operating in
tighter spaces, the M4A1 is still the preferred weapon.'' Understanding
the organic capability provided by a squad designated marksman, do you
believe with this battlefield assessment's implication that ``pure-
fleeting'' of 5.56mm ammunition carbine rifles created a capability gap
within maneuver squads?
General Milley. At issue is whether the capability gap, if any,
creates an unacceptable level of risk to force and mission
accomplishment. While a larger caliber such as 7.62mm provides greater
effects at greater range, the Army's current assessment is that the
inherent capabilities of the M4A1, including extensive modifications
over the past 10 years, appropriately mitigates that risk. The M4A1's
M855A1 enhanced performance round provides greater range and improved
down range effect and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, organic to
infantry squads and other networked lethality capabilities, provides
the ability to engage and destroy point targets at 600 meters. Moving
forward, the ongoing Small Arms Ammunition Configuration Study is
intended to inform the process of determining the optimal ammunition
and caliber combinations for future squad small arms, taking into
account desired target effects at various ranges.
35. Senator Ernst. During your testimony, you said that Russia was
the greatest existential threat to the United States. Currently, Russia
is aggressively modernizing its small arms and individual soldier
equipment as a part of its overall military modernization strategy.
Will you prioritize fielding small arms and ammunition which will
provide the infantry soldier with weapons and ammunition that have
greater range, reliability, and lethality, than the current legacy
small arms weapons in use today?
General Milley. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that, within
budgetary constraints, we strive to achieve and maintain overmatch
against any adversary, including at the individual soldier level.
36. Senator Ernst. In my conversations with soldiers who have
served in Afghanistan, I am told insurgent forces developed a full
understanding of the small arms capabilities and limitations of our
infantry squads. This understanding caused our enemies to use tactics,
techniques, and procedures to exploit the limited range of the 5.56mm
ammunition and the M4 carbine by attacking from distances they knew an
infantry squad could not return effective fire. While infantry squads
have the capability of a designated marksman with a 7.62mm weapon,
soldiers had difficulty concentrating small arms fire on enemy
positions outside of the M4's maximum effective range for a point
target. What is your response to these reports from soldiers? Do you
believe our infantry squads are currently equipped with the best small
arms and ammunition against enemies located at the maximum effective
range of adversary 7.62mm weapon systems?
General Milley. Our Infantry squads possess weapons capabilities to
combat threats at multiple ranges. Adding to the increased capability
of the M4A1 is the M855A1 enhanced performance round, which provides
greater range and improved down range effect. The M249 Squad Automatic
Weapon, also organic to Infantry squads, provides the ability to engage
and destroy point targets at 600 meters. The Army will continue to
leverage science and technology and use the Small Arms Ammunition
Configuration Study to provide our soldiers small arms overmatch
capability for 2025 and beyond.
37. Senator Ernst. Last year the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) found serious issues with the Army's
ability to develop, procure, and field equipment for soldiers and
squads to include small arms. The report blames a culture of mistrust
between Army stakeholders with different chains of command and
unnecessary paperwork required by neither the Office of the Secretary
of Defense or by Congress which results in a significant drag on the
Army's acquisition system in this area. A potential example of this is
that the Army will take more than a decade to acquire a non-
developmental handgun. Are you willing to conduct an impartial
investigation of the issues raised in this report?
General Milley. If confirmed, I will review and assess the issues
raised in this report. I agree that achieving soldier/squad systems
integration is a significant challenge. To address this, the Army
approved the first dismounted soldier baseline in September 2014, which
views soldier systems as a common integrated platform that optimizes
size, weight, and power to support the mission. The Materiel
Development, Science and Technology, and requirements communities--in
particular the Maneuver Center of Excellence--work together to more
effectively integrate and perform trade-offs among disparate systems.
To ensure continued innovation, the Soldier Enhancement Program, which
uses a ``buy, try, decide'' model to bring innovative solutions into
the formal requirement systems, leverages the input from multiple
stakeholders to procure the most innovative and effective equipment for
our soldiers.
Furthermore, the Army is committed to pursuing improvement in our
acquisition process by prioritizing proper oversight of weapon system
development, prevention and mitigation of cost and schedule growth, and
reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy. Accordingly, the Army is taking a
close look at its own internal acquisition policies and processes to
remove unnecessary bureaucracy and eliminate unnecessary or redundant
requirements on acquisition programs imposed by Army regulation. I have
been advised that this effort will be completed later this year.
support of deploying and deployed units
Senator Ernst. I understand there are currently three pending
Operational Needs Statements (ONS) from deploying or deployed Army
units for the Palantir system. The ONSs in question are for the 95th
Civil Affairs Brigade (#15-20234), 1/1 Special Forces Group (#15-
20390), and 10th Special Forces Group (#15-20428). These ONS were filed
between 6 and 8 months ago and have yet to be rejected or approved by
the Army. The Army approved identical ONSs from the 1st and 5th Special
Forces Groups earlier this spring, yet it is my understanding the three
ONSs in question remain in limbo. To help my office better understand
the issue I request answers to the following questions:
38. Senator Ernst. What is the current status on these three ONSs?
General Milley. The Army remains committed to providing soldiers
with what they need to accomplish their missions and recognizes the
importance of good stewardship and fiscal responsibility. When an
Operational Needs Statement (ONS) is received, distinct, in-depth
analyses focused on specific considerations of the request are
completed at different echelons; each of the three actions is at a
different stage in the process.
The ONS from 1/1 Special Forces is still being reviewed at the
United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and has yet to be
passed to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) for action.
USASOC is completing a detailed analysis of the request based on its
Command priorities and the range of potential solutions. They will
assess the unit's current need and the long term operational and
sustainment impact of introducing a commercial, non-program of record
capability into the network architecture of multiple combatant
commands. For instance, intelligence and signal staffs must coordinate
accreditation and authority to operate for all new systems introduced
to each network.
The ONS from the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade has been endorsed at
USASOC and is undergoing a detailed review and assessment at HQDA. The
DA review and analysis carefully weighs the impact of a decision to
support deployed or deploying commander's requests for force tailoring
against an equally critical requirement to protect the viability of the
Army's tested and competitive acquisition program and its related
funding stream. The DA review process is iterative in order to clarify
the requirement. On occasion, the requesting unit is able to modify its
concept for capability employment and amend the scope of the request.
The 95th ONS is still early in the process and has already experienced
refinements.
The ONS from 10th Special Forces has completed the DA review and
assessment process. It will be presented to the acquisition decision
authority for approval by the end of the month.
39. Senator Ernst. When does the Army expect to respond to these
ONSs?
General Milley. The original purpose of the Operational Needs
Statement (ONS) process is to provide deploying commanders a method to
request materiel capability to address gaps in the unit's organic means
to accomplish assigned missions. The urgency of these requests is
evident as the unit will be at risk for mission failure if the
capability is not provided. The analysis required to support this type
of request is relatively straight forward. In most cases, decisions to
adjust existing prioritization and resourcing plans can be reached
relatively quickly.
Over time, and in order to fully capitalize on technical advances
and new capabilities developed in the commercial sector, the Army
expanded the ONS process to be used for force tailoring and
enhancement. The calculus surrounding the decision to support this type
request is far more complex and time consuming. More important, these
requests are submitted by units that generally already have a basic,
less capable capability for task accomplishment and are not at risk for
mission failure. This allows the Army to place a premium on getting the
answer right.
The three requests for Palantir fall in this category. As the Army
remains committed to providing soldiers with the best available
capability to accomplish their missions, the Army is equally committed
to making the best decisions when confronted with competing priorities.
The Army approved 10th Special Forces ONS on 31 July 2015. The review
and assessment of the final two requests will not be complete until
later in the summer.
40. Senator Ernst. Why were identical ONSs filed by 1st and 5th
Special Forces Groups approved while these ONSs are still pending?
General Milley. The Operational Needs Statements submitted by the
1st and 5th Special Forces Groups were endorsed by the United States
Army Special Operations Command and forwarded to Headquarters,
Department of the Army for action more than 90 days earlier than the
requests from the other units. Although the requests are for the same
commercial solution, the review, assessment, and eventual validation
decision must take into account the specifics of each unit's situation.
The three remaining requests each outline distinct concepts for the
employment of the requested capability with the requesting units slated
to deploy and operate in different regions of the world. The uniqueness
of these considerations makes the depth and duration of each review
different.
The Department also has resourcing options for requirements
identified by units deploying into the named operational contingency
theater. Without this funding, the strategy to support approval of the
capability for the later requirements is more challenging.
Additionally, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade has a significantly
different organization, mission set and manning posture when compared
to the Special Forces groups. The unit's concept for employment of the
capability is also unique and requires different certifications and
accreditations.
41. Senator Ernst. What do you view as an acceptable time period
for a unit to wait for a response to an ONS?
General Milley. The Army regulation governing the Operational Needs
Statement (ONS) process does not prescribe a specific timeframe for
subordinate unit review and assessment. It does, however, prescribe a
total of 14 days for the Army G-3/5/7 to lead the DA staff's review and
analysis of the request and provide a response to the requestor. In
cases where a requesting unit will be at risk for mission failure if
the capability is not provided, decisions to adjust existing
prioritization and resourcing plans can be reached relatively quickly.
However, when units that already have a basic capability for task
accomplishment submit an ONS to obtain a new or more advanced
capability, the calculus surrounding the decision to support is far
more complex and time consuming. On these occasions, the Army places a
priority on getting the answer right.
post-traumatic stress disorder
42. Senator Ernst. How would referencing Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) as Post-Traumatic Stress help improve the Army's
efforts to de-stigmatize PTSD?
General Milley. The Army recommends against referencing Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as Post-Traumatic Stress (PTS).
Efforts to normalize soldiers' response to combat stress are important.
However, it is essential to clearly define PTSD to ensure that soldiers
who experience serious impairment receive the clinical treatment they
need. All behavioral health diagnoses, including PTSD, are defined
according to the American Psychiatric Association and International
Classification of Diseases diagnostic manuals. A term like ``PTS'' is
inconsistent with other conditions that can occur as a result of trauma
(e.g., major depressive disorder). As such, the American Psychiatric
Association, RAND Corporation, and VA National Center for PTSD have all
stated that the term ``PTS'' should be avoided.
It is important for the Army, Department of Defense and Veterans
Affairs medical practice to remain consistent with national clinical
standards and diagnostic nomenclature. Clinicians, health care
administrators, and insurance companies rely upon this standard
nomenclature for treatment and disability evaluation purposes. Finally,
the strongest predictors of soldiers willingness to engage in
behavioral health treatment are their awareness that they have a
problem and their perceptions of behavioral healthcare. According to
our medical professionals, both in and outside the Army, changing the
name PTSD to PTS will not address the known reasons that soldiers are
reluctant to seek care. The key is to continue efforts to de-stigmatize
the condition, regardless of the term.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
executing a credible pacific rebalance and the army's force structure
43. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, does the U.S. Army listen to
and follow the President's strategic guidance?
General Milley. Yes.
44. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, does this include the
President's Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region?
General Milley. The Army follows the national strategic guidance
given to us by the President, including the re-balance to the Asia-
Pacific.
45. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, does the U.S. Army still
believe that permanent, forward-stationed units, are critical to
deterrence?
General Milley. Yes, a forward presence is critical to both assure
our allies and deter our adversaries.
46. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion,
does it make any strategic sense for the U.S. Army to reduce forward-
based forces at Alaska's JBER by two-thirds since 2012, especially in
the middle of Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific?
General Milley. Given the fiscal realities we face, global
balancing and disposition of Army forces must be made in accordance
with National Strategy. The Army is balanced in favor of an Asia-
Pacific Rebalance. With nearly 350,000 U.S. Military assigned, PACOM is
the largest combatant command in terms of manpower. PACOM has nearly
3.5 times the number of assigned military personnel than the next
largest COCOM. Active duty Army personnel committed to PACOM total
approximately 80,000; EUCOM is the next largest at 32,000. The Army has
and will continue to maintain forces both CONUS and OCONUS-based that
are ready to respond to threats from any region around the globe. Given
approximately 24 percent of the Army's Operational Force's combat power
is in the Asia-Pacific, even with continued reductions in endstrength,
the reduction of forces in Alaska does not significantly undermine the
Rebalance. The Army has substantial ground capabilities committed to
the Asia-Pacific, positioned throughout continental United States,
Hawaii, Alaska, Washington State, South Korea and Okinawa that have and
will continue to perform security cooperation activities with our
Pacific allies, and remain ready to respond in crisis. Given the
current situation, our posture towards the Asia-Pacific presents a
capable response to mitigate regional threats.
47. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how does reducing forces in
Alaska NOT undermine the Rebalance to the Pacific?
General Milley. Given the fiscal realities we face, global
balancing and disposition of Army forces must be made in accordance
with National Strategy. The Army is balanced in favor of an Asia-
Pacific Rebalance. With nearly 350,000 U.S. Military assigned, PACOM is
the largest combatant command in terms of manpower. PACOM has nearly
3.5 times the number of assigned military personnel than the next
largest COCOM. Active duty Army personnel committed to PACOM total
approximately 80,000; EUCOM is the next largest at 32,000. The Army has
and will continue to maintain forces both CONUS and OCONUS-based that
are ready to respond to threats from any region around the globe. Given
approximately 24 percent of the Army's Operational Force's combat power
is in the Asia-Pacific, even with continued reductions in endstrength,
the reduction of forces in Alaska does not significantly undermine the
Rebalance. The Army has substantial ground capabilities committed to
the Asia-Pacific, positioned throughout continental United States,
Hawaii, Alaska, Washington State, South Korea and Okinawa that have and
will continue to perform security cooperation activities with our
Pacific allies, and remain ready to respond in crisis. Given the
current situation, our posture towards the Asia-Pacific presents a
capable response to mitigate regional threats.
48. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if you were one of our allies
in Asia-Pacific, would you think that, from an Army force perspective,
that our Rebalance is still credible? Is our Rebalance still credible?
General Milley. Yes, our rebalance is credible. Approximately 24
percent of the Army's combat power is in the Pacific. The Army is
participating in an increased and accelerated exercise and training
program. With nearly 350,000 U.S. military assigned, USPACOM is the
largest combatant command and has almost 3.5 times more assigned
personnel then the next largest COCOM.
49. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, even though the U.S. Army has
more forces OpCon to PACOM and JBLM has increased 54 percent since
2001, don't more forward-stationed troops, like those in Alaska and
Hawaii provide more credible deterrence?
General Milley. Forces positioned closest to a threat generally
provide a strong deterrent capability to known challenges. Also,
missions such as Pacific Pathways, theater security cooperation with
allies, and power projection capabilities, provide an additional
deterrent. Lastly, the Global Response Force still maintains an
airborne IBCT capability with a worldwide 96-hour deploy capability.
50. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, which forces--those at JBLM
or those in Alaska and Hawaii--provide a better deterrence posture
against threats in the Pacific and the Arctic?
General Milley. No single location provides a ``better'' deterrent
posture. The best deterrence is provided by an array of forces forward
deployed across the AOR coupled with partner-nation exercises, as we
currently have.
alaska's bcts (russia and arctic importance)
Senator Sullivan. General Milley, please consider these points when
answering the next set of questions:
Point #1: Thus far, this committee has heard me discuss
what the Russians are doing the in the Arctic with a huge military
build-up. The CRS map included with this document ``207856 Arctic Push
Chart'' is evidence of that.
Point #2: Recently, the Finnish Defense Ministry told the
WSJ:
o ``In the Arctic area [the Russians] have twofold objectives.
To secure the Northern Sea Route and [exploit] the energy-resources
potential. They are increasing their ability to surveil that part of
the world, to refurbish their abilities for the air force and the
Northern Fleet. They are exercising their ability to move their
airborne troops from the central part of Russia to the north.''
Importantly he added, ``[The Russians] are masters of chess, and if
something is on the loose they will take it . . . ''
Point #3: According to recent news reports,
o ``Moscow has undertaken a construction blitz across the Arctic
to establish military superiority in the region. Russia is constructing
ten Arctic search-and-rescue stations, 16 deepwater ports, 13
airfields, and ten air-defense radar stations across its Arctic
coast.''--Business Insider (June 10, 2015)
Point #4: According to CRS, the Russians recent conducted
a HUGE military exercise which included:
o 38,000 troops
o 3,360 military vehicles
o 41 ships
o 15 submarines
o 110 Aircraft
o Elements of Russia's Western Military District and elite
Airborne troops
o Lasted 5 days and included the long-range destruction of
simulated enemy land and naval units.
Point #5: Just a couple months ago Russia's Minister of
Natural Resources Sergey Donskoy said of the Arctic,
o ``There is no alternative to the fields on the shelf. Even the
so-called shale revolution in the USA has not stopped the companies'
urge, with support from the state, to extract Arctic oil.''
Point #6: According to our own estimates, the Arctic
could hold as much as 15 percent of the world's remaining oil, up to 30
percent of its natural gas deposits, and about 20 percent of its
liquefied natural gas.
Point #7: The U.S. Army just announced last night that
they are removing 2,600 airborne soldiers from our Nation's only Arctic
State.
51. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion,
what is Russia doing in the Arctic?
General Milley. Given above Russian actions and behavior, it is my
personal opinion that Russia is trying to expand its strategic
influence in the Artic in order to exploit previously unavailable
natural resources. Objectively, Russia has increased its military
presence in the Arctic, reopened abandoned Soviet-era bases, boosted
troop presence, built new facilities, and refurbished infrastructure
and air fields across a region that stretches from Russia's borders
with Norway and Finland to the seas off Alaska. Russian President Putin
has said a unified system of naval bases for ships and next-generation
submarines should be created in the region, establishing the Russian
Arctic Strategic Command in December 2014. Additionally, in October
2015 President Putin said two satellites will be deployed to monitor
the Arctic, which he described as a priority because of its strategic
location and natural resources. The Arctic is one of the world's
richest regions in oil and natural-gas fields. President Putin has said
Arctic zones claimed by Russia are believed to hold significant amounts
of such resources. Additionally, in recent years, Russia has been
increasing its military presence in the region, where it has competing
territorial claims with other countries, including Canada and Denmark.
52. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion, how
late are we to recognizing the importance of the Arctic? In comparison
to Russia and their forces, their ice breakers, and their large
exercises, are we even in the game?
General Milley. We are still in the game. The Army is well-postured
to respond to combatant commander requirements in the Artic or
throughout the Pacific. While the U.S. Army is fulfilling the
requirements outlined in the 2013 Arctic Strategy, I will work closely
with the Department as they develop an operation plan.
53. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion,
does the Administration's current 13-page Arctic Strategy, published a
year before Russia invaded a sovereign country, fully address the
increased threat environment in the Arctic?
General Milley. I have not yet had the opportunity to discuss the
strategy with the COCOM Commanders, the Service Chiefs, or the
Administration. If confirmed, I will work with those commanders to
assess the overall strategy and the Army's role in it and participate
with the Department in development of an operation plan.
54. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion
then, does it make strategic--or even practical sense--to remove forces
from the Arctic and my state of Alaska, before we have a strategy?
Isn't this a classic example of putting the cart before the horse?
General Milley. Optimally, I would prefer to have a strategic plan
prior and then determine force structure to support the plan. However,
given the reduction of the Regular Army by nearly 120,000 soldiers over
five years, the Army is faced with only undesirable choices. The
planned reduction of forces in Alaska is based on a comprehensive
review of strategic requirements and installation capabilities intended
to best posture a smaller Army to balance the full range of strategic
demands. That said, the timing of the inactivation and conversion of
the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team should allow for completion of
the DOD Arctic strategy and a review of force structure plans.
55. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, do you believe that Russia is
threat in the Arctic, and if so, how big of a threat?
General Milley. While I believe Russian nuclear capability possess
the greatest and only military existential threat to the United States,
they are also a significant regional conventional threat. However, I do
not believe the Kremlin currently has a desire for a direct armed
confrontation with the West either in Europe, Asia, or the Artic. I
define threat as capability plus intent. Russia is clearly increasing
its capability in the Artic, however it is my opinion that Russia does
not currently have the intent to militarily confront the United States
in the Artic. It is my opinion that current Russian intent is to
maintain and increase access to resources previously unavailable in the
Artic by establishing transit routes to exploit various oil and mineral
deposits. Historically however, we know that intent can change quickly,
and we must remain vigilant and monitor Russian activity in the Artic
closely. Russia is reactivating several Soviet-era bases and
constructing ten search-and-rescue stations, 16 deep-water ports, 13
airfields, and ten air-defense radar stations across its Arctic coast.
Moscow is also creating a Joint Strategic Command North (JSCN) from
components of the Northern Fleet in order to maintain a permanent
military presence in the region. When complete, it will include a naval
infantry brigade, two mechanized brigades, an air defense division, and
a coastal missile defense system.
role of the secdef in army decisions
56. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in DOD, does SECARMY or the
Army CoS have the direct responsibility to consult with our
international allies and friends, or does that responsibility rest more
with the SECDEF?
General Milley. The Army is responsible to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for coordination regarding international relations
and arrangements. Regarding matters the Army has been given the
authority to directly coordinate with our allies and friends, the
responsibility is shared by both the SECARMY and Army Chief of Staff--
with the SECARMY having ultimate responsibility, and the Army Chief of
Staff managing the execution of those responsibilities.
57. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, do you believe that the
SECDEF should at least have a say in important force structure
decisions in strategic OCONUS locations, especially the dynamic threat
environment?
General Milley. Yes, I do.
58. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, should the SECDEF have been
consulted in the important force decision to remove forces from Alaska
and Hawaii?
General Milley. I do not know if SECDEF was consulted on that
decision. However, I believe SECDEF should be consulted on major force
structure decisions.
4-25 abct capabilities and spartan pegasus
59. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, where would this Army's
arctic training, equipment, and force projection come from, if not from
the two BCTs in Alaska?
General Milley. The Army's center for arctic training and equipment
resides in the United States Army Alaska within the Northern Warfare
Training Center (NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, which the Army plans
to maintain. The NWTC is the U.S. military's premier cold-weather and
mountain environment training center, which is also tasked with
developing tactics, techniques and procedures to enhance the Joint
Forces Doctrine. With regard to force projection, in the event of a
contingency in the region the Army will provide combat-ready assigned,
allocated, or apportioned forces to the combatant commander consistent
with classified contingency plans. Additionally, GEN Brooks has said
that the airborne battalion task force that will remain after the
inactivation of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team will serve as a
nucleus of arctic/cold weather expertise around which other forces can
form with prior training to conduct airborne operations in Arctic
environments such as Exercise Spartan Pegasus, which this year involved
approximately 150 paratroopers or a company-plus of combat power. The
airborne battalion task force remaining in Alaska will retain the
capability to conduct Exercise Spartan Pegasus as well as other
operations elsewhere in the Indo-Asia Pacific Region.
60. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, could Exercise Spartan
Pegasus have been done with any other Army Airborne unit in the Pacific
or in CONUS?
General Milley. The Army's center for arctic training and equipment
resides in the United States Army Alaska within the Northern Warfare
Training Center (NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, which the Army plans
to maintain. The NWTC is the U.S. military's premier cold-weather and
mountain environment training center, which is also tasked with
developing tactics, techniques and procedures to enhance the Joint
Forces Doctrine. With regard to force projection, in the event of a
contingency in the region the Army will provide combat-ready assigned,
allocated, or apportioned forces to the combatant commander consistent
with classified contingency plans. Additionally, GEN Brooks has said
that the airborne battalion task force that will remain after the
inactivation of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team will serve as a
nucleus of arctic/cold weather expertise around which other forces can
form with prior training to conduct airborne operations in Arctic
environments such as Exercise Spartan Pegasus, which this year involved
approximately 150 paratroopers or a company-plus of combat power. The
airborne battalion task force remaining in Alaska will retain the
capability to conduct Exercise Spartan Pegasus as well as other
operations elsewhere in the Indo-Asia Pacific Region.
61. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what do you suppose Vladamir
Putin or Kim Jong-un are thinking now that we are dramatically reducing
the only Arctic-capable Airborne Brigade in the Pacific?
General Milley. In my assessment, the reduction of the airborne
brigade to an airborne battalion task force has not had any real
influence on Russian thinking or decision-making. NATO has been the
primary threat expressed by President Putin and driving Russia's
military doctrine in regards to the Arctic. As a general principle, I
think that North Korea would welcome any drawdown of U.S. forces in the
region.
62. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what is the strategic risk
that we are assuming by reducing the 4-25, in terms of both the Arctic
and Pacific regions?
General Milley. The Army assessed that although 4/25 Airborne
Brigade Combat Team is converting to an airborne infantry battalion
task force, it allows USARPAC to retain an airborne capability for
rapid deployment and vertical insertion as part of joint entry
operations, or other missions, as needed throughout the entire Pacific
area of responsibility, to include any potential operations on Fire
Cross Reef. Based upon approved combatant commander plans and OSD
requirements, the Army assessed there is limited strategic risk assumed
in both the Arctic and Pacific regions by reducing 4/25 Airborne
Brigade Combat Team. If confirmed, I will review the strategic risks
associated with the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team decision.
secretary gates' comments, the 2014 qdr, and the sequester
63. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion, are
the President and the Pentagon still making Army force size decision
based on the comments of Former Secretary Gates and the resulting
military strategy documents, including the most recent 2014 QDR?
General Milley. I have no personal knowledge of planning and
budgeting decisions under Secretaries Panetta or Hagel and have not had
the opportunity to discuss with Secretary Carter. However, I believe
the budget cuts associated with the 2011 Budget Control Act are the
dominant factor in current planning and budgeting decisions.
Furthermore, I believe the decisions for sizing the Army are
fundamentally based upon available fiscal resources and, if confirmed,
I will advocate for a strategy-based force sizing construct.
64. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if the Congress fixes
Sequestration, will Army Force structure automatically return to
490,000 or above, or will it remain at the 2014 QDR level of 450,000?
General Milley. The funding requested by the Fiscal Year 2016
President's Budget will resource a 980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC,
335,000 ARNG and 195,000 USAR), and if Congress does not fix
sequestration, then the Army would reduce to 920,000 Total Army
(420,000 AC, 315,000 ARNG and 185,000 USAR). If the Congress wants to
reverse the reductions to the Army and also to Alaska, the Congress and
the President would have to avert Sequestration at a funding level
higher than proposed by the President. I have been advised that to keep
the Total Force at 980,000 (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG, 195,000 USAR),
the President and Congress would have to agree to fund the Army at
nearly $6B per year above the President's request. There is no
automatic return to 490,000; it must be funded in the President's
Budget and approved by Congress.
65. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, given that 50,000 of the
80,000 reduction came from the elimination of the temporary end
strength increase (22,000) and wartime allowance (10,000), reductions
to Europe (11,300), and the number of trainees, transients, and
students (7,300), what type strategic thinking did the U.S. Army use to
decide remove forward forces from Alaska, before looking at CONUS
installations?
General Milley. When making any major force structure decision the
Army considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. These include
the Military Value Analysis (MVA) Model: Training, Power Projection,
Well Being and Mission Expansion. The Army takes into account Strategic
Considerations, Cost and Efficiencies, Readiness Impact, Mission
Command, Statutory Requirements, Feasibility, Environmental &
Socioeconomic Impacts and Community Input.
66. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, General Odierno testified
that The Army size of 450,000 is adequate to meet the demands of
current and future threats but at ``significant risk.'' What exactly
does ``significant risk'' mean, said in way the American people would
understand?
General Milley. ``Significant risk'' means that it is questionable
whether or not the U.S. can achieve stated combatant commander
objectives without extended delay and substantial cost and casualties.
67. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, your testimony states that
some of the assumptions made in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
``now appear optimistic, particularly in light of the rise of ISIL, a
resurgent Russia, Iran's actions in the Middle East, and challenges in
the Pacific region.'' In your personal opinion, do agree with General
Odierno, is 450,000 adequate to meet the threats of ISIL, an aggressive
China, a Resurgent Russia, and unpredictable North Korea, and perhaps
new threats that will emerge in the next few years?
General Milley. I agree with General Odierno that a 980,000 Total
Army (450,000 AC, 335,000 ARNG and 195,000 USAR) provides the minimum
capacity to execute the missions envisioned in the current national
strategy at ``significant risk.'' I believe, however, that a 1.045
million Total Army (490,000 AC, 350,000 ARNG and 205,000 USAR)
resourced at a level of funding adequate to balance end strength,
readiness, and modernization would address an unpredictable future
security environment at less risk.
68. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if not, what is? Is 490,000
sufficient?
General Milley. I believe that a 1.045 million Total Army (490,000
AC, 350,000 ARNG and 205,000 USAR) at a consistent, predictable level
of funding adequate to balance end strength, readiness, and
modernization would be more sufficient to address an increasingly
unpredictable future security environment.
69. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, is it disingenuous for
Administration to entirely blame Sequester for causing Army the
drawdowns, when the President's own strategic desires for a smaller
Army are largely driving these reductions within the Pentagon,
regardless of budgets?
General Milley. Budget Control Act funding reductions required the
Army to make some very difficult decisions in order to find some
balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization. The
Pentagon's and President's decision to reduce the size of the Army is
driven by the QDR 2014. It takes both the Congress and the President to
pass a law and provide funding to avert sequestration and return the
Army to an Active component endstrength greater than 450,000 or
420,000. Reducing force structure and end strength, while maintaining
the barest acceptable level of readiness along with delays in
modernization was the only responsible way for the Army to execute
missions within the budget. As the current Chief of Staff of the Army
has testified, the Army size in PB16 of 980,000 Total Army (450,000 AC,
335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR) is adequate to meet the demands of the
current and future threats, but at ``significant risk.'' If confirmed,
I will assess combatant commander requirements to ensure that we
provide the best possible mix of capabilities within our resourcing.
70. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, is this our generation's Task
Force Smith moment?
General Milley. If confirmed, I am committed to preventing a repeat
of Task Force Smith. The historical experience of Task Force Smith
graphically illustrates the risks our Nation takes when we fail to
maintain readiness and invest in modernization. As I assess risk to
mission and risk to force, our Army's history--including Task Force
Smith--will inform that assessment. As the Army struggles to balance
end strength, readiness, and modernization in a year of fiscal
constraint and uncertainty, the lessons of Task Force Smith must not--
and will not--be forgotten.
reversibilty of the army's decisions
71. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, is it accurate that the
Brigade Task Force left at Fort Richardson, was left there so that the
Army's decision to remove forces could be reversed?
General Milley. Converting the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team in
Alaska to an airborne battalion task force allows us to preserve combat
power and provide the foundation for regeneration of combat power in
the future.
72. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what specific things would
have to happen for this decision to be reversed?
General Milley. If confirmed, I commit that I will work with you,
your staff and the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure the Army
remains postured and ready to respond to the strategic environment. The
reductions of the Brigade Combat Teams in Alaska and Georgia to
battalion task forces are designed to be reversible should the fiscal
environment improve.
73. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if confirmed, do you commit
to work with me to reverse the Army's decision and to return forces to
my strategically important state?
General Milley. If confirmed, I commit that I will work with you,
your staff and the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure the Army
remains postured and ready to respond to the strategic environment. The
reductions of the Brigade Combat Teams in Alaska and Georgia to
battalion task forces are designed to be reversible should the fiscal
environment improve.
agree with army's recent force structure decision
74. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, from a strategic location
perspective, where other than Alaska does placing an airborne BCT best
address your top three threats of Russia, China, and North Korea?
General Milley. Russia and China are both regional powers with
global reach. In a resource constrained environment, a CONUS-based
airborne brigade combat team, which we have with the Global Response
Force, is best positioned to respond to the complete range of global
threats.
75. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if your personal opinion
then, considering the location and the severity of all the threats, do
you agree with the U.S. Army's decision to downsize strategically
centric forces in Alaska?
General Milley. As I discussed in our office call, if confirmed, I
will rigorously review the decision to downsize forces in Alaska, and I
will visit Alaska soon to personally review the facts on the ground.
76. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your military judgement,
is this a strategically-wise decision for the long-term security of the
United States against threats like Russia, China, and North Korea?
General Milley. Because of budgetary pressure, the Army had to make
several difficult decisions to meet the requirements outlined in the
National Security Strategy while balancing endstrength, readiness and
modernization. The Army has and will continue to maintain forces--both
CONUS- and OCONUS-based--that are ready to respond to threats from any
region around the globe.
jblm
77. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, do units at JBLM give you as
much power projection into the Pacific as units in Hawaii and Alaska?
General Milley. Power projection is a function of both physical
location and co-located or available resources: airfields, position of
shipping, port throughput capacities, and rail infrastructure. These
variables are taken into account to determine deployment timelines.
However, without access to that analysis and specific contingency
requirements, I cannot directly answer the question. If confirmed,
however, I will review the Army's power projection capabilities against
the combatant commanders' requirements.
78. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, why is a CONUS-based
installation (i.e. JBLM) seeing dramatic increases as a result of the
Rebalance to the Pacific, but the two OCONUS states--that lean into the
Pacific--are seeing dramatic reductions? Is our Rebalance really
credible from the continental U.S.?
General Milley. Without question, the Army has had to make very
difficult choices, consistent with a reduced budget, to ensure we are
able to meet National Security objectives and combatant commander
requirements across all regions. Yes, a rebalance is still credible
given the facilities, infrastructure, and posture of Army forces at
JBLM in concert with Alaska and Hawaii. With about 24 percent of the
Army's combat power residing in the Asia-Pacific, our posture there
presents a credible assurance to our allies and deterrent to our
adversaries. Through this posture and continued security cooperation
activities with our Pacific allies the Army will remain ready to
respond in crisis.
79. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how much longer would it take
to deploy an airborne or styrker unit from JBLM versus Hawaii or
Alaska?
General Milley. Without question, movement of Army forces from
CONUS to points in the Pacific will take longer than a movement of
forces already stationed in the Pacific; how much longer is dependent
on a host of variables, such as shipping, port throughput, rail,
infrastructure, airfield capability, as well as size of the force and
destination. If confirmed, I am willing to provide the Committee
scenario-based timelines in an appropriate classified forum.
your input into the army force structure decision
80. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what was your personal input
into this force structure decision?
General Milley. Army Forces in Alaska do not come under U.S. Army
FORSCOM command or control. Therefore, specific to downsizing forces in
Alaska, I did not render a recommendation nor participate in discussion
with respect to those forces.
81. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, did you advocate on behalf of
CONUS-based forces, and to detriment of Pacifically-aligned OCONUS
forces?
General Milley. No.
training in alaska (mva, f-35)
82. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, have you ever trained in
Alaska?
General Milley. No, but if confirmed, I look forward to getting to
Alaska and seeing firsthand the training opportunities Forts
Richardson, Wainwright and Greely have to offer.
83. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, given Alaska's diverse
training lands, the size of training space, the possibility for joint
training and international training that already goes on, does it make
any sense to you of how JBER would be in the bottom third of the
training category? Does this pass your smell test?
General Milley. I have been briefed that Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson's (JBER) ranking in the bottom third of installations at
which one or more Brigade Combat Teams are stationed was the result of
the limited training acreage that is part of the installation, the
number of ranges, size of impact area and training restrictions. This
criteria was based on JBER's 54K acres as addressed in the 2013
Programmatic Environmental Assessment.
84. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, given the F-35 will be the
Air Force's new close-air-support platform, and that it will begin to
arrive in 2019, did the Army's analysis weight the need for joint
training with the F-35 in close-air-support missions? Is there anywhere
else in the U.S. other than the JPARC where the Army could fully train
the CAS mission with the F-35A?
General Milley. To my knowledge, the Military Value Analysis, which
informs decision making, does not consider any potential future weapons
systems capabilities of the other Services. Close Air Support (CAS) can
be trained at the majority of the Army's major installations and CAS
can also be trained at the three Maneuver Combat Training Centers as
part of instrumented Brigade Combat Team live fire and force-on-force
exercises.
85. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, before you are confirmed,
will you release the entire Military Value Analysis (MVA) and Total
Army Analysis (TAA) documents for all the bases considered to U.S.
Congress? Please include those documents in your response.
General Milley. If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with
the Senate Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I
work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10
responsibilities. In this case, to my knowledge, the Army has followed
its established processes for decision making. I have been briefed the
Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed Services
Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any
documents within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise
oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you
and any member of the Committee to further explain our process and
rationale.
86. Senator Sullivan. General Millley, if for any reason you cannot
release the MVA and the TAA documents, if confirmed, do you commit to
doing so once you are confirmed?
General Milley. If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with
the Senate Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I
work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10
responsibilities. In this case, to my knowledge, the Army has followed
its established processes for decision making. I have been briefed the
Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed Services
Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any
documents within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise
oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you
and any member of the Committee to further explain our process and
rationale.
general questions regarding the u.s. army force structure adjustments
(fiscal year 2016-17)
87. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion,
what alternatives should the U.S. the Army have considered, as opposed
to reducing strategically-important forces in Alaska and Hawaii?
General Milley. As stated in my previous testimony and office
calls, if confirmed, I will participate in the Arctic strategy review
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will review the reduction of forces
as necessary to determine if there are appropriate alternatives. As I
previously mentioned, I will visit Alaska soon to personally review the
facts on the ground.
88. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what is the exact number of
soldiers that will be reduced in Alaska and can you provide an
installation-specific profile of how many soldiers will reduced from
each installation and how many soldiers will remain following the
reductions?
General Milley. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) is reduced
by 82,603 spaces and Fort Wainwright is reduced by 873 spaces for a
combined total of 82,676 spaces. JBER retains 82000 spaces and Fort
Wainwright retains 86,223 spaces for a combined total of 88,223 spaces.
89. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, specifically what elements of
are being reduced in Alaska and specifically what elements are being
kept?
General Milley. In addition to conversion of 4/25 Airborne Brigade
Combat Team to an airborne battalion task force, reductions are also
being made to portions of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
company, aviation units, music performance teams, the Stryker brigade
combat team, an explosive ordnance company and a contingency
contracting team. Most of these reductions are based on design changes
that impact a significant amount of like units across the Army and are
not limited to the units in Alaska.
90. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what are the exact dates that
these reductions in Alaska officially begin and end?
General Milley. These phased reductions will begin in January of
2016 and continue until 15 October 2016 when the 4/25 Airborne Brigade
Combat Team inactivates and becomes an airborne battalion task force.
91. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what specific cost/strategic
factors did the U.S. use to make this decision and can you provide all
of that information to me?
General Milley. The Center for Army Analysis used four criteria
consisting of 16 attributes to determine the rank order of the
installations to best support the Army in meeting defense strategic
requirements. The most important criteria for ranking installations
were Training and Power Projection; the other two criteria analyzed
were Well-Being and Expansibility.
The Training criteria considered five key attributes: 1) the number
of acres of maneuver area; 2) training area without environmental
restrictions; 3) training facilities; 4) volume of restricted airspace
and 5) the size of an impact area. Power Projection considered: 1) the
rating of surface deployment infrastructure such as rail loading
tracks, marshalling area and truck loading ramps; 2) the rating of air
deployment infrastructure; and 3) deployment support infrastructure
(e.g., container transfer pads, vehicle scales, and vehicle staging
areas).
I have been advised that your comprehensive data request to the
Secretary of the Army, dated August 4, 2015, for all MVA and TAA
related data is under review and that you will be advised of the status
of that review in the forthcoming response.
92. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what will be the remaining
combat elements of the 4-25 ABCT and what missions will they be capable
of and what missions will they no longer be capable of?
General Milley. A battalion task force will remain from the 4/25
Airborne Brigade Combat Team. Planning for its structure is almost
complete and it will consist of four airborne infantry companies, one
field artillery battery, one engineer company and a support company
with a total strength of 1050 soldiers. This airborne battalion task
force will have the capability to conduct combined arms maneuver
missions in support of the full range of military operations (Phase 0-
V) in support of a brigade combat team or a division. This airborne
task force will have a more robust staff and support elements than
normally found in other battalions throughout the Army enabling them to
operate independently for 24-48 hours, including sustainment, support,
intelligence, and communications capabilities. In short, the airborne
battalion task force will be able to conduct a wide range of combined
arms maneuver and wide area security missions and will be used in
conjunction with other Army, joint or combined forces to achieve
tactical and operational end states.
93. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in terms of threats in the
region and the AOR, including North Korea, China, and Russia, what are
the specific risks that the United States Army is assuming in relation
to each of these threats, and in your personal opinion, is the U.S.
Army accepting too much risk?
General Milley. Regarding Russia, because of security condition
changes in Europe, the current United States Army posture does not
support a comprehensive response for timelines or capacity to deter,
deny, or defeat Russian aggression. However, working with the United
States European Command, the Army is in the process of mitigating this
posture shortfall through expansion and prepositioned equipment--the
European Reassurance Initiative funding is critical to supporting that
effort.
Regarding the Asia-Pacific, the key United States security priority
is to maintain a credible deterrent posture and provide reassuring
military presence in the region in order to maintain regional
stability. North Korea's nuclear weapons are the leading risk to United
States Army forces and the security of its partners. We must work with
our interagency and multinational partners to bring about the
verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. To
mitigate the risk of contingencies in the Asia-Pacific, the United
States Army is working to rebalance its forces committed to the region
in Korea, Japan, Hawaii, Alaska, and at Joint Base Lewis-McChord,
enhance the rapid deployment capabilities in the Global Response Force,
and mature our military relationships through routine exercises and
engagements such as Pacific Pathways.
The budgetary pressures forcing the Army to downsize, defer
modernization, and potentially ration readiness further delay the time
at which these three essential elements will finally come into balance.
I am concerned that we not underestimate the degree of readiness, end
strength, and modernization required to confront current and future
security challenges in the Pacific AOR and around the globe and, I will
work to ensure that we do not.
94. Senator Sullivan. General Dunfrod, in your personal opinion,
are the U.S. Army's reductions in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017
more driven by Sequestration or the 2014 QDR?
General Milley. The Army's reductions in fiscal year 2016 and
fiscal year 2017 are driven by both the Budget Control Act of 2011 and
the 2014 QDR. The Budget Control Act reduced the Army's funding. This
funding reduction resulted in the 2014 QDR, which was the basis for the
reduction in the Army's end strength.
95. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in the U.S. Army's decision,
what, if any, thought was given to the recent actions of President
Putin and the Russian in the Arctic and how heavily were his recent
aggressive actions weighed?
General Milley. I have been advised that the decision was made with
full understanding of Russia's actions in the Arctic and with equally
full knowledge that the Army is capable of projecting combat power from
the continental United States on very short notice.
96. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, recently, General Brooks
(USARPAC) alluded that he could respond to contingencies in the South
China Sea, specifically at Fire Cross Reef, utilizing the 4-25 ABCT and
could do so ``tonight.'' Following these reductions, would this still
be a true statement?
General Milley. The Army assessed that although 4/25 Airborne
Brigade Combat Team is converting to an airborne infantry battalion
task force, it allows USARPAC to retain an airborne capability for
rapid deployment and vertical insertion as part of joint entry
operations, or other missions, as needed throughout the entire Pacific
area of responsibility, to include any potential operations on Fire
Cross Reef. Based upon approved combatant commander plans and OSD
requirements, the Army assessed there is limited strategic risk assumed
in both the Arctic and Pacific regions by reducing 4/25 Airborne
Brigade Combat Team. If confirmed, I will review the strategic risks
associated with the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team decision.
97. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how do these reductions in
Alaska impact the response to a Korean Peninsula contingency and what
specifically is that impact?
General Milley. Even with the reduction of 4/25 Airborne Brigade
Combat Team, the United States Military and the United States Army in
particular retains sufficient capability and capacity to respond to a
conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
98. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how do these reductions in
Alaska impact the Army's ability to quickly respond to contingencies in
the Arctic?
General Milley. According to the briefings I have received, the
reductions in Alaska will not severely limit the Army's ability to
quickly respond to contingencies in the Arctic. The Army has
substantial ground capabilities committed to the Asia-Pacific,
positioned throughout continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska,
Washington State, South Korea and Okinawa. Active duty Army personnel
committed to U.S. Pacific Command total approximately 80,000, which is
more than double those Army forces committed to U.S. European Command,
the next largest at 32,000. Given fiscal realities and our National
Strategy, the Army must remain globally balanced given world-wide
threats. With that in mind, the Army has and will continue to maintain
forces both CONUS and OCONUS-based that are ready to respond, including
rapid response, to threats from any region around the globe.
99. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how much excess facility
capacity will Fort Richardson have after the 4-25 ABCT is reduced and
specifically what excess facilities will those be?
General Milley. This analysis is ongoing. Overall, Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson's permanent party Army authorizations will
decrease by about 2,600 from fiscal year 2015, so the Army anticipates
excess capacity will exist. U.S. Army Alaska and the 25th Infantry
Division will provide revised facility requirements to the Air Force
Joint Base Commander in the coming months. If confirmed, I will work
with the Alaska delegation and the Air Force to ensure you are provided
this data once available.
100. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, will the reduction of the 4-
25 negatively affect the DOD/VA Joint venture hospital on JBER?
General Milley. The DOD/VA Joint Venture Hospital at Joint Base
Elmendorf Richardson is a venture between the Air Force and Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA). Over the course of the next few months, Joint
Base leaders will work with U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) to assess JBER's
end state requirements for mission support, infrastructure and
personnel, to include the joint venture with the VA. This assessment
will determine the impact of the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team
reductions on the DOD/VA Joint Venture Hospital. I have been informed,
until these requirements are firmly understood, there are no planned
reductions of services or personnel.
101. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how much input did USPACOM
have in the U.S Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii
and what specifically was that input and how heavily was it weighed?
General Milley. I have been briefed that United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) was represented by U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)
throughout the process that determined the recently announced Army
force structure decisions. This includes: USARPAC input at the
resourcing panels for units and the Council of Colonels; 2-Star General
Officer Steering Committee; 3-Star General Officer Steering Committee;
and culminating briefings to Department of the Army Senior Leaders for
the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and Military Value Analysis (MVA). Their
input was weighted commensurate with strategic priorities to include
the Asia-Pacific rebalance, world-wide operational demands, budgetary
pressures, and a shrinking Army. Even after this reduction of 40,000
soldiers from the Army's endstrength, USPACOM will have more Army
forces available to it than any other overseas combatant command.
Additionally, during confirmation preparation, I personally
discussed the Army's decision with both GEN Brooks, Commander USARPAC,
and ADM Harris, Commander USPACOM. They both indicated to me that the
reduction of 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team to an airborne battalion
task force was within the range of acceptable risk.
102. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how much input did USEUCOM
have in the U.S Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska and what
specifically was that input?
General Milley. I have been briefed that United States European
Command, as represented by United States Army Europe, participated in
the Army's comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force
structure decisions. Their input helped inform a decision to best
posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic priorities, including the
Asia-Pacific rebalance, and world-wide operational demands. I do not
know the specifics of their input or how it was weighted.
103. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, I have been told that the
final decision to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii came down to
tradeoff between those forces and the 173rd ABCT in Vicenza, Italy. Is
this accurate, and if so, specifically what strategic considerations
(location, deterrence, proximity to threats, access to nearby or
organic lift, and capabilities) went to making this decision?
General Milley.I have been briefed this is not accurate. The
decision to reduce forces in Alaska and Hawaii did not involve a
tradeoff with forces of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in
Vicenza, Italy.
104. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, how much input did
USNORTHCOM have in the U.S Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska
and what specifically was that input?
General Milley. I have been briefed that United States Northern
Command, as represented by United States Army North, participated in
the Army's comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force
structure decisions. Their input, like others, helped inform a decision
to best posture a smaller Army to fulfill strategic priorities,
including the Asia-Pacific rebalance, and world-wide operational
demands. I do not know the specifics of their input or how it was
weighted.
105. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, to what extent was the U.S
Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska coordinated with ALCOM and
what concerns were raised/mitigated from this coordination? To what
extend was this decision coordinated with the Air Force side of JBER
and what concerns were raised/mitigated from this coordination?
General Milley. I have been briefed that Alaska Command, as part of
Northern Command, and represented by Army North, participated in the
Army's comprehensive process that facilitated the recent force
structure decisions.
I have been briefed that Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER),
like the other 29 installations at which substantial Army forces are
stationed, helped inform and facilitate the Army's decision process
through participation in two environmental and socio-economic analyses,
providing input to the Military Value Analysis, and facilitating
``listening sessions'' for installation communities. Commands were
solicited to ensure the accuracy of data and Army awareness of issues
and concerns associated with their installations. While analysis
focused on potential losses at the former Fort Richardson, it
considered impacts to JBER as a whole. In both the 2013 and 2015
processes, JBER and the surrounding community were informed of the
substantial potential losses, the command provided data and information
to support the process, and community listening sessions were conducted
in April 2013 and February 2015. I do not know the specific concerns
raised or how they were mitigated.
106. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, to what extent were our
South Korean Allies consulted on the U.S Army's decision to reduce
forces in Alaska?
General Milley. To my knowledge, our South Korean allies were not
consulted on pending force structure decisions in Alaska.
107. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if so, what were their
concerns and how much were those concerns weighed?
General Milley. To my knowledge, our South Korean allies were not
consulted on pending force structure decisions in Alaska.
108. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, to what extent were our
Japanese Allies consulted on the U.S Army's decision to reduce forces
in Alaska? If so, what were their concerns and how much were those
concerns weighed?
General Milley. To my knowledge, our Japanese allies were not
consulted on pending force structure decisions in Alaska.
109. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, to what extent was section
1043 of the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA considered in the U.S Army's decision
to reduce forces in Alaska?
General Milley. I have been briefed that section 1043 of the Fiscal
Year 2016 NDAA was considered in the Army's decision.
110. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in your personal opinion, is
it strategically wise to reduce forces in the Arctic before we have a
new Arctic strategy and OPLAN?
General Milley. Optimally, I would prefer to have a strategic plan
prior and then determine force structure to support the plan. However,
given the reduction of the Regular Army by nearly 120,000 soldiers over
five years, the Army is faced with only undesirable choices. The
planned reduction of forces in Alaska is based on a comprehensive
review of strategic requirements and installation capabilities intended
to best posture a smaller Army to balance the full range of strategic
demands. That said, the timing of the inactivation and conversion of
the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat Team should allow for completion of
the DOD Arctic strategy and a review of force structure plans.
111. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, to what extent was section
1262 of the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA considered in the U.S Army's decision
to reduce forces in Alaska?
General Milley. I have been briefed that section 1262 of the Fiscal
Year 2016 NDAA was considered in the Army's decision.
112. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, to what extent were
Alaska's, and specifically JBER's organic strategic airlift and close
proximity to large and robust training areas, weighted in the U.S
Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska?
General Milley. There were four major categories considered in the
Military Value Analysis with capability and power projection as major
areas of study and analysis conducted over the last year. All major
installations were likewise evaluated and their results were compared.
Without question, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, like many
installations, maintains outstanding facilities and training areas
manned with dedicated military and civilian professionals. The results,
however, when compared to all other installations led to the decisions
made.
113. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what countries has the 4-25
ABCT worked closely with and possibly trained with and what is the
impact of this reduction on the mil-to-mil relationships with those
countries following the reduction of this unit?
General Milley. In fiscal year 2015, 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat
Team has
executed military-to-military engagements with Australia, Thailand,
Japan, South Korea, Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Canada, Finland, Norway,
and Chile. These activities have ranged from individual participants
attending partner nation schools to airborne and battalion-sized task
forces conducting multilateral exercises. Our
Pacific partners and Allies consider U.S. military-to-military
engagements to be a key component of reassurance in a volatile region.
The Army is still assessing the full implication of the reductions, but
initial assessments from leaders on the ground indicate that this will
not impact our commitment to the region and our ability to conduct mil-
to-mil engagements. If confirmed, this is something that I will watch
closely.
114. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, following the Air Force's
initial decision to remove a squadron from Eielson, senior Air Force
Officials soon went up to Fairbanks and North Pole communities to
explain the decision. When will this be done in the case of Fort
Richardson and who will be sent?
General Milley. I have been advised that the outgoing and incoming
Commanding Generals, MG Shields and MG Owens, U.S. Army Alaska met with
and briefed a number of Alaska community leaders, including Senator
Murkowski, Senator Sullivan, Congressman Young, the Governor and the
Mayor of Anchorage, after the notification of reduction of forces was
announced in order to explain the Army's decision. I am unware of a
townhall type community session held to address local questions and
concerns. If confirmed, and as I committed to in our office call, I
will personally visit Alaska and will bring selected members of the
Army Staff with me to further assess the Alaska installations regarding
the force structure decision that was made.
115. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what impact has the Army
assessed will occur to the greater Anchorage housing market and to the
greater Anchorage economy as a result of the decision to reduce the 4-
25 ABCT?
General Milley. The housing analysis is ongoing. Overall, Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson's (JBER) permanent party Army authorizations
will decrease by about 2,600 from fiscal year 2015. On-post housing at
JBER is privatized under an Air Force housing privatization program.
Across the Army, about 60 percent of soldiers are married. Of those,
about 30 percent typically live on-post. Only a subset of married
soldiers living off-post own their own homes. Anchorage's rental
vacancy rate is 3.9 percent, and the vacancy rate for ownership is 6.7
percent--both of these are significantly lower than the rest of the
United States, and are evidence of a housing market where supply is
lower than demand.
In the Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment (SPEA),
the Army used the Economic Impact Forecast System (EIFS) to estimate
the impact of force structure reductions to the greater Anchorage
market area. Although the actual reductions are much lower than the
worst-case scenario analyzed in the SPEA, the sales volume is estimated
to be a loss of $182M. The estimated income loss is $176M. Employment
(Indirect) is estimated at a loss is 796 non-federal jobs in the area
as a result of the reduced direct service contracts and reduced demand
for goods and services.
116. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, will installations with
reductions be allowed to access DOD OEA funds to mitigate the effects
of these reductions?
General Milley. As I understand it, depending on each unique local
set of circumstances, Army installations affected by force structure
reductions may qualify for assistance from DOD's Office of Economic
Adjustment (OEA). OEA provides technical and financial assistance to
states and communities that are impacted by Defense program changes,
such as a personnel reduction at local military installations. The Army
coordinated the release of the force structure reduction announcements
with OEA so that they were prepared and ready to field community
inquiries regarding possible forms of assistance available through OEA.
117. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, what effects with the U.S.
Army's reductions in in Alaska have on USARAK and USARAK's HQ?
General Milley. United States Army Alaska Headquarters will be
reduced by 814 spaces as part of the ongoing Department of the Army
reduction of two-star and above headquarters units.
118. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, in what ways does the U.S.
Army's decision to reduce forces in Alaska impact Alaska-based Joint
training exercises such Red Flag-Alaska, Northern Edge, and Alaska
Shield?
General Milley. I have been advised that the impact will be
minimal. The purpose and intent of these exercises will remain the
same--that is, to practice deployment and employ for operations in cold
and austere environments. As in the past, if the Army forces in Alaska
are employed in other theaters the Army will source from outside Alaska
allowing additional units in the Army to train in the unique conditions
of Alaska.
119. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, before you are confirmed,
can you please provide the Military Value Analysis (MVA) Model and the
Total Army Analysis used to make all of the Army's fiscal year 2016-17
force structure decisions?
General Milley.If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with the
Senate Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I work
with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10
responsibilities. In this case, to my knowledge, the Army has followed
its established processes for decision making. I have been briefed the
Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed Services
Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any
documents within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise
oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you
and any member of the Committee to further explain our process and
rationale.
120. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, can you provide more
information on the U.S. Army's possible desire to convert at National
Guard brigade at JBLM to Styker brigade?
General Milley. The plan as I understand it is to convert the 81st
Armor Brigade, with units in Washington and California, to a Stryker
brigade with units in Washington, Oregon and California. This
conversion would provide an additional infantry battalion on the west
coast and would leverage training available with the Stryker brigades
located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord.
121. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if confirmed, do you pledge
to ensure that the U.S. Army is completely transparent about the entire
fiscal year 2016-17 force reductions and makes all the documents used
to make all of these decision available to Congress?
General Milley. If confirmed, I commit to being transparent with
the Senate Armed Services Committee and with the entire Congress as I
work with the Secretary of the Army to carry out my title 10
responsibilities. In this case, to my knowledge, the Army has followed
its established processes for decision making. I have been briefed the
Army has provided the detail requested to the Senate Armed Services
Committee and Committee staff. If confirmed, I will release any
documents within my authority that the Committee requests to exercise
oversight responsibilities, and I will be happy to sit down with you
and any member of the Committee to further explain our process and
rationale.
122. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, if confirmed, do pledge to
fully review the Army's reductions decisions, especially in light of
the emerging concerns in the Asia-Pacific, the Arctic and given that
there is a pending Arctic strategy?
General Milley. Yes.
123. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, the Army has told me that
they hope to reverse the decision in Alaska. If confirmed, will you
work with me, and them to bring all the U.S. Army forces back to my
state and the Arctic?
General Milley. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the
disposition of Army forces in accordance with the national strategy,
and provide my best military judgment and advice on the issue to the
CJCS, the President and this Committee.
pacific pathways and redundant missions
124. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, yes or no, would you agree
that the DOD needs to avoid mission redundancy in budget constrained
environment?
General Milley. Yes.
125. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, Pacific Pathways is a
program which puts Army soldiers on Naval Shipping--or commercial
shipping contracted by the Navy--and lands Army helicopters on ships.
Is this Army program mission redundant with the core function of the
U.S. Marine Corps? Which service is best deploying from ships, the U.S.
Army?
General Milley. Pacific Pathways is not redundant with the core
function of the U.S. Marine Corps which is amphibious assault. Pacific
Pathways exercises the strategic movement of Army forces by sea and
does not involve Army forces conducting amphibious assault. Strategic
movement of Army forces by sea complements the movement of Army forces
by air and is a fundamental requirement to ensure the Army can move
globally to fulfill its core competency of providing relevant and ready
land power capability to the combatant commanders as part of the Joint
Force.
Pacific Pathways are umbrella operations built upon existing
exercises. It is an evolution in how the Army conducts existing
exercises that provide significant return on investment in both
readiness and support to PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan.
Each ``Pathway'' is tailorable and scalable, encompassing either a
heavy, medium, or light force package based on the Pathway's exercise
scenarios and the training objectives of the Pathway unit. The Army
plans to conduct three Pathways per year, with a projected estimated
total cost of $45 million per year or an estimated average cost of $15
million per Pathway.
126. Senator Sullivan. General Milley, exactly how much does the
program Pacific Pathways cost each year and how much does each
individual ``Pathway cost?''
General Milley. The Army plans to conduct three Pathways per year,
with a projected estimated total cost of $45 million per year or an
estimated average cost of $15 million per Pathway.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
stryker reprogramming
127. Senator Manchin. General Milley, the Army recently submitted a
reprograming request to upgrade the lethality of the Stryker. In light
of the situation in Ukraine, what is the operational significance of
this reprogramming request?
General Milley. The recent aggression against Ukraine presents a
significant security challenge to the stability of Europe and impacts
all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Heavy combat
equipment is being prepositioned within Europe to mitigate some of that
risk. However, the timeline to fully generate decisive combat power,
and deploy operational forces to man these equipment sets may not set
the necessary conditions in the earliest phases of a potential
conflict. Currently assigned United States Army ground forces include
the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) Stryker brigade combat team, a Stryker
unit designed to be rapidly deployable within urban and complex
environments with a combination of mobility, lethality and
survivability. To address the capability gap of achieving lethal
effects against the most likely threats while providing stand-off
against potential threat weapons systems, the Army's priority is to
improve lethality of assigned 2CR ground forces. Providing an improved
direct fire weapon system to support infantry at a greater range and
improving lethality against a wide array of targets is urgently needed.
128. Senator Manchin. General Milley, what would be the impact if
this reprogramming request were not approved?
General Milley. Approval of the fiscal year 2015 $9.8 million
Research Development Test and Evaluation reprogramming request will
enable initiation of developmental engineering and will facilitate
Original Equipment Manufacturer competitive source selection. Simply
put, if the reprogramming action is not approved, the commander's
lethality upgrade will not be met in time to influence, shape, and if
needed, control potentially volatile situations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
patriot missile
129. Senator Shaheen. General Milley, there are currently thirteen
U.S. allies around the world that have purchased and deployed the
Patriot air and missile defense system. A number of these partners have
turned to the Patriot system as a result of emerging threats in Europe
and the Middle East. Do you agree that the Patriot will be the Army's
premier air and missile defense system for the next few decades?
General Milley. Yes, the Patriot is the Army's premier air and
missile defense program and a critical enabler to the joint air and
missile defense structure. It will remain a critical system for the
next few decades. The Army intends to comprehensively modernize
Patriot, with multiple, phased efforts to maintain and improve system
capabilities against an evolving threat environment. This strategy
allows us to defeat both current and emerging threats while sustaining
the system for the long term through modifications.
130. Senator Shaheen. General Milley, given the joint environment
and cooperation needed to counter these threats, do you believe it is
in the interest of our other allies and partner nations to defend their
air space and improve interoperability with the U.S. military, by also
deploying Patriot in their armed forces?
General Milley. Integrated air and missile defense must be a shared
responsibility with our allies and partner nations. A focus area of the
Army's Air & Missile Defense Strategy is to build partner capacity and
maintain forward presence. The Army continues to pursue increased
interoperability with allies and partners through exercises and
training events such as the recent training exercise with Poland.
new hampshire national guard
131. Senator Shaheen. General Milley, the New Hampshire National
Guard has experienced a 32 percent decline in force structure since
2007. This percentage is ten times the decrease in the National Guard
as a whole during the same period. There are seven states with a
smaller population than New Hampshire, but have a larger guard force
structure. What is your assessment of this disproportionate
reduction?
General Milley. If confirmed, I will coordinate with the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Army National Guard
to assess the force structure of the New Hampshire National Guard. I
have already been briefed the Army National Guard (ARNG) attempts to
balance its force structure across the 54 states and territories
commensurate with the ability of individual states to recruit, train
and sustain soldiers. I have been advised that in 2007 the New
Hampshire ARNG had an allocated force structure allowance of 2,254
spaces and assigned end strength of 1,645 soldiers (72 percent
assigned). As part of the ARNG Rebalance and Grow plan, this 609 space
end strength deficit was taken into consideration and New Hampshire
ARNG force structure was cut in order to right size and improve
readiness. Upon the completion of the fiscal year 2017 Command Plan
(May 2015), New Hampshire ARNG will have a targeted programmed strength
of 1,505,000.
132. Senator Shaheen. General Milley , currently, New Hampshire
ranks 51 out of 54 in terms of the poor condition of its facilities and
armories with many of these structures being more than a half century
old. In your testimony, you emphasized the importance of the Army
National Guard as part of the ``total'' or ``one'' army concept. Given
your support of the Guard, how will you ensure the National Guard has
the resources it needs to upgrade facilities or fund new military
construction projects?
General Milley. The Army will review the current parity model that
is used to allocate increasingly scarce resources across the Total Army
and will work to ensure we make the best possible and fairest use of
our resources to ensure Total Army readiness.
133. Senator Shaheen. General Milley, the New Hampshire National
Guard
employs a unique program called the Care Coordination program. This
program provides support to guardsmen and their families throughout the
deployment cycle with mental health issues, suicide prevention,
employment services, and educational assistance to name a few. I would
be interested in your perspective on the importance of programs like
this and the need to ensure that our servicemembers and their families
have resources available before, during and after overseas deployments.
General Milley. The Army has invested in a wide array of Family
Programs that support the Total Army's Soldiers and Families before,
during, and after deployments. I strongly believe these programs to be
an investment in the Army's most valuable asset--our people. If
confirmed, I will be steadfast in my commitment to providing soldiers
and Families a quality of life commensurate with their service and its
unique demands, while exercising stewardship of taxpayer dollars. PB16
includes funding to ensure soldiers and families are prepared to face
the everyday challenges of military life, and to provide for a ready
and resilient Total Army.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
army aviation restructuring initiative
134. Senator Gillibrand. General Milley, I recently sent a
bicameral and bipartisan letter to Secretary McHugh and General Odierno
related to the Army Aviation Restructuring Initiative and its impact on
Fort Drum. Inactivation of any of Fort Drum's squadrons would have
significant negative impacts on the economy of northern New York,
including the local healthcare and school systems on which the Army
heavily relies, as well as the Army. Will you ensure that I receive a
clear explanation regarding the impact of this year's appropriations
and authorization bills on the 10th Mountain Division?
General Milley. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of General Mark A. Milley, USA
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 4, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of
Staff of the Army and appointment in the United States Army to
the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and
3033:
To Be General
General Mark A. Milley, 6104
------
[The biographical sketch of General Mark A. Milley, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of General Mark A. Milley, USA
Source of commissioned service:
ROTC
Educational degrees:
Princeton University, BA, Political Science.
Columbia University, MA, International Relations.
United States Naval War College, MA, National Security and
Strategic Studies.
Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic Course.
Infantry Officer Advanced Course.
United States Army Command and General Staff College.
United States Naval War College.
Foreign Language(s):
Spanish
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 10 Jun 80
1LT....................................... 28 Nov 81
CPT....................................... 1 Mar 84
MAJ....................................... 1 May 92
LTC....................................... 1 Aug 96
COL....................................... 1 Apr 02
BG........................................ 2 Jun 08
MG........................................ 2 Mar 11
LTG....................................... 20 Dec 12
GEN....................................... 15 Aug 14
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug 14........................... Present...... Commanding General,
United States Army
Forces Command, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina.
Dec 12........................... Aug 14....... Commanding General,
Ill Corps and Fort
Hood, Fort Hood,
Texas and OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM,
Afghanistan.
Nov 11........................... Dec 12....... Commanding General,
10th Mountain
Division (Light),
Fort Drum, New York.
Jun 09........................... Nov 11....... Deputy Director for
Regional Operations,
J-3, Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Jul 07........................... Jun 09....... Deputy Commanding
General (Operations),
101st Airborne
Division (Air
Assault), Fort
Campbell, Kentucky
and OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM,
Afghanistan.
Dec 06........................... Jul 07....... Military Assistant to
the Secretary of
Defense, Office of
the Secretary of
Defense, Washington,
DC.
Jul 05........................... Dec 06....... Chief, Global Force
Management Division,
later Assistant
Deputy Director for
Joint Operations, J-
3, Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Dec 03........................... Jul 05....... Commander, 2d Brigade
Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort Drum,
New York and
OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM, Iraq.
May 03........................... Dec 03....... Commander, 2d Brigade
Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM,
Afghanistan.
Sep 02........................... May 03....... Deputy Chief of Staff
for Transformation, G-
7, 25th Infantry
Division (Light),
Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii.
Mar 02........................... Sep 02....... Commander, United
States Provisional
Brigade/Task Force
Eagle, 25th Infantry
Division (Light),
Multinational
Division (North),
Eagle Base, Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Jun 00........................... Mar 02....... G-3, later Chief of
Staff, 25th Infantry
Division (Light),
Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii.
Aug 99........................... Jun 00....... Student, United States
Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode
Island.
Jul 98........................... Jul 99....... Senior Battalion Task
Force Observer/
Controller,
Operations Group,
Joint Readiness
Center, Fort Polk,
Louisiana.
Jul 96........................... Jul 98....... Commander, 1st
Battalion, 506th
Infantry Regiment, 2d
Infantry Division,
Eighth United States
Army, Korea.
Jun 93........................... Jun 96....... S-1, later S-3
(Operations), later
Executive Officer, 2d
Brigade, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort Drum,
New York and
OPERATION UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY, Haiti.
Aug 92........................... Jun 93....... Student, United States
Army Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Jan 92........................... Jul 92....... Foreign Area Officer
Training Program,
United States Defense
Attache Office,
Bogota, Columbia.
Oct 90........................... Dec 91....... Student, Columbia
University, New York
City, New York.
Apr 90........................... Oct 90....... Student, Defense
Language Institute,
Presidio of Monterey,
California.
Jan 89........................... Feb 90....... S-3 (Operations), 5th
Battalion, 21st
Infantry Regiment,
7th Infantry Division
(Light), Fort Ord,
California and
OPERATION JUST CAUSE.
Jun 86........................... Jan 89....... Commander, C Company,
later Commander,
Headquarters and
Headquarters Company,
5th Battalion, 21st
Infantry Regiment,
7th Infantry Division
(Light), Fort Ord,
California and Multi-
PNational Force and
Observer Task Force,
Sinai, Egypt.
Jun 85........................... Jun 86....... Assistant S-2/3,
Bayonet Combat
Support Brigade, 7th
Infantry Division
(Light), Fort Ord,P
California.
Oct 84........................... May 85....... Student, Infantry
Officer Advanced
Course, United States
Army Infantry School,
Fort Benning,P
Georgia.
Jun 82........................... Oct 84....... Commander, Operational
Detachment ``A'', A
Company, later B
Company, 2d
Battalion, 5th
Special Forces Group,
Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.
Feb 81........................... Jun 82....... Assistant Battalion
Maintenance Officer,
later Platoon Leader,
A Company, 4th
Battalion, 68th Armor
Regiment, 82d
Airborne Division,
Fort Bragg, North
Carolina.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, International May 13-Feb 14 Lieutenant General
Security Assistance Force Joint
Command/Deputy Commander,
United States Forces-
Afghanistan, OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM, Afghanistan...........
Deputy Director for Regional Jun 09-Nov 11 Brigadier General/
Operations, J-3, Joint Major General
Staff,Washington, DC...........
Deputy Commanding General Apr 08-Jun 09 Brigadier General
(Operations), 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault)/Combined
Joint Task Force-76, OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan..
Military Assistant to the Dec 06-Jul 07 Colonel
Secretary of Defense, Office of
the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.................
Chief, Global Force Management Jul 05-Dec 06 Colonel
Division, later Assistant
Deputy Director for Joint
Operations, J-3, Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operational assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, International May 13 -Feb 14 Lieutenant General
Security Assistance Force Joint
Command/Deputy Commander,
United States Forces-
Afghanistan,OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM, Afghanistan...........
Deputy Commanding General Apr 08-Jun 09 Brigadier General
(Operations), 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault)/Combined
Joint Task Force-76, OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan..
Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Jun 04-Jun 05 Colonel
Team, 10th Mountain Division
(Light), OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM, Iraq..................
Commander, 2d Brigade Combat May 03-Dec 03 Colonel
Team, 10th Mountain Division
(Light), OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM, Afghanistan...........
Commander, United States Mar 02-Sep 02 Colonel
Provisional Brigade/Task Force
Eagle, 25th Infantry Division
(Light), Multinational Division
(North), Eagle Base, Bosnia-
Herzegovina....................
S-3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, Aug 94-Jan 95 Major
10th Mountain Division (Light),
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY,
Haiti..........................
Cdr, Headquarters and May 87-Nov 87 Captain
Headquarters Company, 5th
Battalion, 21st Infantry
Regiment, 7th Infantry Division
(Light), Multi-National Force
and Observer Task Force, Sinai,
Eypt...........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Decorations and Badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal.
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster).
Defense Superior Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Bronze Star Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Army Commendation Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster).
Combat Infantryman Badge (with Star).
Expert Infantryman Badge.
Master Parachutist Badge.
Scuba Diver Badge.
Ranger Tab.
Special Forces Tab.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General Mark
A. Milley, USA in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Mark A. Milley
2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Staff, United States Army.
3. Date of nomination:
4 June 2015
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
June 20, 1958, Winchester, MA (Middlesex County, Massachusetts).
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married; May 4, 1985 to Hollyanne (Haas) Milley.
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Member of AUSA, 10th Mountain Division Association, 101st Division
Association, 82d Airborne Division Association, Special Forces
Association, 506th Infantry Regiment Association.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
MIT Seminar XXI Fellow--National Security Program.
ROTC Scholarship Princeton University.
French Airborne Wings (earned and filed).
Afghan National Army Medal (presented not filed).
Polish Military Medal (presented not filed).
French Military Medal (presented not filed).
Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Symbol of Honor for National
Police (presented not filed).
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
General Mark A. Milley
This 15th day of May, 2015
______
[The nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA was reported
to the Senate by Chairman McCain on August 4, 2015, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2015.]
NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain,
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain [presiding],
Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of
Lieutenant General Robert Neller to be the 37th Commandant of
the Marine Corps.
General Neller, we thank you for joining us this morning.
We are grateful for your many years of distinguished service to
our Nation and for your continued willingness to serve.
We also welcome members of your family joining us this
morning, and thank them for supporting you and our Nation. As
our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony, we invite
you to introduce any family members that are joining us.
As our Nation confronts the most diverse and complex array
of global crises since the end of World War II, the next
Commandant will be responsible for ensuring that the Marine
Corps remains the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness.
After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, our
marines have remained in high demand, performing the full range
of theater security and crisis response missions across the
globe. With instability spreading across the Middle East and
North Africa, and tension gripping the Asia-Pacific, more than
ever our Nation is counting on the forward presence, strategic
agility, power projection, and rapid response that are the
Marine Corps hallmarks.
But, as we confront the realities of a more dangerous
world, drastic reductions in defense spending are forcing our
marines to take on a growing set of missions with fewer and
fewer resources. Over the last few years, the Marine Corps has
been cut from 202,000 Active Duty marines in 2012 to 184,000
today. Over the next 2 years, the Marine Corps will fall to
182,000; and, if sequestration returns again, we will be left
with 174,000 marines, a force ill-prepared and ill-equipped to
respond to a crisis or major contingency.
The combination of budget cuts, force reductions, and
rising demands on our marines has reduced readiness, lengthened
deployments, cut training and time at home with families, and
put the Marine Corps under considerable strain. This madness
must stop. As I said earlier this week, this is not just about
reversing the effects of sequestration. We must replace the
arbitrary spending caps on defense that were imposed under the
Budget Control Act of 2011. That's the only way that we will
get back to a truly strategic--strategy-driven defense budget.
As General Dunford emphasized in his most planning--recent
planning guidance, the Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary
force. Over this past decade, as the United States was focused
on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, America's potential
adversaries were investing billions in so-called anti-access
area denial capabilities that threat the Marine Corps ability
to fight from the sea. At the same time, budget constraints
have left the Marine Corps short of its requirements for
amphibious warships. On the current path, the Marine Corps will
not have the correct mix of amphibious warships until 2024.
This is particularly concerning in the Asia-Pacific, where the
Marine Corps plays an essential role in our rebalance policy.
Despite growing tensions in the region, our marines still lack
sufficient sealift and airlift capabilities to respond to a
major contingency in the Asia-Pacific. We must do better if the
United States is to accomplish a rebalance that successfully
reassures our allies and deters our adversaries.
General Neller, if confirmed, another significant challenge
you will face is shortfalls in aviation readiness. As you well
know, high operations tempo over a decade of sustained combat
has degraded readiness--in marine aviation. Today, nondeployed
marine aviation squadrons are 20 percent short of the number of
aircraft needed to train or respond in a crisis. As you will
surely agree, the Marine Corps aviation bench is simply too
shallow to be ready for future challenges. We will be
interested to hear your views on putting the Marine Corps on
track to restoring aviation readiness.
Finally, General Neller, if confirmed, you will be
responsible for recapitalizing and modernizing for future
challenges. In the air, the Marine Corps is rapidly approaching
a significant milestone with the initial operational
capability, or IOC, of the F-35B joint strike fighter. Concerns
remain about the warfighting capability of these aircraft
reaching IOC. We will be looking to you, General Neller, to
ensure our marine aviators have safe and reliable aircraft that
will allow them to effectively carry out their missions. On the
ground, the amphibious combat vehicle remains the Marine Corps
top acquisition priority. Given the importance of replacing our
aging fleet of amphibious vehicles, the Marine Corps must learn
the lessons of past failures, such as the expeditionary
fighting vehicle, and deliver this needed capability on time,
at cost, and up to expectations. We will be relying on you,
General Neller, to make sure the job gets done.
Thank you. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join the Chairman in welcoming Lieutenant General
Neller to the confirmation hearing regarding his nomination to
be the 37th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.
General Neller, welcome to the Armed Services Committee.
Thank you for your many years of extraordinary service to the
Corps and to the country. Also, thank your family for their
service right alongside you every step of the way.
General Neller, you have an exemplary record of service,
and you're highly qualified for the position which you've been
nominated. You have commanded marines from the platoon level to
the division level, and are--you are currently the commander
Marine Corps Forces Command and commander Marine Corps Force
Europe. Before this current assignment, you also commanded U.S.
Marine Corps Forces for Central Command.
General Neller, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you will
be tasked with the recruiting and retaining of quality force
and ensuring that force contains the necessary structure and
readiness levels to meet our Nation's current challenges and
the posture to respond to tomorrow's crises and contingencies.
These responsibilities are demanding enough on their own;
however, you will also be asked to assume control at a time of
immense financial and fiscal challenge, particularly because of
sequestration. I know we will discuss a number of these
challenges this morning.
Again, thank you for your service and the service of your
family. Thank you for your great marines, who make us all proud
every day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General, in order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it's important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress be able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
So, would you answer the following questions:
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
[The witness answered in the negative.]
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
[The witness answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Welcome, General. Please proceed. Perhaps you'd like to
introduce your family.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, TO BE GENERAL
AND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
General Neller. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Reed.
My wife, Darcy, is here. Our 40th wedding anniversary is
next month. I already have the present, so I'm in good shape.
[Laughter.]
General Neller. Our three children are not here: Kurt,
Brett, and Claire. They are off--Kurt lives in Traverse City;
Brett lives in Houston; and Claire and her husband, Jim, and
the most important member of our family, grandson Connor, are
in Austin, Texas. I'll talk a little bit about all of them in
my statement.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Neller. Our parents--our mothers both live in East
Lansing, Michigan, and both our fathers are deceased and both
veterans. My brother is a retired Navy captain. My dad served
in the Army. Darcy's dad and her--his three brothers are all
World War II vets, served in the war. So, we have a history of
service in our family.
So, with that, I would like to present my opening
statement.
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today.
Before I offer my brief remarks, I do want to express my
condolences to the families of the marines and sailor lost in
the tragic shootings in Chattanooga. Our thoughts are with the
families as they struggle to cope with this incomprehensible
loss. For Gunnery Sergeant Sullivan, Staff Sergeant Wyatt,
Sergeant Holmquist, Lance Corporal Wells, and our shipmate,
Petty Officer Smith, you will not be forgotten.
I'll begin by thanking the President and the Secretaries
Carter and Mabus for their confidence in nominating me for this
office. I would also like to thank this committee and the
Congress for your faithful support for our men and women in
uniform under your leadership. The Marine Corps today is a much
different and better force than the one I joined 40 years ago.
I also want to recognize my partner, friend, and strongest
supporter, who sits with me today, Darcy. We started our Marine
Corps journey at the same time, although she didn't sign up;
she just went with it.
[Laughter.]
General Neller. She has an unconditional love for marines
and their families. She understands the difficulties and
stresses of military families, and serves as a strong advocate
for their support. While I was off doing what was required, she
ran the house, worked outside the home, volunteered, raised
three kids, who all have their own lives and careers and are
doing very well, thankfully--moved 26 times, to include three
times overseas, and allowed me to think that I was contributing
to the effort. Now that we have our first grandson, Connor, I
have moved down in the pecking order in the Neller household,
beneath him, the children, and the dogs. As I said, we'll be
celebrating our 40th anniversary, and I'm thankful that she's
here with me today.
I accepted a Reserve commission in the Marine Corps in June
of 1975 out of the University of Virginia because I wanted to
get married and I needed a job. When I joined, we had just come
out of Vietnam. Discipline was not good, equipment was in poor
condition, and training was poorly resourced and rudimentary.
Though we were well led and we trained hard, we were not ready.
So, in those early years, I learned to expect little and to get
less. But, more importantly, I soon realized that being a
marine, and an officer in the marines, was much more than just
that job that I was looking for; it's a profession, it's a
mindset, it's a life. I came to realize that the marines and
sailors we serve, and their families, are special people. If
they are well led by those willing to share the hardship and
the risk, led by those who firmly but fairly coach, teach, and
mentor them, and by those willing to ensure they have what they
need for the mission and for their families, that they could
accomplish incredible things.
I had many teachers in those early days, but the best were
the Vietnam-era staff NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers] who, for
whatever reason, took the time to keep me out of my own way,
mold me, and advise me when those were--when those times were
tough.
I also learned the hard grind of life in the infantry, how
to operate, move, and survive in every clime and place, how to
lead those that were not always willing, and how to build a
team. I learned why the Marine Air-Ground Task Force [MAGTF], a
team of teams, is the way we fight and why we win. I learned
that we are most effective as a maritime force using the sea as
maneuver space, and, as soldiers of that sea, we hold an
advantage over our adversaries when we come from our Navy ships
both on the surface and in the air. I learned that the support
and well-being of our families is just as important as the
ammo, food, and water we need to keep ourselves focused and
successful in the fight.
So, over these past years, through the efforts of great
leaders, like Commandants Wilson and Barrow and those that
followed, to include our current Commandant, General Dunford,
and his wife, Ellen, who have set the conditions for our future
success. With the support of the Congress and the Nation, we've
kept at it. We've gotten better--better people, better
equipment, better facilities, better training, better
education, better leadership--and we were put on a path to
where we are today--a high-quality corps of men and women who
are smart, fit, disciplined, trained, experienced, take care of
each other, and are ready to fight tonight and to provide what
America expects of her Marine Corps: an expeditionary crisis
response force in readiness. Although material readiness,
fiscal and other challenges do exist, and which must be
addressed, I am immensely proud of where the Corps is today.
All that said, we cannot rest on our laurels and become
complacent. I don't have to tell this committee that the
complexity of the global security environment creates a level
of uncertainty that increases risk to our Nation, from violent
extremism across the globe and Cold War-like aggression in
Eastern Europe, cyberthreats and contested waters in the
Pacific. Because of the security environment we face, the
President and our National leadership expects its military to
be able to provide the military options and capabilities to
meet these challenges and to protect the security interests of
the American people. Among those military options they expect
to have is a Marine Corps that can respond to crisis across the
full range of military operations. They expect the Marine Corps
to be the Nation's force in readiness. They demand that, when
the Nation is least ready and needs us most, the Marine Corps
will be the most ready, will answer the call, and win.
In order to be that Marine Corps, we must be willing to not
just be good, but to get better, be able and willing to look at
new and different ways of performing our craft that maintain an
operational edge every day. Every marine we recruit and
reenlist, every decision we make, all the equipment we procure,
all the training we do must make us operationally better.
Flexibility, innovation, dealing with change, uncertainty,
thinking out of the box, all these things have to be
commonplace and something that is expected from marines. It has
been in the past, and it must be so in the
future.
Finally, if confirmed, I promise to dedicate myself to
sustaining and providing the Nation that kind of Marine Corps,
a Marine Corps of the highest-quality young men and women our
Nation has to offer, the most disciplined, best-trained and -
equipped and operationally-capable Marine Corps we can afford,
and the best--to the best of my ability, to ensure the health,
well-being, and opportunities for success of the men and women
who accept the challenge to be a U.S. Marine.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before
you this morning. I'm ready for your questions.
Chairman McCain. Well, thank you, General.
Recently, General Dunford stated to this committee, quote,
``We cannot execute the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review with
the budget cuts as a result of the Budget Control Act.'' He
continued, stating that ongoing cuts will threaten our ability
to execute the current defense strategy. Do you agree with that
statement of General Dunford's?
General Neller. Chairman, I do believe, if we are held to
the sequestration level this year and in the following years,
we will not be able to execute the strategy.
Chairman McCain. Would this continued sequestration and its
effects put the lives of the men and women serving in the
Marine Corps in greater--at greater risk?
General Neller. Senator, if our readiness is degraded
because we can't resource the training and we can't modernize
the force, if we had to commit that force, there would be
increased risk.
Chairman McCain. You know, in the 1970s, you referred to
General Wilson and General Barrow, and you referred to the
really terrible situation that existed. Do you see a parallel
to that today with continued sequestration?
General Neller. Chairman, anytime we come out of conflict,
there is always risk to this effect. But, they're all
different. We've--some--we've been able, after 12 years of war,
to keep a very qualified and capable force. Because we've been
resourced and supported by the Congress, I don't believe we're
near that place that you and I remember from the '70s. There's
always risk that things could happen that could take us there.
I believe that's what many of us are concerned about. But,
right now, we're not there. If confirmed, I give you my
personal pledge that we'll do everything in our power to never
go back to that place again.
Chairman McCain. We've spent a lot of billion dollars on
acquisition, as you know. At least in my view, the ongoing
scandal is the cost overruns, the F-35B, complete testing of
the CH-53 heavy-lift helicopter--the list goes on and on of
cost overruns. Will placing service chiefs in a greater
position of responsibility of service acquisition programs help
fix--address this problem, in your view?
General Neller. Chairman, I don't think any of us who are
on the receiving end of the acquisition process are totally
pleased. I'm not a acquisition professional, but I think we all
wonder why it takes so long, costs so much money, why there's
delays. So, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with
this committee and then the Secretary of Defense to improve
this----
Chairman McCain. Do you believe that----
General Neller.--process and involve the service chiefs in
the process.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe that we could make this
process more efficient if you played a role in that process--if
the service chiefs played a role in that process?
General Neller. I would like to believe, if confirmed, that
I could provide value-added to the process and make it more
effective, Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
I'm sure you've observed the ongoing situation in Ukraine.
Would you favor providing defensive weapons to Ukraine?
General Neller. Chairman, it's my military opinion, if we
provided additional weapons to the Ukrainians, that they would
be more capable of defending their territory.
Chairman McCain. I want to go back, just a second, to the
budget situation, because there is great controversy on that
issue. I'm not sure my colleagues on both sides of the Capitol
understand the consequences, not only for our ability to defend
the Nation, but the greater risks to the people that we ask to
defend us. Maybe you could talk to us a little bit about that
and the impact on retention and morale, and of the--of our All-
Volunteer Force.
General Neller. Well, Chairman, in my current role as
commander Marine Forces Command, I try to get out and speak to
marines and sailors as often as I can. This force is very
smart. They are informed. So, they are aware of what's going on
with the funding. I believe they're concerned, they're
watching. They want to know what's going to go on with
compensation. They want to know what's going to go on with the
modernization and training. This Congress and this Nation has
been very generous to them in the last 12 years, so they've
created a very high--they have a high expectation in their mind
of what's--you know, what's supposed to be right. They don't
have the context I had. They don't understand what it is to go
short. They'll learn, if they have to.
So, I do have some concerns about retention. I do have
marines ask me, ``Hey, what's going to happen about pay and our
gear and our training and our bases, our housing, and those
things?'' They know there's choices to be made. But, I believe,
whatever those choices are--and we can explain them to them,
and they are reasonable, rational people, and they'll make the
decision--and I believe that they'll stay. But, that remains to
be seen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, General, for your service.
The Marine Corps continues to test, develop, and evaluate
gender-neutral occupation standards. I think the expectation,
the goal, is that every MOS [Military Occupational Specialty]
would be available to qualified female in Marines, as well as
males. You're just opening up the base infantry course to
company-grade female officers. Can you comment upon the
expectations and your commitment to making sure that this is
accomplished?
General Neller. Senator Reed, first off, just let me say,
as I said in my statement, that whatever we do, it's got to at
least maintain, if not improve, our operational capability.
Since the Secretary made the decision to open up these MOSs,
we've done a number of things. First, we assign women in MOSs
that they already held to previously restricted units to begin
the process of integration. We've opened up other MOSs that
were previously closed to female marines, like maintenance MOSs
and light anti-air defense. Right now, there's--94 percent of
all MOSs in the Marine Corps are open to females. We sent women
to Infantry Training Battalion as enlisted marines. They
volunteered. We ran them through the training, developed data,
and see what their ability was to pass through--pass that
curriculum. We also allowed women--have continued to allow
women to compete in the infantry officers course. The last
thing we did, in a measured, deliberate way, was to form a task
force--an integrated task force to put together men and women
in teams, in units--infantry, artillery, tanks, light-armor
Amtracs, and run them--prepare them, train them, and run them
through an evaluation to get some data, because we found there
was not a lot of data. So, we're still assessing that data, and
that data will drive, along with operational views, what the
recommendation to the Commandant will be on opening up those
remaining MOSs.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. This is a challenge for the--
not only the Marine Corps, but the Army. Just, as we speak,
there are three women candidates in the mountain phase of
Ranger School to see if we can validate and create a--in the
Army, a pathway for Ranger qualifications for females as well
as males. But, thank you, and I--for your commitment to that.
Last year, the Personnel Subcommittee had a hearing, and
the former senior enlisted advisor to the Commandant, Sergeant
Major Richard Barrett, stated--and I've always listened to
sergeant majors, they're pretty smart people--but, I thought it
was remarkable what he said. In his words, ``If we do not get
hold of slowing down the growth of personnel costs, if we do
not pay a little more attention to the healthcare that we so
generously have received in my 33 years, I have never seen the
level of quality of life, ever--this level. We have never had
it so good. I make that point because, if we do not get a hold
of slowing the growth, we will become an entitlements-based,
healthcare-provided-based Marine Corps, and not a warfighting
organization.'' He further stated, I am told, in colorful
tones, that marines care most about the next fight, training,
and modernization. That, I think, is the dilemma that we all
face. Can you comment upon that?
General Neller. I'm not going to speak for Sergeant Major
Barrett. I've heard the comments. I know Sergeant Major
Barrett. I think his concern is, is that we created, because of
the generosity of the Congress and the fact that we were at
war, and from--for rightful, proper reasons, we did a lot of
things with medical care, and we had some shortfalls.
Senator Reed. Right, absolutely.
General Neller. I mean, our facilities are the best I've
ever seen. So, we've taken advantage of the situation and the
money that was available. So, a young marine coming in today,
when he walks around, or she walks around, they see what they
see; they don't see what it used to look like. You know,
Senator Tillis will attest to that down at Camp Lejeune. I
mean--and the same thing at Camp Pendleton--it's very nice. Not
perfect. It's good enough. But, it is--it's new. We're going to
have to sustain that.
So, I think Sergeant Major Barrett's concern is, How do we
sustain it? Have we created an expectation that we can meet? If
we can't meet that, what are the marines going to do? At the
same time, that's important, but it's as, if not--to me, it's
more important that the training we give them and the equipment
we give them has parts, it's maintainable, the training is
challenging, demanding, interesting, and it's going to improve
our operational capability. So--and we've done that--so,
maintaining that level, I think, is what his concern is, and
much of that is tied to resources.
Senator Reed. Now, my impression has always been that
qualify-of-life issues, access to childcare, access to medical
facilities, are critical, but soldiers and marines understand
that, if they're not well-trained, well-equipped, and ready to
go, that's the big quality-of-life issue, because that means
they survive or they don't survive and the mission gets
accomplished or doesn't get accomplished. So, we'll have to
work with that.
My time is expired. One other issue I'll just put on the
table. We had a brief chat in the office. The sense that the
next battle we fight, the first phase will be cyber-dominated,
so we'll be fighting in the dark. So, perhaps there'll be an
opportunity for other questions later this morning about how
marines will relearn some of those old things, like maps and
lensatic compasses and--you know, that might be very critical
in the next fight, even though we have the most sophisticated
equipment in the world.
Thank you very much for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. The Chairman asked you the question about
the Ukraine. I was glad he did. I was over there when they had
the parliamentary elections. For the first time in 96 years,
they only had one Communist on their Parliament. I mean,
that's--that's for us, that's for the West, that's their
allegiance to us.
Your answer was very similar to General Dunford when you
said, ``Yeah, we--they should have defensive weapons over
there.'' What would be your choice, in looking at them, as to
what priorities, what types of weapons they need the most right
now?
General Neller. Senator, I've never been to Ukraine. I've
been to Georgia. They've made similar requests. I think what
they're--what I've heard, at least from the Georgians, they're
looking for defensive weapons--antitank guided-missile-type
weapons.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, why don't--for the record, why don't
you just, kind of, send your suggestions, your--in looking and
making those evaluations.
[The information referred to follows:]
We should continue the provision of non-lethal supplies and
defensive equipment (counter fire radars) and ISR support to Ukraine
and continue our training of their forces. If the future dynamics in
the Ukraine change and necessitate a more robust military response, I
would recommend the provision of weapons and systems--such as anti-
armor weapons--and the necessary trainers to employ these weapons
capable of effectively countering the battlefield threats the Ukrainian
military feels they need the most assistance in defeating.
Senator Inhofe. I know that they've just finished the B-
model testing in--of the F-35 out in Yuma. You haven't had a
chance to go over and review it. Now, I understand you will--
you are in the process of doing that now, but what is your
opinion so far? Have you developed any yet?
General Neller. Senator, as you said, VMFA-121 [Marine
Fighter Attack Squadron 121] is the first F-35B squadron out at
Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma, Arizona. We--our plan was to
declare IOC with them this month. That's still the plan. They
did an operational readiness evaluation. From what reports I
have received, but I have not seen ``the report,'' they did
very well. That report is with the Commandant, and he's going
to take a look at that and make a recommendation as--to the
Secretary, as far as them being IOC. I'd--I'm hopeful that they
passed. I think they passed. I think one of the concerns we
have with any new system is the number of spare parts that are
available to keep the aircraft at the requisite level of
readiness. But----
Senator Inhofe. But, you're in the process of making that
evaluation now, or they are.
General Neller. The evaluation----
Senator Inhofe. You'll be inheriting that responsibility.
General Neller. Sir, the--General Dunford, I believe, is
going to make the recommendation on IOC soon.
Senator Inhofe. General Dunford has forecasted that next
decade will be characterized by small-scale crises in and
around coastal areas. I understand that the Marine Corps is
changing its plans for development of the next-generation
armored combat vehicle from a self-deploying vehicle to a
wheeled vehicle. I always wonder, when that happens, and when
things are as tight as they are now, although what we're facing
now is unprecedented, was that a budget-driven decision or do
you think it's the right vehicle?
General Neller. Senator, we had hoped to buy a high-speed
planing vehicle. It became too expensive and it didn't have the
reliability. We have not given up on high water speed. We're
continuing to do research and development.
In the meantime, we need a new vehicle. The current
amphibian tractor is over 40 years old. There's not a lot of
room left to improve it. It's not very survivable on a modern
battlefield. It has a flat bottom. It's made of aluminum. So,
we're pursuing off-the-shelf vehicles from vendors, and we're
going to continue to keep the Amtrac or the amphibian alive,
and we're going to select down to two vendors, this fall,
build--take 16 of their vehicles and test them, and then down-
select. So, we believe this vehicle will not only swim--I
believe it will swim--it'll improve our mobility and
survivability on land.
Senator Inhofe. You know, the tragedy in Chattanooga was
one that we're all--you already expressed your sentiments about
that, and we all share your sentiments--there is a lot of
reaction--political reaction. Different people are talking
about different levels of security that they should be able to
use, whether it's private weapons, issued weapons. Do you have
any thoughts on that?
General Neller. Senator, I know that there's a number of
studies and investigations ongoing about increasing the force
protection for those servicemembers of all our services that
are outside the wire, if you will, outside the major posts and
stations where we have law enforcement and armed security.
There's some things we can do right away, just more physical
protection, protection of glass, glass that you can't see
inside. Now, that could include arming individuals. There are
some potential consequences to that. But, I think we need to
take a look at it. So--but, at the same time, we have
recruiters out there, and they're out to recruit. The story in
the media this morning is that they got interviewed and then
they went back to work. They had to go----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
General Neller.--recruit. So----
Senator Inhofe. Well----
General Neller.--I don't want anything that we do that's
going to--we need to stay connected to the American people. So,
whatever we do has to ensure that we continue to go to schools
and go out there and find those good young men and women that
want to be marines.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, I understand that. But, in terms of
protection, I think most of up here would look to you--to the
military, to the uniforms--for advice along these lines. So----
The last thing I wanted to mention is, we--our schedules
didn't get together, because of a bill that I'm involved in
right now. Would you make a point to come by so we have a
personal visit?
General Neller. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Neller, thank you so much for your service to our
country, your family's sacrifice, because I know it goes hand
in hand.
Sir, with that being said, I've asked this question to
everyone who's come through this committee for their approval,
and that would be, What do you assess as the greatest risk--or,
threat the United States of America faces from another country?
General Neller. If you're asking me about a country,
Senator----
Senator Manchin. Who poses the greatest threat to the
United States?
General Neller.--I would say another nation-state. I would
agree with General Dunford that Russia has the most increasing-
capable force, and their actions and the fact that they have
strategic forces make them the greatest potential threat,
although I don't think they want to fight us. Right now, I
don't think they want to kill Americans. I think violent
extremists want to kill us. Their capability is not that great,
but their intent is high. The fact that they have a message
that seems to resonate around the world, not just in this
country, but in other countries in the Western world, they
concern me equally.
Senator Manchin. Your overall view, basically with that.
So, Russia seems to be the one who has the greatest capability
of doing harm to us, if they would desire that. So, we have to
keep our eye on the ball. But, we don't seem to have any
relations with them, or, if they are, they're just--I've been
told that the Cold War is colder today than it was when it was
declared. So, I don't know how you would interact, as far as
trying to build that relationship or communicate with your
equals in Russia, or do you have open lines of communications
with them?
General Neller. I've met with Russian officers in previous
places, in previous times. I've never met with--they have a
naval infantry or a marine corps. If there were opportunities
to meet with them, like there are with any other country,
it's--there's always a--it's always good to talk, even if you
disagree. I met with Chinese officers, and we didn't agree on
very much, but we had a nice lunch.
Senator Manchin. I appreciate that.
Second, I would say that, you know, I think all of our
hearts go out to the families of the marines who lost their
life in Chattanooga. We hope that never repeats itself again.
What's your plan of doing that, to make sure that the Reserve
offices and recruiting offices are safe and secure around the
Nation?
General Neller. Well, Senator, this--whatever we do as a
military, it's going to have to be consistent. Admiral Gortney
is the Commander of Northern Command [NORTHCOM], so he's
ultimately responsible for the force protection, and we provide
advice. We have a Marine component with NORTHCOM. So, we would
work with them to implement whatever policies or procedures
that we could do. But, in the immediate moment, they've
increased certain levels and measures that they've put in
place, which I'm not going to discuss here, that I believe are
prudent at this time. There are some more physical things that
they're going to look at.
Senator Manchin. You know there's a lot of discussion here
on the Hill, basically about those who work in that type of an
environment should be armed to protect themself with
government-issues. They've even talked about their own private-
issues, they're bringing them on in for protecting themself.
So, that seems to be the dialogue that's going on right now. I
don't know if you have an opinion on that, if you would like to
see those who work--or, if you worked in a recruitment office,
would you want to have government-issue arms to protect
yourself?
General Neller. Senator, I think we need to take a look at
it, but I have some concerns about the second- and third-order
effects of that, particularly on the recruiting--the recruiters
and their access and things they need to do. There are some
practical matters that have to be worked out. But, I believe
that'll all come out in the investigations and the planning
that's going on right now. So, I'm going to--I would--I'm not
going to discount it, but I think that's probably at the end
and the most extreme measure that we could take to do what we
need to do, which is protect those servicemembers out there
doing their mission.
Senator Manchin. If I could ask you, just your view,
because marines always seem to be the first ones in when we
have a conflict. With that being said, over in the Middle East
is Afghanistan and Iraq. What's your feelings about a three-
state solution in Iraq, versus trying to continue to keep a
one-state Baghdad solution to the problem that we have over
there? Seems like that we're not getting very much traction on
going down the same path we've been down. So, I don't know what
your thoughts would be on a Kurdistan, a Shi'itestan, and
Sunnistan, and have Baghdad basically have three separates so
they would have the desire to fight, where we don't have the
Sunnis' desire to fight right now, it seems.
General Neller. Senator, I would respectfully say that's
way out of my lane, to talk about a three-state solution, but I
do believe----
Senator Manchin. But, do you think we have--I'm so sorry,
sir, because my time is running--but, do you think we have a
problem with getting the Sunnis the will to fight in that area?
General Neller. I was in Anbar for a year. They'll fight.
But, they have to believe, like any person who's fighting, that
the government that supports them is going to support them. So,
if the Iraqi government can convince the Sunni tribes in Anbar,
in Saladin, in Diyala, it is my personal, professional opinion,
they will fight. If they can't do that, they will continue to
have a hard time.
Senator Manchin. Thank you so much, sir, appreciate it.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Thank you, General Neller, for your service, and Ms.
Neller, for your service and your family's commitment to
defending America.
I think you answered well when you said, ``Right now, we
don't think the Russians want to kill us, but the ISIS [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria]--ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant] does,'' and actually taking action to that end.
I had the opportunity to be with a wise member of
parliament of one of our allies recently, and his comment was
that our number-one achievable priority now should be to defeat
ISIS before it grows and becomes even stronger, and that
there's a danger that it could grow stronger. How would you
think about that, in terms of our immediate achievable
priority? Should we be taking more effective action to confront
the rise of this extremist group in Iraq and in the Levant?
General Neller. Senator, I believe that the actions we're
taking now in support of the Iraqi government, the
effectiveness remains to be seen. Right now, I mean, they're in
the process of trying to regain control of Ramadi. So, I
believe that--I believe the Iraqis can do this. I believe they
have the capability, and, if well led and supported, they have
the will.
So, to your bigger question of, Do we need to go after ISIL
and make sure that they are not able to create a safe haven and
to continue to foment their violent theories of how life is
supposed to be?--yes, sir, I do. If confirmed, I would be--look
forward to offering potential other options that we could
possibly be more effective. But, right now, I think--I think
we're going to see some success, here. I may be wrong. But,
it's not going to be overnight. It's going to take some time.
Senator Sessions. Well, a key area is al-Anbar region. You
were there for a year. Were you there when the transformation
took place--and the marines, I know, were involved in that--
when they--the tribal leaders reacted against al-Qaeda and
basically ran them out of the area?
General Neller. Yes, Senator, I was.
Senator Sessions. So, you've seen that. How did we help
them? What did we do to convince them that they had the kind of
support that they could be successful and throw out al-Qaeda?
Do you believe that we can do that again? Are they capable of
throwing out ISIS, which I also believe they do not favor, and
oppose, and wish were not there?
General Neller. We supported, as we are now, the Iraqi
Security Forces. The situation was not as--there was--the
adversary didn't actually hold as much ground then as they do
now. I'm not aware--I have not been there since I left, in
2007. I was back in 2011, right at the end, when the U.S.
forces pulled out. So, my knowledge base is aged, and I would
hope to go back and see it with my own eyes, if confirmed as
the Commandant, to get a better understanding of what's going
on. But, similar to what we're doing now, we provided
capability, we provided support, we provided training. At the
end of the day, our goal was that they would own it, because,
at the end of the day, they have to fix this.
Senator Sessions. Well, they were successful, to a degree
that many of us didn't expect. It was a decisive moment in the
creation of a stabilized Iraq. There's no doubt about it. I
remember, I believe General Stewart--was it Colonel--I don't
know if was colonel or general at that time; now he's a defense
intelligence commander--but, he was there, and we did a lot of
things that supported them and gave them confidence. Without
putting large numbers of forces on the ground, without leading
in combat operations and conducting those operations, do you
think that providing embedded soldiers with the Iraqi forces,
with communications systems, with the ability to call in
airstrikes, resupply, evacuation, those kind of things that an
embedded American soldier might provide, and the confidence it
provides--could that be a positive factor in helping the Iraqi
forces have the confidence necessary to get on the offensive
and once again throw off these extremists?
General Neller. Senator, it's been my experience that if we
have Americans with foreign militaries providing those
capabilities, that they do perform at a higher level. But,
there have to be other things in place so that the force
protection of those forces, those soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines, is also guaranteed.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thank you, and I trust that you
will provide the best military advice you can to the President,
to your superiors, and to the Congress. I'll ask you, Will you,
when asked, continue to give your best advice?
General Neller. Yes, Senator, I will.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Senator Sessions, that was a great series of
questions, because they were the same ones that I had.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. So. I appreciate it.
I just want to touch--refine a couple of those points.
You're not only being nominated to be Commandant of the
Marine Corps, you'll be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
National Security Council Advisor to the Secretary of Defense,
Advisor to the President. You don't strike me as a guy that's
going to be shy about speaking up when you feel it's necessary,
but I want to urge you to do so. Your value, your experience,
your wisdom, your judgment is why you're in this position. If
you don't provide it in an unvarnished way, then you're not
fulfilling this job. I deeply hope that you will be forthcoming
and as straightforward as you have been today with the highest
levels of the administration, because that's just vitally
important. The President isn't well served if he doesn't have
people who tell him the straight truth. Are you committed to
that mission?
General Neller. I am, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you.
Again, to follow up on Senator Sessions' questions about
our role in Iraq. You were there, as you've mentioned. How do
we--what are the elements of a successful advise-and-assist
mission? How do we convey the will to fight, other than simply
providing weapons and supplies? What are the pieces? What did
you learn from your experience in Iraq that we--because we are
going to--we have to have these people fight for themselves. If
they don't, this battle is lost.
General Neller. Senator, there's--there is the material
piece. You have to give equipment that's reliable and works,
and then you have to train the force to use that equipment, and
they have to have confidence in it, they have to be competent
in its use. They have to be able to shoot, use the radios,
drive. Then they have to be willing to go out and confront
their adversary. That requires leadership. The most difficult
part, I believe, will be--there are leaders there. Every--
there's leaders in every unit. You've just got to find them.
You know, one of the frustrations we had previously, back many
years ago, was, there were Iraqis there, and we had to make
sure that the right Iraqi was leading the unit. That wasn't
always the case.
So, again, I have not been there. I have not met the
officers in charge. The marines that are there--from time to
time, I hear from them. They are not discouraged. They're
pressing. So, they need people to train. They need the
equipment. They need the ability to train them. Then they
need--the Iraqi need--Iraqis need leadership.
So, it's kind of a stew of things that have to be put
together. I think we're trying to help them make that stew.
We'll see, here--as they go toward the Ramadi objective, we'll
see if they're effective or not.
Senator King. Well, the discussion today has centered on
Iraq, but we've also got the problem of Syria, where we don't
have a security force to be training and working with. My
concern is that time is running out, in the sense that ISIL is
not only gaining ground, they're gaining ground
organizationally. There have been reports recently that they're
looking more and more like a state. They are governing, they
are talking about succession of their leadership, and they are
consolidating in many of the areas where they are. I understand
the limits of American force, and that we can't do it all with
airpower, but how do we deal with Syria? We're doing some
limited training there, but it seems very insignificant, given
the nature of the threat. We could be very successful in Iraq,
but you've still got that large ungoverned area of eastern
Syria that is a potential home base for this group.
General Neller. Syria, in my mind, is much more complicated
than Iraq, although--and they are--but they are linked. So, if
Iraq were able to reestablish their borders, in my military
opinion, it would facilitate what we would do in Syria. But,
right now I think the objective to train Syrian opposition
fighters against ISIL is--with the ability to protect
themselves--is a prudent move. It hasn't been as successful as
I believe any of us had hoped. But, right now, I'm--I think
that's as good as we're going to get right now. But, the Syria
situation, again, I follow it, but I don't--I'm not there, I
don't live it every day. It is exponentially, in my mind, more
complicated than Iraq.
Senator King. I agree.
Thank you, General. Thank you, again, for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, and your wife, for the service you and
your family have given to this country. We look forward to your
continued service in the future. Thank you, sir.
When it comes to recruiting and retaining your marines,
what's the most important thing? Is it modernization? Is it
having that up-to-date equipment? Is it operations tempo? Is it
compensation? What's the most important to these young people?
General Neller. Senator, we've done a lot of surveys to try
to find out, you know, what is the one thing that convinces a
marine to stay. It--there is not one thing. It's--could be duty
station, it could be a chance for special training, it could be
opportunity to go overseas, could be education, it could be
just quality of life and the experience that they've had. So,
every marine is different. So, we have to offer kind of a--you
know, find out what it is, and, if we want to keep them,
convince what it is we have to offer them to keep them. So,
they're--we're fortunate that we've had a lot of marines, we
have not had problems either recruiting or retaining. I'm not
naive enough to think that that'll always be the case. But,
right now, we have sufficient tools, if you will, to convince
people to stay. I would say, though, for married marines, a lot
of them, it's housing and childcare and medical.
Senator Fischer. How are you able to fulfill the combatant
commanders' requirements? You're looking at reductions as we
move forward, here, and there are some risks involved with
those reductions, I think. Are you able, right now, to fulfill
those requirements? Do you think you will continue to be able--
and do you think you may have to change your role in the future
in order to meet there requirements required by those commands?
General Neller. Senator, right now, we believe we are
meeting the combatant commanders' requirements. The combatant
commanders have a lot of requirements. Our concern right now,
as a service--as the Marine Forces Command, my task to the
Commandant is to help generate the force to meet those
requirements. So, we are working--you know, we're trying to
keep the force at a 2-to-1 deployment ratio. If the force gets
smaller and the requirements don't go down, we're going to be
inside that, which is of concern to us. So, you're always
balancing risk to the force versus risk to the mission.
So, we'll work with the combatant commanders to see if we
can't figure out new, different, innovative ways to give them
the capability they need to meet the mission and, at the same
time, buy us a little more dep-to-dwell [deployment-to-dwell]
relief.
Senator Fischer. What's the mission of the Marines?
General Neller. The mission of the Marine Corps is to
provide the Nation's force in readiness as crisis response and
to seize and secure advanced naval bases as part of the naval
campaign, and to do those things as the President may direct.
Senator Fischer. Have you seen that mission change during
your time in the Marines?
General Neller. No, ma'am, I have not.
Senator Fischer. As we look ahead at different threats that
are coming up in the future, do you see the development of the
anti-access weapons, like the long-range anti-ship missiles--is
that going to impact the Marines' operations at all?
General Neller. Clearly, the increasing capabilities of
potential adversaries and the anti-access area denial
battlespace is of concern. We talk about this. We exercise it.
We train it. As we've gotten our forces off the battlefields of
Iraq and Afghanistan, and gotten back on ship, we're working
that with our naval partners as part of the naval campaign.
There's both a technical piece to this and also a tactical
piece to this. We have to be a little more artful and skillful
in how we approach this, because they have capability. So, the
days we could sail where we wanted to sail without
consideration of that, those days are gone.
Senator Fischer. So, you think that will have a strategic
impact, then, on how marines are going to be deployed in the
future?
General Neller. We're going to have to be very wary of
these capabilities, and we're going to have to part--as part of
a Joint Force and a naval campaign, there will have be the
conditions set so that we can safely project that Marine Corps
power ashore.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. It's an honor to meet you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Fischer. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know we had an opportunity to discuss, General, sexual
assault and the problem around it, and the progress that we see
in some of the numbers, but the stubborn and cultural issue of
retaliation. You have certainly made a commitment to me that
that is going to be a priority for you to figure out the best
way to get at that, in terms of the culture within the Marine
Corps.
I also want to take a moment to acknowledge that the
Marines have work to do, in terms of recruiting women. As you
know, only 7 percent of the marines are women. If you're
confirmed--when you're confirmed, you'll have to make a really
important decision on whether to recommend that any positions
remain closed to female marines. What I'm worried about is the
pipeline. If we are not recruiting more women, you are not
going to get women in the various positions that will allow the
kind of integration that's going to ultimately make the Marine
Corps stronger and better, and make our Nation more secure. So,
I would love to have some feedback from you, after you're
confirmed, about any ideas that you have as the chief on how we
can do a better job of recruiting more women marines.
General Neller. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Let's talk about your audit. I'm a
former auditor. I'm big on audits. You all--you've been under
audit longer than any of the other services. You've had the
opportunity to gain the most from this process. It's my
understanding that, through the audit process, the Marine Corps
identified that it, historically, was requesting too much
annual funding for permanent changes of station, and was able
to reallocate about 100 million in the 2012 Future Years
Defense Plan [FYDP] to make better use of those funds. I mean,
this is a great example. I think people think an audit is like
going to the dentist; you know, you know you've got do it, and
it's going to be painful, and, when it's over, you're not sure
that it really was worth it. But, audits aren't like that,
because audits reveal a lot that help you allocate resources
more effectively and figure out where your needs really are and
maybe, like you've found with the FYDP, that there was an
ability to move money around in a way that was important to the
Marines.
In 2017, all of the services are supposed to have--be
audit-ready. I've been on this, and on this for as long as I've
been sitting on this committee, and I'm skeptical that we're
going to get there by 2017. I'm also concerned that it's the
last statutory deadline the services and the DOD [Department of
Defense] must meet. I would like to have your commitment to
make the audit process within the Marines a permanent priority,
going forward, so we never again get to this place where we
have a massive amount of resources with no transparency.
General Neller. Senator, you have my commitment, if
confirmed, that we will work this as hard as we can and get a
clean or a qualified audit that shows that we can account for
every single penny we spend.
Senator McCaskill. Let's talk about--thank you for that
commitment, and I will be like a broken record on the audit
thing until we get audits from all of our branches and we can
begin--it would really help us in our jobs. It would help us
make the case, if we were able to have the transparency that an
audit provides.
Let's turn to readiness just for a moment. In response to
the advance policy questions for this hearing, you noted that
the current 1-to-2 deployment-to-dwell ratio is unsustainable.
I want to talk about the fact that the challenges posed by ISIS
in the Middle East and an aggressive Russia, neither one of
these were planned for. So, what would the effect be on the
force if a significant Marine Corps response was required to
address an unplanned contingency overseas in the near future?
General Neller. Well, Senator, you'd have to do one of two
things. You'd have to either grow the force--we believe the
optimal size force for the Marine Corps is 186,000 marines. We
can't afford that. So, if we had an--a commitment elsewhere, we
would take forces that are currently forward deployed, such as
in the Far East, in Okinawa, and we would have to reposition
them to wherever that contingency was. We did that during the
combat in Iraq, and it's only through the past few years we've
been able to reestablish our presence that we've had,
historically, in the Pacific. So, we have some options. The
other option, the least favorable, is, we go all-in. We
activate our Reserves, and we go and do what needs to be done.
We've done that before, too. That--you can do that for a short
period of time, but, as you mentioned, it's not sustainable.
Senator McCaskill. What is the short period of time? I
mean, in your best estimate--and I don't want to hold you to
anything here, but--I mean, what I'm trying to get a handle on
is, we are wrestling with very difficult decisions about the
Middle East and Iran's nuclear capability. There are some in
the Senate that I believe are tempted by the idea that we could
go in and bomb Iran and set off what could be a war much bigger
than any that we have been trying--any contingency that we've
been trying to fight in over the last decade in the Middle
East. What--I mean, how soon would we have to do emergency
spending? Is that, in fact, the most efficient way and best way
to do it?
General Neller. Senator, I--it's a difficult question. I'd
have to get back to you, as far as the details, without knowing
the exact size of the force, what the exact mission was, what
the combat ratios were, and what we would need to do, what we
have to accomplish, militarily, to achieve whatever the
political objective was.
Senator McCaskill. I--and I know it was kind of a dumb
question in that regard, because it's very hard for that
question to be answered without more specifics. I guess I'm
just trying to get out into the conversation that talking about
things in the abstract sometimes sound a lot better than what
it is in reality. The more we are informed about what the
reality would be, I think, the better job we can do making sure
you have everything you need.
I appreciate you. I enjoyed meeting your wife. I understand
that she and I almost share a birthday. I think, with--we are
born when we're born, that you're supposed to be really strong
and capable of being mean and capable of taking no prisoners.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. So, I am pleased----
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill knows about that.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. Yeah. I am pleased that she and I might
share some of those traits. I think she will be a terrific
addition to the barracks and to the hosting that you do there
for so many. I know how proud she is of you and how proud we
all are of your family.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, congratulations on your nomination.
I also want to echo--I know that many of my colleagues on
the committee want to echo--what you talked about, in terms of
our shock and sense of condolences to the families and friends
of the marines from Chattanooga. We've got to make sure that
kind of activities don't happen again.
I wanted to go back to the issue of readiness. You see,
from this committee's questions, you're going to get a lot of
different questions from the committee on a whole host of
different subjects. But, I wanted to ask about the primary
mission of the Marine Corps infantry, which is the heart and
soul of the Marine Corps, and it's the mission to close with
and destroy the enemies of our Nation. Sometimes we don't talk
about that, that what we're really focused on doing in the
Marine Corps is being ready to kill the enemies of our country.
Does that remain the highest priority, in terms of Marine Corps
training, particularly infantry training, or do you see the
Marine Corps being pulled in a variety of different areas,
different missions, different mandates, in terms of training?
General Neller. Senator, our--you know, we train for a
variety of missions. I believe--I can only speak for myself,
but my professional opinion always been is, if I can do the
high end of the mission, the most high-risk, the most
dangerous, the most kinetic, that--and I've trained the force
to do that, and they're disciplined--that I can bring them back
down to the other end. There are specific things. So, we do
practice HADR [Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief] things.
We do NEOs [Non-combatant Evacuation Operations]. We do
training of foreign militaries. But, our primary mission is to
be a force in readiness that can fight at all parts of the
range of military operations, but particularly at the high end.
Senator Sullivan. You know, you and the Chairman were
talking about the 1970s. As you know, infantry officers in the
Marine Corps are often encouraged to read a--this book, which I
think is a great book. It's called ``This Kind of War,'' by
T.R. Fehrenbach, which actually focuses on the 1950s and the
Korean War and an example of what you mentioned earlier about
the Marine Corps being a force in readiness when the country
was least ready. But, do you worry about levels of readiness
and training, that we could have another Task Force Smith in
the next 5 to 10 or 15 years if we don't get our funding and
training levels in readiness, properly adjusted?
General Neller. Senator, that's also one of my favorite
books, not because it's a good story, just because it's a good
lesson.
I think that's always in the back of our minds. I think the
current fiscal situation kind of brings it a little bit more to
the forefront. But, at the same time, as long as we can recruit
and retain good marines, and our gear is functional, I don't
see us going to the point of where--of what happened,
historically, to that force when it was put on the Korean
Peninsula. Could it happen? I'm not going to speculate on that.
All I can tell you is, if confirmed, I will give every ounce of
effort I possibly can to not ever allow that to happen, just as
I know--not to speak for General Milley or any other service
chiefs--I know General Dunford--that's our job. That's why, if
confirmed as the Commandant, I'm responsible to you that that
doesn't happen.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Let me turn--the Chairman mentioned that the--in his
statement, the importance of the Pacific rebalance and the
critical role that the Marine Corps is playing in that. I think
it's something that this committee, this Congress, is trying to
support. I think, in some ways, the Obama administration
undermines their own strategy, in terms of the credibility of
the strategy, by slashing Army forces in the Asia-Pacific,
which is what they're proposing to do. I just have a few
questions related to the rebalance.
Are you satisfied with how that's going, overall, in terms
of the credibility of the rebalance for all the services? More
particularly, are you satisfied with the redeployment of
marines from Okinawa to Guam, Australia, possibly Hawaii? Do
you think that, when we do that, that we're going to have the
strategic lift to take what's a concentrated force now in
Okinawa to a much more dispersed force--will we have the
strategic lift to be able to move those forces if and when we
need them in a contingency?
General Neller. Senator, I'm not qualified to make a
comment on the status of the other services, as I simply am not
witting to what they're doing.
As far as the Marines, we left Okinawa to go to Iraq and
Afghanistan. We're back. The force that was there before is
present. They're training, they're properly equipped, they're
ready to go. We have changed our deployment. Now, instead of
one of the battalions going to Okinawa, it goes to Australia
for 6 months, and then eventually, because of the agreements,
we'll distribute the force to Guam and put some more marines
on, on Hawaii.
I think the concern is, as you state, that once we do this,
our ability to move that force--training opportunities on
Okinawa, mainland Japan, Guam, are limited, and you have to be
able to move to where the training is. You have to move to
other nations. You have to be able get to Korea, you have to
get to Thailand, you have to get to the Philippines. To do
that, you need sealift and airlift.
So, when we do this--and we will do this--we--we're going
to have to--that's going to be the hard part. There are some
opportunities with high-speed vessels and things with the Navy
and the movement of a three-ship ARG [amphibious ready group]
from the east Coast to the Pacific area, which will give us
more lift. So, that's going to have to happen. But, I concur
with you that the strategic lift is kind of the long pole,
potentially, in that tent.
Senator Sullivan. So, right now, you don't believe that
that--our strategic lift capability matches our proposed
deployment laydown?
General Neller. It--I believe it will, but it remains to be
seen once we get on Guam and have to move these forces around.
We do a pretty good job right now, but, again, we're not on
Guam, and we've got decent training in Hawaii, up in the--up at
the PTA [Pohakuloa Training Area]. But, we still have to be
able to move these forces around. So, I'm concerned about,
particularly, gray-hull amphibious lift.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Neller, thank you and your family for your service.
Of course, the Marines are an important part of the
military presence in Hawaii at Marine Forces Pacific Command
and at the Kaneohe Bay. We're going to get more marines as we
move them out of Futenma, Okinawa. So, thank you very much for
all that you do.
I also am very committed to the rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific. You mentioned in your advance questions, quote, ``Our
strong Marine presence in the region"--meaning the Asia-Pacific
region--"plays a significant role in promoting the regional
security and stability.'' So, if confirmed, I trust that you
will continue to support a tangible--tangible rebalance to
build and maintain the important partnerships that we have in
this area of the world.
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hirono. You mentioned, in your--the earlier
response to Senator Sullivan, how important training is. So,
the missions that the marines perform, including theater
security cooperation, exercises with partner nations' forces,
and contingency operations, require our forces to maintain a
high level of readiness and training. The availability of
training ranges, such as Pohakuloa Training Area, which you
just noted, on the Big Island and others, are critical to the
Marine Corps' ability to conduct operations in the Pacific.
Could you share your thoughts on the importance of training
ranges, especially as we continue the rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific?
General Neller. Senator, if we're going to do what we need
to do to be ready, we have to have ranges that support our
ability to use our weapons and to maneuver the force. One of
the great advantages of a training area like Pohakuloa is that
we're able to go up there and drop bombs and shoot artillery
and do a lot of the things that we need to do. There is some
maneuver space up there. Plus, we have the advantage--we have
to actually deploy there. So, you go up there, it's like--
whether--even though it's only a matter of miles, it doesn't
really matter; you pick up, and you move. So, wherever we go as
we position this force around the Pacific, we have to be
concerned that the--that there's ranges and training areas
there so that that force can, at a minimum, sustain the
readiness that they have once they arrive.
Senator Hirono. I think this--this committee is definitely
aware of the need to have these training areas. We have a
number of them in Hawaii. But, there are always issues relating
to making sure that we are in concert with the concerns of the
community. So, that will remain, especially with regard to
Pohakuloa.
You were asked some questions regarding sexual assault in
the military, which this committee has spent considerable time
on. So, you note that it is the responsibility of the
commanders to set a positive climate. So, beyond command
climate surveys, for example, what other methods are used to
determine a commander's ability to establish a positive command
climate, where a marine would feel that he or she could report
a crime without fear of retaliation? I think this becomes ever
more important as you integrate women into the various
positions in the Marine Corps. So, for example, what kind of
guidance would you give your commanders about specific actions
they should take to create an environment in which retaliation,
which is a major focal area for our--for many of us on this
committee, both overt and particularly the subtle forms of
retaliations that could occur?
General Neller. Senator, we have a very detailed selection
process for those that are--have the opportunity and privilege
to lead marines. So, a part of--their records are reviewed, and
a board of senior officers determine that they are the best and
most capable. Once they assume that office, their seniors in
the chain of command monitor what goes in that unit, not just
operationally, but what goes on as far as their discipline. So,
that's being tracked. We also have courses, before they assume
command, where we talk to them about what their
responsibilities are. This topic, along with other topics, are
part of that. So, they understand their legal responsibility,
their legal authority, their moral and ethical authority to
lead their marines.
Senator Hirono. We recognize, General, that changing the
culture is not an easy task. So, I know you're aware that this
issue will be of ongoing concern to all of us.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. General Neller, thank you very much for
your service. Thanks for coming by the offices to talk to so
many of us before this hearing.
How many marines do we have now in the United States?
General Neller. In the continental United States right now?
Senator Wicker. I mean, how--in the United States Marines.
General Neller. Just under 184,000, Senator.
Senator Wicker. You don't anticipate that number dropping
very much in the next 4 to 5 years, do you?
General Neller. We believe that by the end of fiscal
year17, we'll be down to around 182,000.
Senator Wicker. So, maybe a drop of only 2,000, Marine
Corps-wide.
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Okay. It would--would it be a mistake to go
much lower than that?
General Neller. If we were to go lower than that, Senator,
the dep-to-dwell ratios that I'm concerned about, and the
Commandant's concerned about, would be--would increase the risk
to the force and our ability to meet combatant commanders'
requirements.
Senator Wicker. With those requirements and the ratios that
you want to maintain, how are we doing with recruiting? Are we
getting the type of young person we need? What motivates
someone to join the Marine Corps today?
General Neller. We're doing very well. I think that's
something that we're watching. But, our manpower director,
Lieutenant General Brilakis, the other day, briefed us that
right now, for the next fiscal year, we've already signed up 55
percent of the requirement. So, those marines are in a pool,
waiting to come to recruit training. They're not just marking
time, they're working with their recruiters, voluntarily, to
get themselves ready to go.
The quality of those recruits--potential recruits--is very,
very high. We have a very high standard, and I think that's
both a credit to our recruiters, and also--reflects in the
quality of the force.
On the officer side, we have at least three college
graduates waiting for every spot to go--become a Marine
officer.
So, we're in a very good place. Again, I don't take that
for granted, but I'm hopeful we can keep that going.
What inspires or motivates somebody to join the Marine
Corps? Senator, that varies from individual to individual. It
could be something to prove, somebody told them they couldn't
do it, family heritage, want to serve their Nation, want to
learn a trade, want to get a--the great benefits of the 9/11
G.I. Bill, or they just want to be a marine.
Senator Wicker. You were walking through a student union,
and a poster caught your eye, back in the '70s. Is that right?
General Neller. Actually, it was a big, tall guy wearing
those--blue uniform.
Senator Wicker. Okay. More than a poster.
What frustrates our Active Duty marines now?
General Neller. Oh, I think sometimes they get frustrated
with their leadership. I think we have to work hard to
challenge these young men and women. They're smart. They want
to be--they want to do important things that keep them engaged,
but, when they're done, they want us to say they're done.
That's fair. So--but, they--because we've done such a good job,
you know, we're kind of victims of our own success. So, we owe
them, you know, good training, good gear, good organization,
good leadership. Then their end of the deal is, show up, bring
their A-game every day, work hard, train hard, and then, when
we're done, then they can, you know, take a little bit of a
break; at the same time, knowing they're never, never not a
marine.
Senator Wicker. Let me follow up on your conversation with
Senator Sullivan about sealift. I want to thank the Marine
Corps for making the case for the amphibs, and particularly the
12th LPD [Landing Platform/Dock]. We--I don't think we would
have gotten the 12th LPD through this committee and through the
Congress, both houses, on a bipartisan basis, if it had not
been for the Marine Corps coming and saying that that--we very
much needed that for us to complete the mission.
Mr. Brzezinski was here earlier this year and talked about
the need for the amphibious forces to be in the Baltic. We've
had discussion about Russia and the seriousness of the Russian
threat, as well as the more immediate threat of ISIS. But, what
is the reason for being particularly careful, as Mr. Brzezinski
mentioned, about the amphib forces in the Baltic Sea area?
General Neller. Well, Senator, we just actually did an
exercise in the Baltic with our U.S. and a number of coalition
ships. It was called Agile Spirit, I believe, commanded by Vice
Admiral Jamie Foggo, who is the 6th Fleet commander. So, we did
an exercise in the Baltic. I'm sure it was paid close attention
to by certain countries in that part of the world----
Senator Wicker. I hope so.
General Neller.--as we--I do, too--and as we projected
power ashore, did a landing with Poles and Lithuanians and
Estonians, and then trained ashore, and then with U.S. Army
forces there. So, there is interest in the Baltic because it's
on the perimeter of certain land masses that you might have to
gain access to. Then, three NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] allies are--that are very small countries, live
on the east end of the Baltic Sea, and they're concerned about
potential aggression against them. So, we're there to reassure
them.
Senator Wicker. I would say--it's fair to say they
remember, not too long ago, when there was a different dynamic
in that area, and they appreciate the Marines being there with
them and the United States being there with them.
Thank you for your service, and thank you for your
testimony, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Neller, and to your family.
Congratulations on a wonderful service, thus far.
A few questions. I want to go back to--you talked a bit
about gender integration earlier, and we're--I want to kind of
get your--your take, first, on how it's going, and then the
kind of philosophy that the Marine Corps is undertaking to
carry out that mission, if you could talk about that.
General Neller. Senator, when the Secretary made the
decision to open up all occupational fields, the service chiefs
and the services were getting a certain amount of time to take
a look at how they might do this. We have worked hard to work
in a way to figure out how we will integrate. We've opened up
MOSs, we've put marine--female marine officers, staff NCOs, and
NCOs in units where previously women weren't allowed to serve.
They've done well. We're going to continue to do that.
Then, to determine the last part, whether we would, based
on a standard, allow women to serve in infantry, artillery,
tanks, light-armored reconnaissance, amphibian tractors, and
reconnaissance, we formed a task force of volunteers, and we
put them together as a unit. They trained up and they went to
29 Palms into the Mountain Warfare Center and did a series of
tests. Those tests are complete. The data has been collected.
It's being analyzed, and it'll provide information that will
inform the Commandant about whether or not he will request a
waiver for any of those MOSs.
So, I have not seen all the data. I've seen some of it.
I've been involved in this process for some time. When we first
sent volunteer female marines, enlisted, to the Infantry
Training Battalion to try to gain data and determine their
ability to complete that course--of the number that went,
about--they have about a 40--36 percent completion rate. Again,
you know, we--we're still looking at this. We are--we have not
made any sort of pre-decision. So, again, whatever we do, it is
about individual standards, it is about the capability of the
unit, and that unit becoming better, or at least as good as it
is now.
So, that decision's going to come. I believe we had a good
process. We've got information. It's fact-based. We're working
with the Army, and we're sharing the data with them. I'm sure
that General Dunford has spoken to--I know he's spoken to
General Odierno, and he'll work with General Milley if he is
confirmed as the next Chief of Staff of the Army.
Senator Kaine. Can I ask a question about the standard,
kind of the philosophy in setting the standard? As you set the
standard in the areas that are not yet gender-integrated, is
the standard-setting just describing the current functions the
way we've always done it, or is the standard-setting a new
analysis of what are the attributes that are the most needed to
do the best job in this particular MOS?
General Neller. I have not seen all the different task
condition standards. They will be functionally-based. They
won't be--I mean, there may be a screening process for any
marine, male or female, but it'll be not lift so much weight as
if you have to load the tank main gun, I have to load the
Howitzer, I have to prepare the charge, I've got to carry the
projectile, I've got to drag the cannon, I have to carry the
load, I have to go this fast, this far, with this much weight.
It'll be those types of things. So, that's the data we've got
and what the data says about how men and women did. I went out
and saw the unit that did the test. It was a very hard test. It
was hard. Regardless of whatever happens, I'm--you know, I'm--I
can tell you that the marines out there, particularly the women
marines, they did a great job. It was pretty motivating.
Senator Kaine. I'm going to switch gears to an area of the
Marines that is incredibly important. I'm not sure everybody
focuses on them. They train in Virginia--and it's good to have
a UVA [University of Virginia] grad before us--the Marine
security guards who train at Quantico. Everywhere I travel, if
I'm ever at a U.S. Embassy, I always stick my head into Post 1
to thank these important members of, not only the embassy
family, but important members of the Marine Corps. This is a
job that is getting more attention. This is a job where I
think, on Armed Services, we've devoted more resources to it.
How familiar are you with that unit, and especially in terms
of, kind of--Do they have the resources they need? Are we
training enough? Because we sure need them around the world.
General Neller. Senator, I'm not completely conversant in
their entire training program of instruction. I--like you, when
I got to embassies, I talk to the marines. They're very high
quality, they're very highly screened. It's a great retention
tool for us to keep marines in. I do worry, because they are so
capable that we don't--we don't get a lot of them to stay after
their service. They have--they've got options. You know, I
always ask them, ``How many of you are going to stay?'' If
there's any of them that say they are, I immediately volunteer
myself to be their career planner so I can convince them to
stay, because they are some of the very best and brightest
young men and women we have. But, I think they're trained well,
I think they're resourced well. I've never been to an embassy
where they told me they were wanting or lacking for anything,
or the regional security officer. So, I'd have to get back to
you on any more detail, but my basic rudimentary response is, I
think they're in good shape.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you very much for your
testimony.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Neller, thank you very much. Darcy, thank you for
being here today. I appreciate your great service to our
Nation.
I will just fire off one quick question. I apologize, I am
going to have to step out again. But, one of my top priorities
has been ensuring that our soldiers and our marines, those
that--who are really engaged in close contact in combat, and
those who are taking the majority of casualties in our Nation's
conflicts, are armed with the best possible weapons available,
and give them the will and the fight to win. I mean, we have to
make sure that they have the best possible sidearms, their
personal weapons. That's one of the first things our young men
and women do, qualify on their individual weapon.
So, with that being said, I am very concerned about the
military's lack of modernizing our small-arms programs. I know
the marines have recently gone from utilizing the squad
automatic weapon, the M-249, to the light infantry automatic
rifle, the IAR. So, I'm glad that they are modernizing in some
aspects. They still have not modernized the M-4. I would just
like your thought on the small-arms program, maybe where you
see we need to go with that, if we do need changes. Just very
quickly, sir.
General Neller. Senator, I have complete confidence that
the weapons we equip our marines with are the very best that we
can get. The M-4 is not that--you know, even the marines in a
rifle squad carry an M-16A4, they don't carry an M-4, because
we want them to have that longer barrel for that longer reach.
So, talking about weapons is a very emotional subject with
marines, but I've never heard anybody say they didn't think
that what they had was going to allow them to be successful in
a battle.
We don't want it to be a fair fight. The IAR is a good
weapon. We're going to keep the SAW [squad automatic weapon],
but in a different way. We're always looking at better ways to
improve everything we have. We've fielded the Javelin, we've
fielded and improved TOW [tube-launched optical-tracked wire-
guided missile], we've got new Howitzers. We're always working
on the tanks. I mean, so, you know, there's no lack of emotion
and energy and enthusiasm, when I walk around, about our
weapons. From everything I can tell, I think everybody's
satisfied. Doesn't mean there's not better ways to do it that
we can't look at it, whether it's ammunition, whether it's
magazines. But, I--my personal view, in my current position,
is, we're in a good place.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, General. I appreciate that very
much.
In the interest of time, I'll submit my--the other
questions for the record.
So, thank you, General Neller, I appreciate it very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to thank your family and your friends who are here
with you today. It speaks volumes about you.
General Dunford, as Commandant, worked very hard on the
mental health issue. I just wanted to make sure to get a
commitment from you to prioritize mental health and suicide
prevention as part of your readiness for all your marines.
General Neller. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Donnelly. That--as part of that, that there be no
stigma in seeking help.
General Neller. Senator, we've worked this, and I can
personally tell you, as hard as we can. I believe we made
progress. To the best of our ability, every marine knows how--
knows they're out there, that what we want to do, first and
foremost, is help them if they need it.
Senator Donnelly. One of the things, you know, in working
in this area over the past few years, is finding out how
critical leadership at the squad and platoon level is to
finding out mental health problems. You know, I want to make
sure that your leaders at the squad and platoon level know,
``Make a call, talk to somebody. If you see one of your marines
going sideways on you or having struggles"--they probably see
it before anybody, don't you think, General?
General Neller. Senator, I agree completely. I can tell you
that the focus of our training and--as we do the suicide
prevention and how to react to that--is focused at that level.
I can give you personal accounts of where sergeants, junior
staff NCOs, were there at the forefront to either give a hand
or keep a marine from doing something that they probably wish
they hadn't done, and saved their lives.
Senator Donnelly. General, I spoke this morning to the
Governor in an area that you're very familiar with, Anbar
Province. We were going over the efforts that are in place
right now to retake Ramadi and Fallujah, and to protect Haditha
and obviously all of western Iraq. What is your view on how to
best rebuild the relationship with the Sunni tribes and to
partner with them against ISIS?
General Neller. Senator, again, I have not been in Iraq, in
Anbar, since I left, on my birthday in 2007. I would like to go
back and see it for myself. But, I don't think the relationship
with the Sunni tribes is a real--the issue is not with us, it's
with the government in Baghdad. They have to believe that their
central government is going to at least give them some modicum
of support, that they're going to fix the roads, let the water
run, give them gasoline, make the electricity work, fix the
roads, and let them, you know, worship as they see fit. So,
that relationship that was damaged, it was tenuous, at best; it
was damaged by previous governments in Iraq. If Mr. Abadi can
do that, then I think he will gain their support. But, he'll
have to work really hard.
Senator Donnelly. In Afghanistan, you know, we face
significant challenges moving ahead. The Marines have been such
an important part of securing entire areas of Afghanistan, of
creating secure regions. As you look at that, what do you see,
moving forward, as some of the keys to success, to stability
there, to holding on there?
General Neller. Senator, I've visited Afghanistan a number
of times, but I never served there, so my experience base is
limited. But, again, I think it goes back to the Afghan
government believing that we're going to be there to support
them, that the resources are going to be there, and that they
have the confidence, and that their soldiers have the
confidence, that there's going to be somebody there to back
them up. They're similar problems. We need to stay there and
work with them. I believe, my experience is, that, you know,
they--if a foreign nation believes that there's somebody that's
behind them, that they're likely to do the right thing, the
right way, and hopefully for a longer period of time.
Senator Donnelly. Well, I will finish with this. My father-
in-law was a Guadalcanal marine, and he would be very proud of
your service, of all your years of service, and would look very
much forward to you taking command of the Marine Corps. So, we
wish you the very best.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. General Neller, Ms. Neller, welcome, and
congratulations. Thank you both for your service.
General Neller, I want to start--and, first, I apologize
for having to step out. We had to have a quorum in Judiciary
Committee, and had to step out briefly, so I apologize if I'm
asking a question that's already been asked. But, I'd like to
start by talking about what will be your top ground
modernization program priorities.
General Neller. Well, Senator, right now, the two top
programs--and they are yet to be fielded--is the joint light
tactical vehicle and the amphibious combat vehicle. Both of
them are--the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle], as I
understand it, is close to low-rate initial production; and the
ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle], we should down-select to two
vendors with 16 vehicles this fall, and then we'll eventually
pick one. So, on those--in that area--and there's a couple of
other things, but--a radar--a multipurpose radar and a whole
variety of other things--but, right now, as far as specific
programs, those two are at the top.
Senator Tillis. Can you talk a little bit about the reason
why they're top and the difference it makes, in terms of your
capabilities?
General Neller. Well, for the JLTV, we need a wheeled
vehicle that has more survivability than the Humvee. The
Humvee's been around since the mid-'80s. We've improved it a
little bit, but it's--there's only so much growth left in the
frame. We need something that's going to give us more
survivability and traffickability. So, we need to recapitalize
and get a new vehicle. The decision has been made that the JLTV
is that vehicle. So, we're going to buy 5500 of them, and--I'm
assuming that they're going to meet the requirement. I have not
looked at any of the test data, but--I don't even know who the
vendor is.
On the ACV, same reason. The amphibious vehicle we have
today is 40 years old. We've refurbished it, rebuilt it a
number of times. It's okay. It's okay in the water, and not so
okay on the ground, particularly if there's IEDs [improvised
explosive devices], because it's flat-bottomed. It's just not
survivable. So, we have to--and that, because that vehicle
spends 90 percent of its time ashore, we have to find something
that's going to give us more survivability ashore, but that yet
can still move through the surf and get us to the beach.
Senator Tillis. That actually leads to the next question I
had, which has to do with ship-to-shore maneuvers. I got some
exposure to some of the challenges when I was down at Camp
Lejeune, a month or so ago. Can you talk a little bit about the
ship-to-shore maneuvers--all the way from the connectors, LCUs
[Landing Craft Utilities]--and elaborate on the ACV, in terms
of the additional capability it gives you, as compared to what
you have today?
General Neller. Amphibious warfare is very complicated. It
involves a lot of moving pieces. You're also subject to the
vagaries of the weather and the sea. So, we've got to get to
the objective area in the--in our amphibious ships. We use air-
cushion vehicles and landing craft--large landing craft to move
heavier loads ashore. Neither the Amtrac or what we--the ACV is
going to be able to give us a long-range launch, so we have to
be worried about anti-access area denial. So, we'll work
through some choreography and sequencing of the force. We want
to be able to land under cover of darkness, take advantage of
that for our security. So, this ACV that we buy, just like the
Amtrac that we have, is--has to have some surf capability, some
sea-keeping capability, and it's got to move at a certain speed
so that we can do this with a--under a period of darkness.
Senator Tillis. The last question I have for you has to do
with the size of the force. I know that there have been some
studies from Marine Corps University that was setting the
optimum size of the Marines at about 186,000--just below
187,000. We're at 184,000. We're moving to 182,000. That 5,000
differential, that's a lot of marines and a lot of killing
capacity. I know, when I met with you in my office, you're the
sort of person that's going to make it work, no matter what
your--what you--whatever hand you're dealt. But, are you
reaching a--I mean, do you think that 182- is a workable
number, or is that just a number you're working with because
that's where we are with troop reductions? Or do we need to
look back at getting to that optimal number, if you agree with
the assertion that 187- is the optimal number?
General Neller. Senator, the optimal number for a 3-to-1
deployment ratio, which is what we would aspire to, is 186-.
We've built into the--our plan, as we've drawn down, you know,
some reversibility of that. We know what units we took down,
and cadred, and what units we would bring back. 182- is at that
point where we can meet the combatant commanders' requirements
and provide a 2-to-1 dep-to-dwell, which we think is the
minimum sustainable level.
So, yes, we can do it at 182-. 186- would be better. But,
right now, that's not affordable. If resources were made
available, or we were required--or able to do that, we would
grow the force back, but that would take some time.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, General Neller. I look forward
to supporting your confirmation.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Neller, for being here, your commitment
to service, all your sacrifices. Thank you for your family to
be here. We're very grateful for your dedication.
You and I had a chance to talk about a lot of these issues
in advance, and I was very grateful for that meeting. After our
meeting, I sent you a report that I did summarizing cases at
four bases in 2013, just as a snapshot to understand what do
the cases look like. I want to just brief you on that.
The--in Camp Pendleton, for 2013, they had 50 cases of
sexual assault alleged. Now, 10 of those cases were from
spouses, so you have an issue with domestic violence that's
important to look at. You also had 18 who were civilian. So, 28
out of 50 are not part of our survey. So, when we surveyed--the
DOD surveyed sexual assault last year, the estimated 20,000
sexual assaults, that doesn't include civilians or spouses. So,
more than half of your Camp Pendleton cases aren't even counted
in those numbers.
The other statistic is, the servicemembers was 21. Now, the
other thing I want you to be aware of, because this is a
challenge we have in responding appropriately--among your
spouses, 8 withdrew their complaint within a year, so they
didn't have confidence in the system, they just didn't--no
longer wanted to prosecute. Of your civilian complainants, 8
withdrew during the year. Then, of your servicemembers, 8
withdrew. So, nearly half of the cases that were reported--and
to report a case, you've got to put your name on the bottom
line, you typically get a rape kit, which is very invasive. Any
one of these situations, it's now public. For them to
withdraw--nearly half to withdraw within a year does not show
confidence in the system.
So, that brings us to what Senator McCaskill raised, is
this issue of retaliation. How much retaliation is existing? We
know from the survey that last year it was 62 percent of cases,
someone who reported a rape was retaliated against during that
process. Retaliation comes in all forms, as you know: 53
percent social--peer-to-peer; 35 percent administrative; 32
percent professional; 11 percent a punishment. So, you know,
arguably, more than half of these cases, there's some form of
chain-of-command retaliation.
So, really do look to the lower-level commanders, the unit
commanders. We have an issue with sexual harassment and sexual
discrimination. In all cases, 60 percent of it comes from the
unit commander. So, you really have to dig deep to begin to
create a better climate, which I think is going to be essential
for you to be successful so you have good order and discipline
within the ranks.
So, as we talked about, I look forward to working with you
on that. I think it's very vital.
I appreciated your answer to Senator Kaine about combat
integration. One issue that I'd like to raise is, I know that
the physical fitness tests are gender-normed, and I know that,
in the case of Colonel Kate Germano, she was trying to create
even tougher requirements for them so that they could meet
standards. As you look at your standard review, and as you look
as to whether you're going to waive--ask for a waiver for any
positions today, I would urge you not to seek waivers, because
all you're saying is, there's no one who can meet the standard
today. But, if we begin to create tougher standards to come
into the Marines, to make them gender-neutral, you will have
women who can meet those standards. They just might not be able
to meet the standard today. So, asking for a waiver says,
``Under no circumstances can any woman ever meet the
standard.'' I would caution you not to take that action,
because, the future of the force, we want all of our best and
brightest.
So, I'd like to ask you, just basically, When you are going
to relook at these issues, do you expect that you will ask for
an exception or a waiver?
General Neller. Senator, I have not seen all the data, and
I'm--don't believe we've, in any way, shape, or form,
presupposed whether we will or not. I have not talked to the
Commandant, General Dunford, about this. I will, eventually,
because he is no longer going to be our Commandant, and then--
so, he's going to have--I would ask that he would, you know,
inform me as to what we're going to do.
So, I take all your points. Again, I want every marine to
have the best opportunity to be successful. Nobody joins the
Marine Corps to fail. Okay? You know, I'm going to ask marines
that, ``Anybody join here to fail? No? Good. So, we're going to
be successful.'' So, we've got to put them in the best place
where they can be successful and do the best for themselves,
but, more importantly, for the unit. So, I know this is going
to talk close scrutiny, and this is not something that anybody
takes lightly, but we will--again, we want to make sure that we
have the most operationally capable force. But, I take your
points, and I do appreciate all the guidance you gave me during
our meeting.
Senator Gillibrand. Yeah, thank you, General. I'm very
grateful for your service.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your service. As others have said
before, it's not only yours, but your family's, and we're
grateful to you for taking on this very important mission.
No one joins the Marine Corps to fail. That's for sure. I
know that you want to give every opportunity to every marine to
serve to the best of his or her ability. Part of the reasons
that marines may, in quotes, ``fail,'' or appear to fail, may
be invisible wounds of war, like post-traumatic stress. My
colleague, Senator Donnelly, asked about mental health issues.
Post-traumatic stress is the result of combat-related injuries
that really have never been recognized in the past as much as
they are now, and maybe not now as much as they should be. My
very distinguished colleague and I--Senator McCain--sponsored a
bill called the Clay Hunt Veteran Suicide Prevention Act to
provide more research as well as more care to marines and
others who were injured in duty, often in combat, as a result
of post-traumatic stress, other invisible wounds, and mental
health generally, to help prevent suicides that occur among
them.
I would welcome your commitment that you will encourage and
support even more efforts to deal with post-traumatic stress
and traumatic brain injury and those invisible wounds of war.
General Neller. Senator, you have my total commitment to
those actions.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Do you have any specific initiatives that you've
contemplated--I know it's early to ask you, but--in that area
to encourage more marines to come forward, to identify
themselves? Senator Donnelly asked about the stigma that's
often associated with those kinds of wounds, but I just wonder
if you have any specific initiative.
General Neller. You know, Senator, I don't, at this time.
But, all I can tell you is this. You know, we--like everybody
else, we learned a lot, the last 12 years. You know,
unfortunately, we learned a lot about some bad things. I do
think that the force is--that recognizes these invisible
wounds--I remember a captain got IED'd several times, and we
sent him to Landstuhl, and he was berated because he looked
like he was fine. But, I honestly believe those days are gone.
That said, and there may be marines out there, or any
servicemember out there, who's still dealing with something
that's bugging them. The marines I talk to, and the marines I
serve with today, I don't know anybody that's not out there,
reaching out to talk to them, and try to help them. They have
to--if they believe that you're going to try to help them,
they'll come forward. There are a lot who have. There may be
some that--who have not. Those with TBI [tramatic brain injury]
that have been diagnosed, we need to continue to take care of
them, because they're part of the force until they're no longer
on this Earth. So, we're not perfect. We still have a lot to
learn. Our Wounded Warrior regiment takes care of marines and
stays in contact with them, even after they're no longer on
Active service. So, we owe all of them our best support. I
commit to you that, if confirmed as Commandant, that they're
going to get it from me.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Well, I welcome and I
applaud that commitment and your sensitivity on this issue. I
can guarantee, without being an expert, that there are marines
and soldiers and sailors and airmen who are out there with
wounds that are bugging them, and they need the encouragement
to come forward.
Let me shift to----
Chairman McCain. Could I just interrupt, Senator?
Are you familiar with the legislation, Clay Hunt Suicide
Prevention Act?
General Neller. Sir, I am not.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Neller. I will become familiar with it, though, if
confirmed, or if--I'm interested now. I wasn't aware of it,
Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. We'll make sure that your office
receives some additional material on it, but Senator McCain has
really been a champion. I've been very proud to work with him
on this issue. It's critically important. Twenty-two veterans
every day in this country, the strongest, best country in the
history of the world, commit suicide. This bill is an effort to
correct that problem.
If I can just focus, in my remaining seconds, on the F-35
joint strike fighter, I know that we have not yet passed the
initial operating capability tests and stage. I wonder if you
could comment on what you see as the importance of this fifth-
generation fighter to the Marine Corps.
General Neller. Senator, we hope, soon, that we will be
able to declare, based on our readiness evaluation, that we are
at IOC.
As far as the airplane, it's going to replace three
different airframes: the F-18, the Harrier, and the EA-6B. I'm
not sure we even realized the potential of this airframe, other
than the fact that it's a fifth-generation aircraft and we'll
be able to enter airspace of our adversaries that we weren't
able to enter before, and safely do whatever the mission is.
The real exciting thing about this airplane, other than we
can hold targets at risk as part of the joint force that we
didn't--weren't able to hold at risk before, is the electronics
and all the information that this thing is going to be able to
gather and eventually disseminate to the force on the ground.
I'm an infantry guy. Planes are nice, but they're really nice
when they drop bombs and they tell me what's on the other side
of the hill. So, that's really what I'm interested in. I think,
you know, this airplane, potentially, if it does what we
believe it's going to be able to do, is not just going to help
us do what we do now better, it's going to change how we do
what we do. That's what we're going to have to learn as we go
through this.
So, it is expensive. The more we build, the more our allies
buy, the cheaper it will be. So, I'm excited about the
potential that this provides to--not just to the Marine Corps
and the naval force, but to the joint force.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank you, General, for your service to the
country, and your wife, as well, and your whole family.
Appreciate all that you've done and are willing to take on in
this important position.
Wanted to ask you about Iraq. I know that several others
have asked you about--but having served our country in Iraq,
and just seeing that the Director of FBI, James Comey, said,
this week, that ISIS now poses a greater terror threat to the
U.S. than al-Qaeda, that's pretty telling. What is it that we
need to do in Iraq now to address ISIS that we're not doing?
General Neller. Senator, I'm--my time in Iraq is a bit
dated, although I'm somewhat informed in my current job as to
what we're doing, as far as Marines and the joint force. So, I
think we're doing what we need to do right now. We're training
the Iraqis, we're ensuring the provision of equipment and
ammunition and supplies. We're working in their operations
centers, working with them, advising them. The only thing that
we're not doing is, we're not accompanying them, at least to
the best of my knowledge.
So, at the end of the day, whether we do or not, they are
the ones that are going to have to do this. They are the ones
that are going to have to restore their territory. I believe,
based on what I've seen them do in the past, that they have the
capability to do that. Because we have to defeat ISIS, we have
to get them to a point where they're insignificant and that
they're just some people on the Internet saying a bunch of
stuff, but they don't have any capability or anything to back
it up. Right now, they are not--that's not where they are. They
have land, they have terrain, and they're masquerading as a
country.
Senator Ayotte. As you look at what is--where we are with
Iraq and our current force posture in Afghanistan, what we have
consistently heard from General Dunford and others is that it's
important that we have a conditions-based withdrawal from
Afghanistan, as opposed to a calendar withdrawal. Would you
agree with that? Thinking about what we've seen happen in Iraq,
post our leaving.
General Neller. Senator, it's my military opinion that a
condition-based withdrawal is more effective than one based on
time.
Senator Ayotte. Because, obviously, your enemy can wait you
out and know when you're going to leave, versus what's
happening on the ground. You would agree with me on that?
General Neller. I would say that's a accurate statement.
Senator Ayotte. So, as--one thing you said, in terms of
what we're doing in Iraq right now, that we've repeatedly had
raised in this committee--from your experience on the ground,
generally does the employment of joint terminal attack
controllers [JTACs] make airstrikes more accurate and
effective?
General Neller. I would agree that the provision or that
capability or having that within a--with a maneuver unit makes
them more effective.
Senator Ayotte. So, one of the issues that I think needs to
be addressed, obviously, right now, as I understand it, with
Iraqi Security Forces--do you believe that our American
military dropping airstrikes in Iraq right now would be more
effective if JTACs were embedded, at the tactical level?
General Neller. In principle, yes, Senator, but I--there's
got to be some methodology we've worked out, that I'm not
witting to, that--you know, for a pilot to go out there, as
good as they are, to just find a target, there's got to be some
coordination going on, because we do have Americans within
their operations centers, so there's got to be some
coordination where they're being given at least a general
location or a target or something to look at so that they're
just not out there flying around. But, I don't know the answer
to that, but--so--but, if we--there were controllers, generally
a unit is more effective, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Certainly, that's what the JTACs do on the
ground, is help our--help ensure that the targets are more
precise and effective.
I wanted to ask you also about--you and I spoke briefly
about this in my office. With what happened in Benghazi, where
brave Americans were murdered, where are we today, in terms
of--and one--I think one of the things that all of us were
really upset about was the fact that our military couldn't
respond quickly enough to help. Wanted to know where we are
today. If we had another Benghazi-type attack in North Africa
or the Middle East tonight, would the Marine Corps be in a
better position to respond?
General Neller. Senator, today, post-Benghazi, in what is
referred to as the new normal, the Marine Corps deployed a
special-purpose MAGTF, a ground combat unit, and some MV-22
Ospreys to Spain. That force has grown. It's a full infantry
battalion spread across three bases, and a squadron of 12
Ospreys. They have an alert force on a 6-hour alert. If there
was known to be some sort of indications or warning, they could
position themselves on other bases in the Mediterranean or even
in Western Africa. There's a number of security locations we've
established, where we could go, with the support of the host
nation.
So, our capability is much greater, particularly if we have
some idea that something's going to happen or we know that
someone is going to go there, and we need to provide them with
protection. So, we're in a much better place than we were at
that time.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General, congratulations on your nomination. The Marine
Corps, in my view, is the--for--pound for pound, the finest
fighting force that we've ever created. So, let's just keep it
that way.
Is it true that ISIL is targeting military personnel and
their families, calling for attacks against our military
personnel and their families here at home?
General Neller. Senator, I'm not aware that they've
specifically targeted American citizens. I am aware that they
have put information about American citizens on social media.
Senator Graham. It's my understanding that they've urged
people to come after our military personnel and their families,
and they're encouraging people here and abroad to do so.
If the recruiters had been armed, do you think things would
have been different?
General Neller. Senator, I don't know.
Senator Graham. I think they would have been. Here's the
question I don't want to have ever again, ``I don't know"--I
mean, the answer. Because we've got to know. So, I think it
would have mattered. I know this is not your job, unilaterally,
to decide. So, it's now time, in my view, to get real with
where we stand as a Nation. They're coming after us here and
everywhere else, and we'd better get ready for--to be able to
defend our people.
General Dunford said that he thought the greatest threat to
America today was Russia, not radical Islam. Do you agree with
that?
General Neller. I agree with General Dunford that, as a
nation-state, Russia is probably the greatest threat. But, I
believe that the greatest threat to the American people,
because they say they want to kill us, is radical extremism.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me, the greatest threat
of all is a radical Islamic nation-state with a nuclear weapon?
General Neller. Any radical organization with a nuclear
weapon is of great concern, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that, if Iran--do you
believe that Iran is a radical Islamic nation-state?
General Neller. I believe that Iran is a state that is
involved itself in a number of nefarious activities which have
created instability across the Middle East and other parts of
the world.
Senator Graham. Do you believe the Ayatollah really means
it when he says, ``Death to America'' and ``Death to Israel"?
General Neller. Senator, I have never spoken to the
Ayatollah to ask him that question.
Senator Graham. I doubt if you will. But, given all the
behavior of Iran and their past activity, would it be smart to
assume the worst when it came to the Ayatollah, and not the
best?
General Neller. It would be my military advice to continue
to watch them closely in everything they do, and judge them on
their actions, and hold them accountable for those things that
they do that violate international law and disrupt the
stability of the region and the world.
Senator Graham. Would you agree they're the primary
destabilizing influence right now in the Mideast, they're
supporting extremist organizations that have toppled four Arab
capitals?
General Neller. I believe that they are an extremely
destabilizing force in the Middle East.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me, Assad wouldn't last
15 minutes without Iranian and Hezbollah help?
General Neller. Sir, I'm aware that the Iranians are
supporting the Assad government. I don't know, if they
withdraw, how long he would last or not last.
Senator Graham. Well, but that's----
General Neller. But, sir----
Senator Graham. Put it this way. He's--they're Assad's main
benefactor.
General Neller. They are providing a great deal of support
to him, yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that the pro-American, pro-
Western government in Yemen was toppled because of Iranian
support for the Houthis?
General Neller. I believe that the Houthis received a
significant amount of support from Iran. To what degree that
allowed them to topple that government, that----
Senator Graham. Let's put it----
General Neller.--would be conjecture on----
Senator Graham.--this way.
General Neller.--my part.
Senator Graham. If Iran stopped supporting the Houthis, do
you think we'd have a different outcome?
General Neller. Senator, that would be speculative on my
part. I've been to Yemen a couple of times. The government they
had was troubled. They have a huge amount of tribal and
factionalism in there. Clearly, Iranian support to the Houthis
facilitated their successful actions in Yemen to topple the
Hadi government.
Senator Graham. Do you agree that Hezbollah would have a
hard time surviving without Iran?
General Neller. They would certainly not have the same
capability they have today.
Senator Graham. So, my point is, from a Marine Corps----
Chairman McCain. General, you're not answering the
Senator's questions. Would you answer that question? Do you
believe in that, or not?
Senator Graham. General, I'm not trying to put you in a bad
box. I'm just trying to explain to the American people who the
Iranians are and what they're up to. That's all I'm trying to
do.
Do you agree with me that they are a very destabilizing
influence in the Mideast, they're the largest state sponsor of
terrorism, and we should know that?
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Finally, as to the Marine Corps, you've indicated that, in
1975, the Marine Corps was a place that was in a bad spot.
You've come a long way. Do you agree with me that, if we impose
sequestration and we fully implement by 2021, the Marine Corps
will be in a bad spot?
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Graham. At a time we need the Marine Corps the
most.
General Neller. We would not be able to provide the
capabilities that we need to provide to the Nation.
Senator Graham. In your time as a marine, have you ever
seen a more--a larger need for the United States Marine Corps
than today, in terms of the threats we face?
General Neller. Senator, this is a very challenging time,
and I think it's a--this is a time when a force like the Marine
Corps would have a great capability to--for the Nation.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Well, General, before we close, when you
say, ``We're doing what we need to do in Iraq,'' I think--you
know, I don't know where you've been. Obviously, ISIS is
winning in Iraq. For you not to be in favor of us having
forward air controllers on the ground, in some scholastic
answer--you know full well, as I do, forward air controllers
make the difference. There are--75 percent of the sorties that
are flown return to base without firing a weapon.
This line about, ``They're the ones that have to do it
themselves"--General, they can't do it themselves. We know
that. The Iraqis cannot do it themselves. That's why they're
losing. That's why they've lost their second-largest city.
That's why ISIL continues to make gains. The only people that
are fighting against them are the Iranian-backed Shi'ite
militias.
So, the Iraqis have to do it, but, without American
assistance, including airpower, including forward air
controllers on the ground, we're going to see the stalemate.
For you to say, ``We're doing what we need to do,'' then maybe
you can tell me what we're doing that will win against ISIS.
Can you tell me that?
General Neller. Senator, what we're doing, I believe, is
providing advisor teams and support to train----
Chairman McCain. That's succeeding, and that's causing
success, is that right?
General Neller. It's stemmed the tide for ISIS, but it is
not removing them from Iraq, so it is not----
Chairman McCain. So, you believe that ISIS is----
General Neller.--succeeding right now.
Chairman McCain. So, you believe that ISIS is losing.
General Neller. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman McCain. You believe they're winning.
General Neller. No, sir, I don't believe they're winning,
either. I believe they're at a stalemate right now.
Chairman McCain. They're at a stalemate. When you have a
stalemate, then, when the enemy controls the largest--second-
largest city in--about a third of it--and the only people that
are fighting against them are Shi'a militias backed by
Iranians, with Suleimani, who was responsible for the deaths,
in General Dunford's testimony, of 500 marines and soldiers,
orchestrating the attacks, I don't think we are, quote, ``doing
what we need to do,'' General.
I'm going to give you some written questions. I--I'm very
disappointed in a number of your answers.
Let me just go back again. You know what happened in that
recruiting station, don't you? The guy walked up to the door
and shot and killed four marines. You know--that was in the
media. I'm sure, no matter what job you're holding, you knew
that, didn't you?
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Then shouldn't we have had those marines
be able to defend themselves?
General Neller. Senator, the marines needed to have the
force protection they need. At the recruiting station, there
was only one individual wounded. It was at the Reserve Center
where they were--where they killed. But, yes, they should have
been able to defend themselves, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
I'll have some questions for the record.
Chairman McCain. But, General, if you think we're doing
what we need to do in Iraq and Syria, then we have a real
strong and different view of the situation there. We lost too
many good marines in the Battle of Fallujah and Ramadi. Senator
Graham and I were over there. One of my sons fought there. For
so--for us to say we're doing what we need to do, I think,
frankly, is not in keeping with the appreciation we should have
for the sacrifice that those brave young people made.
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just simply want to say
I don't think anyone understands the sacrifices that the
marines made in Iraq better than General Neller. I think his
comments are his professional opinions, based upon what he
knows, not as the commander in Iraq, but as the aspirant to be
the Commandant. But, I certainly think that there's no one that
feels more deeply about the situation in Iraq on a personal
level, from leading marines there, than General Neller, and
that should be part of the record.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Robert
B. Neller, USMC by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follows:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the
warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian
control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant
commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly
improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders,
among other things, in joint training and education and in the
execution of military operations.
Question. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-
Nichols Act provisions?
Answer. No, not at this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
Question. Should service chiefs be given greater authority over and
responsibility for their service's acquisition programs?
Answer. I am in favor of ensuring that Service Chiefs have an
appropriate balance of authority and responsibility over their
service's acquisition programs, and believe there must be appropriate
accountability throughout the process. Understanding that many of these
programs are lengthy, complicated and expensive, I share the
frustration of many in the services that we cannot produce an important
combat capability in a more timely and affordable manner.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. Section 5043 in title 10 of United States Code clearly
prescribes the duties and functions of the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. The Commandant, subject to the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of the Navy, leads the recruiting, training,
organizing, and equipping of the Marine Corps to support military
operations by combatant commanders. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Commandant is responsible for advising the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
these duties?
Answer. In my over 40 year career as a Marine, I have served in a
variety of key service and joint assignments that I believe qualify me
to perform the duties of Commandant. I have commanded Marines at all
levels including general officer commands as Commanding General, 3rd
Marine Division, Commander, Marine Forces Central Command, and my
current assignment as Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Command and
Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Europe. Other successful general officer
assignments have included Director of Operations on the Joint Staff and
President, Marine Corps University. In addition to these leadership
assignments, I have served as the Director, Operations Division, Plans,
Policies and Operations (PP&O) Directorate, Headquarters Marine Corps,
Director of Operations, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and Deputy
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) during
Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commandant of
the Marine Corps?
Answer. I do not at this time see the need for significant changes
in activities or structures to enhance my ability to perform the duties
of the office to which I have been nominated. However, I am confident
that opportunities for improvement can and should be pursued. If
confirmed, I will continue to study and seek to better understand the
full range of issues affecting the Marine Corps and our broader
National Security.
relationships
Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish
important relationships between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
other officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
of the Commandant to the following officials:
Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject
to the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense has
authority, direction, and control over the Department.
Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is the Chief Management
Officer of the Department, acting for and on behalf of the Secretary,
performing duties and exercising authority the Secretary of Defense
prescribes. Subject to the authority, direction and control of the
Secretary of the Navy, I would be responsible to the Secretary of
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the operation of the
United States Marine Corps.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense are the principal staff
assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to
their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise
policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and
directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the
Secretary applicable to all DOD components.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President and Secretary of Defense. The President directs
communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the
Combatant Commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the
Secretary of Defense in performing their command function. If
confirmed, I would cooperate fully with the Chairman in the performance
of his responsibilities.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs his
duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other duties as
assigned by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, I would cooperate fully with the Vice Chairman in the
performance of his responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Secretary of the Navy is the head of the Department of
the Navy and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all of
its affairs. Except for the title 10 duties and responsibilities as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant performs his duties
under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the
Navy and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The function of the
Headquarters, Marine Corps, is to assist the Secretary of the Navy in
carrying out his responsibilities. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Commandant is responsible for advising the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the deputy and principal
assistant to the Secretary, and acts with full authority of the
Secretary in managing the Department. The Under Secretary serves as the
Chief of Staff of the Secretariat and the Chief Operating Officer of
the Department. He acts for and on behalf of the Secretary, performing
duties and exercising authority the Secretary prescribes. If confirmed,
I would be responsible to the Secretary of Navy and the Under Secretary
for the operation of the United States Marine Corps.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy set the
Department of the Navy's strategic direction by developing and
overseeing policies and programs within their respective functional
areas. If confirmed, I will ensure coordination with the Assistant
Secretaries in addressing matters that may impact their respective
domains.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal and ethics officer
of the Department of Navy and serves as counsel to the Secretary and
other Secretariat officials. The General Counsel's duties include
providing legal and policy advice to officials of the Department of the
Navy, as well as making the controlling legal determinations within the
Department. If confirmed, I would establish and maintain a close
professional relationship with the General Counsel and his staff, and
would actively seek his guidance to ensure that United States Marine
Corps policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the
highest principles of ethical conduct.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy provides legal and
policy advice to the Secretary of the Navy, directs the Judge Advocate
General's Corps, and is primarily responsible for providing legal
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In
coordination with the General Counsel of the Navy, the Judge Advocate
General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy.
The Judge Advocate General maintains a close relationship with the
General Counsel and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant on
matters of common interest.
Question. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. With the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, the
Assistant Commandant has the authority and duties with respect to the
Marine Corps as the Commandant delegates or assigns to him. Orders
issued by the Assistant Commandant in performing such duties have the
same effect as those issued by the Commandant. If confirmed, the
Assistant Commandant and I will work seamlessly to ensure the
successful operation of the United States Marine Corps.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and
equip their respective forces. Combatant commanders cannot ensure
preparedness of their assigned forces without the full cooperation and
support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Service Chiefs are obligated to provide military advice. The
experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable
resource for the combatant commanders and the national command
authority. If confirmed, I will continue the close bond between the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Service Chiefs.
Question. The Combatant Commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to the President
and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions
assigned by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the
President. Subject to the direction of the President, the commander of
a combatant command performs duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense; and is directly responsible to the
Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions
assigned to the command. Title 10 makes the Commandant of the Marine
Corps responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces in
support of combatant commanders. Fundamentally, these duties and
responsibilities are to prepare the Marine Corps to fight and win on
the battlefield. Provision of the service specific and joint
capabilities required by combatant commanders to perform their
missions--today and in the future--forms a large basis of the
Commandant's responsibility. Today's security environment dictates that
the USMC work closely with the combatant commanders to execute our
national military strategy.
major challenges and priorities.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. The next Commandant of the Marine Corps will continue to be
faced with the readiness challenges that exist during a period of
fiscal austerity. The Marine Corps is the nation's force-in-readiness,
and the next Commandant will be responsible for ensuring the Nation has
that immediate response capability when they need it. Other significant
challenges confronting the next Commandant will include modernization
and recapitalization of equipment for the future force.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. The current Commandant and the Corps' senior leadership
have been wrestling with these challenges for the past several years.
Today our Marines are operating forward around the globe performing the
mission of America's expeditionary force-in-readiness. If confirmed, I
will ensure those Marines deployed and those next to respond have the
resources and training they need to be successful. I will also continue
some of the initiatives instituted to meet our readiness and training
challenges such as developing better readiness metrics, improving
leader-to-led ratios, identifying key enlisted leader billets and
investing more time in the development of those key leaders. If
confirmed, I will also work with the Congress on reforming our
acquisitions process to achieve a faster, more cost effective means of
getting the equipment that our warfighters need for today and tomorrow.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps?
Answer. If confirmed, readiness will remain a top priority. I will
ensure that the American people have a Marine Corps that's ready to
respond when the Nation is least ready.
We are a people organization. We have the finest young men and
women in our ranks that the Nation has to offer. I will look at ways
and means to continue to recruit and retain the highest quality
individuals and provide the best opportunities for each Marine to be
successful.
most serious problems
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the execution of the functions of the Commandant?
Answer. The most serious problems in the execution of the functions
of the Commandant are the ability to meet the title X responsibilities
of manning, training, and equipping the expeditionary crisis response
force needs of the combatant commanders in today's security environment
within the fiscal constraints of the current economic landscape. The
task of applying resources in a way that successfully addresses both
near-term and long-term challenges is a difficult one for every service
even in a normal budget process. The request for forces in response to
the ``New Normal'' security environment challenge clearly presents
problems to both the Services who provide forces and combatant
commanders who request them. More immediately, the continuation of
sequestration or of `sequestration-like' budgeting practices affixes
every Service Chief in a position where short-term remediation efforts
begin to dominate their time, at the expense of long-term service
planning, concept development and human capital management.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and associated
timelines would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue institutional reforms to
improve readiness reporting and assessment. To mitigate fiscal
challenges I will seek balance between current readiness demands and
future modernization through a strategy development process that
examines today's security requirements and future challenges.
organize, train, and equip responsibility
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible for
organizing, training and equipping forces provided to Corps and
component commanders, including the prioritization of funding and
effort to meet these needs in the near term, while developing
capabilities for the far term.
How would you characterize your experience in force management and
capability requirement decisions?
Answer. I would characterize my experience as well versed and
justly qualified. Over the last three years, I served two years as
Commander, Marine Forces Central Command, and the last year as
Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces
Europe. I was primarily responsible for force management and capability
requirement decisions in all three capacities to promote regional
security, maintain proven partnerships and interagency cooperation, and
deter and defeat transnational threats.
Question. What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing,
training and equipping the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps has proven itself in combat throughout its
history, but more pertinently, over the past 14 years in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The unique organization of America's force-in-readiness as
an air-ground team, naval in character and expeditionary in nature, has
been proven as relevant to address the nation's crisis and contingency
response options. If confirmed, I will continue to exercise the title X
responsibilities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to meet this
relevant and necessary national requirement.
I will continue to look at ways to improve how Marines are trained
and educated to meet future security challenges, exercise
experimentation to identify ways to improve how our Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces (MAGTFs) are employed, and leverage new systems and
innovative technologies to improve how we perform our mission.
security strategies and guidance
Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range
and diversity of threats to national security we face today?
Answer. Current trends are producing an increasingly complex
security environment. State and non-state actors alike present a
challenge to U.S. and international security. Proliferation of nuclear
weapons and technology among non-nuclear states and non-state actors
will remain a top concern. Adversaries have access to advanced, dual
use technologies, scientific techniques, and open source knowledge that
could result in the engineering of chemical and biological weapons and
improved dispersal methods. Terrorists continue to seek capability to
conduct a significant attack against the United States, and cyberspace
will increase as a contested domain.
Should major operations and campaigns occur, they are likely to
have a significant maritime and littoral dimension.
The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took into
account a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources.
Question. With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the
Department of Defense as a result of sequestration, is the Defense
Strategic Guidance still valid?
Answer. I concur with what Chairman Dempsey testified to earlier
this year, that we are on the edge of acceptable risk. Further cuts
will require a reassessment of the strategy.
Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of
ISIL have occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in
January 2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate for the
threats we face today or do you think an update is warranted?
Answer. Although Russia has asserted more opportunistic aggression
since the DSG was published, engagement remains an important means to
achieving regional stability. Enhancing the capabilities of partner
nations and conducting interoperable coalition operations remains
significant. As for ISIL, DSG objectives of security, non-
proliferation, countering violent extremists, and upholding commitments
remain valid. The DSG appropriately identifies continued U.S and allied
presence in the region to achieve these objectives.
Question. In your view, is our defense strategy and current
establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
Military Departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. Forces
properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
Nation faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. The Defense Strategy as laid out in the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review and the Defense Strategic Guidance is still valid, with
the roles and missions of the Military departments adequately
distributed to meet current and potential threats.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense
establishment?
Answer. I believe continual assessment is necessary to ensure the
Department is optimally aligned to safeguard our national defense. If I
identify an area that needs change, I will address it in the
appropriate forums.
military capabilities in support of defense strategy
Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the
necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014
QDR? Please identify areas of higher risk.
Answer. Yes, but I am very concerned that over the past few years,
the Marine Corps' ability to recapitalize and modernize for the future
security environment has been undermined due to lower than optimal
budgets and the need to fully resource deployed and next-to-deploy
Marines.
Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities
to decisively win in future high-intensity warfare?
Answer. The 2014 QDR correctly specifies the set of capabilities
needed to win decisively in future high-intensity warfare, but the
Marine Corps needs to keep its technological advantage by investing
more in the long-term modernization of its warfighting equipment. I do
not believe that the current budget levels allow for that modernization
to occur given the other demands on the Marine Corps.
According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American
forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale
multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or impose
unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.''
Question. In your opinion, does the Department's force sizing
construct provide adequate capability to address the country's current
threat environment?
Answer. The Marine Corps is the Nation's force-in-readiness and is
sized to 182,000 Marines to meet the current guidance. In my opinion,
this is the maximum allowable risk that the Marine Corps can accept in
the current threat environment. We are operating at a 1 to 2 deployment
to dwell ratio, which is not sustainable over the long term.
Question. Is the Marine Corps adequately sized to meet this
requirement?
Answer. The Marine Corps is adequately sized to meet the current
requirement in the short term, but I am concerned about our capacity to
meet unexpected operational demands, especially in the event of a Major
Contingency Operation. We would be ``all in,'' and would be unable to
support other commitments around the world to include theater security
cooperation.
Question. If the Marine Corps cannot meet the demands placed on it,
how will you address this issue?
Answer. The Marine Corps is the Nation's force-in-readiness and I
will ensure that those Marines deployed and next-to-deploy are fully
supported. I will take risk in home station units readiness, which is
our Ready Force that can respond to crises or major combat operations.
defense reduction
Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the
following defense budget reductions on the Marine Corps' capability,
capacity, and readiness:
Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion?
Answer. The passage of the Budget Control Act coincided with our
planned reduction in force structure. Since our end strength above
182,000 was financed in OCO, we were able to operate effectively.
However, we already had to accept risk by reducing our end strength to
182,000.
Question. Sequestration in FY 2013?
Answer. The Marine Corps was able to absorb the mandated cuts due
to sequestration in 2013 primarily by leveraging unencumbered Overseas
Contingency Operations funds and unexpended investment resources.
However, the furlough of civilians during the summer of 2013 severely
damaged the morale of our Civilian Marines.
Question. Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the FY
2015 budget, in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review?
Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 provided the Marine Corps
with a stable funding profile for both Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015. Even
with this stability, the funding levels were below the optimal level to
achieve balance across the force in terms of readiness and
modernization. I have concerns about underfunding our investment
programs, which is critical to the long-term readiness of the Marine
Corps.
Question. Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps
starting in FY 2016 onward?
Answer. If the Marine Corps budget for FY 2016 and beyond is capped
at the Budget Control Act levels, the Marine Corps will be unable to
meet its obligations to the Defense Strategic Guidance and the National
Security Strategy. The permanent end strength of the Marine Corps would
need to be reduced below the planned levels of 182,000. I would need to
rely on Overseas Contingency Operations funding, which are not subject
to the discretionary caps, to meet the obligations under the DSG and
the NSS.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the Budget Control
Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year 2016 Budget
Resolution passed by the Senate and House of Representatives do not
assume this, but instead provides $38 billion of the requested spending
through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget.
Question. Should this OCO funding not be available, what
recommendations would you have, if confirmed, for how the Marine Corps
should manage additional cuts for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. Without OCO, the Marine Corps would not be able to meet the
requirements of the current Defense Strategic Guidance and would result
in a Marine Corps with fewer trained and ready Active Duty battalions
and squadrons than would be required for a single major contingency.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on readiness for the Corps?
Answer. We are relying on OCO funding today for many requirements
that have become enduring. Without OCO, the readiness of the Marine
Corps will be significantly impacted, especially to home-station units.
I will shift as many resources as needed to ensure the readiness of
units deployed and those next-to-deploy.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on Marine capabilities?
Answer. The capabilities of the Marine Corps will be diminished.
international partnerships
Question. Interactions between the naval and marine forces of
different countries are often conducted at the Chief of service level,
including international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational
exchanges, and protocols for operations.
If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure the Marine Corps continues
to build strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit
opportunities in international cooperation?
Answer. I believe that in order to be postured as the nation's
crisis response force, we must continuously engage with ally and
partner security forces around the globe, to gain access and build
relationships. The Marine Corps does this through its component
headquarters to the Combatant Commands. The current security climate
and fiscal uncertainty call for increased cooperation with our allies
and partners to encourage burden-sharing, project United States
presence, and build security globally. Security Cooperation activities,
such as those executed by the Marine Expeditionary Units and Special
Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, enable our own operational
readiness while developing interoperability with our strategic partners
and building partner security force capabilities to support more
effective coalition operations and contribute to their own defense.
However, our strategic engagement should focus not only on our most
capable partners, but also on the partner security forces who can
benefit from the ethos, professionalism, and relatively smaller size of
the Marine Corps.
If confirmed, I would seek to maintain the current initiatives that
have made the Marine Corps the partner of choice for amphibious
operations and combined arms, while orienting the Service for the
future operating environment.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with
international marine leaders, forums, and processes?
Answer. As a result of my previous experiences, including most
recently my positions at Marine Forces Central Command and Marine
Forces Europe, I am very familiar with international Marine and Naval
Infantry leaders, as well as leaders of other international allies and
partners who share similar mission sets. If confirmed, I will continue
to leverage various means to build and reinforce personal relationships
to cooperatively build a more secure and stable international
environment. These engagement opportunities will range from senior-
level conferences and formal staff talks to personal interaction during
travel to partner nations or visits by partner nation leaders to the
U.S. I will continue to leverage service programs, such as Foreign
Military Sales and personnel exchanges, to advance U.S. Government and
Department of Defense objectives.
joint operations
Question. Naval operations are becoming increasingly ``joint'' as
Marines plan to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships;
the U.S. Army and Air Force begin to invest in counter-maritime
capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and
implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and area-
denial (A2/AD) networks--a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle
Concept in 2010.
How would you characterize your familiarity with the other
services' capabilities and how they organize, train and equip their
forces?
Answer. In my current position I have become very familiar with how
the Army and Air Force organize, train, and equip and as Marines we
work side by side with and share a similar approach to problem solving
as the Navy. The most salient aspect of Joint Force capabilities is
that we are all reliant on the capabilities of the other Services,
Special Operations Command, other departments within the U.S.
Government, and our closest allies to execute the diverse set of
missions needed to ensure our continued security.
Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to
increase Joint interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve
cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed?
Answer. As our Nation's premier crisis response force in readiness,
there is a high probability that forward stationed and deployed Marine
Expeditionary Forces will be the first forces on the scene of a
developing crisis. As such Marines will provide critical enabling
capabilities for follow-on Joint Forces. Therefore, interoperability is
a must.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service Chiefs and
combatant commanders to increase our ability to share information in an
environment where we are likely to lose communications or security for
periods of time. In the current and future threat environment it is
essential that the services continue to develop our compatibility,
through equipment procurement, electronic systems, and training
regimens. In this way, the Marine Corps, as the Nation's force in
readiness, will not only be the most ready when the Nation is least
ready, but also be able to bring other services into the fight when
necessary.
capacity and end strength
Question. Is the Marine Corps' end strength large enough to execute
the 2015 National Military Strategy? (CD&I)
Answer. The currently budgeted force, which decreases to 182k in
FY17, remains the force that assumes the maximum allowable risk that
can meet the current Defense Strategic Guidance. The Marine Corps has
yet to fully analyze the 2015 National Military Strategy to determine
if the planned force size is adequate to meet the new strategy.
Question. Is the capacity of the Corp's sufficient? Is the balance
between the institutional support base and the deployable combat units
about right? (CD&I)
Answer. The current budgeted force is the maximum allowable risk
that I am willing to accept. We are operating at a 1 to 2 deployment to
dwell ratio, which is not sustainable over the long term. Our capacity
to meet unexpected operational demands is stressed, especially in the
event of a Major Contingency Operation.
Question. What is you view as how to best leverage the Marine Corps
Reserves?
Answer. The Marine Corps Reserve and its associated programs exist
to augment, reinforce and sustain the Active component as an integral
part of the Marine Corps Total Force. In addition to providing
operational and strategic depth, they provide individual augmentation
to regional Marine Forces and Marine Expeditionary Force staffs to
reinforce the Active Component across all warfighting functions.
Question. Are the end strength, capabilities and readiness of the
Marine Reserves adequate to reinforce the Active component for current
operations? For planned contingencies?
Answer. Yes, however many of the same concerns regarding readiness,
training, and education that I expressed for the Active Force also
apply to the reserves.
headquarters streamlining
Question. The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters
functions of the Department of Defense and the Military Departments.
If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what
would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying
and implementing reductions in the Marine Corps headquarters?
Answer. I will appoint key representatives to work with
counterparts from the Department of Defense and our sister services to
consider functions that could potentially be consolidated or
streamlined. We will first and foremost make recommendations and
decisions that are critical to the mission. If any decisions result in
reductions in personnel, the Marine Corps will make those decisions
following a strategic review of our workforce.
Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you
consider to be the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions
within the Marine Corps?
Answer. I have no specific recommendations at this time. We would
obviously look for areas of redundancy or where consolidation or
reductions would be the least impactful. The potential for
consolidation or reduction of functions is not something to take
lightly. A thorough review and analysis of what we do now, what could
be done better, what makes sense, and the resulting impact on our
personnel, both military and civilian, must be completed before any
recommendations and decisions are made.
Question. To the extent that the Corps has functions that overlap
with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other Military
Departments, what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing
redundancy?
Answer. These decisions would need to be made on a case-by-case
basis. I would first require a thorough analysis of what is currently
being done by all staffs and departments, what could be done better,
what makes sense and the resulting impact on our personnel, both
military and civilian. These steps must be completed before any
recommendations and decisions are made. If decisions require reductions
in personnel, the Marine Corps will make those decisions following a
strategic review of our workforce.
Question. Is the Marine Corps on track to reduce the size of its
headquarters in accordance with Secretary of Defense's directive of
2013?
Answer. The Marine Corps is on track to meet the Secretary of
Defense's direction to reduce the size of its headquarters, to include
the number of civilians and military personnel. I will commit to
working with the Secretary and the Congress to keep our headquarters as
lean as possible while providing support to the operating forces
throughout the world.
readiness
Question. What is your general assessment of the current state of
readiness of the Marine Corps?
Answer. For over a decade, Marines have proven their mettle in
responding to a wide range of crises worldwide. Doing so, however, has
caused stress on home station units. We have appropriately prioritized
the readiness of those Marines who are forward deployed and in harm's
way. I am concerned about the long term implications to our equipment
modernization and infrastructure sustainment should sequestration-level
funding return.
Question. Are the infantry regiments and battalions of the Marine
Corps at acceptable levels of readiness?
Answer. Our deployed infantry battalions and regimental command
elements are ready to operate across the range of military operations.
However, full spectrum readiness varies among home station infantry
units. We depend on a budget that protects current unit readiness and
long-term investments--this is all part of balanced institutional
readiness. Currently, institutional readiness is out of balance as
resources that would otherwise have been applied to non-deployed units
and investment accounts are re-prioritized to deployed and next-to-
deploy units to safeguard near-term operational unit level readiness.
The availability of amphibious shipping for training further
complicates the attainment of full spectrum readiness for all infantry
units.
Question. Are units in the key supporting arms (i.e. armored
reconnaissance, tank, artillery and engineers) at acceptable levels of
readiness?
Answer. Our forward deployed and forward engaged units are ready to
operate across the range of military operations. However, full spectrum
readiness varies among home station units.
Since the Marine Corps deploys task organized forces to meet
combatant commander requirements, key supporting arms units continue to
balance the demands of providing ready units to task organized forces
for worldwide employment against the requirement to generate whole unit
capabilities to operate across the full range of military operations.
Question. What is the level of readiness in the fixed and rotary
winged squadrons and wings? Is this adequate?
Answer. Over a decade of sustained combat operations and high
operations tempo, coupled with chronic underfunding of sustainment
activities and the current fiscal environment has led to degraded
readiness in Marine Aviation. We are currently able to meet all
operational commitments with ready forces, but these forces often
achieve the required level of readiness just prior to deployment.
Prioritizing forward deployed readiness comes at the expense of next-
to-deploy and non-deployed units.
Current levels of readiness are not adequate for our nation's
force-in-readiness. Across the Marine Aviation fleet, our non-deployed
squadrons are 20 percent short of the required number of aircraft
needed to train or to respond to contingency or crisis. Among the
factors contributing to readiness shortfalls are: aviation depot
capacity and throughput shortfalls; underfunding in flying hour and
other sustainment and logistics accounts; lack of experienced and
qualified personnel; slower than needed procurement funding for
recapitalization of legacy aircraft.
Question. How deep is the ``bench'' of ready units available for
deployment beyond the deployed MAGTFs and Special Purpose MAGTFs?
Answer. Home station units constitute the ready force that would
respond to unforeseen crises or major contingency. The Marine Corps
retains the capacity to support its portion of the strategy; however, I
am concerned about our ability to generate ready follow-on or surge
forces should they be requested by the combatant commanders. Since the
Marine Corps fights as task organized forces, I am particularly
concerned about Marine Corps aviation readiness. Our ready aviation
``bench'' is too shallow and does not have the resources it needs to
train and be ready for future challenges. Specific details cannot be
discussed in this unclassified forum.
Question. Given current operational tempo is the Corps able to
maintain its desired BOG dwell ratios for its ground and air units?
Answer. The Marines Corps seeks to allocate forces supporting
current operations with a deployment-to-dwell range of 1:2 to 1:3 for
the majority of our units. We will work with the combatant commanders
and provide forces that support operational and Service requirements.
Question. If readiness is not at acceptable levels, what is your
vision and plan to achieve required levels?
Answer. The Marine Corps continues to reconstitute to a ready force
after over a decade of persistent conflict. As the Nation's ready
force, the Marine Corps does not have the luxury to take an operational
pause after completing major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will
prioritize the resetting of Marine Corps equipment and restore home
station readiness. Near-term readiness remains a top priority. I will
work with the Department's leadership and the Congress to ensure the
Marine Corps is properly resourced to deliver a ready Marine Corps
today and in the future.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for
maintaining readiness in the near term, while modernizing the Corps to
ensure readiness in the out years?
Answer. Near-term operational readiness and the readiness of those
Marines who are forward deployed and forward engaged remain my top
priority. I will ensure that our manning, training, and equipping
processes support the next generation of ready Marines to answer the
Nation's call. I will work with the Department's leadership and the
Congress to ensure the Marine Corps is properly resourced to deliver a
ready Marine Corps today and in the future.
budget
Question. Is the Marine Corps' budget adequate to execute
operations, maintain readiness, procure needed weapons and equipment,
modernize, and sustain quality of life?
Answer. The FY 2016 budget represents the limit of acceptable risk
for the Marine Corps in terms of both end strength and funding; while
we can meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance today,
there is no margin. The budget rightly prioritizes near-term readiness
at the expense of modernization and facilities, which is not
sustainable in the long-term.
financial management and audit
Question. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
recently withdrew its previously clean opinion on the Marine Corps'
FY12 Statement of Budgetary Activity (SBA). This is a significant
setback not only for the Marine Corps, but also for the Department, as
the Marine Corps was supposed to be the first service to attempt an
audit, and the clean opinion was initially hailed as evidence of the
Department's progress on audit.
Should the Marine Corps have declared it was audit ready in FY14,
given the fact it has not corrected its known financial management
weaknesses?
Answer. Yes, we were ready for the FY14 audit. We had successfully
completed all the work and answered all the audit questions from the
auditors for both the FY12 and FY13 audits, and we were prepared to do
the same for FY14. We also knew the nature and impact of previously
identified Marine Corps and DOD financial management and system
weaknesses, and we understood the status of ongoing corrective actions.
None of these known weaknesses were showstoppers for the audit, and
corrective actions frequently take multiple years to fully implement.
Conducting the FY14 audit helped identify additional Marine Corps
improvement areas, and resulted in the DODIG and our Independent Public
Accounting firm identifying a significant DOD-wide accounting issue.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Marine Corps
is implementing corrections to its financial management systems and
processes necessary to ensure it can undergo audit of its full
financial statement in FY18?
Answer. The Marine Corps has a well-established plan to be ready
for the full financial statement audit by FY18 and to implement
improvements to its financial management and business processes and
systems. Success in achieving full auditability is a top priority as we
demonstrate good stewardship of the nation's resources, and we are
committed to making fiscally informed decisions.
recruiting and retention
Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Marine Corps'
success in recruiting the highest caliber American youth for service
and retaining the best personnel for leadership responsibilities?
Answer. The key to Marine Corps' recruiting success is the
continued focus on finding highly qualified young men and women who are
seeking the challenge of serving their nation. Continued access by
recruiters to high schools and colleges not only assures the
opportunity to engage a diverse and quality market, but also a market
with the proven mental abilities to serve in technically challenging
fields. Another key component of our recruiting success is the Marine
Corps' image of smart, tough, elite warriors. The time proven
intangible benefits of service, pride of belonging, leadership,
challenges, and discipline are what we offer. Those attributes are what
allows us to remain America's Force in Readiness.
Question. What steps do you feel should be taken to ensure that
current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact the
overall readiness, recruiting and retention, and morale of the Marine
Corps?
Answer. Effective recruiting will require that we continue to
maintain a high quality and properly resourced recruiting force. I also
believe sustaining an operational tempo of at least 1:2 will ensure
that our readiness, retention, and morale remain high.
Question. What is your assessment of current recruiting standards,
particularly DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits, and their
propensity to accurately predict minimal attrition and future success
in military service?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the compensation
reforms and the effects on recruiting and retention.
Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department's
proposals aimed at slowing the growth of personnel and health care
costs will have on recruiting and retention in the Marine Corps?
Answer. I believe the Department's reforms can promote recruiting
and retention necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force. If
confirmed, I will continue to carefully review all compensation reforms
for any effects on recruiting and retention.
Question. Do you believe that if Congress does not support these
proposals, the resultant pressure on training and modernization
resources could begin to harm retention?
Answer. I believe that all personnel costs--including compensation
reforms--must be viewed through the lens of overall readiness, to
include training, equipping, and modernizing our Marine Corps. If
confirmed, I will carefully review the compensation reforms and the
effects on overall readiness to ensure your Marine Corps has the proper
balance to maximize its crisis response and warfighter capabilities.
military compensation
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military
compensation?
Answer. The Marine Corps is meeting our recruiting and retention
goals, and the current compensation package helps produce the force we
need. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the adequacy of military
compensation to ensure we recruit and retain the highest quality
Marines.
Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the
rising cost of personnel?
Answer. Given the fiscal constraints on the Department of Defense,
I believe that the compensation proposals put forward by the President
in the 2016 budget request are reasonable measures to slow the growth
in military compensation in order to strike a balance between personnel
costs, training, equipment, and modernization that protects readiness.
Question. Do you personally support the Administration's
compensation and health care proposals?
Answer. Yes, I support these proposals. They slow the rate of
compensation growth which is necessary for the Marine Corps to maintain
readiness under current budget constraints. This budget achieves the
necessary and appropriate balance in compensation, training, equipment
and modernization. It sustains the recruitment and retention of high-
quality personnel needed to defend our Nation, while still providing
quality compensation and health care benefits to our Marines. If
confirmed, I will continually assess compensation and health care to
ensure that we continue to maintain this balance.
Question. As the Marine Corps has the highest percentage of
servicemembers who leave after their first term, what is your
assessment of the adequacy of compensation and benefits available for
non-career servicemembers?
Answer. By design, the Marine Corps is a young service and
purposefully retains fewer servicemembers at the first reenlistment
decision point than the other services. Today, we are meeting all of
our recruiting and retention goals and the quality of the force is
extraordinary. Based on those facts, I believe compensation and
benefits for non-career servicemembers are adequate.
Question. Former Commandant, General Amos, and the Sergeant Major
of the Marine Corps Barrett have talked about the nexus between what
marines are paid today and the dangers associated with becoming, as
they put it, ``an entitlement-based, health-care providing based Marine
Corps,'' implying a relationship between the military compensation and
benefit system and the ethos of military service.
Do you share these concerns?
Answer. Our Marines must be paid adequately and their families
should be supported through various programs like housing, child care,
health care, and commissary and exchanges. However, the Marine Corps'
primary recruiting and retention motivator is our culture and warrior
ethos; it is what Marines sign up for and what we deliver.
Question. If so, what are the implications for the All-Volunteer
Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continually assess compensation to
ensure that we continue to maintain the right balance between
compensation, training, equipment, and modernization.
education for marines
Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the
ability of career-oriented Marines to transfer their earned benefits to
spouses and dependents.
What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on
recruiting and retention of Marines?
Answer. I believe that the Post-9/11 GI Bill positively contributes
to recruiting and retaining high quality Marines. For recruits,
education benefits, including the Post 9/11 GI Bill, are cited as the
most influential benefit in making the decision to join the Marine
Corps. In regard to retention, the ability to transfer Post 9/11 GI
Bill benefits directly influences retention by requiring 4 additional
years of service. In addition, 53 percent of Marines indicated that the
ability to transfer their benefits was an influence to stay in the
Marine Corps.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the
transferability option on retention and career satisfaction of Marines?
Answer. According to Marine Corps surveys, for all non-retirement
eligible Marines who were required to make an FY15 reenlistment
decision, 53 percent indicated that the ability to transfer their
benefits was an influence to stay in the Marine Corps.
Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits
are to young Marines, and what trends do you see in the Marine Corps'
ability to pay for such programs at current levels over the FYDP?
Answer. Post-secondary education is an important part of individual
Marines personal and professional development. Encouraging qualified
Marines to utilize any and all resources to better themselves via
education and training is part of the Marine Corps ethos. This leads to
better Marines and in turn better citizens. I understand that the
Marine Corps is adequately funded to provide tuition assistance
benefits to qualified Marines. In addition, the Post 9/11 GI Bill
provides a very generous education benefit.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current
eligibility criteria for tuition assistance?
Answer. I believe the Marine Corps is properly executing the
tuition assistance program. I have no recommendations to change current
Marine Corps eligibility criteria at this time. However, as with other
programs, we are constantly reviewing eligibility criteria for
efficient and effective use of resources.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. The Department in January, 2013, rescinded the policy
restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the
primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and
gave the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions
currently closed to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep
a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense. The Marine Corps continues to develop gender-free physical and
mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal
of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those
positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that during the review,
validation and development of Marine military occupational standards,
they are operationally-relevant, occupation-specific, and gender-
neutral.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are
realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission
capability?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on military requirements and that assignment decisions should be
made solely on the basis of a servicemember's ability to meet validated
gender-neutral occupational standards? If so, what steps would you take
to ensure that such decisions are made on these bases?
Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps Force Integration Plan is a
deliberate, measured, and responsible approach to research, set
conditions and integrate female Marines into ground combat arms MOSs
and units to the maximum extent possible. The Marine Corps' unwavering
focus remains on combat effectiveness and ensuring the fullest success
of each Marine. Recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary
of Defense, and the Congress will be made in that context.
Question. Do you believe that any marine, male or female, who can
meet the performance criteria the Corps is currently testing and
validating, should be given the opportunity to serve in those
occupations, including Infantry?
Answer. The Marine Corps' top priority is combat effectiveness and
the accompanying high state of readiness to meet emerging challenges
across the range of military operations. The Marine Corps will ensure
that all individuals regardless of gender are assigned to serve in an
occupational specialty for which they are most fully qualified.
relationship between staff judge advocate to the commandant of the
marine corps and counsel for the commandant, united states marine corps
Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Marine Corps
allocated between the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the
Counsel for the Commandant?
Answer. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (SJA to CMC) is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the
Commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps staff and agencies. In
particular, the SJA to CMC supervises and manages the legal matters
arising in the Marine Corps regarding military justice, operational
law, civil and administrative law, legal assistance, and ethics, and
any other matters as directed by the SECNAV and the CMC.
The Counsel for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as a component
of the Office of the General Counsel of the Navy, provides the Marine
Corps with legal advice in the following areas: acquisition law,
including international transactions; business and commercial law; real
and personal property law; civilian personnel and labor law; fiscal
law; environmental law; intellectual property law; ethics and standards
of conduct.
Question. Who has responsibility for providing legal advice on
military justice matters in the Marine Corps?
Answer. The SJA to CMC is responsible for delivering military
justice advice to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Headquarters
Marine Corps. In all other commands throughout the Marine Corps, judge
advocates are responsible for providing legal advice on military
justice matters.
Question. What is the role, if any, of the Counsel for the
Commandant in the duty assignments of Marine Corps judge advocates?
Answer. The Counsel for the Commandant has no formal role in the
duty assignments of judge advocates. The statutory responsibility for
the assignment of Marine Corps judge advocates remains with the
Commandant. By SECNAVINST, the SJA to CMC is responsible for advising
DC, M&RA on the assignment of judge advocates.
Question. What is your view of the need for the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. The ability of the SJA to CMC to provide independent legal
advice to the Commandant is paramount. The SJA to CMC's legal advice is
independent because he is not subject to evaluation or supervision in
the content of his advice from anyone other than the Commandant.
Similarly, 10 U.S.C section 5046 prohibits any officer or employee
within the Department of Defense (DOD) from interfering with the SJA to
CMC's ability to provide independent legal advice to CMC.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Marine Corps
judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to Marine Corps
commanders?
Answer. Like the SJA to CMC, Marine Corps judge advocates at all
levels must be able to provide--and commanders must receive--
independent advice. 10 U.S.C section 5046 also prohibits interference
with the ability of Marine judge advocates to provide independent legal
advice to their commanders.
joint officer management
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System?
Answer. I believe that the Goldwater-Nichols joint officer
requirements have improved the breadth of experience and overall
quality of our senior officers. In addition, the establishment of the
`experience path' a few years ago to attain Joint Qualification created
another avenue for our best performing field grade officers to be fully
qualified. It has proved to be a valuable enhancement to Goldwater-
Nichols.
Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are
needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Marine
officers?
Answer. No.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to
general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and
professional demands of Marine officers?
Answer. Yes. The requirements are consistent with the Marine Corps'
ongoing efforts to continue with the alignment, cooperation and
coordination between the services and the combatant commanders in joint
training, education, and execution of military operations.
Question. If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements
for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that Marine
officers are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific
leadership experience and professional development?
Answer. N/A
Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification
requirements on the ability of the services to select the best
qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that
will satisfy service-specific officer professional development
requirements?
Answer. The requirements for joint qualification are complementary
with the successful career path of our most competitive officers.
Question. Do you think a tour with a Combatant Command staff should
count toward the Joint tour requirement?
Answer. Yes. The mission of the Combatant Commands staff is
directly related to the achievement of unified actions that supports
the national security strategy, national military strategy and
strategic planning of combined operations.
Question. What factors do you consider most important in the
difficulty experienced by field grade Marine Corps officers in
satisfying joint requirements for promotion?
Answer. Given the current high operational tempo, the biggest
difficulty in satisfying joint requirements is career timing of the
most competitive officers. Naturally, there is a high demand within the
service for the top officers for both command and other key billets.
The Marine Corps makes joint assignments a priority as early as the
rank of Major and nominates the most competitive officers to joint
billets that complement their professional development.
Question. Do you think that, in today's operational environment,
these requirements for promotion to O-7 should be modified?
Answer. No.
Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that officers who
are competitive for promotion to general officer rank are able to
fulfill all joint education and experience requirements?
Answer. Field grade officers are assigned to Joint Duty assignments
and to JPME II producing schools (War Colleges) based on their
performance. Our most competitive officers are provided those
assignments.
Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and
assigned group of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank
of flag rank officer?
Answer. Through a closely monitored manpower process, we will
continue to formally screen and select our best officers beginning
early in their careers for resident joint education, screen them for
command of operational units, and assign them to key joint billets that
complement their professional development.
military health care
Question. What is your assessment of the medical care provided to
Marines wounded or injured on the battlefield?
Answer. When Marines go into harm's way, Navy Medicine personnel
are with them to provide outstanding medical care. Our Marines have a
special bond with their physicians and corpsmen and this relationship
has been well-earned over countless generations by caring for our
wounded Marines on the battlefield. During our most recent conflicts,
we have seen significant advances in combat casualty care that have led
to unequalled survival rates for our injured. Throughout all echelons
of care--from the battlefield to the bedside--we have improved our
capabilities and rapidly implemented clinical practices that saved
lives. These efforts have transformed trauma care both in the military
and the civilian sector. We have also made significant progress in
treating traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder as
well as ensured that all our wounded Marines have access to exceptional
military treatment facilities to aid in their recovery and
rehabilitation.
Question. What is your assessment of the health care available to
Marines and their families in their home stations?
Answer. Health care is crucial to mission readiness and an
important component of quality of life for our Marines and their
families. Marines must be medically ready to meet their demanding
responsibilities and they also must be confident that their families
have access to high quality health care. Within the Marine Corps, we
rely on Navy Medicine to promote, protect and restore our health and
they perform these responsibilities very well. I am pleased that our
Marines and their families receive exceptional care at our Navy
military treatment facilities and will work to ensure this remains a
priority.
family readiness and support
Question. Marines and their families in both the Active and Reserve
components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in
support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned
of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of
deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues in the Marine Corps, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure
that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced,
especially in light of current fiscal constraints?
Answer. The most important issues are providing timely and accurate
communication to our Marines and their families while properly
resourcing the support functions on our bases and stations. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Marine Corps provides Marines and families
with a comprehensive and effective community-based support system. In
this time of fiscal constraint, I will have to prioritize our core
programs that support the Marine warfighter and families.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be
relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active Duty
and Reserve personnel, retirees, and their eligible family members.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Marine
Corps MWR programs, particularly in view of the current fiscal
environment and, if confirmed, are there any improvements you would
seek to achieve?
Answer. Our greatest challenges are the fiscal realities of
sequestration. If confirmed, I will ensure that we sustain priority
programs that support the health, welfare and morale of our Marines and
families. Ensuring access to those programs that support these
priorities is paramount. I will also maintain a dialogue with our
Marines and families to ensure that our MWR programs adapt to meet
their highest priority needs.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue
to be of great concern to the Committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide
prevention programs and policies for the Marine Corps to prevent
suicide and increase the resiliency of Marines and their families?
Answer. Suicide prevention is a leadership issue. Leadership
attention to risk factors has helped reduce deaths; however, we must
remain vigilant. If confirmed, my priority is to continue the progress
the Marine Corps is making in reducing deaths by suicide. As leaders,
it is our duty to reduce barriers associated with seeking help. My
strategy is to enhance help-seeking behaviors and provide training to
rapidly identify and provide assistance to those at heightened risk.
The resiliency and well-being of our Marines and their families will
remain a top priority.
wounded warrior regiments
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat
operations deserve the highest priority from their service and the
Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis
over the past several years, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps
Wounded Warrior Regiments in facilitating the treatment and management
of wounded, ill, and injured Marines?
Answer. The Wounded Warrior Regiment currently meets or exceeds the
mandates set forth by Congress regarding the facilitation of medical
and non-medical care for wounded, ill and injured Marines. Through the
Recovery Coordination Program, we provide essential individualized
assistance to Marines and families, ensuring we keep faith with those
who have served. The Marine Corps continuously evaluates our wounded
warrior and caregiver programs and incorporates lessons learned and
best practices to improve policies and support. While the landscape of
warrior care has changed, the Marine Corps remains committed to
maintaining the services necessary to support Marines and their
families.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources you would pursue to increase service support for wounded
Marines, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to
civilian life?
Answer. We must continue to fund our recovery care coordinators and
the support they provide to recovering Marines and their families. At
the same time, we will evaluate the effectiveness of this program over
time. If confirmed, I will ensure that we are proactively identifying
symptoms and addressing psychological health needs. The shift in the
demographic of wounded warriors requires that we focus on care for
those with behavioral health issues and chronic illnesses. I view this
as a continuing commitment from the Marine Corps to its Marines.
Overall, I believe the flexibility of the current program allows the
services to develop and implement new programs as needs arise, and I
support this intuitive process.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults
in the Marine Corps?
Answer. Sexual assault has no place in our Corps. It not only has a
long-lasting effect on the individual victim but it also erodes unit
readiness and command climate. The Marine Corps has placed particular
emphasis on eliminating sexual assault and I believe we are making
progress. If confirmed, I will continue to build on the current
foundation. The bottom line is that even one sexual assault is too many
and everyone agrees that more needs to be done.
Question. What is your assessment of the Marine Corps sexual
assault prevention and response program?
Answer. I see positive indicators that our SAPR Program is heading
in the right direction. From FY12 to FY14, there was a 30 percent
decrease in the number of Marines experiencing unwanted sexual contact.
In that same time period, the number of victims and bystanders willing
to file reports increased 94 percent. However, I also believe that
there is still much work to do. We must continue to increase reporting
and decrease prevalence. We need to emphasize prevention, instill in
our Marines the duty to be active and responsible bystanders, and
integrate the SAPR Program with other aspects of behavioral health.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Commanding Officers are responsible for their Marines,
including setting positive command climates that both prevent the crime
of sexual assault and provide a safe, non-retaliatory environment in
which victims feel confident coming forward to report. We believe that
the increase in sexual assault reporting is, in part, due to the faith
and trust our Marines have in their chain of command. In addition,
commanders ensure that any Marine who files an unrestricted report has
timely and comprehensive access to supportive services. The fact that
more Marines file Unrestricted Reports--which automatically trigger
command notification--shows that Marines find this support invaluable.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy and
Marine Corps resources and programs to provide victims of sexual
assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. I understand that the Marine Corps, with help from the
Navy, provides and continues to expand each of these services. Naval
medical support for sexual assault victims is more accessible and
sensitive now than ever before. Victims also have access to non-medical
counseling services; chaplains to provide pastoral care during on and
off-business hours; a 24/7 Sexual Assault Helpline at each installation
provides access to a credentialed victim advocate around the clock; our
Victims' Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO) confidentially assists each
victim through the investigation and prosecution process, ensuring that
victims understand their rights and remain informed. Since standing up
on 1 Nov 2013, VLCO has provided legal services to over 1,000 victims,
including military dependents and have represented clients at all
stages of the military justice process to ensure victims' rights and
interests are protected. Every major Marine Corps installation has a
VLCO office, and to date, no eligible victim of sexual assault has been
turned away from VLC services. However, I fully understand that the
true measure of the effectiveness of these programs is how well they
meet the needs of the victim.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Marine Corps has taken
to prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed
locations?
Answer. I am encouraged, though not satisfied, by our efforts to
prevent sexual assault throughout the Marine Corps. Our prevention
efforts have focused on command climate and bystander intervention.
These efforts include the development and refinement of innovative
training tools and programs for use by commanders to educate their
Marines on the impact of sexual assault and how best to prevent it.
These initiatives will help us sustain and build upon our efforts to
reach the stated purpose of the SAPR Program: to reduce--with a goal to
eliminate--sexual assault from the Corps.
Regarding sexual assault in deployed locations, I believe, as an
expeditionary force in readiness, our at-home activities prepare our
Marines for a deployed environment. Our efforts at home establish the
baseline for those deploying. Besides the efforts outlined above, our
pre-deployment SAPR training program includes additional bystander
intervention and risk reduction strategies. The training also provides
information pertaining to host country customs, mores, and religious
practices. In addition, the training identifies first responders who
will be available during deployment, to include law enforcement, legal,
sexual assault response coordinators, uniform victim advocates,
healthcare personnel, and chaplains.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources of the Navy and Marine Corps to investigate and prosecute
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I am encouraged by the progress we have made in many areas
of victim response, but our goal is to further improve these services
so that more victims stay engaged in the process and, as a result, more
offenders will be held accountable.
The Marine Corps continues to strengthen the qualification
standards for all judge advocates handling special victim cases to
include increased experience, training and prior court-martial
experience. The Marine Corps places a premium on ensuring each counsel
is provided with formal training and trial preparation advice, in
addition to the mentorship and on-the-job training offered by
supervisory JAs. To this end, the legal community has quadrupled the
training budget in the last fiscal year. Leading this training and
advice effort are the Trial and Defense Counsel Assistance Programs
which provide training and advice by serving as centralized resources
and helping to spread best practices throughout the regions. In
addition, the Marine Corps employs six Highly Qualified Experts (HQEs),
seasoned civilian attorneys with significant experience in complex
criminal litigation.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?
Answer. I believe the role of the Commander is central to sexual
assault prevention within the military. The commanding officer of every
unit is the centerpiece of an effective and professional warfighting
organization. They are charged with building and leading their Marines
to withstand the rigors of combat by establishing the highest level of
trust throughout their unit. Commanding officers are responsible for
setting and enforcing a command climate that is non-permissive to
sexual assault, a climate in which the spirit and intent of the orders
and regulations that govern the conduct of our duties will be upheld.
Trust in the Commander and fellow Marines is the essential element in
everything we do. Developing this trust, dedication, and esprit de
corps is the responsibility of the commanding officer. They do this by
setting standards, training to standards, enforcing standards, and
exemplifying those standards.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. Removal of commanders' convening and disposition authority
will adversely affect good order, discipline, and combat effectiveness.
Commanders are responsible for everything that happens within their
command. Based on their responsibility to maintain good order and
discipline and to ensure the welfare of every Marine and Sailor in the
command, commanders exercise their military justice authority as a
moral imperative.
Commanders meeting their responsibilities, advised by lawyers
(SJAs, prosecutors), are in a better position to make a just decision.
There is no more demanding position than Commander and none more
carefully selected or closely scrutinized.
As a practical matter, removing commanders from the military
justice process in favor of lawyers will result in fewer sexual assault
prosecutions. Prosecutors tend to focus on prosecutorial merit.
Assuming the threshold for probable cause is reached, commanders are
more likely than prosecutors to send a case forward irrespective of the
chances of getting a conviction.
Marines must know that their Commander sent a Marine to court-
martial, not an unknown third-party prosecutor, who plays no daily role
in developing and maintaining the bond of trust essential to combat
effectiveness. I believe that the trust that is required for good
order, discipline, and combat effectiveness can only be built and
maintained when Marines know that commanders have the authority to hold
accountable marines who violate that trust.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address the problem of sexual assaults in the Marine Corps?
Answer. I believe we have made progress, but we still have work to
do. If confirmed, I plan to further the progress of Marine Corps' SAPR
efforts and ensure that all Marines are committed to preventing the
crime of sexual assault. We will continue to implement bystander
intervention programs, risk reduction measures, focus on offenders, and
the further integration of SAPR and Behavioral Health issues, such as
substance abuse. We will also study sexual assault as it relates to
other, often co-occurring behaviors like sexual harassment and hazing.
Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent
legislation concerning sexual assault on the prosecution of sexual
assault cases in the military, including cases where prosecution is
declined by civilian prosecutors?
Answer. Since FY12, Congress has passed almost 100 legislative
provisions to improve sexual assault prevention and reporting. These
have included provisions to improve and expand reporting and training,
as well as a host of provisions impacting the legal process, such a
Victim Legal Counsel and changes to the UCMJ. We have implemented or
are in process of implementing many of these provisions. We believe
these changes have helped to increase reporting and provide the victim
an increased voice in the court-martial process. We think these changes
need some run time before we feel their full implementation. We
appreciate Congress' concern on this important issue.
amphibious fleet requirements
Question. How would you characterize the current state of Navy and
Marine Corps joint operations and what is your vision for the future?
What gaps or shortfalls exist today? What changes would you advocate to
strengthen or expand Navy and Marine Corps joint operations?
Answer. Our ability to work together remains solid and unparalleled
but is somewhat limited by our shortfall in amphibious warships. We
currently have only 30 amphibious warships, which is short of our
fiscally constrained requirement of 33. We won't reach 33 until 2018
and will not have the correct mix of amphibious warships until 2024. I
would advocate for the authorization of multi-year and block buy
procurements of amphibious warships, which would sustain the current
shipbuilding plan and eventually achieve and maintain the required
amphibious warship inventory. Further, having additional amphibious
capacity will enable us to train both our staffs and operating forces
in a more routine manner above the Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine
Expeditionary Unit level.
Question. What alternatives would you consider to augment
amphibious ships in providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what
scenarios would these alternatives be necessary and appropriate?
Answer. There are several alternative platforms that should provide
an adequate yet limited base of operations. Some of the alternative
platforms include Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), MLP/Afloat Forward
Staging Base (AFSB), T-AKE and other platforms contained in the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) inventory. Alternative platforms
can be used in a wide range of assigned Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) seabased operations to meet Combatant Commander requirements.
These platforms are not warships and have little to no self-protection,
thus would be more applicable and useful in routine mil-to-mil
exchanges and exercises, perhaps Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HA/DR), and other Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) engagement
roles and missions.
Question. What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy's
amphibious fleet?
Answer. The Department of the Navy's investment in amphibious
warships represents critical investments that enable Naval forces to
execute their assigned forward presence and crisis response missions.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and current Commandant of the
Marine Corps (CMC) have determined that the force structure required to
support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Assault Echelon is 38
amphibious warfare ships, as communicated to the House and Senate
Appropriations and Armed Services committees by SECNAV/CNO/CMC letter
dated 7 Jan 2009. Given fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy
(DON) determined a minimum inventory of 33 total amphibious warfare
ships, including 11 LHD/LHA(R), 11 LPD 17, and 11 LSD 41/49s; this
represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship
requirement for the Assault Echelon in a two MEB forcible entry
operation. The Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
2015 does not meet the 11/11/11 amphibious warship inventory until
FY24. It should be noted that with the addition of the 12th LPD, the
new agreed to fiscally constrained amphibious warship number is 34.
This inventory provides only the minimum capacity for steady state
Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments and
single-ship deployments for theater security cooperation activities.
Furthermore, this inventory does not provide the capacity to support
additional independent amphibious warship demands, such as maritime
security operations. A reduction in capacity detracts from the ability
of the Navy and Marine Corps to accomplish forward presence and crisis
response missions in today's exceptionally dynamic and uncertain
operational environment. The disadvantage of not meeting the
requirement of 38 ships results in our Nation accepting higher risk in
its ability to rapidly respond to surge demand, an emerging crisis, or
contingency response.
Question. What alternatives do you for see if the amphibious fleet
is allowed to decline in size or capabilities?
Answer. There is no alternative to our existing amphibious warship
fleet. However, should future constraints require routine augmentation
of the amphibious fleet, we will pursue alternative lift platforms in
much the same way as we are currently exploring today. However, while
these ships will help bridge the gap to the Combatant Commander demand
signal for upwards of 54 amphibious ships, they come with significant
limitations and are more useful during routine engagement operations
during Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations. Reducing the size or capacity of
the amphibious fleet will significantly increase the risk and reduce
the capability to deter aggression, respond to crises, and meet current
OPLAN requirements.
Question. What risks are associated with these alternatives?
Answer. Alternative lift platforms are capable ships and can
augment, with multiple limitations, selected amphibious warship mission
sets, but these alternative platforms are not amphibious warships, and
as such, do not possess the necessary capabilities for full-scale
conflict. They do not meet the requirements necessary to embark and
deploy an amphibious assault echelon for forcible entry operations.
Specifically, they lack adequate force protection and the utility
required to operate above the permissive level.
naval surface fire support
Question. The DDG-1000 program was initiated to fill the capability
gap for naval surface fire support. The original requirement for 24 to
32 DDG-1000 ships, each with two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, was
reduced to 12 ships, then to 10 ships, then to 7 ships, and finally to
3 ships.
In your view, does the total Navy program, with this significant
reduction in the number of DDG-1000 destroyers, meet the Marine Corps'
requirement for naval surface fire support?
Answer. Current and projected naval surface fire support is
inadequate. With the truncation of the DDG-1000 program, a maximum of
six 155mm Advanced Gun Systems will be available for service in the
fleet when all three ships are fully operational at the end of the
decade. This will not support the doctrinal capacity requirements of a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Current destroyer and cruiser fleets with
existing 5"/54 and 5"/62 (Mk 45) lightweight guns have limited
capability beyond thirteen nautical miles which diminishes the effects
of naval surface fires in an anti-access, area denial environment. The
Marine Corps has established a ninety-six nautical mile range
requirement to meet current operational employment concepts. We are
supportive of the Navy's hyper-velocity projectile as an interim
solution and the electro-magnetic railgun as a possible solution in the
long term. The risk assumed by a lack of surface fires will put
additional demand on our already taxed tactical aviation assets.
Question. What other capabilities would you rely upon to help meet
naval surface fire support requirements?
Answer. In the absence of adequate naval surface fire support
capability and capacity, we will rely on manned aviation platforms and
future armed remotely piloted aircraft delivered fires, and ground-
based artillery and rockets. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), with
necessary range and effects to support expeditionary operations in the
littorals, is an essential complementary capability to aviation and
ground-based indirect fires, referred to as the triad of fires. The
triad of fires provides a balanced approach. With current capability of
NSFS being insufficient, we will have to rely on aviation delivered
fires, and when feasible, ground-based indirect fires. However,
analysis conducted to date indicates that neither will provide adequate
capacity in some operational scenarios and during different phases of
operations (e.g. afloat ground systems will be unavailable to fire in
support of maneuvering units and aviation units will be heavily tasked
in an A2AD environment).
asia-pacific force dispositions
Question. Do you believe the planned joint force mix of tactical
aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future threats in the Asia-
Pacific theater of operations where the ``tyranny of distance'' is such
a major factor?
Answer. I would have to defer to the PACOM Commander's assessment
of the Joint Force tactical aircraft mix requirement. Marine Corps
aviation is prepared to do its part in supporting operations in the
PACOM Theater.
My biggest concern in this area is the degraded readiness of the
aircraft we currently have on hand.
Question. Do you believe we have sufficient sealift and airlift
capabilities to move Marines around the Asia-Pacific Theater for both
training and contingency purposes?
Answer. No. There is not enough amphibious warship capability to
support an assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades
required for contingency response. The Navy and the Marine Corps have
determined that 38 amphibious warships are needed in the inventory to
support this requirement. There are 30 amphibious warships in inventory
today.
The Department of the Navy (DON) determined a minimum force of 33
total amphibious warships represents the limit of acceptable risk in
meeting the 38-ship requirement. Based on a wartime operational
availability rate of 90 percent, 33 ships [11 LHD/LHA(R), 11 LPD 17,
and 11 LSD 41/49] are the minimum number in inventory necessary to meet
the requirement for 30 operationally available warships while taking
into account those ships in heavy maintenance and modernization periods
that are unlikely to meet OPLAN timelines. The amphibious force
inventory will reach the 11/11/11 requirement in FY24 with the delivery
of LHA 8.
Helping to bridge the shortfall of intratheater lift for training
is the JHSV. For example, a JHSV will be based in Guam in order to
fulfill lift requirements for the training hub in Guam and the Marianas
Islands. JHSV helps to fulfill this requirement by providing the lift
for Marines traveling to Tinian to utilize the range proposed for
Tinian. JHSV is also planned to be based in other areas in the Asia-
Pacific, such as Singapore, to fulfill similar training requirements
throughout the AOR.
Question. What alternative concept of operations, platforms, and
basing opportunities exist to address potential shortfalls in this
area?
Answer. There are no alternatives that have been developed to
mitigate the wartime or contingency response requirement for an
amphibious fleet.
The Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) maintains numerous
auxiliary platforms (T-AKE, MLP, AFSB, LMSR, JHSV, etc.) which have
been successfully used in Phase 0/1 operations. MARFORPAC routinely
uses T-AKEs for Theater Security Cooperation events in the Asia-Pacific
Theater. The Navy is exploring additional Phase 0/1 tasking options for
MSC vessels in order to free combatant vessels for higher level
tasking.
MSC contracts the high speed transport ship WESTPAC Express to
rapidly move Marines throughout the Asia-Pacific Theater. The Joint
High Speed Vessel (JHSV) will complement the requirement for intra-
theater lift of Marines when it is deployed to the Asia-Pacific
Theater.
anti-access/area denial
Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the
emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries
and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the
maritime freedom of movement and action in certain regions.
Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities
are a concern?
Answer. Yes, the United States faces a growing range of challenges
in gaining access and operating freely in the maritime, air, and cyber
commons. Most prominently, the proliferation of technologies that
allows potential adversaries to threaten naval and air forces at
greater ranges complicates our access to some regions (anti-access), as
well as our ability to maneuver within those regions (area denial),
including the littoral and landward areas. These technologies include
long-range ballistic and cruise missiles supported by state of-the-art
command and control, and integrated targeting networks; guided rockets,
artillery, missiles, and mortars; advanced submarines and ``smart''
mines; advanced integrated air defense systems; fifth-generation
fighter aircraft with enhanced sensors and weapons; and electronic
warfare, cyber, and space capabilities. Certainly a distinct challenge
during wartime, these military technologies are also a concern in
peacetime. For example, the free flow of goods and services can be
threatened or impeded by state or non-state actors employing A2/AD
technologies in key maritime crossroads.
Question. If so, what do you believe joint forces need to be doing
now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all
strategically important segments of the maritime domain?
Answer. We need to pursue a multifaceted approach, as we are, in
fact, already doing. For example, Marines in the operating forces are
strengthening and expanding our partnerships with friendly nations that
share our concerns. These partnership activities often result in new
opportunities for basing U.S. Forces overseas or increased options for
temporary support during emerging contingencies. Partnership activities
also help improve interoperability so that we have greater capability
and capacity to defeat such threats. Concurrently, the Air-Sea Battle
concept looked at the problem from a system versus system perspective.
The insights from that effort generated understanding that a limited
number of exquisite systems can always be overwhelmed by an
exponentially larger number of simple, inexpensive systems: a six-shot
revolver is better than a bow and arrow, and may even defeat six bows
and arrows, but is quickly overwhelmed by 100 bows and arrows. These
ASB insights have been subsumed into a more comprehensive effort, Joint
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, which looks at the ways and
means to defeat adversary strategies, not just systems. That effort
will address issues such as the use of all domains: air, land, sea,
space and cyber to create access. This 5 Domain joint force will be
capable of creating the conditions to project military power in
contested areas with freedom of action. This concept will also explore
distributed MAGTF maneuver, expeditionary advanced base operations,
streamlining and integrating our intelligence and operations functions,
and fully networking the naval team. What we envision is an integrated
naval force--a network of sensors, shooters, and information sharers,
afloat and ashore. The final goal is not to set conditions everywhere,
but to set the conditions we require at the right time and place of our
choosing to achieve superiority in a manner with which the enemy cannot
cope.
Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
process of transforming to meet new and emerging threats?
Answer. The senior leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps convened
this past June to develop the guidance that is driving the Littoral
Operations in a Contested Environment concept. I was directly involved
with that in my present assignment as Commanding General, Marine Corps
Forces Command--just as I've been directly involved in major Navy-
Marine Corps exercises, such as Bold Alligator--in improving our
ability to operate in A2AD contested regions. If confirmed as
Commandant, I'll continue to build upon that unified naval effort, not
only by working with the Chief of Naval Operations to provide unified
guidance and direction, but by ensuring the right leaders are in place
at the appropriate subordinate echelons. Further our efforts as a naval
force will be integrated with our joint and coalition partners. On that
end I will continue to work on our interoperability and compatibility.
Question. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and
emerging threats, what are your goals regarding transformation of the
Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps has historically been a very adaptive
organization. Conceptually, I think we are already on the right track
through the development of Expeditionary Force 21 and the Littoral
Operations in a Contested Environment concept. My job as Commandant,
should I be confirmed, will be to ensure our organization and processes
impart certain time-honored skill sets, knowledge, beliefs, and
professional judgment to our Marines, while also creating the
conditions that allowing them to understand and adapt effectively as
the future unfolds. We will continue to emphasize our expeditionary
roots and the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain on short notice as
our nation's force in readiness. Finally we need to continually refine
how we recruit, train and educate our Marines so that they can fight
and win regardless of what the future holds. We know that we will face
chaotic and lethal adversaries. We know that we will often operate in
the urban littorals where the mental and physical strength of our
Marines will be challenged. So we know that we must continue to evolve
and improve the individual Marine. Finally, we face many challenges and
it is therefore important that we encourage and foster innovation in
everything we do. We're bringing in great people who want to serve our
Nation as Marines. It's the Commandant's job to create the conditions
that allow them to evolve the Marine Corps so that we provide what the
Nation requires.
china
Question. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and
maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China
Sea, affected security and stability in the region?
Answer. China's actions in the South and East China Seas, as well
as its rapid military modernization and growing defense budgets, have
led many in the region, including the United States, to question its
long-term intentions. China's vague assertions and enforcement of its
unilateral territorial claims, as well as their aggressive land
reclamation efforts in the South China Sea have a destabilizing effect
in the region and have generated territorial disputes with other
regional actors. Many of these disputes involve U.S. Treaty Allies and
partners, with whom we have long-standing cooperation and defense
commitments. Our Allies and partners in the region are increasingly
looking to the U.S. for leadership and support in the face of these
challenges, and so our response to China's challenges to the existing
international norms and laws should be firm and consistent.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the
United States-China military relationship?
Answer. The U.S. military-to-military relationship is a critical
component of our overall bilateral relationship and an important aspect
of our regional strategy. This is particularly important as China's
military modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence, drawing
our forces into closer contact and increasing both opportunities for
concrete cooperation, as well as the risk of accidents or
miscalculations. Currently the military relationship is contributing to
overall stability in the region by developing patterns of interaction
and habits of cooperation through both bi-lateral and multilateral
engagements. This stability allows us to increase measured cooperation
with China in areas of overlapping interests, while improving our
ability to manage other aspects of the security relationship. Further
improvement of our military relationship with China can strengthen
trust and transparency.
Question. What are your views regarding China's interest in and
commitment to improving military relations with the United States?
Answer. I believe China recognizes the United States will have an
enduring presence in the Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in
sustaining military-to-military contacts. If confirmed as CMC, I will
continue to support United States policy objectives and strategies
toward China in order to develop areas of practical cooperation and
risk-mitigation in a way that protects our national interests and
supports overall stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance
of sustained military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. Military to military relations are an important part of not
only our bi-lateral relationship with China, but is also an important
facet of our overall strategy to Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.
Sustaining a military-to-military relationship with China supports our
United States objectives by demonstrating to the region that the United
States and China can engage in practical cooperation in areas of mutual
interest to deliver public goods and maintain regional stability.
Sustained military contact with China at the policy and senior leader
level also provides opportunities to develop common views on the
international security environment and constructively manage any
differences. Our overall goal is to promote our national interests by
reinforcing international norms and standards, and strengthening
regional understanding, transparency, and familiarity amongst all
nations in the Asia-Pacific. Our approach to this relationship with
China must be conducted in a thoughtful way that promotes the common
interest of regional security and stability.
Question. What role do you see for the Commandant in this process?
Answer. I believe that the Commandant of the Marine Corps plays a
pivotal role to personally sustain meaningful working relationships
with his counterparts all over the world, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific where we have more than 22,000 Marines forward stationed or
forward deployed west of the International Dateline. I believe that our
strong Marine presence in the region plays a significant role in
promoting the regional security and stability that have afforded many
Asia-Pacific nations, including China, unprecedented economic growth
and prosperity. As CMC, I would continue to strengthen our regional
partnerships, alliances, and the regional security architectures that
have fostered this positive environment.
russia
Question. What additional steps, if any, are likely to prove most
effective at deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe?
Answer. A continued, strong, whole-of-government approach is
essential. Political and economic consequences are critical aspects of
the international response to Russian aggression. Militarily, the U.S.
must remain prepared and committed to our NATO allies and stand ready
to counter military aggression against NATO members. I believe our
continued commitment of Article 5-related planning, training, and
adjustments to U.S. and NATO force posture, to include the basing of
forces and pre-positioning of material, along with our contributions to
Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, have enhanced readiness and better prepares
the entire alliance to deter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.
Question. What can the Marine Corps do to help NATO?
Answer. Ultimately, we stand prepared to provide exceptionally
capable expeditionary forces to fight alongside our allies. These
forces have been tested in combat for more than a decade and maintain
constant readiness. These forces also exercise and train regularly with
our NATO allies--current examples include Exercises SABER STRIKE in
Lithuania this June and TRIDENT JUNCTURE in Portugal, Spain, and Italy,
which continues throughout the fall. Such exercises ensure
interoperability with NATO maritime nations and strengthen teamwork
throughout the alliance.
Question. Does the Marine Corps, as part of a combined joint force,
have what it needs in Europe?
Answer. The Marine Corps does not have a large force permanently
postured in Europe, although we have capable and ready forces available
to respond quickly to emergent crises. Due to a shortfall in United
States amphibious shipping in the European theater, the Marine Corps
relies on land-based Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force
(SPMAGTF), based in Spain to serve as the `most ready and capable'
Marine crisis response force inside the EUCOM and AFRICOM Areas of
Responsibility (AORs). However, it should be noted, that while SPMAGTF-
CR-AF is a credible and capable response force, the Marine Corps always
prefers to respond as a U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Team, such as the
robust capability sets found in the Marine Expeditionary Unit and
Amphibious Readiness Group. To further mitigate our risk, we pre-
position equipment, both afloat in our Maritime Pre-positioning
Squadrons, and in storage caves within Norway. The most potent and
likely Marine Corps force contributions to large-scale operations in
Europe would be expeditionary forces, which leverage our strategic
mobility and operational flexibility. These may include MAGTFs deployed
on amphibious shipping or transported to Europe via strategic airlift
and linked up with prepositioned equipment in the theater.
army and marine corps cooperation
Question. What are your views regarding the joint development and
acquisition of Army and Marine Corps equipment?
Answer. In my experience, the Marine Corps and the Army collaborate
whenever our mission profiles converge. From a business perspective,
collaboration leverages significant Army fiscal, manpower, and test
resources in the refinement of operational capabilities requirements
and the research, development, and acquisition of technical solutions
to meet those requirements. Long term benefits include lower average
unit costs for both services.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should have a role in
synchronizing Army and Marine Corps requirements and service programs?
Answer. The Army and Marine Corps Board (AMCB) works at every level
to make sure both services collaborate on best practices. I believe the
AMCB provides sufficient oversight to synchronize requirements and
programs.
Question. What programs would you consider to be candidates for
joint program development for the Army and Marine Corps?
Answer. I am confident in knowing the Marine Corps actively seeks
opportunities where it makes sense to conduct joint program
development. A partial list of collaborative efforts includes, the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle; Joint Battle Command-Platform, Blue Force
Tracker and Nett Warrior; robotics systems; and more than twenty
different infantry system programs encompassing direct and indirect
fire weapons, anti-tank systems, night vision and thermal sighting
equipment, individual protection such as body armor and helmets, and
reconnaissance gear.
marine corps forces special operations command
Question. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC),
is a subordinate component command to the U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) established in 2005.
What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and
growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues
that you would have to address to improve its operations?
Answer. MARSOC has made tremendous progress over the last nine
years and has become not only an important component to USSOCOM, but
has also enabled better interoperability between the Marine Corps and
USSOCOM. MARSOC has supported combat deployments to Afghanistan where
Marines have both conducted Village Stability Operations and partnered
with Afghan National Army Commando Battalions. Marine Raider Battalions
have recently aligned to USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM and USPACOM to ensure
Marine SOF provides regionally astute and culturally proficient teams
and companies to their respective Theater Special Operations Commands.
MARSOC's professionalization of the force has become commensurate
with USSOCOM career management and development as the Marine Corps has
supported the implementation of career paths for enlisted Critical
Skill Operators, and recently, for Marine Special Operations Officers.
These career paths allow Marines to serve in MARSOC, or SOF related
billets, in the Joint Force and MAGTF for the duration of their career.
Although that in itself is significant, improvements are still needed
in how and to what level we integrate SOF and special operations
capabilities in a complementary manner. I believe the SOF-MAGTF linkage
is critical to ensure the combatant commanders and Joint Force is best
supported, not only during crisis-response situations, but also as part
of enduring special operations supporting their Theater Campaign Plans.
recapitalization
Question. The Marine Corps intends to concurrently recapitalize
several of its front line systems. The MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
and the Joint Strike Fighter are both in production now.
Do you believe that these production plans are realistic in light
of the demands on resources imposed by maintaining current readiness?
Answer. Yes, absolutely, they are one and the same. Every dollar
spent on modernization has a direct and tangible effect on current
readiness. Likewise, every dollar decremented from our procurement of
future systems increases both the cost and complexity of maintaining
our legacy systems beyond their projected life.
The real key to reducing risk in capacity and recovering readiness
is in recapitalization. We are roughly halfway through our transition
of every aircraft in our inventory and must constantly balance current
readiness and modernization to maintain our operational advantage and
increase it as we buy a newer force.
Question. Do you believe that these modernization programs will
survive unless Congress amends the Budget Control Act to eliminate or
reduce the effects of sequestration for fiscal year 2016 and beyond?
Answer. If we return to the sequestration-level cuts in Fiscal Year
2016, we will face serious risks to the modernization plans we
currently have and may have to reassess the overall modernization
strategy. This could result in consequences which could lead to reduced
readiness rates in highly demanded capabilities.
Question. Is it your understanding that MV-22 readiness rates in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the United States have achieved desired
levels?
Answer. The MV-22 has met and exceeded every readiness metric
during years of wartime flying and CONUS training while clearly
establishing itself as one of the safest aircraft ever flown. The
SPMAGTFs have achieved a 75 percent readiness, while the MEUs are at 69
percent. Fleet-wide readiness has increased from 53 percent to 62
percent between 2010 to 2015. But, I believe our readiness rates with
this fantastic aircraft (and all our USMC aircraft for that matter)
need to be better than that. As a force in readiness I can't have 25-31
percent of my aviation assets ``down.'' In fact right now, across the
USMC, 19-20 percent of my aviation assets that are supposed to be on
the flight line (not in scheduled depot maintenance) aren't able to
fly. That is unsatisfactory for the nation's force in readiness. I
intend to work with you to turn that around--quickly.
Question. In your view, will the MV-22 be sustainable over time at
an acceptable cost?
Answer. Yes. The vast capabilities of the aircraft outweigh the
costs associated with a tiltrotor when compared to conventional rotary
winged aircraft. The MV-22's ability to travel farther with more
payload than conventional helicopters helps reduce the logistical
demands of supporting operations with many more conventional
helicopters. Cost per flight hour has decreased by 21 percent between
2010 and 2015. ($11,651 to $9,163 per flight hour). We continue to work
with all stakeholders to identify ways to drive out cost from MV-22
sustainment.
modernization of capabilities
Question. The Marine Corps' current concepts for modernization of
its amphibious capabilities includes ships, ship to near-shore or shore
connectors--such as the LCAC--and armored amphibious combat vehicles.
Modernization across these systems is complex, technically challenging,
and potentially unaffordable given the budget environment today and for
the foreseeable future.
What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious
maneuver and assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer. We currently possess the correct amphibious maneuver and
assault systems to support Combatant Commander engagement and demand
across the Range Of Military Operations (ROMO). Expeditionary Force-21
(EF-21) describes the capability and capacity necessary to execute
MAGTF seabased operations from concept of employment, technology and
specific Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) necessary for
success. We are also a force in transition as new equipment is fielded
and optimized for seabased application. We will also continue to
improve naval integration and interoperability between Navy and Marine
forces as we develop future complementary and supporting capacities and
capabilities.
As ACV characteristics and capabilities are developed, they will
have to be integrated within our future comprehensive surface connector
strategy. We are actively considering the capabilities and limitations
of the Navy's current fleet of surface connectors and their future
development of replacements for those vehicles when developing
requirements for ACV procurement to ensure interoperability. The Navy
and Marine Corps are fully integrated on requirements development for
the ACV. Finally, we ultimately remain committed to a high water speed
vehicle as part of a complementary family of surface and air
connectors. We'll continue to work with the Navy on requirements within
the context of the Surface Connector Council.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize
development and acquisition among needed capabilities for sea basing,
connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore
to achieve your vision for a full spectrum force?
Answer. In order to achieve a full spectrum force, a balanced
approach that procures a family of systems is necessary to deliver the
required capabilities. Amphibious warships and the supporting
sustainment ships are the foundation for amphibious operations and
establishment of a seabase. Interoperability of the Seabase with the
elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is key when
considering maneuver from the seabase to the objective (Operational
Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)/Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM)) and is
accomplished by surface and vertical connector assets (ACV/LCAC/V-22/
HSV/LCU, etc). Current and continued amphibious program development and
application will provide the needed capability afloat and ashore for
full spectrum operations. Through leadership and careful consideration
of the needs of this force, we can prioritize procurement in such a
manner that we maintain our current competencies while pursuing
transformational modernization as systems become older. This will allow
us to avoid equipment obsolescence while building a family of systems
ready to confront the challenges of the decades to come.
Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that
modernization of the amphibious force--ships, connectors, and
vehicles--is achievable and affordable in the near and long term?
Answer. Fully fund, sustain, and deliver the current USMC and Navy
Programs Of Record (POR) for procurement and sustainment of MAGTF
warfighting functions and equipment . . . and sustain the necessary
support for Navy programs that enable Navy/Marine seabased force
projection and response. We must ensure delivery of new/improved
capabilities to the fighting force, and equally important, maintain
current and legacy equipment to operational and tactical design
readiness levels. We should also accelerate delivery or return to
service/improvement of priority programs and equipment that directly
contribute to higher unit readiness and operational deployability. For
example, accelerate delivery of LHA-8 and the ACV program, and
procurement of LX(R) . . . and when feasible due to funding or priority
constraints/restraints, extend legacy systems/platforms until full
operational capability (FOC) of the replacement is achieved. These
actions completed through thoughtful and deliberate programmatics will
ensure a modern and highly capable seabased MAGTF force for today and
tomorrow.
Question. In your view, will projected reduction in Marine Corps
end strength, if implemented, reduce the Navy's and Marine Corps'
requirement for amphibious ships?
Answer. No. There is no direct correlation between Marine Corps end
strength and amphibious warfare ship requirements. The amphibious
warfare ship requirement is based on forward presence and rotational
Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) as well
as deployment and employment the Assault Echelons (AEs) of two Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). Regardless of end strength, the Marine
Corps will always possess the ability to generate forward deployed MEUs
and rotational forces to support day-to-day combatant commander forward
presence and shaping requirements, as well the ability to generate the
AEs of two MEBs to support forcible entry operations contained in major
war plans.
Question. Given your vision of future high-intensity combined arms
combat inland, fighting a peer or near peer opponents, are current
modernization plans and budgets adequate?
Answer. While the Marine Corps is postured to conduct operations
across the range of military operations, our highest priority
modernization efforts are those associated with our core competencies:
amphibious forcible entry and crisis response. These core competencies
require continued development of our capabilities for surface and air
ship-to-shore movement, command and control from a seabase, operational
reach, and Marine Expeditionary Units, Marine Expeditionary Brigades,
and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Our high priority
modernization programs have been protected at the expense of both lower
priority modernization and infrastructure maintenance or development.
Moreover, fiscal constraints and rapidly changing technology and our
current acquisition processes prevent necessary and timely investment
in critical capabilities such as: intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, cyber, electronic warfare, and information warfare. In
the end, we must maintain the warfighting capacity to ensure that our
combined arms Marine Expeditionary Forces are trained and equipped to
meet an uncertain future.
Furthermore, a return to BCA-level spending/full sequestration
would further exacerbate institutional readiness imbalances. More
tradeoffs would be made in acquisitions of needed equipment, essential
training, living and work spaces, family support centers, and end
strength to protect the Marine Corps' performance of its statutory
obligations. Sequestration impacts on key modernization programs will
have catastrophic effects on achieving desired capabilities to defeat
emerging threats and will place an unacceptable burden on legacy
programs such as the AAV (40 + y/o) and the HMMWV (out of productions
since 2012).
amphibious combat vehicle
Question. The Navy/Marine Corps amphibious assault capability today
includes a large number of self-deploying amphibious assault vehicles
(AAV-7) to carry infantry ashore, and a smaller number of small vessels
called connectors that can ferry other vehicles, such as tanks and
artillery, and supplies from ships to shore.
The Marine Corps has changed its plans for development of a next-
generation armored combat vehicle. Instead of investing in development
of a new self-deploying amphibious assault tracked combat vehicle, the
Marine Corps intends to reduce technical and fiscal risk by acquiring a
wheeled combat vehicle. Currently four foreign designs are being
evaluated. A down select to two is scheduled to occur within months.
The two finalists are to be evaluated in splash tests designed to
assess effectiveness in amphibious movement from assault ship to shore.
Is the USMC confident that these foreign-designed wheeled armored
personnel carriers as observed to date will be able to swim in combat
conditions, and in varying sea states?
Answer. Yes, we are confident that at least two contractors will be
capable of delivering prototypes with the capacity to achieve water
mobility performance on par with or greater than our existing assault
amphibian along with the capabilities needed for the landward portion
of the ACV mission profile. The Marine Corps has conducted extensive
open-ocean and surf zone testing of various prototype 8x8 armored
personnel carriers that represent current available technology. This
testing contributed to the development of both our ACV requirements and
our over-arching modernization strategy.
It should be noted that only two of the five proposed designs for
ACV 1.1 are based on foreign designs--one of which was specifically
required to enable the conduct of amphibious operations for that
nation's naval infantry.
Question. If the wheeled vehicles cannot swim, what is the
operational risk that the U.S. Navy may be unable to carry a sufficient
number of connectors to transport all of the wheeled personnel carriers
ashore within the required time period?
Answer. In order to rapidly build up combat power ashore we need
self-deploying amphibious combat vehicles. Our Ground Combat and
Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) is predicated upon maintaining this
capability. Nonetheless, we still rely heavily on the Navy to enable
our surface movement from ship to shore using the inventory of Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) connectors. If
the ACV cannot swim, the number of sorties carried out by surface
connectors will increase, which will in turn lengthen the time it takes
to place decisive capabilities on the objective and place the force and
mission at risk.
Importantly, I believe the basis of this question will prove to be
counterfactual. I am confident that the ACV will possess the capacity
to achieve water mobility performance on par with or greater than our
existing assault amphibian. That said, our phased modernization
strategy mitigates risk to the Marine Corps' ability to sustain surface
forcible entry through the development and subsequent employment of
complementary amphibious armored personnel carriers. The current AAV is
undergoing a survivability upgrade and a focused sustainment
improvement regimen. Simultaneously, the wheeled portion or other two
thirds of our required armored lift will be fielded and incrementally
improved to ensure the full range of required capabilities are
available via ACV. Finally, the strategy allows for the replacement of
the upgraded AAV in the mid-2030's. This replacement will be informed
by a mid-2020s decision point regarding the achievability and
application of high water speed capability and a comprehensive
assessment of ship-to-shore options.
Question. Do you support the Marine Corps' decision to develop and
field a wheeled armored vehicle to replace the AAV-7, the current
amphibious assault vehicle?
Answer. Yes, the current phased modernization strategy provides a
responsible means to realize significant near term improvements in
capability while sustaining surface assault capacity without high
acquisition risk and cost. The combination of modernized AAV and
incrementally improved and fielded Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) is
a well thought out portfolio approach that balances the competing
demands of performance, cost and, schedule in a period of marked fiscal
constraints while providing the Marine Corps with multiple options to
adapt as the future unfolds. The improved capabilities inherent in our
current ACV competitors will provide our Marines with superior mobility
on the modern battlefield.
Question. In your view, where does armored amphibious assault fit
in the set of capabilities required to field a credible amphibious
operations capability?
Answer. Armored amphibious surface assault is absolutely essential
to our ability to field a credible amphibious capability that poses
menacing dilemmas simultaneously and in depth across all domains; air,
maritime, land, cyber, and space. To this end, surface assault elements
will complement, and be complemented by, vertical envelopment
capabilities (CH-53K, MV-22). These maneuver elements will work in
concert with capabilities that provide Naval and Aviation fires
(manned--F35 and unmanned--UAS / UAX), and other defensive and
offensive (Electronic Warfare, Cyber, Information Operations)
capabilities. Of course, this dynamic collective capability, which will
operate from the sea base--often distributed--will be synchronized with
command and control systems and logistics sustainment. With this, we
must always view amphibious operations within a Joint construct. The
salient point is that each of these capabilities relies upon one
another to generate the synergy, tempo, kinetic, and cognitive effect
necessary to impose our will on our adversaries.
The increased likelihood of operations in the littorals requires a
renewed focus on the Marine Corps' responsibility to be organized,
trained and equipped, ``for service with the fleet in the seizure and
defense of advanced naval bases.'' The Naval services have long sought
to develop complementary means of conducting vertical and surface
littoral maneuver from increased distances, and via multiple
penetration points, using the sea as maneuver space to offset the range
and precision of modern weapons.
f-35b requirements
Question. The Marine Corps has stated that its F-35B requirement is
420 aircraft. The total number of F-35s planned for the Department of
the Navy is currently set at 680.
Do you believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully
accommodate the needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps has looked at this number carefully a
number of times based on our global commitments, plans, COCOM
requirements, and the national defense strategy. In 2013 McKinsey and
Company was hired by AT&L to do an F-35 Operations and Sustainment Cost
Reduction Strategy study. The study applied requirements of the
National Defense Strategy to include deployment and warfighting
contingencies. The results of that study were that the Marine Corps was
buying the right number of aircraft.
Answer. In near term, however, we are not buying enough airplanes.
Our legacy airframes are aging and have been supporting combat
operations for 15 straight years. Continuing to repair and modernize
those aircraft will only get us so far and we are beyond the point now
where we need to recapitalize the fleet. We have driven efficiency into
our procurement plan and as a result, our total aircraft inventory
today is 10 percent larger than what our inventory will be at the
completion of the F-35 transition.
Question. How do you assess the progress of the first squadron to
be equipped with the F-35B as they complete fielding? Are they on track
to achieve initial operational capabilities on time?
Answer. I believe we are on track to achieve initial operational
capability. The Deputy Commandant for Aviation sent a team to assess
the IOC readiness of that squadron last week. I've been informed that
the inspection went well. The current Commandant is analyzing the data
from the event and is expected to make a statement about it soon.
-53k
Question. The first flight for the CH-53K has been postponed once
again, the latest delay of many for the $25 billion program.
What is your assessment of the current status of the CH-53K
program? Is it on track to achieve initial operational capabilities on
time?
Answer. The CH-53K will transition to first flight this year and
production is on a schedule that meets the timeline for delivering
aircraft as currently planned and budgeted. The recent CH-53K technical
challenges have been overcome and developmental test continues.
Progress continues in all phases of the program and we have no major
emerging concerns. Developmental Test revealed minor developmental
discoveries. These discoveries are normal for any new program of this
type. We believe that finding these issues prior to first flight will
ultimately improve testing efficiency.
Question. What is the effect of the CH-53K delays on the CH-53E
fleet? On overall USMC readiness?
Answer. The CH-53E transition to the CH-53K is already slow due to
the shallow ramp rate in production and the transition scheduled to be
complete by 2028. Consequently, we will have to continue to operate the
CH-53E for a longer period of time than originally planned. We
currently have a shortage of CH-53Es, and that problem is exacerbated
by the need to operate the legacy fleet longer than anticipated. We
have a major four year readiness recovery program in the making to
ensure we gain maximum service life and capability from the 53E fleet.
However, we can't sustain the 53E indefinitely and any future budgetary
reductions to the CH-53K program will aggravate this situation. The
Marine Corps is strongly committed to keeping the program on track and
keeping the Program of Record buy in order to avoid the inventory
shortfalls we are experiencing now.
joint acquisition programs
Question. What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs,
such as the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter?
Answer. I support joint solutions to common capability gaps.
Working with other Services is, and always has been, a major element of
the Marine Corps overall Research and Development (R&D) and Procurement
strategy. Our limited budgets demand that we adhere rigorously to the
well-established Department of Defense (DOD) hierarchy of materiel
alternatives. If we cannot find a solution to our materiel needs in the
commercial marketplace, we always look next to take advantage of
investments that other Services, DOD Components, or our foreign
partners are making. This reduces our need to spend R&D dollars on
unilateral efforts, and it gives all participants involved with joint
programs the opportunity to reduce unit procurement costs, and
ultimately, life-cycle operation and maintenance costs. The end result
is realized in the form of commonality and affordability across the
Services making it much easier to share sustainment resources such as
training, maintenance equipment, and supplies.
Question. Do you see utility in encouraging the services to conduct
more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and
unmanned systems?
Answer. Yes. Encouraging joint development begins with
collaboration of requirements during the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System process and the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC). This is a key element of fostering joint development
among the Services. The Marine Corps is working with the Army on
unmanned systems and robotics.
Question. If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend
implementing more joint program acquisition?
Answer. Within the Department of Defense, the enforcement
mechanisms are well established. The JROC plays an important role in
harmonizing the Services warfighting requirements and ensuring that
joint program opportunities are fully examined.
religious guidelines
Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations
around the world where they must engage and work effectively with
allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be
different than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is
not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their
culture and society. Learning to respect the different faiths and
beliefs of others, and to understand how accommodating different views
can contribute to a diverse force is, some would argue, an essential
skill to operational effectiveness.
In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the
military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and
other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without
impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious
belief?
Answer. Yes, the religious accommodation policies are sufficient.
They strike a balance between individual expression of belief and the
needs of the Marine Corps to maintain good order and discipline, unit
cohesion, military readiness, and combat effectiveness.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes, however we must also consider any impact on military
readiness and combat effectiveness.
Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and
respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and
beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to
preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments?
Answer. The Marine Corps respects individuals' personal religious
faith and we believe that the current policy accommodates our Marines
and balances individual beliefs with the needs of the Marine Corps.
Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about
personal faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing
servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment?
Answer. The Marine Corps respects individuals' personal religious
faith and we believe that the current policy accommodates our Marines
and balances individual beliefs with the needs of the Marine Corps.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commandant of the Marine
Corps?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
counter-isil strategy
1. Senator McCain. Is our current strategy against ISIL succeeding?
General Neller. To date, our strategy is not succeeding. Though we
have made it difficult for ISIL to operate openly in many areas, and we
are supporting allies who are confronting ISIL on the battlefield with
some success, ISIL still holds many of the areas they have gained, and
they appear to have traction with and support from many in the region.
They remain positioned in Iraq, have made gains in Syria, have
established a presence in Libya and have gained adherence from Boko
Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabab in Somalia and even some Taliban in
Afghanistan. Additionally, and as concerning, is the impact their
information campaign has had in gaining recruits willing to travel to
join them especially from the Western World and to radicalize others in
the homeland of the U.S. and our allies, to execute acts of terror at
home. They are both a threat as a physical force and in their ability
to incite terrorist actions through their messaging.
2. Senator McCain. Are the ends, ways and means of this strategy
aligned to achieve the goal of degrading and destroying ISIL in a
duration of time that does not pose unacceptable levels of risk to U.S.
national security interests?
General Neller. To defeat any adversary, all elements of national
power must be employed with sufficient and comparable effort to do so,
and at present this does not appear to be the case. I say that tempered
by the fact in my current assignment, I am not immersed on a daily
basis in the national strategy. If confirmed, this would be something
that would have my personal attention. That said, based on our current
level of effort in the military LOOs, and the success thus far achieved
in denying a sanctuary and Building Partner Capacity (BPC), unless
changed by some yet to be seen dynamic, e.g., a change in the
leadership of the primary combatants or their primary supporters, or a
greater commitment of Turkish or GCC forces to ground offensive action
in Iraq and/or Syria, I believe the campaign timeline to ``defeat''
ISIL at the current level of effort and the success of the current LOOs
must be viewed in years.
3. Senator McCain. You characterized the current conflict with ISIL
in Iraq and Syria as a ``stalemate.'' You said that neither side is
winning. However, as General David Petraeus has said about the fight
against ISIL, ``these are fights where, if you are not winning, you are
probably losing, because time in not on your side? Would you agree with
that assessment?
General Neller. I would agree that a stalemate with ISIL is not an
acceptable option for the United States or its allies, if only because
stalemate, as a resolution, permits the establishment and continuation
of what would become a nation state that is engaged in hostilities with
U.S. interests. At the tactical level today, I see a stalemate. After
the appearance of ISIL on the battlefield in Syria, and then in Iraq,
they made rapid gains. In Iraq, these gains were partially due to the
poor leadership and readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces but also due
to the disenfranchisement of the Iraqi Sunni in the areas where ISIL
made their advances. These advances have been stopped and to some
degree reversed, due in some part to the actions of the U.S. and other
coalition members, but until the territorial integrity of Iraq is
reestablished there will be no ``win.'' Further, it is important to
recognize there are financial costs associated with war, and all are
aware of fiscal situation of this country and many others. In this
regard, I believe Gen Petraeus is correct. For this to drag on without
an end in sight will challenge us not only fiscally, but from the
perspective of the support of the American people, which is critical to
any U.S. military effort. The best way to gain the support of the
American people is to be successful. We are not winning, in the sense
that the metrics one would expect to see in a successful military
campaign are not necessarily evident.
4. Senator McCain. Have our operations to date seized the strategic
and operational initiative from ISIL? If not, why?
General Neller. No, to date, they have not. Our actions in support
of the Iraqi Security Forces did stop the ISIL advance and push it back
to the current state. Since then Ramadi and Fallujah have fallen and at
this time, ISF operations supported by Shiite Popular Militia Forces
supported by Iran are attempting to take back these towns and to push
ISIL back from the Bajii area. The Kurds in the north are holding/
making some progress. If the Iraqi's were able to apply pressure on
ISIL in multiple areas at the same time it would force ISIL to fight on
multiple fronts, increasing the possibility of collapsing the ISIL
forces in Iraq. So at the operational level of the campaign they have
not seized the initiative.
Without being there to see with my own eyes I am not well
positioned to answer the ``why not.'' Based on what I have read in open
source materials, the ISF lacks the aggressive spirit and combat
leaders to take the fight to the enemy. ISIL is willing to fight and
die for their cause. Strategically, I cannot speak of how all the
coalition, especially the GCC nations who have a stake in this fight,
are working together to synchronize their efforts, not just militarily
but across all the elements of national power. The United States cannot
do this alone and must build a coalition for both Iraq and for Syria to
take the fight to ISIL and stabilize the region as a whole.
5. Senator McCain. Our current counter-ISIL strategy assumes that,
with enough United States and coalition training, assistance, and
support, including air strikes, ground forces in Iraq and Syria will
develop sufficient capability and will to go on the offensive against
ISIL, defeat them on the ground, take back territory in their countries
from ISIL, and put ISIL on the path to defeat. Do you think this
assumption about Iraqi and Syrian forces is realistic? If not, how
would our strategy have to change in order to maintain our goals of
degrading and destroying ISIL?
General Neller. Based on my experience with the Iraqis, though now
somewhat dated, I believe the assumption for Iraqi forces is realistic.
There is at least a standing force to begin with and I believe they can
be trained to defeat ISIL. To do so they need equipment and training to
fight as a unit. More importantly, they must be paid, have a reasonable
belief that if wounded they will receive medical care, and if they die
their family will receive something. Most importantly, they must have
good leadership. Finally, all of this will be for naught if the Bagdad
government does not provide an equitable level of support to the Sunni
Iraqis and treat them in a just way. This is probably the most
difficult piece and the part which if it is not corrected will continue
to fuel a Sunni insurgency against the Baghdad government. At the end
of the day, the Iraqis have to fight the fight and win the fight. They
can do this.
Though I have met with the Jordanian leadership on several
occasions from 2012-2013, my sense of the fight in Syria is dated. I
have no sense of the quality, skill, intelligence, and motivation of
those who are being trained to fight against ISIL, so based on that and
based on the results achieved thus far, my military opinion is that
this will be much more difficult. As I stated in my testimony, Iraq is
complicated but at least all but ISIL are on the same side of the line
of contact. Syria is exponentially more complex due to all the various
players: the Assad regime, Russia, Iran/IRGC, Hezbollah, Lebanon, and
Israel, Syrian Opposition factions, Al Nusra, Kurds, Turkey, Jordan,
the GCC nations and ISIL who fight on one comingled battlespace.
6. Senator McCain. Given the attacks conducted in Little Rock,
Arkansas; Fort Hood, Texas; and Chattanooga, Tennessee, should our
soldiers, sailors and airmen, and marines serving in the United States
be armed to protect themselves? If so, what should commanders account
for in training, operations and threat assessments?
General Neller. First and foremost, it must be our absolute
priority to provide adequate protection to our servicemembers,
regardless of duty station. We need to remain ever vigilant and
prepared to modify our posture based on the threats we face. These
measures already include the presence of armed security at our gates,
base security forces/Military Police, and unit duty officers being
armed and other force protection processes and measures in place.
Additional measures can be put in place when called for.
While I am confident that the security of our major bases in the
Marine Corps is adequate to protect the force and our families on base,
security at our approximately 1500 Recruiting Stations/Sub Stations and
approximately 150 Reserve Centers, many of which we share with other
Services, are somewhat less secure. Our Reserve Centers could more
easily have armed servicemembers on duty since they have weapons
present and a means to secure them. I believe we are doing this at the
present time, in compliance with state and local laws, and where the
marine bearing the weapon has met all the qualifications to carry a
weapon and has received the necessary instruction in the rules of use
of force.
Recruiting stations are the most problematic. At present, there are
limitations on storage for ammunition and weapons in some locations. We
could remedy this, but it will take time and funding, all of which can
be provided. Another important consideration to me is the time taken
away from the recruiting mission to perform and sustain these
requirements, and more importantly time taken away from efforts to find
and recruit the best men and women to be U.S. Marines and the potential
that bearing arms might restrict recruiters' access to the places where
they find these same young Americans--high schools and college
campuses.
I have a responsibility to protect all our marines and their
families. The safety of the force will be among my highest priorities
and I will be paying close attention to the investigations and
Secretary of Defense directed reviews into the recent tragedy in
Chattanooga to identify areas where we can make improvements, including
examining whether and how to arm the force. I will also seek the views
of the recruiting force on this issue. In the meantime, we must look at
immediate improvements to harden their facilities as well as other
security actions that we can implement now.
I am not ready to say, at this time, that we should. I will make
force protection one of my highest priorities, including in appropriate
environments and conditions, arming the force.
Regarding what commanders should account for in training,
operations and threat assessments, the Commandant has directed a review
of our authorities for carrying weapons and policies regarding
qualifications, training levels and frequency, and applicable
certifications. That review, and the lessons we glean from the ongoing
investigations and Secretary of Defense directed reviews into the
tragedy in Tennessee will inform our way forward. What I can say is
that we need to proceed with caution when introducing additional armed
personnel into the public environment.
iran
7. Senator McCain. How would you characterize the Iranian regime's
regional ambitions? Do you believe Iran is currently succeeding in
achieving those regional goals?
General Neller. In my opinion, Iran sees itself as the preeminent
power in the Middle East. They believe this is their historical
heritage and right. Their actions around the region, in support of
other Shiite followers, have caused instability within existing
governments, many of whom are allied with the U.S. I believe Iran
causes problems in Bahrain, and Iranian adventurism will continue to
find footholds there and elsewhere so long as there is an audience
predisposed to receive it. So, in varying degrees, Iran is succeeding
in shaping and changing the political environment in Yemen, Southern
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to their view and against United States
security interests.
8. Senator McCain. Do you believe that the Assad regime in Syria,
Houthi forces in Yemen, and Hezbollah are as operationally effective as
they have been in large part due to Iranian support?
General Neller. Based on my information and understanding, Iranian
support, from weapons, training, funding, active participation of
Iranian advisors and even in some cases units, has been a significant
contributor to the effectiveness of each of these groups. Hezbollah has
probably benefitted the most. They are a de facto Iranian state within
Lebanon that would not have the weaponry or military capability they do
without Iranian support.
9. Senator McCain. Do you believe that the United States is doing
enough to counter Iran's malign influence in Iraq, Syria, and the
region at large? If not, what more can and should be done?
General Neller. Wherever possible we should step up our efforts
against Iran's malign activities. We know that Iran is involved or
complicit in destabilizing countries from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, and
Yemen and throughout the region. It is also clear that Iran uses
support to militants, support to terrorist groups, and hybrid warfare,
all of which are eminently activities NOT in the national security
interests of the United States. It is in our interest to push back in
every possible way against these destabilizing and damaging actions.
The Iranians must be watched constantly, and when they violate treaties
and laws such as through the shipment of illegal arms to their proxies,
they must be confronted.
We should be more aggressive in this area, to include sharing
information about their illegal and destabilizing activities. We must
never give them a ``pass'' on things they do which are illegal and
impact our interests and those of our allies. I will endeavor to
provide my best military advice on any requested military options for
countering Iranian aggression, whether that aggression is direct or
through their proxies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Inhofe
readiness of the force
10. Senator Inhofe. How do lower readiness levels and a smaller
force impact our ability to deter aggression?
General Neller. The Marine Corps is operating with elevated risk in
meeting the tenets of the defense strategy. At funding below the
President's Budget request, we would have less readiness and inadequate
forward presence to assure allies or respond to crisis in the manner
needed. The defense strategy requires a sustained ability to deter
aggression, operate effectively across all domains, and respond
decisively to emerging crises and contingencies. The Marine Corps, as
the nation's expeditionary-force-in-readiness, does this by defending
the homeland with forward presence. Smaller, less ready forces will
produce fewer forward deployed forces, resulting in increased risk to
our national security interests.
11. Senator Inhofe. Should the United States be postured to fight
two Major Contingency Operations simultaneously? What is the impact of
only being postured to fight one Major Contingency Operation?
General Neller. Given the complex global security environment and
the requirements for safeguarding U.S. interests detailed in our
national documents such as the National Security Strategy, the National
Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy, we must be able
to effectively fight our adversaries in more than one theater of war,
even if our capability only allows for winning in one theater and
deterring/holding in the other.
Being postured to fight one Major Contingency Operation reduces the
military's deterrent effect and would likely reduce the confidence of
our allies and partners.
12. Senator Inhofe. Given the current force structure of the Marine
Corps sized at 182,000 and a global environment that is becoming more
unstable, how do you get the Marine Corps back to a goal of 1 to 3
deployment to dwell ratio without growing the Marine Corps knowing the
world is not getting safer? How much longer can the Marine Corps
sustain the 1 to 2 ratio?
General Neller. We believe the optimal size force for the Marine
Corps is 186,000 marines. As previous Commandants have testified, the
186K force was designed as a 1:3 deployment to dwell force; however,
this force is unaffordable. That being said, the American People expect
the Marine Corps to be nation's force and readiness, and they demand
that when the Nation is least ready and needs us most, the Marine Corps
will be the most ready, will answer the call and win. At our current
size of approximately 184,000, the Marine Corps seeks to allocate
forces supporting current operations with a deployment-to-dwell range
of 1:2 to 1:3 for the majority of our units. Utilizing that range, we
will work with the combatant commanders and provide forces that support
operational and Service requirements. As an integral part of the Marine
Corps Total Force, the Marine Corps Reserve will continue to play a key
role in providing the essential shock absorber for the Active
Component.
182,000 is the minimum force where we can meet the combatant
commanders' requirements and provide a two to one deployment to dwell.
We are working with the Joint Staff and combatant commanders to develop
new, different, innovative ways to give the combatant commanders the
capability they need to meet the mission, and at the same time, buy the
Marine Corps more dep-to-dwell relief. If we were to go lower than
182,000 marines, the reduced deployment-to-dwell ratios would increase
the risk to the force, the time we need to prepare for deployments, and
sustain our readiness and our ability to meet combatant commander's
requirements.
13. Senator Inhofe. Given the Marine Corps current state of tiered
readiness and current global commitments, if a major or even minor
contingency operation were executed today in one of the COCOMs, is it
possible the Marine Corps would have to send forces into combat that
are not fully trained and ready? Would you have to take forces from
other COCOMs? If yes, what would be the impact on operations in those
COCOMs?
General Neller. Today forces that are forward deployed are ready to
operate and fight tonight. That said, if a major contingency/operation
arose and the majority/all of the force were required, we would deploy
them at their current state of readiness. This is not optimal, but if
necessary, we will do the Nation's bidding. Marines do not run away
from a crisis or fight. Although we are always committed to generating
ready forces, a strategic surprise or another situation of vital
national interest may erupt where national leaders order the deployment
of forces that are not sufficiently manned, trained, and equipped--
essentially not being fully ready for the mission.
We will do everything in our power to protect the readiness of
marines deploying into harm's way and look to the Congress for the
support required to guarantee this readiness. A return to sequestration
level spending puts the military on the path to degraded readiness and
the hollowing of the force. Deploying such an unready force, whose
readiness could have been protected, is unacceptable.
If we had a commitment elsewhere, we would take forces that are
currently forward-deployed, such as in the Far East and Okinawa, and we
would have to reposition them to wherever that contingency was. We did
that during the combat in Iraq. The other option--the least favorable--
is we go all in. We activate our reserves and we go and do what needs
to be done. We've done that before, but it's not sustainable for more
than a short period of time.
It's a difficult question without knowing the exact size of the
force, what the exact mission was, what the combat ratios were, what we
would need to do, and what we would have to accomplish militarily to
achieve the political objective. Wherever they are assigned around the
globe, the combatant commanders will get Marines who are smart, fit,
disciplined, trained, experienced, take care of each other, and are
ready to fight tonight and to provide what America expects of her
Marine Corps: an expeditionary crisis response force in readiness.
security of the force
14. Senator Inhofe. Do we need to reassess our security levels,
rules of engagement, training requirements, ability to increase manning
of armed security personnel, and authorization for military personnel
to carry government firearms both concealed and openly carry to and
from duty?
General Neller. We learned a great deal in the aftermath of the
Washington Navy Yard shooting and developed a comprehensive list of
recommendations that was approved by both Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of Defense. The recommendations became a task list that
included directed improvements specific to both Marine Forces Reserve
and Marine Corps Recruiting Command. In addressing Chattanooga, we've
reconstituted the Washington Navy Yard Integrated Product Team to
ensure that the earlier work informs our observations for the future.
USMC actions following the 16 July Chattanooga shooting will focus
on the following: Arming/Enhanced Security Postures, Improved Physical
Security, and Alert & Notification/Information Sharing. While a great
deal of emphasis is being placed on the arming of personnel, we also
need to look at the long-term and sustainable approach to improving the
physical security of our facilities. We know that we have challenges in
our desire to improve mass notification and warning capabilities at our
off-installation facilities, and we're exploring a number of possible
solutions; nothing is off the table. The recent events have identified
a continuing risk that all military personnel face every day while
carrying out their duties, and we must ensure that we are prepared and
ready to address this risk. To continue supporting the security and
safety of our Marines, a review of security, force protection, and
arming policies has been conducted. All our commanders have been
directed to conduct a review of their current antiterrorism, physical
security and force protection policies, procedures, and measures. If
higher guidance or local conditions were to require the arming of
security personnel, commanders are charged to ensure that all
applicable requirements are properly addressed, documented, and
enforced.
Rules for the use of force are in place, and weapons qualification
and training requirements are well-documented. Aboard our
installations, we have a cadre of Military Police and Civilian Police
officers who provide 24 hour security. Commanders have established
auxiliary security forces aboard the installations to augment law
enforcement personnel in the event of increased force protection
requirements or emergencies. Commanders also have authorities to
establish Camp Guard units.
Commanders have authority to allow personnel to carry concealed
weapons in the performance of their duties and all authorizations are
provided in writing. Open carrying of weapons is currently limited to
personnel in an on-duty status. The ability to carry weapons to and
from duty is limited by policy to General Officers and Criminal
Investigators.
providing lethal weapons to the ukraine
15. Senator Inhofe. In your opinion, what types of lethal weapons
and assistance should the United States be providing the Ukraine to
help defend their terrorist?
General Neller. Russian aggression and their support to separatists
in Ukraine and elsewhere are deeply troubling. That said, given the
nature of the crisis, the pursuit of a diplomatic solution remains the
optimal way to achieve a resolution consistent with our national
interests and the interests of our allies in the region. In the
meantime, we should continue the provision of non-lethal supplies and
defensive equipment (counter fire radars) and ISR support to Ukraine
and continue our training of their forces. If, in the future, the
dynamics in Ukraine necessitate a more robust military response, I
would recommend the provision of weapons and systems--such as anti-
armor weapons--and the commensurate trainers to employ the weapons
capable of effectively countering the battlefield threats the Ukrainian
military feels they need the most assistance in defeating.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Cotton
iran
Senator Cotton. General Neller, I am sure during your time at I MEF
Deputy Commanding General you saw the reports of Marines killed in
Iraq, and might have known Marines that were killed in the Beirut
Marine Corps Barracks bombing in 1983. Iranian terrorists and proxies
have a long, infamous record of killing Americans around the world. The
deal cut with Iran on their nuclear program will lift sanctions not
only for the Iranian economy, but also for some of the worst actors
within the Iranian regime. These are entities that form a nexus of
companies and organizations that support not only proliferation and
Iran's attempts to create a bomb, but also coincidentally support
terrorist groups like Hezbollah, and Iranian militias in Iraq who have
targeted and killed many American men and women in uniform with
explosively formed penetrators (EFP).
16. General Neller, what do you say to the survivors and families
of our men and women killed by Iranian proxies and bombs over the last
35 years knowing that we are going to underwrite their continued terror
campaign by lifting sanctions against all of these bad actors,
including IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghassem Suleimani?
General Neller. I did know Marines killed in Beirut and like you
have seen first-hand death on the battlefield. When I have met and
talked with the families of those we lost, I did my best to comfort
them and to assuage their grief. As you know first-hand, this is hard.
I tell them that their loved ones did their duty and we who knew them
are enormously proud to have served alongside such brave men and women
like those who have lost their lives at the hands of the cowards who
hide behind weapons of terror. I can only hope and pray that these
words and our willingness to talk with them, provides them some
comfort. Regardless if we end up with an agreement with the Iranians on
their nuclear program, I give you my word that this regime's nefarious
and destabilizing actions, assuming that they continue, will have my
closet attention and that Marines will be both aware of this threat and
be prepared to counter them, wherever they may be.
asia
17. Senator Cotton. Asia is arguably the most important region in
the world economically for the United States. Asian nations surpassed
Europe as our leading trade partners in 1977, and total trade with Asia
is double the trade with Europe. Asia is our largest source of imports
and second largest export market (outside of North America), and the
region has outpaced every other region on in the growth of exports
since 2005. The United States trades more with South Korea than with
Germany, more with Singapore than with France, and more with Japan than
with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France combined. The U.S. must
have a sustained role in the region, and that role is secured by
American military might. Marine amphibious forces remain a critical
capability in demonstrating American military might.
As the Commandant will the amphibious combat vehicle remain a top
priority for the Marine Corps?
General Neller. Yes. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is the
centerpiece of the Marine Corps' Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle
Strategy (GCTVS) and a key enabler of our operational concept--
Expeditionary Force 21. As such, ACV is the Marine Corps' number one
ground acquisition program and is critical to our ability to conduct
expeditionary amphibious operations as well as to provide armored
protected mobility and maneuver during the conduct of operations
ashore.
Armored amphibious surface assault and maneuver ashore are
absolutely essential to our amphibious capability. The Naval services
have long maintained the need to possess complementary means of
conducting vertical and surface littoral maneuver from increased
distances, and via multiple penetration points, using the sea as
maneuver space to offset the range and precision of modern weapons. The
ACV is vital to our ability to meet our statutory obligations to the
Nation.
18. Senator Cotton. How important will amphibious capabilities be
for our Allies in the Pacific? How will you ensure amphibious
interoperability with our Allies?
General Neller. Amphibious capability will always be important in
areas dominated by the littorals. As such, we prize both the
capabilities of our allies in the Pacific and our ability to
interoperate with them. Further, amphibious capabilities are
increasingly important for our partners and allies as they are pursuing
ways to meet Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions
and crisis response demands in the region.
Interoperability is also essential and allows the U.S. to work in
inclusive and coordinated ways to counter challenges to regional
security and stability. Interoperability is ensured over time by a
commitment by each state to work together on shared interests. We are
able to do this through the Marine Rotational Force--Darwin, a unit we
are looking to increase the size and scope; our units stationed in
Okinawa and Hawaii; the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) which is
based in the Pacific; as well as the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEU's based
out of San Diego which regularly transit the region.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Sullivan
top priority
19. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, in your role as commandant
you are charged with manning, training and equipping marines for
service as directed by the president. When confirmed, what do you see
as an area that will require your immediate attention, what will be
your first priority?
General Neller. The current Commandant and the Corps' senior
leadership have been wrestling with the current fiscal and readiness
challenges for the past several years. Today, our marines are operating
forward around the globe performing the mission of America's
expeditionary force-in-readiness. If confirmed, my number one priority
will be to ensure those marines deployed and those next to respond have
the resources and training they need to be successful. I will also
continue initiatives instituted to meet our readiness and training
challenges such as developing better readiness metrics, improving
leader-to-led ratios, identifying key enlisted leader billets and
investing more time in the development of those key leaders.
pacific lift
20. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, the current Commandant has
said in multiple forms (hearings, public speaking engagements, answers
to Advanced Policy Questions from the SASC), that lift capacity to
support the shifting laydown of forces in the Pacific theater will be
insufficient and constitutes a major concern for you. In your response
to the Committee's questions you stated that you ``look forward to
working with the Services and the U.S. Pacific Command to address'' the
lift needs in the Pacific. In your prepared questions you state,
``There is not enough amphibious warship capability to support an
assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades required for
contingency response . . . There are no alternatives that have been
developed to mitigate the wartime or contingency response requirement
for an amphibious fleet.'' General Neller, if confirmed, what are some
of the ways you would consider to address this pending shortfall? Does
Congress need to appropriate more funds?
General Neller. Increased funding for amphibious warships will
certainly be important. It is true that we currently lack the 33 ships
in a mix of 11 LHD/LHA(R), 11 LPD, and 11 LSD/L(X)R required to embark
an assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). The
current Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for 2015 does not meet
the required mix until fiscal year 2024. I'd like to mention the fact
that the amphibious ship total will actually be 34 because of the
wisdom of the Congress in providing funds to support the requirement of
a 12th LPD. My recommendation is to authorize multi-year and block buy
procurements to ensure that the current shipbuilding plan stays on
schedule. This will allow both the service and industry to operate on a
predictable and more cost effective schedule which will ensure the
maturation of this plan and prevent its completion from continually
getting pushed further into the out years.
21. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, do we have sufficient lift in
the Pacific to accommodate the Marine Corps redeployments from Okinawa?
If no, how confident are you that we will have it by the time the
marines begin redeploying throughout the Pacific?
General Neller. Amphibious warfare ships provide the best
operational capability and embarkation capacity to enable marines to
conduct missions throughout the Pacific. We currently have 30
amphibious warfare ships in the battle force inventory, which is below
even the agreed upon minimum number of ships in a fiscally constrained
environment (33), let alone the optimal number (38) for crisis and
contingency response. Our first redeployment from Okinawa to Guam is
scheduled for fiscal year 2021 which pre-dates the completion of the 33
ship amphibious fleet by several years. This will further stress an
already under-size fleet. All this said, we must: focus on
recapitalizing our amphibious warship inventory by protecting and
properly funding the ship building program; improve the readiness/
maintenance of the ships we have; and continue to develop alternative
lift platforms for Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations.
22. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, as Admiral Roughead testified
to the SASC in April, do you believe we should also consider moving
additional naval and maritime assets forward into the theater to
support our peacetime and contingency lift?
General Neller. Yes, I agree with Admiral Roughead that the more
forward presence we achieve in the Pacific with naval and maritime
assets, the better we will be able to accomplish our peacetime missions
as well as respond to crisis and contingency operations. Additionally,
he is correct that simply moving assets around the Pacific is not
optimal. Creating additional operational capability and embarkation
capacity will provide us the best freedom of movement and allow us to
most effectively handle the significant number of missions in this
massive theater.
pacific pathways
23. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, over the last two years, the
U.S. Army has been conducting an expeditionary-like set of exercises
called Pacific Pathways. During these exercises, U.S. Army forces
deploy off ships to exercise with our allies in the Asia-Pacific
Region. Recently, General McMaster testified in front of the Airland
Subcommittee stated about the Army's new Operating concept, ``We're
emphasizing really two concepts . . . one is expeditionary maneuver.''
General Neller, in your personal opinion, in a budget constrained
environment, can we afford to have an Army mission in the Pacific that
is redundant with another service's long-standing mission?
General Neller. The Pacific is a significantly large AO, with such
a large number of opportunities to train and operate with allies and
partners, that there is sufficient space for operations of both the
Marine Corps and the Army. However, as the service with primary DOD
Directive and title 10 responsibility for the development of amphibious
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment, our capabilities are
reliant on the Nation's investment in our partnered Navy programs. It
is therefore imperative that the Marine Corps maintain its historic and
habitual relationship with the Navy aboard amphibious assault ships in
order to respond with well trained and well equipped amphibious forces.
Insufficient inventory and operational availability of the Navy's
amphibious warships for training and readiness of marines makes
increased demand problematic. Any U.S. Army expansion to a greater
capability in amphibious operations should not come at the cost of U.S.
Marine Corps amphibious training and readiness or negatively impact our
historic and habitual relationship with the U.S. Navy aboard ships.
24. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, in testimony before the SASC,
General Milley said that the U.S. Army ``has to do both'' missions of
seaborne capabilities and airborne assault capabilities. In your
personal opinion, does the U.S. Army have to do both, or does the
Marine Corps already provide this nation's amphibious assault
capabilities?
General Neller. Based on title 10, the Marine Corps is responsible
to be organized, trained and equipped to come from the sea across the
range of military operations, and therefore provide amphibious assault
capabilities. The Marine Corps has primary responsibility for the
development of amphibious doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment,
our capabilities.
25. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, in your personal opinion,
what is view on Pacific Pathways? Is it redundant to the Marine Corps
mission in the Pacific?
General Neller. The Pacific Pathways seeks to increase and enhance
allied and partner engagement and interoperability training throughout
the PACOM AOR. The Pacific AOR is sufficiently large and complex that
it supports operations by both the U.S. Marines, and the U.S. Army
without it necessarily being redundant. We look forward to continuing
to work with the U.S. Army to maximize the impact and dividends that
accrue to our operations in the Pacific and prevent any redundancies in
order to achieve the best return on our investments in the region.
marine corps missions
26. Senator Sullivan. General Neller, the Marines Corps has many
missions, including producing responsible and engaged citizens, whether
they serve four or forty years. Can you comment on this mission of the
Marine Corps?
General Neller. Returning Marines to civilian life as responsible
and engaged citizens is a hallmark of marine training and culture. It
is my goal that our ethos of Honor, Courage, and Commitment guides
everything we do, whether conducting humanitarian assistance overseas
in places like Nepal this year, supporting Americans at home like in
Hurricane Sandy, or fighting terrorism while building partner capacity
in places like Iraq. From boot camp to the battlefield and back home
again, the Marine Corps seeks to set up marines for success.
One part of this is helping marines transition. Our Transition
Readiness Program is designed to prepare marines for transition to
civilian life. The Marine Corps Transition Readiness Program does this
by preparing and connecting transitioning marines with resources to
successfully meet educational, employment or entrepreneurship goals
throughout their career to ensure success once they move to civilian
life. The Personal Readiness Seminar that marines attend after arriving
at their first permanent duty station helps plant the seed for their
future. Topics include an overview of personal and professional
development services, and financial topics such as banking and
financial services, savings and investments, living expenses,
understanding debt, and servicemembers' consumer rights. The intent is
to get marines thinking about transition early, so that they may
recognize opportunities while they serve that will prepare them for
success after service.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Shaheen
integration of women
27. Senator Shaheen. Last fall the Marine Corps established the
Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force to evaluate the performance
of women in combat units. I understand that this task force is wrapping
up part of its evaluation this month. Can you discuss the metrics you
will use to determine whether or not women may serve in infantry units?
General Neller. The data which was collected during the GCEITF is
still being collated and analyzed. It encompasses a number of
performance-based metrics that will inform whatever decision the
Commandant makes to the SECDEF on the integration of women into the
ground combat element which includes: infantry, artillery, armor
(tanks, LAVs and Amphibian Vehicles), combat engineers and
reconnaissance units. Whatever recommendation is made will be based on
the Marine Corps' unwavering focus on combat effectiveness and ensuring
the fullest success of each marine. Any recommendations to the
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, and the Congress will be
made in that context.
28. Senator Shaheen. The former commanding officer of the 4th
Recruit Training Battalion at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island
in South Carolina has received much attention after being relieved for
cause in June. This case has raised questions regarding the level of
support female recruits receive to ensure their success. While other
services have integrated basic training, why does the Marine Corps
segregate women during boot camp, and would integrated basic training
increase combat effectiveness?
General Neller. The purpose of recruit training is to make marines
out of the fine young men and women who step forward to take the
challenge to join our Corps. The young men and women who arrive at the
recruit depots to begin the process are generally away from home for
the first time. They have brought with them diverse perceptions of
right and wrong. Equally eclectic is their understanding of permissible
behavior. Their experiences with authority figures may have been good
or bad, proper or improper/abusive. In general, they arrive with
immature, undeveloped and unfocused thoughts on professionalism and
professional conduct. The only thing they have in common is their
desire to be a marine. By capitalizing on that desire, recruit training
transforms these individuals from many diverse backgrounds into marines
imbued with a common set of values and standards.
At the recruit depots, civilians are transformed into basic
marines. It is a physically and mentally challenging ordeal, one that
requires constant supervision. Drill instructors control and manage the
transformation through 24 hour/day interaction with their recruits.
They teach core values, institutional rights and wrongs and what
constitutes proper authority. This teacher-student/father-son/mother-
daughter relationship is the heart and soul of the recruit training
experience and success or failure of the socialization process rests
squarely on this process. After much research and analysis, we believe
that keeping male and female recruits separate at this entry level of
training allows for the most effective transformation from civilian to
marines.
After recruit training, the Marine Corps, unlike other Services,
has a block of training entitled Marine Combat Training between recruit
training (socialization) and military occupational skills training. It
is at Marine Combat Training that newly forged marines are actually
taught combat skills. This training has been integrated since March
1997. The important distinction from other Services is that this
training occurs after recruit training, after the intense
transformation process which replaces diverse and confused perspectives
of right and wrong with strong and clear marine standards of behavior,
and after vulnerable, tentative civilians have developed the values,
mental and physical toughness, self-reliance and confidence essential
to earn the title marine.
deployment to dwell ratio
29. Senator Shaheen. In your advanced policy questions, you state
that the Marine Corps is operating at a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell
ration. You state that this is not sustainable over the long term. Can
you discuss in further detail the impact high operational tempos have
on marines and their families as well as on the reserve force?
General Neller. As the Nation's force-in-readiness, the Marine
Corps must maintain a high state of readiness within our home station
units as they constitute the ready force that would surge to unexpected
crises and major contingencies. At a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell ratio,
the time at home station to prepare for the next deployment is
compressed, which reduces the time to train and the time after a
deployment to be with our families.
In order to continue operating in a high operational tempo, such as
a 1 to 2 deployment to dwell ratio, risk is placed on unit readiness as
personnel are sourced to protect the readiness of deployed or `next-to-
deploy' units. This decision is necessary when validated operational
requirements exceed resource availability. To reduce stress and
impacts, the Marine Corps will continue to ensure that our quality of
life programs focus on core requirements and provide support in the
critical areas that directly impact marines and families; e.g. Yellow
Ribbon Reintegration Programs, family readiness programs, and the
Military Family Life Consultant Program. Our Reserve Force is fully
integrated with the Active Component and, as such, deals with the same
stresses and impacts as the Active Component under this scenario but at
a reduced tempo of 1 to 5. Our quality of life programs are developed
for the needs of our Reservists as well.
marines on foreign ships
30. Senator Shaheen. I understand the Marine Corps is considering
deploying marines aboard foreign ships to increase response times for
contingency operations. What are the risks associated with this
strategy, and is it driven by fiscal considerations?
General Neller. For decades, the Marine Corps has conducted
amphibious interoperability training with allies and partners to
develop their organic capability and our ability to operate with them
should a crisis occur. We currently conduct amphibious training with
Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, the
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. While
developing the capacity to operate more seamlessly with our allies/
partners remains a priority, the Marine Corps is not seeking
relationships that might compromise the ability to command and control
U.S. forces. The Marine Corps must retain the capability to respond
immediately to threats to our Nation's security. For the Marine Corps,
this means retaining the maritime flexibility offered by U.S.
amphibious ships.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Donnelly
amphibious combat vehicle (acv) program
31. Senator Donnelly. General Neller, the Marine Corps has
identified the Amphibious Combat Vehicle as a top priority program.
What capabilities beyond ACV 1.1 do you want to see in ACV 1.2?
General Neller. As I stated during recent testimony, we are
confident that ACV 1.1 will achieve water mobility performance that is
on par with our existing assault amphibian, yet with significantly
enhanced protection and improved land mobility. Water mobility and
range are obviously very important to us. The sooner we get these--
without trading critical armored protected mobility, land mobility, and
troop carrying capacity--the better.
Importantly, ACV 1.2 will include our ACV mission role variants.
These mission role variants include Command & Control and Recovery
platforms, but could also include other variants identified at a later
date.
32. Senator Donnelly. What in your view is the future of amphibious
combat vehicles for the Marine Corps?
General Neller. Future amphibious combat vehicles must have the
capability to rapidly transition from ship to shore, use the natural
and man-made waterways in the littoral regions as maneuver space, and
once ashore, provide the protected mobility necessary to deliver the
infantry to their objectives--be they against an opposing enemy force
or in support a host nation's request for humanitarian assistance.
Our phased acquisition approach supports this effort. ACV 1.1 will
be an amphibious combat vehicle that will provide armored protected
lift for two infantry battalions. Near simultaneously, we will be
conducting critical survivability upgrades to our AAV fleet to provide
armored protected lift capability for four infantry battalions. In
fielding ACV 1.2, we will modernize the required protected lift for
four more infantry battalions. Concurrently, the Marine Corps is
supporting S&T efforts to pursue a High Water Speed (HWS) capability
that will enable an Amphibious Force to rapidly transition from stand-
off distance at a sea base to objectives ashore and utilize other
littoral and inland waterways as maneuver space.
The bottom line is that the Marine Corps' has established an
affordable and technologically feasible strategy that will provide the
Nation with the ability to use the sea as a maneuver space across the
range of military operations.
33. Senator Donnelly. How important will amphibious capabilities be
for our Allies in the Pacific?
General Neller. Amphibious capabilities are increasingly important
for our partners and allies as they are pursuing ways to meet HA/DR and
crisis response demands in the region. Interoperability allows the U.S.
to work in inclusive and coordinated ways to counter challenges to
regional security and stability. Interoperability is ensured overtime
by a commitment by each state to work together on shared interests.
34. Senator Donnelly. How will you ensure amphibious
interoperability with our Allies?
General Neller. The Marine Corps currently promotes
interoperability with our partners and allies through robust exercise
and engagement plans. For example, we hold annual service-level staff
talks with some of our strongest partners in the Asia-Pacific. These
staff talks help facilitate our allies' amphibious development by
coordinating activities such as exercises, personnel exchanges,
international military education and training (IMET), foreign military
sales, and general security cooperation efforts between services.
naval surface warfare center lab structure
35. Senator Donnelly. General Neller, Naval Surface Warfare Center
Crane in Indiana is the largest supporter of the Marine Corps across
all NAVSEA activities. The Marine Corps relies on the Surface Warfare
Center lab structure to meet many of its RDT&E, depot maintenance and
in-service engineering support needs. If confirmed, how will you work
with the Navy to ensure Marine Corps requirements are adequately
prioritized by NAVSEA and the Surface Warfare Centers?
General Neller. The Marine Corps has an ongoing, mutually
beneficial relationship with the NAVSEA Warfare Centers. This
partnership deliberately strengthens the understanding of needs and
capabilities through continuous communication and coordination. For
example, we host an annual ``Warfare Center Week'' at Quantico with
proven productive working sessions where the participants discuss and
gain mutual understanding of Warfare Center capabilities, program
information, and program needs. We conduct this event early in the
calendar year to enable and inform resource planning for the following
fiscal year. Negotiations on scope of work continue through the spring,
producing ``Task-books'' with the coordinated specificity to assign the
required Warfare Center technical support to individual Program
Managers and define the required funding. As an added key link in this
teamwork, the Warfare Centers have established a Marine Corps
Coordination team. The engineering staff at Marine Corps Systems
Command participates in biweekly teleconferences with this team to
address emerging opportunities and issues. Continuous engagement with
collaborative processes and open dialogue helps us ensure Marine Corps
requirements are fulfilled through the unique capabilities of the
NAVSEA Warfare Center enterprise.
sniper rifle modernization
36. Senator Donnelly. General Neller, in recent weeks media reports
have highlighted concerns among current and former marine snipers about
the range, accuracy and lethality of the M40A5. What are the top
priority capability enhancements in the Marine Corps' current efforts
to upgrade from the M40A5 to the M40A6?
General Neller. Top priority capability enhancements from the M40A5
to M40A6 are an improved ergonomic adjustable stock which is lighter
and more ergonomically adjustable for individual shooters along with an
improved and more durable barrel; in addition the weapon is lighter and
more transportable due to decreased weight and length. Each M40A6 will
also receive a Scout Sniper Ballistic Calculator adding to the enhanced
accuracy of the sniper suite by increasing first hit probability.
37. Senator Donnelly. Will the new M40 variant have an extended
effective firing range beyond that of the M40A5?
General Neller. No, the M40A6 like the M40A5 is accurate out to
1000 yards. The Marine Corps is continuing its validation of other
weapon systems to determine if adoption of another system in different
calibers is a material solution for our requirements and we are
participating in SOCOM and U.S. Army testing and evaluation of the PSR
in both 300 Win Mag and .338 Lapua.
38. Senator Donnelly. What is your assessment of the feasibility
and advisability of moving to a .300 or .388-caliber round for use by
marine snipers?
General Neller. We are evaluating both calibers in conjunction with
Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army. Further, we are also
looking at the feasibility of replacing M107 SASR with a weapon that
uses .300 Winchester Magnum or .338 Lapua ammunition. Our current .308
caliber weapon (the existing M40 Sniper Rifle) provides range to 1000
yards and allows us to train on all existing sniper ranges. Both .300
Winchester Magnum and .338 Lapua would give us extended range to 1200+
m and provide accuracy for the anti-personnel mission. Finally, .338
Lapua has potential for an anti-material mission.
39. Senator Donnelly. General, Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane
supports Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command with weapons
systems like the MK-13 .300 WINMAG Precision Sniper Rifle AND THE 7.62
Combat Assault Rifle, both of which were developed by NSWC Crane for
the Special Warfare community. How can the expertise and capabilities
available at NSWC Crane be leveraged in future conversations about
modernizing marine sniper rifles?
General Neller. We currently leverage both the expertise and
knowledge of NSWC Crane and are active participants in many of their
programs. We have leveraged them in such things as the SOPMOD kit or
M4A1 CQBW kit, we were active participants in the SCAR and coordinate
with them on most programs especially SOCOM weapons and equipment. We
will continue to leverage their abilities into the future.
ground based operational surveillance system
40. Senator Donnelly. General Neller, GBOSS is built by NSWC Crane
as the Lead System Integrator. How do you believe G-BOSS can impact or
improve our force protection efforts stateside or abroad to monitor the
flow of foreign fighters across lines?
General Neller. The G-BOSS system originated in 2006 through the
Urgent Needs Process in support of our marines engaged in OIF and OEF.
Their positive impact to improving our force protection and
intelligence collection efforts against our enemies, including foreign
fighters, in Overseas Contingency Operations have been detailed in
numerous lessons learned and After Action Reports. The current GBOSS
Family of Systems with its three variants--GBOSS Heavy, GBOSS Medium,
and GBOSS Light--scale well to our Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
structure and allow for operations involving units down to the company
level. Primarily, G-BOSS is used in support of overseas operations for
force protection, check point security, route reconnaissance, patrol
over-watch, IED emplacement detection, intelligence collection, and
personnel/vehicle identification.
In May of 2013, the Deputy Commandant for Plans Policies and
Operations (DC PP&O) in coordination with Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration (DC CD&I) developed a DOTMLPF Change
Request requirement document for G-BOSS. The requirement details the
interim transition plan for current G-BOSS related equipment
inventories from post OIF and OEF to steady state operations. It also
defines a steady state interim requirement for 41 total G-BOSS systems
that support Marine Corps' persistent ground surveillance requirements.
In 2015 a Letter of Clarification increased that requirement through
Fiscal Year 2020 to our currently funded 52 Systems. These 52 systems
support deployed Marine Forces, Special Purpose (SP) MAGTF-Central
Command and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Augmentation Program
(MAP) as well as sustaining home station training. The Marine Corps'
Director of intelligence has initiated comprehensive MAGTF sensing
strategy to identify how future MAGTFs will ``sense'' to achieve
battlespace awareness. G-BOSS and other similar capabilities will serve
as key assets in that future strategy.
The Marine Corps does not intend to use GBOSS as a home station
base security system in anything other than a short term augmentation
role to our existing systems. GBOSS is a tactical system, designed to
be expeditionary and rugged with integral power systems including
generators that would be as ill matched to long term CONUS Bases and
Station Force Protection requirements as it would not compare favorably
in capability for cost against other less tactical purpose built base
security systems that would require less sustainment, training, and
maintenance.
muscatatuck urban training center
41. Senator Donnelly. General Neller, the Marine Expeditionary Unit
has a vital role in our post-9/11 force. They have performed in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, Turkey, and Kosovo, to mention just a few.
They also have the task of spearheading the Humanitarian and Disaster
Relief mission so vital to our international partners. The Marine Corps
has utilized Camp Atterbury and Muscatatuck Urban Training Center
previously as a cost-saving option for pre-deployment training. How can
these facilities be of greater service to facilitate more training
opportunities for the Marine Corps?
General Neller. Initial analysis is that we keep both locations
gainfully employed throughout the calendar year. Muscacatuck has been
scheduled and used frequently by Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC), Marine Forces Reserve (MFR), Expeditionary Operations and
Training Group (EOTG II MEF), Training and Education Command (TECG),
and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. Atterbury has the preponderance
of use by a host of elements from MFR, which use it as primary training
grounds for reserve elements from MO, IL, IN, and TN, as well as
MARSOC, and Recruiting Station Indianapolis. Loss of either would have
a huge impact on MFR training for the greater Midwest.
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Robert B.
Neller, USMC follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 15, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as Commandant
of the Marine Corps and appointment in the United States Marine
Corps to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections
601 and 5043:
To Be General
Lt. Gen. Robert B. Neller, 0298.
------
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Robert B.
Neller, USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Lt. Gen. Robert B. Neller, USMC
Source of commission:
Platoon Leaders Course (PLC)
Educational degrees:
University of Virginia, BA, 1975.
Pepperdine University, MA, 1981.
Military schools:
The Basic School, 1976.
Armor Officers' Advanced Course, 1983.
Amphibious Warfare School, 1984.
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1991.
NATO Defense College, 1994.
Joint & Combined Warfighting School, 1995.
Capstone, 2004.
Joint Force Air Component Commander, 2005.
Navy Strategic Thinking Course/Executive Business, 2010.
Senior Executive EEO Seminar, 2010.
Joint Qualified Officer.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2nd Lt.................................... 4 Jun 75
1st Lt.................................... 4 Jun 77
Capt...................................... 1 Sep 79
Maj....................................... 1 May 86
Lt. Col................................... 1 Aug 92
Col....................................... 1 Oct 97
Brig. Gen................................. 1 Jan 03
Maj. Gen.................................. 21 Jan 07
Lt. Gen................................... 11 Jan 11
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jul 14........................... Present...... Commander, United
States Marine Corps
Forces Command;
Commanding General
Fleet Marine Force
Atlantic; Commander,
United States Marine
Corps Forces Europe
(Lt. Gen.).
Aug 12........................... Jun 14....... Commander, U.S. Marine
Corps Forces, Central
Command (Lt. Gen.).
Jan 11........................... Aug 12....... Director for
Operations, J-3,
Joint Staff (Lt.
Gen.).
Aug 09........................... Dec 10....... President, Marine
Corps University
(Maj. Gen.).
Jun 07........................... Aug 09....... Commanding General, 3d
Marine Division (Maj.
Gen.).
Aug 05........................... Jun 07....... Deputy Commanding
General, I Marine
Expeditionary Force
(Forward) (Brig. Gen./
Maj. Gen).
Jul 02........................... Aug 05....... Director, Operations
Division, Plans,
Policy and Operations
(Col./Brig. Gen).
Mar 02........................... Jul 02....... Assistant Division
Commander, 2d Marine
Division (Col.).
Dec 01........................... Mar 02....... Deputy Director of
Operations, EC/J-3,
U.S. European Command
(Col.).
Jun 01........................... Dec 01....... Assistant Division
Commander, 2d Marine
Division (Col.).
Jul OO........................... Jun 01....... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, 2d Marine
Division (Col.).
Jun 98........................... Jul 00....... Commanding Officer,
6th Marines, 2d
Marine Division
(Col.).
Jul 97........................... Jun 98....... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, II Marine
Expeditionary Force
(Col./Lt. Col.).
Jul 94........................... Jul 97....... Staff Officer, Policy
and Requirements
Division, Supreme
Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (Lt.
Col.).
Jun 93........................... Jan 94....... Executive Officer, 7th
Marines, 1st Marine
Division (Lt. Col.).
Jul 91........................... Jun 93....... Commanding Officer, 3d
Light Armored
Infantry Battalion,
1st Marine Division
(Maj./Lt. Col.).
Jun 91........................... Jul 91....... Plans Officer, 1st
Marine Division
(Maj.).
Jul 88........................... Jul 90....... Commanding Officer,
Marine Corps Security
Force Company Panama
(Maj.).
Jul 86........................... Jul 88....... Project Officer,
Headquarters, Marine
Corps (Maj.).
May 83........................... Jun 86....... Instructor; Company
Executive Officer,
Defense Section Head,
The Basic School
(Capt./Maj.).
Feb 81........................... Sep 82....... Company Commander,
Alpha Company, 1st
Battalion, 1st Marine
Division (Capt.).
May 80........................... Feb 81....... Headquarters Element
OIC/Personnel
Officer, Headquarters
Company, 1st
Battalion, 1st Marine
Division (Capt.).
Nov 79........................... Apr 80....... Director of Students,
Marine Corps Recruit
Depot San Diego
(Capt.).
Nov 78........................... Nov 79....... Aide De Camp, Marine
Corps Recruit Depot
San Diego (Capt./1st
Lt.).
Jun 77........................... Nov 78....... Assistant Series
Commander; Series
Commander, Marine
Corps Recruit Depot
San Diego (1st Lt.).
May 76........................... Apr 77....... Platoon Commander,
Company L, 3rd
Battalion, 4th
Marines, 3rd Marine
Division (2nd Lt.).
Oct 75........................... Apr 76....... Student, The Basic
School (2nd Lt.).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director for Operations, J-3, Jan 11-Aug 12 Lt. Gen.
Joint Staff....................
Deputy Director of Operations, Dec 01-Mar 02 Col.
EC/J-3, U.S. European Command..
Staff Officer, Policy and Jul 94-Ju1 97 Lt. Col.
Requirements Division, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe.........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operational assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commanding General, 3rd Marine Mar 09-Mar 09 Maj. Gen.
Division/Operation Enduring
Freedom........................
Deputy Commanding General, I Feb 06-Feb 07 Maj. Gen./
Marine Expeditionary Force
(Forward)......................
Operation Iraqi Freedom......... Oct 05-Oct 05 Brig. Gen.
Staff Officer, Policy and Jan 97-Feb 97 Lt. Col.
Requirements Division, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe/Operation Allied Force..
Commanding Officer, 3d Light Dec 92-Feb 93 Lt. Col./Maj.
Armored Battalion, 1st Marine
Division Operation Restore Hope
Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Feb 90-Ju1 90 Maj.
Security Force Company Panama
Operation Promote Liberty......
Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Dec 89-Jan 90 Maj.
Security Force Company Panama
Operation Just Cause...........
Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Aug 88-Dec 89 Maj.
Security Force Company Panama
Operation Contingency Security.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Decorations
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Combat Action Ribbon
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation
Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Iraq Campaign Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Armed Forces Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon
Navy Arctic Service Ribbon
Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Ribbon
Marine Corps Drill Instructor Ribbon
NATO Medal
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Robert B. Neller, USMC in connection with his
nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Robert Blake Neller.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
3. Date of nomination:
15 July 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
9 February 1953, Camp Polk, LA.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to D'Arcy A. Neller (39 years). Maiden name: Dutch.
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Lifetime Member, University of Virginia Alumni Association.
Member, Marine Corps Association.
Lifetime Member, Third Marine Division Association.
Member, AARP.
Military Officers Association of America.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller, USMC
This 8th day of July, 2015
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller,
USMC was reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on August 4,
2015, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2015.]
NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL JOHN M.
RICHARDSON, USN, TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan,
Reed, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine,
and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets today to consider the nomination of Admiral
John Richardson to be the 31st Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral Richardson, we thank you for joining us this
morning. We're grateful for your many years of distinguished
service to our Nation and for your continued willingness to
serve.
We also welcome members of your family who are joining us
this morning, and thank them for supporting you and the Nation.
As is our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony we will
invite you to introduce any family members that are joining us.
The next Chief of Naval Operations will lead our Navy in
confronting the most diverse and complex array of global crises
since the end of World War II. With instability spreading
across the Middle East and North Africa, more than ever our
Nation is counting on the forward presence, power projection,
and rapid response that the Navy uniquely delivers.
In the Asia-Pacific, China is undertaking an ambitious
naval buildup that seeks to project power and influence in key
waterways of the Asia-Pacific and beyond. While our rebalance
to the Asia-Pacific has shown some success, this policy has not
yet addressed the shifting military balance in any serious
manner. While some would rather avoid a discussion of our
competition with China, this relationship will be a serious
challenge for our Navy. And yet, while worldwide challenges
like these grow, the Defense Department has grown larger but
less capable, more complex but less innovative, more proficient
at defeating low-tech adversaries but more vulnerable to high-
tech ones. And worse, the self-inflicted wounds of the Budget
Control Act and sequestration-level defense spending have made
all of these problems worse.
Now more than ever, a strong Navy is central to our
Nation's ability to deter adversaries, assure allies, and
defend our national interests. And yet, by any measure, today's
fleet of 273 ships is too small to address these critical
security challenges. The Navy's requirement is 308 ships. The
bipartisan National Defense Panel calls for a fleet of 323 to
346 ships. And our combatant commanders say they require 450
ships. With continuing high operational tempo and drastic
reductions to defense spending, we will conduct the downward--
we will continue the downward spiral of military capacity and
readiness until Congress acts.
Admiral Richardson, there are several challenges that will
require the next Chief of Naval Operations' personal
leadership. I look forward to discussing many of these today.
First, each Ford-class aircraft carrier has experienced
more than $2 billion in cost growth. This program continues to
be plagued by technology immaturity, concurrent development and
production, and a lack of reliability test data for critical
systems. This is unacceptable. I repeat, unacceptable. And I
fully expect the Navy's ongoing study of alternative aircraft
carrier designs to provide real options.
Next, the Navy still needs to justify the littoral combat
ship's transition to a frigate, which is required in the Senate
NDAA, and all 3 of the LCS mission packages must overcome major
technology integration challenges to deliver the promised
warfighting capability.
Several other important new shipbuilding efforts will
require the Service Chief's leadership in the coming years,
including building the first Ohio-class replacement submarine,
building the first Flight-3 destroyer with the new air and
missile defense radar, and integrating the Virginia payload
module on attack air--submarines. In naval aviation, it will
take strong leadership to address the strike fighter shortfall,
oversee the smooth and timely integration of the F-35 joint
strike fighter into the fleet, and ensure the right
requirements for the first unmanned carrier-launched airborne
surveillance and strike system. We must also maintain our
advantage in the capability and capacity of our munitions.
Fielding new weapons, like the long-range anti-ship missile,
and improving existing ones, like the family of standard
missiles, will continue to be essential. Our ships and planes
have been operating at a sustained high operational tempo for
over a decade. And it shows. Clearing maintenance backlogs and
restoring the Navy's readiness will be a priority.
Finally, we cannot forget about our members of the United
States Navy. High operational tempo and lucrative opportunities
outside the Navy continue to drive some our best talent to
leave the service. I'm interested in your plans to manage
operational tempo and views on how best to provide a
competitive and modern compensation package that provides the
right retention incentives. No matter how many dollars we
spend, we won't be able to provide our military the equipment
they need with a broken defense acquisition system that takes
too long and costs too much. With this year's National Defense
Authorization Act, this committee has embarked on a major
effort to reform this system, including ways to empower our
service leaders to manage their own programs and take on
greater accountability.
Admiral Richardson, we are interested to hear your views on
improving defense acquisition based on your many years of
service. Thank you. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcome Admiral Richardson and his
family--his father, his wife, his daughter. Thank you all very
much. We all understand that no one serves alone in the Navy or
elsewhere, so thank you very much.
You have an extraordinary record of service to the Nation
in the Navy, and we thank you for that. You have a remarkable
record as the Director of Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, your
current assignment. And, in that assignment, you are familiar
with many of the issues Senator McCain raised: acquisition. How
do you design a program that's not only effective but is
affordable? And those are one of the major issues you're going
to confront as the CNO.
You'll be asked to ensure that we have a quality force--
that's recruiting, training--and, in this respect, ensuring the
highest ethics are employed in the service, particularly when
it comes to the issues of domestic violence, which we've seen
all too often in the military services. That's another role we
expect you to play.
We have a world that is full of crises, and the Navy is one
of the major ways that we project force and we deal with
uncertainty and changing conditions. And it remains that way.
But, as the Chairman has pointed out, one of the issues you'll
face is affordability. How do we afford all the ships that we
need? How do we bring on the next class of ballistic missile
submarine, the Ohio replacement class? And then, these
challenges are exacerbated by the prospect of looming
sequestration or temporary arrangements to get by year to year
rather than a long-range plan to fund the Navy and the other
services.
So, all of these challenges will be before you. I'm
confident that you will be able to face them, and look forward
to your testimony this morning.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Admiral, before we continue, let me ask
you the standard questions that we ask all of military
nominees.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress be able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
Admiral Richardson. I do.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Richardson. No, sir.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Richardson. I will.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisals for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Richardson. They will.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Welcome. And please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, NOMINEE TO BE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Richardson. Thank you. Chairman McCain, Senator
Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored
and humbled to appear before you as the nominee to be our next
Chief of Naval Operations. I am grateful for the confidence of
President Obama, Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mabus.
I'd like to begin by thanking Admiral John Greenert and his
wife, Darlene, for their magnificent service to our country for
over 40 years, and especially for their role in leading our
Navy these past 4 years. They have been tireless and superb
advocates for our sailors, their families, our Navy, and our
Nation.
I'm grateful to have my family here with me today,
Chairman, as you recognized, as they have been throughout my
entire career.
My dad is here with me today. My dad's a retired Navy
captain who served with distinction for 25 years through the
Cold War. And I remember, like it was yesterday, the nights
that my mom and we six kids would get together in our living
room, and my dad would come out in his service dress blues and
his seabag. We would say goodbye for 6 months, and then we
would carry on, supporting each other until my dad came back
home. I got my start in the Navy from my dad, and he continues
to advise me, sometimes vigorously, and make me proud.
My wife, Dana, is here.
Chairman McCain. I had the same experience.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Richardson. My wife, Dana, is also here. Dana and I
met as classmates in York High School in southern Maine, and we
married just as soon as we could after I graduated from the
Naval Academy. And over the last 33 years, Dana has raised our
five children while I was away at sea, and has supported Navy
families in every way possible. She's always been there with
me, challenging me and adding perspective that I long ago grew
to depend on.
Our daughter, Rachel, one of our five children, is here
representing the Richardson tribe. She's a student at the
University of Virginia and is a summer intern in the Amputee
Center at Walter Reed.
Our oldest son, Nathan, is a Navy lieutenant. He and his
wife are serving overseas in Naples, Italy. Our other son,
Daniel, is doing research for renewable fuels in Hawaii. Our
two youngest children, Matthew and Veronica, are visiting
family in Oregon before they return home to go back to school.
If you ask Dana, she would say, ``We're just a typical Navy
family.'' We have moved 20 times, our kids have attended dozens
of schools, we've lived all around the country and overseas.
Today, the Richardson family, like so many other Navy families,
is ready to continue to serve our Nation.
I am also conscious that I am here before this committee
for the very first time, and I want to thank you for your
leadership in keeping our Nation secure and keeping our Navy
the strongest that has ever sailed the seas. And, if confirmed,
I very much look forward to working closely with you to
continue that important work.
I see the naval profession as a bond of trust and
confidence with the American people and with our sailors. And I
hold some core beliefs about our Navy that guide me. The Navy
must be at sea, underway. It must be present around the world,
protecting American interests, enabling access to international
markets and trade, responding to crises, and providing
security. We are at our best when we operate with others,
including our fellow services, especially the Marine Corps, as
well as with our partners and allies.
The muscle and bones of the Navy are our ships, submarines,
and aircraft, highly capable, exercised frequently, well
equipped, and ready to operate from the sea and far from home.
But, the heart and soul of our Navy are our sailors. Every day
around the world, our sailors can be found on, under, and over
the sea. They are smart, resourceful, committed Americans who
want to be part of something special, to serve their country by
being part of a high-performing team. They are rightly proud of
what they do. And they are a formidable force. Despite a
growing set of challenges and some significant strains, they
continue to go to sea to do what must be done today, and to
adapt and innovate in order to prevail tomorrow. It is a
privilege to work with, and especially to lead, such a capable
and resilient team.
America sends us their sons and daughters, their brothers
and sisters, their fathers and mothers to go to sea with us,
potentially into harm's way. In return for that sacrifice, our
Navy must provide them a positive and respectful environment
where they can thrive and achieve their highest potential.
And finally, the American people demand, as they should,
that we execute our mission in a prudent and responsible way,
worthy of their confidence in us.
The bottom line is that, in any situation, in any
competition, and certainly in any fight, America expects that
their Navy will find a way to win. And we will.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I
will give everything I have to honor and strengthen the bonds
of trust and confidence that your Navy has with our Nation and
its people.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson, General Dunford recently stated--made a
couple of statements in his appearance before this committee.
One was that he said we can't--we cannot execute the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review with the budget cuts as a result of
Budget Control Act, known as sequestration. He continues
stating that ongoing cuts will threaten our ability to execute
the current defense strategy. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman McCain. Do you believe that, as other witnesses
have--in uniform have stated, that continued adherence to
sequestration will put the lives of the men and women serving
in the Navy at greater risk?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman McCain. You do.
Are you seeing what I'm hearing, that there is becoming a
morale problem and possibly, over time, a retention problem
because of the effects of sequestration on ability to plan,
ability to train, readiness, long deployments, et cetera?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, from my experience, when I get
around the fleet--and I do a fair amount of that--morale
remains high, but there is a degree of unsettledness and
uncertainty that arises from uncertainty in the fiscal
environment. And so, as we manage our way through continuing
resolutions, the looming sequestration--sequestration always
looming over us, and manage our way through these times of
reduced resources, there is an unsettled feeling in the force
as this uncertainty clouds the air. They remain committed, as I
said in my statement, to doing the job that they have been
given. They want to be trained properly to execute the mission.
And so, that's the way I see it right now.
Chairman McCain. Which sequestration is a hindrance to.
Admiral Richardson. It is, yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Department of Defense has announced a 2-
month gap of aircraft carrier presence in the Middle East later
this fall while we are conducting air operations from the
carrier there. Does that concern you?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, that does concern me, but I would
say that the overriding message that I hope is clear is our
firm commitment to a naval presence in that region. We've been
there for decades.
Chairman McCain. And the absence of the carrier doesn't
really authenticate a commitment.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think the commitment does remain
strong, and we'll work to mitigate----
Chairman McCain. So, does this impair our ability to carry
out operations, the absence of the carrier?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think we will mitigate the
absence--any absence of the carrier through other capabilities,
using the entire----
Chairman McCain. Tell me one other--tell me what replaces
an aircraft carrier, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. Well, sir, you could use other air
assets, strike assets to mitigate that gap.
Chairman McCain. For example.
Admiral Richardson. Land-based air or----
Chairman McCain. So, now you're--believe that land-based
air can replace the presence of the carrier?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, there's no question about the
value of an aircraft carrier in the region, sir.
Chairman McCain. Well, then that doesn't comport with what
you just said.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I was trying to make the point
that--about our long-term commitment in the region.
Chairman McCain. I'm talking about a 2-month gap in the
short term.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. That gap is a reflection of
the earlier strains on the force, long-term commitments----
Chairman McCain. Yeah, but my question was, Is that going
to hinder our ability to carry out the needed operations in the
region, where obviously there's conflict taking place?
Admiral Richardson. Without that carrier, there will be a
decrement in our capability there, yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. After more than 2 million--billion dollars
in cost growth of the first three Ford-class carriers, what--
it's an example, and a glaring example, of cost overruns and
schedules delays. What extent would giving the Chief of Naval
Operations greater responsibility for acquisition programs help
reduce cost overruns, schedule delay, and fix this problem,
which, at least in the view of many of us, have difficulty
justifying to our taxpayers?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I share your concern about the
cost overruns of the carrier, and I agree with you that they
are unacceptable. From my experience, controlling cost and
schedule while delivering capability really resides from
adhering to a few fundamental principles. One is clear command
and control that is lean and agile. We've got to have a
definition of requirements that is informed by available
technology and available resources. You've got to have a stable
design and a build plan before you begin production. And
finally, you have to have informed and close oversight. I think
that the Chief of Naval Operations is involved in every step--
every one of those four steps. And, if confirmed, I look
towards--forward to being very involved in acquisition.
Chairman McCain. Well, unfortunately, the last Chief of
Naval Operations testified before this committee that he didn't
know who was responsible for it. I hope you're aware of the
changes that we're trying to make in the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] which would make the Chief of Naval
Operations more involved.
And finally, do you believe that it's appropriate, or would
you be supportive of, a provision in the NDAA which calls for
examinations of alternative platforms for aviation, as opposed
to what is basically, right now, the only game in town?
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I look very much forward
to supporting that study completely and seeing what information
it produces.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Admiral
Richardson.
Following on the Chairman's questioning, the biggest
program--new program coming online is the Ohio-class
replacement. And you talked about sort of getting it right,
from the beginning, which is requirements. And you're in a very
significant position right now with your participation on the
nuclear reactor program. Are you satisfied with the
requirements, as they exist today, of 16 missile tubes on the
Ohio-class, one of the most significant aspects?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, the current requirements for
the Ohio replacement program are exactly what we need to
continue to deliver that capability.
Senator Reed. And not only now, but if you're the CNO,
you'll continue to look closely at those requirements to ensure
that they're necessary and sufficient, though.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. The other--what other requirements in--with
respect to the Ohio-class replacement do you think are
critical, besides the two? Are there any other key, sort of,
game changers that you're looking at?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. Certainly, as I look at the
Ohio replacement program, a program that will be defending the
Nation well into the--for 50 years--well, potentially into
2080s--there are some things that you must build into the ship
that you must get right from the very start, and then there are
some things inside the ship where you allow technology to
mature and advance. I would say that a critical component that
must be addressed from the start is--in addition to the missile
tubes--is stealth. And we've paid a great--amount of time and
energy to make sure that we have the stealth requirements of
the submarine right.
Senator Reed. Very good.
One of the things that we have done in the last several
years in the National Defense Authorization Act is create a
sea-based deterrence fund to try to aid the construction and
deployment of this new class of submarines. And the Navy is
developing plans to use this sea-based deterrence fund. Do you
have any notion of when those plans will be forthcoming and
available to us?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, you know, the creation of
this fund, I think, highlights the existential importance of
this program to our Nation, and also that executing this
program will require a combination both of resources and
authorities. We're conducting a study right now to both mature
the design and mature the build plan. We should get that
completed by the fall timeframe, and I look forward to
collaborating when we have that more mature.
Senator Reed. And the essence underlying this national sea-
based deterrence fund, the same logic, I presume, will apply--
this is maybe a comment more than a question--to the necessity
as we go forward to replace the air- and land-based legs of the
triad, also. Because, a service--exclusively service-funded
program is very expensive, given competing demand. So, is that
your logic?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I agree with that logic. Sir,
these are critical builds to reconstitute our strategic triad.
Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One of the other areas which gives us an edge, and we hope
increasing edge, an increasing one, is the labs and the test
facilities and the intellectual infrastructure of the Navy. And
it's all over the country. We have the Naval Under-Warfare
Center in Newport, but there are so many critical aspects of
this. Particularly in these difficult budgetary times, do you
have any concerns about appropriate funding for the
laboratories? And will we lose out, in terms of their
contribution to national security?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think it's absolutely critical
that we maintain this intellectual capital to inform our
decisions, not only today, but even more so into the future,
addressing your concern that programs like Ohio replacement
remain attuned and relevant, going forward. It's absolutely
critical that we fund this so that we can remain relevant. Also
look forward to participating in discussions that can make them
more agile and competitive with their private-sector
counterparts, as well.
Senator Reed. Just a final point. I think your comments are
right on target. You need an infrastructure of research
centers, the Navy, other services, but they have to be much
more agile, much more connected to commercial procurement,
commercial enterprise, and that's a challenge that you'll have
to take on as you assume these duties.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Before I recognize Senator Ayotte, I'd
like you to affirm that the finest shipyard on earth is the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Is that correct?
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Well, thank you, Chairman. I appreciate
your confirming what we all know, and certainly what Senator
King agrees with me about, that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
is the finest naval shipyard on earth.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. We have a great partnership between Maine
and New Hampshire on this shipyard.
And I actually know that you have a history with the
shipyard. I certainly have been there before, and----
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am, I sure do.
Senator Ayotte.--we look----
Admiral Richardson. I--well, that's where my wife and I
met, was up there, and we dated all around Portsmouth. So, we
go all the--that's our----
Chairman McCain. See? Just as I----
[Laughter.]
Senator Ayotte. So, we will welcome you back to the
shipyard, and we'd enjoy that.
But, I thank--I very much thank you and your family for
your service to the country and willingness to take on this
important leadership position during these challenging times.
And yesterday, before the Committee on Readiness, Senator
Kaine and I hosted a hearing that was focused on best practices
at our Nation's public and private shipyards. And I believe my
staff provided that testimony to you.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. And one of the things that came out that is
happening at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a very strong
partnership between labor and management that has driven
performance significantly, where they are producing--producing
the work they're doing on our attack submarine fleet ahead of
schedule, under budget. And a takeaway from the hearing was
that some of these best practices that are being put in place,
that we need a better mechanism to share those among the
shipyards before--public shipyards--to ensure that we can learn
from each other to make sure that that strong partnership is
there for excellent performance between labor and management.
And I know that the Naval Sea Systems Command, NAVSEA, Labor-
Management Partnership Forum is an important start in that
effort, but I think there can be more done, based on the
hearing we had yesterday.
So, I wanted to ask you about this issue, and your
commitment to ensuring that we institutionalize best practices
among our workforce and relationships between labor and
management among all the four shipyards.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am. First, I would say that
they just are a magnificent team up in Portsmouth. And all of
our public yards are absolutely strategic jewels in our
Nation's capability. Even in my current job as Director of
Naval Reactors, we are very involved with the shipyards. And it
has been a thrust of my time here as the director to do exactly
that, ma'am, is that we can share best practices, and we can
share lessons learned, as well, more effectively. And so, that
has been a--an emphasis of my time here, and will continue, if
confirmed as CNO.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it.
As we look at the request for combatant commanders for the
support from our attack submarine fleet, and then we look at--
we have--currently, we have about 54 attack submarines, and
we're only meet of half of combatant commanders' request for.
And as we look at some of the activity, particularly in the
Asia-Pacific region, we know that there's--this is very
important, to have this capacity. And yet, where we're headed
is the number of attack submarine fleet--of subs is actually
going down to 41 as we look forward to 2029. And so, one thing
that this committee has done is really focusing on having the
Navy procure at least two Virginia-class submarines per year.
What are your thoughts on this shortfall and how we address
it? Now, overriding everything, of course, is sequester and our
need to resolve that. But, going forward, assuming we can work
together to resolve that, which has got to be top priority,
what's your thought on making sure that we have what we need?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I think it's very clear, and can
show hard evidence that we currently enjoy superiority in the
undersea domain. But, that domain is hotly contested, and we
cannot rest for a minute and remain confident. We have to
continue to keep pressing.
To address your question, ma'am, exactly as you say, we've
got to continue to try and mitigate that dip in attack
submarine force level before the--below the requirement of 48,
and we are doing everything we can to mitigate that. One is
that the two Virginia-class submarines per year are a critical
part of that program, very highly successful, continuing to
deliver below budget and ahead of schedule. That must continue,
and we must continue to try and reduce that construction time.
As well, we're looking to do what we can to extend the life
of our current Los Angeles-class attack submarines and every
other thing we can to mitigate that trough.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you.
And I know that my time is expired, but I know the Chairman
would share this concern, since we're in this public forum,
that we say something about what Russia did yesterday in the
United Nations, in terms of blocking the request for an
investigation into MH-17. And I think it shows--it's not
related to this hearing, but it shows our concerns that we've
been trying to address in this committee on Russia.
And I thank you for your willingness to serve in this
important position.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I was hoping
you would introduce me by saying I'm from the home of the
greatest Naval Surface Warfare Center in southern Indiana, that
naval bastion.
Chairman McCain. I'll try to do that in the future.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Donnelly. Admiral, thank you. And, to your family,
thank you very, very much. Like the Chairman and like you,
Admiral, my dad was a Navy veteran. He was a little bit below
decks on the ship, but loved every minute of having a chance to
be part of it.
When we look foreign and we look at the challenges we have
in the nuclear area in regards to submarine warfare, one of my
greatest concerns is the efforts to attack us, cyber-wise, to
find out our technology, to find out our plans, to find out how
we plan to map it out, going forward. And so, it's not only on
the naval side, but on our contractor side. And I was wondering
what is being done to make sure that there's no backdoors open
with our contractors that other countries can get into.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I share your concern about
activity in the cyberdomain. As we speak today, that is a hotly
contested domain. And, just on our defense and Navy networks,
we are, you know, subject to tens of thousands of attacks per
day. Attribution is very difficult, but, just like in other
domains, success, I think, revolves around being properly
organized, trained, and equipped. And Navy is moving out in
that area with 10th Fleet, the formation of cybermission teams
that would provide not only defensive and support capabilities,
but offensive tools that would be available, should our leaders
choose to use those.
With respect to protecting our networks, we use a variety
of tools. Some of those exact techniques, I'm reluctant to talk
about in an open forum.
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Admiral Richardson. But, we do maintain, both from a
physical security, a cybersecurity, and personnel, appropriate
measures to prevent those sorts of intrusions.
Senator Donnelly. And I know you're working hard on it, and
working in connection with our contractors to go over best
practices with them to ensure that every avenue to the
technology, to the intellectual capital, is cut off.
One of the things we do at Crane Naval Warfare Center is,
we collaborate a lot with the Air Force on systems and how to
save money and how to kind of be able to--and I know this is a
subject dear to the Chairman's heart--How do we make every
dollar go a little bit further? How do we work in coordination
to see if something can fit on--in both the Navy and in the Air
Force? And I'm sure you would want to continue that effort.
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely. Everywhere we can, not only
meet the requirements of the mission, but be more efficient and
effective, I'm very open to that. And particularly with respect
to the work there at Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, and
their work in fighting the proliferation of counterfeit parts
and those sorts of things is a big part of maintaining our
security in the cyberdomain.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you. And I had the privilege of
traveling with you to one of our facilities. And, during that
time, we had a discussion about the mental health of our
sailors. And I am sure that you will continue the efforts of
Admiral Greenert in making sure that--the mental health
challenges our men and women face, that you're there to make
sure there's no stigma and that services and assistance are
available.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, absolutely will remain fully
committed to that, to help our sailors be fully part of a
connected team so that, when challenges come of any sort, they
can fall back and feel--and get support.
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you this. What keeps you up at
night? What is your greatest concern? Number one, logistics-
wise, what do you need the most? And, number two is, what's the
greatest danger you see out there, in your job?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I think the Chairman mentioned
it, and it's been discussed here already at the hearing. The
thing that has my attention is the growing complexity and
urgency of our security environment around the world. Our
Nation is pulled in so many different directions, not only the
Indo-Asia-Pacific, but also we mentioned Russia and their
activity in Europe, and certainly the activity in the Middle
East. Contrasting to that is--sequestration, I think, is a
symptom of sort of a level of awareness that I look forward, if
confirmed, to enhancing, to make that message more vivid so
that we can close the gap between the growing requirements in
the security environment, and things like sequestration would--
which would threaten the resources to address it.
Senator Donnelly. Admiral, thank you for your service to
the country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Admiral, thank you very much for your
service. And thanks, to your family, for their service, as
well. The Navy is unique among our services, that, in wartime
or peacetime, the deployment pace does not really change, and
we know it puts strains on families. So, both for what you
represent for our sailors and what you represent for all their
families, we're grateful for all of their service.
Admiral, is China an adversary?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I think China is a complex
nation. They are clearly growing in every dimension. Many of
the things that they do sort of have an adversarial nature to
them. They--they've got a vastly growing nation. Their activity
in the South China Sea in land reclamation certainly has
potential to destabilize that region.
Senator Cotton. So, it doesn't sound like rosy relationship
right now with China, between the United States and our allies,
but various published reports have speculated that civilian--
our Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China that the
Obama administration has submitted to Congress may facilitate
the transfer of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology to
the People's Liberation Army's Navy. This is very troubling to
me. And, given the trends you cite, I would imagine any
increase in the capability and lethality of the PLA navy would
also worry you. Do you believe that the United States Navy has
a appreciable military advantage over the PLA navy at this
point, especially regarding nuclear naval capabilities?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, this is something I obviously
watch extremely closely. The details of this are very, very
technical and difficult to discuss in an open forum. I would
look forward to discussing those in a classified setting with
you.
But, we have taken a look very closely at the successor
agreement to continuing to exchange nuclear technologies. I
believe that, in aggregate, we would be better with a renewed
successor agreement than without it.
Senator Cotton. Even if you suspected or knew that the PLA
navy was going to divert that civilian nuclear technology
towards nuclear naval systems?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, again, the details of exactly
that assessment are classified, but I can say, with a fair
degree of confidence, that we are better with this agreement
than we are without it.
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you.
Right now, the Navy is on a budgetary path to 260 ships or
less. Do you agree with the findings of the 2014 National
Defense Panel, which was a bipartisan and congressionally
mandated group of experts, that we should have a target force
of between 325-346 ships?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think that the strategic
environment--you know, we could easily justify an appetite for
more ships, but another dimension of the strategic environment
is the resource part of that environment. Our current plan for
a 308-ship Navy represents, right now, the very best balance to
meet the demands, not only of the security environment, but
also to do that with available resources.
Senator Cotton. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus has said
that quantity has a quality of its own. Do you believe that
that is true? And, if so, is 308 ships going to be enough of a
quantity to give us that quality of its own kind?
Admiral Richardson. I 100 percent agree with Secretary
Mabus about the quality of the number of ships. And the current
plan does allow us to meet our responsibilities in the defense
strategic guidance, albeit with some risk.
Senator Cotton. In the recently issued National Military
Strategy, General Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of
Staff, describes the need to counter certain revisionist
states--Russia, China, Iran, North Korea principally among
them. But, he also writes that the U.S. military advantage has
begun to erode. Are there areas in which the U.S. Navy's
military advantage has begun to erode, relative to our
adversaries?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, this is a very dynamic
environment, and the technological environment is changing very
rapidly. As the Chairman mentioned, we've got to become more
agile in our acquisition systems to stay competitive in that
realm. But, I'm confident that, with the support of this
committee and with Congress and the innovation of the Navy, we
will do that. But, as you said, you know, some of our readiness
is starting to--we're still recovering from the effects of the
2013 sequestration as we continue to build our readiness back
up so that we've got appropriate responses forces for global
contingencies.
Senator Cotton. So, the flip side of what you just said is,
without adequate support from this Congress, then our military
advantage, as it relates to our Navy, may, in fact, begin to
erode?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Well, I hope that we provide you and all
the sailors that you represent the adequate support you need,
both to modernize our fleet and to continue to be a forward-
deployed force to project American power.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to
working with you.
Chairman McCain. We might now hear from the Newport News
Naval Shipyard, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. And Norfolk, as well, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Norfolk. Excuse me. Both.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks, Admiral Richardson. And congrats to your
cavalier daughter, Rachel. We're glad to have her here, as
well, and your family.
You've got a big day Saturday. The launch of the USS John
Warner, a Virginia-class sub, at the Norfolk base, a former
chair of this committee, and wonderful colleague. And that's a
great program, actually, to exemplify a couple of issues. The
Chair asked questions about acquisition reform. The Virginia-
class program, because of this kind of ``coopetition'' between
the shipyard at Newport News and Electric Boat in Connecticut,
has been a pretty solid program, in terms of delivering the
subs, as contracted, on time, on budget.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Are there lessons from that acquisition
strategy that, you know, we replicate on Ohio-class or other
platforms?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, we intend to leverage all of
those lessons to design and deliver the Ohio-class, using many
of the same tools that have been successful in Virginia. And we
hope to bring to you a design that is very mature. That was one
of the key successes to the Virginia program. We hope to
provide you a stable build plan that, if funded with
predictable funds, will allow the team of shipyards at Newport
News and Electric Boat to allocate risk and deliver those
submarines, along with the Virginia-class, at the lowest
possible price.
Senator Kaine. Another aspect of the USS John Warner is--
it's obviously a nuclear sub, and you are the--currently the
commander of Navy Nuclear Propulsion. When we talk about
sequester and the effects of sequester on the defense mission,
sometimes I think we ought to make sure we're broadening our
view. In your current role, you work very closely with the
Department of Energy around nuclear reactor work, as well,
don't you?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. And sequester doesn't just affect defense by
affecting the Department of Defense. The nondefense accounts,
Department of Energy being one, that are affected by sequester
also have a significant effect on our national security, isn't
that correct?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, that's exactly right. And
Secretary Moniz has been very clear about the national security
mission that he has in the Department of Energy, not only for
naval reactors, which he fully supports, but also in the
nuclear weapons business.
Senator Kaine. So, if we were just to fix sequester in the
defense accounts, but not fix sequester in the nondefense
accounts, things like nuclear research through the DOE that has
a direct impact on national security would still be
compromised, correct?
Admiral Richardson. That's true, yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. I want to ask you about readiness and the
measures of readiness. Because Senator Ayotte and I are chair
and ranking on the Readiness Subcommittee. Let's get into the
metrics a little bit.
My understanding is, normally you have about a third--Navy
would have about a third of its ships forward deployed to
support regional commanders, but then have an additional
component, usually three carrier strike groups and three ARGs,
in a surge status, so kind of trained up and ready to deploy
within 30 days. Talk to us about how sequestration and
budgetary uncertainty affects that surge capacity, the
readiness to respond to the unforeseen contingency.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator, certainly, our priority has been--and Admiral
Greenert's made this clear--that we will not deploy forces
unless they are fully ready. And so, those forward-deployed
strike groups and amphibious-ready groups will be ready in
every respect. But, to meet our responsibilities in the Defense
Strategic Guidance, we also need that surge force to respond to
contingencies once those forward-deployed forces have done
their mission. Currently, you know, our requirements are that
we have three carrier strike groups and three amphibious-ready
groups ready to deploy in the event of a contingency. Right
now, we are at one of those three. We are on a path to recover
so that we've got full readiness in both of those areas by
2020, but that also is contingent on stable and reliable
funding to get us there.
Senator Kaine. And so, from the earlier testimony, even the
forward-deployed--when we end up with this 2-month carrier gap,
the forward-deployed is affected by budgetary uncertainty, and
then, up until 2020, our surge capacity and readiness is--has
been significantly affected, and we hope to get back to that
surge capacity that we think is optimal.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Just last item, quickly. Senator King and I
were in India in October and visited the shipbuilders at the
Magazon docks in Mumbai. And there was a great deal of pride
there, and a great deal of desire to partner with the United
States. I like the fact that you mentioned the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region. I view India and the Indian navy as a partner
of growing importance as we look at this pivot to Asia. And I
think there's a strong desire to partner with the United
States, participate in naval exercises. They do more joint
exercises with the U.S. than any other nation, and I would just
like your opinion about that as my final question.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I agree, there's tremendous
importance to that region, and also potential to further those
relationships. And, if confirmed, I look forward to getting
personally involved in making those ties stronger.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you so much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Admiral, for being here today. And I do want to
take special time and thank your father, your wife, Dana, and
your daughter, Rachel, for accompanying you today.
And, Rachel, a special shout-out to you for serving at
Walter Reed right now. I have a dear friend that recently went
through the Amputee Center. So, thanks so much for all your
great service, as well.
Admiral, in reference to the Iran nuclear agreement, the
Obama administration has continuously said, over and over
again, that the alternative to the Iran nuclear agreement is
war. He--the President has made it clear in his statement, that
the only alternative is war. So, as I'm out visiting with other
people, that's kind of the response. It's picked up, and people
are saying, ``Oh, we have to go to war if we don't sign this
agreement.''
In your best military judgment, do you believe that the
only alternative to this nuclear agreement is war?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I think--my way of answering
that would be that a major mission of our Armed Forces, the
Joint Force and certainly the Navy, is to use all means
necessary to deter that type of war, not only through
preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but also by
deterring any kind of--many of the other tools that they use to
disrupt activity in that region. So, they've got considerable
conventional forces, ballistic missiles, surface forces, and
they've talked about mining the Straits of Hormuz, they support
terrorist organizations throughout the region. We need to use
the full set of capabilities that the Joint Force and the Navy
can deliver to deter that. And that military contribution is
also just a subset of a whole-of-government approach along with
our allies in the region.
Senator Ernst. So, a whole-of-government approach. And I
think that's extremely important, that we remember that, that
we do not have to sign this agreement, and that does not
necessarily mean that we will be going to war with Iran. Is
that your assessment?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I do support a whole-of-
government approach and----
Chairman McCain. Admiral, you were just asked to give your
personal opinion, if asked for it. The Senator is asking for
your opinion as to whether there are other options besides
going to war with Iran.
Admiral Richardson. I think that there are other options
besides going to war.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you.
Since we're on that topic, Iran's military budget is
approximately $11 billion per year on defense. Its posture,
however, is bolstered by a variety of asymmetric and relatively
low-cost capabilities and tactics, including swarming at sea,
artillery rockets, ballistic missiles, and UAVs. And, as you
know, through this agreement, Iran will gain about $150
billion, due to sanctions relief, and the ability to purchase
more advanced weapons and equipment through the lifting of the
U.N. arms embargo. And even if a small portion of the sanctions
relief money is directed towards their military capabilities in
Iran, what types of weapons and equipment do you believe that
Iran would purchase to improve its ability to project force
within the Persian Gulf?
Admiral Richardson. Well, ma'am, I think that we would, as
we have been throughout, be sensitive to the proliferation
market in weapons. And so, I would be very concerned about them
increasing their ballistic missiles fleet--force, as well as
their anti-ship cruise missiles, the mines, and the surface
combatants that you mentioned, as well.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Well, I appreciate that.
And I do think it is something that we have to be ever
vigilant about. This is a very serious matter that we are
facing today with Iran and its potentially increased military
capabilities in that region. This is not an American problem,
this is not an Iranian problem, this is a worldwide problem.
So, I appreciate your attention to the matter, and I do
look forward to supporting you in your confirmation.
Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral, in this day and age where people move around so
much, and particularly service families, it's hard to determine
where someone is from. My definition is, it's where you went to
high school, so I claim you as a proud son of the State of
Maine. Delighted to have you here today.
A second point. I spent some time, a year ago, on one of
your Virginia-class submarines under the ice in the Arctic.
When I came home, my wife said, ``What most impressed you?''
And I think she expected to hear about the marvelous technology
and the amazing command center and all of that. And I said,
``No, what really impressed me was the young people on that
boat.''
And you have extraordinary people. The officers, of course,
were excellent. But, what really I noticed was the spirit and
dedication and pride of the enlisted people, of the sailors. It
was their boat, and they were so engaged and proud of the work
that they were doing. I just want to commend you and pass along
the observation that you are taking command of an extraordinary
group of people. And, of course, the technology, which we've
talked a lot about today, is important. But, ultimately, it
seems to me it's the people that are going to make the
difference.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, thank you for that
recognition. And I could not agree with you more. And I am so
privileged for the opportunity presented here today.
Senator King. One of the questions that the Chairman asked
you at the beginning--he goes through a set of standard
questions--is, Will you give your personal opinion when called
upon in your position? I want to emphasize that. You're going
to be in the National Security Council. You're going to be in
the Oval Office. You're going to be at the upper reaches of the
decisionmaking process at the Pentagon. You've got to speak up.
If--you have extensive experience, wisdom, and background to--
judgment to be brought to be bear on these questions. And I
hope there'll be that--we all experience that moment in a
meeting where you say, ``Should I say something, or not?'' I
hope you'll remember this moment and, even if it's the
President of the United States, say, ``Mr. President, I have to
respectfully disagree.'' We need that from you, and I think
that's one of the most important things that you bring to this
position.
Will you give me a commitment that you're going to be just
this side of obnoxious in making your case at the highest
levels of the United States Government?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I specialize in going well beyond
obnoxious.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Richardson. And I look forward, if confirmed, to
participating in those discussions. And I will use----
Chairman McCain. If you need practice in that, Senator King
will help you out.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Your confidence is
overwhelming.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I mentioned about the Arctic. I see the
Arctic as an area of tremendous both opportunity and challenge.
Characterize our force structure and capabilities in the
Arctic, vis-a-vis Russia, particularly in the area of
icebreakers.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, the United States is an Arctic
nation, and the security environment in the Arctic is changing
as navigation passages open and access to natural resources,
you know, opens up, as well. We must remain engaged in the
Arctic. The Navy is on a--has developed a roadmap to increase
our capability in the Arctic to pace this changing security
environment. We are partnering closely with the whole of
government and other sister services, particularly of the Coast
Guard, in this area.
Senator King. But, isn't it true that, in terms of
icebreakers, which are the roadbuilders of the Arctic, we have
one little country road, and--they have a bunch of interstate
highways, or something like 40 icebreakers, we have one.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. Senator--Admiral Zukunft,
from the Coast Guard, has testified, I think, in very clear
terms, that we need to address this icebreaker situation.
Senator King. I think it's a serious problem that we're
going to have to really put some attention to. And I understand
it's in the Coast Guard's jurisdiction, but it's--it certainly
affects your ability to operate in that region.
Admiral Richardson. We're absolutely closely partnered, no
daylight between us on that.
Senator King. In your advance policy questions, you
mentioned that you believed it would be in the national
interests that we accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Could
you expand on that a bit?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I do believe that. I think
that becoming part of that community would give us a great deal
of credibility. And, particularly as it pertains to these
unfolding opportunities in the Arctic, this provides a
framework to adjudicate disputes and participate as everybody,
you know, moves to, you know, improve their capability and
posture in the----
Senator King. Well, in fact, because we're not members of
that treaty, we are in--we are literally losing ground in the
Arctic, isn't that correct?
Admiral Richardson. I think that becoming part of that
treaty is an important part of our movement into the Arctic,
yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your
service.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral, for that testimony on
the Arctic. I know that Senator Sullivan will have more on
that. But, we--it seems to me that the--just the icebreaker
situation is indicative of the difference in emphasis that
Russia and the United States seem to place. Would you agree
with that?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if you just look at the resources,
they've been very focused in the Arctic for a long time.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Richardson, thank you for being here.
Congratulations to you and your family. And thank you all for
your years of service.
I also want to thank you for the time we spent in my office
answering a range of questions.
One general question that I would have here, and would
appreciate your personal opinion and your candor, is--it
relates to the current advantage that we enjoy with our
adversaries, like Russia and China, and the specific threats to
those gaps being narrowed as a result of sequestration if you
have to deal with that in 2016.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. As I said, the pace of
technological change is just picking up. And so----
Senator Tillis. Can you talk to specific areas where you--
that are your greatest concern?
Admiral Richardson. I would say that, in particular, the
ability to use a long-range precision-guided munition, a
weapon, to target with greater and greater precision at longer
and longer distances, this anti-access area denial capabilities
that we've talked about many times, are a particular concern.
Senator Tillis. The--what advice would you give us, as
we're sitting here and we're trying to conference the defense
authorization, and we're trying to get an appropriations
process going--if you're kind of guiding us through what we
need to do to help you do your job, what do you need to tell
us? What do we need to stop doing, what do we need to start
doing?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I think that we've proposed a
solid plan, and we've mentioned, already, the effects of
sequestration and uncertainty in the fiscal environment, the
budget environment. And perhaps the greatest thing that we
could do together is put in place a long-term and predictable
stream of funding.
Senator Tillis. Thank you for that.
I'm going to get a little bit more parochial now with my
marines down in North Carolina. And I know the Commandant of
the Marine Corps has frequently stated that the combatant
command requirement, I think, for amphibious ships across a
range of operations exceeds 50. I think the minimum is 38. Yet,
we're at 30 operating today, and it doesn't look like we'll
obtain a amphibious fleet of more than 34 across 30 years of a
shipbuilding plan. Are you concerned with that? And what more
do we need to do? What can Congress do to help you overcome
that ship shortfall?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, this is an area where Navy and
Marine Corps have been discussing and, again, have realized
together that, although the requirement--the military
requirement is 38, the current fiscal environment is going to
drive us to 34. I appreciate the assistance of Congress to
getting us to 34. To address those--that gap between the
requirement and what we can resource, we're looking at
augmenting our lift there with other platforms besides gray
hulls. Gray hulls are absolutely, you know, the requirement
that's needed for the high-end threat, but there may be
applications and opportunities to lift marines using other
platforms.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
And again, I want to tell you I look forward to you--your
confirmation. I wholeheartedly support it.
I would ask some questions about concerns in the Arctic,
but I have a feeling that my colleague here is going to do a
better job of that than I can, because he's got bird's-eye
view. But, I think it is an area that we all share a concern,
and would appreciate your support in addressing his and all of
our concerns.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ranking Member.
Thank you, Admiral, for being here. Thank you for your
service. I'm grateful for your family's service, as well. We're
very pleased to have you in front of this committee.
I want to talk a little bit about combat integration. I
strongly believe that we should have appropriate standards that
meet the needs of the positions and that allow anyone who meets
those standards to be able to do those jobs. According to your
advance policy questions, the Navy will provide a written
report to the Secretary of Defense in September of 2015 with
validation of standards as gender-neutral. Ninety-five percent
of Navy jobs are already open to both men and women. And my
understanding is that the remaining positions are Special
Operations positions. Can you tell me how you will work with
Special Operations Command to assess if you will need to ask
for an exception? And what, if anything, would you--would lead
you to ask for an exception, particularly with regard to the
Navy SEALs?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, it's true that, currently, we
have more than 95 percent of the jobs open, as you said, to
women already. I was privileged to be the commander of the
submarine force as we integrated women into the submarine
force, and that integration has gone spectacularly. They've----
Senator Gillibrand. That's good news.
Admiral Richardson.--really have done a terrific job.
Those discussions, I think, must begin with mission
effectiveness. And I'm interested in any plan that would
improve our mission effectiveness in those areas. We have
really just the Special Operations Forces that remain to be
evaluated. I'm not familiar with the details of those
discussions at those time, but, if confirmed, looking forward
to getting very involved with Special Operations Command to
make sure that we give everybody a fair opportunity.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
And a related issue, prevalence of sexual assault in the
military still remains quite high. And one of the biggest
concerns this whole committee shares is the rate of
retaliation; that, in fact, of all those who reported, 62
percent were retaliated against. And that's the same rate as it
was 2 years ago. And retaliation takes many forms. Fifty-three
percent experienced social retaliation, peer-to-peer. Thirty-
five percent experienced adverse administrative action. Thirty-
two percent experienced professional retaliation. And 11
percent received punishment for an infraction. So, arguably,
more than half of that retaliation is coming from their chain
of command or from some command structure.
So, I would urge you to look very heavily at this issue of
retaliation, because, unfortunately, the effect of it is, less
survivors come forward. And if you have less survivors coming
forward, you have less cases to investigate, and you will
convict less rapists.
And I want to just give you a thumbnail sketch of data that
we got from one naval base. There were--and this is the--for
the year of 2013 at Camp Pendleton--there were 15 cases
considered, two court-martial charges preferred, two proceeded
to trial, two convicted of sexual assault. So, two out of 15
went forward. What we know about the crime of rape, it has very
little false reporting. Some estimate between 2 and 5 percent
are false reports. So, in those cases, you were only able to
get about 10 percent cases to move forward. So, I think we have
to do better, in terms of doing the investigations, assessing
viability of witnesses and credibility of witnesses, and
bringing more cases to trial, because two out of 15 is not a
great rate.
So, those are challenges that you will have. This committee
is very interested in it. I hope you will make a commitment
that you will work with me and the rest of us on trying to end
the scourge of sexual violence, because it does result,
unfortunately, in a lot of people leaving the military. And so,
a lot of your women, a lot of your men, are leaving because
they are experiencing assault within their own ranks.
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, you have my full commitment that
I'll spare no effort to eliminate--we can't be--we can't rest
until sexual assault is eliminated from the services. I can't
think of anything more toxic to teamwork than that insider
threat that preys upon the confidence between team members. I'm
fully committed to eliminating this.
Senator Gillibrand. And one of your challenges will be in
lower command structures, where, in the last survey, women
responded to experiencing some form of sexual harassment and
sexual discrimination. Sixty percent of that harassment, they
reported, was from their unit commander. So, there's an issue
with some commanders that they really need to be trained better
to eradicate sexual harassment and sexual discrimination,
because, again, it creates a negative climate that perhaps is
more permissive toward sexual assault.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am, I think that is absolutely
the most productive battleground. If we're going to solve this,
we're going to solve it with the deck-plate leaders, the chief
petty officers, the officers who are in the spaces and will
eliminate not only sexual assault, but those precursor
behaviors that start us down the road.
Senator Gillibrand. Exactly.
For the record, I will submit a question about cyber. I'm
very grateful for your interest in cyber. And I--my question
for the record will be, What career paths do you see for
members of the Navy who want to make cyber their career?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am, I'll look forward to that.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, good to see you again. Great to see your
family. My father was also a Navy officer, also a father of six
kids. When I joined the Marine Corps, he reminded me, on a
daily basis, that the Marine Corps was Department of the Navy.
Is that true?
Admiral Richardson. That is true, yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Oh, okay. I'll make sure he knows that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. I do want to touch on the Arctic. The
actual numbers are, as Senator King mentioned, one icebreaker
for the United States, about 40 for Russia. They're building
five to six new ones. Some of them are nuclear-powered. I mean,
we are completely just not even in the game. And you know the
importance.
I must admit, I was a little disappointed by your answer to
Senator King, because what's--what I see is happening is, the
Arctic and icebreakers are becoming kind of a bureaucratic
football. So, for example, 4 months ago, I asked Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Stackley to just give me a straight-up
answer on the Arctic, on icebreakers. He kind of did the same
thing, ``Well, it's a little bit in the Coast Guard realm.''
Well, the question is, Is it in the national interests of the
United States to have more than one icebreaker when the
Russians are trying to own the Arctic? What's your answer?
Admiral Richardson. I think the answer is clearly yes.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. So, I think what we need to do is
not keep talking about--I've never gotten an answer from the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Four months ago. I never got
an answer. We just need to know, Do we need it? How many? And
then, How do we get there? No more, kind of, ``Well, it's the
Coast Guard's problem, not really the Navy's.'' In the '70s,
the Navy was the service that supplied icebreakers to the
country, wasn't it?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah. So, I think we need to just get
through the bureaucratic redtape. It's clearly in the national
interests. You just stated it, everybody states that we need to
move forward and quit kind of doing the football back and forth
between the Navy and the Coast Guard. Would you agree with
that?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I am not interested in a
bureaucratic approach to this. We need to have a plan of
action. And I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the--
our partners in the Coast Guard to address this in real terms.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. And it would be good to hear back
from Assistant Secretary Stackley. I asked him a question on
this 4 months ago. He said he'd get back me. He never has.
Just a real quick question, just a yes-or-no answer. We had
an amendment in the NDAA supporting the Pacific rebalance that
said it was the sense of the Congress that the services should
increase force posture to give credibility to the rebalance. Is
it--should services be free to ignore the defense guidance of
the Congress--just yes or no--in the NDAA?
Admiral Richardson. No.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Finally, I want to draw your attention to the chart and
some of the handouts we had here. This relates to China's
reclamation activities in the South China Sea. This is an
example. It's 18 months, before and after, of the Fiery Cross
Reef. I'm sure you're familiar with it, Admiral. It's actually
a 2.7 square--2.7 million square meters, 505 football fields, a
3,000-meter airstrip long enough for any PRC military aircraft.
It's just a huge--one of their large reclamation projects.
We were recently in Singapore, a number of us, at the
Shangri-La Dialogue, and Secretary Carter gave a speech, that I
thought was quite strong, on what our policy is. But, there
seems to be a confusion in the policy. So, Secretary Carter
stated, ``We will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows.'' He then stated, ``After turning an
under---after all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield
simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit
restrictions on international air or maritime transit.''
However, PACOM Commander Harris, just 2 weeks ago at the
Aspen Security Forum, stated, ``It is U.S. policy to afford a
12-minute limit around all of the islands that are in the South
China Sea. And it's been a longstanding policy, not because
they're occupied by China or built up by China, but just in
general.'' He later clarified his statement to include islands
and formations.
Do you think--first of all, to me, that's very confusing
policy--do you think that we need to clarify that? And do you
think that Admiral Harris's statement is just a de factor
recognition of China's reclamation strategy? And is it your--in
your best professional judgment, should we be sailing within 12
nautical miles and not allowing the facts-on-the-ground
strategy to be changed by China to essentially recognize Fiery
Cross Reef and other places?
It's a really important issue, and there's no clarification
from the White House, State Department, or Department of the
Navy. I think Secretary Carter and Admiral Harris's statements
are actually very contradictory. That kind of uncertainty can
create miscalculations.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I think it's absolutely
important that the Navy continue to be present in that region,
for a number of reasons, to provide our continued presence,
that we are there as a matter of routine in international
waters. We do have to respect the legitimately claimed
territorial boundaries. I think that Secretary Carter and
Admiral Harris would agree with me there. And so----
Senator Sullivan. But, does that mean respecting that, in
terms of a 12-nautical-mile radius?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'd have to look at exactly which
of those claims are legitimate. It's a dynamic situation.
There's competing claims down there. But, the bottom line is,
we need to get down there, understand the truth, make that very
clear, and be present in that area so that we don't get
shouldered out of the South China Sea.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I'll be submitting
questions for the record to make sure that the policy of the
United States is clarified on this important issue, because
right now it's very murky.
Chairman McCain. Good luck.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join Senator Sullivan in hoping that this issue is
clarified, because I think it is so important to our national
security, and I'd like to work with him in seeking additional
answers.
And I recognize that those answers will involve more than
just your input and contribution. But, on your contribution,
thank you so much for the great work that you've done
throughout your career to assure that our submarine force is
unmatched in the world in its power, stealth, and strength.
And I want to thank you and your family for your service,
and ask you, first of all, whether you can commit to coming
back to Connecticut to visit our sub base there as one of your
first official visits after you're confirmed, as I expect you
to will be.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
On the subject of our submarine force, the Ohio replacement
program--you probably know more about it than most anyone else
in the Navy and in our Department of Defense. And I believe
that you are committed to it, personally and professionally. Is
that correct?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely, Senator. It's our number-
one modernization priority.
Senator Blumenthal. And in that regard, as the number-one
priority of modernization in the United States Navy, the
pricetag is likely to be in the range of $100 billion, which
seems staggering and obviously has to be met, even though the
Navy has other programs, other modernization efforts, and other
shipbuilding projects. Have you given any thought to how that
will be possible to do?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, as a--as you and I have
discussed, this is an absolutely critical program for the
country, and we are doing everything in the Navy to make sure
that we not only get the requirements right and stable, but
that we treat our cost targets like any other performance
parameter for that program. And we are driving and on a good
track to achieve all of those cost targets.
Having said that, as you said, it will be a significant
investment for the Nation, one that I believe must be done. If
we absorb that entire cost within the Navy, that will come at a
tremendous price, in terms of our other responsibilities in
ships and aircraft. I don't, either, want to leverage that on
our sister services, and so I look forward to working closely
together with the Department and Congress to address this.
Senator Blumenthal. Really, it should be seen as a
challenge for our entire national defense, not just the Navy,
because its ramifications and contributions to our defense
range well beyond just seapower.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I would agree.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me move to another aspect of the
Navy's combat capability, the F-35, which, according to the
analysis I've seen, will be six times more effective than
legacy fighters in air-to-air combat, five times more effective
in air-to-ground combat, six times more effective in
reconnaissance and suppression of air defenses. Again, another
investment--a good word, an appropriate one, I think--to use in
our national defense.
I noted that the fiscal year 2016 (FY-2016) budget request
from the Navy included 16 fewer F-35 aircraft in the last 3
years of the Future Years Defense Plan than were anticipated
just 1 year before. Can you shed some light on that request?
And also, I'd appreciate your assurance that the F-35 is still
a priority for the Navy.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, the Navy remains committed to
the F-35 Lightning as an essential part of our future air wing.
It is the aircraft that is designed from the ground up to
address, you know, the fifth-generation challenges in
information warfare. So, we do remain committed to that.
The adjustments in the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2016, again, just reflect some of the extremely
difficult choices that we're making to balance the best way to
address the national security challenges within the resources
provided.
Senator Blumenthal. And the F-35, like the Ohio replacement
program, is really essential to all of our national defense.
Obviously, the other services share in the costs and the
benefits of it. And I'm hoping that the strategy here will be a
combined Department of Defense commitment to the investment
that's required.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, if confirmed, I look forward
to exploring all those options.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I look forward to seeing you
in New London as the Chief of Naval Operations. Thank you very
much.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. And again, thank you to your family, as
well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, we appreciate the opportunity to have you
with us. And I believe you have the background and the
dedication and the character to lead the Navy. And this
Congress, I believe and am confident, will support you. I hope
that you understand that you have to give us the straight
facts, tell us what you believe, and, if there are problems,
I'll--bring them forward to us, and I believe Congress will
respond if in any way possible.
Will you, as you've committed, I think, in your written
answers, but will you give your best judgment to the President
of the United States and to Congress on all issues of which
you're inquired of?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Sessions. Thank you for that.
I see you've had background as a submarine development
squadron and other submarine effort--other commands. Do you
feel that that will assist you as we deal with the Ohio-class
development?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Sessions. Give us some of the ideas that you bring
to bear on the development of the Ohio-class, which we all know
is important and essential, but also we know we've got some
budget constrictions out there that are going to place that
program in jeopardy if we don't watch it. And I think, more
than a lot of programs, failure on the beginning to get it
right in the procurement process could endanger that program.
So, give us your thoughts about what you think needs to be done
as we go forward.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. I think you've got it exactly
right, sir, that you've got to get that--the requirements set.
And the Navy has done that. We are working towards providing a
mature design so you've got to have a mature and stable design
before you begin production so that you're not dealing in
managing costly change orders after you've begun production.
And then I hope to provide a program--a build plan that would
allow for stable and predictable funding. That allows us--the
Navy to work very closely with the shipbuilders to provide a
production line that results in the lowest cost per unit.
Senator Sessions. I think most of us have come to
understand how unpredictability and uncertainty and alterations
of schedule can drive up cost. And sometimes that's Congress,
sometimes it's Department of Defense's fault, other times the
contractors have to be held to account. But, are you--will you
help us remain committed to maintaining the kind of schedule
that keeps cost at the lowest level?
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely, sir. And what we've found
is that we've got tremendous commitment on the part of our
shipbuilders. They are as committed to driving costs down as we
are. And there are ample opportunities to deliver high-end
warfighting capability at the appropriate price, delivers the
capability that's required for the Nation, and provides
businesses a chance to thrive, as well.
Senator Sessions. You made reference earlier to the triad,
our nuclear defense triad--aircraft, submarines, and land-based
ICBMs. Do you believe that remains a critical part of our
defense structure?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Sessions. Some have questioned that. And I guess
you're familiar with those concerns. I believe you're correct.
I think Congress believes you're correct. But, I hope you will
keep us informed on that, because some would suggest otherwise.
I think that would be a big mistake at this point in time.
You and I had the opportunity to discuss just efficiencies.
I serve on the Armed Services Committee and the Budget
Committee. I feel the tensions there very intensely. It's been
said in--that the Defense Department--in and around the Defense
Department, but each service is committed to maintaining
personnel levels. They fear that if their personnel levels
drive--drop, they'll be diminished in their influence and
power. Tell me, Are you committed to maintaining the defense--
the Navy fleet at the level it needs to be, but, at the same
time, maintaining personnel levels, like private businesses
have to do, lean and productive?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, absolutely. And so, we must
maintain--what we deliver is capability. And we want to,
particularly as the environment--the technological environment
changes, there will be new opportunities that open up for our
people. We want to make sure that we keep our people employed
in the very best possible way doing things that people do best.
And so, I am committed to making sure that we do that in as
lean and agile a fashion as possible.
Senator Sessions. And sometimes rules that we pass in
Congress make that difficult for you. I hope that you will keep
us informed on how we can help you achieve that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Well, Admiral, we thank you for your
testimony this morning, and we thank you for responding with
your personal opinion when it's requested. You're taking on a
very difficult task in very difficult times, and I'm sure that
you are well qualified, and we will attempt to make sure that
your nomination is confirmed before we depart for our ill-
deserved August recess.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Admiral John M. Richardson
by Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provisions? If
so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols was revolutionary in its time and has
helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has
changed in the past 30 years in both the Joint Force and the security
environment. As such, I believe a review would be useful. If confirmed,
I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
the Navy if such a review were undertaken.
duties
Question. Section 5033 of title 10, United States Code, describes
the duties of Chief of Naval Operations and requires that the person
nominated to fill the job have had significant experience in joint duty
assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty
assignment as a flag officer.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief
of Naval Operations?
Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for
organizing, training and equipping forces that will be provided to
combatant, fleet and component commanders; serves as the primary
maritime advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense; is the
senior Uniformed Leader of the Navy; and represents the Navy on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
these duties?
Answer. My career has afforded me a broad range of experience as a
Naval Officer and Joint Warfighter. I have been privileged to command
the submarine USS Honolulu, Submarine Development Squadron 12,
Submarine Group 8, Submarine Allied Naval Forces South, Naval Submarine
Forces, and served as the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program.
My Joint assignments included the Naval Aide to the President, the
Assistant Deputy Director for Regional Operations on the Joint Staff,
and the Director of Strategy (J5) for U.S. Joint Forces Command.
I have also served on a number of Navy staffs including U.S.
Pacific Fleet, the Navy Staff, and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa.
Question. Do you meet the joint requirements for the position,
including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or
did you require a waiver?
Answer. I meet the Joint requirements for the position.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of
Naval Operations?
Answer. No.
relationships
Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish
important relationships between the Chief of Naval Operations and other
officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Chief of Naval Operations to the following officials:
Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. As a
Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) is a military adviser to the Secretary of
Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and
strategy.
Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as
acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods,
the CNO's relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be
the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Department of Defense.
If confirmed, I will endeavor to interact regularly with the Deputy
Secretary to provide my best possible professional military advice and
the same level of support as I would the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Under current DOD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense
coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, to include the
Services, in the functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed
as CNO, I will respond and reciprocate, and use this exchange of
information as I communicate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The CNO is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as
such, works with and through the Chairman in the execution of duties.
Along with the other Service Chiefs, if confirmed I will be a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked with the responsibility for actively
reviewing and evaluating military matters and offering professional
military advice to the President, National Security Council, and
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. When functioning as the Acting Chairman, the Vice
Chairman's relationship with combatant commanders is that of the
Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations
as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I would
exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also heads or has a key
role on many boards that affect readiness and programs and, therefore,
the preparedness of naval forces. If confirmed, I will establish a
close relationship with the Vice Chairman on these critical issues.
Question. The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy for
providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support
combatant commanders in the accomplishment of their missions. In
addition, the CNO assists the Secretary of the Navy in the development
of plans and recommendations for the operation of the Department of the
Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment within
the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the
Secretary of the Navy to perpetuate it.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant
to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The
Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercises such powers, as the
Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a
close relationship with the Under Secretary to achieve the Secretary's
goals.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under
Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary,
the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercise such
powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with
the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to
the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the Secretary
of the Navy shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper
application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within
the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General
Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. Under 10 USC Sec. 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General
(JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of
Navy legal matters assigned by Secretary of the Navy. The JAG provides
and supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services
throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and
services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO
receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge
advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the
JAG's legal advice.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. A unique historical and operational relationship exists
between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities,
programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces
deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as
CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be
exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of
the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.
Question. The Chief of the Navy Reserve.
Answer. Under 10 USC Sec. 5143, the Chief of the Navy Reserve
serves on the staff of the CNO and is the principal adviser on Navy
Reserve matters to the CNO and is the commander of the Navy Reserve
Force. The Chief of the Navy Reserve has an essential role in advising
CNO of Navy Reserve capabilities alignment to Navy's Total Force
mission and operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with
the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the vast progress
and Total Force synergies we have achieved.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.
Answer. Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each
other's strengths and to complement each other's capabilities. We must
achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to
ensure each Service contributes optimally to Joint and combined
operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my
counterparts to enhance Joint interoperability and other aspects of the
Joint relationship in order to improve the war fighting capabilities of
the United States.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide
properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant
commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will
work to foster close working relationships with the Unified and
Specified Combatant Commanders.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. The international security situation is becoming more
demanding and complex as both state and non-state actors challenge our
national interests. Simultaneously, we face an era of fiscal challenges
and uncertainty. Against this backdrop, the principal focus of the next
CNO will be to provide relevant, ready naval forces to meet today's
challenges, as well as to modernize the Navy to protect America's
interests in the future.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain focused on providing adaptable,
agile, and effective war fighting capabilities. Working with the fleet
commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I will continue to
work to establish a sustainable forward presence that is consistent
with our force structure and can quickly respond to crises and deter
conflict. As well I will work to ensure that the Navy, operating as
part of the Joint Force, will remain capable of winning in conflict
should deterrence fail.
As we address increasingly complex security challenges, the Navy
has an obligation to deliver present and future capability in a
fiscally responsible manner. I will work diligently with leadership to
ensure that we deliver the most effective Navy possible for the
resources we are provided. This must include close oversight to drive
out inefficiencies and waste.
Finally, the Navy's success depends on attracting and retaining
high quality people. I will devote myself to enhancing the Navy's
ability to develop leaders--for today and tomorrow. This must include a
comprehensive approach that provides opportunity for each member of the
Navy to reach their full potential, that develops a diverse and
adaptable force, and that supports our Navy families who share in the
sacrifice to strengthen our Nation.
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified above, would you set for your term as Chief of Naval
Operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to more fully exploiting
the electromagnetic spectrum and to harnessing the potential of
revolutionary advances in information technologies.
most serious problems
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the execution of the functions of the Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. For any Chief of Naval Operations, there is always the
challenge of balancing the need for the Navy to be ready today and the
need to modernize for the future. This tension is more acute today
because we face uniquely complex problems in both the security and
fiscal environments--as the security demands increase, the resources to
address these demands are harder to obtain.
Exacerbating these diverging trends, the environment demands faster
and faster responses--as a result we absolutely must be more agile.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and associated
timelines would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. Becoming more agile and responsive is relevant in every
dimension of the CNO's responsibilities--organizing, training, and
equipping. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Defense
Department leadership and the Congress to improve our Navy's
responsiveness.
organize, train, and equip responsibility
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for
organizing, training and equipping forces provided to fleet and
component commanders, including the prioritization of funding and
effort to meet these needs in the near term, while developing
capabilities for the far term.
How would you characterize your experience in force management and
capability requirement decisions?
Answer. I have years of relevant experience in this area. By virtue
of my time as commander, Submarine Development Squadron 12, and
commander, Submarine Forces, I am very familiar with providing ready
forces and capabilities to meet combatant commander demands. Through my
time as commander, Submarine Group Eight, and Deputy Commander, U.S.
Sixth Fleet, I am familiar with defining and requesting forces and
capabilities to execute combatant commander responsibilities. Finally,
as a member of the Joint Staff serving in J3 during Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom, I was responsible for adjudicating all
combatant commander requests with the ability of the services to
provide forces and capabilities.
Question. What innovative ideas are you considering for organizing,
training and equipping the Navy?
Answer. I anticipate a sustained focus on how the Navy can continue
to improve both the process and substance of how it organizes, trains,
and equips its forces. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Secretaries of the Navy and Defense, as well as with the Congress, to
develop initiatives in each of these areas.
security strategies and guidance
Question. How would you characterize current trends in the range
and diversity of threats to national security we face today?
Answer. As Dr. Kissinger testified in January, I believe that the
traditional power and state structures in many areas of the world are
being challenged by different models of governance and power. This
trend is manifesting itself concurrent with advances in technology that
allow both state and non-state actors--even individuals--to act with
increasing range, precision, and speed. The Navy faces an increasing
array of diverse threats that will challenge our superiority and hamper
our access and ability to operate around the world.
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance issued January 2012 took
into account a $487 billion dollar reduction in defense resources.
With the additional $500 billion in cuts to the Department of
Defense as a result of sequestration, is the Defense Strategic Guidance
still valid?
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget Request is the
minimum funding necessary in order to execute the Defense Strategic
Guidance and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Should the budget
be cut below the PB16 levels, the defense strategy would need to be
revised.
Question. In your view, as Russian aggression and the emergence of
ISIL have occurred since the Defense Strategic Guidance was issued in
January 2012, is that strategic guidance still appropriate for the
threats we face today or do you think an update is warranted?
Answer. The guidance in the Defense Strategic Guidance and the
Quadrennial Defense Review remains relevant. No strategy will ever be
able to anticipate all surprises. This reality reinforces the
imperative to continue to do our best strategic thinking even as we
develop forces that can remain balanced, responsive, and adaptive to
unforeseen challenges.
Question. In your view, is our defense strategy and current
establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces
properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
Nation faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. I believe our strategy and structure is essentially sound.
The reality of a dynamic security and fiscal environment demands that
both our strategy and structure be continually assessed and adapted. Of
particular concern is the need to remain ready today and to modernize
for tomorrow in a fiscally constrained environment.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the capabilities, structure, roles, and missions of the defense
establishment?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to examine options that
increase the adaptability and agility of current and planned Naval
forces to further enhance the natural advantages they offer through
their forward presence and responsiveness. I would also look forward to
working with other leaders across the defense enterprise to identify
additional areas where we can improve our ability to address a
broadening range of challenges. I see the need to reconstitute our
nuclear deterrent forces and to fully exploit the potential of
information technologies as areas of particular priority.
military capabilities in support of defense strategy
Question. In your opinion, do current military plans include the
necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in the 2014
QDR? Please identify areas of higher risk.
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget provides for the
minimum necessary capabilities to meet the defense strategy stated in
the 2014 QDR, albeit with considerable risk. The strategic environment
is very dynamic. If confirmed, I will remain personally involved to
ensure that maximize the Navy's capability within available resources
and to provide leadership with my most accurate and timely assessment
of the Navy's ability to meet strategic objectives.
Question. Does the 2014 QDR specify the correct set of capabilities
to decisively win in future high-end engagements?
Answer. I believe so. This is an extremely dynamic environment, and
if confirmed, I will remain personally engaged to ensure that I
maximize the Navy's capabilities within available resources and provide
leadership with my most accurate assessment of the Navy's ability to
win in a high-end fight.
Question. According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR,
American forces should be able to ``defeat a regional adversary in a
large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of--or
impose unacceptable costs on--another aggressor in another region.'' In
your opinion, does the Department's force sizing construct provide
adequate capability to address the country's current threat
environment?
Answer. Currently yes. But after three years of budget shortfalls
and a high operating tempo, the Navy currently operates with
considerable risk in its ability to fully execute this warfighting
mission in accordance with existing plans. The fiscal year 2016
President's Budget Request begins to put the Navy on a path to
recovery. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow leaders to maximize
the Navy's abilities within available resources.
Question. Is the Navy adequately sized to meet this construct?
Answer. The Navy's 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure
Assessment calls for a force of 308 ships. Provided sufficient
readiness is restored and maintained across the Fleet, this fleet size
should support the highest priority requirements for both presence and
``surge'' in the event of increased tensions or outright conflict. The
fiscal year 2016 President's Budget puts the Navy on a path to procure
the right mix of ships as defined by the Navy projections, though there
are some capability risks of concern--amphibious ships, attack
submarines, small surface combatants, aircraft inventory, and other
modernization efforts.
Question. If the Navy cannot meet the demands placed on it, how
will you address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of
the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to prioritize missions to meet the most critical objectives in
protecting national security, and evaluate and clearly articulate areas
of risk.
defense reduction
Question. In your view, what have been/will be the impacts of the
following defense budget reductions on the Navy's capability, capacity,
and readiness:
Initial Budget Control Act reduction of $487 billion?
Answer. The initial reduction from the Budget Control Act of 2011
placed abrupt, deep fiscal constraints on the Navy, which required hard
choices and prioritization. This sudden topline-driven reduction
compelled us to accept risk in our defense strategy in key areas. The
Navy needs the restoration of adequate and predictable funding to
recover balance, resilience, and adaptability.
Question. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013?
Answer. Sequestration in fiscal year 2013 resulted in a $9 billion
shortfall to the Navy's budget, compelling reductions in afloat and
ashore operations, and particularly in ship and aviation maintenance
and training. This resulted in degraded readiness and fleet response
capacity, ultimately contributing to excessively long deployments for
Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. In addition, the
Navy cancelled five ship deployments and delayed the deployment of the
USS Harry S. Truman Strike Group by six months. Civilian furloughs,
combined with hiring freezes and no overtime for our civilian
employees, contributed to reduced maintenance and sustainment output.
We are still recovering from these cuts, particularly in crisis
response capacity. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget Request puts
the Navy on a path to recover by fiscal year 2020.
Question. Reduction of $115 billion in projected spending in the
fiscal year 2015 budget, in line with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review?
Answer. Congress's passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013
averted some of the BCA cuts in fiscal year 2014-2015, but still
resulted in significant funding shortfalls in fiscal year 2014-2015 and
extended budget caps through fiscal year 2023. For fiscal year 2015,
the funding shortfall compelled the Navy to further reduce procurement
of weapons and aircraft, slow modernization, and delay upgrades to all
but the most critical shore infrastructure. If we are held to current
statutory budget levels for fiscal year 2016-2019, the Navy would not
be able to execute the defense strategy as currently written.
Question. Sequestered Budget Control Act discretionary caps
starting in fiscal year 2016 onward?
Answer. If funded at less than the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget Request, the Navy would be unable to execute the defense
strategy as currently written. The required cuts would force us to
further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of
forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize weapons
capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure as a
last resort.
Question. The fiscal year 2016 budget request assumes that the
Budget Control Act will be amended in fiscal year 2016. The fiscal year
2016 Budget Resolution passed by the Senate and House of
Representatives do not assume this, but instead provides $38 billion of
the requested spending through the Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) budget.
Should this OCO funding not be available, what recommendations
would you have, if confirmed, for how the Navy should manage additional
cuts for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget is the minimum
funding necessary for the Navy to execute its responsibilities in the
current defense strategy. The severity of those cuts would determine
the degree to which critical warfighting capabilities would be further
delayed, the readiness of forces needed for contingency responses would
be further eroded, weapons inventories would be further reduced, and
procurement of force structure would be cancelled or further postponed.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on readiness for the Navy?
Answer. The cuts would have a significant impact on readiness for
the Navy. If cut, my advice would be to prioritize the readiness of
forces forward deployed. This would come at the expense of surge and
response forces. In addition, ship and aviation depot maintenance
backlogs would increase and shore infrastructure would further
deteriorate, creating greater risk of mishaps or serious injury.
Question. What are your views on the impact that these cuts could
have on Navy capabilities?
Answer. These cuts would also have a significant impact on the
Navy's capabilities, resulting in a smaller, less capable force.
Modernization and asymmetric capabilities could be slowed, and
inventories of critical assets would be insufficient to execute the
current strategic requirements for the Navy.
headquarters streamlining
Question. The Senate-passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters
functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.
If confirmed, and if the provisions in the bill become law, what
would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying
and implementing reductions in the Navy headquarters?
Answer. It is crucial for the Department to carefully align
resources to the highest priority missions, functions, and tasks, and I
am committed to continuing to examine management activities and improve
efficiency of operations at all levels. If confirmed, I will work with
the Department and Congress to continue to make significant strides in
gaining efficiencies and savings through a more appropriate alignment
of workforce to workload, a streamlining of operations, and the
optimization of mission delivery while reducing redundancies and
overhead.
Question. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you
consider to be the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions
within the Navy?
Answer. Every area and function must be considered as a potential
candidate for reductions. While I view right-sizing the staff to be a
critical responsibility, it requires a thoughtful approach. If
confirmed, I will specifically explore areas where greater use of
advanced processes and technology could add value. I will exchange
information and best practices with other leaders across the defense
enterprise and the private sector to ensure we consider all
alternatives.
Question. To the extent that the Navy has functions that overlap
with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or other military
departments, what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing
redundancy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to participating in a
Department-wide examination of functional overlaps to identify areas
for greater streamlining.
international partnerships
Question. Interactions between the naval forces of different
countries are often negotiated at the Chief of Navy level, including
international exercises, Foreign Military Sales, educational exchanges,
and protocols for operations. For example, recent former Chiefs of
Naval Operations were able to draw on their experience to gain
international cooperation on the Codes for Unplanned Events at Sea
(CUES) by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the use of France's
aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the fight against the Islamic
State.
If confirmed, how do plan to ensure the U.S. Navy continues to
build strong partnerships, overcome challenges, and exploit
opportunities in international cooperation?
Answer. I believe we are stronger when we operate together, engaged
with allies and partners, and if confirmed would enthusiastically
continue to take advantage of these opportunities. Through activities
like leader-to-leader engagements, student exchanges, exercises, and
information sharing, the Navy is already providing a foundation for
strengthening alliances and improving our combined capabilities. I
would seek to maintain these activities and expand upon them where
possible.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with
international naval leaders, forums, and processes?
Answer. Many of my assignments have afforded me the opportunity to
establish solid relationships with international naval leaders and key
forums throughout the world. If confirmed, I look forward to fostering
those relationships and building new ones through a robust engagement
plan.
joint operations
Question. Naval operations are becoming increasingly ``joint'' as
marines plan to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships;
the U.S. Army and Air Force begin to invest in counter-maritime
capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and
implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and area-
denial (A2/AD) networks--a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle
Concept in 2010.
How would you characterize your familiarity with the other
Services' capabilities and how they organize, train and equip their
forces?
Answer. I have been privileged to serve on the Joint Staff, Joint
Forces Command, and on several operational staffs. In these
assignments, I gained an appreciation for the capabilities and
processes that the other Services bring to the Joint Force.
Question. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to
increase Joint interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve
cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service
Chiefs and combatant commanders to seek new ways to combine forces in
adaptive and responsive force packages. I look forward to improving
information sharing standards and architectures within the Naval and
Joint Forces to enhance interoperability.
recapitalizing the fleet
Question. Despite the Navy's 308-ship requirement to meet the
maritime demands of the National Military Strategy, it is currently
operating with 272 battle force ships. Additionally, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the Navy has underestimated the
costs for its shipbuilding plan by approximately 11 percent.
Do you consider the 308-ship force structure requirement to be
appropriate given the current and future strategic environment? If not,
please describe what changes may need to be made.
Answer. Currently, yes. The 308-ship FSA update was completed in
2014 based on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 308-ship battle
force possesses the minimum capability and capacity to continue
protecting American interests, to deter or contain conflict and, if
called upon, to fight and win our Nation's wars.
Question. Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is
significant cost risk associated with executing the Navy's shipbuilding
plan?
Answer. The Navy and CBO are in relatively close agreement in our
cost estimates for the first ten years of the 30 year shipbuilding plan
because we have a good understanding of the ships' requirements and
costs. Beyond the first ten years, our estimates begin to diverge
largely due to uncertainty in costing and differing inflation
projections. As the near term is most relevant from an execution
perspective, the relatively small differences pose limited risk to the
shipbuilding plan. If confirmed, I will be personally engaged to ensure
that the Navy maintains accurate estimates of costs for shipbuilding.
What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy's
shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?
Answer. An immediate concern is maintaining a viable shipbuilding
program while also building the Ohio replacement class submarine. I
will work with Defense Department and Congressional leaders to address
this challenge.
Question. How would you characterize the risks to national security
posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and tactical
aircraft?
Answer. Today, the Navy meets all requirements of the current
defense strategy, albeit with considerable risk.
Question. What adjustments to the respective shipbuilding programs
are necessary and appropriate to reduce operational risk?
Answer. Based on our current strategy, I believe the fiscal year
2016 President's Budget Request reflects the best balance of available
resources to meet our requirements. If confirmed, I will continuously
evaluate this question as a critical part of my responsibilities.
Question. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's
shipbuilding program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?
Answer. The Navy is working hard to reduce cost growth and increase
affordability and stability within our shipbuilding programs. Should
these measures prove inadequate, if confirmed I will work with Defense
Department leaders and the Congress to determine the appropriate
responses and to develop acceptable adjustments.
ford-class aircraft carriers
Question. After more than $2 billion in cost growth in each of the
first three Ford-class aircraft carriers, the costs of these ships
range from $11.5 billion to $13.5 billion.
Do you support the on-going Navy study of alternatives for future
development of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement the
Ford-class carrier?
Answer. I fully support the Department's decision to consider
alternatives to the current aircraft carrier design as well as changes
to the existing Ford-class design to reduce cost while retaining
essential capability. The study will provide insight into the
requirements, capabilities, costs, and alternatives for aircraft
carriers.
Question. In your view, should the Navy build 11 Ford-class
aircraft carriers or should the Navy pursue a different mix of
platforms for sea-based tactical aviation?
Answer. The current plan for the Ford-class construction is the
Navy's best approach for meeting the demand for an 11-aircraft carrier
force. We are not where we need to be on costs and are working hard to
reduce them---more effort is needed. While providing the needed
capability to meet current and projected threats, delivery of this
class will also provide major lifecycle savings compared to Nimitz-
class carriers ($4B/ship due to reduced crewing and maintenance
requirements). If confirmed, I look forward to further reducing the
acquisition cost of the Ford-class ships.
Question. What options would you pursue to control the cost of
aircraft carriers and ensure individual responsibility of officials in
charge of different aspects of the acquisition program?
Answer. I believe that acquisition discipline arises from adhering
to four basic behaviors:
(1) A clear command and control structure that clearly specifies
authorities, responsibility, and accountability;
(2) Unambiguous program requirements, defined early in the process
and informed by realistic assessments of technological maturity and
affordability;
(3) A stable and mature design and build plan before entering into
production; and
(4) A close and knowledgeable oversight process to ensure delivery
of the required capability on time and within budget.
The Navy has taken action to incorporate these behaviors and drive
improved performance. CVN 79 is now benefiting from design maturity,
stable requirements, and a cost-effective construction plan. I will
seek further opportunities to routinely review and align the
requirements and costs for this program.
Question. If confirmed, how do envision being personally involved
in the oversight of this program?
Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Naval Operations, I will be
personally involved in acquisition, to include the CVN program. In each
of my preceding positions, I have engaged with those in my command to
make clear my standards and expectations and directly monitor
performance in meeting these standards. I would continue this approach
as CNO.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's Fiscal
Year 2014 Annual Report states the reliability of four systems--the
electromagnetic aircraft launching system, advanced arresting gear,
dual band radar, and advanced weapons elevators--are the most
significant risks to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) for successfully
completing initial operational test and evaluation.
What is your understanding of the testing and reliability status of
each of these key systems on CVN-78, which is scheduled to deliver in
March 2016?
Answer. My understanding for each of these systems is:
The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) has
nearly completed all initial land based developmental testing
with some shared inverter and reliability testing remaining.
EMALS is currently conducting certification testing of the
first production hardware on board CVN-78. Over 100 deadloads
have been successfully launched in shipboard testing. While not
meeting its original reliability growth curve, EMALS
reliability is tracking to the revised reliability growth plan
reviewed with DOT&E staff in early fiscal year 2015.
The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is conducting land based
developmental testing with deadloads, and will begin land based
developmental aircraft testing at the end of this calendar
year. Certification testing of the production hardware on board
CVN 78 is scheduled to begin in late July 2015. AAG is not
meeting its original reliability growth plan due to technical
design issues but a revised plan was reviewed with DOT&E staff
in early fiscal year 2015. The Navy will commence AAG
reliability tracking when land based performance testing begins
this summer.
Dual Band Radar (DBR) has been in use at Wallops Island
supporting land based integration and testing since March 2014;
land based testing will continue through June 2016. Shipboard
radar subsystem testing began in May 2015, and shipboard radar
testing starts in August 2015. DBR has just begun reliability
tracking at Wallops Island, and will continue through post-
delivery testing onboard CVN 78. The DBR reliability growth
plan was revised and reviewed with DOT&E staff in early fiscal
year 2015.
Finally, the Navy has completed the functional demonstration of
the Advanced Weapons Elevator (AWE) at the land based test
site. While behind schedule, shipboard installation is in
progress, and testing will commence in August of this year. AWE
reliability tracking begins at ship delivery and will continue
through post-delivery testing.
Clearly, the maturity and reliability of each of these systems is
not where the Navy would like them to be. Navy leadership attention is
focused on expeditiously completing these test programs and
demonstrating effective operation and suitable reliability to support
Initial Operational Test & Evaluation in 2018.
Question. What is your understanding of the measures being taken to
ensure these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS
John F. Kennedy (CVN-79)?
Answer. CVN 79 is benefitting from a much more stable design and
near complete test programs for the developmental technologies as well
as construction experience on FORD. For each of these key systems,
hardware design is complete and detailed test and installation
experience is known. Shipboard test performance remains a risk. The
Navy has incorporated lessons learned from these test programs and
shipboard installation into CVN 79 plans. As a cost-saving measure, the
Navy is adapting a proven off-the-shelf radar (Enterprise Air
Surveillance Radar (EASR)) to replace the DBR on all future Ford-class
hulls and air-capable amphibious ships.
ohio-class replacement program
Question. Navy leaders have testified that the Ohio-class
Replacement Program will require significant investment and will result
in equivalent reductions in the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline
or outside funding is not provided.
What is your recommendation for how the Ohio-class Replacement
Program should be funded?
Answer. It is absolutely critical for the Nation to replace the
Ohio-class submarines. The Navy is doing everything it can to limit
requirements and control costs for this ship. Without increased
shipbuilding funding in fiscal year 2021 and beyond, the Ohio
Replacement Program will consume the majority of the Navy's annual
shipbuilding budget, costing the equivalent of 2-3 ships per year. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Defense Department leadership
and the Congress to address this significant challenge.
Question. What additional Congressional authorities do you believe
are necessary for the Ohio-class Replacement Program?
Answer. Obtaining sufficient funding to build the Ohio Replacement
Program (ORP) while also preserving other shipbuilding is a significant
challenge for the Navy. As the ORP design matures and the build plan is
mapped out, if confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary for
Research, Development, and Acquisition to review the ORP shipbuilding
and procurement strategies, including an assessment of additional
authorities that might improve the cost and efficiency of ORP
production and related shipbuilding programs. When that work is
complete, I look forward to discussing the plan with the Congress.
Question. Navy leaders have testified that 12 Ohio-class
replacement submarines must be procured and the Ohio-class Replacement
Program schedule cannot be delayed in order to ensure the first
deterrent patrol occurs in 2031.
Do you support the view that there is no room for delay of the
Ohio-class Replacement Program?
Answer. Yes, the Navy has stretched the Ohio-class to the maximum
extent possible, from 30 to 42 years. There is no room for further
delay of the ORP.
Question. What is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement
submarines that must be procured to meet mission requirements?
Answer. A 12-ship, 16-missile tube SSBN force has sufficient
flexibility and capacity, and satisfies national strategic deterrent
requirements in a cost efficient manner.
Question. What further support could Congress provide to ensure the
Ohio-class Replacement Program remains on schedule?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being personally engaged
with Defense Department leaders and the Congress to find ways to fund
and execute both the Ohio replacement and the rest of the shipbuilding
plan.
Question. Do you assess Ohio-class replacement submarines will have
the capabilities and attributes needed to perform their unique mission
in the 2030s?
Answer. Yes. The program is being designed to provide the Nation's
most survivable nuclear deterrent into the 2080s, and will deliver the
core essential military capabilities required by our Nation in a cost
effective and fiscally responsible manner.
Question. How confident are you that the program will be able to
produce Ohio-class replacement submarines that meet current cost
estimates (i.e., $14.5 billion for the lead ship with plans and $5.2
billion for hulls 2-12)?
Answer. I am confident the program will deliver at the current cost
estimate.
Question. Congress established the National Sea-Based Deterrence
Fund in section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. `Buck' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015.
What are your views on how the Navy should use this Fund to acquire
Ohio-class replacement submarines?
Answer. The Navy is currently undertaking a thorough review of the
program design and build plan, costs, authorities, and other issues
that could affect how the Fund might best be used. If confirmed, I look
forward to sharing the results of that with you in order to inform the
best way forward.
attack submarine force levels
Question. The Navy's most recent statement of requirements for
attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the
Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as
41 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for 16 years.
What options exist to ensure the Navy deploys attack submarines
sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and
other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?
Answer. The Navy can partially mitigate the attack submarine
shortfall through multiple parallel efforts: continuing procurement of
two Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) per year; shortening the
construction timeline for Virginia-class submarines; extending the
deployments of select Virginia-class attack submarines; and extending
the service lives of select SSN 688 attack submarines.
Question. What risks are being incurred by allowing the attack
submarine force levels to remain below 48 for 16 years?
Answer. Under current planning guidance, an attack submarine force
level below 48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for
indications and warning of potential hostile action, and delay or
reduce the arrival of submarines critical to warfighting if conflict
should arise.
chinese nuclear attack submarines
Question. According to the Department of Defense, in the next
decade, in addition to expanding its force of nuclear powered attack
submarines (SSNs), China likely will construct a guided missile attack
submarine (SSGN) incorporating better quieting technologies.
What are the implications for the U.S. Navy, as well as U.S.
military operations in the Pacific, of the deployment by the Chinese of
new nuclear submarines incorporating better quieting technologies?
Answer. Our Nation currently has superiority in the undersea
domain. Military effects from the undersea domain enable and support
joint forces in the air, surface, cyber, land, and space domains to
gain access and be more effective. It is critical that we maintain
superiority under sea in order to achieve desired military outcomes and
strategic influence. The U.S. advantage is being challenged by China
and Russia, and we must be alert to an advancing and adapting threat.
Quieter and more capable submarines will require that the Navy
continually improve our undersea capabilities.
Question. According to the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement submitted by the President, ``China's strategy for
strengthening its military involves the acquisition of foreign
technology as well as greater civil-military integration.'' The report
notes that ``one notable area of interest is China's selection of
domestic manufacturers for the AP-1000, which is a civil nuclear
reactor's canned motor pumps. These are the same domestic manufacturers
contracted to produce the pumps for China's first generation nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine.
What are the risks pertaining to the possible diversion of civil
nuclear reactor technology for military use--particularly for quieting
Chinese submarines and providing longer patrol time?
Answer. These questions are very difficult to discuss in an
unclassified environment. As requested by the Congress, in my role as
Director, Naval Reactors I submitted a classified report on 24 April
2015. These topics were also discussed at classified briefings with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 May 2015 and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on 3 June 2015. If desired, I look forward to
continuing those discussions in a classified setting.
Question. Can you assure the committee that there will be no risk
of military diversion resulting from the United States-China nuclear
cooperation agreement?
Answer. While it is impossible to state that there will be ``no
risk,'' per the terms of the successor United States-China Atomic
Energy Act Section 123 Agreement each party agrees any material,
equipment, components, technology, and information transferred pursuant
to this Agreement shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device,
for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for
any military purpose. Enhancements included in the successor Agreement
help to strengthen enforcement of the terms of the Agreement.
Question. Given China's activities in the South and East China
Seas, in your view, does it make sense at this time to agree to expand
civil-nuclear cooperation?
Answer. The successor United States-China Atomic Energy Act Section
123 Agreement ensures continued United States access to China's
civilian nuclear complex, allowing for the development of a culture of
best practices on nuclear security and safety, as well as the
opportunity to ensure Chinese nonproliferation policies are consistent
with international nonproliferation norms. I believe that the United
States' ability to achieve a positive outcome in this effort is
enhanced through an open and active relationship fostered under this
Agreement.
Question. What message could this cooperation send to our allies in
the region who look to the United States to respond to increasing
Chinese military and political influence in the region?
Answer. I believe that the successor United States-China Atomic
Energy Act Section 123 Agreement is intended to reaffirm that the U.S.
will remain an active partner in the Pacific, and to reassure our
partners and allies of the U.S. commitment to strategic balance in the
region.
Question. In your role as Director of Naval Reactors, what actions
did you take to ensure the AP-1000 pump design and its components would
not enable the Chinese Navy to advance their submarine reactor pump
technologies?
Answer. The AP-1000 reactor coolant pumps are designed by Curtiss
Wright, the same company that produces the U.S. Navy's reactor coolant
pumps. The military and commercial product lines are segregated at the
Curtiss Wright facility. Personnel, cyber and physical security
protocols are enacted at Curtiss Wright and our other critical military
suppliers to protect U.S. Navy technology.
Question. What role does your office play in reviewing license
applications for the export of nuclear technology?
Answer. The Department of Defense, including the U.S. Navy and
Naval Reactors, is involved in reviewing civil nuclear technology
export license requests. These reviews, which are informed by
Intelligence Community assessments, evaluate the implications of
potential diversion to military programs and are an important part of
the Interagency process used to adjudicate export license requests.
ballistic missile defense (bmd)
Question. The Navy plays an important role in defending the Nation
against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in
defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater
ballistic missile threats.
In conjunction with its 2014 Force Structure Assessment update, the
Navy informed the committee that the entire 88-ship large surface
combatant requirement includes having a BMD capability, with 40 of
these needing the advanced BMD 5.X capability. Today, the Navy has 33
BMD-capable ships, with just three of these having the advanced BMD 5.X
capability. In 2020, the Navy projects having 39 BMD ships, with 16
having BMD 5.X.
Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?
Answer. Yes, it is a proven capability the Navy provides to the
Joint Force.
Question. What options should be explored to reduce the shortfall
in meeting the stated requirement of having 88 BMD-capable ships,
including 40 with the advanced BMD 5.X capability?
Answer. The Navy is on a path to field 88 large surface combatants,
to include 40 new and modernized DDGs equipped with advanced BMD
capability.
Question. Do you support removing BMD capability from Ticonderoga-
class guided missile cruisers as part of the Navy's proposed cruiser
phased modernization plan?
Answer. Given my current understanding of the issue, I do. This
represents one of the difficult choices forced by tight financial
constraints. At this point, the Navy has determined that the benefits
to investing in DDG modernization, to include its BMD enhancements, are
greater than those that would result from retaining BMD capability on
the CGs.
Question. If so, how do you reconcile having a shortfall to the
stated BMD requirement and removing BMD from large surface combatants?
Answer. Investing in DDG modernization is the most cost effective
path to meeting our BMD requirement.
amphibious fleet requirements
Question. What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy's
amphibious ship fleet?
Answer. Amphibious ships are a critical element of our joint force
capabilities. I support the current requirement of 38 amphibious ships
and the plan to build 34, given fiscal constraints. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with the Commandant and the Secretary
of the Navy to continue to support amphibious shipping.
Question. What alternatives would you consider to augment
amphibious ships in providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what
scenarios would these alternatives be necessary and appropriate?
Answer. Increased fleet operations have strained combatant
scheduling and reduced our fleet commanders' tasking flexibility. As
such, the Navy has evaluated methods to use auxiliary ships to
augment--not replace--our most capable amphibious ships. We have
successfully embarked marine detachments on ships such as the afloat
forward staging bases (AFSB), destroyers, littoral combat ships (LCS),
mobile landing platforms (MLP), and joint high-speed vessels (JHSV).
Military Sealift Command (MSC) also maintains additional auxiliary
platforms which are successfully operating with marine detachments
today. These platforms help mitigate shortfalls of amphibious shipping.
None of these alternatives provide the same breadth or depth of
capabilities resident in our amphibious fleet. Their use is most
appropriate in settings where the risks of combat are believed to be
low, and where the greatest needs are for lift, rather than the broader
suite of military capabilities offered by more capable amphibious
platforms.
If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Marine
Corps, the Secretary of the Navy, and others to identify the most
appropriate solutions to supporting Marine Corps activities and
operations around the globe, given existing resources.
littoral combat ship (lcs)
Question. In December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his
decision to upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated LCS-33
through LCS-52, to provide a more capable and lethal small surface
combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.
Do you support the Secretary of Defense's decision to upgrade the
LCS?
Answer. Yes, I believe the modifications to the LCS design will add
valuable lethality and survivability to the final 20 hulls.
Question. What is your understanding of the acquisition strategy
for the LCS and LCS mission modules, as modified by the Secretary of
Defense's decision?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense's decision to procure a modified
LCS (Frigate) to follow the LCS Flight 0+, will produce 32 LCS and 20
Frigates. The acquisition strategy procures three LCS per year through
fiscal year 2018. Frigate procurement starts in fiscal year 2019 with
two ships, and continues with three ships per year from fiscal year
2020 through fiscal year 2025. The Navy is updating the mission module
procurement plan.
Question. Are you concerned by the personnel and configuration
management issues that are presented by fielding and sustaining LCS
Flight 0, LCS Flight 0+, the upgraded LCS (frigate), and
``backfitting'' frigate-like capabilities on existing LCS, as well as
the managing the various mission modules and mission module increments?
Answer. The Small Surface Combatant Task Force examined a range of
configurations and platforms before arriving at the plan that was
subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Navy is working
with the shipbuilders to incorporate the changes. If confirmed,
ensuring that this plan delivers the best outcome in a cost effective
manner will be one of my top priorities.
Question. If so, and if you are confirmed, how would you propose
managing and simplifying these configuration issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether any additional steps
are required beyond a close collaboration with the program manager and
the shipyards.
Question. What is your view of the peacetime and wartime mission of
the LCS?
Answer. LCS provides the Navy with critical capabilities to address
validated gaps in Surface Warfare (SUW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM),
and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) in both open ocean and the littorals.
LCS also supports deployed forward presence to meet combatant commander
demand.
Question. What is your assessment of the requirements for
survivability of the LCS Flight 0, Flight 0+, and LCS (frigate)?
Answer. LCS survivability requirements were analyzed by Naval Sea
Systems Command, which determined they are adequate to meet the
missions expected of the ship. The work performed by the Small Surface
Combatant Task Force identified several survivability enhancements for
the Frigate that will be back-fitted as practical in LCS.
Question. What is your assessment of the delivered survivability
capability of the LCS Flight 0, Flight 0+, and LCS (frigate)?
Answer. The delivered survivability capability of LCS meets the
requirements laid out in the LCS Flight 0+ Capabilities Development
Document (CDD).
Question. Do you support the Navy force structure assessment
requirement of 52 small surface combatants?
Answer. Currently yes. I support the Force Structure Assessment
(FSA) requirement of 52 small surface combatants. The Navy plans to
meet this requirement with a combination of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates.
tactical fighter programs
Question. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the
largest and most expensive acquisition program in the Department's
history, was formally initiated as a program of record in 2002 with a
total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the U.S. At projected
procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by the Department well
into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. The program has
not yet completed its systems development and demonstration phase, and
is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its
inception.
The Navy's fiscal year 2016 budget request indicates a program of
record of 369 F-35C, with Navy procurement continuing throughout the
life of the F-35 procurement program.
The overall requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly
20 years ago. Since that time, however, there have been countervailing
pressures to: (1) reduce force structure to conserve resources; (2)
improve capability to respond to prospective adversary technological
advances and increased capabilities from updated threat assessments;
and (3) respond to an evolving national defense strategy.
Do you believe the Navy's F-35C requirement is still valid?
Answer. Yes, the F-35C will be a vital part of the future Carrier
Air Wing.
Question. Do you believe the Navy can afford and needs to procure
310 more F-35Cs with a procurement cost of over $42 billion?
The F-35C provides essential 5th generation strike fighter
capability to our Carrier Air Wings. Without this capability, we cannot
achieve air superiority. The Department of the Navy currently has a
requirement for 340 F-35Cs. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman
and other service chiefs to revalidate the appropriate number of
aircraft the Navy requires to meet the mission.
Do you believe that the Navy will still want to buy the F-35C, an
aircraft design that will be 30 years old before the Navy production is
scheduled to finish?
Answer. The Navy is committed to making the F-35C the next Carrier
Air Wing fighter, complementing the F/A-18E/F until that aircraft
reaches the end of its lifetime in the 2030s.
Question. Do you believe the Navy's current and planned force mix
of tactical aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future threats
around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific theater of
operations where the ``tyranny of distance'' is such a major factor?
Answer. Currently, I do. There are capability, inventory, and
readiness aspects to delivering the required force mix. If confirmed, I
will work with leadership to determine the best options to pace the
threat in a dynamic security and fiscal environment.
Question. The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he
believed the F-35 should be and would be the Nation's last manned
fighter aircraft. Do you believe this to be true?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to
aggressively advance the development of unmanned systems. It is crucial
that we push the boundaries of what unmanned technologies can achieve;
the next generation in tactical aviation will play a large part in this
transformation.
Question. What will be your role in leading capabilities and
requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat
systems in the Navy?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to make the continued development of
unmanned systems a hallmark of my tenure. I intend to push the Navy
into new ways of thinking about combinations of people and technologies
to maximize our operational advantage.
Question. How do you see the future balance developing between
manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy's future force
structure?
Answer. I believe that the advent of advanced information
technology is redefining the approach to obtaining the most effective
relationship between people and technology. There is vast potential to
change the balance of manned and unmanned platforms in general, and
this potential is a key to helping the United States minimize the risk
to our people and stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats.
readiness
Question. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the
Navy to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of
military operations?
Answer. While forward deployed Navy forces continue to meet
readiness standards, I am most concerned about the Navy's ability to
meet the timelines associated with providing either follow-on or
``surge'' forces should they be requested by combatant commanders. For
instance, we are currently not meeting our required crisis response
capacity and do not fully recover until 2020.
Question. What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the
readiness of the Navy?
Answer. The 2016 President's Budget Request provides the minimum
resources to achieve the levels of readiness to meet requirements by
2020. This plan still includes considerable risk, and does not allow
for any unexpected contingencies.
Question. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration
given the impacts we have already seen to readiness in fiscal year
2013?
Answer. It is absolutely critical. Without relief from the current
budget caps, we will fall farther below requirements to the point that
the Navy will not be able to meet our responsibilities in the current
strategy.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods
currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of
Navy equipment?
Answer. To estimate the resources needed for maintenance, the Navy
takes a requirements-based approach that first defines the required
level of readiness for a given unit at a particular time, for a
particular mission. This accounts for personnel, equipment,
sustainment, training, and ordnance. Efforts are made to ensure that
units are appropriately ready, balancing the operational availability
to the warfighters consistent with expected employment. While this
analytical approach provides discipline and predictability to the
system, recent budget perturbations and uncertainty makes cost and
associated readiness estimates much more complex, and drives up the
cost/readiness in nearly every case. When readiness suffers--
particularly in maintenance--it can take years to recover.
Question. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last
several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to
reduce this backlog?
Answer. The fiscal year 2016 President's Budget Request, with OCO
funding, fully funds ship maintenance to continue life cycle
maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address workload
to be completed in our public shipyards, Navy also funds additional
workforce and will send selective submarines to private shipyards. Navy
funds aviation depot maintenance to capacity, increasing funding as
throughput improves.
Question. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance
backlog in order to improve readiness?
Answer. It is very important to the Navy. Maintenance and training
backlogs have delayed deployments, which have in turn forced extensions
for those already deployed. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs, and destroyers
have been on deployment for 8-10 months or longer. This comes at a cost
to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our equipment, and
service lives of our ships. Readiness shortfalls take stable and
predictable funding over a period of years to correct, and force
operational units to extend beyond sustainable levels.
Question. How important is it to receive OCO funding 2 or 3 years
after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is
reset?
Answer. It is very important. We remain reliant on OCO funding for
ongoing overseas operations, reset, and enduring requirements.
Question. In your judgment, is the current and recent operational
tempo adversely affecting the readiness or retention of sailors on
Active Duty and in the Reserve component?
Answer. There is no doubt that our sailors and their families are
mission focused--they are proud to do their job--making significant
sacrifices--as they serve the Nation. Having said that, in my
experience, the dominant factor that is negatively affecting our
sailors' professional experience in the Navy, and the stress that their
families experience, is the frustration associated with things like
delays to getting underway, deployment extensions, training delays and
gaps, delays in maintenance periods, and last-minute parts
availability. These avoidable unpredictabilities are the single biggest
detractor to quality of service.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for
maintaining readiness in the near term, while modernizing the Navy to
ensure readiness in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strive to achieve the appropriate
balance between these two imperatives. My first priority will be to
deliver a sustainable level of mission-ready forward presence and
contingency response capacity to the combatant commanders. However,
these near-term priorities cannot be made at the expense of the
capability and capacity of the Navy's future force. We must maintain
commitment to modernize our Navy to meet tomorrow's challenges,
particularly the need to modernize our undersea strategic deterrent,
and to address emerging opportunities in information technology. If
confirmed, I will work with Defense Department leadership and the
Congress to achieve adequate and predictable resources to meet current
readiness and employment requirements while investing in the future.
Question. In years past, Congress has based additional readiness
funding decisions on the Service Chief unfunded priorities lists.
However, in recent years those lists have not been provided or have
arrived too late to help in our markup process.
If confirmed, do you agree to provide unfunded priorities lists to
Congress in a timely manner beginning with the fiscal year 2017 budget
request?
Answer. Yes. I will make all efforts to comply with Congressional
direction.
Question. In the past, a number of ships failed inspections by the
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), including Aegis cruisers and
destroyers, due to poor material condition. The Navy classified INSURV
inspection results in 2008 and stopped using pass-fail criteria in
2012.
Do you support the current policy of keeping INSURV results
classified?
Answer. Yes, getting an unvarnished assessment of our ships is
critical to understanding the readiness level of the fleet.
Furthermore, the detailed readiness assessment of our forces should be
kept from any potential adversaries.
Question. Do you support the current grading criteria, which lack a
pass/fail determination?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the existing system, which grades ships
using a holistic score and compares them to other ships in their class,
provides more useful insight about a ship's condition and the path to
correct deficiencies.
Question. Given INSURV no longer provides failing or unsatisfactory
scores, how will you ensure Congress is promptly notified when the
material condition of a ship is unsatisfactory?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the readiness of
our fleet is promptly known to Defense Department leadership and the
Congress.
Question. Navy leaders have stated rotational deployments will be
stabilized and more predictable through continued implementation of an
improved deployment framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan
(O-FRP).
What is your understanding of the O-FRP?
Answer. O-FRP is designed to align manning, maintenance, and
modernization of our platforms with training in order to achieve
readiness and meet regional needs in the most effective and efficient
manner. O-FRP should allow the Navy to achieve stable and predictable
7-month deployments, which will help to reset our readiness and
increase certainty for our sailors and families.
Question. Do you support implementation of the O-FRP?
Answer. Yes. As O-FRP goes forward, if confirmed I will work
closely with the fleet commanders to continuously review effectiveness
of O-FRP in meeting our strategic objectives.
Question. To what extent will implementation of the O-FRP improve
the material readiness of the fleet?
Answer. O-FRP is designed to improve material readiness by
providing greater stability and predictability in maintenance
schedules. Restoring predictability to maintenance periods, when
combined with sufficient and predictable resources in our shipyards and
depots should allow for better maintenance outcomes and improved
overall fleet readiness.
Question. What metrics should Congress use to track the material
readiness and material condition of Navy ships and aircraft, as well as
the effectiveness of O-FRP?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the material
readiness of our fleet is promptly known to Departmental leadership and
the Congress.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including
previous Chiefs of Naval Operations, have advocated for accession to
the Law of the Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. I support accession to the Convention. Being a party to the
Convention enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing
freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force
posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world's largest
maneuver space. Access would strengthen the legal foundation for our
ability to transit through international straits and archipelagic
waters; preserve our right to conduct military activities in other
countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) without notice or
permission; reaffirm the sovereign immunity of warships; provide a
framework to counter excessive maritime claims; and preserve our
operations and intelligence-collection activities. Joining the
Convention would also demonstrate our commitment to the rule of law,
strengthen our credibility among those nations that are already party
to the Convention, and allow us to bring the full force of our
influence in challenging excessive maritime claims. Finally, it would
secure for us a leadership role in shaping and influencing future
maritime developments.
Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who
assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
United States?
Answer. There are significant national security impacts from
failing to join the Convention. By remaining outside the Convention,
the United States remains in scarce company with Iran, Venezuela, North
Korea, and Syria, and foregoes the most effective way to counter
undesirable changes in the law or to exercise international leadership.
By not acceding to UNCLOS we deny ourselves the ability to challenge
changes to international law as a result of the practice of nations at
the local, regional, or global level. As some states seek to interpret
treaty provisions in a manner that restricts freedom of navigation,
U.S. reliance on customary international law as the legal foundation
for our military activities in the maritime becomes far more vulnerable
and needlessly places our forces in a more tenuous position during
operations. Moreover, by failing to join the Convention, some countries
may come to doubt our commitment to act in accordance with
international law.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime
disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility
and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we
do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes
are resolved peacefully, countries adhere to the rule of law, and all
nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our
leverage by not signing up to the same rule book by which we are asking
other countries to accept. As for the Artic, the other Arctic coastal
nations (Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland)) understand
the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing
the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of their
extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has
a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of the
Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS.
We must put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and
effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who
are parties to the Convention.
united states force posture in the asia-pacific region
Question. The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense
Guidance.
Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?
Answer. Thus far, I am satisfied with our rebalance efforts, as
they have resulted in a significant adjustment in United States Navy
force structure and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
Question. What do you see as the United States security priorities
in the Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what
specific Navy capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those
priorities?
Answer. The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is becoming a priority not
only for the United States, but for the world. Rising economies, access
to natural resources, critical trade routes, and growing navies all
present both opportunities and risks. In order to protect our
interests, the United States faces a range of challenges in the Asia-
Pacific region, including provocations by North Korea and the growth of
its ballistic missile programs, as well as China's expansion into the
Pacific and Indian oceans, supported by their rapidly growing navy.
Going forward, a whole-of-government approach is warranted.
Moreover, I believe we must address this challenge in a regional
context--continuing to enhance relations with and the capabilities of
regional allies and partners. For our part, as this is such a vast
maritime theater, the Navy must continue to prioritize the full
spectrum of our capabilities towards the Pacific.
Question. Do the budget cuts and resource constraints associated
with sequestration threaten your ability to execute the rebalance to
the Pacific?
Answer. Resourcing levels below the fiscal year 2016 President's
Budget Request would necessitate reworking the current defense
strategy, including the rebalance to the Pacific.
anti-access/area denial
Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-
access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the
prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S.
Navy's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.
Question. Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial
capabilities are a concern?
Answer. Yes. The development and proliferation of advanced systems
that can sense, target and strike ships at increasing ranges and
accuracy is a vital concern to me. If confirmed, I will work with other
defense leaders and leaders in industry to develop technologies that
assure access by the joint force.
Question. If so, what do you believe the Navy needs to be doing now
and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all
strategically important segments of the maritime domain?
Answer. The free use of the maritime commons is critical to the
global economic system and U.S. national interests. The Navy will
continue to first and foremost be present and exercise freedom of
navigation in international waters and to reassure our allies and
partners. Further the Navy must continue to develop new concepts,
platforms, and technologies that can effectively address this emerging
threat to access.
Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats.
Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats,
what are your goals regarding transformation of the Navy?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my primary goals would be to ensure
the Navy fully exploits the potential offered by advances in
technology, and particularly information technology, to enhance our
ability to rapidly and adaptively combine forces and capabilities. To
support this aim, the acquisition processes that design and build these
capabilities must become more agile. Finally, we must consider what
changes must be made to the way that we train and employ our people to
ensure that our sailors remain on the cutting edge of capability. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy incorporates these changes
swiftly and effectively.
china assertiveness
Question. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and
maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China
Sea, affected security and stability in the region?
Answer. China's actions in the South and East China Seas, as well
as its rapid military modernization and growing defense budgets, have
led many in the region, including the United States, to question its
long-term intentions. China has still not clarified its 9-Dash Line
claim, and it continues to conduct land-reclamation and construction
activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been destabilizing
for the region and has increased the risk of miscalculation or conflict
among regional actors. Our allies and partners in the region are
increasingly looking to the United States for leadership and support in
the face of these challenges, and so our response to China's challenges
to the international maritime order should be firm and consistent.
china
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the
United States-China military relationship?
Answer. The United States-China military-to-military relationship
is a critical component of our overall bilateral relationship and an
important aspect of our regional maritime strategy. Right now, I
believe the military relationship is contributing to stability in the
region. This stability allows us to increase cooperation on areas of
overlapping interests, while improving our ability to manage other
aspects of the security relationship responsibly. The broader bilateral
relationship can improve through strengthening trust and transparency
between the two militaries.
Question. What are your views regarding China's interest in and
commitment to improving military relations with the United States?
Answer. I believe China recognizes the United States will have an
enduring presence in the Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in
sustaining military-to-military contacts. If confirmed, I will continue
to use the military relationship as a tool to build sustained and
substantive dialogue, develop areas of practical cooperation, and
manage competition in a way that protects national interests and
supports overall stability in the relationship and the Asia-Pacific
region.
Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance
of sustained military-to military relations with China?
Answer. Mil-Mil relations are an important part of our bilateral
relationship. They can be fruitful because of a shared military
culture, this is true for navies in particular as we operate together
in international waters governed by common rules and must communicate
with one another. The goal would be to protect national interests by
strengthening understanding, transparency, and familiarity. This must
be done in a thoughtful way that protects our interests.
Question. What role do you see for the Chief of Naval Operations in
this process?
Answer. I believe the CNO plays a pivotal role to personally
sustain a meaningful working relationship with all of his counterparts
around the world, to the end of promoting the international rules and
norms that have been the foundation of regional stability for decades
and have afforded nations such as China unprecedented economic growth
and prosperity.
unmanned systems
Question. The Navy's current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop
an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (14 hours) and the ISR
mission.
Given the combat radius of the planned Carrier Air Wing, are you
concerned the Navy's aircraft carriers will lack the ability to project
power at relevant distances, given emerging anti-access/area-denial
threats?
Answer. I am concerned. The rapidly evolving technological and
security environments require that we continually work to develop
concepts and capabilities that will allow us to maintain assured access
and project power when needed. That is why our planned modernization
integrates the warfighting capabilities of the entire Air Wing
including strike fighter, airborne electronic attack, and command and
control modernization to assure access in contested environments. As
part of this integrated approach, the UCLASS program is designed to
provide both Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting
and future strike capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to
participating with other defense leaders and industry to ensure success
in this critical area.
strategic thinking
Question. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and
assigned group of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank
of flag rank officer?
Answer. The Navy has several opportunities for an officer to
develop into a strategic leader. The Naval War College, Naval Post
Graduate School, and other services' schools provide a rich education
in strategy and policy. As well, the Navy has programs with other
colleges and universities both in the United States and abroad that
provide opportunities to become educated in strategic thinking. We are
and will continue to pursue initiatives to improve in this vital area.
conventional vs. nuclear deterrence
Question. What role do you see for the Navy in conventional
deterrence?
Answer. Naval forward presence is critical to conventional
deterrence. Captured in the phrase that the Navy is ``where it matters,
when it matters'' is the ability to be forward to enhance stability and
deter undesired behavior.
Question. How do strategic and conventional deterrence complement
one another?
Answer. It is a complementary relationship. Our Nation's strategic
deterrent has been a bedrock of peace and stability, precluding major
wars for over 50 years. The Navy's contribution to this is the SSBN
force, which has provided a survivable and responsive capability and
100 percent alert coverage since the 1960s. That force recently
celebrated its 4,000th strategic deterrent patrol. Complementing this
strategic deterrent, as discussed above, our conventional naval forces
are present to be seen and to reassure our partners that we have a
global reach that protects the international system. Both work in
tandem within the Joint force to guarantee stability.
offset technologies
Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key
technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional
forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-
based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our
emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological
superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the
United States once again focus on offsetting the erosion of our
technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries.
Which technology priorities do you believe the Navy should be
pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the
United States?
Answer. The advances in information technology--via cyber
capabilities and in the electromagnetic spectrum--present significant
future potential. Related, these technologies, when coupled with
precision guidance and sensors, present significant opportunities for
unmanned systems. The advent of additive manufacturing (3D printing)
technology is another area that should be aggressively pursued.
Finally, advances in power generation and conditioning allow for
opportunities in directed energy weapons. Just as important as any
technology, the process by which the Navy develops and fields new
capabilities must become more agile. We must learn and adapt faster.
Question. What strategies would you recommend be implemented to
develop these technology priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the momentum the
Navy has established to develop and deploy innovative technologies and
to refine our staff organization and processes to become more adaptable
and agile. My sense is that closer collaboration with industry will
enhance our effectiveness in this endeavor.
Question. What role should the services play in their development?
Answer. The Services play a vital role in resourcing the research
and development to address needs, lead creative thinking about the
future, and ensure that promising approaches survive the leap from
research to production. If confirmed, this will get my personal
attention.
science and technology
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a procurement program for the
warfighter.
What are some of the challenges you see in transitioning
technologies effectively from research programs into programs of
records?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with Defense Department
leadership and the Congress to enhance the Navy's ability to develop
capabilities that can be rapidly prototyped and tested in the field,
and if successful, integrated into the fleet. I believe this will
accelerate the learning cycle and allow capability to enter the Navy at
a pace more comparable to the private sector. This must be done
thoughtfully, keeping in mind that Naval systems must operate reliably
for extended periods of time in hostile maritime environments.
Continued mission success and the safety of our sailors depend on these
capabilities.
Question. As the Chief of Naval Operations, what steps will you
take to ensure that the services are benefitting more quickly and
directly from the research being performed by the defense research
enterprise?
Answer. Leveraging the research being conducted elsewhere in the
defense enterprise, ensuring we don't duplicate efforts unnecessarily,
and bringing the technical communities together to share information
are all high priorities for me. Our technical workforce needs to be
able to spend time interacting with researchers and attending
professional workshops. If confirmed, I will engage with universities,
industry, and research institutions to work on our toughest challenges.
Question. Do you feel that defense technologies and systems,
especially in areas such as mobile communications, computing, and
robotics, are keeping pace with global and commercial technological
advances? If not, what do you suggest that the Department do to keep up
with the pace of global technological change?
Answer. Global technological advancements are profound, and I
believe that we should monitor and leverage them that at every
opportunity, as they represent a source of tremendous advantage. If
confirmed, I look forward to identifying specific areas where we can
trust commercial markets to produce capabilities that are suitable--
even preferable--to independently developing them ``in house.''
Question. As you know, robust investment in S&T underpins
technological advances in our military capabilities and is vital for
maintain our military technological superiority over emerging
adversaries.
If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy
is investing adequately in S&T programs?
Answer. Given the challenges associated with identifying a benefit,
it may be most useful to ensure that a fixed percentage of overall
funding remains allocated to basic research. I believe the Defense
Department, to include the Navy, must have a robust understanding of
the areas of basic research that are likely to provide those advances
most relevant to its missions, and invest in those that are least
likely to attract adequate funding from other sources. If confirmed, I
would ensure that the Navy's analysis in this area remains robust.
Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment
level for basic research programs?
Answer. I believe that our current investment in basic research is
appropriate given the current fiscal reality.
Question. What tools would you use to ensure that appropriate
technologies are transitioning quickly into programs of record?
Answer. If confirmed, this will be an area of keen interest during
my tenure as CNO. At every level of this organization, we recognize
that delivering technological superiority to our warfighters is of
paramount importance yet often happens too slowly. I would assist the
Secretary in the acquisition process to ensure that the warfighter's
needs are properly articulated, prioritized, and resourced, and that
the requirements process is agile enough to drive an even faster pace.
The Navy has already started moving in this direction with Task Force
Innovation, establishing a DASN for unmanned systems, and establishing
the office of OPNAV N99 to focus on transitioning new technologies more
quickly.
technical workforce
Question. A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense
today is an impending shortage of high quality scientific and
engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical
centers.
In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active Duty Navy
personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the
Navy research and acquisition system?
Answer. The Navy is continually assessing the appropriate roles for
military, civilian, and contractor personnel to determine the best
approach to meeting our research and acquisition needs. If confirmed I
look forward to exploring this issue more fully.
Question. How would you ensure that directors of labs in your
service have the tool they need to dynamically shape their S&T
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the directors and the
resource sponsors to ensure that we maintain a system that is
responsive to the needs of the current S&T environment, including
people, security, and instrumentation and tools.
test and evaluation issues
Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
acquisition, spiral acquisition and other evolutionary acquisition
processes?
Answer. The operational test and evaluation communities play a
critical role in ensuring the systems the Navy produces are ready for
the stresses of extended operation at sea and ultimately for combat.
This community ensures that our systems will perform to expectations
and allow our sailors and commanders to have the capability and
confidence in their gear that they need to win.
Question. Are you satisfied with the Navy's test and evaluation
capabilities, including workforce and infrastructure?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be
developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. New technologies and rapid prototyping and fielding schemes
will likely require us to develop new test and evaluation capabilities
as well--capabilities that will evaluate new systems in ways that both
provide the confidence in the system's performance and also are
responsive. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
Defense Department leadership and the Congress to explore ways to
achieve both of these aims.
Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD
developmental and operational testing organizations with respect to
testing of Navy systems?
Answer. The evaluation performed by OSD developmental and
operational testing organizations is critical to delivering combat
ready systems. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to partner
with these organizations.
recruiting and retention
Question. What do you consider to be the key to the Navy's success
in recruiting the highest caliber American youth for service and
retaining the best personnel for leadership responsibilities?
Answer. Today our recruiting and retention numbers are at historic
highs. Maintaining this quality as the economy improves will be
critical to our ability to command the seas and provide options to
national leadership. Key to recruiting and retaining high quality
personnel will be to remain true to our values and beliefs. People with
talent such as we see joining our ranks have many choices--and they
chose to join our Navy team because we work together in high-preforming
teams that stand for something noble and true. We must always remain
vigilant to ensure that our behaviors remain consistent with our
values. As such, our ability to revise and renew outdated and
cumbersome policies, practices, and technologies, to permit our current
and future generations to fulfill their potential and their desire to
serve, will be critical to keeping people on our team.
Question. What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure
that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact
the overall readiness, recruiting, retention, and morale of sailors?
Answer. Central to recruiting and retaining high quality personnel
and maintaining readiness and morale is our ability to provide sailors
deployment predictability and the resources necessary to carry out
their mission. Years of continuing resolutions, coupled with the long-
lasting negative effects of sequestration in 2013 and the looming
threat of sequester in the future have increased frustration and
anxiety in our sailors. This ``say-do mismatch'' over time erodes
trust, and factors heavily into a family's decision to stay Navy or
recommend a career in the naval service to others.
Question. What impact, if any, do you believe the Department's
proposals aimed at slowing the growth of personnel and health care
costs will have on recruiting and retention in the Navy?
Answer. If communicated properly and put in the appropriate context
by leadership, slowing growth, while still meeting expectations
regarding those matters that sailors and their families value most,
should allow the Navy to make appropriate adjustments in a controlled
and sustainable manner. Our sailors want to be fairly compensated for
their hard work and sacrifice, but they also join and stay in the Navy
for the sense of purpose and teamwork that comes from operating around
the world as part of high-performing units on advanced platforms.
military compensation
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military
compensation?
Answer. To win in the challenging future security environment, we
must continue to recruit and retain high-quality people and their
families. Our warfighting readiness and ability to win a future
conflict depends on this. My general sense is that the basic structure
of the compensation system is about right. There may be additional room
to achieve greater efficiencies or provide even higher levels of
satisfaction, but doing so will require developing deeper insight into
the specific needs and desires of our sailors and civilians. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Secretary of the
Navy and the Secretary of Defense on these types of initiatives.
Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the
rising cost of personnel?
Answer. I agree with the recent Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) findings that our current
system is generally sound, although we must continue to look for
efficiencies where possible. I support proposals to modernize our
retirement system so long as our sailors are given supporting education
to make choices to best support their families. My inclination is that
the MCRMC recommendation to combine some commissary and exchange
functions make sense; I would like to study this more closely. If
confirmed, I will work with my fellow Chiefs to continue to seek out
opportunities to better align servicemember needs with support, both
through compensation and through updates to how we manage our people.
Question. Do you support the administration's compensation and
health care proposals?
Answer. I support opportunities to find efficiencies in how we
manage and pay for the healthcare of our sailors and families, but am
mindful of the absolute need to keep our commitments to fairly reward
them for their service. As we work through this process, our priority
must be to ensure we continue to recruit and retain high quality people
and their families. Our warfighting readiness and ability to win a
future conflict depends on this.
education for sailors
Question. An important feature of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is the
ability of career-oriented servicemembers to transfer their earned
benefits to spouses and dependents.
What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on
recruiting and retention of sailors?
Answer. According to quick polls and surveys, the Post 9-11 GI Bill
has a positive effect on both recruiting and retention. It provides
excellent opportunities for academic, technical, intellectual,
personal, and professional development of our servicemembers and their
families. This contributes to overall readiness, quality, and morale of
our force.
Question. In your view, what has been the effect of the
transferability option on retention and career satisfaction of sailors?
Answer. The Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and the ability to transfer
unused portions to dependents contribute significantly to both the
retention and morale of our force and have the potential to strengthen
our country's educational base and technological leadership.
Question. How important do you believe tuition assistance benefits
are to young sailors, and what trends do you see in the Navy's ability
to pay for such programs at current levels over the FYDP?
Answer. I share CNO Greenert's commitment to tuition assistance.
Sailor demand for tuition assistance remains strong and our plan is to
maintain funding at the current level. Such assistance continues to be
a key component of the Navy's Learning Strategy and supports overall
readiness by providing academic, technical, intellectual, and
professional development for our sailors.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to current
eligibility criteria for tuition assistance?
Answer. I do not recommend any changes to the program at this time.
Current law and policy provide the Services sufficient flexibility to
tailor the Tuition Assistance Program to meet the requirements for our
sailor's personal and professional development while meeting the Navy's
warfighting requirements.
Question. Do you believe that tuition assistance should be used to
enhance a sailor's career while he or she is in the Navy?
Answer. Yes. Navy-funded education through tuition assistance or
other means is a strategic investment in our people. Sailors develop
critical thinking skills, broadening their intellectual base, and
acquire the ability operate effectively in complex environments--
regardless of the specific course of study.
Question. Do you agree with the Military Compensation and
Retirement Modernization Commission that tuition assistance should be
limited to courses and education that contribute to a sailor's
professional growth?
Answer. As long as we do not become too restrictive regarding our
definition of what ``contributes to a sailor's professional growth,'' I
believe that Navy-funded education should both enhance the professional
growth of our people and the effectiveness of our Navy. As with other
personnel programs this will have to be closely studied and thoroughly
communicated in order to achieve the desired positive effect.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. As you know, 2 years ago, the Department rescinded the
policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have
the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and
has given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The services have opened a large number of
positions to service by women and continue to work to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure we follow Department guidance
and meet our reporting obligations under the law. The Navy will provide
a written report to the Secretary of Defense in September 2015 with
validation of standards as gender neutral in accordance with Public
Laws stating that occupational standards ``accurately predict
performance of actual, regular, and recurring duties of a military
occupation; and are applied equitably to measure individual
capabilities.'' We are on track to certify that these validated
standards are in use or will be in use by 30 Sep 2015 at schools and in
training.
Question. Will you ensure that the standards will be realistic and
will preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will ensure that all standards will be
operationally relevant and accurately reflect the tasks required to
accomplish the mission.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements?
Answer. Over 95 percent of Navy jobs are already open to both men
and women. The Navy will continue to open positions to obtain the
talent necessary to best meet military requirements.
Question. If so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. If confirmed I will continue our present course. Warren
Buffet has been quoted as saying that as he grew up, he had the
privilege of only having to compete against 50 percent of the
population. The Navy's goal is to ensure that we do not afford that
advantage to any potential adversary. Our missions will be executed by
the best qualified and most capable people, regardless of gender. In
order to preserve unit readiness, cohesion, and morale, and to limit
attrition, lessons learned from the surface, aviation, and submarine
integration will be used to ensure future and continued success.
Question. In 2011, the Navy opened service on submarines to women.
What is the implementation status of this decision?
Answer. I am pleased with progress being made; we are moving
forward smoothly and deliberately. Women can now serve on all three
types of submarines; SSBNs, SSGNs, and SSNs. To date, 56 women are
currently serving onboard submarines, including 40 nuclear-trained
officers and 16 supply officers. Sixteen submarine crews in Ohio- and
Virginia-class submarines are integrated. In June 2015, the Navy
announced the names of the first enlisted female submariners. These
sailors will be assigned to the first two of eighteen submarine crews
and will report to USS Michigan in 2016. The women and the men are
performing superbly.
Question. What challenges still exist and what proactive measures
are submarine force leaders taking?
Answer. The integration of women into the submarine community is
progressing smoothly and deliberately. As the force moves toward
integrating enlisted females in 2016, the Navy will continue to adhere
to the principles and will benefit from the lessons learned that have
led to success to date. The crews that will receive these females will
have appropriate levels of training and certification to ensure they
are prepared for these sailors. Additionally, the enlisted sailors are
being assigned to crews that are already integrated with female
officers.
family readiness and support
Question. Sailors and their families in both the Active and Reserve
components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in
support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned
of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of
deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. Each Navy family has unique needs driven by their own
personal circumstances and geographic location. From pay and
compensation, to deployment predictability, to healthcare, our families
have unique concerns that unit leadership must address in a timely and
compassionate manner. Our sailors tell us that predictability, combined
with tailored communication before, during, and after deployments helps
bring families together, building bonds that improve unit readiness and
cohesion.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and potential future reductions
in end strength?
Answer. I believe that most family issues are best addressed and
cared for at the local level by commanders and senior enlisted leaders
whom sailors and their families know and trust. If confirmed, it would
be my responsibility to ensure that commanders have access to the
information and resources they need to respond to local concerns in a
timely and compassionate manner. Additionally, it would be my
responsibility to set a climate and environment that encourages candid
and unsolicited family feedback, good or bad. This direct information,
whether shared through our Ombudsmen network or electronically is an
important look into command climate and readiness.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget
challenges.
If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military
quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of
intense downward pressure on budgets?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to give the current family
support programs high priority and to remain fully engaged in this
area; monitoring it closely to ensure it remains responsive to
families' needs and receives the appropriate level of support. In this
endeavor, I hope to learn from our people and outside industry what
additional initiatives we might introduce to better retain needed
support while driving costs down.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee.
What is your assessment of the Navy's suicide prevention program?
Answer. There is no single proven solution to prevent suicide.
Every suicide is a tragedy, and even one is too many. Our goal to
eliminate suicides will be realized through continued efforts in
communications, skills training, policy, and research. Progress may
fluctuate from year to year, but our Navy's commitment will be rock
steady--we will spare no effort to reach those sailors who are
suffering in this way. This is an area where we need to continue to
improve, and if confirmed I am committed to leading that effort.
Question. In your view, what role should the Chief of Naval
Operations play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both at
home and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all
servicemembers and their families?
Answer. The CNO's role is to ensure that our sailors first and
foremost understand that suicide prevention is a priority mission. The
CNO must also ensure that unit leaders have the information, training,
tools, practices, and policies to be healthy, resilient, and mission
ready day in and day out. I believe that suicide prevention extends
beyond simple policy guidance and oversight, and that it must be a
command-led effort to first connect with sailors who may be in
distress, and then to guide them to the appropriate means to help them
successfully arrive at a ``safe harbor'' where they will be more at
peace.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
home station.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to make resources and
direct care more accessible to sailors and their families. We will
continue to embed mental health providers directly within operational
units. I believe these deckplate resources are a crucial element in
helping to detect stress injuries early before they lead to decreased
mission capability and mental health problems. We are also embedding
mental health providers in primary care settings to ensure these
resources are available upon return to the home station. Finally, I
will do all that I can to reduce the stigma associated with asking for
help so that our sailors take full advantage of the available
resources.
prevention of and response to sexual assaults
Question. The fiscal year 2014 Department of Defense Annual Report
on Sexual Assault in the Military reflects that substantiated reports
of sexual assault in the Navy increased by 17 percent from 420 reports
in fiscal year 2013 to 491 reports in fiscal year 2014.
What is your assessment of this report?
Answer. The report makes clear that while the Navy is making some
progress to eliminate sexual assault, we still have much work to do.
Question. What is your assessment of the problem of sexual assaults
in the Navy?
Answer. The Navy's success is predicated on high-performing teams
bonded through trust and respect. Sexual assault within our ranks has a
poisonous effect on unit performance and cohesion, reflecting a breach
of trust. While I believe that we recognize the seriousness of the
crime, there is additional work to do both to eliminate this crime, and
to provide the strongest possible support to survivors. To be
successful, we must do more to break the continuum of harm that starts
with harassment or a hostile climate, and far too often ends in sexual
violence.
Question. What is your assessment of the Navy sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. I firmly support the Navy's sexual assault prevention and
response program. Having said that, eliminating sexual assault remains
a challenging and complex problem. If confirmed, I will build upon
current efforts and deepen my understanding of how to lead efforts to
improve Navy responses, enhance accountability, and protect all of our
sailors from this crime.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. In my view, having both these reporting options provides
survivors a critical range of options., and both supports our goals of
getting victims the care they need and holding offenders appropriately
accountable.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Commanders must lead the way in our efforts to eliminate
sexual assault. Commanders support victims through participation in the
Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) meetings held monthly,
during which commanders address the needs and desires of survivors to
ensure that they are receiving appropriate access to sexual assault
response coordinators, sexual assault prevention and response victim
advocates, healthcare, and counseling, as well as ensuring all of the
proper arrangements for any requested expedited transfers are being
made. When sexual assault does occur, commanders must lead decisive
response efforts, including the responsibility for appropriate criminal
or administrative actions against offenders.
Most importantly, elimination of sexual assault and the behaviors
that lead to sexual assault will be manifested by deckplate
leadership--the chief petty officers and junior officers in the spaces.
These leaders respond to their Commanding Officer (CO). That CO is
accountable to remain fully engaged in establishing the proper climate
and ensuring that his or her team is following through.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy
resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. I believe the Navy has sufficient resources and authorities
to address the needs of victims. Needs and requirements are regularly
assessed to ensure that sufficient resources are available.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed
locations?
Answer. Sexual assault prevention requires multiple, layered
efforts at several levels working in concert. Navy sexual assault
prevention incorporates cultural improvement through engaged
leadership, education and awareness, intervention, accountability, and
partnerships across Navy organizations. Policy alone will not stop
sexual assault; it requires action at the fleet level and involves all
leaders.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Navy to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual
assault?
Answer. The Navy has increased the training and resources applied
to the investigation and prosecution functions. The Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) has increased the number of investigators
trained to investigate sexual assault offenses and enhanced its
protocols to ensure these investigations are conducted or overseen by
personnel qualified in this specialized field. The JAG Corps has
similarly refined the training provided to judge advocates prosecuting
or advising commanders in these cases, most notably requiring every
attorney serving as lead trial counsel in a sexual assault case to be
special victim qualified. As the law enforcement and legal components
have individually improved, they have also endeavored to become more
collaborative, both in training and execution. NCIS and the JAG Corps
participate in an annual Special Victims Capabilities Course, attended
by numerous members of the response community including trial and
defense counsel, paralegals, Victims' Legal Counsel, and Victim
Advocates. NCIS also created the Adult Sexual Assault Program (ASAP) in
the Navy's largest fleet concentration areas to provide a distinct and
recognizable group of personnel to investigate sexual assault related
offenses. Upon receiving a report, ASAP personnel employ a surge team
response. Members of the team collaborate with trial counsel and victim
advocate personnel, resulting in the faster delivery of an
investigative package to the convening authority. These types of
functions are critical to responding to sexual assault, which in turn
is essential to the commander's ability to maintain good order and
discipline. With the dynamic nature of this area and the fluidity of
our force, we cannot afford to reduce the training and resources
currently provided--we must continue to seek ways to improve.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?
Answer. Engagement by the chain of command is essential as we
create a culture at all levels that is intolerant of actions and
behaviors that lead to sexual assault.
Elimination of sexual assault and the behaviors that lead to sexual
assault will be manifested by deckplate leadership--the chief petty
officers and junior officers in the spaces. These leaders respond to
their Commanding Officer. That CO is accountable to remain fully
engaged in establishing the proper climate and ensuring that his or her
team is following through.
Question. Surveys report that up to 62 percent of victims who
report a sexual assault perceive professional or social retaliation for
reporting. If confirmed, what will you do to address the issue of
retaliation for reporting a sexual assault?
Answer. Retaliation is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will continue
our efforts to address and confront this issue. Everyone needs to be
sensitive to the perception of retaliation, recognize its signs, and
step in to eliminate it. Training to recognize and eliminate
retaliation has been added to the training curriculum for first line
supervisors, prospective command leadership and in the future sailor
training for fiscal year 2016. In addition, each installation-based
Sexual Assault Case Management Group (SACMG) specifically asks for any
experiences of retaliation against any reporters of crime, or against
first responders or witnesses during its monthly review of open cases
of sexual assault.
Question. Sexual assault is a significantly underreported crime in
our society and in the military. If confirmed, what will you do to
increase reporting of sexual assaults by military victims?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the progress being made by
Navy leaders around the fleet. Increases in sexual assault reporting
provide some hope that the Navy is making progress to elevate sailors'
trust and confidence in command leadership and in the SAPR process.
Better understanding of the precursors, indicators and behaviors
associated with this crime, awareness of the multiple avenues to
report, trust that the command will take all reports seriously, and
confidence that the command will support survivors throughout the
process, have all contributed to the increase in reporting. We must
keep sailors' trust in the response process by ensuring the chain of
command is central to this response.
One area of concern is that the RAND report of 2014 indicated that
male reporting rate is very low. We are incorporating male victim
scenarios into our training and awareness, better understanding and
removing barriers to male reporting, and continuing evaluation of
support services to ensure they are gender-responsive.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command, instead of a military
commander in the grade of O-6 or above as is currently the Department's
policy, to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be
prosecuted?
Answer. I support the Department's current policy. The Uniform Code
of Military Justice operates as both a criminal justice system and a
critical component of a commander's authority to maintain good order
and discipline. I believe our military members and national security
will best be served by retaining the military commander's key role in
the military justice decision process. While the Navy cannot do without
the legal analyses and recommendations provided by our highly
proficient judge advocates, and I demand that all leaders in the
Services to take advantage of this expertise, I firmly believe the
military commander's role is indispensable in the prosecutorial
process.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance our prevention
efforts through responsive fleet-wide training based on what we've
learned, addressing the spectrum of destructive and inappropriate
behaviors to improve our ability to recognize and interrupt the
continuum of harm as early as possible. I intend to continue command
and leadership engagement and involvement at all levels.
We have enhanced our response efforts by full implementation of
Deployed Resiliency Counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS
investigative capability using specially trained Master-at-Arms, and
continued legal assistance to victims through our Victims' Legal
Counsel program. I will continue to assess the extent to which these
resources are effective and sufficient. We will incorporate male victim
scenarios into our training and awareness, better understanding and
removing barriers to male reporting, and continuing evaluation of
support services to ensure they are gender-responsive.
Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of recent
legislation concerning sexual assault on the capability of Navy
commanders to prosecute sexual assault cases, including cases where
prosecution is declined by civilian prosecutors?
Answer. It is still too early to fully understand the impact of
recent legislative changes. Initial surveys indicate that the changes,
particularly those related to victims' rights, have increased trust in
the system. That trust has led to increased victim reporting and
participation, which we believe is enhancing commanders' ability to
prosecute sexual assault cases, including those in which prosecution is
declined by civilian authorities.
religious guidelines
Question. American military personnel routinely deploy to locations
around the world where they must engage and work effectively with
allies and with host-country nationals whose faiths and beliefs may be
different than their own. For many other cultures, religious faith is
not a purely personal and private matter; it is the foundation of their
culture and society.
Learning to respect the different faiths and beliefs of others, and
to understand how accommodating different views can contribute to a
diverse force is, some would argue, an essential skill to operational
effectiveness.
In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the
military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and
other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without
impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious
belief?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and
good order and discipline?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, does a military climate that welcomes and
respects open and candid discussions about personal religious faith and
beliefs in a home-port environment contribute in a positive way to
preparing U.S. forces to be effective in overseas assignments?
Answer. In my view, a military climate that welcomes and respects
open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in garrison
can positively prepare U.S. forces to be effective in overseas
assignments. However, there must be clear guidance about the importance
of mutual respect and trust.
Question. Would a policy that discourages open discussions about
personal faith and beliefs be more or less effective at preparing
servicemembers to work and operate in a pluralistic environment?
Answer. I believe that a military climate that welcomes and
respects open and candid discussion about personal religious faith in
garrison can positively prepare U.S. forces to be effective in overseas
assignments. In a world that appears to be increasingly committed to
expressing religious belief, possessing this skill is necessary to not
only understand our adversaries, but also understand our partner
nations (consistent with the National Strategy on Integrating Religious
Leader and Faith Community Engagement into U.S. Foreign Policy). Any
policy that discourages open discussion diminishes our ability to
develop these skills. However, there must be clear guidance about the
importance of mutual respect and trust.
Question. In your view, when performing official military duties
outside a worship service, should military chaplains be encouraged to
express their personal religious beliefs and tenets of their faith
freely, or must they avoid making statements based on their religious
beliefs?
Answer. I believe that current Navy instructions and Chief of
Chaplains training notices provide adequate guidance to Chaplains
regarding how to serve as a Chaplain in a pluralistic environment while
maintaining the tenets of their faith.
Question. Do you believe chaplains should be tasked with conducting
non-religious training in front of mandatory formations, even if they
may be uniquely qualified to speak on the particular topic, such as
suicide prevention or substance abuse? If so, do you believe guidance
provided to those chaplains on what they should and should not say with
respect to their faith is adequate?
Answer. Yes. Chaplains, like all naval officers should be prepared
to provide training in subject matter areas they may have an expertise
in or have specialized training that would be of benefit to members of
the command. I believe that current Navy instructions and Chief of
Chaplains training notices provide adequate guidance to Chaplains
regarding how to serve as a Chaplain in a pluralistic environment while
maintaining the tenets of their faith.
active duty end strength
Question. The Navy's Active Duty end strength is projected to grow
from 323,000 in 2013 to 327,000 this year to 330,000 personnel in 2020.
The Navy has made great strides in improving the ``fit'' and ``fill''
of sea-going billets in recent years.
What are your greatest personnel management concerns?
Answer. If confirmed, I want to ensure that the Navy has the
necessary policies and statutes in place to adequately recruit and
retain the next generation of sailors with the talent and skills to man
our fleet. My efforts will be focused on obtaining sufficient and
persistent insight into the needs and desires of current and
prospective sailors and Navy civilians, with the goal of enhancing our
ability to tailor our programs to continue to attract and retain the
best talent. These trends can change quickly--if we wait too long, we
may find ourselves unprepared and unable to effectively respond.
Question. What additional force management tools does the Navy
need, and which of these require Congressional authorization?
Answer. The current force management authorities and tools are very
complex. If confirmed, I would be an active participant in Secretary of
Defense Carter's Force of the Future effort to pursue a broad range of
initiatives aimed at attracting and retaining talent. I would seek to
engage in a thorough review of existing tools and authorities, and
would look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and
the Congress to pursue necessary adjustments.
joint officer management
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols was revolutionary in its time and has
helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has
changed in the past 30 years in both the Joint Force and the security
environment. As such, while I do not see any urgent need for specific
changes, I believe a review would be useful. If confirmed, I would work
closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy if
such a review were undertaken.
Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are
needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Navy
officers?
Answer. While I do not currently see any urgent need for change, I
do believe that this is an area appropriate for renewed evaluation. If
confirmed, I would welcome the chance to work closely with the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy if such a review
were undertaken.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to
general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and
professional demands of Navy line officers?
Answer. I do not see any urgent need for immediate change. Having
said that, I believe that a review would be useful and if confirmed, I
look forward to exploring this issue in cooperation with the other
members of the Joint Chiefs.
Question. If not, what modifications, if any, to the requirements
for joint officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military
officers are able to attain meaningful joint and Service-specific
leadership experience and professional development?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue with
Defense Department leadership and the Congress.
Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification
requirements on the ability of the services to select the best
qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that
will satisfy Service-specific officer professional development
requirements?
Answer. We operate and fight as a Joint team. While meeting all of
the many demands for advancement is a challenge, I firmly believe that
developing appropriate joint understanding is a critical element of
higher-level leadership. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring
whether there are more effective ways to achieve this objective, and if
so, discussing them in greater depth with Defense Department leadership
and the Congress.
Question. Do you think a tour with a combatant command staff should
count toward the Joint tour requirement?
Answer. Yes.
department of the navy talent management initiatives
Question. On May 13, 2015, the Secretary of the Navy announced
several talent management initiatives, including: changes to Navy
fitness tests, a transition to the same uniform for males and females,
increasing female enlisted accessions, opening all operational billets
to women, tripling the length of maternity leave from 6 to 18 weeks,
expanding the Career Intermission Program, altering the promotion
selection board process, revising year group management, ending General
Military Training as it currently exists, and increasing graduate
education opportunities.
Do you support these changes?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Which of these changes, if any, do you believe should be
modified, delayed, or eliminated?
Answer. I support each of these new initiatives and if confirmed,
look forward to implementing them in a thoughtful and responsible way.
navy reserve
Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the
Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to
achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, end strength,
and force structure?
Answer. The Navy Reserve, over 58,000 strong, fully accomplishes
its mission of delivering strategic depth and operational capability to
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint Force. As part of the Navy's Total
Force of Active and Reserve sailors supported by Government civilians,
Navy Reserve sailors bring value through scalable utilization options
to meet Navy requirements. Approximately 25 percent of the Navy Reserve
delivers operational support on any given day, increasing Total Force
operational capacity. The manner in which the Navy employs its Reserve
component provides responsive and flexible options to meet Navy mission
requirements. If confirmed, I will support efforts to leverage our Navy
Reserve capacity in new areas where our Reserve component could
increase Total Force efficiency and effectiveness in executing the
mission.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy
Reserve as an operational Reserve, as opposed to its long standing
traditional role as a strategic Reserve?
Answer. The Navy Reserve is both operational and strategic. The
Navy's integrated approach to Total Force employment enables Reserve
sailors and Reserve units to train for strategic requirements, while
also supporting Navy's day-to-day operations. Operationally, the Navy
Reserve's capability is routinely utilized to support mission
requirements through scalable employment options. Strategically, the
Navy Reserve's capacity provides a surge force for the Navy. We should
retain a Navy Reserve that is both operational and strategic, thereby
providing maximum flexibility to meet unknown future requirements.
Commanders have assured access to their Reserve component sailors, so
we can confidently assign missions to the Navy Reserve where it makes
operational and fiscal sense.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
maintaining and enhancing the Navy Reserve as a relevant and capable
operational Reserve?
Answer. Our Navy Reserve is as relevant and capable today as it has
been at any time in our history. We have invested in our people and our
equipment, we have an integrated Total Force approach to filling
operational and support missions, and we honor the service of our
Reserve sailor's families and employers. In the future, we need to
continue investing in our Navy Reserve with an appropriate level of
discretionary funding and equipment recapitalization to meet mission
requirements. Moreover, as we continue to support the Secretary of the
Navy's Task Force Innovation and sailor 2025 initiatives, we will
maintain a robust ability to recruit and retain the highest caliber
sailors by delivering flexible career paths and opportunities that
enable a lifetime of service.
Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the
Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. The optimal role for the Reserve component is as a partner
in the Navy Total Force, where we view missions in terms of
capabilities first, and then decide where the capability should reside.
The value of the Navy Reserve is in both their strategic capacity to
provide sailors and units for mobilizations in support of Global Force
Management requirements, as well as their operational capacity to
provide daily support to the fleet through flexible access options.
Question. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign
homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions
exclusively to the Reserves?
Answer. The Navy's approach to utilizing the Reserve component is
to examine each mission from a Total Force perspective and decide what
capabilities are needed, how often we need them, and what component is
best suited to carry them out. In my opinion, this approach has worked
well and could usefully be applied more broadly across the defense
enterprise.
nuclear naval propulsion program
Question. Executive Order 12344 ``Nuclear Naval Propulsion
Program'' of February 1, 1982, which was codified in section 2511 of
title 50 United States Code, states ``The director [of the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program] shall be appointed to a serve a term of 8
years, except the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Navy
may, with mutual concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the
respective appointments.''
Is it your understanding that both the Secretary of Energy and
Secretary of the Navy have concurred on releasing you from your term as
Director?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, is 8 years the appropriate length of tenure
for the position of Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program?
Please explain.
Answer. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program currently has a superb
record of safety and effectiveness that is founded on a culture defined
by deep expertise, honest and detailed self-assessment, an unwavering
focus on facing the facts, and doing the technically right thing. This
approach serves as a model for the Navy and the Nation to discipline
very complex technology operating in harsh environments. The Director
must set the tone in each of these areas. Based on my 3 years as
Director, I strongly support an 8 year tenure for the Director as the
best way to keep this model intact.
Question. What is your view of the role of the Director of the
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program in the preservation of the Program's
unique fail-safe culture of zero defects engineering, personnel
excellence, and training?
Answer. Since the beginning of the Program under Admiral Rickover,
the Director has played a critical role, both inside and outside the
Program, to preserve and sustain the culture. It is true to this day.
Question. What is your view of the role of the Chief of Naval
Operations in the preservation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program's unique fail-safe culture of zero defects engineering,
personnel excellence, and training?
Answer. The CNO plays a key role, working with the Director of
Naval Reactors and Fleet Commanders, to ensure that the Program gets
the resources needed to preserve the culture of excellence. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to support the NNPP as CNO.
Question. How would you characterize the professional relationship
between the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and the
Chief of Naval Operations, including the responsibility to organize,
train, and equip nuclear-powered vessels?
Answer. In my experience both as Director and as a career nuclear
operator, there is a strong professional relationship between the
Director of Naval Reactors and the CNO. This relationship is founded on
a common understanding of the importance of nuclear powered warships in
our Nation's defense, the importance of the Program's record of safety
and effectiveness in ensuring access around the world, and in the
importance of the Naval Reactors organization as a model for achieving
sustained excellence. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance this
professional relationship.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
size of the navy
1. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, from 2006 to 2012, the
Navy's requirement was around 313 ships. In Navy's latest assessment
earlier this year, the number was revised to 306 ships. Since 2012 and
the 313-ship Navy, our national security challenges and the demands on
our Navy have only grown, yet the size of the fleet the Navy says we
need has decreased. How can you explain the decline in the fleet
requirement in view of Russian aggression, the Chinese military
buildup, the Islamic State conquests, and expanding Iranian state-
sponsored terrorism and support to anti-American regimes?
Admiral Richardson. The current security environment is dynamic
with an increasing array of diverse threats. The Navy has identified
that sourcing all Global Combatant Commander requests would require
about 450 combatant ships with requisite supporting structure and
readiness. However, with an equally dynamic fiscal environment, our
strategy must also consider the fiscal limitations and accept risk
against known threats and reduced capacity to respond to unforeseen
developments in order to meet the highest priority security missions.
The Navy's Force Structure Assessment produces the minimum
requirement to meet the future steady state and warfighting
requirements determined by the Navy's analytical process, with an
acceptable degree of risk (i.e., does not jeopardize joint force
campaign success). The Navy's 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure
Assessment calls for a force of 308 ships. This assessment is informed
by operating concepts, including employment cycles, crewing constructs,
and operating tempo limits. To meet the dynamic security environment,
the Navy utilizes cost-effective approaches to increase our presence,
such as forward basing, forward operating, and forward stationing
ships. By increasing the number of ships forward stationed and forward
based and improving our deployment preparation process through the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP), the Navy can deliver the same
amount of presence with fewer ships. Provided sufficient readiness is
restored and maintained across the Fleet, a fleet size of 308 ships
should support the highest priority requirements for both presence and
``surge'' in the event of increased tensions or outright conflict.
2. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, from 2006 to 2012, the
Navy's requirement was around 313 ships. In Navy's latest assessment
earlier this year, the number was revised to 306 ships. Since 2012 and
the 313-ship Navy, our national security challenges and the demands on
our Navy have only grown, yet the size of the fleet the Navy says we
need has decreased. If confirmed, will you realistically revalidate the
fleet requirement in light of the most diverse and complex array of
global crises since the end of World War II?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. The reality of a dynamic security and
fiscal environment demands that both our strategy and structure be
continually assessed and adapted, including our fleet requirements. The
Navy conducts a Force Structure Assessment when there is a significant
change in the global security environment. I will provide my best
assessment of the requirements in light of the security environment,
the fiscal constraints, and the resultant risk.
glenn defense marine asia
3. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, you were the consolidated
disposition authority for cases in which Navy personnel were reviewed
for their involvement with a Navy contractor, the owner and CEO of
Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Leonard Francis. Last January, he pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery, bribery, and conspiracy to
commit fraud charges in Federal district court, admitting to what the
Department of Justice described as a decade-long conspiracy involving
``scores'' of Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud, and
millions of dollars in bribes and gifts, including: over $500,000 in
cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel
expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays and spa
treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs,
top-shelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars,
designer handbags, watches, fountain pens, designer furniture,
electronics, ornamental swords and hand-made ship models. In exchange,
Mr. Francis solicited and received classified and confidential U.S.
Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also sought and
received preferential treatment for his company in the contracting
process. Based on your experience as the consolidated disposition
authority, why do you believe so many senior career officers and Navy
civilians became involved with this criminal enterprise?
Admiral Richardson. The events remain the subject of an ongoing
federal investigation led by the Department of Justice. It would be
inappropriate for me to discuss details of the cases or my personal
opinions while the investigation is still in progress. Across our Navy
the vast majority of our officers, enlisted and civilians conduct
themselves with honor and integrity. As CNO, I intend to make character
and integrity a hallmark of my tenure.
4. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, you were the consolidated
disposition authority for cases in which Navy personnel were reviewed
for their involvement with a Navy contractor, the owner and CEO of
Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Leonard Francis. Last January, he pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery, bribery, and conspiracy to
commit fraud charges in Federal district court, admitting to what the
Department of Justice described as a decade-long conspiracy involving
``scores'' of Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud, and
millions of dollars in bribes and gifts, including: over $500,000 in
cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel
expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays and spa
treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs,
top-shelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars,
designer handbags, watches, fountain pens, designer furniture,
electronics, ornamental swords and hand-made ship models. In exchange,
Mr. Francis solicited and received classified and confidential U.S.
Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also sought and
received preferential treatment for his company in the contracting
process. Do you believe senior Navy officials were aware of this
problem? If so, why was nothing done to stop it?
Admiral Richardson. The events remain the subject of an on-going
federal investigation led by the Department of Justice. It would be
inappropriate for me to discuss the case while the investigation is
still in progress. As CNO, I intend to make character and integrity a
hallmark of my tenure.
5. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, you were the consolidated
disposition authority for cases in which Navy personnel were reviewed
for their involvement with a Navy contractor, the owner and CEO of
Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Leonard Francis. Last January, he pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery, bribery, and conspiracy to
commit fraud charges in Federal district court, admitting to what the
Department of Justice described as a decade-long conspiracy involving
``scores'' of Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud, and
millions of dollars in bribes and gifts, including: over $500,000 in
cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel
expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays and spa
treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs,
top-shelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars,
designer handbags, watches, fountain pens, designer furniture,
electronics, ornamental swords and hand-made ship models. In exchange,
Mr. Francis solicited and received classified and confidential U.S.
Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also sought and
received preferential treatment for his company in the contracting
process. If you are confirmed, what will you do to ensure this type of
criminal corruption will not happen again?
Admiral Richardson. I will continue the efforts to educate Navy
personnel on the standards of ethical conduct required of all
servicemembers and continue to evaluate the state of ethics culture and
demand the highest commitment of integrity. Finally, I will review any
assessments of the contracting and husbanding processes conducted in
light of these events, and work with the Secretary of the Navy to
ensure proper oversight measures are in place and enforced and efforts
are taken to increase the transparency of the process. When necessary,
I will ensure that individuals are held accountable when they fail to
live up to their ethical responsibilities.
unsubstantiated lobbying allegations
6. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, Congress established
specific prohibitions to limit indirect lobbying, including the Anti-
Lobbying Act, which prohibits the use of taxpayer funds by federal
agencies to conduct grassroots lobbying to pressure Congress to support
``any legislation or appropriation by Congress''. There are also
prohibitions against using appropriated funds to support or defeat
legislation pending before Congress. The DOD Inspector General recently
completed a review of remarks you made to attendees of the 2014 Annual
Symposium Naval Submarine League in which you suggested, in part, that
attendees should contact their Members of Congress to support the Ohio-
class replacement submarine and the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund,
as part of your ``Commander's Guidance.'' The DOD Inspector General
concluded that you did not spend taxpayer funds on publicity to engage
in grass-roots lobbying and did not violate applicable standards. If
you are confirmed, do you commit to working with the Secretary of the
Navy, the General Counsel of the Navy, and the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy to provide clear guidance to ensure that Navy officials
understand the permissible role and the limitations under the law, in
communications intended to influence Congress?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. I have already begun this effort from my
present position, and will continue to work to ensure Navy officials
understand the limitations under the law in this important area.
nuclear naval propulsion program
7. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, in February 1982, Executive
Order 12344 entitled ``Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program'' was signed
and later codified in title 50 United States Code. Among other
direction, it states ``The director [of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program] shall be appointed to a serve a term of 8 years, except the
Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Navy may, with mutual
concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the respective
appointments.'' In your view, is 8 years the appropriate length of
tenure for the position of Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program? Please explain.
Admiral Richardson. Based on my 3 years as Director, I strongly
support an 8 year tenure for the Director as the appropriate model to
ensure program continuity, technical expertise and rigorous self-
assessment.
8. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, in February 1982, Executive
Order 12344 entitled ``Nuclear Naval Propulsion Program'' was signed
and later codified in title 50 United States Code. Among other
direction, it states ``The director [of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program] shall be appointed to a serve a term of 8 years, except the
Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Navy may, with mutual
concurrence, terminate or extend the term of the respective
appointments.''If confirmed, are you confident the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program's unique fail-safe culture of zero defects
engineering, personnel excellence, and training will remain intact and
your early transition will not adversely impact the program?
Admiral Richardson. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program's unique
culture of rigorous engineering, personal excellence, training and
honest self-assessment is not based on a single individual but on an
overall culture of knowledge and accountability throughout the Program.
Although I am transitioning earlier than anticipated, the culture that
is in place, including the systems, procedures, and other leadership,
will ensure that the NNPP will retain its standards. Having said that,
I strongly support the 8-year tenure for future Directors.
littoral combat ship (lcs)
9. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, in December 2014, the
Secretary of Defense announced his decision to upgrade the Littoral
Combat Ships, designated LCS-33 through LCS-52, to provide a more
capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with
the capabilities of a frigate. Do you support the Secretary of
Defense's decision to continue production of LCS, including the upgrade
to a so-called Frigate?
Admiral Richardson. I support the Secretary of Defense's decision
to continue Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) production, and procure a
Frigate (FF) based on the LCS Flight 0+ design. The 20 Frigates and 32
LCSs will fulfill the 52-ship Small Surface Combatant requirement in
the Navy's latest Force Structure Assessment.
The Frigate modifications to the LCS design will add lethality and
survivability features as well as organic SUW and ASW multi-mission
capability.
10. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, in December 2014, the
Secretary of Defense announced his decision to upgrade the Littoral
Combat Ships, designated LCS-33 through LCS-52, to provide a more
capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with
the capabilities of a frigate. In your view, what problem is the
Frigate upgrade necessary to solve? In other words, why is the current
LCS with its mission modules insufficient?
Admiral Richardson. Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0+ and its
associated mission packages are sufficient and meet JROC-validated
requirements in surface warfare (SUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW),
and mine countermeasures (MCM).
Following SECDEF direction in February 2014 to provide alternative
proposals for a small surface combatant that is even more lethal,
survivable, and mission capable than the LCS Flight 0+, Navy
established the Small Surface Combatant Task Force (SSCTF). The SSCTF
analyzed 600 modified-LCS designs, 50,000 new ship designs, and 18
existing designs and ultimately recommended a modified design of LCS
Flight 0+ to SECDEF. This recommendation incorporated the most cost-
effective improvements to the lethality and survivability of the LCS.
In December 2014, following a review by CAPE, DOT&E, and AT&L,
SECDEF approved Navy's recommendation to procure 20 modified-LCS. These
ships, along with the 32 focused-mission LCS Flight 0/0+ will fulfill
the 2014 re-validated Force Structure Assessment requirement for 52
small surface combatants. In January 2015, SECNAV designated this
multi-mission SUW/ASW ship as a Frigate.
Frigates will execute the same SUW/ASW missions as LCS but will
incorporate additional lethality and survivability upgrades, accepting
less risk, thus increasing its utility to the combatant commander.
goldwater nichols
11. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, in your response to our
advance questions, you stated the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ``was revolutionary in its time and
has helped to transform the Department of Defense. However, much has
changed in the past 30 years in both the Joint Force and the security
environment. As such, I believe a review would be useful.'' In your
view, what types of reforms should a review of Goldwater-Nichols
address?
Admiral Richardson. At this point, I am not sufficiently informed
to identify specific areas where I think Goldwater-Nichols should be
modified. However, the Act was written over 30 years ago, in an
environment that is significantly different than the one we face today.
Given that reality, I believe that a comprehensive review should be
done that examines each part of the Act, with the goal of determining
what revisions can be made to advance the intent of the original Act.
other defense acquisition reform
12. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, I am deeply concerned that
the United States is beginning to lose its technological dominance. In
this year's defense bill the Senate has proposed giving the Department
a number of new authorities and acquisition waivers to access non-
traditional sources of technology in Silicon Valley and in other
innovative places around the globe. I fear, however, that the Pentagon
will not use these authorities--preferring to stick with business as
usual. How can the Navy better access and integrate commercial and
military technology to remain ahead of its potential adversaries?
Admiral Richardson. I appreciate Congress' proposals to give the
Department some new authorities and acquisition waivers to access non-
traditional sources of technology in Silicon Valley and other
innovative areas. In my view, doing this effectively would include
redefining the relationships and connections between our Navy Research
and Development (R&D) centers and those centers in private industry and
academia with the goal of lowering barriers between the Navy and non-
Navy centers of innovation. As well, I will focus on making adjustments
within the Navy to better streamline processes to take advantage of
what we learn; to convert new ideas into effective programs. In this
way I hope to mainstream innovation within the Navy.
13. Senator McCain. Admiral Richardson, the naval nuclear
propulsion program has had a longstanding tradition of innovation and
the ability to attract top-notch talent going back to the 1950s. The
development of the USS Nautilus launched in 1954, the development of
much of our strategic deterrent in the 1950s, and the launch of the
first reconnaissance satellites from that era mark a time when the U.S.
could successfully deploy operational capability rapidly and maintain
its technological dominance. Are there any acquisition reform lessons
that can be learned from the 1950s and early 1960s, such as with the
development of the Nautilus program, as well as from the subsequent
experience of the naval nuclear propulsion program?
Admiral Richardson. Cornerstones of the Naval Reactors Program's
acquisition success have been based on the following:
a. Not resting on past successes. NR continues to put in the hard
work necessary to technically understand the actions to be
accomplished, to garner support, and to pull together the best
manufacturers and engineers to work the challenge. NR strives daily to
hold the appropriately high standard, both from a technical and
acquisition perspective. Per ADM Rickover, ``another principle for
managing a successful program is to resist the natural human
inclination to hope things will work out, despite evidence or doubt to
the contrary.'' Fighting this tendency requires a government staff that
is technically competent to be able to effectively oversee the industry
contractors hired to deliver the needed products. First and foremost,
identifying the key risks and challenges that we confront and putting
in place effective risk mitigation plans is critical. This requires
involved, technically competent government managers. Finally, we
continue to be self-critical, learning from past challenges and
evaluating ways to improve the way we and our contractors do business.
b. Recognizing the uncertain budget going-forward. From the very
beginning, NR understood the challenge of balancing the need for robust
technical plans with cost consciousness. During tight budget
environments, this balance can be challenging to maintain and technical
needs frequently, are at risk of becoming secondary to cost pressures.
NR continually fights this pressure, requiring an in-depth
understanding of the technical risks and challenges inherent in each of
its undertakings and ensures that Program budget requests align with
technical plans. Additionally, NR personnel are trained to make the
hard technical decisions required to ensure programs are delivered
within budget and schedule.
c. Ensuring personal responsibility. NR emphasizes the need for
every engineer in the organization to feel personally responsible for
their decisions, since mistakes can result in technical failures,
inability to meet warfighting needs, and drive costs up. ADM Rickover
was known to say, ``Unless one person . . . can be identified when
something goes wrong, then no one has really been responsible.'' This
mindset informs how we go about our daily business, designing and
manufacturing propulsion plants for the long term and living with the
consequences of our decisions.
d. Continuity--NR insists that managers and engineers be experts
in their areas and act though they will have their job forever.
Otherwise, there would be inadequate knowledge, experience, and
corporate memory and people can rotate out of jobs without having to
face the consequences of their decisions.
e. Bringing in the best talent. NR demands the sharpest talent,
and today more than ever the competition is keen. Making decision that
properly balance risk, effectiveness, and cost. that requires well-
trained technical personnel that are empowered to make tough technical
decisions. We work extremely hard to identify, recruit, and retain the
cream of the crop. Today's competitive environment more than ever is
making retaining this top talent at NR exceptionally challenging.
Overall, Naval Reactors success is not based on any revolutionary
or magic acquisition strategies. Its foundation is based on talented
individuals being vested in their decisions, continual self-assessment
and improvement, and hard work.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
ohio-class replacement program (orp)
14. Senator Wicker. Admiral, senior Navy leaders--including the
current Chief of Naval Operations--have said that the Ohio-class
replacement submarine program (ORP) is the Navy's top priority program.
Do you agree that the Ohio Replacement Program is the Navy's top
priority program?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, it is an absolutely critical, even
existential, program for the Nation and our number one modernization
priority.
potential consequences of orp cost overruns
15. Senator Wicker. As you've said in your responses to the
Committee's advance questions: ``It is absolutely critical for the
Nation to replace the Ohio-class submarines. The Navy is doing
everything it can to limit requirements and control costs for this
ship. Without increased shipbuilding funding in fiscal year 2021 and
beyond, the Ohio Replacement Program will consume the majority of the
Navy's annual shipbuilding budget, costing the equivalent of 2-3 ships
per year.'' I am deeply concerned by the second part of your response
that insufficient shipbuilding funds could cost the Navy the equivalent
of two to three ships per year.Can you elaborate for us your personal
assessment of:
- The need for additional shipbuilding funding;
- The potential impact of ORP on other shipbuilding programs; and
- How much worse this impact could be if ORP experiences schedule
delays or cost overruns?
Admiral Richardson. The Ohio replacement is an absolutely critical
program for the country, and we are doing everything we can in the Navy
to ensure that we deliver a submarine that meets the Nation's security
requirements at the most judicious cost possible. To this end, we are:
- ensuring that the performance requirements of the platform are
adequate and stable before beginning design
- ensuring that design is stable and mature before beginning
construction
- will build these platforms in a way that leverages all lessons
from the successful Virginia-class program
- meets all cost targets; in fact the Navy is considering cost
targets as equivalent to every other performance parameter for the
program.
We are on a good track to achieve all these goals.
Even when all of the above goals are met the Ohio Replacement
Program represents a significant investment for the Nation, an
investment that I believe is absolutely imperative.
If the Navy is forced to ``absorb'' the entire cost of ORP within
Navy accounts, it will of necessity come at the expense of other
capabilities, to include construction of additional ships and/or
aircraft. If funded at projected levels, the Ohio Replacement Program
would equal about half of the shipbuilding funding each year starting
in fiscal year 2026.
I look forward to working with Defense Department leaders and
Congress to formulate the necessary authorities and appropriations to
fund ORP in a way that does not devastate the Navy budget, including
the shipbuilding program.
sequestration
16. Senator Wicker. In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented
numerous cuts in response to sequestration. This included cancellation
of five ship deployments and the delayed deployment of a carrier strike
group to the Middle East. Since 2013 we've witnessed the rise of ISIS,
Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea.
Given sequestration's impending return a little more than two months
from now, we must acknowledge that the world is more dangerous today
than it was in 2013. What is your view on how sequestration would
threaten DOD's ability to decisively project power abroad?
Admiral Richardson. If we return to sequestration in fiscal year
2016, the Navy would be unable to execute the defense strategy as
currently written. The required cuts would force us to further delay
critical warfighting capabilities for the future, and reduce readiness
of today's forces needed for contingency response, including further
reduction in our stocks of weapons and munitions. As a last resort, we
would cancel or stretch procurement of needed force structure. If
funded at sequestration levels, the Navy would be unable to satisfy
currently-expressed direction to provide power projection capacity,
specifically in the areas of strike fighters, command and control
platforms, and electronic warfare assets, advanced radar and missiles,
and munitions.
17. Senator Wicker. In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented
numerous cuts in response to sequestration. This included cancellation
of five ship deployments and the delayed deployment of a carrier strike
group to the Middle East.Since 2013 we've witnessed the rise of ISIS,
Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea.
Given sequestration's impending return a little more than two months
from now, we must acknowledge that the world is more dangerous today
than it was in 2013. What is your assessment of the impact
sequestration would have on our expeditionary forces?
Admiral Richardson. If we return to sequestration in fiscal year
2016, the Navy would be unable to execute the defense strategy as
currently written. The required cuts would force us to further delay
critical warfighting capabilities for the future, and reduce readiness
of today's forces needed for contingency response, including further
reduction in our stocks of weapons and munitions. As a last resort, we
would cancel or stretch procurement of needed force structure. If
funded at sequestration levels, the Navy would only be able to provide
a contingency response force of one Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and one
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), significantly less surge capacity than
our operational plans (OPLANs) require.
18. Senator Wicker. In fiscal year 2013, the Navy implemented
numerous cuts in response to sequestration. This included cancellation
of five ship deployments and the delayed deployment of a carrier strike
group to the Middle East. Since 2013 we've witnessed the rise of ISIS,
Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe, and a belligerent North Korea.
Given sequestration's impending return a little more than 2 months from
now, we must acknowledge that the world is more dangerous today than it
was in 2013. Certain sectors of the defense industry--such as
shipbuilding--are extremely capital intensive. Our fiscally constrained
environment threatens to close production lines that would take years
to restart. Given your prior experience as the Director of Naval
Nuclear Propulsions Program, what is your assessment of the risks to
DOD industrial base given our current budget environment?
Admiral Richardson. The shipbuilding industrial base is a national
strategic jewel--we must preserve it. To best sustain this base, and
also get the best value for the Nation, program stability and
predictability are critical. This is especially true in shipbuilding,
where construction can span years. Disruptions in naval ship design and
construction plans are significant because of the long lead time,
specialized skills, and extent of integration required. Instability,
unpredictability, and cancellations caused by sequestration will likely
cause some suppliers and vendors to close their businesses, and
experience shows that it would take years to recover from the loss of
the skilled, experienced and innovative workforce--if it were even
possible. To the maximum extent possible, the Navy is committed to
protecting shipbuilding and the industrial base under funding.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
joint requirement for electronic attack
19. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Richardson, in testimony this year
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the current Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Greenert, stated that an additional 15 Growlers are
needed to fulfill the Navy's requirement for airborne electronic
attack. While other platforms have electronic attack capability, it is
my understanding that the Navy's analysis showed that no platform could
replace the full-spectrum capability of the Growler. Admiral Greenert
then noted that an ongoing study is looking at the joint requirement
for airborne electronic attack. Will this study inform the Navy's
decision on airborne electronic attack for fiscal year 2017 and across
the FYDP?
Admiral Richardson. The current study will provide insight that
will allow the Navy to optimize our EA-18G procurement plan and force
structure to meet all joint EA-18 G requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
cyber
20. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richardson, I appreciate your
interest in cyber. I believe this is a critical issue for our military.
We need to start growing cyber warriors. How do you envision the career
path for sailors who specialize in cyber?
Admiral Richardson. I am committed to growing cyber warriors in the
Navy. We have created the Cyber Warfare Engineer (CWE/1840) designator
to attract and manage the best technical talent in this field. Our CWEs
are officers that specialize in cyber operations for up to 10 years.
After this period, they can transition to our Information Professional
(IP/1820) or Information Warfare (IW/1810) communities or separate from
the Navy and return to public or private sector careers. In addition to
CWEs, we are establishing 44 teams of Sailors to support the Cyber
Mission Force (CMF). The Navy teams include officers (designators: CWE/
1840, IP/1820, and IW/1810) and enlisted personnel (ratings: cryptology
(CT), information technology (IT), intelligence specialist (IS)). The
Navy does not have a separate career path for CMF Sailors beyond that
specified by their designator or rating.
combat integration
21. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richardson, you said that the
determination about whether to open remaining Navy positions to women
would be dependent on ensuring mission effectiveness. Can you please
describe the potential ways in which allowing women to compete for
these positions might harm mission effectiveness?
Admiral Richardson. I never meant to imply that allowing women to
compete for any position might harm mission effectiveness. My comment
was only to point out that, as with the introduction of any new
capability to the force, the ultimate test is whether the effectiveness
of the team is enhanced by that new addition. As I testified, over 96
percent of all Navy jobs are already open to women. Our experience to
date in integrating women into previously closed occupations has been
extremely successful, and women continue to serve with distinction and
perform in a manner that enhances our mission effectiveness.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
workload at public and private shipyards
22. Senator Kaine. Admiral Richardson, some of our public shipyards
are experiencing a need for additional employees, while at the same
time our private shipyards and repair facilities are preparing for a
temporary decrease in workload. Is the Navy aware of this situation and
what plans have been developed to mitigate disruptions in the workforce
of our ship construction and repair industries?
Admiral Richardson. I am very aware of these concerns. For new ship
construction, the Navy has focused on stabilizing workload through the
use of multi-year and block-buy procurements.
For repair work, the Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC) work with
both public and private shipyards to reach a shared understanding of
projected workload. To execute this workload, the Naval Shipyards are
focused on increasing workforce productivity by improving throughput
and overall efficiency and performance. Where capacity exceeds that of
the public yards, efforts are made to bring in the private shipyards to
share the burden. The nature of ship repair work often results in a
fluctuating workload, but by taking a shared approach to address the
total challenge, the best balanced and stable workload is derived and
allocated in a way that will keep both public and private shipyards
optimally employed.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
asia pacific rebalance
23. Senator Hirono. In regards to the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
I know we are on a path to base 60 percent of our ships in the Pacific.
What do you envision in terms continuing or advancing our mil-to-mil
engagements which could help enhance security and prosperity in the
region?
Admiral Richardson. The Navy's military-to-military engagement will
continue to support the broader Department of Defense strategy in the
region. The Navy is adapting our posture to be more geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable in
the Pacific. At the same time, we are working with regional partners to
improve their maritime security and maritime domain awareness in order
to increase regional capability and deter further conflict.
pacific missile range facility
24. Senator Hirono. The Pacific Missile Range Facility continues to
be an outstanding facility--it is the only range in the world capable
of tracking objects in the surface, subsurface, air, and space realms
simultaneously. My hope is that the Navy continues to treat this
national asset as a priority. There appears to be a need to update
underwater test range capabilities, which I believe the Navy is
beginning to address. How valuable is PMRF to the Navy and
organizations such as the Missile Defense Agency for testing,
evaluation, and readiness?
Admiral Richardson. The Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) is a
valuable and integral part of the Navy's training range capability and
hosts important Test and Evaluation (T&E) capabilities as well. PMRF's
unique and strategic mid-Pacific location, combined with range space,
instrumentation, and logistics support, provides important capabilities
to Ballistic Missile Defense testing and helps sustain Navy readiness.
The PMRF underwater range capability is under consideration for
improvements, along with other key readiness upgrades that compete for
limited resources.
25. Senator Hirono. If confirmed, can I have your commitment that
you will do what you can to ensure that PMRF maintains its status as a
premier facility?
Admiral Richardson. Yes. PMRF's contribution to Navy readiness, as
well as its role in test and evaluation of important future weapon
systems, is widely recognized and understood.
red hill
26. Senator Hirono. I continue to be concerned about the fuel
storage tanks at Red Hill on Oahu. I understand that the fuel held in
these tanks is essential to many military operations in the Pacific. At
the same time, the aquifer that residents depend on for their water
supplies must be protected from contamination. If confirmed will you
monitor this situation and step in where required?
Admiral Richardson. The Navy is fully committed to operating and
maintaining Red Hill to the highest standards of safety to ensure the
protection of Hawaii's drinking water. The Navy routinely evaluates and
tests the water beneath and around the Red Hill complex, and I will
continue the oversight of that process to monitor this strategic asset
and ensure the safety of the drinking water. To ensure complete
transparency with the local community, the Navy routinely works with
local regulators in carrying out monitoring and testing in accordance
with required standards.
For example, the Navy has strict procedures in place to identify
and quickly respond to any release of fuel. Additionally, the Navy has
nine groundwater monitoring wells and an additional sampling point to
routinely test ground water in and around the Red Hill Bulk Fuel
Storage Facility. This monitoring system is part of a 2008 State of
Hawaii's Department of Health approved groundwater protection plan. The
Navy routinely submits its analytical test results and summary
evaluations to the State of Hawaii's Department of Health and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for review, assessment and approval.
Currently, under Administrative Order of Consent (AOC)
collaboration, the Navy, Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and State of Hawaii Department of Health are
identifying best available, practicable technologies to upgrade the Red
Hill tanks to further protect Hawaii's drinking water, and retain the
facility's ability to support current military operations and maintain
Pacific Command's strategic fuel reserve.
Since 2006, the Navy and Defense Logistics Agency invested $145
million to modernize Red Hill facilities and environmental testing
capabilities. We plan to invest an additional $70 million in Red Hill
over the next five years to further enhance the structural integrity of
all tanks and the facility's operational efficiency. These numbers do
not include additional work that would be required through the AOC.
27. Senator Hirono. How would the Administrative Order on Consent
(AOC) between EPA, Hawaii Department of Health, and the Navy affect
naval operations in the PACOM AOR?
Admiral Richardson. The mission requirements for naval operations
in the PACOM AOR will continue to be met by the Red Hill fuel facility
on Oahu if the AOC is finalized in its current form. The current draft
AOC, as approved by the Navy, includes timelines for facility
modifications that allow anticipated Naval operations in the Pacific
AOR to be executed as scheduled.
navy energy program
28. Senator Hirono. Secretary Mabus has set out a very forward-
thinking approach to the Navy's energy needs and has strongly made the
case that focusing on diversifying fuel sources and improving energy
efficiency will save money and improve the effectiveness of our forces.
Are you committed to implementing Secretary Mabus' strategy and, if so,
what will your priorities be in this area?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, I am committed to implementing Secretary's
Mabus' strategy for diversifying fuel sources and increasing the energy
efficiency of our forces to enhance combat capability. In this way, the
United States enhances its strategic position by becoming less
dependent on imported fossil fuels.
To achieve this end, I am committed to diversifying the Navy's fuel
supply and stressing the importance of the Navy's testing and
certification of advanced alternative fuels. Additionally, I will
continue the emphasis on innovative technology in operational energy
that improves the energy efficiency of the Fleet.
29. Senator Hirono. Also, is the Navy on track to sail its ``Great
Green Fleet'' by 2016?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, Navy is on track to meet the Secretary of
the Navy's goal of sailing the Great Green Fleet in 2016.
______
[The nomination reference of Admiral John M. Richardson,
USN follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 4, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as Chief of
Naval Operations and appointment in the United States Navy to
the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and
5033:
To Be Admiral
Admiral John M. Richardson, 1324.
------
[The biographical sketch of Admiral John M. Richardson,
USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Admiral John
M. Richardson, USN in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
part a--biographical information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
John M. Richardson.
2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Naval Operations.
3. Date of nomination:
June 4, 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
April 8, 1960; Petersburg, VA.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Dana Richardson (formerly Dana Silva).
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
None.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
John M. Richardson
This 22nd day of May, 2015
[The nomination of Admiral John M. Richardson, USN was
reported to the Senate by Chairman McCain on August 4, 2015,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 5, 2015.]
NOMINATIONS OF MR. JOHN CONGER TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER; MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK TO BE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; AND MR. FRANKLIN R.
PARKER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS
----------
Thursday, November 19, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain,
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed,
Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of Ms.
Alissa M. Starzak to be General Counsel of the Department of
Army; Mr. Franklin R. Parker to be Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Mr. John Conger to be
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller;
and Mr. Stephen P. Welby to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering.
We welcome all of you here this morning, as well as members
of your families. As is our tradition, at the beginning of your
testimony, we welcome you to introduce those members of your
family joining you this morning.
Ms. Starzak is currently the Deputy General Counsel at the
Department of Defense. She has also served as counsel and a
professional staff member on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and as Assistant General Counsel
at the Central Intelligence Agency. I look forward to your
testimony on a number of pressing issues inside Army and the
Department of Defense.
Mr. Parker is currently Chief Counsel of the Maritime
Administration in the Department of the Transportation. The
Navy office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs has the great
responsibility of taking care of our sailors, marines, and
their families and the Navy's civilian employees. I look
forward to your testimony on how you plan to support the most
important part of the Navy, its people.
Mr. Conger is currently the Assistant Deputy Under
Secretary for Installations and Environment. The Comptroller's
office, where he has been nominated to serve has a critical
role to play at this time of budgetary challenges. The
Department of Defense spends more than half a trillion dollars
a year, but after years and years of effort, it still cannot
pass an audit. The Department is alone among Federal agencies
in being unable to provide the Congress or the American
taxpayer assurances that their dollars are spent as
appropriated. It is hardly surprising that according to the
Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense is
at high risk for waste, fraud, and abuse due to decades of
financial mismanagement.
After 2 decades of empty promises, many of us are extremely
skeptical that the Department will be able to audit its
financial statements in 2017 as the law requires. While the
organization of the Comptroller is also dual-hatted to serve as
the Chief Financial Officer, those financial management duties
are often dominated by the annual work of creating and
defending the budget. Mr. Conger, this committee is interested
in hearing what steps could be taken now to begin reversing
this trend.
Finally, Mr. Welby is currently the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Systems Engineering at the Department of Defense.
The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering has long been vacant. So we are eager to have the
position filled on a permanent basis. As you know, defense
research and innovation is essential to maintaining the
cutting-edge technologies that provide superior capabilities
and protection for our warfighters.
I have concerns regarding the ability of the Defense
Department to transition technologies from the laboratory to
the warfighter in an effective, efficient, and timely manner.
At the same time, the Department is chasing innovative
companies in places like Silicon Valley, but it does not appear
to be making the necessary changes to its research,
contracting, and acquisition policies that would allow us to
take advantage of commercial innovation. The challenges faced
by the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, which Secretary
Carter launched to better connect the Department with Silicon
Valley, is one embodiment of these concerns. I look forward to
your testimony on how you plan to lead the defense research
enterprise and how you will accelerate defense innovation and
technology transition.
I thank the witnesses for their willingness to serve and I
look forward to their testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, witnesses, for your willingness to serve and
your service to date. Thank you very much. I join the chairman
in welcoming you here to this hearing to fill these important
vacancies in the Department of Defense. As we heard during the
hearing we held earlier this week, managing an organization as
large as the Department of Defense can be very challenging and
requires strong leadership. If confirmed, I am confident that
the nominees before us will have that strong leadership
profile.
Mr. Conger, who has been nominated to be the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, has
extensive experience working on national security issues. As a
congressional staff, Mr. Conger worked on budget and
appropriations matters and has a deep appreciation for how the
annual budget process works. In addition, Mr. Conger has
overseen the Energy, Installations, and Environmental portfolio
at the Department, providing oversight management of the
Department's $850 billion real property portfolio. Mr. Conger's
knowledge and experience will be critical in an era of
constrained budget resources, as well as ensuring the
Department finally achieves a clean audit of its financial
statements, as the chairman has indicated.
Mr. Welby, who has been nominated to be the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, serves as
the Deputy for that position. Mr. Welby is well positioned for
this job, given his strong technical background and experience
both in government and industry. If confirmed, he will be
responsible for ensuring that our research programs and
institutions that perform cutting-edge R&D [Research and
Development], like the defense labs and DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency], are as innovative and effective as
possible. I want to hear his plans to advocate for and champion
those labs, their people, and the important advanced technology
products that they produce for our warfighters.
Ms. Starzak, who has been nominated for the position of the
Army General Counsel, has extensive legal experience in
positions that have prepared her well for this position. After
her private sector experience, Ms. Starzak has worked in the
Office of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] General
Counsel, she served as counsel on the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and currently serves as the Deputy General
Counsel in the DOD's [Department of Defense's] General
Counsel's Office. Ms. Starzak will be joining a new command
team with a new Army Secretary and Chief of Staff where they
will work together to address the many challenges that the Army
faces.
Mr. Parker, who has been nominated for the position of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, appears well suited to lead Navy personnel programs.
His experience in the Navy General Counsel's Office and as
Chief Counsel for the Maritime Administration, as well as his
private sector experience, will give him a unique perspective
to apply to the many important challenges he will face.
Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Chairman McCain. There are standard questions that are
asked of all nominations, and I will go through these questions
and you can respond by simply saying ``I do'' or responding in
the negative.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive
testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Have you adhered to the applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Conger. Yes.
Mr. Welby. Yes.
Ms. Starzak. Yes.
Mr. Parker. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Conger. No.
Mr. Welby. No.
Ms. Starzak. No.
Mr. Parker. No.
Chairman McCain. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Conger. Yes.
Mr. Welby. Yes.
Ms. Starzak. Yes.
Mr. Parker. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Conger. Yes.
Mr. Welby. Yes.
Ms. Starzak. Yes.
Mr. Parker. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Conger. Yes.
Mr. Welby. Yes.
Ms. Starzak. Yes.
Mr. Parker. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Conger. Yes.
Mr. Welby. Yes.
Ms. Starzak. Yes.
Mr. Parker. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Conger. Yes.
Mr. Welby. Yes.
Ms. Starzak. Yes.
Mr. Parker. Yes.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Conger, we will begin with you.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN CONGER TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER
Mr. Conger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members
of the committee. It is a privilege to be here to answer your
questions regarding my nomination to the position of Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller. I am humbled
and honored by the support I have received from President
Obama----
Chairman McCain. Would you like to mention a family member
who is here?
Mr. Conger. Absolutely. I would like to introduce and offer
my deepest appreciation for my wife, Kristine Minami. I could
not set out on this demanding path without her love and strong
support.
Chairman McCain. Welcome.
Mr. Conger. I would also like to recognize my son, Conner
Minami, who is only 4 and not here today.
Chairman McCain. He will miss it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Conger. Yes.
I appreciate the support that I have received from the
President, from Secretary Carter, who originally hired me into
the Pentagon in 2009 when he was the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the support I received
from Deputy Secretary Work and Under Secretary McCord.
I would also like to recognize my dad who, along with my
grandfather and my uncle, served in the U.S. Navy and set a
strong example of public service.
For more than 20 years, I have worked national security
issues, both as a congressional staffer, most of that working
appropriations and budget issue, and in senior Pentagon
positions overseeing the Department's Installations,
Environment and Energy portfolio. Each has taught me important
lessons that, if confirmed, I would bring to this new and
challenging role.
Mr. Chairman, the defense budget details a carefully
balanced set of priorities and risk with clearly more risk than
any of us desire. The Department has worked to balance
readiness to meet today's complex security challenges with the
need to ensure that we are investing in future capabilities. As
you have articulated well, the risk would be unacceptable if we
were forced to adhere to the caps in the Budget Control Act. I
am glad to see that we have achieved a reprieve from those
limits for 2016 and 2017.
The DOD [Department of Defense] Comptroller has a critical
role in providing the justification to Congress why the funds
we have requested are critical to meeting to our strategy. This
office has the unique capability and responsibility to
associate resource decisions with their real world impacts to
better inform Congress as it deliberates.
As you know, this case is made more difficult by the fact
that the DOD has not passed a financial audit. Without a clean
audit, it is harder to make the case that we are efficiently
using all of the funds Congress has provided us, even as we
request more. In this environment, I believe it is absolutely
critical that we dedicate ourselves to passing this audit, both
for the improvement to financial management that it promises
and for the credibility that it will provide to our requests
for more funding.
If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to assist Under
Secretary McCord and the Department's leadership in meeting
these challenges. I am grateful for your consideration, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Conger follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. John Conger
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Members of the Committee. It
is a privilege to be here to answer your questions regarding my
nomination to the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Comptroller. I am humbled and honored by the support I have
received from President Obama, from Secretary Carter (who originally
hired me into the Pentagon in 2009 when he was the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), from Deputy
Secretary Work and from Under Secretary McCord.
Before continuing, I would like to introduce and offer my deepest
appreciation to my wife and partner, Kristine Minami. I could not set
out on this demanding path without her love and strong support. I'd
also like to recognize the joy of my life, my son Conner Minami, who is
only 4 and is not here today.
I would also like to thank my Dad who, along with my grandfather
and my uncle, served in the U.S. Navy and set a strong example of
public service.
For more than 20 years, I've worked national security issues, both
as a congressional staffer--most of that working appropriations and
budget issues--and in senior Pentagon positions overseeing the
Department's Installations, Environment and Energy portfolio. Each has
taught me important lessons that, if confirmed, I would bring to this
new and challenging role.
Mr. Chairman, the defense budget details a carefully balanced set
of priorities and risk, with clearly more risk than any of us desire.
The Department has worked to balance readiness to meet today's complex
security challenges with the need to ensure that we are investing in
future capabilities. As you have articulated well, the risk would be
unacceptable if we were forced to adhere to the caps in the Budget
Control Act, and I am glad to see we have achieved some reprieve from
those limits for FY 2016 and FY 2017.
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has a key role in
providing the justification to Congress why the funds we have requested
are critical to meeting our strategy. This office has the unique
capability and responsibility to associate resource decisions with
their real world impacts to better inform Congress as it deliberates.
As you know, that case is made more difficult by the fact that the
DOD has not passed a financial audit. Without a clean audit, it is
harder to make the case that we are efficiently using all of the funds
Congress has provided us, even as we request more. In this environment,
I believe it is absolutely critical that we dedicate ourselves to
passing this audit--both for the improvement to financial management
that it promises and for the credibility it will provide to our
requests for more funding.
If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to assist Under Secretary
McCord and the Department's leadership in meeting these challenges. I
am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Welby?
STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN P. WELBY TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Mr. Welby. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you this morning as
the nominee to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering. I wish to thank the President and
Secretary Carter for their support of my nomination.
Chairman, I would like to also take a moment to thank my
wife Kimberly, my son Bradan, and my daughter Claire, who are
here today.
Chairman McCain. Welcome.
Mr. Welby. I would also like to particularly acknowledge my
father, Patrick Welby, who is behind me whose service in the
Army and whose service as a New York City fire officer, until
he was injured in the line of duty, really taught me the true
meaning of public service.
Chairman McCain. Welcome, sir.
Mr. Welby. Our military technology advantage is essential
to supporting our Nation's ability to deter aggression and to
succeed in conflict. Today our technology edge is challenged by
the globalization of technology the globalization of technical
talent and the emergence of foreign military capabilities
particularly intended to directly counter our own military
strengths. This increasingly competitive global technology
environment demands more agile approaches to technology
delivery and development and faster adoption of new, innovative
solutions that can offset the growing technical capabilities of
potential threats. The Department needs to commit to
continuously refreshing the core technologies that sustain our
defense and that mitigate technological surprise and that
support our modernization efforts. The Department also needs to
focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of our research and
engineering establishment to ensure that the delivery of
advanced capabilities can be conducted in a fiscally
constrained environment.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that our defense
research and engineering enterprise remains focused on
sustaining the technological superiority of U.S. forces, both
addressing the demands of our current conflicts and addressing
the needs of the evolving security environment, by accelerating
the delivery of advanced capabilities that can make a critical
difference from laboratory to battlefield.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
your time and attention, and I look forward to answering your
questions this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Welby follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Stephen P. Welby
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, it is an
honor to appear before you this morning as the nominee to serve as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. I wish to
thank the President and Secretary Carter for their support of my
nomination. I would also like to thank my wife Kimberly, my son Bradan,
and my daughter Claire, who are here today, for their support and
encouragement and I'd like to particularly acknowledge my Father,
Patrick Welby--whose service as a New York City Fire Officer, until he
was injured in the line of duty, taught me the true meaning of a career
in public service.
Our military technology advantage is essential to our nation's
ability to deter aggression and prevail in conflict. Today, our
technical edge is challenged by the globalization of technology and the
emergence of foreign military capabilities intended to directly counter
our own technical strengths. This increasingly competitive global
environment demands more agile approaches to technology development and
faster adoption of new, innovative solutions that can offset the
growing technical capability of potential threats. The Department must
continuously refresh the core technologies that sustain our defense
advantage, that mitigate technological surprise, and that support our
modernization efforts. The Department must also focus on the
effectiveness and efficiency of the research and engineering
enterprise, to allow the delivery of advanced capabilities faster in a
fiscally constrained environment.
If confirmed, I am committed to focusing the defense research and
engineering enterprise with a focus on sustaining the technological
superiority of U.S. forces--addressing both the demands of our current
conflict and the needs of the evolving strategic environment--by
accelerating the delivery of the advanced capabilities that can make a
critical difference, from laboratory to battlefield.
I thank you Mr. Chairman and members of this committee for your
time and attention, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Starzak?
STATEMENT OF MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Ms. Starzak. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Reed, and members of the committee. I am honored to appear
before you today. I would like to begin by expressing my
gratitude to President Obama for my nomination, as well as to
Secretary Carter for his support.
I would not be here today if it were not for the family,
friends, and coworkers who have supported me over the years. I
especially want to thank my wonderful family, including my
husband, Andrew Ferguson, who is here with me today, and my
sister, Jocelyn Starzak, who is also here.
Chairman McCain. Welcome.
Ms. Starzak. I also want to thank my parents and my two
amazing children who are 3 and 6 and therefore not here today.
Throughout my life, my family has taught me the value----
Chairman McCain. Next time it will be required attendance
for all children.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Starzak. Throughout my life, my family has taught me
the value of serving others. My goal has always been to live up
to the expectations that they have set.
I also want to thank those, both civilian and military,
that I have had the privilege of working with during the 4 and
a half years I have spent serving in the Department of Defense
Office of General Counsel. Their commitment to protecting
America and improving the lives of the dedicated men and women
who serve all of us by putting themselves in harm's way for our
country inspires me every day.
The role of the Army General Counsel is, first and
foremost, to provide solid and timely legal advice to Army
senior leadership. If confirmed, that would be my first
priority. I believe my background and experience in the
executive branch, the Congress, and the private sector have
well prepared me to serve this function.
If confirmed as the Army General Counsel, I am committed to
working closely with the Army Judge Advocate leadership to
address the legal challenges facing the Army. I strongly
believe in the value of having civilian and military lawyers
work together to offer the best possible legal advice to our
clients.
If confirmed, I will make every effort to live up to the
confidence that has been placed in me.
I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Starzak follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Alissa M. Starzak
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the
Committee. I am honored to appear before you today. I would like to
begin by expressing my gratitude to President Obama for my nomination,
as well as to Secretary Carter and Acting Secretary Fanning for their
support.
I would not be here if were not for the family, friends and co-
workers who have helped me over the years. I especially want to thank
my wonderful family, including my husband Andrew Ferguson and my two
amazing children. It is unfortunate they could not be here with me
today.
I also want to thank those--both civilian and military--that I've
had the privilege of working with during the four and a half years I
have spent serving in the Department of Defense Office of General
Counsel. Their commitment to protecting America and improving the lives
of the dedicated men and women who serve all of us by putting
themselves in harm's way for our country inspires me every day.
The General Counsel of the Army advises Army leadership on the
legal implications of the many challenges facing the Army. I believe my
background and experience in the Department, the Congress and the
private sector have well prepared me to serve in this role.
I am committed to working closely with the Army Judge Advocate
leadership, and strongly believe in the value of having
civilian and military lawyers work together to offer the best
possible legal advice to our clients.
If confirmed, I will make every effort to live up to the confidence
that has been placed in me.
I am grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Parker? Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. FRANKLIN R. PARKER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
Mr. Parker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and
members of the committee. It is an honor and a privilege to be
here before you today.
Joining me today, I am honored to have a wide swath of my
family, my wife Ann, my son Franklin. His little sister Diana
was not able to be here today, and it is probably a good thing
for everyone. My mother Janice, my father Franklin, my sister
Lisa, my uncle Glynn, my cousin Frank, my sister-in-law Luong,
and my good friend, Steve Raden.
Chairman McCain. Is there anyone who could not make it?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Parker. There were a couple.
Chairman McCain. Welcome to all of you. I know this is a
proud moment for you.
Mr. Parker. I am honored and privileged to be here today
regarding my nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
Before we begin, I would like to thank President Obama,
Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mabus for their support of my
nomination. I would also wish to express my sincere
appreciation to my colleagues, both past and present,
specifically those at the Departments of the Navy and
Transportation and at the Maritime Administration, for whom I
hold the greatest respect.
I thanked my family previously, but in particular, I would
like to recognize my father, Franklin Parker; my uncle, Glynn
Parker; and my cousin, Frank Harris, whose service in the Air
Force and Army and whose experiences as Vietnam veterans
instilled in me the deepest appreciation for our servicemembers
and the sacrifices and contributions that they routinely make
for our Nation. It is on the shoulders of these men and women
that we all truly stand.
Lastly, I wish to acknowledge with deepest gratitude my
grandfather, Fred Curls, who passed away earlier this year at
the age of 96. I thanked him not only for his service in the
National Guard but also for serving as my inspiration to enter
public service and for teaching me that anything is possible in
our great Nation.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a
privilege to be considered for this opportunity to serve our
men and women in uniform, as well as our civilian personnel who
share their mission and complement their efforts to uphold our
defense. Their commitment to our Nation deserves not only our
respect but a corresponding obligation to them and their
families that we make every possible effort to honor and
support their service.
Over the course of my career, I have worked in the private
sector, as well as in both defense and civilian agencies. I
have performed legal and nonlegal roles. I have served as an
action officer, a manager, a senior executive, and as a member
of agency leadership. In every context, however, the one
constant has been the primacy of people. Our people conceive,
create, enable, and execute everything we do. People are our
greatest and most powerful asset, and this is no truer than for
those who serve in our Nation's defense.
In this realm, it is critical that our decisions always
support readiness, that we bolster the morale of our force,
that we seek to create an environment that is free from
harassment and abuse, and that we ensure that our personnel
have the tools they need to be successful in the field and
healthy at home. These needs are even more pronounced as we
continue to manage multiple conflicts and threats in a highly
constrained fiscal environment.
If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure that
our manpower and Reserve policies and practices meet the
standards that the men and women of our Navy and Marine Corps
deserve. I view this not only as an honor but as an obligation.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee
and the Congress to provide the best for our servicemembers and
civilian personnel. In so doing, I will make every effort to
reward the faith you have placed in me and that our men and
women who serve have placed in us. I am truly grateful for your
consideration of our my nomination, and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Franklin R. Parker
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the committee. I
am honored to appear before you today regarding my nomination for the
position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs. Before we begin, I would like to thank President Obama,
Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mabus for their support of my
nomination. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to my
colleagues past and present--specifically those at the Departments of
the Navy and Transportation, and the Maritime Administration--for whom
I hold the utmost admiration and respect. In addition, I wish to thank
my family--my wife, my children, my parents and my sister--whose
steadfast support enables everything I do. In particular, I would like
to recognize my father Franklin Parker, my uncle Glynn Parker, and my
cousin Frank Harris, whose service in the Air Force and Army instilled
in me the deepest appreciation for our servicemembers, and the
sacrifices and contributions they routinely make on behalf of our
Nation. It is on the shoulders of these women and men that we all truly
stand. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge, with deepest gratitude, my
grandfather Fred Curls who passed away earlier this year at the age of
96. I thank him not only for his service in the National Guard, but
also for serving as my inspiration to enter public service and for
teaching me that anything is possible in our great Nation. Mr. Chairman
and members of the committee, it is a privilege to be considered for
this opportunity to serve our men and women in uniform as well as our
civilian personnel who share their mission and complement their efforts
to uphold our defense. Their commitment to our Nation deserves not only
our respect, but a corresponding obligation to them and to their
families that we will make every possible effort to honor and support
their service. Over the course of my career, I have worked in the
private sector as well as in both defense and civilian agencies. I have
performed legal and non-legal roles, and have served as an action
officer, a manager, a Senior Executive, and a member of Agency
leadership. In every context, however, the one constant has been the
primacy of people. Our people conceive, create, enable and execute
everything we do. People are our greatest and most powerful asset, and
this is no truer than for those who serve in our Nation's defense. In
this realm it is critical that our decisions always support readiness,
that we bolster the morale of our force, that we seek to create an
environment that is free from harassment and abuse, and that that we
ensure that our personnel have the tools they need both to be
successful in the field and healthy at home. These needs are even more
pronounced as we continue to manage multiple conflicts and threats in a
highly constrained fiscal environment. If confirmed, my highest
priority will be to ensure that our manpower and Reserve policies and
practices meet the standards that the men and women of our Navy and
Marine Corps deserve. I view this not only as an honor but as an
obligation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee
and the Congress to provide the best for our servicemembers and
civilian personnel. In so doing, I will make every effort to reward the
faith you have placed in me, and that our women and men who serve have
placed in us. I am truly grateful for your consideration of my
nomination, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Conger, we talked about an audit. For 15 years, we have
been talking about an audit. For 15 years, we have legislated
the requirement for an audit. For 15 years, we have not gotten
one. What do you think the chances are of getting one this time
around?
Mr. Conger. So the progress that the Department has made
and the new thing that has happened even this year is that the
service budgets are under audit right now. They are not
necessarily going to pass an audit this year, but they are
under audit for the first time. The Marine Corps has been under
audit for several years. So there has been a considerable
amount of progress.
Chairman McCain. There was a recognition of failure of the
Marine Corps audit as well.
Mr. Conger. Yes. So the Marine Corps audit that had
originally received a clean audit but then later that was
retracted was because of an anomaly that was discovered and
appropriately retracted. But that actually helps the rest of
the audit----
Chairman McCain. So the answer to my question is do you
think we will have an audit this year.
Mr. Conger. I think that the budgets of the services are
under audit, but they are not necessarily going to pass.
Experience shows that----
Chairman McCain. When do you think we will have an audit, a
complete audit just like every other branch of government has
undergone?
Mr. Conger. It is hard to predict when we will pass an
audit.
Chairman McCain. It certainly is. You really put your
finger on it. It is hard to predict especially after 15 years
of failure.
Mr. Conger. But the difference now is that we are being
audited, and that process will point out what needs to be
fixed. Those corrective actions will improve our chances each
year, each subsequent year----
Chairman McCain. Each year?
Mr. Conger. Yes. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. I can tell you that is not exhilarating to
me saying ``each year,'' after 15 years of failure, Mr. Conger.
I am sorry that I sound so pessimistic. The taxpayers of
America, after all these years, still cannot get an audit, and
you are telling me that each year we will get better.
Mr. Conger. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. I want you to do better. Okay? That is
what I want. That is what the Congress and the American people
want. We want an audit that the American people and this
committee and the Members of Congress can look at and then make
the right decisions. Without us knowing those fundamental
facts, it is very hard for us to legislate on behalf of the
American people.
Mr. Conger. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Starzak, Congress, as you know, for
years now and in the latest authorization bill, which we are
told the President will be signing today or tomorrow or very
soon, specifically prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo
detainees to the United States in both the authorization bill
and the defense appropriations bill.
Does the Constitution in your view authorize the President
to act contrary to the law, including laws he signed as
President? I am specifically referring to the recurring rumor
that is banging around out there that the President will act by
executive order to close Guantanamo. Now, in your view, does
the President have that constitutional authority?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I do not believe that issue would
come before me as Army General Counsel, but I have no reason to
question the constitutionality of those restrictions.
Chairman McCain. I am not asking whether you question it. I
am asking whether you believe that the President has the
constitutional authority to act by executive order to close
Guantanamo Bay. I just read you a list of the requirements when
you come before this committee.
Ms. Starzak. Senator, as I think the Attorney General
testified earlier this week, I believe the statutory
restrictions would prohibit transferring detainees to the
United States.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Parker, same question.
Mr. Parker. Senator McCain, this is not an issue that I
have worked on.
Chairman McCain. I understand that, Mr. Parker. It is the
right of this committee to ask questions that we feel are
important.
Mr. Parker. Absolutely, Senator McCain. I just am not in a
position to provide an answer on this particular question. It
is not one that I have looked into and really have----
Chairman McCain. Then we will await your written answer
while you look into it.
[The information referred to follows:]
This seems to be an issue beyond the scope of the position for
which I am being considered. I would defer it to the appropriate
offices with authority on this issue.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Welby?
Mr. Welby. Chairman, I am neither a lawyer nor have any
particular experience in this matter. So I would have to go
with the advice of others on this topic.
Chairman McCain. I understand.
[The information referred to follows:]
I am not a lawyer and I lack the personal background and training
to provide an appropriate response to this question. It is my
understanding that this issue would not fall under the purview of
ASD(R&E).
Mr. Conger?
Mr. Conger. Sir, I am not a lawyer, nor have I looked into
this particular issue. I would have to get back to you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Chairman, I agree that this is an important issue. However, I
am not an attorney and know that such complex legal issues are best
assessed by the appropriate legal experts. I would refer such a
question to them to ensure you got an accurate and informed answer to
your question.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Parker, the Marines recently released
the results of their major research study on combat
integration. Before reviewing the report, Secretary Mabus
indicated he will not support any exceptions to policy to close
any ground combat elements to women, and he also said that he
would not even review the conclusions of the Marines study.
Are you familiar with the Department of the Marine Corps?
Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force report?
Mr. Parker. I am aware of the report, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Would you have made the same decision as
Secretary Mabus before conducting a review of the report?
Mr. Parker. Senator McCain, I am aware of the report, but I
have not had an opportunity to review the report and I have not
spoken with Secretary Mabus. Without having reviewed the report
and its analysis and its findings, without having spoken with
the Secretary about his thought process, I cannot offer an
opinion on whether or not I would have made the same decision
as Secretary Mabus.
Chairman McCain. Would you agree that this will be in your
area of responsibility?
Mr. Parker. Absolutely, Senator McCain. Once a decision is
made by the Department of the Secretary of Defense--by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, I will be closely involved
in implementation of whatever decision is made.
Chairman McCain. Well, we would want to know your view on
this issue, Mr. Parker. So I would hope that you would take a
look at this task force report and get back to us as to your
views on it.
[The information referred to follows:]
If I were developing the Department of the Navy's position, I would
avail myself of all information and facts related to the issue, as I
understand Secretary Mabus did. Now that Secretary Carter has announced
his decision to open all operational specialties to women, the only
remaining issue is implementation. All qualified servicemembers will be
able to serve in all occupational specialties based on their ability to
meet operationally relevant, occupation-specific, individual standards,
and it is my view that this policy will maximize the combat
effectiveness of the Navy and Marine Corps.
Chairman McCain. Finally, Mr. Conger, would you agree that
we have a lot of work to do in accounting for both the number
of personnel, as well as the expenses associated with our
responsibilities? For example, we do not know how many civilian
employees we have. We do not know how many contract employees
we have. We are thinking about a mandate on end strength for
both civilian personnel such as we have for uniformed
personnel. What do you think about that?
Mr. Conger. I think that it is critically important to know
how many people we have in the Department and that the
personnel office should have that information in order for us
to be able to budget appropriately.
Chairman McCain. I thank you. I thank the witnesses.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conger, we have had a series of very thoughtful
hearings at the direction of the chairman about revisions at
the Department of Defense, Goldwater-Nichols. This week we had
former GAO [Government Accountability Office] Director David
Walker. We had General Punaro and others.
I will quickly reveal my lack of accounting knowledge by
asking--I got the impression that one way might be to get our
arms around the audit is to not do it individually by service
by service but start at the Department of Defense level because
their materiality issues are much different than in the
particular services. Again, this is a real question.
Is there a different approach to the audit process that we
could take that would be more effective than what we have been
doing the last several years in terms of trying to get the
services to do audits to then build on them to do a DOD audit?
Mr. Conger. So I appreciate the approach that you are
suggesting or contemplating, and I understand the differences
in materiality that evolve from looking at the larger
enterprise. The Department has a strategy that has been moving
the ball forward. We have been giving regular updates to this
committee on the progress on that. I do not believe that the
Department is planning on changing its strategy.
Senator Reed. Again, I am reflecting what the chairman has
said and what we have all known. This is a strategy that is
being pursued for 15 years resulting in the inability to
produce the audit. I think it would be useful if at least you
could sort of, as you push this along, think there might be an
alternate way to do this. Again, these are really talented
individuals who made the suggestions.
Mr. Conger. Yes. If confirmed, I would be happy to look at
alternative strategies and try and figure out more effective
ways to accomplish this.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Welby, thank you for your service and thank you for
your father's service. Thank you, sir.
One of the aspects of your responsibilities are the
government laboratories. They play a key role. At times, we get
complaints or comments that they are antiquated in terms of
equipment, management, in terms of their ability to function as
they have in the past as real incubators for change and
innovation. Can you give us some thoughts about your particular
approach to the laboratories and how we can engage them better?
Mr. Welby. Senator, thank you.
I began my career as an intern in an Army research
laboratory here in Maryland and spent a decade kind of working
on cutting-edge problems that really made a difference, early
GPS [Global Positioning System] activities, early work on
unmanned air vehicles, some of the roots of some of the
artificial intelligence briefings that are going on today. I
think the energy and excitement that I see in the workforce in
our laboratories is critical to ensuring that we are on the
cutting edge of getting capabilities that matter to our
warfighters. The laboratories have served as an incubator of
technology and as a coupler to take advanced technology and
drive it towards military needs.
If confirmed, I do intend to very closely look at the state
of our laboratories, the state of their capital equipment, but
most importantly, I am concerned with the state of our people
to ensure that we have the right mix of talent, the right mix
of skills in our laboratories. I am particularly concerned with
the graying of our laboratory workforce, and I want to make
sure that we refresh the talent that will serve us in the
future in the laboratories.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Welby.
Ms. Starzak, one of the roles you will have to play is to
work very closely with the Judge Advocate General of the Army,
the uniformed individual that is your counterpart. You have had
extensive experience at the CIA, Department of Defense, et
cetera. Can you give us sort of a notion of how you intend to
work and share responsibilities and emphasis?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, my understanding is that the Army
TJAG General Darpino has a number of separate responsibilities,
as well as our joint responsibilities. I think it is very
important that she be able to provide independent advice to the
Secretary on the issues that are in her jurisdiction. I think
we would work together very well. I know General Darpino. She
is terrific.
Senator Reed. She has been very helpful to this committee
on a host of issues. Again, I think the combination of the two,
you will be very effective for the Secretary of the Army.
Just a final question, Mr. Parker, and that is, again, in
the hearings that the chairman has, I think, very thoughtfully
put together, the Goldwater-Nichols issues have come up again
and again. One aspect--and he has alluded to it--is civilian
personnel. Your responsibilities will include sort of the
incentives for, the number of, looking at how they are
integrated with Active Duty military personnel. Can you give us
any ideas, as you begin, of what insights or what approaches
you might take to deal more effectively with civilian
personnel?
Mr. Parker. Senator Reed, that is an extremely important
issue, and that is one that will be one of the top priorities,
if confirmed, for me, really taking a look at the existing
authorities and how best we can make sure that we modernize
them in order to attract, recruit, and retain the highest
quality workforce that we possibly can. I know there are a
number of efforts ongoing as we speak, both in terms of looking
at existing authorities, also in terms of talent management,
and I would continue to work, if confirmed, in those areas, and
I would be open to and I would work with the committee as well
in seeking the input of the committee and the Congress for ways
to best implement solutions to some of these issues.
I think one last aspect that is extremely important,
however, is that whatever reforms are made, that we do not
compromise readiness in the process. Maintaining that important
balance is something else that I would make sure to prioritize,
if confirmed.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Ms. Starzak, you were a lead investigator
for the Senate Intelligence Committee majority staff study into
the CIA's rendition, detention, and interrogation practices. In
your time as a lead investigator, did you access and review a
set of documents known as the Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I had access to materials at the CIA
facility that they provided. That includes what I believe to be
the Panetta Review, although it was not called that when I was
on the committee. I left for the Department in 2011.
Senator Cotton. Did you access and review the Panetta
Review more than once?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I believe I had access to it. I do
not remember at this point, 4 and a half years later, how often
I accessed it.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that computer forensic
analysis would indicate how many times it was accessed?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I am sorry. I am not a computer
expert. I do not know.
Senator Cotton. Do you recall recording, making use of, or
taking notes about the content of the Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I do not recall doing that.
Senator Cotton. As you know, the CIA believes the
Intelligence Committee staff should never have had access to
the Panetta Review. Are you aware of how or why the CIA
computer system set up for committee staff to review CIA
documents included the Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I have no idea. My understanding is
that the computer system was set up for the committee's access,
and the committee staff accessed all documents through the
system that was set up.
Senator Cotton. Did you ever speak to any current or former
CIA official's staff or contractors about making the Panetta
Review accessible on this computer system?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I had no discussions about that
particular document.
Senator Cotton. None whatsoever.
Ms. Starzak. None with the CIA staff, no.
Senator Cotton. Are you aware of other Intelligence
Committee staffers who spoke to any current or former CIA
official's staff or contractors about making the Panetta Review
accessible on that computer system?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I just do not know.
Senator Cotton. A committee staff member or members printed
out a hard copy of the Panetta Review and removed it from the
secure CIA document review facility and transported it to
committee offices. Under the procedures agreed to by the
committee and the CIA at the time, were committee investigators
free to remove hard copies of any document they wished from the
secure facility without consultation and authorization by the
CIA?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, as I mentioned, I left the committee
in 2011. I believe, based on media reports, that that incident
happened long after I had left the committee. I am not familiar
with the circumstances of that arrangement.
Senator Cotton. So you do not recall the agreement that the
committee had with the CIA about all access to any document,
not just the Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, my understanding is that issues were
supposed to be worked out with the CIA, but again, I do not
know the specifics of that particular document.
Senator Cotton. Was there an agreed upon process by which
the CIA could authorize the removal of certain hard copies of
documents from that facility?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, the CIA did clear documents to be
brought back to the committee SCIF [Sensitive Compartmental
Information Facility]. That was certainly something that had
happened. That was how the review was brought back. It was
brought back through the CIA.
Senator Cotton. Are you aware if the committee gained such
authorization from the CIA to remove the hard copy of the
Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, as I mentioned, I was not at the
committee at the time that it was reviewed, or at least media
reports suggest it was reviewed. So I just do not know.
Senator Cotton. Media reports suggest that it was reviewed
for the first time in 2010 when you were at the committee and a
lead investigator there.
Ms. Starzak. Senator, you asked when it was removed. Maybe
I misspoke. I meant when it was removed from the CIA facility.
Senator Cotton. When is it your understanding that it was
removed from the CIA facility?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I do not know. I know it was not
removed at the time I was at the committee.
Senator Cotton. Are you aware of the identity of the
committee staff members who took part in printing and removing
the Panetta Review?
Senator Cotton. Senator, as I mentioned, I was not at the
committee at the time. All I have seen are the same media
reports that everyone has seen.
Senator Cotton. Okay. I want to call your attention to a
poster.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Cotton. The first page of each document in the
Panetta Review contains a lengthy step as shown there. In
relevant part, it reads, this classified document should not be
distributed without express permission from DRG-RDI [Director's
Review Grasp for Rention, Detention, and Interrogation] or
CIA's Office of General Counsel. This document also contains
material protected by the attorney-client and attorney-work
product privileges. Furthermore, this document constitutes
deliberative work product protected by the deliberative process
privilege. It should not be relied upon by persons outside of
DRG-RDI.
Do you recall seeing this stamp on the Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, it is probably more than 5 years
since I would have seen it. I do not remember it at this time.
Senator Cotton. Do you recall speaking with anyone in the
CIA or on the Intelligence Committee staff about seeing a stamp
such as this on the Panetta Review?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I do not remember discussing it.
Senator Cotton. You are a member of the DC Bar and the
California Bar during the relevant times?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I am inactive in California, but I am
a member of the DC Bar and inactive in California.
Senator Cotton. At the time in 2010 and 2011?
Ms. Starzak. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Were you aware that the DC and California
professional responsibility rules regarding proper handling of
privileged documents that may have been inadvertently disclosed
by the CIA to committee staff?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I believe that the inadvertent
disclosure applies to litigation issues. I think congressional
oversight is significantly different. In fact, with respect to
that statement, I would note that Congress actually does not
recognize deliberative process privilege as being something
that protects disclosure from Congress. So, for example, this
committee has requested a number of documents that are
protected--that could arguably be protected by deliberative
work product. The Department of Defense provides them--has
provided documents as recently as this week that would be
potentially subject to that privilege from outside disclosure.
Senator Cotton. It will be your position, if confirmed as
General Counsel of Army, that this committee is entitled to
review any material that you or anyone in the Army
inadvertently or unintentionally discloses to Congress?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I think the executive branch and the
Congress do not always agree on the scope of privileges. I
think that is actually an important thing. I think it is part
of the separation of powers. We always expect tension between
the executive branch and Congress on exactly what material can
be disclosed.
I think that the important part is comity between the two.
So my understanding with respect to disclosure is often that
the executive branch tries to accommodate Congress to the
maximum extent possible.
Certainly in the context of the review, the CIA review, the
committee was provided access to more than 6 million pages.
Many of them were deliberative in nature. Many of them were
prepared by attorneys. There was no indication at the time that
that was inadvertent.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Ms. Starzak.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses for your service.
All of you have come up within the kind of Federal family,
DOD certainly but also intel agencies or DARPA or the DOT
[Department of Transportation].
We have just gotten a 2-year budget deal and an NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act]. The 2-year budget deal
also lifts for the second 2-year budget deal in a row to a
significant extent the BCA [Budget Control Act] caps imposed in
August of 2011.
In your current positions, talk about what difference it
makes to getting the missions done that we have gotten a 2-year
budget deal that lifts the pressure of the BCA caps. I will
start with Mr. Conger.
Mr. Conger. So in my current responsibility set, with
oversight over installations, energy, and environment issues, I
think it is most starkly presented in the context of facility
maintenance at our installations. When we are constrained by
the budget and we have choices to make as far as where to take
risk, we take that risk in facility maintenance over readiness
of operational forces. That is the prudent thing to do.
Facilities degrade slower than readiness does.
However, when there is more flexibility provided, more
budget available, we are able to perform that maintenance.
Frankly, it is better in the long run to do the maintenance
upfront. So I think that is probably the starkest place where
the dynamics change.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Conger.
Mr. Welby?
Mr. Welby. Senator, quickly just the ability for stability
to allow us to plan I think is critical, and I appreciate the
efforts here to ensure that we have the stability required to
allow us to plan. Science and technology advancements are made
over time. It requires a continuity of effort and focus. I
believe that the stability that the budget agreement offers
allows us to have that focus at least over the next 2 years.
Senator Kaine. Ms. Starzak?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I agree with those comments. I am not
an expert in that particular area but I agree.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Parker?
Mr. Parker. Senator, I agree with those comments as well.
In my current position with the Maritime Administration at the
Department of Transportation, it does help provide stability
especially for our defense sealift programs like our maritime
security program. Being able to have that certainty for the
next couple years definitely helps to ensure that those
programs can continue to operate.
Senator Kaine. The chair and ranking on this committee have
really pushed the notion that we need to provide the certainty.
I would just like to say to all my colleagues I think what the
budget deal does is it starts to normalize two things: first,
2-year budgets instead of a 1-year budget, which gives all of
you a better planning horizon and enables more stability for
the reasons you have described; and second, the notion that the
BCA caps are a discipline, a starting point, a default but not
a straightjacket. For the second 2-year budget deal in a row,
we have treated BCA caps in that way, and I think that is very,
very positive. I am interested in your testimony.
Ms. Starzak, one of the issues that I am kind of interested
in is when we do the NDAA, we put a lot of policy into it and a
lot of it is legal policy. You have been in the General
Counsel's Office in the DOD and now going in the position with
the Army, the largest of the service branches. Maybe the issue
that we have talked about, just to use it as an example, the
biggest in terms of policy is the set of reforms that we have
made with respect to military sexual assault. Talk a little bit
about the challenge of taking those reforms and then
implementing them throughout the DOD or just within the Army.
In the particular case of the legal reforms with respect to the
way we are trying to treat the sexual assault problem, what is
your assessment of the progress we are making in having those
reforms percolate down through the entire organization?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, there have been significant reforms
in recent years, particularly on the military justice side. I
believe the Department is currently implementing more than 50
pieces of legislation addressing military justice and sexual
assault. They have been challenges, honestly. I think the major
reforms, the article 32, for example, major reforms to article
60, which relates to the back end of prosecutions have been
significant. The Department has--they are doing their best to
make changes to the manual for courts martial, for example, to
ensure that there is common understanding of how those will be
applied. But it is incremental. I think there has been a lot of
change in a very short period of time. So the Department is
struggling in some ways to keep up.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Conger, I was interested in your answer
to Senator McCain's questions about the audit because I hear
more recently--you know, coming in and there is not an audit,
it seems like are you kidding me. But I do not have the
background or the history of we are going to have an audit for
year after year after year. Go into this issue of who is now
under audit. Talk about the four branches, which branches are
under audit, and how long have they been under audit. So did
the Marines start before the others?
Mr. Conger. Yes. The first year that the Marine Corps
budget was audited was in fiscal year 2012.
Senator Kaine. Then tell me about the other service
branches.
Mr. Conger. The other service branches will be under audit
for their fiscal year 2015 budget, and that will be the first
time.
Senator Kaine. For the first time.
So the Marines have been under audit since 2012 but have
not yet gotten a clean audit.
Mr. Conger. That is right.
Senator Kaine. You would expect, I guess, that if the other
service branches go under for the first time in 2015, it is not
likely that they are going to get a clean audit the first time
around?
Mr. Conger. Absolutely.
Senator Kaine. But the fact was before 2012, nobody was
even under audit. I guess the process is you put them under
audit and then you work with the service branches to get them
to not only be under audit but to start to pass audits.
Mr. Conger. Yes, sir. It is not a trivial thing to be under
audit. The auditors expect a certain responsiveness. When they
ask for documentation for a particular transaction, you are
supposed to be able to provide that in a reasonable amount of
time. We just did not have the systems in place to be
responsive at all.
Senator Kaine. Is there also then a need for an audit not
just of the service branches but kind of overall? Again, I am
not an accountant, but the overall OSD [Office of the Secretary
of Defense] enterprise. Are there additional audits that really
need to be done in addition to the four service branches?
Mr. Conger. So in addition to the four service branches,
the defense agencies will have their budgets under audit. In
addition to the budget parts of the audit, there will need to
be an audit of inventory, the existence and completeness.
Essentially do you know everything that you have got whether it
is real property, buildings--and I work on that piece of it
right now--but also every piece of equipment, every tank, every
aircraft carrier. Do you have that inventory comprehensive? Do
you have a value associated with that? Do you know how much
that book value is of that particular asset? Then documentation
of all the liabilities of the Department.
Senator Kaine. I have gone over time, but this is very,
very critical to the committee. If Senator Manchin was here, he
would not follow up and just pile on on this. It is so
important that this be done, and if you can make a major
advance on this audit issue, then we will put a statue of you
up out here.
Mr. Conger. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Tillis, on behalf of the
chairman.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Ms. Starzak, you said something that made me kind of look
back at the family. You were talking about the tension between
the branches, and I think that is what you are saying here. If
you cannot follow the discussion, just understand we are kind
of doing our fiduciary responsibility for our roles. For the
youngsters here, we are not trying to be mean.
But I do have to ask you some questions about Guantanamo
Bay, and I am going to try to ask them in the context of the
job that you would be moving into. If the President directed
the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United
States, in your professional judgment would the officers of the
Department of Army be at legal risk of violation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, it is unclear what role the
Department of the Army would have in that, and so I think it
very much depends on that question.
Senator Tillis. I am not an attorney, but I know attorneys
move quickly into hypotheticals when you get a response like
that. So hypothetically, if we had Army officers involved in
the transfer of Gitmo detainees, do you think that they could
potentially be in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, my understanding is that there are
appropriations restrictions that address the transfer of
Guantanamo detainees to the United States. I do not have any
reason to think the Army officers would necessarily be involved
in that effort.
Senator Tillis. But it would seem to me in the hypothetical
that in a way you could extend your legal judgment should the
Army be involved to anyone else because it is going to be one
branch of the services. So I think if, in the hypothetical,
they were involved, do you believe that they would be in
violation or potential violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, Anti-Deficiency Act prohibitions--if
there is a restriction in an appropriations bill, that
potentially leads to an Anti-Deficiency Act violation. So if
something is done inconsistent with a restriction in an
appropriations act, yes, it would be a violation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act.
Senator Tillis. Ms. Starzak, thank you for that answer.
The administration typically invokes article II, section 3
of the Constitution when they are arguing against the Anti-
Deficiency Act. What is your legal opinion on whether the
Faithful Execution Clause still applies in a situation where
there is an affirmative prohibition against the use of funds
under the law?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I think it is very circumstance-
dependent. I think you have to look at exactly what the law is,
potentially exactly what the constitutional infirmity might be.
Senator Tillis. What we will do is I would like maybe we
can either get another hypothetical or get to the specific
circumstance, and we will submit that for the record for
follow-up questions. Thank you.
Mr. Conger, it is amazing to me when you think about the
Department of Defense and every single private sector company
that they work with has to do an audit every year, and they
have done it every year for a long, long time. In fact, it is
probably a requirement for them to do business with the
Department of Defense.
As somebody who came from an audit firm, it is remarkable
to me that we are having difficulty auditing an organization
that has a half trillion dollar budget. As somebody--if you
were thinking about a board of directors and you came back to
the board every year and said, well, we just cannot get the
audit working, you know, what is the likelihood that they are
going to make an investment in an enterprise that I would like
to make more investments in?
My question for you is if they fail to meet the audit-ready
status, if any part of the organization fails to meet the
audit-ready status by 2017, who specifically should be held
accountable for that failure?
Mr. Conger. So it depends on which part of the organization
is not meeting its responsibilities. People should be held
accountable for those things that they are responsible for and
have the authority to be able to execute.
Senator Tillis. We will submit for the record--I want to
know the specific person who should lose their job if they fail
again to produce an audit-ready status in 2017. But instead of
putting you on the spot here, we will put you on the spot in
the written questions.
Senator Tillis. This also relates to Guantanamo Bay. If you
are confirmed as the Comptroller, would you support the use of
appropriated funds to execute the transfer of detainees from
Guantanamo Bay to the United States?
Mr. Conger. So not having--the simple answer, Senator, is
that we should be following the provisions in the law. So I
would expect us to do that. I would rely on legal advice to
decide exactly how we would apply those funds.
Senator Tillis. Because I know that we will have the
opportunities to submit questions, that is another specific
question that I would like to get your answer to.
Senator Tillis. I am sensitive to time. Mr. Parker, I just
have a question for you. I will try and get in under the wire.
The Marine Corps recently released the results of their major
research study on combat integration. Are you familiar with
that report?
Mr. Parker. I am aware of the report, Senator.
Senator Tillis. Are you familiar with the Department of the
Marine Corps? recommendations? Specifically before I ask that
question, given the time, do you support the decision of
Secretary Mabus to not allow the Marine Corps? recommendation
to go before the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Parker. I am aware that the Secretary has provided a
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, but I am not
aware----
Senator Tillis. Do you think it is wise to take the people
who are on the ground that completed this extensive research to
not have that be instructive to the Secretary's decision-making
process?
Mr. Parker. I am not aware of the Secretary's decision-
making process.
Senator Tillis. So do you or do you not agree with the
decision of Secretary Mabus to not allow the Marine Corps?
recommendation to go forward to the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Parker. I am not aware of what Secretary Mabus
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. I am not aware of what
was----
Senator Tillis. It is my understanding that his
recommendation is not to allow the Marine Corps?
recommendations to go to the Secretary of Defense. Do you think
that is a good or bad idea?
Mr. Parker. I have not spoken to Secretary Mabus about his
thought process and about his review of the report.
Senator Tillis. We will submit that for the record so you
will have the opportunity to speak with the Secretary.
Senator Tillis. This is just another hypothetical question.
If you extend the thought process that I think Secretary Mabus
may have, do you believe that women should be required to
register for the draft?
Mr. Parker. You know, that is a complex question that----
Senator Tillis. It is actually a pretty simple question if
you take a look at Secretary Mabus' apparent policy trajectory.
So that is another one we are--given that I guess it may be
complex, that will be another one we will submit for the
record.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me recognize Senator
King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Starzak, I just want to clarify the record on this
business of the Panetta Review. When did you leave the
Intelligence Committee?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I left in May of 2011.
Senator King. When was the removal of the document and
taken to the secure facility here in the Senate?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I do not know the exact date. I was
not on the committee at the time. It was certainly after I left
the committee.
Senator King. Late 2013. Does that sound correct?
Ms. Starzak. That is approximately my understanding from
media reports.
Senator King. In other words, you had been gone from the
committee for 2 years when this action took place.
Ms. Starzak. Yes, Senator.
Senator King. You had nothing to do with it whatsoever.
Ms. Starzak. No, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you. I just was confused by the prior
line of questioning. I wanted to clarify that.
Mr. Welby, one of the issues that we are continually
talking about here is how to develop technology and how to get
it into the hands of our military in a timely way. Talk to me
about how we can accelerate the adoption of technology and
handle the whole issue of R&D in the Defense Department.
Mr. Welby. Senator, in the commercial sector, time to
market is what drives business success. I believe increasingly
speed is going to be a critical measure for our research and
development enterprise. I believe that we need to exercise the
Department's muscles in prototyping and demonstration, the
tools that allow us to take capabilities that are developed in
the laboratory, in industry, defense and non-defense, and put
them into a military context, get operators exposed to those
ideas to short circuit the long requirements process that we
have today.
Senator King. Specifically, do you intend some kind of
reorganization or restructuring in order to make that happen?
Just saying it here in this committee is not going to make it
happen. If Senator Inhofe was here, he would tell you that
currently it takes 23 years to get a new airframe from
conception to the tarmac and into flight. That is unacceptable.
Mr. Welby. Senator, I entirely agree.
Two things that have happened recently that I have had a
hand in that have been working to accelerate that process. We
have shifted one of the four offices in ASDR&E [Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering] and renamed
it to focus it on concept prototyping as a way to rapidly move
technology forward, to accelerate that process of moving
material from the lab into the field.
But I think most importantly, we have begun structural
changes to the way we buy. With this committee's support, the
Department has refocused its efforts on modular open system
architectures, on ways that we can plug and play technologies,
new emerging technologies, into existing systems so we do not
have to go through that long lifecycle with a tightly
integrated system. Today if you buy a computer, you can plug
new cards into it to increase its capability over time. We want
our military systems to have that same kind of plug and play
upgradeability to allow us to insert technology faster over
time.
Senator King. I would urge you to pursue that aggressively
because it seems to me that is one of the serious problems. If
we are going to build, for example, the new Ohio class, it is
going to have a 40-year life. It has to be designed in such a
way as to be upgradeable. Otherwise, it is obsolete the day it
hits the water.
Mr. Welby. I agree entirely.
Senator King. The other issue with R&D--we had a very
interesting hearing here a couple weeks ago about carriers, and
it became apparent through the discussion that the overruns on
the new carrier are largely attributable to the fact that we
are doing R&D while we are building the ship. How do we
separate R&D from construction of a new class of weapon system?
Mr. Welby. Senator, I believe that there is a series of
questions that need to be asked at the start of any
modernization program, any acquisition program focused on risk
and particularly the technological risk, the risk associated
with the technologies, with the manufacturing technology we
plan to use, with the technology we would use to integrate
those systems.
In 2009, this committee established the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering position, the
position I currently hold, to advise the Under Secretary and
Secretary on technical risk on programs, and I have been doing
my best over that period of time to kind of bring that
conversation forward. I think we have done a much better job
over the last 5 years in terms of not starting programs without
a clear understanding of the maturity of the capabilities that
go into them. That discipline is critical to ensuring that we
can manage the cost and schedule and reliability of our
programs.
Senator King. Well, you have some challenges with Ohio
class coming, the new strike bomber coming. We are talking
about some major weapon systems. I hope that you will focus
very intensively on time and risk. I think those are the two
factors.
Mr. Conger, I am out of time, but I just want to join my
colleagues in saying there is no more important mission from
the financial point of view than getting this audit system in
place. I tell people in Maine that we cannot audit the
Department of Defense, and their jaws drop. We got to fix that.
Mr. Conger. I understand, Senator.
Senator King. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
On behalf of the chairman, Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Starzak, I just want to kind of follow up and give you
a little more context on the--you have been getting a lot of
questions on Gitmo [Guantanamo Bay]. I think what it does it
reflects, obviously, an area of focus that this committee has
been very interested in, the chairman, Senator Ayotte, all of
us really. There are provisions in the NDAA. It looks like the
President is going to sign that.
But I think you see some of the frustration because it
actually represents a broader frustration with an
administration and a White House that sometimes seems to
blatantly, in a lot of our views, ignore the law and do what
they think they can do despite the fact that the law or the
Constitution says otherwise. It has been kind of a theme, and
it cross well beyond the military issues.
So let me just ask a couple of questions and even a
hypothetical or two that relate to this kind of--so the oath of
office that the members of the military take, that actually all
of you take--to whom or to what are you pledging an oath to?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, the oath is to the Constitution of
the United States.
Senator Sullivan. Correct. All the members of the military,
when they take their oath--is it to the same entity?
Ms. Starzak. Yes, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So let us say kind of like what the AG
[Attorney General] said recently in her testimony that it seems
pretty clear that under the current law and the law that the
President is getting ready to sign, the authority to close
Gitmo resides with the Congress. I am not going to ask you if
you agree with that or not.
But let us say you do agree with that. Let us say you look
and you are a smart lawyer, that you see that you think that is
correct. It seems like the Attorney General of the United
States was leaning that way in testimony. It would be good to
know, for written testimony, if you can provide your answer on
that, once you look at the NDAA provision. I am not going to
ask you here right now.
Senator Sullivan. But let us assume that you look at the
NDAA provision, you get back to this committee, you say you
think that the authority to close Gitmo firmly resides with the
Congress of the United States. Then the White House, regardless
of that, says they are going to do it anyway. As the chairman
said, there are some rumblings along those lines. You are the
General Counsel of the Army. What would you do? What would you
do? If you came out with a written opinion, maybe it was not
public, but maybe it was internal, saying you cannot do this,
Mr. President, and then the White House overrules you and says
we are doing it anyway, what would you do as the General
Counsel of the United States Army?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I think, if confirmed as Army General
Counsel, my role would be to mitigate against risk of legal
implications for the Army. So I would specifically look at the
legal implications for the Army. I think that would be a
significant challenge, obviously, if there was a disagreement.
Ultimately, though, I would point out----
Senator Sullivan. If you thought the President was
violating the law or the Constitution and you had in a written
statement stated that either publicly or to the White House and
they said, hey, forget it, we are doing it anyway, what would
you do?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, like I said, I think that the
importance would be from my written legal advice to apply to
the Army. There are internal ways to ensure that your legal
opinion is heard. Ultimately, though, the lawyer for the
executive branch is the Department of Justice. So it is really
up to the Attorney General to make a final determination on
interpretation of legal provisions or on----
Senator Sullivan. So you would not resign if you thought
that the White House was undertaking actions that were clearly
contrary to the law or the Constitution?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I think you would have to look very
carefully at the circumstances. It is very hard to talk about
that as a hypothetical issue. It is hard to determine what
would happen.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. So just for the record, in terms of
your written comments, if you could get back to us on--take a
look at the NDAA provision, take a look at what the Attorney
General is saying, and if you can directly answer the question,
does the President of the United States, in light of the NDAA,
have the authority to unilaterally without any congressional
authorization shut down Gitmo. Can you get back to us on that?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I will look at that.
Senator Sullivan. Can you get back to us?
Ms. Starzak. Yes. Yes, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Parker, you know, one of the big
issues that I know probably recognize--it is an issue that all
of us are concerned about--are the high rates of suicide among
military members, among our veterans. I know that you talked
about in your testimony that you support efforts to encourage
resilience among sailors and marines and their families. I
appreciate that. Do you have any specific initiatives or ideas
to help prevent suicide among Active Duty members or members of
the Reserve?
I am a reservist in the Marines. Like a lot of members in
the military, I have seen the devastation that suicide can have
with regard to units. Are you familiar with the Clay Hunt
Suicide Prevention Act that the Congress passed at the
beginning of this year?
Mr. Parker. Senator, every suicide is a tragedy. I
understand that the Department is working very hard to try to
do what it can to reduce the numbers of suicides. I know there
are a number of programs in place that it is currently
administering to really help individuals come forward and seek
help, to help others to intervene when they see that there is a
situation that might lead down that road. I know it is
something that, if confirmed--it is something I will take
extremely seriously. I will try to continue to implement and
work through the programs that exist and also see if there are
other ways to help address this terrible issue. I will be happy
to work with the committee as well and seeking the committee's
ideas on how best to address it also.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Donnelly, please.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the entire group, to Mr. Parker and to everybody else,
we have been working on this suicide issue for a long time now,
for a number of years. Last year we were able to get in the
NDAA that every servicemember can get a mental health
assessment. This year's NDAA--I worked together with Joni Ernst
and Roger Wicker and John Boozman. We were able to get
additional mental health assistance through what is called the
care package. For private practitioners, mental health
professionals, they can get special training to make them
servicemember-friendly. Physician assistants we have been
talking about as well. So if you will keep this on the front of
the burner because we lost over 400 young men and women last
year to suicide that were Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve
combined. It is critically important for each one of them. That
is a brother or a sister, mom or dad, son or daughter who is
gone and lives have been turned completely upside down.
So you all work in different areas. You are the
Comptroller. You are Manpower and Reserve. But it will touch
each and every one of you each and every day. We appreciate
your efforts to stay on top of that.
Mr. Welby, I wanted to ask you specifically in regards to
your efforts, the importance of DOD's R&D efforts to maintain
our military's technological edge. As we work to improve
collaboration across government, academic, and private sector
enterprises--and this is something that I know is critical to--
well, to our whole country but also to Mr. Heinrich because of
his home state. How do you view the role and the value of our
military labs in the long term? To my State too because of the
labs there.
Mr. Welby. Of course. Senator, I believe the DOD labs are a
critical resource for the Department. I believe that they
represent the key engine by which we map technology from the
larger academic and private sector into those domains that are
militarily critical. There are things in our laboratories that
no one else will do, the key efforts we have in propulsion, in
energetics, the military-specific IT [Information Technology]
work that goes on, our biomedical teams. It is an amazing
caliber of people and talent in our laboratories. I think it is
critical that we preserve those. I think it is critical that we
couple them to operational needs. It is critical to connect to
them to a much larger community globally and in academia to
ensure that we are getting talent and ideas flowing to our
laboratories.
Senator Donnelly. One of the things we have seen recently
is the sale of IBM's [International Business Machines]
semiconductor manufacturing business to a foreign-held company.
It pretty much threw a wrench into our Trusted Foundry Program.
What I am wondering is where we are with the strategy to manage
supply chain risk for microelectronics going forward.
Mr. Welby. Senator, the Department reacted to the concern
over the sale of the IBM Trusted Foundry to the GlobalFoundries
group. We have built a series of mitigations to the loss of
that capability, a near-term mitigation that ensures that the
trusted facility remains available to the Department for a
period of time, that allows us to make lifetime buys of
critical parts that come off that line. It preserves the
security context in which we ensure trust in that facility at
least for the near term.
In the long term, we need to recognize that the
globalization of the microelectronics sector, microelectronics
being so critical to our defense technology--it is going to
require us to adapt the way we do business in microelectronics.
We are going to need to be smarter about how we ensure the
integrity of the devices we buy.
Senator Donnelly. One of the other areas we will probably
have to continue to increase on is detection of counterfeit and
similar things. Is it not?
Mr. Welby. I agree and that is part of our strategy, to
ensure that the parts that we do buy are in fact trustworthy.
Our efforts with the Joint Federated Analysis Center, the work
going on at places like Crane or at Sandia National Labs that
are supporting this nationwide network that allows us to look
into electronics and ensure that they do only the things that
we want them to do is going to be critical to that long-term
strategy.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
I am just about out of time, but I want to ask Mr. Conger.
You know the issue of audits is critical to us. You have heard
it. You have heard it from other members as well. Do you have
an audit game plan, a list of metrics, that we can follow
whether we are on target, whether you have the people you need
to do the work you need to create this audit culture across the
board that by this year, we expect to be at this point, by the
following year, we expect to be at this point so we have a road
map as opposed to just hoping that we can get somewhere on
this?
Mr. Conger. Yes. The Department does have such a plan. It
provided an update on that plan on Monday I believe to this
committee, and we can certainly provide that----
Senator Donnelly. Will you update that if you are in that
position?
Mr. Conger. Absolutely. I would be intimately involved in
updating that plan regularly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Ayotte, on behalf of Chairman McCain.
Senator Ayotte. I thank the chair.
I want to thank all of you for being here and your family
as well.
Mr. Conger, I wanted to ask you. You are currently
performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Energy, Installations and Environment. In that capacity, you
are responsible for oversight of DOD's environmental cleanup
programs. As you know, in 2014 chemicals used in Air Force fire
fighting foam were discovered in the well water in Portsmouth,
New Hampshire. This is a very concerning issue for my
constituents in that area. The so-called PFCs [Perfluorinated
Compound] have been associated with certain types of cancer.
Together with Senator Shaheen, I have worked closely with the
Air Force, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to ensure the
Air Force cleans up the mess it made and the Federal Government
provides full support to the local community.
Mr. Conger, do you agree that it is important for the Air
Force to clean up the mess that was created in the Portsmouth
area in the well water and make every effort to notify
personnel who may have been exposed to these PFCs and provide
necessary support for the local community?
Mr. Conger. Senator, I absolutely agree that that is
important. I have been in regular contact with Miranda
Ballentine, my Air Force counterpart, who has been working very
hard on this issue personally and has gone up and, I think,
done town halls up in the community as well.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I appreciate that, and when you are
confirmed for this new position, I would appreciate your
continued focus and attention on making sure the people of
Portsmouth are fully supported, people are notified that may
have been exposed to PFCs, including military personnel, and
that we do all we can to ensure that obviously the mess is
cleaned up and that anyone who needs any assistance on the
health end gets it.
Mr. Conger. Yes, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
So, Ms. Starzak, I wanted to just clarify one thing. You
have been Deputy General Counsel for legislation at the
Department of Defense since May of 2011. Is that right?
Ms. Starzak. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. In that capacity since you have been in
that position, the law has really been the same with regard to
transfers from Guantanamo. The defense authorization, at least
since I have been on this committee and since you have been
Deputy General Counsel, has said that it does prohibit
transfers from Guantanamo to the United States of America.
Would you agree with that?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, yes. With respect to domestic
transfers, the law has not significantly changed.
Senator Ayotte. Right. Obviously, there has been changes on
the international transfers. Also on the military construction
appropriation, the provision has essentially been the same,
which is prohibiting resources going toward modification or
construction in the United States of America?
Ms. Starzak. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. So I know that Senator Sullivan had asked
you--we are going to give you some time to review the
provisions, but you have already been Deputy General Counsel.
The provisions are what the provisions have been. So I want to
make sure I understand. Do you believe those provisions are
constitutional?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, as I said to Senator McCain, I have
no reason to doubt the constitutionality of those provisions.
As you mentioned, the restrictions have been in place for some
time. We have abided by them to date.
Senator Ayotte. I think that is what we all really want to
be assured of. I know as the General Counsel for the Army--the
reality is I was just in Guantanamo and most of the guards
there are in the Army. So this is going to be a direct issue
for you to face as Army General Counsel if the President makes
the decision that he is not going to follow this law. Would you
recommend that the President follow the law?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, my understanding is that the
Department is--certainly the Department but the administration
at large is looking to work with Congress on those provisions.
I think as the Attorney General stated, it is very important to
follow the law.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I appreciate that.
I do have a question. So on May 31st of 2014, there was the
so-called Taliban Five transfer that occurred. You were Deputy
General Counsel at that point for legislation. The law at that
time provided--in clear violation of the law, Congress was not
given 30 days notification of the transfers of those five very
dangerous individuals in exchange for one of the prisoners of
war, Bowe Bergdahl. So I wanted to ask you were you aware of
that transfer in advance, and did you advise both the Secretary
of Defense and anyone in the White House of what the law was
and what the law they were supposed to follow at the time in
notifying us?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I was not involved in the legal
determination about whether the 30-day notice would apply at
that time.
Senator Ayotte. In any way?
Ms. Starzak. I was not involved in the legal analysis on
that point.
Senator Ayotte. Were you aware of the transfer in advance?
Ms. Starzak. Very shortly in advance, not at the time--the
day before basically.
Senator Ayotte. So you did not raise the issue of the law?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I think at that point, the Department
of Justice had issued or had concluded that the 30-day notice
did not apply in the very specific circumstances of that case
because it was an attempt to save the life of Sergeant
Bergdahl.
Senator Ayotte. Well, it is not how I read the provision.
But I do appreciate your answer on it. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Heinrich, please.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Mr. Welby, welcome. I have a couple of questions for you.
First, I wanted to get your thoughts on the direction of
directed energy in the coming years. I started my career in
directed energy at Air Force Research Labs, then Philips Labs a
couple of decades ago let us say. But a lot has changed and in
some very positive ways in recent years. I think this is an
area where we are once again really seeing a great focus and
some real opportunities. So I just wanted to get your thoughts
on where you see those opportunities and what specific programs
within directed energy that you would be advocating for in this
position.
Mr. Welby. Senator, I have also had a long engagement and
very effective engagement with the folks out at Kirtland on
directed energy of course. It has always been one of these
technologies that is just another 10 years away, but I think it
is here. I think we now are realizing the opportunities of
those years of investment in this capability.
I point to the Navy's deployment on the Ponce of a directed
energy system as a prototype for close-in defense. The Navy has
been talking about that demonstration publicly. I think it is
an example of the near-term viability of directed energy as a
real game changer for future military operations.
I am very excited about the ability of solid state lasers
today to scale in interesting ways, the ability for fiber laser
technology to really now begin to see its fruition, and quite
frankly also the technology of solid state bar lasers and what
is happening in those areas. I think that we are only limited
by imagination and how it might apply in these technologies. I
think many of the power challenges, diode brightness challenges
are now being resolved. So I am very excited about it. I think
that we have teams that are thinking not only about the
technology now but thinking about their application, and I
think that is a very exciting time for directed energy.
Senator Heinrich. I could not agree more, and I look
forward to working with you through this transition because, as
you said, historically it has always been something that is a
few years away, and now we are seeing real opportunities for
application. I think it is important that we make that
transition and start fielding these technologies in ways that
can really support our warfighters.
The MILCON [Military Construction] process has done, I
think, an incredible job of making sure that we adequately
modernize our bases around the country even at times when
resources have been relatively limited. I want to ask you about
the prioritization of the MILCON towards our DOD labs. Are we
doing enough there to make sure that our labs are actually
modernizing at the pace to support their missions?
Mr. Welby. Senator, I recognize the many competing demands
for the pool of military construction dollars. Often, of
course, operational requirements challenge the long-term
investment in our research facilities. I do believe that the
provisions that allow us to reallocate a certain fraction of
RDT&E investment into near-term modernization and maintenance
provides an excellent mechanism to allow laboratory directors
to cover those most critical needs. But I expect that as we
start to think about the future of our laboratories, we will be
identifying opportunities where we will see challenges in terms
of our facilities and the need to think about the new
capabilities, new test facilities, new experimental facilities.
We need to be thinking about how we balance that in the overall
request.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
I will yield back, Chairman.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Heinrich.
The situation is that Senator McCain will not be returning.
I have to go to the floor for the beginning of the debate on
the flood bill. So I am proposing unanimous consent that at the
conclusion of Senator Gillibrand's testimony--Senator King has
already an opportunity--excuse me--her questioning that the
hearing be adjourned. Is there any opposition?
[No response.]
Senator Reed. Hearing no opposition, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator King. Is there not something mischievous we could
do while McCain is not here?
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. I am trying to keep my title as the most
boring person in the United States Senate. There is no
mischief allowed.
[Laughter.]
Senator Gillibrand. Yes, sir.
Ms. Starzak, there was a report issued yesterday, I do not
know if you saw it. It was published by the Associated Press,
and it was criticizing the military justice system for
concealing cases of child sexual abuse. This report found that
just over half of sex offenders in military prisons were child
sex offenders, and many of them are serving lesser prison terms
as a result of lenient plea deals. More needs to be done to
protect children from sexual predators.
Additionally, this report highlights the lack of
transparency in court martial proceedings. For example,
transcripts and pretrial agreements are only available through
FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests, which is obviously
not the case for civilian courts.
What can be done to improve our military justice system in
trying to punish child sex offenders, and how can we increase
transparency in the military justice system such as moving it
to PACER [Public Access to Court Electronic Records] or a
PACER-like system that we have in the civilian world? Why does
a military judge have no knowledge of or no ability to impact
plea deals? Would you support changing that?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I am aware of the article. I did read
it. Obviously, any incidents of child sexual abuse is
absolutely horrific. I think the Department needs to do all it
can to ensure that we do not have that problem, that we prevent
it in the first instance. I think the Department is certainly
interested in pursuing changes, if necessary, to ensure that.
With respect to your question on transparency, that is
something the Department has been looking at very closely over
the past few months. I anticipate that the Department is likely
to have a recommendation on that front that will come to
Congress hopefully in the near future.
Senator Gillibrand. How do you think we can increase our
confidence in the military justice system? In the context of
military sexual assault, you have a 62 percent retaliation rate
for people who do actually have the courage to come forward and
report that they have been sexually assaulted. What do you
think the best approach is to stop retaliation and change the
climate?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, I think, unfortunately, retaliation
is a very difficult problem to tackle. I do not think it is
entirely military justice-oriented. I think it is very
important to change climate with respect to retaliation. I
think one of the main issues that the Department has been
looking at are ways to get at that problem, and I think 62
percent is, obviously, completely unacceptable. Victims have to
have a voice in the process. They have to feel like they can
come forward. That is critical just for the integrity of the
military.
So I certainly share your concerns with respect to that. I
think the Department has been looking at the retaliation
problem very closely and hopefully we will come up with some
recommendations on that issue.
Senator Gillibrand. Some have used the argument that there
are insufficient numbers of military lawyers to implement the
Military Justice Improvement Act. You appear to agree that more
lawyers are needed in your advance policy questions where you
said to address emerging requirements, including special victim
capabilities and special victims counsel, the Army JAG [Judge
Advocates General] Corps is planning to grow.
How do you reconcile this plan to grow the JAG Corps to
address what we all agree is a top concern for the military
with claims that there are insufficient numbers of judge
advocates to implement MJIA [Military Justice Improvement Act]?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, my understanding is that the Military
Justice Improvement Act requires attorneys at the 2006 level,
which is very high in the military justice world. So I think
that there are not the numbers of 2006's necessary. So I do not
think those two are necessarily inconsistent. I think the
growth that we are seeing is at the prosecutor level, the
people who are actually in court level, not at the 2006 level.
Senator Gillibrand. I think that the bill only says the
decision-maker has to be 06 or above, which is not dissimilar
to the current decision-making for non-lawyers who are
commanders, but the people involved in these cases can be more
junior.
But there seems to be a need to professionalize the lawyers
within the military so that they actually get some specialized
training. In the civilian world, for example, only very rare
DAs' [District Attorney] offices have successful records for
prosecuting rape cases such as the Manhattan DA's office where
they have had a victims crime unit since the 1970s. Because
they have specialized, because they have allowed seniority to
develop amongst their prosecutors, they actually can take some
of the hardest cases and actually get convictions.
Have you considered a way to professionalize the
prosecutor's office within the military so that we can get
better conviction rates and get better prosecution of these
very tough cases?
Ms. Starzak. Senator, one of the changes that we have seen
in recent years is the implementation of a special victims
prosecutor program in the Army. So I understand that there is
now a set of prosecutors in the Army who are more experienced
who oversee the prosecution of sexual assault cases. They tend
to be people with significantly more experience in military
justice, and they also, during the course of their training, do
a 2-week detail to a DA's office to learn specifically how
special victims units work. So I think that that is an
important thing to look at. I think they certainly have been
developing in that area.
Senator Gillibrand. So I would like you, for the record, to
give me some recommendations for how we can professionalize all
of the services' prosecution units so that we can really make
the military the state of the art in terms of being able to
prosecute effectively violent crimes in the military. Thank
you.
[The information referred to follows:]
I agree that it is critical to have a well-trained, professional
Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps. I believe that the Army JAG Corps
has made great strides in recent years in providing specialized
training to prosecutors, particularly to special victim prosecutors,
who handle sexual assault and domestic violence cases. Those
prosecutors conduct training with major civilian special victims units
and attend an array of courses and symposia annually at both the Army
JAG Corps' School and at various civilian locations, all focused on
improving their prosecutorial skills. If confirmed, I will work closely
with The Judge Advocate General and the Provost Marshal General to
identify areas where further improvement is possible in the areas of
investigating and prosecuting crime.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator King, did you have any
additional----
Senator King. No. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Good.
Ms. Starzak, I just had to leave to go to a hearing on a
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, of which I am a
member, and the issue is child abuse and sexual exploitation.
Thanks to technology, it has become a much more serious issue.
So it is not part of the military, but it is an issue that,
because we are an All-Volunteer Force, spills over into the
military. So I hope you will have a look at that issue and ways
that it may apply to the United States Army. It is a very
unpleasant subject to discuss, and some of us shy away from it.
But it is a growing problem in America and the world rather
than one that is getting smaller. So I hope you will take the
time to look at that and how it relates to the men and women
who are in the military.
By the way, on the issue of sexual assaults, I hope you
will look at a number of the measures that we have already put
in this year's defense authorization bill, a number of measures
over the last 2 years. If you think those measures are
inadequate, we would be more than happy to listen to any
recommendations that you have to improve. I am very happy with
the work of particularly Senator Lindsey Graham, who was a JAG
lawyer for some 33 years, who I think struck the right balance
in the legislation that we passed. Senator Gillibrand has been
heavily involved in this issue as well. So we look forward to
working with you.
We thank all the witnesses. There may be some follow-up
questions that hopefully we can get in before the end of the
week when Congress takes a well deserved rest for a week. We
will try to--our incompetent and insubordinate staff seems to
be amused by that comment.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. We will try to get--when we get back,
reporting--your nominations reported out of the committee and
to the floor of the Senate as soon as we get back. Hopefully we
can get that done and let you get to work.
I thank the witnesses. I especially thank all the family
members who have come here today. I know that it is a moment of
great pride for them as you were nominated by the President of
the United States to assume great positions of responsibility
and authority, so I thank you for your willingness to serve and
do not think you are going to enjoy coming before this
committee. Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. John Conger by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and each
of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is the
principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary on fiscal and
budgetary matters. If confirmed, as the Comptroller's principal
assistant, I will support the Secretary in the entire range of
responsibilities of the Comptroller that the Secretary may require.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. My relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense will
be based on the same role as described above. I have worked closely
with the Deputy Secretary on installations and environmental issues and
I would expect to have a similar relationship as Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). If confirmed, I would support the
Deputy Secretary in any matter within the purview of the Comptroller
that the Deputy Secretary may prescribe.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) is the primary assistant and advisor to the Comptroller.
If confirmed, I will do everything I can to help manage the Comptroller
organization and represent the Comptroller when called upon to do so.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
Under Secretaries, to carry out the policies and guidance of the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both directly
and more frequently through their Director for Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment on any matter pertaining to resourcing our
forces and military operations and financial management.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of
the Military Departments on the entire range of resource allocation,
budget execution, and other financial management issues. More
frequently, I will work through the Military Department Assistant
Secretaries for Financial Management. I will ensure that they are aware
of the President's and the Secretary of Defense's policies and
priorities and assist them in implementing Departmental policies and
programs as they may relate to their specific Services.
Question. The heads of the defense agencies.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
heads of the defense agencies in any matter pertaining to resources and
financial management. I will ensure that they are aware of the
President's and the Secretary of Defense's policies and priorities and
assist them in implementing Departmental policies and programs as they
may relate to the specific agency.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the
Military Departments.
Answer. The Department's Comptroller and I will work very closely
with the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military
departments in the development and execution of budgetary matters,
fiscal policy, and initiatives of the President and the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant
Secretaries in contributing to the successful development and
implementation of effective DOD policies and programs and management of
the defense budget.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
works closely with the Department's Office of the General Counsel on a
daily basis. I will, if confirmed, consult and coordinate with the
General Counsel on all legal matters, and specifically, matters related
to fiscal and budgetary issues that may have legal implications.
Question. The Director, Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation.
Answer. The Comptroller and Director of the Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluations are partners in managing the annual
Program/Budget Review process and developing the budget and
accompanying Future Year Defense Program that supports the National
Security Strategy. If confirmed, I will coordinate and work closely
with the Director in meeting his or her duties and in providing advice,
assessments, and options to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work to improve the
management of the Department's complex operations and organization. In
particular, I will work with the Deputy Chief Management Officer on
developing and implementing the Secretary's reform agenda as well as
improving the systems that provide management information, particularly
financial management information, and the development of appropriate
metrics in those areas.
Question. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment on the Joint Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director for Force
Structure, Resources, and Assessment on the Joint Staff in the
management of the Program Budget Review process and all other matters
relating to resourcing our forces and military operations.
Question. The Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Comptroller in managing the
near near-daily interaction with the Office of Management and Budget on
the preparation and execution of the Department's budgets, and the
advancement of both the Administration's and the Department's
management priorities.
Question. The Comptroller General.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review the recommendations
of the Comptroller General and the Government Accountability Office
regarding DOD financial matters and, as required, support actions to
improve the Department's processes.
duties of the principal deputy under secretary of defense
(comptroller).
Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in
the performance of his or her duties and acts for him when the Under
Secretary is absent. The duties of the Comptroller of the Department of
Defense are set forth in section 135 of title 10, United States Code,
and in DOD Directive 5118.3. Among the duties prescribed in statute are
advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense in supervising and
directing the preparation of budget estimates of the Department of
Defense, establishing and supervising Department of Defense accounting
policies, and supervising the expenditure of Department of Defense
funds.
What background and experience do you possess that qualifies you to
perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)?
Answer. I have more than 20 years of experience working on national
security issues, both as a congressional staffer and in senior Pentagon
positions. In each of these roles, I have worked to shape the defense
budget, and each has provided valuable experience that I will leverage,
if confirmed, to assist the USD (Comptroller) in developing and
managing that budget.
I spent most of my time as a congressional staffer working for a
senior member of the House Appropriations and Budget Committees, where
I not only developed a deep understanding of the congressional
processes used to construct the annual budget and appropriations bills,
but the underlying defense policies we were trying to affect, from
military construction to quality of life to acquisition programs.
As a senior leader in the Pentagon for most of the last 6 years, I
have overseen the DOD's $850 billion real property portfolio of more
than 500 installations (encompassing 500,000 buildings and structures)
and the roughly $40 billion annual budget for military construction,
family housing, facilities sustainment, base operations, environment,
and energy programs. In this role I have directly managed an
organization of about 200 civilian, military and contractor employees,
and an annual program budget of approximately $400 million.
Moreover, in my role as Senior Real Property Official for DOD, I
oversee the audit readiness efforts the Services and Agencies undertake
to assert existence and completeness for real property and our work to
achieve proper valuation of our real property assets and environmental
liabilities. I participate in the DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness (FIAR) meetings chaired by the USD (Comptroller) and the
Deputy Chief Management Officer, and I chair my own Functional Business
Governance Board that I use to drive the use of standards and monitor
progress toward auditability.
Question. Describe how the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Comptroller should prioritize both its comptroller and financial
management duties.
Answer. The comptroller and the financial management duties are
complementary priorities--two parts of a whole. I will assist the
Comptroller in advising and assisting the Secretary in the preparation
of the budget and will also assist the Comptroller in executing his
fiduciary responsibility to supervise the execution of the funds
enacted by Congress.
Question. Describe your knowledge of accounting and financial
management principles and how you have applied this knowledge in
previous positions.
Answer. I am not an accountant by education and training but in my
current capacity, I have worked closely with Comptroller personnel and
have acquired a working knowledge in the practical application of
accounting and auditing standards as they apply to my functional
responsibilities for installations and environment. I am a firm
believer that our financial stewardship responsibilities involve all of
the functional business areas. If confirmed, I intend to continue my
practical education and encourage my peers to do the same.
In addition, in my experience as a congressional staffer and as a
senior manager in the DOD, I have become intimately familiar with the
account structure, processes, and rules associated with the DOD budget,
its associated appropriations and individual line items.
In my Pentagon role, I have been a resource manager for
approximately $400 million in annual spending and provided oversight
for $40 billion in accounts covering military construction, family
housing, facilities sustainment, base operations, environment, and
energy programs.
In each of these roles, I had the responsibility to review
investment priorities, identify offsets for higher priority actions,
and make recommendations to my leadership based on financial and
accounting information as well as other factors.
Question. Do the indirect relationships between the DOD CFO and the
service CFOs hinder the ability to effectively direct and coordinate
efforts to improve financial management in the Department of Defense?
Answer. I do not believe so. There are indirect relationships
across multiple DOD portfolios between OSD principals and their Service
counterparts--not just financial management. Ultimately, the authority
vested in the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
gives the Department the appropriate ability to provide direction and
policy guidance to the Services. This principle applies as much to
improving financial management as to other aspects of managing the
Department.
Question. Do you believe the structure of the dual hatted
Comptroller/CFO position allows for the appropriate level of attention
to both functions?
Answer. I do. Moreover, budget and execution are closely related,
especially when resources--whether slated for the future or current--
are limited. Knowledge of one supports the other, both prospectively
and retrospectively. The synergistic relationship between the two
enhances management and oversight by the Under Secretary over each of
these two functions.
defense budget
Question. Given the growing strategic threats the United States
faces with respect to a resurgent Russia, North Korean cyberattacks,
and the rise of the Islamic State, how does the current level of
defense spending adequately confront these challenges?
Answer. The FY 2016 budget request provides for the necessary
resources to execute the nation's defense strategy with manageable risk
and was developed with the identified challenges in mind, though as
Secretary Carter testified earlier this year, it requires us to accept
elevated risk in some areas. I have seen that in the installations
portfolio as we accept lower funding in facilities sustainment,
ultimately pushing larger repair bills into the future.
Ultimately, this budget balances the need to maintain a ready force
to confront today's challenges with the need to ensure we can continue
to meet challenges into the future. While readiness must take top
priority, we must ensure the Department's investment accounts are
funded to sustain, recapitalize, and improve our capabilities, so we
can meet future challenges.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief
Financial Officer?
Answer. The USD (Comptroller)'s ongoing challenge--and therefore
the PDUSD's as well--is to develop credible, defensible defense budgets
that balance multiple priorities and requirements, ensuring our ability
to meet the challenges posed by current threats while investing in our
future capabilities so we can continue to meet the Nation's security
needs into the future. These resource decisions directly impact the
ability of our Armed Forces to continue to fulfill their missions.
At the same time, the USD (Comptroller) has a critical role in
providing the justification to Congress why these funds are critical to
meeting our strategy, and why the Budget Control Act spending levels
are insufficient. This office has the unique capability and
responsibility to associate resource decisions with their real world
impacts to better inform Congress as it deliberates.
The next 2 years will also be pivotal as the Department strives to
achieve audit readiness by 2017. The Comptroller and his Principal
Deputy have indispensable leadership roles in both helping the
Department to meet this goal and driving them to prioritize it. I
recognize the importance of this effort in achieving the credibility
necessary to secure the increased resource levels referenced above.
Lastly, we need to build the financial management workforce of the
future. I am familiar with the substantial amount of effort that has
gone into building a training program for the financial workforce, and
I recognize continued momentum will take effort. This is particularly
important as the Department strives toward auditability, recognizing
that will need to be a sustained effort, not simply a dash toward 2017.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. This is a team effort. If confirmed, I will work closely
with other senior officials in DOD, our Comptroller staff, the Military
Departments and Defense agencies, the Office of Management and Budget,
and Congress to develop policies to meet these challenges.
I will also provide my commitment, leadership, and support to our
staff in the immediate office of the Comptroller, the Defense Finance
and Accounting Service, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency in
meeting these priorities.
I will ensure that we maintain our progress on the centerpiece of
our financial management improvement efforts, which is achieving
auditable financial statements.
In building the workforce of the future, we need to maintain and
enhance the quality of our financial management workforce. It is
important to continue the commitment made in implementing the course-
based certification program for Defense financial managers that was
authorized by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY
2012.
financial management
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the efforts
and progress that have been made in DOD since 1999 toward the goal of
being able to produce a clean audit?
Answer. DOD has made significant progress in the last 6 years
towards achieving auditable financial statements. Since 2009, the
Department has established a clear set of priorities that have
translated this important initiative into an enterprise-wide effort,
involving all functional communities with strong senior leader support.
However, the size, scope, and complexity of the Defense Enterprise
continue to pose challenges. Now, there is an increased understanding
of what is required and a commitment to succeed.
I understand there is a substantial amount of work ongoing,
including efforts to address some of the most challenging problems.
Under the leadership of Mike McCord, the current Comptroller, the
Department is already executing an updated strategy to achieve
auditable statements on its Statement of Budgetary Resources through
audits of successive Schedules of Budgetary Activity.
As you know, audit requirements involve far more than budget
information, and I have been watching efforts on real property more
closely than others. Existence and completeness of our real property
inventory is a requirement for audit, for example. In this area,
inventories and controls are significantly stronger than they once
were, but there is schedule risk. The Navy, for example, will only
assert for existence and completeness in 2016, which leaves little
margin for any schedule slips that may happen due to unforeseen
circumstances.
Question. In your view, what are the main impediments within the
Department that prevent it from achieving the 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act goal of ensuring the financial statements of the
Department of Defense are validated as ready for audit by not later
than September 30, 2017?
Answer. In my view, the main impediments involve change management.
We are trying to review and transform where necessary, long standing
business processes that have been supporting our missions for many
years, but are NOT always sufficient to meet financial audit
requirements. In some cases, we have also implemented modern, more
compliant systems to facilitate the necessary changes while also
helping to sustain them. Changing a huge, global enterprise in a
resource constrained, dynamic national security environment is a truly
daunting task. But the Department is committed to making these changes
and becoming ready for audit. If confirmed, I'm prepared to continue to
be a part of leading this change.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the recent
withdrawal of the Marine Corps' fiscal year 2012 clean audit opinion
for its Statement of Budgetary Resources? In your view, what are the
implications of this withdrawal of the opinion for the Department of
Defense?
Answer. My understanding of the withdrawal of the Marine Corps 2012
Opinion is that it occurred because of an audit finding that occurred
while the Marine Corps' auditors were completing their work. Because
they were working under contractual and time constraints and didn't
have time to determine the actual impact on their opinion, there was no
practical way for them to investigate the issue before they had to
close out their work. The OIG--who issued the opinion for FY 2012 and
who administers the Marine Corps audit contract--were also concerned
that the uncertainty that this situation created required them to
withdraw their opinion. Until there is a more thorough review, we will
not know the full implications.
While I recognize this is discouraging for a Marine Corps team that
has been such a leader in the Department on audit readiness, it
represents great value for the Department if we apply the lessons we
learn here to the larger audits in advance.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
Department's efforts to achieve a clean audit opinion?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Under Secretary Mike McCord
and other senior leaders in the Department to champion DOD's efforts at
becoming audit ready and eventually achieving a clean audit opinion.
``Championing'' can take many forms, including change management,
attaining resources, and--most certainly--promoting and sustaining this
as a high priority for the Department.
Question. How will your efforts differ, if any, from previous
initiatives that have been unsuccessful?
Answer. My efforts will be in support of our current game plan
that, as I mentioned before, is producing positive results. Previous
efforts were not successful because they lacked senior leadership
support and were limited to a narrow functional group. That has
changed. If confirmed, I will be joining the Comptroller team at a good
time as we are turning our attention to the balance sheet--assets and
liabilities. My work on existence and completeness of real property and
environmental liabilities should allow me to immediately contribute to
this initiative.
Question. What is your assessment of the resources and time that
will be required by the Department of Defense to achieve independent
audit readiness, to obtain a modified adverse or qualified opinion, and
to obtain an unmodified ``clean'' opinion?
Answer. My assessment is that achieving audit readiness by the
currently required statutory date is a very ambitious goal that will
likely require some amount of additional resources. The experience of
non-defense, cabinet level agencies that have successfully followed
this path indicates that it requires an incremental investment to get
ready for, and actually support this new kind of audit. Despite the
cost, this investment represents a necessary, positive change.
Once we begin, this audit regimen will continue each year, and
based on other agencies (e.g., Homeland Security), it will take a
number of years to actually begin to achieve positive audit opinions.
Getting into audit is critical though and we are just beginning that
process in the largest parts of DOD. The budgetary, manpower, and
systemic resources DOD commits toward audit must be appropriate and,
most importantly, sustained, in order to sustain the positive progress
needed to achieve and then maintain a clean opinion.
Question. What incentives or authorities do you think would help
the Services and Defense Agencies to prioritize activities that would
accelerate the process of achieving a ``clean'' opinion?
Answer. I believe the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
currently have the needed incentives and authorities to achieve a clean
audit opinion. However, managing audit preparations alongside other
competing mission requirements has and always will be a challenge,
given scarce resources. I also do not know that accelerating
preparations or audits will yield better results. The Services already
have audits underway and I understand that the Fourth Estate is
accelerating its preparatory timelines. I think that providing budget
stability and sustained, constructive oversight will help us maintain
focus on this important goal.
gao high risk list
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) placement of Defense Financial
Management on its ``High Risk List'' since 1995?
Answer. Given the Department's size, complexity, and lack of
auditable financial statements, the GAO's consistent placement of DOD
Financial Management on its High Risk List is fair. Without passing an
audit, one cannot know for certain that Defense decisions are made
based on timely and accurate data, and that appropriate controls are in
place to prevent fraud, waste and abuse of resources.
The GAO's most recent report indicates that while leadership
commitment, capacity, and our action plan objectives are partially met,
the DOD has yet to show demonstrated progress and an ability to monitor
that progress. These things, among others, prevent the Department from
getting off the High Risk List. These kinds of constructive criticism
from the GAO have proven useful in setting FIAR strategy, seeking
resources, and implementing audit enablers, such as enterprise resource
planning systems.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to have DOD Financial
Management removed from the High Risk List?
Answer. The GAO has a prescribed process for removing a subject
from the High Risk List that involves satisfying them on five criteria.
Given GAO's assessment on the Department's Leadership Commitment,
Capacity, and Action Plan, the way to convince GAO to remove DOD
Financial Management from the High Risk List appears to be to
Demonstrate Progress and an ability to Monitor that progress. We are
certainly on the verge of demonstrating progress as part of our audit
readiness efforts, and it would seem that removal from the High Risk
List will happen naturally as the audit readiness effort proceeds.
Question. In addition to Defense Financial Management, the GAO
identifies Defense Contract Management, Supply Chain Management, and
other areas where the obligation and tracking of taxpayer dollars is
also ``High Risk''. Why do you believe the GAO consistently finds
problems with DOD in these areas involving the spending of taxpayer
dollars?
Answer. In my judgment, each of these functional areas reflects a
culture that is mission oriented and often focuses on results without
adequately linking those results to costs and process controls. Our
size, our de-centralized organizational construct and functionally
stove-piped, non-standard way of doing business result in weaknesses in
processes that result in problems that are often highlighted in audits.
Frequent turnover of personnel only perpetuates these problems. I can
point to changes in systems and processes, as well as initiatives such
as FIAR that are beginning to address the root cause of some of these
problems. I'm encouraged that GAO's last report highlighted some of
these changes and provided us credit for them, while also pointing out
that we have much more work to do.
chief management officer
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Chief
Management Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer's past efforts
to improve the business operations of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The Department formally established the DCMO on October 17,
2008 with the responsibility to better synchronize, integrate, and
coordinate the business operations of DOD. Additionally, the Department
gave the DCMO specific duties in strategic planning, performance
management, process improvement, and defense business systems
oversight. Since that time, the DCMO's responsibilities have continued
to grow.
Most recently, on December 4, 2013, former Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel announced an organizational review that directed the
strengthening of the DCMO to better coordinate and integrate DOD's
business affairs by creating a leadership focused on management
concerns and creating a single management, business oversight, and
administrative organization within OSD and across DOD. This was done by
realigning the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M) and its
components under the DCMO, and realigning the oversight of business
systems from DCMO to the DOD CIO. The new DCMO is focused on four
activities: management, policy, and analysis; administration; planning,
performance, and integration; and compliance and open government. The
DCMO reorganization, with its refocused mission, was completed on
October 1, 2014.
I believe the current DCMO is properly organized, with the right
authorities, to continue to improve the management and business
operations of the DOD.
Question. Are there responsibilities performed by the Comptroller
that you believe should be reassigned to the Chief Management Officer
or the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware of any
responsibilities that should be realigned from Comptroller to the Chief
Management Officer or the Deputy Chief Management Officer. If
confirmed, I will reassess the duties and responsibilities assigned to
both offices and will offer my advice to the Comptroller.
Question. Are there responsibilities performed by the Chief
Management Officer that you believe should be performed by the
Comptroller?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware of any
responsibilities that should be realigned from the Chief Management
Officer to the Comptroller. If confirmed, I will reassess the duties
and responsibilities assigned to both offices and will offer my advice
to the Comptroller.
authorization for national defense programs
Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section
114 of title 10, U.S. Code, is necessary before funds for operation and
maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military
construction may be made available for obligation by the Department of
Defense?
Answer. I believe the Department has an obligation to follow the
law, to include fiscal law that governs authority to spend funds.
funding for military operations
Question. As long ago as 1995, the Department of Defense has paid
for the cost of ongoing military operations through supplemental
appropriations. Current law requires that DOD include in its annual
budget submission a request for those incremental increased costs
associated with ongoing military operations, now called Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO).
What is your understanding and assessment of the history, current,
and future use of OCO appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing
military operations?
Answer. The key is providing sufficient resources to support our
deployed troops. The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
budget has successfully funded operations since FY 2010. The amount
requested in the OCO budget has decreased significantly. Given the
uncertainty of the current world situation, it is important that we
retain some budget flexibility to deal with emergent needs and that we
be cautious about prematurely eliminating OCO funding. If confirmed, I
would look forward to working with the oversight committees to review
the use of a separate OCO budget or whether other funding mechanisms
could be utilized. If confirmed, I will ensure that the leadership is
aware of all statutory requirements to include the OCO funding levels
for FY 2016 and FY 2017 included in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
Question. Uniformed leaders in DOD have testified to Congress that
constraints and limitations on the execution of OCO appropriations make
it difficult to exercise necessary flexibility when needed to meet a
wider than operations range of military requirements.
What is your understanding and assessment of the statutory and
regulatory constraints or limitations on the execution of OCO
appropriations?
Answer. I am not aware of any unreasonable statutory or regulatory
limitations on the use of OCO funds. If confirmed, I will make a point
to work with the unformed leadership to identify major impediments and
challenges in executing OCO funds and ensure that we have adequate
funding tools to continue supporting our warfighters.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
law, policy, or regulation that govern the execution of OCO?
Answer. I am not in an informed position to recommend changes. If
confirmed, I will review the current body of law, policy and
regulations governing the execution of OCO funds and seek improvement
as necessary.
tracking and timeliness of dod reports
Question. The responsibility for tracking Congressionally-required
reports largely is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller).
Based on your experience in both the legislative and executive
branches, how do you evaluate DOD's current system for tracking and
evaluating the sufficiency of reports required by Congress, and
delivering required reports in a timely fashion?
Answer. During my time in the Pentagon, I have worked closely with
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs to identify and track reporting requirements. The established
system works well and in my experience, the requirements are accurately
captured, assigned and tracked. Coordination on sufficiency always
includes a review by the Office of General Counsel to ensure we are
meeting the requirements in law.
I believe the Department makes every effort to prepare
congressional reports in a timely manner. Often reports request data
that require unique data gathering processes that make it difficult to
meet the established deadline. There is always room for improvement and
if confirmed, I will work to ensure the reports assigned to the
Comptroller's office are timely and responsive.
Question. If confirmed, would you support efforts on behalf of the
Department to review current reporting requirements and, where
appropriate, recommend elimination of reporting requirements?
Answer. Yes
Question. If so, how would you intend to implement such a plan in
order to achieve efficiencies?
Answer. Secretary Carter has already challenged the Department to
seek reform proposals and efficiencies in all our business processes. A
review of current congressional reporting requirements falls within
that direction. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues across
the Department, particularly the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, to identify reports that may no longer be needed
and work with the oversight committees to eliminate those reports that
no longer serve any purpose.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
department of defense audit
1. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Conger, do you believe that the Department
of Defense is on track to achieve full audit readiness by September 30,
2017?
Mr. Conger. I believe that we have established a credible plan that
will position us to achieve full audit readiness by September 30, 2017.
It is also an ambitious plan and will require significant leadership
focus over the next 2 years. It will require change management and
execution throughout all business areas--not just financial management.
If confirmed, I will actively support our CFO and DCMO in monitoring
execution of this plan.
2. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Conger, what major tasks remain before
reaching full audit readiness, and what is the primary obstacle to the
September 30, 2017 deadline?
Mr. Conger. Three areas present particularly challenging obstacles.
Feedback from our recent budgetary audits indicates ability to provide
auditors complete transaction universes with adequate supporting
documentation is one. The second and related area involves business
systems controls and the sheer number of systems that need to be
reconciled. Finally, the processes used to acquire assets will need to
be changed to capture the information necessary to properly value these
assets. Our current risk-based plans address each of these. If
confirmed, I will actively participate in risk mitigation relating to
these challenges.
3. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Conger, do you agree that full audit
readiness is not just a state to be achieved, but one that we must
maintain perpetually?
Mr. Conger. I do agree that full audit readiness, along with
ongoing annual audits will establish an improved state of business
discipline that must be obtained. The only thing more important in
earning positive audit opinions is keeping them so sustainment of our
audit ready state is always an important consideration.
4. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Conger, what key metrics will you monitor as
audits are carried out?
Mr. Conger. We will measure progress using a three-pronged
approach:
1) We have established interim milestones for each critical
capability required for full financial statements auditability, such as
policy decisions and process changes needed to value assets. I will
closely monitor progress against each of these milestones on the
critical path.
2) We have established key metrics that focus on our critical
capabilities relating to our audit plan. For example, we will track the
number of successful system reconciliations and the reduction in
unsupported journal vouchers as a way of monitoring our remediation
efforts.
3) We will also prioritize our SBA audit findings and begin to
track status of remediation.
5. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Conger, do you commit to making audit
readiness a top priority if you are confirmed?
Mr. Conger. I do. It is clearly already a DOD-wide priority. If
confirmed, I am committed to continuing to support it in this new role.
6. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Conger, once confirmed, will you proactively
keep my office informed regarding the Department of Defense audit?
Mr. Conger. I will definitely keep your office informed of our
progress on the audit. With so many competing priorities, we
particularly value the interest and support from members of our
oversight committees. The Comptroller staff routinely provides updates
to your staff, either as requested or pursuant to release of our semi-
annual reports. If confirmed, I will ensure that you will continue to
be kept informed of our progress on this initiative.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
qualifications
7. Senator Tillis. Mr. Conger, What are your qualifications to
serve as the Deputy Chief Financial Officer of the world's largest and
most expensive bureaucracy at a time when it cannot account for how it
spends hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars?
Mr. Conger. I have more than twenty years of experience working on
national security issues, both as a Congressional staffer and in senior
Pentagon positions. In each of these roles I have worked to shape the
defense budget, and each has provided valuable experience that I will
leverage, if confirmed, to assist the USD (Comptroller) in developing
and managing that budget.
I spent most of my time as a Congressional staffer working for a
senior member of the House Appropriations and Budget Committees, where
I not only developed a deep understanding of the Congressional
processes used to construct the annual budget and appropriations bills,
but the underlying defense policies we were trying to affect, from
military construction to quality of life to acquisition programs.
As a senior leader in the Pentagon for most of the last 6 years, I
have overseen the DOD's $850 billion real property portfolio of more
than 500 installations (encompassing 500,000 buildings and structures)
and the roughly $40 billion annual budget for military construction,
family housing, facilities sustainment, base operations, environment,
and energy programs. In this role I have directly managed an
organization of about 200 civilian, military and contractor employees,
and an annual program budget of approximately $400 million.
Moreover, in my role as Senior Real Property Official for DOD, I
oversee the audit readiness efforts the Services and Agencies undertake
to assert existence and completeness for real property and our work to
achieve proper valuation of our real property assets and environmental
liabilities. I participate in the DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness (FIAR) meetings chaired by the USD (Comptroller) and the
Deputy Chief Management Officer, and I chair my own Functional Business
Governance Board that I use to drive the use of standards and monitor
progress toward auditability.
If confirmed to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), I am committed to work with the USD (Comptroller) to
ensure the Department meets its goal to be audit ready by 2017.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
working to achieve dod auditability
8. Senator Hirono. Mr. Conger, DOD's financial management has been
on GAO's High Risk List since 1995 because of pervasive deficiencies in
its financial and related business management systems, processes, and
controls. GAO has stated that, ``DOD's risk management policies
associated with preparing auditable financial statements are not in
accordance with widely recognized guiding principles for effective risk
management. And, DOD continues to experience impediments to deploying
its planned modern business systems on schedule and with the intended
capabilities.'' If confirmed, what steps do you intend to take in order
to ensure that each service effectively manages its risk, deploys
capable business systems in a timely manner, and meets its auditability
deadline?
Mr. Conger. I firmly believe we are on the right track and while we
still have work ahead, we are making progress. The most recent GAO High
Risk update acknowledges our progress and notes that the Department
needs additional emphasis on monitoring progress in measurable way. In
the Department's most recent audit readiness status report, a risk-
based approach is being employed to address deficiencies identified in
ongoing budgetary audits, as well as in the new areas that relate to
the full financial statements that will be audited beginning in FY
2018. If confirmed, I plan to actively participate in the governance
and oversight process, ensuring that we are positioned to meet our
auditability deadlines. This oversight also will provide specific
emphasis on business systems controls that are critical to sustaining a
state of audit readiness.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. John Conger follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 4, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
John Conger, of Maryland, to be a Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense, vice Michael J. McCord, resigned.
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. John Conger, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Mr. John Conger
Education:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1987-1993
M.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1993)
B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1991)
International Space University
Summer 1995
Certificate of Completion (1995)
George Washington University
1994-1996
M.A. Science, Technology and Public Policy (1996)
Employment Record:
Department of Defense
Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Energy, Installations & Environment)
December 2014-Present
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
& Environment)
September 2012-December 2014
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations & Environment)
June 2009-Present
Office of Congressman Chet Edwards
Associate Appropriations Committee Staff
January 2007-June 2009
Legislative Director
January 2001-June 2009
House International Relations Committee
Professional Staff
August 2000-January 2001
Office of Congressman Sam Gejdenson
Legislative Assistant
January 1999-August 2000
Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman
Legislative Assistant
October 1997-January 1999
Adroit Systems Inc.
Legislative Affairs Analyst
October 1995-October 1997
Airborne Reconnaissance Systems Analyst
June 1993-October 1995
Honors and Awards:
Military Order of the Purple Heart Special Recognition
Award (2008)
National Association of State Approving Agencies
Outstanding Support Award (2008)
Military Officers Association of America Paul W. Arcari
Award (2007)
Military Coalition Freedom Award (2006)
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. John
Conger in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
John Charles Conger.
2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
3. Date of nomination:
March 4, 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
August 4, 1969, Los Angeles, CA.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Kristine Minami.
7. Names and ages of children:
[The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1987-1993).
M.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1993).
B.S. Aeronautics and Astronautics (1991).
International Space University (Summer 1995).
Certificate of Completion (1995).
The George Washington University (1994-1996).
M.A. Science, Technology and Public Policy (1996).
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Energy, Installations & Environment),
Department of Defense,
Washington, DC,
December 2014-Present.
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations &
Environment),
Department of Defense,
Washington, DC,
September 2012-December 2014.
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations &
Environment),
Department of Defense,
Washington, DC,
June 2009-Present.
Associate Appropriations Committee Staff,
Rep. Chet Edwards,
Washington, DC,
January 2007-June 2009.
Legislative Director,
Rep. Chet Edwards,
Washington, DC,
January 2001-June 2009.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Professional Staff Member,
House International Relations Committee,
Washington, DC,
August 2000-January 2001.
Legislative Assistant,
Rep. Sam Gejdenson,
Washington, DC,
January 1999-July 2000.
Legislative Assistant,
Rep. Jane Harman,
October 1997-January 1999.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
N/A.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Member, Japanese American Citizens League.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Democratic Precinct Chair, MD District 20, 2005-2006.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
N/A.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
$500 to CHET EDWARDS FOR CONGRESS on 5/13/10.
$250 to OBAMA FOR AMERICA on 6/18/11.
$500 to OBAMA FOR AMERICA on 7/15/12.
$250 to OBAMA FOR AMERICA on 10/16/12.
$250 to FRIENDS OF HEATHER (MIZEUR) on 5/21/14.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Awards/Recognitions:
Military Order of the Purple Heart Special Recognition Award
(2008).
National Association of State Approving Agencies Outstanding
Support Award (2008).
Military Officers Association of America Paul W. Arcari Award
(2007).
Military Coalition Freedom Award (2006).
Fellowships:
NASA Space Grant Fellowship (full tuition at GWU, 1994-96).
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Articles:
``DOD, Climate Change, and National Security,'' The Environmental
Forum (published by the Environmental Law Institute), March-April 2014.
``Space Visions of a New Generation,'' co-authored with Lawrence
Friedl, Space Policy Journal, May 1996.
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I've made public comments on a number of occasions (panels, etc)
but do not generally work from prepared texts. The exception is formal
testimony, and I have submitted formal statements for the record on
each of the following occasions.
Testimony:
Statement on FY16 Budget Request (used same statement for each):
3/11/2015 SASC
3/3/2015 HAC-Milcon
3/3/2015 HASC
Statement on FY15 Budget Request (used same statement for each):
4/2/2014 SAC-Milcon
4/2/2014 SASC
3/12/2014 HAC-Milcon
Statement on FY14 Budget Request (used same statement for each):
5/9/2013 SAC-Milcon
4/24/2013 SASC
4/11/2013 HAC-Milcon
Statement on Sikes Act Amendments
3/21/2013 House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs
Statement on Base Realignment and Closure
3/14/2013 HASC
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
The witnesses will be protected from reprisal consistent with the
law.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
John Conger
This 18th day of March, 2015
[The nomination of Mr. John Conger was reported to the
Senate by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Stephen P. Welby by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (ASD(R&E)) is the principal staff advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) and to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, for
research and engineering matters. The ASD(R&E) serves as the Chief
Technology Officer for the Department of Defense.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe my strong, multidisciplinary background in
technology and technical leadership has prepared me well to perform
these duties. I have over 28 years of professional experience as an
engineer and technologist, serving both in and out of government,
working on cutting-edge technology development. I am currently serving
as the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)). As the DASD(SE), I serve as
the senior leader for the Department's systems engineering workforce,
support the Military Departments and Defense Agencies in the execution
of engineering and development efforts, and advise the USD(AT&L) on the
technical execution and risk of major defense acquisition programs. I
began my technical career in a defense laboratory, and I have
previously served in a number of leadership roles at DARPA. If
confirmed, I believe my background and experience would enable me to
discharge the responsibilities of the ASD(R&E) to develop technology
that enhances the operational capabilities required by our armed
forces.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. I believe that I have the necessary background, skills, and
ability to perform the duties of the ASD(R&E).
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense will assign to you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties
and functions commensurate with those of a Chief Technology Officer,
and any other duties the Secretary may deem appropriate.
relationships
Question. Section 138(b)(8) of title 10, United States Code, and
DOD Directive 5134.3 discuss the responsibilities and functions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Other
sections of law and traditional practice also establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering with the following:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Deputy
Secretary to provide advice and assistance commensurate with the role
of a Chief Technology Officer, including transitioning technology to
the field, prioritizing science and technology investments, supporting
a culture of institutional innovation, and leveraging technology to
enhance current and future military capabilities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. The ASD(R&E) is subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the USD(AT&L). If confirmed, I expect to support the
USD(AT&L) with technology insight and technical leadership for the
defense research and engineering community.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence to ensure our research and engineering
needs are synchronized across the Department. I believe intelligence on
emerging adversary capabilities is critical to informing and shaping
our defense research and engineering programs.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) to ensure that
investments in research and engineering meet the overall priorities of
the Department and are managed in accordance with DOD policy.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that our current
research and engineering workforce is ready to support the needs of the
Department, and to ensure that the technical talent necessary for the
future readiness of our forces would be available to the Department.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of
Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Deputy Chief
Management Officer of the Department of Defense on issues regarding the
effective and efficient execution of the Department's research and
engineering practices.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to foster a close working
relationship with the Military Departments to support their research
and engineering priorities and technology investments and to ensure
that the overall Department research and engineering portfolio is
aligned and balanced.
Question. The Service Acquisition Executives.
Answer. Research and Engineering is critical to the overall
acquisition process, so I view the Service Acquisition Executives as
being among the primary customers of the knowledge and capabilities
developed through the defense research and engineering enterprise. If
confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Service Acquisition Executives on research and
engineering matters that leverage technology for their missions.
Question. The Service Science and Technology Executives.
Answer. The Service S&T Executives are responsible for developing
and executing the science and technology programs for their respective
Service. If confirmed, I would work to share technical insights and to
ensure that the overall DOD S&T investment is coordinated and provides
the best possible military capabilities and return on the taxpayer's
investment.
Question. The Directors of Department of Defense Laboratories and
Research Centers.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely, through the heads of
the DOD components, with the Directors of Defense Laboratories and
Research Centers to provide them with the guidance, resources, and
support needed to deliver technology in support of DOD needs. I would
also work to establish and maintain standards for laboratory and
research center performance.
Question. The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to ensure that DARPA
continues to explore new technical fields, create technological
surprise, and develop new technologies that have a profound impact on
national security in accordance with DOD Directive 5134.10.
Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency on research and engineering matters, including
those pertaining to weapons of mass destruction.
Question. The Joint Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Joint Staff to
consider technology options and alternate procedures to enhance DOD
systems and ensure our warfighters are affordably equipped with
superior warfighting capabilities.
Question. The Director, Defense Test Resource Management Center.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director, Defense Test
Resource Management Center to consider technology options and alternate
procedures to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the test
resources employed in the test and evaluation of DOD systems, including
new and developing requirements such as cybersecurity testing.
Question. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, to include consideration of technology options and
alternate procedures for enhancing the operational test and evaluation
of DOD systems.
Question. The Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Office.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of the Joint
Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, or any successor to it, to identify
technology and system solutions for defeating current threats and
countering future anticipated threats.
Question. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief
Information Officer to provide and align technology options to support
the delivery and cyber protection of enhanced information management,
information assurance, satellite communications, navigation and timing,
spectrum utilization, and global military telecommunications
capabilities.
Question. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of the
Defense Information Systems Agency to support the provision, operation,
and surety of the Department's globally accessible enterprise
information infrastructure, command and control, and information-
sharing capabilities.
Question. The Director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to ensure DOD
research and engineering goals and priorities are aligned with the
Administration's goals and priorities.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering?
Answer. The Department currently faces the most technically
challenging future defense environment we have seen since the Cold War.
I believe the critical task for the ASD(R&E) will be protecting the
future technological edge of U.S. forces, by ensuring that the
warfighter has access to technical capabilities that counter, defeat,
and provide compelling overmatch against those that can be fielded by
any potential adversary. U.S. military technological strength provides
the critical underpinning to U.S. conventional deterrence. Today's
emerging competitive technology environment will require faster and
smarter development and adoption of innovative, technologically enabled
capacities that offset the growing technical capabilities of potential
threats.
A second challenge involves ensuring that we can affordably deliver
advanced capabilities in an efficient and effective manner, to permit
modernization to continue at pace, even in a fiscally constrained
environment. This challenge motivates the use of novel technologies and
new system concepts and architectures that enable significant
reductions in overall lifecycle cost.
A third challenge is the need to refresh continually the core
technologies that support our defense advantage--the disruptive
breakthrough capabilities that allow the U.S. to ``leap ahead'' of
potential adversaries. The discovery engine that underpins our
warfighting technologies offers a critical hedge against uncertainty,
mitigates against technological surprise, and supports our system
development efforts.
A fourth critical challenge is the need to ensure that the defense
research and engineering enterprise is responsive to the demands of
both the current conflict and the developing strategic environment--
accelerating those advanced capabilities that can make a critical
difference from laboratory to battlefield.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would develop research and engineering
plans that address these and other challenges, leveraging the strengths
of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to meet the defense
science and technology needs of the warfighter. These plans would
emphasize opportunities for increased effectiveness and efficiency
across the Department's research and engineering enterprise.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. A long-term challenge for the defense research and
engineering enterprise is the ``graying'' of our workforce, within the
office of the ASD(R&E), across the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies, and within the defense industrial base. Our senior workforce
possesses significant skill and experience, but over the near term the
R&E enterprise will see an accelerated loss of experience as a
significant fraction of its workforce retires. Attracting, developing,
and retaining talent with critical twentyfirst century skills in
domains such as advanced microelectronics, cybersecurity, embedded
software development, and data analytics will be a significant
challenge to the performance of the functions of the Office of the
ASD(R&E) over the next decade.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other OSD offices and the
Military Departments to explore creative solutions to refresh the
technical talent of the Department's workforce. Solutions may include
specific workforce development initiatives, opportunities to provide
greater flexibility to those who wish to spend a ``tour'' with the
Department as part of their career, and innovative projects to enhance
the environment and culture of the Department's research and
engineering institutions to make them more attractive to key talent.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect my priorities for the Department's
research and engineering enterprise to be consistent with those
established by the Secretary and the USD(AT&L).
These priorities would include:
1) Responsively addressing the technological needs of the
warfighter in support of ongoing operations.
2) Developing technologically enabled capabilities that establish
and preserve U.S. military technological advantage against potential
adversaries.
3) Developing leap-ahead science and technology that offer a long-
term disruptive advantage to U.S. forces.
4) Maintaining the capacity of the Department to attract and
retain the best and brightest scientists and engineers.
5) Encouraging appropriate relationships with academia and
industry to pursue cutting-edge science and technology.
6) Enhancing warfighting capabilities by supporting acquisition
programs with technologies that make weapon systems more effective and
affordable.
Question. What defense technologies do you consider the highest
priorities for development to enhance DOD's ability to pursue its
designated missions?
Answer. I believe that an effective research and engineering
program must focus on balance--balance between near- and long-term
technology development and balance between pursuing technology that
supports continuous improvement in military capability and technology
with the potential for more revolutionary impact. There are many
opportunities to leverage technology to provide capability advantage
for U.S. forces. Today, near-term opportunities exist in areas such as
autonomy, data analytics, communications, electronic warfare,
propulsion, cyber-defense, undersea technologies, advanced
manufacturing, and space technologies that can shape new systems
concepts and operational architectures. Over the longer term, emerging
ideas in areas such as quantum science, material science, biology, and
new computational architectures will feed future capability
opportunity.
Question. What will be your strategy for developing these
technologies in a manner to support needed defense capabilities in a
timely and cost-effective way?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look at all available development
strategies and evaluate them against the constraints of being timely
and cost-effective. I believe that the future competitive national
security environment will drive the Department to place increasing
value on the pace by which we move technologically enabled capabilities
from concept to field. To accelerate our pursuit and exploration of
innovative concepts, the Department must make best use of its own in-
house capabilities, those of academia, and those of industry--large and
small. We must also be open to new engagement with innovative non-
traditional commercial entities and make better use of the global
capabilities of our partners and allies.
investment in science and technology
Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to assess the
size and portfolio of investments made under the defense science and
technology (S&T) program?
Answer. I believe the Department's S&T program must forge ever-
closer relationships with the requirements, intelligence, acquisition,
sustainment, and logistics communities as it discovers, develops, and
matures advanced technologies. Metrics and measures can help the S&T
community assess its effectiveness in meeting the needs of these
communities. The Department's current S&T investments range from those
addressing long-term, strategic objectives to those focused on
narrower, nearer-term project goals, and appropriate metrics must be
established that reflect the differences in nature, goals, and risk
versus payoff of the work. If confirmed, I would leverage the ongoing
efforts of the 17 communities of interest under the Reliance 21 process
to identify and characterize technology impact through performance
measures. The Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative is also focused on
improving performance of the S&T enterprise by developing metrics and
measures that can help identify where we are having the most impact in
creating options to help shape future military competition, moving
technology into the hands of our warfighters, and creating
opportunities for new and novel military capabilities. If confirmed, I
would leverage these ongoing efforts.
Question. What role should the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering play in the detailed development and
coordination of service and agency S&T investment strategies, programs,
and budgets?
Answer. I believe the ASD(R&E) should provide investment and
management guidance that integrates Military Department and Defense
Agency efforts to provide a full spectrum of DOD capabilities. Each of
the Military Departments and Defense Agencies S&T programs should
leverage and complement each other's efforts. The ongoing Reliance 21
effort provides an overarching framework to support joint S&T planning
and coordination, ensuring that the joint DOD S&T community provides
solutions and advice to the Department's senior-level decision makers,
warfighters, Congress, and other stakeholders in the most effective and
efficient manner possible. If confirmed, I anticipate leveraging the
Reliance 21 process to support information sharing, alignment of
effort, coordination of priorities, and support for scientists and
engineers across the Department.
Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of S&T programs
in meeting the Department's transformation goals and in countering
irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive threats?
Answer. The Department's S&T portfolio plays a vital role in
producing and maintaining operational advantages for our force, in
meeting the Department's goals for transformation, and in countering
irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive threats. The DOD
S&T program provides the foundation for all of the Department's
capability development. An investment in S&T that is balanced across
near-term capabilities and long-term technological options ensures that
critical warfighter challenges are met with effective, multi-domain
solutions. With the warfighter and national security in mind, our
scientists and engineers generate innovative solutions to address the
vast array of current and future threats.
Question. What S&T areas do you consider underfunded by the
Department?
Answer. The ASD(R&E) and the DOD Components balance S&T resources
across the budget submission to ensure that resources are applied to
the highest payoff areas and are focused on the most critical emerging
technologies. The Department continually assesses which technology
areas have the greatest opportunity to bring advantage to our
warfighters and we develop new programs and focus research in those
areas. Routine communication among the ASD(R&E) and DOD Component S&T
executives is critical to ensure we remain closely aligned and focused
on the most critical threats. While I believe the overall S&T budget is
appropriate, given the many demands on national security resources, I
believe there are a number of fastmoving areas where the Department
should consider additional emphasis. Some potential examples include:
Advanced robotics; autonomous, distributed and collaborative systems;
new frontiers in quantum science; new computing architectures; new
engineering, design and manufacturing capabilities; advanced cyber-
security capabilities and increased emphasis on prototyping and
experimentation. If confirmed, I would work with the Military
Departments and Defense Agencies to ensure that our portfolio of
investment is balanced and adequately focused on these and other
potential high-payoff S&T areas.
Question. In your judgment, will the funding levels in these areas
affect the Department's ability to meet the threats of the future?
Answer. In a time of significant pressure on resources, the
Department has continued to protect stable S&T funding, in order to
preserve its capacity and prepare for an uncertain future. I believe,
with appropriate balancing across technical opportunity, the
Department's S&T budget is sufficient to prepare adequately for the
threats of the future.
Question. Do you feel that the Department's current science and
technology investment strategy strikes the appropriate balance between
funding innovative, disruptive technologies and addressing near-term
operational needs and military requirements?
Answer. Yes, I believe the current DOD S&T investment strategy
strikes an appropriate balance between funding innovative, disruptive
technologies (such as new capabilities for directed energy weapons) and
addressing near-term operational needs and military requirements (such
as software and systems capabilities to increase operator
effectiveness). As technology evolves and the threat changes, DOD must
constantly re-examine and adjust our S&T strategies to ensure that this
balance is maintained.
basic research
Question. Given the continuing nature of basic research and the
broad implications and applications of discovery-focused and
innovation-focused sciences, what criteria would you use, if confirmed,
to measure the success of these programs and investments?
Answer. DOD's investment in basic research has played and continues
to play a central role in creating and preserving our military
technological advantage. Today's fielded technologies are rooted in and
dependent upon the basic research discoveries of past decades. Basic
research introduces disruptive change, born of new knowledge and
physical insight, but this change typically emerges over time.
If confirmed, I would continuously assess our investments in basic
science and discovery by asking a series of questions about each
effort:
Does this basic research investment lead to the creation
of new fields of interest and/or help mitigate DOD capability
challenges?
Do the investments lead to original approaches and novel
technical strategies to meet DOD needs?
Does this investment lead to original, multidisciplinary
approaches or support radically new perspectives?
Are the results of this research contributing to and
being vetted by the broader community, including universities,
industry, and through publication in peer reviewed journals?
Do the types of problems and approaches supported by this
DOD investment selectively attract the finest scientists and engineers
in the Nation to build a broader and smarter national security
community?
I believe these questions provide a test of the relevance and
quality of DOD's S&T investments.
Question. What concerns do you have, if any, about current levels
of funding for Department basic research? How would you plan to address
those concerns?
Answer. I believe that, in the context of finite resources, the
current level of funding for the Department's basic research is
reasonable, and represents a historically stable balance with overall
S&T funding. Stability of research funding is necessary to provide
continuity of research capabilities. If confirmed, this is an area I
would watch closely.
Question. If confirmed, how would you determine whether there is an
adequate investment in basic research to develop the capabilities the
Department will need in 2025?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review existing studies of the
Department's basic research activities and budgets. Making this
assessment is, in part, a subjective one, depending on the balance of
research opportunities, near-term needs and long-term investments, and
input from experienced S&T resources. This includes input from external
sources, including the National Research Council and the Defense
Science Board.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to
increase efforts in unfettered exploration, which has historically been
a critical enabler of the most important breakthroughs in military
capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would reemphasize to the DOD Components S&T
executives, my belief that basic research is a critical component of
our future military capability, and that the Department--from its
senior officials to its bench scientists--should engage and be engaged
with the Nation's and the world's leading scientists and engineers. If
confirmed, I would also commit to the Department's policy of minimizing
restrictions on Department scientists to perform and interact with
great research, and to reinforce our policy that sponsored fundamental
research shall be performed without restriction, other than those
restrictions imposed by law or national regulation.
chief technology officer
Question. If confirmed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, you will be the Chief Technology Officer
(CTO) of the Department of Defense.
What do you see as the role of the CTO of the Department of
Defense?
Answer. The role of the Chief Technology Officer of the Department
is defined in the ASD(R&E) charter. The charter defines the role of the
ASD(R&E) as the Principal Staff Assistant to the USD(AT&L) and the
Secretary on all technical matters. The ASD(R&E) should provide
guidance to shape the DOD S&T program and should lead efforts to
develop technology options for the Department. The CTO should also
contribute significantly to ensuring that major acquisition programs
are conducted with acceptable technological risk.
Question. What experience do you have in your career that will
enhance your ability to serve as CTO of DOD?
Answer. My broad background in defense technology development
provides the critical background and requisite knowledge to permit me
to serve effectively as CTO of DOD. This experience includes time spent
as a researcher in a defense laboratory, as a program manager and
senior leader directing major research investments at DARPA, working
critical technology programs with each of the Military Departments, and
my experience over the past five years as the DASD(SE) within the
Office of the ASD(R&E)
Question. Do you believe the position for Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering currently has adequate authorities
to exercise the responsibilities of a CTO?
Answer. Yes
Question. How are the activities of the Advanced Manufacturing
Institutes being incorporated into the Department's science and
technology activities?
Answer. I am aware that each of the Advanced Manufacturing
Institutes currently has an S&T lead to connect each Institute back to
the Department's broader science and technology activities. If
confirmed, I would review the interaction of the planned work of the
Advanced Manufacturing Institutes with the Department's science and
technology activities.
Question. What is the status of the Department's long-range
research and development planning activities? What noteworthy results
have been realized from that initiative so far?
Answer. The Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program is
a line of effort under the Defense Innovation Initiative which is
focused on identifying emerging technology and materiel opportunities
that could strengthen DOD capabilities in a competitive future national
security environment. Since November 2014, I have been leading the 2015
LRRDPP study, which has included engaging technical experts across the
Department's research and engineering enterprise, as well as academic,
not-for-profit, and defense and non-defense commercial organizations,
to identify emerging opportunities for future military innovation. The
classified LRRDPP study continues to identify opportunities to
accelerate and demonstrate new system concepts that can inform future
materiel plans.
It is also anticipated that this effort will identify key research
and engineering areas for assessment and prioritization in future
research and engineering planning. To date, among other input, the
study has completed its review of over 400 submissions received from
outside the Department in response to the 2014 Request for Information
and have conducted site visits, meetings, and interviews with DOD and
Department of Energy labs, small businesses, corporate research and
development centers, academic institutions and intelligence community
organizations. We are in the process of synthesizing the results of
this study into a set of classified recommendations for the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. We have synthesized the results of the first
phase of the study into a set of classified recommendations for the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. The second phase of the study is ongoing.
We anticipate that these specific results will emphasize themes
supporting the use of limited autonomy to enable deploying manned and
unmanned systems together in new ways to enable new capabilities,
themes that permit the execution of precision capabilities from long
range, and themes that provide new ways to counter the complex threat
environment we anticipate when operating against technologically
advanced actors in the future.
offset technologies
Question. During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key
technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional
forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-
based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our
emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological
superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the
United States once again focus on offsetting the technology advantages
being gained by our adversaries.
Which technology priorities do you believe the Department of
Defense should be pursuing to maintain the military technological
superiority of the United States?
Answer. Since the Cold War, U.S. forces have had assured
conventional military technology dominance over every adversary they
have faced or might have faced. The combination of precision weapons,
advanced intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems, stealth,
digital command and control, and space-based capabilities including
navigation and communications have provided clear technology overmatch
against any potential adversary. Over the last 30 years, others have
had significant opportunity to study the systems and technologies that
advantage U.S. military capabilities. In recent years, other nations
have begun to field systems that are closing the gap with U.S.
capabilities and, in some cases, directly challenging the technical
advantages we have used in the past to enable U.S. power projection.
This is a result of specific investments made by potential future
competitors, the globalization of advanced technology, supply chains,
and technical talent, and the loss of technical data through cyber
exfiltration.
I believe that the Department of Defense should pursue innovative
technologies that will minimize the effectiveness of these foreign
investments and create the opportunity to impose extraordinary cost on
future adversaries. These technological priorities should shift future
national security competition from areas where U.S. advantages are
narrowing to areas where U.S. strengths in agility, flexibility, and
technical execution can flourish. Critical to executing these
priorities will be identifying opportunities to drive cost out of
future systems--through advanced design technologies; prototyping and
demonstration; and advanced, flexible manufacturing capabilities to
reduce risk. If confirmed, these areas would be a high priority for me.
Question. What strategies would you recommend that Secretary Carter
implement to develop these technology priorities?
Answer. The Department is emphasizing the need to pursue innovative
system concepts and technology solutions being developed within the
Department itself, within the defense sector, and within the non-
defense commercial sector, where the pace of technology adoption is
often greater. We have increased our engagement with technology
developers globally to ensure that we have awareness of and can
leverage the best technical capabilities, regardless of source. Most
importantly, the Department is reemphasizing the importance of
prototyping, demonstration and experimentation as a means to mature
rapidly emerging technical capabilities, gain insight into the
operational capabilities they might offer, and to more rapidly inform
modernization program development. These three approaches--(1) openness
to innovation, (2) speed from idea to implementation, and (3)
prototyping, demonstration, and experimentation to inform decision
making--provide a means to explore new offsetting technological
advantages, and if confirmed, these approaches would be a priority for
me.
Question. What role do the Services have to play in their
development?
Answer. I believe that the Military Departments play an essential
role in developing, maturing, and fielding the future systems necessary
to shape the future competitive strategy of the Department.
technology readiness assessment process
Question. Have you participated in or observed the development of
Technology Readiness Assessments to support Milestone Decisions for
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes, as the DASD(SE), I have observed and supported the
Technology Readiness Assessment process and its employment in defense
acquisition decisions.
Question. What is your assessment of the value, strengths, and
weaknesses of the current process?
Answer. The Technology Readiness Assessment process provides a
valuable measure of the maturity of critical technology elements in a
defense acquisition program and can be useful in highlighting areas
where relatively immature technologies may increase acquisition program
risk. The existing process, however, reduces this very complex and
somewhat subjective assessment to a single number, which offers limited
insight into the actual risk that an acquisition system may bear. There
are many technical risks that should be assessed in evaluating a
defense acquisition program, including integration risk, supply chain
risks, and reducibility risks. Technology Readiness Assessments can
contribute, but they are only one part of a holistic assessment of
overall program risk. If confirmed, I would be particularly attentive
to ASD(R&E) efforts to assess the full range of technical risk as part
of our efforts in support of defense acquisition programs.
Question. Would you recommend any changes to the processes used for
the assessment of technological maturity and integration risk of
critical technology elements?
Answer. In my current assignment as DASD(SE), I led an evaluation
of our acquisition technical risk management process and have published
guidance to the Department on more effective formal risk management,
with a particular focus on improving our capacity for active risk
mitigation. If confirmed, I would continue to investigate methodologies
that would provide better insight into technology maturity and
integration risks in the context of an overall acquisition program risk
management framework.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering is properly staffed and resourced to
support decision makers in complying with the technology certification
and assessment requirements that are its responsibility?
Answer. I believe the Office of the ASD(R&E) is currently
adequately staffed to perform its various responsibilities with respect
to technology certification and assessment.
Question. What changes, if any, would you anticipate making, if
confirmed, in this process?
Answer. If confirmed, I do not anticipate proposing any changes to
the current technology certification and assessment requirements, but I
would seek to leverage better these assessments as part of an increased
emphasis on technical risk management and mitigation as a critical
engineering function.
coordination of defense s&t internally and with other agencies
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to integrate the S&T
programs of the Services and Defense Agencies to reduce redundancy,
leverage investments, and promote cooperation in order to achieve
greater efficiency and technological advancement? Will you use existing
structures such as Reliance 21?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to continue to employ the
Reliance 21 process to integrate and coordinate Military Department and
Defense Agency S&T programs. The Reliance 21 process has been
successful in leveraging S&T efforts across the DOD Components to
improve efficiency and effectiveness, spur collaboration, and reduce
undesirable duplication of effort.
Question. Do you believe the mechanisms of coordination between
federal civilian agencies and the Department are adequate to ensure
that the military can best leverage the advances of agencies such as:
National Science Foundation on defense needs for basic science,
especially in social sciences?
Answer. DOD funds basic research in targeted areas deemed most
critical for defense but also relies heavily on complementary basic
research insights funded by U.S. Government agencies such as the
National Science Foundation. I believe that coordination between the
DOD and NSF is critical and is currently adequate and effective.
In the social sciences in particular, where defense efforts tend to
be more narrowly scoped for particular regions and problems, DOD
projects frequently build on NSF-funded basic research insights
regarding the more universal drivers and mechanisms for conflict and
cooperative behavior at individual and group levels. Without a robust
NSF investment in social sciences, DOD would need to divert its social
science research funds away from specific defense issues to fill in
those foundational gaps.
Question. National Aeronautics and Space Administration on
hypersonics and other space research and the viability and availability
of testing facilities?
Answer. I believe the current level of coordination of DOD efforts
with NASA is adequate and effective. NASA provides input for our
biennial Space S&T Strategy report and the Department reviews draft
NASA technology roadmaps to identify areas for cooperative activities.
In addition, NASA and DOD participate in numerous forums where our
staffs interact, at both the working and senior levels, to discuss and
coordinate our efforts.
Question. National Institutes of Health on areas in which military
medical research and vaccine development overlap with civilian medical
needs?
Answer. I believe the current level of coordination of DOD efforts
with NIH is adequate and effective. The focus of NIH investment (the
broad health needs of the Nation) and the focus of DOD health care S&T
investment (the specific and unique medical needs of the warfighter)
differ, but in areas where military and civilian research needs overlap
many programs are complementary and mutually supportive. The degree of
collaboration in these areas is extensive. For example, programs for
the development of Human Immunodeficiency Virus vaccines are
collaborative efforts with the aim of meeting programmatic objectives
of both the NIH and the military. These efforts have made use of the
extensive laboratory and clinical trials managed and maintained by the
military while taking advantage of the extensive fundamental and
applied research effort of both the NIH and the military focused on
developing new vaccine candidates. The synergy between these programs
was critical to the development of the only vaccine candidate that
provided some degree of protection against HIV and for improvements to
the vaccine that will ultimately be used to protect both military and
civilian populations. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD (Health
Affairs) and the Surgeons General to foster collaborative research and
development efforts with NIH in areas of mutual interest.
Question. Intelligence Community in setting defense research
priorities to prepare for future threat environments?
Answer. I believe that the DOD effectively leverages the
Intelligence Community to inform defense research prioritization and
planning. In my current role as DASD(SE), I support the reinvigorated
initiatives under Better Buying Power 3.0 focused on integrating
acquisition, intelligence, and requirements more closely. One
additional initiative is the Science and Technology Intelligence Needs
Plan that informs the intelligence community on the Department's
intelligence needs for S&T. If confirmed, I would ensure that dialogue
between the Department and the Intelligence Community is open and
transparent.
Question. Department of Homeland Security on Homeland defense and
national security-related science?
Answer. I believe that the current level of coordination of DOD
efforts with the Department of Homeland Security is adequate and
effective and provides strategic leverage across the technology
investments being made by the two Departments.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with other federal
agencies and the Office of Science and Technology Policy to improve
coordination?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other federal agencies and
with the OSTP to ensure that DOD research and engineering are well
coordinated with other government efforts.
technology strategy
Question. What weaknesses, if any, do you see in the current
Defense S&T strategic planning process?
Answer. I observe that the current Defense S&T strategic planning
process is significantly labor intensive--which can create challenges
in generating timely recommendations to support the Department's annual
budget submission.
Question. What do you believe are the key attributes for a good
technology strategic plan that can be effectively utilized for
programming and budgeting purposes?
Answer. I believe an effective technology strategic plan should
include (1) specific, time-phased, and actionable recommendations for
technology development and demonstration; (2) a clear mapping between
technology activities and potential outcomes, demonstrating clear
relevance to the Department's mission; and (3) specific quantified
goals and targets to provide insight into progress.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that strategic
plans are utilized during the budget planning and programming process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to make Reliance 21 and the
Communities of Interest more strategic in their planning and more
efficient and effective in implementation through directly, explicitly,
and transparently linking Reliance 21 recommendations to ASD(R&E)
budget inputs and recommendations.
technology transition
Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the
last few years. Challenges remain, however, in successfully
transitioning new technologies into existing programs of record,
fielded systems, and major weapon systems and platforms.
How would you assess the effectiveness of current transition
systems?
Answer. The current system is most effective when transitioning
technological capabilities to support existing programs of record. The
S&T laboratories are well connected and responsive to the needs of the
program offices. Initiatives such as the Rapid Innovation Fund and
Foreign Comparative Test provide program offices with access to non-
traditional small businesses and international businesses--sources of
new and novel solutions.
The current system is less able to recognize and transition
opportunistic capability--new and emerging technologies opportunities
that emerge during development or which disrupt current acquisition
plans. In these cases the Department needs to be more effective at
assessing technical opportunity and creating opportunities to deploy
more rapidly emerging capabilities to achieve maximum benefit with
minimum impact. If confirmed, I would work to improve mechanisms for
planned and opportunistic technology transition into DOD systems.
Question. What challenges exist in technology transition within the
Department?
Answer. A key challenge in technology transition is the mismatch
between the risk acceptance posture of technology developers and that
of acquisition program managers. Technology developers are motivated to
take risk and to explore the art of the possible, while acquisition
managers are motivated to minimize risk and to pursue stable, well-
understood capabilities to minimize overall acquisition program risk. I
believe that aligning incentives so as to motivate program managers
continually to review technology options to improve performance and
reduce cost, and to motivate technologists to harden, demonstrate, and
de-risk emerging technologies, would significantly aid technology
transition.
Question. What would you do, if confirmed, to address these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would vigorously support the Better Buying
Power 3.0 direction to emphasize technology insertion and technology
refresh in program planning. Initiatives under Better Buying Power that
emphasize modular, open system architectures, initiatives that support
rapid technology insertion, and initiatives that promote increased use
of rapid prototyping and experimentation to mature and derisk
technologies and demonstrate operational utility all help increase the
Department's ability to transition research and development more
quickly and effectively to operational use.
Question. What is the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering in facilitating communication between
technical communities, acquisition personnel, and end users to speed
technology transition?
Answer. I believe an effective ASD(R&E) must work closely with the
requirements community, the acquisition community, the research and
development community, and the operational communities to provide new
technologies that sustain our technological superiority against
potential future adversaries. The ASD(R&E) must coordinate across this
broad set of communities: coupling technical opportunity to emerging
requirements; informing technology development with operational
feedback; and aiding transition of capabilities from research and
development to acquisition. If confirmed, I would connect and
coordinate these diverse communities to speed technology transition
from concept to field.
Question. Do you believe that we need to change the manner in which
we fund technology transition in the Department of Defense? If so, what
changes would you recommend?
Answer. Technology development is sometimes challenged by the
availability of nonprogram-specific applied technology funding used to
mature technologically driven capabilities, to prototype and experiment
with emerging system concepts, and to support bridging technology
development to support the transition of technology to programs of
record and the warfighter. While the Department has protected S&T
funding levels, Advanced Component Development and Prototypes funds are
increasingly consumed by the demands of modernization programs and
other uses directly tied to specific acquisition programs. If
confirmed, I would explore ways to provide the flexibility needed to
improve technology transition.
systems engineering and prototyping
Question. Do you feel that the Department of Defense has sufficient
systems engineering expertise in its current workforce or contractor
base?
Answer. Based on my engagement across this community and with
acquisition leadership in each of the Components, I believe that the
current systems engineering technical capacity and capability
supporting the DOD is sufficient. I also believe that this workforce
possesses and has demonstrated strong technical capabilities. It will
be important to ensure that the workforce is technically refreshed as
new challenges arise, and as technical disciplines mature.
Question. What will be the impact of further reductions in
personnel to the ability to execute the systems engineering missions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. System Engineering oversight functions that are part of the
Military Departments and OSD headquarters elements will likely be
impacted by proposed across-the board headquarter staff reductions, and
additional efficiencies will need to be identified to meet mission
requirements
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe should be made in
the Department's systems engineering organization and practices?
Answer. I have worked with the Military Departments to optimize
organic systems engineering practices. These are now reflected in
policy, the foremost example being the recently updated DOD Instruction
5000.02 that revised DOD systems engineering policy, and reflects a
stronger engineering participation and technical risk consideration
across the acquisition activities. Our current systems engineering
organizations and practices are adequate but should evolve as
engineering tools and methods are developed and matured.
Question. What is the value of competitive prototyping in
increasing the success of DOD acquisition efforts?
Answer. Competitive prototyping is most effective at increasing the
likelihood of success of DOD acquisition efforts when it drives real
risk reduction in the actual product that the Department will acquire
and field. Under the right conditions, competitive prototyping can be
expected to have several benefits to DOD programs, including: reduction
of overall technical risk; validation of cost; validation of design;
evaluation of the manufacturing process; and refinement of program
requirements. Competitive prototyping imposes costs, since the
Department must carry multiple offerors far enough through the design
process to produce prototypes for evaluation. This cost penalty can
sometimes reduce the advantage of competitive prototyping, making it
most effective in cases where the cost/benefit ratio is clearly
advantageous, where multiple design options merit further exploration,
or where the competitive environment drives early return on lifecycle
cost.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to increase the amount of
systems engineering projects and competitive prototyping efforts that
are undertaken by the Department of Defense and its contractor base?
Answer. In my current role as DASD(SE), I have supported robust
systems engineering and risk-appropriate, cost-effective prototyping.
If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize a robust systems
engineering process across the Department's acquisition portfolio.
venture capital strategies
Question. In recent years, some components of the Department of
Defense have attempted to follow the lead of the intelligence community
by using venture capital firms to make investments in developing
technologies.
What role do you believe that venture capital firms should play in
DOD's investments in developing technologies, including in the Small
Business Innovation Research program?
Answer. I believe that small, early-stage companies are a
significant driver of innovation in our Nation--leveraging U.S.
strengths in entrepreneurship, acceptance of risk, and access to
technical talent and smart capital to create businesses that are
shaping the commercial technology landscape. I believe the Department
needs to be engaged with innovative early-stage firms throughout the
country, to explore the relevance of applying cutting-edge commercial
capabilities to meet the Department's needs and to encourage small
innovative companies to see the Department as a smart and engaged
potential customer for their ideas. The Department's Small Business
Innovation Research program is a very effective means of engaging these
companies. If confirmed, I would explore an alternative means to reach
out to these companies, such as by using venture-capital-like
approaches to engage companies early, with the objective that they
consider the Department's requirements among the targets for their
product development priorities.
Question. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the use
of venture capital strategies?
Answer. Venture capital strategies could permit the Department to
engage innovative companies in a natural way--by supporting their need
for critical investment to support the development of innovative
capabilities. This could provide the Department with access to
innovation that we might not be able to reach through other approaches.
Venture capital strategies, however, are inherently risky. Most early
stage companies likely will not achieve breakthrough innovations, and a
venture capital strategy must be patient enough to accept the risk
profile associated with making a number of investments with the goal of
seeing a fraction of them yield concrete benefit.
Question. When DOD does decide to use venture capital strategies,
what steps do you believe the Department should take to ensure that DOD
funds are invested in technologies and companies that properly reflect
national defense priorities, avoid the potential for conflicts of
interest by industry partners, and ensure that the Department's
investments are not diluted?
Answer. I believe it would be critical to evaluate carefully
investments made through a venture capital strategies approach, and to
assess whether leveraging a venture capital strategy is truly the most
effective and appropriate model for investing in a particular
technology or engaging a particular company.
Question. What other strategies do you intend to employ, if
confirmed, to ensure that the nation's most innovative companies work
on Department of Defense research and engineering programs?
Answer. In April, Secretary Carter announced the Defense Innovation
Unit-experimental, an activity in the San Francisco Bay Area to provide
a mechanism to increase the Department's presence in an area of
significant entrepreneurial innovation. Communication and outreach
efforts are effective ways to attract and engage innovative companies.
If confirmed, I would explore methods to increase the Department's
engagement with and outreach to the most innovative companies across
the Nation.
international research cooperation
Question. In your view, how should increased globalization of
defense technology affect DOD's research and technology development and
investment strategy?
Answer. The increased globalization of defense technologies
provides both opportunities and challenges for the Department. To the
extent DOD can leverage technology developments in allied and friendly
nations, DOD will be able to redirect resources to address other
critical needs. This would also provide opportunities for DOD to
increase commonality with these nations, creating increased
efficiencies for all. However, globalization of defense technology
creates challenges to our technological superiority through
proliferation of advanced military capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of cooperative
research and development programs with international partners?
Answer. Our international cooperative research and development
programs are based on equitable investment by all participants. In
addition to reducing cost burdens, these cooperative programs enable us
to interact with the best and brightest in many nations. Cooperative
research and development programs deepen our defense relationships with
our allies and other partner nations.
Question. In your view, what are the obstacles to more effective
international cooperation, and, if confirmed, how would you address
those obstacles?
Answer. Successful international cooperative research and
development programs require trusted partnerships between the nations
involved in them. These require commitment by all parties, which
includes providing adequate levels of funding and involvement. If
confirmed, I would attentive to ensuring our proposed international
cooperative efforts address these commitments.
Question. How will increased international technology cooperation
affect our domestic defense industrial base?
Answer. International cooperative research and development programs
can provide opportunities for the industrial base to work with and
develop relationships in other nations. This can lead to increased
business opportunities through creation of trusted partnerships. It can
also provide the Department with increased access to world-class
research and researchers.
Question. How should DOD monitor and assess the research
capabilities of our global partners and competitors, and of the global
commercial sector?
Answer. DOD maintains awareness of global S&T and commercial
capabilities through our global technology watch efforts and through
the Military Departments' regional and global international S&T
offices. If confirmed, I would support and strengthen these critical
tools for providing situational awareness of the competitive global S&T
landscape.
test and evaluation
Question. What are your views on the adequacy and effectiveness of
the Department's development and operational test and evaluation
activities?
Answer. I believe the Department's developmental test and
evaluation and operational test and evaluation activities are adequate
and effective. Test activities play a critical role in informing
acquisition decision making and in identifying programmatic
opportunities for application of additional engineering and risk
mitigation resources.
Question. What will be the impact of further reductions in
personnel on the ability to execute the test and evaluation missions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. Further reductions in test and evaluation workforce
capacity would require the Department to identify new efficiencies to
effectively execute its T&E mission and will require careful planning
and management attention. Developmental test and evaluation oversight
functions that are part of the Military Departments and OSD
headquarters elements will likely be impacted by proposed across-the-
board headquarter staff reductions, and additional efficiencies will
need to be identified to meet mission requirements
Question. What changes do you anticipate will be made in the
Department's developmental testing organization and capabilities?
Answer. I do not anticipate changes to the Department's
developmental testing organization and capabilities. The establishment
of the position of the Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation,
now the DASD(DT&E), significantly strengthened the Department's test
discipline and practice, and I have had the privilege of working
closely with the DASD(DT&E) in my current capacity.
Question. What modifications would you recommend to the test and
evaluation processes in the Department of Defense to more efficiently
and quickly develop and deliver operationally effective and suitable
technologies to the warfighter?
Answer. I believe that the test community needs to be engaged early
and continuously with acquisition programs to ensure that opportunities
for early, effective, and cost efficient test are designed into program
plans and that test activities produce actionable information to inform
programmatic decision making. I also believe that strong DT&E can be an
effective way to minimize risk, and to avoid discovery of issues in
OT&E by identifying and correcting issues early in the design and
development process. If confirmed, I would support efforts to improve
the test community's early and continuous engagement.
small business issues
Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that the Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program serves a useful purpose in
meeting the Department's research goals?
Answer. The policy oversight and responsibility for the SBIR/STTR
falls within the Department's Office of Small Business Programs. If
confirmed, I would work closely with the Director of Small Business
Programs to ensure that the program remains focused on innovation and
technology advancement and aligned with the Department's overall
research goals. The SBIR /STTR program is a major contributor in
meeting the Department's research goals and fosters a broad and
innovative small business industrial base to meet critical warfighter
needs.
Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR
program to improve the transition of S&T capabilities into acquisition
programs?
Answer. The recent Better Buying Power 3.0 included efforts focused
on improving the transition of SBIR-developed S&T capabilities into
acquisition programs. Last year the Department included transition
goals and incentives in DOD Instruction 5000.02. If confirmed, I would
pursue reinforcing these initiatives to continue to improve SBIR
transition with guidance, education, and training across the
Department.
Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR
program to improve its ability to attract non-traditional defense
contractors, such as small startup companies, into the program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would explore avenues to continue to
improve the ability of DOD to attract non-traditional defense
contractors through a comprehensive outreach and communication
strategy. Annually the Department reviews over 10,000 SBIR/STTR
proposals, of which approximately one-third are from newly formed
businesses engaging with the Department for the first time. The
Department recently has significantly increased its outreach to
minorities, HUB zone, and underserved states, and I believe these
efforts should be fostered and expanded.
Question. What guidance or direction do you consider necessary
regarding transition of the research results of SBIR programs to major
weapon systems and equipment?
Answer. I believe the Department has adequate guidance and
direction to support transition of SBIR results to major systems
acquisition, but these efforts require continuous emphasis by
Department advocates identifying and leveraging opportunities for
transition.
Question. What emphasis would you place, if confirmed, on
participation by the acquisition community in setting research
priorities for the SBIR and in accepting new solutions into existing
programs of record?
Answer. I believe the acquisition and S&T communities must be
strongly engaged in setting research priorities for the SBIR program to
ensure the relevance of these efforts to the Department's research
goals and to foster transition from SBIR to programs of record. If
confirmed, I would emphasize these efforts.
Question. In your judgment, are modifications needed to the
Department's SBIR program to ensure it meets the Department's goals and
is updated to support research costs of the small business community?
Answer. I am currently unaware of the need for any modifications to
the Department's SBIR program.
defense laboratories
Question. What is your overall assessment as to the technical
capabilities and quality of Defense laboratories relative to their
Department of Energy, FFRDC, industry, academic and foreign peers?
Answer. I believe that DOD laboratories are a critical and unique
component of the Department's research and engineering enterprise. They
provide the science, technology, and engineering expertise to DOD that
allows our Nation to maintain a technological edge over potential
adversaries. DOD technical expertise also plays a prominent role in
developing technologies that benefit the Nation as a whole. While
Department of Energy, FFRDCs, industry, academic, and foreign
laboratories make vital contributions, they cannot replace the unique
capabilities and expertise of the in-house Defense laboratories and
their unique focus on, and access to, U.S. warfighter needs.
Furthermore, subject matter expertise developed in the DOD laboratories
provides the knowledge necessary to evaluate and mold technologies
developed by private industry and academia to meet DOD's unique needs.
The DOD laboratories' complete focus on the warfighter and the mission
make them unique, irreplaceable assets.
Question. What are your views on the most effective management
approach for personnel at these facilities?
Answer. I believe that the most effective management approaches for
the Defense laboratories are ones that provide laboratory leadership
with the flexibility needed to shape their workforce to meet the
rapidly changing needs of the warfighter. The authorities currently
granted to defense laboratories as Science and Technology Reinvention
Laboratories are appropriate for managing the personnel at DOD
laboratories and, with the support of Congress, are continually being
refined to meet the changing laboratory workforce management needs of
the DOD.
Question. A review of defense laboratories operations shows various
deficits in personnel management, infrastructure renewal, physical
plant recapitalization rate, support services adequacy, etc. Some
analyses have indicated that these deficiencies result from excessive
centralized control.
Do you support significantly increased delegation of operating
authority to the lab director?
Answer. I believe empowering individual leaders at the lowest
appropriate level is part of the necessary flexibility for effectively
managing a laboratory. There is a complementary need for some
centralized coordination in order to ensure that resources are expended
both efficiently and effectively. I currently am unaware of a need
significantly to increase delegation but, if confirmed, I would study
this issue and recommend changes as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to
improve the quality, technical capabilities, and mission performance of
the Defense laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, and building on the work of Better Buying
Power 3.0 to look at laboratory return on investment, I would assess
the current quality, technical capabilities, and mission performance of
the Defense laboratories. I would then work in collaboration with the
heads of the DOD components, and through them, the laboratories to
implement any needed changes.
Question. Would you support transitioning certain laboratory
capabilities into FFRDCs or Government Owned-Contractor Operated
facilities?
Answer. I am currently unaware of any capabilities that should be
transitioned to FFRDCs or Government Owned-Contractor Operated
facilities. If confirmed, I would make any needed recommendations as
part of the assessment of laboratory capabilities.
laboratory personnel management
The Department's research and development laboratories perform
unique functions in serving national security missions and do not
readily fit into the general operational management structure.
Question. Would you support increasing the flexibility of the
laboratories on personnel matters?
Answer. The quality of the Department's research and development
laboratories is completely dependent on the ability of the labs to
attract, recruit, and retain topnotch technical talent with skill sets
critical to military innovation. Increased flexibility in personnel
matters is an important factor in recruiting and retaining the high-
caliber workforce needed by the DOD's laboratory enterprise. I support
making maximum use of available direct and flexible hiring authorities
for scientists and engineers, as well as allowing full use of all
Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory personnel authorities in
order to compete to attract the best and brightest talent to the DOD
laboratories.
Question. What particular workforce challenges does the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering have?
Answer. Recruiting and retaining a world-class technical workforce
is a pressing challenge for the defense research and engineering
enterprise. The DOD mission requires specialized scientific and
engineering skills and the Department needs to compete effectively to
identify and leverage this limited talent pool. I believe that
attracting, developing, and retaining talent with critical twenty-first
century skills in domains such as advanced microelectronics,
cybersecurity, embedded software development, and data analytics will
be a significant challenge to the Office of the ASD(R&E) over the next
decade.
An additional long-term challenge for the defense research and
engineering enterprise is the ``graying'' of the workforce, within the
Office of the ASD(R&E), across the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies, and within the defense industrial base. The senior workforce
possesses significant skill and experience, but over the near term the
R&E enterprise will see an accelerated loss of experience as a
significant portion of its workforce retires. If confirmed, I would be
attentive to these challenges.
Question. How do the personnel flexibilities of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering compare to
those of DARPA or the Defense Laboratories? Should the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering be
permitted to use the same hiring flexibilities as these organizations?
Answer. I believe personnel flexibility is critical for recruiting
and retaining the best and the brightest to our laboratory enterprise.
DARPA and the Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories (STRLs)
have special authorities with regard to personnel flexibility, that do
not apply to the Office of the ASD(R&E), I believe that these personnel
procedures, including those applicable to OASD (R&E), have been
adequate for the needs of the DOD, although I note that increased
flexibility can prove useful for any part of the DOD.
scientific and technical conferences
Question. A recent GAO study indicated that the lengthy and
burdensome approval processes for legitimate conference attendance
requests at the Department of Defense have severely curtailed
attendance at academic conferences. Has the work and mission of the
laboratories and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering been hindered by conference approval processes
and travel limitations?
Answer. Collaboration with scientific colleagues is key to the
success of DOD laboratory and Office of the ASD(R&E) personnel, as is
the ability to share technical findings with the broader research
community. Scientific exchange is one of the primary vehicles for the
exchange of new ideas and is a vehicle through which new concepts and
technological innovation bloom. Academic and technical conference
participation for the DOD professional workforce, including scientists
and engineers, is an essential element of the S&T mission and a
critical means of achieving and maintaining global technological
superiority.
While the Defense Laboratories and the Office of the ASD(R&E)
continue to meet their mission, the conference approval processes and
travel limitations have hindered this type of important collaboration.
If confirmed, I would work with the USD(AT&L), the Deputy Chief
Management Officer, and the Components to explore means to reduce
unnecessary impediments to technical collaboration.
Question. Has the application of the new conference approval
processes since the issuance of OMB Memorandum M-12-12 ``Promoting
Efficient Spending to Support Agency Operations'' improved the
effectiveness of the DOD research and engineering community in
executing its designated missions?
Answer. The September 23, 2015 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary
of Defense and the associated DOD Conference Guidance Version 3.0
issued simultaneously by the Deputy Chief Management Officer recognize
the importance of participation in technical meetings, symposia and
conferences to the DOD Science and Engineering community. These revised
policies have significantly streamlined approval authorities for
technical conference attendance and are intended to remove unintended
barriers to technical collaboration, while maintaining appropriate
management visibility and management to control travel costs. I expect
that implementation of this revised policy will address previous
concerns over burdensome local implementation of M-12-12 policy.
Question. Does the application of the conference approval process
in DOD align with best practices of the commercial sector or leading
public and private academic institutions?
Answer. Recent revisions to conference approval policy are intended
to align DOD practice more closely with best practice of leading public
and private institutions. If confirmed, I will monitor and assess
impacts of this recent policy change on the research and engineering
workforce.
technical and acquisition workforce issues
Question. In your view, does the Department have adequate technical
expertise within the government workforce to execute its designated
acquisition and technical development missions?
Answer. I believe the current scientific and engineering workforce
numbers and skill mix are sufficient to meet DOD's current acquisition
and technical development needs, but several trends raise future
concerns. The first trend is the large number of employees in the
technical workforce nearing or at retirement age. We expect that
approximately half of the technical workforce will be eligible to
retire in the next 10 years. The second challenge is with the most
recent hires: those with 0-5 years of experience. Studies indicate that
the individuals in this age group may expect to change jobs every 3-5
years. Consequently DOD will need to compete with industry to retain
the newest employees. Finally, in fast moving technical areas, the
Department will need to refresh, retrain, and upgrade the skills of its
acquisition and technical development workforce. If confirmed, I would
carefully monitor workforce data for early indications of excessive
turnover and/or accelerated loss of key skills.
Question. What efforts will you undertake, if confirmed, to improve
the technical capabilities of DOD in critical areas, such as systems
engineering, information assurance, social and cultural sciences, and
software engineering?
Answer. The DOD Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
workforce represents a diverse set of very specific technical skills.
Critical, high demand skills such as systems engineering, cyber
security and information assurance, large data analytics, social and
cultural modeling, and software engineering are areas that require
particular and continued attention. Other domains, such as nuclear
engineering, aerospace engineering, naval architecture, and energetics,
in which DOD--unique skill sets are required, also merit specific
attention. As DASD(SE), I have worked closely with leaders across the
engineering community to address critical technical capabilities needed
by the DOD workforce. Mitigation actions have included improved
training and education, development of guidance and best practices, and
investment in the development of new methodologies to address DOD
challenges. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the engineering
and scientific communities to address these needs to ensure we have a
workforce that can meet current and future DOD challenges.
defense advanced research projects agency
Question. What is your view of the appropriate relationship between
the Assistant Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering and the
Director of DARPA?
Answer. The Director of DARPA reports to the USD(AT&L) through the
ASD(R&E), I believe this the appropriate relationship. In my current
position, I have an excellent, strong, and ongoing relationship with
DARPA.
Question. What do you believe is the proper research mission for
DARPA?
Answer. Since its founding, DARPA has a long history of being an
effective engine of transformative innovation. DARPA's ability to apply
innovative solutions to address some of the most difficult problems
that face the DOD, now and in the future, has been the cornerstone of
its success. The agile, flexible, and inventive nature of the agency's
organizational culture has been successful in driving the pace of
technology development for the National Security enterprise. I believe
the proper role for DARPA is to conduct high-risk, high-payoff research
for the Department, and to share that work with the Military
Departments and others within the government.
Question. What adjustments do you expect to make, if confirmed, to
the current style of DARPA research program management and investment
strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with DARPA, as well as
the Military Departments and other DOD Components, to provide a
balanced technology portfolio across the Department. Based on my
current awareness of the DARPA research program and investment
strategy, I do not see a need to make significant adjustments to the
agency's current strategy.
Question. What do you believe are the key characteristics of an
effective DARPA director?
Answer. I believe an effective DARPA Director should have the
ability to develop and communicate a vision of the DARPA research
program, have the ability to attract exceptional technical talent to
the agency, have the ability to motivate teams internal and outside the
agency to take on challenges of national importance, be able to connect
and bridge DARPA research to the operational and acquisition community,
and be prepared to take on the most critical technical challenges that
face the Department.
Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship
between DARPA and the Service S&T programs?
Answer. I believe that the DARPA and the Military Department S&T
programs should be coordinated, supportive, and complementary. DARPA is
particularly focused on pushing the envelope to develop high-risk,
high-payoff, leap-ahead advances, while the Military Department S&T
programs draw upon and further develop these and other technological
advancements to maintain the broad and deep technology base required to
develop innovative capabilities for the warfighter. DARPA's strategy
allows the agency to pursue opportunistic thrusts to dramatically
advance particular technical capabilities, while the Military
Department S&T programs seek a more balanced risk portfolio.
Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship
between DARPA and the Service laboratories?
Answer. I believe that the programs relationship between the
Military Department laboratories and DARPA is one of being partners in
developing technology solutions for the warfighter.
science, technology, engineering and mathematics (stem) education
Question. Do you believe that DOD specifically and the Nation as a
whole is facing a crisis in STEM education?
Answer. As the government's largest employer of federal scientists
and engineers, the Department has a large stake in identifying and
attracting necessary STEM talent. This, in turn, means the Department
depends on the Nation's success in producing a capable, competitive
talent pool in STEM fields.
STEM education and maintenance of a vibrant STEM workforce are
national security imperatives. Today's military capabilities reflect
the great reach and impact that scientists, engineers, and
technologists have made on our national security and economy. DOD's
future STEM capacity, however, is at risk. In 2008, the percentage of
engineering graduates among all university graduates in the United
States remained among the lowest in the world, at 4.4 percent (by
comparison, China was among the highest at 31 percent). The Department
of Labor predicts that in the next decade, 80 percent of jobs will
require STEM skills, yet according to the Department of Education, less
than 25 percent of college students pursuing bachelor's degrees will be
specializing in STEM fields. Excellence in is imperative to national
security and the Nation's economic well-being; however, as much of
DOD's workforce approaches retirement, DOD and industry will face a
significant challenge in attracting superior STEM talent.
Question. In your view, how will this affect DOD's ability to
pursue its missions?
Answer. I believe that the health of the STEM talent pool directly
affects DOD's ability to pursue its mission and goals. The Department
seeks to ensure continued success at recruiting STEM talent, enhancing
STEM education, and providing opportunity to the children of military
families, and assuring a STEM-capable workforce through strategic
outreach
Question. What role do you think DOD should play in supporting STEM
education?
Answer. I believe the Department should be actively engaged at all
levels across the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
education continuum--pre-college through graduate--and, more
importantly, work with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the
National Science Foundation, the Department of Education, and other
Federal components involved in national security, to generate a ``whole
of government'' approach to address national security STEM workforce
development.
Question. How do DOD's efforts fit in with the larger STEM
education program consolidation initiative announced by the President?
Answer. DOD efforts span a broad educational continuum, from
elementary through graduate school and into workforce development. The
Department's STEM efforts align with the Administration's larger STEM
education program consolidation initiative in numerous ways. DOD
collaborates with the lead Federal agencies--the Department of
Education (pre-kindergarten through 12th grade STEM education), and the
National Science Foundation (undergraduate through graduate STEM
education). It also works with the Smithsonian Institution (informal
STEM education) as well as with other Federal agencies on a regular
basis through the Federal Interagency Working Groups (IWGs). For
example, DOD contributed to the development of the Federal STEM
Education 5-Year Strategic Plan and IWG charters, and it continues to
provide significant input about its programs to joint agency efforts in
support of enhancing evaluation and increasing the impact of the
Federal investments in STEM education. DOD actively advises and assists
with implementation of the Federal STEM Education 5-Year Strategic
Plan.
health of r&d enterprise
Question. What is your assessment of the current health of the
DOD's R&D enterprise as a whole?
In general, I believe the health of the DOD's R&D enterprise is
good, but there are signs of stress as a result of reduced DOD manpower
and budget. DOD is seeing some indications that retention of younger
employees is a potential concern. Another trend is a growing number of
employees in the technical workforce nearing or at retirement age.
Approximately half of the technical workforce will be eligible to
retire in the next 10 years. The cumulative effect of downsizing,
reduced opportunities for technical collaboration, and uncertainty
about future funding stability may be having a negative impact on the
overall health of the R&D enterprise by decreasing the Department's
reputation as an employer of choice.
Question. Are rules currently in place to govern DOD R&D conducive
to a healthy enterprise?
Answer. I believe current statutory authorities, rules, and
regulations have been sufficient for a healthy R&D enterprise, but the
Department finds itself in competition for critical technical talent
and is challenged by the flexibility of the current processes.
Question. DOD has recently taken criticism for not devoting enough
funding to constructing and upgrading facilities for R&D. If confirmed,
how would you address that issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of existing
authorities in addressing concerns over constructing and upgrading
facilities for R&D.
Question. How would you work to reduce the overall costs of the R&D
enterprise, while still maintaining the integrity and quality of the
Department's R&D work? In which areas would you strive to build
efficiency?
Answer. I have not assessed the efficiency of the current R&D
enterprise. Under the Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative, the
Department is taking a holistic look at costs and overhead across the
R&D enterprise, with the goal of improving performance and efficiency.
If confirmed, I would strongly support this effort.
Question. How do you think continued budgets under sequestration
will affect DOD science and technology funding?
Answer. I believe the threat of sequestration significantly affects
the Department's ability to perform effective long-range S&T planning.
To date, the Department has made a concerted effort to prioritize and
protect S&T funding in its budget requests. If, however, the full
effect of sequester were triggered in any year, I believe that there
would be an immediate reduction to S&T budgets.
defense innovation initiative
Question. Former Secretary Hagel recently established a broad,
Department-wide initiative to pursue innovative ways to sustain and
advance the country's military superiority and improve business
operations. How has the Department integrated that initiative with
Research and Engineering?
Answer. One of the lines of effort under the Defense Innovation
Initiative is focused on identifying emerging technology and material
opportunities that offer opportunity to strengthen DOD capabilities in
a competitive future national security environment. The effort, called
the Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program (LRRDPP), was
named in reference to the seminal 1973 study that identified many of
the key military thrusts of the last 30 years. Since November 2014, I
have been leading the 2015 LRRDPP study, which has engaged technical
experts across the Department's research and engineering enterprise, as
well as seeking separate input from academic, not-for-profit, and other
private sector sources to identify emerging opportunities for future
military innovation. The classified LRRDPP study, when fully completed
early next year, should identify opportunities to accelerate and
demonstrate new system concepts that can inform future materiel plans.
This effort will also identify key research and engineering areas for
assessment and prioritization in future research and engineering
planning.
Question. How would you further those efforts?
Answer. While the current LRRDPP effort has been a valuable
assessment of emerging technology and system opportunities, I believe
the Department needs to establish a stronger capacity to conduct
regular, periodic, independent assessments of broad emerging defense
and non-defense technology opportunities, both to inform our DOD's
science and technology investment priorities and to ensure that the
Department is continuously experimenting with new and emerging
technologies that can inform and improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of critical military capabilities.
Question. How would you increase the effectiveness of the Long-
Range Research and Development Program Plan (LRRDPP)?
Answer. The initial LRRDPP effort focused largely on future weapon,
air combat, maritime, and space capabilities to counter emerging peer
and near-peer state actors. It did not include an assessment of
technology-enabled future land combat. Earlier this year, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense requested an LRRDPP follow-on study, with the
participation of key technology and operational experts from the U.S.
Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Force communities,
of emerging technical opportunities for future land combat. This effort
is currently under way.
trusted foundry program
Question. What is the status of the ``Trusted Foundry'' program for
providing a secure source of microchips for sensitive defense systems?
Answer. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) manages the
DOD Trusted Foundry Program. This program provides the Department and
other government agencies with access to trusted microelectronics
design and manufacturing capabilities necessary to meet the
confidentiality, integrity, availability, performance, and delivery
needs of U.S. Government customers. DMEA accredits suppliers as
``trusted'' in the areas of integrated circuit design, aggregation,
brokerage, mask manufacturing, foundry, post processing, packaging/
assembly, and test services. These services cover a broad range of
technologies and are intended to support both new and legacy
applications; both classified and unclassified. There are currently 72
DMEA-accredited suppliers covering 153 services, including 22 suppliers
that can provide full-service trusted foundry capabilities.
Question. What is being done to respond to the recent announcement
that IBM plans to sell its Foundry capabilities to a foreign controlled
company based in the United Arab Emirates?
Answer. In July 2015, Global Foundries purchased IBM's U.S.-based
Trusted. DOD, the IC, and the Department of Energy assessed how the
loss of access to the Trusted Foundry's specialized IBM technology, IP,
and R&D knowledge would disrupt their current and future national
security programs. Based on this assessment, the DOD determined that
continuity of supply of unique trusted products over the short- and
mid-term is critical, and that a revised strategy is needed to ensure
long term access to trusted state of the art microelectronics.
For the short- and mid-term, DOD continues to work directly with GF
to ensure appropriate accreditations can be in place for the successor
company to serve as a DOD Trusted Supplier. For the long term, the DOD
is taking a broad look toward future, state-of-the-art needs,
projections for the commercial microelectronics marketplace, and
technology solutions that may enable access to commercial fabrication
facilities, to inform alternative approaches to ensuring access to
trusted, state of the art microelectronics.
Question. How might the Department mitigate the risks of losing
that capability to a company with foreign ownership?
Answer. The Department is studying long-term options and
alternatives to the current Trusted Foundry approach. The DOD is taking
a broad look toward future, state-of-the-art needs, projections for the
commercial microelectronics marketplace, and technology solutions that
may enable access to commercial fabrication facilities, to inform
alternative approaches to ensuring access to trusted, state of the art
microelectronics. The vision for these new approaches involves shifting
the burden of hardware assurance from policies that restrict access to
the commercial sector, to technologies and processes that enable
cooperation. Options include improved hardware and software assurance
tools for analyzing provenance and functionality, new technology
capabilities to enable trust from untrusted sources, and continued
maturation of the broader trusted supplier network that DMEA certifies.
DOD and other federal agencies are contributing to these analyses, to
identify sustainable approaches to securing the microelectronics supply
chain of the future.
Question. How does the Trusted Foundry program support a secure
supply chain for field-programmable gate array (FPGA) chips?
Answer. The current Trusted Foundry program does not address FPGA
chips; it provides access to custom-manufactured application specific
integrated circuits (ASICs). FPGAs are frequently a more affordable
alternative to ASICs, but unlike ASICs, they are commercial-off-the-
shelf items produced for a broad market of users. FPGAs have unique
trust issues. They are globally designed and manufactured, and unlike
ASICs there are currently no U.S.-based foundries supplying FPGAs for
DOD use.
It is DOD policy to employ protections that manage risk in the
supply chain for components or subcomponent products such as FPGAs. The
Department has issued guidance on supply chain risk management
practices to address components such as FPGAs. If confirmed, I would
support efforts to continue to mature these practices as we learn more
about their effectiveness.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if
confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and
other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
our own anti-access/area denial strategy
1. Senator Hirono. Mr. Welby, there is much concern about China's
ability to deploy cost-effective ``anti-access/area denial''
capabilities in the Pacific that could frustrate our ability to project
power into that theater in the event of conflict. However, China must
also ``project power'' across the South China Sea to secure the series
of island chains that ring their mainland. This geography offers the
United States and its allies in the region the ability to present China
with an effective and affordable anti-access/area denial challenge. In
other words, the very technology trends that we are expressing concern
about could be harnessed to check China's power projection capability.
Could our own anti-access/area denial strategy help the U.S. and our
allies help to contain China's military in a conflict?
Mr. Welby. The combatant commander, U.S. Pacific Command, is
responsible for developing the plans and strategies to conduct
operations in the South China Sea and other areas of the Western
Pacific. We work closely with the commander and his staff to identify
the current and future capabilities PACOM will need, in order to guide
our research and development efforts. ASD(R&E) is actively pursuing
technologies that will improve existing PACOM capabilities and
developing new technical capabilities that will allow U.S. and allied
forces under U.S. PACOM command to maintain a credible deterrent and
successfully execute PACOM plans. These efforts include technical
efforts focused on addressing ``anti-access/area denial'' capabilities
as well as efforts focused on creating asymmetric advantages for U.S.
Forces. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize these efforts.
2. Senator Hirono. Mr. Welby, have you considered this concept in
the context of your ``Third Offset Strategy''?
Mr. Welby. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary are exploring the
concept of a ``Third Offset Strategy'' to address specific challenges
we see in future conflicts due to the rapidly evolving global national
security environment and the proliferation of advanced technical
capabilities. Technology is one aspect of this discussion. In support
of these efforts, ASD(R&E) has been evaluating technical approaches
that can mitigate against the growing anti-access/area denial challenge
and that can create asymmetric advantages for U.S. Forces in a future
competitive environment. I consider these efforts critical to
maintaining our warfighters technical edge in a future competitive
technology environment.
3. Senator Hirono. Mr. Welby, what technologies would you want to
develop to support this idea?
Mr. Welby. Working with the Services, the combatant commanders, and
others, ASD(R&E) has identified and is pursuing a number of
technologies that have the potential to deliver significant new or
improved capabilities to the Joint Force in a range of militarily
relevant domains including, but not limited to: Missile Defense, Air
Warfare and strike, Maritime warfare, Land Warfare, Communications, and
Surveillance. Many of these areas may also be able to take advantage of
emerging concepts in electronic warfare, advanced computing (including
applications of large data and deep learning), and advances in manned-
unmanned teaming and systems. If confirmed, I would prioritize these
efforts.
science & technology to support combatant commanders
4. Senator Hirono. Mr. Welby, although the combatant commanders
(such as PACOM) are the ones who actually execute military operations,
it seems like many times their needs and requirements are subordinate
to the needs and priorities of the Military Service bureaucracies. As a
result research programs are not established that connect with their
priorities and these needs go unmet. How will you work to ensure that
the needs of PACOM and the other combatant commanders are adequately
prioritized by the Services as they build their science and technology
and research budgets and programs?
Mr. Welby. ASD(R&E) works to insure that the long term needs of
combatant commanders shape the science and technology investments of
the Department. ASD(R&E) maintains liaisons with all of the Combatant
Commands. These liaisons also perform outreach to the Service Component
Commanders in each command. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
the Department's research and engineering enterprise deepens its
connections to the combatant commanders, including PACOM.
5. Senator Hirono. Mr. Welby, what programs would you strengthen to
better connect research activities to the combatant commanders?
Mr. Welby. If confirmed, I will work to promote active dialog and
interaction between the combatant commanders and their subordinate
Service Component Commanders with the R&D activities within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and those in the Service Research &
Development organizations. I particularly believe that our programs
focused on Experimentation and Concept Prototyping offer an excellent
opportunity for engagement--as these efforts provide an excellent
opportunity to jointly explore the operational impacts of emerging
technology and to accelerate emerging capabilities to the force.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Stephen P. Welby follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 19, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
Stephen P. Welby, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary
of Defense, vice Zachary J. Lemnios, resigned.
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Stephen P. Welby, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Stephen P. Welby
Education:
MS Computer Science, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD,
1996
MS Applied Mathematics, The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD,
1991
MS Business Administration, Texas A&M University, Texarkana, TX,
1988
BS Chemical Engineering, The Cooper Union for the Advancement of
Science and Art, Manhattan NY, 1987
Employment Record:
United States Department of Defense--Washington, DC
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering
September 2009-Present
Raytheon Missile Systems--Tucson, Arizona
Deputy Vice President, Advanced Missiles and Unmanned
Systems
February 2009-September 2009
Self Employed, Independent Aerospace and Defense
Consultant--Bethesda, Maryland
August 2008-February 2009
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency--Arlington,
Virginia
Director and Deputy Director, Tactical Technology
Office (2004-2008)
Acting Director and Deputy Director, Information
Exploitation Office (2001-2004)
Program Manager, Information Systems and Special
Projects Offices (1997-2001)
October 1997-August 2008
US Army Research Laboratory--Adelphi, MD
Project Engineer and Team Leader
1988-1997
US Army School of Engineering and Logistics, Red River
Army Depot--Texarkana, TX
Engineering Intern
1987-1988
Honors and Awards:
Full Undergraduate Academic Scholarship, The Cooper Union
for Advancement of Science and Art
Secretary of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service
Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award
Department of the Army Achievement Medal for Civilian
Service
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Stephen P.
Welby in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Stephen Patrick Welby
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
3. Date of nomination:
March 19, 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
3 February 1965, Manhattan, NY.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married, Spouse: Kimberly Jean Villa.
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
MS Computer Science, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD,
1996
MS Applied Mathematics, The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD,
1991
MS Business Administration, Texas A&M University, Texarkana, TX,
1988
BS Chemical Engineering, The Cooper Union for the Advancement of
Science and Art, Manhattan NY, 1987
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
2009-Present, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering,
United States Department of Defense, Washington, DC
2009-2009, Deputy Vice President, Advanced Missiles and Unmanned
Systems, Raytheon Missile Systems Tucson, Arizona
2008-2009, Self Employed, Independent Aerospace and Defense
Consultant, Bethesda, Maryland
2004-2008 Director and Deputy Director, Tactical Technology Office
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Arlington, Virginia
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
2001-2004 Acting Director and Deputy Director, Information
Exploitation Office Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Arlington, Virginia
1997-2001 Program Manager, Information Systems and Special Projects
offices Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Arlington, Virginia
1988-1997 Project Engineer and Team Leader U.S. Army Research
Laboratory, Adelphi, Maryland
1987-1988 Engineering Intern U.S. Army School of Engineering and
Logistics, Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
None
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
Senior Member, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Member, International Council on Systems Engineering
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Full Undergraduate Academic Scholarship, The Cooper Union for
Advancement of Science and Art
Secretary of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service
Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award
Department of the Army Achievement Medal for Civilian Service
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
See attached for a copy of the latest three speeches given.
Below table summarizes speeches or presentations done over the past
five years. Speeches are highlighted in yellow.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Stephen P. Welby
This 7th day of April, 2015
[The nomination of the Mr. Stephen P. Welby was reported to
the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Alissa M. Starzak by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I believe that Goldwater-Nichols and other reforms
significantly improved interservice and joint relationships within the
Department of Defense. The principles that animated Goldwater-Nichols--
including enhancing civilian control of the military, improving
military advice to civilian leaders, strengthening the role of
combatant commanders to allow them to accomplish the missions assigned
to them, and encouraging joint officer management--continue to apply
today. I understand that there is currently a desire to take a careful
look at Goldwater-Nichols to assess whether any changes are necessary.
Although at this time, I am unaware of any need to amend Goldwater-
Nichols, I look forward to being involved in those discussions, if
confirmed, and to recommend any changes I believe to be warranted
through the established process.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. As noted above, I am not aware of any need to amend
Goldwater-Nichols.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?
Answer. The duties and functions of the General Counsel of the Army
are determined and assigned by the Secretary of the Army. The General
Counsel provides legal advice to the Secretary of the Army, the Under
Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and other offices within the Army
Secretariat and serves as the chief legal officer of the Department of
the Army responsible for determining the controlling legal positions of
the Department. I understand that the General Counsel's
responsibilities extend to any matter of law and to other matters as
directed by the Secretary, to include overseeing matters in which the
Army is involved in litigation, taking final action on certain claims
filed against the Army, providing professional guidance to the Army's
legal community, and establishing and administering the Army's policies
concerning legal services.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. Because of the broad nature of the duties and
responsibilities of the office, the Army General Counsel must not only
have good judgment and legal skills, but also the ability to build
strong relationships and work collaboratively with individuals in the
Army, across the Executive branch, and in the Congress. I believe my
experience, both inside and outside the Department of Defense, has
prepared me for this role.
After receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree, magna cum laude, from
Amherst College, I attended the University of Chicago Law School, where
I was an editor on the Law Review and graduated with honors. After
graduation, I served as a law clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Jackson,
Mississippi. I subsequently moved to Washington, DC, to practice law at
the law firm of O'Melveny and Myers, where I focused on compliance,
corporate investigations and white collar defense. In 2005, I joined
the Office of General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency,
before becoming a counsel on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in 2007. I currently serve as a Deputy General Counsel in
the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, working on a
variety of legal issues related to Congress, including issues directly
related to the Army. I believe that this legal and practical
experience--in three branches of government--will serve me well in
addressing the wide range of issues that will face the Department of
the Army.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the General Counsel of
the Department of the Army?
Answer. I am confident that I have the necessary legal and
professional experience, analytic skills, and leadership abilities to
be the General Counsel of the Department of the Army. If I am
confirmed, I will establish and maintain close and professionally
cooperative relationships with the talented and dedicated attorneys in
the Office of the General Counsel, with The Office of The Judge
Advocate General of the Army, and with other offices dealing with
matters of mutual interest in order to provide the best possible legal
services to all members of the Department of the Army.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will be ready to execute the
responsibilities of the General Counsel set forth in the General Order
prescribing the duties of each principal officer of Headquarters,
Department of the Army. In addition to these duties, I anticipate that
the Secretary of the Army will expect me to manage the Office of
General Counsel efficiently and effectively, ensuring that it provides
accurate and timely legal advice. I also anticipate that the Secretary
will expect me to work collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General,
the General Counsels of the Department of Defense, the other Military
Departments, and the Defense Agencies, and the legal staff of other
federal agencies.
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense?
Answer. While the General Counsels of the Army, Navy and Air Force
serve as the chief legal officers of their respective departments, the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense is the chief legal officer
and final legal authority for the entire Department of Defense. If
confirmed, I intend to continue the close professional relationship I
have with Mr. Robert Taylor, the Acting General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, by meeting regularly and collaboratively working
in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of Defense.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?
Answer. The General Counsel of the Department of the Army must
provide accurate and timely legal advice on the full spectrum of
matters that arise in the Army. In a time of shrinking budgets, the
General Counsel will be confronted with significant legal matters
related to balancing and transitioning the Army. In addition, I expect
that the General Counsel will confront significant challenges related
to the prevention of, and response to, sexual assault, military and
civilian personnel policies, acquisition, and compliance with
environmental law.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to prioritize legal issues consistent
with the Secretary of the Army's priorities, and to work closely with
the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, The Judge Advocate General, and the
attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel to provide timely,
accurate, and candid legal advice. If confirmed, I will also ensure
that the Office of the General Counsel is appropriately resourced and
staffed to address those priorities.
Question. What do you see as the most significant legal issues the
Army will face in the coming year?
Answer. In an environment of declining resources, the Army is
facing difficult policy choices and a period of significant transition.
Those efforts to rebalance and reform the Army will invariably involve
significant legal questions. Although it is difficult to predict
exactly what other significant legal issues will arise in the coming
year, if confirmed, I will work closely with the talented team of
attorneys and judge advocates in the Office of the General Counsel to
address those issues.
Question. Does the Army Office of the General Counsel have the
resources to deal with these problems?
Answer. At this time, I believe the Office of the General Counsel
has the resources needed to address the many difficult legal issues
confronting the Army today. If I am confirmed, I will be in a better
position to evaluate this important management and leadership issue.
Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of
issues which must be addressed by the Office of the General Counsel of
the Department of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to carefully examine the structure and
functioning of the Office of General Counsel to ensure that it
continues to appropriately address the needs of the Army as changes are
made to the Army's operating framework. To provide high-quality, timely
legal advice, the Army legal community must be integrated into the
broader Army community and involved at all stages of the decision-
making process. If confirmed, I also intend to carefully review
programs for attorney recruitment and retention to ensure that the
Office has the skills and capacity to address the challenges of the
future.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the formal and informal
relationship between the General Counsel of the Army and the following
offices?
The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
Answer. I understand that the Acting General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, Mr. Robert Taylor, has worked closely with the
General Counsels of the Military Departments. If confirmed, I intend to
continue the professional relationship I have with Mr. Taylor, which
will include routine consultation, communication, and cooperation on
matters of mutual interest, furthering the best interests of the
Department of the Army and the Department of Defense.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. As the head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of
the Army is responsible for all affairs of the Department. If
confirmed, my primary responsibility will be to provide the Secretary
with clear, concise, and correct legal advice and counsel, and to
perform the duties and functions he has assigned. In order to execute
these responsibilities to the highest standard, I intend to establish a
strong relationship with the Secretary of the Army that will enhance my
ability to communicate with him directly and candidly on all matters.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military
officer of the Department of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The Chief of Staff is directly responsible to the Secretary
of the Army on all matters except those related to his role as a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with
The Judge Advocate General to continue the excellent relationship
between the Army General Counsel, the Chief of Staff, and the Army
Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. I understand that the five Assistant Secretaries of the
Army perform the duties and responsibilities assigned to them in
statute and prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. In broad terms,
the Assistant Secretaries formulate and oversee policies and programs
within their functional areas. As the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army, the General Counsel is responsible for
providing legal advice, counsel, and guidance to the Assistant
Secretaries and their staffs. If confirmed, I will seek to establish
strong, productive relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries
and ensure that the Office of the General Counsel continues to provide
timely and correct legal advice to their respective staffs.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, I understand
The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the
Secretary of the Army and the primary legal advisor to the Chief of
Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army
generally. Additionally, I recognize that The Judge Advocate General
has the primary responsibility for providing legal advice and services
regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
administration of military discipline. A close, professional
relationship between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army's
legal community is critical. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively
with The Judge Advocate General to provide the best possible legal
support to the Army.
Question. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
Answer. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense is
responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on criminal
investigative matters and all other matters relating to the prevention
and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse within the Department of
Defense. If confirmed, I will work with the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense on matters related to the Department of the Army
to ensure that Army interests are fully and fairly represented and to
ensure Army actions taken as a result of Department of Defense
Inspector General recommendations are executed in compliance with
applicable law, directives, and regulations.
Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
Answer. The Inspector General of the Army reports directly to the
Secretary of the Army regarding the discipline, efficiency, and economy
of the Army, and on other matters specifically assigned by the
Secretary. If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining a close and
professional relationship with The Inspector General to ensure that he
and his staff have the legal advice and support they require for
mission success.
Question. The General Counsels of the other military departments.
Answer. Like the General Counsel of the Army, the General Counsels
of the other Military Departments serve and act under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretaries of their respective
Departments. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with them on
matters of mutual interest. I know that the Acting General Counsel of
the Department of Defense, Mr. Taylor, facilitates this effort in order
to best use the legal services across the Department of Defense. I look
forward to participating in this effort.
Question. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
Answer. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the
Executive Branch and may issue controlling guidance on certain legal
issues. I also know the Attorney General and the Department of Justice
represent the Department of the Army in litigation before Federal
district courts and State courts. I view a strong relationship between
the Army and the Department of Justice to be critical to success, and
if confirmed, I will work in conjunction with The Judge Advocate
General and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to ensure
the continuation of the Army's current cooperative relationship with
the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
relationship with the judge advocate general.
Question. In carrying out your duties if you are confirmed, how
will you work with the Judge Advocate General of the Army?
Answer. It is essential that the Army General Counsel maintain a
close and cooperative relationship with The Judge Advocate General. A
productive and positive relationship sets the tone and the direction
for the effective delivery of legal services to the Army at all
echelons. I know The Judge Advocate General shares this view, and if
confirmed, we will work together to ensure the Offices of the General
Counsel and The Judge Advocate General work closely together in the
spirit of teamwork to deliver the best possible legal services to the
members of the Army.
Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of
the Army allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate
General?
Answer. The Army General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer
for the Department of the Army. As a component of the Army Secretariat,
the Office of the Army General Counsel is charged to provide advice to
the Secretary of the Army and other Secretariat officials on any
subject of law and on other matters as directed by the Secretary of the
Army. The Army General Counsel is authorized to provide the controlling
legal opinion in any matter for the Army. The Judge Advocate General is
the chief legal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of
the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with
the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as the
military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The law prohibits
interference with the ability of The Judge Advocate General to provide
independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army, which I fully
support. The Judge Advocate General provides supervision over the
delivery of a wide-range of legal services across the Army. The Judge
Advocate General also has primary responsibility for providing legal
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the administration of military discipline. The Offices of the Army
General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General have a well-developed
and supportive working relationship in their respective
responsibilities. If confirmed, I will work to continue this productive
partnership for the benefit of the Army.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that legal opinions of
your office will be available to Army attorneys, including judge
advocates?
Answer. I understand the respective offices of the General Counsel
and The Office of The Judge Advocate General have a longstanding
routine and cooperative working arrangement. Open lines of
communication and collaboration are essential to ensure legal views and
opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel and the
Office of The Judge Advocate General are readily available to all Army
attorneys, both civilian attorneys and judge advocates. If confirmed, I
will support this relationship in a positive manner.
Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense
to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates
General to the General Counsels of the Department of Defense and the
military services, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting any officer
or employee of the Department of Defense from interfering with the
ability of the Judge Advocates General of the military services and the
legal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide
independent legal advice to the Chairman, service secretaries, and
Service Chiefs.
What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the
Army to have the authority to provide independent legal advice to the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. I believe it is essential that the expertise of The Judge
Advocate General be available to the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief of Staff of the Army. I fully support the law, in both principle
and in spirit, empowering The Judge Advocate General of the Army to
provide independent legal advice honed by years of experience and
informed judgment on military affairs to the Secretary of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Army judge
advocates to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?
Answer. Army commanders are charged with the responsibility to
maintain discipline and to ensure the lawful conduct of the forces
under their control, in addition to the proper functioning of their
unit or organization. Army Judge Advocates at all levels provide
valuable aid to commanders and leaders to maintain discipline and to
help avoid a myriad of legal pitfalls in the day-to-day business of
command. A Judge Advocate's ability to provide candid legal advice to a
commander and staff, both openly and in confidence as needed, is
absolutely critical. Army commanders need and deserve the best legal
advice and judgment available. This is best achieved when Judge
Advocates are empowered to provide commanders with independent legal
advice, supported by appropriate guidance from supervising attorneys.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the
current relationships between the uniformed judge advocates and the
Army General Counsel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will always look for opportunities to
improve and to strengthen the relationships between the uniformed judge
advocates and the staff of the Office of the General Counsel. At this
time, I am not aware of any need for change, and my understanding is
that the current relationship works well.
Question. Are legal opinions of the Office of the Army General
Counsel binding on all Army lawyers?
Answer. Because the Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer
for the Department of the Army as directed by the Secretary of the
Army, legal opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel
are controlling throughout the Department of the Army. As a general
matter, however, I understand that opinions are typically drafted in
collaboration with The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I would
ensure that significant legal opinions are informed by the expertise of
both civilian attorneys and judge advocates.
Question. How will you ensure that such legal opinions are
available to Army lawyers?
Answer. Written opinions of the Office of the General Counsel for
the Department of the Army are distributed in the ordinary course of
business, using normal departmental distribution processes. If
confirmed, I expect to continue this practice.
Question. If confirmed, are there specific categories of Army
Counsel legal opinions that you expect to reconsider and possibly
revise? If so, what categories?
Answer. I am not aware of any specific categories of Army General
Counsel legal opinions in need of reconsideration or revision. If
confirmed, however, as the need arises, I would review opinions
warranting revision consistent with contemporary law in consultation
with the appropriate attorneys and subject matter experts within the
Army and elsewhere as appropriate.
Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice gives
primary jurisdiction over military justice to the Judge Advocates
General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
How do you view the responsibilities of the Army General Counsel in
the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge
Advocate General of the Army?
Answer. The Judge Advocate General's responsibilities to ensure the
proper administration of the military justice system require direct and
independent advice to the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I look
forward to supporting The Judge Advocate General on military justice
matters with consultation, advice, and assistance, as needed.
attorney recruiting and retention issues
Question. If confirmed, how do you assess your ability to hire and
retain top quality attorneys and provide sufficient opportunity for
advancement?
Answer. I believe my background and experience have prepared me to
meet the challenges of recruiting and retaining top quality attorneys
and providing meaningful and rewarding opportunities for those
attorneys to advance. Nevertheless, I believe the Army will face
significant challenges in the coming years as we compete with the
private sector and other federal employers for quality attorneys, while
shrinking resources will force us to demand more from the highly
qualified attorneys we already have. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure the Army allocates sufficient resources to attract and select
only the best qualified candidates for military and civilian attorney
positions. In doing so, I will work closely with the Office of The
Judge Advocate General to retain the best attorneys to provide first-
rate legal services to the Army, its commanders, soldiers, and family
members.
Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have a
sufficient number of civilian and military attorneys to perform its
missions?
Answer. My understanding is the Army General Counsel has a
sufficient number of civilian attorneys to perform its mission, and the
Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG) has enough military and civilian
attorneys to meet its current requirements. To address emerging
requirements, however, including special victim capabilities (required
by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act) and special victim
counsel (required by the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act),
the Army JAG Corps is planning to grow. Recognizing that as the Army
draws down, legal support requirements may increase, I will closely
monitor these emerging requirements and ensure they are resourced
appropriately.
Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting
and retention of attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or
established?
Answer. I understand the legal market is projected to become
increasingly competitive over the next several years, with fewer
students graduating from law school and a likely increase in hiring by
private sector law firms. In my view, it is crucial that the Army renew
our commitment to funding current incentive programs, like student loan
repayment and career retention bonuses, notwithstanding the current
fiscal challenges. These programs are needed to attract and retain the
highest quality attorneys.
detainee issues
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing legal issues regarding detainees?
Answer. Although issues relating to the treatment of detainees most
often arise in combatant commands, there are many Army judge advocates
serving in those combatant commands, and the General Counsel of the
Army may in some circumstances have an appropriate role in assisting
those judge advocates with legal issues regarding detainees.
Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
In your view, is the section 1403 prohibition in the best interest
of the United States? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, I believe this prohibition is in the best interest of
the United States and is fully consistent with protecting our national
security.
Question. Do you believe that the phrase ``cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment'' has been adequately and
appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?
Answer. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 define ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment'' as the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. I think this definition provides a clear
standard for ensuring that detainees in the custody of the U.S.
Government are treated in a humane manner.
Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Army
should play in the interpretation of this standard?
Answer. The General Counsel should play an independent role in
advising the Secretary of the Army and those who fall under his command
on the standards governing the treatment of persons detained by the
U.S. Army, including any interpretation of this legal standard.
Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of
the Army should play in the interpretation of this standard?
Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army should be intimately
involved in the interpretation of legal standards governing the
treatment of detainees and should provide independent legal advice to
the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General and the lawyers
she leads--many of whom have served multiple deployments--bring
experience and an important perspective to these and many other
operational matters. If confirmed, and if called on to offer any
guidance on this standard, I would expect to work collaboratively with
The Judge Advocate General to provide clear advice to the field.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes, I support the requirements in revised Army Field
Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and DOD
Directive 2310.01E, reissued on August 14, 2014, that all detainees and
detained personnel be treated humanely and with respect for their
dignity.
Question. Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended
by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel
and inhuman treatment.
In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that
provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S.
detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?
Answer. I believe section 2441 provides an appropriate standard for
protecting both U.S. detainees in foreign custody and foreign detainees
held in our custody.
Question. Section 812 of title 10, United States Code states: ``No
member of the armed forces may be placed in confinement in immediate
association with enemy prisoners or foreign nationals not members of
the armed forces.''
Consistent with the statute, what recommendations would you provide
the Secretary of the Army, if confirmed regarding the possible holding
of foreign detainees at DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and
Disciplinary Barracks?
Answer. In the event that the Secretary of the Army sought my
advice on such a matter, I would ensure that my advice was consistent
with applicable law, including section 812.
Question. What types of modifications would be needed at military
detention facilities to ensure they are compliant with domestic and
international law as well as meeting the special security
considerations necessary for the safe detention of foreign law of war
detainees?
Answer. At this time, I am not familiar with what modifications, if
any, would be needed to ensure that a military detention facility
complies with domestic and international law.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for
addressing the safety and security of the general public living near
these facilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would defer to law enforcement experts
about what measures would be necessary to ensure the safety and
security of the general public living near these facilities, and would
work closely with them to ensure that safety issues are appropriately
and lawfully addressed.
Question. In November 2012, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) published a report titled: Guantanamo Bay Detainees:
Facilities and Factors for Consideration if Detainees Were Brought to
the United States. That reported noted that only one DOD facility, the
U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, currently holds
``inmates with sentences exceeding 5 years as well as inmates sentenced
to death.'' The report also stated: ``in order to conform with
international law and DOD policies . . . '' detainees are to be
``protected from public curiosity (for example, pictures of detainees'
faces are not disseminated publicly).''
In your view, what steps would need to be taken in the handling of
law of war detainees in order to comply with international law and DOD
regulations, including the ``public view'' prohibition raised by GAO?
Answer. The Department of Defense takes seriously its obligation to
comply with the Geneva Conventions and other legal requirements
relating to the treatment of detainees, including the requirement not
to hold detainees out for public curiosity. If confirmed, I would
ensure any advice I provide regarding law of war detention is
consistent with those requirements.
criminal jurisdiction over contractors on the battlefield
Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was
enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts
to persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the
United States.
In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for
alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other areas of combat operations?
Answer. I believe that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act of 2000 (MEJA) does provide appropriate criminal jurisdiction over
contractor employees in areas of combat operations. Although these
types of prosecutions are rare, MEJA is an effective tool to hold
contractors and Department of Defense civilian employees accountable
for serious criminal acts. All people supporting our Armed Forces,
regardless of their location, should be held accountable for their
actions, and MEJA can be an effective means of achieving that end.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?
Answer. My understanding is that MEJA is sufficient in its current
form.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
developing Administration recommendations for changes to MEJA?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be actively involved in any
effort to develop Administration recommendations for changes to MEJA.
Because MEJA applies to civilian personnel working across the
Department of Defense and its contractors, I would certainly work with
officials in other agencies and military departments on any recommended
changes to MEJA.
Question. Section 552 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 extended criminal jurisdiction of the military courts
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field during time of declared war or
a contingency operation, such as our current operations in Afghanistan.
In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction for
alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Afghanistan and
other areas of combat operations?
Answer. Yes. The UCMJ provides appropriate jurisdiction for alleged
criminal actions of contractor employees in Afghanistan and other areas
of combat operations. Civilians serving with or accompanying our Armed
Forces overseas who commit crimes should be held appropriately
accountable. While it is difficult to prepare for every scenario that
may arise in a deployed environment, article 2 of the UCMJ provides a
means to address the misconduct of civilians accompanying the force in
areas of combat operations.
Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice to reconcile
jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?
Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to examine, from an Army
perspective, the relationship between the Department of Justice and the
Department of Defense and to give thought to whether it reflects the
appropriate balance.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to
ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of
contractor employees?
Answer. I have no recommendations for any such changes to the UCMJ
at this time. If confirmed, and if after further review I perceive a
need, I will recommend any changes I believe to be warranted.
identification of potential extremist views
Question. In your view, do current Army policies limit the ability
to include information about extremist views in official records that
may assist in the identification of potential threats?
Answer. No. To my knowledge, current Army policy does not limit the
ability to include this type of information in official records. The
Army maintains several types of records that may help identify
individuals whose extremist views could pose a threat. These official
records include, but are not limited to, records managed by several
U.S. Army commands, such as the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, the
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and the U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command.
Question. Do current Army procedures hinder the ability to share
this type of information with other official agencies charged with
identifying and monitoring potential extremist or terrorist activities?
Answer. My understanding is that Army procedures do not prohibit
sharing this type of information with other official agencies where
appropriate. Documents collected in official records are available to
individuals or organizations that have a ``need to know,'' which
includes appropriate law enforcement agencies.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army balances the
need to identify and respond to potentially harmful extremist views
held by soldiers against individual privacy and respect for the right
of soldiers to hold and express personal beliefs?
Answer. Commanders are responsible for building healthy and
positive social climates based on dignity and respect for treatment of
one another, and maintaining good order and discipline. As such, the
Army emphasizes the exercise of calm and prudent judgment to achieve
the proper balance between security and the need to preserve a
soldier's right of expression. I understand that the Army gives
commanders discretion and latitude to balance the mission of
safeguarding the security of the United States while preserving the
constitutional right of expression.
Question. Do you see a need for a change in this balance?
Answer. I do not currently see a need for change, but I am prepared
to examine this issue if confirmed.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do Department of Defense policies
concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately
accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including
individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have
different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. I believe the Department of the Army and the Department of
Defense's policies support the goals of religious tolerance and mutual
respect. If confirmed, in this area as well as other areas, I would
ensure all Army policies uphold the Constitutional tenets of the Free
Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. I have been advised that under current Army policy, when
participating in mandatory official events, chaplains are not compelled
to offer prayers that are inconsistent with their personal beliefs or
faith, but they are expected to remain sensitive to the pluralistic
Army and society they serve. Given the diversity of religious views in
the Army, this policy appears to strike the proper balance.
Question. Section 533 of the FY13 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 112-239), as amended by section 532 of the FY14 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) protects rights of conscience
of members of the armed forces and chaplains and prohibits, so far as
possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel
action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or
assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held
beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage.
In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely
held belief in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse
personnel action or similar other adverse action, if he or she shares
those personal views on the subject in a personal capacity?
Answer. If soldiers wish to express their personal views about this
issue in an open forum and caveat those as such, it is within their
right to do so, and they will not be subject to adverse personnel
action or similar other adverse action for expressing those views. This
is a fundamental right, and if confirmed, I will ensure that all Army
policies protect this and similar rights.
role in the officer promotion and confirmation process
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the integrity and
proper functioning of the officer promotion process?
Answer. I understand the Secretary of the Army is responsible for
the proper functioning of the Department of the Army's promotion
selection process. The Army General Counsel is responsible for ensuring
that the conduct of the board process conforms to all legal
requirements; this includes reviewing all Memoranda of Instruction and
selection board reports to ensure they comport with statutory
standards. The Office of the Army General Counsel works closely with
the Office of The Judge Advocate General to advise the Secretary of the
Army of any case in which a selection board report or selection board
process fails to adhere to the statutory standards and to provide
counsel on appropriate corrective action.
Question. Do you see a need for change in this role?
Answer. I have been advised that the current process is working
well; however, if I am confirmed and determine that a change is
necessary and proper, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), The Judge Advocate General,
and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, to effect such change. Proper
execution of this process is essential to maintaining the trust of the
Army Officer Corps, the Congress, and the American people.
general officer nominations
Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse
information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated
by senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense prior to nomination for promotion and certain assignments.
If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer
promotion system, particularly in reviewing general officer
nominations?
Answer. I have been informed that for all Army officer promotions,
including general officer promotions, the Office of the Army General
Counsel, in coordination with The Office of The Judge Advocate General,
plays an active role in the officer promotion system, to include
reviewing Memoranda of Instruction that govern the conduct of promotion
selection boards and subsequent promotion selection board reports.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the legal sufficiency
of statutory selection board processes?
Answer. I understand the Secretary of the Army is responsible for
the proper functioning of the Department of the Army's promotion
selection process. Prior to approval by the Secretary of the Army, all
Memoranda of Instruction for officer promotion selection boards are
reviewed by the Office of the Army General Counsel, in coordination
with the Office of The Judge Advocate General, to ensure the
Secretary's instructions conform to statutes and accurately reflect his
guidance regarding attributes necessary for service in the next grade.
All reports of promotion selection boards are processed through the
Office of the Army General Counsel prior to final action on the report
by the Secretary. The Army General Counsel must be satisfied that the
Army has met applicable statutory standards and that individual
selection board reports conform to the law. The Army General Counsel
must advise the Secretary of the Army of any case in which a selection
board report fails to adhere to the statutory standards, either
generally or with regard to a particular officer being considered for
promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Army and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the
Army General Counsel helps to ensure that Army promotion policies
properly implement applicable laws and regulations and are fairly
applied.
Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the
Department of the Army in reviewing and providing potentially adverse
information pertaining to a nomination to the Senate Armed Services
Committee?
Answer. It is my understanding that under current Department of the
Army practice, regarding General Officer nominations, the Office of the
Army General Counsel reviews each selection board report, as well as
departmental communications to the Committee, the President, and the
Secretary of Defense, to ensure that the reports and communications
comply in form and substance with law and applicable directives and
regulation. The Office of the Army General Counsel gives special
attention to cases of nominees with substantiated or potentially
adverse information and cases with reportable information in order to
ensure that such information is reported to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in a timely, accurate, and comprehensible manner.
military personnel policy and cases
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the General
Counsel and civilian attorneys assigned to the Office of General
Counsel play in military personnel policy and individual cases,
including cases before the Board for Correction of Military Records?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and
other senior leaders to ensure that the Army properly develops and
fairly applies military personnel policies. If I am confirmed and
become aware that the Department did not fairly and lawfully apply
military personnel policies, I will take appropriate action to ensure
that the Army properly resolves the issue. I understand and fully
respect the independent role that the Army Board for the Correction of
Military Records (ABCMR) plays in the correction of military records,
and if confirmed, I will coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who exercises overall
responsibility for the Army Review Boards Agency regarding the legal
sufficiency of ABCMR recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Fiscal Year 2013 Department of Defense Annual Report
on Sexual Assault in the Military reflects that reports of sexual
assaults in the Army increased by 51% from fiscal year 2012 to 2,149
reports of sexual assault in fiscal year 2013.
What is your assessment of this report?
Answer. Although the Department of Defense did not conduct a study
of the prevalence of sexual assault in fiscal year 2013, I understand
there are indications that the increase in reporting in fiscal year
2013 reflects an increased willingness of victims to come forward
rather than an increase in the number of sexual assaults. Nevertheless,
there is still more to do to prevent and punish the crime of sexual
assault. If confirmed, I intend to provide my full support in helping
the Army achieve this goal.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. I understand that the Army has taken substantial steps to
addressing the issue of sexual assault. Through the combined efforts of
military and civilian leaders at all echelons, I am informed that the
Army has implemented an unprecedented number of program and policy
initiatives to address this insider threat.
I support the Army's commitment to a holistic approach to change
culture, prevent sexual assault and harassment in the ranks, support
and advocate for victims, and hold offenders appropriately accountable.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. I am informed that since implementing the restricted
reporting option (which does not initiate a law enforcement
investigation) in 2005, the number of total reports has continued to
increase. The restricted reporting option gives victims time to
understand the process, seek the counseling and care they need, and to
consult with an attorney if they wish. I understand the conversion of
restricted reports to unrestricted continues to increase, which I
believe is an indication that victims are gaining more trust in the
system. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to work to
improve upon its response system and to enhance victim support.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. I believe the chain of command has an important role to
play in providing compassionate care and necessary support to victims
of sexual assault. As a general matter, the commander--as well as the
commander's subordinate commanders and staff members--has a
responsibility to care for soldiers in the commander's charge. I
understand that the Army is working hard to foster a climate in which
victims trust their chain of command to support them if and when sexual
offenses occur.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Army
resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. My understanding is that the Army is dedicated to providing
soldiers, civilians and eligible family members who are the victims of
sexual assault with extensive medical, psychological, and legal support
services. I am aware that sexual assault victims are offered the
services of a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) and a Victim
Advocate (VA). When a victim of sexual assault comes to any Military
Treatment Facility in the Army, his or her medical needs are managed by
a Sexual Assault Clinical Provider and his or her behavioral health
care is provided by the Sexual Assault Behavioral Health Provider.
Victims of sexual assault are also entitled to the services of a
Special Victim Counsel. The Army Special Victim Counsel program is
staffed, resourced, and supported by the Department of the Army; the
Army JAG Corps is currently growing to meet emerging requirements.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed
locations?
Answer. I understand that both the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief of Staff of the Army have made the prevention of sexual assault a
top priority and are providing resources consistent with that
prioritization. As a result, leaders at every echelon and in every
location must be committed to preventing sexual assaults and caring for
victims, and the Army is working diligently to ensure that all soldiers
share these commitments.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Army has in place to investigate and prosecute
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I understand that the Army has invested substantial
resources and training toward the investigation and response to
allegations of sexual assault. As stated above, the Secretary of the
Army and Chief of Staff have made the prevention of sexual assault a
top priority and are providing resources consistent with that
prioritization.
Question. What is your view on the value of the Army's Special
Victims Counsel Program? Has this program had an impact on the
reporting and prosecution of allegations of sexual assault in the Army?
If so, what is that impact?
Answer. My understanding is that the Special Victim Counsel Program
has been successful for both victims and commanders. The feedback from
victims is that this program is an invaluable resource as they navigate
the administrative, medical and justice systems within the Army.
Commanders indicate that they can now act with confidence that they
understand the victim's position and preferences.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?
Answer. I believe that commanders can drive change in culture.
Commanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails
to do, which includes training soldiers on how to prevent sexual
assault and holding all leaders accountable for creating a culture that
does not tolerate sexual assault. As part of these responsibilities,
commanders are responsible for fostering respect within their units,
creating a climate in which sexual assaults and sexual harassment are
not tolerated, holding offenders accountable, and cultivating an
environment in which victims feel comfortable reporting all forms of
misconduct.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. I think it is difficult to fully assess the potential
impact of such a significant change to the military justice system.
Requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine
whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted would, in
effect, create a separate justice system for sexual assault cases, with
uncertain consequences. The Army must encourage a climate in which
victims feel comfortable in reporting misconduct, perpetrators of
sexual assault are held accountable for the crimes they commit, and all
soldiers believe the system to be fair and transparent. I believe that
both commanders and judge advocates have important roles to play in all
components of that effort.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address the problem of sexual assaults in the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be an ardent supporter of the Army
Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program and will work
with the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), and the
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 to ensure that eliminating sexual assault
remains a top priority throughout the Army.
assignment of women in the military
Question. In January 2013, Secretary of Defense Panetta rescinded
the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, excluding
women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is
to engage in direct combat on the ground. The Military Departments are
required to develop detailed plans for implementation of this directive
and to complete integration of women into newly opened positions and
units as expeditiously as possible, considering good order and
judicious use of fiscal resources, but no later than January 1, 2016.
Any recommendation to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed to
women must be personally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and by the Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the
evaluation of the plans of the Department of the Army to integrate
women into occupational specialties or recommendations to keep specific
occupations or units closed to women?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to provide legal advice
regarding plans to integrate women into those occupational specialties.
recommendations of the response systems to adult sexual assault crimes
panel
Question. On June 27, 2014, the Response Systems to Adult Sexual
Assault Crimes Panel (RSP) released its report fulfilling the
requirements of section 576 of the Fiscal Year National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239). This report contained 132
recommendations in the areas of victim services, victim rights, the
role of the commander in the military justice process, and the
investigation, prosecution and adjudication of sexual assault.
If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the
evaluation of the recommendations of the RSP for possible
implementation in the Department of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with The Judge
Advocate General to advise the Secretary of the Army about the RSP's
recommendations and, where appropriate, how they should be implemented.
whistleblower protection
Question. Section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, prohibits
taking retaliatory personnel action against a member of the armed
forces as reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition,
protected communications include communications to certain individuals
and organizations outside of the chain of command.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior
military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who
report misconduct to appropriate authorities within or outside the
chain of command?
Answer. The General Counsel has the primary role of advising the
Secretary of the Army and those who fall under his authority on the
standards governing treatment of servicemembers reporting misconduct to
any appropriate authority. I am fully committed to protecting those who
report misconduct to appropriate authorities. Army policy provides for
reporting and investigation of retaliatory actions, and for appropriate
corrective and disciplinary action. Additionally, the Secretary of the
Army, pursuant to the requirements of section 1034 of title 10, has a
special obligation to ensure appropriate action is taken to correct the
record of those who have been subjected to reprisal and to ensure
appropriate disciplinary action is taken against those who engage in
prohibited personnel actions against servicemembers reporting
misconduct. It is critical for senior Army leaders to be aware of legal
requirements so as to avoid improper retaliatory actions against those
who bring matters of interest to our attention. My staff and I will
work to ensure statutory and policy requirements are understood and
appropriately executed.
support to army inspector general
Question. What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of
the Army should have in reviewing the investigations and
recommendations of the Army Inspector General?
Answer. The Inspector General is a key member of the Secretariat,
and if confirmed, as counsel to all Secretariat officials, I will
ensure the Office of the General Counsel of the Army continues its
current professional relationship with The Inspector General. I
personally intend this to include routine, direct, and candid
communications. I have been advised that Army General Counsel's office
routinely provide independent and objective legal advice to the Office
of The Inspector General in regard to all matters that relate to
Inspector General programs, duties, functions, and responsibilities. In
coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will oversee the
provision of effective legal guidance to the Office of The Inspector
General in conducting investigations and making recommendations.
Additionally, based on the Army General Counsel's responsibility to
review legal and policy issues arising from the Army's intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, I will work closely with The Inspector
General concerning proper reporting of the Army's intelligence
oversight activities.
civilian attorneys
Question. Judge advocates in the armed forces benefit from an
established career progression, substantial mentoring and training
opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal areas and
leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the
military departments normally do not have established career programs
and may do the same work for many years, with promotion based solely
upon longevity and vacancies.
What is your understanding of the personnel management and career
development system for civilian attorneys in the Army?
Answer. Civilian career development is important to me, and it is
my understanding that all civilian attorneys and paraprofessionals
supporting Army legal services are now covered by a comprehensive
career program that promotes and facilitates their recruitment,
training, education, development, advancement and retention. To achieve
these goals, a career program office was established. I have been
informed that the career program office publishes two governing
documents, which the Army terms ``Army Civilian Education, Training,
and Education Development System'' plans. There are separate guides for
civilian attorneys and paraprofessionals, but both are functionally
tailored to the legal career field and combine formal training with
developmental assignments.
Question. In your view does that system need revision? If so, what
do you see as the major problems and what changes would you suggest?
Answer. From what I have been told, the career program is still in
its early stages of operation, and program evaluation is ongoing. If
confirmed, I will serve as the career program's functional chief, and
will advocate for, or direct, revisions when appropriate.
client
Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel
of the Department of the Army?
Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the
Army is the Department of the Army, acting through its authorized
officials.
acquisition issues
Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
that Army procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law
and DOD acquisition policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
Army, the Under Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, the Chief Information
Officer, the Director of Small Business Programs, and other senior Army
officials to ensure that Army acquisition programs comply with
applicable laws, regulations, and policies. The Army's acquisition
leadership must accomplish its primary mission of acquiring equipment
and services for the Department while complying with an extensive
framework of legal and policy requirements. Army lawyers best support
this mission through early involvement in acquisition program and
procurements and through proactive assistance in identifying potential
issues and shaping effective, legally-supportable business strategies
throughout the acquisition life-cycle.
Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
that Army acquisition officials understand flexibilities provided by
Congress in the acquisition and financial statutes and can take
advantage of those flexibilities to act in the best interests of the
Army?
Answer. I believe the legal community is uniquely suited to assist
Army officials in this area. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Department's senior leadership to ensure that Army acquisition programs
and financial operations comply with their governing legal and policy
framework but also to question and modify program strategies that
reflect an inaccurate or unduly restrictive interpretation of
applicable authorities.
Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by
Army personnel and by Army contractors?
Answer. It is essential that the Department have well-understood
business rules designed to avoid or mitigate organizational and
personal conflicts of interest. Army lawyers play an important role in
this area through robust programs for acquisition ethics training and
proactive involvement in the Army's acquisition, logistics and
technology programs and contracting operations. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology and other Army senior leaders to foster an
organizational climate that is sensitive to the importance of avoiding
conflicts of interest and that appropriately addresses specific
situations that arise.
Question. Allegations of fraud and abuse during contingency
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wide-spread.
What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army
personnel are properly trained in contingency contracting and are
supervised in the performance of their duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
Army, the Under Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, and other senior
officials to ensure that the Army legal community continues to support
the contingency contracting initiatives adopted in response to the 2007
Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in
Expeditionary Operations, also known as the ``Gansler Commission
Report.'' I would also work closely with The Judge Advocate General of
the Army and other senior leaders in the Army legal community to ensure
that an appropriate level of legal resources are allocated in support
of contingency contracting.
detecting conflicts of interest
Question. Personal and organizational conflicts of interest have
become a major concern. DOD's expanded use of private contractors being
tasked to perform key functions that the services had formerly
performed in-house and the new requirement to fill thousands of DOD
civilian positions with experienced, qualified individuals present
challenges in preventing conflicts of interest and the appearance of
conflicts of interest.
What do you think the Army should do, and what should the General
Counsel's role be, in ensuring that the Army identifies personal and
organizational conflicts of interests and takes the appropriate steps
to avoid or mitigate them?
Answer. Because of their potential not only to result in an unfair
competitive advantage, but also to damage the credibility of the
institution, conflicts of interest are unacceptable in any
organization. As the Army's Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO),
the General Counsel is responsible for management and oversight of the
Army Ethics Program. These duties include ensuring that Army personnel
who are required to file financial disclosure reports do so at the
appropriate time and that ethics counselors timely review these reports
to prevent or mitigate conflicts of interest. In addition, if
confirmed, I will help ensure that other circumstances of potential
conflict of interest are addressed promptly, consistent with legal
requirements.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army takes to
identify and address potential conflicts of interest during the hiring
process?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware of the steps the Army takes to
identify and address conflicts of interest during the hiring process.
If confirmed, I will look into that issue and ensure that appropriate
safeguards exist.
legal ethics
Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of
the Army attorney or an Army judge advocate should take if the attorney
becomes aware of improper activities by a Department of the Army
official who has sought the attorney's legal advice and the official is
unwilling to follow the attorney's advice?
Answer. If an Army attorney suspects that the Army official, either
in exercising functions or in failing to do so, violates a law or
standard of conduct, the attorney should immediately bring the matter
to the attention of the attorney's supervisor. If not satisfactorily
resolved at that level, the matter should be brought to higher level
supervisory lawyers or authorities in the chain of supervision or
command.
Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono
activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of
policy or does the policy need to be reviewed and revised?
Answer. I understand the former Army General Counsel established a
supportive and permissive pro bono legal practice policy for the Office
of the Army General Counsel, consistent with statutory restrictions
prohibiting federal employees from representing clients before the
federal government, including the federal courts. Many rewarding pro
bono activities are available to government attorneys in their private,
non-official capacity in areas such as family law, consumer law,
landlord-tenant disputes, and other civil and criminal law matters. If
confirmed, I would review pro bono policies to determine whether any
change would be appropriate.
Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines
that establish the rules of professional responsibility for attorneys
in the Department of the Army provide adequate guidance?
Answer. Much of the value and respect for the law depends on the
proper ethical conduct of lawyers. I believe that the laws,
regulations, and guidelines establishing rules for attorney
professional responsibility for the Department of the Army are well
developed and adequate. The Army's ethical rules are based on the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Both
uniform and civilian Army attorneys are subject to state licensing
authority ethical codes. By regulation, Army attorneys must remain, at
all times, in good standing with a at least one licensing authority in
the United States, including those of U.S. states, U.S. territories,
the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This
complimentary system of ethical oversight is implemented on a day-to-
day basis by the exercise of competent and conscientious supervision by
experienced Army attorneys at all levels. If confirmed, I would consult
and review the current professional responsibility policy and systems
with The Judge Advocate General and, as appropriate, seek revisions and
improvements.
litigation involving the department of the army
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Department of the Army and the Department of Justice with respect
to litigation involving the Department of Defense?
Answer. Under section 516 of title 28 of the U.S. code, the
authority to represent the military departments in litigation is
reserved to the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General. It is my understanding the Department of Defense and
the Department of the Army, along with the other military departments,
have a positive and mutually supportive relationship with the
Department of Justice. I understand coordination between the Department
of Justice and the military departments is timely and consistent on
every level. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively with The Judge
Advocate General and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense
to ensure the interests of the Army are fully understood and
appropriately pursued with the Department of Justice in litigation.
Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence
and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its
current supporting role?
Answer. In general, because of established close working
relationships, I think the Department of Justice is effective in
defending the interests of the Department of the Army. If confirmed, I
will routinely consult with The Judge Advocate General and the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense to determine whether adequate
authority and resources are available to protect the full measure of
the Army's interests in litigation.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the
Department of the Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
panetta review
1. Senator Cotton. Ms. Starzak, during your hearing, you responded
to a number of my questions by stating that your employment with the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ended years ago and that you do
not recall details of the events I inquired about. Please make every
effort to refresh your memory of these events. Also, please describe
what efforts you have taken to refresh your memory, including any
conversations with colleagues and any review of news articles, notes,
files, e-mails, and other records that you possess or to which you can
gain access.
Ms. Starzak. Consistent with the rules established by the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence for discussion or review of Committee-
sensitive material, I have no access to non-public Committee material
related to the Committee's study for review. I do not possess any
notes, files or emails related to the review to refresh my memory.
During the hearing, questions were asked about events that occurred
after I left the Committee in 2011. As I was not personally involved in
those events, I have no additional information about them.
2. Senator Cotton. Ms. Starzak, the first page of each document in
the Panetta Review contains the following lengthy stamp: ``This
classified document was prepared by the CIA Director's Review Group for
Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (DRGRDI) for DRG-RDI's internal
discussion purposes and should not be used for any other purpose, nor
may it be distributed without express permission from DRG-RDI or CIA's
Office of General Counsel. This document contains [certain classified
information]. This document also contains material protected by the
attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges. Furthermore, this
document constitutes deliberative work product, protected by the
deliberative-process privilege, and is not a final, conclusive,
complete, or comprehensive analysis of DRG-RDI or CIA. Rather, it was
created to suit the needs of DRG-RDI, in support of informing senior
Agency officials about broad policy issues. While every effort was made
to ensure this document's accuracy, it may contain inadvertent errors.
For this reason, and because this document selectively summarizes,
draws inferences from, or omits information from the sources it cites,
it should not be relied upon by persons outside DRG-RDI.''
As a trained attorney I would hope that one would read this caveat
and feel it best to consult with interested parties to best preserve
governmental prerogatives, exercise proper congressional oversight, and
meet ethical and legal obligations.
a. When you saw this stamp, did you notify and seek guidance from
any CIA officials?
i. Who specifically did you seek guidance from?
ii. Did these CIA officials provide you with any instructions?
b. Did you notify or seek guidance from any SSCI officials?
i. Who specifically did you seek guidance from?
ii. Did these SSCI officials instruct you to continue your review
without notifying the CIA?
Ms. Starzak. I participated in many conversations with CIA officers
related to the study and the provision of documents to the Committee.
Although the terms of reference for the study provided to the CIA by
the Committee suggested that the Committee intended the study to
examine issues that could arguably be subject to privilege, I do not
remember having any conversations in which CIA officers or attorneys
indicated that CIA was seeking to withhold documents from the Committee
pursuant to deliberative-process, attorney-client or attorney work-
product privileges. Indeed, many of the documents I reviewed in
connection with the study--including some documents the CIA delivered
to the Committee's space in the Hart Senate Office building--were
marked as deliberative or predecisional or had been prepared by CIA
attorneys. I am not aware of any claims that these documents were
provided to the Committee inadvertently, notwithstanding their markings
or the fact that they were prepared by or for attorneys. As such, the
caveat referenced above would not have provided the document a
different legal status than many of the other documents that the CIA
provided to the Committee for the purpose of congressional oversight.
I have no memory of seeking guidance from either CIA or SSCI
officials about the particular document referenced, which was one of
the more than six million pages of CIA records to which SSCI staff had
access at the CIA facility.
c. Did you notify or seek guidance from any other officials,
advisors, attorneys, or persons apart from those you may have consulted
at the CIA or with SSCI?
Ms. Starzak. No.
d. Have you ever been asked to speak to an investigator regarding
an individual who may have accessed, removed, or had knowledge of the
removal of a hard copy of the Panetta Review Document to SSCI offices?
Ms. Starzak. No.
e. Did you ever speak with the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms or the CIA
Inspector General during their investigations relating to the discovery
and removal of these documents?
Ms. Starzak. No.
rdi investigation
3. Senator Cotton. Ms. Starzak, the SSCI rules of procedure 10.4
states that the ``Committee staff shall assist the minority as fully as
the majority in the expression of minority views, including assistance
in the preparation and filing of additional, separate, and minority
views, to the end that all points of view may be fully considered by
the Committee and the Senate.''
a. Do you believe you fully complied with this rule during your
time with the committee?
Ms. Starzak. I am not aware of any minority views being prepared
related to the RDI investigation during my time on the Committee.
b. Senator Cotton. During your time with the SSCI, did you ever
request that access to CIA documents during the RDI investigation be
denied or turned off for any Republican committee staff member?
i. Senator Cotton. If so, was your request denied, overridden, or
reversed?
Ms. Starzak. Republican Committee staff was provided access to CIA
documents at the CIA facility throughout the two and half years I
worked on the study. I never requested that access to CIA documents be
denied for any Republican Committee staff member.
I do recall an isolated incident in which the CIA temporarily
suspended a minority committee staff member's access to documents after
majority staff requested to reconfigure the computer system. The
reconfiguration of the system mistakenly resulted in the temporary
suspension of the minority staff member's access to certain CIA
documents, an outcome that was never intended. Once the error was
identified, the CIA restored the minority staff member's access to CIA
records as quickly as possible.
bergdahl case
4. Senator Cotton. Ms. Starzak, President Obama traded five
hardened Taliban commanders for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, who served in the
military branch you would like to advise. The GAO found that President
Obama broke two laws with this trade--a 30-day congressional
notification requirement and the Anti-Deficiency Act.
a. Do you agree with the GAO that President Obama broke the law
twice with this transfer?
Ms. Starzak. The Department of Defense prepared a notification to
Congress on the conclusions of the report, stating that it disagreed
with GAO's conclusions. That notification is attached.
b. Susan Rice has stated that Sgt. Bergdahl served honorably. Is it
your position as well that Sgt. Bergdahl served honorably? Should the
Army encourage other soldiers to serve as honorably as Sgt. Bergdahl?
Ms. Starzak. I understand that there are preferred charges pending
against SGT Bergdahl alleging desertion and misbehavior before the
enemy, both of which are offenses under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Given the possibility that these charges may go to trial, I
believe it would be inappropriate for me to characterize SGT Bergdahl's
service or to comment on his guilt or innocence.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
guantanamo bay
5. Senator Tillis. Ms. Starzak, In the event that the President
directed the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo to the United
States, in your professional legal judgment, would officers of the
Department of the Army be at legal risk for a violation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act if they were to execute a transfer of detainees from
Guantanamo to the United States, contrary to the prohibition against
use of appropriated funds for that exact purpose?
Ms. Starzak. The Department of the Army's operations are currently
funded by a continuing resolution that incorporates funding
restrictions from the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015.
Sections 8112 and 8113 of the DOD Appropriations Act, 2015 prohibit the
use of funds to, respectively, ``transfer, release, or assist in the
transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or
possessions'' Guantanamo detainees and ``construct, acquire, or modify
any facility in the United States, its territories, or possessions to
house'' Guantanamo detainees. If the Department of the Army were to act
in a manner inconsistent with those funding restrictions, it could
potentially be a violation of the Antideficiency Act.
6. Senator Tillis. Ms. Starzak, what do you believe is the proper
authority under which the President could decide to unilaterally close
Guantanamo and move inmates to the U.S. by executive action?
Ms. Starzak. There are currently statutory prohibitions on the
transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United States. As
such, I believe it is appropriate for the Administration to engage with
Congress to address those statutory restrictions on the transfer of
detainees.
7. Senator Tillis. Ms. Starzak, the administration typically evokes
article II, section III of the Constitution when arguing against an
anti-deficiency act violation. What is your legal opinion on whether
the faithful execution clause still applies in a situation where there
is an affirmative prohibition on use of funds in the law?
Ms. Starzak. The Constitution requires the President to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed. To the extent that Congress
lawfully imposes restrictions on the use of appropriated funds, the
Take Care Clause would require the President to comply with those
funding restrictions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
guantanamo bay
8. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Starzak, after reviewing at the NDAA
provision and the Attorney General's recent statements regarding
Guantanamo Bay, does the authority to close Guantanamo Bay reside in
the Congress of the United States?
Ms. Starzak. I believe this is a reference to the comments of the
Attorney General to the House Judiciary Committee in which she
indicated that the law currently does not allow for the transfer of
detainees from Guantanamo to the United States. My understanding is
that the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 and
restrictions from the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015
incorporated into the continuing resolution currently funding DOD's
operations prohibit the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees to
or within the United States through December 31, 2016. Thus, I agree
with the Attorney General that, to the extent that closure of the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility requires the transfer of a number of
detainees to the United States for continued detention, the law does
not currently allow for that.
9. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Starzak, does the President, in light of
the FY 2016 NDAA, have the authority to unilaterally shut down
Guantanamo Bay without Congressional authorization?
Ms. Starzak. As noted above, in light of the FY 2016 NDAA and
restrictions from the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015
incorporated into the continuing resolution currently funding DOD's
operations, to the extent that closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention
facility requires the transfer of a number of detainees to the United
States for continued detention, the law does not currently allow for
that.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 13, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
Alissa M. Starzak, of New York, to be General Counsel of
the Department of the Army, vice Brad Carson, resigned.
------
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Alissa Michelle Starzak
Education:
Amherst College
1991-1995
AB
University of Chicago
1997-2000
JD
Employment Record:
Department of Defense (Washington, DC)
Deputy General Counsel (Legislation)
May 2011--Present
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington,
DC)
Counsel
January 2007-May 2011
Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC)
Assistant General Counsel
August 2005-January 2007
O'Melveny & Myers (Washington, DC)
Attorney
November 2001--August 2005
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (New Orleans,
LA)
Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly
2000-2001
Honors and Awards:
None
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Alissa M.
Starzak in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed, use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in Committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Alissa Michelle Starzak.
2. Position to which nominated:
General Counsel, Department of the Army.
3. Date of nomination:
January 13, 2015.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
August 3, 1973, Binghamton, NY.
6. Marital status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Andrew G. Gerguson.
7. Names and ages of children:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.
Amherst College, 1991-1995, AB, May 1995.
University of Chicago, 1997-2000, JD, June 2000.
9.Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
May 2011-Present: Deputy General Counsel (Legislation), Department
of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC.
January 2007-May 2011 : Counsel, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
August 2005-January 2007: Assistant General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, Washington DC.
November 2001-August 2005: Associate, O'Melveny & Myers,
Washington, DC.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2000-2001.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.
None.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Obama for America, 2012, $200.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
N/A.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.
16. Speeches: Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Alissa M. Starzak
This 7th day of April, 2015
[The nomination of Ms. Alissa M. Starzak was reported to
the Senate by Chairman McCain on December 7, 2015, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2015.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Franklin R. Parker by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
What modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions, if any, do
you believe are necessary for the readiness of the armed forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether there is a need for
changes to the Goldwater-Nichols provisions. Given that changes would
likely have implications across all Services and the potential to alter
the basic command and control and operational readiness of our forces,
any proposed changes would have to be carefully considered by senior
leadership across the Department of Defense (DOD). In the area of
personnel policy, I understand the Goldwater-Nichols provisions that
govern promotion policies are nearly thirty years old and, if
confirmed, I will review those in detail to see if they continue to
meet the needs of our current force.
duties
Question. Section 5016 of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs shall have ``as his principal duty the overall supervision of
manpower and Reserve component affairs of the Department of the Navy.''
If confirmed, what duties do you expect that the Secretary of the
Navy will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe the Secretary of the Navy will
require me to provide overall supervision and oversight of manpower and
Reserve component affairs for the Navy and Marine Corps. I would be
responsible for developing integrated policies and programs related to
military personnel (Active and Reserve components) and the civilian
workforce. Additionally, I would provide the necessary oversight of our
total force--military, civilians and contractors--to ensure the most
efficient workforce balance.
Question. What actions will you take to enhance your ability to
perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will apply my experience in government
service to further my understanding and knowledge of the Department of
the Navy, its people and organizations. I will diligently evaluate the
challenges it faces and the resources necessary to sustain and
transform it. I will seek advice and counsel from the military and
civilian personnel of the Department and from Members of Congress and
their staffs.
Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
relationship with the following officials:
The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for conducting all
the affairs of the Department of the Navy and for formulating and
implementing policies and programs consistent with the policies and
objectives established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to help him
achieve his goals, particularly those involving manpower issues. My
role will be defined in part by powers he may choose to delegate to me.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The position of Under Secretary of the Navy is currently
vacant. As the Chief Operating Officer of the Department of the Navy,
the Under Secretary plays a significant role in prioritizing and
synchronizing the efforts of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy. If
confirmed, I would establish a close, direct, and supportive
relationship with the new Under Secretary of the Navy, or the person
acting in that capacity.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate with them on our combined
interests and work together to support the Secretary's goals.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The General Counsel is the senior civilian legal advisor to
the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries and
their staffs. If confirmed, I expect to consult and rely upon the
General Counsel on a variety of legal issues in discharging my
responsibilities.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the senior uniformed legal
advisor to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations and
serves as the Department of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy
Affairs. If confirmed, I expect to consult and rely upon the Judge
Advocate General on a variety of legal issues in discharging my
responsibilities.
Question. The Inspector General of the Navy.
Answer. The Naval Inspector General is the senior investigating
official in the Department of the Navy and the principal advisor to the
Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps on all matters concerning inspection, investigations,
and audit follow-up. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a
close and professional relationship with the Naval Inspector General.
Question. The Chief of Legislative Affairs of the Navy.
Answer. The Chief of Legislative Affairs is responsible for
developing legislative strategies for the Navy. If confirmed I will
work closely with him as it relates to the Department's legislative
requirements for manpower and personnel and to ensure an open and
candid dialogue with the oversight committees and individual Members of
Congress and their respective staffs.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Total Force Management as it relates to
readiness, Active and Reserve component affairs, health affairs,
training, and personnel requirements and management. These
responsibilities include the issuance of guidance to the Military
Departments. If confirmed, I will develop a close and professional
relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness. I will continuously communicate and coordinate with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on matters of
mutual interest, articulating the views of the Department of the Navy.
I will ensure that the Department of the Navy is administered in
accordance with guidance and direction from the Department of Defense.
Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness.
Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness advises the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness and, from time to time, performs
responsibilities that require the issuance of guidance to the Military
Departments. If confirmed, I will continuously communicate and
coordinate with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness on matters of mutual interest and in
furtherance of the best interests of the Department of the Navy and the
Department of Defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs.
Answer. This is a new position and currently not filled. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is
responsible for the overall supervision of manpower and Reserve affairs
of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will communicate and
coordinate with the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, or the person acting in that capacity, in the
development of programs and policy related to military and civilian
personnel in furtherance of the best interests of the Department of the
Navy and the Department of Defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness.
Answer. This is a new position and currently not filled. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness is responsible for
advising the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness on key readiness and training issues. If confirmed, I
will communicate and coordinate with the new Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Readiness, or the person acting in that capacity, on
matters of mutual interest and in furtherance of the best interests of
the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense.
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. The Chief of Naval Operations is the senior military
officer of the Department of the Navy and has a direct reporting
relationship to the Secretary of the Navy. If confirmed, I would work
with the CNO to support the Secretary in areas of manpower policy as
well as program execution.
Question. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations is the second highest-
ranking commissioned officer in the United States Navy, and serves as
the second-in-command for the Chief of Naval Operations. If confirmed,
I will work very closely with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, as
required, on manpower issues.
Question. The Chief of Naval Personnel.
Answer. The Chief of Naval Personnel is responsible to the Chief of
Naval Operations for Navy's manpower readiness. If confirmed, I would
maintain a close relationship with the Chief of Naval Personnel, ensure
that the manpower, personnel, training, and education needs of the Navy
are met, and to provide the best possible support for sailors and their
families.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. The Commandant is the highest-ranking officer in the United
States Marine Corps and has a direct reporting relationship to the
Secretary of the Navy. If confirmed, I would work with the Commandant
to support the Secretary in areas of manpower policy as well as program
execution.
Question. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is the second
highest ranking officer in the United States Marine Corps and serves as
the second-in-command for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If
confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant Commandant of
the Marine Corps, as required, on manpower issues.
Question. The Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs.
Answer. The Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs assists the Commandant by planning, directing,
coordinating, and supervising both Active and Reserve forces. If
confirmed, I would maintain a close relationship with the Deputy
Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, ensure
that the manpower, personnel, training, and education needs of the
Marine Corps are met, and to provide the best possible support for
Marines and their families.
Question. The Surgeon General of the Navy.
Answer. The Surgeon General of the Navy is the Chief of the Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery. If confirmed, I would look to the Surgeon
General for advice and insights on the spectrum of medical affairs
affecting our Navy and Marine Corps personnel.
Question. The Chief of Navy Reserve.
Answer. The Chief of Navy Reserve is the principal advisor on Navy
Reserve matters to the Chief of Naval Operations and the commander of
the Navy Reserve Force. If confirmed, I would work closely with the
Chief of Navy Reserve on the numerous operational and policy matters
affecting the Reserve component of the Navy.
Question. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve.
Answer. The Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, is the principal
advisor to the Commandant on Marine Forces Reserve matters. If
confirmed, I would work closely with Commander, Marine Forces Reserve
on the numerous operational and policy matters affecting the Marine
Forces Reserve.
Question. Marines, sailors and their families.
Answer. Those men and women who answer the call to duty and service
are our Nation's most valuable national security assets. If confirmed,
I will work to ensure sailors and marines are fully trained, integrated
and ready when called upon. I will also work diligently to care for
sailors, marines and their families across the Department of the Navy
to ensure they enjoy a comfortable quality of life that meets their
individual and collective needs as they serve and sacrifice on behalf
of our Nation. Additionally, I would meet with sailors and marines
wherever they are stationed, when practicable, to gain their insights
and to remain informed of the issues and concerns most important to
them.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe my personal background, my
educational and my professional experiences qualify me for this
position.
The son and nephew of Vietnam veterans--my father an Air Force
Captain, my uncle an Army Lieutenant Colonel--I was raised with a deep
appreciation for what it means to be called to serve our Nation. It was
instilled in me at an early age that we must always respect our
servicemembers and their service, and that we must always care for them
as they have for us. Following 9/11, I left the practice of law to
pursue a life of public service. After earning an advanced Public
Policy degree in Political Advocacy and Leadership from Harvard
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, I returned to
private legal practice specializing, in part, in legislative and
regulatory affairs, where I gained valuable experience working with
Congressional offices on public policy issues.
In 2009, I was honored to receive an appointment as Special
Assistant (attorney-advisor) to the General Counsel of the Department
of the Navy. During this extraordinary opportunity, I worked on a range
of matters that provided me with critical insight into issues impacting
the Department, its servicemen and women, and its civilian personnel. I
was afforded the unique opportunity to participate in DOD's
Comprehensive Review Working Group, which examined the impacts of a
repeal of the ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' policy; exploring the potential
effects of one of the most significant military personnel policy
changes of our time. For my service, I was honored to receive the
Department of the Navy's Meritorious Public Service Award in 2011 and
the Distinguished Public Service Award in 2012.
In 2012, I was appointed as Chief Counsel for the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) at the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
where I serve not only as MARAD's chief legal officer, but also as its
third-ranking official. In this capacity, my responsibilities include
not only legal matters, but also impact broader personnel, management,
and policy concerns in support of MARAD's mission. Core to this mission
is the training, employment, and retention of the U.S. merchant
mariners and maritime professionals who support our Nation's commercial
and military sealift requirements. In addition to my core duties as
Chief Counsel, I have been closely involved in other personnel-related
initiatives such as serving on DOT's Senior Executive Service (SES)
Performance Review Board, participating in Office of Personnel
Management-led interagency efforts to improve SES onboarding practices,
and playing various roles in hiring, diversity, mentoring, quality of
life, professional development, outreach and other efforts.
I believe the sum of my experiences in private practice and
government; my efforts on both military and civilian personnel matters;
my legal familiarity with governmental authorities and limitations; my
perspective having served in both defense and civilian agencies; my
understanding of government processes, organizations, and dynamics; my
roles as an action officer, a Senior Executive and as a member of
senior Agency leadership; my work with Congressional offices and staff,
and the deep respect and appreciation I hold for the women and men who
serve our Nation, equip me with the skills I need to effectively
perform the duties of this position.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs?
Answer. In my view, the fundamental challenge facing the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is effectively
manning the entire force, which equates to balancing military readiness
with future requirements. Manning the force with the right manpower mix
of qualified military, civilian, and contractor personnel in the
current and foreseeable fiscal environment will be a critical
challenge. The Department of the Navy must continue to recruit, train
and retain the very best, maintain the superior pay and benefits
package our sailors and marines deserve, and ensure the best care for
our wounded warriors and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
If confirmed, I will work within the Department of the Navy-
Department of Defense framework to address manpower requirements while
supporting our servicemen and women and their families. I will work to
ensure that major headquarters are properly adjusted per congressional
and SECDEF guidance. I will support SECDEF and SECNAV initiatives such
as Force of the Future, Task Force Innovation, and Talent Management
initiatives to enhance flexibility in career and workforce management
and help develop and retain the Department of the Navy's highly trained
personnel. I will address requirements by garnering the expertise of
the civilian and military leadership within the Department of the Navy,
the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and will be open to input from Members of
Congress and the Department's oversight committees.
systems and support for wounded soldiers
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat
operations deserve the highest priority from the Navy and the Federal
Government for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from Active Duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis
over the past several years, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Navy to
improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and
injured marines and sailors, and their families?
Answer. I am aware that the Navy and Marine Corps take seriously
the importance of caring for the medical needs of their personnel and
their families. I understand the Navy Safe Harbor program and Marine
Corps Wounded Warrior Regiment programs were established to improve and
integrate support services, and speed delivery of coordinated care. In
addition to these programs, I am aware the Navy 21st Century sailor and
marine initiative has been established to address other areas to
provide the full spectrum of whole life support. If confirmed, I will
continue to support and optimize these and other vital programs for
Wounded Warriors and their families.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy's support for
wounded marines and sailors, and to monitor their progress in returning
to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
Secretary of the Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health
Affairs), Surgeon General of the Navy, the Department of Veterans
Affairs leadership, and the veteran service and non-profit
organizations in local communities to continually evaluate and improve
existing programs and initiatives provided to our wounded and their
families. In addition I will look to continue the Department's Annual
Wounded Warrior Hiring conference. I will continue to champion the best
practices of training, hiring and retaining our wounded, ill and
injured servicemembers into both government and private career
opportunities. I thank Congress for its continued support, as I believe
our Nation and our Department owe these wounded sailors and marines a
debt that can never fully be paid.
officer management issues
Question. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs you would have significant responsibilities with regard
to officer management policies, the promotion system, and recommending
officers for nomination to positions of authority and responsibility.
If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you make to the officer
management system?
Answer. I understand the officer management systems, and in
particular the promotion system, are constantly being evaluated and
efforts made to improve them. I am not yet familiar with the specifics
of the program, or the results of the latest evaluations. However, if
confirmed, I will fully consider and evaluate any recommendations from
Navy and Marine Corps leadership for system improvement.
Question. Do you believe the current Navy procedures and practices
for reviewing the records of officers pending nomination by the
President are sufficient to ensure the Secretary of the Navy, the
Secretary of Defense, and the President can make informed decisions?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy's processes and
policies to identify eligibility and suitability for appointment or re-
appointment as officers provide sufficient information for these
decisions. If confirmed, I will fully support efforts to enhance
personnel suitability screening associated with nominations for
appointments to higher positions of leadership, trust and
responsibility.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and
reasonable for the officers involved?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, current procedures for vetting
personal and professional information seek to protect the rights of
individual officers and the interests of the Navy in advancing only
those who have clearly demonstrated exceptional character, competence,
and commitment to the Nation's values. If confirmed, I will support
these vetting processes and, for any changes proposed, I will ensure
the due process rights of individual officers are protected.
technical training and assignment of general and flag officers
Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of general and flag
officers have advanced training and degrees in scientific and technical
disciplines?
Answer. Anecdotally, it has been my personal experience that the
general and flag officers I have worked with predominantly have
sufficient training and degrees to fulfill their responsibilities. In
my previous position as an attorney in the Office of the General
Counsel of the Navy, it was apparent to me that many of the general and
flag officers with whom I interacted had scientific and technical
backgrounds likely obtained through a scientific or technical
undergraduate and/or graduate degree.
If confirmed, I will closely monitor the inventory of senior
officer personnel to ensure our Navy and Marine Corps has officers with
the technical and scientific training necessary to perform their
duties.
Question. Are the career paths for officers with technical skills
appropriate to ensure that the services can execute complex acquisition
programs, adapt to a rapidly changing technological threat environment,
and make informed investment decisions on DOD and Army resources? If
not, what will you do to address this deficiency?
Answer. It is my understanding that there are multiple factors that
affect a general/flag officer's ability to ensure the effective
execution of complex acquisition programs. I understand that the
Department of the Navy policy for the Acquisition Workforce requires
that those general/flag officers serving in positions with oversight
responsibility for major acquisition programs have at least 10 years of
experience, prior experience in a Critical Acquisition Position, as
well as prior experience as an acquisition Program Manager or Deputy
Program Manager.
Additionally, I understand that the Department of the Navy (DON)
attempts to provide a robust development program for its acquisition
program leaders. For example, I understand the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition has Acquisition War
Rooms that provide well-researched lessons learned on what has been
successful in Shipbuilding/Combat Systems Acquisition as they relate to
current programs. Newly selected leaders are required to go through the
War Rooms. Further, DON offers an ``Understanding Industry'' course
that arms participants with an understanding of the mindset of Industry
leaders, better equipping participants to more effectively negotiate
business arrangements. Additionally, I understand DON allows selected
acquisition leaders to participate in the Secretary of Defense
Corporate Fellowship Program, a year-long training opportunity with
Industry to gain first-hand experience with corporate operations.
Combined with existing acquisition experience, Defense Acquisition
University training, and graduate education, these initiatives are
intended to collectively develop well-rounded Program Managers.
Question. In your view do current general and flag officer
assignment policies provide and incentivize qualified officers to serve
in acquisition programs? Do tour lengths for those assignments enable
and empower such officers to effectively manage acquisition programs?
If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the
effectiveness of senior officers assigned those duties?
Answer. I am aware the DON has policy to ensure that acquisition
officers promote at the same rate as those in non-acquisition
positions. In addition, I understand the department has made efforts to
incentivize those leading and executing acquisition programs. There are
more than ten different awards recognized in the annual DON Acquisition
Excellence Awards Ceremony, with multiple others submitted for
recognition at the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) level. The department also recognizes
leaders of acquisition programs in the USD (AT&L) magazine. DON policy
requires tour lengths that are consistent with OSD policy, i.e., four
years (or closest major milestone) for those leading major programs and
three years for those serving as Program Executive Officers. Beyond
that, DON's Program Review process attempts to ensure program leaders
are empowered to make decisions to effectively manage their programs.
If confirmed, I will evaluate whether there is a relevant and
sufficient match between acquisition education requirements and senior
officer training and education.
general and flag officer nominations
Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse
information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated
by senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense prior to nomination.
Answer. [Noting that the guidance has been updated as DOD
Instruction 1320.04 in January 2014]
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the officer
promotion system, particularly in reviewing general and flag officer
nominations?
Answer. The officer promotion system is governed by the Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act and the Reserve Officer Personnel
Management Act. If confirmed, I will review all flag and general
officer nominations prior to approval by the Secretary of the Navy. If
there are any concerns, I would consult with the Chief of Naval
Personnel or the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs to discuss the issues prior to routing the nomination
to the Secretary.
I understand that current regulations and procedures provide senior
civilian oversight to ensure information relevant to prospective
nominees is appropriately considered by promotion boards and officials
within the recommending hierarchical chain. If confirmed, I will engage
with and monitor these processes to preserve the integrity of the
promotion system to ensure that the officers promoted are physically,
mentally and morally qualified to serve at the highest levels.
Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the Services to
timely document credible information of an adverse nature for
evaluation by promotion selection boards and military and civilian
leaders?
Answer. I believe that consideration of all information is critical
to ensuring the reliability of selection board results. I consider this
to be a vitally important responsibility. If confirmed, I would
carefully review the selection process for military and civilian
leaders to ensure information of an adverse nature is properly
evaluated. It is my understanding that the Navy's process to identify
credible information of an adverse nature for evaluation by promotion
selection boards and military and civilian leaders provides sufficient
information for these decisions. If confirmed, I will review and
monitor these processes to determine if there are areas for
improvement.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
only the best qualified officers are nominated for promotion to general
and flag officer rank?
Answer. I understand that a thorough screening process and review
is conducted on convening orders for flag and general officer selection
boards to ensure clear guidance is provided to all flag and general
officer selection board members. While I am not fully aware of the
existing process within the Department of the Navy for developing and
promulgating selection criteria for general and flag officers, if
confirmed I would examine this process closely. If confirmed, I will
provide the Secretary my frank assessment of the existing processes and
will make recommendations regarding any changes necessary to ensure the
best qualified officers are nominated.
end strength reductions
Question. In this year's budget request and Future Years Defense
Program, the Department proposes making additional cuts to the Marine
Corps active and Reserve component end strengths. The Department
proposes reducing the marine Active component to 182,000 by 2020, and
plans to keep the Marine Corps forces at 182,000 if sequestration
continues.
In your view, can the Marine Corps meet national defense objectives
at the strength levels proposed without sequestration? What about at
the strength levels proposed with sequestration?
Answer. I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
testified that the Marine Corps can meet the requirements of the
Defense Strategic Guidance today at the President's Budget levels, but
there is no margin. Lowering end strength due to sequestration or
enforcement of the Budget Control Act funding caps would not allow the
Marine Corps to execute the current Defense Strategic Guidance. I
understand a new strategy would need to be developed that would take
into account fewer warfighting units available to deploy in defense of
the Nation.
Question. If the Marine Corps must reduce its active component end
strength to 182,000, where does the Marine Corps take risk with respect
to the national defense strategy?
Answer. I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
testified that the Marine Corps has been forced to prioritize near-term
readiness for forward deployed marines and assume risk in home station
readiness, modernization, infrastructure sustainment, and quality of
life programs.
If confirmed, I will work with Marine Corps leadership to minimize
the risk to overall Service readiness.
Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional
force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has
provided the past three years?
Answer. I understand Congress has given the Marine Corps the
authorities necessary to accomplish its present drawdown. If confirmed,
I will assess Departmental processes and results to ensure the Marine
Corps reduces end strength in a smart, measured way and identifies any
additional legislative changes needed in a timely manner.
Question. In your view, should the number of general and flag
officers in the Marine Corps and Navy be reduced commensurate with the
drawdown of total Marine and Navy end strength?
Answer. I am aware that the Services recently conducted a
Congressionally-directed review of active component general and flag
officer billets. A similar review is underway now for the Reserve
component. If confirmed, I will ensure that any recommendations
regarding changes in the number of authorized flag and general officers
are based on the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, considering the
nature of responsibilities associated with any specific position.
lessons learned
Question. What do you believe are the major personnel lessons
learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) which you would seek to address if confirmed as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs?
Answer. I am confident that there are valuable personnel lessons
learned from OEF and OIF. The sacrifices of our sailors and marines,
and their families in support of these operations, were made at great
cost. It is impressive that all the Services have been able to maintain
a high-quality all-volunteer force through more than a decade of combat
operations. The continuous integration of Active Duty and Reserve
forces throughout and since these Operations has been remarkable as
well. I am aware that there have been many lessons from OEF and OIF
about the impacts of stress on the force, and there is still more to
learn and to do in support of the physical and mental resiliency of our
sailors and marines, and for veterans seeking to reintegrate with their
families and communities, to include transitioning from the uniform. If
confirmed, I will seek out and review the hard-earned lessons learned
with senior leaders within the Department of the Navy.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue
to be of great concern to the Committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide
prevention programs and policies for the Department of the Navy to
prevent suicides and increase the resiliency of marines, sailors and
their families?
Answer. I share the Department of the Navy view that every suicide
is a tragedy, and that suicide is also a leadership issue. I understand
that the Services have taken significant steps to improve suicide
prevention efforts. If confirmed, I will support efforts to encourage
strength and resilience among sailors, marines and their families, and
to foster command climates supportive of psychological health and help-
seeking behavior. It is critical that the Department continues to
emphasize the importance of personal responsibility, peer-support and
bystander intervention, and that it continues to emphasize that seeking
help is a sign of strength.
family readiness and support
Question. Marines, sailors and their families in both the active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for marines, sailors and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal
constraints?
Answer. Sailors, marines and their families are the Department of
the Navy's greatest assets. Addressing their needs can be more
challenging in times of war or contingency operations, particularly in
a fiscally constrained environment. If confirmed, I will work with the
Services to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, the
Department remains agile and responsive to the needs of servicemembers
and their families, within fiscal realities. Whether assisting them in
transitioning to civilian life, or providing financial education
throughout their service, addressing their needs and desires will be
essential to success.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for marines, sailors and their
families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be
relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active-duty
and Reserve personnel, retirees, and families.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Navy MWR programs,
particularly in view of the current fiscal environment and, if
confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve?
Answer. It is vitally important not to marginalize MWR program
contribution to readiness and retention. If confirmed, I will work with
the Services to ensure program relevance and sustainability. I am aware
that in a fiscally constrained environment, it is critical to optimize
MWR's revenue generating capability and to protect the profitability of
the military exchanges that help fund MWR programs.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. What is your assessment of the Navy's sexual assault
prevention and response program?
Answer. In recent years, I understand over 150 program and policy
initiatives have been implemented in an effort to provide a
comprehensive approach to sexual assault prevention and response
(SAPR).
I am aware that in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14), reports of sexual
assault in the Department continued to increase over previous years,
though I understand that an increase in sexual assault reports may not
necessarily represent increased incidents of sexual assault. For a
crime that is universally underreported, the Department believes this
trend may represent in part an improved command climate since when a
sailor or marine trusts the command to respond appropriately, he or she
is more likely to make a report. I understand that the DON is also
committed to further efforts to address sexual assault through new
training initiatives, such as bystander intervention training. Despite
these efforts, however, I concur with the Department's view that there
is more work to be done and that this issue requires continued focus at
the highest levels.
Question. What is your view of the provision for restricted and
unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?
Answer. I understand that the system allowing both restricted and
unrestricted reporting is valuable to ensure that all persons have
access to support services.
If confirmed, I would be committed to ensuring that victims have
the option whether to report and, if they decide to do so, they can
report in a manner that respects their privacy, their rights, and their
desire to participate in the military justice system.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Through their words and deeds, commanding officers set the
tone for, and are ultimately responsible for, command climate. As a
result, they are the lynchpin for establishing and maintaining a
positive command climate.
Every commander must be held accountable for ensuring the well-
being of each individual within the command. The chain of command is
integral to providing compassionate care and support to victims. It is
also fundamental to implementing command-wide training on how to
support survivors and ensuring implementation of military policies
regarding sexual assault prevention and response.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy
resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. I am aware that the Department has placed a significant
focus on providing support to victims. I have been informed that
victims are offered a range of resources to provide them with the
proper physical, emotional and legal support. I understand that newly
established programs and positions such as Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARC), deployed resiliency counselors, and Victims' Legal
Counsel (VLC) have afforded important guidance, support, and advocacy
for victims. Meanwhile, I understand the medical community strives to
provide individuals with compassionate, competent, and victim-centered
care.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed
locations?
Answer. I understand that the Department is aggressively attempting
to address the problem of sexual assault no matter where an offense is
committed. Specifically, I understand that SARCs, deployed resiliency
counselors, and VLCs are available worldwide. The Department has also
established peer-to-peer training for every sailor and marine. Given
the connection between alcohol use and sexual assault, the Department
has established alcohol sales policies on every Navy installation. In
addition, I understand the Department has established new base security
measures in resident housing. If confirmed, I will support continued
efforts to eliminate all forms of sexual assault, in all locations, and
will advocate for the continuous development of effective new
approaches to combat the crime and to support victims.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources Navy has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of
sexual assault?
Answer. I understand there has been significant focus on ensuring
sufficient resources and training for NCIS and Navy and Marine Corps
judge advocates. I am aware that NCIS is required to investigate every
allegation of sexual assault and I understand that changes have put
into place specialists who handle investigations, courtroom litigation
and provide victim support.
Adequacy of training and resources for investigation, prosecution,
and defense of allegations of sexual assault is critical to ensuring a
thorough investigation and fair trial of sexual assault cases while
protecting both the victim's privacy interests and the constitutional
rights of the alleged offenders. If confirmed, I will monitor the
Department's training and resources closely to ensure that they
sufficiently prepare and equip those who investigate and prosecute
sexual assault allegations.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?
Answer. I believe that preventing and responding to sexual assault
is not just a legal issue--it is a leadership issue. The chain of
command is responsible for the health and well-being of the
servicemembers they have been entrusted to lead and plays a fundamental
role in the Department of the Navy's (DON's) prevention and response
efforts. As a result, the chain of command must practice, promote and
reinforce these efforts at every level in order to create an
environment and culture in which sexual assault is not tolerated.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. I believe that, in the military environment, the chain of
command has a central role in ensuring the well-being of
servicemembers, but I also understand concerns that have been expressed
regarding the role of the chain of command in sexual assault
prosecutions. If confirmed, I will closely examine this important
question, and will keep an open mind regarding options for improving
the system for prosecutions of sexual assault.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue ongoing work to implement
statutory mandates, Secretary of Defense initiatives, and Service
initiatives, and would monitor these new initiatives for effectiveness
as they are implemented. I would consider any independent
recommendations and would also continue collaboration with
Congressional oversight committees; keeping an open mind regarding
their concerns and suggestions for addressing this important issue. In
addition, I would stress the importance of training as well as the
significance of a commitment from leadership at all levels to create
and sustain a climate that refuses to tolerate sexual assault or
retaliation against survivors.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do Department of Defense policies
concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately
accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including
individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have
different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. I understand the Department of the Navy (DON) and the
Department of Defense (DOD) take very seriously the Constitutional
freedom expressed in the First Amendment for the free exercise of
religion on the part of all citizens, including members in military
service, and respects those who observe no religion. I am aware that
commanders, leaders, and chaplains are responsible for ensuring those
rights are afforded to all of our sailors, marines, their families, and
DON civilians, and for striving to protect their civil liberties to the
greatest extent possible, consistent with military requirements.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. The Navy's Chaplain Corps provides religious support to the
Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard on the basis of the
servicemembers' respective free exercise rights. Chaplains provide
prayers on many occasions in both private and public settings, and I
understand chaplains are never required to pray outside of their
individual convictions, beliefs, religious traditions, or the tenets of
the religious organization that provides their endorsement to DOD and
DON. I understand that there are no Department policies that restrict
prayers, either in manner or content, though chaplains are encouraged
to be respectful of other faiths when praying during official
ceremonies where attendance is mandatory.
Question. Section 533 of the FY13 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 112-239), as amended by section 532 of the FY14 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) protects rights of conscience
of members of the armed forces and chaplains of such members, and
prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any
adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion,
schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious
denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex
marriage.
In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely
held belief in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse
personnel action or similar other adverse action, if he or she shares
those personal views on the subject in a personal capacity?
Answer. I understand that sailors and marines may express
sincerely-held moral or religious views about same-sex marriage when
speaking in a personal capacity, but must avoid any appearance that
they are expressing an official position. DOD's Equal Opportunity
policy (DODD 1020.02E) guarantees all servicemembers an environment
free from harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. Having an
environment free from discrimination helps ensure that sailors and
marines reach their potential and contribute as much as possible to the
mission. So while I understand the Department recognizes that some
servicemembers may hold very sincere religious convictions in good-
faith opposition to same-sex marriage, it nevertheless requires all
sailors and marines to abide by DOD's Equal Opportunity policy in their
official capacities.
officer accessions
Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relative
distribution from the sources of commission to meet the Navy's officer
accessions requirements and sustain the viability of the Naval Academy,
Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the Officer Candidate School?
Answer. My understanding is that each commissioning source brings
different strengths in terms of prior military experience, academic
background, diversity, and indoctrination into military culture. The
existence of different commissioning sources likely makes naval service
appealing to a wider range of young men and women than would be
attracted by any single program. If confirmed, I would need to look at
the reasons each Service relies on a particular source for a specific
number of officer commissions each year, to determine whether the
relative distribution is appropriately aligned with the skills and
experiences necessary to meet the requirements of the force.
united states naval academy
Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at
the United States Naval Academy to prevent and respond appropriately to
sexual assaults and sexual harassment and to ensure essential
oversight?
Answer. My understanding is that the United States Naval Academy
(USNA) possesses policies and procedures designed to prevent and
respond appropriately to sexual harassment and sexual assaults and to
ensure essential oversight. I believe it is critical at every level to
promote a positive command climate that does not tolerate any form of
sexual assault,or sexual harassment. I understand that the USNA
recognizes this and that the highest levels of school leadership are
engaged on this issue. Recently, the USNA has played an integral part
in the launch of the ``It's On Us'' campaign that addresses prevention
of sexual assault on college campuses and has participated in a number
of civilian institutional forums designed to share best practices. If
confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be to support the ongoing
efforts to strengthen the USNA programs and policies that attempt to
eliminate sexual assault and sexual harassment.
Question. What is your assessment of the policies and procedures at
the United States Naval Academy to ensure religious tolerance and
respect?
Answer. It is my understanding that the USNA follows Department of
Defense and Department of the Navy policies on religious accommodation
and has procedures in place aimed at ensuring religious tolerance,
respect, and support for midshipmen, faculty, and staff in their
personal faith choices. I fully support this Constitutional right and
recognize its importance to our Nation and the Department of the Navy.
If confirmed, I will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the
Department of the Navy's policies reflect religious tolerance for all
faiths.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. The Department of Defense, in January, 2013, rescinded
the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which
have the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat
operations, and gave the military services until January 1, 2016, to
open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an
exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an
exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The services were tasked to develop
gender-free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards and have
submitted their reports and recommendations to the Military Departments
who in turn provided their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
no later than 30 September 2015 for review and final decision.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe my role would be oversight and
advice to the Secretary of the Navy regarding these standards.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are
realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission
capability?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work closely with both the Navy
and Marine Corps and seriously consider their respective input in
development or implementation of the standards.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you
take to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. I understand the Department of the Navy is committed to
evaluating the requirements of each position in order to select and
train sailors and marines, who can meet the requirements of their
military occupational specialties, regardless of the gender of the
individual. My understanding is that decisions will not be based on
which positions to open, but rather on what positions require an
exception to remain closed. I understand that exceptions to policy (if
any) would be subject to a very high bar and that military requirements
would be the primary consideration for any such exceptions.
Question. If an exception to policy is requested, what criteria
should be used to determine whether to grant or deny that exception?
Answer. It is premature for me at this time to offer my opinion on
the appropriate criteria for granting exceptions to policy. However, I
understand that criteria related to military requirements would play a
central role if any exceptions are requested. I share the Navy and
Marine Corps view that it is imperative to always maintain the high
military standards that are necessary in defense of our Nation.
legislative fellowship program
Question. Each year, the Services assign mid-career officers to the
offices of Members of Congress under the Legislative Fellows Program.
Upon completion of their legislative fellowships, officers are required
to be assigned to follow-on positions in their services in which they
effectively use the experience and knowledge they gained during their
fellowships.
What is your assessment of the process for the recruitment,
selection, preparation, and assignment to Members of Navy officers in
the Legislative Fellows program?
Answer. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps Legislative
Fellows programs are open to a wide variety of Line and Staff Corps
officers permanent grades of O2 to O5 and some E-6 to E-9. Competition
is keen, and the selection process focuses primarily on individual
performance, promotion potential, career, timing, breadth of
experience, academic and subspecialty qualifications, needs of the Navy
and Marine Corps, and availability for follow-on assignment, as well as
communication skills, aptitude, personality, and the general ability to
adapt to a Capitol Hill work environment. I understand that Fellow
selectees are provided with training within the Office of Legislative
Affairs and in a Capitol Hill workshop, and that they are offered the
opportunity to earn a Legislative Additional Qualification Designator
(AQD).
Question. What is your assessment of the value of the Legislative
Fellows program to the Navy and the utilization of officers who have
served as legislative fellows?
Answer. I understand the Fellows program educates Navy personnel on
the workings of the legislative branch of government, while enhancing
Navy/Marine Corps' ability to fulfill its role in the national policy
development process. I understand that the Navy/Marine Corps benefit
from assignment of personnel to Congress by bringing a unique
perspective to the process of drafting and passing legislation, and by
affording the incumbent an opportunity to learn about the legislative
process. Specifically, Fellows receive instruction and hands-on
experience in a Congressional office through dedicated training and
developmental activities; a full-time, one-year assignment to the staff
of a Member of Congress who serves on a Defense-related subcommittee;
and liaison with the Navy/Marine Corps Office of Legislative Affairs
(OLA).
management and development of the senior executive service
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Navy
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and
technical fields?
Answer. I am very interested in supporting the development and
management of the senior executive workforce for the Department of the
Navy. The quality and capabilities of the civilian executive leadership
is vital to the functioning of the Department. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure that senior executives have a diverse portfolio of
experiences and strong leadership skills that support the Department's
mission and organizational goals. I understand that the Department has
an enterprise approach to senior executive management through an
Executive Management Advisory Panel and an annual Talent and Succession
Management process. My understanding is that these processes were
designed to ensure the Department has the leadership and technical
talent for the mission including acquisition, financial, scientific and
technical capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the executive
management process and ensure that the policies are in place to
attract, retain, and develop the best senior executives for all
positions.
balance between civilian employees and contractor employees
Question. The Navy employs many civilian employees and contractors.
In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on
the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same
functions as federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up
an integral part of the Department's total workforce.
Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Navy?
Answer. I believe the Department of the Navy's best interests are
served by achieving and maintaining the right balance of military,
federal civil servants and contractor employees in each organization
and set of functions. I am aware that for each function, the Department
of the Navy must consider the most appropriate, effective, and cost-
efficient source of labor to meet mission requirements. If confirmed, I
would be committed to identifying and maintaining the optimal mix of
military, federal civil servants, and contractor personnel and to
practices that ensure the best stewardship of taxpayer resources.
Question. In your view, has the Department utilized contractors to
perform basic functions in an appropriate manner?
Answer. For every function, the Department should consider the most
appropriate and effective sources of labor, and apply scrutiny to
processes at all levels to ensure that no inherently governmental
functions are outsourced. It is also critical for the Department to
examine mission requirements and best stewardship practices of existing
resources when determining the most effective use of contractors. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with the Secretary of the Navy,
the Under Secretary, and other leaders to assess the extent of the
Department's reliance on contractors and to ensure compliance with law
and policy.
Question. Do you believe that the Navy should undertake a
comprehensive reappraisal of ``inherently governmental functions'' and
other critical government functions, and how they are performed?
Answer. I understand that the Federal Activities Inventory Reform
(FAIR) Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Total
Force Management statutes of title 10 govern the proper sourcing of
labor. It is always in our best interest to carefully review the
direct, indirect, and potentially unintended consequences of a decision
to contract out functions, and to take precautions to ensure that
inherently governmental functions are not outsourced. If confirmed, I
am committed to enforcing the processes necessary to perform this
analysis, and to ensuring Departmental compliance with the FAIR Act and
the FAR.
Question. Are there non-monetary reasons why the Navy would need or
desire one type of manpower over the other? If so, provide relevant
examples where of those reasons? Under what circumstances should cost
be used as the primary factor?
Answer. I understand there are multiple factors that contribute to
workforce mix decisions, many of which are non-monetary. If the duties
are deemed inherently governmental, (for example work that involves key
fiduciary responsibilities) then the work must be sourced by military
or federal civilian employees, without consideration for cost.
Similarly, cost might not be the driving factor when sourcing a short-
term project that requires highly specialized expertise not readily
found in the federal workforce. However, cost would likely be used as a
primary factor when filling requirements that are neither inherently
governmental nor core business processes of the Department of the Navy.
Additionally, in some cases, it may be desirable for certain positions
to be used as shore rotation billets even if, narrowly considered, the
positions might be filled by civilians at lower cost (since it is not
reasonable to expect sailors and marines to spend their entire careers
assigned to ships and other operational units). For every function, the
Department should consider the most appropriate, effective, and cost-
efficient source of labor to meet the mission requirement.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate
officials in the Navy to review the contractor and civilian force mix
for cost and mission effectiveness?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with other appropriate
officials in the Department to review the contractor and civilian force
mix. As required by statute, if confirmed, I will also work closely
with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Comptroller, and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to ensure that
the Department of the Navy continues to operate in a manner consistent
with the Department of Defense guidance.
Question. Would you agree that the balance between civilian
employees and contractor employees in performing Navy functions should
be determined by the best interests of the Navy and its mission
requirements?
Answer. Absolutely, and the Department of the Navy's continuous
success in mission accomplishment hinges upon continuing to employ the
most effective and appropriate workforce mix of available labor
sources.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial
constraints placed on the size of the Navy's civilian and contractor
workforce, so that the Navy can hire the number and type of employees
most appropriate to accomplish its mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to ensure that the
Department of the Navy has the most appropriate, effective, and cost-
efficient workforce to accomplish its many missions, within available
resources. I will also support efforts to remove any inappropriate
constraints on the size of the civilian or contractor workforce.
acquisition and technology workforce
Question. The Department of Defense is in a global competition for
the highest quality STEM professionals at the entry-level, mid-career,
and senior levels. These individuals are charged with managing billions
of dollars' worth of taxpayer resources in complex acquisition
programs, directly providing technical support to military operations,
supporting the development of technically informed policies and
regulations in areas ranging from cybersecurity to use of drones; and
performing world class research and engineering functions in in house
labs and centers.
Do you feel that the Navy can currently compete with the private
sector for the highest quality technical performers at the early
career, mid-career, and senior levels?
Answer. I understand that the Department of the Navy is
experiencing some success in regard to hiring the highest quality
technical performers across the full career spectrum and, for the most
part, is competitive with the private sector for the Nation's best and
brightest talent. Our country's technical workforce is driven by the
opportunity to practice hands-on science and engineering within one's
chosen discipline. The Department continues to provide such
opportunities for prospective candidates at generally competitive
salary rates. However, I understand Departmental hiring managers face
significant hurdles in the hiring process that are not shared by
private sector employers. Streamlining the hiring process to overcome
these hurdles would allow the Department of the Navy to increase its
hiring success rate across early career, mid-career, and senior levels.
I understand several current Departmental proposals are aimed at
broadening workforce talent recruitment (including STEM occupations)
and retaining personnel by expanding career opportunities and
developing talent management processes.
Question. How will you work to enhance policies and flexibilities
necessary to allow the Navy to compete with the private sector for this
talent?
Answer. I understand the Department of the Navy's ability to
compete for and retain talented technical performers at all career
levels is dependent upon streamlining the hiring process and ensuring
that the technical workforce is engaged in hands-on research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) initiatives. Specifically, I
understand that direct hiring authority at the Navy Warfare Center and
Laboratory levels would facilitate the Department's ability to compete
for talent, as would providing technical hiring managers with the
flexibility to identify and hire appropriate talent within a timeframe
that is consistent with that of the private sector. In addition, I
understand that the Department of the Navy's Task Force Innovation
provides its workforce the opportunity to improve the DON through new
and innovative ideas, to assist not only with mission execution, but
also with workforce attraction and retention.
If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other Departmental
leaders to ensure that policies, practices, and new initiatives fully
leverage the flexibility authorized by Congress to enable the
Department of the Navy to remain competitive with the private sector in
attracting talent.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided in a timely manner to
this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Thom Tillis
women in combat integration
1. Senator Tillis. Mr. Parker, the Marines recently released the
results of their major research study on combat integration. Before
reviewing the report, Secretary Mabus indicated that he will not
support any exceptions to policy to close any ground combat elements to
women. Are you familiar with the Department of the Marine Corps' Ground
Combat Element Integrated Task Force report?
Mr. Parker. I am aware that the Marine Corps submitted a report
internal to the Department of Defense on the Ground Combat Element
Integrated Task Force, but I am not aware of any official release of
that report.
2. Senator Tillis. Would you have made the same decision as
Secretary Mabus before conducting a thorough review of the report and
understanding the rigorous research efforts done to prepare the report?
Mr. Parker. My understanding is that Secretary Mabus thoroughly
reviewed the Marine Corps report and submitted a consolidated
Department of the Navy (DON) recommendation to the Secretary of
Defense, as directed by Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey in their
guidance on this policy. The official decision in this matter is
currently with the Secretary of Defense.
3. Senator Tillis. The Marine Corps' research demonstrated that
women suffered higher injury rates among women than men when engaged in
field combat exercises and training. Does that concern you?
Mr. Parker. Injured sailors and marines always concern me
regardless of the circumstances leading to the injury.
4. Senator Tillis. Mr. Parker, Do you support the decision of
Secretary Mabus not to allow the Marine Corps recommendation to go
forward to the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Parker. I am aware that Secretary Mabus has submitted his
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and included in his
submission all recommendations and supplemental materials provided by
the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations.
5. Senator Tillis. If yes, wouldn't it be best to allow the
Secretary of Defense to review all recommendations and research
materials and then make a decision?
Mr. Parker. It is my understanding that Secretary Mabus thoroughly
reviewed all provided materials before making his final recommendation
to the Secretary of Defense and that Secretary Carter intends to
carefully review all data and recommendations before making a final
decision.
6. Senator Tillis. Mr. Parker, Do you believe women should be
required to register for the draft?
Mr. Parker. I understand that the decision to rescind the 1994
Direct Combat Definition and Assignment Rule may require an analysis of
the Military Selective Service Act. If confirmed, I will further review
the Military Selective Service Act and work with Congress, if
requested, on this issue.
guantanamo bay
7. Senator Tillis. Mr. Parker, In the event that the President
directed the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo to the United
States, in your professional legal judgment, would officers of the
Department of the Navy be at legal risk for a violation of the Anti-
Deficiency Act if they were to execute a transfer of detainees from
Guantanamo to the United States, contrary to the prohibition against
use of appropriated funds for that exact purpose?
Mr. Parker. If confirmed, this is an issue for which I would have
to seek legal counsel. Generally, I understand that if an agency incurs
an obligation in excess or in advance of amounts that are legally
available, the agency has violated the Anti-Deficiency Act.
command climates
8. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Parker, how will you encourage strength
and resilience and foster supportive command climates?
Mr. Parker. Developing and maintaining resilient sailors, marines
and families with effective fitness, readiness and transition programs
while decreasing and deterring destructive behaviors through awareness,
training, and accountability has been a priority in the Department of
the Navy. If confirmed, I will continue the emphasis on core programs
including physical readiness, substance abuse prevention, family
readiness, suicide prevention, sexual assault prevention and response,
sexual harassment prevention, equal opportunity, transition assistance
and hazing prevention.
suicide prevention efforts
9. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Parker, do you have any specific ideas for
initiatives to prevent suicide in our military?
Mr. Parker. Every death by suicide is a tragedy and an unacceptable
loss to the Department of the Navy. Suicide is a difficult problem and
despite diligent efforts by the Department of the Navy, DOD and the
nation, we still do not know how to prevent all suicides. However,
there are evidence-based practices that are known to reduce risk by
improving protective factors, reducing risk factors, and reaching out
and providing help and resources to those at risk. If confirmed,
continuing robust suicide prevention programs in the Navy and Marine
Corps will be a priority for me. I will ensure that the Navy and Marine
Corps suicide prevention programs monitor the latest research on
suicide prevention and implement procedures that show potential to
reduce suicides.
10. Senator Sullivan. If so, what are your specific ideas?
Mr. Parker. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy and Marine
Corps suicide prevention programs monitor the latest research on
suicide prevention and implement procedures that show potential to
reduce suicides.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Franklin R. Parker
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 26, 2015.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the
Committee on Armed Services:
Franklin R. Parker, of Illinois, to be an Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, vice Juan M. Garcia III.
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Franklin R. Parker, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Franklin R. Parker
Education:
Yale University
1992-1996
Bachelor of Arts, Sociology
Stanford Law School
1996-1999
Juris Doctor
Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government
2002-2004
Master in Public Policy, Political Advocacy and
Leadership
Employment Record:
U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration (Washington, DC)
Chief Counsel
February 2012-Present
U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the General Counsel
(Washington, DC)
Special Assistant (Attorney-Advisor) to the General
Counsel
August 2009-February 2012
Winston & Strawn LLP (Washington, DC)
Associate
January 2005-August 2009
Catholic Charities, Archdiocesan Legal Network
(Washington, DC)
Pro Bono Legal Clinic Volunteer
January-August 2009
National Conference of State Societies (Washington, DC)
General Counsel (Volunteer)