[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 114-90]

HEARING

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

__________

HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 11, 2016

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk

C O N T E N T S

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Page

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1

WITNESSES

Connery, Hon. Joyce, Chairwoman, Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board................................................... 6
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration................................ 3
Regalbuto, Hon. Monica, Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Department of Energy............................... 5

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Connery, Hon. Joyce.......................................... 53
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G........................................ 27
Regalbuto, Hon. Monica....................................... 44
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 25

Documents Submitted for the Record:

Statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell, Deputy Administrator
for Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security
Administration............................................. 65
Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Energy.... 69
Section 3119 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016........................................... 70

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

Mr. Bishop................................................... 73

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Mr. Bishop................................................... 92
Mr. Cooper................................................... 87
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 91
Mr. Larsen................................................... 90
Mr. Rogers................................................... 77
Mr. Wilson................................................... 93

FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

----------

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 11, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building Capitol Visitor
Center, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to
order. We want to welcome to our hearing the President's fiscal
year 2017 budget request for the defense-related activities
carried out by the Department of Energy [DOE].
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I know
it takes a lot of time and energy to prepare for these
hearings, and I really appreciate your commitment in doing
that.
Our witnesses today are Lieutenant General Frank Klotz,
retired, Administrator, NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration]; Ms. Monica Regalbuto, Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy; and Ms.
Joyce Connery, Chairwoman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board.
General Klotz, you have some very able folks here today in
support of you. I would like to recognize them. Admiral Frank
Caldwell. Brigadier General S.L. Davis. And Anne Harrington.
Glad to have you all here.
If any of our members have questions directly for these
folks later in the hearing, we will ensure that they can step
forward to the table where the microphones are and respond. And
I know Admiral Caldwell has a supplemental written statement
that will be introduced and accepted for the record.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell can be found in
the Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Rogers. Before I hand the floor over to the ranking
member, let me briefly highlight just a few key issues for
today's hearing.
First, since this is our subcommittee's first budget
hearing for fiscal year 2017, let me put a marker down. Let's
start the year by putting to rest the notion that our nuclear
deterrent is unaffordable. That is just ridiculous. A recent
think tank report got it right, quote: ``The issue is not
affordability--rather, it is a matter of prioritization. Should
nuclear forces, and by extension their modernization programs,
be given higher priority in the budget than other forces?''
We have an answer to this question. From the Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and everyone down the line, senior leaders across the
board have stated clearly and unequivocally that our nuclear
deterrent is, quote, ``the Nation's highest priority mission,''
close quote.
So our senior military and civilian leaders have shown that
our nuclear deterrent will be robustly supported even if it is
at the expense of other capabilities, because it is our top
priority. These programs are not optional, and are at the core
of U.S. security and international stability. And at the very
center of the core are the people and the programs at NNSA that
provide our Nation with our nuclear deterrent.
General Klotz, we are happy to have you yet again at our
subcommittee representing the dedicated individuals who work at
our nuclear enterprise. Their important contributions to the
Nation are largely unsung, but we certainly thank them and know
what you do and appreciate it. And once again, the subcommittee
will take a detailed look at the NNSA's budget request and
scrub it hard to ensure it is meeting the Nation's military
priorities.
When it comes to meeting the day-to-day needs of the
military, NNSA must also focus on the programs that set it up
for the future. That means having the people and skills, the
infrastructure and tools, and the structures and processes to
meet the highly uncertain nuclear future. I fear we are
focusing too much on the present and not enough on the future.
But we will be getting into that during the question period.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here. I look
forward to the discussion. Let me now turn it over to the
ranking member for any opening statement he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
also welcome the witnesses.
It is rare in the modern Congress to have essentially a
good news hearing, but I think this one of those hearings. I am
thankful for that, because at least at the authorizing level,
it looks like these programs are going to be fully funded. In
some cases, there are increases. In a few cases, there are
decreases. The leading one is the Nuclear Nonproliferation
account, which goes down some 6 or 7 percent. But we all have
to acknowledge that Russia is not exactly a willing partner
these days to help us contain that massive hoard of fissile
material.
But the key bit of good news for folks back home is here
you have a highly contentious Congress that is agreeing on what
is our number one defense priority, and we are agreeing on a
bipartisan basis, and we are putting our money where our mouths
are. So, that is good news for the American people, that is
good news for America, that is even good news for this
Congress.
So essentially we have a lot to celebrate here. We will
have not only questions today, but also questions in the closed
session to follow this. But we should not overlook the central
fact that the administration and the Republican majority in
Congress are keeping the nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and
reliable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the ranking member.
We now will ask each of our witnesses to make an opening
statement summarizing their written testimony, and I would like
to ask you to keep it to 5 minutes so we will have time for
questions. Your written testimony will be, without objection,
accepted for the record.
First, we will recognize General Klotz for any opening
statement you would like to summarize.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

General Klotz. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and
Ranking Member Cooper and members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to present the President's fiscal year
2017 budget request for the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration. We value this committee's
leadership in national security, as well as its robust and
abiding support for the missions and people of NNSA. And thank
you especially, Chairman, for your kind words for all the
people, men and women out there, who work in this important
enterprise.
Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of
DOE's budget, is $12.9 billion, an increase of nearly $358
million, or 2.9 percent, over the fiscal year 2016 enacted
level. This budget request continues the administration's
unwavering commitment to NNSA's important and enduring
missions.
These missions are defined in the NNSA's Strategic Vision,
which we released in the fall of last year. These missions
include to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
weapons stockpile; to prevent, counter, and respond to the
threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and to
support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
power and to protect American and allied interests around the
world.
To succeed, NNSA must maintain crosscutting capabilities
that enable each of these core missions. Again, as defined in
our Strategic Vision, these crosscuts focus on advancing
science, technology, and engineering; supporting our people and
modernizing our infrastructure; and developing a management
culture focused on safety, security, efficiency, and adopting
the best practices across government and the commercial world.
If you would like, Mr. Chairman, I would be very pleased to
provide a copy of this document to the subcommittee for the
record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DOE/NNSA Enterprise Strategic Vision--August 2015 can
be found at https://www.
scribd.com/document/290190538/NNSA-Enterprise-Strategic-Vision-August-
2015
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Rogers. Without objection.
[The document is retained in the committee files.]
General Klotz. The budget materials and briefings we have
provided over the past 2 days to you and to your staff describe
NNSA's major accomplishments in the year 2015, as well as the
underlying rationale for our budget proposal for fiscal year
2017. Let me just briefly highlight a few points, given the
time we have.
First and foremost, the United States has maintained a
safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile
without nuclear explosive testing for over 20 years. As a
result of consistent funding provided by this Congress,
supported by this subcommittee, and the significant
improvements that NNSA has made in program management over the
past 2 years, all of our life extension programs are on
schedule and within budget.
NNSA's science and technology base also continues to yield
critical modeling and simulation data in support of the
stockpile. In fact, just last year the National Ignition
Facility at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory increased its shot
rate, its experiment rate, from 191 in the year 2014 to 356 in
the year 2015, almost doubling it, including the first-ever
experiments involving plutonium.
Our budget request also supports recapitalization of NNSA's
aging research and production infrastructure, most notably the
facilities where we perform our major uranium, plutonium,
tritium, and other commodity operations. Of significance, NNSA
completed the first subproject for the Uranium Processing
Facility, entitled Site Readiness, last year, on time and $20
million under budget.
As a whole, NNSA will arrest the growth of deferred
maintenance in fiscal year 2016 thanks to the appropriations
bill which the Congress passed at the end of last year, and
with your support for our budget request, we can begin to
reduce deferred maintenance in fiscal year 2017.
This year's request for the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account, as Mr. Cooper pointed out, is 6.8
percent lower than the fiscal year 2016 enacted levels, for two
reasons. First, prior year carryover balances are available to
execute some of the programs. And second, as you know, we
proposed terminating the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Project
and pursuing a dilute and dispose approach as a faster, less
expensive path to meeting our national commitment and
international agreement to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess
weapons-grade plutonium.
The request for our third appropriation, the Naval Reactors
Program, keeps pace with mission needs and continues NNSA's
commitment to the three major initiatives: the Ohio-Class
Reactor Plant System Development; the Land-based S8G Prototype
Refueling Overhaul; and the Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project in Idaho.
I am pleased to be joined by my colleague, Admiral Frank
Caldwell, who is testifying, I believe, for the first time in
front of this subcommittee.
For each of these missions, NNSA is driving improvements in
our management and governance. For all of our programs, we have
instituted rigorous analyses of alternatives, defined clear
lines of authority and accountability for Federal and contract
program and project management, improved cost and schedule
performance, and ensured that the Federal project directors and
contracting officers had the appropriate skill mix and
professional certifications to effectively manage NNSA's work.
Our budget request for Federal salaries and expenses
reflects an increasing emphasis on improving program and
project management across all our mission pillars.
So in closing, Mr. Chairman, the nuclear security
enterprise continues to make significant progress. Through
discipline, careful planning, and your continued and strong
support, we believe we can make smart investments to build on
that progress and meet new challenges in the future. Again,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in
the Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. There was, as the ranking member
said, a lot of good news in that opening statement, none better
than seeing that you are finally starting to cut into the
backlog of deferred maintenance. That is a nice milestone. I
appreciate that.
Ms. Regalbuto, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF HON. MONICA REGALBUTO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Secretary Regalbuto. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am
pleased to be here today to represent the Department of
Energy's Office of Environmental Management and to discuss the
work that we have already successfully accomplished and what we
plan to accomplish under the Presidential fiscal 2017 budget
request.
The total budget request for the EM [Environmental
Management] program is $6.1 billion, which includes $673
million of proposed mandatory funding and $5.3 billion for
defense environmental cleanup activities. The request would
allow EM to maintain a safe and secure posture across the
complex, while maximizing our work on compliance activities.
I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a number
of EM's recent accomplishments. At the Savannah River Site, the
4,000th canister of radioactive glass was recently poured.
Achieving the milestone enabled us to close the seven high-
level waste tanks. At the Moab Site, half of the estimated 60
million tons of uranium mill tailings have been removed and
shipped to an engineering disposal cell. At Hanford, we have
completed cleanup of the bulk of River Corridor, including more
than 500 facilities and 1,000 remediation sites.
The fiscal 2017 budget request will allow us to continue to
make progress in ongoing cleanup priorities. Among EM's top
priorities is the safe reopening of WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot
Program]. EM continues to support the recovery from two
incidents at the facility that interrupted the nationwide
program for the disposition of transuranic waste. The request
will support initiating waste emplacement operations by
December of 2016.
At Idaho, the request will support the Integrated Waste
Treatment Unit. This facility is planned to treat approximately
900,000 gallons of sodium-bearing waste. At the Savannah River
Site, we will complete construction and ramp up commissioning
activities at the Salt Waste Processing Facility, which will
significantly increase our ability to treat tank waste. In
addition, we will continue to receive, store, and process spent
nuclear reactor fuel.
At the Hanford Office of River Protection, the request
supports continued construction of the Low-Activity Waste
Facility, Balance of Plants, and outfitting the Analytical
Laboratory, which are the centerpiece of the Department's plan
to begin the direct feed of low-activity waste as soon as 2022.
The request for Richland allows us to continue important
work on the Central Plateau and to complete the demolition of
the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant, once one of the most
dangerous buildings in the complex.
At Oak Ridge, the request supports continuing design for
the Outfall 200 Mercury Training Facility at the Y-12 National
Security Complex and complete the demolition of Building K-27,
the last gaseous diffusion enrichment process building. It will
mark the first time that a gaseous diffusion enrichment site
has been completely decommissioned.
With the most challenging cleanup remaining, we understand
the importance of technology development in reducing the
lifecycle costs and enhancing our effectiveness. To help
address many of the technical challenges involved, the request
reflects a total investment in technology development of $33
million. The funding will allow us to continue to integrate
robotics technologies into our efforts to help improve overall
work and quality of life by easing the performance of
physically demanding tasks.
In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
Office of Environmental Management. We are committed to
achieving our mission, and we will continue to apply innovative
strategies to complete our mission safely. Thank you, and I
will be very pleased to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Regalbuto can be found
in the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you.
Ms. Connery, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOYCE CONNERY, CHAIRWOMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Ms. Connery. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on the fiscal 2017
budget request.
My name is Joyce Connery, and I have been with the Board
for 6 months. I am joined today by two of my fellow Board
members, Bruce Hamilton and Sean Sullivan. Bruce and I are both
new to the Board this year.
As you may know, the Board is the only agency that provides
independent safety oversight to DOE's defense nuclear
facilities. These facilities and their operations are essential
to our Nation's defense, as noted by the chairman. They perform
work that includes the assembly and disassembly of nuclear
weapons, surveillance of the stockpile, fabrication of
plutonium pits and weapons components, production and recycling
of tritium, nuclear criticality experiments, subcritical
experiments, and a host of activities to address radioactive
legacy waste resulting from 70 years of nuclear weapons
operations.
The Board's vitally important oversight mission is achieved
with a relatively small budget and a cadre of technical
experts. In fiscal year 2017, the Board's budget request is $31
million and supports 120 FTEs [full-time equivalents]. With
these resources--and our staff, our people are truly the
Board's greatest resource--we will continue to perform
independent safety oversight throughout the complex.
Within our oversight responsibilities, we strive to
proactively address safety issues at DOE defense nuclear
facilities to eliminate threats to public health and safety.
Specifically, we advise DOE and NNSA on the need to
effectively integrate safety into the design of new facilities,
strengthen the protection of workers through improvements in
work planning and conduct of operations, and to improve
emergency preparedness and safety culture at sites with defense
nuclear facilities.
In recent years, the Board has increased its emphasis on
emergency preparedness and response capabilities, making
recommendations both complex-wide and site-specific. The
complex's aging facilities and resultant backlog of maintenance
have created additional concerns. Delays to NNSA's efforts to
modernize its infrastructure can exacerbate safety-related
issues and require that ongoing work be performed in degrading
nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety standards.
The Board supports DOE and NNSA's efforts to develop new
defense facilities, and we will continue to work closely with
them to integrate safety into their designs at the earliest
possible stages.
While increasing emphasis has been placed on emergency
management preparedness and response, I personally have also
been concerned with the state of the oversight throughout the
defense nuclear complex and staffing challenges at both the
Federal and contractor level.
Difficulties retaining proper technical competencies have
led to concerns of insufficient Federal safety oversight, and
similar concerns on the contractor side impact conduct of
operations.
Staffing shortages may be the result of an aging and
retiring workforce, competition for highly skilled workers, and
compounded by the slow pace of the clearance adjudication
process.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, this concludes my
opening statement. Thank you again for the opportunity to be
here today. We at the Board look forward to our continued work
with this subcommittee, and I stand ready to respond to any
questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Connery can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I thank all the witnesses. We will
now move into questions, and I will start with myself.
General Klotz, I want to go back to what I was just talking
about a minute ago on that deferred maintenance issue. From our
conversation yesterday, my understanding is this year's fiscal
year 2016 budget allowed you to basically take care of deferred
maintenance, to make sure we don't add to the backlog, so
basically level funded. And from my understanding, this new
number in fiscal year 2017 will allow you to cut into the
backlog.
Can you explain that? Because there seems to be some
dispute that this number would allow you to actually go into
the backlog, as opposed to level funding for another year.
General Klotz. Thank you very much for the question,
Chairman Rogers. Thank you also very much for your leadership
on this important issue.
When I was in the military, I learned that when dollars are
constrained, the first dollar always goes to operations and
maintenance of the weapons systems, and the dollar that goes to
fix infrastructure and facilities always gets deferred to the
right. And if you keep deferring it to the right, over time you
get to a point where your facilities and your infrastructure
reach a tipping point and it begins to impact both operations
and maintenance, as Chairman Connery just mentioned, in some of
our facilities.
This year we are asking for $3.7 billion in our ask--our
backlog is at $3.7 billion--and what we are asking for will, in
fact, begin to cut into it. I think the confusion--and I went
back yesterday after having discussed this with you and your
staff yesterday--I think the confusion is the chart that we
used with the staff yesterday is of such a scale, that the
decrease that we see----
Mr. Rogers. It doesn't show up.
General Klotz [continuing]. Doesn't show up. It doesn't
show up. I think that is the explanation I have been given by
my staff.
But 2 years ago, the Secretary of Energy asked all elements
of DOE to halt the growth of deferred maintenance, and we have
worked very hard to put that into our budget. And because of
the support we got from you last year, we begin to level it in
2016, and if we get the request that we want, we will begin to
see that go down.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
You heard me say in my opening statement that NNSA may be a
bit too focused on the present at the expense of the future.
Now, I am the first to admit that this subcommittee has long
been asking you and your predecessors at NNSA as a whole to get
on top of today and the issues like life extension programs and
big ongoing construction projects, and to your credit, you guys
have made some significant steps in those areas.
So I commend you, while also encouraging you to keep
reaching. That is the job of an oversight committee, after all.
But it is very important that we be thinking about these future
endeavors. So let's talk about the future.
Reviewing the budget request, I am deeply concerned that
NNSA is proposing major cuts to three forward-looking, future-
focused lines that develop and mature safety and security
technology for future warheads. By quick math, it looks like
the request would short the safety and security technology
maturation activities by almost $140 million. That seems very
shortsighted, like we are simply locking ourselves into current
technologies.
Why is the NNSA proposing this? Is it just lack of funds?
General Klotz. Yes, sir. The short answer is yes, sir. We
have a lot of projects we want to cover in our weapons activity
account in fiscal year 2017. I think the most important thing
is we have very stable life extension programs, which are a
very high priority for us and a very high priority for the
Department of Defense, which expresses its requirements through
the Nuclear Weapons Council. We are on important glide paths on
all of those, and we wanted to make sure that those continue.
So it was some tough decisions made, and of course General
Davis is here to dig into the details if you would like. We do
that. We felt that was the way in which we could balance the
budget within the top line that we were issued.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Congress has recently authorized two new
programs for NNSA that are future-focused, the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program and the Prototype Nuclear Weapons for
Intelligence Estimates, PNWIE, program. These programs were
created by Congress at the urging of several expert commissions
and are about ensuring NNSA has the capabilities and skills to
respond quickly to new or changing environments. The Stockpile
Responsiveness Program is only a few months old because of the
veto silliness on the fiscal year 2016 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], but tell me what NNSA is doing to implement
it in this year and fiscal year 2017.
General Klotz. Thank you very much, Chairman. This, by the
way, is something which we fully support. It is extraordinarily
important that throughout our complex we continuously exercise
all the capabilities associated with maintaining the stockpile
from design, to development, to manufacturing, to prototype
building, and conducting the various experiments that test the
various components associated with the nuclear weapons
stockpile.
Many of these activities are already exercised on a routine
basis as we do our life extension program and as we do the
routine surveillance and the science, technology, and
engineering that lies under that.
NNSA has recognized for some time the importance of
maintaining stockpile responsiveness. And in the fall of 2014,
the Defense Programs, which has responsibility for weapons
activities, chartered what they call the Defense Program
Advisory Group and asked them what was required to challenge
the workforce and sustain the capability for the future. They
have, in fact, had meetings up till now, and we are expecting a
report early in 2016 which deals with that.
One approach that we are using that I would like to
highlight here that has not received much publicity is that we
are engaged with the United Kingdom on a program called the
Joint Technology Demonstration, the JTD. The United Kingdom,
like us, faces many of the same issues associated with
sustainment of their nuclear deterrence, and we are working
together to craft a program in which designers and program
managers in both the U.S., and our laboratories, and in the
United Kingdom will work together through design, develop, and
issues associated with manufacturing of components for nuclear
weapons.
We are also carrying out a number of hydrodynamic and
subcritical experiments. We have asked for money in this budget
to, in fact, enhance our capabilities to conduct those types of
experiments at the Nevada National Security Site, and we have
also engaged in a number of other certification readiness
exercises associated with it.
So we need to come back with you--you are right, the NDAA
was signed late in the year--and come back to you with a more
fully fleshed-out plan about how we propose to go ahead. But we
fully share both the sentiment and the objective as laid out in
the program.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You cited some of the
good news from General Klotz as being the work on deferred
maintenance. I would like to point out another feature of his
testimony, which as he said at least a couple of times, the
magic words ``on time and under budget.'' We rarely hear those
in Washington, but we are always grateful when we do, and I
appreciate the good work that went into producing those twin
excellent results, on time and under budget.
I would also like to single out the Naval Reactors Program.
I have always been fond of it. It is an amazing tradition of
excellence the Naval Reactors has pursued over lo these many
years, and I just appreciate Admiral Caldwell and his
predecessors making that tradition of excellence happen.
We have talked about some of the good news. Some of the bad
news is a contractor, a former contractor at Y-12, B&W Y-12,
now called B&W XT, mishandled classified documents. And one of
those was a Security Level 1 violation, which is, quote,
``actual or high potential for adverse impact on national
security.''
NNSA proposed a $240,000 fine, but then, apparently,
according to this excellent article by Frank Munger of the
Knoxville News Sentinel, NNSA decided to waive the fine, and
the reasons given were the contractor's timely response to the
concerns, even though later in the article it says that
employees have been saying that this mishandling of classified
information had been going on for years.
So, to me, a prompt response is pretty weak after mistakes
have been happening for years. And then the other reason was
that B&W was already penalized by having its management fee
reduced for fiscal year 2014.
This, to me, sounds like 40 lashes with a wet noodle. This
is not going to increase contractor accountability. So is this
the right way to handle this misdisposal of classified
information?
General Klotz. Thank you for the question, Mr. Cooper. We
take the protection of classified information, as well as the
security of our facilities, extraordinarily seriously, and that
is why in this particular case the Department of Energy
Enterprise Assessments Office, Office of Enforcement, inquired
into this matter and came to the conclusions that it did.
With respect to holding the contractor, in this case the
former contractor, at Y-12 accountable, one of the things that
the article said, I can't remember if it was the one you cited
or other articles, said that we had decided--that I had decided
that somehow that B&W had suffered enough. That word does not
show up anywhere in the letter which I sent to B&W on this
issue.
We made our decisions based on the rules which we follow.
And there are a number of things which can be used to mitigate
the civil penalty that is assessed via a formula. One of those
is whether we have already in a sense penalized or held the
contractor responsible through the annual fee determination
process.
In the case of B&W Y-12, we had already subtracted from the
fee which they were eligible for as part of the annual program
review and used that as a mitigator to say, while perhaps maybe
not under law this falls into the concept of double jeopardy,
it certainly does in terms of principle. So we hold them
accountable in terms of the financial fines either through the
fee determination process or through the fine process.
There have been a couple of instances in the past, at least
since I have been sitting in the seat at NNSA, where we have,
in fact, imposed a civil fine because we had not taken a fee
for that particular activity. But this was specifically noted
in the process of determining what their fee was for that year,
and so that is why we mitigated that.
Mr. Cooper. Well, it is hard to unscramble this egg and we
can't turn back the clock. But I am curious, I am assuming B&W
and/or its subsidiaries are still doing work for NNSA?
General Klotz. They are.
Mr. Cooper. The Department?
General Klotz. They are, in the broader DOE, yes.
Mr. Cooper. Are any steps taken to make sure that they
treat classified information more carefully at their other?
General Klotz. Well, we hold everybody to the same
standard, whether it is B&W or any of our other M&O [management
and operations] contractors or subcontractors. They know what
the expectations are. That is why we carry out the oversight
that we do, and that is why we thoroughly investigate,
document, and make as a matter of public record when they have
fallen short in protecting either the facilities or the
classified information they have responsibility for.
Mr. Cooper. I know that you have high standards, but you
haven't always been on duty at NNSA, and the workers here told
the reporter that this had been going on for years. So you have
to wonder.
General Klotz. Yes, it had been, yes.
Mr. Cooper. Assuming there is a second violation by B&W,
will the fines be tougher the second time?
General Klotz. That is I think what you call a hypothetical
question, Congressman. So, we take this very, very seriously,
and clearly we have to judge each and every case on the
specific facts associated with that. But, again, protection of
classified material, protection of the facilities which our M&O
partners have responsibility for is one of our top priorities.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will withhold
further questions at this time.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here.
General, I always especially appreciate men like yourself
who have given their entire life to the cause of freedom.
General, do you believe that the need for our capability to
detect, identify, and characterize nuclear weapons programs,
illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, and nuclear
detonations is something that is increasing in this environment
or decreasing, that need to be able to do that?
General Klotz. The need is always there to be able to
detect, and particularly as more and more countries look to
civil nuclear power as a way to solve their energy demands and
needs in the future, the ability to detect whether or not the
materials that are associated with civil nuclear power are
being diverted for military uses will continue to be a
challenge and a greater challenge. It is something that we
spend a lot of time thinking about. Our laboratories and our
production facilities are engaged in significant research and
development to ensure that we are staying ahead of the power
curve on this.
Mr. Franks. So it is your testimony that that need for that
capability is an increasing need?
General Klotz. Yes.
Mr. Franks. And if you were to identify any particular
area, and I realize it is sort of a broad question, is there
anything that is especially of concern to you, of special
concern to you, as far as being able to sense any special
threat out there that we face in terms of proliferation?
General Klotz. I think if we talked about specific threats,
we would need to do that in the classified session, which is
coming after this. But, again, what we would look for would be
those types of indicators which suggest that a country--or, for
that matter, a nonstate actor--is, one, trying to acquire
special nuclear materials, and then using those special nuclear
materials, diverting those special nuclear materials either for
use in nuclear proliferation or nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Franks. Well, notwithstanding the ranking member's, I
think, cogent comments related to the diminishing involvement
on the part of Russia with us, what would you say that the
diminished request here for the DNN [Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation] and R&D [Research & Development] on budget,
how does that square with the increasing need for the
capability but a lesser request for the funding to do that?
General Klotz. I would be happy to answer that, but since
we did invite Anne Harrington and Admiral Caldwell and General
Davis up, would it be okay if Anne addressed that because that
falls directly, since she came all this way?
Mr. Franks. Sure.
General Klotz. Would that be okay?
Mr. Franks. Absolutely.
Ms. Harrington. First, thank you very much for the question
and particularly for recognizing what is very important in my
line of business, which is the evolving and emerging threats.
To go back to your initial question very quickly on the R&D
side, we have two programs specifically in the R&D area that
address those issues. We have what we call our Material and
Weapons Development Program that looks at nuclear fuel cycle,
especially challenges from noncooperative foreign environments.
That looks at advanced technologies for detecting proliferant
activities, such as nuclear material production, related
facilities, equipment processes, and that is about $80 million
that is in this budget for that.
And then we have another area called Ground-Based Nuclear
Event Monitoring, and that is the detection of low yield and
evasive tests, seismic and radionuclide detection, and
exploitation of what we call our dynamic sensor network data,
so how do we better interpret the data that we are collecting
through all of the systems that we have deployed.
So the goal of these is to meet emerging requirements, to
detect and significantly lower the thresholds at which we can
detect evasive testing.
Mr. Franks. So the reason for the decreased budget is?
Ms. Harrington. The decrease in the budget in R&D
specifically?
Mr. Franks. In the DNN and the R&D, yes.
Ms. Harrington. That is related to a one-time expenditure
that we don't have to make again. Part of it is related to a
classified case where we have found a solution to a problem
that we thought we were going to have to extend into future
budgets.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am hoping we can maybe
get their perspective on any characterization of the North
Korean claim to have detonated a hydrogen bomb at some point,
but in the closed session. And with that, my time is out. Thank
you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
of Alabama, Mo Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. I will defer, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Nebraska, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Oklahoma. I am sorry. That was very disparaging. I did not
mean to say that.
Mr. Bridenstine. I am not going to comment. I love Nebraska
too. All right.
General, the Secretary of Energy wrote to the Director of
OMB [Office of Management and Budget] that because of a recent
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS,
decision to not block a foreign company from buying a microchip
foundry here in the U.S., NNSA will need a quarter of a billion
dollars between fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2021 to
mitigate the loss of this secure, trusted manufacturing
capability.
I understand these capabilities are needed both for NNSA's
nuclear weapons work as well as for its satellite programs.
Since I am assuming this was the Mubadala Development Company
out of the UAE [United Arab Emirates], can you explain why
CFIUS didn't block this transaction?
General Klotz. Thank you for the question. Sorry, I am glad
we clarified it was from Oklahoma since my mom is from there.
Mr. Bridenstine. She sounds like a great lady.
General Klotz. Two things at first, and then I will get to
your question. First of all, of course the responsibility for
CFIUS falls to the Treasury Department, and our role in the
Department of Energy and in the National Nuclear Security
Administration is to provide technical advice for decisions
that they are making. The second thing is that the specifics of
this case we can raise in closed session.
Let me just say in general, however, you said something
that was very, very important, and that is that a trusted
supply of radiation-hardened advanced microsystems is
extraordinarily important to the nuclear weapons effectiveness
in our stockpile. There is sort of an assumption that radiation
hardness is radiation hardness and that the radiation hardness
for space systems also would apply for nuclear, but we have a
much more stringent standard for that.
We have done much of our work in the area of both research
and development and fabrication of radiation-hardened
microelectronics at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque
in a facility known as MESA, which I think stands for
Microsystems and Engineering Science Application. It is a
facility which, quite frankly, is long in the tooth, to go back
to the chairman and the ranking member's comments, and needs to
be recapitalized, and it is a facility which is using
technology which, quite frankly, the commercial world has now
gone beyond, for instance, using 6-inch silicon wafer
processing as opposed to what is now the standard 8-inch.
So we have asked for $14 million in this year----
Mr. Bridenstine. Let me interrupt just real quick. Did DOE
or DOD [Department of Defense] participate in the CFIUS
decisionmaking process on this transaction?
General Klotz. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. And nobody recommended blocking it?
General Klotz. That, I can't go into here.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. But you do recognize that a quarter
billion dollars is a lot of money to the taxpayer for this
decision?
General Klotz. I recognize, I would state that having a
supply of trusted radiation-hardened advanced microsystems is
very, very important to the United States and to the nuclear
weapons stockpile.
Mr. Bridenstine. So you cannot comment on how much it is
going to cost?
General Klotz. No. For our specific piece of what we would
do within the NNSA, as I said, we will spend money this year to
complete analysis of alternatives to see where we go forward on
the MESA project.
Mr. Bridenstine. But it will cost something. Do you know
where that money would come from?
General Klotz. It will come out of the NNSA budget, to do
the work that we do within NNSA.
Mr. Bridenstine. Have there been other CFIUS cases, for
example, the decision to not block IBM's sale of its server
business to China's Lenovo?
General Klotz. That, I don't know.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. We need to be very cognizant of
these new liabilities for NNSA and the DOD.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
allowing me to participate.
I understand the service of each of the witnesses today,
and I look forward to continue working with you. I especially
recognize your dedication, as an alumnus of DOE headquarters,
and as being the only Member of Congress who has worked at
Savannah River Site, which I am very grateful that I represent,
along with Congressman Jim Clyburn of South Carolina.
I ask, first, the unanimous consent to distribute a memo
dated November 20, 2015, from Secretary Ernest Moniz to the
President, along with section 3119 of fiscal year 2016 NDAA.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 69.]
Mr. Wilson. I appreciate Chairman Mike Rogers providing for
discussion multiple times before this subcommittee a major
issue: in shifting the United States plutonium disposition
strategy from the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, MOX,
at the Savannah River Site, this method would require, by
shifting, a renegotiation of the Plutonium Management
Disposition Agreement with the Russian Federation.
In a memo dated November 20, 2015, from Secretary Moniz to
President Obama, the Secretary says in regard to the shifting
of the disposition strategy, quote: So far we have no read on
the MFA, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, response.
This issue will need further interagency work in the context of
overall complicated U.S.-Russia relations.
There is a proposal abandoning MOX where $4.5 billion has
been invested for 70 percent completion, and shifting to a
strategy that even Secretary Moniz admits we do not know or
have any idea when the Russian Federation--what they will ask
in return.
I am concerned the admittedly complicated U.S.-Russia
relations will lead to a swift and conciliatory negotiation
which is not realistic. I am concerned that we are without a
plan if Russia asks for concessions that the United States
cannot make. If so, we risk incurring the immense cost of
resurrecting MOX and reassembling the workforce and
infrastructure that are crucial to its success.
We know that the proposed repository for the down-blended
weapons-grade plutonium would be with the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico. We know that the facility
remains closed, yet WIPP received less funding at the request
of fiscal year 2017 than fiscal year 2016.
Keeping this in mind, there have been assurances that WIPP
would open as soon as possible, but how long after WIPP reopens
will it be operational?
Additionally, on Tuesday night, led by Governor Nikki Haley
and Attorney General Alan Wilson, the State of South Carolina
was forced, as required by law, to sue the Department of Energy
for up to $100 million in 2016, payable to the State of South
Carolina, as a result of failure to move 1 ton of plutonium
from South Carolina despite the State twice pushing back a
deadline. This puts at risk the people of South Carolina and
Georgia as the repository. Terminating this project does
nothing to move material out of the region. This will not save
taxpayers' dollars and will jeopardize nonproliferation. This
committee should reject the President's proposal to terminate,
and we should continue to move forward with construction to
convert weapons-grade plutonium into green fuel.
And in conclusion, General Klotz, section 3119 of the
fiscal year 2016 NDAA directed the Department to submit, with
the budget justification materials for fiscal year 2017, an
updated performance baseline. Can you tell us what the update
is on this baseline status?
General Klotz. Thank you very much, Congressman Wilson. And
let me just say at the outset, I know and respect the passion
and the intensity which you bring to this particular issue, and
I very much appreciate the fact that over the past couple years
we have been able to work very closely together, in a very
collegial and civil manner, as we work through what is an
obvious difference of opinion on terms of policy. And I
especially appreciate the many trips that you have taken to the
MOX Facility with our people to discuss the issues that are
there.
There was a lot in your question, but let me just say that,
with respect to the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement,
the administration, the U.S. Government remains firmly
committed to disposing of all 34 metric tons of excess, surplus
weapons-grade plutonium, as we have agreed with Russia in that
agreement. But over the last couple of years there have been
several efforts to analyze the current MOX fuel approach and
alternatives, such as the 2014 DOE review, which was actually
the first thing I testified----
Mr. Wilson. And, General, I can't interrupt a general,
because you are too good, but the question about the baseline,
what is the status of that? And the reason I like visiting MOX,
you have got a lot of professionals there that I like.
General Klotz. Thank you, sir. And believe me, they
appreciate seeing you come down and other senior leaders come
down.
The language in the NDAA was, I think, passed in November
of 2015, if I am not mistaken. I am told by my staff it takes
as much as 18 to 24 months to do a performance baseline, and
even more than I suggested to the chairman yesterday, several
million dollars to do that. So there is just no way, unless we
can make time stop between November of 2015 and to the
submission of President's budget, to do a full performance
baseline in terms of the costs as requested there.
Our sense still is, based on the reports that we have done,
is that the dilute and dispose option is still a much less
expensive and a faster way of disposing of this excess weapons-
grade plutonium.
Mr. Wilson. And I look forward to the baseline.
General Klotz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. And I would say he does make a good point,
baseline is required. So I would ask you to try to expedite
that if you could.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And, General, I would like to follow up on the line that
Mr. Wilson was giving. I have the same concern about MOX, I am
just not as civil as he is. But in both versions of the NDAA
that was passed last year, including the one that was signed by
your boss, it does clearly say that you shall carry out
construction and project-support activities relating to the MOX
Facility. And the 3119 section to which Representative Wilson
referred does clearly say that you have to include those budget
justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the
DOE budget for fiscal year 2017 and that updated performance
line. It is not an option.
So I do have questions. I haven't seen that baseline
either. You admit that it is not there. But how are you now
disregarding the direction that was given you in the bill, in
the law, and terminating this project? How can you respond to
that?
General Klotz. Well, first of all, on the construction, we
understand in the 2016 Authorization, Appropriations Acts, we
are to continue construction. We will continue construction
through the end of 2016. And our proposal, of course, in the
fiscal year 2017 budget is to terminate the program. And the
reason that we make that argument is because the several
studies that we have done over the past 2 years indicate that
there is a much faster, much cheaper way to dispose of this.
The costs of----
Mr. Bishop. Then let me interrupt with that one, because if
there is indeed a cheaper way, a cheaper technology, it is not
necessarily a proven technology. You have given us no specific
cost estimates. There is no methodology of that. I mean, you
haven't given us the data that you need to do before you go in
that direction.
It seems to me that once again the administration is
clearly bypassing the intent of Congress and not giving us the
data that was required before you make that change in
direction. You have no ability to close this facility.
General Klotz. Well, the technology and the process by
which we do it is proven. There is already close to 5----
Mr. Bishop. Have you submitted that to us?
General Klotz [continuing]. 5 metric tons of diluted
plutonium currently in the facility at WIPP. So we know how to
do that.
Mr. Bishop. But, General, that has to be part of the
baseline you submit to us. That is the decision we get a chance
to make here. And I think this committee has spoken several
times over the past few years about the direction we expect you
to go in that.
General Klotz. Congressman, you are absolutely right. This
is the proposal of the administration in our fiscal year 2017
budget proposal. We recognize, as I used to say when I taught
political science, the President proposes and the Congress
disposes. This is our proposal.
Mr. Bishop. Would you have that printed and given to some
other people within the administration?
Could you also, though, recognize this? Will there be a
stop-work order coming from any of the organizations here on
this project before Congress gets to once again reaffirm what
we want you to do?
General Klotz. We discussed this just before coming over
here. What I have been told by my staff is we will continue
construction all the way through fiscal year 2016 as laid out
by the direction of Congress.
Mr. Bishop. Will there be a stop-work proposal after that?
General Klotz. I don't know. I don't know the answer to
that. Let me get back to you on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 73.]
Mr. Bishop. I appreciate that. But I once again would like
to reaffirm, I think you have seen the direction that Congress
has given in last year's NDAA. Any deviation from that would be
problematic at best.
I will yield back.
General Klotz. I take your point.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Klotz, I am going to ask you a single question,
also following up on MOX, and then give the rest of my time to
Representative Wilson. Regarding the termination, the possible
termination of the MOX project, how would that be received by
the Russians?
General Klotz. That is a very good question, Congressman,
and one of the issues which we have to work through. The
Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement says that this
plutonium will be disposed of by irradiation or by other means
agreed to by the parties. So we can engage in a discussion with
the Russians about this particular issue.
In fact, we have already--the Russians came to us earlier
in the life of this agreement and asked to change the approach
that they were taking, and we agreed to that. In fact, then
Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed
an agreement in 2010 which memorialized that.
Now, I think the Secretary of Energy has said this clearly.
If not, I will say it. We have been engaged at our level in
discussions with our counterparts in Russia about the
possibility of this particular approach. They have listened to
us very respectfully. Quite frankly, their view is, when you
are ready to go forward with this, we will sit down and we will
discuss it in more detail. And I suspect, just like it will be
on this side of the Atlantic, it will be a whole-of-government
approach in Russia to what their final position will be.
But from the technical point of view, the people that we
deal with, they fully understand what we are doing, they
understand the economics of it, they understand the physics and
the chemistry of it, and agree that we have a topic that we can
sit down and discuss.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I will defer the rest of
my time to Representative Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman.
And again, General Klotz, thank you for--all of you--for
being here. But it does concern me that the law was clear,
section 3119, and so I hope whatever the baseline is, it can be
provided. Because every other report that we have received,
there were flaws, as far as I am concerned, because each one
failed to recognize that we have a proven technology, the mixed
oxide fuel fabrication, because this has been done in France
for nearly 50 years.
And then I find, when they claim that there are cost
overruns, so much of that is because there have been changes in
specifications which the contractors then have, by the
Department, and which then causes additional cost. And, sadly,
it is really frustrating to me that people would be critical
when, in fact, it was due to changes in specifications.
And then other issues that are just mind-numbing. When it
is stated that for the green fuel, the fuel that will be
produced, that there are not contracts for the fuel, well, in
the industry, people don't buy fuel till the last second
because of the variations of price, which we see today in other
energy fields. And when I hear that argument, I am thinking
that is just--and you hadn't made it, but other people have,
other reports.
And over and over again there are misstatements that are
being made that I think should be addressed and to achieve what
can be so important of nonproliferation at a time with, sadly,
the rising tensions with the Russian Federation. Over and over
again I can see positive of why this should be done, and so I
really hope there will be a change of course.
And beyond that, Dr. Regalbuto, in the budget request for
2017, the traditional Savannah River risk management operations
control point was separated into two control points,
environmental cleanup and nuclear material management, causing
considerable confusion. Can you explain the Department's
rationale for this, and were the site contractors notified of
the change?
Secretary Regalbuto. Thank you for your question, Mr.
Wilson. I do recognize that this year the way the tables have
been printed out are a little bit different than they have been
done in the past, and we are providing in our Web site a sheet
for everybody to follow and track exactly where everything is,
which we will be happy to provide to you too.
In general, the budget request for Savannah River went up
$111 million. This is actually a recognition of the mission of
H Canyon, HB-Line, L-Basin, and L-Area. So with the plus-up of
$111 million, it allows us to continue to support those
decisions.
In addition to our traditional milestones, which are
related to the processing of tank waste, we also have an
opportunity to initiate another in-tank technology that we will
be testing starting this year and then into 2018.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much for referencing H Canyon
Facility, a world-class treasure that not everybody knows. So
thank you.
Secretary Regalbuto. I do use it every day, so I am very
happy that our funding is properly----
Mr. Wilson. I am happy to meet you any time and point it
out. Thank you.
Secretary Regalbuto. Thank you.
General Klotz. Could I just add, Mr. Chairman, of course H
Canyon is extraordinarily important, not only to the work on
the Environmental Management side, but also to NNSA. This is a
key facility and one which we need to maintain for the long
term.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank the gentleman. I thank the
witnesses. I wanted to do a second round of questions, but we
are going to be called for votes in a little over a half an
hour. So we will just submit those to you and ask that you
provide written responses for the record in the next 10 or 12
days.
But with that, I would like to recess for about 5 minutes
while we go to 2337 for the classified portion--oh, 2216.
Faking you off there. We will see you in 2216 in just a few
minutes.
[Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
executive session.]

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A P P E N D I X

February 11, 2016

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 11, 2016

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING

February 11, 2016

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP

General Klotz. The President's FY 2017 budget proposes to terminate
the MOX project. The Department will request the MOX prime contractor
to determine activities required to place the facility and project in a
safe and secure state, winding down construction, design, support, and
procurement efforts as quickly as possible so that termination can be
done efficiently and cost effectively. DOE will issue contract
direction to MOX Services as early as practicable to halt construction
activities for 90 days while the discussion and development of a
termination plan take place. [See page 18.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 11, 2016

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program is
only a few months old because of the veto silliness on the FY16 NDAA,
but tell me: What is NNSA doing to implement it this year and in FY17?
How is NNSA going to adjust and refocus its RDT&E and stockpile
activities to meet the intent of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program?
General Klotz. NNSA recognizes the nuclear security enterprise's
need to maintain the complete set of skills and expertise to respond to
future stockpile challenges. The enterprise need includes exercising
all capabilities required to ensure that the nuclear deterrent remains
safe, secure, effective, reliable, and responsive as required by the
fiscal year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Several activities within the current Stockpile Stewardship Program
that meet the direction of Section 3112 of the FY 2016 NDAA have
already been implemented. Relevant activities include:
Planning for an increased rate of hydrodynamic and
subcritical experiments (at Nevada National Security Site, U1a
facility) to test and exercise designers, engineers, and
experimentalists.
``Certification Readiness Exercises'' (research and
development studies and experiments) for our technical experts to
identify and reduce technical risks to the life extension programs
early in the process.
Significant acceleration of the shot rate at the National
Ignition Facility to exercise designers, experimentalists and
diagnosticians.
Collaboration with the United Kingdom on the Joint
Technology Demonstrator, which exercises the workforce throughout the
design, develop, manufacture, and prototype lifecycle.
The Defense Programs ``Capabilities for Nuclear
Intelligence'' (CNI) portfolio with the Research Development Test &
Evaluation portfolio provides training and development activities for
designers, engineers, and experimentalists on non-US nuclear weapons
concepts, providing great benefit to the stockpile stewardship program.
120-day studies on interoperable warhead concepts,
conducted in 2012, which also tested the capabilities of technical
experts.
Additionally, in early FY 2015, NNSA's Defense Programs
Advisory Committee began analyzing how well current stockpile
stewardship activities exercise and challenge the workforce throughout
the entire nuclear weapons life cycle. The committee expects to deliver
a report to NNSA in 2016, providing their recommendations relevant to
the Stockpile Responsiveness Program. This report will provide a basis
to establish the scope required to ensure stockpile responsiveness in
the future. The FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan will
more fully address NNSA's plan for the Stockpile Responsiveness Program
based on these results and further analysis.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, unlike the newly born Stockpile
Responsiveness Program, the PNWIE program has been statutorily required
for three years. Just a few weeks ago--and almost a year late--the
committee received the NNSA lab directors' plan for how to carry out
this program. But the cover letter states that DOE ``is not advocating
for implementation of the plan.'' Meanwhile the law explicitly says
``the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the directors, shall
carry out the plan,'' but gives him the authority to adjust how it is
implemented. General, I know we share the same goals here. We want to
set NNSA up for the future and we want our lab scientists and engineers
to do this work. What are you doing to implement this program? When
will you begin executing an initial PNWIE effort?
General Klotz. There was no funding authorized or appropriated
specifically for the Prototype Nuclear Weapons for Intelligence
Estimates (PNWIE) program in fiscal year (FY) 2016. However, DOE/NNSA
is already executing activities that exercise the continuum of
integrated lifecycle activities, including design, development,
prototype building, and experimental testing. These activities include
intelligence-informed efforts conducted by Defense Program's
Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence (CNI) program, which is
coordinated with the Foreign Nuclear Weapons Intelligence Initiative
(FNWII). The CNI effort includes a training and development practicum
as well as activities that range from materials characterization to
modeling to sub-system level testing. Of note, NNSA is also allocating
additional funding to the Joint Technology Demonstrator (JTD) program
that we recently initiated with the United Kingdom. The JTD program
will sustain core capabilities in the design, manufacture, testing,
fabrication and assembly of flight-ready hardware. Finally, we are
developing a stockpile responsiveness framework to summarize and
examine the FNWII, JTD and all ongoing stockpile activities that are
responsive to the goals of section 3111 of the FY 2015 NDAA.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, what more could NNSA be doing on
deferred maintenance if provided additional funding? We need to start
bending this curve down and Congress needs to step up. Can you please
provide a list of high-priority projects that you aren't funding in the
request?
General Klotz. Over the past three years, NNSA has been successful
in slowing the annual growth of deferred maintenance from $250M/year to
$100M/year. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2016 allows us
to stop the growth of deferred maintenance. Our FY 2017 request allows
us to begin reducing deferred maintenance and arresting the decline of
NNSA infrastructure by:
Increasing funds for recapitalization and maintenance
efforts
Disposing of excess facilities
Increasing buying power via strategic procurement of
common building systems across the enterprise (e.g., roofs, HVAC)
Improving project management capabilities to make risk-
informed investment decisions
However, additional strategic investments in infrastructure could
be made to accelerate NNSA's progress in arresting the declining state
of infrastructure and reducing deferred maintenance. As requested, a
list of prioritized infrastructure investments is provided below. Note
that neither I nor the Secretary endorse any of these additional
priorities given the spending limits created by the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2015 (BBA). We have made extensive efforts to thoroughly assess,
prioritize, and balance the program to achieve the major requirements
in the FY 2017 budget request. Any extra funding inserted into our
Recapitalization program will come at the expense of other programs we
deem more important to the effectiveness of the nuclear enterprise as a
whole.

National Nuclear Security Administration
Infrastructure and Safety
Unfunded FY 2017 Recapitalization Projects--As of February 2016

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Project
Rank Site Project Name Cost ($K)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 LLNL Site 300 Electric Utility Display System Upgrade $ 7,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 LANL LANSCE Sector A Tunnel Fire Suppression System Installation $ 3,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 LLNL B132N HVAC System Variable Air Control Replacement $ 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Y-12 Bldg 9204-2E Wet Pipe Systems 1&2 50 Year Sprinkler Head Replacement $ 5,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Y-12 Bldg 9995 Air Handling Unit (AHU) 2000 Replacement $ 6,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Y-12 Area 5 15 kV Underground Cable Replacement $ 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 KCP Kirtland Ops NC-135 Site Disposition $ 4,900
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 LLNL Bldg 175 Characterization $ 1,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Y-12 Bldg 9204-2 Ceiling Concrete Replacement (additional scope) $ 6,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 PX Bldg 12-84E Generator Replacement $ 2,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 KCP Bldg 2 Specialty Welding Applications Capital Equipment Replacement and $ 1,200
Upgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 LANL PF-4 Vault Storage Renovation $ 7,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
13 LLNL Utility Safety Upgrades to Plating Shop, B322 $ 2,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 SNL C914 Seismic Upgrades to Achieve Code Compliance $ 9,720
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 LLNL Bldg 292 Characterization $ 2,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16 LLNL Site 200 and 300 Transition and Disposition of 48 Trailers $ 2,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 SNL SNL--Hawaii Mt. Haleakala Disposition of 3 Facilities $ 934
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 LLNL Site-Wide Low Conductivity Water System Station/Cooling Tower Replacement $ 6,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 LLNL Main Campus--Failing Underground Utility Valves and Water Distribution $ 5,000
Piping Replacement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 PX Building 12-84E Generator Replacement $ 2,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 SNL C912 Major Building Renovation, Phase 3 $ 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 LLNL B131 Engineering's Cornerstone Office Building Upgrade $ 7,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
23 KCP Product Testing Area Capital Equipment Replacement $ 2,490
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24 SNL Substation 5 Loop Upgrade, Redundant Feeder Installation $ 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25 Y-12 9204-04 Deinventory $ 8,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26 PX Bldg 12-24E Chiller Replacement $ 2,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 LANL Small Improvement Project in 3 Facilities (53-003,22-0005, 03-0039) $ 1,300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 LLNL B805 Classified Machine Shop Infrastructure Renovation $ 3,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 LANL CMR Initial Facility Closure (additional scope) $ 1,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 LLNL B327 Non-Destructive Evaluation Laboratory Renovation $ 2,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 LLNL B391 HVAC Water Temperature Control Upgrade $ 3,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32 Y-12 Re-line Failing Sections of Sitewide Potable Water Distribution Piping $ 8,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 LANL TA-03-0102 Component Manufacturing Virtual Vault Type Room Installation $ 1,599
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
34 KCP Production Area Renovations for Floor Space Optimization $ 2,143
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
35 LLNL Disposition of Buildings B326, B221, & B221 Retention Tanks $ 2,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
36 SNL C911 Renovation to Convert Office to Lab Space $ 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
37 PX Bldgs 12-85 and 12-96 UPS Replacements $ 2,250
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
38 PX Bldg 12-44 UPS Replacement & Equipment Room Reconfiguration $ 3,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
39 PX Bldg 11-51 Generator and UPS Replacement $ 2,250
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
40 PX Bldgs 12-98E1 and E2 UPS and Generator Replacement $ 3,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
41 LANL Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Glovebox and Systems Renovation $ 8,250
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
........ Total $ 164,536
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, you submitted a plan last September on
three projects where NNSA was considering using public-private
partnerships to build new, modern buildings and get out of some of
these ancient facilities. What's the status of these projects? Why
can't we get these going as public-private partnerships?
General Klotz. As stated in our Public-Private Partnerships Report
to Congress, we are required to perform an Analysis of Alternatives
(AoA) to determine best value to the government. When completed, our
analysis must be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
as consistent with the A-94 and A-11 guidelines agreed to by OMB, the
Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Budget Committees.
Pantex Administrative Support Complex (ASC):
DOE's AoA for the Pantex ASC revealed that a public-private
partnership would satisfy the mission need at the best value to the
government.
High Performance Computing Innovation Center (HPCIC)/Collaboration
in Research and Engineering for Advanced Technology & Education
(CREATE):
NNSA is completing business cases for each of these projects, but
has not yet submitted them to OMB review.
NNSA Albuquerque Complex Project (NACP):
NNSA included the NACP as a line item in the FY 2017 President's
Budget Request.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, I want to revisit with you my theme of
setting NNSA up for the future. You'll recall an editorial ``Mr.
Moniz's Nuclear Warning'' by the Wall Street Journal, published January
12th, that is based on a remarkable letter from your boss, Secretary
Moniz, to the Director of OMB. The letter points to the problem we
discussed--decaying NNSA infrastructure--as well as many other problems
that require significant funding to address. The letter concludes by
requesting that in the FY17 budget request OMB provide NNSA ``an
upwards adjustment of $5.2 billion over FY18-FY21 to fund the
Administration's goals and priorities'' related to the nuclear
enterprise. It goes on: ``Failure to address these requirements in the
near term will put the NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning
in FY18, will not provide an appropriate statement of the Obama
Administration legacy, and will provide a misleading marker to the next
Administration as to the resource needs of the nuclear security
enterprise.''
So General Klotz, we're talking about the future. And the budget
request before us--while okay in the immediate year--the Secretary of
Energy is saying it is short a billion dollars a year over the next 5
years. And we've heard GAO say that there is a major gap between NNSA's
programmed activities and its out-year budget profile.
You have a duty to be clear with Congress and the American people:
What are the no kidding budget requirements for the 5-year program at
NNSA? Does the budget request and 5-year plan before us fix the issue
the Secretary wrote about in his letter to OMB?
General Klotz. I am confident that the FY 2017 President's Budget
for NNSA meets all of our national nuclear security requirements.
We will be able to do so because the President and Congress reached
an agreement last fall to raise the FY 2017 sequester cap in the
Bipartisan Budget Act. This provided us the necessary flexibility to
put together a responsible FY 2017 budget.
The budget projections for future years, FY 2018-FY 2021, remain
subject to the sequester caps set in the Budget Control Act of 2011.
Adjustments to the Congressional sequester caps are needed so the next
Administration can continue the progress we have made in our nuclear
security programs.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, will NNSA submit a rebaseline on the MOX
project, as required by the FY16 NDAA?
General Klotz. Yes. The Department is in the process of updating
the performance baseline.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, we see that the budget request includes
a substantial decrease in the amount that was expected to be requested
for the life extension program for the W80-4 warhead that will arm the
LRSO cruise missile in the late-2020s. Last year you projected you
would request $312 million for this program in 2017, but now we see you
are only requesting $220 million. This is a 30% reduction and it's
occurring very, very early in the program. I'm worried this shows a
lack of commitment to this incredibly important program. Our military
and DOD officials have spoken repeatedly about the critical nature of
getting LRSO in the field. So, to be clear, is the Obama Administration
100% committed to the 2025 date for a first production unit for this
warhead? Is this commitment iron clad and will this budget request
support that? Can we say we have your word on this?
General Klotz. Yes, the Administration is committed to the 2025
date for a first production unit (FPU) of the W80-4. NNSA balances
priorities among the near-term and long-term needs of managing the
stockpile to include life extension programs; necessary sustainment and
recapitalization of infrastructure; essential investment in research,
development, test, and evaluation; and activities to maintain the
expertise of the highly-skilled workforce to ensure a responsive
capability. The W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) remains a high
priority. The reduction was caused by the delay in budget execution as
a result of the 2016 continuing resolutions. This delay slowed
technology maturation activities in Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and
Design Options) and has resulted in a projected carry-over of roughly
$50 million that will be used to address program requirements in FY
2017.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, the B61-12 and W76-1 life extension
programs are both well underway at this point. Please give us a status
update on these programs. Are you confident they will finish on time
and on budget? What are the major risks to the successful execution of
these programs? Are they technical? Or are they in getting the funding
needed to execute?
General Klotz. The FY 2016 enacted budget for the B61-12 Life
Extension Program (LEP) is $643.3 million and the FY 2017 budget
request is $616.1 million with $2.9 billion planned for FY 2018-2021.
That funding profile reflects the transition from Development
Engineering (Phase 6.3) to Production Engineering (Phase 6.4), which
occurred in June 2016, as component activities begin pilot production
and production qualification activities. The final cost and schedule
baseline for the B61-12 LEP will be completed in August 2016 as part of
the Baseline Cost Report.
As with each major modernization program budget, the FY 2016 budget
for the B61-12 included an amount of management reserve to address
emerging risks and has been used to offset shortfalls in leveraged
science and engineering programs that are supporting technology or
production readiness. The B61-12 LEP expects to carryover a portion of
the risk based funds into FY 2017 giving it the ability to support the
W88 ALT 370 reprogramming proposed in FY 2016. While there are
potential concerns with reducing the B61-12 risk funds, there is a
greater impact if the W88 ALT 370 is not fully funded in FY2016.
Currently, the B61-12 LEP shares $250 million in common electronics
development costs with the W88 ALT 370. If these activities were
delayed, it would impact B61-12 common scope and/or increase B61-12
costs. On balance, it is a manageable risk to fund $5 million of the
W88 Alt 370 reprogramming. That is not to say that the reprogramming
carries no risk to the B61-12 LEP, but this option does offer the least
risk to the overall Defense Programs mission.
The most significant risks to the B61-12 LEP are inconsistent
funding, significantly reduced funding, and continuing resolutions of
significant duration. If the program does not receive the funding
requested through the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP),
the program may not be able to complete the work load that has been
planned for each year, address risks that are realized in future years,
or maintain the current schedule. Additionally, a year-long continuing
resolution in FY 2018, for example, could hold the program to the FY
2017 funding level--a reduction of more than $110 million from what is
planned in the FYNSP for FY 2018. Those unplanned and dramatic funding
reductions are the most serious risk to the program.
The W76-1 LEP is on schedule and within budget. The program is in
its eighth year of full-scale production. By the end of FY 2015, NNSA
had delivered almost 60 percent of the total required W76-1 warheads to
the United States Navy. The last production unit will be produced no
later than the end of FY 2019.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, counterintelligence and cybersecurity
threats to NNSA and its facilities are increasing in quantity and
sophistication. Can you assure us NNSA can defend against all of these
threats and prevent the escape of sensitive information? The DOE-IG
recently reported on a host of problems NNSA is having implementing its
``2NV'' cloud computing solution. What did the IG find and do you agree
with them? How are you fixing this?
General Klotz. The NNSA is doing everything it can to assure that
it is protecting the information and information assets with the funds
appropriated and the resources available. Cybersecurity is one of the
greatest challenges the U.S. Government faces. NNSA is always working
to stay ahead of our adversaries to protect our networks and databases.
We take this task very seriously as our program is responsible for
safeguarding our Nation's most sensitive nuclear security information.
We are modernizing our sensors and defenses, conducting independent
performance evaluations, and have employed a strong central control
construct to reduce our risk and the probability of data exfiltration.
However, there are no guarantees in cybersecurity, the adversaries
are continually evolving using more advanced technology and there are
always opportunities to improve our security posture.
With regard to the NNSA's challenges with 2NV, the DOE IG
identified three basic points of failure: lack of project management,
lack of oversight, and ineffective communication mechanisms between
project teams and NNSA leadership. NNSA concurs with the IG's
assessment of the project and through reforms that have been
implemented since the initial launch of the 2NV project, NNSA is
confident that we have put in place the administrative infrastructure
needed to ensure effective implementation of 2NV and our other IT
projects.
NNSA has carefully reassessed project requirements and realigned
the deliverables to mission and business functions. NNSA has also
implemented numerous project management improvements. Most notably, we
have issued and implemented the requirements of NNSA Supplemental
Directive 415.1, Project Oversight for Information Technology, and
established the Office of Policy and Governance to provide ongoing,
independent oversight for our projects to ensure the principles of the
new directive are consistently applied.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, when will NNSA submit data in compliance
with subsection (f)(4) of 50 U.S.C. 2441a, regarding the number of
contractor employees who have been employed under a service support
contract to NNSA for a period of greater than two years? This
information is critical to understanding whether NNSA is illegally
employing personal service contractors. Please submit the data by to
the committee by the end of March.
General Klotz. NNSA does not have any personal service contracts,
as we do not have statutory authority to enter into such contracts.
NNSA submitted data in compliance with subsection (f)(4) of 50 U.S.C.
2441a regarding support service contracts with the President's FY 2017
Budget. A copy of the appropriate section from the President's FY 2017
Budget is attached (please see attached graphic).

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, please elaborate on why NNSA
proposes such significant cuts to technology maturation efforts within
Defense Programs. What are the long-term effects of such cuts?
General Klotz. In the FY 2017 President's Budget Request,
technology maturation (early development) funding was reduced in order
to fund higher priority needs within the weapons program. NNSA is
balancing near and long-term risks in a fiscally constrained
environment, incrementally prioritizing long-term technologies for
planned insertion opportunities in future stockpile modernization
programs.
Mr. Rogers. General Klotz, NNSA's staffing analysis shows that
Defense Programs and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program have the
same number of federal employees. But Defense Programs has four times
the funding and most of the safety, security, and liability issues. Why
is there such a huge imbalance in staffing?
General Klotz. Both Defense Programs (DP) and Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN) require an appropriate amount of staffing to
ensure their respective mission requirements are achieved.
Since FY 2012, the DNN full-time equivalent (FTE) count has
decreased from 260 to its FY 2017 projected level of 187 (28%
decrease).
The DNN business model includes managing twelve major programs to a
global customer base supporting over 100 countries, international and
USG interagency partners. DNN also exercises nuclear export control
regulatory responsibilities which has significant federal manpower
responsibilities.
As DNN's mission evolves in response to future Presidential policy
guidance related to global nuclear security threat reduction, the
program will continue to analyze how the future mission requirements
will impact future manpower and staffing needs. In FY 2017, DNN will
continue its efforts to meet current and future workforce needs by
analyzing how evolving missions are affecting job requirements.
NNSA, like other technically inclined agencies, faces increasing
attrition numbers on an annual basis, due to the difficulty of
attracting and retaining skilled, trained, and educated individuals to
fill (and backfill) critical roles within the nuclear security
enterprise. NNSA has embarked on a workforce and human capital strategy
which leverages all the management tools and flexibilities at our
disposal to ensure that we recruit, hire and retain the best workforce
to execute our mission. Reshaping of the entire NNSA workforce,
including DNN and DP, over the next several years will be essential to
effectively executing our mission. This includes identifying and
developing the appropriate skill sets as well as examining the size of
the overall and programmatic work forces.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Regalbuto, you served on the technical team for the
Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) under Secretary Chu and now you lead DOE's
Environmental Management program. Just this past year, DOE asked the
court to amend the consent decree to provide the Department another two
full decades before being required to start processing tank waste at
the Hanford Site in Washington State. Do you believe you can get the
entire WTP system, including WTP's pre-treatment facility, operational
by 2039? Will you have to build more double shell tanks at Hanford and
at what cost? What will be the total lifecycle cost for WTP for design,
construction, operation, and eventual demolition?
Secretary Regalbuto. The Department of Energy (DOE) had proposed
milestones, together with conditions that could require those
milestones to be modified as additional information is obtained, based
in part, on the need to resolve the remaining technical issues at the
Waste Treatment Plant's Pretreatment and to a lesser degree, High-Level
Waste facilities. The milestones proposed by DOE were also based on the
uncertain amount of redesign activities that may be needed once
technical issue resolution is completed. DOE informed the court that it
will voluntarily initiate direct feed low-activity waste operations as
soon as 2022, allowing vitrification to begin for the much larger low-
activity portion of the tank waste prior to achievement of initial
plant operations for the overall WTP complex. After the date of this
hearing, the Court in the case of Washington v. Moniz, NO: 2:08-CV-
5085-RMP, issued its third order regarding the parties' proposals to
modify the Consent Decree. DOE is currently undertaking a detailed
examination of the Court's decision. The tank cleanup mission at
Hanford is both massive and complex. DOE remains committed to the
successful completion and operation of the Waste Treatment Plant as a
method for processing waste stored in underground tanks at Hanford as
soon as practicable.
DOE does not expect to have a need to build more double-shell
tanks. If, however, the construction of new double-shell tanks becomes
necessary, DOE estimates it would cost $85 million to $150 million to
build a new, one-million gallon double-shell tank.
A credible estimate of total lifecycle cost for the WTP design,
construction, operation, and eventual demolition is not available at
this time due to a number of uncertainties and technical and
programmatic issues associated with the WTP Project. Key issues
include: resolution of technical issues with the Pretreatment and High-
Level Waste facilities; on-going efforts to re-baseline the Low-
Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and Balance of Facility
portions of the project; and assessment of the on-going litigation with
the State of Washington. All of these factors will likely result in
changes to the Total Project Cost for the WTP project and the costs
associated with operations and eventual demolition.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Connery, what are the safety impacts of NNSA's
deteriorating infrastructure and $3.7 billion backlog of deferred
maintenance? Is all of this decrepit infrastructure becoming a safety
hazard? Has your Board held any hearings on this issue, or sent any
letters to DOE or NNSA? Does DNFSB support efforts to buy-down NNSA's
backlog of deferred maintenance?
Ms. Connery. The complex's aging facilities and resultant backlog
of maintenance are continuing safety concerns. Delays to NNSA's efforts
to modernize its infrastructure have exacerbated safety related issues
and have necessitated that ongoing programmatic work be performed in
degrading defense nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety
standards. The Board supports DOE and NNSA's efforts to develop new
defense nuclear facilities and will continue to work closely with them
to integrate safety into their designs at the earliest stages.
The Board agrees that infrastructure risk can become safety risk.
It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA deferred maintenance
backlog of $3.7 billion includes nondefense nuclear facilities and
infrastructure that have little or no bearing on the safety of defense
nuclear operations. Many of the items in NNSA's deferred maintenance
database are roofs, office air conditioning systems, shop utilities,
and the like. At some sites these types of deferred maintenance vastly
exceed corrective maintenance backlogs or deferred preventive
maintenance on nuclear safety-related structures, systems, and
components (SSC) and processing equipment. Nevertheless, infrastructure
risk in a nondefense nuclear facility can pose a nuclear safety risk
under some circumstances.
The number and severity of risks increases when the amount of
deferred preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance backlog
rises. Each nuclear facility has a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and
accompanying Technical Safety Requirements which set forth the
preventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the safety
class and safety significant SSCs credited in the DSA to prevent or
mitigate hazardous accident scenarios. The implementation of these
maintenance and surveillance requirements is key to ensuring the SSCs
will reliably perform their credited safety functions.
The Board has made maintenance of safety systems and management of
aging infrastructure continuing areas of emphasis in recent years. In
the past three years, this effort has included on-site reviews of
maintenance programs at five NNSA facilities by our staff, multiple
visits by Board Members to evaluate maintenance programs and aging
infrastructure at the Y-12 National Security Complex and Pantex, public
hearings at Pantex and Y-12 which addressed these topics, letters to
NNSA on maintenance programs at Pantex (November 12, 2015) and Sandia
National Laboratories (May 12, 2014), and a letter to NNSA on the
structural integrity of aging production facilities at Y-12 (February
4, 2015). In addition, the Board annually receives a written report and
briefing from NNSA on maintaining safety of aging facilities at Y-12 in
response to a prior reporting requirement issued by the Board.
Furthermore, the Board has also increased its focus on emergency
preparedness and response capabilities, the last line of defense for
this aging infrastructure. Hosting both public meetings and hearings,
the Board subsequently made several recommendations complex wide and
site specific on emergency preparedness and response capability. In
September 2014, the Board issued Recommendation 2014-1, Emergency
Preparedness and Response, to address deficiencies with DOE's
promulgation of and oversight of compliance with requirements. The
Board focused staff reviews in 2015 on the assessment of implementation
of these requirements at defense nuclear facilities. These assessments
included site-specific reviews at the Pantex Plant and Savannah River
Site as well as observation of drills and exercises at the Y-12
National Security Complex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Pantex
Plant, Savannah River Site, and Hanford Site. The review at the Pantex
Plant led to the identification of significant issues that warranted
near-term resolution. As a result, on November 24, 2015, the Board
issued Recommendation 2015-1, Emergency Preparedness and Response at
Pantex, to address the identified deficiencies.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Connery, do you believe DNFSB's enabling statute
requires all Board Members to be provided full access to all Board
information, including information on all Board employees and
personnel? Congress has legislated on this matter twice and that was
the clear intention. Do you agree?
Ms. Connery. The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, provides that each
Board Member shall have full access to all information relating to the
performance of the Board's functions, powers, and mission. I fully
support individual Board Members' access to information as interpreted
by the Department of Justice in the memo previously provided to this
Committee. I agree to be bound by the opinion from the Department of
Justice to allow sharing of all information, including information on
all Board employees and personnel, necessary for the Board to fulfill
its policy making function and its oversight function over the
Department of Energy. I further agree with the Atomic Energy Act
language that I will not withhold from Board Members, information that
is made available to me that relates to the Board's policy and
oversight functions. In the sharing of information, I seek the advice
of the General Counsel to ensure that the Board complies with the
Atomic Energy Act and all other statutory and legal requirements for
the protection of information such as the Privacy Act and the
protection of classified information.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Connery, what steps are you taking to address the
concerns expressed by DNFSB employees in recent OPM employee surveys?
Ms. Connery. DNFSB took a number of actions in FY 2015 to address
employee concerns expressed in the 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey (FEVS) survey results. Examples include: establishment of a
working group to adopt agency core values; use of an executive coach on
an ongoing basis to develop better communication techniques; regular
agency-wide and office staff meetings to provide increased
opportunities for employee feedback and participation; and expanded
leadership training for its executives. In 2015 DNFSB's FEVS results
indicate the agency made notable progress in multiple areas. DNFSB
achieved a response rate of 84% (34% higher than the government-wide
average) and experienced increases in almost all scores (96%), with 59%
of the scores improving by double-digits. I believe this shows the
agency is moving in the right direction to address employee concerns,
and we will continue to build on these efforts to influence positive
change.
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Caldwell, you're putting together a report to
Congress on the potential of using low-enriched uranium fuel in navy
reactors. Your predecessor (who is now your boss) told us last year
that there are no military benefits provided by switching to low-
enriched fuel in Navy reactors. Do you agree?
Admiral Caldwell. US Navy warship requirements determine naval fuel
system design features including use of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
fuel. Substituting low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for the HEU in
current naval fuel systems would decrease reactor energy and lead to
more frequent reactor refueling. LEU fuel would fundamentally decrease
the available energy in a naval reactor, thereby reducing a naval
warship's availability and longevity. The impact of LEU may be
mitigated in aircraft carriers by developing an advanced naval fuel
that could increase uranium loading beyond what is practical today and
meet the rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors. An
advanced fuel system might enable either higher performance with HEU
fuel or use of LEU fuel in aircraft carriers. Advanced fuel development
is estimated to take about $1 billion, 10-15 years to develop, and
would have to begin well in advance of any ship application. Successful
development of an advanced fuel system is not assured.
Switching to LEU fuel in naval reactors would be beneficial in
allowing the U.S. to take a leadership role in non-proliferation by
reducing the need to produce new HEU. Although an LEU development
program would likely not produce a more militarily desirable reactor
design, the knowledge gained during the research and development work
would be beneficial to advance the state-of-the-art in U.S. naval
reactor design and manufacturing. Fuel development work would also help
sustain and build the cadre of highly specialized naval fuel experts
and unique fuel irradiation and post irradiation examination
infrastructure.
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Caldwell, what are your top priorities for
FY17? Is your budget aligned with that of the larger Navy? What happens
if your program gets out of alignment with Navy programs like the OHIO-
class Replacement program?
Admiral Caldwell. Naval Reactors' entire budget supports the safe
and effective operation of the nuclear-powered Fleet, today and
tomorrow. Naval Reactors' funding requests can be directly linked to
this single, over-arching priority of supporting the safe and effective
operation of the nuclear-powered fleet. In FY 2017, this entails
effective oversight of the operation and maintenance of 97 reactors in
73 submarines, 10 aircraft carriers, and 4 training and research
reactors. This priority will be met in the most effective and judicious
way possible.
The main budget components that support today's operating fleet are
Naval Reactors Operations and Infrastructure (NOI), Naval Reactors
Development (NRD), Program Direction and Construction. The remainder of
the budget, primarily OHIO-Class Replacement Reactor Systems
Development, S8G Prototype Refueling and the Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project, supports tomorrow's fleet. In FY 2017, the
OHIO-Class Replacement project will continue life of the ship reactor
core manufacturing development activities and detailed design of
reactor plant heavy equipment to support FY 2019 GFE procurement. The
S8G Prototype Refueling project will complete construction of the
Radiological Work and Storage Building and commence refueling equipment
checkout and training at the shipyards. The Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project will finalize key facility and equipment
requirements and advance facility design to support establishing the
Performance Baseline in FY 2018 and the start of construction in FY
2019.
Our budget is aligned with the larger Navy. We work closely every
day with our partners in the Navy to ensure that our budget is aligned
with the mission, performance requirements and schedules.
Specifically, for the OHIO-Class Replacement program, the
Department of Energy and Navy efforts are directed at supporting this
schedule, including development of the propulsion plant design to
support procurement of long-lead components in FY 2019 to support a
construction start in FY 2021 and ship delivery in FY 2028. After
completing ship operational testing, the first OHIO-Class Replacement
must be on strategic patrol by 2031 to meet STRATCOM force level
requirements. Given that the first OHIO-Class Replacement submarine, a
ship twice the size of the VIRGINIA-Class submarine, is planned to be
constructed within the same span of time; this schedule is aggressive
and requires close coupling of Department of Energy and Department of
Navy activities to ensure on time ship delivery.
The design and construction of OHIO-Class Replacement is a complex
effort that requires extensive coordination between not only Naval
Reactors and the Navy's Shipbuilders, but also the Navy's Strategic
Systems Programs that are responsible for the missile systems and the
British Navy, who will use the Common Missile Compartment design in
their upcoming SSBNs. Because they each depend so heavily on each
other, these four design efforts must be synchronized, in close
collaboration to retire risk early and minimize estimated construction
costs.
Given the criticality of Naval Reactors' Department of Energy
activities to Navy priorities and mission, funding cuts to Naval
Reactors' DOE budget can adversely impact strategic objectives and
plans, especially ship design and construction and nuclear operator
training.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. A recent NAS report recommended a clean-slate approach
to building new nuclear weapons and building prototypes in order to
exercise design and production skills. Do you agree and do you believe
NNSA and the labs should focus on building prototypes? What would the
cost be and how would it compare with NNSA priorities?
General Klotz. NNSA recognizes the need to ensure that the nuclear
security enterprise maintains the complete set of skills and expertise
to respond to future challenges, exercise capabilities required to
ensure that the nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, effective,
reliable, and responsive as required by the FY 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA). For this reason, NNSA's current Stockpile
Stewardship and Stockpile Management portfolios address many of these
necessary capabilities. In particular, our current portfolio includes a
spectrum of strategically aimed efforts in prototyping from small-scale
validation experiments to well-diagnosed hydro tests up to larger
demonstration experiments. At the component level, we are prototyping
new technologies for improving safety and for limited-life components
that will make the stockpile easier to maintain. We are also building
weapon prototypes at the system level and using our world-class science
facilities--the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL and the Dual
Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at LANL--to study
how these prototypes perform under extreme conditions found in nuclear
weapons. Lastly, NNSA has an effort to study how new technologies, in
particular advanced manufacturing, can be used to accelerate the
prototyping process
In early FY 2015, NNSA charged the Defense Programs Advisory
Committee with analyzing how well current stockpile stewardship
activities exercise and challenge the workforce throughout the entire
nuclear weapons lifecycle to ensure critical skills were not being
neglected. When finished, the Committee's report will be used to inform
adjustments to future activities to include building prototypes.
Mr. Cooper. Following up on a previous question--a recent article
revealed that classified information, including information related to
uranium operations was dumped in the regular garbage at Y12 for 20
years. Is NNSA doing a damage assessment?
General Klotz. In conjunction with the recent issuance of the
Preliminary Notice of Violation (PNOV), the Program Office (NA-10) is
working with the Y-12 Field Office to review the need to conduct a
damage assessment, taking into consideration all relevant information,
to include the current circumstances of the material being maintained
at a DOE controlled burial location. A document review is underway, and
a fact-finding trip to Y-12 is planned, to speak with knowledgeable
individuals first hand.
Mr. Cooper. What dismantlement work is planned in FY17 and why is
this funding necessary?
General Klotz. The funding requested in the FY 2017 budget for
dismantlements supports the President's goal to accelerate the
dismantlement rate of previously retired weapons by 20 percent. NNSA
will hire and train additional technical staff in FY 2017 to be ready
to increase dismantlement rates starting in FY 2018. This will allow
NNSA to dismantle the weapons retired prior to 2009 by the year 2021,
rather than the original goal of 2022.
Mr. Cooper. What are the next steps and challenges on
nonproliferation that NNSA is addressing? Are we laying the proper
foundation to be ready to meet new proliferation threats such as the
expansion of nuclear know-how about the nuclear fuel cycle if nuclear
energy spreads, or such as 3D printing?
General Klotz. The work of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN)--supporting the ``Nuclear Threat Reduction''
pillar described in the NNSA Enterprise Strategic Vision--is carried
out within the context of a dynamic global security environment, which
is described in NNSA's annual report entitled Prevent, Counter, and
Respond--A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This
environment is characterized by the persistent vulnerability of nuclear
and radiological materials (particularly in regions of conflict); the
pressure on arms control and nonproliferation regimes from enduring
interest in nuclear weapons capabilities by state- and non-state
actors; the global expansion of nuclear power and possible spread of
fuel cycle technology; the increasing opportunities for illicit nuclear
material trafficking due to expanding global trade volumes and
increasingly sophisticated procurement networks; and the rapid advance
of technology (including cyber) that may shorten nuclear weapon
development pathways and directly affect nuclear safeguards and
security missions.
Of the many developments in the global nuclear security environment
relevant to DNN's work, one of the most important is the possible
proliferation risk associated with the expansion of civil nuclear
energy. Ensuring that ``nuclear newcomers'' (i.e., states that do not
currently have civil nuclear power programs and generally have little
experience with managing nuclear technologies) are able to develop
safety, security, safeguards, export controls, and emergency response
systems to support their emerging nuclear energy programs will continue
to be an important challenge.
DNN is helping to address this challenge through various efforts,
including the development of assured fuel supply and spent fuel take-
back strategies to discourage newcomer states from developing
indigenous fuel-cycle capabilities. DNN is also engaging partners from
day one to help them build the safety, security, safeguards, and export
control capacity and infrastructure necessary to ensure safe and secure
nuclear programs. Finally, DNN is launching an ``over-the-horizon''
strategic study focused specifically on the implications to DNN
programs of future trends in the global nuclear fuel cycle, including
the expansion of nuclear energy. The results of this study will help
inform future programmatic activities.
Emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing represent
another important development in the global security environment. On a
regular basis, new technologies emerge that can significantly benefit
our nuclear security enterprise but that also pose proliferation risks.
NNSA is working within the Department and with other U.S. Government
agencies to establish a systematic, coordinated approach to ensuring
that the U.S. Government can reap the benefits of emerging technologies
while mitigating associated proliferation risks.
Last year, NNSA established an Emerging Technologies Working Group
(ETWG) as a formal mechanism to proactively identify, analyze, and
respond to emerging technologies of concern. The group is co-chaired by
DNN and the Office of Defense Programs, and includes participation from
various offices Department-wide and the DOE complex. The ETWG began its
work by considering the proliferation risks associated with additive
manufacturing. As an immediate measure, the ETWG is developing
classification guidance to help control this particular technology. The
ETWG also is considering whether other policy guidance or export
control regulations would be feasible and appropriate to apply as the
technology develops.
In accordance with the requirement in Section 3139 of the FY 2016
National Defense Authorization Act, NNSA is also working with the U.S.
interagency to develop the President's strategy to address additive
manufacturing nonproliferation risks while balancing national security
needs. NNSA will be briefing various congressional committees on the
status of that strategy in the near future.
Mr. Cooper. Is NNSA considering the sterilization option (which
might be a simpler option that would dispose of the pits at Pantex, and
which the Red Team report chaired by Dr. Thomas Mason referenced), in
addition to the dilute and disposal option for disposing of excess
weapons-grade plutonium?
General Klotz. NNSA has announced that it will pursue the dilute
and dispose option as it is a proven, demonstrated technology. Other
options may be further evaluated as part of the NEPA process or the
project management critical decision process, as deemed reasonable.
Mr. Cooper. Are you confident of the contents of the drums that
will be going to the site? Are you confident that either drums that are
at WIPP, either currently above ground or below ground would not cause
the same accident?
Secretary Regalbuto. The Office of Environmental Management is
confident of the safety and the content of the transuranic (TRU) waste
containers currently stored above-ground at the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP). All waste emplaced at WIPP has been isolated in the
disposal rooms, and separated from the environment and workers by steel
bulkheads, in accordance with all applicable requirements.
Regarding future shipments to WIPP, including containers at the TRU
waste generator sites awaiting shipment and TRU waste containers that
will be shipped to WIPP in the future, our TRU waste program efforts
will ensure there is no threat of a thermal reaction similar to the
breached drum containing nitrate salt-bearing waste from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL).
This confidence is based on rigorous changes made at WIPP which
include: completion of corrective actions identified in response to the
WIPP Accident Investigation Reports; enhancements to the WIPP safety
envelope, the WIPP Safety Management Programs and safety basis;
improvements to the oversight and assessments of the TRU waste program
by WIPP management and operations contractor, the Carlsbad Field Office
and DOE Headquarters; rigorous new requirements for the
characterization of waste, chemical compatibility and waste container
constituents; and improvements to the WIPP waste acceptance criteria.
The inventory of LANL wastes remaining from the waste stream involved
in the WIPP incident will be treated to ensure any risk is fully
mitigated prior to shipment to WIPP.
Mr. Cooper. Why is the DNFSB important for nuclear safety and the
nuclear enterprise?
Ms. Connery. The Board is the only agency that provides independent
safety oversight of the Department of Energy's defense nuclear
facilities, ensuring safe operations for the workforce and the public.
These facilities and their operations are essential to our Nation's
defense, performing work that includes: the assembly, disassembly, and
surveillance of nuclear weapons; fabrication of plutonium pits and
other weapon components; production and recycling of tritium; nuclear
criticality experiments; subcritical experiments; and a host of
activities that address the radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years
of nuclear weapons operations. In operating the facilities that
accomplish these missions, the Department of Energy functions
predominantly as a self-regulating entity, responsible for managing
cost and schedule as well as safety. The Board was established to
provide a needed counterbalance to budgetary and schedule pressures and
to serve as an extraordinarily expert technical advisor on matters of
safety. The Board has assembled a technical staff of unparalleled
capability that consistently identifies safety issues that eluded the
Department of Energy and its contractors, enabling the Board to press
DOE to correct problems and provide adequate protection to the workers
and the public. Recent examples of the Board's contributions to safety
include the Board's identification of the following major safety
issues:
Systemic problems in DOE's readiness to respond to
emergencies at its sites which had persisted unaddressed despite the
wakeup call of Fukushima Daiichi--The Secretary of Energy accepted the
Board's recommendation and issued an implementation plan that commits
to corrective actions including a complex-wide assessment of problems
and a rewrite of DOE's governing directive, DOE Order 151.1C,
Comprehensive Emergency Management System.
Dysfunction of Los Alamos National Laboratory's
criticality safety program, including the exodus of the laboratory's
criticality safety staff--In response, the Laboratory Director paused
all work involving fissile materials at the Los Alamos Plutonium
Facility and initiated corrective actions including rebuilding the
lab's criticality safety expertise, reevaluating the criticality safety
evaluations for fissile material operations, and gradually
reestablishing the lab's ability to safely perform fissile material
operations through a comprehensive series of readiness assessments.
DOE's failure to manage the upkeep of the software code
RADCALC, which is used to determine the type of packaging needed for
safe shipment of various radioactive materials--In response, DOE
alerted users to suspend use of the noncompliant software, audited the
responsible vendor and issued a stop work order based on the audit's
results, and initiated an extent of condition review for similar
software.
Improper analysis and control of flammable gas hazards in
the Defense Waste Processing Facility, which converts high-level
radioactive wastes into glass in a high-temperature melter--In
response, DOE instituted compensatory measures to place the facility in
a safe condition, formed a dedicated team to resolve the safety issues,
and began the development of a new flowsheet for the facility to
address the hazard.
Failure of the design strategy for Hanford's Waste
Treatment Plant to properly prevent erosion and plugging of process
piping that DOE plans to rely on for transfers of highly radioactive
slurries for decades without maintenance--DOE plans to address this
issue through systematic evaluation of hazards, reassessing the
pipeline design strategy, performing additional erosion testing, and
establishing appropriate waste acceptance criteria for the facilities.
In addition to identifying safety issues of such magnitude, the
Board also assists DOE in characterizing safety concerns and developing
avenues for improvement. In the past year, for example, the Board
provided an informational report to DOE that systematically evaluated
the structures of aging facilities at the Y-12 National Security
Complex, to assist DOE in making informed decisions regarding the
potential to use those facilities for programmatic work for several
more decades. Likewise, the Board provided a major report to DOE on
opportunities to reduce the quantity of radioactive material-at-risk in
the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, to reduce the hazard posed by this
facility to workers and the surrounding communities.
Without the expertise and needed external perspective provided by
the Board, the Department of Energy would have a significantly reduced
capacity to identify and resolve safety issues at its defense nuclear
facilities.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. Do you expect a bow-wave in terms of costs for funding
the life extension programs? How is NNSA preparing to handle 4-5
concurrent life-extension programs?
General Klotz. FY 2017 Future Years Nuclear Security Program
(FYNSP) funding for life extension programs (LEPs) increases from
$1.340 billion in FY 2017 to $1.919 billion in FY 2021, with
significant increases occurring in FY 2018 (+$266 million) and FY 2021
(+$281 million). Beyond the FYNSP, the nominal cost of the LEPs, as
reflected in Figure 4-33 of the FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan (SSMP), plateaus, varying between $1.8 billion and $2
billion per year. Effectively, we will have climbed the ``bow wave''
during the FY 2017 FYNSP. However, it is important to note that only
the W76-1 and B61-12 LEPs currently are baselined, and the W88 Alt 370,
while baselined for its original scope, is being re-baselined to
reflect the addition of the conventional high explosive refresh. The
estimates for all other LEPs being performed over the next 25 years
(W80-4, IW-1, IW-2, IW-3, and B61-13) are based on planning estimates
as described in the FY 2017 SSMP, and their cost should be viewed as a
cost range. These estimates are done in advance of the Phase 6.2/2A
studies that will establish the specific scope for each LEP, so they
are subject to change once those studies are completed. For the period
FY 2022-2041 this cost range varies by about +/-$300 million per year
around the nominal values described above. Regarding how NNSA is
preparing to handle four to five concurrent life extension programs,
the best preparation is advance planning for their execution. That's
one of the reasons the SSMP is a 25-year plan that lays out our entire
scope of activities and current plans for the LEPs. It should also be
noted that while multiple LEPs may be ongoing at any particular point
in time, some will be in Engineering Development where the
preponderance of activities fall on the labs, while others will be in
production which falls more heavily on the plants. We are already
successfully executing three LEPs simultaneously.
Mr. Larsen. What are the opportunities to expand R&D into
technology to detect and better understand current and future
proliferation threats?
General Klotz. The DNN R&D program makes strategic contributions to
DOE's goal to reduce nuclear security threats through the innovation of
unilateral and multi-lateral technical capabilities to detect and
better understand: 1) foreign nuclear weapons program activities; 2)
illicit diversion of special nuclear materials; and 3) global nuclear
detonations. The program is emphasizing R&D that supports low-yield or
evasive nuclear test monitoring, Big Data (such as data analytics and
computation), and evaluation of emerging technologies (such as
microfluidics and additive manufacturing) that have multiple commercial
applications as well as proliferation threat potential in nuclear
material production applications.
Mr. Larsen. The FY16 NDAA mandated transferring certain NNSA
facilities that qualified for transfer to the Department of Energy
Environmental Management program within 3 years. What additional
funding would the DOE need and can the EM program execute?
Secretary Regalbuto. The Joint Explanatory Statement to the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) states that ``The
Office of Environmental Management shall not accept ownership or
responsibility for cleanup of any National Nuclear Security
Administration facilities or sites without funding specifically
designated for that purpose. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directed
to identify all requests for transfers of facilities or projects from
other DOE offices in its budget request justifications in future
years.'' The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 114-92) requires that the Department develop a plan for the
activities relating to the deactivation and decommissioning of
nonoperational defense nuclear facilities.
DOE had already begun an effort to address excess contaminated
facilities. In January 2015, the Secretary directed the establishment
of an Excess Contaminated Facilities Working Group within the
Department. The Working Group developed and executed an enterprise-wide
data collection effort to obtain updated cost and risk assessments to
deactivate, decontaminate, decommission, and demolish excess
facilities. The Working Group is updating and validating data as a part
of its efforts to develop policies to institutionalize a corporate
approach to address issues associated with the transfer of National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) facilities to the Office of
Environmental Management (EM). The Working Group also will be
finalizing and issuing a report in 2016 as required by section 3133 of
the FY 2016 NDAA.
Mr. Larsen. Can you explain the decrease in funding in the FY17
President's Budget relative to the FY 16 enacted level and FY 16 PB
level for Richland operations at Hanford?
Secretary Regalbuto. EM establishes its cleanup priorities
considering risk, compliance milestones and life-cycle cost
considerations across the EM complex. The FY 2017 budget request
reflects the progress in risk reduction at Richland and positions the
Department to continue significant cleanup activities, which include
the Plutonium Finishing Plant closure; a sustainable path toward
addressing the contamination beneath the 324 Building; groundwater
remediation; and K West Basin sludge removal.
Mr. Larsen. The FY 16 NDAA required a report on the feasibility of
using LEU in naval reactors. This research was supported with $5
million in the omnibus. Can you provide an update on the status of this
study?
Admiral Caldwell. The report on the feasibility of using LEU in
naval reactors is currently in interagency review. Upon completion of
the interagency review, Naval Reactors will formally sign out the
report and provide it to the congressional defense committees.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Does the dilute and dispose option entail any
concern over criticality as the MOX contractor is arguing? And now that
the Department of Energy has terminated the program, is it still worth
doing a new funding baseline for MOX?
General Klotz. Sandia National Laboratory has reviewed the recent
assertions of the risk of criticality issues at WIPP and concluded they
are unfounded. According to Sandia, while burial at WIPP would increase
the amount of weapon-grade plutonium several fold, criticality of down-
blended and packaged Pu-239 cannot result. The assertion that
Criticality Control Overpacks (CCO) would become crushed resulting in
criticality is simplistic and not credible. The salt formation would
squeeze the disposal rooms and waste, but this process cannot separate
the Pu from the diluting materials to form an undiluted critical mass.
The FY 2016 NDAA requires the Department to submit a revised
Performance Baseline. Therefore, the Department is in the process of
updating the performance baseline.
Mr. Garamendi. How much work are you doing in FY17 or how much
capability are you retaining specifically to support the Interoperable
Warhead (IW1), which was deferred at least 5 years in 2015 into 2020 or
beyond?
General Klotz. NNSA plans to restart the IW-1 Phase 6.2,
Feasibility Study and Design Options, in FY 2020 to support an FY 2030
first production unit. NNSA is continually developing technologies to
support a variety of options for future nuclear weapon alterations
(Alts), modifications (Mods) and life extension programs (LEPs),
including IW-1. As those technologies mature, individual weapon
programs assume funding responsibilities to further develop those
technologies to full maturity for program-specific applications. As the
B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 move to full scale production, NNSA will
transition staff and other resources from those programs to the IW-1
program.
Mr. Garamendi. Does NNSA need to produce any pits to support the
current and planned life extension programs?
General Klotz. There is no requirement to produce pits for the
current life extension programs (W76-1, B61-12 and W80-4). NNSA may
need to produce pits to support the first interoperable warhead (IW-1).
NNSA remains committed to meeting the NWC requirements for plutonium
pits and we are making progress on the fabrication of a development pit
using existing materials. This will help exercise our plutonium
capabilities and critical skills and is a major step toward reaching
pit manufacturing goals.
Mr. Garamendi. In terms of the funding profile, when does NNSA
start seeing a bow-wave for funding the life extension programs?
General Klotz. Current funding in the FY 2017 Future Years Nuclear
Security Program (FYNSP), specifically for life extension programs
(LEPs), increases from $1.340 billion in FY 2017 to $1.919 billion in
FY 2021, with significant increases occurring in FY 2018 (+$266
million) and FY 2021 (+$281 million). Beyond the FYNSP, the nominal
cost of the LEPs, as reflected in Figure 4-33 of the FY 2017 SSMP,
plateaus, varying between $1.8 billion and $2 billion per year.
Effectively, we will have climbed the ``bow wave'' during the FY 2017
FYNSP.
It is important to note, however, that only the W76-1 and B61-12
LEPs currently are baselined, and the W88 Alt 370, while baselined for
its original scope, is being re-baselined to reflect the addition of
the conventional high explosive refresh. The estimates for all other
LEPs being performed over the next 25 years (W80-4, IW-1, IW-2, IW-3,
and B61-13) are based on planning estimates, as described in the FY
2017 SSMP, whose cost should be viewed as a cost range. These estimates
are done in advance of the 6.2/2A studies that will establish the
specific scope for each LEP and are subject to change once those
studies are completed. For the period FY 2022-2041, this cost range
varies by about +/-$300 million per year around the nominal values
described above.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. This committee acted through the NDAA to ensure that it
is better informed about the authorization for export of critical
nuclear technologies. The February 25 deadline for the administration
to notify to Congress a list of those technologies is almost upon us.
Will the administration be in compliance?
General Klotz. The Department of Energy has prepared, in
consultation with the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Director of National
Intelligence, a list of technologies that should be protected from
diversion to a military program in those countries that are considered
a ``covered foreign country'' in Section 3136 of the FY 2016 NDAA.
In order to develop this list of technologies, the Department and
the consulting agencies considered what possible contribution would be
made to a nuclear weapon or naval propulsion program if such technology
or assistance was diverted from a peaceful intent to a military
program. The Department is finalizing this list and its submission to
Congress and will be prepared to brief Congress on the results of our
consultations.
The Department is also working to revise its 10 CFR Part 810
application review process to ensure that for any application that
comes forward for a listed technology to a ``covered foreign country,''
the appropriate notifications are made to Congress in accordance with
the NDAA. Finally, the Department also is developing a process to
ensure that the list of technologies remains up to date and addresses
technological developments within the nuclear industry and the nuclear
weapon and naval propulsion capabilities of the ``covered foreign
countries.''
Mr. Bishop. Maximizing U.S. influence on global nuclear safety,
security and nonproliferation is a concern of this Committee, and we
cannot achieve this goal without an effective and efficient nuclear
export authorization process. What is the status of the DOE's Process
Improvement Program for nuclear technology exports under Part 810?
General Klotz. In February 2015, the Department concluded a three-
year comprehensive revision of its regulations at 10 CFR Part 810 (Part
810), governing the transfer of nuclear technology and assistance
abroad and to foreign persons. The revised Part 810 regulation
clarifies and streamlines the authorization process to reflect the pace
of nuclear commerce, while continuing to address proliferation risks
associated with nuclear technology transfer. DOE's National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) currently is implementing a Part 810
Process Improvement Plan (PIP) and e810 online authorization system to
further improve and modernize the Part 810 application and U.S.
interagency review process.
As a part of the PIP, NNSA has committed to make the Part 810
program compliant with ISO 9001, which includes a continuous
improvement program. NNSA already has implemented a number of actions
intended to improve and expedite the review process, including: a new
docketing procedure; issuing specific authorizations conditional on
subsequent receipt of foreign assurances; and developing a procedure to
use Atomic Energy Act (AEA) Section 57b.1 for foreign assurances for
China. This action will eliminate the need to secure government-to-
government assurances for specific transfers authorized under the U.S.-
China 123 Agreement; instead, those transfers will be covered by the
assurances of the 123 Agreement. This not only eliminates the most
time-consuming element of securing a specific authorization, but places
those technology transfers under the stronger nonproliferation
assurances of the 123 Agreement. Other areas identified in the PIP that
the Department continues to work on and will implement over the next
weeks and months include: improving process and data management;
reforming and publishing in the Federal Register a new U.S. interagency
process for 810 reviews; revising internal DOE review procedures to
reduce time in process; improving assistance to exporters with more on-
line guidance and technical resources; more enforcement and compliance
monitoring of Part 810 reporting by U.S. persons; and considering
implementing a risk-based application review approach.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. In a memo dated November 20, 2015 from Secretary Moniz
to the President, the Secretary says--in regards to the shifting of the
disposition strategy--``So far, we have no read on MFA response. This
issue will need further interagency work in the context of overall,
complicated U.S.-Russia relations.'' Can you explain the current status
of talks with the Russians of shifting our plutonium disposition
strategy?
General Klotz. Consistent with the PMDA, the United States has been
in contact with the Russian Government since 2013 to keep it apprised
of the U.S. reviews of disposition methods. During July 2014
consultations in Moscow in PMDA channels, the Russian side advised that
the two sides should re-engage in consultations after the United States
had made a decision. In January of this year, a team apprised Russia of
the Administration's decision to pursue another disposition method and,
at an appropriate date, to pursue consultations as provided for in the
PMDA.
Mr. Wilson. We have already spent $4.5 Billion on the MOX project.
What is the Department's plan if Russia were to ask for concessions
that the United States can not make in order to support a change in our
disposition strategy?
General Klotz. The PMDA (paragraph 1 of Article III) clearly
provides a path for the Parties to agree on methods of disposition that
do not entail irradiation as fuel in reactors (``any other methods that
may be agreed by the Parties in writing''). We will not speculate on
what may or may not be Russian views in these consultations or on what
legal form an agreement might take.
Mr. Wilson. What would the overall cost be to resurrect the MOX
project if Russia is ultimately unwilling to allow a change in our
disposition strategy?
General Klotz. While it is difficult to provide a definitive
estimate, we expect it would take at least 1-2 years to ramp the
project staff back up, which would add approximately $600-900 million
to the total cost of the project. The projected $600-900 million
increase to restart would be in addition to the overall lifecycle cost
of the MOX approach estimated to be $30-50 billion.
Mr. Wilson. WIPP received less funding in the request for FY17 than
it received in FY16. The Department of Energy has stressed its
commitment to open the facility as quickly as possible, but how long
after WIPP reopens will it be fully operational?
Secretary Regalbuto. FY 2017 budget request provides funding to
resume waste emplacement operations in December 2016, so long as it is
safe to do so. The WIPP Recovery Plan identified that a replacement
permanent ventilation system is required to support an increased rate
of waste emplacement operations at WIPP. This will require two capital
asset projects that are being implemented consistent with the
Department's project management requirements. The design of these
projects is not sufficiently mature to allow estimating when WIPP will
achieve this increased rate of waste emplacement operations.
Mr. Wilson. In the budget request for 2017, the traditional
``Savannah River Risk Management Operations'' control point was
separated into two new control points, ``Environmental Cleanup'' and
``Nuclear Material Management''--causing considerable confusion. Can
you explain the Department's rationale for this and were the site
contractors notified of this change?
Secretary Regalbuto. As a result of the interdependency of nuclear
materials management and disposition activities at the Savannah River
Site across multiple Department of Energy (DOE) missions, a new control
point entitled ``Nuclear Material Management'' is being proposed for
Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Under this control point, planned work
activities under the PBS 12, Spent Nuclear Fuel Stabilization and
Disposition Program would be merged with PBS 11, Nuclear Material
Stabilization and Disposition Program.
Accordingly, the scope and funding for the surveillance and
maintenance of non-operating nuclear facilities (F-Area Complex
Facilities as well as the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuels Facility),
disposition of source term holdup within the F-Area Materials Storage
Facility (235-F), and future deactivation of nuclear facilities
currently operating at the Savannah River Site, which were previously
included in PBS 11, would be placed into a new PBS entitled
``Surveillance, Maintenance, and Deactivation.'' This new PBS would be
placed under the ``Environmental Cleanup'' control point along with the
Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition and Soil and Water
Remediation PBSs. Site contractors were notified of these proposed
modifications when the FY 2017 President's Budget Request was released.

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