[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EGYPT TWO YEARS AFTER MORSI (PART II)
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 16, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-132
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. David Schenker, Aufzien fellow and director, Program on Arab
Politics, Washington Institute for Near East Policy............ 7
Mr. Eric Bjornlund, president, Democracy International........... 19
Steven A. Cook, Ph.D., Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle
East and Africa studies, Council on Foreign Relations.......... 27
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. David Schenker: Prepared statement........................... 10
Mr. Eric Bjornlund: Prepared statement........................... 21
Steven A. Cook, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 29
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 42
Hearing minutes.................................................. 43
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 44
EGYPT TWO YEARS AFTER MORSI (PART II)
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
First, on behalf of all of the members of our subcommittee,
we would like to express our deepest condolences to our dear
friend and the ranking member of this subcommittee, Ted Deutch.
Ted's mom, Jean, passed away last week, and I know that the
hearts of every member of this committee go out to Ted and his
family during this difficult time.
In Ted's absence, Mr. Connolly will serve as our ranking
member today.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Connolly for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
any other member seeking recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our esteemed panel of witnesses.
And, without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days
to insert statements and questions for the record subject to
the length and limitation in the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. This is the
second part of a hearing that we began in May, looking at
Egypt's transition since Morsi was removed from power. In the
hearing earlier this year, we heard some differences of opinion
about the best way to move forward with our policy on Egypt,
including exactly how much leverage the United States has or
should attempt to wield over Egypt's domestic affairs. Egypt is
an important ally and security partner for the United States.
Egypt's strategic location, its assurance of safe passage
through the Suez Canal, its peace treaty with Israel, and its
demographics and cultural influence all mean that Egypt will
continue to play a positive, crucial role in the Middle East in
the years ahead.
Egypt is in a struggle with terrorism and Islamic jihadist
groups, like ISIS and Al Qaeda, a struggle that will not be
over, sadly, any time soon. It is essential that we maintain
alliances like the one we have with Egypt, not only as a
partner in providing logistical support in the region but also
as a participant in our shared fight against a twisted radical
Islamic ideology.
Egypt's strong relationship with Israel, particularly with
regard to their antiterrorism cooperation in the Sinai, is also
of strategic benefit to us in the United States, especially in
a region that so often appears bent on Israel's destruction.
Yes, we have significant human rights concerns with Egypt,
including inexcusable restrictions on freedom of the press,
assembly, association, and expression; yes, reports of
deplorable prison conditions, torture, and inhumane treatment,
and discrimination of women and minorities should not and must
not be swept under the rug. These issues must be addressed, and
I continue to call on Egypt to improve its human rights
practices and to allow more political space for Egyptian civil
society.
The Egyptians are increasingly looking elsewhere for
friends and allies outside of the United States, and it doesn't
help when the Obama administration--excuse me, Mr. Connolly--
keeps sending mixed messages.
We can work with Egypt to improve our security
relationship, to push for human rights changes that we want to
see, and to help it toward a long-term stability, economic
growth, and progress on the democracy front that President Sisi
himself has advocated because make no mistake: Long-term
stability will only come with the kind of prosperity, respect
for human rights, and self-determination that allows all
Egyptians to feel that they have a say in the future of their
beloved country.
Egypt just finished the last runoff in its long-delayed
parliamentary elections, and while initial observations and
reports do not indicate significant progress, I am hopeful that
the new legislature will be able to make greater strides in the
months ahead. As we all know, democracy is more than just
elections, and both the Sisi government and the new legislature
should use this time to set the stage for a full democratic
transition in the future. One sign of goodwill that President
Sisi could make immediately is pardoning the 43 pro-democracy
NGO workers who were wrongly convicted in 2013 under Morsi.
Correcting Morsi's mistakes this way would go a long way in
demonstrating President Sisi's commitment to a democratic
future and in repairing the damage that both the Morsi and the
Obama administration did to the U.S.-Egypt relationship.
Despite the Obama administration's missteps, the Egyptian
people should know that they do have a friend in the United
States, a friend who is ready to be a better partner, a
stronger ally, and one who is ready to assist when asked in
order to achieve the stable, prosperous, open, and inclusive
nation that Egyptians all deserve.
Lastly, I would like to once again thank my good friend
from Virginia, our ranking member acting today in this
capacity. I know that Mr. Connolly has followed these issues
for years, ever since he was a Senate staffer on the Foreign
Relations Committee. In June 2014, Mr. Connolly and I, as a
matter of fact, asked GAO for a study, a report on U.S. foreign
assistance to Egypt. And in a couple of days, we will receive
the third installment of our report. And I know that we are
looking forward to that.
And, with that, I am pleased to yield to today's ranking
member, my good friend from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and, gosh, I didn't know
she was aware of my past work with the U.S. Senate Committee on
the Foreign Relations.
The title of this hearing is ``Egypt Two Years After Morsi
(Part II).'' It might be more appropriate to acknowledge that
Egypt has moved beyond the post-Morsi period and transitioned
clearly into a new and distinctly different era, clearly under
the leadership of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. While we can
still view many domestic developments in Egypt within the
context of President Morsi's removal from power and the
upheaval experienced during and subsequent to the 2013 military
coup, Egypt's new leader, President el-Sisi, increasingly owns
this moment in Egyptian history.
The U.S. has long paid a price for stability through a
strategically important relation with Egypt, and it is the
people of Egypt who have had to bear the price with respect to
eroded rule of law, the loss of any political space, and the
limits on freedom of expression. However, it is in this
uniquely el-Sisi moment in Egyptian history that we have seen
the simultaneous dissolution of security and democratic
freedoms. As we move beyond the re-litigation of the 2013 coup,
and as Egypt turns the page on the post-Morsi era, the U.S.
owes this important relationship an honest appraisal of Egypt
under this new government.
First, the U.S.-Egypt relationship is critical to regional
stability and U.S. security interests. As the second largest
recipient of U.S. military assistance and a major non-NATO
ally, Egypt has long undergirded our security strategy in the
Middle East, chief among which is, of course, preservation and
maintenance of the Camp David Accords. The U.S. brokered the
1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, ended a historical
pattern of violence between the two nations and brought
collaboration in a relationship previously defined by absolute
conflict. The fact that the treaty was affirmed under both
Morsi and now el-Sisi is the kind of continuity and commitment
to peace this region desperately needs.
However, the Arab world's most populace nation faces a
growing security threat from within, including terrorists
blowing out of Libya into the Sinai, and the Egyptian
Government has been beset with the challenge of trying to quell
these insurgencies, where more than 700 security and defense
personnel--Egyptian personnel--have, in fact, been killed.
The breakup of the Russian jet over the Sinai that claimed
224 lives was one of the more high-profile demonstrations of
security failures in Egypt to date. The U.S. provides defense
articles to assist with counterterrorism initiatives, but
cooperation has suffered from poor relationships with Egyptian
security institutions whose interests are sometimes misaligned
with those of the United States. The effort to align and
strengthen those relationships has been tempered by what many
have characterized as a faltering democratic tradition--
transition in Egypt punctuated with significant human rights
violations. Congress has raised concerns about the trajectory
of Egyptian democracy and put limiting conditions on U.S.
assistance in the consolidated appropriations bills of Fiscal
Year 2014 and Fiscal Year 2015.
I have been glad, as the chairman noted, to collaborate
with Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, in working with the GAO to
evaluate ongoing security assistance programs in Egypt. Despite
the administration's March 31 announcement that it would
release frozen military assistance to Egypt, concerns remain.
The Secretary of State has yet to certify that Egypt is
supporting democratic transition, and we have witnessed
troubling developments in the judicial system and brutal
crackdowns conducted by security forces. The stream of mass
death sentences--death sentences--handed down by Egyptian
judges and the killings at al-Nahda and Rabaa al-Adawiya
squares erode confidence in the rule of law. The announcement
that former President Morsi himself has been sentenced to death
was labeled unjust by our own State Department, and there is no
doubt that carrying out the sentence would perpetuate the cycle
of violence and zero-sum politics in Egypt.
It is estimated that there are now more than 40,000
political prisoners, along with 22 journalists behind bars in
Egypt. I have met with individuals personally affected by this
crackdown, including a young man, Mohammed Sultan, a young
activist detained for more than 400 days after participating in
citizen protests. I joined human rights groups in the U.S.
State Department in advocating for his release and was pleased
to see him finally return home to his family and have the
opportunity to meet with Secretary Kerry to discuss his ordeal.
What is important: Mohammed Sultan is an American and a victim
of the Egyptian justice in the el-Sisi era.
The recently concluded House of Representatives elections
did little to consolidate democratic gains, as the chair
alluded. As the State Department noted on December 4 regarding
those elections, the U.S. remains ``concerned about low voter
turnout and limited participation by opposition parties''--it
is a bit of an understatement--``Furthermore, the United States
continues to have concerns about limits on freedom of peaceful
assembly, association, and expression, and their impact on the
political climate in Egypt and calls upon the Government of
Egypt to ensure these fundamental freedoms.''
As we discuss U.S.-Egypt relations, we must ask ourselves
difficult questions about the long-term goals of the
relationship in light of backsliding on both the security and
civil engagement fronts. Those goals should inform our dialogue
with the el-Sisi government and how we confront the fissures
that have opened up in this alliance.
One thing of which we can be sure is that continued human
rights abuses and power consolidation at the expense peaceful
opposition in Egypt is neither consistent with U.S. interests
and principles nor an expedient path to an ultimately secure
region.
I look forward to hearing the testimony. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for an excellent
statement, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and
thank you for your leadership in this very important time in
our history in dealing with Middle East issues. President el-
Sisi and his team have saved not just the people of Egypt but
the entire Middle East from an unstoppable onslaught of radical
Islamic terrorism. That is the bottom line. If he would not
have acted, if he was not there today, if he fails, radical
Islamic terrorism--that is fundamentally anti-Western in
nature--will succeed throughout the Middle East. Leading up to
al-Sisi's courageous actions, President Morsi made it clear
that he was discarding the pledges of moderation and democratic
reform. Morsi was and is part of the Muslim Brotherhood, which
for decades has struggled to obtain power in order to achieve
radical Islamic objectives. Let's note that one of President
Morsi's promises was to free The Blind Sheikh, who is now being
held in the United States, for his leadership and guidance in
the attack on the World Trade Center, which he was trying to
kill thousands of Americans. Yet Mr. Morsi was promising to
free him from American captivity.
President Morsi's radical agenda became evident, and the
people of Egypt rose up against what they saw was turning Egypt
into an anti-Western caliphate. El-Sisi stepped in at that time
when there were massive demonstrations against Morsi and
prevented bloodshed at that point. And, of course, he won't get
credit for that.
And we know that during times of crisis like this, whether
it is in our country or other countries, there are things that
are totally not consistent with a democratic society at times
when things are stable. That is why it is important to lead
Egypt toward stability and more democratic process. Morsi set
out to do just that.
One last note, if Egypt, again, falls to radicalism, anti-
Western radicalism, soon all the governments in that part of
the world will be overwhelmed. There is no question about that.
Our own Government has not been supportive, using the
imperfections, which are many--and we have imperfections here,
I might add, many of them--using those imperfections as an
excuse to perhaps put us in jeopardy for a major expansion of
radical Islamic terrorism in that part of the world. Thank you
very much for your hearing today.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Meadows of North Carolina.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for your leadership and might I say your
consistent voice on this issue. There has never been a day that
we can't look to your leadership on this particular issue, and
I thank you for that. As the witnesses testify today, I think
probably the biggest issue that many of us will be looking
toward hearing is, how do we take a system that is perhaps not
perfect but also address those issues in a spirit of respect
and truly out of appreciation for where Egypt is today?
It would be a mistake to focus so much on the imperfections
without acknowledging some of the areas that have been
addressed, and specifically Ambassador Tawfik, who is now back
in Egypt, was the Ambassador from Egypt to Washington, DC, to
the United States, during both government operations, was a
personal friend. And one of the things that continued to be
mentioned over and over again was how the Egyptian people felt
like the United States had abandoned them in that friendship.
So if there is one message, Madam Chairman, that I want to
communicate to the Egyptian people today, it is that there are
a number of us, not just on Capitol Hill but across the United
States, who look forward to an ongoing personal relationship
with those in Egypt and that they can count on not only our
strategic partnership but our friendship as we work through
some of the difficulties that may face us.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Trott of Michigan.
Mr. Trott. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Connolly. Although it has been a tumultuous few years,
Egypt has always been an important and integral part of the
United States-Middle East policy, even more so as our allies in
the region face a range of threats from various state and non-
state actors.
While most of the testimony today is going to rightfully be
focused on security and stability in the elections, I would
like to bring awareness to the situation of the
Copts, the region's largest Christian community. This past
October, we commemorated the 4-year anniversary of Maspero,
where peaceful protestors, mostly Copts, were attacked by state
security forces. January 1 commemorates the 5-year anniversary
of the bombing of the All Saints Church in Alexandria, where
Copts were attacked and killed reportedly by non-state actors.
This follows a disturbing trend of persecution against a
peaceful group of people who have been in Egypt since Saint
Mark brought Christianitythere over 2,000 years ago. The Copts
under Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were at the height of
their modern-day persecution, with unprecedented attacks and
rhetoric aimed at their Pope and religious institutions.
I was happy to see President Sisi visit a Coptic church to
celebrate Christmas last year, and I hope that this is a sign
that his administration will be as inclusive as possible with
the Copts. This is an important issue I plan to stay focused on
as Egypt looks to regain its footing, both domestically and
internationally. I look forward to hearing from our esteemed
panel particularly how the Copts are faring under President
Sisi and what steps the Egyptian Government is taking to ensure
that the Copts are part of Egypt's future.
I yield back my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Trott.
Mr. Clawson of Florida.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you to the chairwoman for having this
hearing. You are always consistent, and we appreciate that, as
Representative Meadows said.
I appreciate you all coming. I am very interested to see
what you think about how Egypt is going to handle ISIS and at
the same time treat their citizens, particularly Christians,
fairly. What are they going to do with Russia? And how are they
going to treat Israel? And how do you get all that right at the
same time? I think they have got a big balancing act here, and
I am very curious what you have all got to say about it because
we need to stop ISIS. We need to protect all folks,
particularly Christians in this case, and we have got to
protect Israel. So I am looking forward to hearing what you all
have to say.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all of our members
for their opening statements.
I now would like to introduce our distinguished panel of
witnesses. First, we are pleased to welcome Mr. David Schenker,
who is the director of Arab Politics at the Washington
Institute for Near East policy. Previously, Mr. Schenker has
served as the Department of Defense top policy aide on Arab
countries, and he is the author of several books on Middle
Eastern countries, as well as a regular contributor to several
major daily newspapers.
Welcome, sir.
Next, we would like to welcome Mr. Eric Bjornlund, who is
the president and cofounder of Democracy International. Eric
has served for the National Democratic Institute as a senior
associate and Asia director and as director of program
coordination and general counsel. He was also a Woodrow Wilson
fellow at the Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Welcome.
And, last but certainly not least, we would like to welcome
back Dr. Steven Cook, who is the senior fellow for Middle East
and Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to this,
Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and
Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. Your statements
will be made a part of the record. Please feel free to
summarize. We will start with Mr. Schenker.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SCHENKER, AUFZIEN FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
PROGRAM ON ARAB POLITICS, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY
Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member
Connolly, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an
honor to be here today to discuss security in Egypt 2 years
after Morsi.
While the increasingly repressive trajectory of Sisi's
Egypt should be a concern for Washington, the ongoing
deterioration of security in Egypt is the more immediate
threat. The recent downing of the Russian airliner over the
Sinai by the Islamic State has drawn international attention to
the problem. The reality, however, is that terrorism in Egypt
is not confined to the Sinai. Terrorism in Egypt has traversed
the Suez Canal and is taking root in the Nile valley.
Historically security in Egypt, and particularly in the
Sinai, has never been particularly good, but it has
deteriorated after the fall of Mubarak, and the violence spiked
after the removal of Morsi, morphing into a full-scale Islamist
insurgency now led by Wilayat Sinai, an Islamic State
affiliate.
Since Morsi's removal, in addition to the bombed Russian
airliner, we have seen tourists targeted the Sinai, checkpoints
and police stations attacked, RPGs fired at ships in the Suez
Canal. MANPADs have brought down ships and helicopters over the
Sinai, and a Russian Kornet anti-tank weapon sunk an Egyptian
warship in the Mediterranean off the Sinai coast. Over the past
few years, more than 1,000 Egyptian soldiers and policemen are
estimated to have been killed in the Sinai.
Meanwhile, west of the Suez Canal, Egypt resembles the
country in the 1990s when the State battled an insurgency led
by Gamaa al-Islamiyah. In 2014, there were more than 300
attacks perpetrated in Egypt outside of the Sinai, and that
number is likely to double in 2015. In this past summer alone,
you had the chief prosecutor of Egypt, Hisham Barakat,
assassinated in Cairo. You had a state security building bombed
in Cairo and a suicide bomber attempted to target tourists in
Luxor, all within 2 months.
No doubt Egypt is situated in a difficult neighborhood, but
many of problems are self-inflicted. Egypt, for example, has
not prioritized border security with Libya, the primary source
of weapons flowing to the Sinai. Egypt's domestic
counterterrorism capabilities are likewise lacking. If the
accidental killing of eight Mexican tourists in the Western
Desert in September 2015 is any indication, intelligence
gathering on communications between the military and other
domestic security agencies is also a real problem. Clearly,
intelligence gathering remains a serious deficit in the Sinai
as well, even though cooperation with the Israelis is
reportedly helping fill some gaps.
Security challenges facing Egypt are enormous, and at
present, Cairo does not appear to be up to the task. Given the
regional deterioration, the continued stability and security of
Egypt should be a priority for the U.S. There is much that we
can do to help--working with Cairo--to mitigate the threats.
These might include counterterrorism training. Egypt's heavy-
handed and purely military approach has not succeeded, and it
is not likely to succeed. It is not a problem of manpower. It
is a problem of tactics. Egypt is resistant to change, but
Washington has to continue to push Egypt to adopt modern COIN,
counterinsurgency, techniques.
Second, developing the Sinai. Egypt's Sinai
counterinsurgency approach is one-dimensional, but successful
COIN campaigns have both civilian and military aspects. Absent
educational and economic opportunities, the Sinai will continue
to prove fertile ground for jihadist recruitment. We really
have to invest in the Sinai and get our allies to do so.
We should leverage the Gulf. We have not been particularly
good or successful in conditioning assistance to Egypt. I don't
think we should pursue that route. We should be working with
our Gulf allies, who give a lot more money, frankly, to Egypt
than we do. There would be a lot more leverage, I think, there.
And they would help perhaps to get Egypt to move toward
economic development and adopt modern COIN techniques in the
Sinai.
We also need to increase visibility in the Sinai. Sinai
currently is closed. We don't have a very good idea of what is
going on, especially important given the extensive reports of
collateral damage and human rights abuses there.
We should also help Egypt to secure its border with Libya.
We pressed them to reprogram some of the $1.3 billion in their
foreign assistance dollars to put different systems on the
border. They have refused. They should devote financial
resources to aerostat balloons, C4ISR, and even Black Hawk
helicopters.
We have to help Egypt improve its airport security. This is
a problem that Western financial and technical support can
solve or at least help mitigate. We should prevent further
unproductive delays in transfer of equipment. When we stop the
flow, for example, of Apache helicopters, that is a primary
tool in the counterinsurgency. There are other things we can
keep from Egypt if we want to express our disappointment or
anger with them. They viewed this, the withholding of the
Apaches, as confirming the conspiracy that we wanted the return
of the Muslim Brotherhood to government in Egypt.
Finally, we should avoid trying to leverage U.S. military
assistance. It is not a productive policy. Even though the
human rights are problematic and perhaps counterproductive to
long-term stability of Egypt, the cutoff in U.S. assistance
will neither improve Cairo's conduct nor enhance our already
fraught bilateral relationship.
With that, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schenker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent
suggestion.
Mr. Bjornlund.
STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC BJORNLUND, PRESIDENT, DEMOCRACY
INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Bjornlund. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Connolly, other distinguished members of the subcommittee. It
is an honor to appear today to address these important issues.
The recent House of Representatives elections in Egypt,
which took place in stages from October to early December,
marked the conclusion of the so-called roadmap to democracy
declared after the ouster of President Morsi in July 2013.
While these recent elections, along with the constitutional
referendum and Presidential election last year, have completed
a process of civilianizing the highest levels of government,
they have not resulted in a more free or democratic Egypt.
Since 2013, Democracy International has monitored the
electoral component of the roadmap through multiple
international observation missions and a regular presence in
country. As president of DI, I have had the opportunity to
visit Egypt many times since the spring of 2013 and to lead our
observation missions there.
Democracy International deployed the largest international
mission to observe the constitutional referendum in January
2014. In May 2014, we carried out one of the largest
comprehensive missions to observe the Presidential election
process. But after the parliamentary elections were rescheduled
for October to December of this year, we were unable to obtain
visas for core staff members and observers until after voting
had commenced in October. This initially limited our access to
the process during the pre-election period and precluded the
deployment of a full observation mission for the first stage.
We, nonetheless, observed voting in 158 locations in 5
governorates. For the second stage in November and early
December, our observers witnessed the balloting in 422
locations in 8 governorates, and we conducted more than 160
meetings with a broad range of stakeholders.
The elections took place amidst a backdrop of arrests, an
ongoing crackdown on civil society and the media, and forced
disappearances. Once-strong movements and political parties
have been silenced. Opponents of the government have been
arrested. Courts have ordered dissolution of their
organizations. And an orchestrated campaign equating dissent
with terrorism is echoed by much of the Egyptian media. This
climate has not been conducive to meaningful democratic
elections.
Public interest in the most recent elections was muted.
Turnout was relatively low, especially among younger Egyptians.
During 8 days of voting across the country, our observers
rarely saw voters under the age of 35. Critics of the
government, including groups who might identify themselves as
liberals, as well as those that opposed the removal of former
President Morsi, were largely prevented from participating or
chose to boycott. Islamist parties, which constituted a
majority of the Parliament elected in January 2012, were almost
entirely absent or excluded.
The electoral system did not promote inclusion. Most of the
members were elected as individuals and are nominally
independent; 120 of the 596 members were elected on a winner-
take-all basis from lists running in four large districts.
Unlike traditional list systems in other countries which
provide a means for including smaller parties and minority
points of view, the list portion of the system in Egypt had the
opposite effect. In fact, For the Love of Egypt, which is
widely perceived to have the support of the government, won all
120 of the list seats.
Despite the presence of international and domestic
observers, the election process was not fully open to
independent scrutiny. Domestic election observation was neither
robust nor widespread. Legitimate accredited international
observers encountered obstacles, while others were simply not
able to participate. The Carter Center announced in 2014 that
it would not monitor the legislative elections after assessing
that political space has narrowed. NDI, IRI, the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, and Freedom House, among others, were not
able to even consider the possibility of observing or otherwise
supporting Egyptian efforts because of the unjust and widely
condemned trials and spurious convictions of 43 NGO workers in
2013.
To the credit of the High Electoral Commission and those
who provided technical assistance to it, especially the
International Foundation for Election Systems, the balloting
process for the elections was conducted in an administratively
satisfactory manner, and polling officials appeared diligent
and conscientious. Nevertheless, procedures in polling stations
and for the counting where we observed varied considerably from
one to another. This might have been more worrisome if voter
turnout had been higher or the elections had been more
vigorously contested.
We should not misinterpret the orderliness of these
elections. Larger stories about the parties and candidates who
were not allowed to participate, the voters who stayed away,
and the independent observers, domestic and international
alike, who could not observe, all of which has occurred in a
climate of political repression and declining freedoms. These
elections reflect the trend we have observed throughout the
past 2 years, decreasing space for political competition and
increasing repression of opposition.
Genuine democracy is the only path to long-term stability
in Egypt. Political repression and a disregard for basic rights
make real democracy impossible and will only increase the
ongoing polarization of Egyptian society. For Egypt to move
forward with peace and stability, its leaders need to embrace
political inclusion and to reorient the country toward broader
respect for human rights and effective democratic institutions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bjornlund follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Cook.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN A. COOK, PH.D., ENI ENRICO MATTEI SENIOR
FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, Mr. Connolly, today
the ranking member. It is a pleasure to be before you to
discuss Egypt 2 years after Morsi.
As you are well aware, the United States has invested $76
billion in Egypt since 1948. Egypt is important to the United
States because it is at peace with Israel; it operates the Suez
Canal, which is critical to both global trade and U.S. security
policy; and it provides logistical support to American Forces
operating in and around the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
There was tremendous hope after Hosni Mubarak fell in
February 2011, that Egypt would become democratic, provide an
opportunity for its people to live prosperous, dignified lives.
Unfortunately, those hopes have been misplaced. The coup d'etat
that brought an end to the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed
Morsi's brief tenure at the Presidency has also not resulted in
stability, prosperity, or democracy in Egypt. The most oft-
cited figures are, since Morsi's ouster, an estimated 41,000
Egyptians have been jailed; about 3,000 have been killed. Those
numbers, though, are certainly too low since they don't include
most of 2015.
It is also important to point out, however, that 700
soldiers, officers, and other policemen, have lost their lives
in a nasty insurgency raging in the Sinai Peninsula. In
November 2014, in an ominous sign, the homegrown Egyptian
jihadist group, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, pledged its allegiance to
the self-declared Islamic State and changed its name to the
Sinai Province of the Islamic State.
The four most important things that Members of Congress
need to know about Egypt are the following: First, the Egyptian
state is weak.
Second, President Sisi has not consolidated his power. That
Sisi does not command the state should not be surprising. It
took Mubarak the better part of a decade to clear away all of
his opponents. In Egypt today, there is a struggle among
multiple competing centers of power that include the
Presidency, the armed forces, the General Intelligence
Directorate, the Ministry of Interior, and the senior
judiciary.
Three, Egypt's hypernationalist political discourse is
polarizing and radicalizing the political arena.
Four, Sisi has clearly not learned the lessons of the
Mubarak period. His overreliance on force and coercion is an
inefficient means of establishing political control. If you ask
me today if I believe that Egypt is stable, the intellectually
honest answer is: I don't know, but President Sisi has offered
us some clues to that stability based on the way he rules, and
the way he rules, relying almost entirely on force and
coercion, does not give me confidence.
What is the appropriate policy toward Egypt? It depends on
what the United States wants, an issue with which policymakers
have been struggling for the last 10 or 15 years. Democracy, it
makes little sense to talk about supporting democratic
transition in Egypt today. There is also little reason to
believe that the United States has the capacity to influence
the direction of Egyptian politics. The Obama administration
went so far as to delay military assistance and change the
terms of that aid for the future. Yet it did not change
Egyptian behavior.
On the economy, some believe that this is an opportunity
for the United States to make a difference on the Egyptian
economy. We should be cautious here. Those in power in Egypt
today do not believe in an inclusive, broad, capitalist
political economic development, but rather they are statists.
On security, Egypt is confronting a significant threat in
the Sinai Peninsula from extremist groups. Unlike the
Government of Iraq, which until the recent Ramadi operation has
relied on Shiite death squads, Egypt has used its regular army
in the fight. For a variety of reasons related to the U.S.
assistance program, the senior command's resistance to altering
its doctrine, and restrictions on the armed forces that stem
from the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the military has proven
itself neither well-prepared nor well-equipped to take on the
insurgency. They are getting critical assistance from the
United Arab Emirates and, if reports are to be believed,
Israel, but only the United States can really provide the
resources necessary for the Egyptians. If the Egyptian armed
forces distrust the United States--I am in whole agreement with
David Schenker, how the suspension of critical defense articles
have driven a wedge between the United States and the Egyptian
armed forces.
What should the United States do? Very quickly, three
things. First, in our diplomacy with Egypt, we must emphasize
first-order first principles of tolerance, equal application of
law, compromise, and nonviolence. Second, we must invest in
Egypt's political future. It seems now that Egypt's future is
unstable and authoritarian, but Egypt can change very quickly.
It is worth our time and effort to invest in that political
future.
And then, finally, we must support Egypt's fight against
extremists. The United States should maintain its assistance
package at current levels. It should also encourage the
Egyptians through the promise of additional resources to alter
its doctrine, its mix of equipment, to meet what the Pentagon
calls 21st century threats. It seems perverse to offer to pay
the Egyptians to do something that they already should be
doing. But if our national interest dictates that we should
help the Egyptians in this fight, it is the most effective
means to go forward.
One last thing. Policymakers should be realistic about
Egypt. The United States and Egypt have enjoyed strategic
relations since the mid-1970s. Those relations are changing.
These two countries are drifting apart. The Egyptians, as you,
Madam Chairman, pointed out, are looking for new friends around
the world. This is something consistent in Egyptian foreign
policy. We must be prepared that our ability to affect what
happens in Egypt is rather limited.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Thank you to all three of you for excellent testimony. We
will start voting at 2 p.m. So in order to make sure that our
members have the ability and the time to ask questions, I will
begin with Congressman Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And, again, I would
like to stress that any country has its imperfections and
especially countries that are in crisis and where there are
great threats from the outside and the inside generally have
major inconsistencies with what I would consider to be part of
what Americans believe in.
But let's just note that--let me ask the panel, however,
when we are trying to figure out where Egypt is, all this
criticism that we just heard and a lot of criticism we just
heard, could you tell me another government besides Israel in
that region that has a better electoral process, that actually
is more closer to democracy, besides Israel? Anybody on the
panel got a suggestion?
Mr. Bjornlund. Tunisia.
Mr. Cook. Tunisia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What?
Mr. Cook. Tunisia.
Mr. Bjornlund. Tunisia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Besides Egypt.
Mr. Bjornlund. Tunisia.
Mr. Cook. Tunisia.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Tunisia. Okay.
Mr. Cook. Turkey.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So Tunisia and--I don't know if Turkey is
included in that or not. But that is not necessarily--they try
to be part of Europe and part of that region. So Tunisia and
Turkey are the models that you think would be good. Does
Tunisia have a pretty stable government now finally? I mean,
they went through the new Arab Spring. And I understand they
were one of the few countries that went through that and came
through with some stability. Is that right?
Mr. Schenker. They look better than almost any other
country in the region.
Mr. Cook. That does not necessarily suggest that they are
stable.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will accept that. So where would you
stack in terms of, let's say, Qatar or, let's say, Saudi Arabia
or how about--because Saudi Arabia just had an election. How
are their elections and their treatment of minorities and
things such as that?
Mr. Cook. Are you asking me, sir?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, I am asking the panel.
Mr. Cook. I would say that when we are thinking about how
Egypt has approached its own population and its own electoral
systems, it is--its electoral system, as Mr. Bjornlund pointed
out, is drawn in a manifestly unfair way that makes it
difficult for----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, I noticed that.
Mr. Cook [continuing]. Makes it difficult for opponents to
actually----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note, Mr. Cook, could you hold
on 1 second? What you are describing is our electoral system.
Their system of winner take all is what we do here. And so what
you are complaining about is that they haven't taken the
European system, but they have taken our system, and that is
really bad.
Mr. Cook. I am uncomfortable with the idea that the United
States' political system is analogous to that in Egypt.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, you may be uncomfortable. So you
don't like it.
Mr. Cook. I am profoundly uncomfortable with that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. You don't like our system.
Mr. Cook. That is not what I said.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You are uncomfortable with our system. The
bottom line is I am not uncomfortable with it. Our Founding
Fathers weren't. And the bottom line is the other system may be
better. You may be better to have, say, so many people are
voting for a Congressman that we will allot a certain number of
Congressmen from the other party although none of them won in
the election. But that is what the Europeans do. We don't do
that. And now you are condemning el-Sisi for that? Wait a
minute. Okay.
I have got a couple minutes. I have got to get a couple
more questions out. We have President el-Sisi, who went to
their clergy, the leadership of the Muslim clergy, and asked
for tolerance, for people to try to work together and to cut
off this sort of anti-Western radicalism and to accept other
faiths. Is there another leader in the Middle East that you can
tell me that did that? Muslim leader? Is there any other Muslim
leader that did anything like that in the Middle East?
Mr. Schenker. The King of Jordan.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Jordan?
Mr. Schenker. King of Jordan.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Good. Okay. King of Jordan. Got any more?
No. At the least, General Sisi is the best, except for Tunisia
and perhaps Turkey and now maybe Jordan. The bottom line is you
have to compare General Sisi not in terms of when things are
calm, not in terms of basically democratic governments in
Europe. You got to say: This is an emergency situation that has
happened. You have talked about the insurgencies that he is
facing and what our Government seems to have done, and we won't
provide them drones. We didn't provide them spare parts for
their tanks even. We have--they had a tough time getting any
Apaches. When they finally got the Apache helicopters, they
didn't have defensive systems on them. And I don't know--have
they got the F-16s? Have they now been delivered finally?
Mr. Cook. They have the fourth largest inventory of F-16s.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Were they delivered?
Mr. Cook. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Fine. Because when I was there 2
years ago, they weren't. And then I went back a year later, and
they still weren't. Okay. My time is just about up. Let me just
note: I don't believe Egypt and General Sisi are polarizing
their society. It is really easy to criticize someone in the
middle of a crisis situation like that. For someone to suggest
he is polarizing it at a time when Morsi basically was to most
Egyptians trying to create an anti-Western caliphate and then
to blame Sisi for polarizing and not having elections----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
You know, I spar with my friend from California on this
panel from time to time. And we are going to spar right now. I
saw my friend from California put words in the mouth of Dr.
Cook. And if we are going to lecture people about whether you
believe in our system, I will point out that it was the
official position of the United States Government that Morsi
won a free and fair election, whether we like it or not. And my
friend finds himself in the position of being an apologist for
overturning a free and fair election. That is not American.
That is un-American, even if you don't like the results. And I
am no apologist for the Muslim Brotherhood or Morsi. But I
remain troubled as an American and as a Member of this body
that we find ourselves apologists for a military coup that
overthrew a free and fairly elected government, one we didn't
like, one that was trending in the wrong direction. But is this
government trending in the right direction? You seem to
suggest, my friend, they are. I beg to differ.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
Seeing that he is----
Mr. Connolly. Of course.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you believe we are at war with radical
Islamic terrorists?
Mr. Connolly. I can't hear you. I am sorry.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you think that we are at war with
radical Islamic terrorists, just as we allied with Stalin
during the, against Hitler, et cetera?
Mr. Connolly. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. There is no question that there is this
dialectic in the world, and we are part of that. And our
concern, let's--I think we would agree on, what do we want in
Egypt? We want a stable, democratic, moderate Islamic
government. How do you achieve it is the question. And I
suggest that what the Morsi or what the el-Sisi government is
doing guarantees that you will not achieve it. It guarantees
there will be a backlash. It guarantees there will be no
political opposition worth its salt, driving people into the
arms of the very radicals or the Islamic Brotherhood you and I
don't want.
So, pragmatically, what must we pursue and what must we
encourage in Egypt to get the result you and I would both agree
on? And that is where you and I disagree. I think being an
apologist for this government and its methods is guaranteed to
lead to a result we are going to really deeply regret. And
given the testimony that our leverage is more limited than
ever, God forbid we tie military assistance conditionally. What
else have we got? Goodwill? Please, please, please? I mean, our
leverage is pretty limited. And so I think we do to need to
rethink our policy in Egypt. We agree on a bottom line we want.
But we don't agree on how to achieve it.
In fact, I am passionately convinced that if we pursue what
my friend from California wants us to pursue, we will guarantee
sooner or later an outcome that will be absolutely antithetical
to our interests and our desires and, frankly, the interests of
the Egyptian people. Glossing over problems with this current
regime on the human rights front, on the media front, freedom
of press, freedom of assembly, I don't think does anyone a
favor. And doing it in the name of our fight against radical
Islam is a smokescreen. We do not promote democratic values in
the Middle East by actually pulling back on our advocacy for
those same democratic values because it is inconvenient, or it
is a moment of emergency, or the elected government we didn't
like went off on a track that we think, you know, was unhelpful
or worse.
I think it is very clear that the human rights abuses that
have occurred in Egypt are, frankly, far more serious than the
predecessor regime that was overturned. And I don't mean by
that to be an apologist for that predecessor regime. I was in
Egypt. I was very uncomfortable with the direction of the
Muslim Brotherhood government and told them so and came back
feeling pessimistic, frankly, about the direction of Egypt. But
I sure am not hopeful about the current direction of Egypt. And
I believe it is going to exacerbate our problem in the fight
against terrorism, whether it be in the Sinai or in the region
as a whole. We need to stabilize that relationship. And I think
we need to put on our thinking caps about what elements are
going to be required to do that.
With that, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much for your cogent
argument, Mr. Connolly.
Dr. Yoho--oh, Mr. Clawson, sorry. The bigness of Dr. Yoho
hid the thinness of the basketball player.
Mr. Clawson. Where does the trend go with respect to
Israel?
Mr. Cook. The relationship with Israel is better than it
has been over a long period of time, primarily because there is
a confluence of interests in the Sinai Peninsula. Both security
services are cooperating and providing critical intelligence to
each other to ensure that the extremist threat is met as
effectively as possible, given all the deficits that the
Egyptians have in combatting it. The troubling aspect, though,
is that while government-to-government relations are good, the
overwhelming number of Egyptians still regard Israel in an
entirely negative light, overwhelming, 90-plus percent.
Mr. Schenker. Can I add to Dr. Cook? Egypt has asked Israel
about 20 times to increase the number of troops, fixed-wing
aircraft, helicopters, armored vehicles, tanks, to revise the
terms periodically of the Camp David security annex to allow
Egypt to put in more equipment. Israel has acceded to this.
There was one incident 2 or 3 years ago where actually an
Israeli drone, purportedly with Egyptian permission, flew over
the Sinai an armed drone and killed five terrorists. So the
cooperation on that level is excellent. But, still, as Dr. Cook
points out, only, the only channels are at the highest levels
of the intelligence. There is not a working level in
intelligence exchange between Israelis and Egyptians, nor on
the military levels on the working level. This is a government-
to-government at the highest level relationship, not a peace
between two peoples.
Mr. Clawson. And so if this intersection of incentives for
security of the Sinai, if that ever goes away, as we lose, as
our country loses influence, I think all three of you said that
in your opening statements, does that put our, will that put
our ally at more risk?
Mr. Schenker. I believe that Sisi recognizes that the
ongoing peace treaty with Israel is in Egypt's interest and is
going to honor that. I don't have any concern about that
personally. It is not popular in Egypt at all. But it is not
going anywhere. Now, if we were to start chipping away at the
1.3 billion in FMF and the 250 in ESF, I don't think the peace
treaty would go away, but it would become more problematic.
Mr. Clawson. Our money is the glue.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Clawson.
Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I apologize for
getting here late.
Gentlemen, what is the status of ISIS in Egypt? And if you
covered that already, I apologize. Are they growing? Do they
have bases? Do they have training centers, recruitment centers,
in your opinion? Mr. Schenker?
Mr. Schenker. Well, I will take this first. I believe, you
know, after ISIS, after Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, the biggest
insurgent group in the Sinai, joined with ISIS last year, they
have increased the number of operations, increasingly lethal
ones, and appear to be getting a good flow of highly advanced
weapons for which they have done----
Mr. Yoho. Where do they come from?
Mr. Schenker. The Egyptians say many of them are coming
from Libya.
Mr. Yoho. From Libya, they came from----
Mr. Schenker. Well, from after the end of the Qadhafi
regime.
Mr. Yoho. Were they stockpiles of ours? Because I have read
reports that we had stockpiles of weapons that we had dropped
over there that we don't know where they went.
Mr. Schenker. Well, I think what we have seen is that we
believe that ISIS has used or Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has used SA-
18s--these are Russian-made that were in Qadhafi's stocks--to
bring down the Egyptian helicopter over the Sinai. But they
also apparently are now working with Hamas in Gaza. Some of
these tunnels still exist. And ISIS is getting a cut of the
weapons moving through the Sinai going into Gaza, working with
the Bedouin there. So they also, perhaps, are getting weapons
from Syria because we have seen the Kornet anti-tank weapon,
which is a top-of-the-line Russian anti-tank weapon that the
Assad regime had, and they used it apparently to sink an
Egyptian warship off the Sinai coast in the Mediterranean.
Mr. Yoho. Let me interrupt you because you were talking
about they were coming from Hamas. Is Hamas getting those
through Iran? Do we have any information that they came
directly from Iran, especially since the Iranian nuclear deal?
I don't want to call it a deal.
Mr. Schenker. I don't have any direct information on that.
I would assume some of this stuff is coming from Libya still.
It used to come from Sudan. But Sudan, apparently, has changed
sides. It is more oriented toward Saudi Arabia these days than
Iran.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Bjornlund, in your opinion, are you seeing
influence and an effect from Libya and Syria spilling in and
disrupting the Sisi government in Egypt?
Mr. Bjornlund. Our focus is on democracy and elections. So
it is not something that we have been able to directly do
interviews about or talk to people about. So I would defer to
my colleagues.
Mr. Yoho. I am glad you brought that up because I want to
touch on a base that my colleague from Virginia brought up. You
know that, let's see, he stated that we want a democracy in
Egypt. What do the people of Egypt want? What does el-Sisi
want? I mean, democracy as we know it doesn't generally work in
one of those countries if they don't have the human rights, the
protection of free speech, the religious freedom, the things
that we believe in here, and not knowing their rights come from
a creator, as we believe, versus they come from government. And
so is it, what do they want over there?
I mean, we keep trying to say: We are going to help you
with democracy. And if you don't understand how democracies
work and the fight from the ground up, you know, through the
people, I would like to hear your input on what the people are
looking for, you know, what form of government serves the
people of Egypt best?
Mr. Bjornlund. The United States has had a policy for
decades now to support democracy around the world.
Mr. Yoho. I know. And I am not a big fan of that. That is a
neoconservative approach that I don't think our Government
should do.
Mr. Bjornlund. And there is the sense that democracy--if
you define it in a culturally appropriate way--is a universal
value. It is something that is about having a form of
government that shows respect for all people and that all
people have some say in how they are governed. And I think it
is no different in Egypt, that people want to have their rights
respected. They want to be able to go on with their lives and
be involved in the system of government that they have.
The fundamental problem in Egypt is that there is
significant polarization. There are very strongly held views
that are very different from each other. There are large groups
that believe religion should play a very important role in how
government is organized, and other people that are members of
minorities or are more secular or have interests that are
threatened by that that have a different view of how government
should work. And the long-term challenge for Egypt is to come
up with some kind of social compact between these different
views about what society is about. And we call that democracy.
That is the word----
Mr. Yoho. Well, if I go back to the Founders, Ben Franklin
said: ``A democracy is two wolves and a sheep deciding what to
have for dinner. And the sheep always loses.''
The thing that makes our country work is it is a
constitutional republic that protects the rights of the
minority.
Mr. Bjornlund. Absolutely.
Mr. Yoho. And it came from the ground up.
Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Bjornlund. Could I just take this opportunity?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bjornlund. I just want to clarify, because we talked a
little while ago about the elections. And I want to make sure
that everybody realizes the election system that they used for
the Parliament, electing the Parliament in Egypt, is not at all
similar to the system in the United States. Most of the members
were elected in multimember districts. A few of them were one
seat, but they ranged up to four. And voters were instructed to
cast the number of ballots that there were number of seats.
Those are mostly not party-affiliated people; they are most
calling themselves independents.
The winner-take-all aspect of the election is the list part
of the system, which is 120 of the 596 votes. And that was
large--these are large districts with, you know, tens or dozens
of members in them, where it you got 51 percent of the vote,
you got 100 percent of the seats. That is not the U.S. system.
And the point I was making is it is not the European system
either.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Yoho.
And my crack staff or my staff on crack, I don't know which
one it is, had some wonderful questions for me to ask our
panelists. But, lamentably--it is not a bad problem to have--we
have a series of votes on the floor. So we will have to adjourn
our subcommittee.
But I want to thank you so much for your excellent
testimony.
And Mr. Connolly always wants to have the last word.
Mr. Connolly. No, I just wanted to thank you. I wanted to
thank you for this hearing. I think this was a really
thoughtful conversation. I hope we can expand on it because
this is a critical relationship. And we have to try to get it
right. So thank you all for participating. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So much depends on it.
Mr. Connolly. So much depends on it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And condolences again to Mr. Deutchand his entire staff as
well.
With that, this subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you,
ladies and gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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