[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEEP SPACE EXPLORATION:
EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
October 9, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., ZOE LOFGREN, California
Wisconsin DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
RANDY K. WEBER, Texas DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan PAUL TONKO, New York
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California MARK TAKANO, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
GARY PALMER, Alabama
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
DRAIN LAHOOD, Illinois
------
Subcommittee on Space
HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma AMI BERA, California
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama, ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BILL POSEY, Florida MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVE KNIGHT, California
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
October 9, 2015
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 12
Written Statement............................................ 13
Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 16
Written Statement............................................ 18
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 19
Written Statement............................................ 20
Witnesses:
Mr. Doug Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions; Former
Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA
Oral Statement............................................... 21
Written Statement............................................ 23
Mr. Dan Dumbacher, Professor of Engineering Practice, Purdue
University; Former Deputy Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA
Oral Statement............................................... 32
Written Statement............................................ 34
Discussion....................................................... 41
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Doug Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions; Former
Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA............. 56
Mr. Dan Dumbacher, Professor of Engineering Practice, Purdue
University; Former Deputy Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA........... 77
DEEP SPACE EXPLORATION:
EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
----------
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:17 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian
Babin [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. The Subcommittee on Space and will come to
order, please.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Committee at any time.
Good morning. Welcome to today's hearing entitled ``Deep
Space Exploration: Examining the Impact of the President's
Budget.'' I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening
statement.
Last week was an amazing time for the space community. A
major Hollywood film about the exploration of Mars debuted
within days of NASA announcing a significant scientific
discovery: liquid water on Mars. The coincidence of these two
events garnered the public's attention, and rightly so. Rarely
does popular culture and science align in such a serendipitous
fashion.
The attention also prompted obvious questions from the
public such as ``how will discovering water on Mars impact
future exploration,'' ``are we really going to Mars,'' and
``how and when are we going to get there?'' These are all
questions that the general public may not have the answers to,
but thankfully NASA does.
Because of bipartisan direction and investments made by
Congress, we are well on our way to Mars. We are building the
most powerful rocket ever built, the Space Launch System, so we
can launch large payloads to beyond-Earth orbit with decreased
risk to overall missions. We are building the Orion crew
capsule so that our astronauts can travel farther into deep
space than ever before, and we are upgrading our Ground Systems
to support 21st century operations. NASA has already tested the
RS-25 engines and five segment boosters that will power the
SLS; they've already launched an uncrewed version of Orion; and
the Kennedy Space Center is undergoing revolutionary upgrades.
But there is much more that needs to be done if the United
States plans on launching a mission to Mars. We need to build a
habitat module, advanced in-space propulsion, and a lander and
ascent vehicle to name a few components.
Fortunately, we don't have to develop all of these
capabilities at once. We can develop them incrementally over
time. There are also potential opportunities for international
and commercial partnerships that could be leveraged as well.
The first step on the journey to Mars, however, begins with the
development of SLS, Orion, and the related Ground Systems.
Unfortunately, Congress's support has not been matched by
the Administration. In 2010, the President signed the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 into law, thereby directing NASA to
develop the SLS and Orion systems. This piece of legislation
was the product of a democratically controlled House and Senate
that passed with 185 Democrats and 119 Republicans,
demonstrating overwhelming bipartisanship. These programs are
critical for the journey to Mars, and yet since 2010, the
Administration has attempted to cut their funding every year.
This year alone, the President's budget request contains a
cut of $343.5 million for SLS and a cut of $104 million for
Orion. All told, the President's budget has requested nearly
half a billion dollars in cuts to these programs this fiscal
year. This Committee's NASA Authorization Act for 2016 and 2017
fully rejects these proposed cuts, and both the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees have approved bills to do the
same.
Even though Congress consistently rejects the
Administration's proposed cuts year after year, the proposed
cuts still have a negative impact on the programs. The annual
budget uncertainty that the Administration perpetuates impairs
NASA's ability to manage the program efficiently on behalf of
the taxpayer.
At the same time that the Administration has been
strangling these programs, the NASA workforce has been
diligently trying to keep the programs moving by setting up
alternative cost and schedule commitments called Management
Agreements. The agreements are separate from the official
commitments in the KDP-C. While it is promising that NASA is
trying to make the best out of a poor situation, having
multiple plans could potentially lead to confusion and
inefficiencies.
Fortunately, SLS and Orion have been successful in spite of
the external challenges placed on the programs. This is largely
thanks to the supremely professional workforce at NASA and the
contractors. To all the hardworking men and women who are
advancing the development of these programs, please know that
your hard work is very much appreciated. Your work on these
programs will inspire the next generation of explorers,
maintain U.S. leadership globally, and chart new courses for
humanity. Thank you for all that you do. You are the best this
nation has to offer. My hope is that folks across the
Administration will reverse course and begin to support the SLS
and Orion programs, and the workforce that makes them possible,
with the funding necessary to continue their success. SLS and
Orion are crucial for deep space exploration, and the first
steps to Mars.
We have two steely-eyed missile men before us today who
were directly involved in the management of the human
exploration program while they were at NASA. I look forward to
hearing about how we can all ensure the success of our nation's
human exploration program.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space
Chairman Brian Babin
Last week was an amazing time for the space community. A major
Hollywood film about the exploration of Mars debuted within days of
NASA announcing a significant scientific discovery--liquid water on
Mars. The coincidence of these two events garnered the public's
attention, and rightly so. Rarely does popular culture and science
align in such a serendipitous fashion. The attention also prompted
obvious questions from the public such as ``how will discovering water
on Mars impact future exploration,'' ``are we really going to Mars,''
and ``how and when are we going to get there?''
These are all questions that the general public may not have the
answers to, but thankfully NASA does. Because of bipartisan direction
and investments made by Congress, we are well on our way to Mars. We
are building the most powerful rocket ever built, the Space Launch
System, so we can launch large payloads to beyond Earth-orbit (BEO)
with decreased risk to overall missions; we are building the Orion crew
capsule so that our astronauts can travel farther into deep space than
ever before; and we are upgrading our ground systems to support 21st
century operations. NASA has already tested the RS-25 engines and five
segment boosters that will power the SLS; they've already launched an
uncrewed version of Orion; and the Kennedy Space Center is undergoing
revolutionary upgrades.
But there is more that needs to be done if the United States plans
on launching a mission to Mars. We need to build a habitat module,
advanced in-space propulsion, and a lander and ascent vehicle to name a
few components.
Fortunately, we don't have to develop all of these capabilities at
once. We can develop them incrementally over time. There are also
potential opportunities for international and commercial partnerships
that could be leveraged as well.
The first step on the journey to Mars, however, begins with the
development of SLS, Orion, and the related ground systems.
Unfortunately, Congress's support has not been matched by the
Administration. In 2010, the President signed the NASA Authorization
Act of 2010 into law, thereby directing NASA to develop the SLS and
Orion systems. This piece of legislation was the product of a
Democratically controlled House and Senate that passed with 185
Democrats and 119 Republicans--demonstrating overwhelming
bipartisanship. These programs are critical for the journey to Mars,
and yet since 2010, the Administration has attempted to cut their
funding every year.
This year alone, the President's budget request contains a cut of
$343.5 million for SLS and a cut of $104 million for Orion. All told,
the President's budget has requested nearly half a billion dollars in
cuts to these programs this fiscal year. This Committee's NASA
Authorization Act for 2016 and 2017 fully rejects the proposed cuts,
and both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have approved
bills to do the same. Even though Congress consistently rejects the
Administration's proposed cuts year-after-year, the proposed cuts still
have a negative impact on the programs. The annual budget uncertainty
that the Administration perpetuates impairs NASA's ability to manage
the program's efficiently on behalf of the taxpayer.
At the same time that the Administration has been strangling these
programs, the NASA workforce has been diligently trying to keep the
programs moving by setting up alternative cost and schedule commitments
called Management Agreements.
The agreements are separate from the official commitments in the
KDP-C. While it is promising that NASA is trying to make the best out
of a poor situation, having multiple plans could potentially lead to
confusion and inefficiencies. Fortunately, SLS and Orion have been
successful in spite of the external challenges placed on the programs.
This is largely thanks to the supremely professional workforce at NASA
and the contractors. To all the hardworking men and women who are
advancing the development of these programs, know that your work is
appreciated. Your work on these programs will inspire the next
generation of explorers, maintain U.S. leadership globally, and chart
new courses for humanity.Thank you for all that you do. You are the
best this nation has to offer.
My hope is that folks across the Administration will reverse course
and begin to support the SLS and Orion programs, and the workforce that
makes them possible, with the funding necessary to continue their
success. SLS and Orion are crucial for deep space exploration, and the
first steps to Mars.
We have two steely-eyed missile men before us today who were
directly involved in the management of the human exploration program
while at NASA. I look forward to hearing about how we can all ensure
the success of our nation's human exploration program.
Chairman Babin. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from Maryland, for an opening statement.
Ms. Edwards. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
I want to welcome back our two witnesses, Mr. Dumbacher and Mr.
Cooke, today, and I say ``back'' because both of you have
appeared before our Subcommittee previously, as former leaders
of NASA's human exploration programs. I appreciate your past
public service as well as your willingness to testify here
today.
Mr. Chairman, last December, millions of people in America
and around the world tasted the future when NASA conducted the
Exploration Flight Test-EFT-1 in which the Orion crew vehicle
traveled farther into space than any human spaceflight vehicle
since the Apollo era. That future is an exciting one that
includes sending humans to the surface of Mars. And Mars is the
goal that we established in our bipartisan House-passed,
overwhelmingly House-passed, NASA Authorization Act of 2015. We
sent it over to the Senate. And it's the consensus goal for
human space exploration of a distinguished National Academies
panel that recently examined U.S. human space exploration.
So, it's quite fitting, Mr. Chairman, that we follow up on
our Subcommittee's review of the Space Launch System and Orion
crew vehicle programs that was held last December, just after
the EFT-1 flight test, and see where these programs stand now.
By any measure, the progress on SLS and Orion is visible and
tangible. NASA and its contractors deserve credit for the many
accomplishments achieved to date. Tests of the SLS solid rocket
booster engines and the RS-25 main engine are reviving and
modernizing the propulsion activities that brought us through
the successful Shuttle era. Elements of the Orion crew vehicle
that will return American astronauts to deep space are being
fabricated even as I speak. And just a few weeks ago, the Orion
program was approved to transition from formulation into
development, a major milestone known as Key Decision Point C or
KDP-C.
This hearing should provide an opportunity to discuss the
outcomes of the Orion KDP-C review and clarify any questions,
including the perception, by some, of a two-year ``slip'' to
the first crewed flight test known as Exploration Mission-2, or
EM-2. However, I would note that the members of the panel were
not involved in this recent Orion KDP-C review. Only NASA can
address questions regarding the KDP-C milestone, discuss the
breadth of accomplishments achieved to date, and inform us of
the challenges going forward. Only NASA can do that.
That's why, Mr. Chairman, I'm actually quite puzzled that
NASA was not initially invited to testify, and why I extended
an invitation to the Associate Administrator of NASA's Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to serve as a
witness. Unfortunately, the Associate Administrator's
international travel schedule precluded his ability to appear
this morning. So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we'll give NASA
the opportunity in another hearing to provide the details on
the SLS and Orion programs that this Subcommittee needs to
hear.
The fact is that ensuring that SLS and Orion make maximum
progress, especially in this environment of budgetary
uncertainty, is a job for both the Administration and for
Congress. And just as a side note, I would say that the budget
caps known as the sequester give rise to the inability for us
to get a multiyear bipartisan authorization and appropriation
to the President's desk as the evidence of our support for SLS
and Orion and for the journey to Mars. We have to lift those
budget caps in order to accomplish the goals that we've set out
for the agency and for its contractors. Ensuring that SLS and
Orion make maximum progress, especially in this environment of
budget uncertainty, is a job both for the Administration and
for Congress. And as the National Academies report reminds us,
achieving the goals for sending humans to deep space requires a
joint commitment on the part of Congress and on the part of the
Administration.
Mars is a goal that's worthy of this great nation, and I
look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, to enable
NASA's continued progress toward that goal.
And before I yield, I want to welcome an intern for a month
in my office, Salil Maddy, who is at the Madeira School. We
share interns with them every year, and two of them here today
are very interested in space, and so we welcome them.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space
Ranking Member Donna F. Edwards
Good morning. I'd like to welcome back our two witnesses, Mr.
Dumbacher and Mr. Cooke. I say ``back'' because both of you have
appeared before our Subcommittee previously, as former leaders of
NASA's human exploration programs. I appreciate your past public
service as well as your willingness to testify today.
Mr. Chairman, last December, millions of people in America and
around the world tasted the future when NASA conducted the Exploration
Flight Test--EFT-1--in which the Orion crew vehicle traveled farther
into space than any human spaceflight vehicle since the Apollo era.
That future is an exciting one that includes sending humans to the
surface of Mars.
Mars is the goal that we established in our bipartisan House-passed
NASA Authorization Act of 2015. And it's the consensus goal for human
space exploration of a distinguished National Academies panel that
recently examined U.S. human space exploration. So, it's fitting, Mr.
Chairman, that we follow-up on our Subcommittee's review of the Space
Launch System and Orion crew vehicle programs that was held last
December, just after the EFT-1 flight test, and see where these
programs stand now.
By any measure, the progress on SLS and Orion is visible and
tangible. NASA and its contractors deserve credit for the many
accomplishments achieved to date. Tests of the SLS solid rocket booster
engines and the RS-25 main engine are reviving and modernizing the
propulsion activities that brought us through the successful Shuttle
era. Elements of the Orion crew vehicle that will return American
astronauts to deep space are being fabricated as I speak. And just a
few weeks ago, the Orion program was approved to transition from
formulation into development, a major milestone known as Key Decision
Point C or KDP-C.
This hearing should provide an opportunity to discuss the outcomes
of the Orion KDP-C review and clarify any questions, including the
perception, by some, of a two-year ``slip'' to the first crewed flight
test known as Exploration Mission-2 or EM-2.
However, I would note that the members of the panel were not
involved in this recent Orion KDP-C review. Only NASA can address
questions regarding the KDP-C milestone, discuss the breadth of
accomplishments achieved to date, and inform us of the challenges going
forward. That is why I was puzzled, Mr. Chairman, that NASA was not
initially invited to testify, and why I extended an invitation to the
Associate Administrator of NASA's Human Exploration and Operations
Mission Directorate to serve as a witness. Unfortunately, the
Associate Administrator's international travel schedule precluded
his ability to appear this morning.
So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will give NASA the opportunity in
another hearing to provide the details on the SLS and Orion programs
that this Subcommittee needs to hear. Because ensuring that SLS and
Orion make maximum progress, especially in this environment of
budgetary uncertainty, is a job for both the Administration and
Congress. And as the National Academies report reminds us, achieving
the goals for sending humans to deep space requires a joint commitment
on the part of Congress and the Administration.
Mars is a goal worthy of this great nation and I look forward to
working with you, Mr. Chairman, to enable NASA's continued progress
toward that goal.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
I now recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At a fundamental level, space exploration--the mission of
NASA--is about inspiration. This inspiration fuels our desire
to push the boundaries of what is possible and to reach beyond
our own planet.
The American people are fascinated with space exploration.
Just last week, the discovery that water sometimes flows on
Mars' surface made headlines across the world. And the latest
space film, The Martian, has sparked questions about when NASA
will send astronauts to Mars. Today's hearing seeks to answer
those questions and examine the effect of the President's
budget on our exploration programs. In its fiscal year 2016
budget proposal, the Obama Administration proposed a cut of
over $440 million from the programs that will take us to Mars:
the Space Launch System and Orion crew vehicle. This isn't new;
the President has tried to cut SLS and Orion every year since
he took office.
But there should be no misunderstanding: there is
bipartisan support within Congress for SLS and the Orion crew
vehicle. This Committee restored the proposed cuts in our
authorization bill, and the House and the Senate Appropriations
Committees restored these funds and supported SLS and Orion at
the levels necessary to keep their development on track. Yet
the Administration continues to try to strangle these programs.
NASA recently announced that the first crewed mission for
SLS and Orion was delayed by two years because the
Administration would not allow NASA to budget for the programs.
The Administration regularly cuts SLS and Orion, and Congress
continues to restore its cuts. The budget instability caused by
the Administration makes it hard for NASA to plan and execute
these critical programs. The fact that NASA can still maintain
these earlier dates in the face of Administration opposition is
a testament to the ingenuity, resolve, and professionalism of
the NASA workforce.
The Obama Administration cannot continue to claim that it
prioritizes Mars exploration if it refuses to prioritize and
support the programs that will get us there.
The SLS and Orion programs represent what is most
impressive about the American spirit: our desire to explore.
The technologies that are developed for these programs
exemplify our greatest breakthroughs and demonstrate American
ingenuity.
The Apollo program 50 years ago demonstrated that we could
reach the Moon. Orion and SLS will take us beyond that and
rekindle the American spirit of discovery and advance humanity
farther in space than ever before. Congress will continue to
ensure that these national priorities receive the funding they
need to stay on schedule and on budget.
Great nations do great things, and fortune favors the bold.
The next several years will determine whether American
astronauts will be the first to plant a flag on Mars. We want
them to have arrived there onboard an Orion crew vehicle,
propelled by the Space Launch System.
Mr. Chairman, I also just want to comment on the recent
handout that we have all seen by the Administration called
``NASA's Journey to Mars.'' Regrettably, however, this proposal
contains no budget, it contains no schedule, no deadlines. It's
just some real pretty photographs and some nice words. That is
not going to do it. That is not going to get us to Mars. This
sounds good, but it's actually a journey to nowhere until we
have that budget and we have the schedule and we have the
deadlines. And I hope the Administration will change its
posture and decide in the future that it is actually going to
support SLS and Orion and keep them on schedule because their
proposals to cut SLS and Orion every single year is not helping
us achieve the great goals that most Americans want to achieve
in space.
And I'll yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Full Committee
Chairman Lamar S. Smith
At a fundamental level, space exploration--the mission of NASA--is
about inspiration. This inspiration fuels our desire to push the
boundaries of what is possible and to reach beyond our own planet.
The American people are fascinated with space exploration. Just
last week, the discovery that water sometimes flows on Mars' surface
made headlines across the world. And the latest space film, The
Martian, has sparked questions about when NASA will send astronauts to
Mars.
Today's hearing seeks to answer those questions and examine the
effect of the president's budget on our exploration programs.
In its Fiscal Year 2016 budget proposal, the Obama administration
proposed a cut of over $440 million from the programs that will take us
to Mars: the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion crew vehicle. This
isn't new; the president has tried to cut SLS and Orion every year
since he took office.
But there should be no misunderstanding: there is bipartisan
support within Congress for SLS and the Orion crew vehicle. This
Committee restored the proposed cuts in our Authorization bill. And the
House and the Senate Appropriations Committees restored these funds and
supported SLS and Orion at the levels necessary to keep their
development on track.
Yet the administration continues to try to strangle these programs.
NASA recently announced that the first crewed mission for SLS and
Orion was delayed by two years because the administration would not
allow NASA to budget for the programs.
The administration regularly cuts SLS and Orion and Congress
continues to restore its cuts. The budget instability caused by the
administration makes it hard for NASA to plan and execute these
critical programs.
The fact that NASA can still maintain these earlier dates in the
face of administration opposition is a testament to the ingenuity,
resolve, and professionalism of the NASA workforce.
The Obama administration cannot continue to claim that it
prioritizes Mars exploration if it refuses to prioritize and support
the programs that will get us there.
The SLS and Orion programs represent what is most impressive about
the American spirit--our desire to explore. The technologies that are
developed for these programs exemplify our greatest breakthroughs and
demonstrate American ingenuity.
The Apollo program fifty years ago demonstrated that we could reach
the moon. Orion and SLS will take us beyond that and rekindle the
American spirit of discovery and advance humanity farther in space than
ever before.
Congress will continue to ensure that these national priorities
receive the funding they need to stay on schedule and on budget.
Great nations do great things. And fortune favors the bold. The
next several years will determine whether American astronauts will be
the first to plant a flag on Mars. We want them to have arrived there
onboard an Orion crew vehicle, propelled by the Space Launch System.
Mr. Chairman, I also just want to comment on the recent handout
that we have all seen by the administration called ``NASA's Journey to
Mars.'' Regrettably, however, this proposal contains no budget; it
contains no schedule, no deadlines. It's just some real pretty
photographs and some nice words. That is not going to do it. That is
not going to get us to Mars. This sounds good, but it is actually a
journey to nowhere until we have that budget and we have the schedule
and we have the deadlines.
And I hope the administration will change its posture and decide in
the future that it is actually going to support SLS and Orion and keep
them on schedule because their proposals to cut SLS and Orion every
single year is not helping us achieve the great goals that most
Americans want to achieve in space.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,
the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and good morning. Let me welcome our witnesses. I look forward
to your testimony.
In view of the uncertainties in today's schedule, I will be
brief in my remarks so that we can have enough time for a good
discussion with our witnesses.
This Committee has long supported a strong human
spaceflight and exploration program for the nation. I'm excited
about the prospect of America leading an international team to
the surface of Mars not too many years from now. And I hope
that our two witnesses, who have significant previous
experience in NASA's human exploration program, will help us
better understand the challenges NASA faces in realizing the
goal.
NASA has just released its updated ``Journey to Mars''
report, and I hope that we will invite NASA to come before this
Committee to discuss it. As Ms. Edwards has noted, NASA should
really be at the table today for this hearing.
Getting to Mars will be very challenging. We all know that.
And we know that it will take adequate funding if we are to get
there efficiently and safely.
I have made no secret of my willingness to invest more in
NASA, and this Committee has that authority. All we have to do
is authorize it and its human exploration, aeronautics,
science, and technology programs because it is an investment,
not just spending, an investment that will pay long-lasting
dividends to this nation as it has in the past.
But it's not just a question of more money. It's giving
NASA more predictability as to when that money will actually
show up. If this Congress is looking for reasons why NASA's
exploration program faces potential delays, we need to look no
further than ourselves right here on this Committee. Too many
times in recent years, NASA has had no idea when it would
actually get an appropriation, whether it would actually be
reauthorized, whether that appropriation would be for more than
a few months, or whether they may even have to suspend their
work due to a government shutdown. That is no way that a
government should treat a premier program and a premier R&D
enterprise and its dedicated workforce to have it to operate.
If we are going to ask NASA and its contractors to carry
out the extremely challenging job of getting America to Mars,
this Congress is going to have do its job as well.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back, and I wait
to hear what you are going to authorize for this mission.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson of Texas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Full Committee
Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses. I look forward to your
testimony. In view of the uncertainties in today's schedule, I will be
brief in my remarks so that we can have enough time for a good
discussion with our witnesses.
This Committee has long supported a strong human space flight and
exploration program for the nation. I am excited about the prospect of
America leading an international team to the surface of Mars not too
many years from now. And I hope that our two witnesses, who have
significant previous experience in NASA's human exploration program,
will help us better understand the challenges NASA faces in realizing
that goal.
NASA has just released its updated ``Journey to Mars'' report, and
I hope that we will invite NASA to come before this Committee to
discuss it. As Ms. Edwards has noted, NASA should really be at today's
hearing too.
Getting to Mars will be very challenging. We all know that. And we
know that it will take adequate funding if we are to get there
efficiently and safely. I have made no secret of my willingness to
invest more in NASA--in its human exploration, aeronautics, science,
and technology programs. Because it is an investment--not just
spending--an investment that will pay long-lasting dividends to this
nation.
But it's not just a question of more money--it's giving NASA some
predictability as to when that money will actually show up. If this
Congress is looking for reasons why NASA's exploration program faces
potential delays, we need look no further than ourselves.
Too many times in recent years, NASA has had no idea when it would
actually get an appropriation, whether that appropriation would be for
more than a few months, or whether they might even have to suspend
their work due to a government shutdown. That is no way for America's
premier R&D enterprise and its dedicated workforce to have to operate.
If we are going to ask NASA and its contractors to carry out the
extremely challenging job of getting America to Mars, this Congress is
going to have do its job too.Thank you, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mrs. Johnson.
Let me introduce our witnesses now. First we have Mr.
Douglas Cooke who will be testifying, the Owner of Cooke
Concepts and Solutions, and a former Associate Administrator of
Exploration Systems at NASA. This division is responsible for
building Orion and the SLS, the two vehicles that will take
humans to deep space destinations including Mars. Mr. Cooke is
the recipient of several awards including the Presidential
Distinguished Rank Award and Presidential Meritorious Rank
Award. He has over 40 years of experience in human spaceflight.
He received his bachelor's in Aerospace Engineering from Texas
A&M University, and we're very happy to have him here today.
Thank you, Mr. Cooke.
Our second witness today is Mr. Daniel Dumbacher. Mr.
Dumbacher is a Professor of Engineering Practice at Purdue
University. Mr. Dumbacher served as Deputy Associate
Administrator in the Exploration Systems Development Division
at NASA. He has received the Presidential Rank Award for
Meritorious Service and the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal.
Prior to this 35-year career with NASA, Mr. Dumbacher earned
his bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from Purdue
University and a master's in Business Administration from the
University of Alabama. He is also a graduate of the Senior
Managers and Government Study Program at Harvard University.
I now recognize Mr. Cooke for five minutes to present his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DOUG COOKE, OWNER,
COOKE CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS;
FORMER ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
EXPLORATION SYSTEMS, NASA
Mr. Cooke. Thank you, Chairman Babin----
Chairman Babin. Mr. Cooke, if you could start over and turn
on your mic.
Mr. Cooke. I apologize.
I want to thank Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Edwards, and
from the full Committee, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member
Johnson, and Members of this Committee for this opportunity.
My interest in human exploration of space has been a
primary focus of my life and career since the flights of Yuri
Gagarin and the Mercury astronauts. The success of programs to
send people to the Moon and Mars is of paramount importance to
me, and I believe to everyone.
I applaud your bipartisan support and the people at NASA
and in industry who work diligently every day to make these and
other NASA programs successful.
The important questions you're asking specifically address
deep space exploration, so that is the part of the budget I'll
address.
The most challenging aspect of managing these programs is
due to constrained budgets and unplanned changes to operating
budgets, whether real or contrived. The technical challenges
are fun in comparison. The disparity between the President's
budget request, or PBR, and budgets passed by Congress for
exploration vehicles--the Space Launch System, Orion, and
Ground Systems--causes problems in managing and executing these
programs. It also causes issues in perceptions of program
health.
To advance these programs Congress has consistently passed
budgets each year that are significantly greater than the PBR.
It has been clear Congress intends to follow through with this
necessary funding, yet the Administration asks for less.
NASA managers are required to plan the complex development
schedules to the PBR over the five-year runout. NASA fixed cost
are included, and are a higher percentage of a lower PBR
budget. This leaves less money for SLS and Orion progress.
Constrained budgets limit what work can be accomplished more
efficiently in parallel. It moves stated flight dates later
than if they planned to Congressional budget runouts. Contracts
are negotiated with companies for content and schedule, flight
dates and expectations are set. When there are major policy or
priority shifts or disruptions to the budget process on
funding, these detailed plans and their interdependencies have
to be changed, schedules and contracts are renegotiated at
additional cost, adding to the problem.
As an example, the 2016 President's request for SLS, Orion,
and Ground Systems is 2.86 billion. Under current spending
under the Continuing Resolution, NASA should be spending at a
rate commensurate with the 2015 level of 3.25 billion, or 382
million more. In fact, the current 2015 spending level is 118
million more than the President's budget proposes for the year
2020 in their five-year runout.
On the other hand, for 2016 alone, this year's House bill
is 546 million over the President's 2016 request and the
Senate's bill is 647 million more. If a budget bill is passed
for NASA this year at these higher levels, the programs will
adjust spending upward. Programs will make the most of these
funds in advancing progress, but changing spending rates
creates inefficiencies. They will still plan to the budget's
reduced level for 2017 and beyond. I do advocate for the higher
levels. If the Administration would propose at needed values
within small percentage points of consistent Congressional
levels, spending rates would be much more stable and planning
more reliable. I believe this disparity in policy priorities
has remained since the cancellation of the Constellation
program.
I was asked to comment on the use of the Joint Confidence
Levels, an analysis used in the KDP-C milestones for SLS last
year and the same milestone for Orion this year. These
milestones led to NASA announcements of delays for SLS of a
one-year and up to a two-year slip of the first crewed flight.
Theoretically, the JCL is a good statistical analysis for
evaluation of the uncertainties in programs that affect budget
and schedule. An accurate JCL calculation requires meticulous
collection of extremely detailed tasks, costs and schedules;
costing program resources.
The JCL provides a valuable function for rigorous
inspection of a program. However, from my direct experience in
implementing it, I believe it has little utility for predicting
schedule milestones in this budget environment when planning to
the President's budget request rather than actual Congressional
appropriated budgets. JCL outcomes become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Because actual budgets are actually higher year-to-
year, NASA tries to maintain earlier planning dates and is
trying to mitigate this confusion but could be more efficient
if the source of confusion were not there.
There are significant differences in budget and oversight
practices between the Commercial Cargo and Crew and the
traditional exploration programs. With the experience gained
thus far, best practices should be established for both while
preserving safety and accountability.
SLS and Orion are first critical developments in our human
exploration of the solar system. They are making great progress
in spite of these burdens.
I want to thank the Committee and your staff again for your
continued support of NASA and human spaceflight. I have
submitted further detail in my written testimony, and welcome
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooke follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. We appreciate it.
I now recognize Mr. Dumbacher for five minutes to present
his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DAN DUMBACHER,
PROFESSOR OF ENGINEERING PRACTICE,
PURDUE UNIVERSITY;
FORMER DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
HUMAN EXPLORATION AND
OPERATIONS MISSION DIRECTORATE, NASA
Mr. Dumbacher. Chairman Babin and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss NASA's deep space
exploration efforts on this, the 31st anniversary of Astronaut
Kathy Sullivan's spacewalk. On this day in 1984, Dr. Sullivan,
current NOAA Administrator, became the first U.S. woman ever to
see the Earth from that unique vantage point.
I thank you also for your support of our nation's space
exploration efforts. It is an honor for me to represent Purdue,
a public land-grant university, educating the next generation
of explorers. I find the students of today to be part of a
curious, passionate, and dedicated generation. These young
voters are ready to build and create a better future for all of
us.
And, as a former NASA team member, I want to express my
utmost respect for the NASA/industry team's accomplishments in
the current environment. This team is working on a scale larger
than Apollo with a constrained budget. Much like today's
students, their enthusiasm and dedication to the mission is
evident every day and sets the leadership example.
The NASA 2010 Authorization Act and the 2014 Pathways to
Exploration Report from the National Research Council provide a
sound, inclusive basis for space exploration goals and
objectives that should be adequately funded.
I believe we are at a critical juncture in our exploration
efforts. As we continue missions to extend our presence further
into the solar system, we must build the foundational
capabilities for humans to go onward: the Space Launch System
and Orion. We must effectively utilize humanity's principal
technological achievement, the International Space Station, as
an exploration test bed and valuable research facility, and we
must seed the initial phases of commercial space travel.
Given the budget instability and continuous policy debates,
the NASA/industry team is making great progress. The team is
dedicated to building all systems as safely as possible, as
soon as possible, and as cost-efficiently as possible. The
Space Launch System has successfully passed its Critical Design
Review along with engine tests, booster tests, and structures
that were flight-tested last December. The Orion capsule
completed its first flight test last December, and is
proceeding to systems testing. Orion's European Service Module
is on track for the first flight and launch infrastructure is
on schedule.
Keeping these critical programs on schedule is essential
for two reasons. One, the United States needs to continue to
maintain our global leadership in space. We must leave this
legacy of leadership for the next generation. Two, schedule
equals cost. Maintaining funding stability, and therefore
schedule, is essential to minimizing the cost of these
programs. NASA's leadership, plans, and management
implementation reflects the need for cost efficiency with
reduced insight/oversight, reduced management and integration
overhead, all while carefully maintaining and improving crew
safety over previous systems.
Budget stability is the major issue in executing these
programs. All players in the appropriations process have a
stake in maintaining this budget stability. This budget
stability has two basic components. First the annual debate
between the Executive Branch request and Congressional
appropriations is an important factor that drives inefficiency.
The second aspect of budget stability is the recent history at
the national budget level of continuing resolutions and
government shutdowns. Both components lead to cost and schedule
impacts to the programs via continuous re-planning, confusion
across the entire team, and loss of team focus.
NASA diligently manages risk, cost, and schedule through
daily, direct contractor interaction, periodic element program
reviews with detailed discussions of technical and programmatic
progress, issues, and risks. The Joint Confidence Level is a
model risk-based approach to assess potential technical and
programmatic uncertainties and their possible sensitivities and
impacts to the cost and schedule of a program. This has proven
to be successful in robotic mission programs but is much more
difficult for the large, longer term programs such as the Space
Launch System and Orion.
In summary, the biggest challenge in developing the Space
Launch System, Orion, the launch support infrastructure, and
Commercial Crew is budget stability, not the eventual technical
issues. Managing these programs efficiently and effectively is
the result of the dedicated NASA/industry team across this
country, and the international partners.
The government-funded Lewis and Clark expedition helped
open the frontier for the commercial development of rail
transportation and other opportunities to the West Coast.
Today, NASA is opening the frontier of space and helping to
build the space economy.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dumbacher follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Dumbacher. We appreciate
your testimony.
I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. I
presume these will be for both of you guys, if that's okay.
When the Administration slipped the recent Orion launch
schedule, NASA was very quick to point out that they were still
planning the original launch date. If NASA program managers
believe that the earlier launch readiness date could be kept on
track with historical Congressional appropriations, then why
doesn't the agency commit to those earlier dates to begin with?
Mr. Cooke, how about you first?
Mr. Cooke. I understand what you're asking. Within the
agency and within the Administration, NASA plans to the
President's budget request, which is the Administration policy,
and that's where the confusion comes in when the Congressional
budgets are higher. Naturally, people in these programs are
wanting to progress, they are wanting to plan as much work into
the funding they get, and so the appropriated budgets are
utilized, and they make as much progress as they can. However,
if planning in out years to the President's budget request, if
they're doing that, then at some point it becomes self-
fulfilling as the long lead items can't be planned on or bought
or paid down, and so gradually the advanced planning overtakes
what the schedule that they might have held.
Chairman Babin. Okay. And how about you, Mr. Dumbacher?
Mr. Dumbacher. Congressman Babin, I agree with everything
that Mr. Cooke just said. I think it's clear from a program
implementation perspective that when we try to put the best
plan together that we can and we are continuously working--in
my tenure at NASA, we were continuously dealing with a plan
against the President's budget request as necessary by policy
within the Administration, and also having to recognize that
the appropriations process was probably going to change that
number and increase it, that we also had to develop another set
of plans to be prepared for the appropriations process. That
was standard operating procedure. We did it annually because of
the policy debates that were ongoing, and we did the best we
could with the planning and with the execution given that
uncertainty that we were working with each year.
Chairman Babin. Okay, sir. Thank you.
My second question would be, if NASA reverted to the manner
in which it applied termination liability to contractors under
the Constellation program as well as how it treats the ISS
program and JPL, how much more money would that allow the
scientists and engineers to devote to development work and how
would that impact the schedule?
Mr. Cooke. In terms of the past, for instance, for the
International Space Station, there were actually words in
legislation that helped that situation so that termination
liability was less of a burden to the programs. Currently, or
early in--actually as post termination of Constellation
program, the programs--each program has to set aside, and each
project has to set aside funding to protect for termination
liability. As I understand it, the number for SLS and Orion
right now is on the order of 420 million, and that--if that is
held back, then that's money that's not going to execution.
I think there may be some relaxing of how that's done
currently but the contractors are actually, as I understand it,
responsible for maintaining the termination liability. So in
any event, any help that they could have in not having to hold
back funding would be beneficial, in my view.
Chairman Babin. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Dumbacher?
Mr. Dumbacher. Chairman Babin, I agree with Mr. Cooke just
said. There--during our execution of SLS and Orion up until I
left the agency, termination liability, having to withhold that
work or having to hold that money back each year meant that it
was that amount of work that we were not making progress with
across SLS and Orion. It was an impact to the program. It was
an impact to our schedule. And it became--and it was an annual
issue that we had to deal with both from a government policy
implementation perspective as well as a corporate risk
management strategy perspective.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, and I'll recognize the
gentlewoman from Maryland.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again
to the witnesses.
Mr. Dumbacher, in your prepared statement, you referred to
the National Academies' Pathways to Exploration report and note
that its recommendations ``should serve as the basis for an
overall strategy and plan for human exploration.'' This
Subcommittee and the House have similar views and called for a
human exploration roadmap in the House-passed 2015 NASA
authorization bill.
I just wonder what your views are on the key thrusts that
are made by the Pathways report and whether NASA's strategy of
Earth-reliant proving ground and Earth-independence satisfy the
National Academies' recommendation, and if they don't, why not?
And then what should Congress expect to see in a solid
strategy? What are the key elements for a roadmap that we
should be looking at that have a little bit more precision?
Mr. Dumbacher. Congresswoman Edwards, I think the 2014 NRC
report that--and I will be honest, I am speaking from my own,
not the fact that the chairman of that committee is now the
president of my university----
Ms. Edwards. That's not a conflict.
Mr. Dumbacher. That's the way the faculty look at it.
That report lays out a very sound approach. It lays out an
approach and should be, in my opinion, used as a touchstone
along with the 2010 Authorization Act to put a strategy
together. I think your question about the Earth-reliant proving
ground, Earth independent, that's the first level of it. It's
not--it needs to be fleshed out in greater detail with more
strategy along the way. I think the key elements of that
strategy need to recognize that this is exploration--we will be
learning each step of the way--and it has to be flexible and we
have to have the ability to modify the strategy based on what
we learn because, in essence, what we are doing with
exploration is, we are expanding our neighborhood from low
Earth orbit out to cislunar space and then eventually to Mars,
and I hope beyond that.
So I think those elements are essential to build upon the
plan, and I think the NRC report gives us a good methodology by
which to think about it, a good starting point, and also some
good indication frankly from a funding perspective in terms of
what kind of funding would be reasonable along with an
inflation growth to be able to implement such a strategy.
Ms. Edwards. So let me just ask you, Mr. Cooke, then about
funding because we've heard talk already on this Committee
about the debates and the push and pull that have gone back and
forth between Congress and the Administration, but do you have
some thoughts about the constraints that this uncertain
environment with the sequester caps in place and basically
living at level funding in what Mr. Dumbacher has described as
an exploration environment, what kind of constraints that puts
on our ability to fully explore and develop this program?
And then lastly, I mean, I have often thought that it might
make more sense for Congress to simply put a date certain, an
endpoint. NASA is saying maybe in the 2030s. Well, what if
Congress came back and said, well, how about 2020, and then we
develop a budget and a program around something that's more
certain than just continuing to expand it into the future, and
I'll leave you with the balance of my time.
Mr. Cooke. I believe that the flat budget is one--well,
it's a fact that with inflation, a flat budget has less buying
power over time, so to explore and move beyond where we are,
move to the next steps after SLS and Orion, it will require
increased funding. There was at some level, and not terribly
high, I think, but funding does need to be restored over time
to exploration in order to make these goals, and I think it is
a good question to ask if we are to get to, say, the Moon, by a
date, to Mars at some date, what does it take to do that and I
think that's your question. I think it's a great question. It's
one that deserves an answer. It's--that's really the way it
should be done.
And then of course, you can decide, and then it gets into
debate of deciding whether or not it can be afforded, but
certainly that's the way a program should be laid out, in a way
that has development funding that is more efficient than what's
being done currently under caps and flat-lined budgets.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Babin. Thank you.
Now we recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a question for both of you. How should NASA pick a
human exploration mission end timeline?
Mr. Cooke. I believe--and I have been able to briefly read
the report that was put out yesterday by NASA. I think there
are a lot of good elements in it. But I think in laying out a
program, one thing that is missing from it and one thing I've
stated before, in fact, I testified on it in May of 2013 in
this Committee, I believe that we need to start with a
discussion in the community, whether it is science or the
exploration committee including our international partners,
those who are interested in developing resources on the Moon,
we need to have a conversation up front to lay out objectives
for what we will achieve on these missions. It's not just a
matter of well, we're going to build this rocket to go to this
place. It's important to understand what we want to achieve,
and I think laying that out helps guide the steps involved. And
personally, I believe those steps include going to the Moon, to
going potentially to the moons of Mars and to Mars itself.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Dumbacher, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Dumbacher. Congressman Brooks, yes, I do. A couple of
points to add to Mr. Cooke is that as it's necessary to bring
the stakeholders along, it's also--I think we need to be very
careful recognizing the funding constraints that we operate
within that we need to make sure that the elements that we
build for exploration don't just become one-offs or just be
able to used once, that they have a continuous applicability
through the rest of the exploration strategy. I think that's a
key element that we need to do, and we also frankly need to be
very careful about making sure we live within the funding
constraints that are in the appropriations levels that are
provided by the Congress. So those are the two key elements I
would add to what Mr. Cooke had.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you. This is again a question for both of
you, and Mr. Cooke, I've already heard your comments about
going to the moon, Mars's moons and perhaps Mars, but if you
have any additions, please offer that.
What do you recommend as NASA's SLS and Orion missions?
Mr. Cooke. I believe that the SLS and Orion represent the
first critical steps in any exploration activity beyond Earth
orbit. You need the lift capacity of the Space Launch System.
You need the volume if its payload----
Mr. Brooks. I understand that, but do you want our missions
to be?
Mr. Cooke. I think personally, there's discussion about
cislunar space. That is definitely a possibility. It could be a
very good intermediate point in Mars, a place to send Mars
missions from, but I do believe in going to the Moon.
The Moon that we know now based on spacecraft that have
gone there since Apollo has opened up a different Moon than
we've seen before that's much more dramatic and landscaped.
We've mapped resources. I think there's a lot to learn if we
sent people there. So I think that the Moon is still an
important place to go on the way to Mars eventually.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Dumbacher, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Dumbacher. Yes, Congressman. A couple of things I would
add are, again, everything we do needs to be buildable towards
Mars. It needs to help take us towards Mars and be usable along
the way. We need to do the testing necessary to make sure that
we learn how to operate in environments where we are further
away from home than we've ever been in the distant retrograde
orbit cislunar space area. We'll be nine days away from home as
compared to three days away from home during Apollo.
Another aspect I would add is an increase in mission
frequency. I think it's important that we shorten up the time
between missions. That means additional funding, but it is--I
believe it's important that we increase the mission frequency
to maintain our skills, build our skills and then be able to
learn as quickly and provide the benefits back as quickly as
possible.
Mr. Brooks. I'm almost out of time, but this is a short
question.
Since Orion is running behind schedule, what can be flown
on the Space Launch System in its place from a test standpoint?
Mr. Dumbacher. Congressman, that's a--I'll take that first.
We--that's a good question. I think the two programs have
been integrally linked from the beginning in that the first
flight test EM-1 needed to have an uncrewed version of Orion,
and I believe that they are on schedule for that flight, and
with NASA continuing to work to the management agreement of
2021, assuming the Congressional appropriations levels, they're
still working to the existing plan. What other cargo missions
there might be would remain to be seen but I think we would
have to have--NASA would need to take a look at possible cargo
missions, other possible payloads, other possible science
missions.
Mr. Cooke. And I would agree that there are possibilities.
I agree with what Mr. Dumbacher said, and the plan is for Orion
to fly. But in the future, SLS will provide a unique capability
for larger telescopes with larger apertures potentially. There
has been discussion on a Europa mission at some point.
There are potentially uses in defense space as well. It has
unique capabilities that could provide other very good
opportunities.
Chairman Babin. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you.
Now I call on the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll begin with Mr. Dumbacher. You talked about budget
stability. You mention in your testimony that the NRC report
and the 2010 Authorization Act should be followed to ensure
adequate funding for SLS and Orion. Could you please explain
what you mean by that, and especially in light of the fact that
the last time humans left low Earth orbit was 1972 with Apollo
17? What would this do to increase our confidence that the EM-2
launch will actually be carried out in 2021?
Mr. Dumbacher. I think, Congressman, first of all, at the
Congressional appropriations level and NASA continuing to work
towards the 2021 date for the Orion first crewed flight, I
think the Congressional appropriations levels and accounting
for inflation over this time period, recognizing the loss of
purchasing power that that infuses into the system, can help--
Congressional appropriations can maintain the 2021 date, and I
think that's important.
For the overall exploration, I think the thoughts put
together as part of the NRC report that talk about a level of
funding that basically starts out similar to the Congressional
appropriations level, grows at about two to three percent per
year in real growth plus inflation on top of that, I think
provides a good, sound basis, and importantly, if NASA knows
that that's going to be the plan over the long term, they can
plan to that, and that's the important part is if you know what
you're working to over a longer horizon and you can plan to
that, that is a key part.
One of the things we struggled with in my time at NASA was
the budget request that came out as a one-year budget request
and the budget horizon from then on was labeled as
``notional.'' As a program manager, I struggle with, how do I
plan to a notional budget? So the key point is, knowing what
the numbers are, having some feel for what those numbers are
going to be over a five-, ten-year budget horizon and then you
can put a reasonable program together.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooke, Chairman Babin talked in his opening statement
about the Administration's strangling NASA with the budget
cuts. I along with many of our colleagues on both sides offered
amendments in Committee to increase the NASA authorization,
only to be told that our Committee hands were tied by the
Budget Control Act and by the bicameral budget passed in the
House and the Senate with Republican majorities.
How much of these budget cuts are driven by sequester, by
the Budget Control Act?
Mr. Cooke. I honestly can't answer that specifically on the
Budget Control Act. My experience has been primarily between
Congressionally passed budgets and President's budget, and I
would say as an example right now of what I think could be
done, if NASA were to be able to count on the Congressionally
approved levels, is make a decision to go to a larger upper
stage than the first--than the one flown on the first test
flight. We're flying an interim upper stage based on Delta
upper stage for this test flight, and if NASA could count on
the Congressional levels, it could probably make a decision to
go to the upper stage it needs for exploration. That would keep
NASA from having to human-rate this interim upper stage for the
first crew flight, which would save a significant amount of
money. So just the efficiencies gained in a higher budget in
terms of the development, in developing the right answer
instead of interim steps would be of great benefit.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Cooke.
Mr. Dumbacher, again, budget stability. We just avoided a
government shutdown at the end of September. We're now looking
at hitting the debt ceilings in the next couple of weeks. We've
postponed the budget and the government shutdown debate until
December 11th. What would--what was the impact on Orion and SLS
when we shut down the government for 16 days in 2013? What
would be the impact if we shut it down for 10 days later this
year?
Mr. Dumbacher. Well, I cannot speak to the exact details of
what a potential impact would be for 10 days down the road from
here, but back two years ago when we did have that 16-day
shutdown, there was a significant impact to the program,
particularly because at that point we were-- particularly Orion
was coming up on the hardware and the integration, a year away
from the exploration flight test. And so having to stand down
the team for 16 days and then restart it, when you consider the
level of budgets that we're talking here and the burn rate that
we had at that time, which I recall, if I do my math correctly,
was on the order of $60 million a week, that's a significant
impact to the program because it's not just the 16 days, it's
the planning that the team had to go through to prepare for
that, it's the phasing down to get to that shutdown, and then
it's the restart to come up after the shutdown. So that was a
significant impact to Orion and to SLs as well as Ground
Systems across the board just for a 16-day impact.
Mr. Cooke. I'd like to add to that just briefly. NASA is in
a unique situation on something like a shutdown. It is not like
most agencies. It's developing something. It's developing
hardware. It's--they're programs that are underway. So it's a
lot of people with a lot of interrelated tasks and jobs that
most agencies don't deal with. So a shutdown does have an
impact in development.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Babin. Thank you. I would remind the gentleman
from Virginia that in our budgeting and authorization and
issues of exploration, we fully funded--this Committee always
fully funded that, and what you were referring to was not
exploration with some of those issues.
I now would like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher, the
gentleman from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It's good to see you fellows again and again over the
years.
How much is the Mars initiative going to cost when it's
completed? When we get the person on Mars and back, how much
will we have spent?
Mr. Cooke. I think at this point, since we don't have a
specific roadmap with missions laid out, we really don't know
the cost. I will say that if you take any program--if you take
the Shuttle program, if you take the Space Station program and
if you put the full cost at the front end of it and said this
is what it was going to cost, it would be a big number, and----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, let me ask you this then.
Has--you mean there's no document that you've read that NASA--
and we've all signed on that says this is how much is going to
be spent to achieve this goal? What did we agree to? Congress
hasn't--we don't even have a budget so we don't even know how
much it's going to cost for the biggest project in NASA to
achieve its goal? I mean, this is insane. How much have we
already spent on the Mars project?
Mr. Dumbacher. Well, Congressman, let me--first of all,
this has been a long-term investment from the initial vision
for space exploration days and going into the Constellation
program. I cannot give you off the top of my head specific
numbers, but I can tell you----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Hold on. Do you think NASA knows? So what
I'm getting here is that we don't even know how much--there is
no figure as to how much is going to be spent and we don't know
how much has already been spent, which means we don't know how
much more will be necessary to be spent from now to achieve the
goal, but we're talking about, you know, tens of billions of
dollars here. The NASA budget altogether is 17 billion. Let me
just note, when we started off down this road, some of us
suggested that we were going to have to drain money from every
other NASA program or it wasn't going to work, and it's not
working, and it's because we don't have the money, and right
now just from the testimony, you're saying we're not being
responsible at this level, they're not being responsible at
NASA either.
We have a huge asteroid that's going to come by the Earth
or at least not right by the Earth but closer to the Earth than
usual in the next few days, and we have no plan that if
something happened that we recognized something was coming and
that five years from now it was going to hit the Earth and
destroy it. We don't even have in place a plan to actually
deflect an asteroid yet. We've got--and let me just note,
people are complaining about the budget, we're not giving NASA
the money that it needs for the development of this huge rocket
that's necessary for Mars. Well, if we were going to--if people
really believed that having a man on the Moon planting our flag
as compared to just having robots is worth all of these
billions, well, they've got to put their money where their
mouth is, but nobody does that. We have--nobody's willing to
prioritize.
NASA spends a billion dollars a year proving global
warming, just to prove it, a billion dollars a year. Well,
maybe if someone on that side of the aisle might be willing to
give up that money and put it--if they really believe in going
to Mars, putting it into the big rocket that we need to take us
to Mars, well, then maybe we'd have some hope that we can be
successful in something, but nobody's that responsible here.
By the way, of the billions of dollars our government
spends, we are borrowing 20 percent of it from our children who
will repay the Chinese or the Japanese or whoever is buying up
our debt. We aren't even--and people are complaining. That's
why we have the sequester in place because no one was willing
to make a choice.
What I'm seeing here, and again--look, my father was a
pilot. My dad--and we have this great aviation technology that
we put to use for humankind now. That happened because people
were actually responsible. They made responsible decisions
about development of technology.
And Mr. Chairman, I'll just end my little tirade by saying
that I think that we are not being responsible. I think Elon
Musk will be on Mars before NASA is and not him spending any
government money as well. Thank you.
Mr. Bridenstine. [Presiding] The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter,
for five minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank
you for your service to the country. Thank you for your service
to the future because that's what this is about. And I just
feel very fortunate that I got a place on this Committee to
talk about things like this, and had an astronaut in my office
not long ago, a guy named Terry Virts, and my guess is, both of
you have worked with him, where he said this is not rocket
science, this is political science, and the part that we're
dealing with right now is political science, and Mr.
Rohrabacher and I, you know, may have some differences but
generally this Committee--and I have been on a lot of
committees in this Congress. This Committee gets along and
agrees more than almost all the other ones.
And so looking at this, you know, we're the authorizing
committee so you got the Budget Committee, the authorizing
committee and the Appropriations Committee. I on this Committee
would like to be able to give you something that says you are
authorized to get us to Mars as quickly as possible. You know,
I'd like to be able to say something in an authorizing
language--ten years from now, we're going to have our
astronauts on Mars for the future, for science, for discovery,
for whatever. And so for us, if there's a goal of something
like that, then we've got to find a way to do it so that you
can provide a ten-year plan, knowing under the Constitution
from year to year, no Congress can bind the next Congress--
that's just the way the Constitution is--but to give you some
real guidance in setting a plan over a period of time to get us
there.
And so for me, I just suggest to my friends on this
Committee, you know, say this is a national interest, it's a
huge investment, either we raise taxes to make that investment,
which, you know, will give some people, you know, heartache, or
we say we're going to prioritize this against the whole other
budget, all the other appropriations. Or we can do a public-
private partnership and get some additional investment, or we
could do a joint venture with some other countries as we've
done with the Space Station. And I'm a Star Trek guy and I look
at the bridge of the Enterprise and I see every nationality
possible and then people from other planets too. But we can do
those kinds of things or maybe fee-based, but that's our
problem. That the political science piece of this thing.
Now, the two of you have had to deal with Congress, you've
had to deal with the White House. What would you suggest that
we do to give you a ten-year plan? Mr. Cooke?
Mr. Cooke. I can tell you from experience that the
Authorization Acts have been very beneficial to laying out our
future, and the 2010 Act was very important to us. I encouraged
development of plans because they represent--in the end,
they're obviously a compromise in the end when they all get
passed, and having a consensus on a direction is very
important. The 2005 Act was important to us, the 2010 Act was.
So those do have an impact, and we--they actually--the 2010
Act actually set the motion forward to announce in 2011 the
Orion and SLS programs.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Dumbacher?
Mr. Dumbacher. Congressman, as I stated in my testimony, I
think that as Doug has said, that the 2010 Authorization Act
provides the good starting point. It laid out three years.
worth of funding levels. We-recognizing the constitutional
appropriations process, NASA can do a better job of planning
when it has some idea of what budget level to plan to,
recognizing that that cannot be passed in an appropriations
perspective because of the Constitution but having some concept
of a plan so that if, for example, someone--this body were to
come back and say use something like the 2014 NRC report as a
planning basis, then NASA could go forward and use that.
Mr. Perlmutter. So just a last question. If we said we want
to be on Mars in 2025 in an authorizing bill, could you give us
a budget for that?
Mr. Dumbacher. Then the question would go to NASA to put
that plan together and then they would need to put a budget
requirement to meet that plan and they would need to come back
and show that to this body for funding purposes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bridenstine. The gentleman yields back.
I have taken the gavel here so I'm going to recognize
myself for five minutes before we go to Mr. Posey here for the
next question.
What I'd like to share, I heard Mr. Beyer earlier talk
about the C.R. and shutdown and want to know the impact on NASA
exploration and all that's critically important. I would like
to highlight the fact that under a Continuing Resolution, NASA
exploration actually gets more funding than if we went forward
with the President's budget request, which--and I'm not saying
that because I'm advocating for a Continuing Resolution. I just
want to make sure people understand the President's funding
priorities.
Now, my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, earlier was talking about
SLS and Orion and how much money it's going to cost, and I
don't share his sentiment that maybe those programs are ill-
advised. What I do believe is that if you're going to have
those programs like what Mr. Perlmutter was talking about, we
need to fund them. If we're going to have these programs, we
need to fund them, and it's pretty simple.
So we have seen the Administration repeatedly underfund the
program in its fiscal requests every year. The inadequate
funding requests coupled with delays in program announcement,
arguments over destinations, and the use of accounting tools
such as termination liability have caused further delays in SLS
and Orion. When I see this back and forth between Congress and
the Administration, I am left wondering a number of things.
Since the President is not committed to this or at least it
wouldn't appear that he has been, is this political? Are we
setting ourselves up for political failure? And if I could
get--maybe because he wasn't committed to it from the
beginning. Could I get your opinion on that, both of you?
Mr. Cooke. I don't think we're going toward failure. The
programs, SLS and Orion, are moving forward and making great
progress. It's definitely true that under these circumstances
where the budgets are different and the President's budget
request is less than what's appropriated, it does cause
problems in programs. Decisions have to be made that are not
optimum. So it ends up being inefficient and costs more in the
end. However, even so, you have dedicated people at NASA that
make them work, and they're making great progress.
Mr. Bridenstine. Mr. Dumbacher?
Mr. Dumbacher. I totally agree with everything Mr. Cooke
just said. I have nothing fundamentally to add to that. I think
I would like to reiterate that I do not believe we are working
towards failure either. I think you see success out there. It's
going to be hard at times because we are doing technical things
that no one has done before in terms of manufacturing
technology, manufacturing requirements, bringing in new
technologies and taking humans further than we've ever gone
before. It will be hard, but it's not failure.
This dedicated team across NASA and industry is making it
happen in spite of the political budget debate, and I think
they should be commended for the progress that they are making
to date.
Mr. Bridenstine. And just so everybody here understands, I
just want to make sure that we're going forward and actually
accomplishing what we're setting out to do, and I think people
on both sides of the aisle want to make sure that what we are
funding is not in vain, and I think that's Mr. Rohrabacher's
frustration, you know, people on both sides of the aisle, and
it seems to me that if we continue to hit the president's
budget request and in many case go beyond the President's
budget request and yet we still have delay after delay and we
don't have the launch frequencies necessary maybe to maintain
the safety that is perfectly appropriate for this kind of
program, the question is, are we adequately funding this
program, and how do we go forward in a way that is appropriate,
given that this is very serious business and lives ultimately
will be at stake.
Last question for you guys. As we move forward for deeper
and deeper space exploration, do you see an environment where
commercial habitats would be used maybe as, you know, something
to, you know, orbiting the Moon for the long term, for example,
if you guys could answer that?
Mr. Cooke. I think that's potential. I encourage commercial
development. Actually in the directorate that I managed when I
was at NASA, we had the Commercial Cargo and Crew, and those
are being developed and are needed at this point, and I
certainly think that's a possibility. If the business case is
there to support it, I think that's certainly in the realm of
what could happen.
Mr. Dumbacher. And Congressman, if I may, I would like to
add to what Mr. Cooke just said in that in my view, it's
critical that we continue to perform this exploration
initiative and help build commercial opportunities because that
is the future for the next generation, and it's going to be
hard. We have the real-life things that we have to work through
in terms of business plans and commercial markets and technical
issues and all of that, but this country has a long history of
pushing forward and working to solve those kinds of problems,
and I think we need to continue doing that, not just for our
own benefit but for the benefit of the next generations coming
behind us.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Johnson from Ohio is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
gentlemen, thank you for being here.
Two reasons that I appreciate this hearing. I'm a big fan
of space exploration. I grew up in the age of the Apollo Moon
race. I remember vividly sitting in front of my television so
many times listening to Walter Cronkite as he called the play
by play, and everybody in our country was captivated by
everything that was going on because each mission we were
learning something newer and newer and newer about the tasks
that lay before us, and it's amazing to me to think that we
were able to accomplish that. In 1903, we flew the first
airplane off the sands of Kitty Hawk, and 66 years later Neil
Armstrong stepped out on the surface of the Moon. That's what
we're capable of in America, and so much technology and marvels
that we enjoy today came out of that effort, and so I applaud
it.
I'm also a program manager by trade, having spent 30-plus
years in information technology. I've managed large programs.
So from the perspective of a NASA program manager, gentlemen,
what is the difference between a target date and a commitment
date, and why might it be useful to have a target date that is
earlier than the commitment date?
Mr. Dumbacher. First of all, Congressman, the difference
between a commitment date and a target date is the commitment
date is the agency is legislatively held to reporting
requirements on programs' progress. They--when we were--when I
was in the agency, we purposely had to work through the
commitments, recognizing that I believe it's the Nunn-McCurdy
Act that required that we had to put a commitment there. If we
were 15 percent over schedule or cost, then it was subject to a
cancellation conversation. So the agency had to worry about
that commitment, not just from a legislative perspective but
also from an integrity/trust perspective to demonstrate it can
do what it says it's going to.
The target date is the date that I used, my team used, to
try to keep the appropriate amount of schedule pressure on
getting the work done as cost-efficiently as possible, as
technically correct as we could, and maintaining the safety. It
is the art of project management that says I used the schedule
to help make sure I keep driving the work forward, recognizing
that I don't want to do that at the expense of poor technical
decisions, poor safety decisions, but I still keep enough work
going on because that way I keep--I get it done as efficiently
as I can.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio. I liken this to an analogy of a
student in college, even in high school. You handle the tough
subjects first. You get those things done early in the
semester. That way you're not sitting there with two weeks left
to go before grade reports come out and you're behind. You
don't want to get to that commitment date and find out that
you've got that 15 percent overage in budget or schedule and
have to face a Congressional mandate to come back and worry
about cancellation. So I get it. I just wanted you guys to
explain.
A target date is the discipline to make sure that you don't
miss the commitment date.
Mr. Dumbacher. Right, and the difference between the target
date and the commitment date is the program manager's schedule
margin.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio. Yeah. Got it.
How might additional funding during the period--let's talk
about budget for a second. How might additional funding--during
the period fiscal year 2012 and 2013, how much additional
funding during that period have changed the planning and
management of the SLS and the Orion programs in ways other than
schedule? Am I clear? Does that make any sense? How might
additional funding during that period--other than schedule, how
would it have affected those programs?
Mr. Cooke. The additional funding at that time as well as
now, I believe, helps you to get work done in parallel that you
otherwise have to phase out if you have a limit to your
funding. So you can plan things in a normal sense, things that
are better integrated because you're developing them in
parallel, you know the interfaces, you know how to pull them
together, and if you're constrained where you can't do that,
then you phase things out and you start this task, you stop
that one. In some cases we've had a test, had a flight test on
Orion back in 2010. We ended up laying off people who were
critical to the success of the task because the next priorities
were somewhere else.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio. Right.
Mr. Cooke. We achieved that. We still need it. But we had
to make decisions so we could address the next priorities, and
those things don't necessarily have to happen.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio. Now, Mr. Chairman, this is a great
example of how only a program manager can know how critically
important the certainty around funding to keeping a project on
schedule and not winding up in that conflict with a commitment
date and ultimately see everything wasted if it's cancelled
very, very important.
Gentlemen, thanks for sharing your perspective this
morning.
I yield back.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Now I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey.
Mr. Posey. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let's
dash back to reality just for a second.
Every year, NASA's requests for Orion are lower than what's
needed. Do you both agree with that statement?
Mr. Dumbacher. I would agree with that statement. There is
a prat of that statement, Congressman, that I'm trying to
figure out how to answer you better in that the request is
really the President's budget request.
Mr. Posey. Yes. NASA's request--the President's request is
NASA's request, and vice versa, and it's always lower than the
program needs. Congress always comes back and pays more. The
question is, why doesn't NASA, the Administration request the
amount of money they think they need?
Mr. Dumbacher. Well, I think that would be a question
directly to the Office of Management and Budget because it's in
that budget process that the agency goes through as we build
the budget from the bottom up, from the programs and then they
get submitted and they work within the agency priorities and
then go over to the higher national-level priorities, it's in
that last step where at least from my perspective, I saw here
the numbers change.
Mr. Posey. Well, the fact is, they request less year after
year than they know that they need to keep the project on
schedule. It's a fact. I mean, it's not a political statement
and it's not a scientific statement. It's a fact. And Congress
does in fact always pay more.
Several Members were a little bit concerned about a budget,
how much it will cost to Mars and what the total costs will be,
and I think that's almost a laughable question at this point
because they don't even have a plan yet. You know, in the last
several NASA authorizations, Congress has mandated that NASA
come up with a detailed roadmap for Mars, a steppingstone
approach to exploration, if you will. I believe many on this
Committee feel we've never seen a detailed plan, and I'd like
for both of you to comment on what you see as essential steps
in getting human to Mars and your thoughts on why NASA has not
submitted a detailed plan to Congress as requested?
Mr. Cooke. I have actually got written testimony from 2013
that addresses that specific--that question specifically, but
I'll go ahead.
I believe the front end of it is laying out your objectives
for what you want to achieve in your exploration program by
destination, what is it we want to learn, how is it we want to
prepare from one step to the next, and have a rational approach
to----
Mr. Posey. I agree with you. That's what should be done.
The question is, why haven't they done it?
Mr. Cooke. I can't say--I can't say why since I have left
it has not been done. Actually when----
Mr. Posey. Why wasn't it done while you were there?
Mr. Cooke. Well, when I was there--I left at the end of
September in 2011--we had just gotten through the period after
the 2010 Authorization Act where we worked very diligently
within exploration to answer that, what was asked for in the
Authorization Act, and we announced SLS design and program the
same month I retired. That was the first step. Our immediate
concern was getting the front end of this started. We actually
had a plan that we talked about that after we get the first
steps on the way, we're going to come back and develop the
plan, and----
Mr. Posey. All right. I got that. I got it.
Would you care to respond?
Mr. Dumbacher. Congressman, I think I--agree with what Doug
said. I think part of what needs to happen is a more public
discussion about some of the planning and some of the
strategies that need to be implemented to go to Mars and making
sure we are all clear, that the stakeholders are all clear on
what the goals and objectives are, and then allow NASA to go
put a plan together.
Mr. Posey. You know, every Member on this Committee, bar
none, both sides of the aisle, want NASA to be successful. I
can give you just so many instances, though, when at least from
this perspective, they're their own worst enemy. If they can't
come up with a plan, they want somebody else to do it, if it
takes more funding for a plan, but you know, you have to have a
plan actually before you do a budget. I mean, you can see, I
hope, the negative effects of building a development schedule
around a budget rather than letting the most logical schedule
dictate the financial needs, and it appears that is what's
happening, and Mr. Chairman, I don't know how we reel this
thing in but it's just not something that I'm proud of the way
it's being done, and I see I'm over my time. Thank you.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Posey.
You know, I would also add that, you were asking the
question of what is the cost of going to Mars, and I would ask
what is the cost of not going to Mars.
In our--we had a meeting of some industry specialists in
space the other day, and I was told that there was a Chinese
program planning a permanently crewed space station for 2020,
and I think everybody in this room is aware of who holds the
high ground, has the great advantage. So I would say that we
can't afford not to try to get organized and get this planned
and funded adequately.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here, both of you
folks today, and thank the Members for your questions, and the
record will remain open for two weeks for additional written
comments and written questions from Members.
So this meeting is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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