[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
2016
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
_______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
KAY GRANGER, Texas, Chairwoman
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BARBARA LEE, California
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mrs. Lowey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Anne Marie Chotvacs, Craig Higgins, Alice Hogans,
Susan Adams, David Bortnick, and Clelia Alvarado,
Staff Assistants
_______
PART 5
Page
Funding to Prevent, Prepare for, and Respond to the Ebola
Virus Disease Outbreak....................................... 1
U.S. Department of State...................................... 111
U.S. Agency for International Development..................... 390
Department of Treasury International Programs................. 489
Assistance to Central America................................. 563
United Nations and International Organizations................ 627
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-414 WASHINGTON : 2015
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
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HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey NITA M. LOWEY, New York
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
KAY GRANGER, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
KEN CALVERT, California SAM FARR, California
TOM COLE, Oklahoma CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BARBARA LEE, California
TOM GRAVES, Georgia MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
KEVIN YODER, Kansas BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas STEVE ISRAEL, New York
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska TIM RYAN, Ohio
THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHARLES J. FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DAVID G. VALADAO, California MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland DEREK KILMER, Washington
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia
DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
DAVID YOUNG, Iowa
EVAN H. JENKINS, West Virginia
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
William E. Smith, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2016
__________
Wednesday, February 11, 2015.
FUNDING TO PREVENT, PREPARE FOR, AND RESPOND TO THE EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE
OUTBREAK
WITNESSES
AMBASSADOR STEVE BROWNING, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR EBOLA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRK DIJKERMAN, EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR, EBOLA TASK FORCE, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
JEREMY M. KONYNDYK, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER
ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs will come to order. I want to welcome all
the Members to the first subcommittee hearing of the 114th
Congress. The purpose of today's hearing is to oversee funding
within the State, Foreign Operations Subcommittee's
jurisdiction to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the Ebola
outbreak.
I would like to welcome our three witnesses, Ambassador
Steve Browning, Special Coordinator for Ebola at the Department
of State; Mr. Dirk Dijkerman, USAID Executive Coordinator for
the Ebola Task Force; and Mr. Jeremy Konyndyk, Director of
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
Thank you all for being here.
Although the international response was slow at the
beginning of the Ebola crisis, the level of effort by the
United States has been unprecedented. More than 1,000 American
troops are currently deployed. The CDC has public health
professionals in the affected countries. Our diplomats continue
to work with governments to contain the outbreak. USAID leads
the response on the ground. There are also hundreds of brave
healthcare workers, many of them Americans, who have been
mobilized by nongovernmental organizations to respond to the
disease.
The results of the response effort are staggering and much
different than expected. In September, scientific models
predicted that by January of this year there would be 550,000
Ebola cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia. I will repeat that
number because I had to check it because it is so astonishing:
Predicted 550,000 cases.
Those of us who watched the progression of this disease
from the beginning and witnessed its devastating effects are
all thankful that the actual caseload was nowhere near what was
predicted.
The press reported 124 confirmed cases in West Africa last
week, one of the lowest levels since the outbreak began, and
the total cases reported in those countries is approximately
22,000. This is a fraction of what was predicted.
The administration has announced that almost all of the
U.S. troops in Liberia, which peaked at 2,800 in December, will
come home by the end of April. One hundred DOD personnel will
remain to help the Liberian military and governments in that
region.
But the fight is not over. As our troops come home, the
difficult work of eliminating the disease will fall even more
on the shoulders of aid workers on the ground. Effectively
addressing this next phase of the epidemic is critical.
As we all saw last year, when the disease came to our own
shores, just one case could have devastating effects. Last
fall, my home State of Texas experienced the disease directly.
The Fiscal Year 2015 Appropriations Act includes $2.5
billion of emergency funding in this subcommittee's
jurisdiction, representing a clear commitment by the Congress
on behalf of all Americans to fight the Ebola outbreak in West
Africa and prevent the further spread of the disease.
It is this subcommittee's responsibility to oversee funds
provided to fight the disease, to ensure there is a solid plan
for spending resources, and guarantee that any lessons learned
from this crisis can be applied to future global health
emergencies.
I hope the witnesses can give us an update on how funds
have been spent and how remaining funds will be prioritized to
eliminate the threat of Ebola. We also appreciate your thoughts
on how we can respond more quickly and efficiently in the event
of another international health crisis.
We commend the U.S. military and government agencies who
have responded to this crisis, but we must ensure that there
has not been unnecessary duplication of effort. If so, we need
to change course now and not wait for the next crisis to get it
right.
I want to close by expressing my sincere appreciation for
the healthcare workers who fought the Ebola outbreak and cared
for those in need. They take risks every day that many of us
never have to face. They are heroes, and some of the stories I
have heard are truly remarkable.
I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her
opening remarks.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Lowey. Madam Chairwoman, I join you in welcoming our
distinguished witnesses. This is an important hearing, and I
believe we all owe the thousands of U.S. personnel a debt of
gratitude for combatting the deadliest Ebola outbreak the world
has ever seen.
Last summer, it was a crisis spiraling out of control,
taking lives indiscriminantly, seemingly dismantling
governments and economies in the process. The fact that a mere
6 months later, we have not only prevented an explosion of
infections around the world but bent the curve downward and are
in a position to reflect on what we have learned is a testament
to our expertise and the fundamental generosity of the American
people.
While we were not alone in responding--and I hope we can
discuss the important contributions of the global community and
the affected countries themselves--USAID, CDC, and the
Department of Defense irrefutably led the charge and set up the
systems and practices for the rest of the international
community to follow.
Liberia's President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said, ``We saw
actual boots on the ground. You can't imagine the difference it
made in the hopes of the people. It inspired them to do more.''
While we all hope the worst of this crisis is behind us, I
am gratified that the administration and this committee remain
focused on the work ahead as well as what lessons need to be
learned to improve our response in the future. Clearly, the
international warning system for disease outbreaks failed the
people of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. We need to have
faith that surveillance and alerts will provide enough warning
to stay ahead of outbreaks before they spiral out of control.
I hope our witnesses can offer some insight on how the
world fell behind in addressing the Ebola outbreak and what
changes need to be made to make sure we do not face such a
situation again. This crisis has reinforced that health systems
are not a luxury but a necessity. They cannot be treated as an
afterthought. Without a strong global health infrastructure,
this could happen again. Too many first responders, the health
workers in the affected countries, died serving their fellow
citizens. International doctors and nurses cannot be a
substitute for trained, resourced health workers who have the
confidence and support of their local communities.
Lastly, we have shown yet again that we have the capacity
within different agencies and departments to sustain a
formidable and coherent response. I cannot remember an
international crisis that required such seamless coordination
of so many different parts of our government. I was pleased
that the Congress provided $2.6 billion of the $2.8 billion
requested by USAID and the State Department for Ebola response.
It was not easy, but these resources were appropriated in
recognition of the unprecedented nature of this crisis and the
uncertainty of future needs.
However, I would strongly urge the administration to remain
in close communication with this committee about plans for the
use of funds. The initial plan sent to Congress last month has
not inspired confidence, and I want to express my sincere hope
that coordination will improve.
Again, I commend you and look forward to our conversation
today. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Granger. I will now call on the witnesses to give their
opening statements, and I would encourage each of you to
summarize your remarks so we can leave time enough for
questions and answers. Your full written statements will be
placed in the record.
We will begin with Ambassador Browning.
Opening Statement by Ambassador Browning
Ambassador Browning. Thank you very much, Chairwoman
Granger, Ranking Member Lowey, and distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
the U.S. Department of State's efforts to combat the ongoing
Ebola epidemic and use of the recently appropriated funds.
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa has already resulted in
over 22,000 Ebola-infected persons and over 9,000 deaths. While
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea have been affected the most
by this epidemic, there have been cases in several other
countries, including the United States. The three affected
countries have borne and will continue to bear huge economic
losses as a result of the epidemic.
Thank you for appropriating funds toward defeating Ebola in
West Africa. We appreciate the commitment and support your
demonstrated efforts toward the response.
Though the current case rate is falling, there is a long
way to go. And we have to remember that one undetected case can
start another outbreak. Last week we saw a rise in the number
of cases in the region over the previous week, from 100 to 124,
a reminder that we are not on a smooth glidepath toward zero
new cases, which is the goal we must achieve.
The United States has responded at home and abroad by
implementing a whole-of-government strategy to lead the global
effort on Ebola. With USAID as the lead agency for the
international response, the Departments of State, Health and
Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, and other
supporting agencies have worked together to combat the spread
of the Ebola outbreak. DOD's mission in Liberia in support of
the civilian response has essentially been completed. And we
can be confident that Liberia will continue on the right track
with robust civilian response that we have in place there.
Our Ambassadors and Embassies Monrovia, Freetown, and
Conakry have been essential to coordinating U.S., host
government, and international partner efforts. U.S. Ambassador
to Liberia Deborah Malac, U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone John
Hoover, and U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Alexander Laskaris, and
our interagency teams, both American and local staff, have
worked tirelessly to help keep Washington abreast of all events
on the ground, while encouraging their host governments to
improve their responses.
Additionally, our Ambassador to the African Union, Reuben
Brigety, and his team were instrumental in convincing countries
throughout Africa to provide assistance, including much needed
healthcare workers. All four Ambassadors have displayed
tremendous skill managing U.S. Government response on the
ground.
The Department has focused its energy on diplomatic
engagement to increase international support for the Ebola
response as well as improving coordination with the U.N.
System, all the governments involved in providing resources,
and international government and nongovernmental organizations.
We have used every opportunity to impress upon the
international community the necessity of joining together to
win this struggle.
State has also encouraged nongovernmental actors to join
the Ebola fight. We have worked to identify stakeholders in the
diaspora and private sector to devise ways to help. The State
Department has supported the United Nations system in their
response to Ebola. In mid-September, senior U.S. Government
officials began high-level outreach calls to other governments,
who have now committed a total of nearly $800 million to the
fight against Ebola in response to this call. In addition to
funding, many countries have committed essential personnel and
other resources.
And I brought fact sheets that describe the work of the
broader international community, which I would like to have
submitted for the record.
It is essential that we focus on the immediate response
until the epidemic ends. However, all humanitarian crises
require a recovery period. In addition to the immediate
response, we must ensure regional preparedness and rebuild
health systems, not only in our tradition of humanitarian
assistance but to protect ourselves from future infectious
disease threats.
The U.S. Government is working to improve preparedness
planning, both internally and with the international community.
The President launched the Global Health Security Agenda 1 year
ago to accelerate global action to prevent, detect, and rapidly
respond to infectious disease threats, whether naturally
occurring like the Ebola epidemic or the result of bioterrorist
threat.
State and USAID are participating in an interagency effort
focused on post-Ebola recovery and will work with international
partners, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations
to support sustainable recovery within the region.
I would like to close with remarks from the President, who
stated, ``This disease can be contained.'' It will be defeated.
Progress is possible, but we are going to have to stay
vigilant, and we have got to make sure that we are working
together. If we don't have a robust international response in
West Africa, then we are actually endangering ourselves here
back home.
Thank you for your time and consideration. I welcome the
opportunity to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Granger. Mr. Konyndyk, you are now recognized.
Opening Statement by Mr. Konyndyk
Mr. Konyndyk. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, and thank you,
Ranking Member Lowey, and members of the subcommittee for the
opportunity to update you today on the ongoing U.S. Response to
the Ebola epidemic in West Africa.
And thank you, in particular, Ms. Granger, for your
recognition of the brave healthcare workers who have really
been the central backbone of this entire effort and whose work
has been indispensable.
I also want to thank you for this subcommittee's leadership
in passing the 2015 emergency funding for Ebola. That support
has allowed the U.S. to rapidly scale up a massive response to
this outbreak, which has so far infected more than 22,000
people and killed more than 9,000 of them.
I lead the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at
the U.S. Agency for International Development. OFDA is the lead
Federal coordinator for overseas disasters. And our Disaster
Assistance Response Team, or DART, platform is, in the words of
President Obama, the strategic and operational backbone of
America's response to the Ebola outbreak.
With staff deployed across the region, the DART team is
facilitating a complex pipeline of expertise, funding, and
supplies that has been crucial to the effective regional
response. The DART simultaneously strengthens the broader
international effort, coordinates the unique capabilities of
our interagency partners like the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Public
Health Service, and delivers vast amounts of direct assistance.
This gives the U.S. the unique and singular capability to
project leadership and drive a comprehensive regional strategy
to control and ultimately extinguish this outbreak.
On August 4, we deployed a USAID Disaster Assistance
Response Team to the region, and a few weeks later, I traveled
to Liberia with Dr. Tom Frieden of the CDC to observe the
crisis firsthand. What we saw on that trip was shocking.
Transmission rates were far outstripping the small containment
capacity that existed. And the international response was
hobbled by a lack of resources, personnel, and expertise.
Treatment centers we visited in the capital were turning away
patients. Infectious bodies lay in the streets uncollected. Lab
capacity was minimal. And protective gear for responders was in
short supply. To be blunt, at that time, we were losing to the
disease. It was clear that only a massive, unprecedented
international response with strong U.S. leadership would be
able to stem this outbreak.
Working closely with experts from the CDC and in support of
the governments of the affected countries, the U.S. Government
developed a holistic strategy to contain and ultimately defeat
this outbreak. Through the DART platform, we called on DOD to
bring speed and scale to the effort, building treatment
centers, training medical staff, expanding laboratory testing
capacity, and supporting logistics. We brought in the U.S.
Public Health Service through the DART to operate the DOD-built
Monrovia Medical Unit, which addressed a critical constraint to
the response by assuring responders that they would have high-
quality care available to them should they become infected.
And we mobilized and financed an enormous scale-up of NGO
and U.N. Agency partner capacity, to manage treatment centers,
operate burial teams across Liberia, and launch massive social
mobilization and messaging efforts that have reached millions
of people while also providing coordination and logistic
support.
And our effort is not limited to Liberia. In Sierra Leone
and Guinea, while we have not played the same lead role that we
are playing in Liberia, the U.S. has supported similar lines of
programming in complement to the efforts of the U.K., France,
and other international partners.
This effort has had an immediate impact. I returned to
Liberia in October and found that, while still tenuous, the
situation was already vastly improved. The scale-up of safe
burials and social mobilization had attacked major drivers of
transmission, and the additional case management capacity that
we were bringing online was addressing critical shortages and
treatment beds.
By late October, the outbreak in Liberia had crested, and
transmissions, while still worryingly high, had begun to
decline. The trajectory in Guinea and Sierra Leone was
following suit by the end of the year. As case rates have
declined, we have shifted our goal accordingly from breaking
exponential growth to getting the overall caseload down to
zero. We have scaled back the size and number of planned U.S.-
built treatment centers while continuing to ensure geographic
coverage and access to safe treatment across all of Liberia's
counties. We are maintaining surveillance and community
outreach efforts and adding greater emphasis on targeted
subnational interventions to hunt down every case and ensure
rapid and robust response to new hotspots.
The U.S. has by now mobilized well over 10,000 USAID-
supported humanitarian partner staff across the region and
provided over $939 million in assistance. This is the largest
U.S. response to a global health emergency in history. And we
are seeing remarkable progress.
But the fight is far from over. We know, based on previous
outbreaks, that it can be a long and bumpy road to get to zero.
USAID strategy will continue to adapt along with conditions on
the ground. And we will continue to chase down the last chains
of transmission across the region until all affected countries
have been declared Ebola-free. Thank you, and I look forward to
answering questions.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Granger. Mr. Dijkerman, you are now recognized. Thank
you.
Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman Granger, Ranking
Member Lowey, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to update you on our strategy moving forward
and building on the effort that we have underway to get to
zero. To contain diseases like Ebola, we are focusing on
building more resilient health and preparedness systems in West
Africa and in other hotspots in Africa. Our goal is to detect,
prevent, and respond to future outbreaks before they become
global security threats.
Let me outline our efforts. USAID proposes to invest nearly
$440 million of the Ebola emergency funds in bolstering health
and preparedness systems. These efforts will contribute to the
Government's goal of strengthening health security through the
Global Health Security Agenda. In the three most affected
countries, USAID will begin to integrate the capabilities built
up during the response phase into the existing healthcare
system. This should help us safely restart healthcare services
that have stopped because of Ebola and prepare the system to
address future outbreaks.
We will also work to institutionalize the data and
communication capabilities necessary to detect future flareups
and direct rapid responses. In the 13 West African countries
most at risk of future Ebola outbreaks, we have supported the
development of Ebola preparedness and response plans, and we
are now testing them. These plans build upon earlier guidelines
that we and others developed to contain Ebola and Marburg
outbreaks in Central Africa last year. The focus here is
preparing for and managing cases resulting from human-to-human
transmission.
Furthermore, we are expanding our viral surveillance
program and mitigation efforts to track and contain viruses in
wildlife in West Africa and other hotspots. Our focus here is
upstream to detect and take actions that will mitigate the
transmission of diseases like Ebola from animals to humans
before it happens. This approach has proven successful in
reducing outbreaks of H5N1 or bird flu. While addressing these
health issues, we should not forget that Ebola hit hardest in
three fragile states where half of the population lives in
poverty. Ebola reduced economic activity. People lost their
jobs, their incomes, and many are now less able to feed their
families.
Our best estimates right now show that over 40 percent of
Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, and Guineans are projected to
experience acute food insecurity this year. We plan to target
food vouchers to vulnerable families and individuals, both in
urban and rural areas. Building upon the community mobilization
efforts that have been recognized as having helped turn the
tide in the Ebola response, USAID will seek to strengthen
citizen oversight and engagement with the three governments. We
are also working with school authorities to safely reopen
schools and get children back on track.
By harnessing the ideas of others, we are leveraging our
response to Ebola. We launched a competition that could result
in up to 15 innovations to improve healthcare safety and
patient safety. Our first awards included a redesigned personal
protective equipment with a built-in cooling system. If you
have been to Liberia, you know how hot and humid it gets.
Another innovation is a long-lasting antiseptic spray and
spray-on barrier that repels microbes. We have another
announcement that we will be making today, announcing another
15 innovations from universities and others that will help us
in this fight against Ebola.
Striving to get to zero new cases, strengthening health
systems, and assisting those who lost ground are the best
investments in helping these three countries return to their
path of growth and stability. These efforts are at the core of
USAID's mission to end extreme poverty and promote resilient
democratic societies. They also contribute to Americans'
security at home and abroad.
And, in closing, like my colleagues, I want to honor the
humanitarians, the healthcare providers, the military men and
women, and all Americans who are working to turn the tide in
West Africa.
And, most importantly, I want to thank you all for the
congressional support that made these efforts possible. Thank
you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. We will now go to
questions, and now you can see how much time you have used. If
you will limit the length of your question, we will have time
for two rounds. I know people are very interested in this
hearing, and I will begin with the first question.
The Ebola response in West Africa required contributions of
several U.S. Government agencies, not just those represented in
the room. The Department of Defense and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention have been key players.
Ambassador Browning and Mr. Konyndyk, as the response
evolved, how did the administration ensure there was
coordination among the agencies and no duplication of effort?
And are there more changes that need to be made? What lessons
have you learned from this crisis? And what should be done
differently in future global health emergencies?
Ambassador Browning. Thank you very much. I think the key
point is that we initially recognized the comparative advantage
of the various agencies. In my own work in Uganda, when we were
rolling out PEPFAR, we learned very quickly that CDC has
strengths; USAID has strengths; DOD has its own abilities. And
the administration looked to these agencies to use these
comparative advantages when we first responded.
USAID has the lead on the ground, and through their DART
teams, their disaster emergency response teams, they
coordinated the activities of all the various agencies. As far
as back here in Washington, it was a very emotional, chaotic
time. And we were looking for the best way to respond.
Eventually the administration decided to bring on board Mr. Ron
Klain, who helped bring together all of the agency responses
and provide some structure to our response.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Mr. Konyndyk. I don't have a great deal to add to what
Ambassador Browning said. I would just note that the focus on
interagency coordination has been a core part of USAID's
mandate and focus for many years and something that we have
invested further in, particularly since the Haiti response in
2010. And so what we have seen in this response, I think, is a
proof of concept of some of the investments we have made since
Haiti in being able to identify and organize and coordinate, as
Ambassador Browning put it, the respective comparative
advantages of different agencies.
I think the other thing that has been critical is the
excellent collaboration between our teams on the ground. The
USAID and CDC personnel, in particular, worked very closely
together.
With respect to DOD, that is also an area where USAID has
invested a lot of effort over the years in defining systems and
interoperability between our different machines, if you will,
and we have seen the real payoff here.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
I will now turn this over to Mrs. Lowey for questions.
Thank you.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, thank you, again. We have really been
impressed with your leadership and, equally important, the
results you have achieved. However, I think, from my
perspective, I remain concerned with the weakness this exposed
in the WHO that receives a contribution from our bill. On
January 25, the WHO's executive board unanimously endorsed a
resolution aimed at overhauling its capacity to head off and
respond to outbreaks and other health emergencies. Clearly, we
need a better system to react in a more effective and timely
way.
Could either of you respond about what we have learned
about the role of the WHO and what prevented it from acting? I
know that Dr. Frieden is a member of the WHO's Executive Board.
Is the CDC the agency within the United States Government that
has been charged with seeking reforms that will make the WHO
more effective, or does that fall under Secretary Kerry as the
WHO is the coordinating authority for health within the United
Nations system?
So how do we really ensure that, in the next outbreak, we
have the emergency health workers, funding for the development
of vaccines, and proper treatment regimes in place? And where
does that fall within the responsibilities of WHO?
Mr. Browning. Very good questions, which I am happy to
respond to, and then I will ask my colleagues to also help. In
general, we support the United Nations where and while they are
adding value. And when they are not, we want to enhance their
ability to do well. And in the case of WHO, clearly there were
some missteps in the early response by WHO.
We have met with WHO leadership since then here in
Washington and in Geneva. I am convinced that Dr. Chan has
recognized that WHO did not do well in the early response. They
have come up with some proposals that we have endorsed, some
changes in their structure and in their ability to respond.
They are proposing that the development of a cadre of global
health workers--that was one of the initial weaknesses--that
this cadre, much like firefighters who have been trained and
prepared and ready to go when called upon, that didn't exist in
the early days.
They are proposing an emergency fund that they can tap into
so that their response is not dependant upon pledges and
remittances and receipt of money from the member states. And
they are changing their staffing proposal so that it is based
on merit and not geographic preferences from the member states.
So these are improvements, changes, that we think are
warranted. We are going to help them work toward these changes.
As far as the U.S. Government response, Dr. Frieden is on
the board. Secretary Kerry retains his leadership role in all
of the United Nations' entities. My understanding is the Board
membership requires that the member be a physician, and so Dr.
Frieden was tapped in addition to his medical credentials but
also because of his CDC membership.
Mr. Konyndyk. As Ambassador Browning said and as Director-
General Chan has acknowledged several times, WHO's initial
response had a lot of problems. However, what was particularly
notable when I traveled out there in August was the vast
improvement we saw in their performance once they got their
emergency team involved. So their emergency team, while small
and traditionally underresourced, brought some really important
capabilities and some very, very strong personnel to the
effort. And they rapidly got an additional ETU online in
Monrovia in September and have brought value in various other
ways as well, and we have supported them, as Ambassador
Browning said, where we have seen them adding specific
operational value.
I think the challenge for the WHO and what we are trying to
push from the USAID side through some of these WHO reforms is
to take those valuable contributions and figure out how to
better institutionalize those within WHO. And if they can
achieve that--and we think they can--then that will be a huge
contribution.
Mr. Dijkerman. If I may, in terms of preparedness going
forward, WHO has proven to be a very useful platform for us and
CDC to advance some of the ideas and lessons we are learning.
They were instrumental in helping adopt the 13 component
standard that we need to have in place in the 13 countries to
prepare for Ebola. And because we did it at the WHO, we were
able to involve many other countries.
The fact that we have been able to conduct 13 assessments
and start response programs and not have to pay for it all
ourselves but share it with other members of the WHO has
enabled us to move much faster than we otherwise could.
In addition to that, I focused on the Ebola preparedness on
the human-to-human side, but if we look at the work that USAID
is also doing on the animal-to-human transmission, we there,
too, have been able to work through the WHO and get the
adoption of a One Health approach, whereby we bring together
not only the ministries of health in the countries in the
region but also the ministries of agriculture and the
ministries of security and policing, so that we get a
comprehensive response to diseases like Ebola in the future.
And it helps us figure out how to engage--in the United States
we, for example, put together a 25-university consortium to
work on veterinary sharing of best practices across countries.
Bringing those capabilities together through this structure has
enabled us to mitigate some of the transfer of diseases from
animals to humans by changing practices on the ground in those
countries, by having the veterinarians work in different ways,
by changing market practices and so forth.
So the WHO structure allows us to really leverage what we
are doing. And so certainly there are areas for improvement,
and I think my colleagues have identified that, but we have
been able to use the structure to advance U.S. interests and
U.S. priorities on global health security.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
First, an observation, which is when this subcommittee
spends hard-earned taxpayer money for health efforts around the
world or education efforts--something that the ranking member
is very key on--or security efforts or human rights efforts
around the world, I think the Ebola crisis really demonstrates
that we really do it for our national interest. It is to
protect the interests of the United States, and I think that
was a very clear demonstration of why it is important to look
at elsewhere and try to deal with these issues sometimes over
there so that we don't have to deal with them here. And that
was a great example of that.
Now, there were some gaps, obviously, at the beginning. For
example, we had a healthcare--facility here, I think it was
only one, that was exposed here, and then we had a couple of
healthcare workers who were exposed. It reminds me of,
Hurricane Andrew in the State of Florida, where we were clearly
ill prepared for the storm. After Andrew, Florida became,
frankly, I will tell you, the national leader as far as
preparedness for future storms.
What are the lessons that you have learned--I am talking
about here domestically--so that, hopefully it won't happen
again? The chances are that we will have something else and it
might--not be Ebola, it may be something, frankly, even more
deadly, even worse, even more contagious than Ebola. What are
some of the lessons, that the case of the exposure of the
healthcare workers taught us so that we are better prepared in
the future when we do have another incident, which may not be
Ebola, may be something more dangerous?
Mr. Browning. Certainly. I am happy to respond to that.
While, for the State Department, our focus is foreign and
overseas, we certainly care about the domestic response. And
CDC and HHS take the lead here for domestic preparedness. I
think one of the lessons we have learned in the State
Department is that our national security does not begin and end
at our borders. We must work to ensure that the health
preparedness of nations around the world is strong enough to
protect us and them from these diseases. And they will
continue. They will grow. And we must not forget the lessons
that we learned in this particular response.
We were able to look at our visa operations. We were able
to look at our ability to screen visitors to the United States.
And so that is one procedure that we have improved that will
help our domestic security particularly.
Mr. Konyndyk. So for USAID, we are obviously focused
internationally. So I don't have so much of an opinion on the
domestic piece. But, you know, one thing that does, I think,
touch on the domestic piece is the importance of being able to
quickly mobilize U.S. healthcare personnel for something like
this and what that entails, and so that has been things like
State's great work on getting a medevac system up and running
and as well as working with our partners to develop systems for
how they can identify and deploy these medical staff quickly.
Previously, a lot of our partners had trauma staff who
could deploy on short notice, but they didn't have staff on
call or volunteers on call who were trained and able to go and
do something like this. So having more of a standing capability
and a reserve pool of U.S. healthcare workers who can respond
in this kind of a situation is something that we have
definitely taken away as a lesson.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I would imagine part of that is equipment,
too. I mean, this is not----
Mr. Konyndyk. Absolutely.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You just can't show up there without, you
know, protective gear.
Mr. Konyndyk. Absolutely, and we have worked quite closely
with the private sector on ensuring that there has been a
constant supply of enough personal protective equipment.
Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you.
One of the lessons learned, I believe, that we are trying
to convey is an international one, and that is we see some
complacency setting in in places. We haven't beat the disease.
And one of the things the United States needs to do in its
messaging is to make sure that both in the countries that are
most affected but also internationally we keep the focus on
getting to zero because it is possible for one case to flare
up. We need to remember this did start with one case. And so we
have a leadership role in making sure that we keep everybody
focused on that.
By the same token, we need to keep focused on the fact that
we were very lucky with this disease. It was transmitted by
contact. And if we think about it, it could easily have been
airborne, and then the situation we would have had would have
been dramatically worse. So we need to keep the focus on a
global security agenda that benefits not only ourselves but the
entire world.
And, lastly, I think a benefit that we have seen from other
efforts that we brought to this one is the ingenuity or the
innovation that is found in the United States can be brought to
bear, and we have brought it to bear to the Ebola crisis. We
have already had one grand challenge round that I mentioned.
Today we will be announcing another 15 innovations that will
help healthcare worker safety and patient safety. These are--I
will let the press release come out later, but these are pretty
neat things that are going to make a difference in people's
lives in future outbreaks.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes, Madam Chairman, thank you, and it
is good to be back on this committee. It is my first hearing.
So I am the rookie.
First thing, I want to thank you all. You can always learn
to do better. You know, if you look at the world, the world
looks at the United States to protect them from pandemics,
terrorism, a lot of issues. And we are good because we have
good, trained people.
I want to talk about using technology to help. Ending the
Ebola outbreak will continue to demand significant human and
financial resources, especially having to identify and monitor
Ebola cases in remote areas. You are going to have to project
human resources capacity, human resource needs.
Now, I happen to have in my backyard Johns Hopkins
University and University of Maryland, who were very active
with you in this case. And I want to talk about Johns Hopkins
University houses an advanced supercomputer simulation and
modeling center. The center has the ability to construct
artificial worlds populated by virtual people programmed to
respond as people would to real threats, such as infectious
diseases like Ebola. The result is a highly visual and
spatially realistic window into epidemics dynamics. And by
incorporating psychology and human behavior, including
contagious fear issues, the center's simulation models can help
predict how complex societies and health systems might respond
to a given event and what the ripple effects might be as the
scenario unfolds.
So my question is, starting with you, Ambassador Browning,
do you think modeling, which I am talking about here, as an
example the Johns Hopkins' supercomputer that I just talked
about, would be useful to predict human future resource needs
and where to have future resources available to address
flareups or outbreaks, such as the Ebola situation?
Ambassador Browning. I sure hope so.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's talk about--where my question is
really focusing on, technology, medical modeling, and the
supercomputer at Johns Hopkins.
Ambassador Browning. No, I think, as the opening remarks
made clear, in the early days in the summer of 2014, the models
were all over the place, and they were predicting up to half a
million. I have seen one of over a million cases a year if
there were no interventions conducted. This was not helpful
data for us. I mean, it was the best we had, and we responded
with the data that we had, but Ebola virus disease moves
around. It is a living, breathing creature, and it was really
hard for us to keep a handle on its evolution and its
development. So any kind of modeling that can factor in all the
multiple factors, particularly the psychology of it--and this
is what we are seeing on the ground today. We have got the
medicine. We can deal with the medicine, and there are some
behavioral changes that will come into play. But when people
are afraid of their government, when people run away from
healthcare workers, when people are distrustful of outsiders,
it makes our job incredibly difficult. So, with hard data that
a model like you are talking about, if that could give us more
precise information on how to deal with it, that would be
superb.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you this. Are you familiar
with the supercomputer I am talking about at Johns Hopkins?
Ambassador Browning. I am not.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
Is anyone here at the table? Then I would suggest that you
make contact with them.
Ambassador Browning. Sure.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I think this is innovation that makes us
better, and it does the modeling that we are talking about.
Ambassador Browning. Sure.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Including dealing with the issues of
fear.
Ambassador Browning. Okay.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
You talked some about the problems of coordination among
the different agencies. I want to talk a little bit
specifically about the military. But, before that, I
understand, as relates to the military, that the Administration
is going to bring home--I think they had 3,000 troops in West
Africa, and most of them are home or going to be brought home
soon. I guess that is the good news. There was criticism early
on that it was slow, it was bungled, and that we didn't really
meet the immediate need. But now it raises the question, is
this too early to say we solved the problem and bring all the
folks back home? Because, as I understand it, you would
certainly not say it is over and there is still a lot of work
to be done?
That is the broad question. But let me specifically ask
about the military because they were some of the first
responders. People always say, ``why are we sending the
military there?'' I think we came to understand that they were
there to provide logistical support. They were there to train
healthcare workers and build some of the infrastructure. But
there were criticisms--and we are learning a lot as we look
back--that there were 17 Ebola treatment centers. Some people
argued it took too long to execute, and then they say some of
those structures weren't used.
I want you to talk about that. We have the best-trained,
best-equipped military in the world, obviously, and the
question is, is this the best use of the military? Were they
adequately trained?
You work with all these other agencies. Would you say, as
you look back, that sending the military over there to build
those units was that the right choice? Or as you look back,
might there have been a better response? So talk about that
specifically and if we were slow to get there or if we are, are
we too quick to go home.
Ambassador Browning. Let me address part of that, and then
Jeremy, who has been working with them on a daily basis, I
think, can get into much more detail. I do not believe it is
too early to bring them home. I think now is the time to bring
them home. We asked them to accomplish a discrete number of
objects and procedures, objectives and programs. They have done
that. We are leaving behind 102 uniformed personnel. They will
continue to work very closely under AID's leadership in
Liberia. And if there is a resurgence of Ebola virus disease,
they will have a platform upon which they can build very
rapidly. And this is one of the things that was missing when
the military first came in.
But we don't think that will happen because, in large part,
due to our military's efforts, we have systems in place. We
have physical facilities established now that we didn't have in
the summer of 2014. So I think now is the right time to bring
them home. We want the make sure that everyone there is fully
engaged and employed. And I think the number they have come up
where and the modules that they have identified in consultation
with AID are the right ones to keep our military there.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Crenshaw. Is the military the best? As you look back,
are there other agencies that might have done this better? Was
this the right thing to do, or was it an emergency and it was
the only thing we could do?
Mr. Konyndyk. This was absolutely the right call, yes. What
the military brings is an unprecedented operational speed and
scale that really no one else can match. And that is what they
brought here.
To the question in some of the reports about the timing of
these centers being built and coming online they are complex,
difficult things to build. And Liberia, and particularly rural
areas of Liberia where the military was doing the construction,
is just extremely logistically challenging. I do not believe
anyone could have done it any faster than our military.
On the question of empty facilities, there are some of them
that are not seeing many patients, and that is, in our view, a
very good thing. And the reason for that is, you know, when we
started this, we were trying everything that we thought might
work. And we have adapted and adjusted that over time as we
have seen what has delivered. And to our great relief, some of
these things that did come online very quickly, things like
burial teams, had an impact that was greater than what we
expected at the time. And so we scaled down the size of these
centers as they were being built. We scaled down the size that
they have opened at--they were originally going to open with
100 beds apiece. Most of them now are opening only with 10 or
20 beds apiece because that is the level of demand we expect to
see.
In terms of whether we are pulling the military out too
early, the military went there to do a few specific things:
Logistics, that has largely been handed over. The resupply of
the treatment facilities was handed over to the United Nations
successfully in December. The construction is now completed.
The training piece is now completed. The Monrovia Medical Unit
was completed. And their support to that is being transitioned
to a USAID contractor. And their laboratories are being scaled
back but will remain under a different DOD program under this
new iteration. So we feel very confident that all those main
lines of effort are being effectively transitioned and will not
leave gaps.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Madam Chair. It took me over 20
years, but I am back on this committee. And I am glad to do so.
Very briefly, I have a comment before I have a question,
and that is, I think I speak for all my colleagues on behalf of
this Congress and representation of this Nation, when you get a
chance to thank those people who volunteered and those folks
who went over--and thought of themselves--I know, in New York,
people tried to be brave, but we were thinking about the subway
going near NYU hospital, going downtown, riding a bus. We
didn't know what we were dealing with, and these folks gave so
much love and compassionate of themselves that I think this
Nation has to show its gratitude. So, if I may, for all of us,
when you run into any of them or those people in charge, tell
them how grateful this Nation and this Congress is.
My question. Farm production in the region has decreased in
areas hard hit by Ebola, as farmers in some affected areas fled
to areas seen as safer from exposure to disease. What actions
has USAID undertaken to ensure that farm production in the
region increases again to the level seen before the Ebola
outbreak because I don't think what we want is on top of this
issue to have yet another issue of longer or more hunger that
may exist in the region already?
Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you. I think I will capture that
question right now and turn it over to my colleagues if they
want to add. The analysis that we have done through another
USAID instrument called the Famine Early Warning System and
supplemented with work by the UN World Food Program and the
Food and Agriculture Organization have pointed out there are
areas where production has gone down, but overall, production
has not gone down as much as one would have thought.
What we are seeing is that there are more issues of access
to food by people, particularly those who have lost incomes,
and markets have stopped functioning because there were border
closures. So what we have focused on--and when I mean ``we,'' I
mean our Office for Food for Peace but also through Feed the
Future, working in conjunction with the World Bank and many
other international organizations is trying to get the markets
functioning again. So, rather than bringing in food aid to meet
people's needs, we are looking at giving vouchers so they can
access the market and get the markets functioning, get the food
supply going again.
In some cases--I think this will be more a function of the
World Bank--we are looking at what seeds and tools may be
needed to increase production again because we are getting
indications that, in certain areas, farmers are eating their
seed, if you will, and so we do worry about that.
Overall, we are projecting that there are going to be well
over 6 million, closer to 7.5 million people that will be food
insecure, both in urban areas and in rural areas, so the
responses that we are trying to focus on are to get the markets
functioning, get people access back to the private sector
flows, if you will, rather than bringing food in from abroad.
The other thing that we are focusing on is there are people
that were disproportionately disadvantaged by Ebola compared to
others. So we are putting together targeted food programs and
voucher programs to get them not only back into the market but
see how we can encourage them to get back to health centers.
Simply reopening a health center is not in and of itself going
to solve the problem. People need, as Ambassador Browning said,
to have the confidence that they can go to that health center
and not get sick.
So we are looking at not only reopening health centers but
also doing things through communities. So if they come in with
a voucher and they get immunized, they can get a voucher to go
to the market. And through that process, we can educate them
that there is increased safety in getting health services
again. And this will help, again, some of the most vulnerable--
the orphans, the women, who disproportionately take care of the
children and who have lost earning capacity in markets and
other types of things. So we are trying to focus not only on
the farm side but the whole package in urban and rural areas
for those that have been particularly disadvantaged by Ebola.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you. That was a very informative answer,
and when you say get them back in production or in the market,
that is also encouraging farmers who left to come back to their
land, I would imagine.
Mr. Dijkerman. Yes. And one of the other things we are
trying to do in this response is that before this crisis
started, we had ongoing development programs. So, for example,
we have a program at USAID based on Feed the Future, and they
have had a number of long-term interventions going on that have
stimulated rice markets, supported processing in rice markets
to get more value added. So the World Food Program has actually
been able to buy rice locally from these institutions that we
helped create.
Now, in the planning process going forward, we are sending
out teams from our Office for Food for Peace that focus on
vouchers and food, and sending them out with our Feed the
Future folks so that as we design these immediate response
programs to help people in need, we are also trying to modify
our ongoing development programs to see what opportunities
might be out there, not only in Liberia but in Sierra Leone and
Guinea, to see if we can wrap around some of these other
longer-term investments with some of the short-term problems we
have identified. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And as the new member of this subcommittee, the guy who is
sitting here at the very end of the row, I would like to thank
the chairwoman for the opportunity to work on this very
important committee.
And to the witnesses, as I read your bios, it is
impressive. And it makes us grateful that we have got
individuals like you, who are engaged in what I think is
obviously a very important cause. And many of you committed
your entire lives to these types of efforts. And we thank you
for that.
I would like to express a concern. I may ask for your
response, and then I would like to ask a question. But before I
do that, my concern is this, as a former military officer, as
an Air Force pilot for 14 years, it concerns me the role that
the military has been asked to play in this. And when I talk
with some of my associates who are members of the military
still, it makes me more concerned. They were, in some cases,
deployed without the training that they felt that was
necessary, without some of the protections that they felt was
necessary, and that makes me--again, gives me some cause.
It is kind of like we have this attitude--and I don't blame
us for this, and it is a compliment to the military that that
is a fact--but it is like we sometimes throw our hands in the
air and go, Well, I don't really know what to do, let's call
the military and let them take care of it. And many times we
do, and when we do that, they always do take care of it. I
mean, we are grateful for their abilities and their sacrifices,
but we have to remember that it doesn't come without a cost.
For every military member that is in West Africa, that is a
military member and another dollar spent that could have been
spent or used in their core mission. And I think this falls
outside of that.
I would ask you to respond to that, but I think you have in
some part already. And I would really actually like to spend my
time on something else. And that is, I am an appropriator. As
an appropriator, we are interested in the money. And it seems,
in this case, we did something that Congress often does. And
that is, when a crisis arrives, we throw a bunch of money at
it. And then, you know, we hope that things go well. And
sometimes we don't follow up or hold accountability toward that
money like we should. And I don't think we want to do that in
this case.
So my question is, as I understand it, the State Department
and USAID, the Ebola Response Preparedness Fund was
appropriated something like $2.6 billion, of which we have only
spent a part of it and probably a very small part of it. So I
would like you to tell us, you know, what is in the remaining
funds? And what is our intentions with those, you know,
something more than a billion dollars that is left unspent?
Ambassador Browning. Our plan is to make sure that we have
addressed the need with the money available, and when that has
reached its conclusion, the money returns.
Mr. Stewart. Mr. Browning, do you have an accounting of
that? Do we know how much has been spent of those appropriated
funds, even a ballpark figure?
Ambassador Browning. I think we do--I don't, but the panel
does.
Mr. Dijkerman. Yes. Well, actually what the committee wrote
into the act is that we report every 30 days, and the next
spend plan is going to be coming up pretty shortly. And I think
the other important message we received from the subcommittee
and in our discussions is that we know this is an emergency
response, and it will evolve as we go. The benefit of having a
30-day report to the subcommittee is that we can show how our
knowledge and our response will evolve, and if we finish the
job before we have spent all the money, then, as the Ambassador
said, we will tell you.
Mr. Stewart. But you would anticipate that we would finish
the job before we spend all the money because this is winding
down. Is that not true?
Mr. Dijkerman. When the budget proposal was put together,
we were clear with the subcommittee that we were anticipating a
worst-case scenario. And so there is a likelihood that
something might be left over.
Now, how that will work out, we will have to see because we
are not yet at zero. One of the challenges that we are working
through, as I mentioned earlier about complacency, is that
getting Ebola to zero in the other 24 examples that we have, it
is, as Jeremy said, a bumpy road. This is the first time that
we are trying to get to zero in a very large-scale Ebola
outbreak. We are hopeful. We are confident, but I think we need
to be cautious. And we will be reporting monthly to you as we
do that.
In terms of the funds being disbursed, we have been able to
reimburse over $300 million of the funds that we have used from
other accounts, and we have already committed roughly $100
million to new emergency response activities. And there are
other things that are in the pipeline that focus on
preparedness that we are coordinating with the other donors.
Let me maybe let Jeremy add a few points here.
Mr. Konyndyk. So, just briefly, for the response piece,
which is about $1.2 billion of that, as you noted we are right
now ahead of where we thought we would be when we put the
budget together. There are a lot of twists and turns that could
yet arise. So if we were to see it reemerge in a neighboring
country like Mali or Ivory Coast, that could scramble things
quite considerably. So I think on the trajectory that we seem
to currently be on, then I think we are on track to probably
underspend what we thought.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. My time is up. Let me conclude with
this. You know, I am familiar with the use-it-or-lose-it
mentality, as we all are, but I am asking you not to take that
approach to this. We want to accomplish this goal and this
mission. We all do. But, on the other hand, the fact that we
have this pool of money there does not mean that every penny
has to be spent. And we would look to you for accountability as
to how that money is spent and returning to the people what
money is not necessary.
Mr. Konyndyk. Absolutely.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
This is a terrible dilemma because I have two hearings at
once. So I apologize if some of the things that I may ask may
sound redundant. And let me echo my colleague Mr. Stewart's
comments. This is my first committee hearing on foreign
operations, and I look forward to our robust dialogue.
And thank you for your leadership, Madam Chair, and our
ranking member, Ms. Lowey.
Ambassador Browning, first of all, let me thank you all for
your commitment and your intense passion on getting this right.
I am from Nebraska. As you know, Nebraska has played a--I think
it is safe to say--critical role in meeting the demands of
treatment and trying to convey best practices to try to halt
and stop the disease as well as treat those who have been
impacted. So not only, obviously, do we have an interest, deep
interest, in this for the sake of the proper humanitarian
reasons you pointed out and international stability, but it
also affects us right at home. In that regard, the initial
reports, which were just a few months ago, were dire and
ominous. And we were talking about the good news of slowing the
exponential growth rate, the good news being we have had a what
seems to me to be a complete turnaround from that perspective
in spite of the tragedy of nearly 10,000 lives being lost.
What is the single biggest factor that resulted in this
turnaround that you can point to? Now a lot of things have
converged here, and you have talked about the infrastructure
brought to bear, the leadership of the United States, the basic
improvements in sanitation, changes in cultural practices, and
I see all that. But, obviously, none of this was predictable, I
would say, 3 months ago. Can you answer that briefly? And I
want to go to a couple of other things.
Ambassador Browning. I don't know. So many factors.
Mr. Fortenberry. How refreshing.
Ambassador Browning. I say it quite often. I think it is
hard to identify one factor that stands far and above the
others. It is just hard to separate them, but perhaps Jeremy
can do that.
Mr. Fortenberry. I think we obviously need to lift from
this so that we don't give ominous portents if something breaks
in the future because we have an experience now of best
practices and obviously some template that could be scaleable
quickly based upon our learning of the last few months.
Mr. Konyndyk. And Dirk will speak to that. What I would
say, based on what we have seen, where we have seen rapid
turnaround, it is not a single factor. It is when several
critical factors are all working in tandem. So having safe
burial teams without significant behavior change doesn't work.
Having behavior change without treatment to refer people to
doesn't work. So when you have that sort of virtuous
combination of safe burial practices and capacity, social
mobilization that drives popular behavior change, and adequate
treatment capacity, that people can then refer to, when you
have those things working in tandem, that is when we have
seen----
Mr. Fortenberry. Let me pivot to one other of my questions
right quick regarding social mobilization. Would you define
that further, please?
Mr. Konyndyk. Sorry. Social mobilization is basically a
variety of actions you take to change how a population behaves
on a particular thing. So it is radio programs, house-to-house
communication, and education, a range of things.
Mr. Fortenberry. So let's take the case in Liberia. Because
of the intensity of the impact--and I have been to Liberia
before, but I have not been during this particular period--
because of the intensity, there was not only an awareness of
the need to change certain cultural practices or habits, that
was almost instantaneously implemented because it became a
narrative of an entire country. I assume that is what you are
saying. Is that what you mean?
Mr. Konyndyk. Yes. With a lot of programming to support
that as well. But in Liberia, certainly the ferocity and the
speed with which it broke out drove a lot of behavior change as
well.
Dirk, do you want to talk about the study?
Mr. Fortenberry. I am sorry. I am going to interrupt you. I
have a minute and a half, and I want to get a few other things
on the table. I think Congressman Stewart rightfully points out
that we have been willing as a Congress to assist you in a
robust effort here, but to be prudent with the dollars,
particularly as this has declined, is essential. In that
regard, though, back to our Ranking Member Lowey's question,
the line of authority here or the hierarchy of response
mechanisms, would in my mind point to international
organizations as a first responder, the WHO. You pointed out
the problems there, getting caught off guard or not having
capacity or whatever internal weakness led to them not being
able to be in the lead. But, again, once again, the United
States is put in the lead by, both by choice and default, in an
international crisis situation.
We have got to, as you rightfully pointed out, impress upon
the international community their responsibility to partner
here, even when we are leading. Now, you talked about $800
million committed by other countries. Has that been delivered,
and if that has been delivered, will that offset our costs?
Ambassador Browning. That supplements our contributions.
This was the round that President Obama, Secretary Kerry,
National Security Advisor Rice, picked up the phone. They
called England. They called the Netherlands. They said, Can you
give us some money?
Mr. Fortenberry. This is the new way of doing business.
Ambassador Browning. Right.
Mr. Fortenberry. I want to impress that upon you. It is the
21st Century model for international stability. We can lead. We
have a large capacity to do so, and many other countries depend
upon us. But we will not do this alone as other people simply
either are unwilling to sacrifice or have been empowered to
simply hide behind us and other countries. But I do think,
again, in urging or demanding the WHO bring about certain
reforms that would put them in more of a leadership position,
which is the natural place to look first, I think is a prudent,
long-term strategy policy here. Do you agree with that? I am
sorry. I am out of time.
Mr. Dijkerman. Yes.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Mr. Dijkerman. Madam Chair, if I may just follow up on that
comment because I think it is a very important point you made
about what was the key factor, and as Ambassador Browning said,
we don't know. We have our suspicions. But that is why we have
already embarked upon a process to lay out how we can do an
independent assessment of what the components were of our
strategy and what seemed to work. Another thing that was very
important, at least in Liberia, was the role of the President
herself in taking a very active stance in managing and getting
the messages out there. And getting this independent assessment
done, which will be done with USAID and other agencies, it will
help inform things like the Johns Hopkins model. A model has to
be based on facts. And as we try to get better in predicting
future outbreaks, having these comprehensive independent
assessments are going to help us.
The other thing that we are doing is trying to learn better
now--because we don't have to wait. We can start now, and we
are. We are working with our IG to see what some of our
interfaces were with other agencies, where we can make
improvements. Are there further areas we can further streamline
how we do procurement or coordination with other departments.
And so we have already done some lessons learned, if you will,
but we are trying to have a much more aggressive lessons-
learned evaluative approach now. Actually Johns Hopkins is
already helping us to work on one of the areas that Jeremy
mentioned and you asked about, social mobilization and
communications. One of the things we are finding it is very
local, but we need to have a much more careful assessment about
what worked where and how. And we need to put in place a system
that is going to help us get that information and turn it
around faster than we have been able to do in this response.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Dijkerman, prior to the Ebola outbreak,
the administration launched its Global Health Security Agenda,
and it designated CDC as the lead. I understand that USAID and
CDC plan to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to ensure
that health systems are able, to prevent, detect, and respond
to infectious diseases, such as Ebola. Could you describe the
coordination and the division of duties between USAID and CDC?
Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I will also let Ambassador Browning speak up here because
the State Department is an important partner in the Global
Health Security Agenda. In terms of the Global Health Security
Agenda that we have been focusing on with CDC, the
collaboration has been quite, quite close. Where CDC--and I am
going to speak in gross terms here--but where we have been
working together on the Global Health Security Agenda--there
are a number of components that have been laid out for the
whole U.S. Government. The CDC is focusing on surveillance. It
is focusing on lab capabilities, and it is focusing on the
element of human-to-human transmission. Where AID has tended to
focus in the past--we started this back in 2006 with the
support of the subcommittee--is focusing on the animal-to-human
transmission. I think some of the committee members may be
aware that since about the start of this century, about 75
percent of the new and emergent diseases have come from animal-
to-human transmission. So that is where USAID is focusing.
Now, when we go out to these countries and do assessments,
we do joint assessments. I have some of my health colleagues
here, but the assessments are both with CDC and USAID. And in a
number of other cases, we bring in the WHO and others. So not
only are we lashed up within the U.S. Government on this, but
we are also lashed up with some of the other international
organizations that can help share the load and move this
forward. And I can give you a lot more detail on the components
of the Global Health Security Agenda if you would like.
Ms. Granger. Ambassador, do you have something to add to
that?
Ambassador Browning. I do. I think it more of a whole-of-
government approach, then, as indicated, with CDC in the lead.
This is very much a whole-of-government approach. And let me
use an example from my previous experiences. When I was
Ambassador in Uganda, we built PEPFAR at that time, 10 years
ago, and part of the process was using CDC to help train lab
technicians and public health administrators, and also USAID in
the delivery of direct health care. Ten years later, now in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, we have U.S.-trained
Ugandans who volunteered to come to these Ebola-stricken
countries, used the skills and the practices that we gave them
10 years ago. This is the concept behind GHSA. Build this
capacity in these countries throughout the region so that if
this happens, when this happens again, they will be able to
respond much more robustly than they were this time.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
wisdom, your service. We really do appreciate your experience.
I have been concerned that, while we have stemmed the tide,
some may think that the outbreak is over. Recent news reports
suggest that there is an increase in new cases and that they
were patients who had not been on the lists of people being
monitored for possible infections. Dr. Bruce Aylward of the WHO
said that, quote, ``Some of the new cases had emerged in people
who had traveled far from their original points of infection,
presenting additional complications on how to track all the
people they might have infected and who now may be Ebola
transmitters themselves,'' end quote.
So, with just a few months before the start of West
Africa's rainy season, if the virus reemerges, won't it be more
difficult, especially in remote areas, to identify, isolate,
and treat patients? I would be interested in your plan. Do we
have enough resources to put an end to this epidemic? And have
all those who pledged assistance provided it? And I would also
be interested with the resources that we have spent, have we
put in place, with our partners, adequate local systems, to be
able to respond?
Ambassador Browning. Let me ask my colleague, Mr. Konyndyk,
to take the initial response on that.
Mr. Konyndyk. I think those are all really important
concerns, and I talk regularly with Bruce, and I will see him
in Geneva next week. The biggest challenge now is ensuring that
we avoid complacency and continue to have a very intense focus
on driving to zero. In terms of whether there are enough
resources, there are certainly enough financial resources. And
with the network that has been built up now across the three
countries, we are confident as well that that there are enough
human and medical and logistical resources as well to get this
done. The rainy season will complicate things. We have a few
months before that hits, and I think we will see significant
further progress until then. I am not overly concerned by the
recent uptick in the last couple of weeks. I think that is part
of a natural progression. And that is pretty typical of what we
have seen in past responses, that you don't just have a smooth,
straight, sustained curve. You see some bumpy ups and downs.
The important aspect is that we have a very nimble structure
that now has been built so if we need to focus a rapid response
team on a particular area, we can get them on a helicopter and
get them out there quickly, and we do that regularly. So I
think the structure we have in place can get the job done.
To the point on contact tracing, contact lists, that is a
concern. That is one of the most challenging things because a
case, for example, in Monrovia just earlier this week, there
were a few new cases found. One of them was on the contact
list. Two of them weren't because the way that they were
exposed was they helped carry a woman who they didn't know was
infected at the time back to her house. So it is very difficult
to get someone like that on a contact list. That is just a
long, hard slog. We have a long, hard slog, but I think we have
the resources in place to get the job done.
Ambassador Browning. I would just add that going from
hundreds of cases to tens of cases is difficult. Going from
tens of cases to one case is much, much more difficult. So it
will get harder and more laborious as we get closer to zero. We
just have to keep that in mind.
Mr. Dijkerman. I think the other important element of what
we are focusing on is we have talked a lot about the three
countries, but we are putting the preparedness plans in place
in the other countries. The thing to remember about that,
except for Mali and Senegal, is those other preparedness plans
while we are assessing them, they actually haven't been, if you
will, battle-tested. So what we have encouraged the U.N. and
our partners to do, and we are working with the governments to
have a discussion about, is how we can somehow figure out how
to, respecting everybody's sovereignty, have battle-tested
assets from the three countries be able to cross into other
countries when and if necessary. So if we have suspected or
probable cases across the border, and there are some limits in
the capacity in Ivory Coast because people are migrating and
things like that, then we need to make sure that we have the
means in place to quickly get on top of it, because we know
quickness matters. And if there is a need to bring somebody to
an isolation place, that we figure out how to get them into the
Ebola treatment units right across the border back in Guinea or
something like that. We are not there yet. We know this is
coming, but we are focused on it, and like with the entire
response, we are trying to make sure that we keep the
governments fully in front with us and owning the solutions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to get into the issue of
Challenge Grants. I know that USAID launched a program in
October. It was called Fighting Ebola. It is called A Grand
Challenge For Development. I always like to promote my home
town and institutions and people there, and let's get back to
Johns Hopkins again. They won a grant in constructing a better
protection suit. The prototype is designed to do a better job
than current garments in keeping health care workers from
coming in contact with Ebola patients' contiguous body fluids
both during treatment and while removing a soiled suit. In
addition, it is expected to keep the wearer cooler, an
important benefit in hot, humid regions, such as West Africa.
My questions are, can you talk about these Challenge
Grants? If you look at innovation, I think a lot of times the
private sector and institutions, such as Johns Hopkins, and
University of Maryland Hospital. If they get the proper grants,
they have the ability to really come up with some good product,
which will help you. Which is what makes us stronger as a
country, that relationship between the private sector and
government coming together to deal with these problems. My
question is, can you talk about the Challenge Grant, how you
see them, how as a tool is this better to address epidemics
like Ebola, and could you speak as to how Challenge Grants can
be used as a general development tool?
Mr. Dijkerman. I think you have almost answered it.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am trying to help you. Leading
questions.
Mr. Dijkerman. But there is no question that USAID has long
worked to figure out how to better harness the energies and the
innovations and different ideas and approaches of the private
sector and foundations. And Jeremy can talk more about how we
have done that on many fronts throughout this Ebola crisis,
with the Paul Allen Foundation and others. The Grand Challenge
program that we started is run by USAID, but we do pull in
other U.S. Government resources to help evaluate the proposals
so that we get the right technical people involved to see which
grants and which possibilities make the most sense. So, again,
it is a whole-of-government approach.
As I mentioned, and I don't want to get ahead of our press
release this afternoon, but I really do encourage folks to look
at the array of new innovations that people have identified
that may not help us immediately in this response--actually
some of them may--but they will certainly help us in the next
response. And one of the things that we are following through
on is once we are able to get these products proven and tested,
that we will also try to work with them to bring them to market
and give them the due advertising, if you will, to others so
that they know they are out there to be used. But I think it is
one of the really good things that USAID has built on over the
last couple years, and I give total credit to that to the USAID
Administrator, Rajiv Shah.
Mr. Konyndyk. I want to just call out in particular that
suit that Johns Hopkins designed. It is an amazing design. It
has yet to be fully field tested and all of that. It remains a
prototype, so we will see how it does once it is rolled out in
the field. But one of the biggest constraints that the Ebola
treatment units face is the management and use of personal
protective equipment. These suits are incredibly uncomfortable
to wear. They are incredibly hot. When I was out there, I
talked with personnel who have to work in these every day, and
they talked at the end of a 1-hour shift--and they can only
work for an hour in these suits before it becomes too
overwhelming--their boots, their rubber boots are literally
filled with sweat. I mean, they pour the sweat out of their
boots. So having a better suit that is more comfortable and
feasible to work in will improve patient care.
It also will improve the safety of the workers themselves.
One of the highest risks of exposure is when you are taking off
your PPE. So having a safer way to take off PPE will greatly
reduce the risks to healthcare workers who are working on those
front lines. So this kind of innovation, again, still has to be
tested. We will see how it works. I am sure there will be
further tweaks, but it is a really important contribution.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The good part about the innovation is it
can not only be used for this situation but for many other uses
within our country and hopefully throughout the world.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano, you have the last question.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
And first, let me say that I think I am going to nominate
Mr. Ruppersberger for the Johns Hopkins legislator of the year
award.
Ms. Granger. I took notes.
Mr. Serrano. But it is a great institution, and it should
be commended for its work.
Let me have just one question. High Ebola infection rates
among health workers have contributed to the closure of about
62 percent of health facilities that offer non-Ebola-related
care in Liberia. What steps has USAID taken to help the
affected countries resume the operations of their health
facilities so that they can continue to do work other than
Ebola, which is the one we are concentrating on, of course?
Mr. Konyndyk. I will say a couple words on how the response
piece plays into that and then hand over to Dirk to talk about
some of the longer-term efforts. It is a huge priority. As you
know, Ebola has killed a lot of people, but malaria and
maternal-child health challenges and other things kill far more
people over time in these regions. So getting those services
back online is absolutely critical. It is as critical as ending
this.
That is one of the reasons why even though some of these
Ebola treatment units are not seeing a lot of patients, it is
important to keep them open and keep them operating because it
provides a safety net in that area and that community to enable
those other systems to come online. And our teams have been
telling us that healthcare workers in the normal health
facilities feel a lot more confident going back to their jobs
if they know they have a safe place where they can refer people
who are suspect Ebola cases. And so that is one of the reasons
why we are keeping those open, even if they are seeing very few
patients. It is a critical piece of that.
Mr. Dijkerman. Jeremy, through the response part of the
operation, has already started expanding infection protection
control training and commodities into non-Ebola affected
clinics. But that is part of our response. The other part is
that we need to make sure the clinics are designed or laid out
in a way that they have isolation places. They have to be
worked with to revise protocols, because if somebody comes in
for a safe birth and you think it is a suspect or probable
case, how do you deal with that? So there are a lot of things
that we have to work through and then make sure that the
healthcare workers in those institutions know what to do to
feel safe.
By the same token, I think, as I mentioned earlier, just
simply opening a clinic is not going to cause people to come
back. We have seen some opening of schools, and we are seeing
less than 30 percent of the kids come back. So we need to have
social messaging and education programs and outreach to have
people get the confidence again that this clinic, public or
private, is going to be a safe place for them to go. So we are
working on that. We are also examining the logistics systems so
they can manage and get out there in time in the necessary
quantities the right types of equipment to be able to deal with
Ebola-suspect probable cases.
We are working on the transportation system. So if there is
a case at a health clinic found, how do we get them to a safer,
better isolation facility like an ETU? So there are a lot of
elements that we are working on here. They are being laid out.
Some are in process, as I mentioned, the training, but other
pieces are still being fleshed out. With some of the partners
that we have been working with before, we will have to change
their job descriptions, if you will, to do a bit more to
address some of these preparedness issues.
Mr. Serrano. I thank you for your answer, and I want to
thank you for your service. Our country gets criticized a lot.
At times, we do some of it ourselves. But when we see people
like you and see the volunteers and we see the doctors and the
people that went over, that is America at its best. And we
should be proud of ourselves and continue our good work because
when we help others, we help ourselves and vice versa. And I am
just so proud of the work you do. Thank you so much.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Thank you for the work you do. Thank you for being here
today appearing before the subcommittee.
Members may submit any additional questions for the record.
The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs stands adjourned.
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Wednesday, February 25, 2015.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WITNESS
HON. JOHN KERRY, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, I welcome you back to the subcommittee.
There are many serious foreign policy matters and budget issues
that Members will want to address with you during our time. We
look forward to your testimony.
At the top of the list is addressing the threat of the
Islamic State and terrorists affiliated with ISIL. As Egypt,
Jordan, and the Kurds in Iraq are retaliating and defending
themselves against the group's heinous acts, security
assistance is being delayed by bureaucratic processes across
many agencies and poor policy decisions by this administration.
As a result, our most trusted and capable partners in the
region are not getting the help they need.
Mr. Secretary, there are no excuses for this delay. I know
that this delay is not your responsibility alone, and I have
voiced my concerns directly to the President, as you know. Our
allies and partners in the Middle East must get the help they
need now to combat ISIL--not next week, next month, or next
year.
In Ukraine, violence continues despite a ceasefire that was
reached almost 2 weeks ago. We want to hear your thoughts on
steps being taken to resolve the situation and what assistance
is needed to support the people of Ukraine and the region to
combat Russian aggression.
In Afghanistan, even with a new government in office and a
signed bilateral security agreement, there are continued
challenges, and, in fact, the security environment remains so
unstable that our diplomatic and development personnel are
pulling back to Kabul.
In Africa, Boko Haram has not backed down. They are still
on the offensive, committing unspeakable acts of brutality. And
while there has been progress in ending the violence caused by
the Lord's Resistance Army, the leader of the group, Joseph
Kony, remains at large.
For nearly a year and a half, you have worked with our
international partners to put in place an agreement with Iran,
and the United States must keep the pressure on as a final deal
is negotiated. I am closely watching the elements of an
agreement. I know many of my colleagues share my concerns. The
security of the United States and our steadfast ally Israel is
at stake.
I hope you will address each of these policy issues today.
In addition, we have questions about the budget request for
your department's operations and foreign assistance programs.
The total funding level requested for the State Department and
USAID is 6 percent above last year, but, even at that level,
you have sacrificed some of the priorities of members of this
committee to make room for the administration's initiatives.
It is difficult for me to justify a new $500 million
program at the United Nations to fight global climate change
and additional funding for an embassy in Cuba when, once again,
many programs that have bipartisan support have been reduced
below last year's level, such as democracy assistance and
humanitarian programs.
Another issue we will continue to address together is
ensuring the safety of our Nation's diplomats. We need
assurance that funding is being used effectively to address the
most urgent security needs.
Next, I want to mention an issue that I know is a priority
for you, Middle East peace. Negotiating a peace deal requires
trusted partners, and the recent actions by President Abbas at
the International Criminal Court have jeopardized the trust
that has been built over the years. We want to hear how you
plan to respond to the Palestinians' move to join the ICC. And
we question why the administration's budget request includes
another $440 million for the West Bank and Gaza in light of
these very troubling actions by the Palestinian leadership.
Finally, I want to mention an issue that is a priority for
me, a foreign policy issue in our own backyard. The
administration's budget request includes $1 billion for the
Central American countries, more than double the amount
provided last year.
Many members of this subcommittee understand the need for
an increased investment in these countries to stop the flow of
illegal immigration to the United States. I have, visited these
countries and the U.S.-Mexico border several times and have
seen this crisis firsthand. We need your help today to
understand such a large investment and how it would change the
situation on our border.
Our neighbor Mexico is on the front lines of combating
these troubling patterns of immigration from Central America.
We must do all we can to help Mexico strengthen its borders and
turn away those traveling illegally from Central American
countries. We must also support and use the capabilities of
partners in the region, such as Colombia, to continue to
develop and implement a comprehensive security strategy.
In closing, I want to thank you and the thousands of
diplomats, development officers, and implementing partners for
what you do every day to promote U.S. interests abroad. You
have a very difficult job, and all of the members of this
subcommittee recognize that.
We also know that the United States must lead in these
troubling times. It is our responsibility to hold you to
account for managing the funds this committee provides to
address these challenges.
I will now turn to my good friend, the ranking member, Mrs.
Lowey, for her opening remarks.
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Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey
Mrs. Lowey. thank you to my good friend, Madam Chair.
And welcome. We are so delighted to welcome our
extraordinary Secretary of State.
But before I officially do, if I can ask for the indulgence
of the chair, I would like to acknowledge the absence of our
colleague from California, Barbara Lee, who is unable to attend
this important hearing today. Barbara is a longtime member of
this subcommittee and an advocate of so many vital issues that
we deal with in this subcommittee.
As many of you know, she is not here today due to the
recent passing of her mother, Mildred Parish Massey. And I just
want her to know that our thoughts and prayers are with her and
her family during this difficult time.
Thank you very much.
Well, Secretary Kerry, welcome back. You continue to
represent our country with passion, dedication, energy,
strength. I really do want to thank you for your tireless
efforts.
Since you were sworn in 2 years ago, you have worked
diligently on Middle East peace and Iranian nuclear
negotiations; faced nonstop crises in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine;
consistently worked to counter terrorism and advocated for
human rights and humanitarian needs.
Since the last time you testified, we have seen unspeakable
atrocities committed by ISIL, terrorist attacks in the heart of
Europe, multiple humanitarian disasters in Africa, devastating
refugee crises even on our own southern border, anti-Semitism
once again dangerously on the rise, and several countries on
the brink of disintegration.
Diplomacy and development are needed now more than ever to
address these challenges and countless other global priorities.
And, again, I want to say we are fortunate to have a person of
your intelligence and your caliber in this role today. Thank
you.
I want to start with Iran. With the negotiations underway,
I hope you can update us on progress made to narrow the gap
since the last extension. We all agree we must make it
impossible for Iran to make nuclear weapons, so I hope you will
assure the members of this committee that any final deal will
verifiably close all possible pathways to a bomb, dismantle
crucial elements of Iran's current program, and ensure the IAEA
access to Parchin. The final agreement must achieve these
objectives.
Additionally, I would like your assurances that the United
States will remain in close communication with our key allies
in the region during the remainder of the negotiations.
I am also very concerned about any new funding for the
Palestinian Authority, given President Abbas's unilateral
actions before the United Nations Security Council and the
International Criminal Court. I hope you will update us on your
review of U.S. assistance, which, as you know, is intentionally
conditioned to discourage provocative actions that undercut the
peace process.
Has there been any movement at all toward renewed
negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis? I know
how hard you have worked and how committed you are to that
process. Since Abbas has pursued action at the ICC, do you
think it is even possible for the parties to get together to
reach a deal?
With regard to Ukraine, I am pleased to see the request
includes strong economic and security assistance to help
counter Russian aggression. At the same time, I am very
concerned about next steps should the current ceasefire
unravel.
This year's request also includes funding for new
initiatives in Central America and Africa as well as a
multilateral fund on climate change, yet the request reduces
humanitarian and disaster assistance by $750 million compared
to last year's levels. I look forward to hearing your
rationale.
I would also ask that you update this committee on our
investments in health, women's empowerment, food security, and
international family planning, all of which are vital
components to our foreign policy objectives of improving lives,
expanding economic opportunity, and enhancing our own national
security.
Lastly, while an improvement over prior requests, this
year's budget request again fails to prioritize international
basic education. I know we agree that educated girls and boys
better protect themselves from hunger, poverty, disease, and,
ultimately, extremism. As you have heard me say before, we
simply cannot build the world we want for ourselves and for
future generations without education at the center of our
efforts.
So I thank you again for your leadership, your commitment,
your extraordinary hard work, and for being here today. Thank
you.
Ms. Granger. I will now yield to Chairman Rogers for his
opening statement.
Opening Statement by Chairman Mr. Rogers
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome back to the Hill. I admire your
tenacity and your physical prowess, putting up with the long
travels that you constantly are undergoing.
You are serving as the Nation's chief diplomat during a
truly tumultuous period.
Undeniably, the threat posed by ISIS demands our immediate
attention. We have seen this group of terrorists senselessly
kill innocent civilians and our partners and allies in the
fight against ISIS, and they are stepping up threats to Western
targets. ISIS brutality seemingly has no limits.
The President has asked other countries to play a prominent
role in dismantling ISIS, and the U.S. must support our friends
and allies in this endeavor. I echo the chairwoman's concerns
that security assistance for Egypt, Jordan, and the Kurds in
Iraq must be delivered with all due haste.
When our allies and partners are beating back a shared foe,
they should be able to count on our country to come to their
aid. I fear that countries like Russia are all too eager to
fill any perceived vacuum in U.S. leadership, and I hope you
can address that concern today.
Speaking of support for our friends in the Middle East, I
look forward to hearing from you about the peace process and
its impact on Israel. You have personally poured metaphorical
blood, sweat, and tears into this critically important effort,
working hard to create a conceptual framework for talks between
Israel and the Palestinians.
Unfortunately, the Palestinians have largely walked away
from those talks, preferring instead to pursue unilateral
actions at the United Nations and to join the International
Criminal Court. We look forward to hearing what the next steps
might be to get peace talks back on track.
As Israel's closest ally, the United States must remain
strong as nuclear talks with Iran near their conclusion.
Stability in the region, which is tenuous on a good day,
depends on a resolution wherein Iran is not taking any steps
toward a nuclear weapons capability.
The press reports that some troubling concessions may be
made to Iran despite the fact that Iran defiantly refuses to
answer IAEA's longstanding questions about suspected work on
nuclear weapons designs are troubling.
I look forward to your thoughts about the process of these
negotiations, your level of confidence that Iran will comply
with the terms of any agreement that might be ultimately
reached, and what actions the U.S. will take to enforce the
terms of any deal. Certainly, we hope diplomacy yields results,
but any deal must have teeth to be effective. Economic pressure
and a credible military option should be fundamental tenets of
negotiating an agreement.
And, finally, Mr. Secretary, I regret that we do not agree
on the administration's climate change policies around the
world. The President's politically driven anti-coal
environmental policies have wreaked havoc domestically, sending
tens of thousands of hardworking Americans to the unemployment
lines and casting into question our country's long-term energy
security.
Coal exports are the one bright spot for the thousands of
mining families who are facing disastrous economic conditions
in my district and elsewhere, and yet administration officials
will not promote coal as part of its Power Africa initiative.
However, this anti-coal posture by the U.S. will not
preclude emerging African governments from making use of this
reliable, ubiquitous, and affordable natural resource. These
emerging countries, ripe for investment, will instead turn to
the Chinese for financing and technology to build the same
coal-fired power plants. With China's terrible environmental
record, the projects they will fund will be dirtier than if
American companies were involved.
At the end of the day, these policies are anti-American-
jobs and they will not have the intended environmental
benefits.
I also heard that the administration is encouraging members
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
to impose stringent conditions on the public financing of
overseas coal-fired power plants. As coal capture and
sequestration technology is not yet commercially available,
these conditions would result in a de facto ban on OECD public
financing of coal plants in much of the world.
For example, this plan could preclude funding for highly
efficient coal plant investments in Pakistan. Given U.S.
national security interests and Pakistan's role in the fight
against terrorism, the U.S. should be encouraging affordable
and reliable electricity that can bolster economic growth and
job creation in that country, in turn reducing instability.
In addition, the administration's policies have recently
denied Overseas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, support
to an important energy sector project in Ukraine. I hope you
can explain how these policies are in the long-term interests
of our country and our allies and partners.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking time to be with us
today. This committee takes seriously our role in overseeing
the budget and policies of the Department. We appreciate your
continued engagement with us.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. Secretary Kerry, please proceed with your
opening remarks. Your full written statement, of course, will
be placed in the record. We are going to have another set of
votes fairly soon, so I would ask you to summarize your
statement so we can try to get a full round of questions before
those votes.
Secretary Kerry.
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you. Thank you very much,
Madam Chairwoman; Madam Ranking Member, my friend Nita Lowey.
Mr. Chairman of the full committee, Hal Rogers, thank you very
much.
I appreciate the enormously generous welcome from all of
you, and I particularly appreciate the opportunity to be able
to be here. I think we have some of the best dialogue on the
Hill in this committee, and I always appreciate the chance to
share thoughts with you.
And that is what I want to do. This is not, this is not a
combat. This is really a way to find mutual understanding about
the Nation's priorities. Historically, we have always said that
politics should end at the water's edge when it comes to
American foreign policy, and what we are here to find is the
common ground with respect to our interests and our values as
we project them in the context of foreign policy.
And that is what foreign policy is. It is the best
enhancement of that combination--our values, our interests.
There is always a balance. Sometimes one takes a little more
precedence than the other, and people are uncomfortable one way
or the other. But that is the objective, and, in the end, it is
to keep the American people safe and keep our country strong.
You have all laid out a broad array of issues which I
couldn't begin, obviously, in just an opening comment to
address. So I am going to leave them aside for a minute and
honor the notion that you do have a few votes coming quickly
and we want to really have the dialogue I talked about. So I am
going to give a very, very short summary.
We are here to talk about 1 percent of the budget--1
percent of the entire Federal budget. That is what we put into
foreign policy. Between USAID and the State Department and our
general operations, you are talking about $50.3 billion. And
that 1 percent, my friends, I promise you, will account for
more than 50 percent of the history of this era when it is
written.
So I personally believe it ought to be much bigger than 1
percent, and I think we have very justifiable reasons for
making it so. That is not the budget we have in front of us and
that we are arguing about here today, but I ask you to keep
that in the forefront of your minds as you think about all of
these priorities. Because we are robbing Peter to pay Paul
right now. We are cannibalizing some programs--you have
mentioned it yourself--to do other things that we need to do
that are priorities, and I don't think in the end that serves
America as well as we should be.
I think that the richest country on the face of the planet,
which has significantly reduced its deficit, can examine its
priorities without a sort of rote, automatic process of
sequestration or otherwise by which we limit real choices. And
I just want to start with that.
Secondly, I will say to you very quickly that this is as
complicated a time as, in many ways, we have ever faced,
because the world has changed so dramatically in the last 20
years. Everybody is connected to everybody all the time. The
numbers of cell phones in even poor countries is staggering.
And the degree to which people know what other people have
affects what they want. Aspirations are burgeoning in all kinds
of places that it was never allowed to even be thought of,
historically. So, in the Middle East, in the Sahel, in the
Maghreb, in the Arabian Peninsula, in South-Central Asia, in
Asia, I mean, countless places, there are pressures being
released that are changing the dynamics of foreign policy.
In many ways, we are looking at a world where states are
behaving in the ways--and within the states, all kinds of
different entities behaving independently with their own
agenda, unlike the sort of clarity that seemed to define the
differences in the course of the cold war--communism, freedom,
democracy, et cetera. And we know that, in many dictatorships,
many of these kinds of aspirations were tamped down, through
tyranny and oppression, but tamped down, so we didn't have to
cope with them. Now we do.
It is counterintuitive, but the truth is that,
notwithstanding the threat of ISIL, notwithstanding people
being beheaded publicly and burned publicly and the atrocities
that they are perpetrating--and it is a serious, serious
challenge to us--notwithstanding that, there is actually less
threat and less probability of people dying in some sort of
violent conflict today than at any time in human history. And
with advances of health and with advances of statehood and
other kinds of things, we are living in a very different world.
I am not going to go into all of that now. I just want to
end my quick opening by saying to you this: I am proud of the
way President Obama and this administration are, in fact,
leading on issue after issue after issue. And while some may
disagree with the choice that is made and some may feel that
not enough was done in Libya, Syria, or in some particular
place, I am telling you that never before in our history have
so many crises and so many trouble spots and so many larger
policy challenges been managed simultaneously and, I think,
have been kept on track as much as they are today.
And I will be specific. In ISIL, we built a global
coalition that has Arab countries actually flying sorties
against Arab countries in the Gulf, 60 nations participating in
an effort we will talk about a bit today.
In Iraq, we helped to guide and implement a transition of a
government, with choices made by the Iraqis, their choices,
their destiny, but we helped to create a framework within which
they were transitioning from a Prime Minister Maliki to a Prime
Minister Abadi and a new government that we could work with in
order to be able to go out and fight against ISIL.
In Afghanistan, we helped to shepherd a coalition
government to emerge out of an extremely questionable election
and close and negotiate a BSA and hopefully be in a position to
transition Afghanistan.
In the Iran negotiations, we are not complete. I don't know
if we will get there. But I know that trying is the essence of
United States leadership, to find out whether or not there is a
way with diplomacy to succeed in preventing a country from
getting a nuclear weapon, and that we owe it to our citizens
and the world to prove our willingness to try to do it
peacefully before we have to make other choices if we did.
On Ebola, there were predictions of a million people dying
by Christmastime. At the moment that President Obama made the
decision to deploy 4,000 American troops to go over there and
help build the capacity to be able to try to prevent that from
happening, there were huge questions at the time about how fast
it might spread and how dangerous that might be, what might
happen.
But because of American leadership pulling together
countries all over the world, you can now look at Liberia and
Guinea and Sierra Leone and see huge reductions in infection
and see that, indeed, Americans are not waking up every day to
the news of some new infection and some new challenge.
On AIDS in Africa, we are on the cusp because of our
additional efforts, which you have shared, you have helped
lead, on the cusp of an AIDS-free generation of children.
In Ukraine, we have held together, cobbled together, pieced
together, cajoled, and managed to effect a series of sanctions
that have--while not stopping everything altogether, no,
nevertheless, has given Ukraine an opportunity to survive as an
independent and sovereign Ukraine and has cost Russia a lot.
Mr. Putin may be able to look at what is happening today in
Donetsk or Luhansk or Debaltseve and say, wow, I am going a
great job on short-term tactical stuff. But I will tell you
this: Russia is not doing great right now--50 percent reduction
in the ruble's value, $151 billion of capital flight,
predictions that Russia will be in recession this next year,
extraordinary restraint on growth. And that has happened
because of the coordinated sanctions that we put in place.
Now, there is more that I could run through. I am not going
to do it all now, but I will just tell you: Between TPP and
TTIP, we are pursuing two of the most ambitious and important
trade agreements in recent history.
Forty percent of global GDP is wrapped up in the TPP. If we
can achieve that, we will have a definition of the new
standards of doing business in the region. And even China has
said to us, if this works, if it comes together, could we join
it? We are far better ultimately seeing a China join an
upgraded set of standards for doing business and rules of the
economy and trade than to not do that and have others write
those rules or have no rules at all.
So I can run through, finally, on climate--we can talk
about climate, Mr. Chairman. I hope we will in the course of
this. China, up until last year, was an opponent to doing
anything about climate change. But because we reached out and
worked with them, starting literally a month and a half after I
became Secretary, President Obama was able to go over there,
and China joined in a deal to announce its targets for the
reduction of emissions and fossil fuel dependency and a
commitment of a goal to achieve alternative, renewable, and
efficient energy.
It is a huge impact. And because of that, in Lima, Peru,
other countries came together and joined in to say, we have to
make Paris negotiations a success this year.
So I would say to you that, whether it is in the Arctic,
the Arctic Council, which we will assume the chairmanship of in
about a month and a half, or whether it is on any of these
things I have listed--there are many things I haven't listed--
cybersecurity, health, health structure--around the planet, the
United States of America is proving that, when we lead, we can
make a difference. And the world needs that leadership.
And I hope that in this budget we can reflect the fact,
ultimately, that the 1 percent we put into these endeavors
which result in so much benefit in the long term, so much
security to Americans, will not be nickeled and dimed at a
critical moment where we need to bolster yet more those things
that we are able to do, like the broadcasting, the
countermessaging of ISIL, the counterterrorism initiatives we
need to employ, the deprivation of the pool of recruits for
ISIL. These are intensive efforts, and they will require a
financial commitment. And we need to understand the connection.
Mr. Chairman, I think you said something about the
importance here of taking the budget role seriously. I know you
do. But we need to connect the dots for everybody in America of
the money spent out of this committee and the United States
Congress on the security of our Nation that comes to us through
the work of diplomacy and the work of development on a daily
basis.
And, frankly, we have been hurrying ourselves in the past
years, where there has been a reduction from the population
growth rate and the need and demand for that kind of
investment.
Madam Chair, thank you.
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Ms. Granger. Thank you.
I will start with this question. The administration wants
countries in the Middle East to step up and play a greater role
in the fight against ISIL, as we do. But as Jordan and Egypt
and the Kurds are taking on a significant role, and are often
successful, they are not getting the assistance they need.
The White House claims that there are robust security
relationships with these countries, but I would argue the U.S.
is risking our long-term strategic alliances. The Kurds and the
Jordanians are very frustrated with the amount of time it takes
to get military aid to them. I know you know that because they
have argued that with you, and they have certainly called me.
And the President's policy on Egypt continues to hold
equipment such as the F-16s that are paid for and are clearly
needed in the fight against ISIL and other terrorists in the
region. I wanted to ask you, why is the administration
continuing to withhold equipment for Egypt that would help them
combat ISIL and other threats?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are pushing very hard. In fact,
that is a decision that I think is on the President's desk
anytime now.
We are tied, as you know, by Congress to a certification
process that I have to exercise, and I can certify or I can
waive and make a decision what to move. But we have broken
certain things out.
One of the things we were waiting for, frankly, Madam
Chair, was the announcement of the parliamentary elections.
Now, we finally got that announcement. There were a number of
people in prison. There has been some harassment of Embassy
employees. There have been some other--as you saw, Abd el-
Fattah was just sentenced to 5 years for taking part in a
protest. And, you know, these are things that matter to us,
obviously--the Al Jazeera journalists who are imprisoned, the
NGOs who were required to be listed.
So we have been talking as reasonably and as frequently as
possible with our friends in Egypt. I have a very good working
relationship with the Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukry. I have
had several meetings with President el-Sisi. I am very grateful
to President el-Sisi for his significant cooperation with
respect to a number of security issues.
And we want to get them these additional items. And I
suspect, Madam Chair, that decisions will be made shortly to
try to come to cloture on the, sort of, final choices of how we
move on that.
So Egypt has presented one set of challenges. One thing I
want to make clear: I believe Egypt is helping enormously with
respect to counterterrorism. Egypt is doing a huge amount in
the Sinai. Egypt has been helpful with respect to Gaza. And
Egypt has been essential with respect to some elements of the
peace process, Israel and Palestine. Egypt is could cooperating
very significantly with Israel, and there is great intelligence
cooperation and so forth.
So, by and large, I believe it is important for us to
provide some of these items, and I believe decisions will be
forthcoming that will set out how we may in fact proceed
forward to do that.
On Jordan, I think you know this; we have had many
conversations about it, Madam. I am frustrated, as you are
frustrated. And they have been a little frustrated, and I
understand that.
Before I received your letter, I met several weeks ago with
Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh, whom you all know well, and we
signed a memorandum in which we agreed to put $1 billion a year
for the next 3 years into the relationship with Jordan. This is
before we received the letter from you.
In addition, before I had received the letter from you, I
had already initiated a review based on my conversations with
Foreign Minister Judeh to find out exactly what item was on
request, exactly where it was in the chain of delivery, and why
it might have been delayed.
And I have already--I think just about the time I got your
letter, I received the answer to all of those questions, and I
now have a breakdown of all of those items--tier-one
priorities, tier two, tier three.
And so the tier-one items are now mostly on the way or in
possession. F-16 spare parts, for instance, pilot survival,
night vision, et cetera, are happening. The UH-60 Black Hawks
we are trying to figure out. We will shortly notify you with
respect to some formal procedures on that.
So I could run through the long list with you. I think it
is better, probably, to do that in a classified forum. But I
can just tell you that we are on top of this and moving, and
these items need to get there as rapidly as possible.
Ms. Granger. We talked about this last year at the hearing,
and I remember last year you were talking about these needed
reforms and arrests of journalists and progress on, say,
parliamentary elections. And those things have been done,
literally----
Secretary Kerry. Some. Some.
Ms. Granger. Some.
Secretary Kerry. I think two----
Ms. Granger. Not all.
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Two people were released. But
for every person that gets released, regrettably there have
also been announcements of life imprisonments for one thing or
another.
Look, we are beginning to understand much better the
restraints that President el-Sisi operates under. And there are
some. And I think we are beginning to understand, also, some of
the difficulties of independent judiciary and independent
efforts that reflect on how the process is working there.
What is important is Egypt is committed as a major partner
in counterterrorism. And Egypt is critical, its viability is
critical to long-term stability of the region. I think the
United States needs to reflect that, and the President does in
our policy. And I think we are seeing that happen in what is
unfolding now.
Ms. Granger. You may see it happening. I certainly don't.
And you know we have had numerous conversations. The staff
has asked questions about this. The situation with the Kurds
has gone on for months and months and months. And every time we
ask, we hear, we are making some progress.
Secretary Kerry. Well----
Ms. Granger. The Egyptians came back to me and said, we
don't know what you want, we have no idea. Because we have
urged them to play a part, and they certainly are. The King of
Jordan, for goodness' sake, has put on his uniform and is
flying the planes.
So I think that the slowness of the process is simply very,
very disturbing. And I would like from you a weekly status on
this very immediate threat. It gets worse and worse. And
everyone that we hear talk, the generals that come and say, we
can stop it now, but at some point we can't stop it.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Madam Chair, let me just say to you
respectfully on this issue of the Kurds--because I have heard
this for a while, and I think it is a little out of proportion,
if I can say so.
We have provided more than 34 million rounds of light and
heavy ammunition to the Kurds, 15,000 hand grenades, 45,000
mortars, 50,000 RPG cartridges, and 18,000 rifles. Thousands
more rounds of ammunition and weapons have been identified for
donation and are being prepared for delivery now. This is in
addition to more than 300 tons of arms and ammunition that the
Government of Iraq provided and delivered directly to the
Kurds.
We have also provided 25 MRAPs to our Kurdish partners.
Hundreds of airstrikes have hit ISIL elements in Mosul and the
Sinjar Mountain and other areas of Northern Iraq, which has
provided relief to the Kurdish forces. We have established a
joint operations center in Erbil that has facilitated
unprecedented cooperation with the KRG.
We worked to get--I personally was on the telephone with
President Barzani and others to work to create a corridor which
helped the Kurds to be able to get into Kobane and help provide
relief there and ultimately help win the victory of Kobane.
We have provided $208 million in humanitarian support to
deal with displaced Kurds. That is an estimated 850,000 people
in the Kurdistan area. We have provided 110 tons of
humanitarian supplies to them. We have provided extensive
diplomatic engagement with----
Ms. Granger. I am going to stop you.
Secretary Kerry. Yeah, but I am just----
Ms. Granger. I know what you are going to say, and I know
what you are saying. You know my position. I think you know the
position of Members of the Congress. And so we will continue
this as we go on, but I certainly want to have other people
have the opportunity to ask questions.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
As you know, many of us have had many, many briefings on
Iran, many of which are in a classified setting. So, obviously,
the questions that I am going to ask do not include some items
that have been discussed in a classified setting.
But we know that the United States is at a crossroads with
Iran. The overall package must ensure we have closed all
pathways to a bomb. You have said repeatedly that no deal is
better than a bad deal.
I just want to make a couple of points, and then ask you to
respond.
Can you assure us that a good deal includes the following:
dismantling Iran's centrifuge infrastructure; dismantling its
heavy-water facility at Arak and closing all covert options;
containing strict verification--
Secretary Kerry. I am sorry. What was the second?
Mrs. Lowey. The second one, dismantling its heavy-water
facility at Arak and closing all covert options; containing
strict verification and fully detailing the possible military
dimensions of its programs; allowing full and unfettered access
to any facility, including Parchin, Fordow, Natanz, and other
facilities, military or otherwise; have phased-in sanctions
relief to ensure compliance; and, last, no less than 15 years
in duration.
It has been reported that the Supreme Leader has said, and
I quote, ``I would go along with any agreement that could be
made. Of course, if it is not a bad deal.'' This is, of course,
the same Supreme Leader who repeatedly refers to Israel as the,
quote, ``barbaric Jewish state'' that, quote, ``has no cure but
to be annihilated.''
Many experts with whom I have spoken don't think that
Khomeini is really capable of making a deal, but I know how
hard and how focused you are in trying to make a good deal.
And, again, you have said that no deal is better than a bad
deal.
Do you really see any evidence that the regime is seriously
interested in giving up its nuclear program and working with
the international community?
You have indicated this is the last phase of negotiations
and that the administration would not support another
extension. You have just returned from Geneva. Is this still
your assessment?
You have already stated that a good deal provides us at
least 1 year to respond should Iran renege on the deal and
break out. I still don't understand how we arrived at 1 year.
Why is 1 year enough insurance for us, for Israel, for the
region?
I know how hard you have been working on this issue. I,
again, respect your commitment, your thoughtfulness. But if you
could answer these questions, I would be most appreciative.
Secretary Kerry. I will try to answer as many as I can as
fast as I can, Congresswoman Lowey.
Let me go to the end. That is probably a good place to
begin, which is this question of breakout in 1 year and do we
know it is enough and why do we know it is enough and so forth.
Let me make clear what ``breakout'' is in the context that
we are talking about. And I want to make clear, also, when we
talk about 1 year, we are talking about 1 year for a period of
time that we believe sufficient to build the confidence about
our access and about the workings of the program and to
understand that there isn't a covert track.
But ``breakout'' in the way that many of us thought of it
when I was here in the Senate in the 1980s, late 1980s and
1990s--we were debating still the Soviet Union in the 1980s
with Ronald Reagan and certain missile systems and so forth--
``breakout'' meant your ability to go with nuclear weapons,
that you broke out and, man, you had a nuclear weapon right
away and you would go do something. That is not what we are
talking about here.
What we are talking about here is--``breakout,'' as we
apply it to the 1 year we are looking for for this period of
time, is the time it takes from when they decide from their
constrained and restricted and verified level of enrichment, if
they were to kick everybody out and say, we are going at it
now, and it is just obvious they are going at it, that would be
a breach the moment they did it. You don't need 6 months. The
minute they kick you out, you know they are in breach. So if
you have a year, you have a lot of leeway.
But that is a timeframe from when they make the decision to
not comply to try to get a rush to enough fissile material for
one potential weapon. Remember, enough fissile material for one
potential weapon, 1 year. That is not having a weapon. That
could be years away from having a deliverable weapon or a
tested weapon or a weapon that you have to be concerned about.
So if you have a year from the time in which one of your
inspectors discovers they are not complying or a year from the
time that one of your intrusive cameras or visits or visible
inspections of the mining or their uranium or their production
or their centrifuges shows you something is up, you can slap
sanctions right back on and worse. Or, of course, you always
have all the options we have that exist today. We are not
giving up one option.
When you say to me, do I know that 1 year is sufficient
insurance with respect to the ability to regulate, you better
believe it. And do you know what? You know what we have today?
You know what Israel has today? Two to 3 months. And the reason
it may be 3 or 4 months right now is because of what we put in
place with the interim agreement.
Now, remember, Prime Minister Netanyahu thought the interim
agreement--quote: ``deal of a century for Iran.'' He thought it
was the worst thing that ever happened. And some people in the
Congress echoed that when I came up here to talk about the
interim agreement.
Well, guess what? Every aspect of the interim agreement has
been complied with. The then-20-percent-enriched uranium that
threatened Israel is now gone, reduced to zero. The Fordow that
then we didn't know what was going on in it that threatened
Israel is now inspected on a daily basis. Arak that then
threatened it as a potential producer of plutonium and a track
for weapons production has been stopped dead in its tracks, and
they have not been able to further any commissioning of Arak.
That makes Israel safer.
I mean, it defies imagination to make the argument that, if
Israel was threatened with a 2-month breakout period and they
are now at more months and we are trying to get a year, that
they are not safer.
Now, that is just the beginning of the many pieces of this
agreement. And I am not going to go into all of the agreement
right now, because we don't have an agreement. We may not get
an agreement. They may not be willing to do some of the things
that you listed that you think are the ingredients of a good
agreement. And I am not going to sit here, in fairness, Madam
Ranking Member, and go through each of those items because I am
not going to negotiate here. I want to negotiate with them and
see where we are.
But of course we have to have a resolution of Parchin and a
resolution of Arak so it can't produce plutonium on a bomb path
and a resolution of Fordow so it is not a secret, hidden
enrichment facility and so forth. And those are the things that
we are arguing about right now.
Now, the point I would make to everybody is, in the year
2000s, 2003, under the Bush administration, they had a policy
of no enrichment. It was American policy. There were 164
centrifuges then spinning--2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008--
all during the Bush administration. Nothing stopped. What
happened? They kept building. Now they are at 19,000 that could
function. There are not that many functioning.
And so, obviously, we pursued a policy for a period of time
under a very tough administration that didn't hesitate to use
its muscles when it wanted to, didn't use its muscles on that,
and the fact is we wind up where we are today. Iran knows how
to make fuel. They know how to do this.
So we have to decide, how do we get the best shot at being
able to constrain from the production of a nuclear weapon over
the course of the future years? Now, that is what we are trying
to do, and we are trying to close off each pathway to the
bomb--through Natanz, through Fordow, through Arak, and covert.
And the test of that will be in the days ahead.
Mrs. Lowey. I just want to thank you very much. And,
obviously, we could have a longer discussion, but I guess we
have votes right now.
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are going to have a longer
discussion, I have no doubt about that, if we get an agreement.
And if we don't, we will have a longer discussion about the
things we are going to need to do as a result.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let me talk about Iran.
A New York Times article last Thursday cited a recent
report by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran was
still refusing to answer longstanding questions about suspected
work on weapons designs.
As you say, there is a very short time remaining for
conclusion for that framework agreement. And their continued
refusal to provide IAEA with answers about past nuclear weapons
work, that is troubling. Because if they refuse to answer, how
can we be sure that whatever is agreed upon they will live by
and abide by?
Secretary Kerry. Well, there are a bunch of questions the
IAEA has asked that are going to have to be answered, and we
have made that very clear. The IAEA is going to have to get
answers to questions.
What is more critical than answering, than having some
confession of, oh, yeah, we were doing this back then, is
getting the ability to know what they are doing now with
clarity and going forward so that you can prevent any
development whatsoever.
We presume, I mean, we all have pretty good information, we
are in a nonclassified venue here, but I think I can safely say
that we have made our presumptions based on the information we
have about what they were doing. So we are certainly proceeding
with eyes open that it is our belief they had a weapons track,
and we understand that we need to respond accordingly in
whatever it is that we do here.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, how can we trust Iran, given the
lack of compliance with past agreements with IAEA? Your own
deputy secretary, Tony Blinken, has testified before the Senate
that during the Joint Plan of Action, there were situations
that, quote, ``We believe there were violations of the JPOA,''
end quote. How can we trust them given that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, there have been no violations of
JPOA. I am not sure what he is referring to. There may have
been a place or two we had a question, but they were answered.
We raised one issue. There was one centrifuge which was being
fed at one point in time which we learned of, and we learned of
it because of the verification that we had, which, by the way,
is far less comprehensive than the verification we want to get
ultimately.
But we did learn of it, which is an indication that there
was transparency and that we had accountability. And the moment
we mentioned it, it was really based on a misunderstanding of
what was current. Under the JPOA, under the interim agreement
they are allowed to pursue the current level of what they are
at. This, we argued, was new, and we won the argument, and they
stopped, and that was the end of it.
But, look, a fundamental basis of your question, Mr.
Chairman, you said, how can we trust them? This agreement is
not based on trust. No arms control agreement is based on
trust. Remember, Ronald Reagan's famous ``trust but verify.''
That is a euphemism for make sure you are able to know what is
happening. And that is the guideline of this negotiation. It is
not based on trust.
You may be able to build some trust. The last year of
compliance has, frankly, helped people to have a sense of
seriousness of purpose here and intent. The fact that they did
destroy their 20 percent uranium stockpile. The fact that they
have provided access. The fact that they did stop work on Iraq.
I mean, all of these things begin to build a little bit of
confidence that this is serious.
But we have to build a structure here that gives us great
confidence going out into the future that we will know what
they are doing so it isn't relying on anybody's word or on any
level of trust.
Mr. Rogers. A lot depends on what happens, obviously. So we
wish you the best.
I yield.
Secretary Kerry. A lot does depend on it. I agree with you.
Ms. Granger. Short question.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me try and make it short.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Getting back to what Chairwoman Granger
was talking about and the issue of Egypt and Jordan and our
relationship with them. We know Egypt, as an example, 82
million people, we know there are human rights concerns. We
also know the United States of America has the best country in
the world and a democracy that works, and we want to make sure
that we deal with issues of human rights in the countries that
are our allies. But Egypt is very critical to the Middle East.
They are critical to Israel. They are critical to a lot of our
goals and agendas.
I just want to ask this question. We want to export our
democracy, but we are going into countries that have thousands
of years of traditions. And yet it seems that if they aren't
exactly following our model, that we are slow to be involved.
So my question would be, we want to support democratic
issues in these countries, but what lessons have we learned,
based on what has happened in Egypt especially, by our
democracy efforts. In fact, you had the Muslim Brotherhood
taking control and the country was almost falling apart. And
yet Egypt was trying to take control of their country with all
the issues that they were dealing with as far as unrest and
terrorism.
Should we act more deftly with those countries, based on
their traditions, while trying to influence them with our
traditions, and hold back giving them the resources they need
to take on ISIS or a terrorism situation?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I personally don't believe so,
Congressman. I think that we have to be very, very careful and
very thoughtful about each country's ability to transition and
measure our expectations in a very thoughtful way. We should
not be automatic and sort of simplistic about that endeavor. We
certainly shouldn't stereotype and fit everybody into the same
box because every place is different. And the lessons certainly
that I have learned in the last 10 or 15 years are that we
really need to think very, very carefully about what kind of
political space, what capacity there is for the embrace of our
vision and at what pace.
We sometimes come crashing in with a sense that we can sort
of hold out X amount of aid and say, you have got to do this
and this in order to do it. And they kind of look at us
nowadays increasingly in many countries and scratch their heads
and ask a lot more questions than they used to and are not
quite as impressed by the level of our leverage because,
frankly, it is significantly diminished, if you want to know
the truth.
The Emiratis and Saudis are putting 20 billion bucks a year
into Egypt, and we are putting a $1.3 billion or whatever it
is, $1.6 billion. And so they look at it and they say, well, do
we have to put up with all these headaches since we have got
these other folks we could turn to and we will get some help
there?
President Putin just paid a very visible, well-received
visit to Egypt, and there was an exchange, an agreement for
some very significant purchase of weapons and so forth. They
would prefer to buy them and have the relationship with
America, but they feel like we are sometimes asking more than
the market will bear at the rate at which we are looking to
them to----
Mr. Ruppersberger. We need to evaluate that policy. And
Sisi said a very positive thing, which I think is important in
the Muslim world. He stood up to his mullahs and said that you
have to stop this type of radical jihad. That is a good message
that we hope the Islamic community will send to the small 1
percent of terrorists that are trying to take the world over.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I encouraged them strongly with
respect to a number of people they needed to release. They
released them. I encouraged them to rapidly move to set the
date for the election. They set the date publicly for the
election. We encouraged them to do a number of other things. I
won't go into all of them here. But to the best of our
awareness, they worked hard to try to do those things. They got
some done and couldn't get others done, but we know they made a
bona fide effort on some of them and ran into various
roadblocks.
Ms. Granger. Thank you. I am going to recess the hearing
for members to vote. If you will return as quickly as possible.
Mr. Ruppersberger. We are going to come back?
Ms. Granger. We are going to come back. The hearing is now
in recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Granger. The hearing will now come to order. I will now
turn to Mr. Dent for his questions.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. Good to be with you.
First, I wanted to commend you for your good effort in
Afghanistan with respect to the presidential election where you
helped mediate the aftermath, and successfully, I might add.
And so I want to thank you for your leadership there. And I
agree with what you just said moments ago on TPP and TTIP,
about how essential those agreements are to setting standards
and advancing our interests globally.
On the issue of Ukraine, however, I wanted to raise a real
concern that I have. This very recent cease-fire agreement
facilitated by the Germans and the French seemed very desperate
and feckless, to be quite honest. I believe the West has been
humiliated. As much as I admire the Germans and the French,
they have taken the idea of arming the Ukrainian Government off
the table. Putin knows that. These cease-fires will last as
long as Vladimir Putin wants them to last, and that has been
the case.
It seems that we, the U.S., have outsourced the
negotiations to our friends, and the results have not been very
good, and I am deeply concerned about that. I think there needs
to be greater leadership. The West has been humiliated. And at
some point, I believe we are going to have to provide some kind
of lethal defensive weapons to the Ukrainian Government,
antitank weapons, antiartillery. And I would like to hear your
perspective on that because I just feel that this recent cease-
fire has been really a major setback for all of us.
And I do appreciate your leadership on the sanctions
regime, and I know our European friends always haven't been as
accommodating. So I appreciate hearing your comments.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate that
very, very much.
In fairness, I think that Chancellor Merkel has actually
been leading very forcefully in this and working very, very
hard to make sanctions happen at times where others in Europe
were not quite as prepared to hold the line, take the measures.
So I think that Germany's leadership, France's engagement with
Germany and leadership has been important.
I think it was important for them to try to see whether or
not they could make Minsk meaningful. And they, themselves,
took the position that if Putin didn't adhere to it and was not
prepared to take the steps of the Minsk, that then there is
plan B.
So plan B is really tougher sanctions and additional
support to Ukraine. And I think I would not count everybody out
in terms of whether or not, as a result of what has happened,
they are automatically against the provision of some defensive
assistance to Ukrainians. But there is not yet clarity to the
breach, the total breach with respect to the Minsk effort. The
prisoners were exchanged the other day. Some weapons have
pulled back. Some battalions are now assembled on the border,
not inside. So it is a little unclear, and I think they and we
are waiting to see how this unfolds in the next days and hours.
I talked at lunchtime yesterday with the Foreign Minister
of Germany, who had just come out of the meeting with the
French, the Ukrainians, and the Russians. And it was his sense
that they had sort of mapped out a few potential steps over the
next few days.
So we are getting to that critical decision time,
Congressman. The President has a number of options that he is
asking his team to evaluate, and he will make the appropriate
decision, together with discussions with Chancellor Merkel. In
fact, he may well have talked to Chancellor Merkel today or
yesterday.
Mr. Dent. Can I also just quickly add, speaking of Germany,
we have Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. I am very
involved with the German-American Caucus and study group on
Germany, and we have serious concerns about the State
Department's decision to reduce by half the funding for the
Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. This program is
essentially maintaining a strong relationship between our two
countries.
Secretary Kerry. Right.
Mr. Dent. Chancellor Merkel, I know, raised the issue of
this cut when she visited the U.S. Can you give us the
rationale why the State Department has gone against clear, I
thought, congressional intent and unilaterally moved funding
away from the Bundestag exchange program?
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is still going to remain the
largest exchange program between the United States and any
country in the world. The academic year last year had about 710
total participants, 350 Americans, 360 Germans. And the funding
has been a pretty level $4 million.
The reduction, in our judgment, would allow us to meet some
other high priority demands for exchanges that we are having to
support. One is like Ukraine, for instance. We are trying to
get Ukrainians to be part of it. We are trying to bolster our
networks in the entire periphery around that region. So whether
it is Georgia, Moldova, or the Baltics, other countries, we
want them to be able to participate. So it is really trying to
allocate according to priority and available resources.
Now, if you want to help us and plus it up a little bit,
there is nothing we would like more than to keep it at the same
level. But this is where I am talking about robbing Peter to
pay Paul. All those are virtuous and important efforts, and I
think you can see that.
If you can get some students out of each of those other
places and it makes a difference in the long-term capacity
building of those countries and their outlooks, that is
spreading the wealth a little more. And as I say, the German
program will still remain the largest program we have.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you. Mr. Serrano; I am sorry. I am
wrong.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I apologize.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you. And I want to shift
gears a little bit. I know that the line of questioning has
focused mostly on the Middle East and Iran, but the
subcommittee obviously has other focal points, including food
aid and disaster relief. And so I wanted to just touch on where
we are in our progress with reform. In recent years we have
seen increased momentum to push for reform of our international
food aid programs and make them more effective and more
efficient and save more lives in less time. And so while
obviously the focal point is being more fiscally responsible, I
mean, hopefully our goal is also to make sure that we can end
hunger and provide nutrition to more people. At the same time,
obviously, that helps our own local farmers and agriculture and
production.
The President's budget request included several reform
measures that allow for increased flexibility within those
programs and increased funding for local and regional purchase
of food aid, and that has bipartisan support. But my question
is, do you believe that the reforms that have been proposed,
the increased flexibility for the type of and delivery of aid,
are those essential for responding to the crises that we are
facing today, the ones that we might encounter in the future,
and really enable us to effectively respond to food insecurity,
and at the same time moving towards resilience and self-
reliance?
Secretary Kerry. We hope so, Congresswoman. I mean, that
was the purpose of these reforms, as you know. The effort is to
try to be able to deliver more faster with greater local buy-
in. It increases our reach and it increases the cost savings.
Now, the proof will be in what happens. I mean, right now
it can take from 4 to 6 months to buy and deliver U.S.
products. And we know there was a certain upheaval here about
this. But if you allow more cash-based activities, then USAID's
food programs could become much faster, much more nimble, much
more responsive, and it actually helps to build some capacity
and infrastructure in the communities you are trying to create
a sustainable cycle for. So we think it is the right direction
to move in, and it allows us to reach 2 million more
beneficiaries, about 25 percent increase.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. And just briefly because I don't
have a lot of time left, and I am the ranking member on the
Legislative Branch Subcommittee and have to go back to that
hearing, what steps is the Administration taking to ensure that
the Helms amendment is correctly applied and that U.S. foreign
assistance that may be used for abortions in the case of rape,
incest, and life endangerment and to make sure that preventing
pregnancy in those cases is our primary goal?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I mean, we evaluate it in every
single country and every program where we are. I am not aware
that there has been a specific complaint that something is
lacking or missing in that effort. Is there something specific
that you are----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. There has been--not on the part of
the Administration--an issue surrounding the misinterpretation
of the Helms amendment that prohibits the use of funds for the
performance of abortion as a method of family planning. That it
has been incorrectly implemented, essentially to become a total
ban on funding for abortion. And so that is a--I hate to use
the term ``nuance''--but there is a difference between
prohibiting abortion entirely and prohibiting its use as a
method of family planning.
Secretary Kerry. I understand.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. And so that is the interpretation or
misinterpretation I am concerned about, and I am wondering if
that has been addressed.
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me do this. I haven't had that
specific conversation, frankly. Let me investigate that. And,
of course, I have a----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. By the way, it predates this
Administration.
Secretary Kerry. I am not taking it personally actually. I
remember this debate when I was up here. I just want to find
out exactly, because I haven't been part of any conversation
that has examined some shortfall in it. So let me find out
where we are.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. We will examine that.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you. And thanks for coming. I
know you are chairing something. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Secretary, let me bring you a little bit closer to
home, to this hemisphere, Cuba. As you know, U.S. law states
that if certain conditions are met by the Castro regime, the
embargo in essence goes away. The President has been stating,
he said in the State of the Union that he wants the embargo
just to go away, and he wants Congress to lift the embargo
without fulfilling those conditions that are in the law.
So which of those conditions does this administration
oppose? Or which of those conditions does this administration
believe that the Cuban people do not deserve? Because let me
tell you what they are. They are the release of all political
prisoners. They are the legalization of political parties,
independent press, and independent labor unions, and free
elections.
Those are the conditions in law. The administration has
said that we don't need to meet those conditions, that Congress
should get rid of the sanctions without those conditions. Which
one of those conditions does this administration think are too
much to ask or unfair or the Cuban people do not deserve?
Secretary Kerry. None. They deserve them. There is none
that is unfair. We should ask for all of them. What this
administration believes, however, is that the embargo has not
produced them and will not produce them. In fact, it is the
exact opposite. We believe that if you lift the embargo and
engage more thoroughly with Cuba, you have a much higher rate
of probability and a much faster set of transformations that
can take place. I believe that very strongly, personally. I
believed it when I was here in that Senate.
I think we have actually helped repression by shutting it
down. It is much easier for regimes that are not held
accountable, that don't interact with the world, that sort of
are shut off to be repressive than places that have been opened
up where there is engagement and countries are involved and
families----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let's talk about that, if I may, Mr.
Secretary. As you know, I apologize for interrupting but we
don't have a lot of time.
Secretary Kerry. Go ahead.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. So as of the time of the President's
December 17 announcement, there have been hundreds of political
arrests, including more just this weekend, 200 last weekend,
which include the arrests of over 80 Ladies in White, more than
90 from the Cuban Patriotic Union, including very well-known
activists. By the way, at least 5 of the President's so-called
53 political prisoners that the President said is one of the
things that he got out of this deal for the United States and
for Cuba have been rearrested since then. And yet it seems that
the administration is continuing to negotiate, even though the
regime has not only continued their repression, has been
escalating their repression, but even those that the President
said were kind of the success story, that the Castro regime
released, a number of them have been rearrested.
So, it would seem that the administration is looking
forward to normalization at all costs, regardless of what the
regime is doing. And is there anything that the Castro regime
would do, could do, to stop this administration from
normalizing? Which, as you know, normalizing relations with the
United States for a terrorist regime, that is a pretty good
gift. So what could they do, what should they do, what can they
do that would stop the President and this administration from
normalizing?
Secretary Kerry. Well, first of all, we don't know that
they are currently engaging in international terrorism. That
evaluation is being made.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, Mr. Secretary, there was a shipment
of arms that went to North Korea that even the U.N. stated.
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. So, I mean, I am sure you are aware of
that, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. I am aware of that. But the standard by
which you all wrote the law with respect to what has to be
measured for international terrorism is whether or not they
have engaged in acts of international terrorism in the last 6
months.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You are aware that the Colombian military
confiscated arms recently that were in the hands of the FARC?
Secretary Kerry. Well, this is all being evaluated right
now.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You are aware of that?
Secretary Kerry. I don't know who----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That would qualify as an act of terrorism.
Secretary Kerry. I don't know yet, I am not going to
prequalify what is being appropriately judged with the input of
all of our Intel Community. All the relevant agencies are asked
to contribute to this. You will be well, obviously, advised and
briefed with respect to what the conclusions are on it. And I
don't know what they are yet because they are engaged in that
endeavor. That is a prerequisite, obviously, for the ability to
move forward.
But that said, let me just say to you that we are well
aware of the Ladies in White and the challenges internally.
Actually, I interpret that as sort of a reaction to, it is a
manifestation of the fear that might come. But I think there is
a much greater opportunity to be able to hold them accountable
and deal with that when you have the scrutiny that will come
with additional transactions, commerce, presents, money in
hands of people there, people traveling, open up standards that
come with this. And there is a much greater ability.
I mean, that is how we have operated in many other
countries. I mean, Richard Nixon opened up and normalized our
relations with China. We still have huge disagreements with
China. We normalized and opened up our relations with the
Soviet Union. We had huge years during the Cold War where we
were fighting them in a cold war. But we were able to do more
as a consequence of that engagement. And ultimately, both
changed. One disappeared, the Soviet Union, and the other has
been increasingly partnering, opening up, engaging in different
ways, even as we continue to have some problems.
So these things don't change overnight, and I don't expect
that will, nor do you. The question is, are you better
positioned to be able to fight for the things that matter to
you? Can you leverage people's rights? Can you send an
ambassador in to raise the profile on a particular human rights
challenge? Can you do more to be able to do that?
We have not backed off of one of those priorities. And, in
fact, when Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary Jacobson was
there, she met with civil society. They didn't like it, but she
met with them.
And so we will continue to press our case, but we also
think we are far more advantaged in doing so if we are having
diplomatic relations and engaging and opening up so that a lot
of folks from Florida, from New Jersey, from other places who
have family there would be free to visit, bring ideas, bring
their openness, bring their money and other things, which will
change life in Cuba. I have no doubt about it.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, Mr. Secretary, my time has clearly
expired. I would not use China as a model to talk about when we
talk about human rights. That is precisely what we do not. When
you talk about the success of China, I will tell you that is
not a success.
Secretary Kerry. Please, don't put words in my mouth. I
didn't say----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You mentioned China. I did not, sir.
Secretary Kerry. I did. I mentioned China as a country with
whom we have normalized diplomatic relations----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, we do.
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. And huge differences, is what
I said, huge differences, both on a political system, on human
rights, on business practices, cyber. Run the list.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yeah. And has that helped the human rights
condition of the Chinese people?
Secretary Kerry. But we have diplomatic relations.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Has that helped the human rights condition
of the Chinese people? That is a discussion for another time
because my time is up. I would argue, Mr. Secretary, that it
has not.
Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your service.
Though the origins of Serrano and Diaz-Balart come from two
different islands in the Caribbean, whenever we follow each
other we usually stay on the same island for discussion.
So, on the issue of Cuba, let me congratulate the
administration for seeing the light that this country hasn't
seen for over 50 years and understanding that we do better when
we invade people with blue jeans and sneakers and ideas and
trade than when we try to isolate them. And I think that you
are right, we helped whatever went wrong in Cuba throughout
these years by isolating them. I hope to see that change come
true.
So I have two questions for you and put them together.
Without telling me what I am not supposed to know--I can't
believe I am saying this on TV, we are supposed to know
everything, right--but without telling me what I am not
supposed to know, how are those negotiations going with Cuba
and what is it that we want the Cubans to give us in return for
opening up diplomatic relations?
And secondly, total my opinion, and this is totally my
opinion, we know that our differences with Venezuela stemmed,
one, from the style of President Chavez, but it also came
strongly from their relationship to Cuba. So if we get close to
Cuba, does it open the door to get closer to Venezuela?
Secretary Kerry. Let me answer both of those. First of all,
the negotiations regarding with Cuba right now are really
fairly straightforward regarding diplomatic relations. It is a
process of diplomacy, an automatic process regarding
normalization. The parameters of that were negotiated
originally, which involved the release of the prisoners. There
is obviously a concern about anybody who may have been
rearrested or even the Ladies in White. That issue will be
raised for certain.
In addition, the Internet agreement and other components of
what was already agreed on will be on the table. But the most
important part of this now is really the pro forma stuff of
diplomatic relations, visas, travel, the access and process by
which your diplomats are going to be treated. That is sort of
the hard stuff of diplomatic relations and that is what is
being talked about right now.
With respect to Venezuela and Cuba, I will tell you that I
talked to President--I actually shouldn't--the President of a
Latin American country to tell him that we were engaging in
this policy. And there was almost a whoop of excitement on the
other side of the phone saying, wow, that can really help
change things throughout Latin America. If America can begin to
have a different relationship with Cuba, it will change what
has been a tool, a weapon that has been used against us by
other countries in Latin America. And so, in fact, this
President thought that he was going to undertake to call
President Maduro immediately and talk to him and say, hey,
don't get left behind, look what is happening, be part of the
future.
Now, that hasn't happened yet, and we have serious concerns
about what is going on in Venezuela. And obviously we are sort
of perplexed by the and frustrated by the frequency with which
President Maduro seems to want to blame everything on us when
we have, in fact, done nothing. And every time he is in
political trouble he tries to play the anti-American card and
starts citing some mythical coup or something that isn't taking
place.
It would be great if he could realize the benefits to the
people of Venezuela. The people of Venezuela are currently
being hurt by the policies that he is pursuing, and we hope
that he will realize that we are ready to engage in normal
relationship of nations and become engaged in helping to deal
with the problems of his people, the poverty, the opportunity,
the education that is needed, other things, if he wants to
engage in a legitimate relationship.
But there is no doubt that this was well received
throughout Latin America. Quite surprised by many countries.
Very welcomed by all.
Mr. Serrano. Yes, it was. It was. And I can tell you----
Secretary Kerry. Except, perhaps, Venezuela that may be
highly unsettled by it because it sort of leaves them quite
isolated.
Mr. Serrano. But they are isolated, yes, but still unable
to blame our country for its treatment of Cuba, which has been
used by many Latin American countries throughout the years. So
that is why you saw this whooping, you know, this excitement.
And I think that your statement that the countries in Latin
America would sign up, a lot of Americans just don't understand
that Cuba became a symbol to them--to them--of American
oppression. And so when that gets settled, then Latin America
has to look at itself again.
And we have to look at the fact--and I will close with
this--that Latin America in our generation, Mr. Secretary, went
from dictators to elected people who didn't care about their
constituents to leftist people who built schools and got
elected and built hospitals and got elected. And so if we
understand that and we embrace that, regardless of how left
they are of us, we may accomplish more than what we are
accomplishing in Cuba.
And I just want to congratulate you because I have spent 25
years in Congress saying it is a wasted philosophy and policy
and it serves nothing. And to see this President take this bold
step, it is historic and I appreciate it and I thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The Secretary has to leave here at a quarter till 5. That
is 15 minutes. And we have two members that have not asked
questions.
Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Secretary, welcome.
I want to share with you a story and return to the Middle
East. In 1979, when I was a young colleague student, I lived
for a time in Egypt, and it was the year of the peace accords
between Israel and Egypt, and there was a celebratory
atmosphere of this newfound relationship with America.
But I lived for a time in a remote oasis area with farmers
in the western desert. And one of the farmers, their English
was very limited, so you did the best you could, but one of the
farmers wanted to show me something. And he took me to one of
his neighbors, and he grabbed his neighbor's hand, and he took
his wrist and he bowed and placed his neighbor's wrist right on
his face. His neighbor was a Coptic Christian and he was a
Muslim, and his neighbor had the tattoo of Christianity, which
is common among Copts, on his wrist. He was trying to tell me a
couple of things. One, that they were brothers, that they were
friends, and also that I was welcome there in that village.
This story is very hard to reconcile with what is happening
today, particularly with the emergence of ISIL and this 8th
century barbarism with 21st century weapons that is not only
assaulting life, but it is assaulting this sacred space of
human dignity, this right, this value of being able to hold
reasonably held beliefs and exercise them in religious
tradition.
So once ISIL is hopefully contained, degraded, and
eliminated, we still live with the difficult problem of
assuring a religious pluralism and that the ancient peoples who
have been there, who have every much right to be there as
anyone else, Christians, Yazidis, other religious minorities,
as well as innocent Muslim people who are being victimized by
this, a new day should shine forth whereby this right of
conscience and religious freedom should be respected.
In this regard, in the State Department, I have a
suggestion and a plea for you. You have an Ambassador for
International Religious Freedom, but I understand that his role
is not as perhaps robust as it could be in reporting directly
to you. This assault by ISIL is not only an assault on human
dignity and life, it is an assault on civilization itself. So,
again, once it is contained, this ideal of bringing forth a new
and robust understanding of protecting the rights and dignities
of all persons, no matter their religious faith. Middle Eastern
Christianity is shattered and someone is going to have to pick
up the pieces here.
If we have time, I would like to turn to the question of
how the Kurds can help in this regard because they have been
doing a very significant heavily lift in protecting that
population, as well as the Yazidis. But if you would care to
comment on the Ambassador for Religious Freedom and the
position that they have in the State Department.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Rabbi Saperstein is as distinguished
an advocate as there is, and he has access to me any time. I
mean, I have enormous respect for him. He knows that. I worked
very hard to get him to be able to come in and take this job
on. And the last thing he is going to suffer for is lack of
access to me, I assure you.
This is a huge priority within the State Department. I also
appointed the first faith-based liaison office with Shaun Casey
filling that role. We are deeply involved in trying to pull
interfaith efforts together in order to appropriately stand up
for religious freedom, but also to harness the full measure of
force that comes from leaders within various religions to start
speaking out about the true Islam, about interfaith abilities
and needs, and so forth.
So I am very excited about it. The position has existed
under prior administrations, but I think everybody would agree
that Rabbi Saperstein is hugely appropriate to this moment. And
I expect nothing but good results.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, I agree. I hear you saying, I am
interpreting your words, is that you have elevated and
intensified the positioning of this Ambassador within the
dynamics of the Department. And I think he, as well as whoever
comes along, needs to have a seat at the table as the
rebuilding begins in the Middle East so that not only stability
takes place, but the very basis for that stability of respect
for human dignity and rights as expressed in religious freedom
is right there next to everything else, defense considerations,
economic considerations, human dignity considerations.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is at the center of the struggle
we are involved in.
Mr. Fortenberry. Yes.
Secretary Kerry. And we all need to pay attention to that.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. Madam Chairwoman, thank you.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you, sir. Thank you for your
many, many years of service. Thank you for your patience today
as we have had votes and other responsibilities. And though you
and I might see the world differently in some respects and
politically we may not agree on everything, I do respect the
leadership that you are providing in the administration now.
In framing my question, I would like to tell you that I
spent 14 years as an Air Force pilot, as a military officer.
During that time, I was the pilot rep for the implementation of
START treaty with the former Soviet Union. It was a great
experience. I learned a lot.
One of the things I learned from my military experience in
general from that experience with the START treaty and,
frankly, from some of my experience here in Congress is that
for a treaty or an agreement to work there has to be a modicum
of trust between the two parties. They may be adversaries, they
may not like each other, but both of them must want the treaty
to be successful and, again, for there to be some element to
trust.
And to return to a topic that we have discussed here, but I
would like to pursue it in a slightly different way, I am not
sure that we have that trust with Iran. And let me explain what
I mean by that. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. They have
been recognized as such for more than 30 years, Hezbollah,
Hamas. The list of them working against our interest is very
long.
And so I would ask, to you, sir, two questions. I could go
on for quite a long time telling you what you already know,
that they have been and, I think, view us as an enemy in many
regards, perhaps in most regards. They have a long list of
working against our interests. Can you give me a single example
of where they have worked with us as a partner or with any of
our allies in a constructive way?
And the second question would be, how do we reconcile the
damage that I believe this has done with our primary partner in
the area, and that would be our friend of Israel, and their
suspicions of these negotiations and whether we protect their
interest as well?
Secretary Kerry. Well, first, let me begin, Congressman, I
want to thank you for your service. I really appreciate, like
everybody does, anybody who puts on the uniform and spends a
few years.
Mr. Stewart. I have got to tell you, flying jets was a lot
more fun than what I do now.
Secretary Kerry. As a pilot since I was in college, only
out of currency since I have been Secretary of State, I agree
with you.
Let me just say to you that you raise two issues there. Is
there any issue where they have worked with us? Well, they are
working with us on this right now. They put the interim
agreement in place over a year ago now. I think it was around
November we cut the treaty--the deal, not a treaty. So it has
been more than a year. They have done everything they said they
would do in the context of that.
They have also kept secret those things that we thought
needed to be kept secret as we worked through what could be a
final agreement. I mean, we operate under the rule nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed. And that means that whatever
we may have agreed over here we have got to keep, because it
may require one or the other to say yes to something that may
not be very popular back home, but may be defensible. But it
isn't defensible until you have the whole agreement.
They have not burned us with respect to that, nor we them,
and that has facilitated a kind of dialogue that is pretty
direct and open and allows us now to bear down on some of these
things. They recognize we have difficulties. We recognize they
have difficulties. And we all have bottom lines. That is in any
negotiation.
So the interim agreement is one example of trying to work
together on something. Now there are some things they have done
that help us, but we are not coordinating with them. We are not
working on it. We haven't asked them to do it. But, for
instance, fighting ISIL. They are totally opposed to ISIL, and
they are, in fact, taking on and fighting and eliminating ISIL
members along the Iraqi border near Iran and have serious
concerns about what that would do to the region and so forth.
So we have, at least, a mutual interest, if not a cooperative
effort.
But in the end, I emphasize to you, your second question
was how to reconcile the damage that they may have done or that
they could do to Israel in this. That is making a presumption,
if you don't mind my saying so, that we are not going to have a
deal here that, in our judgment, will absolutely protect
Israel. It is not just Israel, by the way. It is us. It is
every country in the region.
And it is not just us at the table trying to do this.
People need to focus on this. Russia is as adamant as we are
that Iran cannot engage in proliferation activities. China is
at the table. China has been helpful in this process, as has
Russia, by the way. Even in the midst of the fight over
Ukraine, Russia is working to help hold Iran accountable and
get a favorable agreement, as is China. And then we have
Germany, France, Great Britain, all at the table, all as
equally concerned about where this goes.
Then you have all the countries in the region, Turkey,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, they all
have a stake in this.
So we are not flying by the seat of our pants, nor are we
proceeding in a solo basis here. And everybody understands the
implications of the potential of their having a nuclear weapon.
Israel is not the only country. Others worry about it. So they
all want to see that we are trying to negotiate an agreement
which will meet a high standard of accountability and eliminate
the four pathways to a bomb: the Natanz pathway, the Iraq
pathway, the Fordow pathway, and then, of course, the potential
of a covert pathway.
Now, that is complicated. We have to proceed. But you have
to, also, measure this--I say carefully--against alternatives.
Presumptions may be being made here by some people that there
is an alternative way that you somehow get them to--you know,
it is like ``Men in Black,'' you can hold up a little flash pen
and flash it and they will forget everything they have learned
about fuel cycle or nuclear weapons or nuclear production,
peaceful nuclear production.
Do you think that is going to happen? Is there any notion
of reality in anybody's mind that says that we are going to
negotiate a deal where they have eliminated all of their know-
how? And if you don't have verification and if you don't have
insight as to what they are doing, there is a greater
likelihood they dig deeper under a mountain and do something
that you don't know and you wake up one day and, boom, they do
have something.
So you have got to ask yourselves what are the real
alternatives here. I hear people talk about dismantlement. I
mentioned the Bush administration from 2003 on where their deal
was no enrichment. But they just enriched away, and they
centrifuged away, and they went from 164 to 19,000. They did
that while they had sanctions, while there was a prohibition on
the policy, while there was a U.N. resolution. And so you have
got to stop and say, what is the best way to be able to
guarantee they don't get a bomb for the period of time to build
in the future as we begin to change a lot of other things,
hopefully?
Now, I will tell you this. I am not going to go into all of
it now. I want us to see if we have a deal before I put all the
arguments out there. But I am telling you there are many more
arguments than have been heard about why this is important, and
there are many more arguments than you will probably hear next
week. And we need to wait and see what deal we have before you
can really measure what it is that is at stake here and what
the options are and how you feel about it.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We have run out of
time. Mrs. Lowey has an issue she would like to bring up.
Mrs. Lowey. I don't think we have time to discuss it today,
but I would like to raise one point. I know Andy Lack was just
appointed head of the BBG, a talented person, very capable. I
know that you are investing $5 million, as announced by the
President, in Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications. We have failed. We have lost this war. And I
don't get it. As a proud Member of Congress, as a proud
American, I don't understand why we can't communicate more
effectively.
I have been asking this question for a very long time. We
are losing the public relations war. And while I think it is so
important, we can't discuss it today. It is called the Center
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. It is a $5
million program. We have $742 million in program done by BBG.
Together, I think we should figure out how we can be more
successful.
The President brought this up at the conference last week,
and I would love to get a briefing and understand why we are
losing this public relations battle.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I really want to engage in that
discussion with everybody. Russia today can be heard in
English. Do we have an equivalent that can be heard in Russian?
That is a pretty expensive proposition.
They are spending huge amounts of money with speaking
languages that other people understand and putting out
information that other people understand in other countries
around them, and we are not. We are beginning now to do this
with respect to ISIL, and so we are putting out things in Urdo,
we are putting out things in Somalia, we are putting out things
in Arabic.
But this is a big enterprise, folks. I am all for it. The
President is all for it. But it takes money. And we have got to
be prepared to invest in sort of that kind of marketing, if you
will, and the penetration. What we have allocated now under BBG
goes to Radio Free Asia, it goes to TV Marti, it goes to all
these various entities, it is split up, while the real
challenge is not as much there, to be honest with you, as it is
in some of these other places.
So we will all agree we ought to sit down and rethink it,
recommit, figure out how we are going to do this most
effectively. We haven't cornered the market on the wisdom of
that. But you are right, Andy Lack is a very capable guy. We
are hopeful that we are going to have a rejuvenation of that
effort. And we are sure to come back to you and talk to you
about some of the ways we could try to augment our initiatives.
Mrs. Lowey. Let me just say in conclusion, because we are
not going to have the discussion today, Walter Isaacson is a
pretty talented guy too. He headed it for a couple of years
before.
Secretary Kerry. Very talented guy.
Mrs. Lowey. We somehow have failed here, and I would be
interested in having a serious discussion.
Secretary Kerry. I will tell you what, I will commit to
come to you with a program that will lay out, together with all
of those folks you have just named, a stronger approach on
this, and I hope we can have a meeting of the minds on it.
Madam Chairwoman, with your indulgence, can I just say that
we remain as deeply committed now as I was in the very
beginning to trying to work something between the Palestinians
and Israelis. It has been made very, very difficult by virtue
of the Palestinian accession to the ICC, which we strongly
advised them not to do and said would be acting against their
own interests and the interests of a long-term resolution.
As everybody knows, there is a critical election in Israel
in the next weeks. We are assiduously not engaged and do not
want to get in the middle of that. It is up to the people of
Israel to make their own decision. Our hope is, however, that
when that decision is made and a government comes together, we
will have an opportunity to get back to the real work of peace
and of finding a road forward.
And the United States is deeply committed to that as
before, and we are working right now to help make sure the
Palestinian Authority doesn't collapse because of the lack of
revenues and the stress that they are under. But make no
mistake, that remains a major priority of many nations in the
region, and I hear it wherever I go.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Secretary, as we adjourn the meeting, I
have a request. Last year the House established the Benghazi
Select Committee. It is in all of our best interest for the
select committee's work to be completed as soon as possible. So
your assistance in ensuring sufficient resources are dedicated
to respond quickly to the select committee's requests is
appreciated.
Thank you again for your time today. This concludes today's
hearing.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you so much.
Ms. Granger. Members may submit any additional questions
for the record.
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs stands adjourned.
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Tuesday, March 17, 2015.
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WITNESS
HON. ALFONSO E. LENHARDT, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.
I want to welcome the Acting Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development, Ambassador Al Lenhardt.
Ambassador, we look forward to hearing your testimony and
certainly with working with you.
USAID responds to some of the most challenging problems in
the world, from tackling emergency situations, such as the
Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the humanitarian crisis in
Syria, to addressing long-term development needs in some of the
poorest, most conflict-stricken places around the globe. I am
proud of our men and women who serve overseas in our military
and USAID missions, the Peace Corps, and our embassies around
the world. I want to ensure that the United States continues to
lead on the world stage.
Real leadership requires the willingness to review what is
going well and what isn't. I believe there are many areas of
USAID that could see improvement that I hope we can work
together to address. My first concern is that there are many
U.S. Government agencies involved in health, development, and
disaster response activities overseas. I am concerned that
responsibilities may not always be clear, that agencies may
duplicate each others' efforts, and coordination may not occur
as it should.
As you well know, as a former ambassador to Tanzania, an
embassy that was attacked in the 1990s, desk space at U.S.
embassies comes with a high price because of the security
required. Overseas positions for all agencies should be
carefully considered to ensure that the work gets done
effectively and efficiently by the agency with the most
appropriate skills to address the problems at hand. There is no
room today certainly for replication of budgets.
Another challenge that former Administrator Shah tried to
address, is with the Feed the Future Initiative, and I hope you
will continue to do so with other programs as well.
In many countries USAID tries to do too much. The Agency
needs to continue focusing on reducing the numbers of programs
it manages and do those very well. You should terminate the
programs that don't work or may be causing you to spread the
Agency's people and resources too thin. I would love to work
with you on some of those.
My next concern is that it is difficult to get access to
USAID. There are many American businesses, faith-based
organizations, and universities that have development ideas to
bring to the table, and we consistently hear complaints that
they can't find ways to partner with the Agency. So I would
hope you would look at that.
Ambassador Lenhardt, with your military background and your
time spent as a diplomat, you bring a great perspective to the
Agency. I hope you can discuss some of the management
challenges that are directly related to your budget and we can
work together to solve them.
The budget request includes $22 billion that USAID manages
entirely or partially. This includes a $269 million increase
for USAID's operating expenses. It is, frankly, very unlikely
that our subcommittee's allocation would allow us to address
all the areas identified in the request, so we will have to
work closely together to prioritize many competing demands in
international development, health, and humanitarian programs.
I want to close by thanking you and the men and women of
USAID as well as your implementing partners, who are committed
to solving some of the most difficult global development issues
around the world, often in very dangerous places. All of us on
this subcommittee understand and appreciate that work.
I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her
opening remarks.
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Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Welcome, Acting Administrator Lenhardt. As a fellow New
Yorker, I welcome you to our subcommittee and I look forward to
discussing the President's vision for development and global
health.
We cannot build the world we want for ourselves and future
generations without a strong, stable, and well-resourced
development policy. USAID has spent the last several years
endeavoring to rebuild itself as a premier development agency
on the front lines of poverty reduction and disease eradication
while leading international efforts to advance economic
opportunity, health, education, food security, and democracy
activities.
The efforts of you and your AID colleagues, made possible
only by the continued generosity of the American taxpayer, make
us all proud. With so many challenges around the world it is
our responsibility to make sure that USAID has the tools to
prioritize global needs, effectively implement its programs,
and evaluate what is and what is not working. And when
challenges arise, Congress and the Agency need to speak frankly
on how to remedy them.
This year's request includes a significant increase for
Central America to address the root causes and rapid increase
in migration of unaccompanied minors. How does this initiative
build on previous efforts in the region and to what extent are
the Central American countries prepared to partner with you? I
know we agree that our chances of success are significantly
enhanced when local governments are fully engaged and prepared
to contribute. I hope you will also address the long-term plan.
I understand USAID cannot nor should be present in every
country in the world. Nevertheless, is this year's dramatic
increase for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia an attempt to make
up for the fact that USAID has not been very active in Eastern
Europe in recent years? Given Russia's continued provocation
against Ukraine and its neighbors, is the requested assistance
still adequate? How will USAID prioritize any new funding?
I was very pleased that the Congress provided $2.6 billion
in emergency funding to help combat the Ebola outbreak in West
Africa. The U.S. response continues to showcase USAID's ability
to lead international humanitarian efforts, particularly during
a time of crisis.
The outbreak also reinforced that robust national health
systems are an absolute necessity and that without one in place
crises are far worse, require far greater resources, and are
likely to reappear. I hope you will address how we can build an
appropriate health infrastructure to prevent another disease
outbreak.
I also need to raise two additional issues. First, basic
education funding. The fiscal year 2016 request once again cuts
current levels despite widespread agreement on the importance
of these programs to the United States and millions of children
around the world. I hope you will commit to working with me on
both the amount of resources and the quality of USAID's basic
education programs this year.
The second issue is family planning. Giving women some
measure of control over the size and spacing of their families
has long-lasting benefits to them, their children, and their
communities. I hope we can all work together this year to
address this basic need without partisan fights and divisive
policies.
In closing, as I have said before, the strength of USAID is
and always has been its dedicated public servants from the top
down. While I know we will all miss Administrator Shah's
tireless efforts, I look forward to working with you and to
building on the many endeavors started under his leadership.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
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Ms. Granger. Ambassador Lenhardt, please proceed with your
opening remarks. I would encourage you to summarize your
remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your
full written statement will be placed in the record. And we
understand that votes are going to be called about 3:30, so we
hope to have everyone be able to ask their questions. Thank
you.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, Ranking
Member Lowey, and members of this subcommittee, for allowing me
to discuss the fiscal year 2016 budget request for the United
States Agency for International Development.
Thanks to strong interagency partners and bipartisan
support in Congress, we are fortunate to have leaders
throughout government who understand the importance of
development to our own Nation's security and prosperity. At
USAID, we believe that by partnering to end extreme poverty and
promoting resilient democratic societies we are helping
developing countries transform into peaceful, open, and
flourishing partners for our own Nation.
As I testify today, my colleagues at USAID are supporting
that mission and representing our country in dynamic and
challenging environments around the world. We are rooting out
threats before they reach our shores, unlocking flourishing
markets for American businesses, and connecting our young
people and universities with global opportunities, all for less
than 1 percent of the federal budget.
This year's budget request advances our country's interests
while responding to pressing national security priorities all
over the world, from Nigeria to Honduras. By leveraging public-
private partnerships and harnessing innovation we are
maximizing the value of each and every dollar entrusted to us.
At the same time, we are making difficult choices about where
our work will have the greatest impact, shifting resources and
personnel to better advance our mission of ending extreme
poverty around the world.
These investments have delivered real, measurable results
on behalf of the American people. Our Feed the Future program
has helped 7 million farmers boost their harvests with new
technologies and improve nutrition for more than 12 million
children. Power Africa has mobilized $20 billion in private
sector commitments and encouraged countries to make critical
reforms. And thanks to a groundbreaking investment in child and
maternal survival, we are on track to save the lives of up to
15 million children and nearly 600,000 women by the year 2020.
These efforts are at the very core of the new way of doing
business at USAID. After 5 years of reform, I am confident our
Agency is now a more accountable and effective enterprise. Yet,
I am equally humbled by the challenges before us and recognize
that we have much more work ahead of us. That is why my focus
will be on one core discipline, management. I will push our
Agency to be more innovative and strategic in our effort to get
better every day, because while we may not have all the right
answers, we are asking the right questions. Above all, I will
ensure that we are good stewards of the precious resources
entrusted to us.
Spending over 30 years in the Army and becoming a two-star
general, and later as an ambassador to Tanzania, may not be the
typical path to a job in development. But even though my
journey was different from the development professionals with
whom I have the privilege to serve, my conclusion is the same:
America's investment in development is money well spent. Saving
children from hunger and disease elevates our own moral
strength. Empowering entrepreneurs to innovate and create new
markets advances our own prosperity. Strengthening civil
society not only gives a voice to the oppressed, but also makes
our own citizens more secure.
Through our work, we are opening up new paths to
opportunity, energizing the global economy, and reducing root
causes of insecurity. In doing so, we are advancing the values
that unite the American people and the people throughout the
world.
As we work to tackle these global challenges, we will value
your counsel on how we can become even more accountable and
more effective.
Thank you for your kind attention. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you so much.
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Ms. Granger. As you were talking about that, I remember
when I first came on this subcommittee and we were getting
ready to go and Mrs. Lowey was the chair. I received a call
that was from someone named Bono who said ``don't ever forget
you are saving lives.'' There is a difference, so thank you
very much.
I will go into questions. I have one question. Ambassador
Lenhardt, I know that you are aware of a recent press report
that the State Department funded an organization that has been
involved in trying to influence the upcoming elections in
Israel. USAID was not involved in that. But the question is,
how would you ensure that USAID wouldn't use U.S. taxpayer
dollars to fund organizations trying to influence elections,
including some of those of our closest allies?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Madam Chair.
We are not involved in that situation. And before we get
involved in any program, project, or activity we do a thorough
assessment as to the appropriateness of it. In our involvement
and our activities, we determine what are the outcomes and are
they legitimate outcomes, are they ones that we want to see,
and will they advance our committed work? And where the answer
may be no, we don't get involved. It is that simple. So this
particular case, I can assure you that we are not involved in
that.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, very much.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, the Ebola crisis
has reinforced how important functioning and capable country
health systems are. They are important not just for the
citizens of that country, but as Ebola has shown, they are
important to the safety of U.S. citizens as well. I was glad to
hear that the Liberian Government is planning their own
initiative to rebuild their health system.
If you could share with us the current planning for the
emergency fiscal year 2015 Ebola resources to focus on getting
these countries' health systems at least back on their feet, if
not better than they were before they were devastated by Ebola.
Number two, how are we building a focus on stronger health
systems into all of our global health work? And how does having
disease-specific funding impact work on cost-cutting issues
like health systems? And lastly, how is the Global Health
Security Agenda working to ensure that we are ahead of the next
disease outbreak, and what role is USAID playing vis-a-vis
other U.S. Government agencies?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Ranking Member Lowey, for your
question. It is one that certainly we have given a great deal
of thought in terms of our response. Your question is
multifaceted. I will tell you at the top of this, the men and
women who responded from our disaster assistance team were very
effective in coordinating a response that became one that
involved CDC, Department of Defense, State Department, and as
many other interagency teams in orchestrating the coordination,
the collaboration of all of our efforts aimed at stopping the
disease.
At the height of the disease in Liberia there were 100-plus
cases per week. I am happy to report now that we are near zero
in terms of getting down to a point where we can say that this
has been conquered. Guinea and Sierra Leone are being handled
by the French and Brits, but we are assisting there as well. We
are not walking away from that. We want to ensure that we
respond as much as possible across the entire breadth of this
epidemic.
With respect to resiliency of institutions in Liberia, we
are focused on that based upon the excellent and the great
support we got from the Congress in providing for the Ebola
emergency supplemental. Thank you very much for that. Those
resources will be used, in fact, to bring back and reconstitute
some of the institutions. Not all of them, as President
Sirleaf, who was in my office about 3 weeks ago, she wanted to
rebuild the entire country, and I said that was not possible,
but we are certainly looking at how we can, in fact, bring you
back up to a level where you then can take it forward and bring
about your own increase in institutions. Medical is one, but
also the economy, how might the economy be brought back,
because there was a significant hit to the economy in Liberia
as a result of this incident.
My point in all of that is to say simply, this is a disease
that America responded to with great resources, but also a
determination to ensure that we bring it down. We feel very
satisfied at this point in time that things are working, and we
will continue to do that to the point where we finally get this
thing under control and we can put it behind us.
With respect to the Global Health Security Agenda, it is
about detecting, early detection. It is about responding in an
appropriate way as quickly as we can and preventing future
incidents of this kind of epidemic.
Mrs. Lowey. I yield.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Let me just follow up on that question, and it is part of
the debate that takes place in the foreign assistance
community. I think indirectly she was referring to this. On one
hand, this committee will appropriate money to specific sub-
accounts for specific purposes. Some people say that is good.
Yet, it doesn't take into consideration that there are other
issues in the countries we are trying to help, like a health
system. The other side of the debate is that if you had more
flexibility then you could deal with the specifics, but you
could also deal with some of the broader issues that you might
run into in a particular country, which they might need more.
I am wondering what you think about that. We have
historically done a lot of specific appropriations, but from
time to time, we have realized that we miss out on the broader
picture. But if you have too much flexibility then we have a
hard time maintaining our oversight capability and knowing
where the money goes. Are you familiar with that debate, and is
that something you have thought about? Where do you come down
on that?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
I have given a great deal of thought to this. But the
reality is, in a constrained fiscal environment and competing
priorities we can't do everything. We have to be much more
selective and focus on those areas where we think we can do the
most good. As we, in the case of a particular country, are able
to get them up to a level where they then can make it on their
own, middle-income status, then we will work ourselves out of a
job in that country and move on to other locations where we
can, again, do the same kind of goodness.
The reality is, as many opportunities that we want to help
children, help mothers, help education, as was mentioned
earlier, we can't do everything. And so we have to be a lot
more thoughtful about where we can have solid impact. That is
what the Presidential policy directive 6 was all about. How do
we stop salami slicing across the world where no one gets well
and how do we focus then on those countries where we can bring
them up and then move on to others where we can bring them up--
--
Mr. Crenshaw. I figured that. It does make sense that,
when you do that specifically, you are also helping the country
in a broader sense as well and you are more focused.
I have got a little time. Let me ask a more specific
question about wildlife trafficking. You know that is a crisis.
It has become a multibillion industry, and there is a lot of
crime involved and criminal syndicates. I am pleased to see the
administration has taken this under its wing. Our subcommittee,
under Chairman Granger's leadership, in 2014 appropriated $45
million and last year $55 million.
Sometimes I hear that money is not getting down to where it
needs to be to really deal with the problem. I know it is a
complicated problem. On one hand, you look at Nepal, a very
poor country, but, as I understand it, 2 out of the last 3
years has had no poaching. I doubt if they spend $45 million or
$55 million.
So can you give us a little update on how that money is
being spent, and how effective that is? Because I think we want
to continue this fight. They tell me that almost every 15
seconds an elephant is killed illegally in Africa. It is a huge
crisis. So touch on how we are doing with the money we have
already spent or we have appropriated. Is it effective?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
Our programs are aimed at helping countries develop their
own capacity in terms of how they are going to manage many
types of conservation. How do they protect their heritage in so
many cases? And so it is about training, how do we get training
focused down to those rangers and other responding patrols who
are looking for poachers within a particular country.
You mentioned Nepal. It is about how do we get the Nepalese
to handle their own situation, how do they then communicate to
local residents so that local residents become part of the
solution. It is about conservation. It is about land
conservation where citizens within that country understand
their participation and their need to protect the local
environment so they keep poachers out. They know, by the way,
who the poachers are because many of them are taking money
right there on the scene. And so how do you back away from
that?
So the money that we have--and again, competing priorities,
constrained budgets--it is focused on how much good can we do.
In a perfect world, could we have more? The answer is yes. But
the reality is, with as many priorities, that would not be
wise.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Lenhardt. But it is a problem, and it is something
that we are addressing in a meaningful way.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Sure. Let me get into one issue, and I
also want to get into tuberculosis assistance that you have
been working on.
The two main concerns, that Congress has with USAID, and I
want to say it is an important agency for our country to be
able to handle the issues that you do. So it is a very
difficult agency, I am sure, to manage because there is also a
lot of money.
But you talk about how your priority was going to be
management. Let's talk about what your management style will
be. A lot of management has to be accountability. Are you going
to be using more technology? When you have money you have to
make sure that it is spent appropriately, and then come back to
us on transparency and accountability.
So let me get into a little bit more detail about your
management style and what you plan to do to try to deal with
some of the issues that your predecessor has been dealing with.
These changes aren't going to happen overnight, believe me, and
you do have a good agency. So if you could discuss your
management style, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
My style starts with people. It is all about people and
powering down the authority for people to do their job to the
lowest levels and then having them respond with that
expectation to do their jobs. And when it is not working, then
you have to correct for that. You have to fix it in some way,
either through training or, for that matter, replacing
individuals. But it is about the positive aspect of that and
releasing the energy that people have to do the job. You take
care of them, ensuring that they have the tools, they have the
training, and they have the development aspects of how to do
their job better.
But it does not exclude, and it wraps very neatly with
leveraging science, technology, innovation, and partnership. So
that is a major part of it. And if I can cite some of the work
that we are doing in USAID, it is about the Global Development
Lab that helps our professionals who are out there doing a job.
And by the way, they do superbly.
Madam Chair, I thank you very much for recognizing them for
the job that they do. They work in some very tenuous, dangerous
conflict areas of the world, and they do it with aplomb. They
do it with the knowledge that the activities they undertake
bring about a better world, and they do it without hesitation.
So all of that wraps around, I don't think you can separate
anything in particular, I have given you a sense of how I come
at things based upon my training both in the military, as well
as a diplomat running nonprofit organizations, philanthropic
organizations, for a very short period of time a business
operation as well, to tell you that it is about people. You
take care of people, they take care of everything else.
And then you check to make sure that the systems that are
in place to guarantee the efficiency, the effectiveness, and
getting as much out of the limited resources, that is working
for you as well. And when you need to make a midcourse
correction, you make that. Or for that matter, if the midcourse
correction says that you need to suspend, eliminate a program,
then you don't hesitate to do that, having made the right
judgments about how you come at it.
Mr. Ruppersberger. How many employees do you have at
USAID?
Mr. Lenhardt. Sir, I am sorry?
Mr. Ruppersberger. How many employees do you have at
USAID?
Mr. Lenhardt. The number of employees, it is just under
10,000, 9,800-and-some-odd. But, again, we are covering the
world.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am not complaining about it at all. I
think your answer was good. You are only as good as your
people. You have to give the people the resources to do the
job, hold them accountable, and you have to motivate them too.
But I would like you to just get a little bit more
specific, especially as it relates to money. When money comes
in you are going to have to have somewhere in your Agency to
track the money and then make sure the money is spent wisely
and held accountable. Do you have a team that does that?
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes, sir, we do. We have a team that is
focused specifically on that. We call it our Management Bureau.
But also within each of the bureaus, our pillar bureaus as well
as offices, everyone tracks their expenditures. They have to be
able to articulate what it is that they are doing, the
efficiency of that, and then how do they then rationalize the
work, the continued work on any particular project, initiative,
or program.
In addition to that, we have something we call the
Administrator's Leadership Council. And basically what it does
is determine at any point in time whether or not we are green,
amber, or red, and it takes a page from the old military
readiness report. Those things that are green, that is the
expectation. If it is amber, what do you need to bring it up to
the green category? And if it is red, what is the problem? How
do we fix that? What are the resources that you might need in
order to bring it up?
And so we do this routinely. It is done at least several
times a month, sometimes to our chagrin because it keeps
seeming to get rolled around faster each time. But we do it in
a very organized, a very methodical way of ensuring that we are
on the mark and that we have our systems that are checking and
evaluating to make sure that we are there. And when it is not,
then we back away.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, I got to know Mr. Shah over the last couple years
on this committee, and one of the things I tried to impress
upon him the most that was interesting to me was the Food for
Peace program. I wanted to ask you, generally speaking, with
regard to South Sudan, the U.N. Security Council describes
South Sudan's catastrophic food insecurity as one of the worst
in the world. There is a funding reduction in fiscal year 2016
from fiscal year 2014. The State Department and your Agency got
additional emergency funding.
My question is this: In order to reduce future demands for
this kind of emergency humanitarian assistance that can be
overly costly, how does your request help address long-term
food insecurity through agricultural development? I am
concerned because your fiscal year 2016 request only provided
for $10 million in the Food for Peace program, which is the
only program at USAID that focuses primarily on helping small
community farmers to become self-sufficient. Obviously, it is
the whole you can give people money or you can teach them how
to feed themselves analogy. So that is sort of the focus of my
question.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
Food for Peace is but one program whereby we reach out to
countries around the world and try to handle as many
humanitarian assistance--or disasters, in this case--as we can.
But it is not the only program. And so, in addition to Food for
Peace, we have a program Feed the Future. And Feed the Future,
as you mentioned, takes the approach of how do we teach
farmers, how do we teach people how to grow their own food, how
to become more food secure in their own right. And so Feed the
Future currently is working with 7 million farmers around the
world and feeding 12.5 million children nutritious foods,
preserving their lives.
I will tell you that in the case of Tanzania we had farmers
who had increased their yield beyond anything they ever
imagined, in some cases twofold, whereby they not only provided
for their own families, but also had enough that they sold at
market and therefore increasing their own ability to do other
things with the money, send their children to school, have a
better life.
As lamentable as the situation in Sudan is, we are having
success in a number of areas. Where the Sudanese cannot farm,
then we are providing that support.
My point in all of that is to say that there is an
integration of our humanitarian assistance across the board,
across many programs, focused again on how can we bring relief
to as many people as possible. And we are doing that. The
American people are reaching out to people of the world.
And in many cases that I saw in Africa the response is very
positive, very favorable towards Americans, because it is
really the connection people to people that merely solidifies
what I see as our own security, advances our own security, as
well as our own prosperity. Because those countries, once they
come up to a standard where they can start acting on their own,
they start partnering with us. They are our allies. They become
vanguards of democracy wherever they may be in the world.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, General. I look forward to working
with you on this, specifically with regard to South Sudan, as
we move forward.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you. First of all, I want to
congratulate you on the positive aspects of the work that you
do at the Agency that is throughout the world.
There is a question that I should have asked 25 years ago
when I came to Congress that has always been on my head and I
never asked it, and it has to do with Cuba.
Cuba does not, even though things may change, Cuba does not
trust and we spend a lot of time criticizing Cuba. Yet your
Agency was in Cuba. Now, Cuba doesn't open its doors to any
other American Government agency being there, and I know you
didn't invade them by force. So what kind of agreement was
there that would allow your Agency to be in Cuba.
And secondly, notwithstanding what we think about the Cuban
system, whenever they accused us of meddling in their system
and trying to change it, what kept them from kicking us out? I
mean, it is all very confusing, this relationship between USAID
and Cuba.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
Cuba is but one example, but we operate in a number of
closed societies around the world, bringing democratic ideals
to those countries, bringing to those countries support to
civil society within those countries, and then, finally,
ensuring as much as we can and trying to bring about the access
to independent media, information within, and let's say the
example used, within Cuba, among people. It is all about how
can we inspire as much goodness.
We do also have in Cuba humanitarian assistance to family
members of prisoners, political prisoners of one description or
another, from the standpoint of health, food aid, in some cases
providing learning.
So it is not a question necessarily that we are doing
anything nefarious as much as we are doing what we can to
advance democracy.
One of the things that I mentioned----
Mr. Serrano. General, if you will forgive me. I understand
that, and that is very commendable.
My question is, how did you get there? Did they say it is
okay for you to come in and try to undo our system? I mean,
there is a part here that has always confused me. How did the
Cuban Government, who is not friendly to us and we are not
friendly to them for over 50 years, say this Agency is okay to
come in, even though at times we will arrest one of them or
imprison one of them because they are doing what they are not
supposed to be doing. I am totally confused. I can see it from
other agencies that do it in a covert situation, but you don't
operate that way. So maybe it is a question that can't be
answered.
Mr. Lenhardt. Sir, I cannot answer it specifically as much
as to say our brand is well known throughout the world, and so
there are many, I am sure--I suspect, I suspect--there are
places where people wink at the fact that we are there in
closed spaces doing our work.
And by the way, on closed spaces, part of what came out of
the Cuban example is that we developed a new framework, an
operating framework, so that we know what we are doing, how we
are doing it, and ensuring that our implementing partners, who
are valuable members of our team as well, understand the
working in closed societies and the danger of that, and so that
they then protect themselves and they then report up to us as
to what is going on so that we have a sense of is it time for
us to leave potentially--the potential of that rather--and the
fact that we are committed to ensuring transparency, as well as
balancing that with security.
And so that is the example that came out of the Cuban
situation. And it is one where, as the Deputy Administrator,
when I came in Dr. Shah said to me, I want you to get this
under control and figure out how we then respond. And so we
review it on a periodic basis, at least quarterly, coming back
to me to ensure that those countries that are closed to us, we
know how people are operating within those countries and
ensuring, again, transparency, as well as balancing it with
security.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Ambassador, nice to see you. I am confused by
something, and I would like you to clarify it up front. When
Mrs. Lowey, our ranking member, greeted you, she said so as a
fellow New Yorker. When I said hello to you, you gave me the
secret Cornhusker handshake? So what is it, Nebraska or New
York?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Fortenberry. I will stop.
Mr. Lenhardt. I graduated from the University of Nebraska
that I am very proud of.
Mr. Fortenberry. Yes.
Mr. Lenhardt. And I lived in Omaha, Nebraska.
Mr. Fortenberry. I just needed to get this on the record.
Mr. Lenhardt. I am also a New Yorker.
Mr. Fortenberry. But you had a wonderful experience in
Nebraska, and I am glad you did, and so you are always welcome
back home, so to speak.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Fortenberry. I enjoyed your initial presentation where
you talked about your own background as a soldier, having spent
time as well as a private sector manager. Now you are in a new
fight, a new type of fight, fighting poverty, fighting for
values, fighting really for, frankly, international stability
and the future of civilization.
In regards to why we do this, why we spend a little bit of
taxpayer money in this area, it is sometimes a hard question to
ask, constituents ask it, because seemingly there is such
little gratitude for what America does around the world.
I try to answer it like this: That it is very hard for
Americans to sit idly by while other people just die. That is
not who we are. Secondly, we benefit from this exchange that
takes place, both economically, as well as culturally. And
third is, smart development is actually inextricably
intertwined with international stability and that creates the
conditions for our own national security. The military tells
me, send us in last, do everything you can to promote smart
diplomacy, smart development, and smart security outcomes.''
So your work is very important, and I like the enthusiasm
that you are bringing to it and, frankly, the commitment to
answering that hard question that the taxpayer deserves--why
are we doing this?--and to holding the Agency accountable in a
transparent way to the necessity to be effective and efficient.
And I assume you are going to carry on the good work of
Ambassador Shah in trying to develop the metrics that actually
show that.
In this regard, I have two questions. One is, to focus on
the Middle East, there is a dire humanitarian crisis in Iraq
and through many areas of the Middle East flowing from the
ruthless persecution of Christians, Yazidis, innocent Muslims,
as well as other minority faith traditions. Many people are
crying out for help, help to be able to defend themselves, as
well as help for the displaced population.
So it is a heavy lift. This is not fully your job, but it
is a heavy lift. And I understand that your partners, USAID
partners have been able to reach some internally displaced
people, but it is a significant minority.
Also, the other problem is that it is my understanding the
people that you tend to be reaching are the ones housed in
refugee camps, defined areas, versus other refugees flowing
into other countries that still do need assistance but maybe
aren't concentrated in one place.
The second question I have goes to what our Chairwoman
Granger raised regarding potential new partnerships with our
own universities in the area of higher education, but also in
the innovative and smart program of USAID, Feed the Future.
Suddenly, development aid, as it exists through new innovative
sustainable agricultural practices, has become cool. And I
never thought agricultural policy would be cool, having been
studying it myself years ago. But nonetheless to tap into the
energy of the next generation and to further consolidate our
efforts at partnerships with the universities who have
complementary resources I think would be a good outcome for the
efficiency goals that you have outlined.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. I
will start by saying that your observation----
Ms. Granger. Long days.
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Your observation is
right on target with respect to soldiers having to fight. It is
a lot more expensive than development. And so that is the
choice that we first use, development as opposed to sending
soldiers in.
The second part of that is religious groups. In all of our
work, in all of our humanitarian assistance, we don't target
necessarily groups as much as we look at people in need. And
within that group the people in need, both in Syria, as well as
Iraq and other places, there are religious minorities. There
are people who are receiving the benefit of our food aid,
water, and health, as well as other services that we provide.
And so that is happening. And so we are not targeting groups as
much as we are opening the door for as many people.
In the case of Syria, for instance, I would just say that
all of the work we are doing, certainly there is a huge
minority there in the Shi'as to begin with, but also Christians
within that Syrian community as well.
There are a couple of categories. There are refugees, but
there are also internally displaced persons. And in Syria, that
is almost 8 million people, and up to 4 million who are outside
in Lebanon, Turkey, or for that matter Jordan.
So those things are happening in a way that I feel
comfortable in saying that, in a constrained environment,
reduced with resources, that we can't prioritize everything
that is happening, and we are servicing those various
communities.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
Good to see you, Mr. Lenhardt, and congratulations once
again. And I look forward to working with you on so many issues
that are so important to really the survival of many
populations of people, children, vulnerable persons, people
living with HIV and AIDS, mothers. Your work is so important in
terms of the development of not only underdeveloped countries,
but just in terms of the development of human beings so that
they can live decent, healthy lives. So thank you very much.
A couple of questions that I have quite naturally following
up on Mr. Serrano's question as it relates to Cuba, and also
the countries that you mentioned where USAID operates in closed
societies. I have oftentimes visited countries around the world
where people are concerned about USAID workers because they are
not sure what they are doing. They are not sure if they are
working for the CIA and USAID. And I think this really puts a
lot of our staff and contractors at risk, i.e., Alan Gross.
The contract--and we have talked about this--that Alan
Gross was working on seemed to be perfectly reasonable,
bringing in telecommunications, communications equipment to
help set up a communications system where people could
communicate with each other. Reasonable.
But I don't believe, because I was very involved in the
whole case, that Alan knew that this contract that he was
working under and the work that he was conducting was forbidden
by law by the host country where he was doing the work, and so
we know what happened.
And so I am wondering now, have you had a chance to go back
and look--and we raised this before, Congresswoman Lowey and
myself, with Mr. Shah--looked at these contracts to see if
there are some disclaimers on it that if you are engaged in
bringing support to civil society, if you are engaged in these
democracy promotion programs that clearly, one, are against the
laws of another country, do workers and contractors know that
and that they could be subject to arrest? I mean, I think that
we have an obligation to let our people know that they could be
arrested by doing this work.
And then, third, let me just ask you, as it relates to the
countries where USAID is operating, how do we know what
countries you are operating in doing this democracy work? Is it
clear? Is it public? Are you transparent about that? I mean, I
didn't know about the work, I heard about the work in Cuba, but
I never could put my hands on it until it was exposed. So how
do we know where you are doing this work?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, Congresswoman, for your question.
To begin with, yes, in fact we are very cognizant of the work
that we do and we operate in very dangerous environments, as I
spoke of earlier, our implementing partners as well. And so, as
I mentioned that framework earlier in terms of the Cuba
question in response to Cuba, this framework gives a very
specific approach to operating in closed societies or, for that
matter, conflict areas, in terms of how do you protect
yourself, what should you be considering, and how do we
continually assess whether or not the situation may become
untenable to the point where we have to curtail our activities.
But the thing that we have learned is that local
implementing partners know basically what is going on in the
area so they can respond.
Ms. Lee. But that is after the fact, Mr. Lenhardt. I am
talking about up front.
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes.
Ms. Lee. How do people who willingly do this kind of work
know up front that they could be either perceived as a CIA
operative or they are working against the laws of the country,
I won't even call it the host country, but the country that
they are in, that could be perceived as----
Mr. Lenhardt. Ma'am, if I may, we are very transparent in
our activities and there's nothing nefarious. There is no cloak
and dagger. There is nothing that would suggest that our brand,
which is a very recognized, very respected brand around the
world, is going to be put in jeopardy to the point where we are
doing something that could come back to either embarrass us or
to create a major problem.
Ms. Lee. But it has in the past. And I am just wondering
how we can get the information, this committee, this
subcommittee, on where we are operating in this manner and what
we are doing.
Mr. Lenhardt. Ma'am, I can say sitting here that we are
not operating in a manner that tracks with the CIA or, for that
matter, any other intelligence organization. I say that with
great confidence.
Ms. Lee. Okay. But just operating then in closed
societies, doing the democracy promotion programs, is there a
public list that we could have so we can kind of look at where
USAID is doing the type of work that it is doing now in Cuba?
Mr. Lenhardt. Ma'am, we can provide that to you. The
answer is, yes, we can provide that to you.
Ms. Lee. Okay.
Mr. Lenhardt. And gladly.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
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Ms. Granger. Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
And thank you, Ambassador. I am going to follow up a little
bit on what Mr. Crenshaw had been talking about a few moments
ago, and I want to give you a little bit more time to
elaborate, I think, on your answer.
One of the frustrations I have heard by those working in
USAID projects is the inflexibility of funding. When I was in
Ethiopia a few years ago that was a common refrain I heard: We
have money in the HIV/AIDS account, but we need to move the
money to malaria or tuberculosis or some other health issue,
for example. But the funding flexibility wasn't there, and so
they couldn't transition that money to malaria prevention, for
example, even where in a country where AIDS may have been more
stabilized and under control than had been the case.
What can we on this committee do to ensure that USAID and
its partners are able to make the most effective use of these
appropriated funds? Are there statutory changes that need to be
made to provide this flexibility to you?
Mr. Lenhardt. As I understand the question, sir, whether
or not we have funds that move from one account to another,
sir, we have within global health objectives to reduce child
and maternal deaths, as I mentioned, but also an AIDS-free
generation and approaching and preventing infectious diseases.
And so if you are asking the question, is it possible as we see
the drawdown in one disease to move it to another disease, is
that----
Mr. Dent. Yeah. Within a country, that is a common
refrain, or they need money for fistula, for example, for
women's health, they can't move the money. There is money
available, but it can't be spent on the account in which it is
in. There is no flexibility with limited dollars out there. I
would rather be able to give you more flexibility to move money
where it is needed rather than trying to appropriate additional
funds that may not be necessary in every case.
Mr. Lenhardt. But, again, within the global health
account, sir, we do have some flexibility to do that based upon
the need. But, again, it is sometimes about competing
priorities. And that is the biggest driver, more so than
anything else, competing priorities. Would it be possible for
us to be everywhere in the world? We can't do that. We don't
have the resources.
Mr. Dent. And I am not asking you to. But that is the
complaint I heard in the field from our people out there, that
there is money available, but we can simply not move it to
where it could be most beneficially spent.
And now the second question I had, your predecessor, Raj
Shah, had been applauded for bringing a business-minded
approach to the Agency's operations, and by and large the model
appears to be working pretty well.
Can you tell us what objective metrics USAID is currently
using to evaluate the effectiveness of its projects?
Mr. Lenhardt. Which projects, sir?
Mr. Dent. Just how are you measuring the effectiveness,
what are the metrics you are using to evaluate the
effectiveness of the programs under your jurisdiction?
Ms. Granger. Before you answer that, could I say they have
called votes. There are still 308 that haven't voted. We have
two, Ms. Wasserman Schultz and Diaz-Balart, who haven't had a
question.
Mr. Lenhardt. Okay.
Ms. Granger. So we are going to try to do that.
Mr. Dent. That is my last question, though.
Mr. Lenhardt. Okay.
Sir, we use a number of methods to evaluate our programs.
We use a tiered system in some cases based upon independent
evaluations, but also those who are on the ground, our
implementing partners. We also have our USAID personnel who are
on the scene evaluating programs as well.
And so it is a tiered approach. It is multifaceted. It
comes across as looking for the golden thread that weaves
itself throughout to ensure that we are getting maximum benefit
from our programs. And where it doesn't work, and I will give
you a couple examples, if I may. In the last couple of years we
have conducted about 243 evaluations of one description or
another. Fifty percent of those caused us to rethink, reprogram
our direction with respect to a particular activity. And in a
couple of cases, we suspended the program, we stopped the
program. In the case of Malawi we stopped a program based upon
it was no longer effective.
So there is that evaluation that guides some decisions.
Again, how do we conserve, how do we ensure those limited
resources, constrained priorities, limited resources and
constrained budgets are being effective and how they are being
used? And so we continue to make those assessments.
I am trying to get a handle on the question as much as
anything. But I assure you we have those processes underway and
we evaluate. We have a team that also looks at it from the
standpoint of whether it make sense on what we are doing, and
how then do we ensure that the outcomes that we expect are
being realized. And where they are not, then we make
adjustments.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador,
welcome. Good to see you.
Congressman Diaz-Balart and I sponsored the 1,000 Days
resolution last year to call attention to that window in which
we have an opportunity to really make a difference when it
comes to the nutrition and future health of a young child.
So that made it somewhat disappointing that there was a 12-
percent cut in nutrition funding in the President's budget, and
I would like to ask you to explain how are we going to continue
to make sure that we can be a leader and leverage other
countries in what is really a vital area. Now, I ask that
question knowing that we have the Multi-Sectoral Nutrition
Strategy and that we are trying to line up the resources with
the strategy and the goals. But, you know, in the meantime,
that strategy is not complete, and we want to make sure that we
can maintain that leadership role and maintain momentum. So if
you could answer that.
I will just ask my second question since I know we have
votes at the same time. I am concerned, even though we have not
had any major national disasters that required a global
emergency response, thankfully, recently, we have humanitarian
needs that are alarming around the world. We have to make sure
that we have adequate response capabilities, and the budget
request has a 13-percent cut to humanitarian funding which
includes significant decreases in both the migration and
refugee and international disaster assistance account. So can
you also talk about how we are going to be able to maintain
those adequate response capabilities given that proposed cut?
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you. Thank you, Congresswoman. To
begin with, our fiscal year 2016 request for nutrition,
recognizing the absolute importance of nutrition for children,
both from the standpoint of physical wellbeing as well as their
mental development, we have a number of other integrated
programs for nutrition. Feed the Future is but one, but also
specifically within the global health account and global health
programs, nutrition has been identified separately. But across
all of those accounts, we are well positioned to provide for
nutritional value to children as well as to mothers.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, we are talking
about recognizing and providing for 15 million children. With
mothers, it is 600,000 by----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. So, forgive me for interrupting,
Ambassador, but are you realizing efficiencies in that proposed
cut? I mean----
Mr. Lenhardt. It is a combination of efficiencies, but it
is also recognizing that many of these efforts, again, in a
constrained environment, and we are not saying that we are
leaving children behind or not caring for them as much. We
can't do everything. And so, in a budget-constrained
environment and competing priorities, this is where we are. But
we feel that what we are providing is workable, and it is
solving a problem that we both know is something that needs to
be addressed.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Ambassador, again, you are----
Mr. Lenhardt. If you are asking, should we be putting more
money to it----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. This isn't about whether we put
more or less money into it. It is about making sure that we can
maintain our leadership role, and in the interim, until we have
that multisector plan in place----
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. That we not roll
backwards.
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. And so I understand that we can't
be everything to everyone. That is not what I am suggesting. I
want to make sure that with a proposed 13-percent cut, we are
able to maintain that leadership and not go backwards----
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. In terms of the
ability for us to provide assistance for children that badly
need it.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, ma'am. I understand. But, again,
we have nutrition integrated in other programs as well that is
not part of that one identified area within global health. So
that is happening. I will continue to look at that and make
sure that we are being responsive as much as possible, but I am
seeing the evidence of that. I saw it as the Ambassador to
Tanzania, where the difference between a child who has been
provided nutritional-valued foods and one who is not, is
significant.
The second part of that had to do with Ebola. Did I not
answer----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. No, you didn't.
Ms. Granger. Could we go to Mr. Diaz-Balart, and then come
back if we still have time to your second question?
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Sure. I think we have to vote, so I
don't know that we are going to be able to.
Ms. Granger. I think we only have----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I will be very brief, Madam
Chairwoman.
And, again, thank you for your service to our country. You
have been serving our country for many, many years. A couple of
points, and it sounded like you are very committed to the
democracy programs. Is that correct?
Mr. Lenhardt. Yes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. All right. And, obviously, democracy
programs seem to be--are in closed societies. They are not in
Liechtenstein, right, so they tend to be potentially dangerous,
and you have spoken about that.
With that in mind, I just want to bring you back to
Venezuela. I don't have to tell you about the situation in
Venezuela. The administration has been kind of taken aside. The
Secretary of State said that he was compounded by the situation
in Venezuela, and yet the House has consistently put--last year
$8 million for democracy programs in Venezuela. The request
from the administration is $5.5 million. Any chance that there
will be an amendment to that request of $5.5 million since the
administration is now realizing that we seem to have a serious
issue with Venezuela and the lack of democracy therein?
Mr. Lenhardt. And, sir, I cannot answer the specific
question. It is something that--in terms of a dollar amount--
but, again, it is about human rights. It is about independent
media, and it is providing for, in the case of Venezuela,
transparent electoral processes. But, with respect to a dollar
amount, I cannot answer that from the administration's point of
view.
But, again, we operate in those places because there is a
need, because that is who we are as Americans in outreach to
countries and the world, trying to, as much as possible,
encourage democratic institutions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, I am glad to hear that, I mean,
about your commitment to that. This committee has always been
committed to that. I think you are going to see--that emphasis,
not only in Venezuela, but in Cuba and elsewhere, and look
forward to working with you on that.
And I know I am out of time.
Mr. Lenhardt. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Ambassador Lenhardt. Thank you
again for your time.
This concludes today's hearing. And Members may submit any
additional questions for the record.
The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs stands adjourned.
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Wednesday, March 18, 2015.
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS
WITNESS
HON. JACK LEW, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs will come to order.
I would like to welcome Secretary Lew before the
subcommittee to discuss the fiscal year 2016 budget request for
the Treasury Department's International Affairs Programs.
The funding under review today supports contributions to
international financial institutions, such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, global climate change
programs, debt relief, and technical assistance programs.
The budget request totals $3.1 billion, a 28 percent
increase above fiscal year 2015. This funding level reflects
the Congressional Budget Office's higher scoring of the IMF
proposal than that of the administration.
This is the third year that the administration has
requested authority and funding for the IMF. In the past, there
has not been sufficient congressional support for the IMF
proposal. And, frankly, I don't expect much to change this
year.
Turning to the World Bank and the regional development
banks, I have continued to express concerns about multiyear
funding commitments made to these institutions. The
administration argues that these organizations give us more
``bang for the buck'', but I question whether these
multilateral institutions are being held to the same standards
as our bilateral programs.
The banks' lack of transparency in allocating funds and
decision-making hurts their support in Congress. Increasingly,
it seems the United States is one of the only voices demanding
responsiveness and accountability.
I would like to hear from you today about the efforts these
institutions are making to publicly track funding and provide
independent evaluations of program effectiveness.
Last year the administration made a multi-billion-dollar
pledge to the new Green Climate Fund. When you commit the
United States to controversial programs that are unlikely to be
fully funded by the Congress, the administration puts the
credibility of the United States on the line. Mr. Secretary, I
hope you can discuss this more with the subcommittee today.
Finally, while the Treasury Department's role in U.S.
policy toward Cuba lies more in the jurisdiction of the
Financial Services Subcommittee, this subcommittee is also
closely following the administration's move to normalize
relations with Cuba, and I have deep concerns.
Secretary Lew, thank you for being here today. We have many
important topics to discuss.
I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her
opening statement.
Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming our distinguished
person here today. Thank you so much for your service to our
country.
I appreciate you coming before us today to present the
administration's budget request for the coming fiscal year. As
a former director of the Office of Management and Budget, you
are keenly aware of the factors that go into the preparation of
an annual budget proposal. It really is a statement of values.
The administration's fiscal year 2016 proposal calls for
investments in research, education, training, and
infrastructure. Instead of relying on the outdated and
unrealistic budget caps under sequestration, the President
calls for them to be replaced with more targeted spending cuts,
program integrity measures, and the closure of some outdated
tax loopholes. The budget rightly calls for an end to the
mindless austerity of sequestration.
My colleagues may not agree with the administration's
specific proposals, but I hope they can agree on the premise
that a path forward must be found. We did it before with the
Murray-Ryan plan, and we are going to have to do it again.
There is simply no way an appropriations process can
succeed unless we put in place reasonable allocations that give
these bills a chance of being enacted. Without such an
agreement, discretionary funding would be at its lowest level
as a percentage of GDP since the Eisenhower administration.
The President's 2016 budget request reflects the importance
of our continued multilateral cooperation with international
financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. It
continues important efforts to address root causes of
instability, poverty, poor health, lack of education, as well
as continues to promote global economic growth.
Additionally, the President's budget continues to promote
our own economic and national security interests while also
making important investments in multilateral institutions,
recognizing these are a cost-effective way to leverage taxpayer
dollars.
To that point, I remain perplexed by some of my colleagues
who continue to oppose quota reform for the IMF while
simultaneously warning of the risk if the European financial
crisis deepens or if a fresh regional economic crisis were to
emerge surrounding Ukraine.
The IMF is an excellent tool to help stabilize struggling
economies. It provides much needed protection of our own
financial institutions in the event of a foreign financial
emergency. Unless we support the IMF, I fear the potential
effects on our economy would be far worse. I believe we need to
maintain our leadership within the IMF, expand its lending
capacity, and support the quota reforms.
While there are a myriad of issues we can discuss today,
one I hope receives priority is global climate change. As we
are all now beginning to better understand climate change, it
is not just an environmental concern.
These important programs help reduce the instability caused
by population displacement, address declines in global food
supply, mitigate major shortages of water. A failure to provide
for these priorities risks creating conditions for greater
danger, failed states, and populations even more vulnerable to
radicalization.
I look forward to hearing about the administration's
efforts in the coming fiscal year as well as hearing an update
on the effectiveness of prior funding.
Mr. Secretary, we have discussed before the fine work your
Department has done in disrupting terrorist financing networks
and enforcing sanctions against countries such as Russia, Iran,
and North Korea. I continue to be impressed by the work of the
Treasury Department and want to commend, in particular, the
sustained implementation of these efforts as the backbone of
our Iran policy.
I hope to hear what additional economic actions and
sanctions the administration will seek if negotiations with
Iran fail to yield an agreement permanently denying Iran
nuclear weapons capability. Equally, your leadership is crucial
in implementing two key prongs of the administration's response
to the Ukraine crisis: economic support for Ukraine and
sanctions against Russia.
With respect to Russia, I look forward to hearing more
about what role our European partners will play in addressing
the current situation. I would like to hear directly whether we
should expect additional retaliatory countermeasures from
Russia and, if so, what form those may take.
Lastly, I hope you will address recent concerns that have
been raised about some donors providing loans instead of grants
as contributions to multilateral institutions. The committee
needs to understand what the implication of this trend is for
the United States contributions to these organizations.
Thank you for being with us today. Our country, once again,
is privileged to have your experience and thoughtful
leadership.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
I will now yield to Chairman Rogers for his opening
statement.
Opening Statement by Chairman Rogers
Mr. Rogers. Chairwoman Granger and Ranking Member Lowey,
thank you for holding this important hearing.
Mr. Secretary, good to see you. Thank you for coming in
support of your 2016 budget request for international affairs.
Unquestionably, the international programs that fall under
your purview at Treasury have an important role to play in
fostering U.S. leadership around the globe. Given the
tumultuous times in which we find ourselves, this leadership is
perhaps more important than ever before.
When Secretary Kerry testified before this committee 3
weeks ago, we heard from him about the global coalition joined
in the fight against ISIL, the threats posed to our allies in
the Middle East by a nuclear Iran, Russia's bold moves to
assert herself in the region, and how the U.S. can help address
the spread of disease and epidemics around the world. These are
just a few examples.
I say this to make the point that our contributions to
international financial institutions must be targeted to ensure
that we are promoting what Secretary Kerry called ``the best
enhancement of our values and our interests.''
With due respect, Mr. Secretary, I am not sure we see eye
to eye on some of these investments, to put it mildly. I would
like to focus my comments today on your budget proposals,
particularly the International Monetary Fund and the Green
Climate Fund and the proliferation of policies affecting the
U.S. coal industry and power generation for the developing
world.
Taking CBO's scoring of the IMF proposal into
consideration, Treasury's international programs request totals
$3.1 billion. That is a whopping 28 percent increase over
current levels. You know and I know that the committee will not
be able to find that level of funding and stay within our
discretionary allocation.
As the chairwoman noted, the administration has once again
made an IMF proposal that has not had sufficient support in
previous Congresses, and the new Green Climate Fund proposal is
particularly questionable.
Next, Mr. Secretary, I have serious concerns about the
administration's position on coal-fired power generation in
developing countries. The President's politically driven anti-
coal environmental policies have wreaked havoc domestically,
sending tens of thousands of hardworking Americans to the
unemployment lines and casting into question our country's
long-term energy security.
Coal exports are the one bright spot for the thousands of
mining families who are facing disastrous economic conditions
in my district and elsewhere. And, yet, administration
officials are not only interested in precluding U.S. investment
in foreign coal-fired generation, but the U.S. is actively
encouraging our international partners, such as members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to
impose near-impossible conditions on the public financing of
coal plants in the developing world. The results of these
policies are troubling.
First, I believe what we will see is significant Chinese
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. With China's terrible
environmental record, the projects they will fund will be
dirtier than if American companies were involved. At the end of
the day, these policies are anti-American jobs and they will
not have the intended environmental benefits either.
Second, the international community will not make
investments in efficient coal plants in places like Pakistan or
Ukraine. Given our national security interests in those
countries, the U.S. should be encouraging affordable and
reliable electricity that can bolster economic growth and job
creation there, in turn, reducing instability. I hope you can
explain how these policies are in the long-term interest of our
country and our allies and partners.
Mr. Secretary, we thank you for being here today. This
committee takes seriously our role in overseeing the budget and
the policies of the Treasury Department. And we appreciate your
continued engagement with us.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Secretary Lew, please proceed with your
opening remarks. I would encourage you to summarize your
remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your
full written statement will be placed in the record.
Opening Statement by Secretary Lew
Secretary Lew. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, Ranking
Member Lowey, Chairman Rogers, and members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today on our proposed
budget for our international programs.
As we meet here today, the U.S. economy continues to make
considerable progress. By almost every metric, America has come
a long way since the depths of the worst recession since the
Great Depression. Last year we saw the best year of job growth
since the 1990s.
Over the past 5 years, America's businesses have created 12
million new jobs, the longest stretch of sustained private-
sector job growth in our Nation's history. At the same time,
our economy continues expanding and forecasts project above-
trend growth for this year.
American exports set another record last year for goods and
services sold overseas, and our fiscal deficit, which has
fallen by almost three-quarters, is forecast to decline even
further in the next fiscal year. These achievements underscore
America's enduring economic strength, and we can build on this
progress with the right policies and bipartisan cooperation.
The President's Budget puts forward sensible solutions to
keep our progress going, including replacing sequestration by
cutting spending and closing tax loopholes. This commonsense
plan would continue to rein in the deficit and put the debt on
a downward path as a share of the economy.
If Congress does not act, defense and nondefense funding
will fall when adjusted for inflation to their lowest levels in
a decade. This would damage our national security, and it will
keep us from making the investments that we need in key
priorities to grow our economy.
But we do not need to follow this course. With the right
policies, we can fuel economic growth, job creation, and
opportunity while strengthening our national security, driving
long-term prosperity.
The international financial institutions, which include the
International Monetary Fund and the multilateral development
banks (MDBs), are a critical part of this effort. Our
investments in these institutions are some of the most cost-
effective ways to reinforce economic growth at home and to
respond to critical challenges abroad.
To that end, it is essential that Congress pass the IMF
quota reforms. These reforms will put the IMF's finances on a
more stable footing over the long term, help modernize IMF
governance structure, and preserve America's strong influence
within the IMF and, more broadly, as a leader of the
international financial institutions.
As the international community waits for Congress to
approve these reforms that we helped to design, emerging and
developed economies alike are looking to other alternatives as
a means of driving the global system forward.
Our continued failure to approve the IMF reforms is causing
other countries, including some of our allies, to question our
commitment to the multilateral institutions that we helped
create. Until these reforms are in place, the United States
runs the risk of seeing its preeminent role in these
institutions eroded, especially as others are establishing new
and parallel institutions.
The fact is the IMF reforms will help convince emerging
economies to remain anchored in the multilateral system that
the United States helped design and continues to lead. These
reforms are a win-win for the United States. They retain our
veto power and they do not increase our financial commitment.
That is why we are determined to continue to work with Congress
to get these reforms passed as soon as possible.
As a clear example of the IMF's role in promoting American
security and economic interests, the IMF is providing Ukraine
with critical financial and technical support. The IMF is a
cornerstone of a broad international effort to support Ukraine
amid extraordinary circumstances, and it recently approved an
augmented longer term program that will allow Ukraine to pursue
a sustained set of economic reforms.
Similarly, our investments in the World Bank and the
regional development banks are key to advancing America's
economic and strategic interests. My full statement that I
submitted for the record lays out in detail how the MDBs help
grow export markets, increase opportunities for American
businesses, create jobs in the United States, and protect our
national security.
I would like to highlight quickly a few of the areas where
these institutions have recently advanced our priorities.
In Ukraine, the MDBs have stepped in to address the crisis
and stabilize the country, increasing their commitments to
nearly $5 billion.
In Central America, they are working to spur stronger
economic growth, which will help address the root causes of the
flow of migrant children to our border.
In Africa, they have taken a significant number of steps to
fight the spread of Ebola and strengthen health systems.
To be sure, the MDBs are essential to global stability.
Whether it is fostering inclusive economic growth, promoting
food security or increasing natural disaster preparedness, they
are making a difference. It is no surprise that, throughout our
Nation's history, both Democratic and Republicans Presidents
have made it a priority to invest in these institutions.
As you can see from our budget request, we are using what
we have learned from the MDBs and specialized funds to launch a
well-designed and cost-effective Green Climate Fund. This fund
will enable the poorest countries to build resilience and will
help cut carbon pollution globally, advancing some of our vital
security and development objectives.
In closing, let me say that the world is looking to the
United States for leadership and it is essential as ever for
the United States to demonstrate that leadership across all of
the international financial institutions.
This will, of course, require bipartisan cooperation. I
look forward to working with all of you in this committee to
make that happen. Thank you, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
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Ms. Granger. In May of last year, Ukraine issued 1 billion
dollars of new debt on the international capital markets,
backed by the United States. It is my understanding that the
proceeds are providing support for ongoing reforms and
development in Ukraine.
The President's request for fiscal year 2015 includes
another $1-billion loan guarantee, but the funding request for
$275 million to subsidize that loan guarantee is not consistent
with OMB's most recent analysis of the appropriated funds
required.
Could you explain the funding needed and requested for a
loan guarantee in fiscal year 2016.
Secretary Lew. Madam Chairwoman, let me start with the
policy and then come to the scoring. We have played an
essential role in putting together a global response to the
economic crisis in Ukraine.
There is no question that Ukraine has a lot of economic
challenges apart from the security situation. They need to have
enormous reforms. They now finally have a government that is
taking those reforms seriously, and our support and the support
through the IMF is part of what enables them to do that.
I think it is essential that Ukraine have the economic
runway so that it can have the time to put those reforms in
place. Frankly, while the security situation has to be settled
down, if the economic situation isn't resolved, that will
become something that is just an existential threat as well. So
it is critical to Ukraine to get its economic house in order.
We provided a billion dollars of loan guarantees last year
as a part of a global effort, including the IMF support I
described, including bilateral contributions from other
countries and from the European group, and it is being used to
support the economic reforms.
We specifically designed our support last year so that as
they reform their energy pricing system, there will be the
ability to insulate the lowest income households, for example,
from some of the burden. Because if they did not have the
ability to make the impact on the most vulnerable of economic
reforms manageable, the ability to carry out the reforms would
have been jeopardized.
The cost of the loan guarantees does not get frozen for all
time. It is a reflection of what is going on at the time the
scoring is done. So, as I think you know, the risk in Ukraine
has been rising because of the geopolitical situation.
As we have moved through from the first loan guarantee to
the latest request, the cost of scoring has changed and gotten
more costly because it is higher risk. We adjusted to that in
realtime last year.
We would look forward to working with you to continue to
adjust to it, but we have always used the current scoring at
the time we have made our proposal as the basis for estimating
the cost.
Ms. Granger. I understand what you just said. I also have
another concern, and that is when will the additional loan
guarantee we authorized in December be obligated.
It has been 3 months now, I just returned from Ukraine, and
time is of the essence. Can you explain when it will happen.
Secretary Lew. I was in Ukraine myself a few weeks ago and
at the time, signed an initial memorandum of understanding that
launched the process of getting the details worked out.
I met just the other day here in Washington with the
finance minister of Ukraine, who is a real reformer and
moving----
Ms. Granger. I met with her yesterday.
Secretary Lew. Yes, she is driving the reform agenda very
hard. We agreed that our teams would continue to work as
quickly as possible to finalize the terms.
Obviously our loan guarantees, as is the support of the
IMF, has been conditional on the Government of Ukraine taking
certain actions. I am pleased to say that last week the
Government of Ukraine enacted the critical reforms that were
necessary for the IMF to approve their package, which also
frees us to move forward.
I am hopeful that we will be able to work very quickly with
them and put in place a financing. I agree with you, time is of
the essence.
In addition to the USAID, we work very closely with the IMF
to try and make sure that the structure of the IMF package
provided enough up-front support to provide Ukraine the ability
to get through this very difficult period.
Ms. Granger. Good. I think everything we can do to help
them will certainly be appropriate.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
While the Supreme Leader of Iran has said--and I quote--``I
will go along with any agreement that could be made, of course,
if it is not a bad deal,'' we have every reason to question
Iran's real intentions, given their track record. This is, of
course, the same Supreme Leader who repeatedly refers to Israel
as the ``barbaric'' Jewish state that ``has no cure but to be
annihilated.''
I am very concerned by reports of various European
commercial delegations traveling to Tehran in eager
anticipation of sanction relief in the prospect of doing
business with Iran.
Have we weakened the resolve of the world community by
providing sanctions relief in the interim deal?
Secondly, the administration has pledged to continue to
strictly enforce existing sanctions in Iran, other than those
relaxed under the interim deal. Yet, I understand that Iran's
oil exports are being offered from UAE trading firms acting as
middlemen.
What is the current status of overall Iranian oil exports?
Are we talking to China and India, both of whom are reportedly
increasing their imports from Iran this year? If these trends
continue, is the administration going to sanction these
countries? Specifically, what are the exports to China, India,
and Turkey? And will you be making available publicly the
Department's country-by-country estimates on Iranian oil
imports?
Thank you.
Secretary Lew. Congresswoman Lowey, let me start with the
first part of your question on the Joint Plan of Action and its
aftermath.
I think we all remember that, before the Joint Plan of
Action went into effect, there were a lot of critics saying
that it was going to provide massive relief from the sanctions.
We said that was wrong. We said, at the time, that it was
very enumerated relief. We could say very much to the dollar
how much relief it would be, and that is the relief that Iran
has gotten.
It is single-digit billions of dollars of relief at a time
when there is tens of billions of dollars of additional burden
being placed on Iran because of the existing sanctions that
were not part of the Joint Plan of Action.
So over this period of time of the Joint Plan of Action,
the actual pressure on Iran has gone up, not down. I think that
is a very important point because we kept the oil and the
financial sanctions in place and we essentially provided Iran
limited access to enumerated amounts of its own money--not our
money--and, in exchange, we got for the first time in over a
decade a commitment for Iran to not just slow down, but
actually take a step back on its nuclear program. We also put
in place an inspection regime where we can actually see what
they are doing.
So I think what we have seen over the year, year and a
half, almost, that the Joint Plan of Action has been in effect,
we have had the first period of time in recent history where we
have actually arrested the development of Iran's nuclear
program and seen it deteriorate.
I have read a lot and seen a lot of accounts of businesses
going to see whether there is a future to do business in Iran.
The message we have delivered very clearly around the world is,
``Iran is not open for business, and anyone who does business
with Iran--until and unless there is an agreement which
prevents Iran from having nuclear weapons which leads us to
lift the financial and the oil sanctions--doing business with
Iran is at your own risk because we are enforcing the
sanctions, and we will continue to enforce the sanctions.''
There have been reports--oil exports country by country
fluctuate on a month-to-month basis. I would be happy to get
back to you with a more detailed response.
We have been working very closely with all of the countries
that have been cooperating with the--and part of the sanctions
on Iran. While there have been numerous times when I have heard
the burden it is putting on other countries, I have also heard
that they understand clearly that they know that we will
enforce our sanctions and they do not want to get caught in
sanctions enforcement.
I do not think that, if you look at the condition of Iran's
economy today versus before the Joint Plan of Action, they have
seen any big dramatic turnaround. They have seen a slight
slowing of the rate of inflation and slide of the economy, but
they are in a deep hole that they will not get out of unless
they reach an agreement that we find acceptable to assure us
that they will not have nuclear weapons.
We are not there. The negotiators are still working, as the
President has said many times. At best, it is 50/50. We would
be in a safer world if we have an agreement that is, clear,
that will prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons. But until
we are there, our sanctions regime stays in place.
As the President has said on many occasions and as I have
said on many occasions, no options will be taken off the table
if it fails. We will continue to implement sanctions, we will
come back, if need be, with tougher sanctions, and no options
have been taken off the table.
Mrs. Lowey. I will let it go at this point. Thank you very
much.
Ms. Granger. Chairman Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, as I said in my opening
statement, the administration has not been shy about its utter
disdain for an energy source that has kept the lights on in
U.S. homes since the 1740s.
The EPA's regulations, which are constitutionally dubious,
have brought coal mining to a screeching halt and coal-fired
power plants to their knees.
Aside from the devastating effect to the mining families
who rely on this industry for their livelihoods, we are going
to see electric prices skyrocket for families and businesses in
this country, and now the administration wants the same fate
for families and businesses in the developing world.
In 2013, your Department issued new guidance to vote
against World Bank financing for coal-fired power plants unless
the project employs carbon capture or sequestration technology.
And later the Export-Import Bank announced similar new rules to
deny financing for coal-fired power plants. In essence, you
have said we can't mine coal, we can't burn coal, and now we
are going to eliminate the international markets to export
coal.
As you know, carbon capture and sequestration technology,
while promising, is not yet a reality, with commercial
deployment not even expected in the U.S. for several years, to
say nothing of poor countries in the developing world, at the
same time as the administration is setting stringent
regulations for greenhouse gas emissions domestically and
abroad. The Energy Department is consistently slashing the
fossil energy research and development budget to make this
technology a reality.
How do you reconcile that dichotomy, imposing that CCS
structure on developing countries, but refusing to support the
research necessary to get that technology off the ground?
Secretary Lew. Mr. Chairman, I know that we have different
views on coal policy. But I think you have to look at how our
coal policy fits in domestically and internationally.
We are very much of the view that we in the United States
have to develop our energy resources. I think we have shown,
over the course of the last 6 years, great success in
developing our energy resources.
Internationally, our view has been that getting power into
the poorest countries is critically important, and we have
promoted a range of alternative fuels, both in terms of the
less-polluting traditional fuels and renewable energy sources
including hydroelectric power.
I think the policy we have had on coal distinguishes
between the poorest of countries. In the poorest of countries,
we have the exception that, if it is the only available power
source, it is not treated the same as in other countries.
I do not think there is any way to distinguish between the
environmental impact of carbon emissions in one part of the
world from another. Our planet is one system, and it is not
that we are trying to apply rules internationally that are
exactly the same as the rules here. We would not have the
exception for the poorest countries, if we did.
On the other hand, we know that as those countries adapt to
meet the needs of their growing populations and their growing
economies, they are going to need to develop sources that do
not add, in a dangerous way, to the accumulation of carbon
emissions. That is what our policies are designed to
accomplish.
Mr. Rogers. World energy demand continues to rise with 90
percent of increased energy demand driven by the needs of
developing countries. China and India alone will account for
over 50 percent of the total increase between now and 2030, and
these countries together account for 9 percent and 5 percent of
U.S. coal exports, respectively.
How do you expect to meet that demand if coal is not a part
of the equation as a low-cost option?
Secretary Lew. I think China and India are very important
countries to work with. The President has worked with China. We
have reached an agreement with President Xi on reaching goals
that will help advance the reduction of carbon emissions. We
continue to promote similar discussions in India, and they have
committed to substantial commitment in other energy resources.
But I think the fundamental point is that the growth in
consumption, growth in population, and growth in the economies
in the emerging markets, is going to be a big part of where the
additional power generation of the future comes.
They are going to need to adapt, and we, as a global
community, as a world community, are going to need to help find
alternatives that are sustainable, which is why we are working
so hard with them like the Power Africa initiative is part of
that. But the development of renewable energy sources in
countries like China has been such a high priority.
Mr. Rogers. I think this could be a self-defeating policy
as developing countries will simply turn to other countries
with lower environmental standards to finance the plants that
they are going to have to build.
Do you think China or India will step up to the plate to
finance these projects in Southeast Asia and Africa? Is that
the administration's stated preference?
Secretary Lew. Our preference, obviously, is that we
promote the view that it should be a position taken by the
international community, which is why we have taken the
positions that we have in the international financial
institutions.
I cannot disagree that there will be other sources of
funding available for some continued projects, but our goal is
to shift the focus of future development into areas that
address the problems that we face globally in terms of carbon
emissions. The solution is not for us to just proceed in a
business-as-usual way.
As I mentioned earlier, we do have the exception for the
poorest of countries, recognizing that there are some countries
that have no alternative and there they should use the cleanest
technologies available.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, I don't think you and I are
going to agree on much on this topic.
Secretary Lew. I did not think so.
Mr. Rogers. But I thank you for your testimony.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
Secretary, you seem to show up at all the committees I
belong to, and that is a good thing.
Let me ask you a question. Last week the United Kingdom
decided to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank. Yesterday France, Germany, and Italy agreed to join the
bank as well.
What are your views on this bank? Do you think that China
is seeking to enhance its power in the Asia-Pacific region at a
time when our Nation is trying to strengthen its military and
economic presence in the same region?
Secretary Lew. Congressman, let me start with what the goal
of the bank is, to fund infrastructure in Asia. It is an
important objective. It is one that we share. There is a huge
need for infrastructure in many parts of the world, in Asia, in
Africa, even here in the United States. So we do not disagree
on the objective of having a mechanism to fund infrastructure.
The concerns I have raised over the Asia Infrastructure
Bank are that it is not yet clear what the governance structure
of that institution will be and a concern that it not compete
with the high-standard institutions that have been developed
over the last 70 years, which promote very important standards
in terms of labor protection, environmental protection,
anticorruption efforts, and debt sustainability.
The point that we have made, both directly in our
conversations with China and in conversations with other
countries that were considering their participation, is that
those issues really need to be resolved and addressed as
countries make the decision whether or not to participate. We
will continue to engage with countries around the world to make
sure that, both in bilateral and multilateral efforts, these
kinds of standards are an important part of the institution.
I would say that the conversation that we had earlier about
the IMF, some of the back-and-forth, the importance of the
Congress ratifying the IMF reforms is very significant. There
is a lot of concern in developed and developing countries that
the failure to ratify the IMF reforms in the United States, the
last country to act, reflects our stepping away from those
institutions and stepping away from the leadership role that we
have traditionally played.
That is a very dangerous thing strategically and I think it
is a mistake. The reforms are well structured to preserve the
U.S. position in the IMF, and I think the congressional action
to approve the IMF reforms would very much increase the
leverage we have to have these kinds of conversations with
other countries.
Mr. Serrano. It is interesting because you answered my
second question at the same time.
So my third question would be: Do you feel there is a tie-
in between, for instance, approving the reforms and your
ability or our government's ability to talk to the first
question about that Infrastructure Bank and other issues?
Secretary Lew. I must say I spend an inordinate amount of
my time, when I meet bilaterally and in multilateral settings,
defending our commitment to these organizations and making
clear that we are still committed to getting the reforms
approved.
Whenever you have to spend your time defending against
suspicions like that, it just reduces your ability to do other
business and it makes countries start thinking about do they
need to develop other alternatives. I do not think that is a
good thing for the United States, and I do not think it is a
good thing for the world.
That is why I am committed to getting IMF reform done and I
remain hopeful that we will be able to do it because it is just
critical to our national security.
Mr. Serrano. Well, thank you.
And I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Serrano. He answered both questions in one.
Ms. Granger. That was good.
Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
And thank you for being here, for your service.
We talk a lot about sanctions in the broad sense. And I
just wondered--for instance, some people would say the
sanctions we put on Iran brought them to the table. Some people
say that, when we ease the sanctions, they are less apt to
deal. But I want to talk in a broader sense about sanctions, in
general.
How do you decide what kind of sanctions you are going to
put in place?
And, for instance, you mentioned you could almost measure
to the dollar, in general, about what a sanction might do one
way or the other.
I am just curious to know some real-world examples of big
sanctions, little sanctions, that we would understand exactly
how you go about deciding.
And how do you decide whether they are effective? And how
do you decide whether they get outdated? Give us a primer on
sanctions.
Secretary Lew. Congressman, let me start with the broadest
principle, which is that economic sanctions can create economic
pain and economic impact in a country.
We have gotten quite good at designing sanction regimes
that can do that to affect the country that you are trying to
sanction while reducing, to the extent that it is possible,
spillover in areas that you do not want to see the effects
felt.
What sanctions can not do is force a leader to change their
view, and in the case----
Mr. Crenshaw. And I appreciate all that.
Give me some real-world----
Secretary Lew. In the Iran case, just to be clear, what I
was describing in terms of the ability to enumerate quite
precisely, was the relief in the Joint Plan of Action.
Because what we were essentially doing, for the most part,
was freeing up access to resources that we had frozen and
saying, ``You can get X dollars of your money out of it.'' That
is a little different than imposing sanctions where there is a
degree of uncertainty.
But as to Russia----
Mr. Crenshaw. I am trying to understand just, real world,
what--do you sit down and say, ``What is the biggest and best
sanction we can put on Iran?''
Secretary Lew. Well, obviously, what we have done is we
basically cut them off from growth in oil sales and we have cut
them off----
Mr. Crenshaw. And how do you do that?
Secretary Lew. We have put in place limits on how much oil
can be exported, sanctions against the violation of that that
affect both the importers as well----
Mr. Crenshaw. And how do you decide----
Secretary Lew [continuing]. They all need to do business
through U.S. financial institutions----
Mr. Crenshaw. Right.
Secretary Lew [continuing]. Which gives us the ability
through U.S. financial institutions----
Mr. Crenshaw. And how--and I am just talking about real
world. How does that work out when you decide, okay, you can
only export X barrels of oil?
Secretary Lew. Well, we have the ability to tie up funds
that the Government of Iran can't get access to, and we have
the ability to sanction countries that engage in transactions
that violate the sanctions.
Mr. Crenshaw. So you will say, ``You can't buy oil from
Iran''?
Secretary Lew. Yes.
Mr. Crenshaw. And if you do, then what happens?
Secretary Lew. Well, the--the----
Mr. Crenshaw. I am not being argumentative. I am trying--I
am really trying to understand how sanctions work. It is all--
it is more--when I say we are going to put some sanctions on
people----
Secretary Lew. It is hard to give a general answer. You are
asking about Iran. In Russia, we did some very different
things.
Mr. Crenshaw. Like what did you do----
Secretary Lew. In Russia----
Mr. Crenshaw [continuing]. Specifically?
Secretary Lew. In Russia, we did not put sanctions on the
whole Russian financial system. We put sanctions on individuals
who were decision-makers and close to people in the inner
circle to create pressure on----
Mr. Crenshaw. But, I mean, what kind of sanctions--what do
you do to that----
Secretary Lew. They do not----
Mr. Crenshaw. Well, how do you sanction an oligarch?
Secretary Lew. Well, if your accounts are in the United
States and you can not transact business anymore, that impedes
your ability to get access to your money and to do new
transactions.
For example, in Russia, we said, the financial
institutions--we did this in concert with Europe. It was not
something we did unilaterally--we were going to limit the
ability to roll over debt. Russian companies that were
sanctioned could no longer roll over their debt for a year, 2
years or 3 years. They were limited to very short-term
rollovers.
Mr. Crenshaw. Do you do that in terms of the lenders?
Secretary Lew. Yes. Yes. And lenders who violate that would
be violating sanctions----
Mr. Crenshaw. I got you.
Secretary Lew [continuing]. And they do not want to do
that.
The reason I was going to say it is a little bit hard to be
entirely precise, I think we did an excellent job in Russia
targeting the impact where we meant it to be felt.
But we have actually seen the sanctions have greater impact
because there was a voluntary action to curtail financial
relations because there was a fear that the sanctions would get
tougher or a desire to stay very far away from the boundary
line.
So it has actually had a slighly bigger impact, and then on
top of that, the price of oil came down and a weakened Russian
economy took a second hit.
If you look at the design of the Russia sanctions, we were
working with our European allies, very much of the view that we
wanted, to the extent that we could, limit the spillover into
Europe and the global economy. I think we have been successful,
to date, limiting that impact.
It also is not our view that the burden should be felt
broadly by Russian consumers. It should be felt by those who
might be able to effect the decision-making that was taking
place. In Iran, it is much more of a blanket set of policies.
So there is not just one way to do sanctions.
We have learned a lot over the last 10 years in terms of
how to design sanctions more precisely, and they are more
highly engineered. I think what we have learned in the last
year, in the case of Russia, is that you can have a very
significant economic impact without causing as much effect
outside of the country as you might otherwise. What we have
unfortunately not been able to do is change the decision-making
calculus of the leadership in Russia.
In Iran, I think we did change their decision-making to the
point that they came to the table. I believe that they came to
the table to get relief. I think that the relief in the Joint
Plan of Action was just a bit of a taste of what broader
sanctions relief would be.
Their top priority in Iran right now is to get their
economy moving and have some relief. I think that is the only
reason that they are having a serious conversation about
foregoing the development of nuclear weapons. We are not there
yet. I can not say that it has been ultimately successful. But
I do not believe this negotiation would be underway but for
sanctions.
I wish I could say that we had made as much progress in the
last year with Russia. We shall see.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thanks so much.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. First, I want to talk to you about oil
prices in Iran and possibly sanctions. It is a widely held view
that the falling of oil prices are putting pressure on Iran and
Iran cannot repatriate their oil revenues.
But under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran can withdraw $700
million a month from foreign-held reserves. And that being
said, it seems Iran's economy is largely insulated from the
fall in the price of oil, at least in the near term, and the
fall of prices will be insufficient to put new pressure on the
Iran regime to accept a good deal.
My question would be: Do you agree with that premise? Could
you share your analysis of the real impact of oil prices on the
Iran economy.
Secondly, have we seen any indication that oil prices are
impacting Iran's decision-making in the ongoing negotiations?
And, finally, given the state of the global energy markets,
can countries that are purchasing oil from Iran now find
alternative suppliers?
Secretary Lew. There is no question that our sanctions
regime puts Iran in such a seriously bad economic position that
they do not have access to the revenues that would come from
all their oil flows, to begin with. The amount that they do not
have access to limits the impact, to some extent, of the
decline of oil in the short run.
In the long run, they are an economy that is highly
dependent on oil and I think it does weaken them, in terms of
what their prospects are. Even in the short term, it has an
effect, but it is not dollar for dollar. So I think in Russia
it is much more direct.
You know, the challenge in Iran is that in order to
maintain their oil industry at peak production level, it is
more than access to their money they need, they need access to
technology, they need the ability to develop resources.
We have through the sanctions made it harder for them to
continue growing their oil capacity. Looking forward, they see
sanctions relief as being critical to their economic----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you think that is our number one
leverage in the negotiations, the sanctions relief, based on
their economy?
Secretary Lew. I think their economy is in very bad shape.
They still have very high inflation, very high unemployment.
They still face a future that is very bleak. The only hope that
is now in their economy is that, if there is an agreement, it
will get better. That gets dashed pretty quickly if there is
not an agreement.
The relief in the Joint Plan of Action gave, as I said, a
taste of what relief would mean. But it was just a fraction of
the ongoing additional pain that sanctions put on Iran's
economy.
In the period of the first year of the JPOA, you know, it
was about $40 billion of additional sanctions impact and
roughly $7 billion of sanctions relief. It was still a great
deal of additional pain because the oil and financing sanctions
were staying in effect.
They want access to their resources. They want to be able
to grow their economy. They are only going to get that if there
is an agreement that we can have confidence that it prevents
them from having nuclear weapons.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your time. I
have some questions, and it is dealing with many--like many of
us, on the sanctions. I am going to come to that in a moment.
I have to reinforce what our full committee chairman said
about some of his comments and your comments on carbon and his
concerns there.
Just very quickly, I will say that someone in the
administration is going to have to go to 40 million children in
India and China and tell them they will never have health care,
they will never have a job, and they will never have an
education, because you don't have those things without some
source of energy.
And those countries can't build nuclear power plants. They
don't have hydro resources. And it concerns me that they would
view us as fairly arrogant in taking that position and denying
those things when it is beyond their ability to provide them
for themselves.
But putting that aside, coming to the Iranian nuclear
program and the negotiations there--and I appreciate your
comments on this so far--I want to tell you a little bit about
my background. I was an Air Force officer and pilot for 14
years, and I had this great honor of working with the START II
and START III implementation with the former Soviet Union, as
the pilot rep.
Now, I had a very, very small picture of that. I was just a
captain at the time, hardly a person of influence, but I did
see how that agreement was implemented. And I learned from
that, as I have written in editorials in the last few weeks,
that if a nation wants to cheat on an agreement, they can.
They can find a way around that, which brings us to the
point of you having an extraordinarily powerful and influential
position--you and your organization--in our national security,
which I don't think many people would recognize, you know, the
Department of Treasury and national security, how closely they
are tied in this situation.
So let me ask you this. And I want to go through a couple
of questions very quickly--because I think you and I will agree
on this--and that is, the difficulty of organizing our sanction
partners and to come to an agreement to have the current
sanctions imposed, would you agree that that was a significant
effort, that it took, a degree of political capital, it took
quite a long time and that it was a fragile process?
Secretary Lew. Absolutely. One of the things that I think
has really been quite profoundly successful both in Iran and in
Russia has been our ability to work with the international
partners that we have.
Our unilateral sanctions against Iran could not be anywhere
near as effective as they are without the cooperation of other
countries, and it has required ongoing, continued engagement
with them. That is one of the reasons we felt it was so
important for us to not do anything that would be perceived as
inconsistent with the agreement in the Joint Plan of Action.
Mr. Stewart. And I get that. And I do. And I appreciate
that this was a large and an intense effort to come to this
degree of success. That these sanctions are fragile, I think we
would agree with that.
But in light of that--this is my fear, the good news and
bad news. The good news is we got to this point. The bad news
is it is very, very difficult to replicate that effort once
again.
And, you see, I wonder, how rapidly would the U.S. be able
to reverse course if we come to a situation where we feel like
our Iranian partners are cheating or they intend to withdraw
from this agreement, especially, Mr. Secretary, in light of
what you just said, with our partners of Russia and China?
Because I don't think we could replicate this again,
especially again with those two partners. And, if we could, it
would take a long time. And the outcome is not at all certain.
So can you see why those of us who are concerned about this
and--recognize that these sanctions were a great effort, but it
is very, very difficult to replicate that? And to just assume
that we could turn that around and impose those sanctions
again, I don't think that is true at all. I think that is a
stretch, to make that assumption.
Secretary Lew. First of all Congressman, these are issues
that are still currently being discussed, what kind of
sanctions relief should be part of an agreement, if there is an
agreement. So, I do not want to prejudge what the outcome is.
But I would say that in a world where there was an agreement
with Iran, and Iran violated the agreement, we would feel
perfectly within our rights to use every tool at our disposal.
We have a lot of tools to put back in place, very severe
penalties if we need to. Our ability to do that, if we needed
to, even unilaterally, would be very widely understood if that
violation was there.
Mr. Stewart. I understand that. But I do think--and I think
you would agree with me--it is much more difficult after this,
especially with China and especially with Russia. Their frame
of mind is different now than it was a year ago, I think.
Secretary Lew. What I do not think is different is that the
world community agrees that Iran should not have nuclear
weapons. That is why there is this very tight engagement, even
at a time when there is so much tension between the United
States and Russia over Ukraine, tight engagement on working
towards an agreement that prevents Iran from getting nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Stewart. Well, I certainly appreciate that. You and I
agree on that, although, this is a national security and a DOD
question, not necessarily in your area of expertise. But, I am
afraid that this agreement makes that almost a foregone
conclusion that they would rather then preclude him from that.
But, again, that is another topic, and I know you would
disagree with that conclusion, certainly.
Secretary Lew. Congressman, if I could just go back to the
point you made about the children in India.
Mr. Stewart. Yes.
Secretary Lew. I was just in Mumbai and Delhi a few weeks
ago, and I have to tell you, I have never seen air pollution
like I saw in Mumbai and Delhi. So the children in those cities
are right now at risk for the air they are breathing, and I
think we have to remember that as well.
Mr. Stewart. I certainly appreciate that, and you can go to
Beijing and see it just as bad, as in other places as well. But
you can mitigate it. And I do not think that it is an either-
or proposition. But thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And madam, I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you. We will offer another round of
questions.
I am going to ask a question first. In 1993, the NAFTA
agreement included a side agreement to create the North
American Development Bank, NADBank, to tackle environmental
issues on the U.S./Mexico border. NADBank was originally
focused on water and waste water problems, but the bank has now
moved into renewable energy projects. The budget request
includes new funding for the NADBank, and I understand that
part of the increase is because NADBank's ability to borrow on
the capital markets is limited because of a downgrade by
Moody's and other credit-rating agencies.
First, I hope you can explain to Members why the NADBank
was downgraded; second, how much of this downgrade was due to
NADBank's shift to finance renewable energy projects; and
finally, will the authorization language that is needed to
recapitalize the NADBank require a change to the NAFTA treaty?
Secretary Lew. Chairwoman Granger, my understanding of the
downgrade is that there was a technical change in some of the
credit-scoring rules, and it was not a reflection of a change
in policy. So, I am not actually aware of it being due to any
change of activity, but I am happy to check and get back.
Going back to the origins of NADBank, I think it reflects
the close relationship the United States and Mexico have, that
we undertake infrastructure projects on both sides of our
borders. We pay for projects on the U.S. side, they pay for
projects on the Mexican side. It is in the interest of the
region in the United States and in Mexico, and it is a source
of ongoing encouragement to the free flow of trade, which is
very important in terms of U.S. exports as well as Mexican
exports.
I am not aware that the inclusion of renewable projects has
materially changed the structure of that relationship. The
things that I have been most focused on, as I have talked to
our Mexican counterparts, have been things to ease the flow of
goods, roads, customshouses, and the like.
There was one more part of your question and I might not
have answered it.
Ms. Granger. Will this require a change in NAFTA?
Secretary Lew. Oh, I do not believe it does. I think it is
just a funding issue.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. No.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, very quickly, I know that there are things
you can't tell me about the negotiations going on with Cuba,
but can you tell me at least, if you see, or the administration
sees a willingness on both sides, and especially on the side of
the Cubans, on the part of the Cubans, to make something to
change the relationship to, to bring it to the point that I
have wanted it, for the last many years and that other people
have wanted. Do you see that desire to make this work?
Secretary Lew. Congressman, I will have to defer to my
colleagues in the State Department who are engaged in
conversations----
Mr. Serrano. But you have information?
Secretary Lew. Yes. I have not actually gotten a report
from the meetings that took place this week, so I do not have
more current information.
But, let me go to kind of the broader principle about why
we undertook the changes that we did. It was our view and the
view, frankly, of many people in many administrations of both
parties that the program that was in place was not having the
positive effect it was intended to have. It was not opening
Cuba up. It was not leading to the kind of change that is going
to promote human rights and free expression and a move towards
a freer economy in Cuba. That more contact with the American
people, the easier flow of funds amongst family members and the
opening up of easier financial transactions for our
agricultural exporters and the like, would ultimately bring
Cuba closer to where we think they ought to be.
I think it is premature for us to be talking about the full
normalization. I mean, the international financial
institutions, we are barred by law, as you know, from
supporting their entry. We are not talking about changing the
things that are as a matter of law, off limits. We have to take
this one step at a time. We have opened a big door in a way
that I think is going to promote the kind of positive change
that I think we all want to see in Cuba.
I think more contact, more communications, more telephone
contact, more Internet contact, more exposure to printed
material from the United States, is all going to be part of it.
I am hopeful that we will see the kind of change in Cuba that
the Cuban people need, but that will also be good for U.S./Cuba
relations in the long run.
Mr. Serrano. Right. And I am not trying to be funny, but I
know that when you sit around that big table with other members
of the cabinet, their discussions and opinions and so on, and I
can honestly tell you that one of the parts that has confused
me totally about our Cuban policy, I mean, a lot of things have
confused me, is this whole thing of Cuba being on the list of
terrorist nations. It never made any sense, and it is probably
the kind of thing that 20 years from now we will decide was a
political decision made to appease a certain part of the
American community or whatever, but it doesn't make any sense.
Going back to a question that was asked before by Mr.
Crenshaw, what are sanctions like? I remember in the Cuba
issue, for a while--I don't know if it is still in place--where
if a ship did business--or a country did business with Cuba, it
could not dock its ship in any of our ports for 180 days. So,
those were the kind of things that people apply during
sanctions. But, you know, I think many of us are on the same
page, that it is time the end this policy. It has been a
failure for the Cuban people and for our country, and it is
time to move ahead and, you know, just deal with a country that
is 90 miles from our coast.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry, you will have the last question.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. I want to
return to the discussion--which you probably already have. I
missed the balance of the hearing--but on the IMF. You are a
proponent of us embracing this reform package. Could you gives
your rationale, please?
Secretary Lew. Yes, I would be happy to, Congressman. The
IMF reforms were negotiated about 5 years ago, to address the
fact that the world has changed in terms of the size of
different economies, the stage of development of different
economies, but the rules at the IMF have not. It was very
important to the United States that we maintain our position at
the IMF, that we not see a dilution of our veto and the very
substantial role that we play.
There was essentially a reallocation of shares and
executive committee membership so that a couple of seats moved
from Europe to the emerging economies. There will be share
increases that move around amongst countries, all the while
preserving the U.S. interests. It is something that was
considered a very important step forward by the emerging
economies. It is something that even the countries that are
giving up shares that they would rather not be giving up would
like to see finalized so that the institution is stabilized and
it has the resources it needs to go forward. So, that means a
lot of these emerging economies will contribute more.
We do not have to contribute more to meet the new levels of
capital. We have, through the new arrangement to borrow, put
money into the IMF during the financial crisis. That by simply
moving those resources from the new arrangement to borrow into
the general capital, we will meet our share of the new
contributions. While a lot of other countries are bringing new
money to the table, we are just moving it from one IMF fund to
another.
I think it was a very good deal for the United States. It
is a very good deal for the IMF, because it gives the IMF the
resources it needs to deal with whatever comes over the coming
years, and it is a good deal for the emerging economies who
legitimately want to see some increase in their representation
in a body that was designed before they were part of the world
conversation.
Everyone but the United States has ratified. The United
States is the last country. We have helped drive this forward,
design it. It is an institution that we were fundamental to the
creation of and the sustenance of. And our leadership in it is
going to be challenged severely if we do not ratify the
reforms. I think it is a good deal, and the sooner we ratify
it, the better it is for both the United States and the IMF.
Mr. Fortenberry. Even though we don't have any heightened
direct fiscal impact from it, do we have heightened risk from
additional obligations?
Secretary Lew. Well, there is a scoring impact for
technical reasons, but just to put it in perspective, it is
moving a commitment of roughly $60 billion from one fund to
another and the scoring impact is a few hundred million
dollars. It is not a very substantial change, even if one takes
the view that the scoring is the measure of the change. I
personally do not think the scoring is even necessary, but
rules are rules and we have come up with proposals to cover
that cost.
Mr. Fortenberry. As a lender of last resort, though, what
is your perspective on the IMF power to interact with rogue or
to stop, rogue fiscal policies that could undermine the very
substantive change that need to take place in order to stop
whatever crisis they might be intervening in?
Secretary Lew. I think if you look at the IMF's involvement
in the last decade, it has been a force for change not just to
stop rogue fiscal policies, but to require that responsible
fiscal policies be adopted as a condition for IMF support at a
difficult time. Some have criticized the IMF for being too
tough in demanding programs of reform in exchange for support.
I think if you look at some of the situations, whether it
is Ukraine today, or Europe during the financial crisis, there
are important national security interests and economic
interests for the United States. I believe we have a serious
national security interest in making sure Ukraine can survive
through this difficult period adopting the kinds of reforms it
needs to have a future that is free from the kind of corruption
that characterized its past.
And without the IMF, I do not think those reforms would be
as far as they are, and I don't think that they would have the
runway that they have in order to withstand the very difficult
security situation in the east. If you look at Europe, Europe
is our biggest trading partner. If Europe had not had the IMF
to go to, there was nowhere else to stop the spread of the
economic crisis. The IMF was the first line of defense, and we,
as a country that export quite a lot to Europe, that where the
trade flows between the United States and Europe are a
significant part of our economy, benefitted from that quite
directly, not to mention the geopolitical risk of a totally
collapsed European economy.
Even in the last 10 years, the IMF has proved it is an
essential asset in the world financial order, and it provides
the first line of defense. Just a few months ago, when everyone
was worrying about Ebola, the first relief that went to African
countries to give them the ability to deal with the situation,
it came from the IMF, because they can respond quickly.
So I think that, like any institution, one can, raise
questions of whether you would have done exactly what they did
in one situation or another. We have a voice in that, that is
very strong. I am afraid that that voice gets weakened if we do
not come to the table having kept our part of the bargain,
which is what ratification of the reforms is.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Granger. Thank you. Secretary Lew, thank you again for
your time. This concludes today's hearing, and members may
submit any additional questions for the record.
The subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs stands adjourned.
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Tuesday, March 24, 2015.
ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA
WITNESSES
ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AFFAIRS
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
ELIZABETH HOGAN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs will come to order.
I would like to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing:
Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western
Hemisphere; William Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State
for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; and
Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant Administrator for USAID for
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Thank you all for being here.
Last summer, our country experienced a national security
and humanitarian crisis of historic proportions as tens of
thousands of unaccompanied minors were sent through criminal
smuggling networks from Central America across Mexico into our
southern border. Although the number of unaccompanied children
has dropped since then, thousands more are expected to cross
this year. And that is unacceptable.
At the Speaker's request, I led a working group to examine
this issue and provide recommendations. I visited the Texas-
Mexican border several times. I also led a delegation to
Guatemala and Honduras to see where the children were coming
from and why.
There are many reasons why so many families and children
have made and continue to make this dangerous journey. Some of
this can be explained by the administration's slow pace of
deportations and insufficient focus on law enforcement at the
border. The harsh conditions and lack of security in Central
America also play a role. In addition, the lack of economic
opportunity and high unemployment is causing people to look for
other ways to survive.
The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss what the
United States and other countries in the region can do to put
an end to this illegal migration at its source. The United
States has provided assistance to Central America for many
years. We need to take a hard look at what has worked, what has
not, and what changes need to be made going forward.
Last year's appropriations act increased assistance for
Central America and also included support for programs to
combat human trafficking and help countries repatriate and
reintegrate their citizens. The administration's budget request
includes one billion dollars for Central America, more than
double the amount provided last year. The committee needs an
explanation from our witnesses on how such a large investment
will change the situation at our border.
While the United States has a role to play in helping
Central America, we cannot and should not do this alone. Other
countries in the region have a stake in Central America's
failure or success. Our neighbor Mexico is at the front lines
of combating illegal migration, and we must do all we can to
help Mexico strengthen its borders.
In addition, we should also support and use the
capabilities of partners in the region, such as Colombia. There
are a number of lessons we can learn from Plan Colombia.
Specifically, for lasting change to occur, we need a solid
commitment from the partner countries themselves. These
governments must be willing to make hard choices and address
the needs of their own citizens.
I have met with the presidents of some of these countries
and have already seen progress. For the first time, the Central
American governments had come together to develop a joint plan
to address shared problems in the region. Just as I believe the
United States should assist those countries, so, too, should we
hold the governments accountable for following through on their
commitments.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how
we can best address these important issues.
And I would now like to turn to my friend, Ranking Member
Lowey, for her opening remarks.
Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey
Mrs. Lowey. And thank you, my friend, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Granger. You are welcome.
Mrs. Lowey. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, Assistant
Secretary Brownfield, Acting Assistant Administrator Hogan, I
must say it is a pleasure to see you here today and express my
view that we are indeed fortunate to have people of your
thoughtfulness, commitment, and intelligence serving the United
States of America. And I thank you.
Last summer, a humanitarian crisis came to our doorstep,
with nearly 70,000 unaccompanied minors fleeing their home as a
result of the abject poverty, lack of economic opportunity,
rampant critical networks, and weak governments in Central
America.
These conditions have allowed drug trafficking and other
criminal enterprises to grow in size and strength aggressively,
intimidating and overwhelming government institutions and
threatening public security and the rule of law. In fact,
Central American countries represented four of the five
countries with the highest homicide rates in the world. Their
economic growth lags behind that of the rest of Latin America,
and 50 percent of the population lives in poverty, with
underemployment hovering between 30 to 40 percent in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
Clearly, it is in our interest to develop an integrated
strategy for engagement with the countries of Central America.
More must be done to invest in civil society and to provide
alternative livelihoods, education, and opportunities for
youth.
And while I support this effort, I have a number of
questions about the policies being proposed. For example, this
year's request for the region would scale up longstanding State
and USAID programs in Central America. I can't help but ask:
How will these programs be more effective than in the past?
What makes them different? How many years of increased
assistance will be necessary to successfully improve economic
and security conditions? Given the history of organized
corruption, do you all believe there is sufficient political
will to undertake the necessary fiscal and policy reforms?
The administration's engagement with the regions' leaders
at the highest levels and the efforts of Presidents and Foreign
Ministers of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to consult in
Washington on their alliance for prosperity in the Northern
Triangle reflect a strong desire for real change and ownership
of these reforms, which is critical to success.
At the same time, to what extent have civil society groups
been included in these discussions? Who speaks for the
marginalized, the vulnerable, and disadvantaged during these
meetings? Are their human rights concerns being addressed? And
who is addressing the needs of the children who have been
returned to their home country and are in desperate need of
rehabilitation services?
I also want to raise police and judicial reforms, which are
at the core of citizen security. While enforcement by police
and the military is important, security forces must
institutionalize mechanisms to ensure transparency and
accountability as well as respect for the rights of citizens.
What commitments are the three Presidents prepared to make in
terms of enhancing civilian police, providing accountability
for any human rights abuses by police and military forces, and
ensuring access to and credibility of independent judiciaries?
Lastly, I hope you will detail how the requests will
improve our public diplomacy capabilities. Before the crisis
reached its height last summer, were embassy and consulate
officials aware of the aggressive and misleading marketing
tactics being used by coyotes to encourage families to send
their children on a dangerous journey north? What were we doing
to counteract such campaigns? These just didn't appear out of
the blue, and I would be particularly interested in your
addressing that. I hope your efforts include a public diplomacy
component that can prevail over the lies of druglords and
criminals.
And I look forward to your testimonies.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
I will now call on the witnesses to give their opening
statements. I would encourage each of you to summarize your
remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your
full written statements will be placed in the record.
We will begin with Assistant Secretary Jacobson.
Opening Statement by Ms. Jacobson
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman,
Ranking Member Lowey, and members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on the administration's $1
billion whole-of-government request to support the U.S.
strategy for engagement in Central America.
Central America is a top priority for the United States
because important national interests are at stake. When Central
America suffers, the United States absorbs the impacts of
increased migration and other transnational challenges.
Conversely, a well-governed, secure, and economically
prosperous Central America will enhance the security and
prosperity of the United States.
And I would like to submit my testimony for the record and
not take much of your time before we get to your questions.
While conditions in Central America remain challenging,
this region could be one of transformative change. We sense it.
Central American governments sense it. And we are all driven by
an urgency to act quickly but wisely and get it right.
Last summer's spike in migration was a clear signal that
the serious and longstanding challenges in Central America
remain and, in some instances, are worsening. But with renewed
political will among the regions leaders, we are working with
them to change this trend and address the underlying factors
driving migration or be prepared for the tragedy to repeat
itself ad infinitum with higher impact in costs on the United
States.
Over the past 5 years of implementing our Central America
Regional Security Initiative, we have learned a great deal
about what works and what doesn't work on security in Central
America, and this new request builds on that knowledge.
What we learned most of all was that, unless we focus on
improving the ability of governments to deliver services
efficiently with accountability and also improve economic
opportunities, especially for young people, as integral parts
of security, nothing we do to make things safer will be
sustainable. This budget request represents a significant
increase from previous years, but we know that the cost of
investing now pales in comparison to addressing these
challenges later.
Today the governments of this region are demonstrating the
political will necessary to take the difficult decisions that
can lead to systemic change. The Presidents of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras have a plan. They presented the
Alliance for Prosperity in November.
Since last summer, El Salvador has passed an investment
stability law, giving investors assurances that tax and customs
regulations will not change over the course of an investment.
Guatemala has reached agreement on reparations for communities
where human rights were violated by the construction of the
Chixoy Dam. Honduras signed an agreement with Transparency
International to make government procurement information
available and invited the U.N. Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights to the country.
We recognize that requesting additional funds from Congress
will not make a difference unless these governments do more to
invest their own additional resources and advance reforms that
lay the groundwork for success and enable our assistance to
produce the outcomes we all intend.
During months of intensive work with these Presidents, it
is clear that the notion of shared responsibility is more than
a bumper sticker. We believe that each of the countries has
taken and is committed to actions that will promote better
business environment for investors and small business,
strengthen police and judicial systems, and increase government
transparency.
So we are faced with a question: Do we want to work
together with our Central American partners to help them solve
the problems or merely mitigate them? This request for $1
billion is a bold step so that we can do more than mitigate.
We know that we are a long way from achieving our core
goals in Central America. There is no clearer indication of
this than the willingness of tens of thousands of children to
travel to the United States last summer amid enormous risks.
But there is reason to be optimistic about Central
America's future, and we believe now is the time for a new
approach to Central America. We have a vision and a plan, and
we want to work with you to support Central America and protect
U.S. national security. And, as Vice President Biden says,
there is no reason why Central America cannot be the next great
success story in the Western Hemisphere.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
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Ms. Granger. Assistant Secretary Brownfield, you are now
recognized.
Opening Statement by Ambassador Brownfield
Ambassador Brownfield. Thank you very much, Madam
Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
honored to appear with my old friends Roberta Jacobson and Beth
Hogan.
We meet today to discuss the President's strategy for
Central America, but we filter that discussion through our
experience last summer, when tens of thousands of Central
American migrants, many of them children, arrived at our
southwest border. We learned lessons. The most important was
that the solution to the migration crisis is not at our
border--it is in Central America--and the root causes that
drive the migration north.
As Assistant Secretary Jacobson just described, the
President's strategy attacks those root causes with three
prongs: prosperity, governance, and security. I work the
security prong, and I look forward to working with Beth on the
governance prong.
We do not start this exercise from scratch. Since 2009, my
bureau has provided support and assistance, generously funded
by the United States Congress through CARSI, the Central
America Regional Security Initiative.
There are some who suggest that after 6 years there is
little to show for the effort. I do not agree. Thanks to
Operations Martillo and Anvil, drug smuggling by air through
Honduras is down perhaps 50 percent since 2012. Maritime drug
seizures, our best measure of drug flow, have fallen 40 percent
in Costa Rica and 60 percent in Panama.
Seventy-two maritime drug smugglers have come to the United
States to face justice. The homicide rate in Honduras has
dropped more than 20 percent from 2011. And joint border law
enforcement task forces now work along the borders between
Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, as well as Panama
and Colombia.
I do not apologize for CARSI, Madam Chairwoman. I am proud
of it.
But if we had been completely successful, we would not be
here today. I have been in this business more than 36 long
years, and I have learned perhaps two lessons. First, it takes
years to create drug crime and security-driven crises, and it
will take years to resolve them. Second, no strategy succeeds
unless it addresses the fundamental problems and provides
adequate resources to do the job.
The President's strategy addresses the three core
challenges for Central America today. The INL request for the
2016 budget is $205 million, 25 percent more than the amount
generously appropriated by Congress for this year.
The subcommittee has a right to ask--in fact, the
subcommittee has already asked--what more will you see for this
25 percent uptick.
First, much closer integration between INL and USAID
programs in Central America. That is the point of the
President's strategy. The Central America problem is not one-
dimensional. It is security, governance, and prosperity.
Second, we plan to pilot a new programming approach that
links USAID's community programming with INL's model police
precincts. We call it the place-based approach. Jointly, we
identify communities, age groups, security threats, root
causes, and design specific programs to address them. Initial
reports from Honduras on place-based programs are promising.
Third, we will expand those CARSI programs with a
successful track record--specialized and vetted units, joint
task forces, police training and reform, border security, youth
and gang education, drug demand and rehabilitation centers.
Members of the subcommittee, we knew when we started CARSI
together in 2009 that we were in this for the long haul. We
knew that we would learn from programs that worked well and
others that worked poorly. We knew that we would accomplish
only as much as the regional governments' political will would
support.
We have delivered some results. Central America is a better
place today. The United States is a safer place due to those
efforts. We obviously have more work to do. I look forward to
working closely with this subcommittee to get it done.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I look forward to your
comments and questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
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Ms. Granger. Acting Assistant Administrator Hogan, you are
now recognized.
Opening Statement by Ms. Hogan
Ms. Hogan. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify
today, and thank you for the committee's continuing support for
USAID's work in Central America.
I am pleased to update you on our efforts to address the
root causes of migration and the crisis that we saw stemming
from problems in Central America last summer.
As Administrator Lenhardt testified last week, USAID's
mission is to partner to end extreme poverty and promote
resilient, democratic societies. In Central America, USAID
assistance has improved access to health and education, created
new businesses, contributed to justice reforms, improved food
security, and responded to natural disasters.
However, in recent years, social development and economic
growth have been stymied by a dramatic rise in crime and
violence, particularly in the Northern Triangle. This
insecurity is rooted in deep-seated issues of social and
economic inequality, the failure of the region's governments
and private sector to expand economic opportunity for vast
segments of the population, and increases in gang violence and
transnational crime.
We must work together to address the underlying factors
that are compelling migration. As Vice President Biden said,
the cost of investing now in a secure and prosperous Central
America is modest compared with the cost of letting violence
and poverty fester.
To that end, we have developed an interagency whole-of-
government strategy that advances three interrelated
objectives: security, prosperity, and governance.
The heart of USAID's security work is youth-focused crime
and violence prevention. We have supported and tested a range
of community-level prevention approaches in the highest crime
communities in these countries. These include partnering with
civil society, governments, and the private sector to create
safe community spaces, expand after-school activities, provide
job and life skills training for at-risk youth, build trust
between police and residents, and launch community crime-
prevention committees.
Last fall, the results of an independent impact evaluation
confirmed that these community-level prevention programs are
working. The study showed significantly fewer robberies,
murders, and extortion reported in the neighborhoods where
USAID is working compared to similar communities where we are
not.
With additional resources under the new strategy, we are
prepared to help governments of the Northern Triangle scale up
what is working, particularly in the communities from which
youth are migrating.
Advancing prosperity in the region requires a concerted
effort by governments and the private sector to reduce
persistent poverty and create an enabling economic environment
that includes women, youth, and marginalized populations. USAID
is working to drive economic activity throughout the Northern
Triangle with programs that prepare youth to join the formal
labor force and increase their incomes.
Last year, I heard from youth involved in our workforce
development programs that offer these out-of-school youth from
poor and dangerous neighborhoods an alternative to gang
involvement or illegal migration. The success of these programs
is typical of the one I visited in Guatemala, where 75 percent
of graduates obtain employment, return to school, or start a
business within 1 year.
The sustainability of these programs depends upon strong
governance from the Northern Triangle countries. For these
reasons, USAID will continue to promote government
accountability, institutional checks and balances, judicial
reforms, human rights protections, and increased civil society
participation in the democratic process.
In El Salvador, for example, we have had success helping
the government improve tax administration and thereby increase
its spending on its own security programs.
Local ownership also requires partnering with the private
sector to leverage resources and spur development. USAID has 16
active public-private partnerships in Central America. In the
last 5 years, these partnerships have leveraged nearly $160
million in private sector resources to complement our own
investments in development. As an example, partnerships with
more than 40 small and large companies in Honduras are helping
us connect small-scale farmers to valuable markets.
The success of the Central America strategy requires
unambiguous commitment, leadership, and ownership of the
Northern Triangle governments. Fortunately, those countries are
demonstrating a deepening commitment to advocate their own
development goals. This political will, in combination with
improved local capacity, leveraged resources, and new
partnerships, will allow us to help Central American
governments create a peaceful, prosperous, and integrated
region and, in so doing, improve the security and prosperity of
our own people.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
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Ms. Granger. Since last summer, there have been a number of
strategies. You talked about two, the first being the Alliance
for Prosperity, for which the three Central American countries
came together under Honduras' leadership, putting together a
plan. Then, of course, the Vice President put forward a plan,
his own strategy. But neither one of those plans have goals
that are tied to funds to implement them.
Last year in our appropriations act, we required a strategy
to target assistance to address the factors contributing to
this problem, including goals, benchmarks, timelines, and a
spend plan. That was due last week. So I would ask first,
Secretary Jacobson, when we can expect that plan?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think you are referring to the
Central American migration strategy that we owe you all.
Ms. Granger. Right.
Ms. Jacobson. I do know that that has been held up a little
bit by the ``653'' report that we all owe you, and I understand
that that will be coming up very shortly. So we do know that we
owe that for you.
On the larger question of the commitments and the goals for
these funds, what I would say is, if you look at what the Vice
President talked about when he was in the region most recently
and the document that came out of that, with very specific
time-bound commitments, as well as some of the things the
Presidents are already implementing, I think that gives us the
very beginning of a roadmap. Then the leaders and the Foreign
Ministers were here about a week ago to continue that work with
the IDB, the Inter-American Development Bank.
So we are trying to be as precise as we can as we move
forward with this request to get very specific about the
commitments that they are making and that we will use these
funds to support going forward.
Ms. Granger. Before we approve funding, we will have to
have that strategy, which needs to be very specific as to if
and how the Central American Presidents' plan fits into that.
The other thing that is important to me in this is where we
are right now with respect to the number of unaccompanied
children, and what we went through last year. According to the
Department of Homeland Security, over 68,000 unaccompanied
children were apprehended in the United States last year, with
three-quarters of that being from Central America, and most of
the rest were from Mexico.
We, the task force, visited Central America, and the first
question I asked was, do you want your children back? It was a
very straightforward question, and the answer would make a
difference in what we would do as the United States. Their
answer was: Absolutely, we want our children back. But last
year the United States only returned 2,000 children--68,000
apprehended, 2,000 returned.
So now the administration is asking for one billion dollars
to address the causes, but I would ask to the witnesses: Is it
possible to get this under control without changes to our own
laws and policies that allow those children to be quickly
returned to their countries and their families?
How do you take into account that although the children
were coming from Central America, they were transitting through
Mexico. We returned 2,000, but Mexico returned, I think, 18,000
minors from Central America last year.
So I would say, what are we doing right now, and how can
you strengthen our border and also keep that commitment we made
that we would return their children?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I will start with some of this, and I
think my colleagues may have some answers too.
I think there are things that we have to do on every level.
Obviously, I think the President believes comprehensive
immigration reform is part of this process, but I also think
that, although we feel it is critically important to give the
unaccompanied children who came last summer all of the
protections they are due in this process--and that is one of
the reasons that many have not been returned yet; they are
going through that legal process--we did return a very large
number of family units, including children and, obviously, many
individual adults. And the family units we helped with the
reintegration back into the countries that they came from.
Also, the total number of those that were detained by
Mexico was 127,000, most from Central America, up from 89,000
the year before. So Mexico was crucial in this. And much of our
work with Mexico is on their southern border. Assistant
Secretary Brownfield can speak more about that.
So I think we have to be doing both. But, ultimately, so as
not to have this surge repeat itself, part of that is public
diplomacy, part of it is making sure the word is out about what
is and is not in our laws. But part of it, also, is to try and
address some of the underlying causes of why they came. Because
you are right, we have to deal with those who came before, but
we also have to make sure it doesn't repeat itself.
Mr. Brownfield. If I might offer just another minute on top
of that, Madam Chairwoman.
You raise absolutely valid points and questions. Some of
them we obviously cannot answer. As you have correctly
suggested, once a migrant has reached the United States of
America, that person is then brought into the U.S. legal
process. And adjusting that does require either changes to
procedures or changes to law, and it is a broader dialogue than
the three of us can offer guidance to.
However, what we are talking about in this hearing would be
investments that would prevent this sort of thing from
happening in the future. That is what this strategy is designed
to accomplish.
You have correctly noted--and I wish to emphasize this to
everyone in this room--the Government of Mexico performed
exceptionally well during this crisis that we had last year on
our border. Some might say they went beyond what they had ever
done in the past, in terms of cooperating in this effort. I
wish to acknowledge that, and I wish to state it publically and
for the record.
They have asked us----
Ms. Granger. I was not criticizing Mexico in any way.
Ms. Jacobson. No, no, no, no.
Mr. Brownfield. No, you were not. And I just wanted to make
sure--
Ms. Granger. That was not my question to you.
Mr. Brownfield [continuing]. They heard from me. Yes.
Ms. Granger. That was not my question to you. My question
was, should we have to change the laws? Because we sent back so
few. Now these children will have been away from their families
for a year and away from their countries, and I think that is
something we need to address.
I will address one more thing, because you were talking
about root cause us and how we resolve this. When I came to
Congress, one of the first things I worked on was Plan
Colombia. And Colombia is a very different place today,
amazingly different. It was very difficult to do, but you have
businesses that are flourishing and great tourism. But, first,
they made it safe.
And as you are talking about employment and economic
opportunities, companies are not going to move to a country
that is one of the most violent and has the highest violence
rate in the world.
I come, we all come with our different backgrounds. Mine
was Fort Worth, Texas. It has been a very difficult time for
Fort Worth--very high unemployment because we lost a lot of
defense contracts. So, as our economy went down, our crime went
up. The first thing we did was make it safe again so those
businesses would flourish.
So, as we put these processes and these plans together,
please don't give us a plan to fund for a billion dollars that
says, first, we will offer opportunities to have business come.
They are not going to do it unless it is safe.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Now, following up, I agree that Central
American nations need support to address the root causes of
unrest, but it ultimately depends on the leaders of each
country to carry out substantial reforms, to raise revenues,
reduce corruption, strengthen institutions, and expand
educational and economic opportunities for their citizens.
Now, for those of us who have been working in this area a
long time, we know how difficult it is. But we also,
unfortunately, have seen very little progress in some of these
countries, and most of us feel progress in these areas is
essential. So let me throw out a couple of things. Maybe you
can give us some hope for positive change.
To what extent are Central American nations undertaking
fiscal and policy reforms? In your view, are Central American
political and business elites convinced that such reforms are
necessary, so much so that they are willing to even pay taxes?
I would love some examples.
Conditions on assistance are always a double-edged sword.
From your perspective, what are the benefits and drawbacks of
Congress tying our assistance to internal reforms in Central
America? Absent buy-in from the business and political elites,
can the strong fiscal policies proposed in this plan succeed?
And I will throw out a couple of more, and then you can all
take your turn. We know what I am getting at.
So, assuming buy-in from business and political elites
exists, do you believe the reform plans will allow the
countries of Central America to meet the demand for needed
services as well as sustain improvements in government? And how
will such policies translate into increased public trust?
How do we institutionalize the political commitment and
capacity so that any progress made today extends to future
political leadership?
You can take any part of that. And who wants to begin?
Ms. Jacobson. I will start, I guess. Those are great.
I think----
Mrs. Lowey. Not that you haven't heard them before.
Ms. Jacobson. No, but they are exactly the right questions.
And I think they really do get at the issues of, why is this
different? You know, why is this night different from all other
nights at this time of year?
We look at this particular moment in Central America,
facing huge challenges, as different than before, frankly
because of the three leaders in place right now. That is what
is different. There is both a particular urgency to this
crisis, in part demonstrated by last summer, but that was only
the most recent, sort of, exemplar. But it also is a function
of three leaders who, while ideologically very different, all
have the political will to act.
And so what you have seen, for example, in Honduras, a
country where a year ago I would have said it is the country I
am most worried about in that region, you have seen a 21
percent increase in tax revenue because of fiscal reform and
closing of the budget gap by over 3 or 4 percent of GDP. That
is enormously important in 1 year--an IMF standby agreement
after many years of not having one. That was really getting his
hands around a huge problem. And it is only a beginning, but
that demonstrated enormous political will.
I think, frankly, your question about business and economic
elites is a very fundamental one. And one of the comments made
about Colombia, I think, is instrumental here. The chairwoman
is absolutely right; security does come first for businesses.
But what we saw in Colombia and President Uribe was an
agreement with the business class and the economic elite that
they would join the President in focusing on security, they
would be part of that answer. Bill knows that better than
anybody.
We haven't seen that until recently in Central America. The
business class has been slow to get on board and to back those
efforts, and that is beginning to change. And the commitments
that we are seeing to private sector dialogue, to commitment on
investment reforms, and real conversation with both civil
society for their input and the business sector also gives me
great optimism that that is changing.
I think that we have also seen changes in the model of
policing that Bill will talk about from old mechanisms to ones
that are much more community-based and responsive to the
population, a focus on women in the community as, often, heads
of households when men have left.
So all of these things are an accretion of the experiences
we have had in the past with Presidents who are willing to back
those lessons learned based on data that I think give us a much
better chance of success than before.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Ms. Hogan. If I may, I would like to add to that in terms
of what is different. I think we are different in the way we
are approaching these problems. We are approaching them in a
much more integrated fashion, as Ambassador Brownfield just
alluded to.
Also, because these governments are stepping forward and
committing themselves to very tough policy changes that they
are going to take on and new regulations that they are going to
make, we are going to tie our assistance to their ability to do
just that. And so we are not going to have resources lead
reforms; we are going to have resources follow reforms.
If, in fact, we see countries stall or backtrack on the
commitments which they have themselves committed to, we are
going to come back to you and ask your concurrence to reprogram
resources to those countries that are advancing and are keeping
faith with the changes that they have agreed to make.
In El Salvador, we have something called a Partnership for
Growth, and, in that partnership, we have something called a
scorecard. It is a very public document, and it lists very
specifically what donors are going to do and what the
Government of El Salvador is going to do and the private sector
is going to do.
And that is the kind of model that we want to replicate as
we move forward in the implementation of this program so that
it is very clear, not just to governments but to the citizens
of those countries, that this is what their governments have
committed to, and we will hold them accountable to achieving
that. And if they don't, as I say, we will look at other ways
of reprogramming those resources.
Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Ambassador, do you want to add to it?
Mr. Brownfield. I really have very little to add, other
than to say, among the lessons that we learned in Colombia and
Plan Colombia, one, as already stated, there has to be some
degree of security which produces the confidence which then
produces the willingness of the business community to engage
and support.
Second, it requires some courage on the part of a
government, because what the government is doing is changing
the way that society has functioned for years, decades, in some
cases centuries. And it takes a particular sort of government
or an experience of having spent enough time in chaos to be
willing to make that sort of decision.
Third, it takes time. And I know you have heard this from
me before, but I will say it again, and I will put it in a very
personal context. In 2007, I arrived in Colombia as the United
States Ambassador. Plan Colombia, at that point, was closing in
on 8 years of operation. The narrative, at that point, was
still: There are no results. We have not succeeded. What have
we gotten for our investment in Plan Colombia?
Well, we saw that in the course of the next 1 or 2 years.
It had nothing to do with me; it had to do with 7 or 8 years of
investment. And while no one wants to hear that, I will
continue to note that we are in this Central America process
for the long haul, and we are in it because it is in our
national interest to focus this effort and these resources
there.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Let me follow up on what Chairwoman Granger mentioned about
Plan Colombia. I mean, I think everybody understands that it
has been a huge success, potentially the greatest success story
after the Marshall Plan. I mean, it has really been a huge
success.
And, Ambassador, take some credit for it, because you were
there, and I know a lot of the work that you did.
But, clearly, the foundation of Plan Colombia, as the
Chairwoman stated, was security. Listen to President Uribe. He
will tell you. It is security. It is security first, it is
security second, it is security third.
And my concern is that I don't see that emphasis on
security. And I don't disagree with what you all have talked
about, that there are other components. But unless people feel
secure--and I don't care how much opportunity we give, whether
it is in Honduras or Guatemala, those gangs are still going to
go to little girls and take them. Those gangs are still going
to go to folks' families and murder them if they don't join the
gangs, et cetera.
Ambassador, I agree with you. I think CARSI has done some
really good things, and it is a long-term proposition. So my
concern is I just don't see in this proposal, frankly, enough
emphasis on that security component.
So I would just ask you, how is this different from Plan
Colombia and how is it similar to Plan Colombia, particularly
in the security aspect?
Ms. Jacobson. I am going to let Bill answer in a second.
Two things I would say.
One, Congressman, I would say that in Central America one
of the things we have learned is, with seven countries in
Central America, even with the most acute security problems
being in the Northern Triangle, unless we work with all of them
and ensure that they are working together, the criminal
organizations exploit the national boundaries, which we and the
governments have to abide by but they don't. So it is more
complicated, and we have to work with all of them, unlike,
obviously, in Colombia.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I agree.
Ms. Jacobson. The second thing I would say is it is a
fairly significant increase in the CARSI portion of this $1
billion. It is $286 million on what is traditionally considered
security.
I would argue that, unless we do good governance, delivery
of judicial systems and policing and courts and penitentiaries,
all very much part of security, as well as communities that are
safe and have places for kids to go, which is part of the
governance and opportunity portions, that is all security. That
was all done under CARSI. That has increased. So that is new
and expanded in this program, as well.
Mr. Brownfield. I would just add one additional point,
Congressman.
I mean, you are right. Of course you are right. There is
going to be no economic growth and social justice if there is
not security, if you do not have--as President Uribe, who we
have mentioned several times, frequently would say, until I can
get state presence, until I can get police officers and
prosecutors or even mayors to be living in the towns that are
under threat either from narcotics traffickers, criminals, or,
in the case of Colombia, from guerillas, we are not going to be
able to produce the outcomes that we are looking for.
But as Alvaro Uribe would say, we start with security. We
have to get to a certain level on security; then we have to
feed in the social and economic developmental part. And he
would acknowledge that you start heavy on security. At some
point, you reach that tipping point, and then you are able to
ratchet back how much is security and how much is economic and
social development.
I am not saying we are anywhere near that point in Central
America today, but I do say you are correct, the same formula
will apply.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I don't disagree with you. And it is
just that, when I look at this, I see, again, yes, there is
obviously security, and I understand the security component has
different aspects of it. But I just don't see enough emphasis
on how to deal with these criminal enterprises. They are
criminal enterprises. These are drug gangs, narco-terrorists,
narcotrafficking, you know--and I just don't see enough of
that. That is my concern.
So, since I have very little time, have you all been in
contact with SOUTHCOM--Remember, I have SOUTHCOM in my
district. How much of this has been put together, the security
aspect--how much input has SOUTHCOM had? Do you all meet with
them regularly?
And, then, is it their plan, is the security coming from
them? Is it coming from you, Ambassador? Is it coming from you,
the Department of State? How much of this is SOUTHCOM-driven?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, certainly, Bill and I meet regularly
with General Kelly. It is certainly a plan that we worked very
extensively with the interagency. It was developed by the State
Department but then got the input of the full interagency--
Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Department of
Defense, including SOUTHCOM.
And SOUTHCOM has a critical role in this, whether it is
maritime interdiction, detection, and monitoring, and will be
very active in it.
Mr. Brownfield. I will be even simpler than that,
Congressman. There is almost nothing that I am going to do in
the region, from the INL perspective, the law enforcement and
security perspective, that I don't coordinate in some way with
SOUTHCOM. We are two fingers on the same hand, if you will. And
there is nothing I will do that General Kelly is not in some
way, shape, or form aware of.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And my time is up. Thank you, Madam
Chairman. I just do want to emphasize that unless we do have
serious security, to your point, then everything else is wasted
money.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Secretary Jacobson, it is my feeling that, throughout the
years, part of our dealings in Central America and anywhere
south of the Texas border had at times something to do with our
dealings with Cuba. It had an overflow or just a resentment on
the part of some folks in those countries.
Do you think that our present--and I know this hearing is
about Central America, but it becomes one neighborhood. Do you
think that our negotiations now with Cuba will have a positive,
negative, or non-effect on Central America in terms of how we
are seen and what we can ask of them to do?
Ms. Jacobson. Congressman, I have said publically since the
December 17 announcement that it was broadly welcomed by
countries in the region, and that would include Central America
and Mexico, that they supported the President's announcement
and they view the policy decision as very welcome. So I think
they support that and they view it positively.
But in terms of our relationship with Central America and
Mexico, those relations were strong before, and they will
continue as such. But they do view that very positively.
Mr. Serrano. And, again, I know, first of all, that we are
not here to talk about Cuba, necessarily, and, number two,
there are things you can't tell me even if you wanted to tell
me. I shouldn't say that in public because Members of Congress
are supposed to know everything, but there are things you can't
tell me.
I see more of a better relationship with all of Latin
America, I believe, if we straighten out our situation with
Cuba. So do you think that the latest sanctions we put on some
on Venezuelan leaders, members of the government, because of
their relationship with Cuba may hinder our negotiation with
Cuba, without telling me all the things I really want to know
about how those negotiations are going?
Ms. Jacobson. Congressman, I think that the Venezuelan
Government's reaction to those sanctions was predictable, in
terms of their wanting that narrative to be about the United
States and Venezuela, which--the problem isn't about our
bilateral relationship. It is about problems within Venezuela.
But I also think that, somewhat, we expected the countries
in the hemisphere do not like sanctions, and so it was not
necessarily a surprise that they did not support those
sanctions. But those sanctions are not against the Venezuelan
people; they are not against the Venezuelan economy. They are
against seven individuals.
I don't really think they are going to have an impact on
the conversations we are having with Cuba, although Cuba has
publically rejected that move, as well.
Mr. Serrano. Right.
Let me just touch on one last point there, because you
touched on an important point. It seems that, in both cases
that I brought up, you said that, on one hand, there was wide
support from Central America and other places in Latin America
for the December announcement, and you told me that they don't
like sanctions against any of their countries.
So, assuming we reach my dream of seeing full relations
with Cuba, is Cuba in any position to play a role in making our
relations with the rest of Latin America easier to deal with,
or are those separate and apart from our issues with Cuba over
the last 50-odd years?
Sometimes I wonder what role would Cuba play as at least
someone who has--we won't call it an ally; that may shock some
people--but certainly someone that we are now no longer
fighting publicly.
Ms. Jacobson. You know, I think that the influence of Cuba,
in terms of our own bilateral relationships, is not one that I
would overstate. I think our relationships with most countries
are direct, and they are productive in most cases. Where they
are not very productive, whether it has been Venezuela recently
or other countries, I am not really sure that Cuba will be a
helpful country in those relationships.
I think, at this point, after the 50-year experience that
we have with Cuba, we take this one step at a time. And I am
not sure that I can yet view this in a broader context of them
being helpful beyond just reestablishment of diplomatic
relations.
We have seen--and the Colombian Government has been clear
on their role in facilitating the peace process with the FARC.
President Santos has said that he believes they have played a
positive role there, and so we certainly take him at his word
in that case. And we hope that that proves successful.
Mr. Serrano. And one very quick, Madam Chairman, one quick
question.
This is something I should know but I don't know. Are our
American territories in the Caribbean, Virgin Islands and
Puerto Rico, do they fall under a total different, under the
American flag, situation? Or do they also get included in some
of the conversations we have with the rest of Latin America?
Ms. Jacobson. The territories are not, obviously, directly
part of the State Department's responsibilities----
Mr. Serrano. Right.
Ms. Jacobson [continuing]. As they are not independent. But
we do some coordination work, certainly, with Puerto Rico.
Mr. Serrano. All right.
Thank you so much.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
When you get a little older and you start to look back at
your life, you think about formative moments that penetrated
your conscience. And one of those for me was the killing of the
four nuns and laywomen in 1981, as you all recall. I met the
parents of one of the laywomen missionaries--her name was
Jean--at an event in Georgetown when I was a young student, and
I wanted to say something to them, but I couldn't even get out
the words.
And so, when you look back as to where we were a few
decades ago and where we have the potential to be, I think it
does create some hope.
Now, with that said, having been in El Salvador fairly
recently, and having sat next to, in their Congress, physically
sat in their Congress, next to a woman who is former--landed
gentry, if you would put it that way, and a woman who was a
former communist guerilla, and watching them interact, work
toward solutions from different perspectives philosophically,
again, is very encouraging.
But you do get the sense that, because of the wounds in El
Salvador, their ability to look this way, there is a hesitancy,
although they look at places like Cuba and Venezuela and say,
``No, thanks. Those models aren't the right fit either.'' So,
again, another possibility for some hope.
Guatemala has a longer stabilized relationship with us,
and, to a degree, Honduras. But with the highest murder rates
in the world in Honduras, with incapacity throughout that
entire triangle, it becomes an important component, I agree
completely, of our own immigration policy to try to work where
the origins of the problem are.
Now, I thought that the bigger request here was going to
focus primarily on that security component, border security
component, and mutual security efforts to stop the migration
and to fulfill what our chairwoman quoted last year, the First
Lady of Honduras' desires, when she said, ``We want our
children back.''
Now, I hear what you are saying in terms of some additional
complexities in our own immigration law once children have
arrived here. But I thought that the greater component of this,
while not in any way diminishing your long-term perspective on
poverty fighting, capacity enhancement--encouraging this
current good trajectory of enhanced governance is all important
and good--I thought the firm resolve was on that first piece
because of the nature of the problem. One of you said it is the
gateway now through which we are looking at all of the other
issues, this surge-of-children problem.
So can you address that? Because it seems to be packaged as
a priority rather than an immediate priority, to try to stop
this flow and protect these children.
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I am going to ask Bill Brownfield if he
can address that because I think he, along with Beth, have been
the ones who have really responded very quickly to the problem
of last summer and continued to address the issues. Just today,
we saw the announcement of a new border task force on the
Guatemalan-Honduran border. So many of the programs we are
talking about go directly to these issues, including within the
$1 billion.
Can I ask you, Bill, to elaborate?
Mr. Brownfield. Let me start, and then I will pass it to
Beth.
Congressman, I arrived at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador
in June-July 1981. One of the first cases that I took on--I was
as junior an officer as you could be. I was a third secretary.
There is nothing lower than a third secretary in an embassy--
was the investigation of the churchwomen murders as well as the
murders of the two AFL-CIO labor advisers.
I believe we actually got the people who did the act of
murder against the four churchwomen. I do not believe we got
everyone who was involved in the murders of the two labor
leaders.
I mention this to you because by 1984-1985, when we finally
brought these six members of the National Guard to justice in
El Salvador, it shook up the system, it shook up the
institutions, it shook up the nation, because, for the first
time ever, people who had traditionally been part of the never-
held-accountable club for what they did were being held
accountable.
I give you that long preamble because, to a certain extent,
and as the Ranking Member has pointed out, that is what we are
trying to do with our security programs in Central America writ
large today. That is to say, we are trying to get into
communities and groups of people, whether they are
businesspeople or whether they are the political elites or
other elites, and get them to contribute to the solution, which
is necessary if we are going to first break through the
security problem, which, in turn, will allow Beth and USAID to
have the impact that we are all looking forward to in terms of
the economic and social side of the house.
Which allows me to conclude by saying what I think we have
kind of been saying for the last 30 minutes: that it is
security, and it is economic development. You can't have
economic development without security, but, at the end of the
day, you are also not going to get long-term security if you
don't have economic development.
Dr. Hogan, over to you.
Ms. Hogan. Well, I will just quickly say that, as I
mentioned in my opening remarks, the private sector is getting
engaged. We have raised $350 million in public-private
partnerships since 2013----
Mr. Fortenberry. Okay. Let me interject right quick,
because I know my time is up. Are we going to mitigate or stop
the surge of children? A new surge has just started.
Ms. Hogan. Our intention----
Mr. Fortenberry. In the short term.
Ms. Hogan. In the short term, we are mitigating. These
programs will take time to have the full impact----
Mr. Fortenberry. And I am not disparaging the fullness of
the plan. Please understand. But we have an emergency situation
here, and this is a critical moment.
Ms. Hogan. Okay. Let me just say quickly that one of the
things that we did in response to the surge is we invested in
helping governments develop the reception centers to be able to
take back----
Mr. Fortenberry. Correct.
Ms. Hogan [continuing]. These children and families. And I
actually witnessed that----
Mr. Fortenberry. Which, in the midst of this, I touted, by
the way.
Ms. Hogan. Oh.
Mr. Fortenberry. And I think it would be very helpful, as
you all are talking about this, to pull some of those threads
out and highlight them, because it is the crisis at the
moment----
Ms. Hogan. Right.
Mr. Fortenberry [continuing]. While we think long term,
strategically, on the underlying parts of the crisis.
Ms. Hogan. Will do.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.
Let me go back to Cuba for a minute, and I wanted to ask
our Secretary a couple of things with regard to the upcoming
Summit of the Americas.
Now, of course it is no secret that for many, many years I
have believed that Americans should have the right to travel to
Cuba, I mean, since the 1970s, you know. I just think that this
now-50-plus-year policy is what exactly I thought it was then
it was going to be, and it is a failed policy. So I am pleased
to see the President with his historic announcement and moving
toward some semblance of normal relations with an island 90
miles away.
With regard to the seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama
City that is taking place next month, I would like to find
out--and, Madam Secretary, I know you have led a team to
Havana, what, once or twice now--twice--to conduct the
negotiations in terms of renormalizing relations. I just need a
sense of an update from you with regard to lifting the caps on
Cuban and U.S. diplomatic staff and on things like housing for
diplomats and travel, and just where are we in terms of those
negotiations.
And then, within the context of the summit, how do you see
the new move toward normalizing relations impacting the Summit
of the Americas?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Representative Lee.
We aren't there yet. As you know, we are hoping to be able
to open embassies and reestablish diplomatic relations. That is
only the first step in a much longer normalization process. But
in terms of the things that we need for an embassy to run
normally, having sufficient diplomats there and the ability to
travel around the country, et cetera, we have not yet achieved
all of the things that we need. I am still, obviously,
optimistic about making progress there.
The summit is coming upon us. I don't know whether we will
achieve all that we need to open embassies before the summit.
We will keep working to that, but we are not going to impose an
artificial deadline. This has to be done properly.
It is, obviously, the first summit in which Cuba will be
present, and I think that is an important factor. It is also a
summit that will have a civil society forum that will meet with
the leaders for the first time. We expect independent members
of civil society to be there from all countries in the
hemisphere. And it is the first time that there will be an
opportunity for them to be heard by leaders and create a
permanent forum.
And, also, there will be conversations on civil society
participation as one of the themes, as well as democracy and
human rights. So we think those things are important for
leaders from Cuba, Venezuela, and other countries in the region
to hear, as well.
Ms. Lee. Good. Thank you. And I know many Members of
Congress will be attending the summit.
Ms. Jacobson. I hope so.
Ms. Lee. Yes. I have heard that several Members were, and
some here on this committee would like to attend also.
And let me ask Dr. Hogan a couple of questions about the
Caribbean as a region.
So often, the Caribbean has not been put in the proper
place, in terms of our policy, in terms of our foreign
assistance. And since you have responsibility for the West
Indies and Caribbean, could you give us a sense of CARICOM,
where we are in terms of our policy in relations and USAID
toward CARICOM nations and the West Indies?
Ms. Hogan. Certainly. I would be happy to.
In fact, we have just launched a new energy initiative with
the Eastern Caribbean countries to try to help them look at
ways that they can have alternative energy introduced into the
grid. Of course, no island nations are safe from the impact of
climate change and the frequency of increased and more
turbulent storms that they get on a regular basis, so we are
working with them on disaster mitigation and preparation.
We are also working with them under the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative because they, too, have seen a spike in
crime and violence related to the drug trade. As it goes down
in one place, it pops up higher in someplace else, and that has
been the fact that we have seen in the Caribbean. And so we are
working--similarly to the work that we do in CARSI, we are also
doing that work in the Caribbean.
In Jamaica, as well, we have just launched a $10 million
energy initiative. We know that part of the problem for the
Caribbean is that they have a very, very high cost for energy
compared to the rest of the world. So anything that we can do
to help them conserve energy, find alternative uses,
alternative sources of energy, and bring down their energy
costs will help them develop their own economies and their
security.
Ms. Lee. Could you get to this committee the dollar amount
in USAID going to the region, to the Caribbean region, country
by country and then a total amount?
Ms. Hogan. Certainly.
Ms. Lee. Because for many years now I have been a bit
concerned about our level of USAID and what we are doing. I am
glad to hear about the energy initiative. But I travel around
the Caribbean, and I have seen the lack of U.S. presence. And I
do know China is very active in the Caribbean, and I would like
to just see what we are doing as compared to what China is
doing.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And welcome to the committee. It is a pleasure to have you
join us.
I want to just ask a couple of questions, one of which
relates to the situation in Argentina that doesn't appear to be
getting any better to those of us who are concerned about the
ongoing AMIA investigation are becoming increasingly concerned
about.
Obviously, the murder, for lack of a better term, of
Alberto Nisman puts quite a crimp in the opportunity to make
sure that we can more specifically get to the bottom of the
perpetrators. I know that the State Department had offered
assistance to the Argentine judicial system. Although that
appears to be in dispute, from the feedback that I have had
from those who know quite a bit about the ongoing discussions.
Can you give us an update on if and how the U.S. is aiding
the Argentine Government in its investigation?
Obviously, we can't interfere in their internal affairs,
but the AMIA center attacks were horrific and transnational and
represent a growing terrorist foothold that we obviously need
to make sure that we are paying attention to.
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.
And to note that it is 20 years since the AMIA attack. And
I first did my graduate research on the Jewish community in
Argentina, did many of my interviews in the AMIA building
before it was bombed, and so it is very important to us.
We continue to call for the suspects and those involved in
the AMIA bombing to be brought to justice. We think that is
critically important.
In the case of pursuit of those suspects, we have always
said that needs to be pursued wherever that trail leads. We
were skeptical, obviously, of the MOU that the Argentine
Government signed with Iran. And nothing has come out of that
over a year afterwards, maybe almost a year and a half or 2
years. And in the case of Alberto Nisman, we have called for a
very full and transparent investigation into his death, as
well. We will continue to do so.
In terms of an offer of law enforcement support or
assistance, we almost always offer such support when there has
been a high-profile crime in countries. It is up to that
country's government as to whether they want to take us up on
that offer. But, at this point, I don't know of any U.S.
involvement or activity in that investigation. And so we will
continue to be ready to do anything that may be requested of
us, but that is being undertaken by Argentine authorities.
But, obviously, the whole issue continues to concern us,
with no judicial resolution on the matter or resolution for the
victims and their families.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Is there any hope, now that Alberto
Nisman is deceased, given that he was found dead the day before
he was to give testimony that would have shed some important
light on the case, are there other avenues that we are able to
pursue to get the same information or the information that he
had? Or did that information die with him?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think there have been a number of
others both within the Argentine judicial system who have
looked at his material, who are making comments about it, who
are looking into the issues. There are certainly NGOs that have
been active in taking up the issue. The Argentine organizations
themselves, the DAIA and others, have been active.
I think that the case is certainly getting a great deal of
attention and scrutiny. And we are going to maintain our
monitoring and our engagement, obviously, through the Embassy
and our ambassador in Argentina.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you feel as though you are
getting true cooperation from the Argentine Government to get
to the actual bottom of----
Ms. Jacobson. Well, it is not a U.S. investigation.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Right.
Ms. Jacobson. So our ability to, sort of, as you say, get
to the bottom of it is not----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Rather, do you feel as though the
Argentine Government is fully engaged in trying to actually get
to the bottom of the origin of the attack?
Ms. Jacobson. I have to say, that is difficult for me to
evaluate from where I sit. I think we will continue to call for
a full investigation. We will continue to consult with
Argentine authorities and, most importantly, continue to
consult with the entities in Argentina who I think are most
involved, whether it is the DAIA, the Memoria Organization,
which is the victims organization, and try and see how they
feel about the way things are going. It is an extremely
difficult time in Argentina right now, and so we will try and
get the best information that we can from all sources.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. First, Administrator Hogan, my question
is about the issue of security. Last fall, the results of a 3-
year study from Vanderbilt University--are you are familiar
with that study? It talked about the community-level prevention
programs that are working in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Panama.
At the 3-year mark, there were significantly fewer reported
robberies and murders and extortion in neighborhoods with a
USAID presence, which is great, as compared to the control
group of similar communities. Now, residents also reported
feeling more secure walking alone at night. And they took
measurably more collective action to address crime and the
treatment than in control groups. And, again, these are really
good signs.
And, as we all know, a good security environment requires a
lot of attention to detail, including a strong, independent
judiciary, finding law enforcement that are incorruptible. And
this Vanderbilt study, which is encouraging, as well, we know
that crime also, though, moves to where there is opportunity
and a new level.
Now, my questions are basically: In areas without a USAID
presence, how are we going to make sure that the security and
law enforcement puzzle piece is in place before we spend the $1
billion on development?
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for your question.
And you are right; we can't be everywhere. However, this
proposal for a new strategy will allow us to at least scale up
to a level where we think we can have national-level impact,
provided that the government invests its own resources. And I
am happy to say that in Honduras they have created a tax, a
security tax, of which they have given us up to $2 million thus
far to open additional community centers, which replicates the
USAID model.
So, going forward, we know what works, but to expand it to
the level that is required, it is going to require increased
investments from us, from governments, from private sector. And
that is what we hope to achieve.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Good.
Also, one of the points is to build trust between law
enforcement and community and to develop local community crime-
prevention activities. Can you go into a little detail about
those programs? Are they in place now?
Or is that for Secretary Brownfield?
Mr. Brownfield. Congressman, why don't I take on that one,
at least----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
Mr. Brownfield [continuing]. To start, and then let Beth
pick up on that? Because these are the sorts of programs that
we in INL have been supporting for the last 5 years,
particularly in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
We have two that we attempt to link up at, kind of, the
level of kids between about the ages of 12 and 18 with local
law enforcement. One is called the GREAT Program, which is a
gang-related program where we have trained local law
enforcement who offer programs in the schools themselves of 3
to 6 weeks in duration. And the kids, often for the first time
in their lives, are actually dealing police officers but on a
human basis and not on the basis of looking at someone who is
the force of authority, if you will.
The second one is the DARE program, the DARE program which,
by the way, we have it in the United States, as well. That is a
drug abuse reduction program. Same basic concept of using local
law enforcement as well as healthcare professionals to bring,
kind of, drug abuse reduction skill sets to the kids.
My own view is we have hit about 200,000 in Honduras alone,
to give you a sense of scale of what we are talking about. And
they have at least the impact of allowing kids to have
engagement with law enforcement and police in something other
than a confrontational sort of situation.
This is one of the things we would hope to be able to build
on, as well as, as I was describing in my statement, our place-
based approach whereby Beth and USAID and we and INL combine
her community programs with our model police precinct programs
and focus them specifically on individual communities. That is
what we are aiming for.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
Let me ask you about counternarcotics policies. Do our
policies interact with related foreign policy goals of
anticorruption, justice-sector reform, and improving the rule
of law?
Mr. Brownfield. In three words, yes, yes, and yes.
This is to say, one, we cannot and will not, to the extent
that we are aware of it, work with individuals or organizations
that have been penetrated, that are corrupt, and that we are
aware of.
Second, we do work, for the most part, with vetted units,
individuals pulled from the existing law enforcement structures
that are reviewed in terms of their background and then
polygraphed on a regular and systematic basis.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Good.
Mr. Brownfield. So, at the end of the day, the answer is
yes.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do international regulatory and legal
constraints limit the U.S. counternarcotics policy,
potentially, for drug syndicates' foreign safe havens?
Mr. Brownfield. It certainly complicates it, yes. You can
imagine that there are some countries in the world, perhaps
even some within this hemisphere, where it is more difficult to
get cooperation from them on counternarcotics and law
enforcement.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask my final question. What
options might be available to prevent such legal safe havens
from existing?
Mr. Brownfield. My suggestions would be, first,
international agreement or cooperation through U.N. or other
organizations; second, trying to address the issue bilaterally,
which is to say going at the government of those individual
countries that offer the safe haven and attempting to reach
some sort of agreement or accommodation; third would be using
the stick as well as the carrot, and that is applying something
in the way of sanctions, whether individual or collective,
against those governments, those nations, or those individuals
that provide the safe haven.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Thanks.
I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
We will have a second round, and I have a question.
Ambassador Brownfield, last year, you were a witness at our
hearing on transnational crime, and I asked a question about
whether the State Department was using DNA forensic technology
as part of your efforts to support law enforcement. At the
time, the Department was looking into it. Since then, the
Committee included $3 million for DNA forensic technology in
Central America in the fiscal year 2015 Appropriations Act.
Would you tell us about the type of work you plan to do
with these funds to strengthen law enforcement capacity in
Central America through the use of DNA forensic technology?
Mr. Brownfield. Sure thing, Madam Chairwoman.
I am pleased to report that there is an academic
institution located in north Texas which, in fact, has some
degree of skill and expertise on this issue. We have consulted
with them several times in terms of understanding what is the
nature of the science that is available for this purpose. We
are now engaged in conversations to try to structure what a
program would look like.
It is complicated, Madam Chairwoman, because we from INL
and the State Department can work the external, the foreign
side of this, which is to say that side that is in Central
America itself. We need domestic partners--probably CBP, but we
are still working our way through this--who would work the U.S.
side, those who are now in the U.S. adjudicatory system, if you
will. I think we are going to get there.
My vision, subject to correction by any member of this
subcommittee, would be that we use the $3 million that is found
in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill to do that part of
the program that would be linking up potential parents of these
children downstream in Central America and then find a way to
use a domestic agency's authorities and resources to link it up
with the DNA that could be captured from minors, from children
here in the United States.
That is where we are right now. We owe you greater detail
as we work this through with a domestic partner.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Actually, I wasn't going to bring the issue up of Cuba.
Since a couple of my colleagues did and I have Secretary
Jacobson here, let me bring it up.
Narcotrafficking. There are a number of Cuban high-level
officials who have been indicted by U.S. Federal grand juries
for narcotrafficking.
Rene Rodriguez Cruz, who was an official of the Cuban
intelligence service and a former member of the Cuban Communist
Party Central Committee, in your negotiations for
normalization, is his return, his extradition to the United
States, is that one of the conditions that you are asking for?
Ms. Jacobson. We will be talking about law enforcement
issues as part of a dialogue that will take place probably
after the reestablishment of relations. We are beginning
separate dialogues with the Cuban Government on a whole range
of issues, one of which will be deepening the conversation on
law enforcement, including matters----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well----
Ms. Jacobson [continuing]. Such as people who are wanted in
the United States, fugitives and others.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Right. And there are about 80 fugitives. I
mean, there is three or four that are actual, you know, high-
level----
Ms. Jacobson. Right.
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Regime members who were
indicted by U.S. Federal grand juris for narcotrafficking.
There are also fugitives from U.S. law----
Ms. Jacobson. Right. There are also Americans who have fled
to Cuba, yes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Including in the top 10----
Ms. Jacobson. Correct.
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Most wanted terrorist list,
Joanne Chesimard and others.
So my question is this. So you are going to normalize--
before you are going to demand that these fugitives from
American law, be returned. Whether it is those who have escaped
from the United States, which are close to 80, or those who
have been indicted, who are high-level officials. You can
understand how some of us are a little taken back when the
Department of State has gone to the extreme of sending back
three high-level convicted spies, one of them who had a life
sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, the murder of three
Americans, and then went to the extreme of actually
transporting sperm from a convicted spy. I don't know if, by
the way, Madam Chairwoman, if you are aware of this. Our U.S.
Government went to the extreme of transporting sperm from a
convicted spy, again, who was in prison there for conspiracy to
commit murder, the murder of three Americans, so that he could
impregnate his wife in Cuba.
So we have gone to that extreme of releasing and sending to
Cuba three high-level terrorists, and that was before
normalization. That has already been done. And yet, for three
high-level indicted members, senior officials of the Castro
regime, that will not be talked about later, or about 80
fugitives of American law who are there, one of them as far as
we can tell is even living--or has been living, in the Castro
compound, again, who is on the FBI's most wanted terrorist
list.
You are telling me that that will be brought up after you
normalize, correct?
Ms. Jacobson. No.
I want to be really clear about this.
Number one, normalization is a long-term process. What we
are doing now is reestablishing diplomatic relations. Many of
the things we are going to talk about later, including claims,
judgments for terrorism, and fugitives and law enforcement
cooperation will come later as part of normalization but after,
potentially, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. These
are not subjects in which we are having conditions on the table
right now for reestablishment of diplomatic relations. They
will be part of normalization conversations.
Second of all, I want to make clear that nobody transported
anything for fertility. The State Department issued a visa. The
rest of this is the Justice Department and the Bureau of
Prisons.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, the administration did.
Ms. Jacobson. But I want to just be clear about that.
And, third, the three Cubans who returned to Cuba were in
exchange for an extremely high-ranking U.S. intelligence asset
who gave us the Wasp Network, Ana Belen Montes, and Kendall
Myers and his wife--important intelligence knowledge that we
needed to keep this country safe.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without getting into debate now, Madam
Secretary, you do know that those were conditions established
by the regime before. So, in other words, the Cuban regime
established conditions before they would talk about
normalization, including the return of those spies.
And, by the way, the families of the victims were told that
this would not happen, and so they were lied to.
But the regime's conditions, preestablished conditions,
were met by the administration. But the administration, again,
has not conditioned anything, whether it was the return of the
three indicted for narcoterrorism or the close to 80 fugitives
from U.S. law.
That is something that will be discussed later, which,
again, leads a lot of us to believe that these negotiations
are, you know, frankly--it is what Senator Marco Rubio said.
That is what happens when you send your speechwriter to
negotiate with intelligence officers.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart knows the respect I have for him and his
whole family, but I can't pass up the opportunity to just
remind ourselves that those negotiations and those discussions
will also have two sides to it.
I am sure Cubans will want the return, if that is the
proper word, of people who have for years been known to be
living in this country who took part in acts of violence
against Cuba in the early days and in the 1970s in hotels,
people, for instance, in Puerto Rico who were preparing
travels, excursions to Cuba and other places throughout the
country. That may be part of the negotiations, too. So it is
not going to be a one-sided thing.
And you are right, Madam Secretary, that first we
establish--and the thing that--I hate to say this to a
diplomat, but the thing you neglected to say is you can't
negotiate if you don't have relations. You first have to
establish the relations, and then you can negotiate on both
sides. And that is going to happen. And I think the Cubans will
also have claims against us.
I keep almost half-jokingly mentioning an issue that nobody
has paid attention to. I am not the brightest guy on the block,
you know. I mean, there are other people who should have
thought of this. But, you know, for 50-something years, we have
been playing Cuban music--and you think, ``Music?''--Cuban
music in this country, and not a single cent of royalty has
been sent to anybody who lives in Cuba who have written those
songs or whose relatives are still living there.
So this is a long process. You are right. There are
buildings in Cuba that belong to us, this country, are now in
the Cuban hands. There are also things that were taken from
Cuba, like those royalties.
I will give you a last one that--I have no clue if this is
true, but I have been told it is true. When the Cuban
revolution took place, there were a couple of hundred, if not a
couple of thousand, Cubans working on Guantanamo Base.
Therefore, they were Federal employees. Those folks, because we
don't send money to Cuba, when they retired from their jobs, or
their relatives, never got a penny of a Federal pension because
we didn't do that.
So all I am saying is I am backing up your claim that first
you establish relations, then you do--but I just wanted to
clear up that this is going to be a two-sided conversation
because there are claims on both sides.
Ms. Jacobson. I am ashamed that you had to remind me of the
value of diplomacy and its definition. It is true that it is
critical--and this is the point of the President's policy--to
be able to talk about some of the very things that, I agree
with Mr. Diaz-Balart, we must try and talk about and get action
on.
Mr. Serrano. Right.
And one last--I can't believe I am going to ask a non-Cuba
question, but very briefly. The budget for USAID asks for a
large increase. And so the question here is, are the countries
that will receive this increase ready to receive this increase,
ready to put it to work, and ready not to have people who
believe in austerity telling us we wasted more money somewhere?
Ms. Hogan. Thank you for the question. I am happy to
respond.
In fact, we are designing programs now in anticipation of
increased resources both in fiscal year 2015 as well as the
large increase in fiscal year 2016 that we are requesting so
that we will be ready to work with governments and the private
sector to absorb those resources.
You know, this kind of an increase in Latin America and in
Central America specifically isn't unprecedented. We had a huge
increase in resources post-peace-process in Guatemala. We had a
huge increase in resources in the region post-Hurricane Mitch.
This is another huge increase in resources, but it is shared
amongst three countries, and it is to build out what has been
predominantly a security approach to two other lines of action.
So, taken together, we think that we will be able to very
ably invest those resources. So much is needed. And we are very
excited about the opportunities that this request will enable
both the governments and our own agency to help drive
development results in a new way.
Mr. Serrano. My last comment of the day--first of all,
thank you for the work you do for our country and the service
to our country. I know it is not easy, but you do it and you do
it well.
But, without mentioning names, on one of the subcommittees
I was a member of, Madam Chair, as a former Secretary of State
was leaving, we asked that person, ``What do you see in the
future of Latin America? What big change should we be paying
attention to?'' What that person said was very unique, said
that they are going to start electing more and more people that
look like themselves.
And that is where you see, in a country like Bolivia, a
President elected who is part of the majority, the vast
majority. And we have to learn to go into those countries and
immediately say, you elected that person, let's see if we can
work with you before we call you a Socialist or a Communist or
a friend of Castro or something. And I think we have made the
mistake to label people too early without realizing why these
changes have taken place.
We said, have elections. They had elections. When we don't
like the result of the election, then we get upset. We can't do
that anymore.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. I thank the witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee today.
Members may submit any additional questions for the record.
The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs stands adjourned.
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Wednesday, April 15, 2015.
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
WITNESS
SAMANTHA POWER, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger
Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs will come to order.
Ambassador Power, thank you for being here to testify. We
have many important policy and budget issues to discuss with
you today. I am sure you are ready for that.
First, I would like to address the recent announcement of a
framework agreement for Iran's nuclear program. With each
passing day, conflicting reports emerge about the parameters of
the deal. I have serious concerns about promises that may have
been made to lift sanctions on Iran, and I hope you can address
this issue today.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has a critical role
to play in implementing any agreement. Yet, we all know Iran's
record of cooperating with the IAEA is not good. I hope you can
help the committee understand why we should have confidence
that Iran will live up to its commitments this time and allow
IAEA the access required.
I am also deeply disappointed by the hostile actions taken
by the Palestinian Authority to join international bodies over
the last year. Their steps at the International Criminal Court
have put U.S. assistance to the Palestinians in jeopardy.
I am also very concerned about recent statements from
administration officials that suggest the United States is
reevaluating its approach to the peace process and reports that
the U.S. may support a U.N. Security Council resolution laying
out conditions and establishing deadlines. The administration
must send a clear message to the Palestinians that the only
path to statehood is through a negotiated assessment with
Israel.
Concerns also remain about the U.N. Human Rights Council. I
fear that the Council's upcoming report on last year's
hostilities in Gaza will unfairly criticize Israel's right to
defend itself. There are Members of Congress who question why
we should support the Council at all, and I welcome your
comments on this issue.
Regarding budget issues, the request includes a significant
increase for accounts that fund the United Nations and other
international organizations, approximately 25 percent higher
than last year. Like many increases in the President's request,
this one is difficult for me to justify.
The United States is by far the largest contributor to the
U.N., and more work needs to be done to ensure that the U.N.
has its budget under control. For example, U.N. peacekeeping
costs have skyrocketed. The administration should work with the
U.N. to phase out peacekeeping missions when possible and lower
the rate the United States pays for them.
Madam Ambassador, you have committed to reform the U.N.
and, as you know, our appropriations bill contains strong
transparency and accountability requirements. Some progress has
been made, but many international organizations continue to
fall short. After all of these years, there is simply no excuse
for this. I look forward to your thoughts on all of these
important issues.
In closing, I want to thank you and the American delegation
in New York and around the world for the work you do to advance
U.S. interests.
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Ms. Granger. And now I will turn to Ranking Member Lowey
for her opening remarks.
Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ambassador Power, I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming
you today.
Throughout my time in Congress, I have consistently
supported robust U.S. engagement at the United Nations. The
U.N. is instrumental in advancing our national security
interests around the world and in helping confront terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, infectious disease, extreme poverty, and
environmental degradation.
U.N. peacekeepers protect innocent civilians in some of the
most war-torn, ravaged parts of the world, trying to bring
peace and stability for a fraction of what it would cost the
U.S. Armed Forces to undertake the same mission. Organizations
like UNICEF, the World Food Program, U.N. Women, U.N.
Population Fund help reduce poverty, protect children, feed the
hungry, promote women's political and economic empowerment, and
improve health standards for millions around the world.
While the benefits are not always obvious to the casual
observer, the U.N. delivers real results for every American tax
dollar we contribute. The United States cannot be the world's
policeman. As I have said before, no one nation can or should
address today's global challenges alone. That is why we must
continue to work together with the world community using every
tool at our disposal. Unilateral action should be the last
option, not the first.
Those who view the U.N. negatively or advocate for reducing
its resources undermine the U.N.'s effectiveness and limit our
ability to influence international decisions. Simply put, we
cannot expect the U.N. to perform if we starve it of the
resources it requires or if we regard our treaty obligations as
optional.
However, like any organization, the U.N. is not perfect. I
am particularly concerned about its actions with regard to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and comments by the Obama
administration suggesting a reevaluation of our longstanding
policy of defending Israel at the U.N.
Indeed, it was your predecessor, Ambassador Rice, who said,
when vetoing a resolution on settlement activity, ``It is the
Israelis' and the Palestinians' conflict, and even the best-
intentioned outsiders cannot resolve it for them.''
Supporting or remaining agnostic on a U.N. Resolution would
violate the letter and spirit of the Oslo Accord signed in
1993, which endorsed the seminal construct of Land for Peace
through direct negotiations, however prolonged, intense, or
seemingly intractable they may be. Such a stance at the U.N.
would also reward Palestinian intransigence and ignore history.
Madam Ambassador, I hope you will unequivocally assure the
members of this subcommittee that the administration will do
everything in its power to stand firmly with our ally Israel in
opposing counterproductive and reckless U.N. proposals.
Turning to Iran, in addition to ensuring the strictest
inspections and monitoring of any facility, one of the most
critical components of any deal will be the timing of any
proposed sanction relief and our ability to immediately
reimpose sanctions should Iran violate any part of the
agreement.
Given Iran's history of deception, I would like to hear
from you that the core of U.N. sanctions will remain in place
until Iran has taken major nuclear-related steps that
demonstrate their sincerity. I would also like you to detail
the mechanisms with which the U.N. could snap back U.N.
sanctions at any point during the deal and beyond.
Lastly, I hope you will also update the subcommittee on the
U.N.'s conflict resolution efforts, such as ending the
devastating warfare in South Sudan, countering violent
extremism across the continent, which is all the more critical,
given the barbaric massacre of Garissa University students in
Kenya earlier this month.
With unprecedented levels of human suffering and
humanitarian needs around the world, I thank you for your
leadership, your commitment, and passion, and for all you do to
represent American values abroad. I look forward to your
testimony.
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Ms. Granger. Ambassador Power, please proceed with your
opening remarks. I would encourage you to summarize your
remarks so we will have enough time for questions and answers.
Your full written statement will be placed in the record. We
expect votes around 3:20.
Opening Statement by Ambassador Power
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Lowey, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you
so much for the invitation to testify today. And thank you for
the rigor that you all bring in ensuring that America's
contributions to the United Nations are used to maximum effect
in advancing our interests and our values in the world.
As this committee knows and as both of your opening
statements testify to, we are living in a time of daunting and
seemingly perpetual global crises.
In the year since I last testified before this committee, a
deadly epidemic exploded in West Africa, threatening tens or
even hundreds of thousands of lives; a monstrous terrorist
group seized large parts of Syria and Iraq, broadcasting
beheadings and mass executions on YouTube; and Russia trained,
armed, and sent soldiers to fight alongside separatists in
eastern Ukraine, among too many crises to count.
These are the kinds of threats for which the United Nations
was created. Yet, they have exposed profound weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in the international system.
We have seen a global health system led by the WHO that,
despite multiple warnings from credible sources, including our
CDC, was slow to respond to the Ebola epidemic's growing
momentum. We have seen Russia and China through their cynical
veto of an ICC referral resolution at the U.N. Security Council
block a step toward holding accountable a regime that has
tortured, starved, gassed, and barrel-bombed its own people.
Representing our Nation at the U.N., I have to confront
these vulnerabilities every day. But the central point I want
to make to this committee is that, even taking into account
these weaknesses, America needs the United Nations to address
today's global challenges.
The United States has the most powerful set of tools in
history to advance our interests, and we will always lead on
the world stage. But we are more effective when we ensure that
others shoulder their fair share and when we marshal
multilateral support to meet our objectives.
Let me quickly outline four ways we are doing that at the
U.N. First, we are rallying multilateral coalitions to address
transnational threats.
Consider Iran. In addition to working with Congress to put
in place unprecedented U.S. sanctions on the Iranian
Government, in 2010, the Obama administration galvanized the
U.N. Security Council to authorize one of the toughest
sanctions regimes in the history of the organization. This
combination of unilateral and multilateral pressure was crucial
to bringing Iran to the negotiating table and ultimately to
helping reach a framework that effectively cuts off every
pathway for the regime to develop a nuclear weapon.
It is not only on Iran where we have used the U.N. to
catalyze action on issues where the international community has
proven unable or unwilling to respond.
Last September, as people were dying outside of hospitals
in West Africa that had no beds left to treat the exploding
number of Ebola patients, we chaired the first ever emergency
meeting of the U.N. Security Council on a global health issue,
pressing countries to deploy doctors and nurses, build clinics
and testing labs, and fill other gaps that ultimately helped
bend the outbreak's exponentially rising curve.
Of course, America did not just rally others to step up. We
led by example, deploying more than 3,500 U.S. civilian and
military personnel to Liberia, where we helped bring the number
of new infections down to zero last month.
Second, we are reforming U.N. Peacekeeping to meet the
challenges of 21st century conflicts. There are more than
100,000 uniformed police and soldiers deployed in the U.N.'s 16
peacekeeping missions, a higher number than at any time in
history. They have more complex responsibilities than ever
before. And the United States has an abiding strategic interest
in resolving the conflicts where peacekeepers serve, which can
quickly cause regional instability and attract extremist
groups, as we have seen in Mali.
Yet, while we have seen peacekeepers serve with bravery and
professionalism in some of the world's most dangerous
conflicts, as in the Force Intervention Brigade's success in
neutralizing some of the rebel groups in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, we have also seen chronic problems too
often, including the failure to protect civilians.
We are working relentlessly to address these shortfalls. To
give just one example, we are persuading more advanced
militaries to step up and contribute soldiers and police to
U.N. Peacekeeping. That was the aim of a summit that Vice
President Biden convened at the U.N. last September, where
countries like Columbia, Sweden, and Indonesia announced new
troop commitments, and it is the message I took directly to
European leaders last month when I made the case in Brussels
that peacekeeping is a critical way for European militaries to
do their fair share in protecting our common security
interests. This coming September President Obama will convene
another summit of world leaders to build on this momentum and
help catalyze a new wave of commitments.
Third, we are fighting to end bias and discrimination
within the U.N., an issue both of you have raised. Last year,
in keeping with a commitment I made in my confirmation hearing,
I told this committee, ``The United States will stand with
Israel. We will defend it, and we will challenge every instance
of unfair treatment throughout the United Nations.''
We have lived up to that commitment, from mounting a full-
court diplomatic press to help secure Israel's permanent
membership into two U.N. groups from which it had long and
unjustly been excluded, to consistently and firmly opposing
one-sided actions in international bodies. And we will continue
to live up to that commitment.
In December, when a deeply unbalanced draft resolution on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was hastily put before the
Security Council, the United States successfully rallied a
coalition to join us in voting against it, ensuring that the
resolution failed to achieve the nine votes of Security Council
members required for adoption.
Fourth, we are working to ensure that the U.N, lives up to
its obligation to promote human rights and affirm human
dignity, as we did by pressing for the Security Council to hold
its first-ever meeting on the human rights situation in North
Korea. We used that session to shine a light on the regime's
widespread abuses and give a face to its victims, like the man
who was reportedly chained to the back of a car and dragged for
some 30 miles in loops around his village simply for trying to
escape to China.
In closing, let me stress we take very seriously our duty
to ensure taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. So when we request
full support for the accounts that fund the U.N. and affiliated
organizations, it is with confidence that we are doing
everything within our power to make the U.N. more fiscally
responsible, more accountable, and more nimble.
Since the 2008-2009 fiscal year, we have actually reduced
the cost per peacekeeper by 18 percent, and we are constantly
looking for ways to right-size missions in response to
conditions on the ground, as we will do this year through
drawdowns in Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, and Liberia, among other
missions.
When we mobilize the U.N. and its member states to tackle
global threats, we are doing more than just advancing our
interests. We are enabling protection on U.N. bases for more
than 112,000 displaced people in South Sudan who fled after
security forces went house to house killing people based on
their ethnicity.
We are rallying the U.N. General Assembly to uphold the
universal values that America holds dear, as when we convened
and the U.N. General Assembly convened its first-ever meeting
on anti-Semitism in January, where more than 50 countries
condemned anti-Semitism's alarming rise and pledged to take
steps to stop it.
And we are not only helping prevent a generation of
children in West Africa from being wiped out by a deadly
epidemic, but also making it safe for them to return to their
classrooms, as happened just yesterday in Sierra Leone, where
schools reopened for the first time in over 9 months.
These are the stakes. This is the reason we will continue
to work tirelessly to make the U.N. more efficient and more
effective, and this is why we are so grateful for this
committee's support as well as for its efforts to hold the U.N.
to the standards that America's security and the great crises
of our time demand.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
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Ms. Granger. I will have the first question.
Madam Ambassador, one area of the reported nuclear deal
with Iran that is troubling to me is the removal of all U.N.
resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear program. The Department of
State's fact sheet on the parameters of the agreement states
all past U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran nuclear
issues will be lifted simultaneous with the completion by Iran
of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns. The
lifting of all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to
Iran's nuclear program strikes me as quite a concession.
I have questions such as: What is the rationale for the
immediate removal of such resolution? Can you clarify the
timing of the removal of sanctions? Exactly what obligations
must Iran meet under the agreement? Does the promise to remove
U.N. resolutions include the U.N. Security Council resolution
that covers the sale and/or transfer of conventional arms and
ballistic missile technology? If so, how can we credibly assure
our allies in the region that their deep concerns about Iran's
nuclear program, as well as Iran's aggression in the region,
have not been dismissed?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
There is a lot there. So let me try to take a number of
those issues in turn.
First, let me stress a point I made in my opening
statement, which is how central the U.N. Security Council has
been to reinforcing what this body and the Executive have done
in putting pressure on Iran that brought them to the
negotiating table.
I do want to distinguish that the sanctions definitely are
responsible for the kind of economic pressure that Iran faces
that has caused them to make a very large number of concessions
that many would not have expected. However, those sanctions did
not succeed, as you know, in dismantling Iran's nuclear
program.
Indeed, before the Joint Plan of Action, the estimates on
Iran's break-out time were 2 to 3 months. And we are looking at
19,000 centrifuges and so forth that will have to be now dialed
back as part of this agreement.
So, again, the multilateral effects are very real and they
are why we are in a position, we think, to peacefully and
verifiably ensure that Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful
purposes only.
With regard to your question, I think the most important
point to stress is that Iran has to take a whole series of
nuclear-related actions, actions at Iraq, action at Fordow,
action at Natanz, actions, again, to greatly reduce the number
of centrifuges down from 19,000 to some 6,000, the kilograms of
enriched uranium, the quality of that uranium.
All of those steps have to be taken before anything is done
in New York and before any additional sanctions relief is
provided. And those steps will need to amount to us having
confidence that Iran's break-out time has gone from the 2 to 3
months, where we are now, to more than a year. And that is,
again, with those steps that have been outlined in the
parameters document would bring about.
So that is going to take some time. The estimates range
from 6 months to 1 year. But, again, there will not be relief
on the nuclear-related sanctions until those steps have been
taken.
Second, I think, if I may just underscore, that this
relationship is--excuse me--this framework is not a framework
predicated on trust. That is why, again, we have to await the
completion of those steps before you would see Security Council
resolutions.
What we would do in New York, if this went forward, is,
yes, lift the prior resolutions. But we would, of course, need
to put in place a mechanism for ensuring that many of the
sanctions remained.
The conventional arms and the ballistic missile sanctions
we believe should remain for some time. There will need, of
course, to be the enshrinement in a Security Council mechanism
of the nuclear-related commitments that Iran is taking on. And
we are going to need to create some kind of procurement channel
such that any acquisitions or purchases that Iran is
contemplating making that might be dual use would have to get
approved through this procurement channel.
So by no means is it the case that, willy-nilly, we look
and see that a deal is signed and then the Security Council
sanctions that have been so critical to bringing us to this
place simply melt away. Quite the contrary. We are looking at a
phased approach and, again, one that we think leaves us in a
much stronger position to ensure Iran's--the peaceful nature of
Iran's nuclear weapons program.
And if I left out any part of your question, please----
Ms. Granger. I will come back to it.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you again.
And thank you for your service.
Since 1948, the United States has been a steadfast defender
of the State of Israel at the United Nations. I am troubled by
recent reports and press statements by the administration that
the United States would ``reevaluate our approach,'' which
could signal a shift in position at the United Nations. I
believe it is in our national security interest that the United
States unequivocally continues to stand by our democratic
partner, Israel.
Is it still the position of the administration to veto one-
sided anti-Israel resolutions at the U.N.?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I have worked tirelessly, Ambassador Rice has worked
tirelessly, our predecessors in this job have worked
tirelessly, to defend Israel's legitimacy and its security at
the United Nations, and we will absolutely continue to do that.
When there was a discussion about reevaluation, I want to
be very, very clear that there was no contemplation and will
never be a contemplation of reevaluating our deep security and
deep partnership and friendship, relationship, with the State
of Israel. As you know well, the military, the security, and
the intelligence ties are as deep as ever.
We have just in the same period that there have been some
comments made in the public have achieved things working with
the State of Israel in the United Nations that many would not
have thought possible, such as something I mentioned in my
opening statement, which is the first-ever General Assembly
session dedicated to combating anti-Semitism, which occurred in
January.
So, too, of course, we just last fall opposed 18 U.N.
General Assembly-biased and one-sided resolutions against
Israel. And, indeed, in December, as you know, not only did I
vote no on a hastily produced, one-sided resolution, but, also,
I and Secretary Kerry and the President were able to mobilize a
coalition to join us. So we will, again, continue to work
extremely closely with Israel in New York.
And, you know, as you know well, we have a record of
standing when it matters for Israel. I think the one thing that
is important to point out is there have been occasions, such as
last summer during the Gaza crisis, where we worked with the
State of Israel itself and our Israeli colleagues in New York
on a Security Council resolution, and that never came to pass.
It never actually came to a vote because we were not able to
secure sufficient support for it across the Council.
But, again, we will look to see what will advance Israel's
security and what will advance peace in the region and stand,
again, consistently for Israel's legitimacy and security.
Mrs. Lowey. I appreciate your comments.
So the language that was repeated in several print reports,
``reevaluating our approach,'' what did that mean?
Ambassador Power. Well, again, to distinguish a couple
aspects of this, we and our predecessors and, I think, all of
you have long supported a two-state solution achieved through a
negotiation process.
Because of some of the comments that were made in the
election period, it wasn't clear--and I will note, also, some
of the actions of the Palestinians as well, of course, which
were alluded to you in your opening comments--it isn't clear
what the prospects for those negotiations are.
So our objective, as an administration, again, which I
assume is a shared objective, is: What can we do to defuse
tensions? What would it take to get those negotiations back on
track?
And so those are the kinds of questions President Obama is
asking. And as the new Israeli Government comes together, we
will be in close contact with our Israeli friends to think
through again what would lead us to the destination that we all
agree is in the interest of both the Israeli people and the
Palestinian people, which is the achieving of a two-state
solution through a negotiated process.
Mrs. Lowey. I appreciate those comments.
Certainly, as long as I have been in Congress, I have been
hopeful that there would be a two-state solution through a
negotiation process. That is why it was so disturbing when the
administration made that statement, that they were reevaluating
their position at the United Nations. I am hoping, as I hear
you, you are walking back that position and that position is
not the position of the administration.
Ambassador Power. What I am saying is that we are looking
at how we can support what we have long supported, which is
efforts to secure a two-state solution. And in order for a two-
state solution to come into existence, the parties will have to
reach agreement with one another. Absolutely.
Mrs. Lowey. I wanted to make that absolutely clear. Because
the history is clear, if you go back to Oslo and Taba and all
the very serious negotiations. And in many of them, it was the
Palestinians that walked back and walked away, as you know,
whether it was President Clinton or President Bush.
I do hope that in our lifetime we can see a two-state
solution that is negotiated with both parties and we can see
peace in that region of the world. So I thank you very much for
your comments.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Power, good to see you. In this administration,
you tend to be, sometimes the lonely voice in speaking up for
human rights around the world, and I commend you for that.
I have a couple of specifics. Last week in the Summit of
the Americas in Panama, a group of Cuban pro-democracy
activists, as well as a number of American citizens, were
attacked by, among others, the head of the Cuban Intelligence
in Venezuela, Colonel Alexis Frutos Weeden.
By the way, after the attacks, the U.S. citizens were the
ones detained. I have a picture here, Madam Chairwoman, of this
colonel attacking an American citizen. By the way, there are
multiple videos that show that it was not a fight. It was an
actual attack, it has been shown already and expressed by the
press.
So this is the head of Cuban Intelligence in Venezuela
attacking a U.S. citizen. This picture is of two individuals.
The one with the two black eyes is an American named Gus Monge.
The other woman is a woman from the Damas de Blanco, the Ladies
in White, named Leticia Ramos. They were among the attacked.
And, again, here we have a picture of the Americans and the
Cubans who were accompanying them who were the ones who were
detained for being attacked.
Here is my specific question. Now, that we know that it was
members of the Cuban regime who attacked these folks,
unprovoked, and now that we know that there are multiple videos
showing that, what specifically is the United States going to
do to hold the Cuban regime accountable for this egregious
attack on American citizens--violent attack on American
citizens and Cuban activists in Panama?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congressman. And thank you for
being so outspoken on human rights in Cuba and well beyond.
Let me just say that, while I know that there are
differences of opinion up here on some of the moves that the
Obama administration has made with regard to Cuba--it is
probably an understatement--we do sincerely believe that the
engagement we now have with this regime is going to give us
more leverage over time. That said, the human rights conditions
in Cuba remain deeply disturbing.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Ambassador, my time is so limited.
Specifically, we had Americans attacked, violently attacked. I
showed you that. We know who attacked them. We have videos that
show that they were attacked.
What specifically is the United States going to do to hold
accountable those in the Cuban regime who attacked U.S.
citizens?
Speaking of leverage, now, supposedly, we have more
leverage. All right. What specifically are we going to do? What
are we doing to hold those folks who attacked Americans? I
don't remember, I am sure it happens, but it is rare when
Americans are attacked by folks from another embassy where we
have videos. What are we going to do to hold them accountable?
What are we doing?
Ambassador Power. Well, first of all, I would welcome the
facts that you have, which I don't have the details that you
have. I did myself issue a statement, as, I believe, did the
State Department, on the attack when it occurred.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And we can usually count on you doing
that, and I am grateful for that.
Ambassador Power. But I think, again, we now have channels
in which these issues get raised. We are in a process of
normalization. Right? We are not going from zero to 60
overnight. We are in constant dialogue with you. We are in
constant dialog with Cuban civil society.
So, again, as this process moves forward, it is our job to
show those individuals who exercise their peaceful rights that
we have their backs, that we will defend them, and that we will
raise incidents like this, again, through every channel that we
now have with the Cuban authorities.
I will have to take back the question on this specific
incident----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Please, Ambassador.
Ambassador Power [continuing]. On basis of the limited
details that you----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Please, Ambassador, very briefly in the 30
seconds that I have.
In July, a ship sending elicit arms to North Korea was
captured, was intercepted in Panama. You have been very vocal
on that.
What are the consequences for the Castro regime for sending
elicit arms in violation of the U.N. Sanctions to North Korea?
So far, the consequences have been a meeting with the
President of an hour, even though the President didn't meet
with the Prime Minister of Israel when he was here, but he
spent an hour with the dictator of Cuba and his family. So far,
the consequences of the North Korean shipment or of all these
other atrocities has been recognition, normalization.
What specifically are we going to do to make sure that the
Castro regime is being held accountable for shipping elicit
arms to North Korea?
Ambassador Power. Well, as you know, that incident occurred
before the normalization process was announced in December. So,
again, I think it does highlight that the--in the prior--with
the prior administration's policy--this administration's prior
policy in place, we still were----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Except the negotiations have already taken
place, Madam Ambassador.
Ambassador Power [continuing]. Incidents along the lines
that you are describing.
In New York, what we have done is condemned Cuba for its
involvement in that incident. We have secured something that
sounds very bureaucratic and technical, but in my world is
important, which is an implementation notice out of the actual
Sanctions Committee which documents Cuba's role in this, which
is something they and the other parties involved strongly
objected to. Our challenge, as you know, is the nature of the
Security Council and the permanent memberships and those who
stand in the way of more significant action.
But, again, these are precisely the kinds of incidents that
we will not change our response to. We will continue to work
through the Sanctions Committee. We will continue to speak out.
We will not pull our punches on violations of international
law.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ambassador, thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Granger. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thanks very much.
Good to see you, Madam Ambassador.
Ambassador Power. Good to see you.
Ms. Lee. Let me just follow up with regard to the
discussion you were having with our ranking member and just
agree with her that I believe that the two-state solution is
the only option that is going to achieve peace and security in
the region and, also, for the United States.
I also know--well, let me just say I have legislation,
actually, that I have introduced for several years now calling
for Congress to go on record supporting a two-state solution
and the peace process.
Having said that, I want to make sure we are clear that it
is important that both sides, Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas,
agree that a two-state solution is the ultimate outcome and
achievable and what they are seeking, also.
And I know during the last few months, we have had some
dialogue back and forth with regard to whether or not Mr.
Netanyahu wanted a two-state solution and this process to move
forward. So I hope that this chain of events that has taken
place since then, that we are back to now agreeing that the
Palestinians and the Israelis deserve a two-state solution and
that we are going to encourage that to continue.
And I think that the U.N. is going to be very important in
your role in that. But I do know we have a little bit of
history on what took place as it relates to a concern about
whether or not the two-state solution was still a viable option
in both parties' policy as well as throughout the region.
Now, let me just thank you for a minute with regard to
working with us to secure the contribution for the permanent
memorial at the United Nations in honor of the victims of
slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, which this committee
supported. It is really important that the United States and
the United Nations represented us at the unveiling on March 25.
So I have to thank you, Ambassador, for that and, also,
Ambassador Michele Sison, for ensuring U.S. participation. The
African American community is deeply appreciative of the
involvement of our country in that transatlantic slave trade
memorial.
Boko Haram. You know, this is--1 year now marks the
kidnapping of over 200 Nigerian girls. Now, having said that,
there are over 800,000 girls that have been abducted from their
homes in Nigeria totally. It is very important that the U.N.
continue its involvement and the United States.
We supported the U.N. Security Council's resolution calling
for adding them to the sanctions list. Congressman Honda and
Pittenger and myself, we sent you a letter and we asked that
they be included. And you did. And I guess these recent events
now have shown us that we have got to do more.
So I am wondering what the United Nations is doing and what
we could do to support the international community to address
the kidnapping of these young girls and Boko Haram's horrific
actions in Nigeria, but now also their connection to ISIS and
what you see as the next steps.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. And thank
you for your leadership on the slavery memorial, which is
important not only, as you know, in commemorating the horrors
of the past, but also because of the very real occurrence of
slavery in the present, including, probably, the fate of the
girls and how they are living, those that are still in the
presence of Boko Haram or being coerced by Boko Haram.
On Boko Haram, in brief, bilaterally, as you know, we right
from the beginning offered up intelligence and other
assistance--basically, any assistance the Nigerian Government
wanted in order to respond to Boko Haram's capture not only of
those girls, but, also, Boko Haram's rampage through the
northern part of Nigeria.
We have also been very supportive of the regional--the so-
called multinational task force that has come into existence
now with Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, trying to actually
contest Boko Haram militarily. We recognize that it is not a
military solution alone, of course, because the governance
issues and the economic deprivation in northern Nigeria is
going to need to be addressed over time.
It is similar--you mentioned ISIL. They have, of course,
proclaimed allegiance to ISIL. Similar to our anti-ISIL
efforts, you need all the different lines of efforts on
messaging, on cutting off financing. And, again, there needs to
be a military component.
Because of the election in Nigeria, we see ourselves now at
a crossroads where this effort can be ramped up significantly.
The President-elect Buhari has committed himself. He made this
a campaign issue.
And we are hopeful that, with Nigeria determined to tackle,
again, the underlying issues in the north, but most
specifically to find out where the girls are, not just the 200,
but what could be many more than that, and not just girls, but,
of course, boys who were pulled out of classrooms and shot in
the head just for wanting to learn--Boko Haram meaning
education is forbidden--but with Nigeria at the core willing to
help resource this with our support bilaterally and for the
force itself and with our, again, continued messaging that it
needs to be military, but, also, a whole set of other steps to
be taken, that we can move into a new phase.
Just recently, in the tail end of the election season in
Nigeria, Nigeria began to step up its involvement in the north
and Boko Haram is on its heels far more than it has been. But
until they are eliminated entirely, no boy, girl, or citizen in
that part of Nigeria or now into Chad and Cameroon and Niger is
safe.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Rooney.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Ambassador. And I want to say personally I
appreciate your work in the past with issues dealing with
Northern Ireland. As somebody who worked for Seamus Mallon back
in the old days for the SDLP, it is much appreciated.
I want to follow up with something that Congressman Diaz-
Balart brought up. One of the big issues that I think is
important for any Cuba normalization process--and I wanted to
get your take on whether or not you think it is part of it--are
the constituents that came from Cuba that have property claims
felt like, when they left, they would be returning in short
order and weren't able to because of the Castro regime seizing
their property.
Part of the normalization process, in my mind, I think is
property claims--land, homes, businesses. Is this going to be
part of any negotiation for normalization for Cuban exiles in
Florida who are still alive and believe that, once the Castro
regime would fall, that they would be able to reclaim that
property?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congressman.
Let me say that we are now at the very early stage of the
normalization process. And so the dialogues that we have begun
are dialogues on whether or not we can establish diplomatic
relations, dialogues incumbent--necessary in order to establish
diplomatic relations to reopen embassies, perhaps.
And we have started substantive dialogues in talking about
issues like trafficking in persons, which we were just
discussing, communications, telecommunications, information
exchanges, et cetera. But we absolutely believe that these
channels need to be used to push issues that are of concern, of
course, to American citizens, to people living in this country.
That includes human rights, which we spoke briefly about.
It includes property claims and property--efforts at property
restitution. There are issues of U.S. fugitives who are present
in Cuba that we can't ever forget about and need to work
through a law enforcement dialogue.
So, again, we are at an early stage, but nobody is losing
sight, again, of the needs and the demands of American
citizens.
Mr. Rooney. I know one of the arguments is like, ``Well, we
do certain business with China and other countries that are
communist''; but I think that what is lost in the whole
dialogue is that we have constituents in our State, in our
districts, that come to us and ask us and beg us to address
this issue. And, you know, Mario obviously is much closer to
this than I am. But it is so much more real than just doing
business with countries like China, and trying to compare those
two things is just wrong.
One of my other questions I had is kind of a political
question, but I am just curious. How is your job affected by
the policy positions that the President takes, whether it is
with regard to Iran, Russia, what have you, and the other
people that you deal with, knowing that whoever the next
President is going to be, whether it is Hillary Clinton or
somebody on the Republican side, might do things differently?
Do you get a sense that people sort of hedge their bets or do
you just have to go with what you have right now and that is
the reality that you live in? Do you do any kind of future
planning?
Ambassador Power. Well, I think, like my predecessors who
would have been in similar situations, living through the
beginning now of the presidential election cycle, we have to do
just what is in the interest of the American people.
And the U.N., in particular, if we are to reform, let's
say, peacekeeping and deal with sexual assault by peacekeepers
or deal with peacekeepers who duck and cover instead of
protecting civilians, we have to make investments now that may
not even see their full return, you know, until 2 or 3 years
hence.
But I think there is a certain continuity, again, in the
commitment that Americans have to defending Israel's legitimacy
and security within the U.N. I think we have something
resembling a bipartisan coalition that recognizes that we are
in a stronger position when we have paid our dues and when we
are leading from a position of strength. And so that is
something the Obama administration has been able to--working
very closely with this committee, has been able to ensure.
And there is such a great commitment on the part of the
American people, including constituents, off in places you
wouldn't always expect, to atrocity prevention, to trying to
counter monstrous entities like Boko Haram or Daesh.
So, again, things happen far more slowly than I would like
at the U.N., in part because we have got to herd the cats of
193 countries or, in the case of the Security Council, 15
countries. And so we need to just keep plugging along on the
reform agenda, on the strengthening peacekeeping agenda, and on
the--again, defending Israel's legitimacy and security.
And I hope that, whatever happens in November 2016 or in
January 2017, that we have left a stronger U.N., that our
interests are better advanced within the organization, and then
we hand off the baton to somebody who is running quickly and
will carry that cause forward.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Ambassador, thanks for being here today.
I am going to change to threats worldwide, global threats.
And I think one of the most severe threats that we deal with,
other than the issue of weapons of mass destruction and issues
such as terrorism, is cyber and what is happening in the world,
whether it is attacks like China, as an example, stealing
billions of dollars--another country, Russia--from United
States and other countries, including a lot of our allies, but,
also, the destructive attacks, which was really Sony, the first
time we had a destructive attack in the United States.
I am wondering, from a United Nations point of view,
dealing with all these countries, where is the status of the
cyber issue? Have we taken a position on how to deal with this
problem as far as cyber is concerned? And if, in fact, we are
able to prove or the United Nations--and I don't know what
mechanism that would be--that we can show that certain
countries like a North Korea or someone would make those
attacks, would the United Nations be in a position to introduce
sanctions in order to punish or use as a deterrent?
Ambassador Power. Thank you so much for the question.
Let me start by agreeing wholeheartedly with the premise
that cyber threats are one of the most serious national
security threats that the United States faces and it is
something that we are seeing now take effect around the world.
Even the Vatican's Web site, apparently, was hacked just over
the last couple days.
Mr. Ruppersberger. It is going to keep happening all over
the world.
Ambassador Power. It is going to keep happening.
So I think what you saw, of course, in response to the
horrific North Korean attack on Sony is that we moved out with
a very strong executive order, so a unilateral action within
our own capability.
I went door to door in New York to my Security Council
counterparts and made it very clear that this was not something
that one could consider sort of off to the side as something--
that it was something that actually had the kind of economic
and even physical effects of a more conventional attack, I
mean, insofar as Sony being shut down. Of course, there was
also the coercive part of that.
I raised this issue in the Security Council in the session
I mentioned that we convened on the human rights situation in
North Korea because, usually, the human rights atrocities that
a regime is committing is also a canary in the coal mine in
terms of other threats of this nature.
So we are looking, I think, at what the next step is to
ensure that other countries, again, see this as being a threat
of comparable gravity at times, again, to the more traditional
attacks that the U.N. is used to dealing with.
We are not there yet. I mean, it is not the case that we
could move swiftly in the Security Council, particularly given
the presence of the permanent members who might resist this,
again, to get people to see this like other kinds of attacks.
But we are moving out with information-sharing, with technical
advice as to how countries and companies around the world can
strengthen their defenses against these kinds of attacks.
And now that we have just put in place the cyber executive
order, which goes well beyond the attacks carried out by North
Korea, I think that is something that we will seek to multi-
lateralize both within the U.N. framework and then, of course,
through regional cooperation agreements.
Mr. Ruppersberger. From your role as Ambassador to the
United Nations, give an example of China. China has been
stealing billions of dollars from our country and other
countries throughout the world.
The good news for the United States--because a lot of that
information was classified--a company called Mandiant was able
to show the connection between the Chinese Government and their
military and a lot of these attacks. And Mandiant's customers
were The New York Times, Washington Post, major companies.
And we had the information, but, yet, it is important that
we also continue to have a relationship with China because of
who they are, how powerful they are, the fact that we owe them
a lot of money, but we still--you know, need to deal with them.
And I think the best way to deal with China is through commerce
and that that hopefully will pull us together.
From your role and knowing, as an example, the evidence
that we have with respect to China and your role in the United
Nations, how would you handle the Chinese situation, as an
example?
Ambassador Power. The Chinese situation----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Attacking us, we had the evidence that
they attack us. What we need to do is to get China to grow up
and get other countries to help us with a global type of system
to handle these cyber attacks, because they are literally
stealing from countries all over the world trade secrets, that
type of thing. It has been estimated that in the United States,
there are over a billion dollars stolen every year.
How do you see that in the framework of your job as the
Ambassador to deal with this at a global level? Because it is
the only way in the end. We can have our laws and try to do
that in the United States, but it is not going to stop if we
don't deal with the global issue and have sanctions or some
type of deterrent to have these other countries deal with it as
well.
Ambassador Power. Yes. So let me start by saying that,
again, I think the bilateral tool that we have now put in place
through this executive order--the cyber executive order can be
really impactful because, when there are significant harms
carried out by either companies or government institutions or
private hackers who have government affiliations, this is a
tool that we can use in order to hold accountable, punish
people who do that, and deter and, indeed, incapacitate, deny
their access to resources that they might use in order to sort
of strengthen their arsenal in these aggressive actions.
The challenge, which I alluded a little to implicitly
before, in terms of U.N. Security Council action is that China
is a permanent member and a veto holder. So our ability to move
beyond the bilateral through the Security Council turns on
China's willingness to support such an effort.
Mr. Ruppersberger. My time is up. But I would suggest that
we really focus on this as a high priority, especially within
the Security Council, on these countries that are cyber-
attacking other countries throughout the world.
Ambassador Power. I agree with that.
And if I may just add one point, just because we may not be
able to move an enforcement action through the Council does not
mean we can't use the bully pulpit of the council or use that
forum in order to raise the alarm either about one country's
actions or about the threat as a whole.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Good afternoon, Ambassador Power.
I would like to return this discussion to the Iranian
nuclear negotiations for a moment. Secretary Kerry and others
in the administration have said that enhanced sanctions at this
point, if they were to be imposed by Congress, would not be
realistic because our negotiating partners really are champing
at the bit to do business with the Iranians. Yet, we are told
that sanctions will snap back in the event that there are some
kind of major violations of this agreement.
Now, it seems to me like that is wildly unrealistic. How
could we expect sanctions to snap back at a time when we know--
it seems that the Russians right now are lifting their
sanctions by selling these anti-aircraft missile systems to the
Iranians, which would basically prevent the United States or
other nations from enforcing a nuclear agreement if the
Iranians were to have violated it.
So the question is: Do you think it is realistic that
sanctions would snap back in the event of a serious violation,
given the Russians and the U.N.? I mean, I can't imagine they
would support us on this.
Ambassador Power. It is an excellent question. It gives me
an occasion to respond to one of Congresswoman Granger's
questions or issues she raised in her opening statement. So let
me try to take a clean shot at this.
First, let me distinguish the two kinds of sanctions that
we are talking about here and that have brought Iran to the
negotiating table. The first are the very significant bilateral
sanctions that we have brought to bear, including Congress's
licensing and the Executive's use of secondary sanctions
against those countries doing business with Iran.
Those are extremely important. And they were reinforced and
amplified by one of the toughest multilateral sanctions regimes
in history, which was achieved over the course of several
resolutions up in New York.
So it is, I think, implicit in your question. But just so
everybody is on the same page, of course, we will retain as the
United States the U.S. sanctions architecture as we see the
extent to which this deal is implemented, as we see inspectors
seeking access to sensitive sites and whether or not they are
able to secure that access. In other words, we retain a huge
amount of power and snap-back capability ourselves well beyond
the U.N. Security Council.
Mr. Dent. You think those snap-back sanctions will be
effective without our international partners?
Ambassador Power. Well, particularly because we have the
ability to put in place secondary sanctions and because so much
of the world's business occurs in U.S. dollars and because so
many companies want access to U.S. markets, I do.
But I think your question on the second layer, which is the
U.N. Security Council, is still very important. And I want to
assure you that we are not going--we are going to secure an
arrangement to allow for snap-back in New York that does not
require Russian or Chinese support.
So we are not looking at a situation where, in order to
snap back, we would have to do a separate new resolution along
the lines of what we did in 2010 because we recognize that
today's Russia, frankly, is a different Russia than that in
2010 and we want to retain this authority and this capability,
again, within our own power.
Mr. Dent. So you are saying to me that snap-back sanctions
on our part would be effective--given Ayatollah Khamenei recent
comments about the framework, which are completely
contradictory to what we are saying publicly, why would not
enhanced sanctions, if we were to impose them now
congressionally--why would they not have an impact, but snap-
back sanctions would?
That is where I am having a big disconnect. If we passed
enhanced sanctions by Congress, we were told, ``This is
unrealistic. It won't work. Our partners won't support us. We
will be isolated. We will be on our own,'' yet, at the same
time, if the Russians and the Chinese won't participate in the
snap-back sanctions, our sanctions--our enhanced sanctions will
somehow be effective--I don't understand. I feel like I am
hearing two different----
Ambassador Power. There is a very clear answer to that.
Right now Iran is in compliance with the JPOA. The IAEA
has--people have expressed, including earlier, a lot of
skepticism about the IAEA's ability to verify. It has been
granted the access it needed to verify. In the one instance, it
raised an issue with Iran of concern. Iran addressed that
issue.
So you are looking at a JPOA that has been respected and,
thus, the idea of imposing sanctions at this point would seem
very much at odds with the recent--recent only--but the recent
track record to distinguish that then from the scenario that we
were talking about earlier, which is a snap-back scenario,
which is when Iran is in violation of any future comprehensive
agreement.
And that violation would be clear by virtue of the fact
that either IAEA gets the access it needs, reports that Iran is
carrying out the nuclear-related steps that it has pledged to--
these are very different scenarios.
Mr. Dent. I see my time has expired. I just want to
conclude with is, it just seems to me that our Russian partners
seem to be sitting on the other side of the table right now,
given what I just learned about what they are selling to the
Iranians now, and I just don't have a whole lot of confidence
that the U.N. is going to be an effective partner with us at
this point in the event that there is a violation, given that
the Russians seem to be allied and partnered with Russia not
just on this issue, but many other issues. They are trying to
undermine our power and influence everywhere in the world,
including in the Middle East.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Serrano.
Mr. Serrano. Thank you so much.
And thank you, Ambassador, for being here with us and for
the work you do in your service to our country.
I am sorry that my colleague from Florida left, my other
colleague from Florida, because I wanted to make a statement
before I ask a question. And that is that, in negotiating with
Cuba, it is going to have to be a game of give-and-take
because, yes, we have claims on the Cuban Government.
There are Cuban Americans who feel they have lost property.
Whether they abandoned that property or not is a question that
has to be settled. There are American corporations that lost
property in Cuba rightfully--not rightfully--but they did
actually lose the property, and that has to be settled.
But then I always bring up something that makes people
sitting in your chair at different hearings kind of scratch
their head because, in all honesty, most people hadn't thought
about it, and I hadn't thought about it for years. And that is
that one of the most popular types of music in this country is
salsa music. And salsa music, anybody who is into music knows
that it is a New York creation of many Cuban rhythms.
And for years what we have been dancing to and listening to
in salsa was compositions and arrangements that belong to
Cubans in Cuba who may no longer be alive, but whose relatives
are alive, and not a penny was ever paid in royalties to them.
And I have spoken to some people in the business who tell
me we could be talking about hundreds of millions of dollars,
if not more. And when you see a movie and you see Latin music
in the background, chances are it was something written in Cuba
by someone who didn't leave Cuba, who stayed in Cuba, and never
got a penny. So those discussions are both-sided.
Then you have the issue, yes, there are people living in
Cuba that this government would want over here for allegedly or
actual crimes that were committed here. But the Cubans have a
list of people who are hanging around the 50 States and the
territories who they claim have sabotaged and done other things
in Cuba.
So my whole point is that it is not a one-sided issue.
These negotiations will continue to be very delicate because we
have claims on them, but they have claims on us, too. And some
artists are going to come into a lot of money, except there are
no records of how much we owe them.
But I just wanted to do--ask you one question because my
time will run out, and that is: In light of the President's
plan to remove Cuba from the state-sponsored terrorism list,
which I strongly support, how can the U.N. be of help to the
United States in normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba? In
other words, taking Cuba off the terrorist list, is that a plus
for our getting more support from the U.N. to help us with this
whole issue?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congressman. And thank you for
raising the other issue, which I confess I had not reflected on
before, despite being a big fan of salsa music.
With regard to the U.N., what I can say is, up until the
President's decisions from December, Cuba has been a very--even
to call it a polarizing issue would be probably an
understatement.
There is an annual resolution in the General Assembly in
opposition to the U.S. embargo against Cuba that usually
passes, basically, with the support of a majority of countries
within the U.N., but also with only a couple no votes, usually
us and Palau and maybe, I think, on occasion, Israel.
We have been very isolated within the international system,
which I raise, and--again, given my earlier exchange over Cuba,
because I think the steps that we have taken have actually made
it easier, I feel, for me to be heard on Cuban human rights
issues than I was before.
Because every time I would raise Cuban human rights--and,
again, I--Congressman Diaz-Balart, maybe this is just something
I could also direct at you--in the past, when I would raise my
human rights concerns--there have been 600 short-term arbitrary
detentions of Cubans in the month of March alone. But when I
would raise that in the past, all I would hear about is the
embargo.
And now I feel I have a clean shot at making the case
because the diversion that--and, frankly, this is all that
people were doing, was using it as a diversion, but we were
very isolated. And now we are no longer isolated, and I think
we are in a stronger position to raise our human rights and
democracy concerns about Cuba.
That is one example. And we do that whether it is with
regard to individual prisoners. We tried for a long time to get
an independent investigation into the death of Oswaldo Paya,
and I tried that also within the U.N. Cuba--again, this may
change--but has had a lot of support from some of the usual
suspects, but also from some you wouldn't expect.
And so we want to--again, we are very, very sincere that
any process of normalization or--in the event that the state-
sponsored terrorism designation goes ahead and is rescinded,
that is not--does not mean Cuba gets a pass on the human rights
issues of concern.
Indeed, I think that we will be more successful in foraging
coalitions and putting more pressure not just from the United
States, but also from some of our European friends and others,
if we can get, you know, our own issues sort of put to one side
and focus on what really matters, which is the fate of the
Cuban people themselves.
Mr. Serrano. Well, I thank you. I thank you for your work
on all this. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Madam Chair.
At the risk of repeating myself with some of my peers up
here on the stand, I want to tell you a little bit about my
background as I make my observation and then a question.
Now, I had the real privilege of serving as a pilot
representative when I served in the Air Force to the START II
and START III implementation with the Russians, and I learned
even as a young captain that this lesson--and I am certain that
this is true--and that is, if someone wants to cheat on a
treaty such as this, they can find a way to do that. There is
no question in my mind that that is true. I could give you
many, many examples of why I believe that.
But the reason that those strategic negotiations worked
with the Russians and the United States is that there was a
modicum of trust between them. We had a generation of having
negotiated over previous treaties in which they were carried
out and verified, and we believed that we could work with them
because we both wanted the same thing.
I don't believe that is true at all with our negotiations
with Iran. And I appreciate your efforts to move forward on a
very important issue, but I think that you and I or the
administration and I view their willingness to comply with the
treaty in a very different way.
If I could make one other observation and then I will ask
my question. There has been much talk about the snap-back
sanctions, and I think you and I would agree that it took
extraordinary effort on your part--and I know that you were an
important part of that--an extraordinary effort on the
administration in order to put the present sanctions in its
place. And I would say that they are fragile, and I think it
has surprised many of us that they have held as well as they
have.
But imagine, if you would, 2 years from now when multiple
countries, thousands of companies with millions and perhaps
billions of dollars of investment on the line, and every
industry--oil and finance and shipping and aviation--I don't
think you are going to see snap-back sanctions. I think it is
going to be an ooze-back at best. It is going to be slippery
and slimy and full of holes.
And we have already admitted that we will lose China and
Russia, and I think we are likely to lose France as well. And
once that happens, I don't know how you stop the dam from
breaking. Because when other countries see these primary
partners violating any snap-back provisions, I don't know how
we would dissuade them.
Having made those comments--and I am not asking you to
reply because you already have, and we appreciate your response
to this point--my question primarily is this, and that is with
the IAEA. And many of us are frustrated--and I am sure you are
as well--with their inability--and this isn't a criticism of
them. It is a criticism of their Iranian partners--their
inability to get very specific answers to a long list of
questions regarding primarily Iran's military installations and
the role that those have played in the development of their
previous weapons and atomic weapons--or nuclear weapons
programs.
Do you share that frustration? And, if you do, why do you
think that they are going to be any better as they try to
implement and carry out this agreement?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, sir.
And I am going to--I am unable to resist the temptation of
responding just to your opening comments because they are, of
course, very legitimate concerns. And when it comes to the lack
of trust for Iran, we share it.
This agreement framework and any ultimate agreement is
predicated on a lack of trust rather than trust. That is why we
are phasing sanctions. That is why we are talking so much about
snap-back. And I will come to your ooze-back point in just a
second. But----
Mr. Stewart. Can we agree to call it ooze-back from now on?
Ambassador Power. I think the Uzbeks would have a problem
with that.
But the--I think what is really, really important is the
extent of the verification and the transparency regime, the
agreement to implement and then ratify the additional protocol,
the modified code, which requires them to declare anything not
after it is already up and running and built, but, you know,
when the idea has struck, and the extent of the presence, which
we haven't seen.
The JPOA is only over a finite period of time. I concede
that point. But the IAEA has reported compliance. And, as I
mentioned earlier, in the instance when it had a concern, it
raised that with the Iranians and they complied.
Now, you may say, well, that is just because Iran is on its
best behavior because it wants to get the big deal in order to
get----
Mr. Stewart. And if I could comment on that----
Ambassador Power. Yes please.
Mr. Stewart [continuing]. Madam Ambassador, you say Iran is
on their best behavior and, yet, look what they are doing from
Yemen to Syria, to----
Ambassador Power. No. No. No. But stick to the nuclear
issue. I can--I can speak to the other issue. I deal with the
other issues every day on Yemen, on Syria, on Iraq, et cetera.
Mr. Stewart. I know your point. But it is worth making the
point as well. This is as good as it is going to get with them.
Ambassador Power. This is--I am speaking very narrowly
about the nuclear issue.
Mr. Stewart. I understand.
Ambassador Power. I don't think there has been any
improvement in Iran's behavior on the host of other issues that
you mention and that I--again, that we all work on in
cooperation with one another most days.
The--but the fact that every part of the nuclear supply
chain is going to be monitored by the IAEA, the fact that we
will have in the declared sites, the ones we all know about,
state-of-the-art technology, electronic seals, daily access, et
cetera.
But coming back to the nuclear supply chain--because that
is the issue where the covert concerns get raised--they would,
as you know, have to have an entire covert nuclear supply
chain, so not just uranium mines that nobody has ever heard of,
uranium mills nobody has ever heard of, storage facilities
nobody has ever heard of--that takes a lot of work and a whole
lot of subterfuge, and we retain the ability that we have
demonstrated--we and our Israeli friends and others have--to
also have our own independent ways of judging what is going on
on the ground.
So we will also see quickly whether or not the IAEA is
getting the access that it seeks, and we will have a means of
resolving any standoff in that regard that will go in favor of
the IAEA. And so we will come to a point at which they are
either in violation or they are not.
On PMD, just to say that that is one of the issues along
with the changes that need to be made at Iraq and Fordow and
Natanz, those questions will need to be answered in the first
phase before any relief is forthcoming----
Mr. Stewart. And my time is well expired.
Ambassador Power [continuing]. Further--any further relief
is forthcoming.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you.
And if I could just conclude, reemphasizing what I think
both of us have explored here, that if they want to cheat, they
can find a way to cheat. Despite all of the details you have
enumerated here, they still could find a way to cheat. And the
IAEA is very frustrated because they haven't answered their
questions, provided information. I am deeply concerned that
that will be this case 2 years from now as well.
Ambassador Power. But they could--the same argument
applies, as you know, right now with all of the sanctions in
place, the same argument about whether they are able to cheat.
The difference is we will have more inspectors on the
ground and more of an ability to catch them. Right now they are
at a 2- to 3-month breakout time. The difference is they will
be at a 1-year breakout time, which is in the U.S. interest.
Mr. Stewart. I am happy to buy you a beer and continue.
Ambassador Power. Okay.
Ms. Granger. Ms. Wasserman Schultz.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ambassador, welcome. Good to see you.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I am going to mix things up a little
and ask you something not related to Cuba, Iran, or Israel,
because I have a sense, even though I just arrived, that that
was pretty well covered before I got here. Just a hunch.
I want to ask you a couple of questions that are near and
dear to, I know, both me, Congresswoman Lee, Congresswoman
Lowey, and Ms. Granger, and that is the way that women are
treated and the potential for exploitation and what we are
doing about it in U.N. Peacekeeping missions and in U.N.-funded
operations.
But I also want to ask you about the notion of training
women peacekeepers. I know we know that the challenge in having
more women peacekeepers at the U.N. is that there are not a lot
of women in military and police roles. So, as a result, there
is a very small pipeline.
I recently learned about a special training program that is
for female military officers. It was a first-of-its-kind
initiative. U.N. Women in India, in partnership with the Center
for United Nations Peacekeeping, developed and conducted a
special technical course for female military officers. It was
in New Delhi and, apparently, there were officers from 24
troop-contributing countries that participated in the course.
And it essentially is going to sort of build our bench.
I think, obviously, it is important to have in very
specific circumstances a woman on the front lines of the U.N.'s
peacekeeping efforts versus men, not that men can't do a very
effective job. But, obviously, with cultural sensitivities and
gender sensitivities, having more women for a variety of
reasons is really important.
So I wanted to ask you about that program, ask you if you
knew enough about that model to suggest that maybe we could
expand it and use it for training going forward, but, generally
what else can we do to train more women and to put more women
in peacekeeping roles at the U.N.?
And I will ask you the other question at the same time, and
that is just the ongoing efforts to deter sexual exploitation
in U.S. Peacekeeping operations. I mean, obviously, there are--
U.N. Peacekeepers are operating in countries where there are a
lot of challenges, but we have sexual abuse in U.N.
Peacekeeping missions similar to what has gone on in our own
military. I would like to know what steps are being taken to
address that issue because, obviously, anything we can do to
reduce and use our leverage financially to effect change there
is important.
Ambassador Power. Okay. Thank you so much, Congresswoman,
for the change of pace and for the excellent questions. These
are issues very close to my heart, and they should be easier to
fix than they are.
In terms of the program that you reference, we are very
excited about this. We are constantly talking about it publicly
as a way of encouraging more countries to institutionalize
programs like this.
We actually just recently passed another Security Council
resolution that is the re-up to so-called Resolution 1325,
which is the Women, Peace and Security resolution, which sort
of set the framework for this now I guess 20 years ago.
And in that we very explicitly called on countries to
increase the recruitment of female soldiers and female police
within their own militaries and then called on the U.N., also,
to make more of a point when it engages a TCC, a troop-
contributing country, or a PCC, a police-contributing country,
to actually make--send a demand signal that this is what they
want.
As you know, the numbers are strikingly small, but we
have--I have certainly seen in the field in places like Darfur
the effects it has when women police officers are the ones to
go and engage young women who have been raped en route to, you
know, getting firewood, and it is just a wholly different
dynamic.
And the sense of shame and the--you know, trying to tell
that story to a male foreign--you know, not even from your own
country or your own community, but someone who doesn't speak
your language and who is a guy, it is sort of really, really
challenging and just, compounds the pain that these people are
experiencing.
So we, the United States, I think, since 2005 have trained
about just over 5,000 women peacekeepers through our GPOI
program, but we also, through our national action plan on
Women, Peace and Security, on the implementation of 1325, have
made a commitment to try to increase that.
I think the more we talk about it, the more we emphasize
it. It is a big priority for the Secretary General. But the way
the U.N. works, of course, is the Secretary General is at the
mercy of what, again, each of the member states puts forward.
I think our embassies can put also--and our DATs, our
defense attaches, can be engaging in, again, encouraging that
kind of recruitment. But as a general rule, the U.N. tends to
amplify what the dynamics are, as you suggested, within the
composite member states of the U.N.
So the world we need to change is the world inside member
states, and that is why, again, having enormous resolutions and
the political push is important, but we need to do it at the
ground level.
In terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, I think the U.N.
has improved its vetting for troops and police who are going
out into the field. Individuals who have been alleged to carry
out these acts are generally sent home while an investigation
takes place.
There, though, does need to be far more follow-up in the
host country. Because what happens is they go home and then,
again, the U.N.'s relationship with it--I mean, there may not
even be a U.N. Presence in a particular country--tends to
become atrophied.
So we also need to work through our embassies to also keep
the pressure on those countries that say, ``Yes. We are going
to do an investigation,'' but then, you know, enthusiasm for
that can melt away, you know, once the individual is back in
the host country.
So it is--again, we are nowhere near where we need to be,
but we are in a much--there is much more of a top-down
commitment from the U.N. bureaucracy, much more of an awareness
among TCCs and PCCs that this is a priority. And, again, we
need to see results in the field.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Madam Chair, just 10 seconds more of
indulgement, so that I could ask you know, we obviously have
members travel around the world and we have meetings with a lot
of your host countries.
And, to the degree that--we are able to raise issues from
our perspective so that they are not only hearing them from
you----
Ambassador Power. That so would be----
Ms. Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. If you could find a way
to let members know as we are approaching recesses where we
know CODELs are going out, know many of us would be happy to do
that.
Ambassador Power. Great. Thank you so much, Congresswoman.
Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
We are going to have another round of questions, but we are
going to have to be shorter in our questions and shorter in our
answers or I won't get around to everyone.
Ambassador Power. Will do.
Ms. Granger. I am going to ask first about the Palestinian
Authority briefly.
As it is obvious that they are turning their attention away
from direct negotiation, instead going to the U.N. and the ICC,
how do their actions at the U.N. and the ICC affect U.S.
financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority? I see
another $440 million request for the Authority in the fiscal
year 2016 budget request.
I also ask you in that same vein if you expect the
Palestinians to file formal charges against Israel and the ICC.
What are you doing to try to discourage this? And if it is true
that the ICC has already begun preliminary investigation into
Israel's activities, how is the U.S. opposing the ICC's
involvement?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will try to
be very succinct. There were a number of questions there.
First, as you know, we did not believe that the
Palestinians were eligible to become a party to the ICC. We
have made clear privately, publicly, many, many times over that
we oppose their decision to go to the ICC, that it would be
counterproductive, further poison the atmosphere that we were
trying to, as we were discussing earlier, improve and--and
hopeful that the parties can improve so that the aspirations of
the Palestinian people, you know, can be advanced, which is not
something that this ICC track is going to secure for them. A
two-state solution will secure that for them.
So on the funding question, we are reviewing our
assistance. As you know, the Government of Israel has just made
a decision to release some revenue, in part, because at its
core, you know, much of the assistance, whether it is the
assistance that goes through Israel or assistance that comes
from this body, is assistance that we use in order to deepen
the security partnership to counter violent extremism.
The last thing we want is, you know, for the Palestinian
territories to be radicalized, for youth to not have a place to
go, for people not to be paid. And we know who exploits those
kinds of environments. So I think we are in close touch, and it
is a, you know, day-to-day discussion about how we go forward
on the assistance question.
Finally, on the ICC's own relationship to this issue, the
prosecutor has announced that she is undertaking a preliminary
examination. So it is prior to the investigation stage. There
are a lot of questions that she will need to sort through.
Again, we believe that one of those questions should still
center on the eligibility question, given that a two-state
solution has not been secured between the two parties. And
while we are not a party to the ICC, you know, we, again,
engage both the Palestinians to deter them from taking any
further action, and, of course, we engage the court, both
ourselves and through state parties to the ICC, to try to make
very clear what the consequences of moving forward would be for
what, again, we should all be for, which is peace and security
in the region between the two parties.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
First of all, I thank you, Madam Chair, for asking the
question about the ICC and wonder where the chair is going. I
won't pursue that point, but I would be interested. If you have
any additional information, keep us updated.
And I do want to say to Mr. Stewart at the end, I
appreciate his pursuing the question with regard to the
military sites.
In fact, I just recently asked Secretary Kerry that exact
question because, after dozens of briefings that I have been a
part of, there seems to be no progress in Parchin or the other
military sites, and he assured me that there could not be, and
there would not be, a deal unless there was absolute inspection
by IAEA of the military sites.
So I must say I have been asking this question for months,
and I was pleased to hear from the Secretary that this is an
absolute given if there is going to be a deal. Otherwise, their
view is that no deal is better than a bad deal.
So I thank you for bringing that issue up.
I would like to ask another question that we haven't
touched on. We have the whole world to deal with. What about
Russia? What are they really up to? I thought their recent
statement about selling anti-missile equipment to Iran was an
interesting one. I have asked for a long time what does Russia
really want. On the one hand, they are part of our alliance to
try to get a deal with Iran. On the other hand, they continue
to stir up problems not only in Ukraine, but in Syria and Yemen
and Iraq.
So I know that you and the Secretary have looked for
various incentives that will bring Russia into step with the
world community. Could we be on the verge of a new cold war?
Can you enlighten us as to your views as to Russia's intention
in the world? And we know they continue to support the Assad
regime.
To what extent is this driven by Russia's battle with
terrorism in the Caucasus? Is Russia still profiting from arms
sales to the Assad regime? I would be interested to know your
view of Russia's role in their region and in the world and in
our future relationships.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is a
question that, given Russia's role as a permanent member of the
Security Council, I grapple with every day and see different
manifestations of every day.
First, it is really, really important, particularly today
and this week, to point out that Russia's aggression in Ukraine
has not ceased. There was a significant drop in violence, but
now that situation has escalated.
And it has escalated in large part because the separatists
backed by Russia did not withdraw their heavy weapons as they
were supposed to under the Minsk Agreement from the front lines
because Russia maintained a regular army presence within
eastern Ukraine, including command and control and training.
The convoys that are not inspected by the international
community, the OSC or the ICRC, keep coming in. I think we are
expecting the 24th such convoy that just moves across the
border blatantly.
So, again, this is an area of significant concern, and it
causes us again and again--at the time that we would very much
like to see the Minsk Agreement be implemented and move out of
this period of confrontation and diplomatic and economic
isolation of Russia, we now have to be thinking again about
what are the consequences going to be of further aggression in
Ukraine.
So you have that as the most egregious example of Russia's
defiance of international norms. Alongside that you mention the
support for Assad, support even as we work together to
dismantle Assad's declared chemical weapons program.
You know, this is a regime that drops thousands of barrel
bombs on civilian neighborhoods, uses chlorine against children
and adults, for that matter, and, yet, the Russian support for
that government continues. And it is, again, a huge problem and
it has really paralyzed the U.N. Security Council, where I sit
every day, which is responsible for maintaining international
peace and security and cannot meet that responsibility because
of Russian obstructionism.
So you have all of that and the internal situation in terms
of the human rights crisis that civil society and others are
facing, anybody who speaks out being vulnerable, independent
media being cracked down upon, of course, the recent
assassination of a leading opposition figure, and just a really
difficult situation for anybody who wants to express their
views or assemble peacefully, et cetera, inside the country.
And we, again, always make our views known on this, speak out,
and make those concerns, again, known publicly and privately.
So you have all of that on the one hand.
But then, again, back to Congressman Stewart's--the
exchange I had with him, on the other hand, you have the fact
that they did stand with us through the P5+1 negotiations. They
were a--and remain on, again, the declared chemical weapons
program a critical part of dismantling that program and getting
rid of, you know, more than 1,000 metric tons of sarin and
other, you know, toxic chemicals that Assad probably would have
used as a routine weapon of war if they were still within the
country.
On ISIL, on the stopping--trying to stop the flow of
foreign terrorist fighters, we have very, very useful technical
discussions, and I think that is an area where cooperation
needs to continue. Of course, Russia's definition of a
terrorist and our definition of a terrorist, you know, tend to
be different. But on ISIL and on Al Qaeda, you know, again,
that is something that we need to work on together.
So we are entering into a period where we will cooperate on
areas that are in our national security interests, and,
presumably, that is the logic of their cooperation as well. And
we will take measures as we need to when they defy
international norms and commit aggression in their neighborhood
or beyond.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
I will say before we go on that, in the past 5 weeks, I
have been to Ukraine twice with bipartisan, very high-ranking
delegations from Congress, and we sent a letter to the
President. The President of the Ukraine made a very impassioned
plea for weapons for them to defend themselves. They are very,
very concerned about what is going on there.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
By the way, before I say anything else, I do need to thank
Ms. Chartrand--I always get your name--Jennifer, your name
wrong.
But during this crisis when the Americans were being
attacked in Panama City, I contacted her, we contacted her.
They put us in contact with the DCM in our Embassy in Panama,
and they were exceedingly responsive. And I think it is
important to note that. And so I am very grateful for that. So
thank you.
Ambassador, you mentioned a number of issues with Russia,
you know, Assad--I think that the concept that he was a
reformer--that has been thrown out the window. You mentioned
again the support for Assad, the Russian support for Assad. You
know, we have got the weapons to Iran. There is a million
things that we could mention. And I will forget many and you
will forget many.
Obviously, the invasion of the Ukraine, their continuing
aggression in the Ukraine, and they still have troops in
Georgia. And so--and I will tell you the previous
administration at first thought that Putin was a person that--
you know, he looked into his eyes and read his soul and,
eventually, he--President Bush realized and called him a very
cold human being.
Have we reset the reset? And I am not saying this as a
gotcha thing. Is there an understanding that--and I think, from
your words, I mean, you clearly understand that. But is there
an understanding that the--you know, treating and disregarding,
which is what a reset--disregarding past abuses? And, remember,
the reset was done right after the invasion of Georgia.
Is there a different attitude now as to how we deal with
the Russians as opposed to kind of like, ``Well, don't worry
about it. We are okay. We are buddies''? Is there a different
understanding now of the true nature of a regime that I believe
is a dictatorial human rights-abusing regime?
Ambassador Power. Well, I think Russia has taken actions
that have resulted in not only the attempted lopping off of
part of a neighbor, but the attempted neutering and
evisceration of the Democratic progress that Russia had also
made internally, you know, including throwing out USAID, which
was a critical source of support for--and a lifeline for some
of the lawyers groups and independent journalists and
anticorruption crusaders within Russia.
So the relationship, of course, is now one that takes on
these issues. I mean, back in 2009, if you had been told that,
by virtue of U.S. and European sanctions, the ruble would have
depreciated the extent to which it has, economic growth would
have shriveled--I mean, Russia was going in a very different
direction.
But I want to stress this isn't--I mean, sanctions, just as
with Iran, are not an end in themselves. We are not interested
in sanctions that are hurting the Russian economy for the sake
of sanctions. We are interested in Putin ending his aggression
in Ukraine.
Our dialogue with the Russians on Syria is rooted in an
argument that has not proven persuasive up to this point, but
which is that, actually, we both have an interest in seeing the
end of the Assad regime because the Assad regime has made
possible the growth of ISIS across Syria. And, indeed, it was a
safe haven, of course, for those ISIS soldiers that then went
into Iraq and took over Mosul and inflicted such suffering on
so many.
So we still believe that our shared interest in combating
terrorism, in ensuring that chemical weapons are not used and
they don't become a routine weapon of war anywhere--and that
includes chlorine--should allow us still, notwithstanding a
very significant deterioration in the way that we engage with
them by virtue of sanctions and by virtue of their aggression
in Ukraine--we still believe that there have to be areas of
tactical cooperation that we maintain, and the discussion
earlier of sanctions evasion is just one example.
It is in our interest for Russia to be a country within the
U.N. system that observes the international sanctions that
Russia is a part of putting in place. We need--even if we want
to put in place something that is of great interest to
Congresswoman Lee and that others have mentioned, sanctions on
the protagonists in South Sudan who are pulling ethnic Nuer or
Dinka out of the house and just killing them because they are
of the wrong ethnicity, we have to go through Russia in the
Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council.
So we don't have the option of just turning our back and
writing off this country, but we are very clear-eyed about the
differences and the very disturbing trends.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairwoman, I want to thank you.
Ms. Granger. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
Sudan. I co-chair the bipartisan caucus on Sudan and South
Sudan, and we have worked for many, many, many years on a
bipartisan basis addressing the humanitarian crisis in South
Sudan, which is now deteriorating. According to USAID, more
than 1.5 million people have been displaced, 2.5 million people
are facing food insecurity in South Sudan since the outbreak of
violence in December in 2013.
Now, with the recent collapse in the peace talks, I believe
it is very, very critical--and the caucus also believes this--
that the U.S. Government increase pressure on the parties to
reach a negotiated settlement and to work to bring U.N.
sanctions into force.
So, Madam Ambassador, can you tell us what the dynamics are
at the United Nations. You mentioned Russia as it relates to
sanctions, but we have asked for the establishment of an arms
embargo. You know, we can't seem to get that done.
Also, the current U.N. peacekeeping troop levels in South
Sudan--want to know, are they being maintained at the current
level? What do we need to know from this committee's vantage
point that we need to do to make sure those peacekeeping forces
are funded?
And then, finally, with regard to U.N. peacekeeping mission
in Haiti, I believe the troop reduction will take place very
soon and will pull down to what they were prior to the
devastating earthquake in 2010. So what is the timeline of this
reduction? And how will this affect the security in Haiti?
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
And let me, if I could, just take this occasion--since we
haven't had too much time to talk about our budget request,
take advantage of the opening that you have given me to make a
fervent appeal that the President's budget requests be
fulfilled, in part, because of, well, frankly, the whole host
of issues we have discussed up to this point, but because I
think what you see with the Haiti drawdown is that we are--and
with the drawdown in Liberia that is now recommencing, now that
the Ebola crisis has abated, at least in Liberia. Nobody can be
overconfident about that, given its presence elsewhere in the
neighbors. But you can count on us. We are looking at every
mission and seeing where we can recalibrate, right-size.
In the case of Haiti, just to pick up where you ended,
Haiti is entering into a process where elections are occurring,
but they have also massively increased the capability of the
Haitian National Police.
I was down there in January and was told by the U.N. Police
Commissioner that it takes 10 international police to do the
work of one fully trained Haitian police, which is not normally
necessarily the ratio one would expect. But that is a testament
to how far they have come, I think, with the U.N.'s help.
I cannot stress how alert we are to the expanding size of
the demands that we are making on this committee and on the
Congress and the--and the appeal to American taxpayers that I
feel I continually have to make, but it is for these causes
that are critical to our national security.
And so, if we can draw down in Haiti, right-size--because
we don't want to in any way squander the gains that have been
made--if we can consolidate in Liberia and in Cote d'Ivoire--we
have to increase in South Sudan. It is actually a modest
infusion, considering the scale of the threat. We have to
fortify the mission in Mali because terrorists are now taking
on peacekeepers, and even today we had another incident where
there was a suicide attack at a U.N. Base. It is a horrific
situation.
But when you go through the list of the peacekeeping
missions that we are asking you to help us fund, there is just
not one mission that you would take of and say, ``Eh''--you
know, even Cyprus, which is the mission that everybody sort of
cites, is funded largely not by us, but actually by the parties
themselves. And, indeed, of course, given the number of crises
in the world, the last thing you would want to do is
destabilize something when there is a peace process that we
want to ensure reaches results over the long period that that
crisis has existed.
But my point is just join us in this--if you could, in this
process of looking at these missions. We have cut the per-
peacekeeper cost by 18 percent. It can go down more. We are
pushing every day on that. We are shrinking the size of
missions because we know that there is a certain fluidity where
other missions need to be increased. We know there is not an
infinite pie here.
But we are carrying over into this year a significant
deficit from last year, hopefully, less of one than we thought
we were going to be carrying. And, thus, while our appeal looks
bigger this year, the actual requirements are just--are a
little bit lower even than they were in 2015 for 2016, at least
the requirements that we expect.
On South Sudan, just very briefly, as my time is up, we
have put in place through this recent Security Council
resolution--now you might call it a pressure architecture. So
we have a sanctions regime and now we will need to go forward
in collaboration with our IGAD friends, who are trying to
broker this peace process with designations on those who are
spoiling and who are responsible for the breakdown in talks. We
have to be strategic about that and think about how to ramp up
perhaps or what the right sequencing is.
And the resolution also references an arms embargo, and we
are very drawn, as are you, to the idea that, of course,
stemming the flow of arms to this region may be another factor
that could change the calculus.
But the biggest issue in South Sudan is that the very
leaders that this Congress and our administration and our
predecessors supported have not put the interests of their
people above their own parochial desire for power or for self-
preservation. And that is the roadblock that we have to lift,
and pressure has got to be part of that.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Ambassador Power. Thank you again
for your time today and for your service to the country.
This concludes today's hearing. Members may submit any
additional questions for the record. The subcommittee on State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.
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Brownfield, Ambassador W. R...................................... 563
Browning, Ambassador Steve....................................... 1
Dijkerman, Dirk.................................................. 1
Hogan, Elizabeth................................................. 563
Jacobson, R. S................................................... 563
Kerry, Hon. John................................................. 111
Konyndyk, J. M................................................... 1
Lenhardt, A. E................................................... 390
Lew, Hon. Jack................................................... 489
Power, Samantha.................................................. 627
[all]