[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH
IRAN (PART III)
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 23, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-81
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 5/19/15 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D., senior scholar, National
Institute for Public Policy (former Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security)................... 4
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for the Defense
of Democracies................................................. 15
Mr. Ilan Goldenberg, senior fellow and director, Middle East
Security Program, Center for a New American Security........... 49
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........... 7
Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement............................ 18
Mr. Ilan Goldenberg: Prepared statement.......................... 51
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 100
Hearing minutes.................................................. 101
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 103
IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN (PART III)
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THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order.
This morning the committee continues to examine the nuclear
agreement that the Obama administration has arranged with Iran,
and we have a 60-day congressional review period.
Yesterday, Members of the House attended a closed briefing
with Secretary Kerry on this very consequential agreement. And
we will begin to hear the case publicly today as Secretary
Kerry testifies before the Senate. Myself and Mr. Engel led the
briefing yesterday in closed session with the House with
Secretary Kerry, but he will appear before this committee next
week.
What is clear from yesterday's briefing--and clear from
reading the testimony of our witnesses today--is that the
administration has its work cut out making one particular case
to this body, and that is, is this in our long-term national
security interest? All of us want a verifiable and a lasting
agreement, and that is what we are looking at.
But are the temporary constraints on Iran's nuclear
program, the 10-plus years' constraints, worth the price of
permanent sanctions relief? And if Iran does cheat--they have,
by the way, cheated on every agreement that I know of that they
have made in the past--if they do, could sanctions developed
over years be put quickly back in place?
As we will hear from one sanctions expert today, this deal
eviscerates the sanctions web that was putting intense pressure
on the regime up until the interim agreement when we lifted
those sanctions and they began to get $700 million a year.
Virtually all economic, financial, and energy sanctions under
this agreement now disappear. This includes not only sanctions
on Iran's nuclear program, but key sanctions on the bad banks
that have supported Iran's terrorism and ballistic missile
development.
In return? Iran is not required to dismantle key bomb-
making technology. It is permitted a vast enrichment capacity,
and it is allowed to continue its research and its development
to gain an industrialized nuclear program, once parts of this
agreement begin to expire in as little as 10 years. And just to
quote the President on this, he said of his own agreement, ``In
year 13, 14, 15, Iran's breakout times would have shrunk almost
down to zero.''
And with tens of billions in near instant sanctions relief,
it defies logic to think that somehow this money will not
bolster Iran's worldwide campaign of terror. With this
agreement, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force, responsible, by
the way, for the death of hundreds of American troops, this
individual gets removed from a key sanctions list. The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps under this agreement is a winner.
Hamas will be able to rebuild its tunnels faster, and Hezbollah
will get more powerful weapons. And you have all seen in the
last month reporting on Iran's commitment to both of those
institutions, to resupply rockets, missiles, special precision
guidance for Hezbollah missiles, and its commitment to rebuild
the tunnels under Israel. So it is no wonder that Israelis
left, right, and center oppose this agreement.
Even more troubling to us here in the United States is that
Iran--with the backing of Russia--won an 11th hour concession
to remove international restrictions on its missile program in
8 years, and conventional arms in 5. Of course Russia doesn't
care--they will be making hundreds of millions of dollars in
arms sales--and the missiles are not going to be aimed at
Moscow. What the Russians have is the capacity to sell to the
Iranians--and this is what they want to do--targeting
information, frankly. And as the Secretary of Defense just
testified, ``The `I' in I.C.B.M. stands for intercontinental, .
. . which means flying from Iran to the United States.'' He
said that is why we do not want that kind of capacity to be
transferred. Countries build I.C.B.M.s for one reason, and that
is to deliver nuclear weapons.
At the same time that the restrictions on Iran's missile
program come off, so do sanctions on the Iranian scientists
involved in their bomb work. This of course is a deadly
combination. ``Iran's Oppenheimer'' gets a reprieve. A German
citizen involved in the A.Q. Khan network has his sanctions
lifted. It is difficult to see how amnesty to nuclear
proliferators helps us.
In our hearing last week, many members expressed concerns
about the adequacy of the inspections allowed under this
agreement. The administration settled for a 24-day process, but
this week a former top international inspector expressed great
skepticism that this would give inspectors what they need. And
as a former CIA director testified to us last week,
``Our national technical means won't be sufficient for
verifying this agreement. Without an invasive
inspection regime, I would not tell you we will know
enough to give you sufficient warning. So that really
puts the weight of effort on the IAEA's ability to go
anywhere at any time.''
I now turn to the ranking member for any opening statement
he may have.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for calling today's hearing, and thank you for your steady
leadership of this committee.
Welcome to our witnesses. Congress established the 60-day
review period, so that we could take the necessary time to
thoroughly assess the deal on Iran's nuclear program. It is
important that we get input from a range of voices, and we are
grateful for your time. So thank you for coming to testify here
this morning.
We have now had a few days to look at this deal. We have
heard from Secretary Kerry, Secretary Lew, and Secretary Moniz
behind closed doors yesterday. Next week we will hear from them
again right here in this committee. And, obviously, this is a
very complex agreement. It is possibly the most important issue
some of us will ever deal with as Members of Congress. It
demands close analysis and informed deliberation.
While I am still reviewing the agreement, I must say I do
have some serious questions and concerns about certain aspects
of the deal, and I am going to get right to them.
First of all, I would like to know more about access to
undeclared sites. The administration has assured us that no
site is off limits for the inspectors. That is a good thing,
but inspectors are unlikely to have on demand access to
undeclared sites. Iran can take 14 days to comply with an IAEA
request for access. That is problematic.
Suppose after that Iran still blocks the way. Members of
the Joint Commission could take another 7 days to resolve the
IAEA's concerns. Iran then has 3 more days to provide access.
And if Iran continues to say no, another month could go by
while the dispute resolution mechanisms run their course. My
concern is that Iran could use that time period to sanitize
sites and avoid detection if they are breaking the rules.
Secondly, I would like to look at the arms embargo and
ballistic missile sanctions. For months and months, we were
told these programs were off the table. But under the
agreement, the embargo will be lifted in a few years. To me,
that seems like throwing fuel on the fire. If the deal goes
forward, we need to think long and hard about what steps we can
take to prevent Iran from causing even more trouble in the
region once these restrictions are lifted.
On the topic of sanctions relief, I am concerned about what
Iran will do when sanctions are phased out and the spigot is
turned back on. Iran is obviously a bad actor. This is a regime
that orchestrates coups, supports terrorist groups, violates
the human rights of its own people, and projects instability
and violence across its neighborhood.
Iran may use these new resources, tens of billions of
dollars, to improve the lives of the Iranian people. But I am
willing to bet such programs won't come at the expense of
Hezbollah, Shiia militias, Hamas, or the Assad regime. How can
the United States help mobilize an international effort to stem
the flow of resources to Iran's violent and dangerous allies?
Next, I am concerned about what happens when the research
and development ban is lifted. For 8 years, Iran is limited in
its development of advanced centrifuges. Without these limits,
Iran could quickly reduce its breakout time or develop a covert
program. But after year 8, Iran can quickly move toward the,
and I quote, ``next stage of its enrichment activities.'' After
that part of the deal expires, is there anything we could do to
prevent Iran from making rapid progress on its nuclear
technology?
Finally, I have a fundamental concern that 15 years from
now Iran will essentially be off the hook. If they choose,
Iran's leaders could produce weapons grade highly enriched
uranium without any limitation, and they can do so faster than
they could before with more advanced centrifuges.
What can we do to ensure that we just don't find ourselves
in the same place we are today in the year 2030? Because the
truth is, after 15 years, Iran is legitimized as a threshold
state. After year 15, there are no restrictions on producing
highly enriched uranium. That is troublesome.
As we consider these issues, and people will say, ``Well,
what this does is it doesn't prevent Iran from having a nuclear
weapon; it just postpones it.'' That is trouble for me.
As we consider these issues, we must ask ourselves an
important question as well to be fair. What is the alternative
to this specific deal? If this deal doesn't go forward, can our
sanctions regime and the P5+1 coalition hold? Would renewed
pressure bring the Iranians back to the table if this deal
fails? Would new sanctions have to be coupled with military
action? I hope as our witnesses testify today they bear that
context in mind.
So I look forward to hearing from all of you, and I thank
you again for your testimony and your time, and I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
This morning we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished
panel. Ambassador Robert Joseph is a senior scholar at the
National Institute for Public Policy. Previously, Ambassador
Joseph served as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security at the Department of State.
Mr. Mark Dubowitz is the executive director at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He is the author of
15 studies examining economic sanctions.
Mr. Ilan Goldenberg is a senior fellow and director of the
Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American
Security, and previously Mr. Goldenberg served as the Chief of
Staff to the Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
at the Department of State.
So, without objection, the witnesses' full prepared
statements are part of the record, and members will have 5
calendar days to submit statements or questions or any
extraneous materials for the record here.
And, Ambassador Joseph, please summarize your remarks.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT JOSEPH, PH.D., SENIOR
SCHOLAR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY)
Mr. Joseph. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Congressman
Engel, other distinguished members. Thank you for the
invitation to testify this morning before the committee on the
nuclear agreement with Iran.
It is a true privilege for me to be able to provide my
views and recommendations. In my prepared statement, I identify
what I call five fatal flaws to the agreement. Ineffective
verification that will not detect and will not deter Iran from
cheating at suspect sites. Providing Iran with a path to
nuclear weapons, not just enrichment, but also plutonium. The
only commitment that Iran has is not to reprocess plutonium for
15 years. After that, if it decides to do so, it can. Third,
busting the sanctions regime. Fourth, failing to prevent
breakout. And, fifth, failing to limit Iran's ballistic missile
force.
I also identify four strategic consequences--more
proliferation in the region; undermining the international
nonproliferation regime; enabling a more capable, aggressive,
and repressive Iranian regime; and increasing, not decreasing,
prospects for conflict and war in the region.
Given the profound national security implications for the
United States and our friends and allies, I believe this is
truly a historic moment. And at this moment, I don't think one
can overstate the importance of the congressional review and
action on the agreement.
And here I would make four recommendations for your
consideration. First, Congress should vote on the agreement and
reject it if it decides that it is a bad agreement. And I think
the metrics are very clear for deciding whether it is good or
bad. Is it effectively verifiable? Does the agreement deny Iran
a nuclear weapons capability? Does the agreement, following the
expiration of the constraints placed on Iran, prevent Tehran
from building a nuclear weapon in a short period of time? And
is there a meaningful, phased relief of sanctions? And are
there guaranteed snapback provisions?
Because the answers to all of these questions in my
assessment is no, I think it is important for Congress to
reject the agreement and in its place insist on a return to the
negotiating table to seek an outcome that meets U.S. national
security goals.
Second, Congress should, to the extent that it can, with
regard to congressionally imposed sanctions, tie incremental
relief to the fulfillment of Iran's commitments.
Third, if the agreement moves forward, Congress should make
clear that any cheating will result in the immediate
termination of the agreement. We know that Iran will cheat.
Unfortunately, it appears that the Obama administration may
well seek to explain away non-compliant behavior as it has
reportedly done with Iran's failure to meet its obligations
under the initial joint plan of action.
For this reason, I would recommend that Congress establish
a Team B of outside, non-partisan experts, with access to the
highest levels of intelligence to assess Iran's compliance with
all provisions of the agreement.
And, fourth, Congress should move forward with funding to
expand missile defense, both in the region and against the
emerging Iranian nuclear armed I.C.B.M. class missile threat.
To conclude, I have often heard the argument that despite
its many flaws, we should go along with this agreement, because
it is the best that we can do, and because it is as good or
better than previous agreements. But based on my experience, in
one case as head of the negotiations with Libya over its
nuclear weapons program, I know this is not the best that we
can do.
I think that Libya does demonstrate that we can do a lot
better. With Libya, we demanded unfettered, anywhere, anytime
access to all sites. When we said we wanted to go somewhere,
the Libyans took us there, without delay and without
obstruction. And we removed the program by sending over a ship,
by loading up hundreds of metric tons of nuclear equipment, and
we also loaded up their longer range ballistic missiles on the
same vessel, and we sailed it back home. And that was the end
of the Libyan nuclear program.
Now, I am not comparing Libya and Iran. Iran is different
from Libya. Iran is different from North Korea. All of these
cases are different and in some ways unique. But I think what
Libya tells us, at least what it tells me, is that we need to
approach negotiations with these types of rogue regimes using
all tools available. This is not a choice between diplomacy or
the use of force, or diplomacy or economic sanctions. We need
to integrate these tools to support our negotiations, to put
pressure on the other regime, to achieve the successful outcome
of diplomacy.
In the talks with Iran, we violated every rule of good
negotiating practice. This doesn't mean that it will be easy or
cost- or risk-free to reject a bad deal with Iran. There are no
cost- or risk-free alternatives. But the costs and risks of
accepting this agreement far outweigh the alternatives of going
back to the negotiating table.
Certainly, Russia will criticize us. It will criticize us
as it continues its aggression against Ukraine. Certainly,
China will criticize us for doing so, as it continues its own
aggressive activities in the South China Sea. Even some of our
allies will criticize us, but other allies, including Israel
and the Arab States, will cheer us, some in private, some in
public.
And with American leadership in close consultations, I am
confident we can turn this around. At the end of the day, this
is not about a popularity contest. It is about our national
security.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Mark.
STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FOUNDATION
FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Dubowitz. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members
of this committee, on behalf of FDD and its Center on Sanctions
and Illicit Finance, thank you very much for giving me the
opportunity to testify. I am going to spend most of my
testimony on the issue of alternatives and alternative
scenarios, but I want to just reiterate that this is a deeply
flawed agreement, that provides Iran with multiple pathways,
patient pathways, to a nuclear weapon over the next decade to
decade and a half.
Thanks to sunset provisions, a fundamental flaw of this
agreement, Iran must simply abide by the agreement to emerge as
a threshold nuclear power. Ambassador Joseph has said, at the
end of this, it is an industrial sized enrichment program. It
is near zero breakout. They have an easier clandestine sneakout
pathway and an advanced ballistic missile program, including
I.C.B.M.s.
The sanctions regime, the economic sanctions regime, is
being dismantled while Iran's nuclear program is not. Iran will
have hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, and
it will use it to immunize its economy against future economic
pressure.
One of the biggest problems of the deal is it grants Iran a
nuclear snapback. The administration assures us that sanctions
can be reconstituted, even under non-nuclear sanctions like
terrorism. However, this final agreement actually explicitly
acknowledges that Iran would walk away from the agreement if
new sanctions are imposed, a nuclear snapback.
This provides Iran an insurance policy, even in the case of
severe violations, and certainly in the case of small to medium
sized violations, and gives Iran a powerful tool to stonewall
the IAEA, undermine the dispute resolution mechanism, and deter
U.N, EU, and U.S. snapbacks. Mr. Chairman, those are the
problems. A revised deal is a solution.
Now, President Obama has repeatedly said no deal is better
than a bad deal. Mr. Chairman, this is a bad deal. It
undermines the use of economic leverage. It leaves military
force as the only option in the future to stop Iran's nuclear
weapons development.
So what are the alternatives? Well, the President clearly
had a Plan B in mind during the negotiations or he would not
have threatened to walk away from the table if Iran didn't
agree to certain terms. Indeed, no responsible President would
enter into negotiations, especially over something as critical
to our national security, without an alternative. That
alternative still exists--rejecting this deal.
Now, I want to go through three likely rejection scenarios.
None are good. Each can be managed. Scenario Number 1 I call
the Iranian faithful compliance scenario. In this case, after
Congress rejects the deal, Iran decides to faithfully implement
its commitments. It triggers U.N. and EU sanctions relief.
Now, in this case, the President has two options. First, he
can rebuff Congress, and he actually can wield his executive
authority to neutralize the Corker-Cardin statutory sanctions
block and move ahead with the deal. Or, second, he can persuade
the Europeans to join the U.S. in demanding that key parts of
the agreement be renegotiated on better terms, leveraging the
power of U.S. secondary sanctions to keep companies and banks
out of Iran.
Scenario 2 is called the Iranian walkaway scenario. In this
case, Congress rejects the deal. Iran abandons its commitments.
Now, if past is prologue, Iran will escalate its nuclear
program, but it will do so incrementally, not massively, to
avoid crippling economic sanctions or U.S. military strikes.
In this scenario, the President could use the power of
secondary sanctions to persuade the Europeans to join a U.S.-
led effort to isolate Iran again. EU sanctions would likely
hold or, at a minimum, European companies and banks would be
reluctant to reenter Iran.
Now, the administration has said in this scenario $100
billion would go back to Iran. But let us clarify this. That
money is being held in China, India, Japan, South Korea, and
Turkey, and they are unlikely to release the $100 billion in
oil escrow funds for fear of U.S. sanctions, but also because
those sanctions require Iran to spend the funds on goods from
those countries. This is a boon to their exports. Why would
they release the funds so that Iran can go take that money and
spend it elsewhere?
Scenario 3, which I think is the more likely one. It is the
divide the P5+1 scenario. This looks more like Iranian
compliance, Iranian faithful compliance scenario, except the
Iranians try and use diplomatic leverage to try and divide the
Russians and Chinese from the West and the Europeans from the
U.S. Iran still complies with the agreement to trigger U.N. and
EU sanctions relief, but what it does is it exploits the P5+1
discord and remains obstinate on things like inspections and
resolution of PMD issues and the pace of nuclear compliance.
Things get messy, though not to the point of escalation.
The President threatens the use of new sanctions to keep
countries and companies from normalizing with Iran, and he
works to persuade the Europeans to join the U.S. in demanding
that key parts of the agreement be renegotiated.
Now, none of these scenarios are ideal, but they are not
likely to be disasters either, and they are better than this
deal. Now, they depend on the use of American power, coercive
diplomacy, economic sanctions, and force projection. And this
is the point: If the President believes that the Treasury can
enact effective economic sanctions in the future, then such an
option surely exists today. In fact, it is a better option
today when Iran's economy is still fragile and international
investors have yet to return to Iran.
If the President believes, however, that the multilateral
sanctions regime today cannot lead to an improved agreement, or
that the U.S. cannot manage the fallout from the three
scenarios I outlined, then he is actually admitting that we
lack the economic leverage to enforce this agreement in the
future when Iran will be an even stronger and more dangerous
regime.
I would contend that we should test that proposition today
rather than in the future when Iran will be at near-zero
nuclear breakout with a hardened economy, an I.C.B.M. program,
and greater regional power. At that point, a future President
will be left with only two options: An Iranian nuclear weapon
or military strikes to forestall that possibility. Congress
needs to weigh these two much more dangerous scenarios against
the scenarios that I have outlined in considering whether or
not to disapprove of this deal.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Dubowitz.
Ilan.
STATEMENT OF MR. ILAN GOLDENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
MIDDLE EAST SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY
Mr. Goldenberg. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel,
members of the committee, I am pleased to be before you today
testifying on the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and
the P5+1.
I want to make three central points. First, the agreement
isn't perfect, but, if effectively implemented, should deter
Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon for years to come. Second,
the deal is a far better option than any of the realistic
alternatives. And, finally, what will be more important than
the agreement itself are the policies that the U.S. pursues
after the agreement, and I think here Congress has a major role
to play.
The limitations on Iran's uranium enrichment capacity and
plutonium pathway will put it at least a year away from a bomb
using its known facilities. This will create a situation where
Iran will be deterred from going for a bomb, because it knows
that if it started to dash it would be quickly caught and
attacked. This fear of being caught is what has deterred Iran
for the past 20 years from going to the bomb, even as it got
closer and closer.
The agreement should successfully deter Iran from pursuing
a nuclear weapon using secret facilities. The inspection regime
gives the IAEA visibility into every element of Iran's supply
chain, making it exceedingly difficult for Iran to establish an
entirely new secret pathway. Even with less stringent
inspections, we caught Iran at both Natanz and Fordow years
before those facilities became operational, and we can do that
again.
The agreement also puts in place the right incentives for
Iran to comply. It receives no sanctions relief until it has
already implemented the key nuclear concessions, and the
snapback mechanism gives the United States an option to
retrigger sanctions without the possibility of a Russian veto.
The biggest weakness of the agreement, and my co-panelists
have talked about this, is that the restrictions, particularly
on uranium enrichment, start coming off in years 10 to 15. I
would have preferred for this time to be longer, but the most
important elements of the agreement are inspections and
intrusive monitoring, because that is the most likely pathway
for an Iranian bomb, and those stay in place forever.
Moreover, no other option buys 13 to 15 years with a
breakout time that is longer than today, not even a military
option. I am quite confident of this, having spent a number of
years working this issue closely at the Pentagon. Fifteen years
is a long time in the Middle East. And even after 15 years many
of the same options that we have today are still there.
It is true that some of the $100 billion that Iran receives
after it has implemented the key provisions of the agreement
will likely go toward terrorism, but most will go toward
repairing the economy. It was the threat of regime collapse
that brought Iran's leadership to the table in the first place.
It would make no sense for them to not address that core
problem. That is why they are sitting at the table looking for
sanctions relief.
A few billion dollars in extra funds to Iranian terrorism
is a terrible thing, but it is something that the United States
of America can counter through a more aggressive policy of
training partner special operation forces, intelligence-
sharing, joint covert action, and interdiction policies,
working closely with the Saudis, the Israelis, and other key
partners.
What will be much more difficult to counter is an Iran that
is able to provide a nuclear umbrella to its terrorist proxies,
which is why we need to focus on the nuclear question first.
The other argument is that we should have walked away and
gotten a better deal. We already tried that approach between
2003 and 2005, and those talks collapsed. Afterwards, the
United States and its partners began a decade-long effort to
increase economic pressure, and Iran responded by increasing
the size of its nuclear program from 164 to 20,0000
centrifuges.
This is the Iranian centrifuge snapback option that exists
no matter what. It exists tomorrow; it exists under this deal.
This is their point of leverage, so I don't buy the agreement
that somehow this deal creates that snapback option.
If in 2013 we had levied new sanctions and gone for a
better deal, Iran would have continued to build out its
program, and today it would be only weeks away from a bomb. The
United States would be faced with the dilemma of pursuing
military action or allowing Iran to achieve a virtual nuclear
capability today.
Finally, the success or failure of the nuclear agreement
will depend on the policies we now pursue, both in implementing
the deal and in how we approach the Middle East. Congress
should play an active oversight role. It can pursue legislation
that creates additional snapback options outside the deal.
It can establish a committee to ensure long-term
implementation and oversight. It can provide more funding to
the IAEA to make sure we have as many inspectors as possible
and the best technology possible. That is, of course, if the
deal passes the 60-day review period, which will be the first
order for Congress to deal with.
Congress should also push the administration to articulate
a clear regional strategy that involves more forcefully pushing
back on Iran's support for surrogates and proxies and
reassuring Israel and Saudi Arabia. This has been a real
weakness of the administration's policy and one that requires a
course correction that this President can begin, but that
really the next President will have to also lead by pushing
back more forcefully against Iran and by also spending more
time with the Saudis and Israelis addressing their concerns
about Iran.
So I hope we can spend more time today talking about U.S.
policy options going forward, and I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldenberg follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph, as you note, and as General Hayden
testified last week, it is not the declared sites in Iran that
is the biggest concern. It is the undeclared sites, the
military bases where Iran has cheated in the past, the ones
that the Supreme Leader still says we will never see. Those are
the ones that we have got to be concerned about.
You note the considerable delays that can be employed by
Iran, drawing out what should be 24 hours to at least 24 days.
But let me add one more concern. This suspect site provision is
another one of the aspects of this agreement that expires in 15
years. And I would like the members just to concentrate on that
for a minute. As I read this provision, it says, ``The general
provisions section of the agreement says a reliable mechanism
to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns as defined
in Annex 1 will last for 15 years.'' All right?
So, by my read, this is the same time that Iran will be
dramatically expanding its program. Without the suspect site
provision, international inspectors would just be relying on
their underlying authority as part of the additional protocol.
So, Ambassador Joseph, how comfortable are you with that
situation?
Mr. Joseph. Sir, I share your reading of the agreement,
even though there are gaps and ambiguities. If I am
uncomfortable with the suspect site provisions in the first 10
to 15 years, I am very uncomfortable after that. It makes a bad
situation even worse.
I would like to, because it has been raised, just comment
very briefly on this notion of being able to detect cheating
because of our ability to find traces of uranium, enriched
uranium, or plutonium. The IAEA this year has raised concerns
about Iran's cleanup at the military facility at Parchin. And
they have stated that they very well may not be able to conduct
a thorough investigation given Iran's activities.
Also, not all prohibited activities are traceable through
uranium, enriched uranium, or plutonium. I mean, just think
about manufacturing centrifuges, for example, with no traces.
There are many things that Iran could do at suspect sites that
would not be detectable through the national technical means
that we have.
The suspect site inspections are, as I say, a fatal flaw in
this treaty, because that is where Iran is going to cheat. I am
not as worried about Iran cheating at declared facilities where
the IAEA inspectors are watching them. I welcome the additional
access to those facilities and the additional information that
the IAEA will get under the additional protocol and other
provisions of this agreement, but that is not where the
cheating is going to occur.
It is going to be at the suspect sites. We know that,
because that is where it has occurred in the past. And we know
that because the Supreme Leader and other Iranian leaders have
said, ``We will not have access to military facilities.''
Chairman Royce. Okay. And as you note also, if this
agreement is going to really take away Iran's path to a bomb,
why would Iran continue pouring money into its ballistic
missile program? Why has that become such an obsession for the
Supreme Leader that he says it is their responsibility to mass
produce I.C.B.M.s? Just what does this provide Iran in terms of
money to invest in the missile program, missiles that can reach
the U.S., and the ability to access foreign technology with
respect to what Russians wanted out of this deal at the 11th
hour?
With more money and foreign technology, where does their
program go? And what more should we be doing on missile
defense? I say that because up until now, in the interim
agreement for a 1\1/2\ years, we lifted and basically allowed
$700 million per month to go to Iran. And during the same
period of time we see the announcement of the transfer of new
rockets, new missiles, not just to Hamas, but now the precision
guidance systems into Hezbollah.
So they are doing something with the cash. Ambassador?
Mr. Joseph. So Iran will have access to tens of billions,
hundreds of billions over the period of this agreement, once
the sanctions are released and the assets are provided to Iran.
With that money, as you point out, they can invest in their
ballistic missile program. They can invest in their nuclear
program. They can invest in their terrorist surrogates. They
can invest in the Revolutionary Guards and the fomenting of
even more instability throughout the region.
They have put a real priority on ballistic missiles, not
just long-range ballistic missiles but short and medium range
ballistic missiles. This seems to be their delivery means of
choice. And in terms of an I.C.B.M., as you pointed out in your
opening comments, this is a capability that only makes sense
with a nuclear front end. It only makes sense in that context.
So one has to ask the question: Why would they be spending
all of this money on an I.C.B.M. capability if they had no
intention of developing a nuclear weapon?
In terms of missile defense, I think we need to work with
our friends and allies in the region, providing even more
support to Israel in our partnership on missile defense. We
need to work with our Gulf Arab allies on missile defense as we
are doing, but to expand that capability.
We need to ensure that our forces in the region are
adequately protected from the shorter and medium range
capabilities. And I think, first and foremost, we need to begin
to invest more in the defense of the American homeland. That is
what the I.C.B.M. is all about--holding American cities
hostage.
And what has happened is that we have canceled the original
third site in Europe. We have canceled Phase 4 of the phased
adaptive approach, which was the only capability that would
have the ability to shoot down a long-range Iranian missile. We
need to either reinstitute a capability in Europe like the
Phase 4 capability or, at a minimum, I believe, we need to
build another interceptor site like we have in Fort Greely in
Alaska on the east coast to protect against the I.C.B.M.
threat, because protection of the American homeland I think is
the first priority.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Joseph.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know,
in any agreement there are some good things in it, and there
are some bad things in it. There are some questionable things
in it.
For me, the most problematic aspect of this agreement is
that, again, after year 15, there will be no restrictions at
all on Iran on their producing highly enriched uranium. They
are home-free. They are essentially legitimatized as a
threshold state. That bothers me, because if this were a deal
that truly stopped Iran from having a nuclear weapon, then I
would feel a lot more comfortable. I am very uneasy with the
fact that this again doesn't stop Iran from becoming a nuclear
state. It simply postpones it to 15 years from now.
Mr. Goldenberg, how do you react to what I just said?
Mr. Goldenberg. Thank you, Congressman. I agree that the
weakest element of the agreement is the fact that 15 years from
now certain limitations go away. But I think a number of
limitations do stay. First, for the next 15 years we are going
to have clarity into what Iran's research and development
program will look like afterwards and during these 15 years,
and it can't start until year 8 or 9.
And if Iran wants to make any changes to that program, the
United States will have to approve those because there will be
a board that includes the United States that would have to
actually--has to vote by consensus. That means on any changes
to Iran's R&D program, we all need to approve it, so we have a
veto.
We also are going to have 15 years of access to their
civilian nuclear program and what they are planning on doing
and how they are doing it on various elements that are non-
nuclear-related. There is a long history of working with other
countries through 123 agreements, through various mechanisms,
so you get a full picture of what their scientists look like,
what their plans are.
And if we get to year 13 or 14 and this looks all very bad,
there are plenty of opportunities then to start working with
partners, reimposing sanctions, looking at other options at
that point. You know, and we still have also the most important
part for an Iranian sneakout, which I still believe is the most
important question here is, can they build the HEU separately?
That is what they are going to need to do. They are going to
need a covert facility where they can actually spin centrifuges
and enrich uranium.
They are not going to be able to do that for at least 25
years, because they are not going to have the capacity--because
we are going to have 25 years of monitoring of everything, the
entire supply chain, from the moment it comes out of the ground
all the way to the very end. That is one of the strongest
elements of this agreement, and that lasts a lot longer than 15
years.
So I agree it is imperfect. I wish it could be better. I
think all of us do. But I think--as I think members here know
better than anybody, tough negotiations, whether it is a piece
of legislation or an international agreement, are never
perfect. You always have to make sacrifices, as you wisely
pointed out, Congressman, and this is where we are. I still
think it is far superior to the alternative.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Another part of it that is
problematic to me is we were told at the beginning that this
would only be a discussion about Iran's nuclear program, and
that we couldn't raise their support for terrorism, and we
couldn't raise the mischief in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and
all the things they do as support for Hezbollah, for Hamas.
And then we see the agreement, and we see that suddenly
there is an 8-year limit on ballistic missiles and 5 years on
arms sales, which effectively changes the United Nations
resolutions. And suddenly that element of it was put in, which
didn't pertain to nuclear weapons, and that was problematic.
Anybody care to talk about that? Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. Ranking Member Engel, that is fundamentally
the problem. This is not a 15-year deal. In some respects, this
is--I would think of this as an 8-year deal, and you need to
look at this deal from the prism not only of nuclear physics,
but economics, sanctions, heavy weaponry, and ballistic
missiles.
And what the Iranians have done is they have negotiated an
agreement where on the front end of this agreement they are
effectively dismantling our sanctions regime. That means that
they are going to get hundreds of billions of dollars to spend
on not only building their economy but building economic
resilience against future economic pressure, and getting the
money to buy battle tanks and combat aircraft and attack
helicopters. They are getting money to develop an I.C.B.M.
program. That is all front loaded in the beginning.
And so by year 8, you have effectively arms embargo off,
ballistic missiles off, all of the sanctions terminate
including congressional sanctions, and now what Iran has done
is it has hardened its defenses and hardened its offenses. And
so only then, at that point, do the restrictions on R&D and the
nuclear physics sunset provisions start kicking in.
But at that point, what Iran has done is they have
effectively hardened themselves defensively, economically. They
have built a powerful I.C.B.M. program over time. And as well,
regionally, because of the lifting of the arms embargo, Iran is
now a regional powerhouse sowing chaos in the Middle East. At
that point, what they can effectively do is use the nuclear
snapback to threaten to walk away from the agreement unless we
do not reimpose sanctions.
So it is a front loaded agreement for Iran where they get
all the benefits up front, and we are hoping down the line 10,
15 years, that we will be in a position to respond to a much
more powerful Iran nuclear-wise, militarily, ballistic
missiles, and regionally.
Mr. Engel. Let me finish by asking one more question on
another thing that I have concerns about, and that is the
inspections. The joint comprehensive plan of action describes a
system in which Iran permits 24/7 monitoring of declared
facilities. Now, for sites that may have undeclared material,
Iran might be able to delay inspections, the way I read it, for
up to 24 days. Does 24 days provide timely access?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, you know, Olli Heinonen testified with
me yesterday before Financial Services. He was asked the same
question, and he was asked to rate on a scale of zero to 10 the
inspection regime. He said on declared facilities it is a seven
to eight. On suspicious sites, it is a five. And on access to
facilities where Iran would be engaging in the manufacture of a
nuclear weapon, he ranked that as zero.
And so the issue here is that there are three types of
sites where we will want to get into, and it is suspicious
sites and sites where they are building a nuclear warhead where
Dr. Heinonen said at best it is a five, and with respect to a
warhead design it is a zero.
I would make one other comment, Congressman Engel. It is
not about verification and inspection only. It is about
enforcement. The IAEA doesn't enforce; the United States of
America enforces. And what I see from this agreement is what
the Iranians have designed themselves, is effectively they have
immunized themselves against American enforcement, which means
that they can actually stymie and stonewall the IAEA, and they
are going to be actually depending on the--we are going to be
in a position where we are going to have to enforce the
agreements that the IAEA can get into these sites.
If I am Iran, what I do is I play around with the dispute
resolution mechanism and the Joint Commission, because right
now it is five to three, and all I have to do if I am Iran is
flip one European country. And I will flip one European country
by using the nuclear snapback, threatening nuclear escalation
if anybody reimposes sanctions on me, including in an
enforcement situation.
So if they flip one seat, it is four to four, and you have
basically stymied the Joint Commission, and now you are in a
situation where it is not going to just be 24 days, it is going
to be much, much longer.
Mr. Engel. Mr. Goldenberg, on inspections, is your opinion
similar or different?
Mr. Goldenberg. Well, I view it a little bit differently,
Congressman, because my perspective is the reality is any
suspicious site that we find we are going to have eyes on,
realistically in most cases before the IAEA even has eyes on it
through our intelligence community and through the intelligence
communities of our other partners, that is the other redundant
piece of this.
We will have satellites. We have will various other
mechanisms where we can do this. And, you know, Ambassador
Joseph brought up Parchin before. The Iranians have been
spending years trying to clean up Parchin now. They would have
24 days in this scenario to clean something up, and the reality
is that--you know, you saw this in the case of Iraq. You know,
in the case of Iraq, what we actually caught in terms of
inspections was inspectors moving things out of the facilities
because we had satellites on them. If the Iranians start
behaving in a suspicious fashion, we will see it.
And then the only other thing I will say is by far the most
important part of the inspections, in my mind, is the fissile
material, because the reality is, yes, the weaponization is the
nastiest piece. It is obviously for a nuclear weapon. But the
fissile material, the reason we focus so much on the fissile
material is because you need a factory, you need industrial
sized capability that is very difficult to hide in order to get
the fissile material.
A nuclear core in a weapon does nothing for you if you
don't have the material to use in it. And so I think that you
do have to look at these various pieces, but the real choke
point is the fissile material, which is where the agreement is
focused on.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for an
excellent series of hearings. But we were just whispering
something as the testimony was given. What were you pointing
out to me, an important point, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Royce. Well, I was pointing out, by our memory, we
don't ever remember with a case of the Syrian, you know,
reactor, the attempt to build a nuclear weapon site there, that
we ever detected anything there. We don't remember it with
North Korea, the ability to detect what was going on. All we
know is that North Korea ended up doing three nuclear weapons
tests and ended up with a whole inventory of atomic weapons.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And now we are going to say our
intelligence and satellite capabilities are so much more
superior.
But, Mr. Chairman, as you point out, as the 60-day review
period of this Iran nuclear agreement continues, it is so
important for us and Congress to do our due diligence and
review the deal, and, importantly, draw attention to the flaws
and deficiencies, because this will jeopardize our national
security, the security of our ally, the democratic Jewish state
of Israel, and indeed global security.
This nuclear deal will not only not prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon, but it will also likely precipitate
war as other countries in the region scramble to keep up with
Iran.
We are already seeing a conventional arms race. Look what
happened in the Gulf countries council meeting where we tried
to buy them off with a lot of arms. And if Congress does not
vote to block this agreement, we will certainly see, in
addition to a conventional arms race, a nuclear arms race in
the region.
Now, we conduct civil nuclear cooperation agreements, also
known as 123 agreements, with nations across the globe. In
previous agreements, we were successful for winning what is
called the gold standard, an arrangement where our partners
agree to forego enrichment and reprocessing as part of our
civil nuclear cooperation.
But with this deal, Iran will be allowed to enrich, and we
will actually be helping Iran modernize. We will actually be
helping Iran advance its nuclear infrastructure. We will be
setting a precedent here. How can we expect any country that
wants to enter into one of these agreements in the future to
accept the gold standard when they can now look at this deal
and say, ``No, no, no. We don't want the gold standard. We want
the Iran standard.'' How do you see this playing out, Mr.
Chairman, correct, in the next 10 to 15 years?
And, Mr. Dubowitz, thank you for your testimony. This deal
removes the EU and most U.N. sanctions from the top IRGC
officials. Most of you have brought that out, including Quds
Force Commander Soleimani, the Basij paramilitary chief, and
the IRGC air force commander, among many others. This de-
listing of these individuals will unfreeze their foreign
assets. It will lift their travel bans. That means that we will
be facilitating their destabilizing activities overseas.
Why were these individuals included in the final deal?
There is no need to do that. What process will be put in place
to redesignate them, as fanciful as that would be, should they
continue or when they continue to engage in terrorism?
And thank you, Ambassador Joseph. I wanted to ask you about
Annex 5 of the JCPOA, some of you had alluded to this
additional protocol. On implementation day, Iran will
provisionally apply this additional protocol. These are
measures designed to add increased avenues of verification by
the IAEA, and only fully implement these measures pending their
ratification by the Iranian Parliament. What will this do to
inspections, verification, and monitoring of Iran's nuclear
program, if the regime was not actually obligated to implement
the additional protocol? Ambassador?
Mr. Joseph. If I could, let me just add a footnote to the
North Korean experience. We debated for years whether or not
North Korea had an operational enrichment facility. We debated
that for years internally. The issue was only resolved when
North Korea invited an American scientist to the facility,
recorded it, placed it on the internet, and then we decided
that they actually had an operational enrichment facility.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Will American inspectors be allowed in
Iran----
Mr. Joseph. They will not.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. With this deal?
Mr. Joseph. They will not be allowed.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Dubowitz? Oh, sorry, I am out of
time, or almost. Go ahead.
Mr. Dubowitz. Congresswoman, I just want to respond to Mr.
Goldenberg's point. I mean, the real issue here is that what
Iran will want to do is not--they are not going to break out of
their declared facilities. It is going to be in suspicious
sites, and it is going to be in warhead design.
And, by the way, you don't need an industrial sized
enrichment facility in order to produce uranium. All you do is
you need a Fordow-like facility, with a few hundred highly
powered centrifuges, which are much easier to hide, buried
under a mountain on a Revolutionary Guard base. That is not an
industrial sized facility.
The other thing I would say is we did eventually detect
Natanz and Arak. Unfortunately, they were almost built. So at
that point it was too late. So the intelligence community, I
have a lot of respect for the men and women who work there, but
unfortunately we have gotten it wrong. We missed and didn't
stop the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and
Syria. We underestimated Iraq in 1990. We overestimated in
2003.
And now we are in a situation where we are betting the
future of America on the IAEA. By the way, an additional
protocol that both David Albright and Olli Heinonen have said
is insufficient 15 years or 20 years from now, and now we are
going to be betting on our intelligence capabilities to detect
a small lab 200 meters squared where the Iranians are actually
doing nuclear warhead design, which is why Olli Heinonen gave
it a ranking of zero. That is----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Dubowitz [continuing]. Of deep concern.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Alan Lowenthal of California.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
witnesses. I want to go back to the scenarios, if we turn this
down, what that really means and what happens to our partners
in this. What if they start to sell, and what if we see within
weeks that Iran starts to create a nuclear weapon? What are we
going to do? I want to really hear another scenario where they
start to build a bomb, what you think we should do.
Thank you. Mr. Goldenberg.
Mr. Goldenberg. Thank you. The reality is I think the
nuclear snapback that Mr. Dubowitz talked about happens on day
one. We turn down this agreement. I think there is no realistic
new negotiation. This is not an agreement just between Iran and
the United States. It is an agreement between Iran, the United
States, Russia, China, Europe, the U.K., Germany, and France.
Mr. Lowenthal. That is right.
Mr. Goldenberg. And I think what happens afterwards is Iran
starts building, again, enriching centrifuges using spinning
centrifuges, enriching uranium. I don't think that they will
dramatically escalate immediately, but we are only 2 to 3
months away now. That is why we had to stop it in 2013 and
froze it. Within a couple of years, we are looking at Iran
probably being a couple of weeks away from a bomb, at which
point we really have very little confidence about whether or
not we can stop it or not.
At that point, military options become a serious debate. Do
we allow a virtual nuclear weapon? Or do we pursue military
options? Now, to be clear, I think if we ended up in a war with
Iran, we would win handily, obviously.
Their nuclear program, and many of their conventional
capabilities, would be destroyed, but they would still have the
capability to build that nuclear program back up in a lot less
than 15 years, and we would have no ability in terms of
inspections to actually get in there, unless you want to start
taking over the country or trying to coerce them in the types
of ways that are going to require huge amounts of American
manpower.
And so, realistically, then, we have basically taken a
beehive and we haven't sprayed it. We have taken a bat to it,
and the bees are flying everywhere. That is fundamentally what
we are able to do in response. And the other thing I will just
say about this scenario is we don't know what happens once you
open up the can of worms with military action, even successful
military action like we took in Iraq in 1991. We are still
dealing with the consequences of that 25 years later. We still
haven't figured out how we are going to deal with Iraq
precisely, and we still have forces there now and have had to
go through all of this.
So, you know, it is always an option. And I think that
everybody needs to remember--and I think the Iranians
remember--that at the end of the day, if that is the option
that gets pursued, it is going to be much worse for them than
it will be for us, but it will be bad for everyone. And it is
an option that really should be held out as a last resort, and
in the meantime this option, which buys us 15 very good years
followed by additional assurances and opportunities to stretch
this out even further, takes away none of those options in 15
years, in my view, because in terms of speaking about
scenarios, I think it is also important to remember the
scenario of a super-empowered Iran assumes everything goes
right for them in the next few years.
Sanctions aren't America's only tool to counter Iran. We
have the Defense Department. We have the intelligence
community. We have other ways to counter Iran in the region. We
all just flip into sanctions, but you can do things like covert
actions with partners. You can find ways to cooperate with
others. You can push them back in Syria, and you can push them
back in Yemen and elsewhere, without--and you can flex your
muscles to conventional military force without--and still leave
yourself options years down the line.
Mr. Dubowitz. I would just say this, Congressman. There is
an inherent flaw in that argument, and here is the inherent
flaw. The argument assumes that at some point the Iranians are
going to break out to a nuclear weapon, and we are going to
have to use military force to stop them. The question is, if
that is true, would you rather use military force today against
a fragile Iran, which has a small nuclear program and small
force projection?
Or would you rather use military force against Iran in 15
years when they have an industrial sized nuclear program with
near zero breakout, easier clandestine sneakout, and I.C.B.M.s?
By the way, a powerful economy, relatively speaking, that is
immunized against future economic pressure. I oppose military
force, which is why I think this is a deeply flawed deal,
because I think this invariably sets us down a path where in 15
years when they are at near zero breakout, if they break out to
a nuclear weapon, we will only have military force to stop
them.
So Mr. Goldenberg's scenario today--today we actually have
more options. If Congress rejects this deal, we go back to what
I call the messy scenario, the divide the P5+1 scenario. The
Iranians are absolutely going to try to flip it on us, but we
still have U.S. secondary sanctions as a powerful instrument of
coercion. That is what has kept the Russians, the Chinese, and
the Europeans at bay, not multilateral diplomacy. It is fear
that they will be cut off from the U.S. economy and the U.S.
financial networks.
I want to retain economic leverage, which is why we have it
today. Let us negotiate a better deal that doesn't put Iran in
a position that when war comes Iran will be stronger and the
consequences will be much more severe.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Lowenthal.
Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Chairman Royce. And I do want to
thank you again for convening this very incisive set of
hearings that have really brought out the egregious flaws of
this so-called arms control deal.
Americans held hostage--again, we have had several hearings
at the full committee level. I have had two at my subcommittee
level. We have heard from Saeed Abedini's wife. We have heard
from all of the family members. They are incredulous that their
family, loved ones, continue to be held hostage, are tortured,
are mistreated in a myriad of ways. And even with all of this
euphoria at the White House about this deal, they are still not
free. I find that incredible. Your thoughts?
Secondly, on inspections, we all know that the Iranian
Minister of Defense reportedly said that Tehran will never
allow any foreigner to discover Iran's defensive and missile
capabilities by inspecting the country's military sites, echoed
by the Supreme Leader as well. He will never permit inspectors
to inspect Iran's military bases.
Managed access sounds more like managed manipulation or
manipulated access. It is really not clear what all of this 24-
day thing is all about. Going to the committee, what role will
Iran play in preventing inspections when there is suspicious
activity? Could you really walk us through that in a more
comprehensive way?
And, finally, on the issue of ballistic missiles, you,
Ambassador Joseph, talked about, ominously frankly, that this
should include moving ahead with a third interceptor site on
the U.S. east coast. In the end of your testimony you made that
point, as well as other anti-missile defenses being beefed up.
Would you elaborate on what that means? How far in do you
anticipate into the midwest, west coast? But of course you have
said first on the east coast. Do you believe that is a
realistic concern?
Mr. Joseph. Thank you, Congressman. Let me just respond to
a couple of your points, and also to this notion that the
agreement buys us 15 years. That sounds pretty good. But let us
not forget, as you say, Congressman, who we are dealing with
here, what type of regime we are dealing with here.
This is a regime that has proven itself a master of denial
and deception. If Iran today doesn't have a covert program, if
it doesn't have covert activities going on today as you hold
this hearing, it would be the first time in 20 years. Again,
what type of regime are we dealing with?
And talking about, well, Iran will be a threshold state in
15 years. What is the definition? By any definition, I would
say--and I have been in this business a long time--Iran is a
threshold state today.
They have the ability to produce enough fissile material,
at declared facilities let alone covert facilities that we may
not know about, but at declared facilities in what our
Secretary of State says is 2 or 3 months. He says we are going
to postpone that at declared facilities, and he doesn't talk
about sneakout at undeclared facilities. And we don't know the
status of their weaponization.
Why? Because the IAEA has been obstructed, has been
stonewalled by the Iranians ever since the November 11 report
by the IAEA that identified 12 activities that could be
associated and could still be going on, and it included the
design of a ballistic missile warhead, with regard to the
weaponization program.
And as far as I know, Congress has not received the side
agreement between the IAEA and Iran that will get at issues
such as Parchin and the possible military dimensions, the so-
called PMD, the 12 activities. How are you going to make a
judgment? How are you going to make a judgment on this without
understanding what access the IAEA has in that case?
With regard to ballistic missiles and the ballistic missile
defense, I think clearly, as I said, we need to focus on
shorter, medium, and their longer range capabilities. What the
plan was initially was to have a capability in Europe to be
able to shoot down I.C.B.M. class missiles from Iran. We
canceled that in September 2009, the original third site.
We then had a Phase 4 to the phased adaptive approach
arrangement of this administration. Lo and behold, in March
2013, we canceled Phase 4, which was designed against the
Iranian long-term threat. Either we need to put that capability
back in Europe or we need to have the capability in the United
States. We have interceptors in California to protect against
North Korea. We have interceptors in Alaska to protect
primarily against North Korea. But what about Iran? And there
are gaps in our coverage. We need to be able to protect against
that. According to the Missile Defense Agency, the best place
to put this is in the northeast.
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman, could I say something about the
hostages, please? Because they get forgotten. At the last
minute in these negotiations, the Iranians got last-minute
concessions, the lifting of the arms embargo, the lifting of
ballistic missile restrictions. They turned a nuclear deal into
a deal-plus-plus. Why weren't we able, at the last minute, to
demand the release of our hostages and get them back?
Mr. Goldenberg. Congressman, just very briefly on the
hostages, first of all, it is completely inexcusable. They need
to be brought back. Obviously, I think we all agree on that. I
don't think anybody is saying that this regime is--I don't
think the administrative says it, and I certainly don't believe
it. This is a regime that we can work with on all kinds of
other issues. This is strictly an arms control agreement.
But my understanding, at least from talking to some of the
hostages' families that are hearing--and also hearing from
others talk about is they didn't really want this issue
entangled in nuclear diplomacy.
Mr. Smith. You know, I have asked that question, too. They
felt and they were advised by the State Department ad nauseam
to take that position. And when you have a loved one in a
precarious, horrible position like that, you are going to take
the State Department's admonitions to heart.
But they openly said here at hearings they were bewildered.
And I asked Secretary Kerry, as did the chairman, why is this
off the table, on the fringes if you will? Because they pushed
it aside. They wanted a deal and only a deal. They didn't want
anything to get in the way.
I am amazed. I mean, it is shocking that they have not been
released. But I think we should take with a grain of salt
anything a loved one might say now because they don't want to
in any way have the State Department walk even further away.
Never.
And the last point I will say, Mr. Chairman, Naghmeh told
us at the first hearing on behalf of her husband Saeed Abedini,
she went to the State Department and the State Department said
there is, ``Nothing we can do to help your husband. Nothing we
can do.'' That changed in terms of statements that were made,
but it was never an all-in effort to get them out.
Mr. Goldenberg. Well, I agree with you, obviously,
Congressman, that it is----
Chairman Royce. Yes. Let us go to Lois Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses today. Well, I know we all agree
Iran should not get a nuclear weapon, and my approach is just
to try to take a non-partisan, objective scrutiny of this,
because it is so monumental.
And I believe my colleagues have very articulately raised
the concerns. I share, I would say, all or most of the concerns
that have been raised about this agreement. I would like to
focus back on the repercussions of disapproval. I think
approval, if it came for approval, it would be very hard to
vote to approve this agreement.
The question is disapproval, and I want to understand the
potential ramifications. I know you had said--talked about some
of them. First, I would like to have your opinion as to the
other countries in the P5+1 other than us. Do you believe that
there is real motivation on their part for Iran not to achieve
a nuclear weapon, and that they are at the table for that
reason and not just our economic power? That is number one. I
would like your opinion on that.
And then, this is sort of a simple question, but after all
of these years of negotiation, more intense the last couple of
years, if we disapprove, what do you think is the effect of our
standing in the world? Would anyone want to come back to the
table with us? Would we be trusted to sit for years and
negotiate an agreement?
And I think I had one more question, if you can get to it,
which is--and it was touched on before. If this agreement goes
through, for those of you who have not already answered the
question, what efforts could we make in Congress to give
ourselves some more protection?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, Congresswoman, I was the one who laid
out the scenarios, because I think it is absolutely critical
that we don't--we assume that there are going to be disastrous
scenarios today, but then we assume in 15 years everything is
going to be rosy and optimistic. I think we have to look in a
sober way, what are things going to look like today? What will
they look like in 15 years? I think all of us agree in 15 years
things will not look good, given Iran's capacity.
Today, I laid out three scenarios, and I think that the
reason that countries are at the table is not only because they
fear American economic power and sanctions. They are at the
table because every one of the P5+1 does not want Iran to
develop a nuclear weapon.
And so the notion that we will all walk away from the
table, and then go and aid and abet Iran in its pursuit of
nuclear weapons, I think is contradictory to the reasons that
they are there in the first place. It is in their national
security interest.
Number two, the French hate this deal. The French tried
their best to make this a strong deal. I think they are
absolutely incredulous at the scale of the giveaways. So the
notion that somehow the French are going to walk away and not
work with us, and the French are the linchpin in the EU. If the
French are with us with respect to economic sanctions, then the
EU is with us, so we will still retain the power of economic
sanctions.
In terms of our standing in the world, I think, again, this
is not a popularity contest. I think as Ambassador Joseph said,
this is about American leadership, and this is about preventing
Iran from not only developing a nuclear weapon but sowing
sectarian chaos in the Middle East. I think this would be a
reassertion of American leadership, that the U.S. Congress has
said that this deal is going to lead to disastrous consequences
down the road, and that we want to negotiate a better deal that
removes some of these fatal flaws that Ambassador Joseph spoke
to.
Mr. Goldenberg. Congresswoman, look, I agree with Mark
actually here that at the end of the day I don't think our
credibility goes entirely away. I do think it hurts our
credibility that people that negotiate with the United States
of America, because we are the United States of America, we are
the world's superpower.
So I don't think everything goes away, and all these
countries have an interest in preventing Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon. I think it will be very difficult to hold the
unity of the P5+1. I think a lot of the sanctions might start
to atrophy. I think the Iranians will respond in a way that
they will be able to move more quickly in terms of revving up
their nuclear program than we will be able to in terms of
renegotiating or putting in more sanctions and leverage,
precisely because of this situation. And so I think they will
be at the advantage, not us, in this scenario.
I also want to talk--I thought your question,
Congresswoman, about what Congress can do afterwards, because
this I think is very important. And whether you support or
oppose the deal, I think this is something where Congress can
really come together. There needs to be a piece of implementing
legislation. Let us say you get through the 60 days, and if the
agreement is overturned, then I think everything stops and is
fine. That is one scenario.
But if you get through the 60 days, there is still an
opportunity here for members who oppose the deal to say, ``I
hate this deal, but I can make it better,'' and those who are
reticent but support it to say, ``I am uncomfortable, but I am
not going to get in the way.''
But here is how we are going to make it stronger. One, work
with the administration. They should be able to work with
Congress to let us think about different American snapback
provisions beyond the agreement itself that go in place and
could be put into legislation for different scenarios,
particularly middle ground scenarios where things are a little
squishier than, you know, overwhelming breaches, which is one
of the difficulties in the agreement.
Two, some kind of board that oversees, whether it is in
Congress. More money for the IAEA. Pushing the administration
much harder on what they should be doing in the region. There
is a number of things that people here can all agree on I think
and really come together on a very strong piece of legislation.
Chairman Royce. Steve Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goldenberg, let me ask you this. Ambassador Joseph
mentioned a little while ago something that I think makes a lot
of sense. Why would the Iranians spend so much time and so much
effort in developing I.C.B.M.s, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, if they don't intend to acquire and build nuclear
weapons? And if you could make it brief, because I have got a
bunch of questions.
Mr. Goldenberg. Sure. I mean, I think that they started
this program when they intended to build nuclear weapons, and
we have been working to change that and----
Mr. Chabot. Okay. At the end here especially, wasn't that
one of the big things that they insisted on? They insisted and
we succumbed to this--the whole idea of lifting the arms
embargo, which will give them the ability to acquire additional
technology, I.C.B.M. technology from Russia.
So, I mean, I think the answer clearly is they wouldn't
want to proceed with it, if they didn't intend to get nuclear
weapons. Ambassador Joseph, would you want to touch on that
briefly?
Mr. Joseph. Sir, I think you have got it exactly right.
Mr. Chabot. Okay.
Mr. Joseph. I mean, it only makes sense in the context of a
nuclear weapons program.
Mr. Chabot. Right. Let me follow up. You also said
something before, which I think makes imminent sense, and that
is that now that we have got this terrible deal facing us that
we need to protect our cities, and you have suggested that we
have to seriously consider an anti-missile shield on our east
coast. And that is correct; you do support that, is that right?
Mr. Joseph. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Let me follow up on that, then. One of
the very first things that the Obama administration did when
they took office was to cancel our agreement, which was a slap
in the face of two of our strong allies, the Czech Republic and
Poland. And that anti-missile technology that isn't there now,
it was aimed at a potential Iranian missile heading in Europe's
direction or our direction. And so now that they have done
that, and with this agreement, it seems that they have put us
very much in harms way. Would you comment on that?
Mr. Joseph. I certainly would, sir. Not only did the Obama
administration cancel the third site, it canceled every single
program that was designed to develop capabilities to keep pace
with the threat. It canceled the MKV, the multiple-kill vehicle
program. It canceled the KEI, which is what was to be a boost
phase interceptor. It canceled the airborne laser. It reduced
the number of interceptors, the ground-based interceptors at
Alaska. I mean, it eviscerated the program.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me move on, if I can. Thank you.
Mr. Goldenberg, how long was it after the announcement of
this deal that we had people in the street in Iran, including
Iranian leaderships, chanting ``Death to America''?
Mr. Goldenberg. Look, I think that that is--this leadership
nobody is talking about the fact that----
Mr. Chabot. It wasn't very long.
Mr. Goldenberg. It wasn't very long.
Mr. Chabot. Almost immediate we heard that.
Mr. Goldenberg. You also had overwhelming support for the
agreement that----
Mr. Chabot. Now, you have also talked about snapback, the
sanctions, and we can snap them back now. ``Snap'' sounds like
it is pretty quick. You know, snap back. We have got--they are
back on.
Mr. Dubowitz--and, again, if you could keep your answer
relatively brief--are we going to be able to snapback these
sanctions?
Mr. Chabot. Snapback sanctions are a delusion. I could go
on.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. I think you have answered my question
there.
And this 24-hour--you know, or excuse me, 24-day thing
which the administration has been pushing, like which is--
sounds pretty long to me because you can hide a lot of
incriminating evidence in 24 days, but it is really, I
understand, a heck of a lot longer than 24 days in the real
world, because we have to go through a whole series of things
which Iran can block, it is my understanding.
Either Ambassador Joseph or Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Joseph. Well, I certainly--I think they certainly can.
And remember that this is a deviation from the standard
additional protocol, which calls for 24 hours, 24-hour notice.
So in the negotiations that was extended from 24 hours to 24
days, and 24 days is just the first phase, because it can
continue for days or weeks thereafter. And Iran can obstruct
the inspectors and they can get rid of a lot of the evidence in
that timeframe, according to the IAEA.
Mr. Dubowitz. And it is not just 24 days; it is much, much
longer because the time that it takes to snapback the U.N.
resolution, and then U.S., and then EU sanctions, and have that
impact, is much, much longer.
Mr. Chabot. How long can we realistically be talking here
before you could actually get to a site and see what they are
doing? Potentially.
Mr. Joseph. I would think the way that the Iranians can
play this, it could go on for months.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I yield back. This is I think just a
terrible deal, and I hope that we look very closely at this.
And I thank the chairman for letting us look closely at this.
Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am wondering what, if you can name specifically what
materials--you alluded to this earlier, what materials can be
hidden within that 24-day period? And the followup question is,
how specifically can Iran get around the 24/7 monitoring that
the administration is touting of the entire supply chain?
Mr. Joseph. Well, there are a whole host of things that the
Iranians could hide within the 24 hours. I mean, I mentioned
centrifuge manufacturing. Okay? That involves a lot of
different components, none of which necessarily can be traced
to uranium or plutonium.
The Iranians can continue, you know, the deception that we
have seen for years in their games with the IAEA. According to
the inspectors, according to the IAEA, they can undercut the
ability of the inspections.
Ms. Gabbard. I am just wondering if you can give some
specific examples, because we are getting arguments from both
sides. But I am wondering specific materials or specific
problems or areas of vulnerabilities within the supply chain
that can be hidden both from their cameras and their sealed--
their seals and their monitoring that we can look to, and that
you can point to as a vulnerability.
Mr. Joseph. Well, I mean, one specific example is, you
know, centrifuge parts.
Ms. Gabbard. Okay.
Mr. Dubowitz. And another specific example is certainly on
the issue of where Iran would be building a warhead, access to
the computer modeling, the computer codes, the actual design of
the warhead, multi-point detonation devices. I mean, all of
that doesn't leave a footprint. It takes place in a small
laboratory. And according to inspectors, it would be a matter
of a couple of days to literally move out all of that
equipment.
And, Congresswoman, you have to understand, the Iranians in
2003, what happened then is that they hadn't built contingency
plans, so it was easier to catch them. They have learned from
that, so they are not going to just get caught, oops, the
inspectors have all of a sudden identified a site. They built
contingency plans to sanitize the site, and inspectors have
said that you can literally do that in a couple of days.
So the issue is on the most fundamental aspect of the
Iranian nuclear weapons program, the warhead design. We are
effectively blind, and the Iranians have a contingency plan
that in a couple of days they can sanitize a lab, move out all
of the equipment, and even if we do get into that site there
will be no evidence that they have conducted that activity.
Mr. Goldenberg. Congresswoman, if I can just add, you know,
it is true, on the warhead design it is incredibly difficult to
find warheads. It is incredibly difficult to look at--you know,
a nuclear weapon is three pieces. It is the ballistic missiles,
it is the warheads, it is the fissile material. The fissile
material in some ways is the least harmful piece, right,
because it can also be used for civilian purposes.
But that is where you detect, and that is what this deal is
designed to do, because it is a lot easier to detect that. When
you have to put a few hundred centrifuges, when you have to
hide uranium, you can have weaponization plans, but if you
don't have the material to actually do it, and this is
precisely when the administration talks about the supply chain.
What it is saying is it will be incredibly difficult for
the Iranians to be able to actually get the material secretly
that it needs. It has to build an entirely independent system,
starting with, where are we going to get the uranium to, where
are we going to get the centrifuges to, where are we going--you
have to do every piece of this process independently of the
supply chain monitoring that we already have, and that is the
rationale.
It obviously has holes. And, you know, I would love to see
a foolproof system for dealing with weaponization. I don't
think one exists in the world, period, if a country is really
determined to do that.
Mr. Dubowitz. Of course, if you are Iran, you know what you
do is when you have an industrial sized program, and you
actually are producing as Congressman Engel said, an unlimited
amount of enriched uranium, which by the way you can enrich not
only to 3.67 percent, now they get 20 percent, but the Iranians
will enrich to 60 percent and they will use the fact that they
need a nuclear-powered naval fleet.
And so at that point you have got huge quantities of
uranium all around the country, in a country that is more than
twice the size of Texas. So that is when it becomes very
difficult to actually detect a diversion of enriched uranium to
a covert enrichment facility with a few hundred centrifuges
buried under a mountain on a Revolutionary Guard base.
And, by the way, why wouldn't you co-locate that with your
warhead design facility? So you would be able to very quickly
move that highly enriched uranium into another small lab where
you can now turn it into uranium elements for a nuclear
warhead. That is the fundamental problem. In an industrial
sized program, 150 inspectors or 200 inspectors are going to
have a very difficult time detecting that.
Mr. Goldenberg. The additional protocol remains in place in
that scenario.
Mr. Dubowitz. Which every inspector, which every expert has
said----
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Mo Brooks of Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question or
series of questions is directed to each of you, one at a time.
Brief answers would be appreciated, given time constraints.
This past April Iranian Brigadier General Mohammad Reza
Naqdi stated that erasing Israel off the map is non-negotiable.
Do you believe his comments accurately reflect a goal of the
Iranian Government? Ambassador?
Mr. Joseph. Yes, I do.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. Absolutely.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Goldenberg?
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes. But they wouldn't do it if it meant
the destruction of their regime, which I think it certainly
would.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Second question. This past weekend
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini led a rally that
was frequently punctuated by chants of ``Death to America'' and
``Death to Israel.'' Again, do you believe his comments
accurately reflect a goal of the Iranian Government?
Mr. Joseph. Yes, I do.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. It is their animating ideology. Without that
ideology, there is no Islamic Republic.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Goldenberg?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think it is important to remember that
the overwhelming majority of the Iranian population is actually
much more pro-American than pretty much any country in the
Middle East. So this regime has issues, but thus far at least
it has been deterred through, and will continue to be deterred,
by our actions.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. That is not answering my question. Do you
believe ``Death to America'' and ``Death to Israel'' are goals
of the Iranian Government?
Mr. Goldenberg. Not realistic goals that they could pursue
without facing severe consequences that have deterred them for
35 years from acting on those goals in ways that could
actually----
Mr. Brooks. All right. Next, given your responses, do you
also believe that Iran, the world's foremost sponsor of
terrorism, will use the conventional weapons made available by
the Iran nuclear treaty to further Iran's goal of destroying
Israel and killing Americans? Ambassador Joseph?
Mr. Joseph. I think there is a 100 percent chance that they
will do that.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. It has already used conventional weapons to
kill Americans and kill Israelis. Why wouldn't it continue?
Mr. Brooks. Very good way to answer a question with a
question. I tend to agree.
Mr. Goldenberg?
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes. And there is a lot of other things,
sir, that we should be doing to counter those activities, but
it doesn't necessarily preclude a nuclear agreement.
Mr. Brooks. And given how frequently we have seen Muslim
fundamentalists be willing to sacrifice their own lives in
furtherance of their desire to kill unbelievers, we saw it with
9/11 roughly 14 years ago, we have seen it in many other places
around the globe, including the United States. As I see this
agreement, at some point there is a probability that Iran is
going to obtain nuclear weapons. Do you agree or disagree?
Mr. Joseph. I think they can go nuclear today if they so
decide, and have a nuclear weapon in a very short period of
time.
Mr. Brooks. And if they comply with this agreement, do you
believe they still will obtain nuclear weapons, at some point?
Mr. Joseph. It is hard for me to believe that they are
going to comply with the agreement, because, as you know, the
chairman pointed out, they have cheated on every other
agreement. My sense is that they will use this agreement as a
shield for continuing to develop a nuclear weapons capability,
and when they decide they will go nuclear.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. I think at some point it will be an
irresistible impulse to actually test a nuclear weapon. And
even if they don't, they will use the near zero breakout
capability they will have to threaten the United States and
threaten the region, and use it as an instrument of nuclear
blackmail in order to expand their conventional and terrorist
activities.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Goldenberg?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think they have been deterred from
actually going for a nuclear weapon for 35 years, because of
the costs and consequences that come with that. And this
agreement will extend and continue that trend.
Mr. Dubowitz. And, of course, Congressman, that actually
contradicts the claim that if this agreement gets turned down
by Congress, we are going to--Iran is going to engage in
nuclear escalation to a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Brooks. I understand.
Final question. Given the religious zealotry of the Iranian
Government, what degree of certainty do you have, one way or
the other, that Iran won't use nuclear weapons to further
``Death to America'' and ``Death to Israel,'' if and when Iran
obtains those nuclear weapons? Ambassador Joseph?
Mr. Joseph. Well, I think Iran will use nuclear weapons.
They will use it to intimidate. They will use it to blackmail
us. They will use it to deter us from coming to the assistance
of our allies in the region.
Mr. Brooks. But will they detonate them?
Mr. Joseph. Well, will they detonate? I think they will
risk it, and I think they will be very--and the situation will
be very subject to miscalculation, and I think that this could
very easily escalate into their use of a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Brooks. If the chair would permit Mr. Dubowitz and Mr.
Goldenberg?
Mr. Dubowitz. They would certainly detonate it to test it.
And we would want the world to know that they have the
capability to actually deploy a nuclear weapon. Whether they
end up using it, I cannot say. But I think that it doesn't
matter whether they use it or not, fundamentally they will
detonate it, and then they will have a nuclear weapon to
blackmail the United States and the international community for
all of their conventional and terrorist purposes.
Mr. Goldenberg. I agree with my panelists, which is why I
think we need this agreement, which stops that from happening
is, in my view, the better option.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional time
for the witnesses to respond.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Brooks, thank you very much.
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I presume that each
of the panelists believes that today Iran is a nuclear
threshold state.
Mr. Joseph. Yes, sir. I do.
Mr. Dubowitz. They are a nuclear threshold state, but they
are still a very weak state.
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes. They are a nuclear threshold state,
sir.
Mr. Higgins. With this deal, which would reduce the number
of centrifuges from 19,000 to some 6,000, and reduce uranium
and plutonium by 98 percent under this deal, wouldn't Iran
become less of a nuclear threshold or threat to the region?
Mr. Joseph. It is certainly better that Iran, at declared
facilities, is spinning fewer centrifuges rather than more
centrifuges.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
Mr. Joseph. But they are going to have the additional
centrifuges in storage, and they could very easily reconstitute
that capability for breakout.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
Mr. Joseph. Now, we would detect it, but one also has to
consider what may be going on at suspect sites.
Mr. Dubowitz. There is no fundamental difference between a
3-month breakout and a 12-month breakout. Neither is enough
time to reimpose sanctions. Both are enough time to use
military force.
Mr. Goldenberg. Actually, Congressman, I would disagree. I
think there is a huge difference between a 12-month breakout
and a 3-month breakout. And I think we also have to remember
that a 12-month breakout is if everything goes right for Iran
from day one, they build only one nuclear weapon, which nobody
has ever done. You have to build an arsenal. That is the only
way you can credibly deter. So you are talking about a lot more
time than that.
And, fundamentally, it gives us enough time to be able to
respond in all kinds of different ways, politically,
diplomatically, militarily. At a couple of weeks, the only real
option is to pursue--to go military, because you are not going
to have time to do anything else.
Mr. Higgins. Well, it has always been stated that, you
know, the 12-month breakout was necessary from our standpoint
strategically, to be able to detect whether or not Iran was
moving toward a nuclear weapon, and to be able to act against
it before they are able to accomplish that.
I think the one thing that hasn't been emphasized enough
here, nobody is suggesting that the United States is taking the
military option off the table. This is an interim step toward
the goal of using international leverage to get Iran to move
away from its nuclear ambitions.
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman, you should ask Secretary Kerry
how the 1-year breakout was chosen. Was that based on a deep
analysis by the intelligence community and the U.S. Government
that 1 year was exactly the point of time that we needed in
order to have the full range of options that Mr. Goldenberg
said? Or was it chosen artificially or through negotiations
with Iran? I would be interested in his answer.
Mr. Higgins. Do you think he just came out with the 1 year
arbitrarily to make it look better than the current situation?
Mr. Dubowitz. I think that this 1-year breakout was chosen
arbitrarily. It was not put through a deep, rigorous analysis.
Mr. Higgins. Why would they do that?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, because I think at the end of the day
when they shifted the fundamental precept of this negotiation
from Iran's nuclear program judged by its practical needs to a
breakout time, what they needed to do was they sat down with
the physics of this and they tried to figure out what would be
the most they could negotiate with the Iranians based on the
existing enrichment capacity.
And they realized that the Iranians are not going to give
up their entire enrichment capacity. They weren't going to go
down to--1,000 centrifuges to 500 centrifuges the
administration initially started in the negotiation. They back-
ended the analysis, and they came up with 1 year. But I don't
believe that there was any systematic effort in order to
analyze or red team whether 1 year was sufficient.
Mr. Higgins. What you are suggesting is the 1-year breakout
was to appease the Iranians at the expense of the strategic
interests of the United States.
Mr. Dubowitz. I am not suggesting to appease. I am
suggesting that they thought that was the best they could
negotiate.
Mr. Goldenberg. I actually believe----
Mr. Dubowitz. Fundamentally different.
Mr. Goldenberg [continuing]. Congressman, having worked on
this issue inside the Pentagon when we were discussing
precisely these types of questions, the question for us was
always, do we have enough time to clearly see the program, stop
it, and not only that we know we can stop it militarily and
otherwise, but that the Iranians know that we can stop it
militarily and otherwise, so that they are deterred from ever
going for it?
And this is something we talked about for years, and I was
always very confident with a number like that. And on top of
that, I do think we need to--I thought your point, Congressman,
was really important about this being an interim step. The
reality is, there comes a moment where our only options are
military action or essentially accepting a virtual capability,
because we are not going to have the ability to stop it.
At that moment, the President of the United States has to
make a terrible decision, and we all lose, whichever way he
goes.
Mr. Higgins. All right. Could I----
Mr. Goldenberg. And 12 months is not long enough to
reimpose sanctions.
Mr. Higgins. Let me just reclaim my time for one moment. It
said that this deal would result in a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East. The fact of the matter is, Iran has been in
nuclear proliferation for at least 10 years. Who else is
pursuing nuclear weapons in the Middle East, other than Iran?
Mr. Joseph. Well, Congressman, you are well aware of
Pakistan and Pakistan's program.
Mr. Higgins. I am.
Mr. Joseph. Saudi Arabia has said that----
Mr. Higgins. Saudi Arabia can't make a car.
Mr. Joseph. Saudi Arabia has a lot of money, and Saudi
Arabia has a long-time relationship----
Mr. Higgins. And they can't make a car.
Mr. Joseph [continuing]. A long-time relationship with
Pakistan.
Mr. Higgins. Is there any evidence that Saudi Arabia is
moving towards----
Mr. Joseph. And you could say the Libyans. The Libyans
couldn't make a car either, but they had an advanced nuclear
weapons program, because they were able to buy it. They were
able to buy the equipment, and they were able to buy the
expertise. Saudi Arabia has a lot more money than the Libyans
ever----
Mr. Higgins. So the point is, there is already nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East before this deal is voted on
or approved.
Mr. Dubowitz. Yes. But the fundamental difference--I mean,
the Saudis have actually signed multi-billion dollar contracts
with the South Koreans and Russians to build a civilian nuclear
program. The difference is that there will be the Iran
standard. The Saudis will insist on domestic enrichment, and
anybody who says we can de-SWIFT Saudi banks, cut off Saudi oil
exports, and designate the central bank of Saudi Arabia to stop
it from pursuing that path, should do a much more detailed
examination of the Saudi economy. Those options obviously don't
exist.
Mr. Goldenberg. I will just point out that if the Saudis
really wanted to build a covert nuclear weapons program, they
wouldn't be going around on the front page of The New York
Times saying that they wanted to do that. Is it conceivable
they are doing it for leverage?
Chairman Royce. Darrell Issa of California.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goldenberg, where were you in 1979?
Mr. Goldenberg. Sir, I was actually in Israel where I was
born. I was a year old.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So for your entire life, from the age of 1
year old, Iran has been a terrorist state, first pretending
that students had taken our Embassy while in fact it was the
current government, or its legacy government with the same
theological base, that took our Embassy prisoner, held them for
more than a year, and in fact sequentially, when you were 4
years old or so, they blew up--they participated and funded the
organization that blew up 200-plus Marines in Beirut and our
Embassy.
You were 3 or 4 years old when they killed the station
chief, and when they sponsored kidnappings in large amounts.
Did you continue growing up in Israel during the '80s?
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes, sir. I was there until the age of----
Mr. Issa. So the organization and the funding of Hezbollah,
for your entire life, has been responsible, along with Hamas
and other terrorist groups, Palestinian, Islamic Jihad, that
country has consistently funded the murder of Israelis and
Americans for your entire life, from the time you were 1 year
old, and they are doing it today. Isn't that true?
Mr. Goldenberg. Well, sir, when I was 4 years old, one of
my best friends, actually his older brother was killed in a war
by Hezbollah. Yes, it is true. But----
Mr. Issa. Okay. So staying on that for a moment, because
often, you know, it is--you know, the Judiciary Committee,
another committee I sit on, you know, we consider antitrust.
But of course antitrust is based on what the relevant market
is. If you define a market broadly enough, nobody has market
power. If you define it narrowly enough, everybody has market
power.
So I would like to define a question for all three of the
panelists right now. For 36 years, Tehran has sponsored
terrorists from around the world and killed Americans and
countless others. For 36 years, they have had a virtual
straight path, and for 36 years we have heard about students
and Iranians loving America.
What will change in the next 13 years, the time it takes
from where we are today to the time in which perfectly legally
Tehran will have the ability to have nuclear weapons? All they
have to do--and I just want to preface it--all they have to do
is say they want a nuclear navy, and they will have the ability
to do everything it takes to have a bomb ready in a matter of
minutes.
And I will go right down the aisle from left to right,
please.
Mr. Joseph. Sir, I think in 13----
Mr. Issa. Or right to left, depending upon which way you
are facing.
Mr. Joseph. In 13 years, Iran will have the capability to
have a nuclear weapon whenever it decides to do so that. In 13
years, I think in part because of this agreement, Iran will be
more capable, it will be more aggressive in the region, and it
will be more able to continue to repress its people. And the
ultimate solution to this nuclear issue resides with the
Iranian people. And here I----
Mr. Issa. Okay. My question is somewhat short, so I will--
let us keep going down. In 13 years, is there any--do you have
any reason to believe they will be different than they were in
the last 36?
Mr. Dubowitz. Not at all. In 5 years, they are going to
have access to combat aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy
weaponry, in order to create more chaos and kill more
Americans. In 13 years, I prefer in dealing with the Middle
East to assume the worst and be surprised on the up side than
assume the best and be devastated on the down side. So that is
why I assume the worst about the Iranian regime.
Mr. Issa. And, Mr. Goldenberg, I used you for obvious
reasons of your support for this initiative. But if in your
entire life, since you were 1 years old in Israel, a regime has
been able to sustain itself with and without sanctions, through
this entire period, and continue to murder Americans, Israelis,
and others, what is going to change as a result of this deal,
while theoretically we maintain all of the sanctions that were
in place for two-thirds of your life?
Mr. Goldenberg. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. I will just say
we don't know what is going to happen inside of Iran in the
next 15 years. I think it is perfectly conceivable that hard
liners double down and win this fight internally. It is also
conceivable that pragmatists, and I say pragmatists because
they are not liberals, they are not--you know, Rouhanis are not
pushing for democracy. They do value economic engagement and
international legitimacy more. And they did win this huge
debate inside of Iran, which is very unusual and hasn't
happened in a long time.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So, to summarize----
Mr. Goldenberg. But it is possible.
Mr. Issa [continuing]. Two of you believe they will
continue to do exactly what they are doing. Mr. Goldenberg, you
believe they might continue doing what they are doing, trying
to get rid of the big state, the little state, killing
Americans, killing Israelis, sponsoring terrorism,
destabilizing the region, but they might not.
So you are counting on hope based on the partial
elimination. There is a document, a classified document, it is
about three times the thickness of this, that has a list--I
can't name the names, but it has a list of banks and ships and
aircraft, all of which are going to be freed up immediately as
a result of this agreement, so that their economic machine, the
machine that causes their government to deliver goods and
services to their people, and make their people more docile as
a result, that is all the benefit to he regime.
So, Mr. Chairman, I have taken a little extra time. I
appreciate your understanding. I find the question that all
three answered to be the question we should be asking is, what
difference does it make, what change will happen as a result of
this? If we concentrate on the question of nuclear, which I
think is a good one, we miss the bigger question. A terrorist
state for 36 years, given more money and less things that would
cause the toppling of it, will undoubtedly continue doing for
the future what they have done for 36 years in the past.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your continued ability to bring
us facts, and it is enlightening. And I thank you and yield
back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Issa.
Mr. Brad Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. The Ambassador talks about missile defense. A
nuclear weapon can be smuggled inside a bail of marijuana. It
is less prestigious, but it gives you plausible deniability,
which might meet Iran's MO even better.
Secretary Kerry is over in the Senate saying you can't bomb
away knowledge. There are two types of military action we could
take. The one that is dismissed by the Secretary is just
hitting the nuclear sites, sets them back 2 or 3 years.
According to him, the other approach is to threaten World War
II rules of engagement style bombing of all strategic economic
targets in Iran until they invite Mr. Dubowitz to go over there
and clean out their nuclear facility.
I thought I would get a smile out of that one.
Okay. This deal has the good, the bad, and the ugly. We get
rid of--the good is we get the stockpiles, decommission the
centrifuges. The bad is they get their $100 billion. That is
money for their people, money for graft and corruption, money
to kill a lot of Sunni Muslims, money to kill Americans and
Israelis.
The ugly is 11, 12 years from now, and you gentlemen have
all explained why that is true. Just to describe how ugly it
is, it is too ugly for President Obama. He refuses to live in
the White House except for with an Iran that has a 1-year
breakout period and 6,000 relatively primitive centrifuges.
Yet he envisions a world in which his successors are living
in that same house with Iran having 100,000 IR-8 advanced
centrifuges and a breakout time that he describes at basically
zero. Why does he do to his successor, whoever she may be, what
he is unwilling to live with himself?
So we have got to prevent this deal from being binding on
future administrations. This is an executive agreement. It is
not an executive legislative agreement, and God knows it is not
a treaty. We all want to sit here and evaluate the deal. What
would we do if we were President now or a month ago or a year
ago?
The real question before us is not, is it a good deal? The
real question before us is, what should Congress do? And those
who dislike the agreement the most, or at least with the most
unbridled passion say, ``Here is what we do. You should have a
vote in Congress to override a Presidential veto of a
resolution of disapproval.'' Okay. What does that do?
First, it fails. So the last picture the world sees is the
proponents of the deal celebrating their congressional victory.
And then we have to explain to the world that is not an
executive legislative agreement. That was not a ratification,
even though the picture you saw was the proponents celebrating,
because the opponents couldn't stop themselves, couldn't
prevent themselves from bringing the vote up in that manner,
couldn't just have us vote on a resolution of approval and vote
it down.
They had to bring up a veto override. Couldn't contain
themselves. The picture is much louder than the words. The
picture is the proponents celebrating congressional support for
the deal.
Now, let us say we override the President's veto, the dream
of many. Okay. Does that snapback our sanctions? First, it
doesn't do anything at the U.N. The President will vote against
Congress' position at the U.N. Doesn't do anything with the
State Department. They are going to be all over telling foreign
capitals, ``Go do profitable business with Iran to the extent
that Iran adheres to the deal. It is a great deal. Don't listen
to Congress.''
But the question is, will they even follow the statute as
to U.S. sanctions? That is the question I asked at the
classified briefing. Secretary Jack Lew was very clear that he
absolutely refused to answer the question. Okay. It took him 2
minutes to say that, but he absolutely did 2 minutes of not
answering.
So they are not going to follow the law. So even if we
override, Iran still gets all of the sanctions relief because
when we say ``sanctions on Iran'' we don't mean sanctions on
Iran. We mean sanctions on banks and oil companies in Europe
and Japan who choose to do business with Iran, and in this case
they will be doing business with Iran that President Obama
tells them to do.
It is nice to say Congress is going to--we are going to
take our guns with us and go up to the Fed New York Branch and
stop the transactions of the banks that are doing the things we
don't want to do. No. You can't have sanctions. You can't block
a bank from doing business in the United States, unless the
executive branch is. And the proof of this was George W. Bush
who for 8 years violated the Iran Sanctions Act for the benefit
of international oil companies every single day.
And then we get--let us say, though, for--we did do that.
Then the question is, would other countries kowtow to the
United States Congress? It is one thing for Britain to say, or
for Germany to say, or for North or South Korea to say, ``We
are going to buy less oil from Iran because the Americans have
persuaded that that is a good idea, and oh, by the way, they
said, well, banks will have trouble if we don't adhere.''
It is another thing for them to go to say, ``We are
stopping our banks from doing business with Iran, and we are
not going to buy oil from Iran, because we are kowtowing to
sanctions--to a policy that Congress likes, but we think it is
stupid. The President of the United States thinks it is stupid.
The whole world voted against it.'' It would be politically
difficult.
But then let us say that did happen, and we actually went
back to Kirk Menendez, sanctions, and declines in oil
purchases, and we forced every bank to hold on to Iran's money.
Then, we have 4 months for them to develop a nuclear weapon at
a time when we are enforcing the sanctions that have certainly
not crippled them.
I realize we have lower oil prices, which has had an effect
on them. But there are no riots in the streets of Tehran today.
So you gentlemen have done a great job of telling us why
this deal has problems. And I have 0.0 seconds to be fair to
you and let you tell me why the course of action available to
Congress--I think the President may not have boxed in Iran and
blocked every avenue they have to a nuclear weapon, but he has
has boxed in Congress and maybe cut off every avenue we have to
an alternative foreign policy.
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman Sherman, I actually laid out
three scenarios that respond to your question.
Chairman Royce. They may be able to do that in writing.
Mr. Sherman. In writing, and I know we will be talking by
phone, et cetera. And I thought that this would still leave a
minute for you, but obviously----
Mr. Dubowitz. Financial institutions are not going back
into Iran until they know who the next President is, and the
vote of disapproval will absolutely deter them from going back
in, because they will be afraid that if the next President of
the United States comes in on a vote of disapproval with the
political wind in her back, or his back, that they might find
themselves on the wrong end of an enforcement action.
So it is exactly the message to the international community
that says don't go back into Iran right now, which will be the
most powerful deterrent to basically enforce the sanctions over
the next 18 months.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, appreciate your being here. Ambassador Joseph, I
listened to your five flaws; I agree. Your four
recommendations; I agree. Libyan example; I agree.
Mr. Dubowitz, your three rejections of the deal and your
three flaws I thought were all pretty accurate.
Mr. Goldenberg, I agree with you on this agreement is not
perfect. I agree. And I look back at the North Korean NPT with
a peaceful program, and I look back when Japan and South Korea
were at the table, and they wanted a deal because their vested
interests are right there in the area.
I find it interesting that partners in the Middle East
weren't at the table. Israel wasn't at the table. The Saudis
weren't at the table. And they don't want the deal, but yet we
are going ahead with the deal.
You said we should give the IAEA more money to hire more
inspectors, but we can't get inspectors to look at the stuff
they need to now. And I think it has been brought out, the
Parchin military area where we know they more than likely
detonated a nuclear trigger device, and then I look at--you
know, and I think Mr. Issa brought it out very well, along with
Mr. Brooks. Has Iran lied, cheated, deceived the U.S./U.N.,
broken security, or U.N. resolutions, other nations, have they
lied and cheated to the IAEA? And I think we are all in
agreement with that.
With the economic sanctions in place, in fact they are so
tough that Iran was starving. You know, people were having all
these hard times. But while they were doing that, they were
funding Hezbollah, they were funding Hamas, they have an access
through Venezuela, through South America. They funded terrorism
around the world.
Again, as Mr. Issa said, you think of the Khobar Towers, 90
percent of the IEDs that killed or wounded 70 percent of our
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan were funded by Iran during
economic sanctions. Their spread of terrorism around the world
has grown in strength with sanctions. And then when we release
sanctions somewhat, they are only supposed to get a few
billion, but it turned out to be around $14 billion or more,
they go and help Assad.
And you look at their history, and their history pretty
much predicts the future of a country like that. When I look at
them sponsoring the assassination attempt of the Saudi
Ambassador on our homeland, would it be safe to say, especially
when their leaders have been for years, since you were a baby 1
year of age, until the signing of this agreement, or the
agreement, saying ``Death to America,'' ``Death to Israel,''
would you consider them maybe an enemy of our state?
Mr. Goldenberg. Congressman, the Soviet Union was also an
enemy of our state. Iran is an enemy of our state, but we did
negotiate----
Mr. Yoho. I am sorry. They are an enemy of our state.
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes. And the Soviet Union was also.
Mr. Yoho. That is what I wanted to hear. Will this
negotiation, Ambassador Joseph, is it going to strengthen Iran?
Mr. Joseph. Most definitely it will strengthen the regime.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Goldenberg?
Mr. Goldenberg. In some areas, and constrain it in others.
Mr. Yoho. With the release of the money, it will strengthen
it. So we are strengthening somebody that has shouted death
``Death to America,'' as you stated an enemy of the state, and
you are a senior fellow/director, Middle East Security Program,
Center of New American Security, right? Center for New American
Security.
President Obama said that this deal will make the Middle
East, the U.S., and the world safer. Is that correct?
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. If that is true, why are everybody telling us
that we need to bolster our eastern missile defense system, our
western missile defense system, our Alaskan and everywhere
else?
Mr. Goldenberg. I wouldn't necessarily agree with that. I
do think we need to take a lot of other steps in the region.
Mr. Yoho. I think we are being naive here to a level of
non-comparable analysis, from a guy that has only been here for
2\1/2\ years. I don't see this as a good deal. I have only been
here 2\1/2\ years. I don't see this as a good deal, and I think
we should walk away from the table.
Senator Lieberman was here last week. We should run away
from the table and put the sanctions back on now, because as
Mr. Dubowitz says, snapback is a fallacy; it will never work.
Once this goes down--and I hope all of Congress rejects this
deal. When you have the Saudi and nobody else, and Israel
saying, ``Please don't do this deal,'' I think we should
listen. And if we are this lone superpower at the negotiating
table, and I see that what we didn't get and what we gave up, I
think it is time for us to walk away.
And I yield back.
Chairman Royce. The gentleman from Fairfax County,
Virginia, Gerry Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Wow. I have got to
say, I guess I don't have the luxury of having made up my mind
yet. Listening to my friend from California, Mr. Brad Sherman,
apparently it is all simple and clear-cut. It is real simple.
We can make up our minds before the ink is dry on the
treaty, and we even see all the details, or go to a briefing.
If we want to delineate this as just another political contest
up here, then we have to be willing to say U.S. national
security interest be damned, Middle East security interest be
damned, because policy trumps everything.
Now, that is not everybody up here, but it is too many up
here. And I would like to see hearings that actually are used
to actually explore and illuminate, learn more, question,
probe. So I hope these hearings will--that will be the purpose
they serve, not to simply reinforce already arrived at a priori
convictions, because of some other commitment we have made to
some intellectual pursuit that I don't share.
I have heard it is not perfect.
Chairman Royce. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Connolly. On your time.
Chairman Royce. We will have Secretary Kerry here----
Mr. Connolly. I know.
Chairman Royce [continuing]. Next week, along with the
Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Treasury on this,
just to----
Mr. Connolly. And I exempt--if I can have my time--but I
exempt the chairman from what I just said, because actually at
your opening query you brought up something that bothers me,
too, which is the non-identified inspection areas and that 24-
day period. I think that is a problem, and I think it has to be
addressed.
But that has nothing to do with the preconceived notion of
whether this is good or bad or hurt Israel or hurt U.S. or the
Saudis like it. The notion that people say, ``Death to
America'' in Iran, apparently we should never talk to them, we
should never have an agreement that, unrelated to that,
actually takes the nuclear equation or is proposed to take the
nuclear equation off the table.
What is U.S. interest? That is what we ought to be talking
about, and we ought to be hard-nosed about it. And we are all
going to come to different conclusions, but I really hope we
recalibrate and try to diffuse the politics here. I know that
is an impossible request.
But you were trying to point out and got interrupted, Mr.
Goldenberg, but, I mean, in the height of the Cold War, the
Soviet Union, the last time I checked--I am old enough to
remember--was dedicated to the proposition of destroying us and
capitalism. Does my memory fail me? I know you were young,
but----
Mr. Goldenberg. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. Did we have any kind of negotiations
with the Soviet Union?
Mr. Goldenberg. Sir, all the time, on all----
Mr. Connolly. All the time. Did we, including Ronald
Reagan, put the nuclear question front and center, irrespective
of, not in ignorance of, not to the exclusion of, human rights?
Mr. Goldenberg. Absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. Jewish immigration.
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Soviet misbehavior in other parts of the
world.
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Including arming elements that were fighting
us.
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Ah.
Mr. Dubowitz. Yes. But three treaties that were signed----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Dubowitz, I have not asked you a
question.
Mr. Dubowitz. Okay. I will wait for your----
Mr. Connolly. This is my time, and I want to give Mr.
Goldenberg an opportunity, uninterrupted, to answer my
question.
The proposition, Mr. Goldenberg, is made we should just
walk away. It is simple. There are no consequences. In fact, I
dare say the consequences are highly likely to be positive. Is
there at all a conceivable idea that they might be negative?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think that is the most likely scenario.
We are going to--Iran will resume its nuclear weapons----
Mr. Connolly. If you were putting a probability, just humor
me here, but what is the probability you would put on the
Russians and the Chinese coming back to the table if we did
that?
Mr. Goldenberg. Three percent.
Mr. Connolly. Now, I heard a conversation with Mrs. Frankel
about U.S. credibility, and I heard Mr. Joseph and Mr.
Dubowitz, Ambassador Joseph say, ``Well, credibility wouldn't
be that damaged.'' I want to explore with you for a minute the
idea that the United States of America, the world's sole
surviving superpower, that negotiated and led the negotiations,
and led the sanctions, and brought around for the first time in
35 years to the table to talk to us, and wrenched out
concessions, would actually renounce its own treaty, the
consequences would be relatively mild.
Our credibility wouldn't be hurt. What do you think the
consequences would be next time we said we want to lead a
negotiation on Subject X with anybody?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think probably it would be very difficult
for us to be----
Mr. Connolly. Very difficult. So actually the damage to our
credibility could be quite consequential, not minimal.
Mr. Goldenberg. I agree with that, sir.
Mr. Connolly. And, furthermore, final thing, we have heard
scenarios the Iranians will have to deal with it, and, you
know, they have got other problems if we walk away and renounce
this deal.
What kind of probability might we put, though, on the
opposite, that what this leads to, if we say no, is the hard
liners are strengthened in Iran, the very group we don't want
to strengthen, and they accelerate the nuclear program because
now they have nothing left to lose.
Mr. Goldenberg. Congressman, I think if we walk away,
Rouhani and the entire pragmatic faction of Iran is probably
done politically, period, end stop.
Mr. Connolly. And what is likely to happen to the nuclear
program under that scenario, do you think?
Mr. Goldenberg. Accelerate.
Mr. Connolly. It accelerates. And I only submit that we had
to explore that, too. We had to explore, as Mr. Dubowitz and
Ambassador Joseph and Senator Lieberman pointed out last week,
there are consequences for going forward with this agreement.
We have to weigh them very carefully.
But we cannot minimize or ignore the consequences of no. We
cannot pretend that the alternative isn't fraught with danger
as well. And we have got to weigh carefully that balance. Which
risks are we, as Members of Congress, willing to take on behalf
of our country? And for me that is the central question. I
haven't made up my mind yet, but I hope that is what we pursue
in subsequent hearings.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Colonel Scott Perry from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My good friend from Virginia, I don't know what you had for
breakfast this morning, but I would like to on occasion have
some of whatever makes you delusional about American
credibility and what might have been damaged in the last 2
years over this discussion and this----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman? As a matter of personal
privilege----
Chairman Royce. You are out of time.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. It is inappropriate for a Member
of Congress to characterize another member at a hearing or on
the floor of the House as delusional. I ask my friend to
withdraw and retract the remark. It is inappropriate as a
member of a Congress.
Mr. Perry. I will indeed withdraw my remark.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend.
Chairman Royce. And let us get on to the question of
questioning the witnesses here, shall we?
Mr. Perry. Mr. Chairman, absolutely, although I would say
the question of credibility--I must return to that essentially.
We don't have any credibility left on the planet in foreign
relations as far as I am concerned, basically due completely to
this administration and the things they have done now and
throughout their time in office.
That having been said, Ambassador, do we consider Iran a
rational actor as a state?
Mr. Joseph. Sir, I think they are rational. I think they
are a rogue state, but they are rational.
Mr. Perry. They are rational. Indeed, is North Korea
rational or irrational or non-rational?
Mr. Joseph. Sometimes I look at North Korea's behavior and
I think they are more rational than we are with regard to our
North Korea policy.
Mr. Perry. How about with regard to Iran?
Mr. Joseph. As I said, I think Iran is--the Iranian leaders
are rational, but rationality may be something that differs
between Tehran and Washington.
Mr. Perry. Willing to give up the lives of many of their
countrymen--Iran, that is--and North Korea for that matter, but
in this case Iran, for quest of their mission so to speak?
Mr. Joseph. Absolutely. They have demonstrated that over
and over for decades now.
Mr. Perry. Right. Decades. Decades. Millions--not millions,
hundreds of thousands, maybe millions dead at the cost of this
quest.
And it says in the agreement that this agreement, if you--I
am sure you have read it. I have now twice. Built on mutual
respect in the near--in the beginning of the thing. Built on
mutual respect. And respect is earned over a period of time
based on your actions, correct? I mean, that is my--would be
one of my definitions or character----
Mr. Joseph. Well, real respect is. I think this is more of
diplomatic nicety. When you have, you know, thousands of
Iranians chanting ``Death to America'' in the streets within
hours after the signing of the agreement, I wonder about the
respect of----
Mr. Perry. I mean, I guess what I am getting to is the
agreement isn't necessarily based--not necessarily, it is not
at all based in factual actions that can be documented. It is
based on the hope that things will change.
Mr. Joseph. I think it is----
Mr. Perry. From our----
Mr. Joseph [continuing]. Triumph of hope over experience.
Absolutely.
Mr. Perry. So, as I read it, sanctions relief happens early
next year under this agreement, things all happening
essentially at the same time. Sanctions relief happens almost
immediately. That is our part of the deal, right? We relieve
you of the sanctions that are imposed upon you, and they agree
to minimize their enrichment, move and store some of the
enrichment capability, and then work on redesigning facilities,
not dismantle facilities.
And they are not redesigned at that time. There is a road
map, as it says in the agreement, for redesign. Is that--and
get rid of some of their stockpile that we know of, not
including stockpiles and materials provided by the Russians. Is
that pretty much it?
Mr. Joseph. That is pretty much it.
Mr. Perry. Yes. So they get essentially--essentially, we
give everything away, like everything we have, that is the
sanctions. That is what we have, right? We have sanctions.
Mr. Joseph. It is even worse than that. It is more than
sanctions. It is the release of their assets, which----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Joseph [continuing]. You know, is the signing bonus.
Mr. Perry. Right. The 150 billion, right, or thereabouts.
Not 13 billion or 14 billion or million, 150 billion, in an
economy 300 billion or 400 billion. So it is almost half of
their economy they get one fell swoop.
Mr. Joseph. I think the 12 billion to 20 billion was what
they got when they signed the first agreement----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Joseph [continuing]. In November 2013.
Mr. Perry. So you just look at the scale of the deal, like
if you were buying a car, would this be a good deal. And it
seems like you are not getting much car for a lot of money,
right? I mean, in that----
Mr. Joseph. This is a bad deal.
Mr. Perry. Yes. Let me ask you, why is Iran a member of the
Commission? If we feel so badly about them and they are bad,
they are a rogue actor, not--why are they even a part--if a
convict is sentenced, do we allow the convict to then sit on
the jury? Is that what has happened here?
Mr. Joseph. Sir, I think this is just another example of
breaking every rule of good negotiations.
Mr. Perry. Has it happened ever before?
Mr. Joseph. Well, there have been joint commissions that
were set up in the arms control world with the Soviet Union,
but I think here you have clearly a rogue state.
Mr. Perry. The 24 days where we dispute something, that is
only the beginning, right? Isn't there another 35 days
minimum----
Mr. Joseph. Yes.
Mr. Perry [continuing]. To fight that out? Minimum.
Mr. Joseph. Minimum.
Mr. Perry. Minimum 35 days. This might go on interminably
while we have no idea what they are doing. And it is all
predicated on IAEA inspections.
Last question, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your indulgence.
Are there going to be Americans inspecting?
Mr. Joseph. No.
Mr. Perry. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Judge Ted Poe of Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. Are any of you aware of so-
called secret side deals that we are just now learning about?
We will just go down the row. Mr. Joseph?
Mr. Joseph. I am aware of what I have read in the newspaper
about the secret arrangements with the IAEA in Iran on the
question of Parchin and the potential military dimensions, the
12 activities that Iran has engaged in, all related to
weaponization.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Have you seen this so-called secret deal?
Mr. Joseph. No, I have not.
Mr. Dubowitz. I am aware of letters that Secretary Kerry
has provided to the Europeans and the Chinese assuring them
that we will not snapback sanctions against their companies,
and, therefore, enabling them to invest tens of billions of
dollars back into the economy, deals which will be
grandfathered in in a snapback scenario.
Mr. Poe. So you know about the secret deals.
Mr. Dubowitz. It hasn't--my understanding is it is not
classified, but certainly it is not being publicly discussed in
the way it should be.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Mr. Goldenberg. Congressman, I would say it is probably
wise to--you know, just from conversations with the
administration and friends in there, my understanding is you
should really ask them.
My understanding is that these are usually agreements that
traditionally are signed with IAEA and a lot of different cases
that are kept between the IAEA bilaterally, but that the
administration should absolutely be here briefing you, and I
hope they do, on all of the details of that agreement.
But they don't even necessarily have the paper, and it has
a lot to do with the fact that, you know, there are certain
elements that you don't want to get out publicly, period, about
nuclear weaponization and whatnot. But honestly, Congressman, I
would really suggest talking to the administration about it.
Mr. Poe. Susan Rice says that there are some deals that she
will let us--she says she will let us know about.
Moving on to something else, crude oil sanction lifting.
Now, I am from Texas, and I am confused in the sense that we
are going to lift the sanctions on Iran exporting their crude
oil, but the U.S. Government is still not going to lift the
sanctions on the United States exporting our crude oil, or the
prohibition against exporting crude oil.
It seems like, you know, in Texas we want the same deal the
Iranians are getting, and we will even promise not to develop
nuclear weapons. But the Iranians exporting crude oil, will we
be buying that crude oil? I am just opening that up. So is the
United States going to end up buying Iranian crude oil that is
lifted from the sanctions? Any of you.
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, I mean, oil is a global market. Iranian
medium and heavy sour crude will be sold by oil traders around
the world. It is entirely possible that U.S. refineries end up
buying Iranian crude, unless there is some way and there is
some forensic process to figure out whether that molecule of
oil that is actually coming into the United States came from
Iran or came from some other country that sells an equivalent
heavy or medium sour blend.
Mr. Goldenberg. Although, Congressman----
Mr. Poe. Just a second. I only have a few minutes.
I understand that. It is a world market. Crude oil is a
world market. They put more crude oil on the market, and then
whoever buys it buys it. It seems ironic to me.
The other question I have, is their cash. There has been a
discussion about how much money they are going to actually get,
from 50 billion to 150 billion. Hey, billions is billions to
me. However much money they get, what is to prohibit them from
using the cash they have to continue to be the world's largest
state sponsor of terrorism? What is to keep them from sending
money to their terrorist groups throughout the world to cause
havoc? Is there any prohibition in this agreement that
prohibits that from occurring?
Mr. Joseph. There is no prohibition at all on that. And in
fact, if you look at what the Supreme Leader said following
this negotiation, they are going to continue to support their
allies, like Assad, and their friends, like Hezbollah and
Hamas. They are going to continue to do this, and they are
going to continue to foment instability throughout the region.
They say they are going to do that with----
Mr. Poe. Okay. Last question. No, excuse me. I have to ask
the questions. Is not the best hope and policy of the United
States--should it not be that there should be a regime change
in Iran, a peaceful regime change, free elections, and that
would be the best, safest hope for the world and Iran is if
they had a regime change? Yes or no.
Mr. Dubowitz. This deal makes no sense unless that happens,
because you would never want to give the same hard men of Iran
and the Revolutionary Guards an industrial sized nuclear
program with near zero breakout and an I.C.B.M. So President
Obama is betting the future of American national security on
exactly that scenario, a peaceful transformation.
And if he gets it wrong, then the same hard men who rule
Iran will have an industrial sized program, near zero breakout,
an I.C.B.M. And not 100 billion, but hundreds and hundreds and
hundreds of billions of dollars that Iranians will get over the
lifetime of this agreement.
Mr. Joseph. This deal makes it more difficult for a regime
change. This deal strengthens the current regime, gives it more
tools to repress its people. And because it has a nuclear
option, it will feel less threatened by outside intervention
and more able to continue to repress its own people.
Mr. Poe. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We are going to go to the gentleman from
Jackson County, North Carolina, Mark Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank each of you for your time today. I guess I am the
last one up before closing remarks. And so I have watched all
of you. Mr. Goldenberg, would you say that, based on your non-
verbal and your verbal cues, that you are the smartest one at
that table?
Mr. Goldenberg. No.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. So if I have questions about the deal,
then who at that table should I ask, other than you? If you are
not the smartest one, who should I ask?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think you should ask all three of us. I
think three different people can have different perspectives on
a very difficult problem.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Well, let me--because I have some
sincere questions, and it sounds like you have talked to the
administration on this deal. Is that correct?
Mr. Goldenberg. I do talk to them occasionally.
Mr. Meadows. Occasionally. All right. So let me ask you, as
it relates to ballistic missiles and arms sales, that is a 5-
and 8-year, or vice versa, 8- and 5-year, respectively, kind of
caveat. Is that correct?
Mr. Goldenberg. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Well, so explain to me how the second
part of that paragraph says ``or until the date on which the
IAEA submits a report confirming a broader conclusion,
whichever is earlier.''
Mr. Goldenberg. I think----
Mr. Meadows. So could we have ballistic and arms sales a
year from now?
Mr. Goldenberg. If Iran goes above and--far above and
beyond what we expect and is committed to the deal in this
agreement, maybe the IAEA comes to that conclusion. I am highly
skeptical.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So your testimony--let me--because
this is headline-making right here. Your testimony is ballistic
arms sales and ballistic missile sales and arms sales could
happen a year from now if Iran goes above and beyond, and the
IAEA, not Congress, not the U.N., but the IAEA confirms that.
Is that your testimony?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think it is not physically possible for
Iran to do everything it would need to do to----
Mr. Meadows. But your testimony was--so you are changing
your testimony.
Mr. Goldenberg. I guess I phrased it differently, but I
would say that the likelihood of that is infinitesimal.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So what about 2 years?
Mr. Goldenberg. Still incredibly low.
Mr. Meadows. Three years?
Mr. Goldenberg. I think--honestly, I think that I don't
speak for the administration, and you should ask them about
this.
Mr. Meadows. No. You have been talking to them. You have
been speaking for a lot of people this morning. I have been
listening to you. So here is my question. Do the 8-year and 5-
year notes and timeframes really mean anything with that last
little sentence? Because it could happen earlier. Isn't that
correct? You are the smartest guy in the room now.
Mr. Goldenberg. I think----
Mr. Meadows. Could it happen earlier?
Mr. Goldenberg. I am happy----
Mr. Meadows. I am not asking for probabilities. Yes or no.
Could it happen earlier? Yes or no.
Mr. Goldenberg. Could.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Yes. So let me ask you another question,
because I am confused. I have heard Secretary Kerry sitting
almost exactly in your same place saying climate change is the
number one national security threat that we face. That is what
I have heard. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Goldenberg. Congressman, I am not an expert on climate
change.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me ask you a different
question. Why do you think the sale of coal to Iran from the
United States on a President who has talked about climate
change and has a war on coal, why do you think they would put
the sale of coal in this particular deal and selling to Iran?
Does that not seem odd to you?
Mr. Goldenberg. I am not familiar with that provision or
precisely how you----
Mr. Meadows. Well, I thought you read the deal.
Mr. Goldenberg. I absolutely read the deal.
Mr. Meadows. And so you didn't see that in there. I have.
Mr. Goldenberg. Okay.
Mr. Meadows. Do you trust me on that?
Mr. Goldenberg. Sure.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. All right. So let me ask you one last
question. Your testimony here today is that the Middle East and
Israel will be safer under this deal. Is that correct? Let me--
because there was a question here by Mr. Yoho and you said they
will be safer.
Mr. Goldenberg. I believe so.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. So let me ask you this question.
Reconcile this for me. If it is safer, why did this
administration immediately send someone to Israel to give them
and augment their military capability when we haven't done that
before? We immediately set out to help them. So if it was going
to be safer, why are we giving them more money for military is
Israel?
Mr. Goldenberg. Because we are partners. And they obviously
have anxieties about the agreement. I don't think people can
disagree about what the agreement actually says, or people can
disagree about whether it is a good agreement or not.
Obviously, we have disagreements with some of the political
leadership in Israel. There is also a lot of this----
Mr. Meadows. So we are going to give----
Mr. Goldenberg [continuing]. Security establishment in
Israel that if you talk to them has a much more nuanced
perspective, and some of them are anxious, some of them are
supportive, some of them are opposed, and so I think that it
is--one thing we can do is, when you do something that a friend
of yours clearly is not happy about it, you go try to find
other ways to reassure them and let them know we are still
there are for you for----
Mr. Meadows. Well, I thought you might say that, but the
only problem is Ashton Carter said that that is not the reason
he is doing it. There is quote out there that says, no, he is
not trying to appease them. So it is either one or the other.
And with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. I thank the members. We thank the
witnesses. We appreciate their appearance here this morning.
These are critical issues that have been raised, and we are
going to have an opportunity next week to further explore those
issues with our Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury,
and Secretary of Energy.
So, for now, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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