[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EGYPT TWO YEARS AFTER MORSI (PART I)
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-36
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
TOM EMMER, MinnesotaUntil 5/18/
15 deg.
DANIEL DONOVAN, New YorkAs
of 5/19/15 deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Eric Trager, Ph.D., Esther K. Wagner fellow, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 7
Mr. Samuel Tadros, senior fellow, Hudson Institute............... 13
Nancy Okail, Ph.D., executive director, Tahrir Institute for
Middle East Policy............................................. 20
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Eric Trager, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 10
Mr. Samuel Tadros: Prepared statement............................ 15
Nancy Okail, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 22
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 52
Hearing minutes.................................................. 53
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 54
EGYPT TWO YEARS AFTER MORSI (PART I)
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock
a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Mr. Deutch from
Florida for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses and your prepared
statements, without objection, will be made a part of the
record. And members may have 5 days to insert statements and
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in
the rules.
And the Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Egypt has always been of central importance to the Middle
East and the region's stability. It has also been a strategic
interest for the United States, our policy objectives in the
region, and our national security. The Suez Canal remains an
all-important waterway that serves as a strategic asset for
global trade and, just as importantly, the avenue which U.S.
warships can easily traverse between the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf.
Over the past 4 years, we have certainly seen Egypt undergo
drastic changes. As policymakers, we face one of the more
difficult challenges in Egypt, and today's hearing is entitled
Egypt: Two Years After Morsi, to examine the ever-changing
dynamics on the ground of that country.
Since the 2011 revolution, the change we had hoped to see
for Egypt has been slow to come, to say the least. For many of
us, myself included, we believe that human rights is a top
priority that must be taken into account as we formulate our
foreign policy objective. We want to see people living in free
democratic and open societies where everyone can practice,
without fear, their religion and where everyone is treated
equally and fairly.
In March of this year, an Egyptian court ruled that
parliamentary elections had to be postponed, marking a major
setback in Egypt's path to democracy. The authorities in Egypt
and different branches of government must work together to
ensure that the elections are scheduled as quickly as possible
and in accordance with Egyptian law.
It is important to note that elections for the sake of
elections are not the only requirement for a democracy. A
government must also govern democratically and respect the
rights of its citizens. But we also understand that there can
be no economic prosperity and no political stability without
safety and security. And right now Egypt faces threats from the
Sinai and along its border with Libya, and Cairo plays an
important role as a counterbalance to the Iranian regime's
hegemonic ambitions in the region.
Egypt has taken a very active role in the Sinai, which for
years has been ignored by Cairo, and is confronting the radical
terror groups, some affiliated with ISIL. Egypt has long been a
vital--Egypt has also been vital in cutting off and destroying
the tunnels in Gaza used by Hamas and has been working closely
with Israel to combat their shared threats.
Earlier this year, the administration decided to resume
weapons transfers to Egypt to help Cairo counter some of these
threats. In 2013, Mr. Connolly and I commissioned a three-phase
report from the Government Accountability Office to assess our
foreign assistance to Egypt. The GAO is currently conducting
this third phase, which will assess the security-related
assistance, and the timing could not be more important as we
resume these weapons sales.
It is in our national security interest to see that these
terror threats are eliminated and that Egypt remains a
strategic ally and continues to have a good working
relationship with Israel.
Recently, Egypt has taken moves that signal that it is
willing to move away from the U.S. toward a closer relationship
with Russia. Russia has agreed to build a nuclear powerplant in
Egypt, and the two have increased trade dramatically over the
past year, and Putin has vowed to increase Russian weapons
sales to Egypt.
We cannot afford to allow Putin to undermine our ties with
Egypt. It would be a serious blow to our national security
interests. But as friends, it is also important that we take
issue with Cairo's lack of progress on the domestic front. I
still remain deeply concerned over the fate of 43 NGO workers,
many of whom are American citizens who were convicted in
absentia in a sham politically motivated trial.
It would be a simple but important gesture for Sisi to
pardon these individuals and signal that he is willing to move
Egypt forward in a positive direction and could improve the
U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship.
We should also look to reexamine the controversial laws
against civil society, like the NGO law and the protest law. As
much as the Egyptian people appreciate safety, security, and
economic growth after the recent instability, they are also
seeking far-reaching changes to the political process and the
people's relationship with the state.
President Sisi should seize this opportunity to move
forward on long-needed democratic reforms, and the U.S. can
play an important role in that effort. What it boils down to is
finding the right balance between security and democracy, and
the United States must ensure that we leverage our assistance
to promote both simultaneously.
With that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member of
our subcommittee, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This hearing was
intended to give members of this subcommittee the opportunity
to take a broad look at the issues affecting Egypt today and
the U.S.-Egypt relationship.
I would like to take a moment to thank the chairman and my
colleague, Mr. Connolly, who have been extremely focused on
bringing justice to those 43 NGO workers who have still not
been pardoned, including our witness here today, Dr. Okail. We
must continue to press for this justice.
Since the overthrow of Mubarak, there have been differing
opinions on Capitol Hill as to how we should approach Egypt.
But I think we all agree that Egypt plays a critical role in a
very volatile region, and it is, and should continue to be, an
important partner of the United States.
We want to see Egypt succeed economically, and we want to
see long-term stability and safety. In 2011, the people of
Egypt bravely took to the streets to seek freedoms and rights
long denied under the autocratic rule of Mubarak. We were under
no illusions then that this transition would be easy. We could
not then, and we cannot now, expect Egyptian democracy to look
like ours overnight.
The subsequent election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012 was
significant, but it was Morsi's government who chose to jam
through a new constitution with exceptional executive
authority. It was Morsi's government that failed to make tough
economic choices, like reducing government subsidies to meet
IMF requirements that would put the country back on a path to
prosperity. And it was Morsi's government who restricted the
political space, cutting out those who sought to bring real
democratic values to Egypt.
So, in the summer of 2013, the people of Egypt again took
to the streets to protest the barely year-old government,
setting in motion the rise of the well-known military commander
General al-Sisi. After another year of transition and interim
government, the country held a second presidential election in
2 years, electing the long respected general.
For many, the election of President Sisi represented a
return to normalcy. The Sisi government seemed to understand
the need to return economic investment to Egypt and to
strengthen the country's regional ties. The Gulf States infused
Egypt with billions of dollars, with hopes of cementing the new
government as a stabilizing force.
A recent IMF review found that the Egyptian economy has
begun to grow, and I was pleased to see the successful results
of the economic investment confidence in March, which yielded
some $60 billion in investment pledges. I urge the government
to continue to take the tough steps needed to restore Egypt's
financial stability and to bring relief to the people.
Many of us here in Washington have also welcomed President
Sisi's commitment to security issues. The government has faced
a daunting challenge of policing the Sinai, which had become
virtually lawless in the years after Mubarak. President Sisi
made clear that he would continue close cooperation with
Israel's military to prevent terror groups from exploiting this
region. These efforts have come at great cost to the Egyptian
military, and we are grateful for them.
President Sisi has been committed to stopping Hamas from
building and using terror tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza.
The government has destroyed hundreds of tunnels, and in a
speech last week President Sisi estimated his forces have
destroyed 80 percent of these tunnels.
Egypt is also facing great challenges on its borders with
Sudan and Libya, as these countries become havens for terror
training and weapons transit. We all mourn the victims of the
gruesome attack on Egyptian Christians by ISIS affiliates in
Libya, and I, too, am greatly concerned about Libya's potential
to descend into greater chaos, but military action could
potentially provoke even greater internal instability.
Nevertheless, I agree with our Egyptian partners that the
international community must play a role in getting Libya back
on track, and I appreciate Egypt's close cooperation with its
neighbors as they seek to address regional threats as a
regional bloc. I believe the United States must continue to
support Egypt, and I support continued assistance.
But I am pleased to see our administration moving forward
with a rebalance of our aid relationship that will allow Egypt
to better address the most pressing threats and continue to
cooperate with the U.S. in significant areas like
counterterrorism. But like many friends of Egypt, I am
concerned about the erosion of civil society and human rights
in the name of security.
Regardless of who sits in power, the United States should
be delivering the same message to every government leader. And
the message is clear: Human rights matter. I am concerned that
too many restrictions have been placed on free expression. I am
concerned about the arrests of journalists and about religious
freedom, and I am concerned about laws that restrict the work
of civil society actors or prevent any form of peaceful
assembly.
There must be a way to balance necessary security measures
while protecting and enhancing the basic freedoms of the people
of Egypt. This includes fostering good governance, rule of law,
and routing out corruption and accountability for security
services and government actors. And I have to say I was
particularly dismayed this week to see media reports of rampant
sexual abuse by policy and security services.
I am also concerned about the impact of mass arrests and
the handing down of mass death sentences. I hope our witnesses
can speak to the message that this sends to society.
And I also hope to hear from our witnesses their thoughts
on the death sentence handed down on Monday to Morsi and how it
has been received by the Egyptian people. As I have said, I
believe in a strong Egypt and a strong U.S.-Egypt partnership.
I want to see Egypt move forward on a path to stability and
democracy, but even the closest of friends must be able to
share and work through concerns.
Today, I look to our witnesses to help us understand how we
can balance and strengthen this relationship and ensure a
successful future for all of the people of Egypt. And I yield
back.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
I am now pleased to yield to other members for their
opening statements. Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for holding this
hearing today. What happens in Egypt will determine the future
not only of the Middle East but of the world, and we need to
understand that. If Egypt falls under the control of the
radical Islamic forces that now threaten that region, what we
will have is the Gulf countries one by one will fall like
leaves from a tree as the whole dynamic of that region will
change.
Radical Islam will then thrust itself into Central Asia,
and within a short time we will have a monstrous threat to
Western civilization, a historic change, C change, that could
for many years turn--put us into a situation of danger and a
dark future. There is only person and one regime and one
government that stands in the way of that, and that is
President al-Sisi of Egypt. We owe him and the people of Egypt
our utmost support to prevent this horrible scenario for the
rest of the world and the rest of that region.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Timely hearing and
glad we were able to collaborate on a report in terms of the
status of U.S. aid. The fact of the matter is, a coup occurred
in Egypt, and the United States Government has yet formally to
acknowledge that because of the consequences under the law.
The military alliance with Egypt is a very important one,
and I understand putting a certain primacy on that, but we have
paid a price for it. So have the Egyptian people, with respect
to rule of law, with respect to civic engagement, with respect
to the need to create political space.
As the current Egyptian government moves forward, hopefully
we can make progress in all of these areas. If we don't, the
crackdown that has occurred is going to lead to a backlash that
will lead us we don't know where, but certainly we won't like
it, and it probably will have consequences far beyond the
current consequences of the military government.
So I am looking forward to hearing the testimony today and
where we are in terms of these areas with the current Egyptian
government.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you each for
your testimony here today. We look forward to hearing it. I
apologize, I am going to have to step out, back and forth, but
we are monitoring this. I think it is critical that we are here
today making great progress.
Ambassador Tawfik is a good friend here, and I consider him
a personal friend. In both the good and the bad times we have
talked about the progress that is being made in Egypt. It is
imperative that the American people know that we stand by the
Egyptians wanting to govern Egypt, and it is not America
wanting to impose its values on Egypt, but it is also critical
that Egypt stands so strong in a very tough neighborhood to
really add that stability.
And so I look forward to hearing your testimony, look
forward to working with the Egyptian people in bringing not
only the rule of law back front and center but certainly
investments from the United States to continue to flow back to
Egypt.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member, for
calling this very timely hearing on Egypt after Morsi. And
thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
My view is that the post-Morsi description only gets at
part of the equation in Egypt. The Egyptian people have
experienced an incredible amount of disruption, chaos, and
change over the past 4 years. They are living in a post-
Mubarak, post-Revolutionary, and post-Morsi era. And today they
are living under a regime that is perhaps most aptly described
as Mubarak 2.0, turning to oppression in the name of security.
However, there are some significant differences between the
landscape now and Egypt under Mubarak. Waves of unrest have
left the Middle East in utter chaos, have increased terrorist
attacks and flow of refugees in Egypt. The United States has
watched as two successive governments were toppled and is now
reevaluating some of its longstanding policies toward the
Egyptian government.
But most importantly the Egyptian people have seen what
they can do. They have experienced what they can achieve when
they stand together in support of human rights and democratic
freedoms against a tyrannical regime. And I think the question
we need to ask is whether the Egyptian people who have won and
lost so much over the past 4 years are willing to live under a
regime that resorts to the same old tactics of intimidation,
repression, and violence against their own people in the name
of security.
I think ultimately they are not, and that our policies
toward Egypt need to reflect not just a security relationship,
which is vitally important, but also the reality that the model
of supporting an autocratic regime is inherently unstable in
the long term.
We absolutely must push the al-Sisi regime to enact
democratic reforms and respectful fundamental human rights, and
I fear that Egypt will find itself once again in the midst of
volatile leadership change if we do not.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Trott.
Mr. Trott. I want to thank the chairwoman and Ranking
Member for holding this timely and critical hearing. And to the
witnesses, thank you for taking your time to share your insight
on the state of Egypt.
I am from southeast Michigan, and I am proud to represent a
large and vibrant Coptic community. It is a church with a long
history, but it often seems that their interests and concerns
since the 2011 uprising have gone unnoticed, if not completely
ignored. While the Copts have been largely in peril since St.
Mark brought Christianity to Egypt over 2,000 years ago, the
2011 revolution brought renewed hopes of freedom, tolerance,
and more prominent participation in public life.
As we have seen through various governments that have each
had control over Egypt since Mubarak's downfall, the Copts
continue to be marginalized or used as a political tool.
Sectarian conflicts in rural areas often lead to government-
controlled reconciliation sessions, which tend to leave the
victims with no justice and the defendant with no more than a
slap on the wrist.
Under Morsi's regime, the Copts were subject to blatant
sectarian rhetoric, inaction by state security, and even an
attack by state security forces on the Coptic Cathedral.
Subsequently, after Morsi's overthrow, there was what only can
be described as unprecedented coordinated attacks on numerous
Coptic Christian institutions. In what could only be viewed as
a series of positive developments, President Sisi promised to
repair and rebuild numerous Coptic churches and recently called
for a religious revolution.
Today, I look forward to hearing from my colleagues and the
esteemed witnesses on how the Copts are faring under President
Sisi and the current state of U.S.-Egypt relations.
Thank you for your time today.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent statements from all members,
and now we would like to introduce our panelists.
First, we welcome Dr. Eric Trager, who is currently the
Esther K. Wagner fellow at The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. Dr. Trager is an expert on Egyptian politics and
has taught at the University of Michigan--Go Blue--and at the
University of Pennsylvania.
Welcome, Dr. Trager.
Second, we welcome Mr. Samuel Tadros, who is a senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom.
Previously, he was a senior partner at the Egyptian Union of
Liberal Youth and a lecturer at the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
Welcome.
And last, but certainly not least, we welcome Dr. Nancy
Okail. Dr. Okail is the executive director of the Tahrir
Institute for Middle East Policy and has 12 years' experience
promoting democracy and development in the Middle East and
North Africa. And, as we have heard, she is quite active in
promoting peace and democracy in Egypt.
Prior to joining the Tahrir Institute, she served as the
director of the Egypt program at Freedom House and is one of
the 43 defendants convicted and sentenced to prison in the
political trial of the NGO workers in Egypt.
So we welcome you as well, Doctor.
And we will begin with you, Dr. Trager.
STATEMENT OF ERIC TRAGER, PH.D., ESTHER K. WAGNER FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Trager. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, it is a
privilege to be here again before this subcommittee and to sit
on this very distinguished panel.
Nearly 2 years ago, on June 30, 2013, unprecedented
millions of protestors turned out across Egypt to demand
President Mohamed Morsi's ouster. While Morsi, a Muslim
Brotherhood leader, narrowly won the June 2012 presidential
elections, he rapidly lost support. Morsi's assertion of total
power through a November 2012 edict alienated a substantial
cross-section of the Egyptian public, igniting demonstrations
that continued for months.
Then, as the economy plummeted and the tide of popular
opinion shifted further against Morsi, Egypt's state
institutions mutinied. As a result, the Egyptian state was on
the brink of collapse. Meanwhile, rather than offering a
political compromise, the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized
thousands of its cadres to defend Morsi's presidency, and
indicated that it would use violence if necessary.
This is the context in which Egypt's military, led by then
Defense Minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi removed Morsi from power.
Egypt was on the verge of severe civil strife, if not civil
war, and many Egyptians feared that their country was headed
the way of Syria or Libya, yet the manner of Morsi's ouster had
significant consequences for Egypt's democratic prospects. By
toppling Morsi, the Egyptian military locked itself in a ``kill
or be killed'' struggle with the Brotherhood.
The generals believe that they must destroy the Brotherhood
or risk the Brotherhood remobilizing and seeking vengeance. And
this fear is hardly theoretical; the Brotherhood openly calls
for President Sisi's death; and it released a statement in
January calling for jihad and martyrdom in fighting the regime.
As a result, the post-Morsi period is perhaps the most
brutal in Egypt's contemporary history. Over 2,500 people have
been killed, and over 16,000 have been detained. These
developments are quite dispiriting for those who hope that the
Arab Springs represented the dawn of a more democratic era in
the Arab world.
But at the same time, Washington should be realistic. It
cannot influence Egypt in a more democratic direction, so long
as the government and the Muslim Brotherhood are locked in an
existential struggle with each other.
To be sure, the administration has tried to influence
Egypt's political trajectory. In October 2013, the
administration withheld most of the $1.3 billion in annual
military aid to Egypt ``pending credible progress toward an
inclusive, democratically elected civilian government.'' This
was a lose-lose proposition. Withholding military aid had no
impact on Egypt's authoritarianism. And at the same time, it
soured the strategic relationship between Washington and Cairo
in ways that have been mentioned earlier today.
For this reason, the administration reversed its policy in
March and resumed the aid. It is not in Washington's interest
to have tense relations with Cairo. After all, Egypt is an
important strategic partner. It coordinates with Washington a
wide range of regional activities and has maintained a peace
treaty with Israel since 1979. Washington relies on Egypt to
grant preferred access to the Suez Canal and overflight rights
to equip U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf, and to
support the current efforts against ISIS.
President Sisi is also far more aligned with U.S. interest
than Morsi. First, Egypt is once again a strategic partner
against Iran. Whereas Morsi was the first Egyptian President to
visit Tehran since 1979, President Sisi has deployed the
Egyptian Navy against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and
expelled the Iranian Ambassador.
As the administration seeks a nuclear arrangement with
Iran, strengthening the U.S.-Egypt relationship can help
reassure Washington's allies in the Persian Gulf.
Second, Egypt is now aggressively battling jihadists in the
Sinai. After refusing to act for many years, the Egyptian
military launched a major operation in September 2013 against
the jihadists, some of whom now affiliate with ISIS.
Third, Egypt's relationship with Israel has never been
stronger. Whereas, Morsi refused to establish a channel between
his presidential office and the Israeli government, President
Sisi communicates openly and directly with his Israeli
counterpart. There is also unprecedented Egyptian-Israeli
coordination on the Sinai.
Fourth, Egypt is now constraining rather than aiding Hamas,
which is a U.S. designated terrorist organization. Indeed,
whereas Morsi welcomed Hamas officials to the Presidential
Palace in Cairo, the Sisi government has shut down Hamas' Cairo
suburban headquarters.
In closing, the proper policy toward Egypt is for
Washington to cooperate with Cairo on regional strategy but not
condone its repressiveness. If Washington doesn't draw this
distinction, if it instead conditions its relationship with
Cairo on its progress toward democracy, the strategic
relationship will suffer without any positive impact on Egypt's
domestic politics.
Thank you for listening.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trager follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Tadros.
STATEMENT OF MR. SAMUEL TADROS, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Mr. Tadros. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding
this important hearing and for inviting me to testify today.
For the past 4\1/2\ years, and after decades of political
stagnation, the foundations of the political order in Egypt
were shaken to their core as the country's citizens struggled
with questions of democracy, the rule of law, and the country's
identity.
In June 2013, following popular protests, the military
removed President Morsi from power, promising the Egyptian
people not only to bring about stability and security but also
equal citizenship and prosperity. Those hopes are today on the
shoulder of President Sisi following his elections.
While Egypt faces numerous challenges--security, economic,
and political--I will limit--or I will focus in my testimony on
religious freedom questions on the rule of law. I would be
happy to address other aspects of Egypt's challenges in the
Q&A.
On the 26 of March 2015, a mob gathered in the village of
El Galaa in Minya governorate and began attacking Christian
homes and shops. The mob was incensed that Christians had
received a permit to build a church in the village. Instead of
protecting the Christians from that attack, the security forces
allowed the attack to take place and, after the attack was
concluded, held a reconciliation session between the elders of
both communities to see how the situation can be calmed.
The result was a number of demands by the mob. The church
that was to be built would have no dome, no cross, no tower, no
bell, and its entrance was to be on a side street, i.e. it
should have no outer manifestation of Christianity. The
security forces forced Copts to accept those demands in order
for the church to be built, despite Copts having the necessary
permits for their church.
The mob then continued its attack, demanding further that
the Copts who had spread news of the attack in the local and
international press would publish an apology for those
attacking them for tarnishing the image of the village Muslim
residents. Again, those attacks went unpunished, with the
regime arresting an equal number from those attacked and
attacking in order to hold the reconciliation session, again to
force reconciliation between them without implementation of the
rule of law.
Until today this church has not been built. This is
unfortunately not an isolated incident. Similar incidents have
taken place in the village of Al Our, which represents where 13
of those Copts that were beheaded by ISIS in Libya come from.
While President Sisi promised to build a church in that
village, after protests by the residents in that village the
location of that church was to be moved to the outskirts of the
village instead of inside.
Similarly, we have seen the continuation of blasphemy
accusations and trials under President Sisi. Those have
included a number of Christians, Shiites that have been
arrested for simply praying, or for the possession of Shiite
books. That is considered a crime that has led to 6 months for
a Shiite person in prison.
Similarly, atheists have received sentences from 1 to 3
years for simply posting their views and their beliefs on
Facebook. Despite the Egyptian government undertaking a number
of symbolic steps toward religious freedom, including President
Sisi's call for a religious revolution, and his visit to the
Coptic Cathedral, it has failed to implement the rule of law,
protect the country's most vulnerable citizens from those
attacks taking place.
The basis of the Egyptian-American relationship has been,
since 1974 following former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger's visit, that Egypt would become a regional player in
the sight of the United States, that it would play a leading
role in the peace process, in leading the whole region to peace
with Israel, and to stability and prosperity.
For the past 30 years, that relationship has held. Egypt,
despite disagreements with the United States, plays an
important role in the peace process, in the defeat of Saddam's
invasion of Kuwait, and in a host of other issues. Yet the
Egypt of today is no longer the Egypt of the past. Egypt is no
longer a regional player that can lead the region to anything,
but instead is a play field itself, with a host of
international, local, and regional powers competing for the
country's future trajectory.
The United States needs to base its relationship with Egypt
not on the dreams of an Egypt that no longer exists, but
instead on the reality that no one wants an Egypt that looks
like Somalia, no one wants a Somalia on the Nile, no one wants
a Libya bordering Israel, and no one wants a Syria in control
of the Suez Canal.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tadros follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Dr. Okail.
STATEMENT OF NANCY OKAIL, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TAHRIR
INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY
Ms. Okail. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for holding this
timely hearing. It is an honor to be here.
Over the past 4 years, Egypt has experienced several waves
of instability that have prevented tangible reforms.
Unfortunately, in the minds of many, the situation reinforced a
false dichotomy between security and economic stability on one
hand and democracy and human rights on the other hand.
This also enhanced the view that foreign policy toward
Egypt can be viewed in isolation from its domestic affairs. I
would like to take this opportunity to clarify the current
situation in Egypt and how the U.S. can provide effective
support to address it.
We must acknowledge the necessity of the recent U.S.
decision to overhaul its aid relationship with Egypt in a way
that more appropriately focuses on security and terrorism.
However, any assistance provided for these purposes must have
rights and good governance as its cornerstone. Otherwise,
policies are neither effective nor sustainable.
In 2012, Egypt saw 41 attacks of terror. This year alone,
the number has already surpassed 500 attacks. These acts target
police, judges, businesses, and increasingly civilians. Some of
these acts occur because of domestic motivations, and others
are linked to transnational extremism.
In November 2014, a domestic terror group in Sinai, Ansar
Bayt al-Maqdis, was welcomed by Islamic State leader Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi as a new province in the so-called Islamic State.
In the Western desert region, Egypt's porous border with Libya
has caused significant security problems for the country,
allowing free flows of arms and in some cases militants in and
out of Egypt.
Terror groups continue to successfully expand online,
spreading their propaganda and recruiting new members. Many
Egyptians have traveled to fight under the Islamic State than
are in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and it is unknown how many have
returned home.
Evidently, terror threats are on the rise and require all
supports from Egypt's partners. However, the current approach
of sweeping arrests, large-scale military campaigns in Sinai,
and restrictions on rights and freedom, will not be effective
in identifying the actual threats. Physical and cyber threats
should not prompt policies of increased surveillance and
restrictions of freedom of expression, but, rather, require
more open and alternative secular narratives to those of the
extremist groups.
Stability cannot occur without accountability and security
sector reform. Pervasive evidence of torture, expedited trials,
and mass sentencing impede the ability of effective
investigation and prosecute legitimate terrorism. Egypt should
repeal repressive laws and encourage legal training that will
fairly consider the rights of all to due process.
Currently, the political space is highly restricted. Egypt
has been functioning for long without an elected legislature,
and still no date has yet been set for the parliamentary
elections. If the political and public spheres remain closed,
people will have no channel for peaceful engagement, and those
with grievances will have no recourse, or only violent
resource, to communicate their messages.
The current controversial demonstration law severely
restricts Egypt's rights to peaceful assembly. Among those who
have been arrested under the law are prominent activists and
peaceful human rights defenders, including Alaa Abdel Fattah,
Ahmed Maher Douma, Yara Sallam, Sanaa Seif. All those committed
to transparency and democracy and detained under these laws
must be released.
Egyptian civil society remains under threat. As you may
know, I and 42 and other received sentences of 1 to 5 years in
prison for our work promoting democracy. Since this time
proposed drafts for the NGO law have become more restrictive,
many Egyptians are now in the same position as I am, living in
exile, separated from our families, and unable to go back to
our country without fear of serving years in prison. Such
intimidation must stop, and the laws must be amended to civil
society actors to engage in their important work and receive
necessary support from international counterparts.
By recognizing that there can be no security without
rights, and no safety without democratic development, the
United States has a unique opportunity to support Egypt in
restoring its stability in an effective and sustainable way.
Specific recommendations for Congress could be found in my
written testimony.
Thank you so much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Okail follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you to all of
our panelists for their great testimony.
Egypt is strategically important for the stability of the
region, for helping to contain Iran's push for regional
dominance, and for helping counter the terror threats that are
coming from Sinai and Libya.
However, many Egyptians have viewed the United States
negatively since they see the Obama administration as having
supported Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. During the 1\1/2\
years when the administration remained on the fence about what
to do with its Egypt policy, Cairo received billions from its
Gulf allies and signed massive arms deals with Russia and with
France.
So, Dr. Trager, what does this mean for our relationship
and our leverage with Cairo? What does it mean for our long-
term national security interests if Egypt and others move away
from the United States toward Russia and toward other
countries? And as we have heard, terror attacks have increased
rapidly in Egypt in the past 2 years. To what do you attribute
this rise? And how can Cairo improve its counterterrorism
operations? And who are the groups? What are their goals?
Mr. Trager. So our leverage with Cairo, as it pertains to
shaping their domestic politics I think is very, very limited
due to the domestic struggle within that country, the ``kill or
be killed'' dynamic that has really defined the politics of the
post-Morsi era.
And when we tried to shape that by withholding military aid
or much of the military aid, as you said, you know, Egypt
gravitated toward Russia, signed a preliminary arms deal with
Russia, $3.5 billion. It also signed, I believe, a $5.4 billion
deal with France. And that suggests that, you know, this idea
within Washington that Egypt won't have other options, needs
us, and will, therefore, respond to U.S. pressure as it
pertains to its domestic political situation, just isn't true.
And I think we should learn from the experience of the
previous 2 years in which we tried to use the military aid as a
stick, and, you know, Egypt simply went a different direction.
And for sure if Egypt gravitates more toward Russia, or
gravitates toward other--you know, other powers for its
military aid, that will make it even more difficult for the
United States to shape what it has to shape, which is Egypt's
foreign relations and Egypt's external policies.
Now, the rise in terrorism within Egypt, especially since
Morsi's ouster, I think is attributable to many different
things. First of all, Morsi took a pretty light hand in the
Sinai, and the theory of the Muslim Brotherhood was that by
winning power through elections and working to implement the
sharia, which is the Brotherhood's long-term goal, they would
convince Sinai jihadis to lay down their arms and adopt the
Muslim Brotherhood's path to power.
And in former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's memoirs,
she recounts a conversation with President Morsi in which he
said that basically there would be no Sinai attacks under an
Islamist president, which clearly was not true. So part of it
is the light hand that Morsi took in the Sinai, and the fact
that after Morsi was ousted the jihadis feared the return of
the security state to Sinai, and then there was an uptick in
violence that spread west across the Suez Canal, with major
attacks in some of the major Egyptian cities, particularly a
massive attack in Mansura, I believe in December 2013.
The other aspect of the recent attacks seems to be the role
of Muslim Brotherhood youths in slowly gravitating toward a
more aggressive posture vis-a-vis the regime. These tend to not
be the mass-scale attacks. They tend to be IED attacks, attacks
on infrastructure, attacks on police stations.
It does not seem to me that the Brotherhood has made that
decision to attack civilians, and there is actually a very
interesting paper written by the former vice chair of the
Muslim Brotherhood's political party to this effect that I
would be happy to share with the committee.
Now, I need to hedge a little bit and say that we don't
have iron-clad proof that this is the Muslim Brotherhood, or
these are Muslim Brothers. The evidence is circumstantial, but
is reflected in Facebook postings and in various interviews
that I have had since Morsi's ouster. And the unfortunate thing
is, if it is the case, as I frankly believe it is, that the
Muslim Brotherhood is involved in these sort of low profile
attacks, that is going to be very hard for the current regime
to reverse in sort of a negotiated way, because the conflict
between the current government and the Brotherhood is
existential. There is really no room for compromise between the
two. So, you know, my expectation is that Egypt is going to
have a very difficult path moving forward.
And just one final point that the ultimate effect of these
attacks, and the ultimate effect of the declining security
situation, seems to reinforce support for Sisi. And this
repressiveness that we have been discussing today, you know,
has some significant societal support as a result of both the
local context and the regional context.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And, Dr. Okail, as we know, Egypt has constitutional,
international obligations to hold parliamentary elections,
which you were talking about, and you pointed out they have
been postponed, they have been delayed for too long now. And
last month Sisi declared that these elections would not happen
before Ramadan, which begins next month, so another delay.
You point out that these elections could open the political
space for all, but they are--and there are now some beginning
steps of political actors who emerged after the 2011
revolution, but they are running out of resources. What
indications do we have now that there are political groups and
players who can organize, who have the capability to not only
win an election and form parties but to govern effectively and
in a manner that would be free and fair and representative of
all the needs of the Egyptian people?
Ms. Okail. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I do believe that
there are actually new players in the political field in Egypt.
And there are several political parties that started to be, I
mean, organized and shaped after the revolution. However, as
you rightly point out, they are running out of resources, and
they are being restricted.
The elections would allow this opportunity of the people to
be encouraged to actually engage in a real--I mean, channels
into political participation. However, we must look at the
overall environment. In order for these political parties to
campaign freely, to actually voice their own agendas and their
programs and their aspirations for Egypt, they have to have an
ability to voice their demands through peaceful channels, like,
for example, having a free media, which is currently suffering
a lot of restrictions.
At the same time, we should have also independent
organizations that would monitor and oversee these processes,
which is basically civil society organizations who are
currently under restriction because of the current NGO law. And
the draft that has been proposed for these organizations to
function under a new law has been equally restrictive.
In addition, there was also a new amendment in the penal
code that would penalize and criminalize anyone who would
receive funding from foreign sources that would--using language
that is very loose and just threatens national security,
without saying or identifying what would be actually determined
and identified as a threat to national security.
All of this put all the players, whether the political
actors, the political parties as organized entities, and also
analysts and media and civil society actors, under threat and
in limbo, and acting under intimidation, which would not be
conducive for real environment for an effective elections.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch is recognized for his questions.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I would throw this out to the panel. Mr. Tadros, you made
yourself clear that you don't believe that at this point, if I
understood you correctly, that Egypt can be a leader in the
Arab world. To the contrary, I think is how you explained it.
I would just like the panel to look out over the next year
or 2 and tell us where you think things are going. We speak
in--you know, we focus on different silos and security issues,
on human rights issues and civil society. But they are all--
they all ultimately impact not just the people of Egypt, but
they impact the ability of Egypt to be a leader in the Arab
world. They impact the relationship between Egypt and the
United States.
So what will things look like a year or 2 out? And to what
extent does there necessarily need to be progress on all of
these areas for Egypt to be a leader in the Arab world, and do
we need to see the same advances for the relationship between
Egypt and the United States to be strengthened?
Mr. Tadros. I am indeed making the case that the Egypt with
which Dr. Kissinger forged a lasting relationship with the
United States is no longer there. The Egypt that was ruled by
President Anwar Sadat in 1974 when he first met with Dr.
Kissinger was an Egypt that was the cultural leader of the Arab
world, that its influence ranged from Morocco to Iraq. It could
influence the decisions of the regimes there and lead the
region into something.
That is no longer the case. Egypt has deteriorated
throughout the past 30 years dramatically on all fronts,
whether--it is not only the political stagnation of the Mubarak
regime, but it also declined in the role that it played in the
regional affairs, surpassed by countries like Qatar and Saudi
Arabia, now by the UAE. Others have come up and played that
role in the region, leading it with various directions.
The current situation in Egypt is an Egypt that is divided.
It is divided along political lines. There is a fight for the
soul of Egypt, and a country that is being torn apart between
two groups is hardly one capable of projecting power or
influence abroad.
The Egyptian--oh, Egypt is today dependent on Gulf
countries for economic support for feeding the Egyptian people
themselves. It needs those countries' support. It follows Gulf
policies in the situation in Yemen and others. It needs the UAE
in order to be involved in this situation in Libya. It has no
ties to Hamas or the one representative or one group within
Palestine.
Historically, the Egyptian regime has been able to play the
role of peacemaker between Israel and between Hamas and other
terrorist organizations in Gaza. Nowadays, that is no longer
possible. Egypt is no longer able to be the peacemaker between
them. So on all fronts, I think the ability of Egypt to project
power abroad has decreased.
Mr. Deutch. But, Dr. Trager, there is an argument to be
made, isn't there, that in facing the regional security
threats, Egypt is playing a more assertive role. How can--when
Mr. Tadros talks about the fight for the soul of Egypt, how
does the ``kill or be killed'' struggle that you describe
influence all of the other decisionmaking? And can Egypt move--
does that ``kill or be killed'' struggle continue until there
is a clear victor? Or have we already reached that point and we
are seeing that in the actions that Egypt has been taking on
regional security?
Mr. Trager. Well, look, I mean, I think the ``kill or be
killed'' struggle really refers to the domestic political
situation. Sitting here 6,000 miles away, my sense, and perhaps
your sense as well, is that it has been settled. I mean, you
know, President Sisi has for the most part, and the government,
vanquished the Muslim Brotherhood.
But the fact that you have the rise in IED attacks, the
fact that you have the Muslim Brotherhood's official language
toward the regime becoming much more violent, talking about
martyrdom and jihad, I think means that that struggle is going
to continue. And it is going to be very hard to move or
encourage the domestic politics to move in a more positive
direction.
Now, how that hinges on the regional level, it means that
Egypt is going to be more aggressive, and President Sisi has
spoken about this, against radical Islamic groups, particularly
jihadis. The Egyptian role in Yemen, though, is slightly
different. There Egypt is trying to protect Bab-el-Mandeb,
which is the strait that leads to the Red Sea that leads to the
Suez Canal. The Suez Canal is a major source of revenue for
Egypt.
So, you know, for now the Egyptian operation there is
limited, and I suspect that Egypt will actually play a slightly
more conservative role, certainly a more active role in the
region than previous governments. But because of the--you know,
but a more conservative role than we would expect. It is
focusing primarily on strait access in Bab-el-Mandeb, and it is
focusing on countering jihadis from Libya.
I don't personally expect Egypt to send ground troops into
Yemen. They may send, you know, to Saudi Arabia to protect the
border, but I--you know, maybe I will be proven wrong here, but
I don't think that we are going to see a significant Egyptian
military role beyond those kind of more narrow interests.
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Okail, I am out of time, but I hope as we
go forward you will have a chance to talk about the extent to
which Egypt will or will not be able to exert a greater role in
the region while some of the domestic issues continue to be
hashed out. But for now, I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And,
again, thank you for holding this hearing today and drawing our
attention to a country and a struggle that is vital not only to
that country but in the long run to the rest of that region and
to the world and to the people of the United States.
I believe it is just that historic an event that we are
looking at that if we do not do what is right could lead to a
historic catastrophe in the sense of the instability and the
bloodshed that it could create on a global scale. Because if
Egypt--as I mentioned earlier, if Egypt falls to radical Islam,
the other countries in the Gulf, with their enormous wealth and
power, would be transferred to a radical Islamic goal, which
would be a catastrophe for our country and for the Western
civilization and for the people of that region.
So I say Egypt is now playing a positive role, even though
it is less of a role, in that region because it is taking care
of their business at home. Are we being as supportive as we
should be to President al-Sisi in his efforts to, number one,
create a stable Egypt, and, number two, make sure that Egypt
has the weapons and the equipment necessary to play a positive
role in that region?
Now, could I have a short answer from each of the witnesses
on that?
Mr. Trager. Well, thank you very much. I mean, I think that
we could be doing more in terms of, you know, expressing our
partnership with Egypt on certain strategic issues. I think in
terms of validating the domestic political trajectory that
should be a bridge too far for us. You know, we have reasonable
concerns about the political trajectory there, the repression.
There are very reasonable concerns about whether that will, you
know, actually help the situation.
I do think we have a very limited ability to shape that, so
I would urge Congress to urge the administration to move
forward with the strategic dialogue with Egypt to get the aid
and military-to-military relationship back on track.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me note from that answer, President
al-Sisi has not received the weapons that he was expected. He
just recently obtained some helicopters from the United States
and find out that they did not have the defensive measures on
the helicopters that were necessary for them to be used to
thwart a radical Islamic insurgency or some kind of an attack
out in the Libyan end of their country.
That is disgraceful on our part, Madam Chairman, to give
weapons systems that they can't even use. It is a slap in his
face. As well as the spare parts for the tanks that his country
needs, if there is a problem in--especially out in the Libyan
end of his country, this is outrageous.
And the fact that the Russians have come in and given al-
Sisi some support, here is where I disagree with my colleagues,
I think that is a good thing that the Russians are helping
President al-Sisi, and I think that we should take that into
consideration on how we judge Russia instead of considering it
always the enemy of the United States.
Sir, would you like to answer the first question about, are
we playing the supportive role we should be?
Mr. Tadros. Certainly. As the Congressman has mentioned,
Egypt is important, not because it will play a regional role,
but because the fate of Egypt should be a concern to the United
States, a country of 19 million people, a country that borders
Israel, that is in control of the Suez Canal. For all those
reasons, the U.S. needs to be actively involved in investing in
Egypt's future, making sure that Egypt does not fall to the
same regional upheaval that has taken so many countries there.
But this is not only limited to military investment in
Egypt's future, bolstering its military capabilities against
the security threat, but also investing in Egypt's development,
in Egypt's other challenges, in Egypt's rule of law, in
building Egyptian institutions that are representatives of
their citizens, that are welcomed by their citizens, that is a
venue for their citizens to bring about their concerns to their
leadership in order for that country not to collapse the same
way as other countries have.
Unfortunately, the United States has not been doing that.
For so long, the administration has been tied to this question
of, was it a coup or was it not a coup? What do we do with the
military aid? And has forgotten about the other aspects of the
relationship, that it is not only about the military aid but
about other things as well.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Very good answer. Could we have a quick
answer, Madam Chairman, with indulgence, could our last
witness--have her comment on that?
Ms. Okail. Thank you. I think one issue to clarify right
here is that so far the conversation is limited to government-
to-government relationship. However, as President Obama
mentioned in his speech after the Egyptian uprising and said,
it is time to stand on the right side of history and side with
the people. This has not translated into actual policies,
because right now it is confined between military-to-military
relationship, without actual engagement with the Egyptian
people.
And this is--Madam Chairman, answers your question about
the reputation of the United States within the--and the
sentiments of the Egyptian people because they did not actually
feel that there is real engagement. And this can only happen
and translate into actual policies when there are support and
finances and resources that are channeled toward the civil
society organizations that represent the people.
The other point, just to say very briefly, that with the
changing leadership in Egypt in terms of the personality of the
president, there are beyond that inherent structural challenges
for the Egyptian state itself. The institutions that actually
suffered under Mubarak have not actually undergone real
structural reforms, and I am speaking here about the police,
the security sector, and the judiciary itself. And it has, as
we have seen, the same even particular people who are drafting
the laws under Mubarak are the same people who were drafting
the laws under Morsi and until today, and this needs to change
to actually lead to real structural change and development.
Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Dr. Trager, I mentioned sort of three areas it seems to me
we need to be concerned about with respect to Egypt. But
backing up just a little bit, you indicated, and, as you may
know, our State Department has said that the Muslim
Brotherhood, led by Morsi, won a free and fair election.
Now, if the United States is going to have credibility in
the region in encouraging others to move toward a democratic
form of government, our tacit support for military overthrow of
a duly elected government, albeit one we felt was on the wrong
track, and guilty of some serious missteps with respect to
writing a constitution protecting minority rights, and the
like, nonetheless, doesn't that sort of damage our credibility
in the region as we try to encourage others to move in a
democratic path?
Mr. Trager. Thank you for your question. I would argue that
the credibility of democracy in the region, unfortunately,
doesn't rest on our statements and our policies. It, frankly,
rests on the performance of those who are elected. And Morsi's
failure in power, the fact that he used an election to grab
more power through an edict, that he rammed through a very
controversial Islamist constitution, that he failed
economically, that the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized its cadres
to attack protesters, that he tried to crack down on media, and
if the country was really sliding into an abyss--and, frankly,
still has many, many challenges--I would argue that all of
those things significantly undermined, you know, the
credibility of democracy within Egypt. And it is very hard for
us to rescue that from there.
And I say that, by the way, very sadly, but----
Mr. Connolly. Would you cite the current military
government, albeit elected, as the alternative? I mean, is that
a paragon of democratic virtue in the region?
Mr. Trager. I am certainly not arguing that it is.
Mr. Connolly. Do you believe that the current government is
committed to the rule of law?
Mr. Trager. I think that there are major challenges
regarding the rule of law. I think the current government is
faced with significant institutional challenges, and the power
struggle that has, frankly, defined Egypt's post-Mubarak
trajectory since 2011 is still playing out, and we see that
today in tensions between the presidency and the Interior
Ministry and the power of the judiciary. I mean, this is still
a regime that is defining itself.
I agree with you very much that the trajectory is not
democratic. All that I am arguing is our capacity to shape that
is almost nonexistent.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. One of the things I think we should have
learned from the overthrow of the Shah of Iran is that when you
don't allow the creation of political space, then you can't be
surprised at the rise of an element we don't like, because--and
in the case of Egypt, years of repression of the political
space it seems to me made the Muslim Brotherhood the only
alternative to the regime, and nothing in between particularly.
And that is why they won the election.
And it seems to me that the current military government, in
going all out in this existential battle for survival you
referred to, may unwittingly exacerbate the situation we are
concerned about by not allowing political space. Even NGOs not
allowed to function and being pilloried and persecuted for
democratic expression of ideals.
Your comment on that.
Mr. Trager. Well, that is clearly, you know, very possible.
And it is true that, look, we should be deeply concerned about
Egypt's domestic trajectory, and we should be communicating
that very, very clearly. I think that the Secretary of State
made a huge mistake when he said that Egypt is on a transition
toward democracy. That is just not accurate.
But at the same time, I think we have to be conservative in
what we can expect from Egypt under the current circumstances
of a great deal of violence domestically, a deteriorating
regional situation. And, moreover, we should acknowledge the
fact of the past 4\1/2\ years, which is that political change
comes from many different, you know, sources, but the ultimate
decider, for lack of a better word, of that change is the
military, and that has been for, you know, over 40 years our
partner in Egypt.
Mr. Connolly. If the chair would allow just Mr. Tadros or
Dr. Okail to also respond to that.
Mr. Tadros. I would be happy to. We certainly cannot
influence--the United States cannot influence Egypt's
relationship or the Egyptian regime's relationship with the
Muslim Brotherhood. It can, however, influence other aspects
that are not life and death issues through the Egyptian regime.
So the fate of former President Morsi is one issue where we
cannot comment on or affect, because simply President Sisi
realizes that if the Brotherhood ever took power again, it is
his life that will be there. He will be the one hanged.
There are many other issues on the domestic front where the
United States, partnering with Egypt, can influence these
things to a better direction, whether it is talking building
the rule of law, building state institutions, representative
governments. We might not be able to force them to hold free
and fair elections, but we can certainly train the judges
better, we can help the police force deal with protests much
better without killing protesters. There are many areas that
can be worked on.
Mr. Connolly. And, Dr. Okail, if you could briefly comment.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Okail. Yes, please. I just want to underscore that,
again, most of the conversations focus on the physical
interactions, I mean, security physically on the ground and
limiting the ability of people to physically assemble and
demonstrate, forgoing that during this year and age, and this
time, that the internet plays a very important role, and this
cannot be restricted as the ability of the security forces
could do in the streets in shooting people dead.
And we have seen also cases where, if the security is the
prime objective that we want to achieve, we have seen cases,
for example, that one of the defendants who was just sentenced
to death, for example, he was an average, normal young Egyptian
citizen, got radicalized by connection with some of those
terror groups, traveled to Syria, got trained there, and came
back and participated in an organization who are planning to
conduct some terror attacks, in just less than 6 months.
This is how quick and this is how volatile the situation
can be. And this is just one example to give you, that if we
just follow the security approach it will not really lead to
stability or security. And that opening the space for more
alternative narratives to those of the extremist groups, that
would actually be the only answer for that to be defeated, both
on the cyber battlefield and on the ground.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Webber is recognized.
Mr. Webber. The gentleman from Virginia always has such
good questions. I could sit and listen to him all day, and,
like a lot of you, I thought I was going to have to.
Just a joke, Gerry. Just a joke.
You all didn't respond to the gentleman from California's
comments about him thinking that Russia being involved in
helping Egypt was a good thing. Dr. Trager, how do you--what
say you?
Mr. Trager. I mean, I respectfully disagree that Russia
strengthening its relationship with Egypt is a good thing.
Russia clearly has a very different view of the region than the
United States, particularly as it pertains to Iran, and I think
that we should be very wary of the Russian-Egyptian
relationship improving.
We should remember, by the way, that the Egyptian military
supplies are, according to estimates, 52 percent U.S.-made
weapons. Most of the other weapons are Russian-made weapons
from the era in which the Soviet Union funded Egypt. So Egypt
can pivot to Russia in that sense. It can integrate Russian
weapons, and I think that is something that we should be
working very hard to prevent.
Mr. Webber. Is it Tadros or----
Mr. Tadros. Tadros, yes.
Mr. Webber. Mr. Tadros, what say you?
Mr. Tadros. Yes. I would second what Dr. Trager has said,
both for the fact that a close alliance with Russia would have
on Egypt's regional policies, on Iran, on Syria, on other
matters, but also the possibility of a Russian model in Egypt
is not something that anyone should be looking for.
Mr. Webber. Dr. Okail?
Ms. Okail. Yes. I completely agree with Mr. Tadros and Dr.
Trager. I mean, having--losing the opportunity of the United
States having this leverage over--pushing Egypt toward a
direction that aligns with the principals of democracy and
freedom that is like valued in the United States would be a
better, an ideal position than having to side with Russia.
Mr. Webber. Sure. I think it was you, Mr. Tadros, that said
Egypt has no Palestinian relationship? Was that----
Mr. Tadros. I said that in the past Egypt had played a
role, whenever war would break between Hamas and the State of
Israel, in brokering an agreement in exchanges of prisoners, in
things like this.
This relationship is no longer there as Egypt has
dramatically cut its relations with Hamas, so it can no longer
play this role of truce or organizer between the two.
Mr. Webber. Thank you. I wanted you to clarify that.
One of our questions was--suggested this popular satirist,
Bassem Youssef, who is often referred to as the Jon Stewart of
Egypt, having been the brunt of one of his satires--I don't
know who that is--had his--anyway, this guy, Youssef, had his
popular political satire show canceled.
Now, according to reports, Mr. Youssef is saying that they
made this decision to self-censor in an increasingly
restrictive media environment. Is that accurate? Mr. Tadros?
Mr. Tadros. I believe it is.
Mr. Webber. As much as you know about it.
Mr. Tadros. Yes, I believe it is. The Egyptian regime has
had a very restrictive notion about what the press should and
should not cover. They believe that the completely open press
that existed following the Egyptian revolution is something
that undermined national security and led to chaos, and, thus,
they have created restrictions on freedom of the press of TV
programs and others.
Mr. Webber. Okay. Dr. Okail, did you say that Facebook was
playing a role? And is it an increasing role?
Ms. Okail. Well, definitely the internet, in general, is
playing an important and effective role. However, yet, I mean,
still, it is very limited. It doesn't affect the entire
population, 90 million people. Most of them are living in
poverty, and a lot has no access to the internet. And the
mainstream media or the traditional media still play an
important role.
However, just a point about your earlier questions about
media freedom. Another structural problem with the media is not
just the political ability or authority to censor the media,
but it is also the inability and the lack of resources for
independent media to emerge. And that is a huge problem for
many of the voices that needs a platform to democratically
voice their----
Mr. Webber. Let me real quickly to my last question. Is
CAIR, C-A-I-R, Council on American-Islamic Relations, are they
playing a role between the Brotherhood and Sisi? Any kind of
role in that?
Mr. Trager. I don't believe so. There is certainly no
reports that I am aware of that----
Mr. Webber. None of that you know of.
Mr. Tadros. Yes. I don't believe that they are. They have
been declared a terrorist organization, of course, by Egypt's
ally, the United Arab Emirates. So I don't think the Egyptian
regime would be open to any talk with them.
Mr. Webber. Dr. Okail, any knowledge?
Ms. Okail. I am not sure that it would be able to play a
role.
Mr. Webber. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Webber.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you to the panelists. I hope that we can all agree
that U.S. policy toward Egypt over the past few decades has had
some significant flaws. We propped up an unpopular repressive
dictator who abused his people at the expense of his political
cronies and watched on the sidelines as the Egyptian people
finally rose up against his repressive regime.
And as I listened to this testimony and I reviewed the
materials that were submitted, I have become even more
concerned that we are very quickly forgetting about this past
and preparing to repeat history for the sake of stability, as
we said, over these past many years.
And my first question to the panel is whether there are any
discernible differences between the current policies toward
President al-Sisi's government and our previous policies toward
the Mubarak regime? Have we learned anything? I understand we
have restructured, as we say, our security assistance, but have
we truly evaluated the mistakes of the past and adjusted our
policies for the future?
Mr. Trager. Thank you for your question. I would argue here
that we are not propping up the current government of Egypt.
That government emerged from a series of circumstances that are
intrinsic to that country's domestic politics, namely the
fallout from the Morsi era and strong popular support for the
current type of regime.
The second lesson that I think we should draw from the
previous 4 years that you referenced doesn't necessarily
pertain to the extent to which the U.S. should or should not,
you know, support democracy or privilege the military
relationship, but it should be an analytical lesson which is
that the key player in Egypt has been and will likely remain
the Egyptian military. And, in that sense, the United States
has made a wise choice with its partnerships.
Now, it is not an uncomplicated relationship. It is a
relationship that we should be using to communicate our
displeasure with Egypt's current trajectory, and we should in
no way whitewash that trajectory. But, at the same time, that
relationship is very important for U.S. strategy in the region.
Mr Cicilline. Mr. Tadros or Dr. Okail?
Mr. Tadros. I think there are differences. As Dr. Trager
mentioned, the United States is not completely supportive of
the Sisi regime, the same way that could be said of the earlier
period of the Mubarak regime. When President Mubarak took over
power in similar circumstances of an Islamist challenge
existing following Sadat's assassination, there were no
objections from the United States to any policies that Egypt
was doing.
The administration has highlighted a number of areas of
disagreement with the regime and has been publicly expressing
its displeasure with a variety of the regime's policies.
Mr Cicilline. Dr. Okail?
Ms. Okail. I agree with Mr. Tadros and Dr. Trager. But I
think the main difference is the realization that right now, I
mean, what was--with the situation under Mubarak is that the
United States wanted to make sure that the stability continues
and avoid the scary scenario of having the Islamists taking
power.
Right now, we are not having--we are not seeing policies
that would avoid the repetition of this scenario because after
the fall of Mubarak there was a vacuum where there are no
secular political parties able to organize and run
competitively in the elections against the Islamists.
Right now, we don't have--we don't see signs of learning
from this lesson where there are no support for having
political parties organized under open and democratic laws that
actually allow for them to have the resources and ability and
freedom to organize and be there when and if there is a
challenge between them and the Islamists.
Mr. Cicilline. So the last two things I want to ask about
are the status of preparations for parliamentary elections.
Have voters been allowed to register? Are parties and
candidates beginning to register? Is there any real indication
that these elections will in fact be held this year?
And then, secondly, what is the current status of press
freedom in the country? We have heard a lot about the targeting
of users of social media and bloggers, but are there any
independent newspapers or TV channels that are operating? And
are government-run papers and stations still engaged in this
persistent kind of smear campaign against civil society and the
United States?
Ms. Okail. Well, the process has already begun in preparing
for the elections before the constitutional court decision, and
registration was underway and political parties were preparing
for the elections.
Right now, it is on pause waiting for the new electoral,
which will actually affect the way those political parties will
run and campaign for the elections. And it is very related to
your second question about the press freedom, because this is
very important, and it is the only channel that would reach the
masses of the people when they campaign and present themselves
to the Egyptians and their voters.
Right now, the press is undergoing a lot of restrictions.
As I mentioned earlier, there are the political restrictions
that actually lead people to either censor themselves because
of the intimidation and fear of the prosecution, but there is
also the economic restriction because the new young and
independent voices, they would have the talent and ability to
voice their messages, but they don't have the platform or the
economic ability to actually turn that into actual reality.
Thank you.
Mr Cicilline. Thank you.
I thank the chair, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. It has been an
interesting meeting here. I appreciate all the information that
has come out. I have got a whole list of questions here.
The first one is, what is the credibility of the U.S. and
Egypt today versus, say, 10 or 15 years ago? Dr. Trager?
Mr. Trager. Well, I mean, in terms of the popular
perception in Egypt, the popular perception in the United
States is significantly diminished because of this perception
that the United States is interfering in Egypt's domestic
politics. And I want to emphasize that that is not in any way
my view.
Mr. Yoho. I understand.
Mr. Trager. But that is the perception, and it is another
factor and the reason why it is so hard to influence this
country's domestic politics.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Tadros?
Mr. Tadros. I absolutely agree. The U.S. has no credibility
at the moment with either side of the conflict in Egypt. The
Muslim Brotherhood supporters believe that it is supporting the
regime, and vice versa.
Mr. Yoho. Dr. Okail?
Ms. Okail. I agree. I mean, the credibility of the United
States has usually been undermined throughout the 4 years of
the--since the 2011 revolution. And I think, again, that is
because that relationship remains a government-to-government
relationship without actually transferring and conveying the
message to the Egyptian people themselves and addressing their
grievances.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. And I talk to people from all over the
Middle East when they come here, and I hear the same thing: The
U.S. has lost its credibility, and the goodwill that we have
generated over the last 200 years, it is gone.
And let me ask you this. Should the U.S. have acknowledged
the overthrow of Morsi as a coup? Because I know other nations
have, and I think history will record it. And, if so, should we
have responded in the way our laws say that no foreign aid goes
to Egypt?
And I bring this up strictly because we have lost our
credibility. Our word doesn't mean anything. And if we are a
nation of laws and we have these policies in place, if we don't
stand by that and acknowledge that, people aren't going to take
us seriously. And if we had it, it may have changed the outcome
in Egypt. They may have thought differently.
What is your opinion?
Mr. Trager. Well, I think U.S. credibility doesn't rest on
the terms that we use to refer to events in Egypt. It really
hinges on our relationships, and that is really where I think
the loss of credibility with the current Egyptian government
is. That government asks, where does the United States stand?
You know, and the type of hedging that Mr. Tadros referred to
has undercut our credibility not only with the current
government but with both sides. And that doesn't hinge so much
on what we would have called Morsi's ouster.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Mr. Tadros, I want to ask you a separate
question. Since Morsi was elected by the people democratically,
would that have changed what we see today, if we would have
announced that as a coup and say, ``We stand with a democratic
process''? Because we are promoting democracy. And since he was
democratically elected, should we have intervened and said,
``You can't do that; that is a coup''? I mean, what is your
opinion on that?
Mr. Tadros. I don't think it--I don't believe it would have
influenced the decision of the Egyptian military. The Egyptian
people, there were mass protests in Egypt. People were fed up
with the Muslim Brotherhood rule for a variety of reasons. And
U.S. words would not have stopped the country's movement in
that direction, no matter what the----
Mr. Yoho. The Arab Spring would have happened anyway.
Dr. Okail, I have a question for you. If Morsi has his
death sentence carried out, what do you see happening in Egypt
and the neighboring countries?
Ms. Okail. Well, I don't believe they actually will execute
the death sentence. However, of course there will be a lot of
concerns. Just after the verdict on Saturday, there were 20
terror attacks, and that is most likely in reaction to the
verdict.
Again, with the interconnectivity of the transnational
connection between the groups, it may trigger further
coordinated attacks, and have like dire effects in general.
However, we are not sure how would that like fare out.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. And then I want to build on Mr.
Rohrabacher's and Mr. Webber's question about Russia's help in
that region. I heard what you are saying from our perspective.
What is the perspective in Egypt? What are they saying? Is
Russia welcome there and looking at that, Dr. Trager?
Mr. Trager. Well, you know, ahead of this kind of warming
of relations with Russia, the Egyptian media started speaking
very, very favorably of Russia, very favorably of Putin, and I
think the popular view in Egypt is that Russia is an
uncomplicated relationship because they could buy weapons from
Russia and Russia won't worry about the democratic issues that
we are rightly raising here today.
There is one problem with that analysis within Egypt, which
is that Russia isn't giving these weapons away for free. It is
not offering the type of aid the United States is offering. But
certainly in the short run Egypt is able to find other funds
for buying Russian weapons, and they have shown that they can
replace the United States, at least in the short-term
withholdings.
Mr. Yoho. All right. I have one more question, but I am out
of time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Go ahead.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Whoever wants to answer this. Is a democracy possible
without property rights acknowledged by a government in the
protection of human rights as we believe here, life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness, you know, with, you know, freedom
of religion, freedom of speech? Do you see that possible in a
country where we keep trying to promote a democracy without
that government acknowledging those rights?
Ms. Okail. Well, at least the 30 years' rule of Mubarak
proved that this is not possible, that----
Mr. Yoho. I agree.
Ms. Okail [continuing]. I mean, the whole--the entire
assumptions upon which Mubarak was supported is that he is able
to maintain stability, and the human rights violation and the
closure of the political space could be overlooked for the sake
of security and stability.
But it was proven that after like three decades of strong
rule he fell in only 18 days. So, I mean, nothing would be
maintained. Security solutions are essential and important, but
they are not sustainable without real structural changes.
Mr. Yoho. I agree. Does anybody else----
Mr. Tadros. Yes. If I may add, no, democracy cannot be
sustained without property rights, without religious freedom,
and this is why the United States should not only focus on the
question of holding elections as important, and this is, but on
building institutions----
Mr. Yoho. Exactly.
Mr. Tadros [continuing]. The rule of law, property,
economic freedom, and others.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
Ms. Frankel.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a very
interesting discussion, and I have thought of--I have taken
both sides of these issues so many times. But it just seems to
me that the Arab Spring has turned into a very, very cold
winter all over the world. And I think it is quite obvious that
you cannot snap you fingers and get democracy and freedom and
end repression.
And as much as that is our values here, and we would like
to see that happen, what it sounds to me like what is happening
is that we have a--you can just tell from all the questions
here there is this conflict between whether or not it is--is it
security versus democracy?
So a couple questions. First of all, can you say, what do
you think is in our sphere of influence? And what is not? And
where should our priorities be? Should it be the security of
the region? I mean, what--maybe you could mention--this is an
elementary question, but why is it important, or do you think
it is important that Egypt be stable? And should we maybe
sacrifice or turn our head on what are obvious human right
abuses in order to have security?
And I would like to know, if you have time, whether you
think there is a threat of ISIL or any other terrorist
situation coming into Egypt.
And, finally, Madam Chair, I know I am--so if there is
time----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No problem.
Ms. Frankel [continuing]. Whether this coup law, I will
call it the coup law, needs to be changed, because it just
seems to me that we are just playing with words or having to
play with words in defining what happened in Egypt when al-Sisi
took over.
Mr. Trager. Well, just in terms of what is and is not in
our sphere of influence, you know, my view is that the role of
foreign policy is primarily to shape the way states behave
externally, and that it is often difficult to shape the way
states behave internally, and that is certainly the case in the
current situation in Egypt where you have the government and
the Muslim Brotherhood locked in a ``kill or be killed''
struggle, one that the current government is winning but one
that is likely to continue in some shape or form for a while.
And we can influence Egypt's external relations if we
reinforce the military-to-military relationship, if Congress
urges the administration to move forward with a strategic
dialogue with the Egyptian government, and there are many areas
in which Cairo and Washington can better coordinate, for
example, in Libya.
The administration and Cairo are on very different pages
there. Egypt has been, you know, the target of attacks that we
believe emanate from the instability in Libya. It has
responded, reportedly, by launching airstrikes in coordination
with the UAE and was criticized by the administration for that,
which doesn't really help the relationship because from Egypt's
perspective they are attacking imminent threat.
So we need to better coordinate our policy on Libya. And,
frankly, we could be doing a lot to help bolster Egypt's
counterterrorism in the Sinai. That also requires the Egyptian
government approving that. They have been a little bit
resistant to that as the relationship has fallen on difficult
times. But I think by reinvigorating the relationship we might
be able to get on the same page there as well.
Mr. Tadros. I would slightly disagree. I think our sphere
of influence of the United States is not only limited to
foreign affairs but also to domestic ones, as long as those
areas are not life-threatening to President Sisi or the regime.
The United States in the past has helped Soviet Jews.
Despite that being a domestic affair in the Soviet Union, it
was able to influence the fate of those people because it was
not a life-threatening issue. In those areas where the regime
claims or proclaims its willingness to work on them, such as
religious freedom, we should hold it to task and ask it to take
meaningful steps and not just symbolic gestures.
President Sisi should be encouraged to pass a law to allow
the building of churches in Egypt. That is not something that
threatens the stability of the country as a whole.
In terms of the ISIS threat, I think on the long run the
threat from the Sinai is likely to be contained. The more
alarming threat would be the growth of or the spread of
violence from Libya in Egypt. The western desert is the area
that voted most heavily for an Islamist candidate in all
successive elections. It is 1,000 kilometers of borders with
Libya, free flow of weapons from there, tribal ties to the
tribes of Libya, there are many elements there that would make
potential insurgency there much more threatening than the
Sinai.
Ms. Frankel. Can Dr. Okail answer, Madam Chair?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No problem.
Ms. Okail. There is certainly a threat from ISIL to Egypt.
And as I mentioned in my testimony, there is already one terror
group. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis have declared their loyalty to
ISIS, and they got the blessing from their leader.
At the same time, there are several Egyptians who travel to
Iraq, Syria, and Libya to fight there. Some of them come back
home. We don't have actual numbers and information about how
many there are, but they are definitely a real and existential
threat to the security in the country.
As for your question concerning the support for human
rights and whether we can forego that for security, I don't
think that they are mutually exclusive. I think they complement
each other.
And with regards to your related questions about what is in
this sphere of the United States, the United States is already
providing the needed support for--in terms of the military
assistance. However, there is so much that can be done,
particularly with regards to education reform, health support,
rule of law, because so far most of the relationship and the
policies targets--not just from the United States, but foreign
policy in general, is having a very short-term view.
When we look at the region, when you look at Egypt in
particular, out of the 90 million people, a huge percentage of
this are youth under 25 years old. These are the ones that we
would like to invest in, so that we would not be faced in a
situation where in the next elections people will be told that
if they vote for a particular party they will be voting for
God, and people would buy into that and support that.
So we would like to avoid a situation of short-term
policies and have long-term vision and investment in the actual
people who will be shaping the future of the country.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
Mr. Boyle.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you. And, first, I just want to say
specifically to Dr. Okail, as one of the 43 NGO workers who
physically was captured and jailed for the work that you were
doing, I just great admire and deeply respect your work and the
sacrifices that you yourself made.
My question is something regarding very specific and very
recent. I was very concerned with not just Morsi but over 100
now being sentenced from the political opposition to death, to
execution. And while certainly no fan whatsoever of the Muslim
Brotherhood or of Morsi, my question is, a) what is the
timeline--what does the timeline seem like in terms of the
executions? Particularly with Morsi.
And then, number two, to what extent could this have a
destabilizing effect? Because you only need to look at other
historical examples of executions end up triggering a response
in the population that ends up having a destabilizing effect.
So those two questions.
Ms. Okail. Thank you so much for your kind words. I really
appreciate it.
Concerning the executions, we would like--I would like to
put this into the broader context. These are not the first
death sentence that were issued. There were hundreds before,
and for a variety of factions and people. And there are
thousands of people who are in prison.
Whether these sentences will be actually implemented and
executed or not, this is remaining to be seen. Highly likely
they will not be. However, actually, this is another concerning
point because the fact that there are verdicts that are being
issued, and people have the knowledge and the acknowledgement
that they will not be executed, this is an undermining of the
rule of law as itself as a tool for justice, and turning it
from a tool to justice into a tool for intimidation, which will
actually harm the future of the Egyptian sphere of political
development, social, and economic justice that people would
like to see and having the law performing its role, and rather
become highly politicized and highly--and more increasingly
used as a tool of intimidation rather than a tool for justice.
Thank you.
Mr. Tadros. I believe from the Egyptian government's time
or point of view they believe that passing those death
sentences against such symbolic figures as President Morsi, as
the former--or the leader of the Brotherhood, General Guide
Badie, and others, they are sending a message that there are no
red lines, that previous Egyptian governments had shied away
from arresting people like the General Guide, that even Nasser,
in his repression, did not hang the General Guide.
The message from the government is that we are in this
until the end. We are willing to take all necessary steps. And
from their point of view, they believe that this might
discourage some people from taking up arms and violence now
that they realize that there are no red lines completely.
Mr. Trager. I agree with what has been said. I would just
add that we also have to understand the death sentence is in
terms of the ongoing power struggle, specifically in this case
between the judiciary and the Muslim Brotherhood. That goes
back almost 2 years, actually almost 3 years, excuse me, and
so, I mean, I think the sentences, you know, pertain to that,
which is not in any way a justification, just reinforcing that
this is an ongoing power struggle within the country that is
very, very hard to shape from 6,000 miles away.
Mr. Boyle. And I would just conclude with this--and thank
you, Madam Chair--it would be ironic if, after all of this and
a so-called Arab Spring and all of this tumult, what ends up
emerging in Egypt is a fairly pro-Western, autocratic leader
that isn't very fond of the rule of law or human rights. Sounds
a lot like a guy named Mubarak that was in power for three
decades. It would be a bitter irony if, after all of this, that
is what essentially we are left with.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Boyle.
Thank you. And we certainly view Egypt as a strong and
important ally, and striking that balance between security and
democratic reforms, we hope they find that sweet spot.
Thank you so much. Subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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