[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 27, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-9
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., ZOE LOFGREN, California
Wisconsin DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
BILL POSEY, Florida MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
RANDY K. WEBER, Texas ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio PAUL TONKO, New York
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan MARK TAKANO, California
STEVE KNIGHT, California BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BRIAN BABIN, Texas
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
GARY PALMER, Alabama
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
------
Subcommittee on Space
HON. STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland,
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma AMI BERA, California
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama, ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BILL POSEY, Florida MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
STEVE KNIGHT, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BRIAN BABIN, Texas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
February 27, 2015
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Steven Palazzo, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 12
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
Witnesses:
Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration
and Operations Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA)
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 31
Mr. John Mulholland, Vice President and Program Manager,
Commercial Programs, The Boeing Company
Oral Statement............................................... 36
Written Statement............................................ 38
Dr. Garrett Reisman, Director, Crew Operations, Space Exploration
Technologies Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 46
Written Statement............................................ 47
Discussion....................................................... 61
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration
and Operations Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA).................................... 82
Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA)......................................................... 123
Mr. John Mulholland, Vice President and Program Manager,
Commercial Programs, The Boeing Company........................ 137
Dr. Garrett Reisman, Director, Crew Operations, Space Exploration
Technologies Corporation....................................... 151
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Prepared statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice
Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 166
THE COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
----------
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven
Palazzo [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. The Subcommittee on Space will come to
order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Subcommittee at any time. Good morning. Welcome
to today's hearing, entitled ``The Commercial Crew Program:
Challenge and Opportunities''. In front of you are packets
containing the written testimony, biographies, and truth-in-
testimony disclosures for today's witnesses. I recognize myself
for five minutes for an opening statement.
I would like to welcome everyone to our hearing today, and
I want to thank our witnesses for taking time to appear before
the Committee. Today's hearing is a review of the Commercial
Crew Program at NASA. This program holds the promise of
tremendous value for both the taxpayer and the contractors, as
long as the program is executed appropriately.
Last year NASA chose two partners to continue through the
final phase of the program, Boeing and SpaceX. Known as CCtCap,
or Commercial Crew Transportation Capability, this final phase
will provide funding for the partners to complete testing of
their systems. This is a critical phase in our Nation's efforts
to develop and sustain assured U.S. human access to low-Earth
orbit. To date, Congress and the Administration have not been
able to reach consensus on the most efficient way to meet
NASA's launch requirements. However, the promise of this
capability, and new contracting structure, has allowed for
guarded optimism.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed NASA to engage
the private sector for access to the International Space
Station, so long as it did not come at the expense of NASA's
other exploration development programs. Similarly, the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 continued this direction, including
reporting requirements related to safety, and directed NASA to
ensure that the Orion vehicle was able to provide alternative
means of delivering crew to the ISS in the event that partner
supplied vehicles are unable to perform that function. NASA has
done a lot to move the industry along in compliance with these
laws. They have provided funding for early stage development,
funding to mature spacecraft designs, funding to certify those
designs, and ultimately they will provide a steady customer
through the ISS program.
Previous testimony before this committee indicated that
taxpayers will fund roughly 90 percent of the development of
these capabilities, and then in turn pay once again for the
services derived from those capabilities. In total, NASA has
spent, or plans to spend, over $8 billion on this initiative,
which I believe represents a necessary investment, if managed
effectively. In order to protect taxpayer interests, however,
this level of investment by the taxpayer requires a similar
level of transparency and accountability. To that end, it was
concerning to read some of the findings made by the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, also known as ASAP, in its annual report
this year. The ASAP is congressionally chartered to examine the
culture of safety at NASA. It is required to provide advice to
Congress, and to the administrator, measures that can be taken
to improve safety at the agency.
This year, the ASAP was not able to complete their job
insofar as it pertains to the Commercial Crew Program.
According to the report, the Director of Commercial Space
Flight Development at NASA has provided excuses instead of
information. This is described by the panel as a seamless set
of constraints as to why information cannot be shared.
Similarly, the report states this opacity and failure to engage
in open and transparent communication is reminiscent of the
problems that were explicitly identified by both the Rogers
Commission and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
regarding causes of the Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia
mishaps, respectively. Unfortunately, this committee
experienced similar issues when it attempted to get information
on this program over the last year and a half.
I want to be crystal clear to our witnesses here today, and
to the Administration, denying information to ASAP or Congress
about the Commercial Crew Program is unacceptable when the
hardworking American taxpayers are footing the bill for the
program, and the safety of our astronauts is on the line.
Congress and the American people deserve to have answers to the
questions posed by ASAP. I am pleased to hear that NASA is now
being more open, and I hope this trend continues.
Aside from the issues raised in the ASAP report, NASA must
also address several outstanding questions as the program
advances. The decision to use the Federal Acquisition
Regulations to issue contracts for the final phase of the
program was a welcome step from the Administration, and one
that I endorse, but how will waivers to safety requirements
from the Certification Products Contract phase be evaluated and
issued? Given the delays in the Commercial Cargo Program, how
will NASA maintain schedule discipline under the current crew
contracts? Why can't a scaled back Orion launched on a Delta IV
Heavy provide a redundant capability and competition to the
Commercial Crew Program? What level of price competition exists
in the program, now that we know the contractors' bids?
I raise these questions because I want the program to be
successful. In these difficult budgetary times, NASA must
concentrate its limited resources on meeting its core
requirements, one of those being domestic human access to low-
Earth orbit. I truly believe that we can come together to
address these concerns in a constructive, bipartisan way so
that we can once again launch American astronauts on American
rockets from American soil. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space
Chairman Steven Palazzo
Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone to our hearing today
and I want to thank our witnesses for taking time to appear before the
Committee.
Today's hearing is a review of the Commercial Crew Program at NASA.
This program holds the promise of tremendous value for both the
taxpayer and the contractors, as long as the program is executed
appropriately.
Last year, NASA chose two partners to continue through the final
phase of the program, Boeing and SpaceX. Known as CCtCap (Commercial
Crew Transportation Capability), this final phase will provide funding
for the partners to complete testing of their systems. This is a
critical phase in our nation's efforts to develop and sustain assured
U.S. human access to low-Earth orbit. To date, Congress and the
Administration have not been able to reach consensus on the most
efficient way to meet NASA's launch requirements. However, the promise
of this capability and new contracting structure has allowed for
guarded optimism.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed NASA to engage the
private sector for access to the International Space Station (ISS) so
long as it did not come at the expense of NASA's other exploration
development programs. Similarly, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010
continued this direction, included reporting requirements related to
safety, and directed NASA to ensure that the Orion vehicle was able to
provide alternative means of delivering crew to the ISS in the event
that partner-supplied vehicles are unable to perform that function.
NASA has done a lot to move the industry along in compliance with
these laws. They have provided funding for early stage development,
funding to mature spacecraft designs, funding to certify those designs,
and ultimately they will provide a steady customer through the ISS
program. Previous testimony before this Committee indicated that the
taxpayer will fund roughly 90 percent of the development of these
capabilities and then in-turn pay once again for the services derived
from those capabilities. In total, NASA has spent, or plans to spend,
over 8 billion dollars on this initiative, which I believe represents a
necessary investment if managed effectively. In order to protect
taxpayer interests, however, this level of investment by the taxpayer
requires a similar level of transparency and accountability.
To that end, it was concerning to read some of the findings made by
the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) in its annual report this
year. The ASAP is congressionally-chartered to examine the culture of
safety at NASA. It is required to provide advice to Congress and to the
Administrator on measures that can be taken to improve safety at the
agency. This year, the ASAP was not able to complete their job insofar
as it pertains to the Commercial Crew Program. According to the report,
the Director of Commercial Spaceflight Development at NASA has provided
excuses instead of information. This is described by the panel as a
``seamless set of constraints as to why information cannot be shared.''
Similarly, the report states ``This opacity and failure to engage in
open and transparent communication is reminiscent of the problems that
were explicitly identified by both the Rogers Commission and the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) regarding causes of the
Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia mishaps respectively."
Unfortunately, this Committee experienced similar issues when it
attempted to get information on this program over the last year and a
half.
I want to be crystal clear to our witnesses here today and to the
Administration. Denying information to ASAP, or Congress, about the
Commercial Crew Program is unacceptable when the hardworking American
taxpayers are footing the bill for the program and the safety of our
astronauts is on the line. Congress and the American people deserve to
have answers to the questions posed by ASAP. I am pleased to hear that
NASA is now being more open and I hope this trend continues.
Aside from the issues raised in the ASAP report, NASA must also
address several outstanding questions as the program advances. The
decision to use the Federal Acquisition Regulations to issue contracts
for the final phase of the program was a welcome step from the
Administration, and one that I endorsed, but how will waivers to safety
requirements from the Certification Products Contracts phase be
evaluated and issued? Given the delays in the commercial cargo program,
how will NASA maintain schedule discipline under the current crew
contracts? Why can't a scaled-back Orion launched on a Delta IV Heavy
provide a redundant capability and competition to the commercial crew
program? What level of price competition exists in the program now that
we know the contractor's bids?
I raise these questions because I want the program to be
successful. In these difficult budgetary times, NASA must concentrate
its limited resources on meeting its core requirements - one of those
being domestic human access to low-earth orbit. I truly believe that we
can come together to address these concerns in a constructive
bipartisan way so that we can once again launch American Astronauts on
American Rockets, from American soil.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms.
Edwards, for an opening statement.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, for
as much time as I might consume, given that the clock was not
running during your time. Good morning, and welcome to our
distinguished panel of witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing on the
Commercial Crew Program, and the challenges and opportunities.
There is no denying that NASA and its commercial partners have
taken great strides since commercial crew activities began
about five years ago.
Last fall NASA, in partnership with two companies, Space
Exploration Technologies--SpaceX--and the Boeing Corporation,
established contracts to finalize designs, undertake full
development, and carry out the milestones needed to complete
NASA certification requirements to carry NASA, and NASA
sponsored astronauts, to and from the International Space
Station.
As I have recounted on other occasions, I used to be a
skeptic of commercial crew and cargo transportation to support
NASA requirements. I have evolved, but I still have questions.
And while I am now supportive of the program, and industry's
partnership with NASA, I remain committed to ensuring that
these systems are safe. And as the title of the hearing states,
there are both challenges and opportunities ahead.
First, the Commercial Cargo Transportation Program that is
currently underway sheds light on some of those challenges.
Initial operational flight showed up significantly later than
initially anticipated, and a mishap last fall reminds us all
that space flight, even in 2015, is indeed risky and hard, and
when humans are involved, the stakes are immeasurably higher.
Secondly, as we will hear from Vice Admiral Dyer, and I--
the concern that I share with the Chairman, the Commercial Crew
Program's approach is to buy the commercial crew services,
rather than make or manage a development program. This paradigm
shift carries risks in and of itself, given that the services
to be bought don't yet exist. In addition, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel--ASAP--which Vice Admiral Dyer chairs, has
raised concerns about the transparency of the program in
providing the panel, and Congress, with the information it
needs to evaluate safety. As you know, Mr. Chairman, safety
has, and will continue to be, a priority of this committee, and
the NASA Authorization Act of 2015, I would add, the bipartisan
Act passed by the House, directs that safety be the highest
priority of the Commercial Crew Program.
Third, NASA is requesting $1.2 billion for the Commercial
Crew Program for Fiscal Year 2016. That is an increase of over
$400 million from the Fiscal Year 2015 enacted level. However,
the Committee, despite having asked, has no independent
external analysis by which to evaluate whether NASA's budget
requests for the Commercial Crew Program are on target, and
whether the amount the taxpayers are being asked to pay is too
much, too little, or about right. We don't have any
information. The NASA Authorization Act of 2015, again, directs
NASA to provide that analysis. And while that isn't law yet, it
is clear that, from a bipartisan perspective, we expect the
Committee to be provided with that information.
I want NASA and its commercial partners to succeed so that
NASA and the nation will regain human space flight access to
low-Earth orbit once again. And I also want to understand what
taxpayers are paying for, and the terms and the conditions
involved. In particular, I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about several questions. One, how will NASA--SpaceX--
and Boeing ensure safety and a safety culture throughout the
development process in the operational space flights, once they
are certified? What contingency plans will be in place, should
commercial systems not be available by the anticipated 2017
date, or should one provider need to stand down for an extended
period of time? What is needed to appropriately communicate the
risks involved in commercial human space flights to Congress,
the public, and other stakeholders? And what are the policies
in place for cost reimbursement, liability, and risk assumption
regarding individual passengers that contractors could
potentially carry on NASA sponsored missions to the ISS?
Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I want to note that, while
the Commercial Crew Program is important, I hope that this
committee will have the opportunity to discuss all of NASA's
programs and plans that comprise its $18 billion budget request
for Fiscal Year 2016. I think we need to continue our tradition
of inviting the NASA administrator to come in and testify on
the agency's budget request, and I hope we can lock in a
hearing in the near future.
Thank you, and I yield the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space
Ranking Member Donna F. Edwards
Good Morning, and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on The Commercial Crew
Program: Challenges and Opportunities.
There is no denying that NASA and its commercial partners have
taken great strides since commercial crew activities began about five
years ago. Last Fall, NASA in partnership with two companies--Space
Exploration Technologies and The Boeing Corporation-established
contracts to finalize designs, undertake full development, and carry
out the milestones needed to complete NASA's certification requirements
to carry NASA and NASA-sponsored astronauts to and from the
International Space Station.
As I have recounted on other occasions, I used to be a skeptic of
commercial crew and cargo transportation to support NASA requirements.
And while I am now supportive of the commercial space transportation
industry's partnership with NASA, I remain committed to ensuring that
these systems are safe.
As the title of the hearing states, there are both challenges and
opportunities ahead. First, the commercial cargo transportation program
that is currently underway sheds light on some of those challenges.
Initial operational flights showed up significantly later than
initially anticipated and a mishap last Fall reminds us that
spaceflight is indeed risky and hard. When humans are involved, the
stakes are immeasurably higher.
Secondly, as we'll hear from Admiral Dyer, the commercial crew
program's approach is to ``buy'' the commercial crew services rather
than make or manage a development program. This paradigm shift carries
risk in and of itself, given that the services to be bought don't yet
exist. In addition, the Aeronautics Safety Advisory Panel--ASAP--which
Admiral Dyer chairs, has raised concerns about the transparency of the
program in providing the Panel with the information it needs to
evaluate safety. As you know, Mr. Chairman, safety has and will
continue to be a priority of this Committee, and the NASA Authorization
Act of 2015 directs that safety be the highest priority of the
commercial crew program.
Third, NASA is requesting $1.2 billion for the Commercial Crew
Program for Fiscal Year 2016, an increase of over $400 million from the
FY 2015 enacted level. However, the Committee, despite having asked,
has no independent external analysis by which to evaluate whether
NASA's budget requests for the commercial crew program are on target,
and whether the amount the taxpayers are being asked to pay is too
much, too little, or about right. The NASA Authorization Act of 2015
directs NASA to provide that analysis.
I want NASA and its commercial partners to succeed so that NASA and
the nation will regain human spaceflight access to low-Earth orbit once
again.
Yet I also want to understand what the taxpayers are paying for and
the terms and conditions involved. In particular, I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses about:
How will NASA, SpaceX, and Boeing ensure safety and a
safety culture throughout the development process and the operational
spaceflights, once they are certified?
What contingency plans will be in place should commercial
systems not be available by the anticipated 2017 date, or should one
provider need to stand down for an extended period of time?
What is needed to appropriately communicate the risks
involved in commercial human spaceflight to Congress, the public, and
other stakeholders?
And what are the policies in place for cost
reimbursement, liability, and risk assumption regarding individual
``passengers'' that contractors could potentially carry on NASA
sponsored missions to the ISS?
Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that while the
Commercial Crew Program is important, I hope that this Committee will
also have the opportunity to discuss all of NASA's programs and plans
that comprise its $18 billion budget request for FY 2016. I think we
need to continue our tradition of inviting the NASA Administrator to
come in and testify on the agency's budget request, and I hope we can
lock in such a hearing in the near future.
Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. I now recognize
the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Smith.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. America has always
been a Nation of innovators and explorers. We continue to
remain on the forefront of new discoveries and technologies.
Our history is filled with examples of entrepreneurs who pushed
the boundaries of the possible. The Commercial Crew Program
offers a new way to develop human rated systems for government
access to space, with the goal, of course, of ending our
dependence on Russia. Building on the Commercial Cargo Program
could be an important change from traditional programs, but
only if it is done correctly. Today the Subcommittee will
examine the progress made in the Commercial Crew Program. This
committee is dedicated to ensuring the government has safe,
reliable, and affordable access to low-Earth orbit.
The U.S. currently pays Russia $70 million a seat for
access to the International Space Station. It should be a top
priority to launch American astronauts on American rockets from
American soil as soon as possible. American astronauts
personify our nation's pioneering spirit. They represent our
leadership, as explorers, and agents of discovery. A great deal
of trust has been placed in the commercial crew partners,
Boeing and SpaceX, that are partnering with NASA to take our
astronauts into space. This is an extraordinary responsibility
for these companies. It is one that cannot be taken lightly.
It is absolutely imperative that we understand the gravity
of what it means to carry our astronauts into space. This
committee will continue to monitor whether the Commercial Crew
Program will ensure safety, while also respecting cost and
schedule constraints. We can only do this if NASA is open and
transparent about the program. The Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel's recent report highlights questions about NASA's level
of transparency. The Committee has encountered similar issues
as well. For the sake of all who are working to make this
program a success, I hope this will change.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
their progress on these systems, and their ongoing relationship
with NASA. Their insights into the program are invaluable to
us. The commercial space industry offers improvements to the
quality of life for every person on the planet. The discoveries
and applications that have come from space technology are
numerous. Since the dawn of the Space Age, contractors and the
private sector have played a central role in making our
nation's aspirations a reality. The commercial space industry
will ensure that America remains a world leader in space
exploration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Full Committee
Chairman Lamar S. Smith
Thank you Chairman Palazzo for holding this hearing. And I thank
the witnesses for being here to share their expertise. America has
always been a nation of innovators and explorers. We continue to remain
on the forefront of new discoveries and technologies. Our history is
filled with examples of entrepreneurs who pushed the boundaries of the
possible.
The Commercial Crew Program offers a new way to develop human-rated
systems for government access to space with the goa, of course, of
ending our dependence on Russia. Building on the Commercial Cargo
Program could be an important change from traditional programs, but
only if it is done correctly.
Today the subcommittee will examine the progress made in the
Commercial Crew program. This Committee is dedicated to ensuring the
government has safe, reliable, and affordable access to low-Earth
orbit.
The U.S. currently pays Russia $70 million a seat for access to the
International Space Station. It should be a top priority to launch
American astronauts on American rockets from America soil as soon as is
safely possible.
American astronauts personify our nation's pioneering spirit. They
represent our leadership as explorers and agents of discovery. A great
deal of trust has been placed in the commercial crew partners--Boeing
and SpaceX--that are partnering with NASA to take our astronauts into
space. This is an extraordinary responsibility for these companies. It
is one that cannot be taken lightly.
It is absolutely imperative that we understand the gravity of what
it means to carry our astronauts into space. This committee will
continue to monitor whether the Commercial Crew Program will ensure
safety while also respecting cost and schedule constraints.
We can only do this if NASA is open and transparent about the
program. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's recent report highlights
issues with NASA's level of transparency.
This Committee has encountered similar issues as well. For the sake
of all who are working to make this program a success, I hope this will
change going forward.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their
progress on these systems and their ongoing relationship with NASA.
Their insights into the program are invaluable to us.
The commercial space industry offers improvements to the quality of
life for every person on the planet.
The discoveries and applications that have come from space
technology are numerous. Since the dawn of the Space Age, contractors
and the private sector have played a central role in making our
nation's aspirations a reality.
The commercial space industry will ensure that America remains a
world leader in space exploration.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. If there are Members who wish to submit
additional opening statements, your statements will be added to
the record at this point.
At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. Mr.
Bill Gerstenmaier is the Associate Administrator for the Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate at NASA. Vice
Admiral Joseph Dyer is the Chairman of NASA's Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, or ASAP. Mr. John Mulholland is the Vice
President and Program Manager of Commercial Programs at the
Boeing Company. And Dr. Garrett Reisman is Director of Crew
Operations at the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation,
or SpaceX.
In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
testimony to five minutes. Your entire written statement will
be made part of the record.
I now recognize Mr. Gerstenmaier for five minutes to
present his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. BILL GERSTENMAIER,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS
MISSION DIRECTORATE,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you very much for allowing me to
represent the teams that are heavily involved in the
development of the crew transportation systems that will end
our sole reliance on the Russian Soyuz for transportation to
the ISS. This is a very important hearing, and a very important
capability for the United States.
NASA has made tremendous progress in developing these
capabilities. The work began under Space Act Agreements looking
at generic capability, and transitioned to contracts for crew
transportation to the ISS. The first phase of the Contract
Certification Products, made tremendous progress in
establishing clear requirements for the commercial providers at
NASA. During this phase, the providers submitted alternate
standards, hazard reports, certification plans, and
verification plans for their crew transportation systems. The
products were developed by the contractors, and heavily
reviewed by NASA. It is important that this phase allowed the
contractors to use their expertise and best practices, and
submit alternate ways of developing and designing spacecraft
using the latest standards.
I added two pie charts to my written testimony to highlight
the significant amount and quality of work accomplished during
this phase. The first pie chart shows the agency was able to
accept 55 percent of the alternate standards as meeting or
exceeding NASA's requirements. NASA only rejected five percent
of the alternate standards proposed, but there is still open
work to be done with the remaining 30 percent that were
partially approved.
The second chart shows the variances. These are items where
the contractors proposed an alternate method for hazard
control, certification, or verification. This chart shows a
significant amount of open work, with 53 percent of the
variances needing additional definition and discussion. I see
this as a big plus, and it allows the teams to know, prior to
contract start, areas that will need work. It also is an area
that we need to focus on and work over the next several weeks.
This chart answers one of the Committee's pre-hearing
questions, open work and risks. The work in preparation for the
CCtCaP award has enabled the teams to understand the designs
and risk areas, and will be a big advantage in achieving a safe
system for crew transportation. Technically, the contract is
off to a very good start, however, development and flight of
these systems will be complex and difficult activity for the
teams.
The Commercial Crew Program has not received the funding
requested in annual budgets. This underfunding has caused
delays in program execution, and in past, forced NASA to
continuous Space Act Agreements, as opposed to contracts,
because of funding uncertainty. The budget appropriated in 2015
by Congress showed a commitment to the program, and allowed the
agency to proceed with the current contracts. This
Congressional support is greatly appreciated, and the program
hopes to earn Congressional approval for the solid budget
request that we have made in 2016. The budget request is
anchored by negotiated firm-fixed-price contracts. Funding at
these levels is required to end our sole reliance on Russians
for crew transportation in a safe and timely manner.
In summary, the awarding of the contracts establishes the
start of a new phase. Significant real progress continues to be
made, as evidenced by the testimonies from Boeing and SpaceX.
Despite the protested award, which limited communication, and
made for a difficult contract start, work continued, and is
accelerating. The decision, just like two contracts, was not an
easy or trivial decision. The decision was carefully evaluated
at contract selection, and the benefits of competition during
the development phase was seen as necessary to allow for safe,
timely, and cost-effective development. The decision was not
simply to have competition, but was based on evaluating the
details of the proposals, and making a selection decision that
would provide best value to the U.S. government.
Developing new low-Earth orbit human transportation systems
will not be an easy task. There will be challenges, and
difficult decisions will need to be made. The entire agency,
safety, engineering, crew health and safety organizations are
actively engaged in this program. The support and interaction
with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) will also be
critical and important. The agency is working well with the
FAA, and support for legislation on the government astronaut
definition will be needed. The ISS will get a tremendous
research benefit, 100 percent increase in crew research
time,from the additional on orbit crew member provided by the
system.
The Commercial Crew Transportation Program will take us all
working together to ensure the next generation of U.S. LEO crew
transportation systems are developed effectively and safely.
Congressional support is absolutely required to develop safe
and timely crew transportation systems. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]
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Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Now recognize Vice Vice Admiral Dyer for five minutes to
present his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH DYER,
USN (RET.), CHAIRMAN,
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
Vice Admiral Dyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's 2014 activities
and annual report. Mr. Chairman, I have limited the scope of my
testimony to focus on the Commercial Crew Program. Ms. Edwards,
I would note that both the Chairman and I are Southerners, and
I would hope the clock wouldn't run during my testimony either.
The ASAP salutes NASA on the many accomplishments achieved
during 2014. Among others, these include safe International
Space Station operations, growing traction on the ESD program,
and success in supporting ISS logistics via commercial cargo.
The leadership and program management of the ISS is highlighted
for its openness, transparency, and candor. The ISS culture is,
we believe, a space flight exemplar.
In our 2014 report to the NASA administrator and the
Congress, we noted that NASA is experienced and accomplished in
space system procurement by making, managing, and buying. An
example of making is a NASA custom produced satellite. An
example of managing is a launch vehicle where NASA manages
fulfillment of a performance spec often designed and generally
produced by a contractor. An example of buying would be a
commercial satellite launch service from a marketplace that has
already established the bona fides of value, safety, and
reliability.
The CCP program falls into a chasm between the deep insight
of managing and that of buying a product already proven by
broad market acceptance. With CCP NASA is operating at arm's
length, and within a constrained budget. They are attempting to
approach commercial crew transportation as buying a service,
yet the maturity of the product may be more suitable for a
managed development. Nevertheless, NASA is making laudable
efforts to embrace this new model, but is trapped somewhere on
a continuum between managing and buying.
The panel strongly believes that communications and
transparency are necessary to ensure safety must be a central
part of the program. Regrettably, the panel has been unable to
offer any informed opinion regarding the adequacy of
certification, or the sufficiency of safety in the Commercial
Crew Program due to constraints placed on our access to needed
information. Within CCP, candid, timely and transparent
information has been insufficient. The lack of transparency has
been a concern for a number of years, despite the discussions
with the Director of Commercial Space Development, and with
senior NASA officials at headquarters.
Those sets of constraints, Mr. Chairman, which you
addressed as well, included a seamless series that began with
the acquisition strategy, is still being addressed, therefore,
it can't be discussed. That information is pre-decisional.
Responses had said the incident investigation is still being
conducted, and we are not prepared to address. Next was that it
was source selection sensitive, and lastly, a protest has been
filed, and we are unable to address.
All these statements are true, but these should not have
been absolute barriers to the sharing of information. The
responses by the director have been a compilation of all the
reasons information was withheld, rather than figuring out how
to make things work. The ASAP members are, after all, special
government employees. The panel is concerned that the lack of
candor is not limited to interactions with the ASAP, but may
extend to other internal and external stakeholders. This issue
is reminiscent, we believe, of problems identified by both the
Rogers Commission and the CAIB. NASA knows how to work in an
open and transparent manner, and, as noted, the ISS is a great
example. Going forward into 2015, the administrator has
committed to making the changes necessary to resolve the
situation.
Two other quick topics, Mr. Chairman, if I may? I would
like to address budget and constancy of purpose. With regard to
budget, the panel believes it is critically important to
sustain sufficient funding for the CCP program to sustain
competition. With regard to constancy of purpose, the panel
notes that many NASA human space flight programs that have been
initiated in the last 20 years have not been carried to
completion. The ASAP appeals for constancy of purpose, and
notices that the objective is both important and challenging
when there is a change in leadership at the Congress or the
White House. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Vice Vice Admiral Dyer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Vice Admiral Dyer.
I now recognize Mr. Mulholland for five minutes to present
his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN MULHOLLAND,
VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER,
COMMERCIAL PROGRAMS, THE BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Mulholland. Chairman Palazzo, Ranking Member Edwards,
welcome, Chairman Smith, Members of the Committee, on behalf of
the Boeing Company, thank you for the opportunity to provide an
update on Boeing's commercial crew transportation system. We
are honored to be part of NASA's Commercial Crew Program to
provide safe and reliable crew transportation to support the
International Space Station mission. Boeing is the only
provider to have closed NASA's commercial crew integrated
capability contract on time, and to complete a successful
critical design review. With that, we have laid the framework
for completing our design during the current phase of the
program, which was awarded last September.
Boeing's approach is a full service system, providing all
elements needed to transport crew and cargo to and from low-
Earth orbit, including the CST-100 spacecraft, spacecraft and
launch vehicle integration and test, crew training and mission
planning, cargo integration, mission operations, and crew and
cargo recovery. In developing the Boeing system, we apply our
unique integrated approach to meet NASA's human rating
requirements, leveraging our space shuttle and ISS program
experience and tools, along with our certification products,
which are approved by NASA during the certification products
contract. We continue to work diligently to maintain our
planned schedule, completing the first two schedule milestones
on time, and the first two of the next three part milestone.
We have made significant progress the first four months of
the program. We have procured four Atlas V launch vehicles from
United Launch Alliance for our two certification flight tests,
and the first two service flights. Last week we held a formal
groundbreaking with our partners to begin construction on the
crew access tower for the Atlas V launch pad at Cape Canaveral.
Work is underway on the Atlas V emergency detection system,
part of the abort system that supports human rating of our
integrated system.
Boeing and the Kennedy Space Center have completed handover
of the former Orbital Processing Facility, OPF-3. Boeing has
transformed it into a modernized state of the art facility that
will support manufacturing, assembly, and integration and test
for the CST-100 spacecraft. We have installed tooling, and have
received and inspected more than 150 pieces of flight hardware
on the way to assembling the CST-100 structural test article.
Later this year, hardware for the qualification test vehicle
will arrive, and after that the orbital and crude flight test
vehicle hardware.
Other points of progress include system software and
avionics development, along with development of our avionics
and software integration lab. Wind tunnel testing and landing
system testing in ongoing. Our space suit supplier has provided
an innovative, safe, and comfortable space suit prototype. And
we are making significant progress with cabin interior design
features.
Throughout 2015 and 2016 we will complete a number of key
development tests and reviews. We are confident these
milestones will show progress and completion of our structural
test article and qualification test vehicle. Demonstration of
flight hardware, acceptance of the mission control center,
integrated simulation system, and completion of a service
module hot fire launch abort test. We are on track for a pad
abort test in early 2017 to fully check out the abort system,
an un-crewed orbital flight test in spring of 2017, and our
crewed flight test in the summer of 2017. After successfully
achieving human rating certification, we will be prepared to
fly the first service mission by the end of 2017.
As in most development programs, the Commercial Crew
Program presents a number of technical and programmatic
challenges. We are working proactively to meet these
challenges. A key strength that Boeing provides to NASA is that
we have depth in a wide range of engineering and manufacturing
disciplines. We are able to apply those capabilities readily to
achieve NASA's objective for safe crew access to ISS.
Commercial transportation to low-Earth orbit is the right
solution to enable a robust portfolio of NASA programs in
science and human space flight. The Commercial Crew Program
provides safe and affordable transportation of our astronauts,
helps stabilize our American human space flight work force, and
frees up funding for NASA to invest in deep space exploration.
Boeing is making substantial progress in our rigorous crew
transportation development. Boeing is bringing the same quality
to commercial space flight that we bring to our servicemen and
women, NASA astronauts, and to the traveling public every day.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulholland follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Mulholland. I now
recognize Dr. Reisman for five minutes to present his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. GARRETT REISMAN,
DIRECTOR, CREW OPERATIONS,
SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
Dr. Reisman. Thank you, Chairman Palazzo, Chairman Smith,
and Ranking Member Edwards. Thank you very much for inviting me
here today to talk to you about SpaceX's progress under NASA's
Commercial Crew Program. SpaceX is proud to be serving our
nation's space program in a variety of ways. We are flying
cargo missions today to the International Space Station using
our Dragon spacecraft and our Falcon 9 launch vehicle. SpaceX
currently offers the sole capability to return significant
amounts of cargo to Earth from the ISS. We are also launching
satellites for NASA and the Department of Defense, as well as
the world's leading commercial satellite providers. To date, we
have successfully launched the Falcon 9 15 times, and we have--
and that includes six Dragon flights up to the ISS and back.
Capitalizing on lessons learned from these missions, and from
our partnership with NASA, the safest and most advanced human
space flight systems ever seen are our objective.
Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to share a short video
with you to provide a brief glimpse of SpaceX's manufacturing
capabilities, hardware, and activities.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Chairman, human space flight is the reason that SpaceX
was founded. Safe human space flight is of paramount importance
to SpaceX, and also to me personally. Having been an astronaut
at the time of the Columbia accident, I could tell you that I
never want our country to have to experience a loss like that
again. The safety and reliability that we have designed into
the Falcon 9 and the Dragon reflect this longstanding intent.
We are working steadily, thoughtfully, and efficiently with
NASA to yield the safest and most reliable astronaut
transportation system that the world has ever seen.
SpaceX believes that competition is critical to safe,
timely, and assured access to space. The Aerospace Advisory
Panel, the GAO, and NASA all agree that competition is an
essential feature of this program. The value of redundant space
transportation systems has also been repeatedly and recently
demonstrated.
However, since 2011, the United States has depended
entirely on Russia to transport our astronauts to the
International Space Station. This is not a situation our great
nation should accept. Together, we will fix this, and in only a
few more years we will be launching once again Americans, on
American rockets, from American soil. Your ongoing support is
essential to restoring that capability by 2017.
Thank you for your contributions to the Commercial Crew
Program, and to the American space exploration efforts. I am
pleased to take any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Reisman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Dr. Reisman.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony. Members are
reminded that Committee rules limit questioning to five
minutes. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, we are currently paying Russia $76
million for a Soyuz seat to the ISS, which has historically
increased nine percent per year. Your testimony states that the
commercial crew prices will be roughly 50 million per seat, but
that is hard to calculate an apples to apples comparison,
because the commercial crew price includes some cargo. So my
question is, does this $58 million price also include the
investments NASA has made in the CC Dev 1, CC Dev 2, CCiCap,
and the CPC phases, or is this just CCtCap post-certification
mission? I can't hear you.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The cost for commercial crew are just the
costs associated with the post-certification mission
activities. They do not include the developmental costs.
Chairman Palazzo. What would the price per seat be if you
included all development funding for the Commercial Crew
Program.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I can go ahead and do that
calculation for you. I will take the question for the record.
Chairman Palazzo. Ballpark?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We did the calculation the way we did
because it is a fair comparison with the Soyuz. We didn't
include the Soyuz development costs associated with the Soyuz
vehicle in those numbers. So, it is the cost that NASA pays for
the actual service we need to go to ISS. That is the reason we
did the calculations the way we did.
Chairman Palazzo. So you don't want to take a stab at--I
mean, if you included the total development costs, would it be
twice that of $58 million? Is it twice that--what we are paying
the Russians?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. You could----
Chairman Palazzo. Less than that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It will be probably slightly more than
the Russian seat price if you include the development cost in
there. And we can do the calculation.
Chairman Palazzo. All right. Thank you. Your testimony also
states that you anticipate re-baselining the CCtCap schedule
milestones, and that there will be a relatively large number of
changes. Your statement also indicates that this will not
affect contract costs.
So my questions are, will these milestone changes affect
schedules? What--and while I am sure that all parties are very
motivated to develop a capability as soon as possible, does
NASA have any leverage in these contracts to ensure performance
based on a schedule? For instance, if schedules are not met, or
payment simply delayed until milestones are completed, are the
payments lost, or are the payments scaled back?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, the payments will not be made
until the milestones are satisfied, so those payments are
essentially held back, in a sense, until those are met. I think
the contractors can talk directly about where the schedules
have moved and where the milestones are changing.
This is very typical in a contract startup, where you get
the contractor on board, you go through, you evaluate the
details of the schedules. Many of the proposals were written
about a year ago, so it is very appropriate for them to go
ahead and see some updates in movement. We will continue to
monitor the schedule.
You know, we were careful to make 2017 as a goal. We didn't
want to make that as an absolute requirement, and the reason
for that was purely safety. We felt that if we pushed too hard
on schedule, we could sacrifice technical development. We could
sacrifice safety to meet the date certain of 2017. So we will
be cognizant of the date, we will move forward--as fast as we
can, but we will also make sure that safety is present as we go
forward.
Chairman Palazzo. All right. Mr. Mulholland?
Mr. Mulholland. Chairman, if I might add, our final
proposal submittal to NASA assumed an August 1 authority to
proceed, with the award near the end of September, and then
subsequent protest. We re-baselined our proposal consistent
with that approximate two month award delay. We did not want to
compress our schedule, or take any technical risk at this time.
That said, we are working very diligently on several
opportunities to try and accelerate that delivery. But at this
point in the program, it did not make sense to do anything
other than adjust our schedule consistent with the award date.
Chairman Palazzo. Okay. Dr. Reisman, if you want to add
anything?
Dr. Reisman. Just to say, with regard to schedule, that
we--after the original proposal was submitted, we continued to
work diligently on our design, and we found ways, during the
blackout period of the procurement, and during the protest, to
make our vehicle better, safer, and more reliable.
And so that led to summary adjustment of some of the
milestones, but I could tell you that we have a schedule that
has been vetted by NASA, has been integrated upon with NASA,
that has a margin built in to each milestone, and that has a
significant amount of milestone--of margin to mean the ultimate
goal of flying Americans in space in 2017. So we are confident
that we are in a good position.
Chairman Palazzo. All right. And, lastly, Dr. Gerstenmaier,
several media outlets have recently reported that the Russian
space agency is considering exiting the ISS partnership to
support their own Space Station. According to the reports, this
could include decoupling the Russian segments from the rest of
the station, and continuing on their own. Do you have a
response to these reports, and how would NASA respond in such a
situation?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think the details of those reports are
basically that this would occur in 2024 or 2025, which is after
the extension of the Space Station to the period of 2024, we
have not heard anything officially from the Russians on their
plans, but our understanding was, from the media reports, and
from this internal meeting, that it was after 2024, so it would
not have any impact to us through this period of ISS
operations.
Chairman Palazzo. All right. And after 2024, that is when
you expect industry, or non-profits, or somebody else to assume
operations of the International Space Station? But if Russia
does decouple their segments from the International Space
Station, is that--I mean, have you given any thought to how
NASA would handle that? Even though you may not be the operator
at the time, I mean, how would that affect ISS operations for,
you know, whatever group that does take it over?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We will continue to work those plans, but
we have an ability to operate station without our Russian
partners, if absolutely required.
Chairman Palazzo. Okay. Well, thank you very much. I now
recognize Ms. Edwards for her questions.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to the witnesses today. As usual, we never have quite
enough time to go into all the details, so please accept my
apologies. And I just want to note, for the record, that many
Democratic Members are not here today not because they are not
concerned, but because a Democratic caucus meeting was called
at 9 o'clock, at the time of this hearing, so we apologize for
that.
I want to focus on Vice Admiral Dyer, in Mr. Gerstenmaier's
prepared statements, he indicated that the Certification
Products Contract efforts gave NASA an early insight into
vehicle designs and approaches, and it would seem that access
to the contractors' proposals for variances to meet the various
safety requirements, and how NASA handled them, would be pieces
of information that would be critical to ASAP's
responsibilities in advising Congress.
In fact, in Mr. Gerstenmaier's statement, one point in
particular stands out. He says, and I quote, ``Overall, this
phase of the contract was critical to allowing the contractors
to understand the human rating requirements, and NASA's
understanding of how the contractors' approaches intend to meet
those requirements.'' And I want to know from Vice Admiral
Dyer, were you aware of NASA's plans to assess contractor
variance proposals, and did you request access to the variance
proposals, and NASA's subsequent disposition?
Vice Admiral Dyer. Yes, Madam Ranking Member. We were--we
are aware. We have asked for that insight. We have not received
it during the 2014 period. As I indicated in my testimony,
General Bolden, the administrator at NASA, has indicated he is
going to correct the situation. We are beginning to see the
early stages of making that turn. We don't yet understand the
waivers that have been granted, in terms of--beyond that which
Mr. Gerstenmaier shared this morning.
Ms. Edwards. Excuse me----
Vice Admiral Dyer. We look forward to----
Ms. Edwards. --would that----
Vice Admiral Dyer. --that insight, but we don't have it
yet.
Ms. Edwards. Would that--that information would, of course,
help you, in terms of your advice both to the Congress, but
also the, you know, the kind of partnership that is necessary
from NASA, so that we can make sure that we really are paying
attention to the safety concerns that all of us have expressed
an interest in. And we all want to be on the same page about
those things, isn't that right?
Vice Admiral Dyer. You are absolutely right----
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Dyer. --and we look forward for that insight.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. So I want to turn to Mr.
Gerstenmaier, because I am--really, as I hear this, I am just
incredibly dismayed about ASAP's difficulty in obtaining the
kind of information that they need to advise the Congress. So,
you know, and although I hear that there are conversations now
about how that is going to happen, it still hasn't.
And so I want some assurance today, and I know the--all of
the Committee, actually, wants the assurance today that ASAP
will have full and unfettered access to contract information
that is required to ensure document traceability of safety
throughout the development and certification of commercial crew
systems. And so can you give me that assurance today?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes. ASAP will have access to all the
contract details associated with the variances and the other
activities that could help them do their job.
Ms. Edwards. When?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We already did that in January. Vice
Admiral Dyer can discuss the meeting we had in January with the
ASAP panel. We are beginning to give all that data to them, and
we will continue to give it to them.
Ms. Edwards. Okay. And so, I mean, when could we expect, if
we were asking as a Committee, that ASAP would have what they
need to date?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Immediately.
Ms. Edwards. Okay. We will be asking about that again. Mr.
Mulholland----
Mr. Gerstenmaier. And they have already received it in
January, so they got a significant amount of information in
January from the agency, and we will continue to give more as
needed.
Ms. Edwards. Well, I look forward to both NASA and ASAP
communicating with the Committee about what has been received
in what timeline, and what remains to be received, so we would
appreciate that.
Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Reisman, how will you ensure that
NASA and ASAP don't encounter the same problems that ASAP has
experienced in acquiring documents that are needed to evaluate
safety?
Mr. Mulholland. I think that is an extremely important
position. I have the utmost respect for Vice Admiral Dyer, the
ASAP mission. We have had two very successful meetings with
ASAP in the last year, where we went through the details of our
certification plans, validation plans. I was disappointed also
to see the report, and the lack of information provided. In our
meeting with ASAP just a couple weeks ago, I personally pledged
to Vice Admiral Dyer that we would give him any and all
information of our products, regardless of the ability of NASA
to provide it to them.
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Reisman?
Dr. Reisman. We have also been open to the ASAP. We have
had them out to our facility in Hawthorne, and have a standing
invitation to them to invite--to come by anytime. I think we
are talking about August for another meeting just earlier
today. But we are committed to full insight. We are drastically
ramping up our activities in terms of insight for NASA, and
creating complete transparency. We have established working
forums, working groups.
Each SpaceX technical group has a weekly or biweekly
meeting with their NASA counterparts, and communication is
happening daily so that NASA knows exactly what we are doing,
in terms of design and development. We have a buddy system,
where everybody at SpaceX has a point of contact at NASA. We
have deep facility and data access. So, really, we are being as
transparent as we could possibly be.
Ms. Edwards. So--thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
indulging me, and--so I appreciate that, the--and the
relationship that our commercial partners have with NASA. I
want that same relationship with ASAP, so that Congress has the
ability to make sure that we can make determinations about how
we are spending taxpayers' money, and about the progress of the
program, and that we are continuing to stay focused on safety.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And,
again, I appreciate the leadership you and the Ranking Member
are demonstrating by this hearing today, and the leadership you
have taken in this job.
Let us see. Let me give this--the President has requested a
54 percent increase in the funding level for the Commercial
Crew Program, so that is a $1.24 billion request for 2016,
versus $850 million that was appropriated for 200--for 2015, so
we have had this increase in the request.
I guess we should ask Mr. Gerstenmaier--now, if we don't
get full funding, we have been hearing that the date for 2017
is at risk. We have heard that testimony several times. But
yet, every year, we actually are spending less--we are
appropriating less money than has been requested. Congress is
appropriating less than what is requested, yet we are saying
the 2017 date is at risk unless we meet these appropriations,
but we are not doing it. Is the 2017 date at risk right now
because of actions or inaction by Congress to fully appropriate
the request of the Administration for the Commercial Crew
Program?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, as I said in my written and oral
statements, the problem with not getting appropriate funding in
the past year has caused us to slip from earlier delivery
dates, where we had planned to be earlier in 2015 and 2016,
depending on which budget we submitted. Now we are saying 2017,
the 805 that was provided this year, in 2015, is acceptable to
continue to hold that date. It is consistent with the
contracts. The funding that we need in 2016 is absolutely
required to hold the 2017 date.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So if we don't get the full amount
that you have requested, which is $1.24 billion, we could
expect the date to slip?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, the date will slip, and, more
importantly, there is very important work that needs to be done
in this near term timeframe that is important for both safety,
and also important for the overall design of the vehicles. And
without that funding, we will impact those other objectives, as
well as just the date.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So for every year that we let this
slip, we are dependent on the Russians for the transportation
at $76 million per seat. So how much will it cost us extra if
we are letting that date slip?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We use six seats per year, so you could
do the math.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So that is a very considerable price that
we are paying, maybe more than even what--if we just go ahead
and fund the program. I hope that that sinks into people's
minds there. So--and so let us just--and let us also note--let
us--we are depending on the goodwill of the Russians, and I
want to note that they are showing goodwill. They could
actually cut us off altogether, which is one other reason why
we want to make sure that we--the crew program that we are
talking about, that we get back in this business. So every year
that we delay this, underfunding, we actually are paying the
Russians an enormous amount for transportation. That needs to
sink in.
Now, in terms of--how much would it cost, Mr. Gerstenmaier,
if we were--we have heard the witnesses here from the two
companies that are leading the way. They are point companies in
this effort. How much more would it cost us if we were going
about to achieve the same crew capabilities that we are trying
to achieve, if we are going through the old process that NASA
used to have in developing this type of technology? We have two
private sector companies here. We know the cost of that. How
much more or less would it cost if NASA would have gone through
the old system, not the non-commercial system, as the admiral
detail, the difference between what the commercial approach
was, and the old NASA approach was?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I can't provide you a specific number,
but is extremely more efficient to do it the way we are doing
it today. And, again, the structured approach we have used,
where we used Space Act Agreements first, and then we did the
CPC portion of the contract. This contract is to save the
agency a significant amount of funds over a typical procurement
that we would have done from a basic kind of managed from the
beginning type of activity with these providers.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, just in summary, Mr. Chairman, what we
have, although we are looking at a major expense here, this is
a lot less expensive to go with these private sector operations
than if we went with the traditional way NASA would have gone
about developing this same capability. Thank you very much.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Beyer.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Three questions for you
Mr. Gerstenmaier. First, after the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board said that safety should be the highest
priority, NASA's Astronaut office was more specific, urging
that the next crewed spacecraft in a low-Earth orbit should
have a Loss of Crew ratio of no more than 1 in 1,000. The Loss
of Crew, loss of mission requirements for the commercial crew
vehicles, are they still the 1 in 1,000? How do they compare
with those for the Space Shuttle? And do you have the insight
into the commercial crew contracts necessary to be assured that
these vehicles meet the Loss of Crew, loss of mission
requirements?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have the appropriate insight to
evaluate meeting our Loss of Crew and loss of mission
requirements. I think we also have the requirements in our
contracts, in the 1130 set of documents that describe exactly
the Loss of Crew numbers. They are not the 1 in 1,000 numbers
that the crew requested. And we believe that that is not
technically achievable. We think it is also very difficult to
determine Loss of Crew precisely. There is a tremendous
variance about that number. It is a very difficult number to
calculate with any assurance of exactly what that number is.
But we are very interested in keeping that number understood.
We will review that again with the ASAP. We had discussions
with them again in January about how we will meet those numbers
and ensure we have crew safety.
The other big advantage of these systems is they have an
abort system, which was not present on the Shuttle system. That
allows for, essentially, the vehicles to abort if something
occurs with the rocket underneath, which we did not have in the
Shuttle program. And that gets factored in tangentially to the
equation, but it is not directly in the calculation. Also, the
capsules are safer to return, and require less stability during
the return phase, which also makes them safer.
So there is inherent safety in both of these designs. Both
companies are very focused on safety. We will meet the
requirements that are specified across the agency.
Mr. Beyer. If 1 in 1,000, what the astronauts had
requested, is not achievable, what is a number that you do use,
and do think is achievable?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have been using 1 in 500 for both
ascent and entry, and it is the same for our exploration
program, so the requirements for Loss of Crew is consistent
across all agency programs on human space flight.
Mr. Beyer. Mr. Gerstenmaier, on the slippage issue, if, for
some reason, SpaceX, Boeing is not able to perform by 2017,
will you be able to extend the contract with Roscosmos? And I
know there is three year lag times on some of that. Or are
there any other reasons for continuing the contract with the
Russians as backup?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have recently done a synopsis to begin
the investigation to see what our options for extending the
Soyuz into 2017. We currently have Soyuz capability through
calendar year 2017, with a return flight of our crews in the
spring of 2018. We did that synopsis to begin the discussion
with the Russians about acquiring additional Soyuz capability.
We will continue that discussion over the next several months.
But again, if you look at the timing, we need to make a
decision with the Russians sometime this spring to have that
assurance.
We think it is probably in our best interest, even if the
calendar shows that we will be well completed in 2017, there is
some advantage of having an overlap of both Soyuz capability
and U.S. capability at the same time. Because we could get very
late into flow on the launch pad, have a problem with the
launch pad, or have a vehicle very late in the flow having a
problem, and if we don't have a backup capability, we would be
in the posture of having to de-crew the station. So we think it
is in our interest to go pursue additional seats with the
Russians. We will do that over the next several months.
Mr. Beyer. And is there any real wastage to have that
overlap of taxpayer money, or NASA resources?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I believe we will use those Soyuz seats
to our advantage. If the preference will be to fly the
commercial providers as soon as they are ready, then we will
use those Soyuz seat capabilities to the advantage--to give us
additional research time on board station.
Mr. Beyer. All right. Thank you. And one last question.
Every day I pick up the Post and read about Russia violating
the terms of the cease fire in the Eastern Ukraine, the seizing
of Crimea, the continued conflict there. The U.S. sanctions,
and the sanctions from any European countries, are they
affecting your relationship with the Soyuz at all?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. No. To this point, we have a very strong
relationship with the Russians. We work with them every day on
board Space Station. Our teams are in constant communications
back and forth. We have a team of roughly 20 to 30 U.S.
citizens in Russia, constantly monitoring the Space Station
activities, and the partnership at an engineering level, a
technical level, and the program level has been very strong
between the Russians and the----
Mr. Beyer. Okay.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. --U.S. and NASA personnel.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. I yield back, Mr.
Chair.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Lucas.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Dyer, I
could not help but listen with great intensity to your opening
comments, and, of course, the questions so accurately raised by
Ranking Member Edwards. Most of us on this panel--all of us on
this mantle--panel remember the loss of the two shuttle crews.
I suspect most of us remember the loss of the first Apollo crew
many years ago, so sensitivity to safety and understanding that
our astronauts are the most valuable piece of asset in the
programs is of great importance to us.
Could you expand again for a moment about the challenges
that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel faced in 2014 trying
to access the information? Now, I know we have been given
assurances here today that everything is available, but could
you expand on for--that for just a moment?
Vice Admiral Dyer. Yes, sir, I am happy to do so. It is, in
my opinion, first and foremost a leadership level issue, below
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It has been one that I have seen many times
in my DOD experience, where an inexperienced program director,
being perhaps right-hearted, but wrong-headed, believes that
protecting the program from any criticism, or from any of those
that might speak questioningly of it, is a first
responsibility. It builds suspicion and distrust. It is not in
the best interest of the program.
That is beginning to turn around, as Mr. Gerstenmaier said,
but only after the issuance of our annual report. The first
thing we received were gigabytes of data that I would describe
as there is something important in there somewhere, why don't
you see if you could find it? And we are following that up now
with more detailed briefings, and the future is beginning to
look better, but we can't yet answer the question as to whether
or not the certification process looks good and safe to us, and
whether or not the path forward looks to be of good technical
conscience. We will, but we are not there yet.
Mr. Lucas. And the players that made it so challenging, 14
are still in place?
Vice Admiral Dyer. They are.
Mr. Lucas. I can assure you, Admiral, that the Committee
will work with you to make sure that the panel's mission is
completed, for the sake of all of our investments. With that
thought, Mr. Chairman, I actually yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. I now recognize Mr.
Posey.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Reisman, just
curious about the extent to which NASA might impose safety
requirements above the level of safety you would have if you
did not have NASA oversight?
Dr. Reisman. That is an interesting question. We--we have
designed a vehicle, first and foremost, for what we think is
safe, and what we think is the best possible design. We then
make sure that we comply with NASA requirements, but often we
exceed them, and one example is our launch abort system, which
is--as Mr. Gerstenmaier pointed out, is an essential advantage
over both of our vehicles, compared to the one I rode, the
space shuttle.
Our launch abort system really has--the NASA requirement is
not for fault tolerance, but we have made that launch abort
system to be single fault tolerant, to make it even safer than
it has to be per the requirements. So we look at--we make sure
we meet the requirements, and we are committed to meeting
NASA's safety requirements, but we are--we think it is prudent
we go beyond them.
Mr. Posey. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Gerstenmaier, what was the
original cost of a seat on a Soyuz?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Soyuz seat price was--I don't remember
what the original was. On the order of $50 million or so.
Mr. Posey. Okay. And how much is it exactly today?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Today it is $76 million per seat.
Mr. Posey. Okay. That is a pretty significant increase.
Were those increases in cost, and I know they have gone up
gradually, as I have seen--were they anticipated, were they
agreed to in advance, or were they unilaterally set by the
other side?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. They were anticipated and negotiated with
the Russians.
Mr. Posey. Okay. And how much higher does this cost go?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Our historical increase has roughly been
about nine percent per contract, and that was, again, fact-
found on our side, where we looked at that compared to actual
manufacturing costs, inflation, Dollar to Ruble conversions.
All those went into those calculations, and the nine percent
was seen as a reasonable kind of increase. And how can they go,
I can't anticipate.
Mr. Posey. Yeah, when will we expect the negotiations, or
recalculation about the next increase?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We are in the process of doing that now.
We started with a synopsis, of which we received comments back.
We are beginning discussions with the Russians on the contract,
as I have just described to you.
Mr. Posey. Okay. And when do we anticipate that will be
complete?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It will probably be complete in the next
several months.
Mr. Posey. And we should look at probably a minimum of nine
percent, so another $7 million increase, minimum?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think that is very reasonable.
Mr. Posey. Okay. And then when is the next re-analysis
scheduled after that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We don't anticipate requiring any more
additional seats after the seats we will acquire this time. We
would anticipate acquiring six seats for 2018. We believe that
provides sufficient overlap, as I described earlier.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. Mr. Mulholland, I
understand that the CST-100 is designed to fly on multiple
rockets. Can you discuss what makes the versatility possible,
as well as what rockets it is capable of using, and why you
chose the Atlas V as the launch vehicle?
Mr. Mulholland. Absolutely. One of our original design
parameters on the CST-100 was to design the spacecraft for all
launch vehicles in this class to make it easier, if--in the
event we needed to switch to another launch vehicle. We chose
the Atlas V, obviously, because of its reliability. It has
flown 52 times, with 100 percent mission success, unparalleled
technical and schedule reliability.
But from day one we designed the CST-100 for launching on
Delta. We have worked with SpaceX in the past to understand the
loads of the Falcon 9, and we have also worked with emerging
launch vehicle providers to ensure that we drive in long-term
affordability through the entire life cycle of the program.
Mr. Posey. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Knight.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks for having
this today. I have just a couple quick questions. Mr.
Gerstenmaier, on--as far as competition, we are having two
companies involved. Can you give me kind of an idea how
beneficial that is, having--competing for not just dollars, but
competing for safety, competing for innovation? Can you give me
an idea of where we are on that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think there is a tremendous benefit to
the U.S. government, and to NASA, to have competition during
this development phase, and it is much more than cost, as you
described. You know, if we run into a problem or concern with
the safety aspect, to not be totally reliant upon one
contractor, and have the other one available to go ahead and
continue is very important to us. If they run into a technical
problem, maybe a manufacturing problem, parts delivery problem,
or they have a test failure somewhere along the way, having
another provider available to us to move forward and continue
to keep progress heading towards commercial services is
extremely important.
So there are numerous benefits along those lines during
this development phase that keeps both companies at the top of
their game, keeps innovation in the system, keeps making them
want to go ahead and make these milestones to keep moving
forward. So it is extremely important to have competition
during this development phase.
Mr. Knight. And I think--let us see. I think, Vice Admiral
Dyer, we were talking about the 1,000 to 1, or the 500 to 1, or
maybe Mr. Gerstenmaier wants to weigh in on this. What are the
Russians--when we are sending them up, what do we expect of
them, or what kind of track record do they have? Are they on a
1,000 to 1, are they on a 500 to 1, or are they on less than
that?
Vice Admiral Dyer. Mr. Gerstenmaier will be better prepared
to speak to the quantitative numbers. I will tell you that the
Soyuz services do represent, given their years of support, and
the numbers of missions that they have launched, it does
represent a buy opportunity. It is market proven, and the bona
fides of reliability, safety, have been demonstrated over time.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I would say that if you look at--their
actual demonstrated reliability it is probably a little bit
less than 1 in 500, from kind of a calculation standpoint. But
then if you look at their actual demonstrated performance, it
is fairly high. And the fact that, again, they have a pretty
robust system overall, with a good design margin in it, and it
has been demonstrated over the years. So, the--Soyuz again has
the abort system on the spacecraft, much like the other
providers. It is also a capsule design, with a proven, fairly
simple re-entry capability.
So, it probably has a calculated number slightly less than
what we will get with the commercial providers. But, from a
demonstrated, and actually proven over the multiple years, it
is probably slightly better.
Mr. Knight. And I think you can hear from this panel, and
from any American, that safety is the most paramount issue when
we are talking about sending our young men and women into
space. When we were talking about cost, it is about 77 now, and
I guess the new contract will bump it up to about 84, and that
would be comparing to 58 when the American companies are doing
this.
We are not calculating in the development of the American
companies, we are not calculating in all of the things that get
us to that point where we are sending Americans into space, so
it is a little apples to oranges when we are talking about tax
dollars, but somewhere down the road those lines are going to
meet, and the--or the American taxpayer is going to get a
benefit. And so I would expect that that would be somewhere in
the near future, five years into the program, or maybe even ten
years into the program, so it will be beneficial to the
taxpayer to do this. Also from a confidence standpoint, that we
have American companies sending Americans into space, and we
are backing the American dream of having space exploration.
So I yield back, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
indulging me, and letting me pass a couple times to listen to
some of the questions and answers. I am new to this Committee.
The acronyms are plentiful in your business, and I just wanted
to have a chance to talk about, you know, from point of view--
as a Member of Congress, safety issues, cost issues are going
to be more up my alley than the technical issues that you all
are discussing. So let me get down to a couple questions that I
have.
And the first is the safety issue. The Atlas V, I think,
Mr. Mulholland, you said 52 missions, no failures. If, for some
reason or other, Congress were to say, we are not dealing with
any Russian engines from this point forward today, how long
would it take us to come up with a new engine to power, say,
the Atlas V, or some other rocket like that, to take on these
missions?
Mr. Mulholland. I would say ULA and the member companies of
ULA are working diligently with Blue Origin, and also with
AeroJet, to develop a replacement engine for the Atlas V.
Mr. Perlmutter. I hear you, but--and I am not trying to
lead you down a path. It isn't like we could have an engine
tomorrow.
Mr. Mulholland. No.
Mr. Perlmutter. I mean, not even next year probably. Three
or four years, right? Now I am trying to lead you down a path.
Mr. Mulholland. No, it is, you know, ULA is on a plan for a
2019 re-engine of the Atlas V launch vehicle. The Air Force
recently thought that that program would take seven to nine
years. And so it is very important for us to make sure that we
have a launch vehicle that is as robust and reliable as the
Atlas V. There are other launch vehicles we could move to, such
as the Delta, if we needed to. We were not given a bid for the
Falcon 9 during this previous phase of the proposal, but we
have had discussions with SpaceX, if they would be willing to
provide a proposal. But incredibly important that we
thoughtfully move through the ULA re-engine.
Mr. Perlmutter. So, I mean, basically you have got one path
where you are developing other engines that would be American-
made?
Mr. Mulholland. Um-hum.
Mr. Perlmutter. At the same time, we have a reliable engine
that has worked for us 52 times. And you can't just go cold
turkey on that immediately and hope to move forward with these
different programs we have in place, is that right?
Mr. Mulholland. Correct.
Mr. Perlmutter. Okay. So, second question I have, and you
all should know I am from Colorado, and I have certain
companies in my state that are clearly interested in space
exploration, and launches, and delivery, and all of that stuff.
So, as I understand it, the Space Station has what I think Mr.
Gerstenmaier, or somebody may have said, a--we expect a seven--
well, a life through 2024. Yet the missions that you two,
Boeing and SpaceX, have been given as part of your competition
really go until 2023.
And I am just curious, and either--Mr. Gerstenmaier, you
can answer, or, gentlemen, you can answer on behalf of your
companies, am I now to take it that more or less competitive
bids are over for any new kinds of commercial crew
opportunities? And I am talking about the Dreamchaser, or
whatever else might exist.
So, Mr. Gerstenmaier, you are looking pretty forlorn that
nobody has asked you any questions for a while, so I will ask
you.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We anticipate a competitive selection for
services beyond the existing contracts. We have required a
minimum purchase of two flights per contractor in this first
contract, and anything beyond that, we have the option of going
and competitively selecting for future services to the Space
Station.
Mr. Perlmutter. And gentlemen--Dr. Reisman, would you agree
that you are in this to compete and to win, and you think that
SpaceX can do that?
Dr. Reisman. Absolutely. And I just wanted to add that, you
know, John is talking about the possibility of making CST-100
compatible with the Falcon 9. We have had some discussion. I
would put out there that the Falcon 9 is, in our opinion, the
best way for the U.S. to wean itself off its Russian
dependency. It is 100 percent American made. It has 15
consecutive flights, with 100 percent primary mission success.
But by the time, in 2017, when we strap somebody in, we will be
well over 50 missions, and so we will have the same type of
flight heritage that the Atlas V has today.
It was designed from the beginning with human rating in
mind. It has triple avionics streams, factors of safety of 1.4,
so it meets all the human rating requirements. Now, I don't get
a commission, so I can't sell you one of those today, and it is
above my pay grade to talk about these types of strategic
alliances, but I just wanted to say the Falcon 9, in my
opinion, with all the issues we have out there, is certainly
the best path forward for America, not only for NASA, but for
Department of Defense, to break our dependency on the Russians.
Mr. Perlmutter. My time is expired, but if Mr. Mulholland
wanted to respond, it is--I don't know. You--were you getting
ready to say something?
Mr. Mulholland. I think it is important, and obviously we
work with and monitor the Falcon 9 performance as a launch
vehicle buyer. It will be interesting to see, as--the Falcon 9
has gone through a couple of different design changes, and they
are getting ready to go to larger engines, and so it will be
interesting to see the stability and the scale as they perform.
As Dr. Reisman mentioned, they expect to be over 50 missions by
the time the launch services are provided, which would be a
significant increase in their schedule reliability, to be able
to achieve that number of missions per year.
And as they achieve that, and have that demonstrated
reliability that you would need to put crew on it, obviously it
could be considered as a launch vehicle----
Mr. Perlmutter. Okay. Thank you, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gerstenmaier,
real quick question starting off. You know, maintaining two
partners in the program provides competition to price, and a
redundant capability, but if Russia stopped providing Soyuz
seats to NASA, could NASA accelerate the development of a
domestic capability by focusing resources on one partner?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. No, and the way the contract was awarded,
or we put the proposal out, the stated requirement was we would
select one or more providers, so that required both offerers to
give us essentially their best schedule, and give us the best
price, as an individual. There was no idea that we would pick
two out of the selection. So they gave us the best schedules
that they could give us, and the best price at this award,
assuming there might only be one winner out of this selection.
So the current schedule we have is, I believe, the most
aggressive schedule that we could get, and applying additional
funds would not allow us to advance that date any earlier.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Also, Mr. Gerstenmaier, the Commercial
Crew Program is a new way of doing business that requires new
processes for investigating mishaps or accidents. What has NASA
done to prepare for any mishaps or accidents that may occur in
the Commercial Crew Program?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, we would treat these as a major
mishap. There is also a Congressional investigation that would
probably be required and incurred for a loss of life associated
with these programs. It would be similar to the kind of
requirements we have had before for our human space flight
programs, in terms of investigation and requirements following
a mishap.
Mr. Johnson. So is it accurate to say, then, that
procedures are in place to address investigations and oversight
of investigations?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Those procedures are in place. We will
review them again, probably along with the ASAP, and also with
Congress, to make sure they are current and make sure they are
up to date with where we stand today. But the processes and
procedures we have in place today are the basis to start from.
But like with any program, we can go back, reflect on them,
look at them, and potentially improve and enhance them.
Mr. Johnson. Are they spelled out in the contracts? Are
these procedures spelled out in the contracts with the
partners?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I don't know if the accident procedures
are called out specifically.
Mr. Johnson. Can you share those procedures with the
Committee?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Sure.
Mr. Johnson. Can you point us to those?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Sure. They are available.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Great. Mr. Gerstenmaier, the two
contractors have proposed very different prices for
accomplishing the goals and mission requirements set forth in
their respective contracts. How do you account for this large
discrepancy in development costs between the two competitors?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. That question is better posed to them.
Mr. Johnson. Well, you are--but don't you work for NASA?
Aren't you overseeing the contracts? Do you----
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, I am.
Mr. Johnson. Do you have a concern about the----
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I have no concern----
Mr. Johnson. --costs?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. --about the costs. We evaluated both
costs to see if they were reasonable. We looked at the chance
of default. We looked at them. They were reasonable, they were
fully understandable to us, but the specifics of the
differences we can understand. I can describe to you from a
NASA perspective why they were there, but you have the luxury
today of having both contractors here, and they can explain
that to you in much more detail from their perspective than I
can from a NASA perspective. But----
Mr. Johnson. Well, let me ask a follow-on, then. If you
were to use the same joint confidence level methodology for the
Commercial Crew Program that you used for the cost-plus
contracts for SLS and Orion, would you expect the outcome to
resemble the contractor prices and schedules? Would you see any
similarities?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We did an independent cost analysis,
where we looked at the cost of what these contracts should
cost, and we evaluated those against what the actual proposals
were, and they were reasonable and consistent with what we
could see.
Mr. Johnson. Have you done any--has NASA done--considered
doing any JCLs on these contracts?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Right now we have firm fixed price
contracts in place. We don't believe there is a need to do a
JCL on a firm fixed price contract because that value has been
given to us for the service we require, and it is a commitment
by the contractors to deliver for that price.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Reisman, what
plan does each of your companies have to track and mitigate
schedule and funding risks?
Mr. Mulholland. Absolutely, and first, if I might go back
to the cost question, and you talked about the different
approaches of the two companies----
Mr. Johnson. I am out of time, so we will have to see if
the Chairman will indulge, but we will see.
Mr. Mulholland. Well----
Chairman Palazzo. Go ahead, Bill.
Mr. Johnson. He wants--okay. Go ahead.
Chairman Palazzo. Yes, please.
Mr. Johnson. Go ahead.
Mr. Mulholland. I would say that, you know, there is a
difference in approach. I think the only objective evidence is
the NASA evaluation from the source board. Mr. Gerstenmaier put
it in the record, and so the whole source selection statement
is laid out, but there were many instances of statements about
the increase in confidence that NASA has in the Boeing plan
because of the detailed understanding of the certification
requirements, in comparison to SpaceX, who did not demonstrate
as good an understanding of the certification products, or have
as effective systems for development of these key products.
And so it is, I think, that difference in approach. I mean,
you have to remember that Boeing has been a partner with NASA
in the development of every capsule that has taken domestic
astronauts to space that this country has embarked on. And so
it is that deep legacy, and knowledge of--and understanding of
what it takes to design certified, and then field a human rated
spacecraft.
Mr. Johnson. Right.
Mr. Mulholland. And so a lot of focus, from our standpoint,
on the robustness of the design, and the robustness of the
processes needed to not only ensure safety in the design, but
safety in operation through the life cycle.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Reisman, if you want to--
--
Dr. Reisman. Well, John, I mean, it was a good qualitative
answer, but I could tell you that if you looked in detail at
the source selection official statement, that--you will see
that we are--it was neck and neck when it came to technical
mission suitability. There is a seven percent difference in the
scores that were awarded, but there was a 70 percent difference
in price.
And I could tell you that the reason for that--first of
all, we are very happy with the $2.6 billion that we did
receive. That is every penny that we asked for. We have to--I
should also point out that we have to meet the same contract
requirements, the same objectives, and, most importantly, the
same safety requirements that Boeing has to meet. So we have to
do the same thing.
As far as why we are so much ahead, in terms of cost, is
because we are so much ahead in terms of the development of the
vehicle. We have a cargo vehicle today that is flying to the
Space Station. We have a Falcon 9 that is already integrated
with that vehicle. We have a mission control today that is
controlling that integrated rocket and vehicle. We have the
luxury of performing two major abort tests, two of the most
difficult validation tests--hardware tests integrated under the
CCiCap contract, and those abort tests are about to happen. In
fact, the test article is at the Cape right now.
So we had a lot of runway behind us, and, at the same time,
we are also very efficient. We are a vertically integrated
company that does not have to pay subcontractors, upon
subcontractors, upon subcontractors. So we have a lot of
inherent efficiencies, and I think that explains the
difference.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. All right. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thanks.
Chairman Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Dyer, the
United States Government is working to replace the Russian RD-
180 engine with a domestic alternative. Aside from the
domestically sourced RS-68 used on the Delta IV launch vehicle,
is there an alternative engine available today that could
provide the same level of performance and reliability as the
RD-180 engine?
Vice Admiral Dyer. Mr. Brooks, as you heard from both the
SpaceX representative and Boeing representatives, there are
hard discussionsto be made about domestic engines, both new
ones, as well as extended use of the SpaceX engines, there is
not currently a realistic path forward within the constraints
of the schedules that we are talking about for commercial
space, in my opinion.
Now, I will follow it up by saying we believe that the two
contractors represent a great competitive portfolio. On the
Boeing side, they have challenges of process innovation, cost,
and finding a way to a new engine in time. On the SpaceX side,
we would submit that the challenges are configuration, control,
and design stability, as they find innovative and new ways of
doing business with new equipment, but it is a great portfolio.
An engine is critically important, but it is not, in my
opinion, on the path between now and the end of ISS.
Mr. Brooks. You have answered my second question to some
degree, Vice Admiral Dyer, but if you would like to add
anything additional to the second question, feel free. And
after you have responded, Mr. Gerstenmaier, Mr. Mulholland, and
Dr. Reisman, if you would like to share your insight, I would
appreciate it. How important, then, is it for the United States
Government to develop a domestic replacement for the RD-180?
Vice Admiral Dyer. I think it is critically important for
two reasons. For geopolitical reasons, to have an engine that
is American made and unencumbered is important. And, perhaps it
is a sin, but there is a prideful issue of American made that I
think needs to be considered and addressed as well.
Mr. Brooks. Would any of the other three like to add their
insight? Mr. Gerstenmaier? No? Mr. Mulholland?
Mr. Mulholland. You know, I would say it is important to
have domestic capability over the long term ULA, and the member
companies are actively pursuing it. But I would also like to
add that the relationship that we have had with Russia in human
space flight has been long lasting, and beneficial to both
companies, and has allowed us, I think, a bridge to weather
some difficult political situations that we have had globally.
And so that relationship with Russia has been beneficial to us,
and I believe will continue to do so.
Mr. Brooks. Dr. Reisman?
Dr. Reisman. I think a number of us have mentioned that,
you know, we all think it is very important for this country to
have assured access to space without being dependent on any
other country, especially a country that is--we are having a
difficult geopolitical situation with. And there are multiple
ways you can go about doing that. You can start a development
program for a brand new engine for--to replace rockets that are
using Russian engines today in America.
But just--again, I want to emphasize we have a rocket that
is 100 percent American, and it is standing by, ready to do
these missions. We are going through the certification process
with the Commercial Crew Program for human certification. We
are also getting very, very close to completing certification
with the Department of Defense for EELV. So we think we are
standing by and ready to provide that capability for the
country.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Dr. Reisman. Vice Admiral Dyer, I
have about a minute left. This question will be for you. Your
recent report appears somewhat critical of NASA's transparency
regarding the Commercial Crew Program. Did the issues for which
the criticism was based extend to the contractors?
Vice Admiral Dyer. NASA is the controller of information,
and the nexus of many of our questions. The contractors have
been open and sharing in showing us their facilities, sharing
their designs with us, and sharing the questions that they have
posed to NASA. Our questions, in terms of which waivers and
deviations have been requested, how are they being filtered and
sorted, which ones have been approved, and what is the thought
process behind the approvals of those specific waivers?
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Vice Admiral Dyer, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Palazzo. Thank you. I--yeah, votes have been
called. We never have enough time to ask all the questions that
we want. This is a very important topic, not just to Congress,
but definitely to the American people, so I am going to open it
up to one question per side, and I will start with Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, and I will just be very brief. Mr.
Gerstenmaier, I am just curious, because in--a couple of times
in your testimony and your responses, you indicated a concern
with slippage and budget, based on the fact that Congress
hadn't provided the appropriations that were necessary. And I
wonder if you share the concern that I have, that, if NASA were
to come up--were to be able to do an effective independent cost
analysis, that actually that could provide a better basis for
making appropriations, but, in fact, that some of the concern
with the appropriation has been that NASA hasn't been
forthcoming in providing that kind of analysis.
And, indeed, in the 2015 Authorization Act that Mr. Palazzo
and I moved forward, we require that kind of analysis. And so,
I don't want to keep pointing fingers, but it would help to
have that information in order for us to be the best advocates
we can be for the kind of resources that you need. Would you be
willing to do that?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, at this stage, we have definitized
fixed-price contracts, and we would like to discuss those with
you, show you the basis for those contracts, and show you the
variance on those contracts. And that would essentially anchor
any of our discussions for the budgets, and we could show you
the other pieces around that.
So I don't--I am not sure that an independent cost model
for a different acquisition approach, as we are doing with
these commercial providers, provides any other insight, other
than the specifics of the actual negotiated contract that we
have. And we can show you the milestones and the details. We
have already shared it with staff. We will continue to share
that with staff as the basis for our budget.
So we will provide you with the information you need to
understand the budget, and all its detail, and what it is based
on, but it is actually anchored extremely heavily upon these
actual negotiated contracts, and the milestones that were
provided by both SpaceX and Boeing.
Ms. Edwards. And then, just in the time remaining--thank
you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. In the time remaining, I just want to
clarify that--both from Boeing and from SpaceX that, in terms
of all of the development costs that have gone into the--your--
both of your efforts, what percentage of that has been provided
by taxpayers, and what percentage of that has been provided by
you independently, as commercial companies?
Mr. Mulholland. Ranking Member, I don't have that data
readily available. I certainly will get that to you. I would
say that NASA has paid the preponderance of the development
cost, but Boeing has contributed significantly.
Dr. Reisman. So I am going to, unfortunately, have to say
the same thing. And I just asked the guys behind me, they don't
know either, but--so we will get back to you on a precise
number. But I can tell you that, similar to what John said, we
have put--especially in the beginning, we put a lot of our own
money in. We have our own skin in the game, but we have also
enjoyed a lot of help from NASA, so--the exact numbers we will
have to get back to you.
Ms. Edwards. It is important because, you know, the public
believes that the work that you are undertaking now is entirely
your own, and you are entirely footing the bill. We just saw a
recent poll about that, which is actually undercutting our
ability to make a sale that taxpayers need to continue to
support NASA as an agency. And so it is a deep concern of mine
that we have a public that believes, because you guys are very
good at, you know, the promotion of your work, and it is
exciting that it is all your skin in the game. And so why not
just turn it all over to the private sector as though the
taxpayer shouldn't meet any of that burden at all?
And my estimates, the estimates that I have, show that
taxpayers have skin in the game to the tune of about 90
percent, and you all ten percent. And I don't have a problem
with that, but I don't want anybody in the public going away
believing that this is all commercial, and that taxpayers and
NASA, therefore, don't need to be doing this work. And I thank
you for your testimony.
Chairman Palazzo. All right. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
Because of the lack of time, I am going to forego my question.
I am going to submit questions for the record.
You know, there has been a lot of talk about what is
actually the true cost per seat for sending American astronauts
on American rockets back into space. Only time will tell, but
the American people are really going to be the ones to decide
how much are they willing to spend on maintaining--or not
maintaining--but achieving American access to space, and also
maintaining America's leadership in space. So, I want to thank
the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and the Members for
their questions. The record will remain open for two weeks for
additional questions and written questions from Members. The
witnesses are excused, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Mr. John Mulholland
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Dr. Garrett Reisman
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix II
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Statement submitted by full Committee Ranking Member
Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning. I would like to welcome each of our witnesses
to today's hearing. The topic of today's hearing is an
important one as it presages a new chapter in NASA's human
spaceflight activities.
Now almost halfway through this decade, substantial
progress can be seen. The International Space Station was
completed in 2010 and continues to show great promise as an
orbital laboratory. NASA has started to build the next deep
space exploration system of the future with the building blocks
of the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion crewed vehicle.
With the Space Shuttle retired, cargo resupply of the ISS
is being turned over to two commercial providers, albeit a
success made possible through substantial NASA financial
investment and technical transfer. And, as we will hear today,
NASA is working with Boeing and SpaceX to develop of future
crewed commercial orbital transportation services to the Space
Station.
This laudable progress is a testament to the hard work and
perseverance by the NASA federal workforce and its industry
partners. In the process, NASA has learned new ways of doing
things and is adopting some of industry's best practices.
Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that routine
access to space is hard. Nor should we forget the painful
lessons NASA has learned along the way to mitigate the risks of
sending humans beyond the confines of Earth's surface.
This Committee has followed the many twists and turns NASA
took in getting to this point with its Commercial Crew Program.
Various contractual vehicles were used, and I will not take the
time here to recount the Committee's concerns about inadequate
insight into contractor designs and conformance with NASA
safety requirements.
On one hand, I am somewhat comforted that Mr. Gerstenmaier
is at the helm and feel confident in his commitment to fly NASA
astronauts on commercial transportation systems only when
safety has been demonstrated.
On the other hand, I am not comfortable, nor am I pleased,
that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Board known as ASAP,
Congress's safety adviser, was denied access to key information
before contracts were awarded. Indeed, the Commercial Crew
Program's denial caused the Panel Chairman to state in the
ASAP's 2014 Annual Report that ``the Panel is unable to offer
any informed opinion regarding the adequacy of the
certification process or the sufficiency of safety in the
Commercial Crew Program (CCP) due to constraints on access to
needed information.''
Clearly, this is troublesome.
If NASA is to convince Congress that the two commercial
crew transportation systems are safe, it must provide ASAP with
information, by which the Panel can make objective assessments.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize that NASA and its two contractors
have much work to do. The nation needs their important
contributions to the space program.
I hope we can continue this dialogue through future
hearings as part of the open communications that must form the
basis of trust and transparency in this government-industry
partnership.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I yield back.
[all]