[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

COAST GUARD MAJOR ACQUISITIONS

=======================================================================

(114-17)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

MAY 14, 2015

__________

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

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Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/
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______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

31-123 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Vice Chair Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
JEFF DENHAM, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky JANICE HAHN, California
TOM RICE, South Carolina RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
ROB WOODALL, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TODD ROKITA, Indiana CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
JOHN KATKO, New York JARED HUFFMAN, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas JULIA BROWNLEY, California
CRESENT HARDY, Nevada
RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
MIMI WALTERS, California
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
CARLOS CURBELO, Florida
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
------

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN GARAMENDI, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB GIBBS, Ohio CORRINE BROWN, Florida
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina JANICE HAHN, California
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CARLOS CURBELO, Florida JULIA BROWNLEY, California
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York Officio)
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv

TESTIMONY

Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer, Assistant Commandant for
Acquisition and Chief Acquisition Officer, U.S. Coast Guard.... 3
Michele Mackin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 3
James H. Offutt, National President, Navy League of the United
States......................................................... 3

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer..................................... 30
Michele Mackin................................................... 36
James H. Offutt.................................................. 53

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer, Assistant Commandant for
Acquisition and Chief Acquisition Officer, U.S. Coast Guard,
responses to requests for information from the following
Representatives:

Hon. Duncan Hunter of California requested the history for
each of the U.S. Coast Guard's major acquisition program
baselines since 2005....................................... 14
Hon. John Garamendi of California requested information
regarding the U.S. Coast Guard's role in issuing drill
permits and Shell Oil's Arctic drilling operations......... 21

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COAST GUARD MAJOR ACQUISITIONS

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THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2015

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m. in
room 2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Hunter. The subcommittee will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to review the Coast Guard's major
acquisition programs.
As this subcommittee has continually highlighted, the Coast
Guard currently operates tens, and in some cases, hundreds of
thousands of hours short of its operational targets. This means
assets are not there for the Service to secure our ports,
protect our environment, and ensure the safety of our
waterways. Last month, the subcommittee held a hearing on Coast
Guard missions and heard from the Service's vice admiral in
charge of operations who attributed much of the failure to meet
mission performance goals to not having a sufficient number of
modern assets.
The only way to reverse the decline in the Coast Guard's
mission performance is to make the necessary investments to
acquire new and improved assets. Unfortunately, based on the
fiscal year 2016 budget request, as well as the fiscal year
2016 through 2020 CIP [Capital Investment Program], it appears
the President refuses to make those investments.
The President's budget cuts funding needed to acquire
critically needed replacement assets by 17 percent. The budget
also fails to guarantee the funding needed to begin detailed
design for the Offshore Patrol Cutter. Failure to move into
detailed design on the OPC by the end of 2016 could result in
significantly higher costs and substantial acquisition delays.
Moving this and other acquisitions further to the right will
only further degrade Coast Guard mission performance.
Unfortunately, the situation does not improve any time in
the near future. According to the Coast Guard's Capital
Investment Plan, over the next 5 years, annual funding for
acquisitions never exceeds $1.2 billion. That is approximately
$1 billion less than the GAO and the former Commandant of the
Coast Guard have testified is needed on an annual basis to keep
the current acquisition program on schedule and on budget. The
CIP is nothing more than a roadmap to additional acquisition
delays, increased costs for taxpayers, and ongoing mission
performance failures.
I have said this for some time now: If the President is
going to send us budgets that fail to pay for the assets needed
to meet Coast Guard mission requirements, then it is time for
him and the Coast Guard to review their mission requirements.
That is why, in the last bill that we passed, the Howard Coble
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of last year,
required the Coast Guard to submit a revised Mission Need
Statement to this committee. The Mission Need Statement is the
underlying justification for the Service's acquisition program.
It lays out mission requirements and helps identify gaps in
capabilities. So, if you don't have the assets, you are not
going to get the assets unless you change the mission to match
the assets.
The Coast Guard has assured the subcommittee that we will
receive the revised Mission Need Statement in July. At that
time, I intend to hold a hearing to review it and determine
whether the administration intends to continue the charade of
expanding Coast Guard mission requirements without providing
the Coast Guard the assets it needs to meet those requirements.
In the interim I look forward to today's update on the
status of the Coast Guard's current acquisition programs and
the challenges the Service is facing--we got our gavel, now we
can--now we are a real subcommittee, that is good.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. And the challenges that the Service is facing
in fielding these new assets.
I thank the witnesses for appearing today and look forward
to their testimony.
With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Chairman, thank you very much. And, to your
staff, thank you for meeting our need for caffeine and coffee.
Appreciate that.
I appreciate the opportunity to once again assess the Coast
Guard's ongoing efforts to recapitalize its surface, air, and
communications assets. And nothing should be more important to
this subcommittee than our responsibility to ensure that our
Nation's multimission military maritime law enforcement
authority has the tools it needs to meet the many challenges it
faces, day in and day out, off our shores and around the world.
The Coast Guard's Capital Investment Program, or CIP, is
essentially a roadmap. The Coast Guard provides this plan to
Congress to help guide our decisions on what and how much we
should invest annually to fulfill the largest recapitalization
program in the Service's illustrious history.
Fortunately, the Coast Guard has been able to make some
important progress in this effort. For example, it has begun on
the eighth and last National Security Cutter. Once built, this
final hull will complete the transition from the legacy fleet
of High Endurance Cutters to a new, modern cutter fleet that is
fewer in number, but far more technologically capable than its
predecessors.
However, there are concerns. Regrettably, the Offshore
Patrol Cutter, the largest and most expensive acquisition in
the entire recapitalization effort, still remains a concept on
the naval architect's drawing board, and is far, far away from
entering production. Even some of the new assets that have been
provided to the Coast Guard, such as the 14 C-27Js, aircraft,
that were authorized to be transferred from the Air Force to
the Coast Guard--and, by the way, good work, making that
happen, thank you--to bring these new assets online is far too
slow, raising the potential for future operational gaps in the
Coast Guard's fleet of fixed-wing patrol craft.
And then there are other unmet needs. We can go on with a
lengthy list--and I will--of planned or unplanned needs.
Recapitalization of the Coast Guard's--you will like this, Mr.
Chairman--polar icebreaker--I think we have heard that
discussed here many times--of well more than $1 billion
possibly being spent on that. How are we going to get the money
for that? Additionally, there is substantial backlog of unmet
shoreside infrastructure needs that was last estimated at over
$1.4 billion.
And, while we should be pleased that the Coast Guard was
able to complete the Mission Effectiveness Program, MEP, to
extend the service life of its legacy fleet of Medium Endurance
Cutters, the delays in the production of the new OPCs will
almost certainly require yet another round of Mission
Effectiveness Projects. And that is the challenge for Congress.
Mr. Chairman, you were speaking about the President's
budget. And, indeed, it is too little. However, it is
reflective of this thing called the Budget Control Act,
otherwise known as sequestration, which is our problem that--we
need to break through that, and find a much more rational way
of funding the necessary governmental programs.
Well, moving back to the Coast Guard, anything less than a
full-on effort by the Coast Guard to meet its capital
requirements isn't--will leave the Coast Guard far short of
always ready, semper paratus. But a Coast Guard that is a
hollow vestige of the proud maritime institution that has
served this Nation for very long is not what we want. And we
share the responsibility of making sure the Coast Guard has
what it needs to be always ready.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman from California. Our first
witness today is Rear Admiral Bruce D. Baffer, the Coast
Guard's Assistant Commandant for Acquisition, and Chief
Acquisition Officer.
Admiral, you are recognized.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE D. BAFFER, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR ACQUISITION AND CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER, U.S. COAST
GUARD; MICHELE MACKIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING
MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND JAMES H.
OFFUTT, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

Admiral Baffer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hunter,
Ranking Member Garamendi, members of the subcommittee, good
morning. Thank you for the opportunity to speak on Coast Guard
recapitalization. On behalf of the Commandant, as well as the
men and women of the Coast Guard, thank you for your oversight
and continued support of our Service. My complete statement has
been provided, and I ask that it be entered into the record.
The Coast Guard's acquisition directorate is tasked with
managing an annual portfolio in excess of $1 billion to deliver
the goods and services the coastguardsmen need to perform their
missions in the field. To these ends, we continue to invest in
our acquisition enterprise, attracting talented professionals
to the Coast Guard, maturing military and civilian career
paths, and providing training and certification opportunities
to grow and retrain our highly capable acquisition workforce.
We formalized and documented our processes and procedures, and
we are applying lessons learned.
I would also like to acknowledge the very effective working
relationship we enjoy with the Government Accountability
Office. Over the last 14 years, Ms. Mackin has applied her
leadership through numerous audits, helping the Coast Guard
realize our vision as a model acquisition enterprise.
I would also like to recognize the Navy League for their
strong, ongoing support of the Coast Guard, both at the
national and the local chapter levels.
In short, we have been busy. Over just the past few months,
we completed the program of record for the Response Boat-
Medium, with delivery of the 174th boat. We completed
acceptance trials in the fifth National Security Cutter, and
awarded a contract for the production of the eighth and final
cutter in the NSC program of record. We issued a request for
proposals for full and open competition for the remaining 26
Fast Response Cutters, and took delivery of the seventh and
eighth C-130J aircraft.
The Commandant continues to make recapitalization one of
his highest priorities, and, recognizing the budget
environment, we are maximizing every dollar. To this end, we
are emphasizing competition and affordability across the
portfolio by employing DOD's Better Buying Power Initiative,
particularly focusing on competition, early industry
engagement, fixed-price contracts, and affordability as a
requirement.
As an example, our highest priority acquisition program,
the Offshore Patrol Cutter, has been structured to formally
meet the Coast Guard's most pressing offshore mission
requirements through the use of commercial standards, fixed-
price contracts, and state-of-the-market technologies. We are
employing an acquisition strategy that maximizes competition
and promotes the domestic shipbuilding industrial base by
removing the traditional barriers to enter the military
shipbuilding market. We will select a single contractor in
fiscal year 2016 to complete the detailed design, and
ultimately construct the vessel.
On the aviation side, the Coast Guard is regenerating 14 C-
27J medium-lift aircraft, providing much-needed maritime patrol
capability. This subcommittee played a crucial role in
facilitating the transfer from the Air Force to the Coast
Guard, injecting additional capabilities a year ahead of
schedule, and minimizing costs to taxpayers.
I know the subcommittee is particularly interested in our
efforts to increase icebreaking capability. As we continue to
develop requirements for a new heavy icebreaker, we are also
beginning the preservation and evaluation process on Polar Sea.
There is no question that the cost of acquiring a new
icebreaker and potentially reactivating Polar Sea poses a
particular challenge in this current budget environment.
In closing, I am extremely proud to lead the dedicated
professionals working tirelessly to ensure the Coast Guard has
the capabilities to safely and affordably carry out our 11
statutory missions. Successful programs such as the NSC, FRC,
HC-144, C-130J, RB-M, and Rescue 21 are providing mission
capability now, and will be for decades to come. I am
absolutely certain the OPC will be equally successful in
meeting all of our performance and affordability requirements.
But none of these successes happen without this subcommittee's
foresight and commitment.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I thank you
for your steadfast support of our Coast Guard. I look forward
to answering your questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Admiral.
Our next witness today is Ms. Mackin, the GAO's Director of
Acquisition and Sourcing Management.
You are recognized.
Ms. Mackin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Ranking
Member Garamendi, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
having me here today to discuss Coast Guard acquisitions.
As we have noted in our recent reports, the Coast Guard has
made strides in its acquisition management capabilities. As the
admiral mentioned, competition has been injected into recent
procurements, and new assets are being delivered to the
operators. Key test events are also taking place.
I will briefly touch on three issues this morning. First,
the C-27J aircraft transfer and overall status of fixed-wing
flight-hours; second, observations on the major cutter fleet;
and third, I will discuss what we view as the most pressing
concern facing the Coast Guard, which is the affordability of
its acquisition portfolio.
As you know, the Coast Guard is receiving 14 C-27Js from
the Air Force at no cost. Once operational, these aircraft will
contribute to Coast Guard missions. But it will take time and
money to transfer them from storage, assess their condition,
establish a spare parts pipeline, and modify them to meet Coast
Guard missions. The full fleet of 14 operational aircraft is
anticipated in 2022, and about $600 million will be needed to
operationalize the fleet.
A broader observation regarding the fixed-wing fleet is
that, under the Coast Guard's current plan, even with the C-
27Js, the Coast Guard will fall almost 20 percent short of its
annual flight-hour goal, which is currently 52,400 hours. The
Coast Guard is in the process, as was mentioned, of revisiting
its 2005 Mission Needs Statement, and conducting a fleet mix
analysis that may result in a different flight-hour goal, or
different mix of aircraft. However, the fleet mix analysis will
not be complete until 2019.
Regarding surface assets, all eight National Security
Cutters are on-contract or delivered, and the ship recently
completed operational testing. A general observation there is
that the NSC was determined operationally effective and
suitable, but with several major deficiencies. And we are
currently doing a more detailed review of the test at the
request of the subcommittee.
To touch on other cutters, the Coast Guard is preparing to
recompete the remaining 26 Fast Response Cutters, and it is
also pursuing a competitive acquisition strategy for the
Offshore Patrol Cutter. The Coast Guard plans to award a
contract for design of the first tranche of these ships next
year. However, the Coast Guard faces a significant gap between
the projected delivery dates of the OPCs and the end-of-service
life for the legacy Medium Endurance Cutters these ships are
replacing. The Coast Guard is studying how to make the legacy
cutters viable for a longer period to close this gap, but no
decision has been made.
Finally, the Coast Guard faces affordability challenges
that are not reflected in the 5-year Capital Investment Plan.
The primary driver, of course, is the OPC, expected to cost $12
billion, which will take up over two-thirds of the Coast
Guard's acquisition funding while it is being built. Our
concern is that the Coast Guard has not set forth a long-term
acquisition plan for its surface and aviation assets, such as
the 20-year plan we recommended last year, and which this
subcommittee also calls for in its Coast Guard Authorization
Act. Such a plan should include necessary tradeoffs that
reflect budget realities.
We have recommended, since 2010, that the Coast Guard
conduct this type of assessment. We believe this approach would
help ensure that all stakeholders, including Congress,
understand the constraints the Coast Guard is facing long term,
and what it can realistically acquire at expected funding
levels.
Thank you. This concludes my statement, and I will be happy
to answer questions at the appropriate time.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Ms. Mackin.
Our final witness today is Mr. James Offutt, national
president of the Navy League of the United States.
Mr. Offutt, you are recognized.
Mr. Offutt. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Garamendi, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
on such an important topic. I would like to submit my full
testimony for the record.
Mr. Hunter. Without objection.
Mr. Offutt. I offer an abbreviated version now, and look
forward to your questions.
The U.S. Coast Guard is a very unique service, with
military and civil responsibilities, and humanitarian missions.
The Coast Guard has seen its area of responsibility grow to 11
statutory missions. But its budget growth has not kept pace
with this increase, failing to match mission demand or be
adjusted for inflation.
Despite their incredible record of achievement, the Coast
Guard faces many familiar but daunting challenges. Increased
Arctic activity, increased maritime transportation goods, and
increased human and drug trafficking all add demands on the
Coast Guard. The Service will not properly be equipped to meet
these challenges unless we make serious investments now.
The Coast Guard has been clear that it needs an acquisition
budget of $2.5 billion per year to fulfill its mission.
Unfortunately, the administration continually requests an
acquisition budget that hovers at or below $1 billion, with
Congress providing the extra funding. The administration's low-
budget request for acquisition, construction, and improvements,
or AC&I, represent the bare-minimum funding for the Coast Guard
to accomplish its missions. The Navy League notes with
disappointment that the requested funding level for fiscal year
2016 is totally unsatisfactory. Given the fiscal climate, the
Navy League recommends a budget of at least $1.5 billion per
year, as this committee has authorized, to help the Coast Guard
achieve its recapitalization goals.
The highest AC&I priority for the Coast Guard is to lay the
groundwork for construction of the Offshore Patrol Cutter,
which will replace cutters built in the 1960s and 1980s. The
importance of the OPC cannot be overstated. It will function as
a Service operational workhorse to carry out the Coast Guard's
primary missions over the next 40 years. Given the magnitude of
the impending capability gap caused by the cutters, the Navy
League believes Congress should fund the construction of two
OPCs, annually.
Facing more complex challenges and growing demand signal,
Coast Guard will need Fast Response Cutters acquired at six per
year. What a great ship. I visited one in Key West. The
capabilities are multiple times the cutters that they are
replacing. I am amazed at the bridge. The bridge has a very
modern layout, makes the seakeeping very easy, and greatly
reduces that seakeeping workload, and allows the crew to
concentrate more on a mission.
The National Security Cutter acquisition success story.
These cutters work well in far-off regions, and provide better
seakeeping, higher sustained transit speeds, and greater
endurance and range. They also provide an increased array of
mission versatility, among their other benefits.
The Navy League is concerned with the increasing capability
gap caused by the rapid decommissioning of operational assets
before replacements are available. This cost-driven strategy is
not in the best interest of homeland security. The answer is
new ships sooner. The old ones cannot be run effectively. And,
in some cases, can't be run safely.
On the aviation front the Coast Guard will begin using the
C-27J aircraft acquired through the interservice transfer. It
will save about a half a billion dollars in acquisition costs.
It is a great example of interservice cooperation.
In the near future, the Coast Guard will need to make
significant investments in its unmanned aircraft systems. This
will be a significant part of the total force package for major
cutters.
The Coast Guard still faces many of the same challenges
that come with every major acquisition program, including
increased costs, driven by material cost increases and less-
than-optimum production runs. However, these increased costs
have not been met with increased funds, meaning program delays
which, in turn, increase costs for in-service vessel
sustainment. This diverts already-limited funds from
acquisition, further exacerbating the funding shortfall.
Shore infrastructure repairs are estimated to cost $1.4
billion, but the Coast Guard has only been given about $40
million a year for this needed investment. The costs are
increasing faster than the Coast Guard can pay--yet another
devastating cycle.
The need for a new polar icebreaker deserves special
consideration. The Coast Guard must have a sustained presence
there. We need to invest more, but we cannot allow this
investment to disrupt other planned capitalization. The top
line of the acquisition budget must increase. The committee
could also consider a special fund outside the normal AC&I
budget for an icebreaker similar to the National Sea-Based
Strategic Deterrence Fund, created for the National Defense
Authorization Act. The alternative is not funding a new polar
icebreaker, and is a U.S. abdication of Arctic influence and
responsibility.
All the major decisionmakers have agreed the Coast Guard's
recapitalization and modernization at current funding levels
will not sustain the Coast Guard mission. We recognize the
fiscal environment. But, given the role of the Coast Guard,
saving American lives, safeguarding our national security, and
contributing to economic prosperity by ensuring the free flow
of commerce, we believe the Service deserves special
consideration.
In his annual address, the Commandant stated the Coast
Guard has lost nearly 40 percent of our acquisition budget over
the last 4 years. This pattern can no longer continue. The lack
of assets and presence where needed causes the Coast Guard to
make tough decisions every day about which mission to support.
The Navy League would like to thank this committee for its
leadership, thank Congress for being supportive of the Coast
Guard and ensuring they have the resources they need. We must
be good shipmates to all of them, as they have been to every
American.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much for your testimony. All of
you, thank you very much.
The point of this hearing is to get to how we get you the
most stuff, with the least amount of money, on time. That is
the point of this, I guess. And finishing, or piggybacking on
what Mr. Offutt said, if the Coast Guard is making--and the GAO
has said that the Coast Guard makes tradeoffs within the annual
budget process every year. We have heard that from you before.
It is not a good strategy, long term. And I would like you to
tell us why, number one.
And, number two, what does the Coast Guard risk by doing it
like that every year? Thank you.
Ms. Mackin. Mr. Chairman, you are right. We have said that
for, actually, a number of years now. What they risk by this
every year, when the budget comes through, is, obviously,
delaying some assets. We have seen that recently, with the Fast
Response Cutter, which will lead to more costs down the road.
What we would like to see, as we have said for a number of
years, is a long-term plan that sets forth what is needed and,
importantly, addresses these tradeoffs that can be made, so
that everybody--there is transparency. Everybody can see what
is coming down the pike, what is needed to pay for it, and what
some of the tradeoff options might be.
Mr. Hunter. And again, what are the downsides? If they
don't do it through their CIP, and they do it every year, and
react quickly to whatever the budget request is from the
President and our authorization appropriations, what do they
risk?
Ms. Mackin. The risk is that they had, for example, planned
to buy six Fast Response Cutters a year. The budget comes in
less than they had expected. They have to stretch the
procurement out. That is just an example. That could happen in
any number of different programs.
So, stretching out schedule means operators aren't getting
the assets on the schedule that they had expected them. And it
can also lead to increased costs.
Mr. Hunter. Admiral, one question here. Based on the CIP
that you have now, and kind of along this same line of thought,
what programs of record, what acquisition items, will be
delivered on time?
Admiral Baffer. We are delivering all of our acquisition
programs on time right now.
Mr. Hunter. So everything?
Admiral Baffer. The problem is what is the baseline. When
we have to change the schedule based on funding, then they get
pushed to the right.
So, if you look back at the original baseline, they are
delayed. But if you look at what they require, based on that
funding level, they are delivering on time. We are delivering
on time and on budget.
Mr. Hunter. So you are saying--when you change the schedule
to match the budget, then things are on time in the new
schedule. If you use an old schedule, an original one, then
things are no longer on time.
Admiral Baffer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. OK.
Admiral Baffer. That is correct. And what happens is, when
we stretch them out, that lack of predictable funding increases
costs for the program. Time cost money, especially on a major
program. And, as we stretch them out, you still incur the
overhead and the fixed costs that go along with that
production.
Let me just give you an example. We have got the same team
building NSCs right now, where we have got four of them on
contract that we did when we only had one on contract. So we
are able to apply that same overhead, the same oversight, to a
greater number of cutters, greater number of assets. So the
per-unit cost is much more efficient when you can build them
fast. When we spread them out it slows it down. And then that
increases the per-unit cost.
Ms. Mackin. I think what he said is absolutely right. It is
that churn every year that, in the past, has led to having to
do new baselines every year, which is not a small thing to
undertake, to reflect the stretched-out schedules. That is just
not the most efficient way to operate an acquisition program.
Mr. Hunter. So, fill me in, then. Out of ignorance--because
I don't know--how do you compare--if you are trying to compare
whether you are on time or not, and whether programs are being
delivered on time, how do you do that if your schedule--what
baseline do you use? If you really wanted to get an accurate
look at, originally, when are things supposed to be built, and
being delivered, what baseline do you use?
Admiral Baffer. We use the currently approved APB, the
Acquisition Project Baseline, that is approved by the
Department. When things get stretched out because of funding
problems, that requires a new APB. Otherwise, you would go into
breach.
Mr. Hunter. OK, so--but--right. But how do you tell if
stuff is being delivered on time or not, based on--if you
change the baseline every year, and you change the schedule to
match the programs not being on time, but you change the
schedule to match them, so that they are on time, how do you
know which projects are really not on time? Meaning what is
your--what original baseline do you use from 3 or 4 years ago?
Admiral Baffer. Well, it really----
Mr. Hunter. Do you do that at all now?
Admiral Baffer. Well, yes, sir, we do. It comes down to
what is the cause. If it is a funding delay or a contract
delay, is it a program management problem or is it just--we
didn't have the funding to put it on contract? So, in the big
picture, you would go back to the original baseline and say, we
are behind in recapitalizing the Coast Guard because we haven't
built all these ships that we thought we were going to have
built by this time, so we are behind.
From a project manager's point of view, contract
management, what you bought, are you delivering, you know,
within the contract that you said you were going to buy it to,
you can manage to that and you are on time. But it is really--
it is two separate timelines that you are managing to, and it
is very difficult to keep them all straight.
Mr. Hunter. Got you. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi?
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go to the
heart of the question here.
It appears as though--Ms. Mackin, if you could help me with
this--that the maximum money needed annually is somewhere north
of $2 billion for the acquisition programs, for all of it.
Ms. Mackin. That is approximately right. Again, based on
the current Mission Need Statement and program of record,
which, in essence, is the Deepwater program. So that is why we
are--the Coast Guard is now revisiting that Mission Need
Statement. That is important. We are still dealing, to a large
extent, with a very dated Mission Need Statement.
Mr. Garamendi. In your analysis, and for all three of you,
the--there are two ways to get at this. You adjust the Mission
Need Statement to the available money, or you adjust the
Mission Need Statement to the available needs of the 11
statutory responsibilities. Which are you suggesting be done,
which of those two options?
Ms. Mackin. Well, what we would really like to see, and as
this subcommittee has also called for in the Authorization Act,
is a long-term plan that sheds some light on what is needed
over a 20-year period, and indicates what these tradeoffs need
to be. And that way, decisionmakers at DHS and Congress can see
what those tradeoffs are. With the current 5-year CIP or annual
budget process, you don't have that long-term visibility that
we think would really help the Coast Guard get what it needs to
meet its missions.
Mr. Offutt. If I may?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
Mr. Offutt. I believe that the Mission Need Statement is a
different statement that says, based on all of my statutory
requirements and everything, if I were to fulfill all of those
needs, here is what I would have to have, and that is the
Mission Need Statement.
Then you have perhaps this 20-year plan, which recognizes
the budget realities, and shows, in essence, what I would call
a working budget document, which most every business develops,
says, here is where I think I am, and then you could compare
the two and see what your gap is for your Mission Need
Statement. But I wouldn't want to take that Mission Need
Statement, which takes all of your statutory authorities, you
know, from Congress, administration, down through your
interaction with DOD and change that--and I agree, that needs
updated.
So, I think what the problem is is getting this correct in
your--CIP, you are calling it? Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral, considering what the two have said,
what is your response? What about the Mission Need Statement?
How do we get there? Are we even trying to get a new Mission
Need Statement?
Admiral Baffer. Yes, Ranking Member. We are doing a new
Mission Need Statement this summer, as was mentioned earlier.
And that is going to drive to a new CONOPS [Concept of
Operations], and then we are going to be reevaluating the
program of record, both across aviation cutters and everything
else, because it is a balanced system. The number of cutters
influences the number of aircraft, and the C-27Js have
certainly thrown a new wrinkle into that program of record. So
we do need to visit that. But you have to start with that
Mission Need Statement.
Whether we start with a constrained Mission Need Statement
or an unconstrained Mission Need Statement, I think it needs to
start with an unconstrained Mission Need Statement that says
what is the mission we are required to do, but--and it also has
to be adjusted for the budget realities.
Mr. Garamendi. Therefore, it would seem to me that, for our
purposes, we would need to see the unconstrained Mission Need
Statement, and then compare that to the constrained Mission
Need Statement, the latter being, really, a result of the
inability of the administration and Congress to provide the
wherewithal for the unconstrained Mission Need Statement. So,
the two would then put pressure on us to address the
differential. Am I correct here? Is that how this could be
done?
Now, when will you complete this process, so that we might
actually be forced to make a decision?
Admiral Baffer. We are doing the Mission Need Statement
this summer in the CONOPS, and we are going to be doing the
simulations of potential fleet mixes, and measuring the
effectiveness of all those potential fleet mixes throughout the
year. And we are looking at the end of fiscal year 2016 of
having all those potential fleet mixes figured out, where we
have the mission effectiveness of those fleet mixes balanced
against the cost of those fleet mixes.
But it all starts with the Mission Need Statement that is
coming out this summer, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. So we are really looking at the next
Congress before we are going to be able to really drill down
and address this fundamental challenge. I think that is, as I
look at the timing, about the way it will be. Am I correct? I
think so.
Admiral Baffer. It would be the fourth quarter of 2016.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, that is the next Congress that will
deal with it.
In any case, Ms. Mackin, is there--in--I will ask all three
of you. In looking at this, as you know it today, given the
uncertainty because of the process not being completed, is
there any reason to believe that we are not going to be looking
at a number north of $2 billion?
Ms. Mackin. I will just say that the last time the Coast
Guard did a fleet mix analysis, which was a few years ago, it
was not constrained, and it came in quite high, quite a bit
higher than the program of record. At that point, the program
of record was considered the floor. It could not be breached.
What we would like to see is, you know, the realistic budget
projections showing, as you indicated, what can you do in a
more constrained environment, so that that can be transparent,
and then the tradeoffs can be made in an informed way.
Mr. Garamendi. I think what I am driving at, or want to
drive at here, is that it looks to me as though, under any
circumstance going forward, however this thing turns out, we
could wait until the next Congress, a year and a half--
actually, a little more than a year and a half from now, and
then go back through it. Or we can begin to prepare ourselves
today for the reality that we are going to have to look at
something close to or greater than $2 billion a year, in order
to meet even the minimum requirements. I can't imagine a
situation where it is going to come in less than that, unless
you are adjusting the requirements to the constrained budget
situation.
Now, an additional $1 billion for the Coast Guard
activities would seem to be impossible, until we consider all
of the choices that the Congress makes about where to spend
money. For example, Mr. Hunter and I have spent some time on
the Armed Services Committee, where vast amounts of money are
spent on projects that may or may not be as essential as the
Coast Guard's programs.
So, my concern, as a Member of Congress, is that we look
across the program lines--stovepipes, if you will--and say,
maybe we should move $1 billion a year from some activity in
the defense budget or in one of the social welfare budgets,
over to the Coast Guard, so that the Coast Guard could have the
assets that it needs to pluck surfers out of the surf on the
beaches of California when they are in trouble, or all of the
other missions that you have. So I think this is a challenge
for us, and particularly a challenge that our budget committees
ought to be looking at.
Now, am I willing to wait until the next Congress, which I
would hope to participate in but may not, to get at this? The
answer is no. So I want us, in our role--and particularly, I
think, Mr. Hunter and I, who play a role on both committees--to
look at this in a more total-systems way. We know, for example,
that the U.S. Navy cannot operate in the Arctic without an
icebreaker. Yet we have no money for the icebreaker in the
Coast Guard budget. We know that the U.S. Navy must be prepared
to operate in the Arctic. There is no question about that.
So, how can we move money from one pot to another pot to
achieve the purposes of addressing the United States
Government's responsibilities in the Arctic? And the answer is
we could do that if we thought about this in a more holistic
way.
And that is the end of my speech on this matter, but I am
intending to pursue that, and would need your help. I don't
want to wait until 2016, the next Congress. I would like to
have an interim report along the way, as you develop your new
approach to what is necessary.
So, at the end of the summer, you expect to have the first
stage done. Is that right, Admiral?
Admiral Baffer. Ranking Member, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Are you prepared to deliver to us at that
point the elements of the first stage, the results of the first
stage?
Admiral Baffer. We are committed, being very open and
transparent with Congress. And anything we can do to help----
Mr. Garamendi. Good.
Admiral Baffer [continuing]. We would be--we are----
Mr. Garamendi. We know how to find each other.
Admiral Baffer. Yes, sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will yield back.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman.
And, Admiral, on that same thing, if you could get us--if
you could just get us all of your major acquisition program of
record projects, and all together would be nice, and I would
like what you had for a baseline 10 years ago, maybe every 2
years, and I would like to see where it started, before I was
even here, and then how it is proceeding, and how the baseline
has changed to where it was to where it is. If you could do
that, that is everything with an acquisition project baseline,
right?
Admiral Baffer. Right. We can certainly do that, Mr.
Chairman.
[The information follows:]

The tables below include the history for each of the U.S. Coast
Guard's major acquisition program baselines (APB) since 2005.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revised Deepwater Baseline Deepwater APB v1.1 May 15, Program-specific APB revision 1.0 Program-specific APB revision 2.0 (if Program-specific APB revision 3.0 (if
v1.0 December 21, 2005 2007 ------------------------------------------ applicable) applicable)
------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comple- TAC Comple- TAC Approval Number Comple- TAC Approval Comple- TAC Approval Comple- TAC
Number tion\1\ ($M)\1\,\2\ Number tion\1\ ($M)\1\,\2\ Date tion\1\ ($M)\1\,\2\ Date Number tion\1\ ($M)\1\,\2\ Date Number tion\1\ ($M)\1\,\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURFACE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSC............................................ 8 2017 $2,875 8 2014 $3,450 Dec 2008 8 2016 $4,749 Jan 2014 8 2019 $5,504 ......... ...... ....... ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPC............................................ 25 2027 $7,056 25 2021 $8,098 Apr 2012 25 2033 $10,523 Sep 2014 25 2034 $10,523 ......... ...... ....... ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRC............................................ 58 2027 $3,277 58 2017 $3,206 Aug 2009 58 2022 $3,928 Oct 2012 58 2023 $3,928 ......... ...... ....... ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110-123' 41 2021 $116 41 2022 $95 .......... ...... ....... ........... ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
Conversion\3\..................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WMEC MEP\3\.................................... 27 2026/ $338 27 2016 $317 Dec 2008 27 2016 $296.8 ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patrol Boat ...... ....... ........... 17 2013 $117 Dec 2008 20 2013 $179.7 ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
Sustain-
ment\3\........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIRCRAFT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC-130H 16 2015 $383 16 2017 $610 Jun 2009 16 2017 $690 ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
Sustain-
ment\3\........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC-130J 6 2008 Not Speci- 6 2009 $11 May 2009 6 2010 $163 ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
Missioniza-.................................... fied
tion\3\........................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LRS............................................ ...... ....... ........... ...... ....... ........... July 2012 22 2026 $2,761 ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HC-144......................................... 36 2017 $1,590 36 2016 $1,706 Feb 2009 36 2020 $2,222 Oct 2012 36 2025 $2,756 ......... ...... ....... ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-27J.......................................... ...... ....... ........... ...... ....... ........... APB will be developed prior to ADE 2A/2B ......... ....... ....... ........... ......... ...... ....... ...........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H-60........................................... 42 2016 $456 42 2019 $451 Aug 2009 42 Not $451 Nov 2012 42 2015 $466.6 ......... ...... ....... ...........
Speci-
fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H-65........................................... 95 2016 $549 102 Not $741 May 2009 102 2017 $901.2 Feb 2011 102 2019 $929.4 Mar 2014 102 2021 $917.4
Speci-
fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OTHER
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C4ISR.......................................... Not Not $3,481 Not Not $1,353 Feb 2011 Not 2026 $1,353 Nov 2013 Not 2026 $1,053 Dec 2014 Not 2026 $1,053
Speci- Speci- Speci- Speci- Speci- Speci- Speci-
fied fied fied fied fied fied fied
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Objective figures shown for all completion dates and total acquisition costs.
\2\ All funding amounts shown in then-year dollars.
\3\ Program completed or cancelled.

Mr. Hunter. OK. That would be great.
Mr. Graves?
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you for being here this
morning. I appreciate your testimony. It was very helpful, all
three of you.
Admiral, the initial Mission Need Statement with the
acquisition schedule back in 2005, in retrospect, was that
flawed?
Admiral Baffer. That was done during the Deepwater era. The
program of record was pretty good. All of our studies since
then have validated that program of record, and that is why we
have stayed with it. Some of the scheduling and funding
requirements were probably flawed, but the actual program of
record itself was actually a good piece of work, and it has
been validated many times over the course of the years.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. You are a law enforcement agency,
and I am going to take a guess that you have received a
speeding ticket or something at some point in your life. You
look like maybe no. All right, well----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I sure have. But let me ask you. I
mean if you were a cop, and you pulled somebody over, and that
person goes back to the speed limit sign and says ``no, no, no,
it actually isn't 60 miles an hour, it is 80 miles an hour, and
so I am fine now,'' you know, you can't change the rules in the
middle.
And, you know, you indicated that the Mission Need
Statement in 2005 was largely appropriate. But it sounds like,
as you were answering questions before, that you guys have
repeatedly revised the schedule in accordance with funding
availability. And I am trying to discern--and I think, going
back to the previous questions--what kind of problems is that
causing, if you are continuing to move the chart to the right,
move your schedule to the right?
You know, look, this was obviously put together with the
idea that you were going to be able to deliver certain services
and perform certain duties. Are you still able to fulfill your
mission?
Admiral Baffer. Congressman Graves, it--as we move
schedules to the right, it is very disruptive to the programs
and the projects. It is very inefficient. Major acquisitions
have a lot of mass momentum. The contracts are structured for a
certain schedule. When you deviate from that schedule, it is
very difficult to change that, and it causes a lot of
disruption and a lot of inefficiency, both on the Government
side and the contractor side.
One of the things we are trying to do now, and we are doing
it--you see with the NSCs--is get on annual efficient
production rates. We had a big gap on the NSC between the third
and fourth and the second and third, and that caused us a lot
of reduced learning and cost problems at the yard. Now we are
on an annual rate between four, five, six, seven, and eight,
and we are seeing the increased efficiency. We are going down
the learning curve, and we are seeing the cost benefits of
doing that. We are trying to do that with all of our--the
remaining programs.
OPC is structured to be as efficient as possible, and to be
able to stay on that original baseline, and not deviate as we
go. Because, once you deviate as you go, and you have a delay,
delays tend to cause more delays. They tend to cascade on you,
and it all costs additional funds.
Mr. Offutt. Mr. Graves, may I comment?
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Sure, please.
Mr. Offutt. Two quick comments. One, you asked if they
could perform the mission. All the services will perform their
mission to the best of the ability they have with all the
assets they have. There is absolutely no question about that.
So the answer is yes, they will do the missions that are in
front of them to the best of their ability.
The question about Deepwater, which hasn't been raised, is
that the program of record still looks fairly good, based on
what you knew in 2005. Remember, in Deepwater there was a
management scheme chosen that just didn't work out, for a lot
of number--for a number of reasons. And so, the changing of
that management scheme, taking the--you know, taking--getting
rid of a prime contractor and bringing it back into the
internal Government and Coast Guard actually has probably
helped a lot. But, remember, that was one of the major
perturbations in that program, even though it----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Which--sure. And so you would
expect, as a result of that change, that you would perhaps go
back and revisit schedules. But it seems like that some of the
budget requests that we are seeing right now are compounding
schedule problems even more than that evolution from Deepwater
to the changes.
But let me pivot over to the OPC. As I understand, that is
the Coast Guard's number-one acquisition priority. Yet there is
no funding in the budget request this year for that vessel. Are
you ready to go to detailed design this year?
Admiral Baffer. We are--well, we will be awarding detailed
design in 2016. We just finished preliminary design. We are--
couldn't be happier with the progress that the contractors are
making. All three contractors have moved to the contract design
phase, and we are going to be ready to award detailed design
this summer, and pick the final contractor.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Last question. What are the
negative implications of delays on schedules for the OPC, in--
you know, you--at previous hearings we had, joint hearing with
the HASC [House Armed Services Committee], you know, the Coast
Guard has a mission that is zippered in with the Navy and other
services in many cases, and, of course, domestic missions with
drug interdiction, alien interdiction, and others. Could you
address that?
Admiral Baffer. Certainly, sir. The OPC was designed for
affordability. The whole acquisition strategy was designed for
affordability. And that requires us staying on schedule,
getting to two-per-year production. We are not looking for
innovative designs, in terms of technology. We are looking for
innovation, in terms of production efficiency.
So, it is designed for production efficiency. That is how
we are going to make it affordable, and using the competition
to get there, but we need to stay on schedule so that the
contractors get the two per year, where they can run down that
learning curve and accrue all the benefits that accrue by
having a steady, stable, predictable funding stream.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from
Florida is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
So--from south Florida, so, obviously, the Coast Guard
plays a very important role for our economy and our security. I
just wanted to follow up on Mr. Graves's question, because we
got a memo here that said that there was not money in the
budget for the work that needs to be done on the OPC. So where
is the money going to come from?
Admiral Baffer. There is a general provision in the budget
request to allow the Department to reallocate funding to
provide the detailed design, the $70 million, basically, hole
that we have in our budget for detailed design to make that
award in 2016.
Ms. Frankel. So you have that. Then how long does it take
after that? What is the timeline, once that is done?
Admiral Baffer. Once we down-select to a contractor, there
is an 18-month detailed design period. And during that design
period, they also order the material. And as soon as we are
done with the detailed design, we will be starting
construction.
Ms. Frankel. And is there money for that?
Admiral Baffer. There isn't money for that, but we don't
need that yet, because that will be an option on the contract.
So we will need that, you know, in future years, in the out-
years.
Ms. Frankel. So, what is your estimate, your best estimate,
as to actually when those assets will be delivered?
Admiral Baffer. They will start delivering in 2021, ma'am.
Ms. Frankel. Oh, OK. What--so what happens to the assets
that we are using in the meantime? Are they going to last?
Admiral Baffer. That is what our concern is. Some of the
assets that are being replaced are 50 years old, the oldest one
being the Coast Guard Cutter Reliance--is 51 years old. It is
currently getting the job done. But, as you put Band-Aids on
them, at some point there is nothing for the Band-Aid to stick
to. Those assets need to be decommissioned and replaced.
The other class that the OPC will replace is the 270-foot
class, and they are 30 years old now. We just finished the MEP,
the Mission Effectiveness Project, on them, and that bought us
a few years, and we are evaluating their condition right now to
see what we have to do to those ships to extend them a little
bit longer. Our goal is not to spend any more money than we
have to on the legacy fleet, but to make sure we can cover our
capability gaps until the OPCs replace them.
Ms. Frankel. So what are the potential consequences of this
gap, and not getting our--the current fleet up to standards,
while we wait for the new fleet?
Admiral Baffer. If we maintain our current schedule, the
gap is not that large. It is manageable. The concern is, if we
don't get started on OPC, the gap could be very large. And then
it causes the question: What is our offshore mission capability
in the future?
Ms. Frankel. So, could you be more specific as what would
be potential consequences?
Admiral Baffer. Drug enforcement, marine environmental
protection. These cutters perform the whole host of Coast Guard
missions off our coasts and in our EEZ [exclusive economic
zone]. So, depending on what part of the country you're in, it
is the fishery stocks up in New England; it is migrant
interdiction down in the Caribbean; drug interdiction in the
Caribbean and also in the Eastern Pacific; LMR [living marine
resources] up in Alaska. That is a big concern for us. Our
fishery stocks are very important to us, and we need to be able
to manage them in the future.
Ms. Frankel. OK. Thank you. Thank you. I waive the rest of
my time.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. I want to go back
really quick.
You are getting $70 million for the final design review, or
the final design. That is going to come from within the
Department, meaning it hasn't been--it is not authorized, it is
not--it is maybe probably not going to be appropriated. The way
you are doing it right now is DHS just says, ``Hey, we had
some--we had 70 million bucks in our general fund that was
unaccounted for, and we would like you to have it.''
Admiral Baffer. Mr. Chairman, I would be----
Mr. Hunter. Is that what it is, or----
Admiral Baffer. General provision----
Mr. Hunter. I was trying to mischaracterize it, but I
didn't. That was the actual----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. So that is what is happening?
Admiral Baffer. In short, yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. So what happens if they don't give you the $70
million? I mean what if something else breaks in some other
department, and they have to spend the money for that?
Admiral Baffer. Well, we have--you know, this is the Coast
Guard's number-one priority. The Secretary is very interested
in Coast Guard recapitalization, and he is certainly making it
one of his priorities. And we are working with DHS to make sure
that we have the money available when we want to make the award
this summer.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Ms. Mackin, could you help? Explain to me,
because I am fairly new here, right? How does that work? If the
money is not authorized and it is not appropriated, it just
comes out of the Department, could you explain that to me? I
mean how do you--when it comes to tracking, and when it comes
to having foresight on these things, and scheduling, how does
that work?
Ms. Mackin. To be honest, I don't have any more details
than you do on this. We saw what you did, which was the general
provision that was referenced that directed DHS to transfer the
money to the Coast Guard. I am not quite sure how that will
work, in terms of the mechanics. Sorry.
Mr. Hunter. Would it hurt--what happens if the money is
appropriated from Congress, as opposed to a handshake deal with
DHS? Anything? Or the money is the money, it doesn't matter?
Admiral Baffer. On the acquisition side, we are in the
execution business. We execute the funds that are provided to
us, wherever they come from.
Mr. Hunter. So it doesn't matter, really.
Admiral Baffer. Not to us, no.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Graves, you have any more questions?
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I do.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Graves is recognized.
I am sorry, Mr. Garamendi is recognized. Sorry.
Mr. Garamendi. That is OK, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Graves had
some very good questions, and I want to yield just a few
minutes at the end of this to my colleague, who has a question
that she will ask.
But I got to--as a whole series of questions I think we
need for the record, and we will make those available to you--
the Fast Response Cutter engine problem, we need to have some
information on that. The C-27Js, while you do have seven or
eight of them, are they operational? What is going to be
necessary to make them operational? What additional work needs
to be done on that?
This question is about operational testing, the
effectiveness of that whole program. We will get you the
specifics on these, and if you could preset those to us in
writing for the record, it will save some time here.
I do have just one very specific question, probably because
of my history dealing with this issue. The Department of the
Interior recently this week issued a permit for Shell Oil to
drill off the Arctic coast. Was the Coast Guard involved in
that? And how do you propose to provide the necessary--or the
potential support for that drilling? I know it is not
acquisition, but----
Admiral Baffer. Well, Ranking Member, I know we are
currently involved with the Department of the Interior and BSEE
[Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement], and, you
know, and the partnership, because it is--we are all involved
in those communications and those deliberations----
Mr. Garamendi. And, for the record, because--and it is
really not your turf--I would like to know a specific
involvement of the Coast Guard in providing the support. The
last time Shell attempted to drill in that area they had a
problem that required a lot of support from the Coast Guard.
And I want to know how the Coast Guard intends to work on that.
But my next question--so, for the record, if you can----
Admiral Baffer. Be happy to provide that, sir.
[The information follows:]

To fulfill our mandated missions in the region, the Coast
Guard's presence in the Arctic will remain active during the
summer operational window starting in June and ending in
October. The Coast Guard's role in the Arctic is not solely for
the purpose of oversight of Shell's drilling operations, if
approved. Operation Arctic Shield 2015 will provide the Coast
Guard with much broader Arctic domain awareness and an enhanced
opportunity to respond to maritime safety and security
incidents, including fulfillment of our spill response
oversight and direction role as the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator if a spill were to occur.

The Coast Guard has cooperated closely with the Department of
the Interior, in particular with Interior's Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) relative to their role in
ensuring offshore operations are properly permitted and
conducted in a safe and efficient manner, with industry Oil
Spill Response Plans and associated equipment and personnel at
the ready. For Shell's 2015 Arctic operations, predesignated
resources are available and on scene during drilling operations
in order to ensure the most rapid response possible in the
Arctic's challenging environment. The Coast Guard coordinated
with BSEE on their review and approval of the Oil Spill
Response Plan for Shell's Arctic exploratory drilling to ensure
adequacy for Arctic operations.

Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. This is a question for the Navy
League.
You have made a proposal here that there be some sort of a
special account for the recapitalization of the icebreaker.
Could you expand on that and tell us how that might work?
Mr. Offutt. I am sorry, I keep forgetting. Since both of
you were on the Armed Services Committee, and we actually
proposed a long time ago, I think--I don't know if the idea
originated with Navy League, or it came somewhere else--that
the replacement program also----
Mr. Garamendi. Take credit or blame, as the case might be--
--
Mr. Offutt. Fine, whichever.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Offutt. We will take the credit, OK. We have been
proposing something like that in our maritime policy, which we
develop annually, for a long time. And it has come to fruition.
I just think it is a great way--part of the problem we have in
Government is getting our different agencies to work together.
And we ought to look and see who this benefits. And, quite
frankly, there are five or six different agencies that could,
in fact, participate in this program of a superfund, if you
want--maybe that has got a bad taste in my mouth, but a
different--a strategic fund that would contribute to the
icebreaker problem.
And, you know, one is not enough. As we have said before,
it is somewhere in the three to six region, if we are going to
cover our responsibilities, both in the Antarctic and the
Arctic, with what we are seeing with icecap retreat, and some
of those kinds of things. So--and I would leave it to your
counsels to figure out how that fund could get set up. That is
what lawyers are for.
Mr. Garamendi. So there was the National Sea-Based
Strategic Deterrent Fund, which are submarines.
Mr. Offutt. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. And that was set aside. So you are
suggesting something similar to that.
Mr. Offutt. Correct, I am.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, we need to work on that. And I have
already talked about the cross--across these two budgets.
I would like to yield the remaining--my time to my----
Ms. Frankel. I will wait.
Mr. Garamendi. OK. Very good. Then I will just let it go at
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Graves?
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Going back to OPC, if you can't award the contract in
2016--and going back to the somewhat tenuous funding--what is
the impact to the Coast Guard folks in the fleet?
Admiral Baffer. Well, Congressman, the biggest impact to
the fleet will be that gap that we talked about, and having to
spend additional funds on ships that probably aren't worthy of
those additional funds.
The--just a quick aside, I was assigned to the Coast Guard
Cutter Reliance, which is the oldest, the first ship that this
OPC will be replacing. When I first graduated in 1984 from the
Academy, it was 20 years old at the time, and it was already
late for its midlife. The ship was not safe to sail. And I kind
of still carry some--harbor some resentment to the leadership
of the Coast Guard, that they asked us to sail on that ship
that could not make water, where nothing worked, where it was
full of lead paint and asbestos. And when Challenger blew up in
1986 we couldn't get underway, even though we were right there,
in Port Canaveral, for the recovery efforts, because our
exhaust stacks were cracked, and we would fill the ship with
carbon monoxide every time we lit the engines off.
Admittedly, the ship is in much better shape now.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Sounds like college.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Baffer. We took it, and it had to be--you know, the
Coast Guard took it, and it moved it up in the midlife cycle,
and that was part of the recovery process for that ship. And I
visited it while I was at the Coast Guard yard a couple years
ago. It is in much better shape now. But, again, you get to the
point where we just can't ask our young folks to get underway
any more on ships like that. We went 2 years without showers at
sea because we couldn't make water. Those kind of conditions I
wouldn't put my son, who is in the Coast Guard, on a ship like
that, and I wouldn't put other people's children on a ship like
that.
So, we are getting to the point where we need to do
something on the OPC, or we are going to have to put people's
children on ships like that.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I thank you very much. I
appreciate the feedback there. That is very helpful.
Pivoting over to the FRC acquisition, there is--going
smoothly from your perspective? I heard Mr. Offutt talk about
the--how much he enjoyed those boats.
Admiral Baffer. It is--we have the RFP on the street right
now for the remaining 26. We have 32 on contract on the first
phase. They are very successful operational platforms. They are
down working the Caribbean. They were very busy this spring,
with the changing of the relationship with Cuba. And there was
some misinformation on the potential change in what--
immigration policies, and they were very busy. But, because
they were there, and they took care of business, and--we didn't
have a large migration effort, or a large migration incident
because of that.
It has been a very successful program for us. The ranking
member mentioned the engines. We have had some warranty issues
with the engine. It is a firm, fixed-price contract with a
rock-solid warranty, so the engine manufacturer has been very
forthright in fixing those things, and taking care of those
things, but we have had more issues than we would expect on
the--with that particular engine. But we are working our way
through it, and we anticipate more on-time and on-schedule
deliveries for that cutter class.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Which would be awarding 26 in
April of next year?
Admiral Baffer. It will be awarded in 2016. Yes, sir.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. Last question for Ms. Mackin
and for you, Admiral, on the Arctic and Antarctic capabilities,
icebreaker capabilities.
In comparing U.S. capabilities to other countries, do you
think we are where we need to be? Yes or no?
Admiral Baffer. Well, I mean, obviously, I am biased. We,
obviously, are not where we need to be.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. It has been a--somewhat of a
tortured process, watching for the last 10-plus years, this
whole decision on Polar Sea, Polar Star. Where do we go from
here? You are asking for additional funds to do another
condition assessment and chart a path forward. Could you just
try and paint a--paint your vision on what the appropriate path
forward is for us to get where we need to be, in regard to
icebreaking capabilities?
Again, Ms. Mackin, I would love to hear your thoughts on
that, as well.
Admiral Baffer. First we are going to have to build a new
polar icebreaker. Polar Star, it would be a potential
bridging--I am sorry, Polar Sea would be a potential bridging
gap. But, at the end of the day, we are still going to have a
ship, if we reactivate her, that has fuel against the hull,
that doesn't meet Clean Air Act requirements, that doesn't have
the environmental capabilities that current ships need to have,
especially working in a pristine environment, like we see in
Antarctica and up in the Arctic.
So, it only delays the inevitable. We still need to build a
new icebreaker. The problem with a new icebreaker is it has
such a long lead time. It is a very significant asset. The
design is very unique. The construction is very unique. It is
going to take a long time to build. So we need to get started
with that, whether or not we reactive Polar Sea, or not.
Reactivating Polar Sea is a very interesting question,
because the hull is pretty good. But if we tried to take
everything out of the hull and rebuild it from the top, it is a
very expensive shipbuilding evolution. Modern ships are built
in blocks, not in--stick built, from the ground up. So whether
we would actually be cost-effective or feasible in reactivating
Polar Sea in that way remains to be seen. And we have got some
significant engineering work that we have to do to make a smart
decision on that.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Frankel----
Ms. Frankel. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. Is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Well, it does sound like there was a--I put it
politely--a planning error, probably on the part of, probably,
Congress, but I don't know. Because--with this gap.
I was going to say how much is it going to cost, do you
think, to do these repairs during the gap period?
Admiral Baffer. Ms. Frankel, it would depend on how big the
gap is, what our new program of record comes out to be, in
terms of how many cutters we need, and what that new Mission
Need Statement says. Our goal would be not to spend any more on
old ships than we have to. And we probably wouldn't have to do
all of them. It would be: take the best couple, and do what we
have to do to them to carry ourselves across.
But at this point, until we come up with a new program of
record, and we finish our engineering work on assessing what
the 270s would take, we really can't provide a number.
Ms. Frankel. Well, I mean, do you think it is going to be
in the millions?
Admiral Baffer. Oh, yes, ma'am. Definitely in the millions.
I mean it is very significant. If it wasn't----
Ms. Frankel. Yes.
Admiral Baffer [continuing]. We would just be doing it.
Ms. Frankel. OK. All right. Let me--I am going to go to
another subject. That sounds like it is a touchy subject for
you. But sure we didn't help you much with this.
I have a problem with bridges. I don't know whether you
have anything to do with bridges, but south Florida--maybe you
have heard of this issue--we have--it is a--down in Broward
County, Fort Lauderdale, there is what I call a train bridge.
There is a bridge that, in order for the trains to go back and
forth, the bridge goes down, and then there is no boats--I mean
not even--I don't even--I have been there--not even a canoe. I
mean you would have to sort of lie flat in a canoe to even get
under it.
And we literally have hundreds of businesses that cater to
boats and yachts, and so forth, but there is no way to get from
the intercoastal--from the east part of the bridge to the west
part of the bridge under that bridge when it is down. And there
are going to be lots more trains going back and forth, and this
is a very slow bridge, getting up and down.
So, I am just--do you get involved with these kinds of
bridges?
Admiral Baffer. I use bridges, but I am not part of the
regulatory process of bridges. And we would be more than happy
to take a question for the record, and----
Ms. Frankel. Well, do you know----
Admiral Baffer [continuing]. Address that, specifically.
Ms. Frankel. Is there a budget for bridges? Does the Coast
Guard have----
Admiral Baffer. Well, we regulate the bridges, and we
permit them, and we are certainly involved in them. I don't
suspect that we pay for all the bridges out of the Coast Guard
budget.
Ms. Frankel. I will yield to----
Mr. Garamendi. If I recall correctly, within the law there
is such a program, unfunded for many, many years now.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Truman-Hobbs Program. And, yes,
this administration has not funded it, but it deals in
impediments to navigation, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. So go find some money.
Ms. Frankel. Impediment to navigation, OK. Thank you. We
will submit the question.
Admiral Baffer. Yes, ma'am. We would be happy to answer
that.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Curbelo?
Mr. Curbelo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
for your time this morning.
The fiscal year 2016 budget request, $340 million to
acquire six Fast Response Cutters, these are very important to
our area, certainly, in south Florida. And this would be the
first order under the recompeted contract that the Service
expects to award by April 2016. Do you still expect to award
the recompeted contract for the remaining 26 FRCs by April?
Admiral Baffer. Yes, sir, we do. The RFP is on the street
now. We are answering questions from potential vendors. And we
see no reason why we would have any problems meeting that date.
Mr. Curbelo. That is wonderful. I commend you on that, and
I will hold you to it, because, in my visits down to Key West
and Miami, we all know how critical these vessels are. So I
appreciate it.
That is all I got, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. Hey, on the OPC, let me
see. Before you award next year, OMB wants you to do an
alternatives analysis. Is that right? Of different types of
ship designs?
Admiral Baffer. Of different sea state-type sizes. One
would be a modernized MEC, if we took the existing capabilities
of the existing MEC fleet of a 270, modernized it to current
conditions, what would that cost.
Mr. Hunter. But do you--meaning how much is it going to
cost you to do the design alternatives? Do you have to take a
lot of money to do that, to do ship design, or--you don't have
to go as far on it, so it is not as expensive, or what?
Admiral Baffer. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is not a complete
design. It was just a kind of a concept using parametric
figures on--for costs, and what would that ship look like, if
we tried to build it today to modern standards. And then, what
would be a parametric rough order of magnitude cost of that. It
is not a complete design study.
Mr. Hunter. But your RFP that is out there now--right? The
RFP that is out there now has a specific design to--or no, not
at all? Or----
Admiral Baffer. What we have out there is we have
performance requirements that--it is required to meet the naval
vessel rules. It has also got a Coast Guard addendum, which
applies many commercial specs to the NVR.
So it is not a Navy ship and it is not a commercial ship,
it is a Coast Guard cutter. It is designed to be a specific
Coast Guard cutter. It is not plans and specs on how to build a
ship. It is not like what is out on the FRC right now, because
each contractor is designing their ship, their product, to be
built efficiently in their yard. So they have got to meet all
the requirements, and all the NVR specifications, and
everything that we required. It is a pretty thick, lengthy
specification, because we have been operating ships like this a
long time. We know what we need. But they have to meet those
performance requirements. And then that is what they are
submitting. That will be evaluated and awarded.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Could you get us--could you get this
committee the alternatives that you are looking at, just the--
like the 210 MEC change, and whatever other alternatives you
guys have in mind?
And you are not doing that--I am just having a hard time
understanding you. Are you doing that for fun?
Admiral Baffer. No, we are doing it just----
Mr. Hunter. Because you are not really going to use it, you
are just doing it.
Admiral Baffer. It is a cost excursion, it is somewhat of
an academic exercise, just to make sure that our program of
record is the most optimum program that we are doing, and we
get the greatest bang for the buck from the cost-benefit
perspective that meets the mission need, at what cost. It is
all part of our affordability program for the OPC.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Last month, Admiral Michel said that the
recompete for the FRCs that is going on right now, he said that
they made some changes. The subcommittee was unaware that you
were going to put in different design requirements for the
second batch of FRCs. And he said no, that is the way it was
supposed to be, all along.
So, I would like to ask Ms. Mackin. When it comes to
changing specs, can they--because Admiral Michel was very
straightforward and said this will not raise costs, or it will
not make it go over schedule, either. He goes, ``It is just a
few changes, and it will be fine.'' On the Armed Services
Committee and other acquisition stuff, there is no such thing
as a few changes and it will all be fine.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. So, I would just like your point of view on
that, on them changing specs, minimum--they are doing small
changes, nothing crazy. But, still, how do you think that is
going to affect the schedule and the budget for the FRC, the
second tranche of buys?
Ms. Mackin. Well, it is correct, this was always the plan,
to recompete the second part of the FRC buy, and we definitely
think competition--and, especially in a firm, fixed-price
environment like the FRC, will drive prices down. It is
infinitely better than a sole-source environment. So, from that
perspective, we certainly do support the Coast Guard strategy.
That said, I think you are right, they will have to be
careful about managing their requirements, scrutinizing what
the contractors may come back with, to make sure that costs do
stay under control.
Admiral Baffer. Sir, if I could, because we are competing
it, and because you had an incumbent shipbuilder, if we just
said, ``Here are the plans and specs, build the exact same
ship,'' that would have a negative effect on competition.
Because who could come in and compete with a shipyard that is
already building the exact same ship?
So, when we went out to industry and we asked them in our
industry engagement, we realized that we were going to have a
lack of competition if we did say, ``Build the exact same
ship.'' We like the same--we would like to get the same ship.
We like the ship. And, from a life-cycle perspective, that is
the way to do it. On the other hand, in order to get the
competition to drive down acquisition costs, as Ms. Mackin
mentions is the way to do that, we want to open up as much as
the ship as we can.
The performance requirements are all the same. It has to
meet all the same performance requirements. We took the things
that were really important to us to have standardized, because
we have got a large infrastructure associated with it in terms
of training, and things like that, spare parts, so we specified
things like electrical switchboards, engines, things that they
couldn't change. And then the other things we said, ``OK,
outside of these things, you can change, if you like.'' And
that was done to, hopefully, increase competition, and let
alternative vendors come in and then----
Mr. Hunter. OK, let me ask it this way. I am all for
competition, but--and maybe, Ms. Mackin, you can answer this,
or maybe Mr. Offutt, too. If you have a batch where you make 20
ships--let's just say you got a company that makes 20 ships.
You then change a few specs on it and then you now say, ``We
are going to recompete this as a brandnew thing, we are going
to put it out there on the market and see who can bite at
this,'' I don't know how anybody could still match the company
that made the first 20 ships.
No matter what you do, by changing requirements to try to
get the competition out there, I don't understand how that
works. Right? Because they don't have--you already have a
pipeline, they already have their employees, they already have
everything for those 20 ships. And to have a new company come
in and say, ``Hey, we can do it cheaper,'' how? Because,
usually, that is not the case in real life. Right?
Ms. Mackin. I think it--the supply chain is a factor, but
you know, the incumbent contractor might also sharpen his
pencil, now that there is competition out there. And, with the
trade space that other potential vendors have, they might be
able to get a better price. It is possible, just by the basis
of their own supply chain, the relationship with their vendors
and suppliers.
So, as I said, though, the Coast Guard will have to manage
the requirements and make sure that the costs don't increase,
as a result of this.
Mr. Hunter. OK. How likely do you think that is, that costs
will not increase as a result of this? You are dealing with a
brandnew--let's say somebody brandnew gets this contract,
right? You are dealing with a brandnew contractor that you
might not be familiar with, a--different design specs in
certain ways, but nothing crazy. Right? You said the majority
is staying the same. How do costs not go up?
I am just not understanding. Knowing how Government works,
and acquisition stuff--at least on the armed services side--
there is no way that costs don't go up.
Admiral Baffer. The major thing is it is a firm, fixed-
price contract. The contractors are bidding at a firm, fixed
price that they are going to build that ship to meet those
performance requirements at a fixed price. There is no share
line. It is firm, fixed price. So that is really our--not
guaranteed, but that is our warranty against the prices going
up. It is not a cost-plus contract. You would certainly not
want to do this with a different type of contracting vehicle.
Mr. Hunter. All right. Anybody else?
Mr. Garamendi. You have raised some very important
questions, Mr. Chairman, and the answers are almost complete.
The word ``life-cycle cost'' was used in this discussion a
moment ago. And it is possible that the next tranche of ships--
20-plus--could be different in significant ways. And that could
affect the life-cycle costs. You now have two different
maintenance systems that you are going to have to have, and two
different operational systems.
The question, therefore, is are you considering the life-
cycle cost in the equation on the cheapest, best deal?
Admiral Baffer. Ranking Member, not in terms of our
selection criteria, but in terms of how we picked what items
have to be the same, and what items could be changed. Those
have the life-cycle cost----
Mr. Garamendi. So in the----
Admiral Baffer [continuing]. Attributes.
Mr. Garamendi. At the outset you have taken into account
the change that could occur in the life-cycle cost, and you
have tried to eliminate those factors, or those issues,
equipment, whatever, that would have an affect on the life-
cycle cost. Is that correct?
Admiral Baffer. That is absolutely correct, Ranking Member.
Mr. Garamendi. Ms. Mackin, do you agree?
Ms. Mackin. Our understanding of the situation is as the
admiral described it.
Mr. Garamendi. And you will be watching closely as this----
Ms. Mackin. We will be very interested to see how this
turns out.
Mr. Garamendi. I said earlier that this is an ongoing
process. We were talking about the OPC at the time, but it is
an ongoing process. And, as one member of the committee--and I
suspect not the only member--as the process goes forward, I
would like to know, at the critical stages, how is it going,
and not wait until it is a done deal and then call you up here
annually and find out why it didn't work out as we thought.
Ms. Mackin. We would be happy to track that.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. That is my--I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. The gentlelady from Florida is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Just follow up on that question. Are you
required by law to take the cheapest bid? Or do you look to see
what is the best quality?
Admiral Baffer. These are--we use best value contracts.
Ms. Frankel. Best value, OK.
Admiral Baffer. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Frankel. All right. That is it. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter. I think that is it. I would just like to just
keep us--please keep us informed when the--when Secretary
Johnson gives you a check for $70 million or so.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. Let us know when that happens, please. And we
are going to try to keep working that here. So, just in case
something else comes up and they don't do that, there is still
maybe a possibility for a different funding stream, so that the
whole schedule is not put off.
But thank you all for being here. Appreciate your
testimony. And I think we have learned a lot today. And we will
just--we will stay on it. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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