[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ARE WE LOSING THE SPACE RACE TO CHINA?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
September 27, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-95
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., ZOE LOFGREN, California
Wisconsin DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
RANDY K. WEBER, Texas DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
STEVE KNIGHT, California PAUL TONKO, New York
BRIAN BABIN, Texas MARK TAKANO, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
GARY PALMER, Alabama
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
DARIN LaHOOD, Illinois
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
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Subcommittee on Space
HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma AMI BERA, California
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama, ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BILL POSEY, Florida MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
STEVE KNIGHT, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
September 27, 2016
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 4
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative Donna Edwards, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 12
Written Statement............................................ 14
Witnesses:
The Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Mr. Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute
Oral Statement............................................... 36
Written Statement............................................ 38
Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center,
Heritage Foundation
Oral Statement............................................... 44
Written Statement............................................ 46
Dr. James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic
Technologies Program, Center for Strategic & International
Studies
Oral Statement............................................... 56
Written Statement............................................ 58
Discussion....................................................... 64
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission..................................... 80
Mr. Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute...... 100
Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center,
Heritage Foundation............................................ 101
Dr. James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic
Technologies Program, Center for Strategic & International
Studies........................................................ 113
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 122
ARE WE LOSING THE SPACE RACE TO CHINA?
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian
Babin [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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Chairman Babin. The Subcommittee on Space will come to
order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Subcommittee at any time, and welcome to
today's hearing titled ``Are We Losing the Space Race to
China?''
I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening
statement.
After the Columbia accident, President George W. Bush
sought to revitalize our nation's space program by challenging
NASA to return to the Moon and then chart a course to Mars.
Steady advances were made towards those goals with strong
Congressional support for the Constellation program.
NASA made solid progress towards the development of the
Ares I and Ares V vehicles. The Commercial Cargo program was
initiated and the International Space Station neared
completion.
All of that success came to a screeching halt when
President Obama was sworn in. His fiscal year 2010 budget
request slashed well over a billion dollars from the
exploration budget.
He then tasked a blue ribbon commission to evaluate NASA's
current plans. The panel found that the original plan was not
executable, something that should have come as no surprise
given the Obama Administration's budget cut. President Obama
cancelled Constellation in its next budget request, redirected
even more money to Earth Science to support its radical
political agenda, and then guaranteed dependence on Russia for
access to space for an extended period of time, which is still
ongoing.
So what does this have to do with China? Well, this vacuum
of leadership has led not only to extended dependence on Russia
for access to space, but also facilitated the ascendance of
China as a leading spacefaring nation. China has capitalized on
this Administration's weakness by offering partnerships with
other nations on missions, like a return to the Moon, which the
United States chose to walk away from.
Rather than charting a bold course that inspires the
international community to engage with us, the Obama
Administration has alienated historic allies and potential
partners alike. Only because of Congress is NASA building deep
space exploration capabilities.
Unfortunately, the administration refuses to let NASA show
any detailed plans for a Journey to Mars beyond a PowerPoint
chart. China, on the other hand, has demonstrated a willingness
to answer calls for collaboration with open arms. This has
clearly strengthened their soft power and international
standing.
China's near-term plans for space exploration continue
their nation's philosophy of steady and measured progress, but
their long-term goals are very ambitious. They have already
placed astronauts in orbit five times, launched a space
station, and placed a rover on the Moon. They have announced
plans for a larger space station, a first-of-a-kind mission to
the far side of the Moon, and potentially a manned mission to
the Moon in the 2030s.
The Administration's abdication of leadership in space
exploration has significant consequences. If we do not lead,
someone else will. Leadership in space means security,
technological prowess, and innovation. Our future prosperity
depends on our leadership in space. If we do not lead, we will
not set the terms and condition for those who follow.
When the United States explores and embarks on adventures
of discovery, we take with us our ideologies and our
principles. I, for one, want to ensure that space becomes a
domain of freedom and liberty, not autocracy and oppression. If
we do not lead, we will weaken our partnerships. I want
countries to embark with us into the cosmos, rather than team
with China as a last resort.
The Obama Administration has already told the Europeans
that they are not interested in their Moon Village proposal.
They've tried to walk away from their commitments to the
Germans on SOFIA and actually abandoned ExoMars. International
partners have memories. They also have options.
China is building a resume of accomplishments that
positions them as a viable alternative. Given their recent
provocative actions in the South China Sea, and the
longstanding oppression of their own people, we should all be
wary of perpetuating conditions that push other nations to
partner with China.
Furthermore, we should ensure that any U.S. cooperation
with China in space is mutually beneficial, appreciates the
risk of technology exploitation, and fits into a larger
strategic perspective that recognizes Chinese provocation.
Aside from recent tensions in the South China Sea, China
also threatens our nation's cyber security. Couple that with
their irresponsible antisatellite tests, one is hard-pressed to
find a reason to reward their behavior with increased
cooperation. We may not be in a space race with China. We may
not even be competing with China in space, but the strategic
choices we make clearly impact China's space capabilities,
something that we should all pay attention to given that
China's civil space activities are inseparable from their
military.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony today, and I
thank them for appearing.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:]
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Chairman Babin. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from Maryland, for an opening statement.
Ms. Edwards. Good morning, and welcome to our distinguished
witnesses today. I want to thank Chairman Babin for calling
this hearing.
You know, on October 4, 1957, 59 years ago next week, the
Soviet Union stunned the world when it launched Sputnik I into
outer space. That launch, marking the first time a manmade
satellite was placed into Earth orbit, caught Americans by
surprise and indeed sparked fears that the Soviet Union might
also be capable of sending missiles with nuclear weapons from
Russia to the United States.
Not long after, Congress passed legislation establishing
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The
agency's budding space program became important in America's
efforts to demonstrate U.S. preeminence and technological
prowess over the Soviet Union.
To that end, President John F. Kennedy stood before
Congress on May 25, 1961 proposing that ``this nation should
commit itself to achieving the goal before this decade is out
of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the
Earth.''
Following a series of interim achievements that
demonstrated NASA's ability to dock and perform extravehicular
activities in space, the space race ended with the successful
July 20, 1969, Apollo 11 landing of the first humans on the
Moon. How different would today's world be if NASA had not
responded to President Kennedy's challenge?
And now, almost 50 years since that historic event, some
are asking if we are again in a space race, but this time with
China. Two weeks ago, China successfully placed in orbit its
Tiangong-2 experimental orbiting space lab, and that
accomplishment comes on the heels of China's landing a robotic
rover on the Moon, with plans announced to do the same on Mars.
So should we be concerned that China may be closing the gap
in spaceflight capabilities? Well, today's panel is well
qualified to address this question. In particular, I look
forward to hearing about China's pace of progress in exploring
space and how our track record fares in comparison.
I'd also like to know if the recent success of China's
space program is due to its ability to stay on course. In
addition, I'd like to get the witnesses' views on what they
believe the goals and objectives of the Chinese space program
are and what impacts other domestic priorities have on the
conduct of their space activities. So I look forward to hearing
the panel's views on whether the U.S. should seek greater
cooperation with other space-faring nations, including China,
and what challenges we face if we choose to do so.
And just in closing, and in reference to the Chairman's
statement, you know, I think that there's a lot of blame that
can be passed along Pennsylvania Avenue from one end to the
next for the uncertainty, for the contrary priorities and
confusing priorities across Republican and Democratic
Presidents and Members of Congress, and in my very short eight
years on this Subcommittee and on this Committee, I've
witnessed that conflict in priorities, and I think that as
Democrats and Republicans here in the House and the Senate that
we would do our nation well and our nation's space program well
for the future to make sure that we set down priorities that
put us all on the same page when it comes to our priorities for
space exploration, engage our international partners, and
commit the resources across Presidents, Republicans and
Democrats that it's going to take to get the job done.
And so I look forward to hearing from our panel today about
those and other priorities, and with that, I yield the balance
of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]
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Chairman Babin. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
And I now recognize the Chairman of our full Committee,
Chairman Smith.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses for being here today as well.
Just this month, China launched its second experimental
space station. While it's just a single module and is smaller
than the International Space Station, it signifies continued
Chinese progress and persistence.
The Soviets flew their first large, modular space station,
Mir, 3-1/2 decades after the first cosmonaut went to space.
China plans to have their own slightly smaller equivalent to
the Mir space station in operation by the mid-2020s. This is
roughly two decades after China launched its first astronaut
into orbit.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration's cuts to exploration
and disruption of exploration planning has eliminated our
opportunities to return to the Moon, and the Administration has
no real plan for landing people on Mars. China continues to
make progress. We cannot resign ourselves to the remembrance of
past achievements. It is time for the United States to reassert
its leadership.
For over 50 years, the United States has been committed to
the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. Our
philosophical principles of freedom, the rule of law, and
transparency are evident in the actions we take. The United
States shares scientific data and findings, promotes
international cooperation, and maintains international peace
and security in outer space. The world has benefited from U.S.
space leadership.
The success of China's space program will be different.
China does not hold the same values of our society. Unlike the
United States, China does not have distinct military and
civilian space programs. The Chinese military is functionally
in charge of all space activities, with the Chinese National
Space Agency responsible for international affairs and
intergovernmental agreements. China already has demonstrated a
strong disregard for interests of other countries in outer
space through its antisatellite tests. Here on Earth, illegal
incursions into the South China Sea represent a blatant
disregard for the international rule of law. Will their
disregard of international law continue to extend into outer
space?
When China launched its first person into space in 2003, it
caught the world's attention. Over the years, our focus has
waned and now China's accomplishments in space have become
commonplace. We cannot ignore Chinese achievements and become
complacent.
Just yesterday, the New York Times featured a large article
on the largest single dish radio telescope, which is being
built in China. China is making steady progress in all fields
of exploration, including astronomy.
If the United States fails to reassert its leadership,
China's rise may undermine U.S. plans to transfer low-Earth
orbit habitation and human spaceflight from a governmental
activity to a sustainable economic activity undertaken by the
private sector. China stands to fill another void left by this
Administration's disinterest in maintaining leadership in
exploration.
By abandoning plans to return to the Moon, the
administration invited the rise of China as a leader in space.
By reallocating funding from exploration to Earth science, the
administration has put our leadership in space exploration at
risk. Our allies stand ready to partner in an ambitious
exploration program. Unfortunately, the current administration
won't allow NASA to propose one.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:]
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Chairman Babin. Thank you. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Okay. Now we'll move on to--I don't see our Ranking Member
here so I want to introduce our witnesses at this time.
The first one is the Hon. Dennis C. Shea, our first witness
today. He is Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic Security
Review Commission. He was reappointed by Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell for a term expiring December 31st, 2016, and
Mr. Shea's government service began in 1988 when he joined the
Office of Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole as Counsel and
subsequently becoming the Senator's Deputy Chief of Staff in
the Office of the Senate Majority Leader. He's an attorney with
more than 25 years of experience in government, in public
policy, and the Founder of Shea Public Strategies LLC, a public
affairs firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. Mr. Shea received
his J.D. and an M.A. in history and a B.A. in government from
Harvard University.
Mr. Mark Stokes, our second witness today, Executive
Director of the Project 2049 Institute. Previously, he was Vice
President and Taiwan Country Manager for Raytheon International
and later, Founder and President of Quantum Pacific
Enterprises, an international consulting firm. Mr. Stokes has
also served as Team Chief and Senior Country Director of the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. He holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University and graduate
degrees in international relations and Asian studies from
Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate School. Thank you
for being here.
Mr. Dean Cheng, our third witness today, Senior Research
Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation.
Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, he was a Senior
Analyst with the China Studies Division at the Center for Naval
Analysis from 2001 to 2009. He specialized on Chinese military
issues with a focus on Chinese military doctrine and space
capabilities. He has written a number of papers and book
chapters examining various aspects of Chinese security affairs
including the Chinese military doctrine, the military and
technological implications of the Chinese space program, and
Chinese concepts of political warfare. Mr. Cheng earned a
bachelor's degree in politics from Princeton University. Thank
you for being here.
And then our final witness today is Dr. James Lewis, Senior
Vice President and Program Director for the Strategic
Technologies program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, or CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr.
Lewis worked at the Departments of State and Commerce as a
Foreign Service Officer and as a member of the Senior Executive
Service. His government experience included work on a range of
political, military and Asian security issues as a negotiator
on conventional-arms transfers and advanced military
technology, and in developing policies for satellite exports,
encryption, and the internet. Dr. Lewis received his Ph.D. from
the University of Chicago.
So I now recognize Mr. Shea for five minutes to present his
testimony. Mr. Shea.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. DENNIS C. SHEA, CHAIRMAN,
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
Mr. Shea. Well, thank you, Chairman Babin, Ranking Member
Edwards, Chairman Smith, and the members of the Subcommittee
for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I have to note these are my own personal views and not
necessarily the judgments of the U.S.-China Commission though I
draw heavily from the Commission's work.
Examining China's space program has never been more
crucial. Over the next six years, China is poised to take major
steps that will draw significant attention to its efforts in
space and potentially set the stage for a larger leadership
role.
Specifically, China plans to collect soil samples from the
Moon and return them to Earth in 2017, send an unmanned
spacecraft to land on the Moon's dark side before 2020, send a
Rover to Mars in 2020, and complete a space station in 2022.
In this testimony, I want to briefly address three main
points: the key characteristics of China's space program, the
contributions it provides in economical, political and
diplomatic terms, and the implications it presents for future
U.S. leadership in space. The military aspects of China's space
program are covered more fully in the Commission's report of
last year.
China's climb to its current status is one of the world's
top space powers as the result of decades of leadership
attention and steady investment. It has also involved a
significant effort to buy or otherwise obtain technologies from
foreign sources, especially the United States. In particular,
China's large-scale state-sponsored theft of intellectual
property through cyber espionage has no doubt helped fill
knowledge gaps in its space R&D.
China's space initiatives have progressed as a much slower,
more deliberate and more methodical pace than those of the
United States. For example, the United States achieved manned
spaceflight for the first time in 1961 and the Moon landing in
1969, whereas China conducted its first manned spaceflight in
2003 and may not plan to land on the Moon until the 2030s, as
revealed just this year. However, China is also pursuing
multiple large-scale efforts at the same time rather than the
more sequential approach taken by the United States, making it
difficult to compare the two directly.
As pointed out by Chairman Smith, China does not have
distinctly separate military and civilian space programs as the
United States does. Rather, China's military controls the
majority of the country's space assets and operations and
state-owned defense conglomerates are the key actors in the
commercial space sector. Thus, even apparently civilian
projects such as space exploration can directly support the
development of PLA, space, counter-space, and conventional
capabilities. Beijing also provides little transparency
regarding its intentions in space, for example, does not
release detailed budget information on its space activities.
China's space program has furthered its leaders strategic
ambitions. China's advancements in space, specifically its
plans for a space station, lunar exploration, and Mars
exploration provide domestic legitimacy and international
prestige.
China's global commercial efforts in areas such as space
launch services, satellite exports and satellite application
technologies provide revenues and are expected by policymakers
to spark spin-off developments in key economic sectors. Both
space exploration and commercial activities open the door to
China's participation in key international and bilateral
initiatives, which I list in my written testimony.
China has sought to work with advanced space powers where
possible to improve its capabilities, most notably the European
Space Agency. China has seen its greatest success in marking
commercial space services to developing countries, which are
less likely to demand advanced technologies subject to U.S.
ITAR restrictions.
China's space program has economic implications for the
United States in the areas of commercial satellite and spaced
launch services, downstream satellite navigation industries,
and the potential for European countries and their industries
to pursue non-U.S. technologies in order to reach the Chinese
market. The full deployment of China's BeiDou satellite
navigation system plans to provide global service by 2020, and
the introduction of policies to promote its adoption in
downstream industries may affect U.S. firms and these
industries in the future.
On the political side, China's activities have implications
for U.S. leadership and international cooperation efforts in
space. If the United States has a Mars program but no space
station and no lunar program in the near future while China has
all three, China will be able to dictate participation in
manned spaceflight as well as in scientific projects involving
its space station. China has already signed agreements with the
U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs and the Russian and
European space agencies regarding space station cooperation.
Although the United States is prepared to maintain its
leadership in the space domain, China's highly controlled,
methodical and comprehensive approach will open up
opportunities for Beijing in the near term.
Despite the fact that China's accomplishments and
investments in space have been far outpaced by our own, it will
likely appear over the next six years that China is reaching
major milestones and gaining ground. Meanwhile, the United
States will be focused on longer-term exploration projects and
observers will be well aware of the planned deorbiting of the
International Space Station in 2024. This underscores how
important it is for the United States to see through its long-
term space exploration projects so this apparent disparity does
not continue.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shea follows:]
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Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Shea.
I now recognize Mr. Stokes for five minutes to present his
testimony. Mr. Stokes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. MARK STOKES,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE
Mr. Stokes. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee. It's an honor and privilege to be able to have
this opportunity to come and present before you today.
I'd like to make three points. The testimony should be able
to speak for itself, and I can provide more details in the
question-and-answer session. But I'd like to make three points
to sort of emphasize various aspects of developments in China's
space capabilities.
Number one, it's important to draw upon and augment what
Mr. Shea mentioned about the difficulty between distinguishing
military capabilities and civilian capabilities in China's
space program, and this is part of a conscious policy referred
to these days as military-civilian fusion--MCF for short. There
is a long history behind military-civilian fusion dating back
perhaps to the 1980s. Dong Zhou Ping, he had a 16-character
slogan in which military programs or military projects or
civilian projects and investments were intended to support each
other with the military taking priority. The term previously
was referred to in English as integration so the military
integration, not military-civilian fusion, presumably to imply
a greater degree of cooperation between the two sectors.
It is difficult to distinguish military and civilian
programs but one can at least make an attempt to identify an
end user or sponsor, in other words, who is actually managing
the program. There are some aspects of China's space program
that are managed by civilian organizations, and then there are
some military end users. This was not always the case. When
China embarked upon their space program in the beginning, there
was very much of even more of a blurring. Over the last decade
or 10, 15 years, there's been an increasing effort with PLA
developing dedicated military systems, particularly, for
example, remote sensing programs, and there also of course are
other organizations, civilian organizations, that have their
own systems, say, for example, there's an ocean organization
under the state council that's important. But, you know, part
of this has to do with both spin-on and spin-off capabilities
in space.
The second point I'd like to make is related to
technological progresses being made, particularly in the
research, development and acquisition system. This is probably
where China has made the most significant achievements, not
necessarily in the technology itself but in the ability to
mobilize resources and to organize in a very progressive and
reasonable fashion in terms of increasing capabilities.
As mentioned in the written testimony, there is sort of a
stage-phase pathway to fielding systems ranging from
preliminary research or basic research to concept development,
to engineering, research and development, then all the way up
to testing and then fielding. It's important to understand
where each individual program is in the cycle to get a feel for
how far along that they are. There's a pretty wide body of
information that outlines the various programs all the way from
satellites, remote sensing satellites, communication
satellites, guidance navigation satellites, significant
increasingly diverse set of launch vehicles that are being
fielded to include starting last year a solid-fuel launch
vehicle, one of their first to be deployed and operationalized.
There's significant investments in the counter-space systems to
include the ability to be able to track and surveil space
assets, and of course, the manned space program. So there are
significant capabilities that are being developed in this
field.
There are three goals, to put it simply, in my view. One of
the key goals of course is political, political legitimacy. One
has to remember that ultimately the People's Republic of China
is a one-party system, that the Chinese Communist Party seeks
legitimacy in various ways and which the space program is
certainly one of these. There are military goals, and again,
there's a wide body of literature that outlines these goals and
capabilities. And then there are economic goals as well.
And then finally, directly addressing the issue of the
Space Race. It's difficult to define exactly what the Space
Race is, and it's not even clear if we're even competing or we
even view space as an area of competition with the People's
Republic of China. And there may be different playing fields.
For example, the political playing field, I think, is
significant. But regardless from a technology perspective,
Beijing and authorities in Beijing are closing the technology
gap. It's my view that the United States technologically is
likely to maintain advantage, bearing in mind that I'm not an
expert on U.S. space systems, given the United States makes
proper investments in our space capabilities.
In terms of future and goals in terms of what the United
States should do in order to understand this better, in terms
of defining what the competition would be, there's
technological aspects. There's the ability to be able to apply
capabilities that are being deployed, and then some comparison
of the ability to mobilize resources in terms of personnel,
budgets, and then organization.
And with that, I will save the rest of my comments for the
question-and-answer session.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stokes follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Stokes.
Now I recognize Mr. Cheng for five minutes to present his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DEAN CHENG,
SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
ASIAN STUDIES CENTER,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Cheng. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Edwards, Chairman
Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee, my name is Dean
Cheng. I'm the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and
Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation but I'd like to
emphasize that my comments today are my own.
Directly to the point of whether or not there is a space
race underway between the United States and China, I would like
to suggest that there is not a space race per se but rather
that there is a race between the United States and China on
multiple different aspects and fronts, political, diplomatic,
security, all of which have a space component, and that is the
Chinese perspective because the Chinese view space as being an
essential part of the larger effort to raise China's
comprehensive national power.
Comprehensive national power is how the Chinese basically
look at various countries including themselves, how they rank
with each other how capable they are. It includes economic,
diplomatic, political, cultural, science and technology, as
well as military aspects, and from the Chinese perspective,
space development contributes to every one of those elements of
comprehensive national power.
With regards to the economy, space is seen as a pivotal
technology. Because it is so dense, as the Chinese put it, in
science and technology, in high technology, because it touches
on such aspects as advanced materials, telecommunications,
computing, and above all, systems engineering and systems
integration. The Chinese see an advancing space capability
that's almost like a locomotive that will pull along other
parts of the Chinese economy. The space workforce in particular
is seen as building expertise in key areas including systems
integration, and we have seen key leaders in China's space
industry transfer to areas such as the Commercial Aircraft
Corporation, China's effort to build their own wide-bodied
aircraft in the belief that their experience in the space
sector can be translated into building Chinese challengers to
Boeing and Airbus.
We also see this in terms of the Chinese folks on
indigenous innovation. The perception is that China's ability
to field a full-blown space program will spark innovation in
other areas, other key subtechnologies.
In addition, of course, we also see the Chinese using space
in terms of their political efforts, and this is both domestic
and foreign relations. Space is a source of prestige, and
prestige in this case supports both the legitimacy of the
Chinese Communist Party but also the prestige of the People's
Republic of China. For example, space achievements are often
described as CCP achievements, and so China's space program,
which grew out of the so-called two bombs, one satellite
program, not only is a reflection of the relationship the
Chinese view space with regards to key strategic weapons but
also as a means again of promoting innovation. We also see the
expectation that economic development through space will
basically again help spark a revival of the Chinese economy,
which right now seems to be slowing down.
With regards to foreign relations, again, we see space
being used as a key diplomatic tool in both the bilateral and
the multilateral aspects, bilaterally, in terms of sales of
satellites to such states as Venezuela, Bolivia, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, all of whom are key sources of raw materials that
help power the Chinese economy, but also at the multilateral
level, again such as the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization, which brings in Thailand, Malaysia, Mongolia.
These are not major space powers per se, but they are key
neighbors of the People's Republic of China, and they are using
APSCO as a diplomatic tool.
Of course, it is implicit that the ability to maintain
space-based surveillance and to put payloads into orbit
obviously affects Taiwan, obviously affects Japan. I would also
suggest to the Committee that when, not if, the Chinese are
able to go to the Moon, first with a robotic lander on the far
side, to think about how you will communicate with something on
the far side of the Moon. In order to do that, it will require
the establishment of a lunar satellite, satellites that will
orbit the Moon. The implications for military and security
aspects are self-evident. But also, the day that the Chinese
land a human being on the Moon will be an enormous impact on
the United States because how often have we heard we've gone to
the Moon, why haven't we, you know, solved the common cold, why
haven't we solved traffic problems in downtown DC. The reality
is that the day the Chinese are able to do the same thing is
the day that American uniqueness will be openly challenged and
Chinese prestige will be put on the same level as that of the
United States.
Thank you very much, members of the Committee, for your
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you very much, Mr. Cheng.
I now recognize Dr. Lewis for five minutes to present his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMES LEWIS,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank the Committee
for the opportunity to testify on whether we're in a space race
with China, but it's also useful to ask if we have the right
strategy for space exploration in what's become a very
different international environment.
A comparison of the U.S. and Chinese space programs
suggests each reflects different goals rather than being a
race. China's goals are political. Ours are scientific. There
is a degree of parallelism between the U.S. and Chinese efforts
but with the exception of human space exploration, the two
programs are not really comparable.
In most areas, the United States remains unmatched in its
space capabilities. Our unmanned space exploration program has
no equal in its successes, but when we talk about a space race,
we're talking about human spaceflight, the area of activity
where the United States is weakest. The classic space race
between the United States and the Soviets centered on human
spaceflight and landing on the Moon. Each side tried to surpass
the exploits of the other. I think it's now safe to say that
the United States does not consider itself in a space race with
China. The United States is focused on the manned exploration
of Mars, and from a scientific perspective, going to Mars makes
sense, but it doesn't make sense from a strategic perspective.
China does not talk about space races but there is an
unavoidable comparison and competition with the United States.
China's focus in space exploration is on human spaceflight and
its leaders have a great interest in landing on the Moon.
In the United States and Soviet space race, the objectives
are prestige and global influence. Having won the race, the
United States largely lost interest in space. In contrast,
China uses its space programs to gain political advantage. Its
human space programs serve important domestic and foreign
policy purposes.
Human spaceflight was a central part of the Cold War
contest. The assumption was that the system that won the space
race was superior. The competition between the U.S. and Chinese
systems is not as clear-cut, but the rest of the world thinks
we're in a competition with China and that space exploration is
a part of this.
We should be clear that the Chinese space program largely
duplicates U.S. and Soviet exploits from the 1970s and 1980s.
What we do not want, however, is a tortoise-and-hare scenario
where a slow-moving China passes the United States. American
performance in space is an important element in how China will
decide between confrontation or cooperation. We do not want a
situation where China's leaders think, as a PLA general said
last year, that the United States has ``great capability, no
will.''
The future of space exploration requires the United States
to make difficult choices. These choices will determine the
outcome of any space race with China. A strong case can be made
that the United States would be best served by human
spaceflight programs that focus on incremental and achievable
goals. We're in a very difficult international situation, and
our space programs need to adjust to this.
I thank the Committee, and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lewis follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you very much, Dr. Lewis.
I thank all the witnesses for their testimony. I now
recognize myself for five minutes.
Mr. Cheng, a July article in the Wall Street Journal
reported that the Director General of the European Space Agency
was open to the idea of cooperating with China onboard the
International Space Station. China's long-term lunar plans are
also consistent with Europe's lunar village concept. President
Obama cancelled the Constellation program that would have
returned the United States to the Moon and take astronauts onto
Mars. In a speech announcing the cancellation, he argued
against returning to the Moon by stating ``We've been there
before,'' rather arrogantly, I thought.
The NASA Administrator has stated the U.S. does not have to
be the country that says we're going, follow us, we're all
going back to the surface of the Moon, but it's just that the
United States has no intention of leading that effort. We will
support and be along with anybody that goes.
The National Academy of Sciences' report, ``Pathways to
Exploration,'' indicated that returning to the Moon would offer
significant advantages as an intermediate step to Mars. It
appears as though the Administration's policies are pushing our
allies to cooperate with China rather than with us.
Furthermore, it appears as though China may be adopting a more
robust architecture for future exploration than the one
proposed by this Administration.
What impact does that have on our nation's economic
competitiveness, international standing, and national security?
Mr. Cheng. Sir, to begin with, it should be noted that the
previous head of the European Space Agency opined that it would
be very delighted to work with China on manned space literally
within a week of the Chinese ASAT test in 2007, widely
considered to be the single worst regenerating event in space.
So I think it is safe to say that the current head of the
European Space Agency apparently is continuing a policy of
basically being open to Chinese behavior, cooperating with
China regardless of Chinese behavior. I would suggest that the
idea that we do not need to lead in the process of going to the
Moon is consisting with a leading-from-behind philosophy that
this Administration has enunciated with regards to terrestrial
objectives as well.
But I would also emphasize here, sir, that the most
important consideration is that China has been attempting to
push the limits of its sovereignty into international common
spaces. As I said in my spoken testimony, Chinese behavior is
not about space, it is about terrestrial, but what we see in
the oceans, what we see in outer space, what we see in
cyberspace is China pushing its position into all of these
international spaces, and if the United States does not lead,
we will find ourselves operating in the Chinese framework.
Chairman Babin. Thank you very much.
And now, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Shea's testimony highlights that
the Chinese military and civil space programs are tightly
intertwined. Some of you have already alluded to this. But I
would like to hear it again. If not the same organization,
they're tightly intertwined.
Some argue for increased cooperation with China on civil
space. Could this be done without directly benefiting Chinese
military capabilities?
Mr. Stokes. The short answer, it's possible, but I would
recommend doing it very, very carefully.
Chairman Babin. Amen. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much.
And now, current U.S. plans called for a crewed mission to
Mars in the 2030s, and from what we can tell, the Chinese plan
to land a crew on the Moon in the same time frame. U.S. space
exploration efforts have been characterized by uncertainty
lately, particularly in the wake of the Administration's
cancellation of Constellation, that would have returned the
United States to the Moon no later than 2020 if the
Administration had not raised NASA's exploration budget.
Conversely, China has been fairly successful in accomplishing
the goals that it sets for its space program, and Mr. Shea, in
15 years, could we find ourselves watching a Chinese astronaut
land on the Moon when we are years away from a U.S. Mars
mission and no capability to return to the Moon?
Mr. Shea. It is possible. I mean, earlier this year,
officials within the Chinese space program have indicated that
they want to land a Chinese astronaut on the Moon in the 2030
time frame, so that is possible, yes, sir.
Chairman Babin. Okay. Thank you. And I think we'll go to
the next question. Ms. Edwards, the gentlewoman from Maryland.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you very much to our witnesses today.
I want to start with Dr. Lewis. The National Academies'
Pathways to Exploration report recommended that NASA should
vigorously pursue opportunities for international and
commercial collaboration in order to leverage financial
resources and capabilities of other nations and commercial
entities. The report goes on to say an international
collaboration would be open to the inclusion of China and
potentially other emerging space powers in addition to
traditional international partners.
Notwithstanding existing prohibitions on NASA's ability to
engage in bilateral cooperation with China, do you agree with
the National Academies' recommendation?
And then after you answer, I'd like to turn to Mr. Shea,
because in your testimony, you point to some of the public
relations wins that China has achieved, making it look like the
resistance to peaceful kind of cooperation and scientific
cooperation is--rests with the United States. And so Dr. Lewis
first?
Dr. Lewis. Thank you for the question. Essentially, people
like--other countries like cooperating with the United States.
We have better technology. We spend a little more money. It's
more fun to visit here. But to get that cooperation, you
actually need to have programs that promise immediate and
tangible results. So I don't think that saying that working
with the private sector or with other countries by itself is an
adequate strategy.
On cooperation with China, just in the last few years, the
relationship has changed to such a degree that I don't think
that absent indications from China that they were more
interested in a serious and peaceful relationship that
cooperation would be a good idea. We can cooperate with other
countries if we can show them how working with the United
States will get them goals in space, but at the moment, with
the tensions, the bilateral tensions, I don't think cooperation
with China is in our interest.
Ms. Edwards. Mr. Shea?
Mr. Shea. Well, the question reminded me of something
completely different but very much related: Hollywood. If you
haven't noticed, the Chinese companies are buying a lot of
Hollywood. One Chinese company, Wanda Dalian, owns what may be
the largest or second largest theater chain, AMC, in the United
States, and they are aggressively pursuing other Hollywood
acquisitions, so this relates to the public perception. I think
of--and there's pressure within Hollywood to portray China in a
benevolent manner, to portray in a very positive manner in
order to have access to the Chinese market, and I'm thinking of
two movies that are space-related, American movies, like The
Martian, where the Chinese come in at the end and----
Ms. Edwards. Save the day.
Mr. Shea. --save the day, and the China National Space
Administration is viewed as a civilian, genteel, you know,
organization. I'm also thinking of gravity where--the movie
where the Chinese space station helps Sandra Bullock get back
to Earth, but also portrays the Russians as creating the
largest space debris that put the Americans at risk rather than
the fact that, as alluded to, the Chinese created the largest
space debris with their antisatellite test in 2007. So I am--
this is linking Hollywood with the space program, and I think
we could see more of that.
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Lewis--thank you. Your report titled
``Space Exploration in a Changing International Environment''
states that the international environment for space has changed
significantly. You pointed to that in your prepared testimony.
Can you expand on that environment? And then the report also
goes on to state that the new environment necessitates the
development of a new framework for international cooperation.
What would such a framework look like given the end of the
operational life of the International Space Station in 2024?
Dr. Lewis. Thank you. The fundamental change in the last
few years, we are now in a contest, and not just with China but
with other countries including Russia and maybe in particular
Russia, and a space strategy, all of our international
strategies need to recognize this. Now, a contest is not a war,
it's not a new Cold War, but we are in a conflictual
relationship, and I don't think that inactivity is the--or the
perception of inactivity is the right way to deal with this.
The ISS is an interesting question. When it is deorbited,
should it be deorbited, the United States could face a
situation where it no longer has a presence in space. That
would be really disastrous for our international reputation. So
we need to think about the ISS. Some of the international
partners are beginning to ask about the utility of the ISS. We
really need a new project that they would be willing to fund
and participate in, one where we could help lead the
international community because given our technology, our
budget, our past efforts, we are the default leader if we
choose to exercise that. So we need a new project to take the
place of the Space Station or maybe a new way to think about
the Space Station and the Moon to energize the nations that
want to work with us. But among those nations, we should be
very cautious not to work with those who are de facto
opponents.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Babin. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing is entitled ``Are We Losing the Space Race
to China?'' and if I were to try to summarize your collective
testimony, as I understand it, you're saying that the United
States is not losing the race to China but China is gaining
ground.
Mr. Shea, would that be a fair summary of your remarks?
Mr. Shea. I think that's a fair summary. I think over the
next six years you'll see a lot of activity by China--Moon
missions, sending a rover to Mars, completing a space station--
while at the same time we won't see similar activity by the
United States, and we'll see the deorbiting of the ISS
scheduled for 2024. So within this window of time, I think
you'll see that the public perception may very well be that the
Chinese are gaining ground, significant ground, on the United
States while the United States is standing still.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Stokes, did I accurately summarize your
viewpoint?
Mr. Stokes. Yes, you did, sir. When you say space race, it
implies a competition and it implies that we're aware of a
competition. I just don't see that there's that much of an
awareness, at least on the U.S. side.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Cheng, did I accurately summarize your view
on this issue?
Mr. Cheng. Yes, sir, I believe you did.
Mr. Brooks. And Dr. Lewis, did I accurately summarize your
view on this issue?
Dr. Lewis. The thing I wonder about is that we have such a
successful space program in other areas, why doesn't that
translate over to the manned space program? And unfortunately,
when you talk about a race, you're talking about how do you
keep scores, and the score is determined largely by the manned
program. So I think, yeah, you did summarize my views.
Mr. Brooks. I come from a district in the northern part of
Alabama, home of the Marshall Space Flight Center, and some
would say it's the birthplace of America's manned spaceflight
program. I still have about 6,000 people who are employed
either by NASA at the Marshall Space Flight Center or as
support contractors for NASA, so in my district, people are
pretty well educated about NASA and space, and why it is or is
not important. But that having been said, in practical day-to-
day terms, why should Americans care about whether the Chinese
are catching the United States of America in the space race, or
perhaps even one day surpassing us, and whoever would like to
handle that question, please feel free to interject. Mr. Cheng.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, politics is as much about perception as it
is about reality, and in this context here, the People's
Republic of China has mastery of how to present itself as
winning, and the issue isn't necessarily to the good folks in
your district. The problem is how we are perceived in the
context of an international competition, whether it is
conflictual or not, and whether or not we are seen as winning,
and in that regard, a China that scores what is touted by a
state-run media as winning that falls on receptive ears in
Africa, in South America, in Southeast Asia, in East Asia winds
up creating a situation that works against our interests.
Mr. Brooks. Interesting concept. You're talking then in
terms of geopolitical politics and perceptions of the different
nations.
Mr. Shea or Mr. Stokes or Dr. Lewis, why should the
American people care that China may be gaining on us, or
perhaps one day surpassing us?
Dr. Lewis. One of the lessons from the first Space Race was
that space is part of being a superpower, it's part of being
able to influence global politics. It's part of being able to
shape how the world works. And if I had to choose, I'd rather
have the United States shape the world than China.
There is this larger narrative that asks, is the United
States in decline? And a lot of European outlets, every time
the economists get a chance, they say the United States is in
decline. They're wrong, but our inability to perform in manned
space flights contributes to this narrative that the United
States is in decline, China will be the most powerful nation in
2020 or 2030 or sometime. That's not an outcome we want.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Stokes or Mr. Shea, why should the average
citizen, say, in Lexington, Massachusetts, care about whether
the Chinese?
Mr. Shea. Well, I agree with what Mr. Cheng and Dr. Lewis
have said in terms of the diplomatic and geopolitical
implications but also their economic implications. There's been
a lot of technology and economic growth generated from a
successful space program, and we need to keep those benefits
here in the United States.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Stokes, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Stokes. Very briefly. One of the reasons why the United
States chose to compete against the Soviet Union, the former
Soviet Union, in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s is--part of the
explanation is that it was viewed as part of a broader
competition in terms of legitimacy, that between that of a
Marxist Lenin or the Soviet Communist Party and then free and
open society, democracy, the United States. I would argue that
the Chinese Communist Party should be viewed in a similar
light, and that's just in terms of legitimacy, and that's just
one of many, many reasons, I think.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is
expired.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all so much
for coming.
Mr. Shea, you--in your written and oral testimony, you
talked about--let me quote--``Beijing has heavily emphasized
both commercial launch services and satellite exports as the
space industry has developed, and both activities provide
China's space industry with revenues, opportunities to measure
the quality of its products and services against international
competitors, and industrial development synergies, et cetera.''
One of the things this Committee has done in a very
bipartisan way is try to be champions for the development of
the commercial space industry here in the United States. Does
China represent a real threat to our commercial space industry
or is the competition good for our commercial space industry?
Mr. Shea. Not--it doesn't represent a threat, not at the
high end, but there is--one of our recommendations last year
was to look at the ITAR regulations to see whether they're
overly restrictive and China would have access to technologies
that are otherwise restricted by ITAR through non-U.S. sources
so that's one thing we recommended last year.
But China's satellite launch services and satellite
business is really for now at least directed at developing
countries that don't necessarily need the best technology but
need a cheap solution or cheaper solution. So right now that's
where the Chinese are focusing their efforts. But they want to
compete. When we went to Beijing last year, we met with the
Great Wall Industry Corporation, which performs--state-led
performs their satellite launch services for international
customers, and they're very negative about the ITAR
restrictions, not surprisingly, but they want to have greater
access to the market.
Mr. Beyer. Great. Thank you.
And Dr. Lewis, again, this Committee has tried to really be
a champion for open data often directed in different political
things, whether it's the data that the EPA uses to proclaim its
rules or our support for all the scientists that the U.S.
Government funds making their data available to other
scientists. Do you see any of the possibility for open data
coming from the Chinese investments in space? What will we
learn from their new telescope, for example, compared to what
we'll be able to make available to the world from James Webb or
from Hubble?
Dr. Lewis. The Chinese in some ways are still ambivalent
about how to deal with the United States, and there's a strong
national sentiment that calls for confrontation, but there's
also a recognition of the benefits of cooperation and the
strength of the United States, not somebody you might want to
pick a fight with. So we have opportunities to--maybe niche
opportunities--I don't know what my other panelists would say--
to cooperate with them. Their scientists are like our
scientists but their scientists are not always in charge, so
the Chinese will look for cooperation, Chinese scientists will
look for cooperation, and perhaps their government will let
them do it to some extent.
Mr. Beyer. Is the merging of their version of NASA with
their version of the Department of Defense the real bar for us,
that they don't have an independent space agency that's not
militaristic?;
Dr. Lewis. No, I don't think so, Congressman. I think that
it's the larger Chinese policies of pushing back on the United
States, of challenging us in as many areas as possible. So even
if it was a purely civilian space agency, they would still be
answering to President Xi and the party.
Mr. Beyer. We had the author of The Martian here a few
months ago, and as you will recall from the book and the movie,
they turned to China to help when the guy was stranded on Mars.
Is that just a space fantasy?
Dr. Lewis. I wouldn't use the book as a guideline for space
policy. I loved the movie, great movie, but not----
Mr. Beyer. Mr. Stokes, you know, we've heard a number of
times that China really lags, you know, they're 40 years behind
us in terms of getting people into space but their quantum
experiments, you know, QESS satellite, seem to be an exception,
that they may be able to beam quantum encrypted information
between orbiting satellites and ground stations, a
revolutionary technology. Does this give them a specific
advantage over us? Are they experimenting in places that we're
ignoring?
Mr. Stokes. Sir, when you mentioned quantum satellites, I
mean, it goes way over my head.
Mr. Beyer. Oh, okay.
Mr. Stokes. But in general, my understanding is that the
end user of the sponsoring organization based in Shanghai under
the China Academy of Sciences ostensibly civilian. It's
experimental in nature. What the--I think it's safe to assume
that it has military applications as well related to encryption
and other aspects of military capabilities but it's something
we should watch very carefully, and I'll leave it there.
Mr. Beyer. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Beyer.
I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to all of our panelists. I'm glad to see there's so much
agreement on our panel today. There's been a lot of talk about
the Space Race. I want to be clear, we've put men on the Moon.
We got two rovers currently operating on the surface of Mars.
We have explored the furthest reaches of the solar system. The
Space Race is over, and we won.
The question is now how are we utilizing space and how are
our near-peer competitors utilizing space, and the question is,
are we ceding leadership to the Chinese. China is building a
new station, as has already been identified. It has a Moon
rover, recently launched the world's quantum communications
satellite, as we just talked about, which does have very
specific military implications, and it's expanding its BeiDou
PNT system. Taking into account that there is no distinction
between China's peaceful and military space programs, and these
developments become very alarming quickly. Given their
notorious lack of transparency, we do not know their true
intentions with a space station nor do we even know what they
are currently doing on the Moon.
Quantum technology is virtually unhackable and would give
the Chinese a distinct advantage over any current military
communications that we have as a nation. Utilizing BeiDou gives
the Chinese an outlet for PNT that is separate from our own
GPS. As they are developing their own GPS-type constellation,
they are also developing and undertaking direct ascent
antisatellite missile capabilities such as the 2007 direct
ascent test that destroyed a LEO satellite. They are advancing
spoofing and dazzling technologies and carrying out pernicious
state-sponsored cyber espionage including a hack of the
National Weather Service, which compelled us to shut down
ground stations for two days in this country, deteriorating
forecasts and putting my constituents in danger, and that
threatened also the safety of millions of Americans including
the constituents of everybody on this panel.
It is clear that China views space as the ultimate high
ground and they are rapidly making moves to establish
themselves in a position of strength while also improving their
ability to deny us the use of space. Given the threat from
China, we cannot afford to have the DOD doing extraneous
activities not within its mission. As a point of departure, we
must give the responsibility for providing space situational
awareness for commercial and foreign entities to a civil
agency, namely FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
The Department of Transportation and the DOD concurred and
endorsed this proposal in a recent report ordered by Section
110 of the Commercial Space bill recently enacted in 2015. I
urge all of my colleagues to read the Section 110 report.
Next, we have a chance to pass a NASA authorization this
year. That bill should direct NASA to utilize the Moon on our
journey to Mars. Mr. Chairman, I think that's a great idea that
you said and I think we need to go forward with that. Our
allies want to go there as does a wide swath of our domestic
commercial space industry. If we do not, our allies will work
with China. They're either going to come into our orbit or
they're going into their orbit--no pun intended.
Further, the bill should include the formation of a plan
for a post-ISS world. We cannot afford a gap in LEO platforms
similar to our gap in human transportation that currently
exists. Including these policies will go a long way toward
ensuring that we do not leave a power and leadership vacuum for
China to fill.
Unfortunately, NASA under this Administration seems more
focused on forcing partnership with China than in maintaining
our leadership. Former Chairman Frank Wolf was a leader on
this, and our country is grateful for his work. He first
codified restrictions on cooperation with China in space.
On top of their belligerent space activity, China is run by
a brutal regime that imprisons dissidents and persecutes
minorities. State-sponsored cyber-crimes have robbed our
companies of billions of dollars of intellectual property,
doing untold damage to our economy. When does it stop is the
question?
Mr. Chairman, any NASA bill should permanently codify the
restrictions on cooperation with China while also discouraging
others from partnering with the Chinese. We must treat China's
actions in space for the threat that they are and ensure that
we stay ahead of them technologically while preventing any
vacuums in leadership that they might exploit.
Mr. Cheng, my question is for you. Given that China
considers space security equivalent to maritime security, as
you've kind of already talked about, is it reasonable to expect
that China will behave in space similar to how it has behaved
in the South China Sea?
Mr. Cheng. Representative, obviously it's going to be a
little bit difficult to build artificial islands in space but I
think that what we should expect to see is the Chinese
attempting to redefine the international rules to new sets that
will basically benefit the Chinese. There have been comments
about, for example, the requirement that foreign aircraft and
ships should turn off their radars when operating in China's
claimed waters. It would not be surprising if there was a
comparable effort to basically say to operators of space-based
surveillance systems, you turn them on over China at your own
risk.
Mr. Bridenstine. I'm out of time.
Chairman Babin. The gentleman's time is expired. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
I'd like each member to comment on this. What are the
implications that China might match or surpass the U.S.
civilian space capabilities in the near future or the distant
future? And if they do, what are the key areas, what are the
implications of that possibility, and also comment, the risks
and benefits associated with NASA collaborating with China in
space activities? So let me start with Mr. Shea, but I'd like
each panel member to comment on that.
Mr. Shea. Well, I'll answer, Congresswoman, your second
question first. I agree that we need to be very skeptical with
cooperative efforts with China. It has been well documented
they've engaged in a large-scale cyber and other types of
espionage directed at the United States. Their space program is
predominantly a military program as we've outlined in our
report. They're heavily engaged in counter-space activities
such as antisatellite, kinetic antisatellite missiles, co-
orbital antisatellite systems like robotic arms that could grab
satellites. They know that the United States is heavily
dependent on space for its projection of military power so they
are, you know, engaged in a very robust counter-space program
to deter us from taking action or to attack our satellites in
the eventuality of a conflict.
So, you know, I think it would be--you know, your first
question, the broader answer, I think it would be an absolute
shame--I don't see it happening but I think it would be an
absolute shame if the United States somehow were behind China
technologically because of all the political implication--in
space because of the political implications of that, because of
the economic implications of that for our own country, so I
don't see it happening, as I said in my testimony. I think over
the next six years people might perceive the Chinese as gaining
significant ground, which just reinforces the need for the
United States to keep its eye on the ball and to have a very
strong and robust space program.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Stokes. If I can make two quick points. First of all,
as previously discussed, I wouldn't automatically rule out
cooperation in certain aspects of space. I would advocate
looking at our relationship with the People's Republic of China
for a much broader perspective in terms of competitive sense,
that is, a competition in universal values and a competition in
principles. From that perspective, there may be areas of
cooperation, and if there are areas of cooperation, they should
be done from the perspective of how it creates leverage for the
United States in terms of our fundamental interests and our
fundamental values. That's the first one.
The second point is, there are other areas of which I'm
not--I don't sense that we are really competing and China is
making heavy investments. It's in an area--I'm not sure how one
would describe it--but near space. That's that domain between,
let's say, 20 kilometers in altitude and perhaps 100 kilometers
in altitude. Normally it's an area to get through, for example,
in terms of returning through the atmosphere to get back to
Earth, but this is an area where they're making significant
investments including the establishment of dedicated research
institutes in the defense industry both in terms of precision--
long-range precision strike weapons systems as well as
reconnaissance systems able to linger in that particular
domain.
Mr. Cheng. One of the great areas of American strength is
our private sector, and we are seeing with folks like SpaceX
and Blue Horizon an interesting revival of the private sector's
interest in space. Where they are likely to go in terms of
innovation I suspect is something the Chinese are desperately
afraid of because they understand that companies are more
flexible and can often be driven harder because of the vision
of their directors. At the same time, as a result, one suspects
that the Chinese are likely to therefore try and, quote,
unquote, partner with our private sector or simply buy, you
know, controlling interests in stock and the like. In that
regard, I think that one of the areas that we need to be wary
of is quote, unquote, collaboration between Chinese state-owned
enterprises and our private sector.
Dr. Lewis. Thank you for the question. You know, just to
maybe put this a little bit in perspective, the real issue here
is who lands first, and I don't care if it's on the Moon or on
Mars but when you see that picture, do you want the picture of
the astronaut holding the flag to be holding an American flag
or a Chinese flag. We all remember the picture from the Apollo
program. So if we could land on Mars before China can go to the
Moon, great, let's do it, but I don't feel confident in saying
that, who lands first.
On cooperation with the Chinese, and this might be the
first question where the panel sort of disagrees a little bit
so I'm glad we finally got there, they're hostile but they're
also pragmatic. They can be engaged. You can come to
arrangements with them. I think the agreement on commercial
cyber espionage is a good example of that. They are pragmatic
in a way that the Russians are not but we need engagement and
agreement on the rules for how we will operate in space before
we can cooperate. The Chinese will test us, and right now if we
don't push back, cooperation is not in our interest. It's a
complicated relationship but it's one where we have many of the
advantages, particularly in technology, and in most of the
areas of space, we just do better. So the question is, how do
we take advantage of our leadership? How do we come up with a
strategy to lead, and not only with the rest of the world but
with China?
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Babin. Thank you.
I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Knight.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
You know, competition is part of life. I think that America
has led in this endeavor for many, many years. But there's so
much that is going on right now with the technological advances
that are happening today. There are so many things that we can
do.
Back in the early 1960s, we were trying to go to the Moon
because I do believe it was part of the competition. We also
had many programs that were going on in the early 1960s like
maybe the X-20 Dinosaur program that would've been the first
space shuttle, and we decided not to do that. We decided to go
to the Moon, and which is the goal that everyone looks to
today.
But the point is, is we always have an awful lot of things
that are happening, and I think the Chinese are now discovering
that maybe if they put their goals on some finite situations,
they might be able to beat us at certain things so we broke the
sound barrier first, we were on the Moon first. We did all of
these things first, and they might be able to do some of these
finite goals and we might be looking at a hundred different
goals.
So is that what we're kind of looking at today that
competitively, look, we want to be on Mars first, we want to do
this first, or are we looking at the expanse of space
exploration and achieving some of these goals for a much bigger
product, a much bigger program?
Mr. Shea. I think that's a fair point, Congressman. I think
the Chinese, it's my understanding that if they fulfill their
goal of landing an unmanned spacecraft on the Moon's dark side
before 2020, they'll be the first country to have done that. So
you're right, they may be seeking smaller niche goals, maybe
not the big-picture goals but to proceed with a domestic
audience seeking goals that have maybe not as powerful but
goals nonetheless.
Mr. Knight. And I'll jump in just real quick. I want to
thank the Chairman for talking about one of the programs that's
in my district, the SOFIA program, that is an American-German
kind of connection there that we have a telescope that goes
into space and goes above the water vapors and we can do that
type of exploration on a daily basis and change the technology
on a daily basis. Is that something that we should be better
having and having better connections with other countries that
can help us, not just with money but with technology, with all
of the things that we're looking at to advance and maybe
advancing with a connection to other countries and saying this
is what we're trying to get to. Mr. Cheng, go ahead.
Mr. Cheng. Representative, leadership is a matter of not
simply saying we are going to head in a particular direction
but being able to persuade others to join us, and as my fellow
panelists have also pointed out, other nations do want to join
us. It does entail, however, having a vision, having an
objective, having a target, and having the persistence, which
is the one great advantage the Chinese have. Their manned space
program dates back at least to the late 1980s and it has
enjoyed consistent top-level support through multiple changes
of leadership. Whether or not we have that persistence is
something the Chinese are looking at but also our allies, and
so I would hope that the SOFIA program and other programs will
be the start, not the end of that kind of cooperation.
Let me also just note very quickly that we are the main
explorer of the outer solar system. We have sent more, I
believe, probes out beyond Mars than any other nation or even a
group of nations combined, and that too is an area that could
be one of leadership and encouraging cooperation with our
friends and allies.
Dr. Lewis. Maybe to follow up, thank you for the question.
I think the real issue is, you know, what do we want to do
about exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and low-Earth orbit
we know how to do it. It's great. But what do we get out of
LEO, right? And what's the best way to do that? And there's
some issues that I think fall under the purview of this
Committee but also the larger discussion. Do we focus on manned
missions or do we focus on robotic? We've had tremendous
success in robotic. Do we go for Mars or do we go for the Moon?
I tend to like the Moon because I know we can get there. Mars,
it's kind of a long shot but it's a legitimate question. And
finally, we need to rethink the outlines of cooperation both
with our European partners, with the other space-faring
partners but maybe also with China, and in that sense, to your
original point, I think having a clear goal helps. Having a lot
of efforts may not be the best way to achieve cooperation.
Mr. Knight. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir.
I now call on the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank you
for your testimony today. I really do appreciate the panelists
almost nodding as each of you is speaking because you all seem
to be pretty much on the same page, and I think for the Members
up here, very similar kind of view of this, and so I appreciate
your testimony. I'm not often on the same page as the Heritage
Foundation, I can tell you that, Mr. Cheng.
Mr. Bridenstine--so we agree, this panel on a lot of the
space exploration components and this potential for a space
race that we're not winning. We've been able to win in the
past, and Mr. Bridenstine is pretty single-minded in talking
about commercial space and the ability to expand that and the
potential innovation that our private sector brings to, you
know, exploring at least low-Earth orbit if not farther.
There's a thing I'm pretty single-minded about, and Mr. Knight
will start laughing at me, but 2033, okay, so we've had
testimony by NASA engineers and other experts that 2033 orbits
of Mars and Earth are in pretty good alignment to save a lot of
space travel time, and that 17 years helps us put the building
blocks in place to get to Mars, get our astronauts to Mars, so
human spaceflight, Dr. Lewis, which is what you've been talking
about, and one of those building blocks certainly could be
going back to the Moon. Now, I'm not the engineer, I'm not the
scientist, I don't know the best way to do it, but I do know as
a Member of Congress, we need to have long-term mission that we
as Members of Congress stand behind from Administration to
Administration.
So Mr. Cheng, to your point, we've seen different
Administrations change how we looked at our space program. So I
think we do have a potential for a mission that is long-term in
nature that will continue to add to our expertise and our
leadership in space.
Here's my question. We do--we've had testimony by prior
panels that one of the last places where we've had some decent
diplomatic dialog between ourselves and the Russians has been
with respect to our scientists and our space programs, continue
to use their rockets to help us get to the Space Station. Is
there the potential for us to have that kind of dialog with the
Chinese scientists? Is it--you know, you've all used words like
``wary'' and ``skeptical.'' You've used ``cooperation'' and
``competition,'' ``hostile'' and ``pragmatic.'' Is there a way
for us to work with their scientists to really start broadening
cooperation, if you will? And I'll open it to anybody on the
panel if you feel like answering.
Mr. Stokes. If I can just draw one thread that you put out.
You mentioned about the United States using Russian launch
vehicles for some of our satellites and space programs. Of
course, I think it's well known that we formerly did both
satellites to the People's Republic of China and also licensed
some of our companies to be able to use Chinese launch vehicles
in terms of delivering payloads into space. That was restricted
in 19--let's call it 1996, and if I'm not mistaken, it
continues to be restricted until today. I mean, this is
something that every once in a while it's raised again in terms
of allowing the licensing of U.S. satellites and in terms of
sales of satellites and also allowing U.S. companies to
contract launch vehicle providers. The main restrictions that
requires, if I'm not mistaken, a munitions license and there
are restrictions under the 1989 Tiananmen sanctions that exist
until today and perhaps for good reason. But that's certainly
something that could be looked at again, I suppose. It's not
cooperation but it's actually licensing and a technical issue.
Mr. Shea. You know, in our report, I think in my testimony
as well, we outlined--the Wolf restriction doesn't prohibit all
sorts of interactions between Chinese scientists and U.S.
scientists so there are some interactions that are not covered
by the Wolf law. We do cooperate in collision avoidance. My
colleagues could correct me. There's debris. U.S. space
operators inform their counterparts in China when debris is
getting near a Chinese satellite or other--so we do cooperate
in that sense.
You raised the Russians. I mean, one thing I would be
looking at is increased China-Russian cooperation. We see that
here on planet Earth, China and Russia engaged in joint naval
exercises in the South China Sea recently, so I could see
China-Russia cooperation on joint rocket engine development,
maybe Russian participation in the Chinese Tiangong-2, Chinese
space station, going forward. So I'd keep an eye on that well.
Mr. Perlmutter. Okay. Thank you.
And I just think there's this yin and the yang going on
between competition and cooperation to the degree the
competitive juices of America start flowing, I think that's to
the benefit of all of us but also cooperation just to keep
peace in our time doesn't hurt us.
I yield back.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter.
Now I recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cheng, in your comments you mentioned a Chinese program
called One Satellite, Two Bombs. What does that mean and what
does it stem from?
Mr. Cheng. In the 1960s, China under Mao Zedong basically
said that in order to be a competitive major power, China first
off needed to develop nuclear weapons, and in fact, there's all
sorts of rather breathtaking language by Mao about how the
Chinese people will eat grass if necessary. But what that led
to was in 1964 on its own without external assistance, China
exploded its first atomic bomb. In 1967, it exploded its first
hydrogen, or fusion bomb, and in 1970 it launched its first
satellite, the Dong Fang Hong I, two bombs, one satellite. It
is now embodied in Chinese terminology as evidence of two
things: one, how far China is prepared to go in order to
achieve strategic objectives, and two, the self-reliance. Now,
self-reliance doesn't mean that you don't do cyber espionage
and other things but it does mean that at the end of the day,
China sets goals and they will achieve them.
Mr. Davidson. Thanks for that.
One of the ways that the United States collaborated with
China with commercial technology, pseudo-commercial technology,
was to help them launch multiple low-Earth orbit satellites off
of one launch vehicle. Is anyone familiar with this program
wherein the early 1990s almost immediately after removing
release-of-sensitive-technology authority from Defense and
giving it to Commerce, we helped China develop this technology?
Was that good collaboration?
Mr. Stokes. If I can take the first hack at it, that was
the Motorola program, if I'm not mistaken.
Mr. Davidson. Iridium, I think.
Mr. Stokes. The Iridium, yeah, the Iridium program. In
particular, I believe it was certifying their what's called
smart dispenser that has direct application, of course, to a
MIRV capability, and if you look at the timeline, research and
development timelines that match up, it's kind of hard to not
conclude that there was a connection.
Dr. Lewis. It's difficult to answer this question in an
unclassified setting but it was not purely advantage to China.
Mr. Davidson. Okay. Mr. Chairman, could I yield 30 seconds
to my colleague, Mr. Bridenstine?
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bridenstine. I just wanted to directly respond to
something that my good friend, Mr. Perlmutter from Colorado,
said, which was the cooperation with the Russians and using
their launch capabilities for our civil space programs. It was
an article in Aviation Week and Space Technology probably about
seven months ago. I read the defense minister for Russia stated
very clearly--they were asking how are you financing your
military communication, space-based communications programs,
how are you financing your military remote sensing and imagery
capabilities, and he said very clearly in the article that
they're financing it with off-balance-sheet financing from
expenditures from launching foreign satellites and astronauts.
So when we cooperate in that way, we have to be really clear
about what we're doing: we are financing the defense and
military capabilities of the Russians. And I just wanted to get
that on the record.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you.
And I want to tie that together in terms of collaboration,
sometimes perhaps some ways that have benefited us, some ways
that have not been beneficial to us. Clearly, the whole panel
has talked a lot about soft power, and I'm curious, where is
China particularly successful with existing space powers like
Russia, like European countries, but also with non-space
powers. So how has China been successful with their use of soft
power in their space program?
Mr. Shea. Well, China is using space--I think Mr. Cheng
mentioned this earlier. China is using space as part of a
broader relationship with countries, less-developed countries.
With Pakistan, it provides space assistance but it's tied into
this China-Pakistan economic corridor which is on the ground.
China is building out something called One Belt, One Road
initiative, and it intends to provide BeiDou coverage to most
One Belt, One Road countries by 2018. So space is a component
of a broader foreign policy diplomatic outreach to less-
developed countries.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, and I apologize because I have
very little time, but I was glad you connected the One Belt,
One Road, and Mr. Cheng in particular referenced China's
ability to stay on a unified, coherent national strategy, and I
would argue that since the end of the Cold War, they have been
the single nation that has done that with success.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you very much, Mr.
Davidson.
Mr. Perlmutter. Mr. Chairman, may I----
Chairman Babin. You sure can. Go ahead.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks. I'd like to just say to my friend
from Oklahoma, I agree. I wasn't talking about the fact we're
paying for these launch vehicles but to have a back channel for
diplomatic purposes sometimes is very important if the
political systems between the two countries aren't working. So
scientists sometimes lend us that back channel. That's really
what I intended to convey.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter.
This concludes this hearing. It's been very informative,
very educational. I want to thank the witnesses profusely for
their valuable testimony and the members for your questions.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional
comments and written questions from the members.
So this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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Appendix I
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Additional Material for the Record
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